JOURNALISM IN EXILE: CRITICAL JOURNALISM OF DIASPORA FROM TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN MEDIASCAPE

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Journalism in Exile: Critical Journalism of Diaspora

from Turkey in the European Mediascape

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Akanda Taştekin, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

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ABSTRACT

Journalism in Exile: Critical Journalism of Diaspora

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This thesis explores the experiences of journalists who were forced to leave Turkey for political reasons since the mid-2000s and how they have adapted to practising journalism in different countries. The study will delve into the technical, social, and professional aspects of this transformation, including the reasons for their exile, the conditions of threats and oppression that led to their exile, the working conditions they face in their current countries, the challenges and advantages of their situation, and their interactions with other journalists and professional organisations in the journalistic diaspora. Through my research, I aim to illuminate the diverse perspectives and approaches within the community of exiled journalists, taking into account their various professional and political stances. The field of diasporic journalism will be analysed theoretically through Bourdieu's 'field' theory and Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony'. The analysis of media studies in the diaspora will be carried out through in-depth interviews with journalists from three different groups: Kurdish media, *Gülen* Islamist media and left democratic-socialist media. How the diasporic journalistic field organises itself and navigates potential disagreements within this diasporic space is a driving question. Ultimately, my goal is to provide insight into the complex and multifaceted nature of these journalistic communities as they continue to develop and evolve and to provide a retrospective analysis of the evolution of journalistic practices in this context.

ÖZET

Sürgünde Gazetecilik: Türkiye'den Avrupa'ya Sığınan Gazetecilerin Eleştirel Yayımcılık Deneyimleri

Bu tez 2000'lerin ortasından itibaren siyasi koşullar nedeniyle Türkiye'den ayrılmak zorunda kalan gazetecilerin deneyimlerini ele alıp yurtdışında gazetecilik faaliyetlerine nasıl uyum sağladıklarını araştırmaktadır. Sürgünün nedenleri, gazetecilerin yurtdışına gitmelerine yol açan siyasi ve hukuki koşullar, bulundukları ülkelerde çalışma şartları, gündelik hayatta karşılaştıkları zorluklar ve imkânlar, yurt dışında yaşayan diğer gazeteciler ve sivil toplum örgütleriyle etkileşimlerinin gözetildiği bu çalışmada sürgünde yaşayan gazetecilerin yaşadıkları dönüşümün teknik, sosyal ve mesleki yönleri incelenmektedir. Araştırma farklı siyasi duruşlar dikkate alınarak sürgündeki gazeteciler topluluğu içindeki muhtelif bakış açılarına ve yaklaşımlara ışık tutmayı hedeflemektedir. Diasporik gazetecilik alanı kuramsal çerçevede Bourdieu'nun 'alan' teorisi ve Gramsci'nin 'hegemonya' kavramı ile incelenecektir. Diasporadaki medya çalışmalarının analizi Kürt medyası, Gülen cemaati medyası ve sol demokrat-sosyalist medya olmak üzere üç farklı gruptan gazetecilerle yapılan derinlemesine mülâkatlar ile gerçekleştirilecektir. Diasporik gazetecilik sahasının kendini nasıl organize ettiği ve bu diasporik alan içindeki potansiyel anlaşmazlıkları nasıl yönlendirdiği temel bir sorudur. Nihayetinde bu çalışmanın amacı, gelişmeye ve evrilmeye devam eden sürgündeki gazetecilik topluluklarının karmaşık ve çok yönlü yapılarını araştırmak ve bu bağlamda gazetecilik pratiklerinin evrimine dair geriye dönük bir analiz sunmaktır.

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I am sincerely appreciative of the support I received from many of my friends whose names I cannot mention one by one. What I learned is that writing a thesis

requires not only academic knowledge but also strong morale. That is why I am enthusiastic about acknowledging the exceptional support and morale of my friends: İrem, who constantly motivated me with her speeches and encouragements; Burak, who tirelessly engaged in all my theoretical discussions, Lorin, who devoted her time to reading and providing feedback on my chapters, and Batu, who listened to every single idea I had about my thesis and showed me unconditional patience and love.

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for all exiled journalists who were forced to leave their loved ones behind...

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIJA	Afghan Independent Journalists Associations
AKP	*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, Justice and Development Party
ANAP	*Anavatan Partisi*, Motherland Party
ANF	*Fırat Haber Ajansı*, Fırat News Agency
ANJU	Afghanistan National Journalists Union
BIC	Belarusian Investigative Center
CHP	*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, Republican People's Party
CPAWJ	Centre for the Protection of Afghan Women Journalists
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
CWA	Communications Workers of America – Canada
DGM	*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri*, State Security Courts
DJ	*Dansk Journalistforbund*, Danish Union of Journalists
DJV	*Deutscher Journalisten-Verband*, German Federation of Journalists
DP	*Demokrat Parti*, Democratic Party
DVM	Democratic Voice of Burma
DW	Deutsche Welle
EU	European Union
FETÖ	*Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü*, Fethullah Terror Organisation
HDP	*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, People's Democratic Party
IFJ	International Federation of Journalists
IJA	International Journalist Association
IMS	International Media Support
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

JİTEM	*Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele*, Gendarmerie Intelligence
KHK	*Kanun Hükmünde Kararname*, Decree with Force of Law
MHP	*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, Nationalist Movement Party
MİT	*Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı*, Turkish National Intelligence
MSP	*Milli Selamet Partisi*, National Salvation Party
MSSF	Media Safety and Solidarity Fund
NED	Center for International Media Assistance/National Endowment for Democracy
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
NWM	Network of Women in Media
PKK	*Kürdistan İşçi Partisi*, Kurdistan Workers' Party
RSF	*Reporters Sans Frontières*, Reporters Without Borders
RTÜK	*Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu*, Radio and Television Supreme Council
TAZ	Die Tageszeitung
TGS	*Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası*, Turkish Journalists' Union
TKP	*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*, Communist Party of Turkey
TMK	*Terörle Mücadele Kanunu*, Anti-Terror Law of Turkey
TMSF	*Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu*, Savings Deposit Insurance Fund
TSK	*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*, Turkish Armed Forces
USA	United States of America
WDR	*Westdeutscher Rundfunk*, West German Broadcasting Cologne

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The term ‘exile’ holds significant historical and political weight, as it encapsulates the forced displacement of individuals from their homeland due to war conditions, political persecution, or other sociocultural factors. The tale of the exiled recounts the experiences of individuals throughout history who have been displaced, rendered stateless, and disconnected from their roots. This displacement can manifest in various forms, including political, ethnic, cultural, or economic exiles. Political exile may refer to the forced removal of individuals from their native country due to political oppression, persecution, or safety concerns. Dissidents, activists, or opposition figures who pose a perceived threat to those in power may also be exiled. Meanwhile, cultural exile involves the displacement of communities from their cultural roots due to colonisation, war, or genocide. The loss of language, traditions, cultural practices, and feelings of alienation and estrangement often accompany this form of exile. Economic exile, yet another form, occurs when individuals or families leave their homeland searching for better economic opportunities elsewhere, often due to factors like poverty, unemployment, or lack of economic prospects in their home country. Given the diverse forms and contexts in which it appears, the concept of exile can be approached from various angles. Under the titled ‘Journalism in Exile’, this thesis will delve into the experiences of political exiles, focusing on journalists who were compelled to leave Turkey in the mid-2000s and continue their journalistic endeavours in the diaspora across different countries. In other words, I will focus on journalists as exiled subjects. The term exile aptly captures both the circumstances that led to the displacement of these journalists and their living and

working conditions in the diaspora. Journalists face a myriad of challenges, including repression, censorship, violence, and restrictions, which often force them to relocate overseas to continue their reporting work. Around the world, the field of journalism is made even more challenging due to political tensions, conflict zones, and authoritarian regimes.

While diaspora journalism is not a new concept, it has experienced significant growth thanks to advancements in digitalisation, communication technologies, and social media platforms. The ability for journalism to exist independently of physical space and traditional institutions has allowed the widespread dissemination of content produced by exiled journalists in their target countries. What sets exile journalism apart is that journalists continue to practice their profession abroad and produce content in their native language for their home countries, influence political processes from afar, and actively participate in political and social debates. Diaspora journalism encompasses a broader range of publishing for communities living abroad. Exile journalism primarily focuses on political struggle, bringing attention to events and situations occurring in Turkey without censorship, and creating change in the political reality of their homeland. In addition to the usual partisan and militant journalistic practices, the line between activism and professional principles becomes blurred in exile journalism, as journalists fight for their rights and freedoms. The fact that a journalist who leaves their country can continue to have a voice, practice their profession, and transmit their message both within and outside of their country is evidence that a space for resistance to power can be formed. However, it is worth noting that exile journalism in the diaspora can be seen as the work of journalists who are unable to break free from the agenda of their home country, directing their

voices from the outside to the inside, and striving to develop alternative narratives while preserving the space for dissent against their government.

1.1 The purpose of the research

My area of research is centred around the media of exile and explores the various forms of diaspora journalism carried out by journalists originating from Turkey, including European countries and Canada. The journalistic endeavours of these diaspora-based journalists have expanded and become more varied. As a researcher, I am especially intrigued by the broad spectrum of journalistic approaches within this diaspora community. While some of these journalists have been branded as critical and oppositional to the Turkish government, it is essential to acknowledge that they are not a monolithic entity. Since the inception of my study, I have been keenly interested in understanding the different professional and political positions of these journalists in various diasporic spaces. Accordingly, I structured my inquiries around how these individuals group themselves, the dynamics at play within these journalistic groups, and the factors that affect their sense of solidarity or potential conflicts of interest within this unique realm. In other words, with the expectation of these journalistic groups' diverse and varied nature, I anticipate uncovering areas of conflict and solidarity between journalists from distinct political ideologies, cultural backgrounds, and other defining characteristics within the diasporic journalistic field. Ultimately, the purpose of my study is to gain insight into the multifaceted nature of diasporic journalism and uncover the conditions that give rise to political alliances among these groups.

Within my theoretical framework, I planned to analyse the diasporic journalistic space through the lenses of Pierre Bourdieu's *field* theory and Antonio

Gramsci's concept of *hegemony*. Bourdieu's depiction of a *journalistic field* will provide insight into the field's inner dynamics, hierarchy, and relationship with other fields like politics and economy. However, Gramsci's theory of hegemony is also necessary to understand the political alliances and counterhegemonic reflexes among different journalistic groups within the field, as Bourdieu's focus does not address these aspects. At the outset of my thesis, I posited that diaspora journalism holds the potential to challenge political power by providing a voice for the voiceless. Journalists who were unable to practice their profession in Turkey were compelled to leave the country, yet they persevered in their journalistic pursuits in their new homes. This resulted in an unyielding voice that could not be silenced by political forces. I view this endeavour in journalism as a means of countering the prevailing hegemony. Yet, I am realistic about the limitations of this resistance against political power. This prompts me to ponder over the efficacy of diaspora journalism and the labour of its practitioners. Key factors that come to mind include these journalists' international prominence and reputation, the social networks they belong to, and their ability to connect with diverse sources.

Remote reporting presents both opportunities and challenges, with digitalisation enabling this type of diasporic journalism, but also creating a sense of isolation that comes with the detachment from geography. Additionally, even when journalists leave their home country, they are not entirely free from the reach of the state's power. Ongoing state surveillance remains an important obstacle to overcome. I am intrigued by the question of how journalists in the diaspora can continue their work under such circumstances. In addition to material difficulties, ethical considerations arise, such as whether these individuals should be recognised as journalists. The debate around their activism, particularly for those in exile, is also

worth considering. I focus on activism's role in this type of journalism and its potential for transformation. This includes the possibility of journalists living abroad becoming subjects of their own stories, offering more commentary, adopting a radical-militant-more emotional approach, radicalising their writing, and potentially causing a crisis of legitimacy. Since this exile extends beyond physical displacement, it encompasses the deep psychological and emotional turmoil those severed from their roots feel. Being in exile is fraught with emotional weight, as Palestinian-American political activist Edward W. Said (1999) once described it as feeling out of place. From this sense, it is essential to analyse these debates within the context of journalistic ethics and I intend to shape my thesis around these fundamental questions.

1.2 Methodology

This study is based on empirical data and utilised a qualitative research approach. In the literature review, I scrutinised previously published scientific articles, state decisions and laws that pertain to journalism, academic theses, and books on this topic. I employed purpose and snowball sampling methods to conduct my fieldwork, as my interviewees were individuals belonging to a specific group of journalists working abroad. I opted for the snowball sampling technique due to the difficulties of identifying journalists within this group, especially those working in *Gülen* Islamist media. To ensure I reached the appropriate participants, I also relied on referrals from some of my interviewees who met the study's criteria.

Through my research, I was able to categorise these journalists into three distinct groups: those who aligned with the Kurdish media, the Gülen Islamist media, and socialist-left media. Determining who to interview was one of the most

challenging parts for me. In my efforts to ensure a diverse representation, I made a conscious effort to include individuals with varying ideological, political, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. The only commonality among them, if that is not too much of an exaggeration, was their current disagreement with the *AKP* government (Justice and Development Party). During my interviews, I observed that the Kurdish and Gülen media representatives shared a political and ideological alignment, leading them to speak in unison. I interviewed one woman and one man from the Kurdish media, as well as two women and one man from the Gülen media. On the other hand, the left-socialist media group exhibited greater political, ideological, and intellectual differences among journalists. Given this group's higher level of disorganisation and heterogeneity, I decided to include four individuals from this particular section in my study.

Using a qualitative method, I conducted ten semi-structured in-depth interviews with a diverse group of journalists residing in Germany, Belgium, France, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, one of whom was a representative of *RSF* Turkey. All interviews, except for one, were conducted online via Facetime, WhatsApp, and Zoom meetings because the journalists were residing in different countries. The face-to-face meeting took place in Paris. In-depth interviews included journalists' personal life experiences, journalistic practices, professional opinions, living conditions, and their feelings and ideas about conditions.

1.3 The overview of chapters

My thesis comprises six chapters: an introduction, a literature review, a theoretical discussion, a historical background, fieldwork, and a conclusion. As part of my academic literature review, in Chapter 2, I plan to conduct an exploration of various

sociological studies that focus on the intersection of media, journalism, and exile. While there have been a significant number of studies that have examined the media's relationship with power, capital, and the public sphere, as well as its influence on political, cultural, and ideological hegemony and its impact on democratic participation and culture, it is worth noting that the field of exile journalism has been largely neglected in academic research. While the subject of exile and journalism has received limited attention, only a few regional and national studies are available. This is particularly significant given the unique challenges that journalists in exile face, including issues related to censorship, access to information, and threats to their safety and security. By examining the existing literature on this topic, I hope to shed light on the ways in which exile journalism intersects with broader debates about the role and impact of the media in society.

Chapter 3, within the theoretical framework, will be exploring the concept of exile journalism as a journalistic field through the lens of Bourdieu's field theory. Additionally, I will examine the possibility of counterhegemony through diasporic journalism based on Gramsci's term of *counterhegemony*. To better understand the emergence of exile media, I will frame it as a journalistic field and focus on its structural dynamics and subjects. I will investigate the potential for' counterhegemonic resilience' by analysing the alliances, divergences, conflicts, and struggles of exiled journalists against the state. Specifically, I will consider whether exiled journalists in the diaspora can form a hegemonic force against political power. The aim is to better understand the emergence of exile media and to explore the possibility of counterhegemony within this field, which may ultimately contribute to a more inclusive media landscape.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges faced by exiled journalists, I will explore the complex dynamics of the media landscape in Turkey over the past century in Chapter 4. Throughout my analysis, I will shed light on the longstanding tradition of media serving the interests of the state and ruling powers, from the nation-building process to the militarist transformations brought about by coups. I will also examine the evolution of media diversity, from liberalisation to political condensation. Additionally, I will investigate the institutionalisation of censorship through legal regulations and governing bodies. In the final section of this chapter, I will also look at the experiences of journalists who have fled Iran, Russia, Syria, Tibet, Sri Lanka, Belarus and other countries on a global scale. By providing a detailed chapter on the history of press and censorship in Turkey, I aim to gain insight into the construction of the journalistic field both within Turkey and in the diaspora. It is crucial to understand why the press has historically failed to autonomise in order to fully comprehend the conditions that led to the emergence of exile media.

In Chapter 5 of my fieldwork, my goal will be to gain insight into how these exiled journalists defined themselves, how they balanced their roles as journalists and activists, whether they felt safe in their current locations, and mainly, how the diasporic field emerged in the first place. I will seek the challenges they face when it comes to producing content, accessing news sources, and navigating issues related to asylum, housing, employment, and bureaucracy. Finally, I will delve into the potential for solidarity and conditions of alliances as a *counterhegemonic force* within the diaspora, examining whether different groups of journalists could come together to build a common power.

As a final, in Chapter 6, my objective is to present a comprehensive and detailed summary of my findings on the practices of journalism in exile. I want to highlight my observations, the challenge of diaspora journalism, exiled journalists, and their survival in the geographies where they were expelled. By doing so, I hope to provide a deeper understanding of the unique circumstances that exiled journalists face, as well as the valuable contributions they make to journalism. Ultimately, my goal is to contribute to a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the role of journalism in exile and to highlight the important work being done by journalists working in diasporic environments around the world.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW ON MEDIA, EXILE AND JOURNALISM

The study of journalism is an interesting subject for academic research, particularly as a sociological field. While mass media and communication have long been considered integral to modern society, it only recently gained recognition as a field of sociological inquiry. It was the date of 1969 when British communication scholar James Halloran (1969) mentioned the limitations of sociological works in the field of mass media and communications. However, in the past 50 years, media studies have become increasingly important to the discipline of sociology, with a growing number of high-quality studies covering a diverse range of topics. From feminist literature to digitalisation, media ethnography now encompasses a broad spectrum.[1] As academician Bishal Kumar Bhandari (2019) aptly notes, "studying the influence of mass media is imperative as its basic function is to empower, educate, and socialise the society by providing news and information" (p. 193). Studies on mass media, media production process, agents, ownership and control of the media and the press, and the political economy of the press, among other subjects, have become subjects of this field. Lately, digitalisation and the emergence of social media platforms such as YouTube and Twitter have also become frequent subjects of study in media and communication research.

[1] I came across some ethnographic studies and articles concerning feminist digital ethnography while researching feminist media literature, some of them as follows: Parameswaran, R. (2001). Feminist media ethnography in India: Exploring power, gender, and culture in the field.; Bjork-James, S. (2005). Feminist ethnography in cyberspace: Imagining families in the cloud. In Calogero, R., M. (Ed.), Sex roles. Springer.; Brudvig, I. (2021). Towards a feminist digital ethnography. Retrieved from https://ingrid-brudvig.medium.com/towards-a-feminist-digital-ethnography-bb3e907e97af.; Hermes, J. & Kopitz, L. (2021). Casting for change: Tracing gender in discussions of casting through feminist media ethnography. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v9i2.3878 (Last accessed: February 3, 2024).

My thesis delves into a topic that overlaps with various academic works and intersects with multiple fields of study. Specifically, it focuses on diasporic journalism, which is essentially journalism in exile. This topic draws from a wide range of social science literature, including studies on exile, digital media, and journalism. While this broad framework has made it easier to tackle the issue, it is worth noting that the field of media of exile is not a frequently explored area in sociological academic literature. As a result, the limited academic work available on journalism in exile has posed a challenge in creating a solid framework for a topic that is heavily interconnected.

The recent media studies in the field of sociology mainly focus on two issues: The political economy of the media and the issue of digitalising media. Focusing of studies on media and journalism, the relationship between media and politics stands out as a problematique that has long been a subject of thought in academia[2] (Golding & Murdock, 1979 and 1997; Christian, 1980; Mattelart, 1991; Garnham, 2000; Schiller, 2001; Wayne, 2003; Bagdikian, 2004). Accordingly, the study of the political economy of media has been studied from a variety of perspectives, ranging from liberal theories to left-wing critical perspectives.[3]

Among various academic studies, I would like to draw attention to a notable work on ownership and the economy-politics of the press in Turkey, edited by Arsan and Çoban. The book "Medya ve iktidar: Hegemonya, statüko, direniş (Media and

[2] There are many examples of studies on political economy and media studies that can be cited. See Golding & Murdock (1979, 1997), Christian (1980), Schiller (1989, 2018), Wayne (2003), Mattelart (1991), Bagdikian (2004), and Garnham (2000).

[3] Habermas' public sphere, communicative action, and deliberative democracy are widely studied and debated, as evidenced by his numerous critiques and contributions. (Petley, 2011; Fuchs, 2016; Wessler, 2018) Similarly, the Frankfurt School remains a prominent topic in cultural and media studies, with critical theorists such as Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and Walter Benjamin frequently cited in theoretical discussions (Berry, 2011; Fuchs, 2016). Apart from this, scholars from a more left-wing critical perspective interpreted the political economy of the media through the lens of harsh criticism of the capitalist system, including scholars Gramsci and Althusser.

power: Hegemony, the status quo, resistance) by Esra Arsan and Savaş Çoban (2014) presents a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between media and power in Turkey. It features contributions from multiple authors. In the introduction, the authors explore the influence of media as a tool of ideological control, drawing upon Althusser's theory of ideology and ideological state apparatuses. They examine the history of Turkey's political authorities and their relationship with the media. It also discusses how the mainstream media in Turkey, once guided by nationalist and militarist reflexes, is now consistent with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis of political power. The authors argue that while mainstream Turkish media has become a distributor of the dominant ideology, alternative media organs have also faced significant pressure and intimidation policies. Throughout the text, the authors explore theoretical concepts of ideology and hegemony, drawing upon the insights of scholars such as Gramsci, Althusser, and Foucault (Arsan & Çoban, 2014, p. 11-24). I believe that this book is crucial for understanding a general idea about the history of the Turkish press. The press in Turkey has a complex history that involves censorship, repression, and violence by the state. While journalism has never been entirely unbiased, free from political power and capital, Turkey's press has endured even more challenging periods. In my view, comprehending Turkey's political history and the interplay between media and power is critical to understanding the emergence of media in exile. Thus, before conducting fieldwork, I will seek the conditions that shape the journalistic environment in Turkey, including its autonomy and the reasons why it has never been entirely independent, with historical examples.[4]

[4] There are various significant studies on the economic politics of media, in addition to the work of Arsan and Çoban. For a further discussion, see some of them: Adaklı (2014), Baytar (2015), Dursun (2012), and Kurban & Sözeri (2012).

