RETHINKING URBAN TRANSFORMATION AND CONTESTED SPACES: THE CASE OF DİYARBAKIR

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RETHINKING URBAN TRANSFORMATION AND CONTESTED SPACES: THE CASE OF DİYARBAKIR

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Rethinking Urban Transformation and Contested Spaces:

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
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ABSTRACT

Rethinking Urban Transformation and Contested Spaces:

The Case of Diyarbakır

The literature on contentious politics tends to explain the dynamics of collective political struggle on the ground of sequential events in national and international politics. This time-centered perspective in contentious politics usually discards the spatial dynamics of contention. This thesis draws from the growing literature on the geography of contentious politics and examines how the production and transformation of the place witness and produce multiple layers of contention by focusing on Diyarbakır as a crucial case. As the Diyarbakır case demonstrates, the city is not just a stage for contention. Particularly when it comes to the production and transformation of space, micro political dynamics, i.e., local institutional politics over urban transformation projects and everyday politics embedded in local spaces, can co-constitute multi-layered contestations along with macro political dynamics in the city.

ÖZET

Kentsel Dönüşümü ve Mücadele Mekânlarını Yeniden Düşünmek: Diyarbakır Örneği

Çekişmeli siyaset hakkındaki literatür, kolektif siyasi mücadelelerin dinamiklerini ulusal ve uluslararası arenada birbiri ardına meydana gelen olaylar temelinde açıklama eğilimindedir. Çekişmeli siyasetteki bu zaman merkezli bakış açısı, çekişmenin mekânsal dinamiklerini çoğu zaman gözardı etmektedir. Bu tez, çekişmeli siyasetin coğrafyası alanında gelişen literatürü incelemekte ve Diyarbakır'ı kritik bir örnek olarak ele alarak, mekânın üretiminin ve dönüşümünün nasıl çok katmanlı mücadelelere tanıklık ettiğini ve bu mücadeleleri ürettiğini incelemektedir. Diyarbakır örneğinin gösterdiği gibi, şehir çekişmenin sadece bir sahnesi değildir. Özellikle mekânın üretimi ve dönüşümü söz konusu olduğunda, kentsel dönüşüm projeleri üzerinde dönen yerel kurumsal siyaset ve yerel mekanlara içkin gündelik hayatın siyaseti gibi mikro siyasi dinamikler, makro siyasi dinamiklerle birlikte şehirde çok katmanlı mücadeleleri oluşturabilmektedir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* Justice and Development Party
AMNESTY	*Uluslararası Af Örgütü* AMNESTY International
AYP	*Alan Yönetim Planı* The Area Management Plan
CHP	*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* Republican People's Party
CUP	*İttiat ve Terakki Partisi* Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress
ÇEKÜL	*Çevre ve Kültür Değerlerini Koruma ve Tanıtma* Vakfı The Foundation for the Protection and Promotion of the Environment and Cultural Heritage
ÇŞB	*Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanlığı* The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization
DBP	*Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi* Democratic Regions Party
DDKO	*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları* Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Associations
DEHAP	*Demokratik Halk Partisi* Democratic People Party
DEP	*Demokrasi Partisi* Democracy Party
DİKASUM	*Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kadın Sorunlarını Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi* Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality the Center for Research and Application on Women's Issues
DKKBK	*Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Diyarbakır Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Bölge Kurulu* The Ministry of Culture and Tourism Diyarbakır Regional Committee for Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage
DİMOD	*Mimarlar Odası Diyarbakır Şubesi* Diyarbakır Branch of the Chamber of Architects
DMM	*Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyesi* Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality
DTK	*Demokratik Toplum Kongresi* Democratic Society Congress

DTP	*Demokratik Toplum Partisi* Democratic Society Party
HADEP	*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi* People's Democracy Party
HDP	*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* Peoples' Democratic Party
HEP	*Halkın Emek Partisi* People's Labor Party
HES	*Hidroelektrik Santralleri* Hydroelectric power plants
İHD	*İnsan Hakları Derneği* Human's Right Association
JİTEM	*Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele* Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism
KAİP	*Koruma Amaçlı İmar Planı* Preservation Oriented Development Plan
KCK	*Komala Civakên Kurdistanê* Union of Commities in Kurdistan
KDA	*Karacadağ Kalkınma Ajansı* Karacadağ Development Agency
KTB	*Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı* The Ministry of Culture and Tourism
MİT	*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı* National Intelligence Organization
OHCHR	*Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları Yüksek Komiserliği* Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDKT	*Partiya Demokrata Kurdistana Turkiye* Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan
PKK	*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* Kurdistan Workers' Party
PYD	*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrata* Democratic Union Party
SAMER	*Siyasal ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi* Social and Political Research Center
TBMM	*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* The Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TİHV	*Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı* Human Rights Association of Turkey

TMMOB	*Türk Mimar ve Mühendis Odaları Birliği* Uninon of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TOKİ	*Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı* Mass Housing Agency
UNESCO	*Birleşmiş Milletler Eğitim, Bilim ve Kültür Kurumu* United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
YDG-H	*Yurtsever Demokratik Gençlik Hareketi* The Patriatic Revolutionary Youth Movement

To all those who defend peace against

hatred and brutality

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout my undergraduate years, I spent most of my vacations in my hometown Diyarbakır catching up with my friends and family. In 2014, once again I went to Diyarbakır; and on my very first day back I planned to go to our usual coffee house, *Mahya*, to see friends. *Mahya* was a small coffee house where we were used to spend most of our time during and after our high school years. It was the place where we fell in love, built close ties, and politicized through our discussions on Turkish politics, the Kurdish question, or different ideologies. After high school most of us moved to different corners of Turkey, nevertheless, when we came to visit our families in Diyarbakır on vacations we would also visit *Mahya* and see each other there. Any time of the day you could just go out and stop by *Mahya* on your way and you would come across some friends to sit together with and have a talk. In time, this small coffee house came to signify a sense of belonging to us. The important thing was not the region of the coffee beans that it served, but it was about the atmosphere, the friends and togetherness.

It was that summer I saw the ruins of *Mahya*. I learned that there was going to be a big plaza in its place. I cannot describe that feeling. I just stood there for a couple of minutes and felt a strong sorrow for our loss. It took a few hours to digest what had happened, and then I started to wonder about the socio-spatial transformation in Diyarbakır more deeply and this sparked my academic enthusiasm for the relation between the spatial dynamics of Kurdish politics in general. I started to think about the popular discourse on securitization of the region, the Peace

Process, stability and economic development in Diyarbakır at that time, juxtaposed with the destruction of *Mahya*. I wondered about possible implications of the Peace Process on urban growth and the everyday routines of people in Diyarbakır. This enthusiasm to understand the socio-spatial dynamics of the Kurdish issue through locating macro politics in micro politics accompanied me along the way to the urban warfare which broke out in 2015.

Even though the destruction of *Mahya* was a huge loss for me, one which I still recall and feel sad about, Diyarbakır has unfortunately gone through larger destructions because of the urban warfare in Suriçi from September 2015 to March 2016 and that is the main focus of this thesis. The urban warfare between the central state and the PKK started after the autonomous self-rule declaration by the actors from the Kurdish national movement in various districts of the Kurdish region. The Kurdish militias who organized under The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H in Turkish) started to barricade in the districts where the autonomous self-rule was declared and these activities of the Kurdish militias were responded to by the central state with the declaration of curfews and military operations. The central state officially declared curfews at least 63 times both for single days and for indefinite periods of time in the various districts in the Kurdish region (TİHV, 2017) In Suriçi, the autonomous self-rule was declared on August 14th, 2015 (HDP, 2016, p. 21). From September 6th, 2015 to December 2nd, 2015, the central state declared curfews in Suriçi for four times and carried out small-scale operations in the district. During that time, many attempts were made by local NGOs, political parties including pro-Kurdish parties, and central state's representative at the local level to end the conflict in Suriçi. However, the failure, in terms of returning to the Peace

Process and negotiations in the macro politics, resulted in re-escalation of the violence in the local level. On December 2nd, 2015, the central state once again declared a curfew which was followed by a violent urban warfare between the central state and PKK for 103 days (Figure 1).



Figure 1*:* A Suriçi image which highlights the six neighborhoods where the urban warfare took place from 2 December 2015 to 9 March 2016.
Source: [Diyarbakır Söz, 2016]

This thesis raises the question of why the urban warfare emerged in particular places in the region but not in others. More specifically, why did Suriçi become the site for urban warfare in Diyarbakır while the rest of the city did not encounter violent confrontation?

I argue that although the failure of the Peace Process as a result of rising authoritarianism in Turkey can be a macro political explanation of the escalation of violence between these sides, it cannot explain why certain localities became the sites for urban warfare while other districts in the same city or region continued their

everyday life. Thus, I treat the relation between the macro and micro politics as dialectically related, but I particularly focus on understanding the micro political dynamics that facilitated the emergence of the urban warfare in Suriçi. Accordingly, it seeks to elucidate relevant questions: What were the socio-spatial dynamics in Suriçi prior to the urban warfare that took place from September 2015 to March 2016? In what ways did micro political dynamics, which include local institutional politics as well as everyday politics, contribute to the making of Suriçi as an insurgent space? More specifically, through which mechanisms did everyday life which has been (re)produced and shaped historically through social, political and economic interaction of the residents within a certain landscape facilitate this warfare? How did different conceptions of institutional actors in Suriçi simultaneously reconfigure and preserve the configuration of the place from 1999 to 2015? How do all these dynamics dialectically relate to macro political dynamics?

This study proposes a micro level analysis which focuses on the everyday politics and local institutional politics in Suriçi. This thesis shows that the analysis of the everyday politics in a certain landscape is crucial to understand the politics and contention in a given place. The Suriçi case shows that the place is imbued with a certain context, meanings, and symbols which are concurrently deconstructed and reconstructed by the residents and their ideological positions. This forms a certain spatiality in social, economic, political and physical senses which in Suriçi facilitated the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015. In addition, everyday politics are constructed within the material boundaries of the place. In Suriçi, the material boundaries of the place draw the boundaries of interaction of the residents in daily life, and the boundaries of actions and mobilization. The daily interaction within the

material boundaries of Suriçi enables the residents to form solidarity networks, strong communal ties, relations of trust and communal identity, all of which together with the physical characteristics of the place I claim are significant socio-spatial dynamics that facilitated the conflict in 2015. Thus, I argue though the declaration of autonomous self-rule was the central decision of the Kurdish national movement on the basis of the shifts in macro politics in national and international scales; the urban warfare emerged in Suriçi, but not anywhere else in Diyarbakır because of these spatial reasons as well.

Yet this particular configuration of everyday politics, which was conducive to contention, could have been dismantled had the urban transformation projects that were aimed at Suriçi in the decade prior to the conflict been successfully implemented. There have been three large-scale attempts to transform Suriçi as part of Diyarbakır's neoliberal urban transformation. However, the gridlocks in local institutional politics which were the result of power relations between the central state and movement in the local level prevented large-scale urban transformation in Suriçi which had aimed to restructure the place spatially and socially. These gridlocks in a way preserved the socio-spatial dynamics of Suriçi that consequently facilitated the emergence of the urban warfare when the Peace Process between the central state and the Kurdish national movement came to an end in 2015.

1.1 Theoretical framework: Spatializing politics

The urban warfare in Suriçi was one of the most violent encounters between Kurdish national movement and Turkish state and lasted 103 days. However, Suriçi was not an empty battlefield that hosted warfare as a mere result of changing parameters in

macro politics. As Lefebvre (2007) points out in his groundbreaking work *The Production of Space,* the space is not a natural or objective entity; it always has its own history and conflicts within itself. More specifically, Merrifield (1993) argues that ruling ideologies like the capitalist world system have their own spatial configuration, but the realization of this spatial configuration takes different paths in different places with a dialectical relation with macro level politics.

This understanding of space in a sense requires us to consider any events, changes or destruction in one locality not just as a mere result of a macro political decision or change; but also, as a result of micro political dynamics in that locality which includes that place's history, everyday life, and local institutional politics. In the case of the urban warfare in Kurdish cities, even though macro political explanations of the warfare and its implication on macro politics and the Peace Process have been discussed publicly during and after the urban warfare, the question of in which ways urban politics within these districts played a role has remained unanswered. However, as Harb (2017) proposes, certain questions are important to answer to understand context of processes and practices within a certain place:

> How and why does urban space contribute to public action and social movements? What is the relationship between power, space, and resistance? How do different groups utilize space to mobilize and facilitate collective action? Which forces that shape space (physical and technological, as well as social, historical, political, and economic) are combined to guide this action? More broadly, how do specific historical, national policies, and global forces shape cities? How are different inequalities constituted by urban life and how do they reconstitute the city? How do the ordinary practitioners of the city negotiate, navigate, appropriate, resist, and transform urban forms? (Para. 2)

This thesis takes Suriçi, where the declaration of autonomous self-rule turned into a violent confrontation between the central state and the PKK, as a case, and shows that a full-fledged explanation of urban warfare needs a perspective which treats macro and micro political dynamics as mutually constitutive entities. From Merrifield's (1993) perspective, the actualization of such a conflict in different localities cannot be explained by merely focusing on the macro political dynamics, rather we should keep in mind that the urban warfare actualized in different places through different paths due to the space-specific dynamics. In order to understand this path towards to the emergence of urban warfare in Suriçi, I focus on its history, which means how it has been produced by different actors as a social space, i.e., local institutional actors and residents, over time. Moreover, I also pay attention to its socio-spatial configuration before the warfare which contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare together with the macro political dynamics.

In the micro level, everyday politics composed of socio-spatial dynamics were the main reason for how and why the urban warfare was realized in Suriçi. However, the institutional contentions, deadlocks and delays over the urban projects during 1999-2015 which preserved the socio-spatial configuration of the place to an important extent, was the reason why such an insurgent everyday politics was present in Suriçi up until 2015. To examine this process in the micro politics, I primarily take institutional politics into consideration by concentrating on multiple claims over the urban space. I treat local institutional politics as another scale of politics which is interrelated with national or supranational scales of governance.

The reason this study pays special attention to this realm is that two competing institutional bodies, i.e., the local governance and non-elected local state

institutions, were present in Suriçi from 1999 to 2015. The local governance had been dominated by the pro-Kurdish parties of the Kurdish national movement since 1999, and non-elected local state institutions reflected the interests and sensibilities of the central government in the local level. These two bodies had overlapping as well as diverging conceptions of Suriçi which resulted in, on the one hand, a gradual transformation process in Suriçi; on the other hand, deadlocks in different projects which delayed the large-scale transformation of the landscape and demography of the place from 1999 to 2015. Thus, this thesis examines the question of how the conflictual relations over Suriçi have evolved through time between the Kurdish national movement and central state since 1999 by tracing different layers of contention between the actors during planning, processing, and finalizing the urban projects in Suriçi. And, I suggest that these contestations through and over the urban projects unintentionally delayed the socio-spatial reconfiguration of Suriçi which enabled its residents to keep their everyday relations within the same urban design up until 2015.

After presenting the institutional encounters of the central state and movement in the place, this study analyzes the everyday politics which will be argued as the essential facilitator of the urban warfare in Suriçi. I suggest that everyday politics came to existence through socio-spatial dynamics of Suriçi such as everyday life, the history of place, sense of belonging, solidarity networks, neighborhood relations, close ties, trust and architectural design of the place. In order to substantiate this idea, I draw on my fieldwork and in-depth interviews. And, I discuss the characteristics of everyday life in Suriçi together with the mechanisms through which people are politicized and build organized relations which helped the

young Kurdish militias to perpetuate the war for a considerable amount of time against the state.

While addressing these questions this thesis contributes to the literature on the production of space, the geography of social movements, rescaling of the statehood and Kurdish politics in general. First of all, such a discussion over Suriçi contributes to Lefebvre's conceptualization of the production of space by locating his concepts in real life. Lefebvre (2007) with his groundbreaking book *The Production of Space* redefined the space and production of space, and implementing his ideas in real life is usually challenging. This study reassesses Lefebvre's (2007) idea of the production of space with Pierce and Martin's (2015) epistemological approach to the issue. By this means, this thesis strives to ground the Lefebvrian ideas on the production of space in real life by treating Suriçi as a social space and tracing the mechanisms and processes that have produced it.

Moreover, Lefebvre (2007) discusses the revolutionary potential of space by arguing that the violence of power which is used to actualize rationality of the state in a place would be answered through "the violence of subversion" (p. 23). Lefebvre (2007) suggests that experts, bureaucrats and technocratic bodies shape the space via their means to build up a hierarchical space based on the power relations in the society which ultimately would serve the hegemonic construction of the society based on the rationality of the state (p. 23). In Lefebvre's world, subversion against this rationality of the state can be actualized through wars, revolutions, defeats and victories because of the fact that the endeavor to realize state-led normality is always subjected to transgressions in different forms (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 23). By analyzing Suriçi as a case study, this thesis will add on Lefebvrian idea of subversion by

analyzing the mechanisms, process and historicity of such a subversion in the urban context.

Thirdly, as it is stated above, in the literature the emphasis is often on how urban planners, engineers, and bureaucrats construct the space via their tools in order actualize the ruling ideology in the space (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 23, 42, 43; Kipfer, 2008, p. 201; Merrifield, 2006, p. 109; Ng, Tang, Lee, & Leung, 2010, p. 414), however the distinctions within this team of specialists and its implications are understated. Suriçi, case in point, shows us that actors who construct space do not necessarily have to be a part of a homogenous entity which harmoniously serves the ruling ideology in the society. In Suriçi, the municipality which has been run by the pro-Kurdish parties since 1999 had a hybrid role. Pro-Kurdish parties over years have formed its expert cadres from the activists of the Kurdish national movement who strived to challenge the central state's presence and hegemony in Suriçi by reviving Kurdish identity, history and culture within that place through renovations, festivals, fairs and seminars (Watts, 2010, pp. 155-159). Or, during the collaborations over the different urban projects, they continued to challenge each other's authority or appropriate the projects in accordance with their larger agenda. Therefore, this study complicates the homogenous picture of the statehood by analyzing different actors and their relations with each other.

While complicating the homogenous picture of the state, this thesis will benefit from the rescaling of the statehood literature and also contribute to it (Brenner, 2004a; Brenner 2004b; Duncan et al., 1988; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Savaşkan 2015). Brenner (2004a) focuses on the process of rescaling of the statehood during the age of globalism and neoliberalism. He rethinks the governance

mechanisms of nation-states through explaining the changing interscalar relations in the neoliberal world order. However, his emphasis on economic dynamics does not pay specific attention to other historical and socio-political reasons behind the rescaling of the statehood. Moreover, he grounds his theory mainly in the context of European countries which limits his approach when implemented in various cases. Savaşkan (2015) also points out these problems and enriches the discussion by concentrating on the Turkish case. In addition to changing economic parameters, he also provides historical and socio-spatial explanations for the rescaling of the statehood. However, while he explains the decentralization and re-centralization dynamics, he mainly focuses on the logic of the central government in Turkey and the power relations on the macro level. In that sense, this thesis contributes to the literature by suggesting that the local and central are dialectically related entities. Moreover, this study addresses the process of how the decisions of central state have been shaped, challenged and disrupted by the local governments by analyzing representative contention in Suriçi.

Last but not least, this thesis benefits from more contemporary scholars who work on social movements, contentious politics, and geography (Dikeç, 2001; Dikeç, 2005; Harb, 2017; Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto 2008; Martin & Miller, 2003; Miller & Nicholls, 2013; Nicholls, 2007; Nicholls, 2008; Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2014; Schwedler, 2013; Springer, 2011). This thesis engages with these more contemporary ideas on space and contentious politics in order to locate the Lefebvrian understanding of the conflict-driving nature of space in real life. Thus, this study draws on the concepts that are used in the literature such as materiality of

place, close ties, trust, neighborhood relations and solidarity networks and situates them in the context of Suriçi.

Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature on the Kurdish issue in the sense that it grounds the discussions over politicization through Kurdish identity in a spatial framework. Even though there are growing numbers of works in the literature which deal with spatial analysis of the Kurdish issue (Gambetti, 2010; Gambetti, 2015; Gambetti & Jongerden, 2015; Güvenç, 2011; Genç, 2014; Çaylı, 2015; Gündoğan, 2015), the Kurdish national movement and the politicization of Kurdish identity in Turkey are still largely assessed through events, ruptures and discourses in macro-politics from a time-centered approach (Bozarslan, 2003; Marcus, 2007; White, 2015; Gunes, 2012; Gunes & Zeydanlioglu, 2014; Aktaş, 2014; Aydınoğlu, 2014; Aslan, 2015). What happened in Suriçi is a result of both the failure of the Peace Process in macro-politics with the rise of authoritarianism, and socio-spatial dynamics of Suriçi through which Kurdish identity has been radically politicized by Kurdish youth. Therefore, while throughout this thesis I mention developments in macro-politics, my focus is primarily on the politicization through and over space and everyday life in Suriçi which contributes to the literature on the spatial perspective on the Kurdish issue.

1.2 Studying Suriçi as a crucial case

This study does not focus on warfare itself, but its underlying conditions embedded in space. Thus, it concentrates on the emergence of the urban warfare in Suriçi among 30 other urban and rural places of contention. This thesis takes Suriçi as a crucial case due to its centrality in terms of the conflict. As the reports from the

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2017) show, Suriçi was one of the localities where the most serious incidents that led to the largest numbers of dead, destruction of houses, and public and private buildings with the use of heavy artillery, machine guns etc. The use of heavy weapons also resulted in permanent changes in the landscape of the district and its demographic configuration. The destructions that took place during the urban warfare were followed by the urgent expropriation decree of the Council of Ministers in Suriçi (Resmi Gazete, 2016b). The Council of Ministers took the urgent expropriation decision in other districts of the conflict as well, but Suriçi was faced with the largest urgent expropriation decision which targeted to expropriate 6292 parcels of land from 15 neighborhoods (GABB & Sur Municipality, 2016, p. 8; Resmi Gazete, 2016b; AMNESTY, 2016, p. 8). This meant transforming Suriçi entirely. Furthermore, the ongoing curfew in six neighborhoods of Suriçi is the longest curfew in world history.[1]

Apart from being an important center in terms of the urban warfare, Suriçi is also the historical center of Diyarbakır and has been an important center for Kurdish struggle there. First of all, Suriçi is the area surrounded by the city walls of Diyarbakır. It is a part of the larger district of Sur. It includes 15 neighborhoods of Sur district in which the largest clash and destructions took place when compared to other neighborhoods and areas in Diyarbakır (HDP, 2016; AMNESTY, 2016). The population of Suriçi was 49.711 before the urban warfare (HDP, 2016, p. 14). Furthermore, Suriçi is 2000-year-old historical city center of Diyarbakır that had a

[1] Retrieved 19 June, 2018, from http://gazetekarinca.com/2017/08/1-yil-8-ay-24-gun-surda-dunyanin-en-uzun-yasagi/.

historical architectural design left over from the Romans, as well as many cultural and historical monuments from different civilizations. It was also the buffer zone of the UNESCO World Heritages in Diyarbakır which includes Diyarbakır Fortress, the city walls of Diyarbakır, and Hevsel Gardens.

Though Suriçi was a historical city center with uninterrupted urban life for 2000 years, there have been fluctuations in terms of its demographic structure. During the 1980s and 1990s, the civil war between the Kurdish national movement and central state was at its peak in the rural areas. This violence in the rural areas led to displacement of a significant number villagers to the nearby city centers and towns. Suriçi was an important center for the people whose villages were destroyed during this period (HDP, 2016, p. 14). Simultaneously, the local residents of Suriçi started to sell their houses to newcomers and move out (KMD, 2010), and the dispossessed and displaced villagers became the new residents of Suriçi (HDP, 2016, p. 14) which affected the social, political and economic configuration of the place. According to the HDP report (2016) on Suriçi, when we look at the demographic structure of the city in early 2015, we can see that most of the residents in the district were villagers who had experienced the violent civil war during the 1980s and 1990s (HDP, 2016, p. 14). In addition to that, during the 1990s Suriçi was also an important place of encounter between the Kurdish activists and paramilitary forces such as JİTEM and Hezbollah (HDP, 2016). As the residents of Suriçi indicated during the fieldwork, that these social and political structures were based on common grievances in a certain landscape also led Suriçi to become an important center for the Kurdish struggle.

1.3 Methodology

This thesis is built upon a qualitative case analysis drawing on the interviews conducted in Diyarbakır with 41 people in July 2016, March 2017, and July 2017 (Appendix); as well as news, documents and official reports on Suriçi. I cover the literature on theoretical discussions of social production of space, politicization through space and over space, the spatial dynamics of contentious politics, as well as the Kurdish national movement. In addition to these theoretical discussions, this thesis will give a space to empirical research that has been conducted on Diyarbakır and Suriçi. In other words, via interviews I locate the theoretical discussions in the context of the urban warfare in Suriçi. Lastly, reports on the urban warfare and the aftermath of the urban warfare in Suriçi that have been published by Zan Institute, Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB in Turkish), Social and Political Research Center (SAMER in Turkish), AMNESTY International (AMNESTY), United Nations, Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TİHV in Turkish) and People's Democratic Party (HDP in Turkish), since March 2016, when the urban warfare came to an end, will be elaborated.

Interviews were designed as semi-structured, that is to say, a framework was set beforehand; however, the structure of the interviews allowed interviewees to talk about their experiences, prospects and perceptions over space, as well as the multiple, unconventional ways to use space. It also allowed me to ask interviewees to elaborate on certain issues in more detail when it was necessary. The interviews were face-to-face and usually one-on-one; however, women from two families in Suriçi wanted to be together during the interviews. Therefore, there were also two focused groups which were composed of women only to concentrate on women's

experiences. The interviews for the most part lasted thirty minutes to one hour on average. Interviews were tape-recorded with the permission of the interviewees. Nonetheless, because of the security concerns of the interviewees, and to make it easier for readers to follow, interviewees will be known only by their pseudonyms.

In the first part of the interviews, which was conducted with the local residents, the questions focused on everyday life in Suriçi, the transformation of the place by different actors and how local residents approached this issue and when it came to 2015, the reasons and results of growing tension and later the urban warfare in Suriçi. The second part of the interviews was conducted with elites from different occupational and ideological backgrounds who concretely or intellectually contributed to the production of Suriçi. These interviews were semi-structured which allowed these elite groups to provide not only technical details of the transformation of Suriçi since 1999, but also to understand their institutional stands and visions in terms of Suriçi which enabled me to detect a non-linear line of communication between the municipality and provincial representations of central state. In this part of the research, the questions revolved around the projects that took place in Suriçi since 1999 to 2015, as well as the projects which were being discussed after the end of the urban warfare, the ultimate aims of these projects, and lastly their prospects for Suriçi.

I employed snowball sampling during my fieldwork. As would be expected, it was not easy to talk about the urban warfare with residents who directly experienced the violent clash between the central state and PKK. Therefore, I started to conduct preliminary interviews with the residents and mukhtars of Suriçi who I met via my father in July 2016. Then, I continued my interviews with the referrals of my first

interviewees. Since I continued my fieldwork with the referrals of my first interviewees, the following interviewees accepted to talk with me about this sensitive issue more easily. Nevertheless, I was faced with difficulties during my fieldwork. First of all, almost all of the interviewees preferred to be anonymous in a thesis which concentrates on a "sensitive issue". Furthermore, even though I assured them that I would use the information they provided anonymously, they still were not willing to openly talk about politics and what happened in Suriçi. Most of the interviewees preferred to skip the questions regarding politics or sometimes they talked about the politics and their experiences during the urban warfare after I turned off the voice recording.

Specifically after the declaration of the state of emergency in Turkey, it became harder to conduct interviews in Suriçi and in local institutions. I conducted interviews with the actors from local institutional politics in March 2017 and June 2017. I was able to find someone who agreed to talk to me from local governance and non-elected local state institutions via the connections of my father once again. Even so, sometimes those interviews took place behind locked doors and without a voice recording. Particularly during the interviews that took place in non-elected local state institutions, people tended to refer me to another person or even sometimes to their websites directly. Once an officer from ÇŞB suggested for me to check their website, adding that he did not have any more information than was available on the website. Last but not the least, I want to stress the environment of the interviews. I did interviews both in Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality and the Provincial Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, both of which had armored cars at their entrances. In such an environment, it was really hard

to go into the details of the projects in Suriçi that they initiated before and, particularly, after the urban warfare.

Among the interviewees, there were 29 local residents who either still live in Suriçi or had left it before or after the urban warfare. Most of these interviewees had not left Suriçi back then and the interviews took place in Suriçi. However, some of the interviewees who had left Suriçi due to the warfare and destruction I visited in different neighborhoods outside of Suriçi. This enabled me to observe the conditions that people from Suriçi faced as a result of forced migration. Among these interviewees, there were 16 male and 13 female interviewees. Their ages ranged from 17 to 75. Ethnic and religious background of these interviewees differed from one another to understand whether people before the warfare actually did realize everyday practices which could be argued as inclusive for all residents. Even though most of the people in this group of 29 residents were Kurds and Turks, one person was from the Syriac community, one person was Arabic, and one person was Armenian. Additionally, except for the 29 residents of Suriçi, I interviewed two people from the Armenian community who have never lived in Suriçi but carried on religious activities in Suriçi where their church is located. One of these three people was also an old inhabitant of Suriçi, who had moved outside of Suriçi in the 1970s. Therefore, my sample was representative in terms of reflecting the social diversity in Suriçi. In addition to these interviewees, there were 2 interviewees who do not live in Suriçi but attended religious ceremonies of an Armenian church in Suriçi. Among these 29 interviewees, there were also 3 shopkeepers and 2 mukhtars of Suriçi. Two of the interviews were in Kurdish, the rest were in Turkish. Most of the interviewees earn their livings through engaging in economic activities.

Apart from local residents and people who work in Suriçi, elite interviews were also conducted in March 2017 and June 2017 with ten people. These ten people are composed of urban planners, architects, master architects, officers and activists. Among these, two former employees in Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality (DMM) and an employee who still works in DMM explained projects that were spearheaded by the municipality from 1999 to 2015 and thereby the vision of the municipality for Suriçi. People from central state offices mentioned their scope of intervention in Suriçi since 1999 and following the urban warfare. Through their past and prospective projects, they also illustrated how central government and its bodies perceive Suriçi and want to transform it. Furthermore, two architects, one from the Chamber of Architects and the other from Dicle University, provided their insightful critiques on the urban transformation facilities in Suriçi together with their observations on the application process to the UNESCO World Heritage List. Lastly, an urban planner who actively participated in No to Destruction of Sur Platform was interviewed and introduced the platform and its activities.

1.4 Organization of the thesis

In Chapter 2, this study engages with the literature on the production of space, rescaling of the statehood and representative contention, and socio-spatial dynamics of social movements. Firstly, I open up the discussion on social space. I pay attention to the literature on the production of space by analyzing Lefebvre's (2007) innovative book *The Production of Space*. I emphasize the way Lefebvre (2007) conceptualized the relations between the production of social space, state and everyday life. Then, by drawing on Merrifield's (1993) dialectical approach to place-

making, I discuss the relation between the social space and the process of place-making. Then, I try to ground Lefebvre's (2007) notion of the state and the production of space by drawing on the literature on the rescaling of the statehood within the neoliberal age. I provide Brenner's (2004a; 2004b) analysis on interscalar governance mechanisms in different places which complicates the notion of statehood as a unified category. By drawing on the literature provided by Brenner (2004a; 2004b) and Savaşkan (2015) I analyze the process of rescaling the statehood in Turkey. And later, I discuss how this process is contested in Suriçi through representative contention between the central state and Kurdish national movement. Lastly, I provide theoretical framework for the discussion over the contentious politics and space (Dikeç, 2001; Dikeç, 2005; Harb, 2017; Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto 2008; Martin & Miller, 2003; Miller & Nicholls, 2013; Nicholls, 2007; Nicholls, 2008; Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2014; Schwedler, 2013; Springer, 2011). And, I present the analytical tools that are provided by more contemporary scholars to understand the relation between the socio-spatial dynamics of contention.

In Chapter 3, I present the historical background of the contention between the central state and Kurdish national movement which enables us to trace macro political dynamics that brought about the urban warfare in different districts and cities of the Kurdish region. I draw on the literature on the Kurdish issue after the formation of republic as well as the literature on the emergence and evolution of the Kurdish national movement after the 1980s (Bozarslan, 2003; Marcus, 2009; White, 2015; Gunes, 2012; Gunes & Zeydanlioglu, 2014; Aktaş, 2014; Aydınoğlu, 2014; Aslan, 2015). I also largely benefit from Nicole F. Watts (2010) book *Activists in*

Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey which examines the local governance in Diyarbakır and the representative contention through the local governance mechanisms. Lastly, I present the changing dynamics in macro politics starting from 2014 up until 2015 by drawing on recent articles, reports and news to provide possible macro level explanation for the failure of the Peace Process and escalation of the violence between the two sides which resulted in the urban warfare.

In Chapter 4, I scrutinize the urban projects that were initiated by the local institutional actors from 1999 to 2015. By analyzing these urban projects, I analyze the implications of the dynamics within the local institutional politics on the production of Suriçi as a social space as well as on the emergence of the urban warfare. I primarily focus on three large-scale urban projects, i.e., the İçkale Project, the Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project, and the UNESCO process. This study shows that all of these three projects were advanced through the collaboration of the municipality and non-elected local state institutions. These collaborations took place on the ground of the shared enthusiasm to transform Suriçi into a trade and tourism center in the long run. Nevertheless, their distinct ideological positions and priorities complicated these collaborations. Even though they continued to collaborate over these three projects, they tried to challenge each other's autonomy in the place or appropriate these three projects in accordance with their larger agendas. This representative contention through and over the urban projects together with the changing dynamics in the macro politics brought about institutional gridlock in terms of these large-scale urban projects. And, these institutional deadlocks decelerated the urban projects, even bringing Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project to a halt. Thus, I suggest that even though both the municipality and the local state actors engaged in large-scale urban projects which

aimed to transform Suriçi socially and spatially as indicated during the interviews and in the vision of the projects; contentions, delays and gridlocks prevented restructuring of the place in the short-run. The preservation of the physical and social structure of the place as an unintended consequence of the dynamics in the local institutional politics later contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare.