Secondly, in recent decades, digitalisation and digital media have garnered increasing interest across a variety of fields, spanning from cultural studies to social sciences. Although the discipline of sociology was somewhat tardy in recognising digitalised new media platforms as a subject worthy of study[5] (Rohlinger & Sobieraj, 2022), especially since the mid-2000s, this momentum has rapidly changed and the number of sociological studies on digital sociology has recently increased.[6] (Also see Lupton, 2012; Orton-Johnson & Nick Prior, 2013; Marres, 2017; Selwyn, 2019; Orton-Johnson, Prior, Gregory, 2015) In recent years, the rise of digital media and the advent of social media platforms such as Twitter and YouTube have sparked widespread interest. In Turkey, this trend has been particularly prominent in the realm of master's and doctoral theses, which have placed a strong emphasis on the emergence of a new generation of social media journalism. These studies often refer to this new media as 'alternative media,' and many focus on topics such as citizen journalism, internet/video journalism, individual broadcasting on YouTube, blogging, and content production in digital media. Overall, there is a consensus among researchers that this transition from traditional to internet journalism is a significant and important area of study.

The intersection of political economy and digitalisation within media studies carries significant sociological implications. My intended focus on journalism in exile may not be as widely studied as other topics, such as the political economy of media or digitalisation, but still, some important global case studies exist on this matter.

[5] For criticism of sociology's delay in focusing on digital media studies, see Rohlinger & Sobieraj (2022).
[6] Some of the studies related to this discussion can be listed as Lupton (2012), Orton-Johnson & Prior (2013), Orton-Johnson, Prior & Gregory (2015), Selwyn (2019), and Marres (2017).

2.1 Previous research on ‘diaspora journalism’: State monitoring and news security

One of them belongs to Colin Porlezza and Rana Arafat’s study of ‘Promoting newsafety from the exile: The emergence of new journalistic roles in diaspora journalists networks’ (Porlezza & Arafat, 2021). Researchers examine the security challenges faced by diaspora journalists. Their work explores how journalists in the diaspora navigate these challenges and what communication technologies are used to protect those reporting from Syria against both physical and digital risks. The study examines the specific threats faced by journalists and analyses the efforts of networks such as The Syrian Journalists’ Association, The Syrian Female Journalists’ Network, and The Professional Safety of Journalists, all of which were established to support Syrian journalists. The researchers take a security-focused approach to analysing the counter strategies developed by these networks.

Porlezza and Arafat’s study is based on 12 interviews conducted with the founders, administrators, and active members of three online networks. Utilising metajournalistic discourse theory, the study explores the concept of digital diasporic networks, which include professional membership associations, foundations, trade groups, vocational training centres, laboratories, and academic programs. These networks are seen as ‘ancillary organisations’ that aim to promote journalism in the face of violence on the ground (Porlezza & Arafat, 2021, p. 3). The study highlights the role of auxiliary organisations in producing meaning around new ideas within and outside the social sphere. The work concludes that threats to professional security have led to a decline in the presence of professional reporters in the field. Due to the absence of professional journalists in the field, citizen journalists have become significant players in news reporting, but this has resulted in ethical debates regarding the reliance of traditional newsrooms on these inexperienced individuals.

According to the article, Syrian journalists living outside their home country utilise a combination of activism, advocacy, and professionalism to expose the crimes committed by the regime. These journalists work alongside 'ancillary organisations' which provide support for diaspora journalism, including physical and digital security strategies, professional training, and adherence to journalistic principles. This collaboration helps legitimise innovative approaches and political roles that extend beyond traditional journalistic practices. Through metajournalistic discourse analysis, it is evident that there are numerous approaches that diverge from conventional journalistic values and routines.

The study concludes that three networks of journalists in the diaspora adhere to a combination of traditional norms and values but integrate these with their understanding of the role of advocacy groups. These networks believe that safeguarding, educating, and supporting local truth-tellers are essential for promoting democracy and challenging restrictions on press freedom. While these networks aim to uphold normative journalism, they also view journalism as a means to drive social progress. The significance of safeguarding news content against both digital and physical threats cannot be emphasised enough, as underscored by Porlezza and Arafat. In alignment with this concern for security, my focus is directed towards the vulnerabilities encountered by journalists, who are central to this discourse on safety, particularly during times of exile. Rather than scrutinising the credibility of news content, my research focuses on the circumstances surrounding the reporting of journalists in exile.

Another work focusing on journalism in exile was written by Kevin Smets and Yazan Badran in 2021, titled "Anatomy of a precarious newsroom: Precarity and agency in Syrian exiled journalism in Turkey". Smets and Badran (2021) discuss the

challenges faced by journalists in the Syrian exiled community living in Turkey. The study draws on observations and 18 interviews conducted over a period of three months at the *Enab Baladi* news centre, which is a Syrian media outlet based in İstanbul. The authors highlight the concept of a precarious newsroom in the context of migration and displacement, examining the political, economic, cultural, legal, spatial, and humanitarian difficulties that arise. The study seeks to answer questions about how exiled journalists navigate systemic insecurity and how this insecurity is characterised by its paradoxical nature. The authors argue that the precarious newsroom is best understood as a space where precarious labour and precarious life intersect and collide, rather than as separate issues. Ultimately, the study concludes that exiled journalists are particularly vulnerable to insecurity due to their political and professional affiliations, which expose them to a range of risks (Badran & Smets, 2021, p. 1).

This research focuses on Syrian journalists who have fled war-stricken areas and sought refuge in Turkey, rather than those who left Turkey for political reasons. It is intriguing to explore how a country can be both a place of fleeing and a place of refuge. One aspect of particular interest to me is the concept of precarity, which plays a significant role in this study. Accordingly, examining job insecurity within the media of exile offers a broad range of possibilities, as laws and regulations vary from one location to another. Given the differing laws and orders in various geographic regions and countries, it is crucial to examine how well journalists are being secured in different countries, which I intend to do by considering a variety of diasporic journalistic fields.

One of the exiled media studies is conducted by Marcus Michaelsen. Michaelsen (2016) analyses the pressure mechanisms developed by the state through

new digital technologies, while diasporic journalists and activists put pressure on the Iranian regime with the information they bring to the international arena. In his study titled 'Exit and voice in a digital age: Iran's exiled activists and the authoritarian state', he draws on activists and journalists who left the country after the suppression of the demonstrations known as the Green Movement following the elections in 2009 (p. 248-264). The study notes that state actors extend authoritarian practices beyond borders and alienate political exiles from contacts within Iran. Although 'exiting' the country means leaving the country, thus weakening the opposition area, it is determined that this does not destroy the opposition 'voice'. On the contrary, the exiles take their voice with them thanks to the means of communication. Here, reference is made to Albert Hirschman's thesis that 'exit' and 'voice' are mutually exclusive options, expressed as two different alternatives for people under oppression (Michaelsen, 2016; see also Hirschman, 1978, p. 90-107). It is stated that new communication techniques require considering them together. It is emphasised that contemporary forms of migration allow for the overlap of exit, voice, and loyalty.

According to the conclusion of the academic study, exit never means that political exiles are free from the influence of the authoritarian power they escaped from. The intense communication and information exchange environment provided by the internet allows authoritarian regimes to monitor and respond to exiles broadly and quickly. The state uses online information to infiltrate and weaken ties between exiles and their contacts within the country. In the face of the state's pressure mechanisms extending abroad, journalists and activists in exile are also adapting to the threats. This study shows that exiled journalists are monitored by the Iranian state. I am going to include the issue of state monitoring in my thesis. Specifically, I will investigate whether journalists who have left Turkey are free from state

surveillance or if state control continues beyond national borders. I aim to understand to what extent this control affects journalists and how it makes them feel. Additionally, I will explore the different types of state surveillance that exist. If not physical, it can take the form of continued censorship, such as banning exile media publications and articles in Turkey, or problems in consular procedures like passport arrangements, and legal and administrative difficulties. I will delve into these issues further in my research.

2.2 New generation of journalism: 'Media activism'

Apart from state monitoring and news security debates, there are some works discussing media activism in exiled journalism. One of the comprehensive works about activism-journalism discussion belongs to Bill Ristow for the Center for International Media Assistance/National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 2011. The study (Ristow, 2011) titled 'Independent media in exile' is conducted with the participation of 36 journalists representing 33 exile news organisations from Belarus, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, China, Tibet, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. There are 33 organisations in exile comprised of individuals who participated in the Stockholm Conference. Nine of these organisations receive funding support from NED. Out of the 36 journalists surveyed, 25.7% classified themselves as traditional journalists, 11.4% identified as activists, and 62.9% identified as both journalists and activists. According to data, the top concerns for journalists working in challenging environments are security (61.1%), finding ways to distribute journalism (52.8%), finding people to do the job (47.2%), finding resources in their home country (36.1%), technical problems (30.6%), and legal/immigration problems (27.8%). The

survey also revealed that 75% of respondents receive financial assistance, training, material, and consultancy support from international media or press freedom organisations, 63% from NGOs, 34% from individual journalists in their country of residence, 31% from media organisations in that country, and 28% from individuals or groups in the diaspora (Ristow, 2011).

Prior to their departure, the majority of participants were engaged in full-time work (91.4%) while a small percentage worked part-time (8.6%). Notably, nearly half of the participants (42.9%) were not journalists. Participants reported facing significant challenges such as financing (83.3%), personal and electronic security (61.1%), distribution of journalism content (52.8%), recruitment of staff (47.2%), and accessing resources in their home country (36.1%), along with technical problems (30.6%) and legal/immigration issues (27.8%). To overcome these challenges, 75% of respondents received financial assistance, training, material, and consultancy support from international media or press freedom organisations, 63% from NGOs, 34% from individual journalists in their country of residence, 31% from media organisations in that country, and 28% from individuals or groups in the diaspora. Marie Kronmarker, a representative from Fojo Media Institute, shares her thoughts on the attendees of the Stockholm Conference, acknowledging that a significant number of them are activists. She expresses her admiration for their dedication while noting that some of their work may not strictly adhere to the principles of journalism. Meanwhile, Rorald Koven, the European representative of the World Press Freedom Committee, views the debate surrounding journalism versus activism as being overly simplistic. He emphasises the importance of fact-based reporting in all forms of media. Khin Maung Win, director of Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), which was founded by Burmese journalists in Oslo in 1992,

gives a striking example of situations where activism dominates journalism: DVB management decides to follow the 2010 elections in Burma objectively. Many journalists who have been activists in the past object that objectively following the elections would legitimise the ballot box while they have been joining the opposition boycott. Ultimately, the administration's decision complies with, and democratic forces criticise that 'DVB legitimised the elections'. Khin Maung Win says, "We came under heavy fire and criticism from the democracy movement when we started moving towards more independence" (Ristow, 2011, p. 19).

However, this report sheds light on the general topic of exile media, drawing from data presented at a conference. The term 'independent media in exile' is used as a broad descriptor, encompassing various challenges such as financial sustainability, technical limitations in journalism, and security concerns. While the findings presented in this study are valuable, it is crucial to supplement them with first-hand accounts from journalists working in the field. The realm of exile media is vast, with individuals representing diverse personal backgrounds, political stances, and journalistic affiliations. Consequently, the difficulties encountered by these journalists while in exile are unique and vary based on their respective groups. To address this, my thesis will categorise Turkey's exile media into three distinct groups -Kurdish media, Gülen Islamist media, and social democrat-left media- each with its own set of obstacles and opportunities. Through this approach, we can gain a better understanding of the structural differences within the diasporic field.

In addition to these, Masashi Crete-Nishihata and Lokman Tsui (2021) conducted a study titled 'The truth of what's happening: How Tibetan exile media develop and maintain journalistic authority'. The study aims to investigate how journalists can report on the situation in Tibet, where China restricts the free press.

The focus of the article is on maintaining journalistic authority. The researchers interviewed seven Tibetan journalists who live in exile, and six information collectors called communicators who work in the field in Tibet. According to the study, a journalistic network has been established, where witnesses or sources in Tibet provide information to communicators, who then verify it and forward it to journalists in exile. Journalists define their roles not only as journalists but also as media activists. The study concludes that despite the lack of a free journalistic field in Tibet, a network of courage and cooperation has been established between communicators and the diaspora, which has enabled the development of a journalistic authority. Digital security measures have become crucial for the safe use of journalistic applications in order to evade state-sponsored technological tracking systems (Crete-Nishihata & Tsui, 2021, p. 5, 15).

It is interesting that Tibetan journalists identify as media activists, expanding beyond the discussion of objective journalism. However, to further enrich the discourse on activism and journalism within the exile media, it would be beneficial to broaden the scope of 'media activism' to encompass diverse journalistic viewpoints in a comprehensive study: By exploring how the writing, viewpoints, and ideas of journalists in the diaspora have evolved, remained consistent, or diverged, and their thoughts on activism and journalism in exile media, I can scrutinise the activism-journalism dichotomy within a broader context. Therefore, my study will also include the research question to explore the transformations that journalists undergo in the journalistic field.

Another diaspora study exists as an academic study of Kari Andén-Papadopoulos from Stockholm University and Mervi Pantti from the University of Helsinki (2013) that analyses not the activism of journalists but the journalistic

activities of activists. I find this study important to add here, although our subjects of study are different, the perspective of this academic study overlaps with my study and gives an idea about the dualism of activism-journalism. The study titled 'The media work of Syrian diaspora activists: Brokering between the protest and mainstream media' is about Syrian diaspora activists. The study aims to contribute to discussions about the participation of diasporic groups in conflicts in the homeland through activities such as lobbying, establishing relations with international organisations, raising money and procuring weapons, media strategies and new political capacities provided by the internet. Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti's study is based on interviews with 10 activists in five countries between September 2011 and September 2012. The study aims to understand how diaspora activists function as citizen journalists; how they obtain local information and images, how they verify them, what their target audiences are and how they use new communication technologies. Data from international media and press organisations are also used.

In the study, Syrian exiles are described as intermediaries, connecting local activists and distant populations, as well as old and new media, to support the uprising in their homeland. Here, efforts to make the voices of anti-regime protesters heard in Syria, to bridge the gap between social media and mainstream media, and to cooperate with professional journalists are conceptualised as cultural brokerage (Andén-Papadopoulos & Pantti, 2013). Activists in Syria use hidden or spy cameras to avoid detection by security forces. When the internet is cut off, the materials are sent abroad using phone networks or satellite phones belonging to neighbouring countries. A number of online channels, such as Shaam News Network, Activist News Association, and Ugarit News, were instrumental in collecting and disseminating content. The role of international NGOs, such as Witness and Media

Libre, in citizen journalism education is also highlighted. It is argued that understanding the media landscape of a conflict requires acknowledging the significant role that activists play in bridging the gap between the struggle on the ground and the mainstream media. The study concludes that even fragmented opposition groups have managed to establish information infrastructure and disseminate narratives with the help of activists in the diaspora. It is emphasised that diaspora networks have the ability to reshape political struggles in favour of resource-poor actors (Andén-Papadopoulos & Pantti, 2013). Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti's study also highlights the emergence of new forms of collaboration between protesters and professional newsrooms. While news organisations express concerns about the accuracy of content coming from the field, the study argues that activists attempt to resolve this issue through local eyewitnesses or acquaintances. Although this study points out the inadequacy of activists in meeting the criteria of professional journalism, the dilemmas between journalism and activism are not adequately addressed.

Kennedy Javuru (Javuru, n.d.) explores the impact of online media in the Ugandan diaspora on established media and democracy in the homeland. In his research titled 'Alternative journalism or trouble makers: An analysis of Ugandan diaspora online media', Javuru points to the conflict between the traditional paradigm of journalism and the alternative paradigm, which argues that new media in which citizens participate destroy the old media hierarchy (Javuru, n.d.). The study focuses on the Ugandan diaspora in North America and Europe, which accounts for one-tenth of the country's population. He points out that in the past, migration meant a radical break from the starting point to the destination. In the age of lack of communication, people were breaking away from their roots, experiencing culture

shock, and changing while rebuilding their lives. Leaving the country of origin meant establishing a new social structure. According to the author, the original understanding of immigration as a strong break with the homeland was overturned by the recognition that networked media allowed immigrants to maintain ties with their country of origin. Communication at the global level plays an important role in reminding people in the diaspora of their sense of belonging. The Ugandan diaspora uses the internet as a transnational public space where they produce and discuss narratives of history, culture, democracy, and identity. However, the author questions the level of contribution of this transnational public sphere to the democratic struggle in the country. Javuru determines that popular interest stems from entertaining content rather than the demand for alternative media. The author finds claims about the democratising potential of diaspora media utopian. He emphasises that his diaspora online media still has a big mountain to climb to influence government policies in Uganda.

This study is of significant importance as it aims to accurately identify the semantic evolution of the concept of 'exile' throughout history. The term exile from a century ago conveyed a sense of detachment and separation, which could only be bridged through physical proximity. However, with the advent of modern technology, we now have numerous avenues for maintaining communication and avoiding such disconnection. Consequently, media in exile has gained transnational power. The journalists who are the focus of my research are still able to utilise these technological advancements to reach their audience in Turkey and continue their journalistic endeavours; while some of the channels are social media platforms like YouTube, there are also exiled media organisations based abroad and broadcasting in

Turkish. This is precisely why I will incorporate these developments that enable media in exile in my thesis.

2.3 Diasporic-media landscape originating from Turkey

There are two studies that focus on diasporic media originating from Turkey, in addition to various studies on journalism in exile on a global scale. A 10-page article by Kübra Zeynep Sarıaslan (2020) from the University of Zurich, titled 'This is not journalism: Mapping new definitions of journalism in German exile,' explores the work of Turkish journalists living in exile in Germany. The second study is a master's thesis by İrem Çörekçi (2023), titled 'You may exile the journalist, but you cannot exile journalism', which focuses on Sweden's exile media.

Sarıaslan's article seeks to answer the question of how Turkish journalists in exile practice their profession remotely and what tools they use for critical interaction. It also addresses debates about what happens to expertise when journalism conflicts with activism. The author finds that journalists in exile feel alienated from their profession when practising their profession remotely. Journalists selected for the study do not identify themselves as migrants or activists and do not believe they are practising 'ideal journalism' due to the conditions they face in Germany. In addition, journalists complain about coming to the fore as news objects in the media rather than with the news they wrote because of being targeted by the government in Turkey. Journalists in exile face the dilemma of staying in Turkey and facing sanctions, or staying in a freer place and moving away from their news source. The author sees new immigrant journalism as an extension of moral responsibility and humanitarian aid. According to researcher Sarıaslan, she experienced difficulties in finding people to participate in her thesis study. She also found that journalists

were unwilling to be the subject of her research. During her fieldwork, a journalist agreed to be interviewed only if it was guaranteed that no personal questions would be asked (Sarıaslan, 2020, p. 3). The field is thus quite restricted. As a result, the available pool of subjects for research in this area is quite limited. In contrast, my thesis will focus on the personal experiences of exiled journalists working abroad, providing a comprehensive view of the diasporic field. This will include their life stories, journalistic experiences both before and after leaving Turkey, the difficulties they encountered, their departure from Turkey, the arrival process, and their current living and housing conditions.

In addition to conducting 25 semi-structured interviews, Sarıaslan's fieldwork involved attending public events, observing various media domains and newsrooms, and attending meetings. The individuals involved in journalistic practices did not necessarily come from a professional journalistic background. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with individuals who cannot be classified as journalists in exile, including those with German citizenship and no connection to immigration. As a result, the profile and limitations of the interviewees remain unclear in the study. The fieldwork also explores how Turks in Germany are perceived in both Germany and Turkey. While the study conducted ethnographic research and interviewed 25 individuals, it falls short in terms of mapping journalism in exile. The article briefly touches on the relationship between activism and reporting, noting that the two have become intertwined since the Syrian civil war (p. 9). This brief discussion is somewhat lacking in context and, therefore, requires further exploration. I must respectfully disagree with the statement, as it does not accurately reflect the entirety of the situation. While it is true that the Arab Spring brought about a greater awareness of citizen journalism and its role in activism, this debate has been a

longstanding issue for exile journalism. It would be inaccurate to suggest that the Syrian war is where it all began. Therefore, it is crucial to avoid treating the dichotomy between activism and journalism as a novel concept limited to the past decade.

As previously mentioned, the second Turkey-related diasporic media study was conducted by İrem Çörekçi (2023) from Lund University. Çörekçi's thesis deals with the experiences of journalists who sought refuge in Sweden after the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. It explores their relationships with the established Turkish and Kurdish diasporas in the country, and the complexities of diasporic identity. Additionally, the thesis examines key concepts such as exile journalism, censorship, freedom of expression, diaspora, and diasporic contradictions. It seeks answers to the questions of why journalists fled Turkey, how the exile affected their private and professional lives, how they define themselves, and why they produce Turkish content despite living in Sweden. When discussing censorship practices in Turkey, the focus lies on two main concepts: 'exile journalism' and 'diaspora advocacy journalism'. The latter involves advocating for exiled journalists to participate in transnational news production, establish connections with civil society and human rights advocates in both their home and host countries, and support underrepresented voices. Ultimately, this approach aims to foster democratic change.

Çörekçi's thesis examines the identities, backgrounds, migration experiences, daily routines in exile, and connections with Turkey of a group of journalists through the use of media ethnography. Of the ten journalists selected, seven were interviewed in person, while the rest were interviewed through online means. The study also involved on-site observations and interviews with those who were interviewed face to face, which included visits to their homes, workplaces, and other frequented

locations. The research employed media ethnographic techniques along with ten qualitative interviews. This case study is centred around Sandra Harding's standpoint theory.[7] This theory proposes transforming the power practices of dominant social institutions to benefit the least favoured. It is stated that journalists in exile are very successful as journalists but leave a lot behind. Therefore, standpoint theory provides the main framework for the thesis to examine their efforts (Çörekçi, 2023, p. 24). Nonetheless, the theory is merely touched upon briefly and not utilised in practical field research. Furthermore, the thesis lacks clarity on the definition of journalists' endeavours and accomplishments and their manifestation in the field.

Çörekçi concludes that journalists experience 'diasporic ambivalences' due to their fragile political identities and positioning vis-à-vis their homeland. This situation affects their lives in Sweden. Web journalism, which has developed thanks to the transformation in digital technologies and financial conditions, makes it easier for exiled journalists to pursue their profession without being affiliated with traditional media institutions. Digital journalism allows individuals to create their own media, access information and earn money without relying on high authorities for permission. These journalists do not work in the Swedish media but instead produce content in Turkish that is targeted towards an audience interested in Turkey. Journalism in exile is often viewed as a means of activism and a coping mechanism with the challenging conditions in the diaspora. Exiled journalists are highly motivated to advocate for their cause. Many of these journalists, who are currently on trial for *FETÖ*[8] cases, do not feel secure in the Turkish diaspora due to the prevalence of president Erdoğan supporters. Similarly, Kurdish journalists feel a disconnect from the Kurdish diaspora. The experience of living in exile results in a

[7] To read standpoint theory, see Sandra (2008).
[8] FETÖ refers to Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation (Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü).

heightened sense of ‘exile identity’ that supersedes their previous identities. As a result, these journalists often refer to themselves as ‘exile journalists’, according to Çörekçi’s field study.

As I review the thesis on journalists in Sweden, I notice two areas that require further attention. Firstly, the historical background of the Kurdish media in exile should be explored to contextualise its current state better. Secondly, while the AKP government’s oppressive policies against journalists are undoubtedly a reality, a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between media, capital, and power in Turkey requires a historical perspective that precedes the current government. This includes an examination of the history of journalism and censorship in Turkey, which has led to the exile of many journalists. Without this context, the thesis lacks a necessary historicity. From this point of view, these studies offer insufficient insight into the historical circumstances that led to exile.

However, these two academic studies had the advantage of being able to directly engage with the field and interact with journalists in Sweden and Germany. This direct presence in the field allowed for valuable time spent with interviewees in their own habitus, a crucial aspect of observational ethnographic studies. Unfortunately, the dispersed spatial context of a concept like ‘exile’ makes it impossible for me to conduct such field observations. My work focuses on the experience of exile journalism spanning a large geographical area from France to Germany and America to Canada. As a result, my interviews with participants are conducted online from various parts of Europe. While this study allows us to understand various forms of practices of exile media in different geographies at the same time, it also makes it impossible to conduct an ethnographic study in each of these fields.

Following a literature review, it is clear that there is a dearth of comprehensive research regarding exile/diaspora journalism. The examination of two specific fieldworks in Sweden and Germany limited the ability to analyse the diverse experiences of exile journalism across various diasporas. Through my literature research, I have discovered that most studies on exile journalism have focused on specific regions or countries. Some studies have highlighted the location and number of journalists in exile media and provide a valuable overview of the general landscape of exile journalism. However, these regional perspectives may need to pay more attention to crucial details. One example is Turkey's exiled media journalism, where journalists have dispersed to various countries, including the US and European cities. Today, there are Turkish diasporas in nearly every European country, consisting of exiled journalists, academics, politicians, and others from various sections of Turkey, particularly those who are defined as dissidents. The conditions of exile in each country differ according to their specific laws and standards, causing structural differences between exile media in different regions. For instance, exile media in the US may have very different structural conditions than exile media in Germany or France. It is worth mentioning that journalists differ in their political, ideological, and journalistic perspectives, as well as their life experiences in their new locations. While these differences can lead to more organised media in the diaspora and journalistic undertakings, they can also lead to conflicts and disagreements between various journalistic groups within different diasporic spaces. Due to these variables, defining 'journalism/media in exile' poses a significant challenge. To tackle this challenge, a comprehensive field study encompassing diverse diasporic spaces is required to delineate this term, which I intend to do accurately. In a word, my study aims to analyse a diverse range of exile media as a

case study, which has not been previously studied. I will be examining the diverse array of media originating from Turkey, which encompasses a broad range of heterogeneous groups, along with their political alliances and conflicts. This case study will transcend regional/national borders and concentrate on the journalism practices of diasporic groups across multiple regions and the intricate connections between them.

CHAPTER 3

BOURDIEU AND GRAMSCI:

IMAGINING A DIASPORIC JOURNALISTIC FIELD

It is impossible not to mention scholars Pierre Bourdieu and Antonio Francesco Gramsci when discussing cultural domination. It is often said that Bourdieu was ignorant of Gramsci. However, it is possible to find some direct and indirect references and traces of Bourdieu's criticism of Gramsci in his writings.[9] They were both aware that culture is too significant to be secondary. Two important theoretical positions, one of which Gramsci referred to as *cultural* and *ideological hegemony* and of which Bourdieu defined as *fields of power* were opposed to a straightforward economy-based traditional-Marxist imaginary. Both of them analysed how struggles, hostilities, and alliances of agencies are being constantly established among classes/fields within their own logic and rules. Gramsci and Bourdieu already acknowledged the formation of classes on an economic basis but prioritised ideological and cultural dominance in their theoretical framing.[10]

[9] Bourdieu and Gramsci were two intellectuals who shared similar concerns but employed different methods. Gramsci was a founding member and leader of the Italian Communist Party, while Bourdieu was a public intellectual on the left political spectrum, critical of neoliberal and French domestic politics. (Susen and Turner, 2011) Both Gramsci and Bourdieu have moved beyond an economic-determinist approach to analysing society. Gramsci developed his theory during the interwar period when the capitalist system had become firmly established and had acquired a monopoly. This era was when capitalism was highly functional and efficient and could operate more subtly than in the 19th century. Nation-states emerged and consolidated their power during the end of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century. The period also saw the massification, centralisation, and bureaucratisation of education and health systems, the rise of the welfare state, and the emergence of the social state. Nation-states became pervasive structures that penetrated all aspects of society, and bureaucracy became more effective at governing the population. Bourdieu's theories were developed during a time much closer to the present when social sciences underwent a structural transformation. Previously not considered primary, concepts such as culture and art became the focus of social sciences. Bourdieu witnessed radical transformations and structural changes in society, particularly the impact of technology and the digitalisation of mass media coming forward to the 2000s.

[10] Neither Gramsci nor Bourdieu intended to belittle an economic-based theoretical analysis. Both Gramsci's hegemony and Bourdieu's forms of capital already make it clear that no social theory can be constructed without an economically grounded evaluation. In this sense, I find the criticisms bringing to Bourdieu as a "culturalist" or Gramsci as a "superstructuralist" mistargeted.

I will base the theoretical foundation of my thesis on the concepts of Gramsci's ideological-cultural hegemony and Bourdieu's habitus and field. Gramsci's perspective will help us understand the theoretical basis of political powers, the dominant political-cultural ideology, and the possible fields of resistance against them. Mainstream mass media plays a significant role in consolidating the dominant power, while the opponent media has the potential to construct an alternative narrative to resist the hegemonic ideology. According to Gramsci (2012), the consolidation of ideology takes place through the mass media, which reproduces knowledge and determines how, to whom and in what way this knowledge is distributed. Gramsci considers the mass media and journalism as fields of struggle of ideologies and politics, parallel to his theory of hegemony. He views journalism as not only a means of transferring information but also as a means of organisation.[11] Gramsci will provide a macro-scale framework for making sense of mass media in its ideological and cultural dimensions. Bourdieu, on the other hand, provides a set of sociological concepts to analyse this mass media on the ground. His sociology helps us concretely understand the 'fields of power' (*champs de pouvoir*) that establish the conditions of cultural and ideological hegemony. Bourdieu's theory enables us to describe different fields of power such as the field of politics (*le champ politique)*, the field of media *(le champ médiatique)* and the field of culture *(le champ culturel)*, whose power is not limited to political power. These fields have their own rules, hierarchies, and functions, which organise society according to these rules. In the words of Wacquant (1992), the logic of the field is expressed as follows:

> The notion of field is, together with those of habitus and capital, the central organising concept of your work, which includes studies of the fields of artists and intellectuals, class lifestyles, *Grande écoles*, science, religion, the

[11] For a further discussion on press and media as hegemonic instruments, see Gramsci (2012, p. 386-390).

> field of power, of law, of housing construction, and so on. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 94)

I will borrow the concept of 'field' from Bourdieu and aim to conduct a 'journalistic field' study. I will consider exile media as a 'journalistic field'. Gramsci and Bourdieu complement each other in explaining the mechanisms through which cultural and ideological hegemony is organised. Gramsci describes how cultural and ideological hegemony is possible through the use of ideological instruments like mass media. He will speak of mass media as a cultural counter-hegemonic force. Bourdieu, on the other hand, explains the existing conditions of this hegemonic power with the concept of field. I will use Gramsci's concept of counter-hegemony to make sense of the interrelation of actors and groups in diasporic space to delve into their conditions of conflict and solidarity in the journalistic field. This is how I will seek whether exile media journalism in the diaspora can be considered a counterhegemonic force.

3.1 Posing the Bourdieuian concepts: Habitus, capital, field

To understand how the field of journalism emerged in diasporic space, it is important to delve deeper into the Bourdieuian notion of field. Bourdieu's theory combines various intellectual traditions and presents several sociological concepts, including field, habitus, cultural capital and symbolic violence. Bourdieu tries to reconcile the dichotomy between subject and structure. He develops a 'theory of practice' -that combines phenomenology and social physics- to bypass such a dichotomy (Grenfell, 2008, p. 43; Calhoun, 2013, p. 42; Steinmetz, 2013, p. 119). Bourdieu (1990) starts with a very accurate question by asking "How can behaviour be regulated without being the product of obedience to rules?" (p. 65). Bourdieu refrains from labelling individual agency and social structures as inherently passive or active. Instead, he

analyses the rules, the field in which the rules are (re)established, and the agents subject to the rules in a way that both structure and agency are constructed by individual subjectivities and constituted by their habitus. As Michael Grenfell (2008) rightfully asserts, Bourdieu "maps the objective structural relations" with the notion of field – a field that is "such objectivity was constructed by individual subjectivities, constituted by their *habitus*" (p. 4). This is a mutual relationship that shows how habitus and field operate:

> On the one side it is a relation of conditioning, the *field* structures the *habitus*… On the other side, it is a relation of knowledge, or cognitive construction. *Habitus* contributes to constituting the *field* as a meaningful world. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127)

Bourdieu illustrates this as the social reality existing "in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127). In "Distinction", Bourdieu defines habitus as:

> Necessity internalised and converted into a disposition that generates meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions; it is a general, transposable disposition which carries out a systematic, universal application -beyond the limits of what has been directly learnt- of the necessity inherent in the learning conditions." (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 170)

In other words, it is the internalised conditions that construct agents and that are constructed by agents. Although individuals feel free in their choices, they act as assumed and behave predictably in every basic decision. This is related both to the perceptions of how a person ought to behave being ingrained in them by the society they were born into and that the concrete options given to them are already socially constructed. "Any choice of actions and beliefs" that one 'chooses' already depends on the current social context, the "position one occupies in a particular social field" (Maton, 2008, p. 52). Bourdieu uses the metaphor of a 'fish in water' to describe the habitus. Water is safe and comfortable as a fish feels in the water; it is like belonging to that water (habitus). This is where the logic of the field comes in. Fish becomes

"attuned to the *doxa*, the unwritten rules of the game underlying practices within that field" (Maton, 2008, p. 57). Doxa, accordingly, is the "universe of tacit presuppositions," which are already internalised and naturalised in the field (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37).

The concept of the field according to Bourdieu is a "field of forces within which the agents occupy positions that statistically determine the positions they take with respect to the field, there position-takings being aimed either at conserving or transforming the structure of relations of forces that is constitutive for the field" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 30). Bourdieu identifies various forms of fields such as bureaucratic, academic, journalistic, scientific and educational fields. According to Michael Burawoy (2022), these fields coexist and are elaborations of Marx's superstructures (p. 111). From this point of view, the Bourdieuian concept of *field* has certain "features of Marx's concept of the capitalist mode of production" (p. 111). Bourdieu ponders how these fields are interrelated with one another and are related to the field of power in general. He emphasises that the hierarchies that exist in different fields feed into each other, making the distinctions between the dominant and the dominated classes more pronounced in favour of the hegemonic political powers. Due to this homology between fields, "Bourdieu can speak of the 'class habitus" (Bidet, 2022, p. 32). However, he is much more concerned about relations 'within fields' than relations 'among fields'. Critics such as Michael Burawoy (2022) and Gil Eyal (2013) question why Bourdieu only focuses on relationships 'within fields.' Burawoy notes that "What is notably missing is any theory of the relations of interdependence and domination among fields" (Burawoy, 2022, p. 113). Another criticism comes from Gil Eyal. In his article titled "Spaces between fields", Eyal widely discusses the theoretical problem in Bourdieu's concept of field. According to

Eyal, Bourdieu constantly mentions many different fields such as economic, bureaucratic, political, or legal. However, he leaves them as if they are separated fields, by his words, as if they are "distinct spheres whose contents are clearly bounded and well distinguished from one another" (Eyal, 2013, p. 158). In his criticism of Bourdieu's field theory, Eyal argues that the concept has fallen into the same essentialist trap that it sought to escape from Weber's "ideal type" methodology. Specifically, Eyal contends that Bourdieu's attempt to differentiate fields has ironically led him to adopt Weber's essentialism (p. 161). To overcome this issue, Eyal suggests using Bruno Latour's concepts of network and hybridity as partial solutions. Apart from this detailed discussion, it is significant to note that Bourdieu describes the field of power as a space in which elites compete for power (Burawoy, 2022, p. 113). However, he does not provide a clear answer regarding the limits of these fields, stating that "it is always at stake in the field itself" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 100). Nonetheless, each field has its own distinctive logic of practice, it would be possible to chase "the history of its specific shape, operations and the range of knowledge required to maintain it and adapt it" (Thomson, 2008, p. 70).

Bourdieu uses the analogy of a football game to explain social life and the concept of the social field. He defines the field as "positions occupied by social agents (people or institutions)" (Thomson, 2008, p. 68-69). These social agents keep certain positions within the field. Bourdieu speaks of the inherent rules of each field. In other words, each field has its own rules of the *game*. Bourdieu illustrates the game as "worth playing" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). Players are eager to participate in the game, as they seek to preserve, consolidate or expand their interests

(Ermakoff, 2013, p. 102). In that way, they already become part of the battle.[12] Players who are willing to stay in the game internalise the inherited rules, leading to what Bourdieu calls a 'feel for the game' (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 9). "The game is the locus of an immanent necessity, which is at the same time an immanent logic," Bourdieu discusses, "In the game you cannot do just anything and get away with it. And the feel for the game, which contributes to this necessity and this logic, is a way of knowing this necessity and this logic" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 64). Patricia Thomson (2008) perfectly summarises game strategy in one sentence: "At stake in the field is the accumulation of *capitals*" (p. 69). In other words, it is the accumulation of capitals, which determine the rules of the game. However, the accumulation of capitals is not equally distributed among players in the game. Some players are lucky to have more than one capital. Nevertheless, when one feels for the game, they forget about these unequal conditions. In other words, the concept of the game makes agents accept inequality in society. Bourdieu introduces the concept of *illusio* (illusion) to explain why individuals put effort into playing a game, without questioning the rules, and compete within it. Social agents invest to the field where they enter and develop strategies. However, Bourdieu argues that this investment is an illusion of the field. In Bourdieu's words, "Players agree, by the mere fact of playing, and not by way of a contract, that game is worth playing, that is worth the candle, and this collusion is the very basis of their competition" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). The capital that shapes the habitus and sets the rules of the game is more than just a capital of economic accumulation for Bourdieu. Bourdieu's theory on forms of capital is one of the most widely quoted theories across various

[12] I intentionally used the term 'battle' here to emphasise Bourdieu's concept of 'le champ' in French. It is not a simple field, but rather a battleground where knowledge is contested. See Thomson (2008, p. 68).

academic disciplines. From the field of education to the field of economics and cultural sociological studies, Bourdieu's forms of capital have been the leading theoretical context in many academic literatures (Akram, 2023, p. 3). In Bourdieu's words,

> Capital, which, in its objectified or embodied forms, takes time to accumulate and which, as a potential capacity to produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form, contains a tendency to persist in its being, is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally possible or impossible. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 201)

This sentence gives core points of the Bourdieu's understanding of capital. It is the various species of capital that fundamentally constitute the field.

Bourdieu's theory introduces various forms of capital, including economic capital (monetary assets), cultural capital (knowledge, tastes, aesthetics, cultural preferences, language, narrative), social capital (networks, family, heritage), and symbolic capital (honour and prestige). Among these types of capital, symbolic capital is the one that can be exchanged in other fields, as it is widely acknowledged and recognised (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 135). Bourdieu theorises that economic capital can be converted into money and institutionalised as property rights. Cultural and social capital, in certain conditions, can also be converted into economic capital. Educational qualification institutionalises cultural capital, whereas social capital is institutionalised in the form of nobility or connections (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 243). Bourdieu believes that economic capital is not sufficient on its own for grabbing a successful position in the field. It takes more than money to have a reputation. It is necessary to turn economic capital into symbolic capital through cultural and social accumulation to move up the hierarchy in the field. "Economic capital is the dominant type," Bourdieu states, "as opposed to symbolic capital, social capital and even cultural capital" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 93). What will make this economic capital

valuable and move the agents up the hierarchy in the game is to turn this economic capital into a symbolic capital with this cultural and social accumulation. Bourdieu highlights that these forms of capital are not distributed equally. Certain groups have greater cultural, social and economic capital accumulation, which places them in advantageous positions over others. Social fields are pre-structured domains where individuals with capital accumulation can naturally enter – this is the habitus as pre-structured domains. To be successful, one needs to have a good educational background, be multilingual, come from a well-educated and cultured family, and have gone through the cultural and social accumulation processes (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 52-65). Cultural and social accumulation begins before the schooling period. "Differences in the cultural capital possessed by the family imply differences first in the age at which the work of transmission and accumulation begins," Bourdieu discusses (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 246). Bourdieu also refers to cultural capital as *embodied capital*. The reason for that is this cultural accumulation has now become a part of the subject: "External wealth converted into an integral part of the person, into a habitus, cannot be transmitted instantaneously unlike money or property rights" (p. 245). On the other hand, "writings, paintings, monuments or instruments," as Bourdieu lists, become objectified and materialised versions of cultural capital (p. 246). In a sentence, the social agents' accumulation of capital within the field is combined with their experiences and positions, which will reproduce their habitus (Barnard, 2018, p. 35).

3.2 The notion of journalistic field

The concept of the journalistic field was introduced by Bourdieu in his lecture delivered in Lyons in 1995, which was later published as a chapter titled "The

political field, the social science field, and the journalistic field" (See Benson & Neveu, 2005). Bourdieu was known for his extensive studies on education, art, literature, and cultural studies, but his work on media was relatively limited. He wrote considerably little about "screen cultures" with one exception in his book "On television" (Austin, 2016, p. 1). Although Bourdieu showed little interest in television, the internet, or media in general, secondary sources on Bourdieuian sociology have expanded the studies of the field of journalism. Bridget Fowler (2016) comments on Bourdieu's lack of interest in this area as a "blind spot".[13]

Bourdieu defines the concept of field as a "research tool" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 30). He argues that the political field, the social science field, and the field of journalism are autonomous and independent but also interconnected and have the power to influence each other. Journalism is a field with its own set of rules based on a "set of shared assumptions and beliefs" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 47). It is relatively autonomous but interconnected with other fields. Within journalism, it is possible to theorise a diverse field, including "culturally rich but economically starved alternative-literary journalism or culturally poor but economically rich market journalism (commercial television news)" (Benson, 2006, p. 190). Rodney Benson gives examples of the New York Times and Wall Street Journal as dominant 'rulers' of the field of journalism, rich in every sense of capital and symbolic power. The intensity of economic capital within the field can be measured by the form of ownership, financial connections with other media outlets, percentage of audiences, and earnings from advertising. The cultural capital of the field of journalism is expressed through awards such as the Pulitzer Prize or prestigious professional

[13] Further studies on the field of journalism have been contributed by Rodney Benson, Eric Neveu, Guy Austin, and Bridget Fowler in books titled "Bourdieu and the journalistic field" and "New uses of Bourdieu in film and media studies", for a detailed discussion on journalism, see Benson & Neveu (2005) and Austin (2016).

forums (Duval, 2005; Benson, 2006, p. 190). However, in a Bourdieuian perspective, it is not only income or wealth (economic capital) but also cultural capital that hierarchically distinguishes individuals in the journalistic field. The characteristics of the agents entering the field, such as their socioeconomic origins, the schools they attended, and the professional training they received, provide certain positions for them within the field. In terms of educational background, for instance, it is not only a matter of having a university degree, but also of which university one graduated, from which professors one has taken lessons, and who the references are for this person. Media persons who own economic capital are the ones who hold cultural capital with the awards of those who advertise that media. These capitals are not positioned in opposition but are interconnected, creating a complex web of power relations within the field of journalism (Duval, 2005).

Apart from other fields, for Bourdieu, the journalistic field is the crucial mediator and is highly dependent on other fields such as power, politics, economy, and culture. That is why it is better to consider the journalistic field within the broader fields such as power, political, economic, and cultural fields. The journalistic field is influenced by these fields as much as it is influenced by them. Bourdieu writes that "all fields of cultural production today are subject to structural pressure from the journalistic field, as a whole, and not from any one journalist or network executive, who are themselves subject to control by the field" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 56). According to Bourdieu, the journalistic field is "very weakly autonomous" and its status of heteronomy is high (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 33). This is due to the danger of political power's influence and economic pressure on the media. Accordingly, the question of autonomy has been an enduring concern for the profession of journalism. While journalism aims to maintain a certain degree of independence from political

parties and publishers, its connections to economic, political, and cultural fields are inevitable (Schudson & Tifft, 2005, p. 73). Stephen R. Barnard (2018) gives an example of *Fox News* as an "ideal-typical illustration of how political ideology can be combined with an economic motive to produce influential if largely distorting, media content" (p. 42). Gisèle Sapiro's article (2013) "Structural history and crisis analysis" presents a graph of the literary field based on Bourdieu's theory, which illustrates that social agents in the journalistic field are both temporally and symbolically dominated. (See Figure 1.)