In Chapter 5, I present everyday politics in Suriçi by analyzing the everyday life and place-making process in Suriçi by different actors, i.e., local residents. The chapter discusses the ways the residents shape, appropriate, and live in the space. Thus, it extensively analyzes the political, social, economic, and physical dynamics in order to depict the production of the space through everyday interaction by analyzing the narratives of the residents. Then, the chapter focuses on the socio-spatial dynamics to understand the ways the place shapes the claims, identities and capacities of the Kurdish activists in Suriçi which contributed overall to the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015. In order to examine these socio-spatial mechanisms and processes that facilitated the urban warfare, I mainly address the strong sense of belonging to the place and formation of the communal identity among the residents of Suriçi; strong communal ties and everyday relations based on trust and solidarity; relatively autonomous space for politicization, and lastly the physical characteristics of the place. Each of these dynamics is analyzed through the ruptures and continuities that occurred in everyday life. In addition to that, I try to indicate possible implications of macro political dynamics such as the conflict between the central state and the PKK throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Peace Process or the violence against non-Muslim citizens of Turkey in everyday life and the socio-spatial dynamics of the urban warfare. All in all, by examining these socio-

spatial mechanisms and processes of the urban warfare, I provide an alternative answer to the question of why the urban warfare emerged in Suriçi and not anywhere else in Diyarbakır.

In Chapter 6, I present my concluding remarks. After providing a brief summary of my research question and findings, I also point out the contributions of this thesis to the literature. Lastly, I briefly mention the current situation in Suriçi by explaining the process of transformation in the aftermath of the urban warfare, the emerging actors, and the changing sense of place by the residents.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I engage with the literature on the production of space, rescaling of the statehood and representative contention, and socio-spatial dynamics of contentious politics. In the first section of this chapter, I examine the dialectical relation between space and place. I engage with the literature on the production of space by mainly focusing on Lefebvre's (2007) groundbreaking work *The Production of Space*. I pay specific attention to how Lefebvre (2007) conceptualized the relations between social space, the state and everyday life. Then, by drawing on Merrifield's (1993) approach to the place-making, I present the discussion on the production of space and the place-making process.

Lefebvre's (2007) perspective provides a significant insight in the sense that the state as the important actor in the city strives to transform the urban space. According to him, the state seeks to create a fragmented and controlled space in order to realize itself in urban reality. However, he does not explain how this hegemonic process is executed through the multiple scales of the state, i.e. international, national, and local. In the second section of this chapter, I benefit from the literature on the rescaling of statehood provided by Brenner (2004a; 2004b). And, I examine how the state which is taken as a unified category realizes itself in a given place through interscalar governance mechanisms established through international, national, and local scales. I focus on how these diverse but connected scales of governance have been transformed in the age of neoliberalism. Then, I locate the theoretical discussions on the transformation of the central state and local

government relations in the context of Turkey. Lastly, I examine how these changes in the international and national scales have realized and contested the local scale when it comes to Suriçi, Diyarbakır.

In the last section, I go into discussion about the relation between place-making and contentious politics. Within this discussion, primarily, I engage with the contentious politics and social movement literature, and present some of the important conceptualizations that will be used throughout the discussion. Then, I provide how different scholars try to understand politicization through space by offering diverse analytical tools to assess the spatial dynamics of the urban warfare in Suriçi.

2.1 Rethinking the production of space

Lefebvre is one of the first theoreticians who conceptualized space as the network of social, economic, and political relations. Lefebvre (2009) argues that space has been discussed and seen as a neutral and technical realm; hence, urban planning was under the jurisdiction of natural sciences until very recently (p. 169). However, he proposes that rather than being a technical entity, space is a social product which cannot only be understood through numbers and graphics, it also is assessed through its political implications. He clarifies his idea of social space in his seminal work *Production of Space* (Lefebvre, 2007). He straightforwardly puts that: "(Social) space is a (social) product," (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 26). Lefebvre (2007) clearly proposes that space is a social entity due to the fact that the society which resides in it produces it in accordance with the present mode of production (p. 35). However, he also discusses that this does not imply a mechanical process which sees space as a passive object

within which human interaction is hosted. Rather, space is not only a product, but also a reproducer of a certain social, economic and political relations (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 32).

Another important point is that the product is the reflection of present time, but the production process of this product and traces of its history are also its constitutive elements as Lefebvre (2007) underlines:

> The past leaves its traces; time has its own script. Yet this space is always, now and formerly, a present space, given as an immediate whole, complete with its associations and connections in their actuality. Thus, production process and product present themselves two inseparable aspects (p. 37).

In this thesis, Suriçi is treated as a social space which has been produced through social, political, and economic relations throughout its history. It has not been only the end result of a mechanical process, rather it has a historicity of its own, and the way its residents construct their everyday life and the rhythm of the district have been historically constructed. The residents experience this space in their daily lives, and they either reproduce or challenge this configuration of the space in certain ways over time.

Furthermore, Lefebvre (2009) claims that even though decision-makers also promote an "objective" understanding of the space to obscure their political intervention in urban planning, space is not a scientific object that can be separated from ruling ideology or politics (p. 170). As Kipfer (2008) argues, Lefebvre claims socially produced space implies the production of space by ruling ideology, the values of which materialize in the urban reality. This suggests the production of space to be a hegemonic process (p. 200). The urban space is not only a product of the social, political and economic relations, but also a (re)producer of certain social

relations as well as the mode of production. Space helps to sustain relations of domination and control in the society by reproducing them (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 212).

However, according to Lefebvre (2007), decision-makers are not the only ones who try to appropriate the space. Social groups, classes, or fractions of classes try to generate a space of their own:

> […] Groups, classes, or fractions of classes cannot constitute themselves, or recognize one another, as "subjects" unless they generate (or produce) a space. Ideas, representations, or values which do not succeed in making their mark on space, and thus generating (or producing) an appropriate morphology, will lose all pith and become mere signs, resolve themselves into abstract description, or mutate into fantasies (p. 416, 417).

Lefebvre's conceptualization is also crucial in the sense that it proposes a dialectical understanding of the production of space. This dialectical conceptualization is the key analytical tool which enable him to treat space as a never-ending process. Dialectical, constantly produced space also shows how space is ontologically contentious in different ways: "Spatial contradictions 'express' conflicts between socio-political interests and forces; it is only in space that such conflicts come effectively into play, and in doing so they become contradictions of space," (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 365). Lefebvre points out three realms—mental, social, and physical—which co-constitute space in a dialectical way (Pierce & Martin, 2015, p. 1282). To assess these three realms, he suggests three different facets of social space: conceived, perceived, and lived space, which in spatial terms can be listed as representations of space, spatial practice, and representational space (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 40).

In addition to the production of space, the dialectical relation between the production of space and place-making is also significant in order to locate Suriçi in the discussions of the urban warfare which emerged in different localities of the

Kurdish region. First of all, this thesis uses the terms *space* and *place* in a dialectical way as it is suggested by Merrifield (1993). He states Ollman's definition of dialectics: "Dialectics is both a statement about the world and a method of organizing this world for the purpose of study and presentation," (as cited in Merrifield, 1993, p. 517). Dialectics mostly deal with change which treats the present as a result of the dynamism behind the changes. From that perspective, Ollman again argues that: "[...] given that change is always a part of what things are, the problem for the research can only then be how, when and into what they change and why they sometimes appear not to change," (as cited in Merrifield, 1993, p. 517). Thus, if we are to explain a change in a dialectical way we need to trace process, movement, flow, articulations, and contradictions (Merrifield, 1993, p. 517). In other words, when studying space, a dialectical approach seeks to understand "ongoing *processes* of spatialization, territorialization, place-making, and scaling rather than fixed, pre-given, or static entities" (Brenner, 2004a, p. 32).

In addition to that, a dialectical understanding of a subject requires us to take the subject as a total and assess its parts as co-constitutive of this totality. However, Merrifield (1993) warns about treating this totality in a Cartesian sense. He argues that parts are not atomistic entities and articulation of them cannot be equated to the totality, rather parts are relational (Merrifield, 1993). From such a definition of dialectics and relationality, he proposes a dialectical understanding of the relation between the space and place. He argues that capitalist relations in everyday life have been produced and reproduced in certain places which cannot be extricable from global capitalist social space (Merrifield, 1993, p. 520). In that sense, global capitalism has a spatial configuration; however, these spatial configurations can

actualize differently in different locations/places. This does not mean that places are atomistic parts of capitalist spatial configuration, rather space and place are in a dialectical relation which means a change or modification in either sphere would lead to a radical or gradual shift in the other sphere as well. From this perspective, a place is not an empty area which would directly subsume spatial configuration of present times. Its history, social constellation, routines or architecture will affect how this place will adopt, realize, and modify this abstract conception of space and in what ways it will resist this abstraction (Merrifield, 1993).

Although these theoretical approaches to the production of space and place-making are crucial to understand the case of Suriçi as well, according to Pierce and Martin (2015), they do not equip us with epistemologically concrete tools and concepts to assess real life examples. In other words, how all this theoretical knowledge can be applied in different places methodologically still remains a question, according to Pierce and Martin (2015). They, in that regard, endeavor to develop an answer to the question of "how to operationalize knowing space empirically" (Pierce & Martin, 2015, p. 1286). In order to give an answer to that question, they use a dialectical understanding of the space and place. They argue that even Merrifield (1993), a scholar who also tries to present dialectical relation between space and place, sees space as flow and process which come into "fixation" in certain places, yet does not demonstrate to us how one can measure, observe or study this fixation in a more phenomenological way (Pierce & Martin, 2015, p. 1284). They propose a new conceptualization of place as emerging from "[...] the conjunction of many elements, through the process of bundling or quilting of things that will also be brought into other place-bundles," (Pierce & Martin, 2015, p. 1289).

This conceptualization of place-making suggests that it is a relational process of bundling and quilting of "things" or dynamics within the place. And, this relational perspective enables the researcher to investigate the production process of a place epistemologically and methodologically (Pierce & Martin, 2015, p. 1294).

Pierce and Martin (2015) go further and provide certain categories in terms of co-constitutive components within this relation. According to them, co-constitutive components in place-making can be categorized under three titles: physical/material components of places (water, rocks, roads, bridges, plants, human beings, etc.), social components (human's interaction with each other or the world around themselves, as well as their expectations from a potential interaction), and affective components (experiential and emotional factors in place-making) (Pierce & Martin, 2015, p. 1288). Thus, they argue all of these components constitute different bundles of things and social, political, economic dynamics in the place, all of which have intra and inter-relations which need to be deciphered in empirical research (Pierce & Martin, 2015, p. 1288).

From this perspective, in this thesis space and place will not be used as the antithesis of one another theoretically. Rather, they will be treated as mutually constitutive parts. The Kurdish national movement and its conflictual relation with the central state create a type of spatiality based on poverty, deprivation, marginalization, and inequality, reflections of which are salient in the Kurdish region. However, if we take this spatiality as the abstract model of production of space in the Kurdish region, it could be adopted, modified and challenged in different places in different manners. Suriçi, in that sense, is one of the important centers in the Kurdish region in which the movement has organized and come into

conflictual relation with the central state, first institutionally from 1999 until 2015, and later, violently in 2015. Nevertheless, because of the fact that Suriçi has been a place of settlement for a long time, the nature of the organization of the movement and its conflictual relation with the central state unsurprisingly differed from other places in accordance with the everyday reproduction of place by its residents. A comprehensive understanding of this dialectical relation between space and place by focusing on physicality, social and affective components will also provide a better understanding of the socio-spatial configuration of Suriçi.

2.2 Rescaling the urban governance and contestations through local institutions

Lefebvre (2007) examines the role of the state during his theoretical discussion over the production of space. However, his approach proposes an abstract modality of state which does not demonstrate the different forms of governance mechanisms under the state which co-constitute the place. In order to point out this discussion, I focus on Brenner's (2004a; 2004b) conceptualization of rescaling of the statehood. He argues that the state is not unified a body, rather it comes into existence through relations between multiple scales, i.e. international, national, and local (2004a). These interscalar governance mechanisms, according to Brenner (2004a) are dynamic and susceptible to changes within the economic and political realm. Following this line of thought, he focuses on the interscalar governance mechanisms and the changes that occurred within these mechanisms in the neoliberal era (Brenner, 2004a; Brenner, 2004b). He argues that these interscalar relations within the state produce certain spatialities, as they are shaped through spatial dynamics in the neoliberal age (Brenner, 2004a; Brenner, 2004b).

Social sciences in the twentieth-century embraced a state-centric approach which treated nation-states as "fixed, self-enclosed geographical containers of social, economic, political, and cultural relations" (as cited in Brenner, 2004, p. 29). This view also treated space as the static container of the statehood (Brenner, 2004, p. 29). Thanks to the growing intellectual discussions on the historical and dynamic conceptualization of social space, considering space as a mere container for regulatory processes and social relations became outdated. However, Brenner (2004a, 2004b) suggests that giving credit to the historicity or dynamism of social space is not enough to explain the spatial production of the statehood in twenty-first-century. We also need to look at the current economic world order and its governance in different territorial sites through interscalar relations in order to fully comprehend the production of space by the state institutions.

Brenner (2004a, 2004b) holds that the static conceptions of the state and space which enable us to discuss the state and space are dialectically related entities. The dialectical relation between these two phenomena took a different form during the period of neoliberalization and globalization. Brenner (2004a) argues that neoliberalization brings forth the mega cities and metropolises where industrial production is replaced with financial flows and the service sector. And, this new phenomenon which brings cities back to the agenda of critical studies leads us to move beyond the dichotomy of either fully sovereign or eroded nation-states. According to Brenner (2004b), what we call the state is subdivided among the multiple administrative units each of which are assigned with certain regulatory tasks (p. 453). And, this operationalization of the state actualizes through interscalar relations between the supranational, national, and local. Even though sometimes one

scale, for instance the national scale, can be predominant in decision-making processes; the state always operates in a multiscalar and polycentric way which is historically entrenched and may qualitatively be transformed over time (Brenner, 2004a, p. 81).

However, these interscalar relations should not be treated as a harmonious and homogenous constellation of the state institutions. On the contrary, Brenner (2004a) claims that they are emergent, contingent and contested processes which may potentially produce unpredictable outcomes as a result of sociopolitical struggles in different scales (p. 85). Thus, the scalar organization of the state power is conceptualized as a constitutive and also contested dimension of political-economic processes.

After providing this meta-narrative about the multiscalar configuration of state spatiality, Brenner (2004a, 2004b) goes further and explains how the state rescaling in the age of global neoliberalism has had important effects on urban governance. He examines the transformation of statehood in the post-Keynesian era by particularly focusing on European countries. He argues that during the Keynesian period, states embraced a redistributive approach and promoted a balance in terms of economic growth in different urban centers (Brenner, 2004b, p. 453). In other words, urban structuring was the main concern of the national governments.

The state restructured itself and transformed from a managerial, welfarist framework to an entrepreneurial, competition-oriented framework after the 1970s (Brenner, 2004, p. 449). The post-1970s period was the rationalization period of government expenditures that also brought austerity policies (p. 465). These fiscal

austerity policies caused local governments to become more dependent upon locally collected taxes, urban projects or other revenues. This directed local governments to work with state institutions, private sectors, or other organizations to facilitate an "endogenous growth" on the city-scale. In addition to that, the state decentralized its operations by transferring its regulatory tasks and some of its prerogatives to local governments which extended the scope of its autonomy (Brenner, 2004a).

All in all, the literature on the rescaling of the statehood in twenty-first-century explains the changing dynamics between the national and local state institutions which constitute neoliberal urban governance of today. Though Brenner (2004a, 2004b) suggests that rescaling and decentralization processes are determined by political and economic dimensions, he treats economic transformations as the main driving factors. Moreover, he empirically grounds his argument by focusing on the decentralization process in European countries.

However, Brenner does not point out how this process of decentralization can be challenged, adopted or modified in different cases. As Duncan, Goodwin, and Halford (1988) point out, decentralization should not be thought of as a smooth process. Actually, it can easily be overturned into a re-centralization process. For instance, in London during the post-Keynesian era the state decentralized and provided more autonomy to the municipalities. Later, disadvantaged groups in the society started to organize locally and benefited from this relatively high autonomy. They used the municipalities to channel their demands. This, in return, resulted in re-centralization of the decision-making processes by the Conservative central government (Duncan, Goodwin, & Halford, 1988, p. 120). This example of re-

centralization is significant in the sense that it demonstrates different logics behind the state rescaling. As both in the example, and in the case of Turkey and specifically in Suriçi, this is not a linear process.

These insights and critiques of rescaling and decentralization literature are also relevant in terms of understanding the centre-local relations in neoliberal Turkey. Savaşkan (2015) examines the decentralization process in Turkey by claiming that other historical and socio-political dynamics may also be the reason behind the state rescaling beyond purely economic reasons. In addition to that, Savaşkan (2015) also suggests that we should treat this process of rescaling and decentralization as a contingent process which can also be overturned on the ground by other political dynamics, as has been the case in Turkey (p. 6).

Turkey was established as a unitary nation-state which depends on strong central institutions. However, during the 1980s the central government in Turkey also devolved some of its prerogatives and responsibilities to the municipalities in accordance with the global dynamics of the time (Savaşkan, 2015, p. 113). In 1984, the budgets of the municipalities increased together with their scope of influence (p. 123). In 1989, the central government transferred even more authority to the municipalities for better public administration in the locals (p. 125). Though these were important attempts at decentralization, in effect, the state continued to provide health and education services centrally.

When the Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish) came to the power in 2002, it furthered the decentralization process by initiating important amendments particularly during its first years to become compatible with the world

economy. However, a close look shows that it simultaneously undermined the autonomy of the local governance in order to consolidate its power. Firstly in 2004, the AKP government tried to legislate a bill called the Law on the Fundamental Principles of Public Administration and Its Restructuring which aimed to strengthen the role of local governance (p. 126). This bill proposed the transfer of the provincial organizations of ministries to the municipalities, which could have placed the provision of health, education, and all other services in the hands of the municipalities. This bill was vetoed by the then-president Ahmet Necdet Sezer on the grounds that the bill violated the unitary state structure of Turkey (p. 126). After the veto, the AKP government did not re-enact the bill, rather they started to work on the Law on Municipality (p. 127). This law also proposed to authorize the municipalities to open nursery schools within their jurisdiction (p.137). However, this time the Constitutional Court annulled this clause of the bill, because it decided that it was against the unitary characteristic of the education system (p.138). Once, Kemalist elite opposed to the transferring central state's prerogatives to the local governments, the AKP also shifted its focus and started to encourage local governments in terms of the infrastructural facilities, transportation system and construction projects (p. 142).

At the beginning, The Law on Municipality aimed to transfer certain prerogatives and responsibilities of the central state to the local governance. However, due to the abovementioned changes and annulments, it mainly served the reconfiguration of the borders of metropolitan municipalities and small-scale municipalities by the central government, which eventually contributed to the re-centralization. This law, in the long run, enabled the AKP government to close down or restructure the borders of the municipalities run by opposition parties in order to

consolidate and centralize its power (p. 132). Apart from border restructuring, fiscally the municipalities still depended on the budget allocated by the central government, which again undermines the autonomy of the municipalities against its tutelage (p. 147-149).

In addition to that, the AKP government also tried to centralize the urban transformation processes. Even though in 1981 municipalities were allowed to prepare and implement urban plans within their territory, the more TOKİ (Mass Housing Agency) was institutionally empowered and centralized, the less local governments could initiate development projects during the AKP period. In fact, the local governments became only weak partners in the urban projects of TOKİ (p. 140). Another attempt at re-centralization in terms of urban planning was initiated by the AKP after the electoral victory of the Republican People Party (CHP in Turkish) in coastal area in 2009. This time, the AKP government authorized the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, instead of the municipalities, for construction permits in tourism sector (p. 141). In terms of urban plans, this re-centralization movement continued, until finally in 2012, the AKP authorized the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (ÇŞB in Turkish) to modify the urban transformation projects in risk areas (p. 140-141).

Savaşkan (2015) straightforwardly situates the rescaling of the statehood literature in the context of Turkey. He examines these processes of decentralization and re-centralization by explaining not only economic reasons, but also the motives of the actors in the socio-political context. However, he mainly focuses on power relations at the national scale to understand this process of rescaling. In order to

locate this discussion in Diyarbakır, Suriçi, we need to consider the dynamics at the local scale as well. As it will be examined in detail in Chapter 4, in Suriçi the contestation over and through urban projects once again shows that decentralization and re-centralization are contingent and contested processes at the local scale as well on the ground of the socio-political struggles taking place there.

2.2.1 Locating the rescaling of the statehood literature in the context of Suriçi

In order to locate the concept of rescaling in the context of Suriçi we need to analyze not only center-local relations, but also the socio-political struggle that has been organized in the Kurdish region since 1980s which has shaped these interscalar relations. I focus on the period after 1999, when for the first time the Kurdish national movement won the local elections in Diyarbakır and remained in office until 2016. Throughout this period, the pro-Kurdish parties who ran the municipalities did not propose a radical governmentality which strictly objected to the neoliberal restructuring of the urban life. The municipalities continued to flirt with neoliberalism, just as the central government did, through collaborations over different urban projects with the non-elected local state institutions. However, the movement also used the municipalities in a way to demand more autonomy from the state, challenge the dominant central state ideology in the urban life, access different resources, and institutionally contest through and over urban projects.

This process of contestation which had an effect on the relations of central and local is conceptualized by Watts (2010) as “representative contention”. She argues that in social movement literature it is assumed that institutionalization of a

social movement brings incorporation into the system by resorting to a moderate pattern in terms of their protest or demands (Watts, 2010). However, in Turkey, when it comes to the Kurdish question, neither conflict-bearers nor the conflict is considered to be legitimate by the system, even though the party of the social movement is formally accepted. Therefore, she claims that entrance in the legal politics does not necessarily entail a reduction in conflict, rather it may cause larger areas of contention (Watts, 2010, p. 7, 8). Watts (2010) called this a "representative contention" (p. 9) which I believe can be traced through urban projects and municipal activities.

The first important contestation against the centrally imposed spatial configuration took shape at the discourse level. Gambetti (2008) argues that transformation of urban space in Diyarbakır by the central state was accelerated in the 1980s when the economy in Turkey turned its face towards neoliberalism. Through the new legal regulations on urban planning, "the imaginary underlying the Turkish nation-building project: modernization and rationalization" was materialized, particularly in Yenişehir district of Diyarbakır during the 1980s (Gambetti, 2008, p.108). According to Gambetti (2008), Yenişehir was the representation of "the commercialization of land and the subordination of cityscapes to the singular logic of Kemalist modernization" (p. 108). However, the state was not the only actor which tried to encompass the urban reality, the Kurdish national movement also had become an important actor at the spatial level which sparked a counter-ideological move against these state strategies (Öztürk, 2013, p. 77). After People's Democracy Party (HADEP in Turkish), won the local election with the slogan: "We will manage ourselves and our city on our own" [*Kendimizi de kentimizi*

de biz yöneteceğiz] (as cited in Watts, 2010, p. 144), they started to challenge the Turkification of the city through using Kurdish language and expressing Kurdish culture in public life, in the first place by drawing on their institutional power (Gambetti, 2008, p. 99).

Another important realm of contention was urban transformation. As Savaşkan (2015) explains, though the municipalities in Turkey are authorized to initiate urban transformation projects, TOKİ as a strong central body largely undermines the autonomy of local governance (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Karaman, 2008). Because of this, the municipalities became only weak partners in these projects. In Suriçi, however, we see that the incorporation of the municipality in the İçkale Project or Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project brought forth multiple layers of contention both at the discourse level as well as bureaucratic level which will be extensively analyzed in Chapter 4. While the municipality through contentions in various issues tried to enhance its autonomy, the AKP government, on the other hand, tried to centralize the transformation of Suriçi by declaring it one of the risk areas in 2012. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, at the local scale the application process to UNESCO World Heritage List was strategically formulated in a way that the movement once again contested re-centralization attempts by declaring Suriçi as the buffer zone for the heritage site.

Lastly, the movement used formal institutional resources to enhance its autonomy. Watts (2010) argued that formal politics provide certain resources as materials and means which help political parties or elected actors mobilize more effectively. Mainstream political parties usually utilize intrasystemic resources in conventional ways to secure the status quo from which they benefit, or to perpetuate

their movement's interests in formal politics. However, sometimes parties may also deploy these resources in uncommon ways that challenge the rules of the system. The Kurdish national movement according to Watts (2010), both further the movement's interests and challenge the rule of the system through the resources the system provides to them (Watts, 2010, p. 78). Therefore, she suggests that on the one hand, Kurdish activists who took seats in the system became loud-speakers on the issues such as security, identity, and representation; and they created new governmentalities together with Kurdish subjects in the cities of Kurdish region. On the other hand, they have been able to use the material as well as human resources of the system. They even developed parallel state functions which will bypass Turkish state itself (Watts, 2010, p. 13, 14) while enhancing the autonomy of the local government.

All in all, in order to understand the relation between the central and local government which had important effects on urban development, the rescaling of the statehood literature provides important insights. It directs us to reconsider the interscalar relations between international, national, and local levels in order to comprehend the urban governance. These rescaling processes are treated as contingent and contested processes which can only be fully understood within specific historical context. In Suriçi, we can see that even though the local government can form alliances with the central government, there has been an ongoing contention between the central and local governments in different realms. This situation complicated the realization of decentralization and re-centralization attempts of the central state at the local level. This situation will be extensively analyzed in Chapter 4, and I will show how the local government simultaneously

collaborated and contested the central government which once again had important effects on urban restructuring and later on the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015.

2.3 Politicization of space and socio-spatial dynamics of contentious politics

Firstly, according to Dikeç (2005) space is not only political because of the fact that it is the stage of hierarchical power relations within the society; he argues that space as a polemical place is political because it is where a wrong can be addressed or the idea of equality can be pursued (p. 172). Dikeç (2005) suggests that places that we are born into represent certain kinds of "natural" order (p. 173). Moreover, governance mechanisms which have set up a network within these places are the reflection of the dominant group's interests which can be challenged only through politicizing and resisting against that natural or given order (Dikeç, 2005, p. 173). I believe this idea of "politicizing" is important in Suriçi as well. Even though the order has been challenged by the municipal activities since 1999, Turkishness and Muslimness have remained the official ideological frame which sets the tone for everyday life, similar to any other place in Turkey. However, the young Kurdish militias, by demanding autonomous self-rule in their district, have resisted the natural order and politicized through and over Suriçi.

According to Dikeç (2005), this process of politicization can take place in public spaces through never-ending agonistic dialogue by people who are nowhere and anywhere (p. 174). Dikeç (2005) believes that space is not only a passive subordinate to the given order, it is the very organizing principle of the politics in a

radical way (p. 180). Thus, he argues that space is "both disrupted and a source of disruption" (Dikeç, 2005, p. 181).

Another scholar who discusses the emancipatory characteristics of the public space is Simon Springer. Public space also according to Springer (2011) is "ordered" from above (p. 526). This ordering of public spaces, thus, unsurprisingly would be challenged by resistance from below because these spaces are where everyone stakes their claims and can communicate these claims, which increases the potential for disruption (Springer, 2011, p. 526). He argues that public space as the stage for people to perform or demand their distinct interests as rich and poor, white and black, heterosexual or homosexual, becomes a battlefield of conflicting interests (Springer, 2011, p. 526).

This conflicting nature of the interests of society may lead public space to be a place of antagonism which may result in violence (Springer, 2011, p. 526). However, he regards violence as the moment when politics end. His proposition of radical democracy is free from violence: it is constructed through anarchistic terms where agonism, which serves the dissenting and the different, rules the public space (Springer, 2011, p. 528). He argues that while violence from above is bound to protect status quo; violence from below may originate from the demand for equality (Springer, 2011, p. 530). However, violence, in essence, can only beget more violence, regardless of where it comes from (Springer, 2011, p. 530). Thus agonistic, anarchist, thereby emancipatory demands cannot be established through the use of violence according to Springer (2011, p. 530).

Both Dikeç (2005) and Springer (2011) in different manners offer a radical understanding in the terms of politicization within the space, spatial justice, and

radical democracy by providing a normative ground. However, neither of them attempts to provide a comprehensive understanding of which particular mechanisms and processes these ideas on radical democracy or spatial justice can be realized.

Before going into detailed discussions over the spatial dynamics of contentious politics in general, I think it is important to stress the difference between social movements as a term and what happened in Suriçi. Social movements in the literature are described as ritualized and organized political action. They are expected to be persistent in time, articulate clear objectives, follow certain norms and patterns, and make the conflicts they are involved in public through campaigns, tactical repertoires, public performances of their worthiness, unity, members, and commitment (Tilly, 2004). However, even though the Kurdish national movement is treated as a social movement in this thesis, what happened in Suriçi in 2015 was a unique moment in the history of the movement as well. Thus, it requires us to embrace a broader conceptualization to avoid conceptual stretching while assessing the mechanisms and processes that led to such a fragmented moment of insurgency in the history of the Kurdish national movement.

From this perspective, I think the intervention of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) is crucial. They argued that compartmentalization within the contentious politics and focusing on just one of the areas among social movements, strikes, wars, revolutions or other forms of political actions, limits us. Therefore, they conceptualize the term contentious politics as "[…] episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the

claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants" (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 5). This broad definition emphasizes the collective political struggle and does not discard unconventional means of struggle such as violence. The authors stress the causal mechanisms and processes of contention to trace commonalities of these various forms of contention rather than striving to classify varying forms of contentious politics (McAdam et al., 2001).

From this perspective, the Kurdish national movement with its actors in different scales of action is regarded as a social movement in this thesis. However, what happened in Suriçi differs from legal politics, or guerilla movement, which has also been persistent in time with military discipline, tactical repertoires, and norms and patterns of its own. Although what happened in 2015 was a central decision made by the military wing of the movement, it was rather an episodic and fragmented moment within the history of the Kurdish struggle which can be described as urban warfare under the umbrella of contentious politics. After having situated the urban warfare within the concept of contentious politics, we need to decipher the mechanisms and processes of this episodic and fragmented moment within the history of the Kurdish national movement by using the analytical tools provided by the scholars who work on social movements.

The movement engaged with the urban warfare for a very short time. During this time, the Kurdish youth in Suriçi did not benefit from the communication channels or resources to address national politics which had been established over the course of the history of the movement. Rather, young Kurdish militias used local networks, place and other socio-spatial mechanisms, and got into a military conflict

with the Turkish army in city centers for the first time. Nevertheless, I believe that Nicholls' socio-spatial analytical tools which aim to explain social movements will also be helpful to understand the roots of urban warfare by helping us shed light on the factors that facilitate association and organization within Suriçi.

First of all, Uitermark, Nicholls, and Loopmans (2012) argue that the city is not the backdrop of social movements, rather it is a constitutive part of the collective action. Hence, they suggest that instead of treating the space as a mere stage of the collective action, we need to understand it as "a relational conduit" through which a movement connects and develops (Uitermark et al., 2012). From this perspective, Martin and Miller (2003) put emphasis on spatial processes and mechanisms that bring about a contention in a place. Martin and Miller (2003) argue that how people perceive, shape and act upon grievances and opportunities can be shaped by the space, place, and scale in which they reside. In other words, social and political processes emerge in a certain time and space. Thus, the space should not be considered an empty container of activism but a constitutive part of social processes which leads mobilization in a certain locality:

> Like time, space is not merely a variable or "container" of activism: it constitutes and structures relationships and networks (including the processes that produce gender, race, and class identities); situates social and cultural life including repertoires of contention; is integral to the attribution of threats and opportunities; is implicit in many types of category formation; and is central to scale-jumping strategies that aim to alter discrepancies in power among political contestants (Martin & Miller, 2003, p. 144, 145).

We need to understand the relation between space and contentious politics as spatially and historically contingent. This perspective both redefines our conceptions of contentious politics, which have been extensively discussed from a time-centered

perspective, as well as shift our attention from episodes of contention to mechanisms and processes in a specific time and space (Martin & Miller, 2003).

As Schwedler (2013) in her article explains, most of the time revolutionary moments, political transitions, social movements and contentious politics are studied as case studies on the basis of grand political or economic theories. Or, they are compared with other countries which have had similar moments in their history. However, spatial dynamics are also important in order to understand why sometimes mobilizations begin in great urban centers and sometimes in smaller towns and rural areas; how these protests spread; why some strategies spread, and others fail; and last but not least in what ways state responses to these protests differ (Schwedler, 2013, p. 230). Until now I provided more theoretical propositions in the sense of politicization of space to answer these questions. It is also crucial to situate these theoretical discussions on the ground by introducing analytical tools which examine disruption within the public space in a more concrete sense through looking at processes and mechanisms.

Particularly, Walter J. Nicholls (2007; 2008; 2009) proposes important analytical tools which contribute to our understanding of the geographical reasons behind social movements. He does not propose an essentialist understanding of the politics of space, rather looks at the dynamics of spaces through networks, trust, strong ties or solidarity that can emerge in places.