Figure 1. Structure of the literary field from article titled 'Structural history and crisis analysis' (Sapiro, 2013)

Low-brow writers, serial writers, journalistic writers, and party writers are located in the dominated pool because they conform to the expectations of the market, the press, or political demand (heteronomy) (Sapiro, 2013, p. 272). The media's ability to reach and influence people makes it subject to political power's scrutiny. Michael Schudson (2005) argues that journalistic autonomy cannot be considered a value in itself (p 222). In other words, the autonomy of the journalistic field can only be

accurately defined by taking into account the economic and political factors that create or limit it. Therefore, it is necessary to include these factors in defining the journalistic field.

In order to analyse the internal dynamics in the field of journalism, it is necessary to evaluate the news production processes and the social actors -including journalists, reporters and media practitioners- involved in these information-producing processes. The mass media plays a crucial role in different forms, which could be categorised as controlling the information flow and narratives, producing content and representing, presenting, and framing the news within the field.

Media outlets are generally owned by substantial corporations with powerful patrons who have good relations with the political power. This indicates that news reports pass through the censorship filter of media bosses and propagate the interest of the ruling elites, even without the direct intervention of the political power. Therefore, the flow of information and narratives is subject to direct and indirect interferences. Regarding news content, there is a question about what media culturally produces, who benefits, and in whose favour. Framing in news reporting, meaning drawing a framework under the public perception, is also crucial to determine what will be included or excluded in the content of the news (Waltz, 2005, p. 14). How does media represent women, immigrants, refugees, or ethnic/religious minorities? How events are presented, and which voices are silenced while some of them are amplified, will reveal media institutions' contribution to establishing hegemonic narratives. The power to frame the news is a symbolic power that is capable of “producing and transmitting symbolic forms” (Barnard, 2018, p. 44). Smaller groups of people have the material conditions, equipment, and manpower to

create the cultural products that serve the status quo, meaning the hegemonic culture[14] (Engstrom & Beliveau, 2021).

This symbolic power is not equally distributed. Those who hold the symbolic capital also hold prestigious positions in the field. Bourdieu gives examples of media professionals, columnists, and commentators who are frequently invited to discussion programmes on television channels. It is no coincidence that the same names appear on the screen repeatedly. For Bourdieu (1996), these individuals are social agents who have gained a strong position in the journalistic field. The unequal relationships within the field are maintained by media practitioners who dominate this structured social-journalistic space. From a Bourdieuian perspective, these places become a field of forces in which social agents "struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field" (p. 40). And the person who is called for television screens most likely holds a good position in the field. However, journalism encompasses a wide variety of issues beyond just television. It is certainly more than television. The journalistic field is a general concept that encompasses investigative reporting, television journalism, and editorial work, among other subfields. For instance, Ida Schultz (2007) writes about different journalistic fields like "investigative reporter habitus", "television habitus" or "editorial habitus" (p. 194). Therefore, it is accurate to say that journalistic habitus can be a combination of different subfields. Bourdieu's journalistic field study in 1996 focused on television, but the media field has expanded significantly since then. With the advent of digital media, platforms such as Twitter have become a platform for expert opinion, while YouTube has become a new kind of television screen. As a result, the journalistic

[14] Erika Engstrom and Ralph Beliveau critically mention smaller groups of people who have the material conditions, equipment and manpower -they literally remark them as manpower- to create the cultural products that serve the status quo, meaning the hegemon culture. To discuss ownership, culture and hegemony, see Engstrom & Beliveau (2021).

habitus has changed. When studying the media today, social media platforms like Twitter and YouTube are essential to consider as new journalistic fields.

3.3 'Diaspora journalism' as a journalistic field

So far, it is discussed how the 'journalistic field' emerges and organises itself within this network of relations using Bourdieuian notions of field, habitus and capital. From there, the focus shifts to the concept of 'diaspora journalism', which I prefer to call 'journalism in exile'. The concept of 'journalism in exile' refers to the practice of journalism by journalists who are forced to leave their home country due to political oppression, censorship, harassment, a threat to safety, and direct and indirect violence against media producers and practitioners. These journalists practise their profession from a diasporic field, which is not on the ground but abroad.

Bourdieu's concept of the journalistic field was developed during a time when national frameworks dominated communication. However, with the advent of digital and transnational communication, the media landscape has changed significantly over the last 25 years. The emergence of digital and transnational communication has significantly transformed the journalistic field, moving beyond the traditional forms of TV, radio, and print journalism. This has led to the emergence of new stakes and options for the journalistic field. Bourdieu's field will enable us to understand the emergence of diasporic journalistic field in relation to other fields. This theoretical basis will help to question the rules of the game, the autonomy of the journalistic space, and its social agents. Additionally, in addition to understanding how this journalistic field emerged, it is essential to understand the relationships between different diasporic journalistic groups within the field, namely as Kurdish

journalistic diaspora, left democrat-socialist journalistic diaspora and Gülen Islamist-sectarian journalistic diaspora.

3.4 Counterhegemonic struggle: Political alliances and conflicts

At this point, I am opening a new discussion that goes beyond Bourdieu's study. I want to examine the alliances formed by exiled journalists in the diaspora, their rivalries, and the line of struggle they have established against the state in the context of 'counterhegemonic resistance'. When I say counterhegemony, I am referring to the Gramscian term of hegemony.[15] Journalists in the diaspora are people who have had to leave the country because of their opposition to the political power. The journalistic activity they continue in the diaspora weaves a field of struggle against the political power through various alliances. Gramsci's notion of counterhegemony will help to formulate the emerging counterhegemonic space of journalistic diaspora. Bourdieu (1996) describes how the relationships are established on the basis of a "set of shared assumption and beliefs" through concepts of doxa, habitus and capital (p. 47). In his study, Bourdieu asks the question of "how" the emerged in the diaspora. However, Gramsci is a politician concerning the strategies to consolidate counterhegemonic power against hegemonic political authorities. So, I include the Gramscian notion of counterhegemony to see the conditions of organisation among

[15] For a long period of time, the word hegemony referred to a political power to lead the way for other political units. Later on, Russian socialists such as Plekhanov, Lenin, and Trotsky later used it more frequently to describe the leading role of the bourgeoisie and proletariat (Haimson, 1966; Boothman & Fontana, 2008). Although the ways of using the concept of hegemony differed, in the socialist movement, their main concern was establishing the hegemony of the working class. Scholars Benedetto Fontana and Derek Boothman discuss the perspectives of Soviet politicians and theorists on hegemony, including Plekhanov, Lenin, and Trotsky. Leopold H. Haimson also studied the concept of hegemony among Russian Marxists and Bolshevism. Finally, the concept of hegemony gained its conceptual and theoretical significance with Antonio Gramsci. Although it is significant to master the etymological and periodic discussion of the term to see how the Gramscian term hegemony was shaped within these debates, such a detailed examination of its periodic distinctions is beyond the scope of this study. For details, see Boothman (2008, p. 33-50), Fontana (2008, p. 80-106), and Haimson (1966).

different groups in the diaspora, including their alliances, competitions and hostilities. The aim is to understand whether the relationship between dissident exiled journalists in the diaspora can form a counterhegemonic power against political power and whether this journalistic field can be called a counterhegemonic space.

Although Gramsci and Bourdieu's analyses of social practices that become the norm, culturally and ideologically hegemonic, and share many similarities, Gramsci's approach differs in that he attempted to intervene and establish a counterhegemonic line of struggle. This is not surprising given that he was a politician and one of the pioneer organisers of the Italian working class. Gramsci played a leading role in theoretical debates by writing for various newspapers and magazines. He aimed to create not only a social movement but also a cultural formation associated with this revolutionary movement (Said, 1995, p. 25). Gramsci's notion of hegemony, as a process of cultural, social and ideological reproduction and non-violent forms of control and coercion, includes the control of mass media as one of the most effective tools in gaining the approval of the people. The mass media shapes and produces its consent by selectively (re)establishing the "social knowledge" of the society within "preferred meanings and interpretations" (Hall, 1981, p. 339-341). Therefore, for Gramsci, the mass media organs are a field of struggles for ideologies of trying to dominate. That is why it is necessary to critically examine how media plays a critical role in maintaining and consolidating the ideological hegemony and performs to gain the consent of the masses in favour of the political power. The construction of consent is only possible with the ideological and cultural hegemonic success. The media and press are one of the most effective of these hegemonic instruments. For Bourdieu, power struggles take place

at the top of these fields that have their own rules of the game. This field is both a *field of struggle* for hegemony as mentioned by Gramsci and a *classification struggle* as described by Bourdieu. The internalised conditions that Bourdieu refers to as *habitus* are not mainly different from Gramscian perspective. However, where Bourdieu strikingly differs from Gramscian cultural hegemony is that Gramsci sees a consciousness at this point. For Gramsci, dominated class could be aware of the domination. On the other hand, in his theory of symbolic domination, Bourdieu imagines dominated class as deeply embodied and cannot see the conditions of their subjugations, since dominated internalises the *doxa*, the rules (Burawoy, 2019, p. 68-71). For Bourdieu, power struggles take place at the top of these fields with their own game rules. In this sense, a field can also be named as a field of struggles in which social agents' strategies are concerned with the preservation or improvement of their positions with respect to the defining capital of the field" (Jenkins, 1992, p. 53). In other words, each field is a space of conflict and competition in which agents try to establish their authority and monopoly over participants (Bourdieu & Wacquant: 1992, p. 17-18). This field is both a field of struggle for hegemony as mentioned by Gramsci and a classification struggle as described by Bourdieu. Both Gramsci and Bourdieu suggest that cultural, social, and ideological reproduction and non-violent forms of control and coercion play a significant role in shaping society. However, Gramsci's approach emphasises the need to establish a counterhegemonic bloc of struggle, while Bourdieu's approach does not include such a political strategy.

For Gramsci, this field's social agents are expected to be *intellectuals*. Gramsci's definition of intellectuality states that every person has the potential to be intellectual, but not all individuals fulfil this function in society. According to

Gramsci (1999), intellectuals are not dependent on social categories. He classifies them into two categories: Traditional and organic intellectuals. In this context, traditional intellectuals represent the already-established cultural elites from privileged social classes and educational backgrounds. Organic intellectuals are "the thinking and organising element of a particular fundamental social class" (Gramsci, 1999, p. 131). Organic intellectuals actively interact with society and have close relations with specific social groups. They share everyday sociopolitical and economic experiences, so they have the ability to closely see various concerns, problems, as well as interests within society. Gramsci's definition of the function of such an inclusive intellectuality successfully transcends an economically determinist and reductionist definition of the 'intellectual class' and achieves a perspective of [intellectuals] cultural function in the reigning relations of production and [their] political correlates" (Thomas, 2009, p. 414). Gramsci believed that intellectuals played a crucial role in shaping society. Media professionals are instrumental in disseminating either dominant or counterhegemonic ideas. Actors in the mass media, reporters, editors, and producers can become leading intellectuals who promote counter-media resilience. Journalists act as spokespersons for various social groups and can influence public opinion through their storytelling. These intellectuals challenge authority and social norms while striving to speak the truth. However, this can lead to their 'exile' from the mainstream media landscape.[16] However, Gramsci's

[16] Academician and Palestinian-American political activist Edward W. Said (1995) mentions intellectuality by referring to Gramsci. Said addresses the embodiment of the many new professions from the late 20th century onwards, like broadcasters, academic professionals, computer analysts, sports and media lawyers, management consultants, policy experts, government advisers, and authors of specialised market reports as a field of modern mass journalism itself (p. 25). Said's metaphorical description of the intellectual as 'exiled' and 'rootless' ironically points to the very concrete conditions of the subjects of my thesis, exiled journalists. Said describes exile in an abstract way, not directly as a physical disconnection from a place but as a symbolic incongruous one. In Said's words, this incompatibility also expresses a contradiction and restlessness. From a metaphysical sense, exile for the intellectual means restlessness, mobility, and constantly unsettling and unsettling others. In Said's words, "You cannot go back to some earlier and perhaps more stable condition of being at home; and,

concept of 'intellectuals' raises questions about which individuals are included, and what criteria should be considered. This ambiguity brings us back to Bourdieu's concept of forms of capital, which offers detailed tools to help answer the question of 'which intellectuals.' The question of who qualifies as an intellectual is complex and depends on various factors. A cluster of 'organic intellectuality' will not be able to define a distinctive subject. Rather than such a definition, who are the journalists who can enter this journalistic field, what kind of education they have undergone, what social and cultural capital they have, what family they come from, what languages they can speak, and many others, are distinctive. These aspects allow for a comparative interpretation of different journalistic groups within the field.

Gramsci views intellectuality as a form of resilience, but for Gramsci, individual struggles do not hold any political significance. In his endeavour to comprehend the social structure, Gramsci seeks to establish a line of struggle by developing different tactics and political strategies, unlike Bourdieu. In this sense, the network of relations established in the journalistic diaspora raises a very Gramscian question of whether this social opposition can be transformed into a collective counterhegemonic force or not, and if so, how. Gramsci presents sets of tactics and strategies that aim to create a counterhegemonic space to win a political struggle in the long run by building various alliances in the journalistic diaspora. For Gramsci, counterhegemony is not only about raising anti-arguments against the hegemonic ideology and culture but also about producing an alternative one. Although Gramsci's concept of hegemony has been the subject of many debates in social sciences, theoretical and political discussions on counterhegemony are

alas, you can never fully arrive, be at one with your new home or situation" (p. 58). The subjects of this thesis, journalists in the diaspora, are exiled in both ways. They are neither in the land where they were born and raised nor have the conditions to return to that land. For a detailed discussion of Said's intellectuality, see Said (1995).

relatively limited. Gramscian counterhegemony refers to the movements and ideologies that challenge, contest, and make an effort to overthrow the hegemonic power at present, opening up a possibility of counter-actions to stretch the boundaries of power. Oppressed groups need a field of action to construct the counterhegemonic blocs, alternative narratives and institutions challenging the status quo. In journalism and media, this can be termed as the 'alternative media'. While mainstream media may continue to spread the news in favour of ideological hegemony, the alternative media comes to the scene as a counterforce to the mainstream. Here, alternative media does not only indicate technical changes in the media, such as the emergence of online platforms instead of traditional printed media or television broadcasting but also includes a political meaning: to be positioned against the opposite of political power and its hegemony. Critical media itself opens a door to struggle against political power, even if it does not do so consciously or willingly. This is because the practice of journalism itself could already mean that some information that the political power would not want to be revealed can be transmitted to the public through the press. Critical media reveals the truth in conflict with political power, which would try to silence dissent voices and marginalize or criminalize one's questioning of the status quo. The alternative media emerges as voices that cannot be stifled. The struggle would only hold power if it could form a counterhegemonic force by building alliances within the journalistic field. Gramsci's notion of counterhegemony can help analyse how such alliances and competitions are formed within different groups in the field. In other words, the fight for a specific identity alone cannot be counterhegemonic. Since politics is about creating alliances, it is important to consider whether alliances can be formed in the journalistic field to resist the political power alliance.

In countries where there is political repression, censorship and political and financial insecurity, journalists who cannot work for alternative-opposition media have no choice but to leave their home countries. This is where diaspora journalism comes in. This field is diverse and includes social agents from different cultural, traditional and political backgrounds. In order to understand this diversity, it is necessary to examine the communities in which journalists are clustered, the institutions they work with, their status, and the networks they establish. So far, the Bourdieuian field and Gramscian hegemony theories have been used to discuss the relationship between the journalistic field, counterhegemony, and the mass media. After this section, I will examine how the journalistic field emerges. I aim to study the relationships between different groups in the diaspora, their level of interaction and organisation, and the conditions of conflict and solidarity among them. The academic aim of my study is to create a framework for discussion within the diasporic field to examine the profession of journalism, media ownership, and patronage relations. Opposition journalists who were compelled to leave Turkey due to various reasons since the mid-2000s are now practicing journalism in different countries, such as Europe and Canada. In this context, the evolution of journalism in terms of its technical, social, and political aspects will be analysed through the lens of Bourdieuian field theory and Gramscian concept of counterhegemony. My fieldwork will seek concrete results of these combined relations in the diaspora.

CHAPTER 4

JOURNALISM: A MINEFIELD IN TURKEY

This section will get into details of the history of Turkey's press over the last century, exploring its many challenges. It examines the press's role during the early republican years in consolidating the regime, the impact of legal regulations and punishments, the constant cycle of censorship, repression, and violence against opposition press and journalists, and the changes in media organisations. This historical account of censorship will shed light on the circumstances that have historically enabled or hindered the existence of an independent journalistic field in Turkey. Bourdieu's assertion that the journalistic field is the most dependent among all other fields will be examined, and I will search for traces of its dependent relationship with capital and politics in the history of the Turkish press (Bourdieu, 2005). In addition to this, I will conduct an analysis of exile media on a global scale, examining how media control and censorship differ across various countries and regions. While Turkey's practices of media control and punishments are more severe, censorship in European countries is more subtle. It is essential to examine the situation of journalists in countries like Iran, Afghanistan, Africa, Latin America, and Russia, as they share the responsibility of crisis of press freedom. Finally, I will evaluate the state of the press worldwide, including the press freedom index, the global challenges journalists face, and how exile journalism impacts journalism as a whole.

4.1 Consolidation of the hegemonic power in the media field in Turkey

The trajectory of the Turkish press history is best described by the idiom, “Nasıl başlarsa öyle gider” (What goes around comes around). Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II was clear about the purpose of the first newspaper in the history of the Turkish press, Takvim-i Vekayi, stating, “This newspaper will be of great help to my power, provided that it does not touch the sacred Sharia (religious law) and the state order” (Mavioğlu, 2014, p. 137). These words have held significance for over a century and have helped define the relationship between press and political power. Journalist Ertuğrul Mavioğlu (2014) accurately assessed the situation, saying, “This sentence alone may be enough to define the relationship between the media and power in Turkey” (p. 137). There have been no fundamental changes in the perspective of the press from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. Just as the Takvim-i Vekayi was founded by the order of the sultan, the Cumhuriyet newspaper was founded by the order of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It was designed to carry out the propaganda of the new Turkish government from the very beginning. From the early republic to the present, the idea of loyalty to the state has been ingrained in the mainstream media. This continuity makes it easier to understand Turkey’s press history and how it has always been on the side of political power and economic capital.

The media in Turkey, which was once influenced by the nationalist and militaristic tendencies of the founding nation-state, now aligns with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis of political power. The mainstream Turkish media has become a mouthpiece for the government’s dominant ideology, while alternative media outlets with more democratic and leftist-socialist views have been subjected to intimidating

policies and immense pressure (Arsan & Çoban, 2014).[17] The achievement of such political dominance was only made possible through the implementation of strict censorship and self-censorship practices, whether directly or indirectly influenced by powerful groups. These interventions included economic pressure on media leaders, direct interference with news content, investigations and punishments for critical journalists, and the dismissal of those who spoke out against government policies. The pro-government media launched a campaign to discredit opposition politicians, journalists, and academics, consistently violating journalistic ethics and principles. The question remains: how was the consolidation of media outlets in favour of political powers historically feasible? And what challenges did opposing media face as a result?

Understanding the relationship between media and political power in Turkey requires an examination of press history, including censorship, oppression, law regulations, and violent attacks on journalists. Power consolidation is achieved through legal regulations and institutions, as well as media organisations and their actors. Examples of legal regulations include press laws, press card regulations, the Press Announcement Institution (Basın İlan Kurumu), Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK: Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu), the Directorate of Communications (Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Bakanlığı). Media patrons who align with capital and political power also comply with current politics while adhering to publishing requirements. I will followingly cover legal regulations and the practices of political rulers in the press and media outlets from the early republic period to

[17] In the opening of the book of Arsan and Çoban, the authors provide a well-structured overview of how the media has been used as a tool for ideological domination, drawing upon Althusser's theory on ideology. This section also includes a summary of the historical relationship between political authorities in Turkey and the press and media. See Arsan & Çoban (2014, p. 11-24) for a more comprehensive understanding.

today. It will explain how the government instrumentalises the media to consolidate its power, subordinating it through regulations and punishment and censorship mechanisms against opposition media, with historical periods and examples.

4.1.1 Autonomy problem in the field of journalism: Media in the grip of the state

Throughout the 19th century and beyond, laws and regulations regarding the press and media, censorship and controlling mechanisms acted as a sword of *Damocles*[18]. In 1931, the Council of Ministers gained the authority to close newspapers that could impact public politics through the Press Law (Matbuat Kanunu) under Article 50. The Press Announcement Institution (Basın İlan Kurumu) was also established in 1961 to exert economic pressure on the press (Timur, 2013, p. 164). As media marketing grew, Turkey's first private publishing law (Law No. 3984) was enacted, and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK: Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu) was established to regulate and supervise radio and television (Kurban & Sözeri, 2012). Regulations for press cards were implemented to increase control over journalists, and the creation of the Directorate of Communications (Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Bakanlığı) following the introduction of the presidential government further consolidated the government's hold over the press. Throughout its history, the Republic of Turkey has consistently worked to strengthen the press in favour of its political power, and unfortunately, it has been largely successful in doing so.

[18] The following story originates from ancient Greek legend, recounting the tale of Damocles. As a close friend of King Dionysios, Damocles was invited to attend the grand feasts prepared for him, surrounded by luxuries and bestowed with the king's crown and throne. Despite his envy and frequent mention of the power and fortune he possessed, Damocles soon realised the sword hanging above the throne represented the fear and anxiety that came with the king's power. This realisation taught him that great power comes with great responsibility. Today, the term is used politically to illustrate the ever-present peril faced by those in power.

During the early years of the republic, legal arrangements and the establishment of institutions were put in place to regulate the press. The primary goal was to solidify the press's dominance and prevent any potential rebellions against the regime. The 1924 constitution law, specifically articles 70 and 77, declared freedom of press (neşir) as a right, with the press being free within the boundaries of the law.[19] The limits of the law were clearly defined, highlighting the importance of adhering to them. Article 142 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which was adopted in 1926, led to the conviction of many journalists, writers and intellectuals until its abolition in 1991 (Öztekin, 2013, p. 61). Takrir-i Sükûn, also known as the law of ensuring peace, was enacted on March 4th, 1925. This law granted the government the power to prohibit all organisations and publications using administrative measures for a period of two years, which was believed to have led to the decline of public order (Zurcher, 1995, p. 250). As the *Kemalist* regime consolidated its power, it initiated a comprehensive modernisation and secularisation program[20] (Zürcher, 1995, p. 251). Since the beginning of the Turkish War of Liberation (Milli Mücadele), Mustafa Kemal sought to control all means of communication. By May 6th 1920, the censorship committee had been established, and it was crucial for the Ankara government to regulate written communication from Istanbul to Ankara. Prior to this, many journalists had been arrested under the Law of Treason (Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu) enacted on April 29th, 1920. The Directorate General of Press and Information (Matbuat ve

[19] 1924 constitution law under article 70, "Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press; of freedom of travel and of contract; freedom of labour; freedom of private property, of assembly, of association; freedom of incorporation, are among the natural rights of Turks," and under article 77 "The press is free within the limits of law and shall not be submitted to any censorship previous to publication." See the 1924 Constitution.

[20] Regarding media control, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal, emphasised the significance of the press and media in building a strong nation-state. He also cautioned journalists against misusing their freedom of the press to become mere adherents of the new regime. He clarified that there would be repercussions for those who disregarded this principle. Many of Atatürk's speeches and statements reflect this stance. For detailed information about Atatürk's speeches in the press, see Parla (1997, p. 152-163).

İstihbarat Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi) was established to ensure that the content of newspapers and the press itself were controlled by the Ankara government. The Independence Courts (İstiklal Mahkemeleri) has become a guarantor in silencing opposite voices against 'national struggle'. The press was utilised to inform the public about the ongoing success of the national struggle movement, resist anti-national struggle propaganda from the Istanbul government, gain public support, and promote the legitimacy of the newly established Ankara government (Bilgiç, 2014, p. 54).

To clarify, during the early republican period, the press was tasked with promoting the modernisation project and the Kemalist ideology while also serving the national interest. In pursuit of creating a unified nation in those early years, all dissenting voices were suppressed and the founding elite responded to any potential threats with authoritarian measures, including direct or indirect violence. The media was not immune to these power struggles and ultimately became aligned with the state. In short, the one-party regime's relationship with the media was heavily influenced by these authoritarian policies.

This perspective in which media is an indoctrination and propaganda instrument continued after Mustafa Kemal's death. İsmet İnönü's administration shared this belief, leading to the suppression of media outlets and journalists. Despite Turkey's pursuit of a balanced foreign policy, its domestic regulations on the press continued to be enforced with great vigor (Zürcher, 2005, p. 283).[21] With the principle of "making the press an organised and disciplined profession," the Law of

[21] If the dominant politics of that period is briefly mentioned, the main factor determining Turkey's internal policies was the external conjuncture. In the interwar period, being away from aggressive expansionism was perhaps the most striking difference between Turkey's foreign policy and the other European states. Yet, while authoritarian and totalitarian regimes were on the rise in Europe, Turkey was not excluded from this. Accordingly, the repression of the press was characterised by these conditions during the interwar period. See Zürcher, (2005, p. 283).

Press Association (Basın Birliği Kanunu) entered into force in 1938 and members of the press passed under the control of the ministry of internal affairs (Timur, 2013, p. 168). However, the transition to the multi-party system also diversified the media order. During the one-party period, *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* newspapers were seen as the semi-official publication organ of the Republican People's Party (CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). The establishment of Hürriyet by Sadat Simavi and Milliyet by Ali Naci Karacan was perceived as support for the Democratic Party (DP: Demokrat Parti). But these two newspapers also had a more independent character. While Turkey's election system transferred to multiparty election, Hürriyet newspaper (1 May 1948), which will be among the top-selling journals in the future, started its publishing life in the last turn of the 1940s. Journalist Hüseyin Akyol (2014) describes this transformation that began in the 1950s as "The military-civilian bureaucratic team that managed and won the War of National Liberation began to transfer power to businessmen and people who own farms, those were newly trying to get rich" (p. 154). According to journalist Akyol, the establishment of the Press Announcement Institution was a remarkable step to prevent newspapers from being dependent on political powers; thus, official announcements were tried to be distributed equally to newspapers.

During times of military coups in Turkey, first in 1960 and second in 1980, the press suffered greatly. The modest liberties of press granted by the 1961 constitution had to be relinquished. The first step towards this restriction was the 1971 Turkish military memorandum[22], which marked the second military intervention. With the economic decisions made in January 1980, the government set Turkey on a path towards liberal economics. The final blow was the military action

[22] Also commonly known in Turkey as the period of 28 February (28 Şubat süreci).

of September 12th, which established the institutions and legal order required by subsequent structures.[23] Remarkably, the press did not resist the dominant political ideology during this period. In fact, the 1980 military coup garnered more support than the 1971 military memorandum due to the belief that it brought "peace and confidence to society" (Koloğlu, 1995). Orhan Koloğlu (1995) explains this with the progress of big capitals; in 1969, %56 of the newspapers' advertising revenue was generated from the official advertisements, while in 1980, this percentage fell to %6,8 (p. 134).[24] In other words, it was now possible for newspapers to publish only with resources from the private sector. In the meanwhile, leading columnists in newspapers such as Milliyet, Hürriyet, Günaydın, Tercüman, Cumhuriyet and Yeni Asır were whitewashing the 12 September 1980 coup d'état as the inevitable intervention that put an end to street clashes and chaos between the right and the left, the censorship mechanism became more crude (Mavioğlu, 2012). Journalists even witnessed a non-commissioned officer arriving at newspaper headquarters with an envelope in hand, delivering instructions directly to the editors-in-chief. Mavioğlu (2014) also points out that after the military coup, media patrons no longer needed a specific structure to follow, as self-censorship became the new norm. The press enforced censorship in a way that eliminated the need for political-military authorities to provide instructions. However, the more the direct instructions decreased, the more entrenched putschist reflexes became in the press. This was not a

[23] In the political climate preceding 1980, the Turkish military was preoccupied with preventing communist influence from gaining power. A significant number of soldiers feared the possibility of relinquishing control of Turkey. Socialists were gaining control over universities, labour unions, and teachers' associations, while large cities were fragmented at the street and neighbourhood levels. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and the National Salvation Party (MSP: Milli Selamet Partisi) employed militants to counter the 'left danger'. Ultimately, Turkey faced yet another military coup d'état in 1980. Following the coup of September 12th, the opposition press experienced increased repression. See Berberoğlu (1997, p. 15).

[24] For further information, Koloğlu (1995) provides a detailed discussion to see how different sections of the press that are not advocates of liberal economics are excluded from the journalistic sector by the military regime.

sign of progress towards freedom, as the desire for authority to control the media remained unchanged. Instead, a sophisticated control mechanism was put in place in the media that ultimately replaced the authority with "court clerks" (zabıt kâtipleri) who carried out the control in a more subtle way (Mavioğlu, 2014, p. 139). At this point, it is worth to note that Bourdieu posits that institutionalisation plays a crucial role in the realm of journalism. This institutionalisation is a way for fields to establish their partial autonomy and to differentiate from other fields (Benson & Neveu, 2005, p. 12). However, in Turkey, such institutionalisation has yet to be fully realised, leading to significant obstacles in the field of journalism's efforts to become self-governing.

The 1997 Turkish military memorandum, famously known as the postmodern military coup or February 28, marked another dark chapter in the history of Turkish media. The media landscape underwent a significant transformation in the 1980s, resulting in notable political ramifications, such as the military's re-entry into the political sphere. Through the provision of briefings to newspaper executives by the Turkish General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı), the soldiers were able to successfully impose their policy on the media, thereby unifying their message. The mainstream media, guided by the military institutions, tried to create the perception that Islamism is on the rise (Sözeri & Kurban, 2012, p. 53). With the briefings given by the Turkish General Staff to newspaper executives, a unity of language was achieved in the media against the policy imposed by the military. One of the scandals in which military intervention was exposed was the Andıç incident. The incident, which has gone down in Turkish media history as the 'Andıç scandal', is the leak to the press of the investigation report of Şemdin Sakık, one of the senior executives of

the *PKK* (Kurdistan Workers' Party)[25], who was captured in 1998, by adding false statements, signed noted by the Second Chief of General Staff Çevik Bir. These statements were published in Hürriyet and Sabah newspapers for two days in April 1998. Some journalists, including names like Cengiz Çandar and Mehmet Ali Birand, were associated with the *PKK* and were dismissed from their jobs (Mavioğlu, 2014, p. 147). On 5 May 2006, when Dinç Bilgin, the boss of Sabah Group, joined a live television program of Nazlı Ilıcak's Sözün Özü on Kanal 7, he admitted the military interventions as follows:

> On the period of 28 February, everything lost its temper. Newspapers were bringing the government down and forming new ones. All public contracts were being distributed to media bosses. Media patrons attacked everything in every which way like sharks. There was a psychological warfare that was considered necessary at that time. A plan was being prepared by experts at some levels of the state and implementation was put into operation. Someone was bringing the handouts to you and asking you to publish them; then you had to publish them. In the *Andıç* incident, we also published the news published by *Hürriyet*. I did not believe the rumours about Mehmet Ali Birand, Cengiz Çandar and the Altan brothers that they received money from Abdullah Öcalan[26], but I had to protect my newspaper from the centre where the andıç was prepared and from the public opinion. Since *Hürriyet* published the news, we were forced to publish it as well. Now I see that we did not do the right thing. At that time, every newspaper had contact with the military. (Haber7, 2006)

[25] Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK: Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan and a group of his friends. It carried out its first armed action in 1984 with the Eruh attack. The movement, which developed on a Marxist-Leninist basis, evolved from the goal of an independent Kurdistan to the idea of democratic federalism and democratic autonomy through armed struggle. It was organised in Iran, Iraq and Syria as well as Turkey. It is on the list of terrorist organisations of the EU and NATO countries.

[26] Abdullah Öcalan, who founded the PKK in 1978, moved to Syria in 1979, where he continued his organisation activities. He provided the PKK with weapons training in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. While the PKK's mountain cadres were based in mountainous areas such as Qandil in Iraq, Öcalan was removed from Syria on 9 October 1998 in response to Turkey's military threats. He had many destinations, and his asylum requests were rejected in Athens and Rome. Although 298 deputies in the Duma approved a bill granting him political asylum, he did not get the green light from the Kremlin due to US pressure. He travelled from Athens to Moscow, from Moscow to Rome, from there back to Greece, and finally from Kenya to the Netherlands, where he was captured by a joint operation of the CIA and MİT and brought to Turkey. Sentenced to life imprisonment, Öcalan is being held in prison on İmralı Island. After Öcalan's imprisonment, the PKK organisation continued to operate in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran, as well as in Europe, with the executive council in Qandil running the organisation. See Taştekin (2016, p. 82) and Yoldaş (2016).

These examples are critical when analysing the press-power dichotomy in order to see that power relations go beyond the narrow perspective of political party interests. Here, it is possible to see that not only political parties try to interfere, but also, there is a direct involvement of the state with its coercive powers such as the law, military and law enforcement. And the construction of consent was subtly added to these direct interventions. In the words of Esra Arsan (2014), "The struggle for sovereignty that took place on February 28 was generally framed in a 'statist' perspective on widespread media channels and fulfilled its duty on the media in the process of 'unarmed persuasion/consent' to the postmodern coup" (p. 226). However, these political interventions to media and the press did not abate afterwards.[27]

The practice of military dictation in journalism here poses a significant obstacle to the notion of autonomous reporting. It is not a clandestine intervention, but rather a phenomenon where state-defined limitations become ingrained within the journalistic field. This acceptance is often perpetuated by select journalists and media entities with vested interests, ultimately shaping the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable within the field. The examples cited above regarding the relationship between media and politics in Turkey's history illustrate why this autonomy has yet to be fully established. As Patrick Champagne (2005) puts it, "the history of journalism is largely a tale of an unattainable autonomy or a never-ending

[27] The 2000s did not bring brighter periods regarding press freedom and censorship mechanisms. The date 19 December 2000 witnessed one of the other dark days of Turkish politics. In various prisons, prisoners began hunger strikes and death fasts in protest against type F-type prisons. On December 19, security forces conducted several operations on the grounds of stopping hunger strikes and death fasts. As a result of these Hayata Dönüş (Return to Life) operations in Turkish prisons, 30 prisoners and 2 soldiers were killed within three days. It was a military operation synchronously organised in 20 separate prisons and in the blocks where the political prisoners' wards were located (See Kıraç, 2020). Radikal newspaper reporter Ahmet Şık and responsible managing editor Hasan Çakkalkurt were tried for disclosing documents in the file before the Hayata Dönüş trial, in which detainees and convicts are being tried for alleged "rebellion". Also, Milliyet newspaper writer Gökçer Tahincioğlu and the editor-in-chief Eren Güvener were on trial because of the articles titled "There was no resistance in Bayrampaşa" and 'Here is the massacre of return to life' (See Önderoğlu, 2002).

saga of autonomy that must be reclaimed because it is constantly at risk" (p. 50). During the Justice and Development Party period (AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), the nature of intervention changed significantly. The Press Advertising Agency's (Basın İlan Kurumu) announcements became a tool to reward publications aligned with the government and penalize opponents by withholding advertisements. Journalists working for critical media were denied yellow press cards or had their existing cards revoked or not renewed, and those without these cards were not recognised as journalists. In her article for the Evrensel newspaper, professor Ceren Sözeri (2018) eloquently explains how the Press Cards Law turned against journalists by stating that AKP government has long used the 'yellow press card' as a weapon against some journalists. With the new regulation, it has become a reward for those who behave well:

> The recently published Press Cards Regulation (Basın Kartları Yönetmeliği) still contains all the issues of the previous version, which was last revised in 2015. What is more concerning is that the new regulation is now linked to the Directorate of Communications. Moving forward, it will be up to Fahrettin Altun, the president of the Directorate of Communications, provided there are no concerns regarding his loyalty, to determine who qualifies as a journalist. (Evrensel, 2018)

According to Sözeri, the initial significant issue concerning yellow press cards occurred in 2015 when press cards for 94 journalists, including noteworthy names such as Cüneyt Özdemir, Murat Yetkin, and Ekrem Dumanlı, were not renewed. Despite the Turkish Journalists' Association and the Turkish Journalists' Union withdrawing from the Commission and seeking legal action to overturn the regulation, no progress was made.[28] This gives the state the power to decide who is a

[28] This is not an uncommon example regarding press card regulations. In the aftermath of a failed coup attempt in 2016, more than one thousand journalists had their press credentials revoked. In January 2020, a similar situation arose when the press cards of Evrensel newspaper employees were cancelled en masse (Evrensel, 2020). Later that same day, it was revealed that hundreds of journalists had their cards invalidated, not just at Evrensel. The Turkish Journalists' Union (TGS: Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası) issued a statement questioning why the press cards of so many journalists were

journalist and who is not so that the state has the strength to monopolise the decision of who is the journalist. Speaking to BBC News in 2017, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that the number of imprisoned journalists in Turkey was two:

> Those who are currently in prison have no journalistic qualifications. They either acted together with a terrorist organisation, or they entered for possession of weapons, or they broke cash machines in many places, and robbed these places. They do have not yellow press cards in their pockets, but a journalist card. And they claim that they were journalists. (Erdoğan's speech, BBC News, 2017)

Thus, the number of journalists in prison is suddenly falling since their yellow press cards were already cancelled. Yet, a month ago from the BBC interview with President Erdoğan, TGS had announced that 160 journalists were under arrest. According to the Ministry of Justice, this number of detainees was 30 (BBC Türkçe, 2017). In a nutshell, a retrospective look at the place of the press in Turkey's political history shows that this mechanism of censorship and repression is not new, and with many forms of legal regulations, the Turkish press was subordinated to the norms of the dominant ideology, which marks a continuity over time.

It is evident that the foundations of independent journalism were not established from the start due to the prevailing circumstances. Given the historical and political backdrop, it is unsurprising that the journalistic field has been comparatively more impacted than other professions. It is significant to examine the different structures and agents of the field to identify potential issues. Focusing solely on the dangers faced by journalists may tell an individual story, but the concept of field is necessary to uncover systemic problems within media in a larger

cancelled (TGS, 2020). They pointed out that hundreds of journalists, from representatives of professional organisations to local media employees, were now unable to do their work. The invalidation of press cards meant that journalists in Ankara could not enter the parliament and ministries. After public outcry, the press cards were eventually reinstated, but neither the AKP government nor the Directorate of Communications explained the initial action (Evrensel 2020). It should be noted that for the government to issue press cards itself goes against journalistic ethics.

context in which how the field operates in relation to others (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 47). One of the major structural issues that contribute to the lack of autonomy in the journalistic field is the constant intervention of political power elites in the field. While the degree to which a Bourdieuian field can operate autonomously is demonstrated by the standards it establishes for advancement and success, these benchmarks are not the only factors influencing a field. Political clout also plays an inevitable role in shaping the field, albeit in a manner specific to each discipline (Maton, 2005, p. 689-690). In countries like Turkey, where authoritarian and centralised tendencies are prevalent, the media has always struggled to establish autonomy. In conclusion, legal regulations and state intervention at each period of time have restricted the autonomy of the journalistic field in Turkey. Since the field of journalism holds a complex position within the realm of power, given the examples, its position seems knotty. Patrick Champagne (2005) rightfully addresses the "ambiguity of the journalistic field's position in the field of power" (p. 49). Champagne states that the journalistic field wields a powerful influence over other domains, however, at the same time, "by reason of this very power finds its operation strongly dominated and controlled by other fields, especially the economic and political fields" (p. 49). So far I have tried to explain the material conditions that make the journalistic field fragile. Moving forward, I will delve into what Champagne calls the 'very powerful in its effects' on this field.

4.1.2 Resist, state violence, punishments: What about critical media?

Within the external factors that intervene in the field of journalism, I already provided a backdrop of the historical context of state-controlled media and the legal framework surrounding it. The forces of repression extend beyond the bounds of law

and politics. A survey of Turkey's century-long press history reveals a persistent trend of statist reflexes. Despite facing significant obstacles, including state violence and legal restrictions, the critical press has remained steadfast in its resistance against oppression and subordination. It is clear that these practices have not been entirely successful in silencing dissenting voices. The censorship of the press in Turkey is no exception. Throughout history, rulers have always faced opposition and resistance, making independent journalism a crucial endeavour. Then, what about the media that resisted this control and maintained a critical stance? This chapter will centre on these dissident media outlets and explore the history of violence against the press and the tradition of punishment.

In the early years of Turkey, a significant portion of society was perceived to be outside the reasonable framework according to the Turkish state's codes.[29] The effort to build Turkish national consciousness was carried out by direct or indirect means of violence. During the one-party period, the government imposed restrictions on freedom of the press, which prevented the media from fulfilling their responsibility of reporting the truth. In particular, during the Kurdish uprisings, it was considered a national duty to publish negative and discrediting articles about any movements that opposed the state authority.[30] For example, during the Dersim

[29] The new republic, which had a nationalist backbone, was absorbing minorities in an effort for a new national consciousness and developing a repressive policy against non-Turkish and non-Muslim identities. For instance, the expressions "race" and "commitment to Turkish culture" frequently mentioned in the Resettlement Law (İskân Kanunu) proved that the new republican regime envisaged a resettlement policy based on race. During the negotiations in the parliament, it was stated that one of the deputies in the parliament defended this Resettlement Law with the words "The Resettlement Law, that make people living on this land feel the honour and value of being a Turk to the bones, is in the privilege to be one of the main law of the revolution." See different examples of how nationalism was a driving force in the early republican period, Timur (2013).

[30] As of 1924, the government's relations with the Kurds deteriorated, rebellions Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 and the Ararat (Ağrı) rebellion in 1926-30 blew up; the state forces bloodily repulsed rebellions. Right after, Tahrir-i Sükûn, which brought the execution of many Kurdish leaders and deported more than 20 thousand Kurds from the southeast, also ensured the closure of eight of the most important newspapers and magazines, including conservative, liberal, and Marxist, in Istanbul as well as some local journals; as national newspapers, only the Hakimiyet-i Milliye newspaper in Ankara and Cumhuriyet newspapers in Istanbul, the publishing organs of the government, remained.

rebellions in 1937, the interior minister Şükrü Kaya asked journals to write about the government's efforts to bring prosperity, peace, and civilisation to the citizens, while omitting any mention of military action (Mavioğlu, 2014, p. 138). This ensured the security of the new regime's power and further solidified the nation-state's ideological hegemony.

But still, other voices continued to raise. Another voice of resistance came from the Kadro movement in the beginning of 1930s.[31] During their two-year publishing tenure, they avoided direct criticism of the regime. Following the closure of Kadro magazine, the intellectuals associated with it were not imprisoned, but instead returned to civil service positions and continued to write for various channels while employed in different state institutions.[32] Followingly, during World War II, Turkish newspapers displayed a wide range of ideological perspectives, despite strict press control. As Turkey was moving towards a multi-party electoral system, two prominent publications, *Vatan* and *Tan*, emerged in the fight for democracy. *Vatan*

Not only newspapers were shut down, but leading journalists in Istanbul were also arrested and sent to the Independence Courts in the east. Although they were later released, they never had the opportunity to practice the profession of journalism again. (Zürcher, 1995) By the entry into force of the press law of 1881 (1881 Matbuat Kanunu) on 25 July 1931, any publication that contradicts the general policy could be closed down, and "those who abuse the freedom of the press" would be precluded (Bilgiç, 2014). Also see Zürcher (1995) and Bilgiç (2014, p. 61-62).

[31] The magazine Kadro, published by a group of intellectuals including Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Burhan Asaf Belge, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Şevki Yazman for 2 years (1932-1934), became one of the most notable critical publishing in the 1930s. For detail, see Yanardağ (1988, p. 27).