Nicholls (2007) argues that it is important to figure out the role geography has on a social movement in terms of the ways it contributes to people's perception of their problems, and their capacities to form networks and identities to struggle against the established system (p. 610). From this perspective, Nicholls (2008)

conceptualizes the city as the black box of social movements and argues that one can decipher processes and mechanisms of social movements through spatial dynamics within the city. According to him, grievances, organizational forms, and consciousness of insurgents are dialectically in a relation with the space: "Thus, the specific role of the city for general social movements is in its function as a relational incubator, facilitating complex relational exchanges that generate a diversity of useful resources for campaigns operating at a variety of spatial scales," (Nicholls, 2008, p. 842).

In addition to this, Nicholls (2008) argues that cities are the places where people relate to the "different ones". The very existence of the different one helps them to feel free in terms of loosening the cognitive straitjacket of their self and this leads them to be bound up no longer with tightly constructed norms and expectations (Nicholls, 2008, p. 843). Loosening of the straitjacket of the self within the city, as well as physical proximity in the city, contribute to organizing around non-traditional means based on new norms, symbols, identities, emotions, and trust for an organization which is constructed through every day face-to-face interaction.

To open up the black box of the social movements, Nicholls (2007) explains how different places contribute to the nature of mobilization. He states that power relations in terms of political and economic life are not articulated evenly in different localities (Nicholls, 2007, p. 612). This means that even though possible implications of macro-political decisions or policies on citizens, in general, can be guessed, it is obvious that in different places citizens experience these power relations in their everyday life in different manners (Nicholls, 2007, p. 612). This situation would lead uneven articulation of grievances in distinct geographies which affects participation

in a social movement (Nicholls, 2007, p. 612). In addition to that, unevenness in terms of the landscape may also lead for the uneven participation of citizens in a social movement in different places; due to the fact that political opportunities in a place also depends on its landscape (Nicholls, 2007, p. 613).

Leitner et al. (2008) also describe how places are not only sites for dense human interactions within given borders, but they are also places where power is imbued and so contested when the time comes:

> Places are sites where people live, work and move, and where they form attachments, practice their relations with each other, and relate to the rest of the world. Yet they are more than just sites where dense social relations within and beyond that place join up. They have distinct materiality and a material environment that is historically constructed -networks of roads and railroads, the layout and design of residences, offices, factories, public parks and recreation areas fences, walls, etc. This materiality regulates and mediates social relations and daily routines within a place, and is thus imbued with power (p. 161).

This materiality of the place which draws the boundaries of interaction also affects the socio-spatial boundaries of actions and mobility. In Suriçi, the architectural design of the district which signifies the boundaries of interaction is treated as the one of the important dynamics that paved the way for the urban warfare. Firstly, the material characteristics of Suriçi affected everyday relations and the interaction of the residents, which had impacts on the way to the urban warfare facilitated. Moreover, the physical characteristics of Suriçi, with its small streets, gateways, old houses made of basalt and city walls, created a place through which the Kurdish youth organized and fought against the armed forces of the central state.

Places are also imbued with a certain context, meaning and symbols, and imaginaries which can be manipulated and subverted during times of contention. In addition, the spatial unevenness of distinct places was also the case when we

compare Suriçi with other districts in Diyarbakır. Suriçi was the home for many cultures and ethnic groups; social and economic relations were based on strong and solidaristic ties; exposure to political violence as a result of the conflict between the state and the movement was very common among local families, and architectural design made hosting such violent warfare feasible. Thus, I argue even though urban warfare was a central decision of the Kurdish national movement, it actualized in Suriçi due to these spatial reasons as well.

Furthermore, a social movement can demand redistributive and/or recognitive adjustments in the local, national, or international level. However, in each scale, this social movement may have an uneven scaling of political opportunities. This may lead a contentious politics to use scale-jumping, which basically means starting from one scale to jump another scale: "Embarking on these types of multi-scalar strategies is by necessity a relational process requiring the development and reconfiguration of social networks across geographical and social boundaries," (Nicholls, 2007, p. 614). Thus, the locality and relations and networks it provides can be the basis of a social movement which demands a change within that locality, or it may jump other scales once it has gotten started.

Moreover, place can create an environment for protesters to engage with one another on the basis of trusting relationships and this enables social movement to act with a certainty in terms of important resources such as lives, goods or reputation without the hesitation in terms of malfeasance or incompetence of others (Nicholls, 2007, p. 615). Nicholls (2007) emphasizes that strong ties encourage people to stick to their demands and contribute to the movement with their participation or resources even though the movement seems to be a risky one in terms of its expected gains (p.

615). The neighborhood is also explained as the one constitutive of tangible bonds which contributes to the construction of strong ties, trust, solidarity networks as well as framing and perceiving this specific place similarly (Nicholls, 2007, p. 616). Yet, all of these do not necessarily mean there should be a homogenous conception of interests among these actors (Nicholls, 2007, p. 617, 618).

When it comes to Suriçi, we can say that these strong ties, trust, solidarity networks and neighborhood relations, in general are the most constitutive parts of the reasons behind how Suriçi could accommodate such an urban warfare. The strong relations among the residents lead them to feel joy, sorrow, and anger together. This process of sense-making in different issues was also strengthened over time through the common grievances they shared in the 1980s and 1990s because of the political conflict. To present the socio-spatial dynamics of urban warfare in Chapter 5, first I will depict the everyday life and material environment in Suriçi. Specifically, I will focus on social, economic and political dynamics that were constructed over time. Later, I will benefit from analytical tools from the literature such as neighborhood relations, strong ties, trust and solidarity networks in examining mechanisms through which urban warfare in Suriçi actualized in 2015.

CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORY OF THE CONTENTION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL STATE AND THE KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

In order to analyze the contention over Suriçi between the municipality which has been ruled by the Kurdish national movement since 1999, and the local state representatives, it is essential to present the history of the rise of the Kurdish national movement and its struggle against the state. Gunes (2012) argues that from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey an exclusive understanding of Turkishness has dominated the central state ideology which has resulted in Kurdish insurgencies over the course of its history. Due to this exclusive understanding of Turkishness, not only Kurds, but also many other minorities in Turkey had to deal with problems regarding the linguistic and cultural domination of Turkishness and the assimilation policies of the Turkish nation-state. However, this so to speak founding principle of the republic based on Turkishness ideologically had its roots in the nationalist wing of Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). CUP was a leading actor in the Young Turk revolution of 1908 which in the beginning rallied around the banner of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Justice" (Gunes, 2012, p. 2). However, later this ideal of liberty, equality, fraternity and justice for *all* Ottoman subjects turned out to take Turks as the dominant nation in the empire (Yeğen, 2007, p. 124). Yeğen argues that considering Turks as *millet-i hakime* went hand in hand with centralization in administration which eventually resulted in distancing Kurdish intellectuals as well as Anatolian Kurds from the central government (Yeğen, 2007, p. 124).

Not only Turkishness but also Muslimness of Anatolia began to prevail during the years of disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, deportation and destruction of non-Muslim, i.e., Greek and Armenian, communities led to a dramatic change in terms of the demographic structure of Anatolia (Gunes, 2012, p. 3). According to Gunes, this history left two important legacies to the newly founded Republic of Turkey. One of them was the ideological legacy which helped Mustafa Kemal and his friends build a republic based on this Turkish ideal. The other legacy was Kurds who remained the largest non-Turkish group after this large-scale demographic change within the boundaries of today's Turkey. Since that time, there have been significant moments in the history of Republic of Turkey when Kurds rebelled against the state's authority by different means. However, any time they rebelled in order to demand their linguistic, cultural and political recognition they were labeled as "separatists" who were against the national unity of Republic of Turkey (Gunes, 2012, p. 3). When we look at the case of Suriçi, we can also suggest that it can be seen as a microcosm of this macro political transformation. Before 1915, although different sources suggest different numbers, at least 30% of the population of Diyarbakır was non-Muslim (Erol, 2015). Apart from non-Muslim residents there were Turcomans, Arabs, and Kurds. After 1915, in Suriçi, two things happened in accordance with the dynamics in macro politics. Primarily, the non-Muslim population in Suriçi dramatically decreased and later, particularly due to the rural to urban migration, the population of Kurds gradually increased, which made Kurds the largest non-Turkish group in Suriçi.

The Republic of Turkey was founded upon the ideal of the Turkish nation-state which invited all of its subjects to become Turks, an ideal which was followed

up by compulsory assimilation policies (Yeğen, 2007, p. 127). The foundation of the nation-state based on a narrow understanding of Turkishness and assimilation policies which were harshly implemented during the 1920s and 1930s provoked major insurrections[2] by Kurds in different cities (Yeğen, 2007, p. 127). These insurrections were harshly suppressed by the central government (Gunes, 2012, p. 3). This harsh repression of Kurds went hand-in-hand with stricter assimilation policies through abolishment of the use of "Kurdistan" in reference to the Kurdish region, and banning Kurdish language or replacing the Kurdish names of villages with Turkish ones (Marcus, 2009, p. 36). Not only these assimilationist policies, but also an absence of novel strategies in substitution for insurrections as well as financial problems led to what Bozarslan (2003) called "twenty years of silence" in terms of Kurdish opposition after the oppression of the last Kurdish insurgency of 1938 (p. 850).

This period of silence and cessation of Kurdish insurgencies led the Republic of Turkey to believe that since the resistance against political integration of the Turkish nation-state ideal had been successfully oppressed thus far, it was now time for the economic integration of Kurds into market relations with developmentalist projects (Yeğen, 2007, p. 131, 132). However, this period of silence was to be disrupted during the 1950s when Kurds, who were either born after the foundation of the republic or in their early thirties back then, once again came together and published magazines (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 852). The memory of the state oppression during the twilight years of the Ottoman Empire and first years of the Republic of

[2] It is suggested that during this time overall twenty-nine uprisings by Kurdish people have been initiated among which 1925 in Sheik Said, 1930 in Agri and 1937-1938 in Dersim are well-known (Çalışlar, 2013, p. 31).

Turkey helped Kurds to politicize and precipitate a new "Kurdism" (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 852).

When it came to the 1960s, the military coup of 1960 again targeted Kurds as a "danger" to state unity and arrested and exiled important Kurdish figures (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 853). Yet, Kurds came back to political stage in Turkey as political subjects with the help of the liberalization period after the coup in terms of freedom of speech and political organization (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 853; Gunes, 2012, p. 17; White, 2015, p. 10). During this period, Kurdish university students enrolled in important universities of Turkey and intellectuals took part in or built organizational ties with Turkish leftist groups (Gunes, 2012, p. 17; White, 2015, p. 10; Bozarslan, 2003, p. 854). Even though one cannot suggest that there was a homogenous group of Kurdish activists back then, Bozarslan (2003) lists some of the main demands of Kurdish activists of the 1960s as being able to freely use Kurdish in the media, radio and education system; and respect for constitutional rights and investments in the Kurdish region (p. 854). However, when it came to particular demands and needs regarding Kurdish identity, these leftist groups showed similar reflexes to the central government and accused Kurds for "separating" from the movement or deviating from the "real cause"; this led Kurdish activists to gradually withdraw from these leftist groups at the end of the 1960s (Gunes, 2012; White, 2015). By the time Kurdish separatism had become a hot debate among the leftist groups in Turkey, Kurds had already started to interpret their problem as Kurds, as a problem of colonialism which had been prevailing for a long time in the Kurdish region (Gunes, 2012, p. 18).

After retreating from Turkish left-wing groups, Kurds first in 1965 formed the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (PDKT in Kurdish) as an organization which paid specific attention to the national problems of Kurds (White, 2015, p. 11). Formation of the PDKT was harshly oppressed by the Turkish state through assassination of the founder Faik Buçak by Turkish secret police and arrest of other founders of the organization (White, 2015, p. 13). Then in 1969, the Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Centres (DDKO in Turkish) was founded. However, its founders also faced a similar end as the founders of the PDKT; all of its leaders were arrested in 1970 (White, 2015, p. 15). These two organizations were two of the most influential organizations during those years. Likewise, many other organizations had also been founded and declined during this period. Today's hegemonic Kurdish political movement which is embodied in the PKK's ideology has also its origins in those days. At this point it is important to highlight that in this thesis whenever the Kurdish national movement is used, it refers to today's Kurdish organizations such as political parties, civil society organizations or different institutions which share the Kurdish "national liberation" (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 859) idea of the PKK, even though it is not overtly indicated in their vision (Watts, 2010, p. 21).[3]

The PKK is still regarded as the one of the main representatives of the demands of Kurdish people in Turkey, and even in Syria after the Syrian civil war.

[3] Watts (2010) argues in her book that she uses the term "movement" to imply "[...] a field of actors sustaining a public a public, collective challenge to authorities based on common purposes and social solidarities." She suggests that there is a realm in which a heterogeneous body of Kurdish activists strive to affect the state's agenda in the direction of their ethnically defined interests. In addition to that, the reason she uses the term "national" is that Watts stresses the endeavour of the Kurdish organizations and activists as working on behalf of Kurdish nation (p. 21). I share a similar perspective to define the borders of Kurdish movement in Turkey.

Even though the PKK has a dominant position in today's Kurdish national movement, it is not the only actor. To provide a comprehensive framework of the contemporary Kurdish national movement, I briefly mention both the PKK and the formal representation of the Kurdish national movement. To begin with, the PKK's founders in 1974 came together and agreed upon the need for a national liberation movement by the Kurds for the Kurds (White, 2015, p. 17). On November 27, 1978, this founding cadre officially announced their political party called *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (Kurdistan Worker's Party) (White, 2015, p. 18). The PKK was first formed as a political party, but then it created its own guerilla force which started to fight against the Turkish state August 15, 1984 (White, 2015, p. 20). The PKK from the very beginning differed from the Kurdish nationalism of the 1960s, which was founded upon cultural and constitutional demands (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 854), due to the fact that it turned into a guerilla movement. According to White (2015), when the PKK was first established and started the guerilla war with the Republic of Turkey, it was composed of a ragged group of guerillas; nevertheless, over time these ragged guerillas became professional rebels who organized in all parts of Great Kurdistan and coordinated under the organization of Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK in Kurdish) (p. 22).

When the PKK started to fight against the Turkish state, there was a state of absolute denial of Kurdish identity. This denial was crystallized via assimilationist policies as well as violence by the central state particularly after the 1980 military coup. This escalation of violence went all the way up until 1999 (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 861). The ultimate problem of Kurds was described as "colonialism" by the founders of the Kurdish national movement (White, 2015, p. 30). According to them, Turks

were occupiers of the Kurdish homeland and this situation could be ended with the foundation of an independent Kurdistan. Although the PKK described its war as a war against the state's colonialism, during the first years of the PKK, rather than a residual confrontation with the Republic of Turkey, it struggled against repressive landlords and tribal chiefs (White, 2015, p. 31). In this way, the PKK attracted Kurdish people as it pointed out Kurdish villagers' everyday grievances in the first place, through propagandising in the villages or hanging banners in coffeehouses (White, 2015, p. 32).

I believe it is important to stress the organization strategy of the PKK here, because even though ideologically it points out the colonial status of the Kurds in Turkish state, it started organizing locally by addressing local representatives of this colonialism. This situation helped local people to link the larger ideological cause of the PKK to their everyday life and their grievances which were comprised of socio-spatial dynamics. Moreover, when one takes Suriçi into account, it can be argued that from the very beginning of the PKK to today, even though in terms of its objectives it has changed its route, it still had a similar strategy when it came to building connections with local people. However, when it came to 2015 there were no feudal landlords to struggle against, so this time people were organized around the idea of self-rule in their locality and struggle against the central state in their neighborhoods.

By the end of the 1980s, this close connection of the PKK with local people caused both destruction and a large migration wave from these areas by the state, but also increased the numbers of guerrillas in the PKK (White, 2015, p. 33). However, it was not only the strategies of the PKK that led to increased attraction to the organization, but also the state's mounting pressure on Kurdish people through

extending the ban on the use of Kurdish language or claiming any connotations of Kurdish identity as separatist by the central state, so much so that after the 1980 military coup the PKK came to be seen as the only solution to the Kurdish problem (Marcus, 2009, p. 121).

Today, Kurds in Turkey ideologically base their demands on the issues of minority rights and political rights through constitutional change. However, in 1978 when the PKK was established, the main aim of the party was the formation of an independent Kurdistan which would have been composed of land from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Marcus, 2009, p. 26; Bozarslan: 2003, p. 858). After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK experienced a paradigm shift in the party program and new ideas for a democratic republic started flourish (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 865). Not that the PKK was abandoning its socialist program of national liberation. Rather, the PKK was inclining to a reconfiguration of the political movement within the national borders of the Republic of Turkey (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 865). Although there has been a paradigm shift towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict within the national borders of the Republic of Turkey and many efforts of disarmament and peace followed this shift, at the end of the day the conflict has not yet been resolved.

Even though the PKK has set the tone in Kurdish issues in many ways, its hegemonic position should not be overestimated in Kurdish national movement as a whole because as stated above, the actors in the Kurdish national movement are beyond the PKK. In official politics, there have been many attempts through NGOs or political parties which carried the Kurdish national movement in different directions as well. In this thesis, I look more closely into the formal political parties which later would run municipalities in Diyarbakır. In the 1990s, the war between

these two military groups was at its peak; yet, it was also the time of initiatives in terms of the foundation of new Kurdish political parties. The People's Labor Party (HEP in Turkish) was the first Kurdish-dominated party which was founded in 1990 (Marcus, 2009, p. 177). The HEP, as the predecessor of political parties such as the Democracy Party (DEP in Turkish), People's Democracy Party (HADEP in Turkish), Democratic People's Party (DEHAP in Turkish), Democratic Society Party (DTP in Turkish), Peace and Democracy Party (BDP in Turkish) and lastly the Democratic Regions Party (DBP in Turkish), was the first pro-Kurdish party which entered into conventional politics and gained seats in local and national politics together with representation in the international sphere (Watts, 2010, p. 3).

It should not mean that before these parties there were no Kurdish politicians in the game, however, it implies that these parties were the first in terms of the challenges they brought to Turkish politics on issues such as Kurdishness, political representation, and the very idea of sovereignty; they raised a public, sustained, and collective challenge (Watts, 2010, p. 17). Before the foundation of the HEP, Kurdish groups used to form coalitions with especially left-wing parties. In 1977 for the first time in local elections, Kurdish politicians entered the elections as independent candidates in the region and won offices in Diyarbakır, Batman and Urfa (Watts, 2010, p. 46).

The HEP was first uniform pro-Kurdish party in the sense of its close relations with the PKK and its preponderant focus on the resolution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey and it was again the first pro-Kurdish party which actually took a place in the system through its national and local electoral success (Watts, 2010, p. 52). Watts (2010) argues that to understand the formation of pro-Kurdish parties one

should not take the PKK as an exclusive explanation in terms of understanding the HEP and its predecessor origins as well as success (p. 52). She suggests that both the HEP and its later predecessors came into existence through first changes in national and international political systems in terms of inclusion within the system; and second, opportunities and resources that were provided by the extrasystemic movement, i.e., the PKK (Watts: 2010, p. 53). Watts (2010) claims that this contradiction which lays at the origin of the legal pro-Kurdish parties has always produced tensions together with opportunities (p. 53).

When HADEP first gained the mayorship in Diyarbakır in 1999, its slogan was "We will manage ourselves and our city on our own" [*Kendimizi de kentimizi de biz yöneteceğiz*] (as cited in Watts, 2010, p. 144). After winning the elections, through sanitation, urban beautification, health services, transportation and a new discourse, these mayors produced a modern Kurdish identity based on a modern city life. However, they always saw peace as the top priority to perpetuate this modernization period in Turkey's Kurdistan (Watts, 2010, p. 145).

The peaceful environment was indispensable for pro-Kurdish parties not only in ideological terms, but also in terms of sustaining its formal status and maneuver capability (Watts, 2010, p. 87-90, 94-121). Watts (2010) clearly indicates that the ceasefire between 1999 to 2004; Turkey's renewed efforts for EU admission from 1999 through the first couple of years of the 2000s; and lastly the transformation from military governance to civilian governance in the Kurdish region by lifting emergency law in 2002 that had been declared in 1987 all together paved the way for opening up more a suitable environment for political organization in urban centers such as Diyarbakır particularly until 2004.

In 2005 the ceasefire ended, and the conflict resumed between the central state and PKK until 2008. Pendency in terms of access to the EU and regional autonomy that was established by Kurds in Iraq had accelerated the tension in national politics. This political atmosphere led the ruling party of the time, the AKP, to take an offensive position against Kurds and this was immediately retaliated by the PKK. This culmination of the conflict left little space for pro-Kurdish activists to maneuver and negotiate. Therefore, Watts argues that pro-Kurdish activists at that time period were torn in the sense that on the one hand they were trying to calm their constituents and continue to give voice to the movement's demands; on the other hand, it became more difficult to ignore or avoid the questions of the opposition in terms of their assessment of the PKK as legitimate or illegitimate. This process of polarization resulted in two things: "Politics of polarization and violence promoted by both state authorities and the PKK made it very difficult for the parties to distance themselves from the PKK and to establish an alternative base of authority" (Watts, 2010, p. 121).

This violent process was interrupted in 2009 when official attempts were made in terms of ending the war between the PKK and the central state. At the time, the process was first called "Kurdish Opening", then "Democratic Opening" and lastly, "National Unity and Fraternity Project" (Aydınoğlu, 2014, p. 185; White, 2015, p. 51). The changes to the name itself shows how the process was doomed to fail, in the sense that it step-by-step turned to state action to end "terrorism" and rebuild national unity which had been the dominant discourse during the years of war as well. Yet, the history of the Peace Process together with its ruptures and continuities has been a topic for important analyses which have focused on multiple

dynamics in terms of national and international politics to trace the negotiations between the Turkish state and Kurdish national movement (Aydınoğlu, 2014, p. 181-204; White, 2015, p. 51-125; Sarıhan, 2013, p. 89-100; Pope, 2013, p. 117-140; Walker, 2013, p. 223-237). However, the final episode of the process which brought an end to the dialogue between the Turkish state and Kurdish national movement is important in order to understand the context through which urban warfare broke out in 2015 in Suriçi. Even though, in 2009, for the first time the Republic of Turkey officially accepted the Kurdish national movement as the addressee and began negotiations with it, it did not last long and the closure of the DTP, arresting Kurdish politicians as KCK members and the escalation of violence in rural areas paved the way towards the end of negotiations throughout 2010 up until the very end of 2012 (White, 2015, p. 53, 54).

On December 31, 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once more announced that there had been negotiations between the two sides which would bring a lasting peace to the conflict. After that, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan responded that by declaring that the armed struggle was now over (White, 2015, p. 100, 101). Despite the ups and downs in international and Turkish politics during the Peace Process[4] (Gergerlioğlu, 2016), the Peace Process was officially accepted through enactment of a law under the title "Bringing an End to Terror and Strengthening Social Unification" (Resmi Gazete, 2014) and lasted until the summer of 2015.

[4] Retrieved 21 May, 2018, from http://t24.com.tr/haber/pkk-kurucusu-sakine-cansiz-pariste-olduruldu,221338;
Retrieved 21 May, 2018, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/6-7-ekim-in-aci-bilancosu-50-olu-27525777.

During this time period an important meeting with the participation of both the central state and Kurdish national movement took place on February 28, 2015, in Dolmabahçe Palace which was later became known as the "Dolmabahçe Settlement". That day a group of politicians, among which were Vice Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan, Minister of Interior Efkan Ala, AKP Group Deputy Chairman Mahir Ünal; and people from İmralı Committee; parliamentarians from the HDP Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Pervin Buldan, İdris Baluken as well as former Vice President of Turkish Intelligence Agency (MİT in Turkish) and Undersecretary of Public Security Muhammed Dervişoğlu, gathered in Dolmabahçe Palace. After the meeting, in a press conference, Sırrı Süreyya Önder read a declaration which included Abdullah Öcalan's call to the PKK to disarm. Even though there have been criticisms as well as suspicions towards this meeting and its premises[5], it has been acknowledged as an important step further to build a long-standing peace nationally and internationally (Balta, Çelik, Çelikkan, Korkut, & Mutluer 2015, p. 19).

However, those times were fragile for both national and international arena. First of all, internationally, there has been a civil war going on in Syria since 2011. Civil war in Syria both in terms of regional instability and emergence of new, non-state actors in the region was understood as a threat to the national unity of Turkey as well as a challenge to Turkey's desire to become a stronger party in the region (Ünal, 2015, p. 110). The Democratic Union Party (PYD in Kurdish) which was founded by

[5] Retrieved 21 May, 2018, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cemil-bayik-silah-birakmayiz-adimlar-atilirsa-silahli-mucadeleyi-birakmaya-haziriz-28604848;
Retrieved 19 May, 2018, from http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/dolmabahce-bildirisi-yeni-sevr-anlasmasi-110920h.htm;
Retrieved 17 March, 2018, from http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-silah-birakmak-lafla-olmaz-172664.html.

the PKK cadres has become important non-state actor within Syrian borders. This new actor started to gain territorial control over the north of Syria which happened for the first time in the history of the PKK thanks to international support, more specifically support from the US (Ünal, 2015, p. 110). While Turkey was nationally negotiating a peaceful resolution of the conflict with the condition of disarmament of the PKK, internationally the PKK was achieving military success within a neighboring country. Apart from being a challenge to Turkey's strong position in Middle East, this also triggered Turkey's concern about the establishment of an independent Kurdistan ruled by the PKK which would be a threat against its unity. This was of course not the only reason which instigated the urban warfare in 2015; however, it can be said that the tension between the PKK and Turkey in the international arena created an environment which complicated peaceful resolution with conflict in another region. Moreover, some also argue that the confidence of PKK in its rising power in the region and the support of international actors in Syria prepared the circumstances under which the PKK called for urban warfare in the Kurdish region of Turkey in 2015 (Akyol & Gürbüz: 2017, p. 159) as a response to deadlocks in Turkish politics in terms of democratization of the country and the Kurdish issue.[6]

[6] Duran Kalkan's, a member of Executive Committee of the KCK statement on autonomous self-rule declaration is shared which has been accepted as the call for the declaration of the autonomous self-rule in the cities: "Let us build democratic self-rule village by village, town by town and resist against the AKP. We are not leaving Turkey and we are respectful to the democratic rules. We shall no longer say we are the only executive branch. If we empower local democracy, we would inflict a heavy blow on the government. I invite everybody to enhance democratic self-rule." (Milliyet, 2015).

At this point it is important to also look at the dynamics in Turkish national politics which had accelerating effects on the process which brought an end to the Peace Process. In 2015, a national election was approaching. It was the first national election of the AKP after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the President of the Republic, and had ended his organic ties with the AKP. Moreover, the HDP was preparing to enter the election as a party regardless of 10% national threshold. This competition was at peak particularly in the Kurdish region due to the fact that the AKP and HDP were the only competitive players when it came to elections in this region. As it might be expected from a country which has a very fragile democratic system, this competition and power struggle precluded peace talks between these two sides.

Independent from the discussions over peace negotiation, in his party caucus on March 17, 2015, the HDP co-president Selahattin Demirtaş pointed at Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his openly expressed desire to replace parliamentary democracy with the presidential system[7] and he chanted three times that: "We won't allow you to be president! (*Seni başkan yaptırmayacağız!*)"[8] On March 21, 2015, the Kurdish national movement, beside its criticism against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP, repeated their insistence on the continuation of the Peace Process by reading the message of Abdullah Öcalan during Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır. Abdullah Öcalan called the PKK to hold a congress for disarmament and he also addressed the

[7] Retrieved 20 March, 2018, from https://www.haberler.com/erdogan-7-haziran-da-400-milletvekili-istedi-6940796-haberi.
[8] Retrieved 20 March, 2018, from http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/231943/_Seni_baskan_yaptirmayacagiz_.html.

government to form a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[9] However, on March 22, 2015, the President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while answering the questions of the press referred to the Dolmabahçe Settlement on February 28, 2015, and said that there was no joint declaration as mentioned.[10] This was a historical retreat which led to growing tension between the two sides. After that, the Peace Process came to a halt until the national election on June 7, 2015.

Until now, I briefly mentioned the changing dynamics in international and national politics which created an environment in which the Peace Process came to a halt and tension between the two sides grew dramatically in the context of rising authoritarianism in Turkey. However, the reflections of these changing dynamics in macro politics on the lives of people can be traced through the human rights violations during that time in the Kurdish region as well as in Suriçi. As the Human Rights Association's (İHD, 2016) report shows, even though there had been a Peace Process between two sides, the human right violations such as extrajudicial execution, torture and torment, and interventions in meetings and demonstrations continued in the first 7 seven months of 2015 in the Kurdish region. Thus, the discursive shifts and growing tension in macro politics in national and international scales, coupled with the political pressures in the local scale led the Kurdish national movement to declare autonomous self-rule in the various districts in the region. The declaration of autonomous self-rule was followed by the curfews and systematic urban warfare in different localities. This urban warfare between the central state and

[9] Retrieved 20 March, 2018, from http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/2013ten-2015e-ocalanin-newroz-mesajlarinin-sifreleri-1318715/.
[10] Retrieved 21 March, 2018, from http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/233651/Erdogan__Dolmabahce_toplantisini_dogru_bulmuyorum.html.

the movement brought the violent and chaotic atmosphere of the 1990s from rural areas to the cities (Akyol & Gürbüz: 2017).

The report of the HDP (2016) on urban warfare in Suriçi also suggests that rising human right violations such as incursions into homes, custody, torture and maltreatment, particularly after the June 7th national election[11] also contributed to the declaration of autonomy in various districts and city centers in the Kurdish region. Therefore, even though, the declaration of the autonomous self-rule which was followed by the urban warfare was a result of changing dynamics in macro politics in different scales; these human rights violations can be argued as another important factor that led people to take a part in or contribute to this urban warfare.

According to the data provided by the Human Rights Association of Turkey (TİHV, 2017) starting from August 16, 2015, the state officially declared curfews at least 63 times for either a single day or for an indefinite period of time in various localities in the Kurdish region. First, on August 16, 2015, in Muş (Varto) the curfew was declared by the central state alongside the declaration of autonomous self-rule by the Kurdish national movement. Then, it continued throughout Diyarbakır (100 times), Hakkari (7 times), Şırnak (13 times), Muş (2 times), Batman (3 times), Mardin (24 times), Bitlis (4 times), Tunceli (2 times), Bingöl (2 times) and Elazığ (1 time). Thus, curfews have been officially declared at least 169 times in 1 city and in 39 districts of 10 cities in the Kurdish region and Suriçi was one of those districts (TİHV, 2017).

[11] According to Official Gazette, in the 7 June elections the HDP gained %12,96 percent of the votes and won 80 deputies in the parliament. The AKP, on the other hand, gained %40,66 percent of votes and won 258 deputies which was not enough to form a government on its own (Resmi Gazete, 2016a).

In Suriçi, autonomous self-rule was declared on August 14, 2015 (HDP, 2016, p. 21). On September 6, 2015, for the first-time curfew was declared in Suriçi for a single day (TİHV, 2017). Then, the central state declared a curfew on September 13, 2015, again for one day. On October 10, 2015, another curfew was declared in the district which lasted 4 days. For the fourth time, the central state declared curfew on November 28, 2015, and this time it lasted 3 days. After that, the central state declared another curfew from December 2-11, 2015. On December 11th the central state suspended the curfew for 17 hours, then it once again declared the curfew for the sixth and last time which still continues in the six neighborhoods in Suriçi (TİHV, 2017). Even though urban warfare in Suriçi ended finally on March 9, 2016, (AMNESTY, 2016, p. 9), in these six neighborhoods[12] where conflict was at its peak, the curfew has been going on for more than 2 years (TİHV, 2017). According to the interviews, though there was no living person remaining in these neighborhoods after the urban warfare, with the ongoing curfew the central state prevented the return of the residents and the continued the destruction of the buildings in the area.

Sur People's Assembly declared autonomous self-rule in Hasırlı neighborhood, Suriçi on August 14, 2015 (HDP, 2016, p. 24). Apart from the members of Sur People's Assembly, co-presidents of Sur Municipality and a number of residents were also there during the autonomous self-rule declaration (HDP, 2016,

[12] The curfew continues in Savaş Neighborhood except for Buzcular Street, Buzcular-1 Street, Eski Yoğurt Pazarı Street, Çiftehan Street; Dabanoğlu Neighborhood except from Bıyıklı Mehmet Paşa Street and Orta Karataş Street, Marangoz Street, Miras Street, Süleyman Nazif Street and Varol Street; Cevat Paşa Neighborhood; Fatihpaşa Neighborhood; Hasırlı Neighborhood and Cemal Yılmaz Nighborhood (TİHV, 2017)

p. 24). They declared the autonomous self-rule with the same slogan that the HADEP used during the 1999 local elections: “We will manage ourselves and our city on our own” [*Kendimizi de kentimizi de biz yöneteceğiz*] (HDP, 2016, p. 24). Güneş Sönmez, the speaker of Sur People’s Assembly, during the statement suggested that the AKP government had returned to “the concept of war” in the Kurdish region with the executions of civilians, tortures and detentions, and therefore they would no longer recognize the central state’s institutions as legitimate governance bodies and would build autonomous self-rule mechanisms within their localities (HDP, 2016, p. 24).

After the declaration of autonomous self-rule, the first thing that the Kurdish militias tried to do was to bear arms and militarily defend “their place” from the state. Fırat, a 31-year-old carpenter from Suriçi claimed that after the declaration of autonomous self-rule, they started to see the Kurdish youth of Suriçi under arms take charge of the public order in different neighborhoods. The Kurdish militias who organized under the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H in Turkish) supported by the PKK started to make trenches and barricades after the declaration of autonomous self-rule. The central state responded to these ditches and barricades by declaring a curfew for the first time on September 6, 2015.