[32] With the words Kemal Karpat, "Kadro's philosophy, in fact, was a superficial combination of Marxism, nationalism, and corporatism (Karpat, 1959, p. 70). Kadro supported etatism and aimed to create the 'ideology of the Kemalist revolution' (Toprak, 1984). Kadro's intellectuals sought an alternative to capitalism and socialism, drawing inspiration from Marxism without fully contradicting the founding ideology of the republic. They pursued this search within reasonable limits, avoiding extreme measures. It is worth noting that Kadro, often portrayed as a symbol of opposition and shut down on accusations of 'Marxism and communism', was actually granted political permission by Mustafa Kemal (Tekeli & İlkin, 2003, p. 142). The critical article for the first issue of the Magazine Kadro, which is thought to have come from Dr. Şefik Hüsnü, a politician of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), is a good indicator of the heated debate within the left about the Kadro and its ideology. For detailed information on how intellectuals of Kadro left TKP and the discussions on how Kadro should be positioned within the left, see Tekeli & İlkin (2003), Karpat (1959, p. 70), and Toprak (1984, p. 13-54).

represented the liberal-leaning perspective, while *Tan* took on a left-leaning stance.[33] However, the *Tan* newspaper's raid on 4 December 1945 was one of the first important examples of the attack and lynching of the government-contracted organisation of civilian forces in the history of the Turkish Republic. Justification for lynching and raid of Tan Daily was Sabiha Sertel's peace on a newspaper 'Scream of the concurrence' *(Muvafakatın Feryadı)*[34], written a day before the attack. Sabiha Sertel was telling that:

> On the morning of December 4, by the order of the government and Prime Minister Saraçoğlu given to the Istanbul parti organisation and the police, Tan printing house was destroyed; The party gathered some fascist, racist young people at Istanbul University -and some naive young people who did not know where or why they were going- and made them attack to the printing houses of *Tan*, *La Turquie* and *Yeni Dünya* newspapers.[35] (Sertel, 1969, p. 308)

This violent tendency continued to manifest itself in different forms and periods. The 'anti-terrorist campaign' against the PKK has given it unquestionably absolute control over the media, reflecting the state's point of view in the news. In the 1990s, as extrajudicial executions and murders increased, publications that emerged as alternative media organs were also the direct target of this violent state policy. Özgür

[33] Tan Daily was a prominent leftist and critical journalism representative during that period. Tan fiercely opposed fascism and advocated for improved relations with the Soviets. Despite publishing scathing articles against the Republican People's Party (CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) government in Tan and Vatan dailies, both newspapers supported the Democratic Party (DP: Demokrat Parti) during the election as the opposition party against the CHP. Meanwhile, pro-government media outlets like Tanin and Akşam dailies published articles targeting newspapers that opposed the government.

[34] Sabiha Sertel is the Turkish journalist-writer and co-founding editor of the Tan Daily with her husband Zekeriya Sertel. She contributed to the publication of many magazines, translated many socialist works and brought some of the classics of Marxism into Turkish such as Adoretsky's 'Dialectical Materialism,' Lenin's 'War and Socialism,' and August Bebel's 'Woman and Socialism.'

[35] In her book "Roman Gibi" (Like a Novel), Sertel shares a story from the time of World War II; her books are confiscated by the police when she returns home, she sees her mother and an employee of their house burning copies of her books in the garden and feels sick at heart. Years later, during her exile years in the 1950s, she meets with young people in Paris and Vienna. They tell her they took the first Marxist education from the books she translated into Turkish. These words become a great consolation to her, and she feels rewarded for her efforts (p. 170). As a result of the intense political pressure and the Tan raid, the Sertel family had to go abroad. After all, Sabiha Sertel died in exile in Baku in 1968, before she had the opportunity to see her country again. See Sertel (1969).

Gündem daily, as one of the first newspapers that comes to mind when it comes to Kurdish media, was repeatedly banned. The repression against publication was not limited to restrictions on content, censorship of news or direct interference by the state, but these journalists were subjected to direct state violence. Its employees were imprisoned, and a total of 76 employees were killed. After the closure of Özgür Gündem, 220 out of the total 467 issues of Özgür Ülke, which started publishing on 28 April 1994, was confiscated. On December 3, 1994, the newspaper's technical service in Istanbul Kadırga, its headquarters in Cağaloğlu and its Ankara bureau were bombed at the same time. Ersin Yıldız, an employee of the newspaper's transport service, was killed in the attack in Istanbul, while 21 employees were injured. Later on, Özgür Ülke was closed down by the Istanbul Criminal Court of Peace on February 2, 1995. However, the closed newspapers were starting to publish again with other names, Yeni Politika was the continuation of Özgür Ülke newspaper, and also closed on 16 August 1995, just 4 months after it started broadcasting. In this process, out of the 126 issues, 117 were censored. During this period, newspapers were being published with huge whitespaces; the pages of the Özgür Politika were being inspected while pages were still in the printing house, and pages were being confiscated on the grounds that they constituted a crime. So, newspaper employees were removing the relevant articles or news that were subjected of crime, and newspaper pages were printed with “censored” white spaces. (Mavioğlu, 2014, p. 145) 57 reporters and 40 distributors of the Ülkede Gündem newspaper, which started broadcasting on 7 July 1997, were threatened, detained and tortured, the newspaper's Batman bureau was bombed on June 21. 278 lawsuits were filed against the newspaper in the State Security Courts (DGM: Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri), 98 of which were decided against it. 125 news, 63 columns, 9 photos, and 14

advertisements were censored until the newspaper was closed on October 23, 1998. Then, once again, Özgür Bakış started its publication life on 18 April 1999, 125 out of a total of 371 issues of the newspaper was confiscated. Yeni Gündem started to publish 27 May 2000, during its ten-month publishing life, it was confiscated 15 times and sued 65 times. The weekly Yedinci Gündem newspaper was able to only publish 60 issues and 30 lawsuits were filed against. While Yeniden Özgür Gündem published for 545 days, a total of 315 were engaged in a lawsuit about the newspaper. Numerous investigations were also inducted and decisions were taken to convene the newspapers Ülkede Özgür Gündem, Toplumsal Demokrasi, Gündem, which were respectively published in 2004, 2006 and 2007. When Yaşamda Gündem started its publication on 9 March 2007, it was able to publish only two issues. Güncel was closed 11 days later of its coming out on 19 March 2007. The weekly newspaper Yedinci Gün received a suspension of publication penalty seven times between the period of November 2007 and October 2008 (Mavioğlu, 2014, p. 144-146). It is crucial to comprehend the challenging circumstances surrounding publishing within the Kurdish media in Turkey to fully grasp the Kurdish exile media. The diaspora's Kurdish media has a lengthier history than that of Turkey, making it a distinctive case in the homeland-diaspora media discussion. The persistent and oppressive state policies towards the Kurdish community are one of the primary reasons for the dearth of Kurdish media representation in Turkey.

The period immediately preceding it was again characterised by repression, censorship and newspaper closures. Between 1983-1991, during the period of Turgut Özal's prime ministership, 1820 lawsuits were filed against 2627 journalists until the beginning of 1990, 12,8 billion liras compensation provision was given. 26 journalists were sentenced to 784 years at total, 195 books and 260 other publications

were banned. In 1990, this process became increasingly harsh, 2814 years in prison for 302 journalists and 64 billion liras in compensation were requested in 223 civil cases. According to Koloğlu (1995), the attitude of the government has also led the security forces to act strictly. During the years that Motherland Party (ANAP: Anavatan Partisi) in power, 171 journalists were beaten up by the police in 55 attacks and even unprinted books and newspapers in print were confiscated (p. 135). With a rough calculation, between the years of 1980 and 1990, the number of cases against the press increased to over 2 thousands while 3 thousand journalists, writers and publishers were put on trial. Articles 6, 7 and 8 under the Anti-Terror Law of Turkey (TMK: Terörle Mücadele Kanunu) in 1991 created serious obstacles to freedom of the press and expression.[36]

This catalogue of oppression and violence inflicted upon journalism and media-press outlets reveals a distressing reality: interventions against the press take many forms, not limited to legal measures. The closure of newspapers, severe censorship, oppression, and direct threats and violence against journalists are just a few examples. It is clear that violence against the press can extend beyond legal mechanisms and manifest in direct physical harm. The sheer volume of such occurrences makes it impossible to keep track.[37]

[36] Terörle Mücadele Kanunu (Anti-Terror Law of Turkey), Mevzuat, enacted in April 12, 1991. See https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=3713&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5 (Last accessed: September 28, 2022)

[37] Susurluk incident as one of the most critical and debatable issues in Turkish political history, was also attention-grabbing during to see how the media was positioned, manoeuvre within the limits of freedom of press as well as censored within the counterguerrilla-state-mafia relations. It is a traffic incident that occurred on 3 November 1996 in Susurluk district of Balıkesir, which revealed the state-police-mafia relations. Leader of the Bucak clan and deputy Sedat Bucak, police chief Hüseyin Kocadağ, Abdullah Çatlı with the false identity Mehmet Özbay and Gonca Us with the false identity Melahat Özbay were in the car that crashed. The reports prepared by the MİT, the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry and the Susurluk Commission on the accident, in which only Bucak survived, revealed illegal relations in the state-politics-mafia triangle (BBC Türkçe, 2021).

By the 2000s, the pressure on the press did not decrease either. AKP government had closed hundreds of publications, including 31 television, 34 radio, 5 news agencies, 62 newspapers and 19 magazines, while taking the mainstream media under its control with the application of the state of emergency imposed by the military coup attempt of 15 July 2016 (Taştekin, 2019). At a time when hundreds of publications have been closed down since 2016 and the mainstream media has been completely controlled, the work of foreign journalists has also become more difficult. Despite the blackout in the Turkish media, international media organisations that publish in Turkish such as BBC News Türkçe, Voice of America and DW Türkçe became expand their staff to fill the gap of reporting on the ground. The increased interest in these publications led to serious disturbances in the government side. The reactions of the government members publicly manifested themselves with statements targeting these media organs. In addition, journalists, who follow both Turkey and the Middle East, especially based in Istanbul, was causing discomfort in the AKP government. Controlling the foreign press proved to be a challenge for the AKP government as opposed to controlling the national press. Although the government had a firm grasp on domestic media, it was aware that those who were out of control could not influence the current political situation. However, outside of Turkey's borders, national censorship mechanisms were not effective, which led to the exclusion of foreign journalists from the country. Some journalists and writers, who were considered experts on Turkey, refrained from visiting the country due to the fear of being detained or deported. This fear was particularly apparent when it came to the Kurdish issue. The threat of deportation loomed large, and those who managed to remain in Turkey were expected to comply with strict regulations to avoid the fate of their deported counterparts. Journalists facing challenges in the

region often refrained from speaking out, hoping that silence would alleviate their struggles. The fear of deportation remained a pervasive concern.[38] Foreign journalists find themselves in a difficult position since government officials begin targeting them and applying various forms of pressure. They are left with a choice: either produce news that catered to the government's sensitivities or face consequences that would effectively hinder their work, such as the non-renewal of press cards and residence permits in Turkey. The press card issue faced by foreign journalists erupted during the Türkiye-EU High Level Dialogue Meetings (Türkiye-AB Yüksek Düzeyli Diyalog Toplantıları) in Istanbul on February 28, 2019. Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President of the European Commission, expressed disappointment with the denial of access to certain journalists at the meeting. He conveyed regret regarding the situation, and affirmed that the EU was collaborating with Turkish authorities to ensure that the freedom of press is upheld. It was reported that several EU journalists were prevented from entering the meeting (Artı Gerçek, 2019).

After all, the most influential process that marked the opposition movement of the AKP era was the Gezi protests. During the Gezi resistance, the mainstream media was seen as siding with the government and actively worked against the protests. The news channels made a conscious decision to refrain from covering the political unrest, violence against protesters, and the widespread demonstrations that were taking place in Taksim Square, Istanbul.[39] Instead, they opted to air nature

[38] One of the most notable instances of this disruption was the detainment of Deniz Yücel and Meşale Tolu, who are German journalists of Turkish descent. Yücel was imprisoned for a year in 2017, while Tolu remained in custody for eight months. Following political negotiations, these journalists were eventually released and returned to Germany in 2018 (DW Türkçe, 2018).

[39] Due to the police's severe intervention, a diverse range of societal groups - from high school and university students to unemployed or employed youth, sports club fans, concerned parents who followed their children instead of calling them home, white-collar workers including lawyers, architects, engineers, doctors, teachers, and academics, as well as workers, shopkeepers, LGBTI+ individuals, anti-capitalist Muslims, and many others who had previously been humiliated - became a part of the resistance that began in Taksim and its surrounding streets. As Çoban (2014) points out, socialist movements have been subjected to police violence in protests for decades, but they have

documentaries, despite the fact that the protests were still ongoing. One particularly notable example of this media blackout was when CNN Türk chose to broadcast a documentary about penguins at the same time that CNN International was airing live coverage of the protests in Taksim Square. It highlighted the need for responsible and unbiased reporting.

In particular, news channels chose to avoid showing the political tension, police brutality against protesters, and the nationwide spread of protests from Taksim Square in Istanbul. Instead, they aired nature documentaries while the heart of the protests continued to beat in Taksim Square. The most memorable example of this silence of the media was the publication of the penguin documentary by the news channel CNN Türk while protests were synchronically continuing in Taksim Square. This was quite tragic because CNN International was broadcasting Taksim Square live in the meantime. A report by Bianet in October 2013 highlighted the extensive list of challenges faced by the media during the four-month resistance, including heavy censorship, arrests, and lawsuits against media outlets that supported the resistance. These actions severely undermined the media's credibility and led to widespread criticism and the adoption of the term 'Penguin media' to describe the media's shortcomings (Bianet, 2013).

A four-month resistance of *Gezi* had a long balance sheet: the oppression directed towards media was intense. The mainstream media hindered reporting and informing, leading to a shift towards social media and alternative publishing channels in Turkey. Social media played a dominant role in organising and

persevered. The Gezi resistance, however, marked a turning point as masses of people flooded the streets quickly and displayed a strong, unexpected resistance. The police's brutal violence did not succeed in dispersing the crowds; instead, it only galvanised more people to join and strengthened their resolve to resist. The media's failure to acknowledge this massive movement caused public outrage and a profound mistrust in the media. See Çoban (2014, p. 199).

communicating with the masses during the protests. People found alternative ways to communicate with each other through Facebook, YouTube, and especially Twitter. As happened and discussed in the demonstrations of the "Arab Spring,"[40] the media blackout during the Gezi protests encouraged a shift towards social media and alternative publishing channels in Turkey. Çapul TV was one of the most well-known examples of the established network in social media, broadcasting live feeds and informing the public about the resistance; and "those who resisted on the street also became volunteer reporters of the resistance" (Çoban, 2014, p. 201-202). The resistance had a long list of attacks, threats, obstacles, detentions, arrests, criminal complaints, investigations, censorship, closures, lawsuits against journalists, as well as controversial dismissals and resignations, all documented in detail.

Since the Gezi protests, the Turkish media has been suffering from an unprecedented "Big Brother" syndrome due to the rage of the government's intervention and control mechanisms and has become unable to breathe (Taştekin, 2020). Former presidential candidate Muharrem İnce's words summed up the situation when he left the broadcast of his programme on the Haber Global channel after it was repeatedly interrupted by President Tayyip Erdoğan's speech: "Erdoğan is speaking on 35 different channels on television... The Republic of Turkey is not the property of Erdoğan's father. Turkey will get rid of this fascist order" (Evrensel, 2020). When Erdoğan called Fatih Saraç, whom he appointed as a "government commissioner" to the head of HaberTürk television in 2013, he scolded him for

[40] Gezi protests is a very good sample in terms of understanding how a field of resistance can come into existence in different ways in times of dissatisfaction of large masses and how counterhegemony can become debatable accordingly. Before that, the Arab Spring uprisings went down in history as a social media organisation that transcended conventional parties. Starting in Tunisia and continuing in Egypt, social media was the primary tool in motivating and organising the masses. At the same time, social media journalism became the most prominent new phenomenon in this process. There was a similar social media wave during Gezi, and Twitter, in particular, became a driving force in mainstream communication at a point where the mainstream media was rendered dysfunctional.

publishing the statement of Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the MHP. This scolding fell on social media with an audio recording and entered the literature as “Hello Fatih” (Alo Fatih) while showing how the media was under control. A recording of a phone call in which Erdoğan berated the new owner of Milliyet newspaper, Erdoğan Demirören, until he cried, for publishing the İmralı reports in 2014, was also leaked to the media. After Gezi, “the government passed through all channels like a cylinder” (Taştekin, 2020). In an article for Al-Monitor, Taştekin recounts the experiences of five editors from CNN Türk, NTV, and Habertürk. He highlightes the symbolic significance of the phrase ‘Hello Fatih’ during the period of 2013-2014. According to him, situation changed when new managers were appointed, and the existing ones began acting as ‘party commissars.’ A communication network emerged, and individuals such as AKP Vice Presidents Mahir Ünal and Ömer Çelik, Presidential Chief of Staff Hasan Doğan, and President of the Directorate of Communications Fahrettin Altun were involved in controlling who could appear on television as a guest and what topics could be discussed. Ministerial advisers also played a role in this process. The editorial directors and Ankara representatives who accompanied Erdoğan were perceived as managers who were ‘ready to receive instructions.’ As a result, guest lists became highly restricted, with only a handful of ‘approved’ experts allowed to discuss topics such as Syria and Libya on dozens of television channels (Taştekin, 2020). In addition, the media executives invited to join President Erdoğan on his plane have undoubtedly been considered in his decision-making. This longstanding practice of ‘air travel with the president’ has proven to be an effective means of establishing broadcast lines, but it has also resulted in internalized censorship. These examples clearly demonstrate direct government intervention in the media, often at the behest of the head of state. Furthermore, they

underscore the ease with which the media can align itself with political power unless it actively resists. However, even though the issue of precise control in journalism, which extends to the minutest of details such as deciding which TV show a journalist can feature in and what they can discuss, may seem like a structural crisis brought about by political intervention, it is more complex than that. It is not solely due to external factors like political elites but is also impacted by the journalistic habitus, which governs the conditions and positions within the field.[41] Essentially, patronage, as well as its 'editorial line', plays a significant role in shaping the rules of the game in this particular journalistic arena.

Last but not least, one of the most radical examples of the media's resistance to the state in Turkey is the Kurdish media. As mentioned before, the Kurdish media, which has been subjected to censorship and violence, whose journalists have been murdered and victimised in unsolved cases, is once again subjected to stricter impositions when it comes to the Kurdish issue and 'the peace' discussions. Between the two elections' period of June 7 to November 1, Turkey went through a tough and bloody political process; the year 2015 witnessed two bomb attacks, cross-border operations, detentions and arrests across Turkey, curfews in eastern and south-eastern provinces and deaths of civilians, soldiers, and police officers. While massacres undertaken by Islamic State (ISIS), such as HDP Diyarbakır rally bombing, 2015 Ankara bombings, Suruç bombing, in all this bloody struggle for power, the press has faced many censorship, prohibitions and judicial difficulties. Investigations were opened against journalists who wrote about the neglects, journalists reporting news were detained, and some beaten by the police while following the news during the

[41] Also, based on the specific positions they occupy within this field, Bourdieu's theory suggests that the interplay of various forces statistically determines agents' actions. See Bourdieu (2005, p. 30).

protests.[42] But media's obedience to the government did not begin in this period, although it was strengthened during the election term. Journalist Ayşenur Aslan, while explaining about the Roboski (Uludere) bombing on the night of December 28, 2011, in which 34 people were killed by dropped four bombs of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri) on villagers crossing the border with Iraq, was relaying the events in the CNN Türk studio with the words "Ferhat Boratav[43] entered the regie in the studio and shouted that 'Uludere news would not be given from broadcast!" (Sendika, 2013). That night when the news channels were buried in silence and not a single line from Roboski bombing passed on televisions, 19 of the 34 people who died were under the age of 18; the bombed group included 38 villagers, including children, and at least 50 mules, more than half of those who lost their lives were from the Encü family (Evrensel, 2021). The fact that an editor-in-chief and a broadcasting consultant entered the studio in a huff, stating that the news would not be broadcast live, also reveals the level of political intervention.

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the media landscape in Turkey, it is crucial to analyse the political climate and its complex relationship with the press. Despite political involvement, the press also serves as a platform for questioning and opposition. It is important to acknowledge that the Turkish media operates within a multifaceted structure that is neither fully submissive nor entirely independent of

[42] To see the news about investigations and violence against journalists, "Suçlu belli: 'Ankara katliamı' öncesindeki ihmalleri yazan gazetecilere soruşturma" (The culprit is obvious: investigation into journalists who wrote about omissions before the 'Ankara massacre'), Diken, 2016, April 15, https://www.diken.com.tr/suclu-belli-ankaradaki-gar-katliaminin-ihmalleri-yazan-gazetecilere-sorusturma/; "Suruç Katliamı anmasında gazetecilere müdahale: 'Özellikle hedef alındık" (Intervention against journalists at Suruç Massacre commemoration: 'We were especially targeted'), BBC Türkçe, 2021, July 21, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-57923323; "Suruç Katliamı anmasını takip ederken gözaltına alınan ve serbest bırakılan muhabir Umut Taştan'ın parmağı kırıldı" (Reporter Umut Taştan, who was detained while covering the Suruç Massacre commemoration and released, suffered a broken finger), T24, 2023, July 21, https://t24.com.tr/video/suruc-anmasini-takip-eden-muhabir-umut-tastan-hala-gozaltinda,55281 (Last accessed: December 6, 2023).

[43] Ferhat Boratav, former editor-in-chief and broadcasting consultant of the CNN Türk. His job at CNN Türk was terminated in 2018 (Cumhuriyet, 2018).

political power. Therefore, the field of journalism has yet to achieve complete autonomy but also has not become fully obedient. In the following section, I will delve into the structural changes that have occurred, such as changes in ownership, media patrons, and economic capital, and examine their impact on editorial independence.

4.2 Structural change of ownership in media and the press

The entry of the capital groups that were outside of the journalistic tradition into the media sector itself brought a structural transformation in media ownership. New capital groups owned the media outlets. In compliance, the January 24 Decisions that gave impetus to the liberal transformation and the conditions brought by with the September 12 military coup d'état, capital groups from outside the profession entered the journalism sector since it had been discovered that media was needed to raise the capital. The owners of the Hisarbank, collecting funds with high interest, founded the Güneş newspaper in order to grow more. Güneş was one of the pioneering newspapers reflecting the spirit of that period; the "media stars", whose salaries are paid in dollars and who live like their bosses, were born in this process. Again in accordance with the spirit of this period, the tabloid newspaper Bulvar began its publishing life (Akyol, 2014, p. 155). Especially while considering the press of the post-1980s, first and foremost, it is necessary to examine the radical change in the economic structure of the country and its impact on both social and political institutions. Conglomeration in the press (medyada holdingleşme) led to a situation where media outlets aligned their content to the non-journalistic interests of their owners. This trend also brought about a shift in the profile of newspaper owners, as those with journalistic backgrounds were replaced by new owners who viewed

editors as representatives of their workplace, rather than as journalists. The conglomeration and acquisition of media outlets also resulted in the displacement of certain Bourdieuian sense of cultural and social norms within the field of journalism. This has led to ongoing debates surrounding the de-professionalisation of journalism, as the journalistic industry has increasingly become a commercial enterprise driven by economic motives, rather than a respected profession. As a result, groups with economic capital have come to dominate the field, rather than those with a deep understanding of the cultural and social codes that are intrinsic to the journalistic tradition.

To understand this structural change in more detail, it is necessary to look at how ownership in the media has changed hands. From 1979 to the 1990s, the families of Nadi, Simavi and Karacan, who grew up in journalism and worked in the press sector for many years, withdrew from the sector. They were replaced by capitalists that active outside the press domain. Aydın Doğan, who started his business life with the Tofaş dealership, became the first example in this field by purchasing the Milliyet newspaper from Ercüment Karacan in 1979. He was followed by Mehmet Ali Yilmaz, the contractor who bought the Güneş newspaper, and Dinç Bilgin, the owner of the local Yeni Asır newspaper in İzmir (Sözeri, 2014, p. 73). In the article published in Gazete Duvar, Faruk Bildirici shares the following observation about the impact of the transformation in ownership with non-journalist bosses in the 1980s:

> For most of these bosses, there was no difference between owning a newspaper or TV channel and running a bank, mining company, or fuel company. Their goal was not ‘public interest’, but to make a profit. As the famous media mogul Robert Maxwell said, ‘I did not invest 90 million pounds in this business to get charity. I am the owner of this business, I am the boss,’ the media owners; the bosses of the holdings in Turkey, had the same understanding. (Gazete Duvar, 2022)

Bildirici explains that these media patrons see in themselves the right to interfere in publishing affairs, with news and publications in the newspapers. For most chief editors, however, there was no intention of resisting these demands. In a word, transferring traditional publishing centre of newspapers to plazas, the intensification of competition in which non-cultural products are given as promotions, tenders and incentive loans, the new dimensions of government-media relations symbolise the transformation of the 1990s. This transformation also transformed 'news-chasing' journalism into journalism that chooses news, limits itself to self-censorship, or plays ostrich.

In accordance with the United States' project to create a "Green Belt" in the Islamic world within the framework of fighting against communism, Islamist movements and communities in Turkey was made a room for. The newspaper established by Işıkçılar community started to be published in April 1970 with the name Hakikat (truth), then continued its publication life by renaming the journal as Türkiye journal in March 1972. Not long after, Milli Görüş Movement (national outlook or national vision) led by Necmettin Erbakan founded the Milli Gazete in January 1973.[44] Zaman journal was added as well in 1986, which soon after its publication in 1986 would pass under the control of Gülen community.[45] In 2016, the newspaper was closed after the Gülen sect had a falling out with the AKP

[44] Milli journal's history of establishment on its official website: https://www.milligazete.com.tr/bilgi/kurulus (Last accessed: September 28, 2022)

[45] The Gülen sect, which the AKP government refers to as the Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (FETÖ: Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation). The Gülen movement, that focuses on education with schools and classrooms in Turkey as well as in dozens of other countries and dominates a wide media network, parted ways with the AKP government in 2013 following corruption revelations. Hundreds of people, including journalists, academics, soldiers, bureaucrats and state employees, fled the country following the investigations and lawsuits launched after the coup attempt on 15 July 2016. Also many of others were tried and imprisoned. The leader of the sect, former preacher Fethullah Gülen, has been living in the USA for a long time. (Arslan, 2014; BBC Türkçe, 2016; Kasapoğlu, 2017).

government had a falling out, authors of Zaman were tried on charges of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation (Milliyet, 2022).

In the AKP era, the holding company owners, who were brought into play as part of the political power's operation to take over the media, also dynamited some of the standards established under the old bosses. "Editorial independence" has become a principle that the new media is most unfamiliar with. In the new era, the government's commissars in the media not only determined the editorial lines but also decided who would be employed or fired, who would be invited as guests on TV programmes and who would be banned from the screens. It came to this point through tax fines levied on critical media outlets, confiscation and transfer operations to 'favoured' businessmen. In addition, during the AKP period, broadcasting organisations affiliated with the Gülen group were deliberately supported. The breakthroughs of the group, which has been active with broadcasting organisations such as Zaman newspaper, Samanyolu TV, Aksiyon Magazine, Cihan News Agency, Burc FM and Dünya Radyo for many years, attracted attention before the two critical elections in 2007. In 2007, New Jersey-based Ebru TV, Today's Zaman, S Haber and S Çocuk were the new broadcasting organs added to the media group (Akşam, 2006). Akın Ipek, the owner of Koza Group, whose companies were confiscated as part of the Fethullah terror organisation investigation (FETÖ: Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü) after the AKP-Gülen community fight, entered the sector in 2007 by buying the Bugün newspaper from the Ciner Group (Bianet, 2008). In 2008, he incorporated Kanaltürk television, belonging to Tuncay Özkan and known by its nationalist line, and he founded a new channel called Bugün TV in 2009 (Hürriyet, 2008).

Major media groups, families, businesses, communities including Sabah, Uzan, Gülen, Doğan, Doğuş, and Çukurova changed hands while some of these

created controversial discussions in the media. Starting with Sabah media group, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF: Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu) confiscated ATV channel and Sabah newspaper from Dinç Bilgin, the owner of Etibank, on October 27, 2000. The ATV-Sabah group passed into the Çalık group, which was close to power, in a controversial tender process in 2007 (Hürriyet, 2007). In this hand-changing operation, a loan of $ 1.1 billion was withdrawn from Vakıfbank and Halkbank. Serhat Albayrak, the brother of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's son-in-law Berat Albayrak, was appointed as the head of the company, which took the name Turkuaz Media Group. Turkuaz Media was sold to Kalyon Holding in 2013 (Hürriyet, 2013). On the other hand, TMSF confiscated a total of 219 companies belonging to the Uzan Group, which has been the focus of controversy for several years due to its bankrupt banks and debts, in 2004 (Hürriyet, 2004). Star newspaper and Kanal 24, which were affiliated to the Star media group, were also among the confiscated companies. In 2006, Star media group was sold for 8 million dollars to Cyprian businessman Ali Özmen Safa and Alaaddin Kaya who is one of the founders of Zaman newspaper (Hürriyet, 2006). In 2007, former Turkish Football Federation President Hasan Doğan and businessman Ethem Sancak became partners in the media group. After Doğan's death, the new partner of the group, which was completely controlled by Sancak in 2009, was Fettah Tamince, the owner of Rixos hotels. In the same year, Sancak transferred his shares to former AKP Deputy Tevhid Karakaya (Hürriyet 2014). In 2013, the Azeri oil company Socar purchased 50 percent of the Star media group for $ 8 million (Hürriyet, 2013).

The Doğan Group, which includes many televisions, newspapers, radios and magazines, was pushed to reconcile with the tax penalties. The second measure targeting the Doğan Group came with a legal regulation. The Law No. 6112 on the

Establishment and Broadcasting Services of Radio and Television Stations (6112 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayın Hizmetleri Hakkında Kanunu),[46] which entered into force in 2011, limited the Sunday shares of media organisations to 30 percent. For this reason, Doğan Group had to sell Star TV, which it bought from TMSF in 2005, to Doğuş Group. In the same year, Doğan Group sold Milliyet and Vatan newspapers to DK Journalism and Publishing inc. (DK Gazetecilik ve Yayıncılık A.Ş), as a joint company of Demirören and Karacan Group. This company was completely taken over by Demirören Group in February 2012 (Sözeri, 2014, p. 74). Milliyet parted ways with journalists such as Derya Sazak, Hasan Cemal and Can Dündar in a short time and was turned into a thornless field for the political power (Cumhuriyet, 2014). Doğuş Group, the owner of NTV, got rid of the operation by adapting to "the delicacy" of the government and gave Banu Güven, Ruşen Çakır, Mirgün Cabas and Can Dündar the axe (Evrensel, 2011).

The Çukurova Group, belonging to Mehmet Emin Karamehmet, also could not escape the wrath of the operations. After the TMSF seized Yapı Kredi Bank, Karamehmet could not pay his debts and lost Show TV, Akşam newspaper, Digitürk, Superonline, Skytürk 360, Güneş newspaper, Lig TV, and Alem FM (Hürriyet, 2004). Show TV was sold to Ciner Group without tender for 402 million dollars. One year later, TMSF seized the Show TV once more again, which was sold to the Ciner Group. Yeni Akit newspaper, known for its closeness to the government, wrote exactly two months ago that the Ciner Group, which had a falling out with the government after 17 December[47], would have to return Show TV (Diken, 2014). The

[46] The Law No. 6112 on the Establishment and Broadcasting Services of Radio and Television Stations (6112 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayın Hizmetleri Hakkında Kanunu), Mevzuat, enacted in 2011, February 15, https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.5.6112-20120704.pdf (Last accessed: October 18, 2022)

[47] The 17-25 December 2013 corruptions operation in Turkey are series of investigations and operations to persons, government officials and family members, sons of several ministers, prominent

seizures by the TMSF were not simple financial operations; the managers it appointed aligned the editorial lines of these organisations with the government and purged opposition journalists and writers. Ownership of media outlets has also lost its transparency. The frequent change of hands of companies, the fact that those who buy and sell are businessmen connected with the government, and uncertainties in capital structures led to the formation of a concept called "pool media"[48] in the Turkish media literature. Gülseren Adaklı (2007) illustrates the scene as stating:

> On the one hand, the *AKP* government has created a 'pool media' that is organically connected to itself, the ownership structure of which has never been fixed and transparent, on the other hand, *AKP* adjusted and is adjusting those who were not included in this pool in some way with the fight against terrorism, trade, tax laws. Today, obtaining reliable information about media companies that are almost completely controlled by the state in Turkey and sharing it with the public requires both labour and intensive efforts and can result in deprivation of fundamental rights. (Adaklı, 2007)

The AKP government successfully ensured the withdrawal of opposition press from the market by implementing penalties such as advertising shortages and tax laws. This was achieved through a focused takeover and capital transfer, resulting in a more compliant media. However, it is important to note that ownership is not the most critical factor in a capitalist network. Power relations will always align with the interests of the state and capital (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014, p. 80). Therefore, even with shifts in media ownership, the capital invested remains a key influencer in shaping the journalistic habitus. The media's consolidation and transfer of ownership has resulted in leaders who are unfamiliar with the journalistic field, lacking the necessary cultural and social background within the industry to effectively lead

business figures, related to corruption, money laundering and bribery. Investigations are initiated by officials who are affiliated with the Gülen Islamist movement. During the time, AKP government and Gülen movement were still allies but there were also emerging visible tension among them (BBC Türkçe, 2023).

[48] Pool media is the mainstream media broadcasting in line with the political power. In other words, the advocacy-partisan media.

media institutions, which can be viewed as one of the structural problem within the journalistic field.

4.3 Exiled journalists around the world: Independent journalism in trouble

As journalists face various forms of repression, restrictions, censorship, and violence, many are forced to travel abroad to continue their reporting activities. However, these issues are not limited to Turkey. In different parts of the world, war and conflict zones, political tensions, and authoritarian practices make journalism an incredibly challenging profession. This section will explore the state of journalism around the globe, including press freedom rankings, the troubling trend of repression and violence against journalists, and the new media outlets established by exiled journalists. I will examine how the experience of exile journalism varies across different regions and how exiled journalists are received in their new homes in the following section.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) released figures for 2021 revealing that China, Myanmar, Vietnam, Belarus, and Saudi Arabia have imprisoned the most journalists of any country in the world. The report also lists Mexico, Afghanistan, Yemen, India, and Pakistan as the top five most dangerous countries for journalists. However, journalists who manage to escape war zones and authoritarian regimes often seek protection in democracies that guarantee freedom of the press and permit them to work in exile. In recent years, numerous European countries have founded organisations and initiatives to help representatives of the media, and government and independently funded support programs have also emerged to provide aid (RFS, 2021; Schönert, 2022). According to RSF, as of December 2021, at least 488 journalists are currently being held in prisons across the globe. The safety of

independent or critical journalists seems to be increasingly compromised, especially in countries that are undergoing conflict or political crisis. RSF's 2023 report shows a slight shift in data, with Vietnam, China, and North Korea occupying the last three spots on the list as solely Asian countries. North Korea is ranked 180th and is referred to as "the world's biggest jailer of journalists and one of the biggest exporters of propaganda content (RSF, 2023). Generally speaking, among 180 countries, the situation is deemed "very serious" in 31, 'difficult' in 42, 'problematic' in 55, and 'satisfactory/good' in 52. Unfortunately, 7 out of 10 countries have a 'bad' state of journalism, while only 1 out of 3 countries falls under the 'satisfactory' category (RSF, 2023). Turkey was ranked 149th among 180 countries in the RSF 2022 World Press Freedom Index (RFS, 2022). Turkey's 2022 ranking on the RSF index is up from the 153rd of a year ago. Turkey was ranked 98th in 2005, 138th in 2010, 149th in 2015, and 154th in 2020 in the index which is announced every year.[49] (Duvar English, 2022) According to the 2023 World Press Freedom Index by the RSF, Turkey has dropped 16 places compared to last year, ranking 165th among 180 countries (RSF, 2023). This has caused Turkey to move from the 'problematic' category to the 'very bad' category, alongside Tajikistan and India. As per the report, critical journalists and media outlets in Turkey often face discriminatory practices like the revocation of press passes, which hinder their ability to work freely and independently. Moreover, the lack of judicial independence and the influence of politics in decision-making, coupled with the arrest of numerous journalists, have contributed to this worrisome trend.

[49] "Turkey ranks 149th out of 180 countries in press freedom index", Duvar English, May 3, 2022, https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkey-ranks-149th-out-of-180-countries-in-press-freedom-index-news-60834 (Last accessed: October 23, 2022)

Several countries have seen increased control and suppression of dissent in recent years. Hong Kong has faced increased controls since 2020, while Belarus saw the suppression of dissidents after a controversial election that same year. Myanmar experienced a coup in 2021, and the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan has led to a significant number of journalists leaving the country. The Ukrainian war in 2022 and an outbreak in Russia in 2023 also contributed to this trend. In Sudan, many journalists have left due to the ongoing civil war. According to the Afghan Independent Journalists Association (AIJA), up to 35% of journalists have left Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover, with many now living in exile in various countries around the world (IFJ Report 2022-2023). Some are also residing in temporary transit countries, such as Qatar, India, and Mexico, with uncertain futures.

A survey conducted by Afghanistan National Journalists Union (ANJU) across 33 provinces, indicates that as many as 318 media outlets have closed since August 15, 2021. 623 media outlets were active before the Taliban. Also, more than 90 per cent of women journalists lost their jobs according to the Centre for the Protection of Afghan Women Journalists (CPAWJ) (AIJA, 2022). The situation for independent journalists also deteriorated dramatically in Russia. Repressions forced numerous journalists from Russia into exile. Additionally, over 50 Belarusian journalists have been compelled to leave their country due to threats stemming from their work following the contested re-election of President Alexander Lukashenko in August 2020. As of the year 2021, at least 12 journalists remain in Belarus, facing the possibility of lengthy prison sentences, according to the RSF report (RFS, 2021). In the 2023 World Press Freedom Index, Russia dropped nine places to 164th place, further behind its last ranking. Additionally, Russia has declined considerably in security scores after the Russia-Ukraine crisis (RSF, 2023).

4.3.1 Journalism in exile on a global scale

Under these difficult circumstances, the majority of journalists who have been forced to flee countless of countries from the Middle East and Africa to Asia and Latin America seeks refuge in Europe, with North America, USA and Canada, being the second most popular destination. A smaller number of journalists prefer neighbouring countries where they find safety. Journalists from Syria have travelled to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, from Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan, from Sudan to Egypt and Ethiopia, and from Iran to Turkey. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq also hosts some Kurdish journalists leaving Turkey. While some journalists in exile can work remotely for the media organs in their countries, others also create their own media in exile. It is a rising trend to continue journalism with individual broadcasting from alternative platforms such as YouTube. In addition to this, some European media organs like BBC News also have wide range of language publishing.

Accordingly, Figure 2 presents an analysis of the global movement patterns of journalists, showcasing the seven key regions on the map: receiving countries, countries of origin, temporary refuge and dangerous regions, main exile journalist flow, exile media, war zones, and areas of tension. The map reveals that America, Canada, and Europe are the primary regions where journalists tend to migrate (RSF, 2023).




Figure 2. Exile journalists map-fleeing to Europe and North America, RSF, (2023)

The report on the Exile Journalism in Europe draws a map of country preferences; exiled journalists from Africa, according to the report, are more often drawn to France and Belgium, whereas those from the Caribbean are more likely to settle in the UK. Also, the language spoken in that country is decisive. Exiles from South America often choose Spain because of the language factor. Geographically, Poland and Baltic states become second homes to Belarusian refugees because of the geographical proximity of the home countries they had to leave. According to Exile Journalism in Europe article, "The sheer number of refugees from Middle Eastern and Arab countries leads organisations in all destination countries to report having received exiled journalists from these regions" (Schönert, 2022, p. 3-4).

Germany's large Turkish community plays a significant role in hosting Turkish journalists, as noted by Jens-Uwe Thomas from RSF. This is in addition to the Recruitment Agreement of foreign workers signed between Turkey and Germany in 1961, which has led to a significant number of people of Turkish origin residing in Germany (Germany Federal Foreign Office, 2021). While exiled journalists from typical countries of origin have been outnumbered by those from Syria, Iraq, and

Afghanistan for several years, journalists from Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Cuba, China, Uganda, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Eritrea, and Sudan also tend to seek refuge in Germany (Schönert, 2019). Recently, journalists from European countries such as Hungary, Poland, Macedonia, and Ukraine have also begun seeking exile in Germany once again.

Exiled journalists are dispersed to different geographies. Afghan journalists who escaped from the Taliban have a remarkable project: Amu TV. Samiullah Mehdi, who works at Radio Azadi, developed the Amu TV project with Lütfullah Najafizada, the director of Tolonews, whom he met in Istanbul after leaving his country in 2021. While Mehdi works from the channel's headquarters, Sterling-Virginia, Najafizada accompanies him from Toronto. They publish in English, Persian and Pashto with a staff of 40 people, half of whom are exiles and half of whom are from Afghanistan. Also, a year ago, another Afghan journalist Zahra Joya founded Rukhshana Media in 2020 to explain the situation of Afghan women. After the Taliban seized power, she fled the country in 2021 and settled in England. The channel continues its publications in English and Persian.[50]

Journalists from various regions and backgrounds often face a shared experience of exile. From Hong Kong to Afghanistan, from Iran to Africa, from Latin America to Russia, there are numerous instances of media in exile. These include online publications such as Meduza, based in Riga, Latvia, which primarily covers news related to Russia; and the Warsaw-based broadcaster Belsat, funded by Poland and other EU countries, providing opportunities for exiled Belarusian journalists (Schönert, 2022, p. 7). Following the contentious 2020 election that saw President Alexander Lukashenko's re-election, independent journalists in Belarus face a

[50] To see Rukhshana Media website: https://rukhshana.com/en/about-rukhshana (Last accessed: December 6, 2023)

perilous environment. In response, the Belarusian Investigative Center (BIC), an organisation established by a group of journalists in Belarus in 2019, relocated its operations to Lithuania. With a team of 50 professionals, comprising journalists, cameramen, and audio and video technicians, BIC concentrates on social media publishing. The government categorised BIC as an 'extremist organisation'. Some of their employees operate their businesses in Poland and Georgia. One of the publications of exiled Russian journalists is 107 IStories (Important Stories). Roman Anin explains that their original plan was to publish their investigative journalism in media outlets like Novaya Gazeta and Meduza, but they found success independently. After attracting the attention of security forces, Anin realized he could not remain in Russia and settled in Prague in 2021. They have managed to expand their reach with daily broadcasts on YouTube and Telegram covering the Ukrainian war (Schönert, 2022).

Gloria Chan, a Chinese journalist who fled Hong Kong, co-founded Green Bean Media in England with a group of friends. Through her publication, Chan sheds light on state censorship of books, movies, immigration, and culture, while humbly stating, "We are not doing something that special... We just want to produce programs that we did in the past. We are not really doing something 'wow'... But no one in Hong Kong can do it" (Marston, 2023). Similarly, TV presenter in Eritrean, Biniam Simon founded Radio Erena in Paris after seeking refuge in France following a video training seminar in Tokyo, fearing arrest upon his return to his country. Since 2009, the radio has been broadcasting in Arabic and Tigrinya languages, reaching 500 thousand listeners (Marston, 2023). Another notable publication is IranWire, founded by Maziar Bahari in 2013, which is a leading outlet for the Iranian opposition. The website is run by professional Iranian journalists in the diaspora and

citizen journalists inside Iran, sharing analyses with audiences worldwide in several languages, including Persian, English, Arabic, Kurdish, Azerbaijani, and Spanish.[51]

Exiled journalists in Africa tend to favour radio broadcasting, and one notable example is Radio Tamazuj. This radio station began broadcasting in South Sudan's capital, Juba, in 2011, and quickly faced backlash from security forces when reporting on sensitive subjects such as corruption, extrajudicial killings, and violence. When its offices were closed in 2015, Radio Tamazuj's employees went abroad. Radio Tamazuj's shortwave broadcasts have become increasingly widespread as a news channel in South Sudan, with low literacy rates (Marston, 2023).