From September 6, 2015 up until November 28, 2015, the armed forces of the central state continued their small-scale operations, but they could not go into the neighborhoods due to the trenches and barricades (Gazete Duvar, 2017). On November 28, 2015, Tahir Elçi, the president of the Diyarbakır Bar Association, made a press conference in front of the Four Footed Minaret in order to draw attention to the destruction in the historical city center because of the conflicts in the

district. He was murdered during the press conference, and after his death the central state declared another curfew on December 2, 2015, which was interrupted on December 11, 2015, for only 17 hours and lasted up until March 9, 2016.[13] During the 103 days of the urban warfare in Suriçi, YDG-H militias and the central state fought with each other in Dabanoğlu, Savaş, Hasırlı, Cemal Yılmaz, Cevat Paşa and Faithpaşa neighborhoods using heavy weapons (Gazete Duvar, 2017).

During these 103 days, local NGOs tried to become a bridge between the central state and Kurdish national movement to open room for dialogue between them (Gazete Duvar, 2017). Local NGOs started to negotiate with the different actors from both the central state and movement for the first time during the curfews in September 2015. The first series of meetings went successfully, and the conflict between these sides seemed to diminish. However, according to local NGOs, by December 2015, the Kurdish militias once again started to build ditches and barricades, which brought about a much more violent confrontation in the six neighborhoods of Suriçi (Gazete Duvar, 2017). Local NGOs once again tried to get in touch with the constituents of the movement and central state. Their attempts did not go well this time. The Democratic Society Congress (DTK in Turkish) suggested that they could not do anything until the government restarted the Peace Process and negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan (Gazete Duvar, 2017). In the context of rising authoritarianism and growing tension in terms of the Kurdish issue in national politics, this demand of the Kurdish national movement did not bring the Peace Process and negotiations back into the agenda. Once the negotiations were suspended

[13] Retrieved 20 June, 2018, from http://www.ensonhaber.com/surda-103-gun-suren-operasyon-sona-erdi-2016-03-10.html

between these sides, the civilian actors of the Kurdish national movement lost their influence, and the central state and PKK became the only effective actors in town. DBP and HDP made many statements which criticized the curfews and conflicts, and called for the state to end curfews and operations.[14] However, despite their criticisms, the curfews and operations continued up until March 9, 2016.

During that time, the central state called the urban warfare in various districts security operations as a response to "terrorist activities" conducted within these districts by the PKK (OHCHR, 2017, p. 5). The curfews prohibited any movement in over 30 neighborhoods and towns. The curfews also prevented the evacuation of the residents who remained in between these "security operations" (OHCHR, 2017, p. 5). During the fieldwork, my interviewees argued that there were the days when they could not find bread to feed themselves during the operations, because they could not go out of their houses. They also mentioned occasions when they were targeted by the security forces when they tried to leave their houses (Ali, personal communication, March 20, 2017). The residents also had to deal with electricity interruptions, water interruptions and lack of internet and telephone networks during this period (AMNESTY, 2016, p. 7). The urban warfare took place in at least 30 urban districts and a number of rural locations which included killings, tortures, gender-based violence against women, displacements, disappearances and

[14] Retrieved 20 June, 2018, from http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/490556/Sur_gerginligi..._Demirtas_tan_icisleri_Bakani_na_yanit.html;
Retrieved 20 June, 2018, from https://www.haberler.com/diyarbakir-da-hdp-lilerden-sokaga-cikma-yasagina-7914034-haberi/;
Retrieved 20 June, 2018, from https://www.haberler.com/hdp-ve-dbp-den-sokaga-cikma-yasagina-tepki-7939642-haberi/.

destruction of homes, as well as cultural monuments in those districts (OHCHR, 2017, p. 5).

During the violent encounter between the central state and PKK, some 2000 people including the civilians, Kurdish militias and state security staff were killed from July 2015 to August 2016 according to official reports (OHCHR, 2017, p. 5). In Suriçi it is estimated that 90 people, including the Kurdish militants and civilians, lost their lives during the urban warfare (HDP, 2016, p. 188). Moreover, according to the statement of Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, 71 security staff also lost their lives in the district (HDP, 2016, p. 188).

In addition to that, the reported number of displaced people is estimated between 355,000 to 500,000 people. Most of those people were Kurds, and had to move to the nearby suburbs, towns and villages, or sometimes other regions within Turkey during the urban warfare (OHCHR, 2017, p. 4). According to the local NGOs, the government assistance to those displaced people was conditioned upon having a clean criminal code which once again violated basic humanitarian principles (OHCHR, 2017, p. 4). Apart from these, during and after the urban warfare, local, national and international NGOs had troubles in terms of accessing the areas of the conflict, and monitoring the human rights violations in those areas; moreover they were subjected to the state surveillance and harassment (OHCHR, 2017, p. 7).

Apart from being a 2000-year-old historical center of uninterrupted urban life, Suriçi was an important center for the urban warfare in the Kurdish region in general as well. According to the data provided by the report of OHCHR (2017), the most serious incidents that caused significant numbers of deaths and destructions

were reported in Cizre (province of Şırnak), and then in Sur (p. 5). When it comes to the destruction of houses, public and business buildings as well, Nusaybin (province of Mardin) and Sur were two important locations where the largest destructions occurred (see Figure 2) (OHCHR, 2017, p. 9). As the report showed, Sur district was destroyed by the heavy waepons which resulted in a permanent demographic change alongside the architectural design of the whole historical center (OHCHR, 2017, p. 9). The total size of the destroyed area in Sur is estimated at 18.7 hectares (OHCHR, 2017, p. 11).



Figure 2: Destructions that took place in Suriçi during and in the aftermath of the urban warfare by July 26, 2016 (OHCHR, 2017, p. 10).

In addition to death and destruction during the urban warfare, Suriçi had to face the largest urgent expropriation decision by the Council of Ministers when compared to other conflict areas in the region (AMNESTY, 2016, p. 8). For instance,

while the Council of Ministers expropriated 22 parcels of land in Cizre from three neighborhoods, it expropriated 6292 parcels of land from Suriçi, which also indicates the permanent change in terms of the demographic structure of the place (GABB & Sur Municipality, 2016, p. 8; Resmi Gazete, 2016b; AMNESTY, 2016, p. 8). Last but not the least, the ongoing curfew in the six neighborhoods of Suriçi is the longest curfew in world history.[15]

All in all, Suriçi has been an important center for Diyarbakır and the Kurdish national movement since the 1980s. Suriçi was also a crucial center during the urban warfare because of the large number of destructions and deaths that took place there. Moreover, Suriçi was the only place the central state aimed to entirely transform in the aftermath of the urban warfare. I argue all of this demonstrates the importance of Suriçi as a place of uninterrupted urban life as well as struggle. Therefore, this study strives to examine the micro political dynamics of urban warfare, i.e., local institutional politics and everyday politics, by taking Suriçi as a crucial case.

[15] Retrieved 19 June, 2018, from http://gazetekarinca.com/2017/08/1-yil-8-ay-24-gun-surda-dunyanin-en-uzun-yasagi/.

CHAPTER 4

LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS IN SURİÇİ, MULTIPLE CONCEPTIONS OF SPACE AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

> […] Groups, classes, or fractions of classes cannot constitute themselves, or recognize one another, as "subjects" unless they generate (or produce) a space. Ideas, representations, or values which do not succeed in making their mark on space, and thus generating (or producing) an appropriate morphology, will lose all pith and become mere signs, resolve themselves into abstract description, or mutate into fantasies. (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 416, 417)

In this chapter, I focus on the projects initiated by the local institutional actors in Suriçi between the time period of 1999 to 2015. These urban projects envisioned a restructuring in terms of the physical and social space of Suriçi. Yet, the analysis of the process of these projects demonstrates that the production of space is embedded in multiple layers of contention even on the scale of institutional politics. This chapter examines the contestations over and through the urban projects in Suriçi and presents the unintended consequences of these contestations on the production of space. Contestations that are embedded in the institutional politics unintentionally prevented large-scale urban transformation in Suriçi up until 2015. This preserved the socio-spatial configuration of Suriçi, and later contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015. Therefore, this chapter also shows how the interscalar relations among the international, national, and local institutions turned into contingent and contested processes in the local scale due to the socio-political struggles, as well by analyzing the contestations through and over urban projects.

Even though the local institutional actors, i.e. the municipality and non-elected local state representatives[16], had different ideological stands, these ideological distinctions in themselves did not lead to a predictable line of communication or non-communication when it came to different urban projects in Suriçi. One can try to explain this unpredictable line of communication through shifts in macro politics during this time period which sometimes hardened the negotiations at the local level. However, on the other hand, the shared neoliberal vision for Suriçi actually complicated their relations by enabling them to cooperate despite the macro political relations. Both of these actors took developmentalist perspectives and were eager to transform Suriçi into a center of tourism and trade (Genç, 2014).

This common motivation created a platform through which the central state and municipality could specifically initiate urban renewal, and historical and cultural revival projects despite their ideological differences. Yet, ideological differences did not vanish during these projects. Rather, both the central state and municipality tried to appropriate these projects in a way that would serve their larger political agendas. For instance, when we look at the İçkale Project, the Kurdish national movement reinforced the Kurdish identity by placing a special emphasis on the multicultural history of the place. However, this endeavor to revive multicultural history of the place was coupled with tourism and trade-centered neoliberal dreams over Suriçi.

In other words, the 2000s witnessed what Watts (2010) called "representative contention" over Suriçi by the Kurdish national movement. This situation caused

[16] Non-elected local state representatives will also be abbreviated as "the central state" due to the fact that these institutional bodies have been appointed by the central state, and represent the central state's interests in local.

deadlocks and delays in certain projects. The Ali Paşa-Lale Bey Project, which came to an end before the project was finalized, would be a good example of this volatile relationship. In this chapter, I first trace this process of representative contention by examining the collaborations and contestations that took place over these projects. Then, I come up with certain implications of these institutional contestations and collaborations for urban warfare.

I also concentrate on the projects which aimed to create a historical and cultural revival. I examine how these projects became an area to perpetuate the representative contention, while they also contributing to the tourism and trade-centered transformation of Suriçi. DMM predominantly initiated these projects without any collaboration with the central state in order to revive the multicultural historical and cultural heritage of Suriçi. At times the Diyarbakır Governorship also came up with restoration projects which aimed to revive historical and cultural heritage. These projects pioneered by public institutions also attracted private investors to initiate restoration facilities by buying Diyarbakır Houses, old inns and mansions, and turning them into cafes and restaurants. This caused a growing real estate market in Suriçi and conjointly a threat of depopulation in the long run. Additionally, I present the social projects which were initiated, mainly tandır[17] houses and laundries, in order to explain the contradictory nature of the place-making process in Suriçi which also unintentionally contributed to the preservation of physical and demographic configuration of Suriçi in small-scale.

[17] Tandır is a kind of clay oven made in a hole in the earth which is usually used to bake homemade bread in the region.

All in all, I argue that the urban projects initiated by the movement and state ultimately aimed to transform Suriçi into a tourism and trade-center. In order to transform Suriçi into an "open air museum", the actors also envisioned a decrease in population as they stated during the interviews. However, during the projects deadlocks and delays due to contestations and negotiations led to an adjournment in terms of finalization of the projects. This situation slowed down the process of depopulation, which enabled residents to maintain their everyday life and relations within the same urban design up until 2015. This unintended consequence of the struggle between the municipality and central state left the physical and demographic structure in Suriçi to an important extent untouched. And finally, in Chapter 5, I argue the dynamics of this preserved socio-spatial structure of Suriçi which contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015.

4.1 Collaborations over the urban projects

In this section I present the process of negotiation and deliberation over the different urban projects. In order to do that, I focus on "Historical City Wall Preservation Band Urban Renewal (*Gecekondu*[18] Transformation) Project" [hereafter İçkale (meaning Inner Castle) Project], "Alipaşa and Lalabey Urban Renewal (*Gecekondu* Transformation) Project" (hereafter Alipaşa-Lalebey Project) (see Figure 3), and application process to UNESCO World Heritage List. Both of the urban renewal projects, as Genç (2014) suggests, aimed to remove unsuitable constructions around the project areas and reconstruct those areas in a way that would allow Suriçi to

[18] Gecekondu is the word in Turkish meaning a shanty house which puts up quickly without proper permissions and infrastructure.

regain its well-deserved appearance. The UNESCO candidacy also serves to reveal the historical and cultural heritage of Suriçi which would contribute to its tourism potential and local development in the long run. This trade and tourism-centered perspective on Suriçi shared throughout these three large-scale projects, intended to gentrify Suriçi not only physically but also demographically, with a certain degree of envisaged depopulation as suggested by the documents and interviewees.[19]



Figure 3: İçkale and Alipaşa-Lalebey Project Areas (Genç, 2014, p. 174).

[19] İçkale Project included the demolishment of 352 unlicensed constructions and Alipaşa-Lalebey Project included the demolishment of 850 unlicensed constructions in the Suriçi area (Genç, 2014, p. 172). According to TOKİ, in total 1050 unlicensed constructions were designed to be demolished (TBMM, 2009). We do not know the exact number of demolishments from 2007 to 2015, yet we know that the residents of the demolished constructions within these project areas were resettled outside of Suriçi, in Çölgüzeli TOKİ houses.

4.1.1 The İçkale Project

The first urban renewal project in Suriçi was "Historical City Wall Preservation Band Urban Renewal (*Gecekondu* Transformation) Project" [hereafter İçkale (meaning Inner Castle) Project]. The preliminary protocol for the İçkale Project was signed by TOKİ and DMM in 2007. This preliminary protocol was followed by a second and final protocol signed by TOKİ, the Governorship of Diyarbakır, DMM and Sur Municipality in 2009. However, the history of this project dates back to 2000 when DMM collaborated with The Foundation for the Protection and Promotion of the Environment and Cultural Heritage (ÇEKÜL in Turkish) and the Governorship of Diyarbakır for "The Walls of Diyarbakır and the Inner Castle Project" (Soyukaya, 2012, pp. 185-186).

İçkale as the center of the ancient city, is an archaeological site which included administrative buildings such as Diyarbakır Prison, State Security Court, the 7th Corps Headquarter of Turkey, as well as religious buildings such as the Armenian Church of Saint George and Hz. Süleyman Mosque. According to Genç (2014), this cultural-political history of İçkale coupled with its location on a hill overlooking Dicle Valley is the answer to the question of why the very first urban transformation project was initiated in this area[20] (p. 173).

For a brief summary of the evolution of İçkale Project, in 2000, DMM, ÇEKÜL and the Governorship of Diyarbakır initiated "The Walls of Diyarbakır and the Inner Castle Project". This first project aimed at restitution, restoration, survey of the buildings, and evacuation of the administrative buildings in the historical site

[20] It encloses 14 ha of land which includes the whole Cevat Paşa Neighborhood and a small portion from the north of Fatihpaşa Neighborhood (Genç, 2012, p. 172).

(Soyukaya, 2012, pp. 189-190). In 2004, after the Gendarmerie Intelligence Service was evacuated from this area, the project was handed over to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to complete the restitution and restoration process of the historical buildings and religious structures. Later, with the request of Archaeology Museum of Diyarbakır, the ministry decided to turn this archaeological site into a museum complex which would later be called the İçkale Museum Project (Soyukaya, 2012, p. 190).

Though İçkale was the historical city center with its old administrative and religious structures intact, there were also local people who resided in and around the project area. Historically this area was never very populous, but after 1980s, just like many other places in Suriçi, İçkale became a destination for migrants from villages, resulting in a rise of population and increase in unlicensed structures in the area (Genç, 2014, p. 173). Therefore, the second stage of İçkale Project was about the transformation of these unlicensed buildings and improving the landscape design of the archaeological site of İçkale. Needless to say, this landscape design also required depopulation of the area around İçkale via evacuation of these unlicensed buildings.

In September 2007, TOKİ and DMM signed preliminary protocol on "Historical City Wall Preservation Band Urban Renewal (*Gecekondu* Transformation) Project" (TBMM, 2009). Five months after this protocol, the general secretary of DMM, Fahrettin Çağdaş spoke about the content of the project to a newspaper. Çağdaş suggested that they were preparing to open Suriçi up to cultural and religious tourism in the long run by protecting cultural heritage in Suriçi (Emlak Kulisi, 2008). He stated that in order to do that, urban renewal activities with TOKİ in and around the city walls would be carried out and would result in the

"cleansing" of 2000 gecekondu in total. Firstly, in İçkale 143 gecekondu[21] would be evacuated and in doing so an area of 30000 square metres would be "cleansed" (Emlak Kulisi, 2008). After officially admitting the preliminary protocol, the final protocol was signed in October 2009 by the Governorship of Diyarbakır, DMM, TOKİ and Sur Municipality. The main objective of the project was stated in the protocol as creating " […] an urban area with contemporary standards and renovate the historic city walls for tourism purposes," (as cited in Genç, 2014, p. 185).

Overall, this project ultimately aimed to transform the İçkale site in a way that it would contribute to revealing the historical and cultural richness of the region, as can be understood from Fahrettin Çağdaş's speech. This revelation of historical and cultural richness would also contribute to touristic facilities in the city, as well as the socio-economic and cultural structure of the city (Soyukaya, 2012, p. 193). As a part of this project, evacuation of the urban residents from their homes is mentioned as a "cleansing" method which would be requisite in order to create an archaeological site and historical landscape in Suriçi. And, we do not see any public discussion in terms of the detrimental effects of this project for the residents of İçkale, neither by the central state officials nor the actors from the movement. Yet, İçkale as the historical city center with all the administrative and military units, as well as a political-cultural center, bore multiple layers of contention in the sense of the multicultural history of the city and violent history of republic.

[21] This number differs in different sources. For instance, in the book of "International Symposium of the City Walls of Diyarbakır" which is organized by Dicle University, ÇEKÜL Foundation, the municipality and The Governorship of Diyarbakır, it is indicated that 161 "unqualified" structures would be abolished (Soyukaya, 2012, p. 192). Fırat Genç (2014), on the other hand, claims that as a part of İçkale Project 352 unlicensed structures were abolished prior to 2014 (p. 172).

4.1.2 Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project

The other urban transformation project was "Alipaşa and Lalebey Urban Renewal (*Gecekondu* Transformation) Project". The first protocol for this urban renewal project was signed by TOKİ and The Governorship of Diyarbakır in March 2008 after the preliminary protocol signed for İçkale Project in 2007 (TBMM, 2009; DKKBK, 2009; DKKBK, 2011). However, the beginning of this protocol differed from İçkale Project in terms of the parties who took initiative in the first place. According to official documents, DMM and Sur Municipality were not attendants of this preliminary protocol in the beginning.

After the preliminary protocol was signed in March 2008, in June 2009 the DTP parliamentarian Selahattin Demirtaş posed a parliamentary question addressed to the prime ministry. In his question, Selahattin Demirtaş asked about the content of the urban transformation project in Ali Paşa-Lalebey (such as how many buildings and workplaces will be destroyed, how many of them will be replaced by new ones, and what will happen to the people whose houses be evacuated as a result of this project, etc.), and if there has been any contact with local actors such as municipalities or NGOs while the project was being formed or signed (TBMM, 2009).

As a response to this parliamentary question, TOKİ indicated that it could sign protocols for urban renewal projects with the municipalities and/or the governorship of the relevant city. Hence, Ali Paşa-Lalebey protocol was signed by TOKİ and the Governorship of Diyarbakır on 31 March 2008. Furthermore, TOKİ suggested that the project aimed to transform these neighborhoods in a way that would resolve the detrimental effects of immigration to the area by cleansing

unlicensed or "unsuitable" structures. This would serve to reclaim the historical and cultural heritage in Suriçi where many civilizations came and passed throughout history (TBMM, 2009). Accordingly, in total 1050 structures would be renewed in Suriçi under the auspices of two urban renewal projects, i. e. İçkale Project and Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project, and 1272 structures would be reserved in Çölgüzeli as TOKİ houses for the residents coming not only from Ali Paşa and Lalebey, but also Fatihpaşa and Cevat Paşa neighborhoods (TBMM, 2009).

Demirtaş's parliamentary question can be regarded as the first step by Kurdish national movement to get involved in this project. Later, in October 2009, TOKİ, the Governorship of Diyarbakır, DMM and Sur Municipality signed a final protocol for Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project to be acted on together. From a more general perspective, this project was compatible with the shared desire of the central state and municipality to transform Suriçi into an "open air museum" that enabled such a collaboration. Yet pragmatically, DMM could have chosen to stay away from this top-down urban project which would have affected primarily its own constituents due to the demographic structure of the project area. Nevertheless, DMM pushed to get involved in the project in order to, according to the interviews, appropriate it in a way that both the detrimental effects of the projects on the residents would be minimized, and the project would be revisited and thereby contribute to the ultimate aim of transforming Suriçi in accordance with the movement's vision. Such a collaboration with secret agendas, unsurprisingly, was doomed to suffer different layers of contention through institutional means.

4.1.3 The candidacy for UNESCO World Heritage List

Last but not least, a significant collaboration to vitalize historical and cultural heritage in Suriçi was the application to UNESCO World Heritage List in December 2011. The candidacy process has been carried out with the efforts of DMM and the leadership of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, as well as with the participation of NGOs, trade associations, and intellectuals and academicians in this process. Even though this candidacy process was proceeded by the central state and Kurdish national movement, as the interviewees who worked in this process suggested; the candidacy process and preparation of the Area Management Plan and UNESCO World Heritage Dossier was carried out namely by DMM officials. The reason why there has been a collaboration on the candidacy process can be explained in two points. First, UNESCO is an organization under United Nations which takes only central states as addressees. Secondly, this DMM-led campaign to enter the UNESCO World Heritage List served the trade and tourism-centered vision of both the central state and Kurdish national movement.

The works on City Walls and Hevsel Gardens in Diyarbakır began with the works on the Suriçi master plan by the municipality (Bayhan, 2013). As a part of this master plan, DMM also accelerated the process of renewal of KAİP (Preservation Oriented Development Plan) which was put on table during Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project for the first time. While the experts from the municipality carried out the technical procedures of the application, the municipality also tried to draw attention from the public as well as the central state officials through city-wide advertisements and lobbying with the central state officials.

Firstly, during the visit of the president of the republic Abdullah Gül on December 30th, 2010, the mayor Osman Baydemir commented on the great touristic potential of the city walls of Diyarbakır (Bayhan, 2013). He shared the desire of getting into UNESCO World Heritage List with the city walls of Diyarbakır and other important monuments in Suriçi with the president of the republic. And, he requested the support of the president in this application process. Next day, Gül visited the city walls, and during his visit he made a public statement to the press. He described Diyarbakır as an "open air museum" and announced that the city walls of Diyarbakır would be under the auspices of the presidency. In March , after this very first bridge was built between the two sides, the municipality established the unit of area management and officially appointed Nevin Soyukaya as the head of the area management unit in December 2011. This was also the official start of the preparation for the application process by the municipality.

Later, on January 3rd, 2012, Osman Baydemir went to Ankara to meet Abdullah Gül once again, and made a presentation about the problems of the city which also included the issues regarding the city walls (bianet, 2012). In 2012, once the Ministry of Culture and Tourism got involved in the process, the application was officially acknowledged by the central state. This also accelerated the process. This process, which took 4 years of preparation, finally ended in success and the Diyarbakır Fortress, city walls of Diyarbakır and Hevsel Gardens were accepted as world heritages on the 4th of July 2015. Once again, the municipality took advantage of being in institutional politics: it used intrasystemic channels and applied to UNESCO World Heritage List with the collaboration of the central state officials.

4.2 Different layers of contestations through the urban projects

The institutional deadlocks between the two parties due to the changes in macropolitics regarding the Kurdish issue, different ideological stands of the sides, and power struggle in local politics led to an adjournment in terms of the realization of the projects, and thus an adjournment of the planned depopulation of the region. In this section, I explain the different layers of contention between these two ideologically distinct partners through and over different urban projects in Suriçi. I argue that despite the occurrence of the institutional deadlocks during the projects the fact that they proceeded together is one of the important reasons which unintentionally helped the preservation of the demographic structure of Suriçi in the short term. I also suggest that through different urban projects the municipality played a role in terms of revealing the multicultural heritage of Suriçi as well as maintaining the livelihood of poor households in Suriçi. I think the scope of the effects of these urban projects by the municipality in terms of the demographic configuration of Suriçi may not be remarkable; however, these projects can be seen as important reflections of the larger representative contention over Suriçi which overall helped maintain the population until 2015. In order to demonstrate this representative contention, I benefit from earlier works which have extensively elaborated these urban projects. In addition to that, I benefit from my in-depth interviews with people who have been institutionally involved in these projects.

4.2.1 İçkale Project

İçkale Project was finalized in 2016 by ÇŞB. As a result of this project, İçkale was gentrified and lost a segment of its population on the basis of the consensus of both

the central state and movement. And, it served the ultimate aim to restore and depopulate Suriçi and turn it to an "open air museum" in the long run, as stated by the officials who worked in the field and in official documents. However, this project did not inspire a sudden demographic shift in Cevat Paşa and Fatihpaşa Neighborhoods (respectively Table 1 and Table 2). The parties in the project signed the preliminary protocol in 2008, and it was just barely finalized in 2016. Though the project served the tourism and trade-centered intentions shared by both the central state and movement, during the process both the central state and municipality tried to appropriate the project in accordance with their larger political agenda. These efforts resulted in different layers of contentions which explain prolonging of the project up until 2016 and the gradual decrease of the population. In this section, I examine the different layers of contentions over the İçkale Project.

Table 1: Population of Cevat Paşa Neighborhood since 2007

Timeline	Population of Cevat Paşa Neighborhood
2007	4089
2008	4244
2009	4518
2010	4200
2011	4034
2012	3740
2013	3418
2014	3350
2015	3256
2016	3297

Source: TURKSTAT (The data collected from the population statistics between 2007 and 2016)

Table 2: Population of Fatihpaşa Neighborhood since 2007

Timeline	Population of Fatihpaşa Neighborhood
2007	7725
2008	7916
2009	7952
2010	7460
2011	7005
2012	6557
2013	6135
2014	5989
2015	5153
2016	5096

Source: TURKSTAT (The data collected from the population statistics between 2007 and 2016)

Firstly, as Gambetti (2008) suggests, after the Kurdish national movement won the municipalities of Diyarbakır, they made important attempts to reveal the cultural and historical richness of the city. Through different projects in Suriçi, they invested in the revelation of non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations existing in Diyarbakır. These efforts to reveal the non-Muslim and non-Turkish history of Diyarbakır, according to Gambetti (2008), led to a process of decolonization of the city. The İçkale Project also started as a part of this imagery of Diyarbakır. Therefore, as much as İçkale Project was designed as a trade and tourism-centered project, it also contributed to the decolonization of Diyarbakır.

In a place where the expression of Kurdish culture and language were highly restricted by the central government, these attempts at decolonization were important. In the end, in the same year as the start of the İçkale Project, the central government appointed a trustee to Sur Municipality and dismissed the elected municipal council of the district along with the mayor Abdullah Demirbaş because of

the approval of "Multilingual Municipality Services" in 2006. Although the AKP, under the pretense of Democratic Opening, claimed to embrace ethnic and religious differences in the country, particularly in 2010 (AKP, 2010), these symbolically important statements by the central government were far from reality within practical life through legal and institutional changes. The hegemonic Muslimness and Turkishness were dominating a public sphere which was challenged by the municipality through various ways, one of these being embracing a multicultural discourse in tandem with historical and cultural revival projects like the İçkale Project.

This challenge to the hegemonic Muslimness and Turkishness was escalated when an archaeological excavation revealed not only the existence of non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities, but also the violent history that these communities had had to face. In 2012, as workers were installing pipes and boilers for a new heating system, they came across unidentified human remains (Çaylı, 2015, p. 78). The human remains were found near a mansion which used to be the headquarter of Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Unit (JİTEM in Turkish) which was held responsible for "disappearing" people during the 1990s in the region. In a short time, these archaeological excavations ignited a public discussion on the national scale between the Kurdish national movement and the central state over the violent history of the Republic of Turkey against minorities.

The spatial proximity of human remains to the JİTEM mansion led pro-Kurdish civil society organizations to demand a revelation of justice and truth in the project site by shedding light on the violent history of the region. In addition to this, in national politics BDP co-chairperson of the time Selahattin Demirtaş commented

on the issue and drew attention to the silence surrounding the "disappearances" of the 1990s. After the movement called for public attention to this issue, the human remains were shifted to the Forensic Medicine Institute in İstanbul and it was discovered that they were at least 100 years old. However, this did not totally resolve the problem. Even though İHD quit pursuing the event, the discussion continued in other public spaces of Diyarbakır. In Çaylı's (2015) fieldwork he interviewed people who suggested that before JİTEM used this mansion, it used to be the headquarter of *Hamidiye Alayları*. *Hamidiye Alayları* was an armed force from Ottoman times comprised of Kurdish soldiers and it was specifically responsible for the deportation of Armenians during 1890s (pp. 77-79). In other words, human remains could belong to the murdered Armenians of Diyarbakır from the 1890s to 1910s. Although this event in itself did not cause a direct confrontation with the violent past of the region, the project was appropriated by the movement in the sense that it contributed to not only the decolonization of the city, but also a larger public discussion over the demand for justice and truth through revealing the place's history.

Moreover, an important unintended or rather unstated result of this project was the evacuation of the Gendarmerie Intelligence Service and 7th Corps Headquarter of Turkey from İçkale, which contributed to the demilitarization of Suriçi. Due to the ultimate aim of transforming the İçkale Project area to an archaeological site, all of the administrative and military units had to be evacuated. This would ultimately contribute to the shared trade and tourism-centered vision of the central state and movement over Suriçi. However, according to Salih, a 47-year-old interviewee who lives in Suriçi and actively participates in the movement, the

movement knowingly strove for the demilitarization of Suriçi, even though they did not overtly express their intention in this regard:

> Near Hançepek, there was Fatihpaşa Police Station in an alleyway. We forced them to remove it. Is a police station appropriate in the middle of a street? The municipality is still trying to remove Çarşı Police Station from Gazi Avenue and pedestrianize it. This kind of project has been ongoing since Osman Baydemir's time.[22] (Salih, personal communication, July 3rd, 2016)

Hence, the demilitarization of Suriçi was another layer of contention which was taking place during the project. The movement, in a sense, has benefited from the trade and tourism-centered discourse and worked with the central state in order to actualize its larger agenda. Yet, the evacuation of the military units did not mean that Suriçi was completely freed from military control, though we can assert that symbolically and militarily the evacuation marked an important change.

4.2.2 Alipaşa-Lalebey Project

As it is discussed above, the Kurdish national movement was not an official party in Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project in the first place. After the parliamentary question of Selahattin Demirtaş in March 2008, the preliminary protocol was renewed with a final protocol which was signed by TOKİ, the Governorship of Diyarbakır, DMM and Sur Municipality in October 2009. This project was also the result of a developmentalist perspective on Suriçi. However, unlike the İçkale Project, it did not start as a restoration project nor aimed to create an archaeological landscape. The project began as an urban renewal project which would have demolished 850

[22] Translated from: "Hançepek tarafında, sokak arasında Fatihpaşa Karakolu vardı. Onu bile biz kaldırttık. Sokak arasında karakol olur mu? Şu an hala belediye bu Çarşı Karakolu'nu oradan kaldırmak ve bu caddeyi trafiğe kapatmaya çalışıyor. Yani ta Osman Baydemir'in zamanından kalmış öyle bir proje var yani."

unlicensed structures (Genç, 2014). And after the demolishments, TOKİ would have constructed multi-story buildings within the project area.

Therefore, the project did not propose to bring the cultural and historical richness of the region to light in order to transform Suriçi to an "open air museum". Rather, the project was in line with the urban transformation projects in different cities of Turkey which ultimately push the urban poor from the city centers to the periphery and create luxury living spaces for the rich in the center. In this section, I elaborate in which ways this conflictual nature of the project induced contestations between the central state and the movement. I suggest that these contestations resulted in a delay in the project's implementation. And later, these contestations, coupled with the changes in macro politics, led to a total termination of the project in 2014. This contributed to the conservation of the physicality of the place and population to an important extent until 2015.

As it stated above, Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project was designed as a top-down large scale urban transformation project which proposed to demolish 850 unlicensed buildings and relocate the residents. This project was compatible with the other large-scale urban projects and shared the enthusiasm of the central state and municipality to transform Suriçi to a trade and tourism center through gentrification and depopulation. However, the project was designed from the center; therefore, the first contestation in the process of this project was the attempt of the movement to get involved.

Throughout my fieldwork, due to the detrimental effects of this project on the residents and the configuration of the place, the project and the involvement of the municipality continued to be subjected to criticism, particularly by the activists from

NGOs and the movement. That said, the involvement of the municipality in this project was also justified by other institutional actors and activists close to the movement by claiming that involvement of the municipality provided a room for maneuver through which the municipality would be able to minimize the suffering of the residents or appropriate the project in accordance with its own vision. Thus, they proposed two main justifications for the question of why the municipality got involved in this project.

According to municipality officer Serdar, first DMM became a party in this project, and then it gained a seat at the negotiation table. In a sense, it used its institutional power to adapt the project. According to Serdar, the project was initially in line with the KAİP of 1990. Hence, TOKİ had the opportunity to build multi-story buildings in Suriçi which were not compatible with Suriçi's urban design. When DMM became a party in the project, it got the opportunity to negotiate and persuade other parties to renew the KAİP. As a result of the municipality's efforts, the KAİP of 1990 was suspended after the final protocol in 2009 up until 2012 when the municipality established a new KAİP for Suriçi. Once the new KAİP was announced, the construction facilities were redesigned accordingly. This situation, according to Serdar, prevented construction of any kind of structures other than traditional civil architecture in Suriçi, meaning that DMM protected cultural and historical heritage in greater Suriçi and specifically in Ali Paşa and Lalebey. However, I suggest that more importantly this process of preparing a new KAİP slowed down the progress of the project.

Another reason why the municipality wanted to become a partner in this project, according to Serdar, was the municipality's intention to minimize the

suffering of the residents of Ali Paşa and Lalebey during the project. Pragmatically, DMM could have remained outside of the project in order not to bear the brunt of the residents' grievances in a project area wherein people predominantly support pro-Kurdish parties. When we look at the results of Local Election of 2009 both Ali Paşa (Figure 4) and Lalebey (Figure 5) neighborhoods predominantly voted for the pro-Kurdish parties, as opposed to Cevat Paşa (Figure 6) or Fatihpaşa (Figure 7) neighborhoods where the AKP was also strong. However, as the municipality officer Serdar claimed, the municipality got involved in the project anyways to smooth out the process of transformation for the residents. Essentially, the municipality wanted to be at the table to improve the conditions of its supporters during the transformation. Serdar suggested that normally in urban renewal projects only landowners get the chance to buy a TOKİ house, however, because of the involvement of DMM the tenants in Suriçi also got the chance to buy a TOKİ house. Moreover, he argues that via the engagement of DMM, the demolishment compensation that was offered to the residents in urban renewal sites in return for their houses was more than the money TOKİ normally would offer. Nevertheless, the movement tried to get involved in a project which would in the end relocate its constituents outside of Suriçi, and in their place it would attract new residents to Suriçi who would probably be different from the former residents on the basis of class or even identity.



Figure 4: The election results for Ali Paşa Neighborhood in 2009.
Source: Supreme Election Council of Turkey, *The Results of General Local Election of 29 March 2009*.



Figure 5: The election results for Lalebey Neighborhood in 2009.
Source: Supreme Election Council of Turkey, *The Results of General Local Election of 29 March 2009*.



Figure 6: The election results for Cevat Paşa Neighborhood in 2009.
Source: Supreme Election Council of Turkey, *The Results of General Local Election of 29 March 2009*.



Figure 7: The election results for Fatihpaşa Neighborhood in 2009.
Source: Supreme Election Council of Turkey, *The Results of General Local Election of 29 March 2009*.

Even though the municipality became a party in the project and tried to adapt and smooth out the process, activists from the movement working in different organizations as well as local people continued to criticize the project. Therefore, the

project, unlike the İçkale Project, did not only result in contestation between the central state and movement, but also resulted in the contestations within the movement itself. After the protocol was signed in 2009, DMM started to work on the project and a new KAİP. To renew the KAİP and implement it during the urban renewal project, they started to analyze every single building and take inventory of these buildings in overall Suriçi. After they completed these analyses in 2012, the municipality began to demolish buildings which did not meet conditions in the project area (Baran, personnel communication, June 26, 2017). However Baran, who is an architecture and a member of Diyarbakır Branch of the Chamber of Architects (DİMOD in Turkish) in Diyarbakır, argued that actually only 6% of the buildings in overall Suriçi were at risk according to results of these inventories and analyses:

> As an urban planner myself, when we make a plan we analyze the structure of the buildings and take inventory. With the help of these we can categorize buildings as robust, moderate, poor or weak. We reached the analysis of the municipality during this process and in these analyses we found out that actually the status of 87% of the structures in Ali Paşa and Lalebey were moderate, which means that they can be preserved through methods such as reinforcement or restoration without any demolishment, and then they can be returned to their landholders.[23] (Baran, personal communication, June 26, 2017)

Nevertheless, according to Kübra, an activist and urban planner from No to Destruction of Sur Platform, prior to 2014 the municipality engaged in the unnecessary demolishment of 432 buildings in Ali Paşa and Lalebey. Moreover, despite all efforts of the municipality to smooth out the urban transformation process

[23] Translated from: "Ben de şehir plancısıyım. Bizler plan yaparken her bir binanın yapı durumları analiz edilir ve envanteri çıkarılır. Yapılar iyi, orta, kötü ve harabe olarak kategorilere ayrılır. Biz belediyenin o dönem çıkardığı analizlere ulaştık. O analizlerde de Ali Paşa ve Lalebey'deki kentsel dönüşüm alanının aslında %87'sinin orta halli yani yıkılmadan da güçlendirme ve sağlıklılaştırma gibi yöntemlerle kurtarılabilir ve mülk sahiplerine iade edilebilir durumda olduğunu tespit ettik."

for residents, the residents did not welcome this project warmly. As Baran illustrates, when the demolishments started in 2012, residents of Ali Paşa and Lalebey actually set a municipality digger on fire when it came to start work.

In other words, whatever the reasons the municipality had for engaging with the projects, in the end it could not avoid the unnecessary physical destruction, nor the sociological problems that derived from this destruction during the project. Though they asserted that they fought for a "smooth urban transformation", this transformation project one way or another aimed to relocate the residents to Çölgüzeli and rearrange the landscape of Ali Paşa and Lalebey in accordance with the dream of turning Suriçi to a trade and tourism center. Nevertheless, the contention which had been started over the urban renewal project in Ali Paşa and Lalebey signals the fact that even though both parties agreed upon the transformation of Suriçi which would bring a demographic and physical change, their methods differed from each other. The municipality was more careful about the preservation of the authentic structure and architectural design of Suriçi, and the grievances of the residents in material terms. Consequently, the divergent concerns and methods of the central state and movement led to constant negotiations between the two sides, which slowed down the progress of the project and unintentionally postponed the physical restructuring and depopulation of Suriçi.

Contrary to the prudence of the municipality, the central state continued its bold moves to actualize the transformation of Suriçi quickly, which would solve the problem of unplanned urbanization and insecurity, and bring about great potential in terms of trade and tourism. According to Genç (2014), due to the fact that this project was "a prestige project," which has been implemented upon the special

request of the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the central government was intent on finalizing the project as soon as possible (2014, pp. 196-197). However, this prestige project did not actualize as smoothly as it would have in another place where the AKP was only player in the town. The engagement of the Kurdish national movement and their contestations through institutional politics over the methods and implementation of the project unintentionally slowed down the project. Therefore, the central state took another step and declared Suriçi as a whole a risk area, thus accelerating the implementation of large-scale projects in Suriçi faster than before.

In November 2012, the Council of Ministers declared Suriçi a risk area which included 187 ha land based on "The Law on the Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk" (ÇŞB, 2015, p. 22). Normally, this law is implemented in areas which carry the risk of causing loss of life and property due to natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and so on, because of its either soil structure or settlement. However, ÇŞB explained the aim of the project in Suriçi as cleansing the area of its poorly-built structures and bringing its historical and cultural values to light, consequently increasing its touristic potential. ÇŞB argued that this decision of the Council of Ministers would contribute to the reconstruction of Suriçi in a way that would equip it with necessary urban infrastructure and social resources. This eventually would transform Suriçi into a healthy and secure living space (ÇŞB, 2015, p. 27). This top-down move to actualize the project created another layer of contention between the parties in the project.

I think a couple of points are important in here. Firstly, this law should be implemented in areas where there is an actual risk of disaster. However, when we look at the aim of the project indicated by the ministry itself, there is no concern for

expected loss of life and property in Suriçi. Rather, the stress is on the "value" of Suriçi with respect to its potential in terms of tourism. More importantly, the ministry's emphasis on security is significant. Once again, the concern of security does not stem from an expected loss of life and property of the residents in Suriçi in the long run. Suriçi itself, with its physical and demographic structure, seems to be an "insecure" area which should be disciplined.

Two months after the declaration of Suriçi as a risk area, in January 2013 the Council of Ministers also approved the "Urgent Expropriation Decision in Suriçi" (Resmi Gazete, 2013). According to Genç (2014):

> In the legal sense, the emergency expropriation decision falls into a rather exceptional category which is different than the already implemented expropriation through the purchasing of private properties. It appears to be the case that, since 2004, the most direct aim of this exceptional method, which increasingly and frequently was applied in urban transformation projects across Turkey, is to expedite the negotiation and agreement process between right holders and institutions in urban transformation areas by the threat of law enforcement. (p. 199)

This decision weakened both the residents in Suriçi and the municipality, which used its institutional power to adapt the project according to its own ideological position.

Even though the central government gained leverage via these decisions, the municipality did not withdraw from the project, and continued to collaborate through evacuations and demolishments in the project areas up until 2014 (Genç, 2014, p. 200). When I talked to Serdar, the municipality officer, he also did not seem to be aware of the detrimental effects of this decision. He suggested that this decision of risk area classification, followed by urgent expropriation, only expedited the implementation of the existing project through bypassing various bureaucratic procedures.

I want to clarify certain implications of these two important decisions on Suriçi by the central government in a nutshell here. Due to the fact that only 6% of Suriçi is composed of risky buildings, the declaration of Suriçi as a risk area which was followed by an urgent expropriation decision made three things possible. First, as we can see in the İçkale Project, local actors in the area collaborated with TOKİ to realize the project; however, with the declaration of Suriçi as a risk area by the Council of Ministers, transformation of Suriçi becomes a problem of the central government rather than local institutions. This does not mean that the central government engaged for the first time with the projects in Suriçi; the representatives of central government have been parties in many different projects. Nevertheless, after this decision the transformation of Suriçi became a national problem targeted by such central bodies as the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Secondly, centralization of the problem strengthened the hands of the central state officials during negotiations between the parties which could expedite the urban renewal projects in Suriçi, as opposed to the prudence of the municipality. Thirdly, targeting 187 ha of lands instead of reconstructing 6% of the separate buildings would potentially lead to a large-scale demographic and physical shift in the long run.

Nevertheless, the project came to a halt in 2014. During the fieldwork, officials with different institutional affiliations offered different reasons which I believe are important to mention because their reasons show the susceptibility of the collaboration between two sides. Firstly, Nermin, a purged official from DMM who actively worked in the UNESCO process, claimed that the urban transformation projects had to stop because in 2014, the municipality declared Suriçi a buffer zone and Hevsel Gardens a world heritage site in the AYP (Area Management Plan)

which prepared in order to apply for UNESCO World Heritage List. Therefore, the urban transformation became inapplicable. Elif, an official from a non-elected state institution, argued that once the KAİP was renewed, the project was no longer profitable for TOKİ. According to the new KAİP, TOKİ could only build maximum two-story structures in Suriçi instead of the multi-story buildings which were on the preliminary protocol, and that meant less profit for TOKİ.

Serdar provided a different account on this issue. He suggested that the house reserves of TOKİ in Çölgüzeli were not enough to accommodate all the residents who would be evacuated. Serdar, on the other hand, suggested that the project de facto stopped with the change of the administration of the municipality after the 2014 local elections. He argued that the new mayors—Gültan Kışanak and Fırat Anlı—were not willing to be a part of such an urban renewal project especially with TOKİ. However, he also added that this was not an individual decision, there was a change in political conjuncture. According to him, in 2014 a peace process between the central state and movement was taking place, yet political oppositions and conflicts had not been fully resolved between the two sides. This caused tension in the political arena and hardened the sides to any collaboration. As indicated in Chapter 3, 2014 was the year when on the one hand two sides tried to further the Peace Process, and on the other hand they came face to face, for instance during the Kobane protests in various cities.[24] This unresolved tension gradually turned into a violent confrontation in the urban space in 2015.

[24] Retrieved 17 March, 2018, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29530640.

All in all, Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project was initiated in 2007 by non-elected local institutional actors. In 2009, the Kurdish national movement became a party in the project through signing the final protocol. However, by getting involved in the project, the movement contested the method and implementation of the project. It tried to not only smooth out the project for the residents, but also adapt it in a way that it would make it compatible with its future image of Suriçi. The contention through institutional politics first extended the duration of the project. And, this extension of project time led the central government to declare Suriçi a risk area, which was followed by the urgent expropriation decision, in order to expedite this symbolically important project. When it came to 2014, all of these already-existing and concrete problems had intermingled with the growing tension in macropolitics which brought Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project to a halt. I suggest this situation overall helped the preservation of the demographic structure of Suriçi to an important extent up until 2015, despite the top-down urban projects or urgent expropriation decisions. This also means that the socio-spatial dynamics which facilitated the urban warfare were unintentionally preserved to a large extent within the same urban design.

4.2.3 The candidacy of Suriçi to UNESCO World Heritage List

As it is stated above, the application to UNESCO was another important collaboration between the central state and Kurdish national movement which aimed to contribute to the trade and particularly tourism potential of Diyarbakır. In fact, this time the municipality had to collaborate with the central state because of the fact that only states can apply to UNESCO to get on the list. Thus, the mayor of DMM, Osman Baydemir, even lobbied with the president of the time, Abdullah Gül, in

order to begin the official application process. However, this enthusiasm in terms of collaboration did not resolve the conflictual relations between the two sides throughout the project. Hence, this project accomplished its short-term objective and got onto the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2015, yet the project witnessed contestations between two sides over different issues.

First of all, even though both parties shared the common goal to turn Suriçi into a trade and tourism center by revealing its cultural and historical heritage, their approaches to the history of Diyarbakır differed from one another dramatically. Particularly, the central government constantly put emphasis on the Muslim heritage in Suriçi.[25] Conversely, the movement tried to further the application process in a way that would reveal the multicultural history and identity of Diyarbakır, and thereby Suriçi. Therefore, this application process, as other restoration and cultural revival projects had, contributed to the struggle against the monolithic understanding of history and culture in Turkey in general, and in Diyarbakır specifically, on the basis of Turkishness and Muslimness:

> Diyarbakır, home of thirty-three civilizations and host of eight thousand years of uninterrupted urban life, is preparing to share its values with the whole world and to contribute to universal cultural values by protecting its historical richness. Our city's addition of two of its many historical and cultural assets, "Diyarbakir Castle" and "Hevsel Gardens" to UNESCO's World Heritage List will be a success in the city's struggle for identity.[26] (Kışanak & Anlı, 2014)

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[25] Retrieved 19 May, 2018, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-diyarbakirda-konustu-17925898;
Retrieved 19 May, 2018, from http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-yildirim-diyarbakirda-toplu-temel-atma-toreninde-konustu/85809#1.

[26] Translated from: "8 bin yıllık kesintisiz kent yaşamıyla, 33 uygarlığa ev sahipliği yapan Diyarbakır da tarihsel birikimlerini korumaya alarak, bu değerlerini tüm dünyayla paylaşmaya, evrensel kültürel değerlere katkı sunmaya hazırlanıyor. Çok sayıda tarihi ve kültürel varlığa sahip olan kentimizin iki değerinin, "Diyarbakır Kalesi ve Hevsel Bahçeleri'nin, UNESCO'nun Dünya Mirası Listesi'nde yer alması, kimlikli kentler mücadelesinde bir başarı olacaktır."

Secondly, though the Kurdish national movement worked with the central state throughout the application process, it continued to challenge the central state authority over Suriçi. As it is mentioned above, in 2012 the Council of Ministers declared Suriçi a risk area and Dicle Valley, including Hevsel Gardens, as a reserve area. While preparing the AYP, the municipality declared Suriçi as the buffer zone of the heritage area and Hevsel Gardens as world heritage. This situation shows that although the municipality continued to collaborate with the central state officials in Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project after the risk area and urgent expropriation decisions, they challenged these decisions through other institutional attempts:

> This declaration of whole Suriçi as a risk area and parallel to this, declaration of Dicle Valley as the reserve building area... These projects were large-scale projects which could have changed the city and Dicle Valley as a whole and could have destroyed the preserved integrity of the area, traces from the history, its authenticity and its originality. [...] Both the municipality and the Chamber of Architects brought the declaration of Dicle Valley as a reserve area to the court and canceled this decision through the court. Consequently, the urban transformation in this process was not initiated.[27] (Nermin, personal communication, March 21, 2017)

In addition to the risk area and urgent expropriation decisions, the AYP also helped the municipality to resist other top-down projects. According to Nermin, when the Area Management Unit started to work on the AYP, they did not know the central state had plans to build hydroelectric power plants (HES in Turkish) over Dicle River. Once they began to prepare the dossier for the application and learned

[27] Translated from: "Suriçi'nin tamamının riskli alan ilan edilmiş olması ve bununla paralel olarak Dicle Vadisi'nin rezerv yapı alanı olarak ilan edilmesi… Bunlar kentin ve Dicle Vadisi'nin tamamını değiştiren, alanın o bütünlüklü korunmuşluğunu, tarihten gelen izlerini, otantikliğini, özgünlüğünü, tamamen yok edebilecek çok büyük projelerdi. [...] Dicle Vadisi'nin yapı rezerv kararını hem belediye hem de Mimarlar Odası mahkemeye taşımıştı ve mahkeme üzerinden bu kararı iptal ettirdik. Dolayısıyla bu süreçte kentsel dönüşüme de girişemediler."

about these HES projects, they collaborated with NGOs to cancel these top-down projects which would have important effects on the ecosystem of the area:

> You are working with all the institutions in UNESCO process. When we asked them about their projects, from the response of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ in Turkish) we learned that there were three HES to be built [on Dicle River]; and one of these HES was planned to be built at the exact location which we had included as a heritage site. What did that mean? These HES would have destroyed the whole Dicle Valley, Hevsel Gardens, and ecosystem of that area. So, it was a very serious risk. During the UNESCO process, we stopped these projects.[28] (Nermin, personal communication, March 21, 2017)

Apart from the contestations during the process, the AYP for UNESCO also demonstrated how the municipality changed its vision after 2014 over Suriçi which had an effect on other formal goings on in the Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project. When the head of the Area Management Unit was appointed by the DMM, it prepared the "Diyarbakır Fortress and Hevsel Gardens Cultural Landscape and Area Management Plan", which listed all the weaknesses and threats in the area. The profit-oriented approach of TOKİ towards the area, the risk of depopulation which would degenerate the socio-cultural configuration, negative outcomes of the urban renewal projects, and the criticisms of the residents on the urban renewal projects were indicated as significant threats in the management plan (DMM, 2014). Therefore, the application process of UNESCO did not only bear layers of contention in itself, but it also reflected the changing vision of the Kurdish national movement over Suriçi. Even though it was not overtly indicated by any interviewees, this situation can be

[28] Translated from: "UNESCO sürecinde bütün kurumlarla birlikte çalışıyorsun. Onlara projelerini sorarken oradan DSİ'den gelen yanıtla üç tane HES yapılacağını fark ettik ve bu HES'lerden biri de tam bizim miras alanımıza denk geliyor. Bu ne demekti? Bütün o Dicle Vadisi'ni, Hevsel Bahçelerini, oradaki bütün o ekosistemi yok edecek bir şeydi. Dolayısıyla çok ciddi bir riskti. UNESCO sürecinde bu HES'leri iptal ettirdik."

argued as a result of the changing dynamics in macropolitics, as well as a growing uneasiness among the activists and residents towards top-down developmentalist projects. This new, more critical perspective towards the top-down, developmentalist projects also explains how the collaborative relations between the central state and municipality came to a halt in 2014. This, I think, also reflects an important cleavage on the road to the urban warfare.

Though this goes beyond the main concern of this thesis, it is important to stress that not only being on the same table during the application process brought opportunities in terms of contention, but also the admission of Diyarbakır Fortress, city walls of Diyarbakır and Hevsel Gardens to the UNESCO World Heritage List created a space for politics for the movement. Although this is an unintended or rather unstated consequence of the process, a link with a United Nations (UN) body provided a space which the local actors in Suriçi could call upon during and after the urban warfare to stop violence in the region.

All in all, the UNESCO process, which started in 2011 and finalized in 2015, bore multiple layers of contention. The movement collaborated with the central state to apply to UNESCO with the intention that it would contribute to tourism potential of the city. However, during the application process the municipality challenged the emphasis on the Muslim heritage of the city by the central state through stressing the multicultural richness of Suriçi. In addition to that, while preparing the dossier for UNESCO, the municipality fought against the risk area and urgent expropriation decisions. On top of that, the movement canceled HES projects initiated by the central state during this period. Furthermore, the process witnessed the municipality's changing perspective over large-scale developmentalist projects

which also had an effect on the formally ongoing Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project. All of these factors indicate that even though the municipality and the central state collaborated over large-scale projects in order to transform Suriçi into a trade and tourism center, the continuing contestation between the two sides in different realms came to light during these collaborations. In the case of the UNESCO process, we can argue that on the one hand it was a significant move to transform Suriçi to a tourism center which in the long run would depopulate the region. On the other hand, this process created a ground through which the municipality resisted the risk area establishment and urgent expropriation decisions which aimed to disproportionately depopulate Suriçi in the short run. This situation once again served for the preservation of the demographic structure until 2015.

4.2.4. Continuing contentions through other urban projects

Both parties in Suriçi emphasized the potential of Suriçi in terms of tourism and trade. In order to realize this potential, both the central state and municipality tried to bring the history of thousands of years and the rich cultural heritage to the light through different cultural and historical revival projects. Particularly after 1999, when the violent clashes between the Kurdish national movement and the central state started to diminish, this focus on restoration and cultural heritage projects gained momentum. Apart from the cultural and historical revival projects, particularly the Kurdish national movement used its budget generated through intrasystemic channels and empowers its supporters for social projects which fell directly into the category of Watts' (2010) concept of the representative contention. In this section I focus on both the cultural and historical revival projects which serve

the ultimate aim of transforming Suriçi into a trade and tourism center, and also social projects which conflict with the long-run outcomes of the cultural and historical revival projects. Suriçi, through different small-scale urban renewal and restoration projects, was subjected to trade and tourism-centered, neoliberal transformation by both the central state and the municipality. However, with the social projects the Kurdish national movement created spaces where residents from the poor neighborhoods of Suriçi could perpetuate their everyday life. This I argue is an example that shows the contradictory nature of the place-making process in Suriçi which in the short-run unintentionally contributed to the preservation of physical and demographic configuration of Suriçi in those neighborhoods as well as in Suriçi in general.

According to Watts (2010), after the Kurdish national movement won the mayorship in Diyarbakır, it started to resist the systematically established strategies of destruction and neglect in the Kurdish region (p. 155) which include letting historical and cultural assets decay. After 1999, through multiple restoration and cultural heritage projects the municipality made an effort to revive not only Kurdish, but also other cultural heritages that flourished in Suriçi which are not specifically Turkish or Sunni, Muslim; coincidentally, these efforts served to boost the tourism potential of Suriçi. Apart from the municipality, the Governorship of Diyarbakır, the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization or Provincial Directorate of Surveying and Monuments also engaged with different restoration and cultural heritage projects. However, due to the fact that analyzing all historical and cultural projects would not contribute to the discussion of this thesis, I limit this section with restoration and cultural heritage projects which had a significant effect on the urban

configuration of Suriçi in terms of its landscape, demography, political or economic life.

When it comes to the social projects, I examine tandır houses and laundries, both of which were established by the municipality. Apart from these two projects, a number of literacy, tailoring, embroidery or jewelry design courses have been opened by different actors in Suriçi; however, the most long-lasting, and therefore most influential social project was tandır houses and laundries. These social complexes opened in Hasırlı Neighborhood in 2004 and were active until the urban warfare in 2015. These social complexes had a lasting effect on the everyday life of the residents, demographic structure of space, and political and economic life in this neighborhood which was one of the poorest neighborhoods of Suriçi.

I start with restoration and cultural revival projects and the layers of contention that these projects contain in themselves. The first important restoration was "The Landscape Project for Ancient City Walls of Diyarbakır" which was initiated by DMM in 2002. This was one of the first projects of the Kurdish national movement after it won the mayorship in Diyarbakır. Before this, the city walls were surrounded by shops, kiosks, restaurants, gas stations, buildings or houses which had been built abutting the walls. This project cleansed an area of 123.570 square meters along the city walls that falls between Fiskaya and Mardin Kapı from "derelict" structures and buildings which were composed of 500 workplaces and 10 houses (Tanrıkulu & Aksoy, 2012, p. 8).

This project ultimately aimed to clean the area all along the ancient city walls from these unlicensed buildings and open the city walls for access of tourists and the residents of Diyarbakır in general. Indeed, cleaning up the area and turning it to a

park which extends all along the city walls created a public space for the residents of Suriçi as well to socialize. Particularly, it created a space for women from Suriçi could visit and spend time with each other or with their families any time of day without feeling uncomfortable. The project was also the first important step to revive Diyarbakır's multicultural heritage. According to Watts (2010), restoring the city walls which have been embroidered with epigraphs in fourteen languages in order to emphasize the historical richness of the city was also a symbolic struggle against the monolithic understanding of Turkish and Muslim history of Diyarbakır. Moreover, according to a report from Karacadağ Development Agency in 2012, this project as the pioneer project had an important effect on later urban renewal projects, i.e. Ali Paşa-Lale Bey and İçkale Projects (Tanrıkulu & Aksoy, 2012, p. 8), which also shared the same desire in terms of cleansing the landscape of Suriçi from "unsuitable structures".

The municipality as an official institutional body benefited from different intrasystemic resources and used them for urban projects which reflected its conception of space. One of these resources was European Union funds. Both being an eligible political body within the national politics, as well as Turkey's good relations with European Union during 2000s, allowed the municipality to take European Union funds and use them in restoration and cultural revival projects. One of these projects was "The Project on *Dengbêjs*[29] and *Dengbêj* Tradition" by DMM.

[29] "The word Dengbêj actually a Kurdish word unifed deng (voice) and bêj-tin (say). *Dengbêj* means the person who tells tragedy, grief, happiness, etc. with rhythm and melody that decorate the music. *Dengbêjî* (Story Teller) is a Kurdish tradition. People who transmit Kurdish language, literature, culture, history and music called *Dengbêj*. *Dengbêjs* are not only story-tellers or singers; they are also transmitters of Kurdish culture and oral literature. They are witnesses of history, memory and poets of Kurdish people with their powerful voices." (DMM, 2017)

As a part of this project a *Dengbêj* House was established in Suriçi. Like a museum, this house was open for visitors every day accept Mondays and between 10 and 15 *dengbêjs* sing there. Moreover, *"Anthology of Dengbêjs"* and a compact disc (CD) of "*Dengbêjs* of Diyarbakır" was published as a part of this project (Tanrıkulu & Aksoy, 2012, p. 15). This project was important in the sense that this house with all the archival documents became a space for the representation of Kurdish culture, oral literature, past and identity in Suriçi. In addition to that, it was compatible with the shared dreams of the central state and municipality to turn Suriçi into a tourism center.

Another symbolic project was "Restoration Project of Surp Giragos Armenian Church". This project was initiated by DMM and Surp Giragos Church Foundation. This church is the biggest Armenian church in the Middle East which was built in 1515 (Tanrıkulu & Aksoy: 2012, p. 22). The restoration of the church was carried out particularly with the financial support of Armenians from all around the world via the foundation of the church. This restoration is significant in the sense that it shows the effort and collaboration of the Kurdish national movement to revive the multicultural configuration of Suriçi. Even though physical violence and discriminatory practices in general, as well as in Suriçi, led to a gradual decline of the non-Muslim population, there remain small communities belonging to different religious groups in Suriçi.[30] This attempt to restore the church and bring it into

[30] Sur Municipality in 2006 carried out a survey and asked its residents which language they use to communicate in their households. According to survey, 72% of residents spoke Kurdish, 24% of residents spoke Turkish, and the rest was composed of Syriac, Armenian and Arabic (as cited in Watts, 2010, p. 146). However, during my fieldwork, a Syriac interviewee suggested that today there are only 4 Syriac families, 1 Chaldean family and 1 Armenian family in Suriçi.

service also had an impact on helping Armenians and non-Muslim communities in general rebuild their ties with the space:

> Both the hearts and churches wanted to be restored. Efforts were also made at that time to form a culture street near the Four Footed Minaret. There is already a church and a mosque right across from the minaret; it was suggested that we build a cem house, a yezidi house, and a synagogue there. The idea was to revive the fraternity we missed that helped people to get closer to each other, but we saw that the state interfered with this.[31] (Adnan, personal communication, March 20, 2017)

In addition to this contribution to the practice of living together, this multicultural representation of Suriçi of course in the long run would serve once again for the tourism-oriented perspective which was shared by the central state and the Kurdish national movement.

Apart from these, the Kurdish municipalities and the non-elected state institutions got involved in other small-scale projects and they renovated historical hostelries, old bathhouses, churches, mansions and old Diyarbakır houses in Suriçi district. These attempts, which were particularly pioneered and promoted by the Kurdish municipalities after 1999, were mostly supported by the residents: "Especially after 1999, when Kurds took over the local governance, these renovations took place. These renovation projects actually turned out to be a bridge which brought people together with their history and their historical sites. This is a positive thing"[32] (Murat, personal communication, July 2, 2016).

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[31] Translated from: "Hem yüreklerde restorasyon yapılmaya çalışıldı hem de kiliselerde. Bir kültür sokağı oluşması için de o dönemde çaba sarf edildi. Dört Ayaklı Minare'nin orada kilise ve hemen karşısında bir cami var zaten; bir cem evi, yezidi evi, havra inşa edelim oraya dendi. Özlediğimiz o kardeşliği canlandıralım düşüncesi insanları birbirine kaynaştırdı ama devletin engel olduğunu gördük."

[32] Translated from: "Tabii, özellikle 99'dan bu yana yerel yönetimlerin, belediyelerin Kürtlerin eline geçmesiyle birlikte bu tarihi yapıların yeniden, bu bahsettiğimiz restorasyon ve gerçekten insanların o tarihi yapılarla tekrar buluşması ve geçmişiyle buluşmadır aslında. Bu olumludur da."

Moreover, the enthusiasm in terms of historical and cultural urban revival arouse the attention of the private sector as well. The efforts to revive historical and cultural values in Suriçi, coupled with diminishing violence in the region, resulted in an increase in investments in the historical city center. Especially after 2010s, the belief in the Peace Process created a sense of stability and stimulated economic growth in Suriçi. At those times, some of the old hostelries or old Diyarbakır houses were renovated by different collectives or private bodies and turned into mostly consumption areas. These consumption areas made contribution to the revival of the culture and history of Diyarbakır not only through the restoration of these historical buildings but also through the local meals and drink they serve, the music they play, the guests they host or the events they organize. This situation contributed to turn Suriçi into a tourism center, however, these economic activities also resulted in an increase in real estate prices in Suriçi. Kerem mentions about how an old house in Suriçi which was worth 70.000 liras was revalued as 250.000 liras within five months just before the war. He argues that the people who bought these old houses at 250.000 with the intention of investment were well aware that they would be able to sell them at 500.000 to 600.000 liras in just one year, a process which is actually very similar to what happens in other urban gentrification cases (Kadıoğlu Polat, 2016; Uzun, 2013). This was of course an important threat to the demographic structure of Suriçi which could have in the long run pushed locals from the area and brought more investors and tourists in their stead.

All of these institutional and personal attempts to revive the cultural and historical richness of the district attracted outsiders to visit and spend time in Suriçi. Kerem, an old Sur inhabitant, said that especially during the Peace Process, in the

evenings until 8 or 9 pm the streets of Suriçi were bustling. He claimed that there was a high mobility and colorful city life back then. During these times, students who was curious about Diyarbakır would come to visit Suriçi; wives of police or soldiers in Diyarbakır would come; and people who were interested in history, culture or art were filling the streets. Kerem described the period by stating that "The spring came to Sur"[33] (Kerem, personal communication, July 2, 2016).

Last but not the least, it is important to present the social projects which differ from restoration or cultural revival projects. As it is extensively elaborated above, both the government and movement had a trade and tourism-oriented projection for the future of Suriçi in mind. Therefore, in the long run, their spatial conception would push especially the poorest segments of Suriçi to the outside while opening up the space for the rental market. Yet, both of the actors still needed the support of the residents in order to prevail either in the hegemonic rivalry in Suriçi or in elections. This led political actors to use intrasystemic material sources and initiate social projects which improved the living conditions of the residents in various ways. During this time period, a number of literacy, tailoring, embroidery or jewelry design courses were opened by different actors in Suriçi, particularly for women; however, the most long-lasting, and therefore the most influential social project were the tandır houses and laundries established by the municipality.

Tandır houses and laundries were established together as a social complex under the name of Beyaz Kelebekler (White Butterflies) in Diyarbakır. The number of social complexes increased over years, however the first one was established in Hasırlı Neighborhood, one of the poorest neighborhoods in Suriçi, in 2003. Hasırlı

[33] Translated from: "Sur'a bahar gelmişti."

Neighborhood was a salient and symbolic place which was populated by immigrants as well as Romas (Gambetti, 2010, p. 119). These families—gypsies and immigrants from villages—were deprived in terms of not having a regular income or sufficient living conditions. Hence, the location of the project clearly signified its target population. However, it does not mean that this social complex was exclusively used by the residents of Hasırlı, as it was indicated during the interviews, many women from nearby neighborhoods also used this social complex in Suriçi.

These places primarily functioned as cost-free laundries and bakeries which helped women to fulfill their daily chores and maintain their households. In the official website they clearly outlined their main goal: "In poor neighborhoods, washing clothes was one of the most tiring and back-breaking domestic work. In order to solve this problem, our municipality built three laundries, each of whose building-site is 150 square meters."[34] (DMM, 2004a). This social complex included washers, dryers, ironing machines, sewing machines, training halls, child-care rooms and all of them could be used as free of charge.

Nonetheless, these social complexes were not only about creating places where women could fulfil their everyday routine; on the official website it was indicated that Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality Center for Research and Application on Women's Issues (DİKASUM in Turkish) and DMM also provided literacy courses, mother and children, health and environment education by the experts of the subjects (DMM, 2004a). Hence, DMM and DİKASUM build these social urban complexes from an inclusive, women-friendly perspective in the sense

[34] Translated from: "Yoksul semtlerde, kadınları yoran ve yıpratan en önemli ev işlerinin başında çamaşır yıkamak geliyordu. Belediyemiz, bu derdi ortadan kaldırmak amacıyla, her biri 150 m2 lik alana kurulu 3 çamaşır evi inşa etti."

that they did not only want to provide a better living conditions for poor families, they also designed these complexes as a place for the socialization and politicization of these women (Gambetti, 2010, p. 118-125; Öztürk, 2013, p.117-121; Alkan, 2006, p. 49). In addition to that, it was a place of learning and socialization for children as well. There was a room for children where they could come together with their peers and socialize while their mothers fulfilled their daily work or attended classes (DMM, 2004b). Over time, these social complexes became more diversified than before. After 2012, courses on *bağlama*, *erbane*, computer, singing, and workshops on theatre for both women and children were established (DMM, 2013).

I claim that these urban complexes did three important things which had effects on the social, economic and political configuration of Suriçi. Firstly, tandır houses and laundries were established in the poorest region of Suriçi, where families typically did not have a regular income and lived in poor conditions. This social project contributed to the maintenance of their lives in Suriçi by creating technologically well-equipped places which helped women to fulfill their overwhelming chores such as washing or baking, free of charge. Secondly, as it is suggested above, all of the trade and tourism-centered projects in the long run expected to create push effects for the residents which would lead them to emigrate. Despite the fact that this project was a small-scale, this project, I argue, created a place which contested the push effects of other projects. Hence, one way or the other it unintentionally contributed to preservation of the demographic structure in the short run. Lastly, this project created a safe space through which women were able to socialize and politicize. This socialization and politicization process which aimed to raise awareness among women of various issues was in line with the ideological

position of the Kurdish national movement. Thus, I think Beyaz Kelebekler created a place for the Kurdish national movement through which it empowered its constituents politically, socially and economically.

In this chapter, I focused on small and large scale urban projects initiated in Suriçi and their significant effects on the political, physical, social and economic configuration of the place. I argued that local institutional actors have collaborated in three important projects on the basis of their shared tourism and trade-center approach towards the place. However, the institutional gridlocks due to their varying ideological positions and concerns in micro and macro politics caused contestations on various grounds, adjournments, and even cancellation as was the case in the Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project. On the one hand, these contestations through and over urban projects in Suriçi showed how the interscalar relations among the state institutions were contingent and contested processes not only due to the dynamics in the international or national scale but also the socio-political struggles in the local level. On the other hand, this situation unintentionally preserved the socio-spatial configuration of the place which contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015.

CHAPTER 5

THE ROOTS OF THE INSURGENCY: SOCIO- SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF THE URBAN WARFARE IN SURİÇİ

The space is not a mere stage where the demands of an insurgent group are articulated, rather it is "a relational conduit" through which a movement connects and develops (Uitermark et al., 2012). Therefore, we need to understand the spatial mechanisms and processes through which contention takes the stage (Martin & Miller, 2003). From this perspective, this chapter aims to explain the spatial mechanisms and processes of the urban warfare by focusing on the dynamics of everyday politics in Suriçi.

Until now, I have presented how experts, bureaucrats and technocrats played a role in terms of production of Suriçi physically and socially alongside the possible implications of that process on the emergence of the urban warfare. In this chapter, I scrutinize how the residents shape, appropriate and live this produced space through their everyday lives. Firstly, I provide a general picture of spatial practices and representational space in order to present economic, social, political and physical characteristics of everyday life in Suriçi by predominantly drawing on the narratives of the residents. In order to ground a Lefebvrian understanding of the production of space in real life, I benefit from Pierce and Martin's (2015) three components of place-making. Thus, I pay attention to physical/material components of the place (water, rocks, roads, bridges, plants, human beings, etc.), social components of the place (humans' interaction with each other or the world around them, as well as their expectations from a potential interaction), and affective components of the place

(experiential and emotional factors in place-making) while deciphering the narratives of the residents.

Then I focus on the central role of the place in terms of shaping the claims, identities and capacities of the political subjects (Nicholls, 2007, p. 610) which contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare. Therefore, I move on to the socio-spatial dynamics of the place such as the long history and strong sense of belonging, communal ties based on trust and solidarity, and its being a relatively autonomous place for politicization, in addition to the physical characteristics of the place. I present the ways these socio-spatial dynamics contributed to the emergence of the warfare in Suriçi rather than elsewhere.

First of all, the long history of the place, the centrality, its multicultural past and common grievances overall helped the residents to form a communal identity associated with the place. Hence, any intervention against this spatial configuration meant an intervention in their identity and culture. This facilitated a collective contestation against the state intervention in 2015 on the basis of the collective identity they had formed throughout history. Secondly, the physical characteristic of the place as well as the opportunity for everyday encounters and dialogue induced Suriçi to be a relatively autonomous place. Being a relatively autonomous place also enabled the Kurdish national movement to organize and intervene in the everyday life practices and problems of the residents. This also facilitated the declaration of the autonomous self-rule which was followed by the urban warfare in Suriçi, as opposed to anywhere else in Diyarbakır. Thirdly, what we see in Suriçi was not just close neighborhood relations: the very idea of the nuclear family has been challenged through strong communal ties among the residents. These strong communal ties

produced certain norms, trust and solidaristic relations among the residents as well. This led young Kurdish militiants to rely on the strong communal ties that have been produced in everyday life. Finally, the physical characteristics of the place are another important socio-spatial dynamic which both is the "concrete" reason for the strong communal ties and also an important facilitator of the urban warfare. Courtyard-type houses which were made of basalt contributed to formation of strong ties among different families, and also protected the young Kurdish militias from bullets as well. The small streets enabled everyday interaction and dialogue, while also preventing the entrance of the large vehicles. Furthermore, the architectural design which had not been changed since the Romans was like a labyrinth with lots of gateways and passages which were utilized during the urban warfare by people who truly knew the place.

5.1 The production of Suriçi as a social space

Suriçi as a social space has been produced by varying actors from different scales over the course of its history. As is extensively discussed in Chapter 4, on the one hand it has been produced by the experts, bureaucrats and technocrats. On the other hand, the residents produced and shaped the place through historically constructed everyday life patterns within the physical reality of Suriçi. From this Lefebvrian perspective, in this section I trace the social, political, physical and economic dynamics of the everyday life that produced and shaped the spatial configuration of Suriçi by drawing on the narratives of the residents.

When we look at the interviews, mostly the residents' historicization begins in the 1980s. Then, residents speak about the changes that took place in the 1990s when the conflict between Kurdish national movement and the central state was at its

peak. After that, residents discuss everyday life in Suriçi during the 2000s as the time of more conciliatory relations between the Kurdish national movement and the state. Lastly, they talk about the escalation of the tension within the city in 2015; and how this ended up as urban warfare which lasted for months. This historicization of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s is based on the things they witnessed and experienced in their everyday life. In addition to that, sometimes they also talk about the stories they heard from their parents. Within this chronological framework, they talk about everyday relations and their economic, physical, political and social components.

The social life in Suriçi has always been the main focus of interviewees. When they started to talk, the first thing they mentioned was human interactions. All started by describing Suriçi based on their everyday relations within their family. Family relations within these narratives are depicted as a conventional extended family model. Interviewees' families usually consisted of a nuclear family, and in addition to that there were at least grandparents and sometimes married sisters and brothers. After mentioning their families, interviews usually continued with strong ties among the neighborhoods, all of which unfold within the concrete reality of Suriçi.

As Lefebvre (2007) points out while introducing his spatial triad—conceived, perceived, and lived space—the concrete reality of the space, i.e., perceived space, also influenced the frame of the social life in Suriçi. Therefore, it is important to comprehend the family and social relations within Suriçi through the concrete reality of the space. These families, before the expansion of today's apartments in the area, were accommodated in traditional Diyarbakır houses. These houses are made of basalt. They usually have two floors and a square shape. In the middle of this square

shape, there is a big courtyard where people can sit or eat together, women can do their everyday housework and children can play. In those courtyard houses bathrooms and toilets are often common spaces. Most of the time these houses are shared by more than one family. In addition to that, each household has private rooms. The interviewees explained the implications of cohabiting within such an architectural design on their family and larger social relations by referring to their childhood memories:

> We, as six families, lived in a courtyard-type house. Until I was fifteen, I did not realize that we were not relatives but just neighbors. I was thinking that we were all relatives in some way. Because we were always together. We all were like a part of a big family. For instance, in summer my mother used to go to the village. At that time, our neighbors would bathe us. They would wash our clothes and feed us.[35] (Mehmet, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

Living and growing together in such an architectural design enabled people to go beyond blood relations when they socialized with one another. In a sense, the architectural design and the spatial interaction it provided led the residents to build another type of "family" based on communal practices. This new conceptualization of family within the spatial context was also different from the capitalist understanding of family as a nuclear unit. Hence, a family in Suriçi did not only consist of parents and children, but it also included their next door or courtyard neighbors.

These neighborhood scale familial relations also complicated the boundaries of public and private life in Suriçi. Normally in apartments, the boundaries of the

[35] Translated from: "Biz altı ev bir avluda kalırdık. Ben ta 15 yaşıma gelene kadar bizim onlarla akraba olmadığımızı fark etmemiştim. Ben akrabalarımızla yaşıyoruz sanıyordum. Çünkü hepimiz her zaman iç içeydik. Hepimiz bir ailenin fertleri gibiydik. Yani mesela annem mesela yazın köye giderdi. O zaman bizim komşularımız başımızı yıkarlardı. Elbiselerimizi yıkarlardı, yemeğimizi verirlerdi."

private are clearly drawn and this restricts the scope of intervention in one another's lives. However, in Suriçi, boundaries of public and private were not that clear. Rohat, the 20 years old interviewee from Hasırlı neighborhood, also explained these familial relationships in his neighborhood during the interview:

> Normally, neighbors can intervene in your family matters to a certain extent, or their sincerity to each other can be limited. Neighborhood relations in Suriçi were different. You could easily go into your neighbors' houses. For instance, when our door was locked or nobody was at home, of course it is nice to get a permission, but our neighbors would comfortably enter our home without any permission. You know, due to the fact that houses were adjacent, all the entrances on the rooftops were connected. Without any problem, we could cross over the rooftops and open the doors of our neighbors. Nobody would ask us questions such as, where you are heading or why did you not get permission first. There were close relations in that sense.[36] (Rohat, personal communication, March 19, 2017)

Furthermore, its small and interconnected streets as important physical characteristics of the space again affected the social life in Suriçi. Small and interconnected streets made Suriçi a place of encounter which enhanced social ties and interaction in the place. Mehmet mentions that before the warfare when you walked through the streets; you would greet at least five people on your way. He emphasizes that what makes Suriçi Suriçi are these close relations that have taken place within the city walls for years and years.

Another example of the daily encounter was women's doorstep socialization with one another. After women finished their daily chores, they laid out small carpets

[36] Translated from: "Komşular (normalde) bir yere kadar aile işlerinize karışabilir ya da samimiyetiniz bir yere kadar olabilir. Oradaki komşuluk başkaydı. Rahatlıkla evine girip çıkabildiğiniz insanlardı (komşular). Örneğin bizim komşularımız kapımız kilitli olunca ya da evde kimse olmayınca, izin almak tabii ki güzeldir ama, izin almadan rahatlıkla girerdi. Evler bitişik olduğu için damlardan birbirine geçiş vardı. Hiç sıkıntı olmadan geçip kapıyı açabiliyorduk. Hiçkimse de bize neden izin almadın ya da nereye gidiyorsun gibi bir soru sormazdı zaten. O yönden sıcak bir ilişki vardı."

in front of their homes and chit-chatted for hours with one another. Not only women, but also children socialized with each other in the small streets of Suriçi. In addition to that, this doorstep socialization enabled them to meet new people who were from outside Suriçi. Physical and architectural structure were again an important facilitator of the social interaction. In other districts of Diyarbakır, particularly women, who do not have jobs outside of the house and live in apartments, do not have spaces for socialization where they can encounter "strangers" or meet new people. Their socialization is generally limited to people they already know as neighbors or relatives. And, due to the fact that they do not have such doorstep socialization, their socialization with their neighbors and relatives was also limited when compared to Suriçi. For children, the situation is not as hard as it is for women, but again their outdoor socialization gets restricted when they live in apartments located on large boulevards.

Even though most of the interviews stressed the strong communal relations within the space, I tried to understand the conditions of women within this social and physical configuration. The conditions of women within the family and private realm go beyond the main point of this thesis, therefore, I sought to understand whether they felt comfortable within the social and physical atmosphere of Suriçi. Most of the women indicated that everybody was in a sense familiar and they felt comfortable going out whenever they wanted. They remarked that most of the time they do not go outside of Suriçi, indeed they only go outside of the city walls when they have relatives to visit there. Rather, they socialize at their doorsteps or park areas alongside the city walls. They also emphasized that throughout the Peace Process of

the 2000s, the streets were crowded until nightfall and this also led women to feel secure when they went out in the evenings.

Although there were social cohesion and communal life practices among the residents, Suriçi was not a homogenous society. Certain habits and manners were different in different neighborhoods. Particularly, when it came to gender norms, there were multiple and clashing gender norms within the place. For instance, while Mehmet mentions the migration after the urban warfare, he also talks about these neighborhood-based differences:

> Until now our women would not go and sit in the middle of the streets. Now, we see that women are sitting in the streets. As I told you, those are the ones who have come from Hasırlı (Neighborhood). In our neighborhood women also go out to the streets. However, when you look at these newcomers they come and sit in the middle of the street, both women and men together.[37] (Mehmet, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

Throughout the interview Mehmet did not display an intolerance towards the newcomers, however his remark clearly indicates that there were clashing of gender norms between the newcomers and old residents of Ziya Gökalp neighborhood.

In addition to the physical framework that also affected the social world in the place, I asked about the physical deficiencies, needs, and improvements in urban life since 1999. The interviewees argued that the infrastructural facilities of the municipality improved the quality of life. Mehmet argued that it was first the mayorship which stepped up to solve the water problem Suriçi has suffered from for 40 or 50 years. They replaced all the iron water pipes which had rotted over time with plastic pipes. Therefore, residents no longer had to carry water to their houses.

[37] Translated from: "Şimdiye kadar bizim bayanlarımız gidip sokak ortasında oturmazlardı. Şimdi bakıyoruz bayanlar sokaklarda oturmaya başladı. Dedim ya işte onlar Hasırlı tarafından gelenler. Bizde de kadınlar çıkardı sokaklara. Ama yeni gelenlere bakıyorsun erkekli bayanlı böyle gelip sokak ortasında oturuyorlar."

Moreover, the municipality reconstructed the sewage system from one end of Suriçi to the other. In addition to that, almost all of the streets were paved with cobblestones. All of these, one way or the other, improved the living conditions of residents. Nevertheless, as 29-years-old Aynur from Fatihpaşa neighborhood suggested, these attempts were not sufficient. She claimed that nobody made any significant investment in Suriçi, and before the warfare they had still been living in poor conditions. However, when I asked what was deficient, she did not point a specific issue, rather she referred to a general sense of neglect.

The political structure of Suriçi was also an important element which shaped and was shaped through everyday life. Even though Murat suggested that Suriçi has always been the center for the struggle, according to Salih, until the 1980s there was no organized ideological platform around which people would gather and articulate their demands in Suriçi. He correlates the rise of the Kurdish national movement with the increase in political consciousness of the residents. The movement, however, was not the sole actor in Suriçi after the 1980s. At that time, Islamic religious groups were strong as well. In the 1990s, when the Kurdish national movement was on the rise in Suriçi, interviewees argued that state-supported fundamentalist religious groups also enhanced their organizations under the name of Hezbollah. According to Salih, in the 1990s Hezbollah became a paramilitary group which initiated executions in the middle of the day. He claimed that the legacy of this paramilitary group led to the emergence of diverse religious organizations during the 2000s. He suggested that today there are more or less 32 Islamic dervish lodges and societies which have their own closed spaces, especially in and around the Saray Kapı neighborhood. Nevertheless, he differentiated these dervish lodges and

societies from Hezbollah in the sense that these organizations went beyond the paramilitary actions and started to organize in everyday life. They opened up Quran courses for the children. They engaged with charity facilities to aid the families who had close ties with the organizations. Salih, as a person who is close to the movement, also mentioned the difference between the movement's approach to the religion, and these groups' approach to Islam on the ground of their relations with the state:

> My grandfather also, for instance, is a Quran teacher and a *melle*[38]. However, he is not a *melle* of the state. He is the *melle* of the mosque without any salary. Now, the only thing that bothers us about these Islamic groups is that these religious organizations summon little children and give them a kind of education which leads to brainwashing and drags them toward different ideological positions. Otherwise, we do not have a problem with the Islamic segment of the society.[39] (Salih, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

Salih, in that regard, differentiates between the anti-systemic and systemic understanding of the religion. According to him, there were different ways of living with or performing religious commitment. The organized religious groups in Suriçi which followed the Hezbollah's line accepted the state-imposed understanding of the religion. On the other hand, the movement did not organize around religion. Religion was everyone's private sphere: it should be about your sincere commitment to your beliefs which should not be manipulated by the state. This belief was also the basis

[38] Melle, in English Mollah, is a person who unofficially but traditionally performs imam's duty especially in Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia. They can also be regarded as Kurdish religious scholars.

[39] Translated from: "Yani benim dedem mesela seydadır, melledir. Ama devletin mellesi değil, caminin mellesidir. Maaş almadan cami hocalığı yapar. Orada oturan insanların rahatsız olduğu konu, (bu tarikatların) çocukları çağırıp o çocukların beynini yıkamaları, farklı bir eğitim verip farklı ideolojilere sürüklemeleriydi. Yoksa bizim bir alıp veremediğimiz yok bu İslami kesimle."

of the multicultural perspective of the movement towards the other non-Muslim groups in Suriçi and in elsewhere.

Lastly, it is important to present through which economic activities the residents of Suriçi continued their everyday life. First of all, it is crucial to indicate that most of the residents of Suriçi have had to deal with poverty. According to the research done by KDA (2012), there were households in Suriçi which did not have any income (p. 123). These households were mostly located in the neighborhoods such as Cami Kebir, Süleyman Nazif, Ziya Gökalp, Fatihpaşa, Cevat Paşa and Cemal Yılmaz (KDA, 2012, p.123). Apart from these households, most of the other residents within these neighborhoods could only spend between 1 to 500 Turkish liras per month (KDA, 2012, p. 123).

Nevertheless, Suriçi as being historical city center provided certain mechanisms and opportunities through which even incomeless or low-income households could continue their lives up until 2015. An important dynamic for economic life in Suriçi was centrality. Suriçi was a center for commerce and shopping. Not only residents in Suriçi, but also peasants or townspeople from all around Diyarbakır would bring their products to Suriçi to sell them. In the mornings, from very early on people would come to Suriçi with their own products such as yogurt, cheese, tomato paste, etc. and sell them in the bazaars of Suriçi which were located in the small back streets.

Thanks to this centrality and economic activities in Suriçi, its residents also had the opportunity to be employed in daily works. When it comes to the centrality,

it saved the residents daily transportation costs and increased their access to cheaper products which were produced locally. As one resident indicates:

> A family of seven-eight people would get along quite well (in Suriçi). Why? They don't need to pay any money for transportation because they can find everything in Suriçi. When it comes to fruits and vegetables, they could get their fruits and vegetables from Hevsel Gardens cheaply.[40] (Mehmet, personal communication, July 3, 2016).

In addition to that, most of the time the household in Suriçi was still the place of production. Women did not only contribute to survival of their families by engaging in domestic work such as cleaning the house or cooking; they also made their own bread, sewed clothes or embroidered to sell. Therefore, in Suriçi families maintained their household economy with the help of these small-scale, self-sustaining productions and piece works, in addition to a regular salary if there was one. However, it also shows that when compared to newly-built luxury areas in Diyarbakır where the household survival is based on a regular salary and consumption; Suriçi, through daily works and the household economy, is still the place of not only consumption but also production.

Apart from these economic activities they engaged in, the residents had also developed survival strategies over time to sustain their households. Some of them used the electricity or water illegally. In addition to that, they did not have to pay janitor expenses or monthly fees for the expenses of their buildings. Strong communal relations based on trust also created an environment in which people could buy goods on credits from stores in Suriçi.

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[40] Translated from: "(Suriçi'nde) yedi sekiz kişilik bir aile gül gibi geçinip gidiyor. Niye? Suriçi'nde her şeye ulaşabiliyordu, bu yüzden ulaşıma para vermiyor. Meyve sebzeyi de Hevsel Bahçeleri'nden gelen ucuz meyve sebzeden alabiliyor."

Economic activities during the 2000s were diversified via restoration and historical revival projects. The historical and cultural revival of Suriçi through various urban projects attracted private investors to open new cafes, restaurants, and other tourist attractions throughout the 2000s. During the interviews, the opening up of Suriçi to larger visitors by cultural and historical projects was welcomed by the residents for economic and ideological reasons. Economically, they believed that more investments by public and private interests would generate wealth within Suriçi from which they could also benefit. However, these attempts at urban gentrification, together with attempts at urban renewal, as extensively discussed in Chapter 4, would only attract the middle and upper-middle class by constructing new luxury houses or opening more and more consumption areas in the place. On the other hand, this economic growth would push the residents of Suriçi to the outskirts of the city as the result of the increase in the cost of living as was the case in almost all the urban gentrification stories (Roy, 2005; Atkinson, 2004). Therefore, before going to the field, I thought that the residents would be discontent about the effects of gentrification on their everyday lives. I expected a fear of displacement among them. During the interviews, I asked interviewees about how they regarded this economic growth and what were the implications of this growth on their everyday life. Their responses, however, were not as pessimistic as I thought. Rather, they were content with the economic developments which in return were expected to be beneficial for them as well. In addition to that, they argued that revealing the tourism potential of Suriçi would contribute to the expression of the Kurdish culture and history which also created a sense of empowerment in their daily life:

> It was last two or three years before the war that people slowly started to make a claim on these historical places. A trade-person would come and see a

> historical building. Then, s/he would renovate it and turn it into a cafe. S/he both protected the history and made her/his business. It was very nice. [...] I can say that the system carried out the development of Sur. It saw the enrichment of Sur. In both historical and other senses, Sur was going to be a monument all by itself.[41] (Salih, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

Another example of this position is provided by Serhat. He argued that people's willingness to come and get to know Suriçi with the increase investments meant peace in itself. Among the interviews, only Yasin seemed to be indifferent to these renovated facilities. He argued that these renovations did not solve his problems as a Kurd. He said that as a Kurd his basic demand was being accepted by the society in every sense. However, these renovations did not lead to any improvements in terms of acceptance of Kurds in larger Turkey. According to him, none of these renovations created an improvement in terms of the use of Kurdish language for instance. Another segment in Suriçi, according to Salih, who may have had problems with these renovations, were Islamic organizations because some of these renovated spaces included alcohol on their menus. He noted how one of these Islamic groups sent a threatening letter to the owner of one of the cafes who served wine during an event.

All in all, Suriçi has been produced not only by local institutional actors through the different urban projects which are extensively elaborated in Chapter 4, but it has also been produced by its residents through the social, political and economic relations that they formed with each other as well as with the place. Not

[41] Translated from: "Savaştan iki üç yıl önce aslında yavaş yavaş artık bu tarihi yerlere sahip çıkılmaya başlandı. Esnafın biri gelip tarihi bir yer görüyordu. Sonra restore edip çok güzel bir kafe yapıyordu orada. Hem o tarihe sahip çıkıyordu hem ticaret yapabiliyordu. Çok güzel de olmuştu. Sistem Sur'un gelişmesini gördü aslında diyebilirim. Sur'un zenginleşmesini gördü. Hem tarihi anlamda hem farklı anlamda Sur artık başlı başına bir yapı olacaktı orada."

only have residents produced Suriçi through their everyday life relations, the socio-spatial dynamics in Suriçi in return facilitated the emergence of the urban warfare. In the subsequent sections I dwell on these socio-spatial dynamics.

5.2 Strong sense of belonging to the place and formation of the communal identity among the residents of Suriçi

The social movement literature strives to understand the process of the collective identity formation which paves the way for any collective action in the political life (Miller, 2000). Scholars tend to look at the class, gender, ethnic or religious identities that bring about social movements, or individual identities in a rational choice model. However, Miller (2000) suggests that the place-based identity formation based on a sense of space may also facilitate political mobilization. He claims that the place-based identity is constructed through space and sometimes it strongly associated with the space itself (Miller, 2000, p. 64).

This section will present the place-based identity formation in Suriçi through the sense of belonging that the residents hold. I argue that the residents constructed an identity on the ground of being from Suriçi, and they combined this identity with their Kurdishness when they organized around the Kurdish national movement. Thus, I claim that the strong sense of belonging to the place contributed to the communal identity formation. This communal identity formation as an important socio-spatial dynamic also facilitated the urban warfare in 2015. However, I present this communal identity formation together with the social, political, and physical dynamics that produced and challenged it throughout the history of Suriçi. Overall, this section will show that communal identity formation is an important component

of the urban warfare in Suriçi, however as a social phenomenon it has been produced and challenged through social, political, and physical dynamics.

5.2.1 The long history of Suriçi and its effects on the sense of belonging among its residents

As Nicholls (2009) discusses, recurrent encounters between various political subjects in a geographically steady space increase the possibility of forming a coherent togetherness. In Suriçi too, the historicity, centrality and interaction between different groups of people were important to form a communal identity on the ground of a sense of belonging. First of all, Suriçi was a historical center where people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds formed dense links with each other and with the space itself over the years. This historicity and centrality are important in order to understand the strong sense of belonging that residents of Suriçi had. Murat, one of the former residents who was forced to leave after the urban warfare, explains this situation as: "If they ask me where is Diyarbakır? I would say Sur is Diyarbakır. Before, there was no other place. There were no such places (that you can see now). These areas were like a desert. There was only Sur,"[42] (Murat, personal communication, July 2, 2016). He also added that any old *Diyarbakırlı* would agree with him in that respect. According to Murat, when an old *Diyarbakırlı* comes to Diyarbakır and cannot visit Suriçi, she would not consider herself as visiting Diyarbakır. In other words, Murat suggests that Suriçi as a place represents the identity of Diyarbakır and what it means to be *Diyarbakırlı*.

[42] Translated from: "Bana deseler Diyarbakır neresidir? Derim, Sur'dur. Daha önce buralar yoktu. Böyle çöl gibiydi. Sur vardı bir tek."

Even though the formal records suggest that after the 1950s migrations from villages to the city began construction of new living spaces outside of Suriçi (Atlı, 2014), interviewees suggest that even in the 1980s there were only very few apartments and villas outside the city walls. This also indicated the importance of Suriçi as the city center for a long time:

> Back then, there was almost no place outside of Sur. In Yenişehir there were some houses here and there. In Ofis there were very few apartments. In Şehitlik, there were again a couple of villas around today's Sümer Park's location. The rest was an empty field. For instance, Bağlar was no more than a vineyard.[43] (Mehmet, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

The depiction of Suriçi's long history as the city center is important in three senses. First of all, the centrality of Suriçi gave people the chance to access all the means that could be expected from a city such as market, transportation, and communication networks. Secondly, inhabitation in Suriçi did not have a short history like in Bağlar, Yenişehir or Kayapınar. This enabled people to give meaning to their life in Suriçi with respect to the historical background of the place. Thirdly, because of the fact that it is an old city center, people who lived there enjoyed the permanence by forming strong communal relations with other co-habitants. As one resident states:

> Sur has its own soul. It is a place where the life has continued for ten thousand years. If I come to Diyarbakır and do not visit Sur, what is the point of coming to Diyarbakır? If I visit Diyarbakır, then I need to see the old history of that city or the cultural structure of it, there is no point to just see apartments. If it is about seeing apartments, then I can go anywhere rather than coming to Diyarbakır. Apartments are everywhere in the end. However,

[43] Translated from: "O zamanlar Sur dışı hemen hemen yoktu. Sur'un dışında tek tük Yenişehir tarafında yapılaşma vardı. Ofis tarafında biraz binalar vardı. Şehitlik'te, şu anki Sümer Park civarında birkaç tane villa şeklinde ev vardı. Geri kalan hep tarlaydı. Mesela Bağlar da bağlıktan başka bir şey değildi."

> there is no other place like Dengbêj House. There is only one Diyarbakır Dengbêj House.[44] (Mehmet, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

This historicity and centrality of Suriçi distinguished it from the other newly established districts and neighborhoods in Diyarbakır. Suriçi as the historical center of Diyarbakır is also the most authentic place in the city. This authenticity of the place also reverberated through the way the residents framed the everyday relations. Salih's depiction, for instance, shows how the residents narrated the unique environment in the district and how the human interaction was understood within this framework of spatial uniqueness: "Sur is literally a distinct region, let's say a distinct city. It is a small city which has a social life in itself. Human relations within Suriçi are excellent, it is not possible to find such a social life outside of Sur,"[45] (Salih, personal communication, July 3, 2016). The interviewees did not make any distinction between the other districts of Diyarbakır. They treat all of other districts which are full of apartments as similar to one another. From this regard, only Suriçi with its historicity and authentic atmosphere enabled its residents to construct a sense of belonging and identity over the space. Yet, as we do not know the situation in other districts, we can suggest that the history of place and the socio-spatial relations formed through this historicity led to a sense of belonging and identity formation

[44] Translated from: "Sur'un bir maneviyatı var. Kesintisiz olarak 10 bin yıldır yaşamın devam ettiği bir yer. Şimdi ben Diyarbakır'a gelip Sur'u ziyaret etmezsem, ben Diyarbakır'a gelmiş saymam kendimi. Ben o eski tarihi, o kültürü görmedikten sonra, o binaları görmenin bir anlamı yok benim için. Binaysa, her tarafta bina vardır. Bugün örneğin Diyarbakır Dengbêj Evi başka bir yerde yok. Bir tek bir dengbêj evi vardır."

[45] Translated from: "Sur gerçekten değişik bir bölge, değişik bir şehir diyelim. Sosyal yaşamı olan küçük bir şehir. İnsan ilişkileri dört dörtlük. Sur'un dışında o sosyal yaşamı yakalamak mümkün değil."

among the residents and this identity formation was a crucial part of any collective action which also included the urban warfare.

5.2.2 Memory of a multicultural site and possible implications on the communal identity formation

This emphasis on the multicultural configuration of the place and the nostalgia for the close relations among the different communities are important to show how the geography and micro-level analysis matter in terms of the identity formation. As Amy Mills (2008) also illustrates in the case of Kuzguncuk, İstanbul, the common identity of *Kuzguncuklu* even transcended the nationalist-identity categories of being Turkish, Jew, or Greek in the narratives of the residents of Kuzguncuk. In Suriçi as well, the narratives of the residents emphasized the importance of being *Suriçili* or *Diyarbakırlı* based on the shared locality and close social relations among different communities. Therefore, in addition to the long history and centrality of the place that constituted the identity of *Suriçili,* was the multicultural configuration of the place according to the residents which was also very much related to their ideological positions. During the fieldwork, the interviewees proudly state that Suriçi has been the homeland for Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Yezidis and so on throughout its long history. Murat was one of the interviewees who proudly described this multicultural configuration of Suriçi: "It is not that easy to talk about Sur. Sur is a place where sounds of the call to prayer and church bells go together,"[46] (Murat, personal communication, July 2, 2016).

[46] Translated from: "Sur'u anlatmak öyle kolay değildir. Çan sesiyle ezan sesinin birbirine karıştığı bir yerdir Sur."

This multicultural depiction of the place which constitutes the identity of the space and their sense of belonging came to light when they described their childhood memories. Childhood memories of interviewees characterize Suriçi as a place of diversity rather than a monolith based on exclusive Muslimness. Even though most of the interviewees were Muslim Kurds, they gave reference to the non-Muslim legacy in Suriçi to describe the multiculturalism, rather than talking about their relations with the other Muslim groups such as Turks or Arabs. They especially talked about the Armenian legacy in the urban life and their relations with them:

> Believe me, Armenian citizens were the most active, productive and crafty residents of Sur. Most of the craftspeople were Armenians back then. The best jewelers or even calligraphists, which was regarded as a Muslim craft, were Armenians. For instance, people are talking about the best foods of Diyarbakır. Chefs who prepared the best Diyarbakır foods and desserts were Armenians. The best *kadayıf*[47] in Diyarbakır was made by an Armenian. We did not see, but we heard. Our late father told us about it.[48] (Kerem, personal communication, July 2, 2016).

There were strong communal ties among Suriçi residents, and Muslim Kurds claimed that they built close relations based on trust with non-Muslim residents: "Our neighbors usually were Christians, Jews, and Armenians. We lived together. When we went out of town we would give our keys to them. We would not give our keys to the Muslim families, but we would give them to non-Muslims; don't get me wrong, we trusted them."[49] (Yasin, personal communication, July 3, 2016).

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[47] Kadayıf is a traditional dessert of Diyarbakır.

[48] Translated from: "İnanın Ermeni vatandaşlar, Sur'un en aktif, Sur'un en verimli, Sur'un en zanaatkar kesimiydi. Çoğu zanaatkar Ermeni'ydi o zamanlar. Mesela en iyi kuyumcular Ermeniydi; hat sanatı Müslümanların diyorlar, en iyi hattatlar Ermeni'ydi. Mesela Diyarbakır'ın en güzel yemeklerinden bahsediyorlar ya Diyarbakır'ın en güzel yemeklerinin ustaları hep Ermenilerdir. Tatlılar da buna dahildir. En iyi kadayıfı bir Ermeni ustası yaparmış. biz görmedik ama duyduk. Rahmetli babamız söylerdi."

[49] Translated from: "Bizim komşularımız genellikle Hristiyanlardı, Yahudilerdi, Ermenilerdi; biz beraber yaşardık. Şehir dışına çıktığımız zaman anahtarımızı

In addition to this trust, interviewees also talked about the respectful relations between them and their non-Muslim neighbors. They usually gave the example of how non-Muslims were respectful during the Ramadan month, and how they kept out of sight when they needed to eat, drink or smoke during fasting times. Kurdish interviewees also stressed that this was a reciprocal relation:

> Back then, we used to have Armenian or Assyrian neighbors. Let me give the example of Ramadan. (During Ramadan) they seemed to fast just like us. They would hide even in their own workplace when they drank water, ate food or smoked cigarettes. Why? They thought, my Muslim neighbors would see and be uncomfortable or feel longing. We also visit them during their religious feasts. They made sweet bread and colored eggs and shared them with us during Easter. In our feasts, we also shared our sweet bread, stuffed meatballs, and dinners with them. For instance, if we were sick they would come to visit us, or if they were sick we would go. There was no difference among cultures or religions. But, what happened? Most of them started to emigrate for various reasons.[50] (Mehmet, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

Agop, a former Armenian resident of Suriçi also emphasized the harmonious environment in Suriçi that he witnessed and heard about from his mother. He argued that they had Jewish, Syriac, Armenian, and Kurdish neighbors with whom they formed close relations which for instance, included fulfilling domestic tasks together back then.

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kendilerine verirdik. Müslüman ailelere vermiyorduk yanlış anlama, gayrimüslimlere verirdik; güvenimiz onlaraydı."

[50] Translated from: "Şimdi şöyle diyeyim eskiden bizim Ermeni veyahut da Süryani komşularımız vardı. Ramazan ayını örnek göstereyim. Onlar da sanki bizim gibi oruç tutarlardı. Kırk tane delikte saklanırlardı kendi iş yerlerinde bir su içmek için, bir yemek yemek için ya da sigara içmek için. Niye? Yav benim komşum görür, rahatsız olur, onun canı çeker diye düşünürlerdi. Yine onların bayramı olduğu zaman biz de giderdik onların evine. Onlar da tatlı çörek, böyle renkli yumurtalar yaparlardı ve bize de getirirlerdi Paskalya'da. Biz mesela bayramda çörek yaptığımız zaman, içli köfteler, yemekler yapıldığı zaman biz de alırdık götürürdük. Mesela biz hasta olsaydık onlar gelirdi, onlar hasta olsaydı biz giderdik. Kültürler, dinler arasında böyle bir fark yoktu. Ne oldu? Çeşitli nedenlerden dolayı çoğu göç etmeye başladı."

However, in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the relation between the multicultural history of the place and the sense of belonging, we have to show the ruptures, the moments of violence alongside the reconstruction of the multicultural identity of the place. First of all, the population of the non-Muslim community decreased sharply throughout the last century. First, during the disintegration years of Ottoman Empire, they were deported and destroyed by the central state and their coconspirators in Diyarbakır, from the 1890s to mid 1910s (Çelik & Dinç, 2015). Later, the population of non-Muslim citizens continued to decrease during the history of the republic in Diyarbakır as part of a general trend in Turkey. According to the interviewees, the first wave of demographic reconfiguration continued during the 1950s, 1980s, and 1990s on a relatively small scale. According to the interviewees, the people who emigrated from Suriçi went abroad or to metropolises such as Istanbul where they could not easily be "spotted" as Armenians. In addition to that, it is important to point out that all these waves of migration correspond to the times when violence against minorities in general and/or violence against specifically non-Muslims had increased in Turkey. The violence against non-Muslims in macro politics had its repercussions in Suriçi, as a microcosm of Turkey, and this can be traced through the everyday relations of non-Muslim and Muslim communities.

As it would be expected, these violent events harmed the relations of mutual trust between the Muslim and non-Muslim residents. During the interview, 53 years old, non-Muslim religious leader Adnan suggested that the idea of living together and trusting relations between the neighbors was damaged in Turkey as well as in Suriçi because of these violent events: "Let's assume that I already had an enmity

with your grandfather, and I insult your father. How much can you trust me? […] In short, we wait with the fear of a spark that will ignite an atmosphere for such a catastrophe once again,"[51] (Adnan, personal communication, March 20, 2017).

Without denying the fact that both Muslim and non-Muslim residents of Suriçi warmheartedly recalled their close relations with each other during the interviews, I think depicting Suriçi like a utopian place independent from its violent history or macro political dynamics would be misleading. Particularly, Muslim-Kurd interviews tended to argue that this violent past remained in the past. As Serhat also put it, Kurds too were responsible in terms of the deportation and destruction of non-Muslim communities in Suriçi, but, now the Kurdish national movement has a multicultural ideological position, things have changed for the better in Suriçi. Even though the multicultural vision of the movement was significant, the discrimination in everyday life did not unfortunately disappear at once. There have been moments of repercussion of this violent past. After non-Muslim groups in Suriçi left the city decade by decade, and the remaining few families became a small minority[52], this physical violence turned into discriminatory attitudes in everyday life. 69-year-old interviewee Ali, as a Muslim-Kurd, also conceded to these discriminatory attitudes during the interview:

> 40 years ago (non-Muslims) started to emigrate. Once they got lonely, we started to… I had a very close friend, he also left years ago. Said was a mechanic. One day, when we were sitting in my community, he told us that we had persecuted him. I said, how? He recalled a day when we were in the queue for the water and then "we" threw his tin of water away and took his

[51] Translated from: "Düşünün ki ben sizin babanızı hakaret ediyorum, dedenizle zaten husumetim vardı. Şimdi siz bana ne kadar güvenebilirsiniz? […] Biz o korkuyla bekliyoruz yani, bir kıvılcım ne zaman çakılacak, o zemin ne zaman oluşacak?"

[52] According to the Syriac interviewee, today in Suriçi there are only 4 Syriac families, 1 Chaldean family and 1 Armenian family.

> place in line. (He continued by saying that) once we started to fight, the imam came out and asked the reason of the fight. Then, "we" told the imam that he was a Christian. And then the imam said something and left."[53] (Personal communication, March 20, 2017)

Even though the story of Ali took place in 1980s, these discriminations against the non-Muslims in everyday life did not disappear once the Kurdish national movement got more organized and came to hold institutional power at the local level. For instance, Diyarbakır Protestant Church was established in 2003, and Süleyman, a member of the church, said that during its first months little children threw stones at the windows of the church a couple of times. He claimed that this happened because of the way these children were raised. However, he added that once they got to know the children and other neighbors, these incidences stopped.

Although it is important to underline the discrimination against the non-Muslims, it is also essential to indicate the changes that the Kurdish national movement brought through institutional politics and everyday life. During the interviews, non-Muslim interviewees also stressed that the discriminatory attitudes had been diminished by the time the Kurdish national movement organized in Suriçi. The multicultural perspective of the movement and implementing this multicultural vision through institutional politics led to both the revelation of the multicultural history of the place and a process of normalization in terms of everyday life.

[53] Translated from: "40 sene önce gitmeye başladılar ya yalnızlaşınca biz de onlara... Benim çok samimi bir arkadaşım vardı. Kaç sene önce gitti. Said, kaportacıydı. Bir gün benim cemaatimde otururken bana dedi ki siz bana çok zulüm ettiniz. Dedim yav nasıl Said? Çeşmenin önünde sırada beklerken onun tenekesini attığımızdan ve sırasını aldığımızdan bahsetti. Sonra biz kavga etmeye başlayınca hoca gelip kızdı, neden kavga ettiğimizi sordu hoca kızdı. Sizden biri de benim Hıristiyan olduğumus söyledi. Hoca da bir şeyler söyleyip gitti."

Davut, a religious leader from the non-Muslim community, gives the example of Kırklar Assembly (Kırklar Meclisi) as an important institutional attempt. In 2012, the mayor of Sur Municipality Abdullah Demirbaş organized to form an assembly which functioned as an advisory committee to the municipality, and every religion and ethnic community had a representative in this assembly[54] up until the beginning of the urban warfare. Davut also attended this assembly and argued that this was an important inclusive policy of Kurdish national movement in the urban scale.

Adnan also stressed that the multicultural vision of the Kurdish national movement helped to rebuild their ties with the space through physical projects. However, he added that these restoration or historical and cultural revival projects in a way also contributed to the idea of "fraternity" which has been missed by the residents of Suriçi from different backgrounds:

> Especially during the last 20 years, Kurds have approached other faiths with a different heart. (…) Now, the HDP comes and says we are siblings, we respect your beliefs. The HDP genuinely actualized its (multicultural) perspective with its practices. (…) They attempted to restore both the hearts and churches. (…) The idea to revive the fraternity we missed helped people get closer to each other, but we saw that the state interfered in this.[55] (Adnan, personal communication, March 20, 2017)

In addition to local institutional attempts, once the Kurdish national movement became more organized in Suriçi, the legacy of the multicultural history and its old neighborhood relations between Muslims and non-Muslims also

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[54] Retrieved 6 March, 2018, from http://www.diyarinsesi.org/haber/kirklar-meclisi-kurulacak-27721.htm.

[55] Translated from: "Özellikle son 20 yıldır Kürtlerin öbür inançlara çok farklı bir yüreği vardır. Şimdi HDP gelip diyor ki biz kardeşiz, siz farklı inanıyorsunuz saygımız var. Gerçekten HDP, bu bakış açısını eyleminde de gösterdi. Hem yüreklerde restorasyon yapılmaya çalışıldı hem de kiliselerde. Özlediğimiz o kardeşliği canlandıralım düşüncesi insanları birbirine kaynaştırdı ama devletin engel olduğunu gördük."

contributed to the normalization in everyday life alongside the institutional attempts by the pro-Kurdish municipalities. Therefore, the discrimination against the non-Muslims in Suriçi was a part of general trend in Turkey, yet the possibility for human interaction to triumph this enmity through spatial dynamics was unique to Suriçi. As Süleyman frankly stated, they preferred to establish the Diyarbakır Protestant Church in Suriçi in 2003, because of the fact that its residents were more open to the idea of a church when compared to other district. In addition to that, the emphasis on the multicultural identity of the place, and the fraternity and trusting relations among the diverse communities show that these discriminatory attitudes had been left behind:

> Here, nobody would say that "She is a Christian let's stay away from her". This was the case for all ethnicities. Those who want to go to church would go to church. Those who want to go to the mosque would go to the mosque. There were also people who would not go to either of them. Nobody would intervene in each other's choices. Sur has think kind of cultural structure.[56] (Murat, personal communication, July 2, 2016)

Therefore, this multicultural structure of the place and political consciousness of the people lead them to respect the differences which is the first condition in terms of living together.

According to Nicholls (2008), radical diversity in the city also provided the residents a sense of freedom from the tightly circumscribed roles, norms and expectations that one may find in culturally homogenous places (p. 3). He adds that this "wild" character of the place will always be targeted by the state so as to maintain the order (p. 4). In return, the places of diversity can inspire new innovative

[56] Translated from: "Burada kimse kimseye "Bu Hıristiyan'dır; ondan uzak duralım," demez. Bu ilişkiler bütün etnisiteler için geçerliydi. Kiliseye gitmek isteyenler kiliseye gidiyordu. Camiye gitmek isteyenler camiye gidiyordu. Her iki tarafa da gitmeyenler de vardı. Kimse kimseye müdahale etmiyordu. Sur böyle bir kültüre sahiptir."

relations (Nicholls, 2008, p. 4). Similarly, during the interviews, this relative "freedom" in terms of the religious activities or expression of different ethnic identities was seen as one of the reasons why the state intervened in Suriçi. Serhat, for instance, argued that this togetherness was against the AKP's monist ideology based on Muslimness and Turkishness. Thus, the state interfered in this "wild" character of the place. According to Murat, the residents of Suriçi fought against this state intervention in a similar way by combining their cultural and political identities which had been constructed through the codes of Suriçi:

> The intervention from the outside to a degree was an intervention in the cultural and political life in Suriçi. (…) They wanted to wipe this culture away. (…) Thus, the people responded to this intervention by integrating the cultural and political identity of Suriçi. In the end, it is not a self-evident phenomenon that a 70-years-old mother gets behind those barricades. Likewise, it is not a self-evident phenomenon that a 17 or 18-years-old teen stands behind those barricades. This occurred via the integration of the politicized Kurdish identity and the identity of Suriçi.[57] (Murat, personal communication, July 2, 2016)

Hence, the multicultural configuration of Suriçi is an important component of the communal identity. Although this multicultural character of the communal identity has been challenged through deportation and destruction of the non-Muslim communities in Suriçi, the close neighborhood relations of the past and multicultural visionaries of the Kurdish national movement supported a certain degree of restoration of the multicultural past physically and socially. When it comes to the its

[57] Translated from: "Dışarıdan gelen bu müdahale biraz da o kültürel ve siyasal yaşama müdahaleydi. (…) Var olan o kültürü ortadan kaldırmak istediler (…) Dolayısıyla insanlar da buradaki siyasal kimlikle kültürel kimliği bütünleştirerek bu müdahaleye yanıt verdiler. Sonuçta 70 yaşındaki bir annenin o barikatların arkasına girmesi öyle kendiliğinden gelişen bir olgu değildir. Aynı şekilde 17-18 yaşındaki bir gencin bu barikatların arkasında durması öyle kendiliğinden gelen bir şey değildir. Bu, siyasallaşan Kürt kimliğiyle Sur kimliğinin bütünleşmesiyle gerçekleşti."

effects on the urban warfare, the multicultural atmosphere of the place reinforced the diversity and thereby, a certain degree of freedom in terms of performing negative rights. This situation has been argued by the residents as one of the reasons why the state engaged in warfare in the first place. However, during the fieldwork the residents also argued that Kurdish militia in Suriçi fought against this central state intervention to their multicultural everyday interaction by acting upon their identity which had also been formed through the multicultural codes in Suriçi.

5.2.3 Arrival of the newcomers and reconstruction of the communal identity

Until now, I presented that both the long history of Suriçi and its multicultural configuration paved the way for a communal identity formation and a sense of belonging. However, of course, human mobility in Suriçi affected not only its demographic configuration, but also its identity. Thus, this section is about the human mobility during the 1980s and 1990s. During the 1980s and 1990s, people, whose villages were burned down during the conflict between the movement and central state, started to come to Diyarbakır. Particularly from 1991 to 1994, when the civil war between the central state and the PKK was at its peak, there was an important human mobility in terms of both immigration to Suriçi and emigration from Suriçi (KMD, 2010, p. 28). This human mobility had important effects on the social, political and economic configuration of the place. The human mobility during the 1980s and 1990s, on the one hand damaged the harmonious narratives regarding the place because it resulted in an increase in crime rates and poverty (KMD, 2010; KDA, 2012). On the other hand, this created spaces for the residents to reconstruct their identity based on common grievances and get politicized through these

grievances. These common grievances as a part of communal identity were another socio-spatial dynamic that contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015.

Suriçi was an important destination for the newcomers during these years because of economic reasons (KMD, 2010, p. 27). They particularly settled in neighborhoods such as Fatihapaşa, Savaş, Hasırlı, Ben u Sen, or Aziziye which are located in the outskirts of Suriçi. This situation brought about a housing problem within these arrival neighborhoods. This both accelerated the urbanization process beyond the city walls and the "slumification" within these neighborhoods. First of all, the old Suriçi residents started to sell or rent their houses to the newcomers at prices higher than the market value and moved to new residential areas outside of the city walls (KMD, 2010, p. 28). The newcomers also started to build shanty houses in empty areas and particularly in the outskirts of Suriçi, or add new stories onto the old houses (KMD, 2010, p. 28).

The concentration of these deprived families to certain outskirt neighborhoods of Suriçi such as Fatihapaşa, Savaş, Hasırlı, Ben u Sen, or Aziziye sped up a process of "slumification" in the eyes of the "other" residents. First, insufficient infrastructure and public services in these neighborhoods could not handle the increase in their population. Due to this, the residents continued to live in very poor conditions (long-term electric cuts, problems regarding the sewage system, etc.) (KDM, 2009). Secondly, these people who were forced to leave their villages did not have any regular income or job, and this impoverishment led these neighborhoods to have the highest crime rates in Diyarbakır (KDM, 2009, p. 19).

Lastly, the image of poor quality shanty houses and multi-story buildings also contributed to the treatment of these neighborhoods as the slums of Suriçi.

This "slumification" along with an increase in crime rates also led these neighborhoods to be perceived as "insecure". For instance, Tülin, a faculty member from the Department of Architecture in Dicle University, argued that throughout her undergraduate and graduate years (which referred to the years between 1991 to 2000), Suriçi was a very unsafe place to go and do research. She claimed that particularly the neighborhoods (Savaş, Hasırlı, Dabanoğlu, Fatihpaşa, Cevat Paşa and Cemal Yılmaz neighborhoods) which were destroyed to a great extent during the urban warfare and evacuated after the warfare were the most unsafe areas. Therefore, when she had to go to Suriçi for her assignments on architectural design, she would have gone with male friends, and they would have avoided entering cul-de-sacs or narrow streets. Even though Tülin explained this feeling of insecurity exclusively on the ground of the fear of theft, it should be noted that during these times Suriçi in general was an insecure place due, for instance, to the unidentified crimes and street fighting between the PKK and Hezbollah (TİHV, 1994).

Although the process of migration was not handled well on the local level and this in turn brought about various detrimental effects on people's lives as well as in urban life, I argue that the common grievances that have been articulated within these neighborhoods created another line of politicization which also contributed to the emergence of the warfare in Suriçi. In the end, it was not a coincidence that the neighborhoods where Tülin felt unsafe were the same neighborhoods in which the urban warfare violently erupted. As Nicholls (2007) argues, the spatial unevenness in terms of the social, political and economic life generates different grievances in the

society. Once these grievances are articulated and politicized, they contribute to mobilization in a given place (Nicholls, 2007, p. 612). After the residents settled in these neighborhoods, they experienced a similar spatial unevenness in terms of accessing social and public services. In addition to that, they lacked regular income. Moreover, Salih, from the Savaş neighborhood, argued that all of the families in these neighborhoods one way or the other suffered from violence of the state:

> In Sur, there was not one community among it in which one family did not pay the price of this political struggle, did not suffer, whose village was not burned down, or who was not tortured. Not one. Any of the families you call for an interview would tell you a similar story. Even if nothing happened to them, their villages would probably have been burned or they would have been forced from their homes. This group of people has all united in Sur.[58] (Salih, personal communication, July 3, 2018)

Therefore, the human mobility in the outskirts of Suriçi affected the harmonious picture of the place by inflicting the fear of crime and creating a divergence between "us" and "them". This situation challenged the communal identity in Suriçi. However, once the Kurdish national movement started to organize around common grievances, newcomers and their experiences within the urban life enabled the production of political unity within Suriçi and an even stronger unity within these neighborhoods. This politicization through common grievances became another socio-spatial dynamic that contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare in Suriçi.

[58] Translated from: "Sur'da öyle bir toplum vardı ki bedel vermeyen, acı çekmeyen, köyü yakılmayan, işkence görmeyen aile yoktu. Sıfır. Hangi aileyi çağırırsanız, röportaj yaparsanız her aile benzer bir hikaye anlatır. Hiçbir şeyi olmamışsa bile köyü yakılmıştır ya da köyden zorla göç ettirilmiştir. O kesim hepsi Sur'da birleşmişti zaten."

5.3 Strong communal ties, relations of trust and solidarity reproduced in daily practice

Nicholls (2007; 2008; 2009) suggests that strong ties, trust, and solidarity networks reproduced through everyday interaction based on proximity and stability are important facilitators of social movements. As in the case of Suriçi, apart from the identity and sense of belonging that have been produced through the place, everyday social practices shaped through strong communal ties, relations of trust and solidarity facilitated the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015.

Throughout my fieldwork, the social life in Suriçi has always been the main focus of interviewees. They usually described the neighborhood relations to illustrate the strong communal ties (re)produced in daily practices and encounters. However, these neighborhood relations and strong communal ties were always described as unique to Suriçi. In other words, these strong communal ties shaped the place-making process in Suriçi, and Suriçi as a social space reproduced these strong communal ties. For instance, Murat asserted that in new residential areas in larger Diyarbakır, for instance in Kayapınar or Yenişehir, neighbors do not know each other. However, in Suriçi everyone, one way or the other, knew each other, even though they were not each other's next door neighbors.

In order to describe the tight communal relations between them, almost all of the interviewees started to talk about the reciprocal relations. For instance, they talked about how every evening each neighbor gives a plate of their own dinner to their neighbors and in exchange, their neighbors also share their food with them. As a result of this dominant social interaction based on reciprocity, every evening the

residents would sit at a dinner table which would consist of at least five-six different dishes.

In addition to the relations based on the reciprocity, interviewees usually referred to the uninterrupted neighborhood relations in Suriçi up until 2015. For instance, Asude, a 58-year-old interviewee, stated that she came to Hasırlı neighborhood when she was 17 years old and that she had same neighbors for 41 years until she had to move out. These uninterrupted neighborhood relations enabled the formation of strong ties over time. These strong ties among the neighbors led them to embrace each other's problems as their own problems or happiness as their own happiness over time. This created a sense of empathy among the residents of Suriçi.

For instance, according to Salih, when someone's husband does not come home at the expected time, this would become a problem for all neighbors. They would go and search for the husband in hospitals, police stations, or coffee houses together. He used this situation to describe the strong connection between neighbors. He suggested that if one of the neighbors had a problem then all of the neighbors would embrace this problem as their own. To illustrate the importance of these strong ties, Mehmet mentioned how they mourned their dead together. Mehmet also stated that when their neighbors mourned they would share in their grief and cook for the mourning family three meals a day for forty days. Not only problems and sorrow, but also happiness was shared with one another as well:

> When there was a wedding, we would embrace it as a neighborhood. Nobody would call one person the host of the wedding. People would say that this

> wedding belongs to this street or that neighborhood. Everybody would make the wedding their own there.[59] (Salih, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

However, it wasn't only strong communal ties that perpetuated a politically organized stand: according to 20-years-old Rohat from Hasırlı neighborhood, the ideological similarity of the families also enriched the communal ties. He claimed that in Suriçi most of the families were Kurdish and ideologically similar to one another. Due to this demographic structure of the place, it was hard not to expect such strong solidarity. In this regard, strong communal ties and political organization in the place strengthened each other through everyday practices.

Salih also suggested that this political unity was one of the reasons why this urban warfare between the movement and central state emerged in Suriçi but not anywhere else in Diyarbakır. He claimed that for instance Bağlar, another district in Diyarbakır where there are people who have a similar socio-economic background, did not become the battlefield for the struggle because of the fact that Bağlar is a fragmented space in terms of the political engagement of the residents. However, in Suriçi, only the area of Saray Kapı neighborhood[60] could be regarded as isolated from the struggle of the Kurds because of the strength of Islamic organizations within that neighborhood. Apart from this exception, Suriçi was a united whole.

When it comes to understanding the production of this unity in a social and political sense, Rohat suggested that in the mornings the residents of Suriçi who had jobs or school would go their jobs and school. Others would go out to the streets and

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[59] Translated from: "Bir düğünde olduğunda onu mahalle olarak biz sahiplenirdik. Düğün sahibi bu kişi demezlerdi. Düğün bu sokağındır veya bu semtindir derlerdi. Herkes orada o düğüne de sahip çıkardı."

[60] Saray Kapı Neighborhood is located next to Cevat Paşa and Fatihpaşa Neighborhoods all of which surround historical Içkale area in Suriçi.

sit together with their neighbors and relatives. He argued that the politics would be the hot topic during these conversations, as might be expected in an environment where you were systematically discriminated because of your ethnic background. This dialogue on the ground of politics also contributed to the collective sense-making in terms of the Kurdish issue or other political discussions. These discussions on politics also dominated the young people's conversations. Ruken, the 17-years-old interviewee from Hasırlı neighborhood, stated that when the Newroz holiday approached, they would come together and start to discuss what to wear during Newroz or what to do for Newroz in their neighborhood with their friends. Thus, spatial dynamics which brought people together in Suriçi also aided the process of learning politics, being a united whole so to speak, and being politically organized around one struggle on the basis of their Kurdish identity.

Nicholls and Uitermark (2014) also draw our attention to the common sense-making processes in the urban context in order to understand the mechanisms through which the place becomes a politicizing machine. They argue that having a space for coming together, discussing and debating their differences and commonalities enable residents to form crucial cognitive frames with each other which will shape their political imaginaries. Nicholls (2008) explains this situation as "loosening the cognitive straitjackets that inhibit connections across difference" (p. 3). This overall allows the insurgents to form a common sense of purpose (Nicholls, 2008, p. 7). From this perspective, in Suriçi as well, the neighbors did not only know each other. They actually related to each other through social and political relations. Relating with each other through everyday encounter and dialogue also served the

construction of a common sense-making among them which fostered a perception of national politics or their everyday problems in a similar frame.

Rohat claimed that this situation was the result of the social life which had been produced through communication and dialogue with one another without excluding differences. He asserted that religious, ideological, and ethnic differences never resulted in any pressure on any groups in his neighborhood. He argues that rather there was always room for people to come together and discuss politics regardless of their differences. Murat also suggests that existing communication channels and the dialogue between the residents created a room for politicization through space because politics was always included in their repertoire of conversation: "As long as people are in dialogue, through talking and discussing, they achieve political consciousness more easily,"[61] (Murat, personal communication, July 2, 2016). This enabled the residents to share their problems, grievances, and difficulties with each other. Murat argued this also paved the way to the formation of a politically organized stand in Suriçi. Murat claimed that these strong communal ties and ideological stand based on common sense-making helped the residents fight against the intervention of the central state in 2015.

These strong communal ties among the residents also led them to trust one another. This strong sense of trust in one another appears in childhood memories:

> Sur was a way of life. Sur was a fraternity, Sur was friendship, Sur was neighborliness, Sur was hospitality. At that time (in Sur), it was such a life that when a resident went somewhere for a while, he or she would leave his or her keys with neighbors or whoever without looking at their ethnicity. The doors were not closed.[62] (Arif, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

[61] Translated from: "İnsanlar diyalog halinde oldukça, insanlar birbirleriyle konuştukça tartıştıkça daha çok siyasal bilince de ulaşıyor."
[62] Translated from: "Sur bir yaşam biçimiydi, Sur kardeşlikti, Sur dostluktu, Sur komşuluktu, Sur misafirperverlikti. Zaten o dönemlerde öyle bir yaşantı vardı ki

Not surprisingly, these strong ties and trusting relations also helped them to build solidarity networks socially, politically and economically among each other as a community. These networks helped them out in terms of the problems they had to deal with in their everyday life. In that sense, according to Arif, Suriçi was a place where you could not find a poor person in the neighborhood. Once they saw a poor person in their neighborhood, all of the residents would support this person or family communally. Although the economic conditions of the residents did not differ from one another to a great extent, they tried to empower one another economically when it was necessary. Thus, these solidaristic relations increased their chances of survival in the district and also helped to sustain the demographic consistency until 2015.

On the foundation of the reciprocity and solidaristic relations, the residents built communal life practices which helped to maintain the households in Suriçi. For instance, they shared their food and stocks which improved everyone's living conditions to a certain degree: "The residents of Suriçi always helped each other. Let me give you an example: if I got ten sacks of wheat from the village, what would I do? I would take five sacks for myself, then I would allocate the remaining to my neighbors"[63] (Mehmet, personal communication, July 3, 2016). Nicholls (2008) also emphasizes these solidaristic relations as "the development of a 'moral' economy between strong-tie groups" (p. 7). As Nicholls (2008) also claims, the development

vatandaşın biri, bir yere gittiği zaman yan komşusu kim olursa olsun, etnik kimliğine bakmaksızın kapı anahtarını kendisine teslim ederdi. Kapılar kapalı değildi."

[63] Translated from: "Suriçi'nde yaşayanlar arasında yardımlaşma çoktu. Örnek verelim, bana köyden on torba buğday geldi. Ne yapıyordum? Beş torbasını kendime ayırıyordum, kalanı da komşulara dağıtıyordum."

of a "moral" economy in Suriçi contributed overall to the construction of a cohesive social structure.

Not only food, but when it was necessary, residents of Suriçi opened their houses to their neighbors and accepted them as a part of their family because of the solidaristic relations and strong communal ties. Ali gave the example of one of their neighbors whose husband had left her and their children for years. Ali and his family invited her and her children into their home and took care of them when the husband was not around. He mentioned that these children, one of whom is a faculty member and the other is lawyer, still call him "Uncle Ali" which is also a beautiful example of how the residents went beyond the blood relations and formed familial relations with each other based on enduring communal ties and solidarity.

These solidaristic relations did not only help to maintain households in Suriçi. Strong political organization and solidaristic relations also led the residents to band together against outside "threats". For instance, as Salih explained, in the 1990s thanks to these solidarity networks people who were warranted for arrest could go and knock on the door of any house and be taken in. If they said that they were in a hard position these people could stay and be sheltered at that house for months without any further question from the host. Ruken also argued that in certain occasions such as the birthdays of Abdullah Öcalan, anniversaries of the foundation of the PKK or Newroz, the intervention of the police in the neighborhood was expected. At those times, when young Kurds would gather for the celebration of these events the police forces would intervene in their gatherings. Then, young Kurdish activists would fight against the police forces and the police forces in return would use tear gas and water cannons on protesters. At those times, other residents

would help the protesters by giving them water or lemons even though they would not participate in the protest directly.

Nicholls (2008) argues that in a place where certain norms are constructed through everyday relations, the collective actors can act upon certain expectations (p. 5). These solidaristic relations in everyday life became the norm in Suriçi, therefore when the Kurdish youth started the urban warfare they relied on these norms. They believed that this solidarity network which had protected the residents of Suriçi from "the foreign threats" until now, would also help them out during urban warfare. To an extent, they were right, however, such a lasting and violent conflict required much more than what these everyday solidaristic relations could offer. Yet, Aynur, the 30 years old interviewee from Fatihpaşa neighborhood, also claimed that during the urban warfare, some of the families who shared a similar ideological position with the young Kurdish militias accepted militants into their homes and helped them. Nazan, the 53 years old interviewee from Ali Paşa Neighborhood, also added that during the urban warfare people from time to time made a commotion by knocking on doors or banging pans, pots or other iron utensils in support of the young Kurdish militias.

These solidarity networks continued even after the urban warfare when residents had to leave Suriçi. Asude argued that even though they had to leave after the urban warfare, their neighbors from Suriçi gave them household goods to ease the process of settling elsewhere. She also added that when they settled down in their new house, she in turn gave away these household goods to newcomers from Suriçi.

All in all, the residents of Suriçi formed strong communal ties, relations of trust and solidarity on the ground of dialogue and proximity throughout the history of

Suriçi. Though the migration wave of 1990s resulted in a dramatic change in terms of the demographic structure of Suriçi, the residents did not express a rupture in terms of these tight communal relations during the interviews. In this regard, the physical characteristics of the place, such as its courtyard houses which enabled the newcomers to live together as more than one family, or its adjacent houses and small streets which encouraged everyday encounter and dialogue, played an integrating role in the sense that these newcomers also became part of the solidarity networks, relations of trust, and strong communal ties. I argue these socio-spatial mechanisms which were reproduced through everyday life practices also contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015.

5.4 Suriçi as a relatively autonomous space for politicization

In addition to the socio-spatial dynamics such as communal identity, strong communal ties, trust and solidaristic relations, it is important to examine how Suriçi before the warfare was an autonomous space for politicization due to its physical and social structure. I argue that being a relatively autonomous space enabled the movement to integrate the everyday life of the residents more easily, as well as created a realm independent from state intervention. This situation, on the one hand, strengthened the movement. In return, the movement tried to expand these autonomous areas in Suriçi through continual bypassing of the mechanisms of the central state during the 2010s when there was a relatively peaceful environment due to the Peace Process. Overall, this facilitated the declaration of autonomous self-rule in Suriçi, rather than any other central districts of Diyarbakır, that was then followed by the urban warfare.

Suriçi's architectural design not only led people to interact with one another, it also helped the residents to "flee from" the state. In a sense, it was a physically safeguarded space which had been built upon strong communal ties, trust and solidaristic relations which had been perpetuated by the residents who shared similar ideological views with each other. This situation enabled the activists from the Kurdish national movement to act in a relatively autonomous space. This situation both facilitated the political organization and helped them to escape state intervention. As one resident indicates:

> In Suriçi houses are adjacent to one another. You can start from a rooftop in Savaş Neighborhood and can go along from one rooftop to another up until Cemal Yılmaz or Hasırlı Neighborhood. The system cannot intervene in this situation. I can remember from my youth that even though one was being sought by the police and the police searched the home to catch that person, it was impossible. Even if all of Sur was blockaded, it would still not be possible to seize that person. When the police knocked on the door, that person could find his/her way in Sur and save himself/herself. Sur was such a place.[64] (Salih, personal communication, July 3, 2016)

Alongside the architectural design of the place, associations and mechanisms that were found in Suriçi by the movement also perpetuated its relative autonomy. The residents of Suriçi developed mechanisms through which they tried to solve their problems without interference of the central state. Rohat, from Hasırlı neighborhood, explains these autonomous mechanisms in Suriçi that enabled them to solve their problems by themselves. He stated that when two families had a problem, neighborhood associations that were established by the movement, or other local

[64] Translated from: "(Suriçi'nde) evler birbirine bitişik. Savaş Mahallesi'nden bir dama çıkıp Cemal Yılmaz veya Hasırlı'ya kadar damdan dama gidebilirdiniz. Sistem buna müdahale edemiyordu. Gençlik yıllarımdan hatırlıyorum mesela aranması olan, cezası olan insanların evine baskın yapıldığı zaman (o insan) mümkün değildi yakalanamıyordu. Sur'un komplesini ablukaya alıyorlardı yine de o insanı yakalayamıyordu. Kapı vurulduğu gibi o insan kendini hemen kurtarabiliyordu. Öyle bir bölgeydi Sur.

bodies of the movement would be the mediator between sides. This mediatory role of the associations and mechanisms of the movement prevented the entrance of the police force in everyday life when there was a dispute between residents. Rohat argued that the demand of young Kurds was basically to perpetuate this self-regulated everyday life in Suriçi without any "foreign" intervention. This also shows that the demand of autonomous self-rule had been already realized in certain areas of everyday life and for some of the residents this demand had been justified through their everyday experiences.

In addition to the mediatory civic mechanisms, the Kurdish youth who later organized under the name of The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H in Turkish) in 2013 became a parallel security force in the place which again strengthened its relatively autonomous structure. The interviewees argued that once the Kurdish national movement became more organized, state-led problems started to arise in Suriçi; they were referring to the drug-trafficking, gambling, and prostitution. According to Arif, after the 1980s the residents had started organizing around the Kurdish national movement more and more, however, when it came to the 1990s the state tried to dissolve this political unity in Suriçi by channeling or not intervening in local drug trafficking, gambling, and prostitution. The interviewees suggested that the state did not intervene in the drug use and prostitution because it aimed to morally and politically corrupt the Kurdish youth through such "bad habits". However, once YDG-H got more organized during the 2010s in Suriçi, thanks to both the relatively autonomous situation and the relatively liberal period, they started to intervene in what they perceived as problems in Suriçi. "The problems

of drugs, gambling, and prostitution" was one of the important problems which they solved by their own means and "cleaned" Suriçi.[65]

Overall, particularly after the 1980s, when the Kurdish national movement started to organize in Suriçi as well, the movement utilized the relatively autonomous environment in Suriçi on the ground of its social and physical structure. This relative autonomy enabled the movement to bypass the central state and its intervention in everyday life in Suriçi. In return, the movement also tried to enlarge this autonomous space by forming its own police force or civic mediatory mechanism, and lastly declaring autonomous self-rule. Therefore, such practices in the history of Suriçi facilitated the declaration of autonomous self-rule which was followed by barricades and ditches.

5.5 Physical characteristics of the place that facilitate collective life practices and undermine the successful state penetration

Another important spatial dynamic that facilitated the urban warfare in Suriçi were the physical characteristics of the place. The physical characteristics of the place facilitated the construction of the abovementioned ideological unity or collective life practices in social and political life. In addition to that, the architectural design in itself undermined successful state penetration before and after the urban warfare. Therefore, it was another significant socio-spatial dynamic that contributed to the emergence of the urban warfare in Suriçi in 2015.

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[65] Retrieved 28 May, 2018, from http://www.yuksekovahaber.com.tr/haber/ydg-hliler-fuhus-evini-yakti-138469.htm;
Retrieved 28 May, 2018, from http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kalesnikoflu-ydg-h-liler-gundem-2004582/.

The significance of the physical characteristics of the place are mentioned during the interviews as well. When the interviewees talk about the reasons for the emergence of the warfare in Suriçi, they stress the physical feasibility of the place as a battlefield alongside its ideological unity. For instance, Arif argued that a great majority of people supported the struggle against the state intervention in 2015, however this in itself would not be enough to explain the emergence of the urban warfare in Suriçi if the physical conditions had not been feasible for such an insurgency in Suriçi. He asserted that in Bağlar district, roads are larger than Suriçi. In a place like Suriçi opening up a trench in order to block state forces from going into the neighborhoods was easier. Indeed, Suriçi had many cul-de-sacs and very small streets in which only two or three people could walk side by side. It prevented the entrance of the large vehicles like tanks. This configuration of the city made it harder to be captured by the state forces. When we look at the 1990s ,this architectural design let people escape from the police raids, and in 2015 and 2016 it enabled the Kurdish militias to transform the small streets into the front lines to defend the inner city.

In addition to small streets and cul-de-sacs, old Suriçi houses which were made of basalt helped the young Kurdish militias defend themselves. When we compare basalt houses to apartments of today, the basalt houses withstand bullets while apartments cannot resist in such attacks. Some of the interviewees also referred to the historical structure of Suriçi and implied that young Kurdish militias “might” have discovered old spots or gateways to defend themselves or escape when it was necessary.

All in all, the analysis of the socio-spatial dynamics of Suriçi demonstrates that the places were imbued with a certain context, meanings and symbols, and images which were simultaneously deconstructed and reconstructed by the residents as well as local institutional actors and their ideological positions. All of these together produced certain spatiality in social, economic, political and physical senses which eventually facilitated the emergence of the urban warfare in 2015. In the case of Suriçi, the material boundaries of the place drew the boundaries of interaction in everyday life as well as the boundaries of actions and mobilization before and during the time of contention. In this thesis, the architectural design of the district which signifies the boundaries of interaction is treated as the one of the important dynamics that paved the way for the urban warfare. The everyday interaction within the material boundaries of the place created an environment through which the residents constructed solidarity networks, strong communal ties, relations of trust and communal identity. I claim all of these were important socio-spatial dynamics that facilitated the conflict in 2015. Moreover, the material characteristics of the place such as having small streets, gateways, old houses made of basalt and city walls facilitated the transformation of Suriçi into a place of insurgency. Therefore, I argue although the declaration of autonomous self-rule was the central decision of the PKK on the ground of changing macro political dynamics in national and international scales, the urban warfare was actualized in Suriçi but not anywhere else in Diyarbakır due to these spatial reasons as well.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 The summary of this thesis

In this thesis, I addressed the question of why the urban warfare emerged in Suriçi and not anywhere else in Diyarbakır. In order to answer this question, I focused on the socio-spatial dynamics of urban warfare in Suriçi which started in August 2015 and lasted until March 2016. As opposed to the macro-level analysis of the warfare which predominantly tries to explain the role of the power relations between the AKP government and the Kurdish national movement in national and international politics, I proposed a micro level analysis which focused on the local institutional politics and everyday politics in Suriçi. This thesis shows that gridlocks in the local institutional politics, which have been the result of power relations between the central state and movement, prevented the large scale urban transformation in Suriçi that aimed to restructure Suriçi spatially and socially. These gridlocks in a way preserved the socio-spatial dynamics of Suriçi which constituted a certain physicality, and through solidarity networks, trust, close ties and neighborhood relations. And, these socio-spatial dynamics facilitated the transformation of Suriçi into a site for the urban warfare when the Peace Process between the central state and the Kurdish national movement came to an end in the context of rising authoritarianism.

In order to ground my arguments, I scrutinized the literature on social space, rescaling the statehood and the geography of social movements. First of all, I treated space as a thing that is produced through political, social, and economic processes.

This Lefebvrian understanding also claims that social space is produced through everyday life and also produces certain everyday relations. This perspective directed to me to pursue everyday life practices which were composed of economic, social and political relations. However, the persistence of these everyday relations should not be treated as a "given". In fact, these relations are shaped by the power relations in the society. Therefore, I focused on the relations between the central state and Kurdish national movement at the local level. I analyzed urban projects in Suriçi by the central state and/or Kurdish national movement to explain in which ways the power relations between them restructured or unintentionally preserved Suriçi.

In order to analyze the implications of local institutional politics on the production of space, and later the emergence of urban warfare, I mainly focused on three large scale urban projects, i.e., the İçkale Project, the Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project, and the UNESCO process. The municipality and non-elected local state institutions collaborated over these three projects on the ground of their shared aim for transforming Suriçi into a trade and tourism center. Though this common goal led the central state and movement to work together on urban renewal and historical and cultural revival projects, because of the different ideological stands of these two parties, as well as the shifts in the macro politics, deliberation was hardened at the local level. Rising authoritarianism and centralization of the state apparatus in Turkey, together with the escalation of the tension between the AKP government and Kurdish national movement, complicated the relations at the local level as well. I argued that these contestations through and over urban projects brought about institutional gridlocks. And, these institutional gridlocks decelerated the urban projects and even sometimes brought the projects to a halt.

The Içkale Project started as part of a large-scale restoration project initiated by ÇEKÜL, DMM, and the Governorship of Diyarbakır. This project continued as an urban renewal project with the involvement of TOKİ in 2007. The İçkale Project was framed by the movement as an attempt to reveal the multicultural history of Suriçi—an important challenge against the hegemonic construction of Turkishness and Muslimness—in the public space. Moreover, excavations led a public discussion in terms of the violent history between the central state and minorities during the last century. Apart from these more symbolic contentions, the movement appropriated the project by the evacuation of the military headquarters from the restoration site which contributed the aim of demilitarizing Suriçi.

The Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project was initiated in 2008 by TOKİ and the Governorship of Diyarbakır without involving the local governments. Thus, we can claim that it was an urban renewal project designed in the national scale in the beginning. However, the movement insisted on becoming a party in the project. This urban renewal project which aimed to destroy multi-story buildings in the project site and contribute to the transformation of Suriçi to a trade and tourism center was indeed compatible with the vision of the municipality for the place. However, according to the municipality officer Serdar, the actual reason why the municipality insisted on becoming a party in the project was to fight against the detrimental effects of the project on the residents in the transformation site. It insisted on renewing the KAİP of 1990 which would prohibit the construction of multi-story buildings. The preparation of a new KAİP lasted until 2012. Additionally, in 2012, Suriçi was declared a risk area by the Council of Ministers which authorized ÇŞB to modify the urban transformation project from the center. However, when it came to

2014, infrastructural problems such as not having enough TOKİ houses for the residents and uneasiness among them, coupled with the escalation of the tension between the central state and movement in the national scale, stalled the project. This situation unintentionally saved the physical structure and population of Ali Paşa and Lalebey.

Lastly, apart from the urban renewal projects, the UNESCO candidacy process was undertaken with the collaboration of the central state and the movement. I took this process as a third large scale project which envisioned important changes in the urban design physically, economically, socially, and thereby politically. This process as well bore multiple layers of contention that I largely examined in Chapter 4. Firstly, this project also challenged the exclusive emphasis on Muslim and Turkish characteristics of the city by stressing the multicultural identity of the place. Secondly, though the movement continued to collaborate with the central state in the Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project after the risk area decision, it simultaneously challenged this decision through the UNESCO dossier which declared Suriçi the buffer zone of world heritage. Moreover, the municipality contested other top-down projects by the central state such as the construction of three HES over Dicle River during the UNESCO process. These attempts are significant in showing that the municipality challenged the top-down projects which undermined its authority in the city. Despite these contestations, both parties continued to collaborate during this application process and subsequently Diyarbakır Fortress, the city walls of Diyarbakır, and Hevsel Gardens were admitted to the UNESCO World Heritage List in July 2015. However, this admission was followed by immediate curfews and urban warfare after the declaration of autonomous self-rule by the movement. Thus, the envisioned

transformation of Suriçi by the local institutional bodies, which aimed to gradually depopulate and transform it into a trade and tourism center, could not be fully actualized. This once again contributed to the preservation of physical, social, economic, and political environment of Suriçi in the short-run.

I also presented certain small-scale restorations, social projects, and historical and cultural revival projects which I believe enable us to trace contestations through the urban projects. I choose the projects in terms of their impacts on the urban configuration of Suriçi in terms of its landscape, social, political, or economic life. In this regard, I analyzed "The Landscape Project for Ancient City Walls of Diyarbakır", "The Project on *Dengbêjs* and *Dengbêj* Tradition" and "Restoration Project of Surp Giragos Armenian Church". Specifically, the restoration and rehabilitation of the city walls was the first important step to open up Suriçi to a larger number of visitors and projects. And, all of these three projects were symbolically important in the sense that they contributed to reveal the multicultural history of Suriçi. However, a close look also shows that revealing the multicultural history of Suriçi also was the way to transform Suriçi into a tourism center by creating new tourist attractions. And, I suggested that not only large-scale transformation projects, but also these small-scale historical and cultural revival projects contributed to the trade and tourism-centered transformation of Suriçi which would also push out the residents of Suriçi in the long run. Nonetheless, to show the complex existence of the movement in the place, I also mentioned tandır houses and laundries as salient social projects in Suriçi which on the other hand aim to empower the poorest segments in Suriçi through helping with the maintenance of their households.

After providing the local institutional relations and how these relations shaped Suriçi through collaborations and contestations, I focused on the everyday politics with the help of in-depth interviews that I conducted with the residents. Firstly, I depicted a general picture of social, political, and economic relations from a historical perspective. I put a special emphasis on the question of how people from various backgrounds constructed an everyday life in Suriçi over time. Later, I stressed the main economic activities and relations among the residents. Lastly, I stressed the way through which the place and everyday relations within the space contributed to the political engagement of the residents.

Then, I concentrated on the socio-spatial dynamics of urban warfare. In this thesis, I paid specific attention to the relation between the place-making and mobilization. More specifically, without treating the urban warfare in Suriçi as a merely temporal event, I tried to locate the urban warfare by paying attention to spatial mechanisms and processes that also contributed to the emergence of urban warfare in the context of Suriçi. I examined the neighborhood relations, strong ties, trust, and solidaristic relations which are the concepts provided by Walter J. Nicholls (2007; 2008; 2009) to understand spatial dynamics of social movements.

I began with the analysis of the strong sense of belonging to the place and formation of the communal identity among the residents of Suriçi. The literature on contentious politics and social movements shows that collective action necessitates collective identity. The scholars who strive to link geography and contentious politics suggest that this collective identity can also be constructed as place-based identity with a strong association with the space itself (Miller, 2010). Thus, I presented the long history of the place, the centrality, the multicultural configuration

and common grievances that were articulated in the place and overall contributed to the construction of a communal identity which later facilitated the warfare as another type of collective action.

Then, I moved to the strong communal ties in Suriçi. The close relationships among the neighbors were easily constructed due to the architectural design of both the neighborhoods and the houses. These neighborhood relations were different than neighborhood relations which are seen in apartments or places which have large boulevards. Nicholls (2007) suggested that strong communal ties reassure people in a way that they can continue to pursue their demands and contribute to a movement. In Suriçi, these strong ties have been constructed through the abovementioned close neighborhood relations. Within such an environment, the neighborhood relations became a channel for politicization before the urban warfare. These relations also became the answer to the question of why young Kurdish militias trusted the residents of Suriçi to help them during the urban warfare. In addition to that, I pointed out solidaristic relations as an essential component of strong communal ties. The residents built their lives on these solidaristic relations which have enabled them to maintain their households, escape from state forces, or treat each other's problem as if they were their own. This, I argued, created a space which on the one hand empowered the residents, on the other hand preserved the community ties through intervening each other's lives.

Thirdly, I paid attention to the relatively autonomous atmosphere in Suriçi in terms of politicization because of its physical and social structure. I explained through which mechanisms the movement bypassed the central state authority and Suriçi became a relatively autonomous place. I argued that this relative autonomy of

the movement also enabled it to engage with the everyday life of the residents and their problems. This relative autonomy empowered the movement and the movement tried to enlarge these autonomous areas in Suriçi by drawing on the relatively liberal environment during the 2010s due to the Peace Process. All of these factors overall facilitated the declaration of autonomous self-rule in Suriçi and the urban warfare in 2015.

Last but not the least, the architectural design of Suriçi had effects on everyday life relations as well as the emergence of the urban warfare. First of all, the architectural design of the historical Diyarbakır houses enabled them to live together as four to five families in one house. Those courtyard-type houses, and the everyday relations which were primarily built within them, I suggested, were the "concrete" reason behind the close relations, strong ties or trust. However, not only the architectural design of the houses but also the streets, neighborhoods and Suriçi in general allowed for everyday encounters. Moreover, these small streets and adjacent houses created a physically safeguarded place in which escaping from the central state forces was easier than in other districts which have big boulevards and multi-story buildings. In addition to that, small streets also blocked the entrance of large vehicles. The houses which were made of basalt were bullet proof when compared to other apartments made simply of concrete. Lastly, as my interviewees suggested, Suriçi did not witness any abrupt and dramatic changes in its history, therefore the urban design to an important extent had remained protected since the Romans. This meant that lots of alleys, gateways, and passages could be used during the urban warfare by the people who truly knew the place.

All in all, I argued that these socio-spatial dynamics which have been targeted by the trade and tourism-centered urban projects remained to an important extent untouched up until 2015, due to the fact that the central state and movement who initiated and collaborated on these projects could not overcome the institutional gridlocks. These gridlocks stemmed from the coupling of already existing ideological differences and the changing dynamics in macro politics. When it came to August 2015, this substantially protected socio-spatial dynamics played an important role in terms of the emergence of the urban warfare in Suriçi as opposed to anywhere else in Diyarbakır.

6.2 Theoretical contributions of the thesis

This thesis contributed to the literature on the production of space, spaces of social movements, rescaling of the statehood and Kurdish politics in general. Primarily, Lefebvre (2007) provides an ontological perspective in his groundbreaking work *The Production of Space*. Though his work dramatically changed our perception in terms of the production of space, locating his concepts in real life is challenging. This study rethinks Lefebvre's (2007) notion of the production of space through Pierce and Martin's (2015) epistemological approach to the issue. And, this study aimed to contribute to the literature which strives to ground the Lefebvrian ideas on the production of space in real life by treating Suriçi as a social space and trace the mechanisms and processes that have produced it.

In addition to the idea of production of space, Lefebvre (2007) also discussed the revolutionary potential of space. He claims that the state in the national scale tries to regulate the society "rationally" through spatial construction. This imposed and

ideologically loaded state rationality, according to Lefebvre (2007) flattens the social and cultural realms (p. 23). This, as he puts it, would provoke oppositions through "wars and revolutions, defeats and victories, confrontation and turbulence" (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 23). This thesis grounded this theoretical discussion by tracing the mechanisms, process and historicity of a warfare in the urban context.

In addition to that, the state, its institutions and actors are depicted as a homogenous entity which share a common goal that actualizes the ruling ideology in the society through space (Lefebvre, 2007, p. 23, 42, 43; Kipfer, 2008, p. 201; Merrifield, 2006, p. 109; Ng et al., 2010, p. 414). The fragmentations or contestations within these institutions or actors remained understated. This thesis, by analyzing the relations between the central state and local government over Suriçi suggests that fragmentations and contestations within the sphere of the state also had important effects on the production of space which need to be taken into consideration.

This thesis has also benefitted from the rescaling the statehood literature and added to it (Brenner, 2004a; Brenner 2004b; Duncan et al., 1988; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Savaşkan 2015). Brenner (2004a) has extensively examined the process of rescaling of the statehood after the 1980s which enabled me likewise many scholars to rethink the governance mechanisms through interscalar mechanisms which in the end produce a certain spatiality. However, he mainly focuses on economic dynamics and does not pay specific attention to other historical and socio-political reasons behind the rescaling of the statehood. Moreover, his theoretical contributions are limited to cases from European Union. In that regard, Savaşkan (2015) enriches the discussion by focusing on the Turkish case. He adds

other historical and socio-spatial reasons which also lay behind the logic of the rescaling of the statehood. However, Savaşkan (2015) concentrates on decentralization and re-centralization attempts initiated within the national scale and the economic, social, political reasons behind it. This thesis contributes to the literature by treating the local and central as dialectically related entities. In other words, this thesis not only focuses on the logic behind the central government which leads it to either decentralize or re-centralize the governance mechanisms, it also pays specific attention to the process of how the central decisions have been shaped, challenged, and disrupted by the local government.

I have also benefited from the literature on politicization and space and the geography of social movements provided by the more contemporary scholars (Dikeç, 2001; Dikeç, 2005; Harb, 2017; Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto 2008; Martin & Miller, 2003; Miller & Nicholls, 2013; Nicholls, 2007; Nicholls, 2008; Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2014; Schwedler, 2013; Springer, 2011). This thesis draws on the discussions of this newly emerging literature on social movements. It contributed to these discussions through locating the concepts such as materiality of place, place-based identity formation, strong ties, trust, neighborhood relations and solidarity networks into the context of an urban warfare.

Lastly this thesis aimed to enrich the literature on the Kurdish issue by analyzing the urban warfare in Suriçi through not only temporal but also spatial dynamics. Today, the Kurdish identity and the movement are still predominantly discussed through a temporal analysis of sequential events and ruptures in macro politics (Bozarslan, 2003; White, 2015; Gunes, 2012; Gunes & Zeydanlioglu, 2014; Aktaş, 2014; Aydınoğlu, 2014; Aslan, 2015). Nevertheless, there are also increasing

numbers of studies which emphasize the spatial dynamics of the Kurdish issue (Gambetti, 2005; Gambetti, 2008; Gambetti & Jongerden, 2015; Güvenç, 2011; Genç, 2014; Çaylı, 2015; Gündoğan, 2015). This thesis also suggests that the urban warfare in Suriçi in 2015 was the result of the sequential events which brought an end to the Peace Process in macro politics, but facilitated socio-spatial dynamics in micro politics.

6.3 The current situation in Suriçi after the urban warfare

In this section, I want to briefly summarize the situation in Suriçi after the urban warfare. As it is indicated in Chapter 3, the report of TİHV (2017) suggests that from August 16, 2015 to March 2016, the central state officially declared curfews for 63 times in the region. On August 14, 2015, the Kurdish national movement declared autonomous self-rule in Suriçi (HDP, 2016, p. 21) which paved the way for the urban warfare which lasted from December 2, 2015 to March 9, 2016 (AMNESTY, 2016, p. 9). Even though the urban warfare has ended, and all of the residents were evacuated[66] from the conflict site on March 9, 2016, the curfew is still persists in six neighborhoods[67] where the conflict was at the peak and the destruction was greatest during the urban warfare (TİHV, 2017).

[66] The estimated total number of the residents who were faced to the forced displacement was 40,000 (AMNESTY, 2016, p. 9).

[67] The curfew continues in Savaş Neighborhood except from Buzcular Street, Buzcular-1 Street, Eski Yoğurt Pazarı Street, Çiftehan Street; Dabanoğlu Neighborhood except from Bıyıklı Mehmet Paşa Street and Orta Karataş Street, Marangoz Street, Miras Street, Süleyman Nazif Street and Varol Street; Cevatpaşa Neighborhood; Fatihpaşa Neighborhood; Hasırlı Neighborhood and Cemal Yılmaz Nighborhood (TİHV, 2017)

After the end of urban warfare, the Council of Ministers held a session on March 21, 2016, and took an urgent expropriation decision which included 15 neighborhoods of Suriçi (Resmi Gazete, 2016b). And, as it is indicated in the Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey, the urgent expropriation decision was grounded on the risk area decision of 2012. This decision not only expropriated private houses and buildings, it also included important historical sites and public buildings such as the Four Footed Minaret, the Grand Mosque, the Virgin Mary Church, Hasanpaşa Inn, Çiftehan, and the building of Sur Municipality.[68]

After the urgent expropriation decision, ÇŞB also revised the KAİP of 2012 in December 2016, which had been prepared by the municipality back then. The changes in the KAİP mainly aimed to solve "security problems" in the region through urban restructuring (TMMOB, 2017). In that regard, it proposed the construction of six new police stations in the district. Furthermore, it enlarged the width of the small streets which would enable the entrance of large vehicles into Suriçi (TMMOB, 2017).

Apart from the urgent expropriation decision, the central government removed the pro-Kurdish mayors from their duties in Diyarbakır in 2016.[69] Simultaneously, the Area Management Unit that was established during the UNESCO process was transferred from the jurisdiction of the municipality to the

[68] Retrieved 21 May, 2018, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/acele-kamulastirma-40075876.
[69] Retrieved 21 May, 2018, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/diyarbakirin-sur-ve-silvan-ilce-belediyeleri-40219637;
Retrieved 21 May, 2018, from http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1318221-diyarbakir-buyuksehir-belediyesine-kayyum-atandi;
Retrieved 21 May, 2018, from http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1333915-3-belediyeye-daha-kayyum-atandi.

Provincial Directorate of Surveying and Monuments under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Senem, personal communication, June 30, 2017). This was also a significant move due to the fact that this unit is the international addressee in the World Heritage site and it was through this unit that the municipality reported the destructions and violations to UNESCO throughout the urban warfare.

When I went to Diyarbakır in June 2017, the urban transformation process had already begun in Ali Paşa and Lalebey. I conducted interviews with the people from non-elected local state institutions such as the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization and its Liaison Office in Sur, the Provincial Directorate of Surveying and Monuments, DMM and Diyarbakır Regional Committee for Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage. I tried to understand the content and process of the urban transformation. In the first place, it was really hard to find someone who would be willing to talk to me. Everybody seemed to be nervous and wanted to remain on the safe side. This led to a tense atmosphere during the interviews. However, not also personal attitudes but also other more concrete reasons enhanced this tense atmosphere. For instance, I conducted interviews within the buildings of the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization and DMM, both of which had police barricades at their entrance. Sometimes we even conducted the interview after locking the doors, though I only wanted talk about the urban transformation projects in Suriçi and nothing more. In such an environment, it was very hard to fully trace the process of urban transformation, yet my interviews enabled me to gain insight about the process.

As Senem, an architect from the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization, suggested the destruction and construction activities in Ali Paşa and

Lalebey after April 12, 2017 (SAMER, 2017), were executed by the Governorship of Diyarbakır and TOKİ as a continuation of the former Ali Paşa-Lalebey Project (Personal communication, June 30, 2017). Furthermore, she claimed that the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization took care of the urgent expropriation decision in the remaining areas, particularly in the six neighborhoods in which there is still a curfew. She also stressed that the urban transformation would be compatible with the KAİP of 2016 and contribute to revealing the tourism potential of the region without destroying any registered buildings (Senem, personal communication, June 30, 2017). However, Baran, an architect from DİMOD, claimed that 89 registered buildings were destroyed before June 2017 (Baran, personal communication, June 26, 2017). What struck me, however, was not the contradictory information provided by the officers from the central state institutions, rather it was their lack of knowledge about the urban transformation process. During the interviews, they usually suggested that I check the statements of the Minister of Environment and Urbanization. Even once, one of the officers frankly admitted that they are not fully informed about the transformation process, they only responsible for the implementation of the projects which have been decided in Ankara.

All of these changes and developments both aimed to centralize the urban transformation process and securitize the urban design and everyday life in Suriçi. These steps by the central government are important in the sense that they would in the long run serve to produce a fragmented and controlled space. However, as this thesis also tries to show, space is not a mere container of every institutional decision, rather these institutional decisions are shaped, modified and contested through the space. Dikeç (2005) also points out space is a polemical place where a wrong can be

addressed and through which people can resist the order (p. 172, 173). Even though engaging with politics may contain many risks due to the rising authoritarianism, we can still see significant attempts both in Turkey and in Suriçi. DMM, until the trustee had been appointed by the central government, worked to improve the conditions of the residents after the urban warfare. However, after the trustee and purge of many officers from the municipalities, the movement lost its institutional channels to struggle against central decisions. Therefore, No to Destruction of Sur Platform was established by the activists from the movement to stop the destructions and forced displacement in Suriçi.

First of all, after the warfare DMM established the Sur Counseling Center under the Area Management Unit (Nermin, personal communication, March 21, 2017). The municipality tried to provide legal and technical support under the roof of Sur Counseling Center. The center aimed to equip and inform the residents legally and technically, and by this means the residents could have refused to agree with ÇŞB or TOKİ and renewed their houses by themselves. In addition to that, Nermin, a purged officer from DMM, also added that the municipality institutionally sued for many destructions and decisions regarding Suriçi. However, when the trustee took over the mayorship, one of the first things he did was withdraw these cases (Personal communication, March 21, 2017).

After losing the institutional mechanisms which had opened the way for contestations in different realms for the movement since 1999, the activists of the movement formed a platform and turned to a grassroots mobilization. No to Destruction of Sur was established on May 22, 2017, in order to stop the destructions in the first place in Ali Paşa and Lalebey with the slogan: “We defend life not

destruction!" [*Yıkımı değil yaşamı savunuyoruz!*] (Kübra, personal communication, June 28, 2017). The constituents of the platform were composed of political parties, trade unions, chambers of different occupations, women associations, and so on. The platform aimed to establish local, national and international networks to prevent destruction. At the local level they organized *yeryüzü sofraları*[70] during Ramadan in 2017 and got in touch with the residents in Ali Paşa and Lalebey. In the national scale, they built networks with other movements and associations such as Istanbul City Defense or Initiative of Families of Suruç. In the international scale, they were in touch with AMNESTY International and committees from the UN. Kübra suggested that they do not only try to build solidarity networks, they also build networks through which they can struggle together against the top-down decisions which open the cities to rent (Personal communication, June 28, 2017). Even though these are important attempts, the platform could not achieve a concrete success which would end the forced displacements or destructions. Yet, I believe that these are important efforts through which politicization against the "order" once again can be established in the meantime.

Throughout this study, I focused on the politics of everyday life alongside the dynamics of the institutional politics to fully understand the production of space by the various actors in the place. While doing that, I argued that the place is always imbued with a certain context, meanings, symbols, and images which are simultaneously deconstructed and reconstructed by the residents, their everyday interactions and ideological stands. Before the urban warfare, these context,

[70] *Yeryüzü sofraları* can be described as public picnics for the iftar meals during the Ramadan. These iftar meals usually aim to highlight solidarity among the people against the ruling elite who holds economic and political power in the society.

meanings, symbols and images in Suriçi were constructed on the ground of communal identity, strong communal relations, reciprocity, security and trust. However, the residents argued that the sense of the place based on communal identity, strong communal relations, reciprocity, security and trust was harmed after the urban warfare.

During the fieldwork, a 23-year-old interviewee Leyla claimed that before the urban warfare they felt free to express any opinions they had, however now they do not feel comfortable when they express their ideas, especially if it is against the ideas of the ruling party. This uneasiness in terms of freedom of expression was not without a reason. I met with Leyla just before Turkish Constitutional Referendum took place on April 16, 2017. During the interview, in order to explain the situation she gave the example of how the AKP supporters used the mosques in Suriçi to propagandize for the "Yes" vote. When they intervened in the situation and asked them not to use the mosque for their political purposes, the AKP supporters called the police. Once the police arrived, they tried to detain Leyla's two cousins. Fortunately, they convinced the police to let go of these two children who were preparing to the enter university entrance exam that next week.

Particularly women expressed their uneasiness in Suriçi after the urban warfare. They suggested that before the conflict, any time of the day they felt free to go outside because everybody was familiar. However, after the warfare they started to see more "unfamiliar faces" and "strangers" in the district, which made them uncomfortable when they went outside specifically at night. Furthermore, 49-year-old Aysel claimed that before the urban warfare, they easily formed relations of trust with their neighbors, however, after the warfare, everybody started to look at each

other with suspicion, and feared to speak about "certain issues" with one another. She added that during the Peace Process they did not have to worry about their children if they were outside at night, but now they feel worried until their children come back home any time of the day. All of these are important changes in the everyday lives of the residents which affect their sense of the place today.

To conclude, 1915 and violent deportation of the non-Muslims; 1920s and Kurdish rebellions against the central state; and lastly, 1990s and an important immigration wave alongside the violent encounter of the Kurdish national movement and the paramilitary forces in the district constitute important ruptures in the history of Suriçi throughout the 20th century. Today, the urban warfare of 2015 has also been a crucial rupture in terms of demographic and physical structure of the place. Despite these ruptures, during the fieldwork, the residents almost invariably depicted the district as a place of enduring communal relations, respect, togetherness, reciprocity, solidarity and trust before the conflict. To a great extent, this was the result of the untouched materiality of the place. In spite of these significant ruptures in the history of the place, the materiality of the place with its small streets, adjacent and courtyard-type houses played an integrating role which enabled residents to (re)construct their relations based on communal relations, respect, togetherness, reciprocity, solidarity and trust. However, today, the residents of Suriçi have come face to face with an urgent expropriation decision which, first of all, causes major social and economic grievances for the residents and a significant demographic shift. However, maybe more importantly in terms of the politics of everyday life, this decision also aims at a large-scale urban transformation which will totally change the

landscape of Suriçi, and thereby the boundaries of the interaction and mobilization in the future.

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APPENDIX

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Nickname	**Age**	**Occupation**	**Date of Interview**
Murat	50	An activist from the movement	02.07.2016
Serhat	34	Wageworker	02.07.2016
Kerem	41	Officer	02.07.2016
Salih	47	Tailor and activist from the movement	03.07.2016
Mehmet	48	Mukhtar	03.07.2016
Arif	45	Mukhtar	03.07.2016
Yasin	46	Security staff	03.07.2016
Fırat	31	Carpenter	18.03.2017
İrfan	57	Tinsmith	18.03.2017
Bedirhan	56	Tinsmith	18.03.2017
Zeynep	61	Homemaker	19.03.2017
Serkan	25	Wageworker	19.03.2017
Ruken	17	Student	19.03.2017
Rohat	20	Student	19.03.2017
Asude	58	Homemaker	19.03.2017
Ali	69	Retired	20.03.2017
Aysel	49	Homemaker	20.03.2017
Gülsüm	37	Homemaker	20.03.2017
Zehra	42	Homemaker	20.03.2017
Adnan	53	Non-Muslim religious leader	20.03.2017
Ayten	46	Homemaker	20.03.2017
Fatma	41	Homemaker	20.03.2017

Belkıs	23	Homemaker	20.03.2017
Leyla	23	Student	20.03.2017
Nazan	56	Homemaker	20.03.2017
Hatice	75	Homemaker	20.03.2017
Nermin	54	A purged officer from DMM	21.03.2017
Aynur	29	Health officer	21.03.2017
Elif	Unknown	KTB officer	23.06.2017
Davut	52	Non-Muslim religious leader	25.06.2017
Agop	58	Retired	25.06.2017
Süleyman	34	Self-employment	25.06.2017
Metin	18	Student	25.06.2017
Baran	28	Architect and active member of DİMOD	26.06.2017
Kübra	Unknown	An activist and urban planner from No to Destruction of Sur	28.06.2017
Şaban	64	Retired	28.06.2017
Serdar	35	DMM officer	29.06.2017
Tülin	43	Professor	29.06.2017
Sevgi	Unknown	ÇŞB officer	30.06.2017
Şerif	Unknown	ÇŞB Officer	30.06.2017
Senem	Unknown	KTB officer	30.06.2017