Despite the ever-changing landscape of geography, journalists continue to face consistent challenges. Latin American journalists, in particular, often find themselves living in exile. Onda Local (Local Wave) radio, established in 2000, serves as the broadcasting platform for Nicaraguan journalists seeking refuge in Costa Rica. One such journalist, Cristopher Mendoza, fled to Costa Rica in 2021 due to the Daniel Ortega regime's pressure. Mendoza laments that the government's 'foreign agent' law has made it exceedingly difficult to contribute to the radio from Nicaragua. He further notes that many of the sources relied on by Onda Local are also in exile, necessitating the assistance of human rights groups to document the situation in the country. He notes that they change the voices in the broadcasts to protect resources. Nicaraguan journalists formed a group called Nicaragua Independent Journalists and Communicators in 2018 to come together wherever they are (Marston, 2023). In 2022, Nicaragua's La Prensa newspaper relocated its newsroom in exile to shield its journalists from the severe police persecution inflicted by the Ortega regime. Pressured by the situation, La Prensa's employees

[51] See IranWire website: https://iranwire.com/en/about (Last accessed: December 6, 2023)

fled the country, with many seeking refuge in Costa Rica or other Central American countries, as well as Venezuela, Cuba, the USA, and Spain (RFS, 2022). The move was an unprecedented event in the history of the country's oldest newspaper, but according to Carlos F. Chamorro (2022) of Confidencial, the lack of press freedom protection in Nicaragua left them no choice but to go into exile to continue practicing journalism (Confidencial, 2023). The situation worsened following La Prensa's coverage of the regime's expulsion of 18 missionaries, leading to dozens of journalists from La Prensa and other media outlets being forced to flee the country. This is precisely what media outlets such as Concidential, 100% Noticias, Nicaragua Investiga, Despacho 505, Café con Voz, and others have been doing since 2022.

Sri Lanka's journalists faced repression during the civil war for over 25 years to its hellish conclusion in 2009. As many as 19 journalists were killed in the period from 1992.[52] Since 2019 the Rajapaksa government has gone on to wage a new campaign of intimidation against journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) says in its 2009 report that at least 11 Sri Lanka journalists were driven into exile amid an intensive government crackdown (Phillips, 2019). In 2015, the Sri Lanka government called on journalists to return to the country, claiming that it was safe. But most of those in exile could not return after experiences of intimidation and threats (SriLanka Brief, 2019). Accordingly, journalist Bashana Abeywardane, who went into exile in 2006, says that at least 70 journalists had fled the country between 2006 and 2011 (Pundir, 2020).

After the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, journalism in the country has been all but criminalised. The killings, arrests and prosecutions of journalists have had a severe chilling effect on independent journalism. The easiest option for many

[52] See the website, https://cpj.org/asia/sri-lanka/ (Last accessed: December 6, 2023)

is to stay in neighbouring countries like India and Thailand. Many journalists are continuing to work in India. Organisations like Myanmar Now, The Irrawaddy and Mizzima, are continuing their vital journalism work from exile. Solidarity actions in support of exiled journalists from Myanmar have been a long tradition in India. Mizzima News, first established in exile in Delhi in 1998 won the International Press Institute's Free Media Pioneer Award in 2007 (AIJA, 2022).

One of the notable names among Pakistani exiled journalists is Taha Siddiqui. He has been in exile in Paris since he survived a kidnapping attempt in 2018. Siddiqui and his wife, Sara Farid, a photojournalist, launched the Dissident Club, a bar and café in Paris that brings dissidents of the world together for discussion, debate, and support. He says that he *is* still working actively mostly writing analyses about Pakistan:

> Since I have gone into exile, I feel like a lot of people reach out to me more, because back home, they cannot talk about their problems. So, they reach out and tell me that I should be the one to talk about it, because I have the safety of exile. **(**Decamps & Kone, 2020)

However, *Siddiqui* also states that he still does not feel completely safe. The reason for this is that even though journalistic activities continue in exile, attacks against journalists still continue:

> People in exile also get attacked, it is happening a lot more in Europe. Just recently, an exiled Pakistani journalist was found dead in Sweden. And I know the Pakistani state is still keeping an eye on me. Someone from the Pakistan embassy came to do surveillance at an event at the Dissident Club just a few weeks ago (in 2020). The military contacts me directly sometimes, asking why I do what I do, telling me to stop. I also need to think of my family back home. My parents get harassed a lot; my father was actually interrogated by the military intelligence in Pakistan earlier this year. We did not know if he was going to come back or not. He ended up denouncing and disowning me as a way to keep the family safe. Even in exile, I am strategic about my journalism. I do not always say everything I would like to say, especially on a subject like religion. (Decamps & Kone, 2020)

After all, although geography changes, it is not possible to escape certain power relations. Apart from the difficulties of continuing journalism in a foreign country, they may have to say goodbye to the profession while considering the safety of the family members they left behind. The anxiety of the rest creates psychological pressures such as restraint and self-censorship, as it does within the country.

4.3.2 Security threats and financial-political barriers to exiled journalists

Although the annals of history abound with tales of exiled journalists, the trials and tribulations of being one are no less daunting. The domain of autonomous media, free from censorship, harassment, and life-threatening situations, is rapidly diminishing. Many journalists are compelled to flee their homelands due to oppression, threats, imprisonment, torture, or sham trials. Leaving the country presents an opportunity for these journalists to secure a safe future for themselves. Life in exile does not mean absolute safety. Journalists may face incidents such as tracking with spyware, physical surveillance, harassment on social media, threats and smear campaigns, actual assault, and kidnapping. Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who wrote for the Washington Post, was killed and his body was destroyed by a special team from Riyadh at the Consulate General of Saudi Arabia in Istanbul, where he went for official procedures in 2018 (BBC News, 2021). In May 2021, by order of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, a warplane grounded a Ryanair civilian plane flying from Athens to Vilnius. Dissident journalist Roman Protasevich, one of the passengers, was arrested (BBC News, 2023). Sajid Hussain, who was granted political asylum in Sweden in 2019 after fleeing Pakistan, went missing 2 March 2020. Sajid Hussain was working part-time as a professor in Uppsala. His

body was found on 23 April 2020 in the Fyris river outside Uppsala.[53] Examples can be multifield, but one is certain, exiled journalists clearly need to be protected from harm, but the due diligence to ensure this is not yet in place.

This difficulty is not only related to threats to life or state surveillance. While moving away from danger increases security to some extent, still, it becomes difficult to produce news or confirm the news produced in exile. While news sources no longer have the safe communication opportunity that face-to-face meetings provide, the risks of communicating with a journalist in exile can also be a deterrent. Alongside these problems, while journalists in exile deal with the problems of the countries they have left behind one-to-one, their perspectives and reflexes can shift from professional journalism to activism over time. With motives such as making their voices heard, maturing the conditions for their return, or mobilising the dynamics of change, journalists in exile are beginning to behave like activists. Whilst journalists struggle with their own personal struggles, they can navigate grey lines between journalism and political activism. They understand that they cannot remain just journalists against the personalized war of pressure, smear, and propaganda. That is why they become a part of events such as conferences, panels, or signature campaigns on freedom of press and expression, especially in professional organisations. The number of people using both identities as journalists and activists is increasing. Terje Skjerdal, academician from the NLA University College, Norway, addresses some deviations in journalism in exile, noting that journalists in

[53] Sajid Hussain was a Pakistani journalist forced to leave his country because of police raid, death threats and interrogations and became a political asylum in Sweden in 2017. Two months after his disappearing, Swedish police found his dead body in a river north of Stockholm. About his death, Salman Masood, "Exiled Pakistani journalist found dead in Sweden", The New York Times, 2020, May 2, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/world/asia/pakistan-journalist-dead.html (Last accessed: October 23, 2022)

exile are greeted with sympathy by international press organisations and their narratives are accepted without confirmation:

> Journalists who flee from oppressive regimes are suppliers of vital information. But how often is the validity of their sources checked? (…) Yet I have come across a number of awkward accounts in my own research concerning people who call themselves 'journalists in exile' and whose reporting has been passed on by the media and press freedom groups in the West without the slightest sense of critical assessment. I suspect that these journalists' horrifying accounts are simply too suitable for support organisations to be double-checked. But uncritical reproduction of these stories carries a great deal of risk of being counterproductive. Authorities in the concerned countries are appalled with the distorted reports that the international community naively swallows, and journalists who are genuinely fighting for their very existence are belittled because they are viewed side-by-side with the opportunists. (Skjerdal, 2010)

According to Skjerdal, the main problem of exiled journalism occurs when one leaves behind journalism to become an activist and that loses objectivity and credibility since the professional standards of journalism take serious damage this situation.

In addition to opposition, being in exile makes it more difficult to get advertising or find financiers from companies in their home country. Obtaining asylum, residence card, or work permit, arranging for accommodation, and finding a new job can evolve into backbreaking processes. Parallel to the increase in the number of journalists in exile in Europe, different press organisations developed supportive programs for them. Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the Rudolf Augstein Foundation and the *Schöpflin* Foundation launched the JX Fund for journalism in exile in April 2022. The aim was to help media workers quickly and flexibly, to enable them to continue their work immediately after they have fled war and crisis zones. The JX Fund helps exiled journalists overcome obstacles in different areas, including financial assistance, workspace, equipment, and legal

guidance. Initially, they supported Novaya Gazeta Europe and two other independent outlets.[54]

The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) launched an international solidarity campaign with Afghan journalists in August 2021 establishing the Afghanistan Safety Fund. The Network of Women in Media (NWM) in India, also started a fundraiser in support of Afghan women journalists in collaboration with Australia's Media Safety and Solidarity Fund (MSSF). The Communications Workers of America – Canada (CWA Canada) is very active in helping Afghan journalists (AIJA, 2022).

Reporters Without Borders acknowledges that journalists forced into exile may experience the hardship of feeling silenced and forgotten by their former audience. To address this, they offer a forum on their website where exiled journalists can share their views, post articles, and report on their experiences. By providing a platform for their stories, Reporters Without Borders seeks to keep their voices heard and their work relevant (RFS, 2009). RSF has assisted 650 exiled journalists throughout the world since its inception. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), based in New York, listed 452 journalists who had been forced into exile between 2010 and 2015 (Schönert, 2022).

Exiled journalists face difficulty in starting a new life. While they may physically leave their home country, their minds are often still preoccupied with the

[54] Some of the organisations, initiatives and projects that deal with or help journalists in exile include Reporters Without Borders, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), the Irish relief organisation Front Line Defenders, the Hamburg Foundation for Politically Persecuted, the EU project Protect Defenders, the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), Journalisten helfen Journalisten (Munich), Dansk Journalistforbund (Copenhagen), Dansk Journalistforbund (DJ)-International Media Support (IMS), the Writers in Exile programme from PEN Centre Germany, the British initiative Exiled Writers Ink, the Martin Roth-Initiative in Germany, Maison des Journalistes in Paris, Refugee Journalism Project in London, and Free Press Unlimited in Amsterdam. (Schönert, 2022) Schönert (2022), also see European Fund for Journalism in Exile: https://www.jx-fund.org/ (Last accessed: October 23, 2022)

issues, struggles and pain of their former lives. Many find it challenging to disengage from their country of origin's ongoing events and concerns. Whenever people are exiled from their country, they carry a piece of it with them wherever they go. Some are unable to reunite with their loved ones left behind, while others are fortunate enough to be reunited with their family and friends in their new land. Still, some individuals choose to close their eyes to life in the land of their exile, far away from their birthplace. To sum up, there is a complex network of journalistic exiles across the globe, from Iran to Latin America, from Turkey to China. A vast and intricate network of journalistic exiles exists. In conclusion, it is important to acknowledge that journalism has served as a powerful tool for political powers and a necessary force for resistance. Journalists have either reinforced or challenged ruling powers, often at great personal risk. Through their close relationships with society, ability to amplify their voices, and power to reach a broad audience, journalists have become involved in various areas of political debates.

Up to this point, my efforts have been focused on highlighting the intricate factors that have shaped the evolution of journalism in Turkey, which has resulted in the exile of numerous journalists, and the challenges faced by diaspora journalism on a global scale. It is equally important to consider the plight of journalists in other countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, Africa, Latin America, and Russia, who also face censorship and oppression. This serves as a reminder that the concept of exile journalism is not unique to Turkey. In terms of Turkey's media landscape, it has become evident that the Turkish media has been unable to function independently, due to the interference of external entities such as government and capital, as well as internal shifts in media ownership. In the 1980s, the media underwent a process of

commercialisation, while in the 2000s, the AKP government established complete dominance over it. As a result, the media during the AKP-era was heavily swayed by the state's influence.

CHAPTER 5

JOURNALISM IN EXILE: A CASE STUDY

In the upcoming chapter, I will delve into the experiences of exiled journalists who had to leave Turkey in the mid-2000s due to political reasons. Despite living abroad, many exiled journalists cover Turkey's political agenda. Exiled journalists often find it difficult to detach themselves from the agendas of their home countries, resulting in publications that primarily cater to their mother languages and old audiences of Turkey. The scarcity of local media workers further complicates matters, with foreigners typically facing more challenges securing work, especially in journalism. Despite these obstacles, some exiled journalists can connect opportunities through social connections and language proficiency. Overcoming these challenges requires access to social, cultural, and economic capital, as noted by Bourdieu. In recent years, more journalists have turned to alternative platforms such as YouTube or podcasts, with the support of civil society, public funding, or institutional publishing, to make their voices heard.

My goal is to explore the concept of diasporic space through the lens of Bourdieu's journalistic field. I intend to gain a deep understanding of the emergence of journalistic diasporic space and the factors that contributed to its formation. I will investigate the working conditions, challenges and advantages of journalists who left Turkey and relocated to various countries. It is essential to note that this diasporic space is not homogenous, encompassing a diverse range of journalists with different traditions, political concerns, and motivations. Therefore, it is not accurate to categorise all of them as 'exiled journalists'. Secondly, I am also curious about how these conditions align with journalistic ethics and whether any ethical dilemmas

unique to diaspora journalism need to be addressed. I will accordingly discuss how these journalists relate to their professionals. I will examine how these journalists interact with their peers in the diaspora, the potential risks of becoming advocates, and the danger of shifting to activism. Last but not least, diverse journalistic groups within the diaspora give rise to possible issues of conflict of interest, organisation, and solidarity. How does this dynamic manifest in the diaspora? Although Bourdieu's sociology provides tools for analysing how the journalistic field emerges, it does not explore the transformative nature of this field nor its potential for building political alliances. Therefore, I will include Gramsci's concept of counterhegemony to examine the relationships between different journalist groups in the diaspora, the conditions of solidarity and conflict, and different political alliances. I aim to analyse the potential for these groups to form alliances and serve as a counterhegemonic force.

5.1 Diversity in diaspora: Differentiation in forms of capital

In the initial segment of this chapter, I will analyse the heterogeneous diasporic space, which will be categorised into three subgroups: the Kurdish journalistic diaspora, the social democrat-socialist journalistic diaspora, and the Gülen Islamist-sectarian journalistic diaspora. I will seek the divergences and intersections within diaspora journalism, considering Bourdieuian notions of forms of capital and the journalistic field.

It is not possible to address dissident diaspora journalism as a homogenous phenomenon. Diaspora journalism encompasses diverse political beliefs, journalistic practices, and audience demographics within the diasporic mediascape. These various positions and tendencies may sometimes reflect Turkey's divisions or

represent unique perspectives on Turkey within the diasporic space. Diaspora journalism can be found across different geographies, with notable clusters in Canada, the United States, and various European countries like Germany and France. Despite the challenges in analysing journalism practices within regional diasporas, which consist of heterogeneous groups in diverse communities, there are still common patterns that can be identified, which is that foremost among these is the ability to produce alternative discourse that counters the official political power in Turkey.

5.1.1 Kurdish journalistic diaspora

From a historical perspective, diaspora journalism has a rich history in Turkey, with the roots tracing back many years. The government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) is not the first to force journalists into exile. Among three groups in the diaspora, the most established diaspora journalism is that of the Kurdish media abroad. In other words, the Kurdish diaspora in the European mediascape has the most established presence. Kurdish journalism sowed its first seeds abroad with the newspaper named Kürdistan (Kurdistan), founded in Cairo, Egypt. The newspaper published its first issue on 22 April 1898, founded by Mikdad Midhat Bedirhan. The 4-page newspaper published 31 issues until 1902. The first issue of the newspaper is celebrated as Kurdistan Journalism Day (ANF News, 2020). Kurdish exiles Celadet and Kamuran Bedirhan brothers are considered the pioneers of Kurdish publishing centred in Syria and Lebanon. Celadet Bedirhan, who created the Kurdish alphabet in Latin letters and prepared Kurdish grammar, published 57 issues of the magazine Hawar (Çağrı) between 1932 and 1943. The magazine was based in Damascus. The Ronahî (Bright) magazine, published for 28

issues between 1942 and 1945, also bore Celadet Bedirhan's signature. Kamuran Bedirhan published the magazine Roja Nû (New Day) between 1943 and 1946. Printed in Beirut, the magazine reached 73 issues. Also during this period, the magazine Stêr (Star) was published under Bedirhan's management. In addition to Celadet Bedirhan and Kamuran Bedirhan, the writing staff of Hawar and Roja Nû included Kadri Can, Osman Sabri, Nureddin Zaza and Cegerxwîn. The same cadres were also the founders of Radio Levant, a Beirut-based Kurdish language broadcaster (Taştekin, 2016, p. 29). Dozens of PKK-orientated media organisations operate in Europe. Med TV, the first TV channel established in London in 1995, was closed down in 1999 due to Turkish initiatives. Medya TV, which began operating in France in 1995, was closed in 2004. Roj TV, which started broadcasting in Denmark in 2004 as a continuation of Medya TV, had studios in Belgium and Germany. Germany banned Roj TV in 2008 and closed its studios in Wuppertal. After a lengthy legal battle, the channel was shut down in 2012. Roj TV, which broadcasts Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic programmes, was replaced by Stêrk TV and Nuçe TV. Nuçe TV was closed down in 2013 (Keles, 2015, p. 66). Stêrk TV, located in Norway, is considered the most critical propaganda channel of PKK broadcasting in Kurdish as of 2023. In addition, Medya Haber, the Kurdish news channel in Turkish, is based in Brussels. The Fırat News Agency (ANF), registered in the Netherlands, broadcasts in 11 languages with a vast network of correspondents in the Middle East and Europe. Yeni Özgür Politika newspaper, reported in the town of Neu Isenburg in Essen, Germany, publishes in Turkish, Kurdish and German. The following examples provide essential data on the long history of the Kurdish media.

Those existing Kurdish media channels in the journalistic field can be considered as Bourdieuian forms of capital, namely as social, cultural, economic and

symbolic capital. By remembering the words “at stake in the field is the accumulation of capitals” (Thomson, 2008, p. 69), this established network represents a range of possibilities for Kurdish journalists who have left Turkey since the mid-2000s. Specifically, it provides an opportunity to secure employment and establish a presence within the diasporic field. Secondly, it allows being organised and more potent in the diaspora. As social capital, the network provides an established community where members can leverage their connections to build relationships. The network serves as economic capital as it has a functioning capital wheel that can aid members in accessing resources and financial support to further their journalistic practices. Ultimately, this network is a valuable resource for Kurdish journalists in the diaspora, offering a collaborative platform.

The last generation of Kurdish exiles also found a place in this already existing media. However, latecomers established new channels as well. Other media organisations emerged during exile journalism in Germany, including Artı Gerçek and ARTI TV. ARTI TV, a diasporic broadcasting organisation, was established after the closure of IMC TV in 2016, which was created in Turkey with the participation of Kurdish people in business in the HDP’s circle (HDP: People’s Democratic Party). ARTI TV features journalists from the Kurdish and Turkish left living in Europe and began broadcasting in March 2017 from its leading studios in Cologne, Germany. The same team had launched the news portal Artı Gerçek a few weeks prior. IMC TV and ARTI TV can be seen as the media representation of the HDP project, which claims to be a party of Turkey. Celal Başlangıç, editor-in-chief of Artı TV and Artı Gerçek, defined their policy at the beginning of the broadcasting process as follows:

> Everyone is limited to their neighbourhood. We aim to open a big umbrella. We set out with this goal, aiming to reach anti-capitalist Muslims, conservatives, socialists, communists, Alevis, Kurds, Armenians, and every

> segment of society whose voices are silenced. Our only common ground is democracy and peace. The only point we oppose is racism. (Gazete Duvar, 2017)

Accordingly, it could be said that the goal is to appeal to a diverse audience and expand their reach.

Both journalists, M. and F., working in the Kurdish diasporic media, have become journalists due to political circumstances beyond their control. Neither of them studied journalism at university. This is the second time Journalist F. has had to flee his home country, who began journalism in Diyarbakır in 1988. The first time of his exile was in the 1990s when he was arrested for his journalistic activities. After leaving Turkey, he spent three years in Germany before settling in Belgium where he has been for the past four years. Journalist F. shares that becoming a journalist was not a dream of his but a necessity to amplify the voices of the Kurdish community. In his own words, "After all, I was a Kurdish young, believing that somehow our voices should be heard" (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023). Similarly, journalist M. became a journalist due to feeling a sense of duty to represent the Kurdish community and their struggles (Journalist M., personal communication, October 25, 2023). M. began her journalistic career at the Dicle News Agency (Dicle Haber Ajansı) in Diyarbakır in 2013. Due to her professional endeavours, she was apprehended in Nusaybin in 2016. Although she was released after four months, her sentence was ultimately upheld. During an attempt to depart the country, M. was detained in Bulgaria and subsequently surrendered to Turkey. It was not until 2019 that M. was finally released, after which she left the country without proper authorisation. Currently residing in Switzerland as an exile, she is unable to return to Turkey. Accordingly, the success of these two journalists can be attributed to the

supportive political climate and organised power of the Kurdish society they work in, more than their educational or familial backgrounds.

In 2016, when journalist F. had to leave Turkey for the second time, he co-founded media organisations called Artı Gerçek and ARTI TV with his colleagues in the diaspora. F. says,

> These two channels were like the prototype of the Turkish media. Our shared dedication to journalism led us to come together. As we recognised the inability to practice journalism freely in Turkey, we felt it was necessary to continue journalistic activity and defend the right to information for the public. So, we continued to be journalists in the diaspora. (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023) (See Appendix B, 1)

Later, ARTI TV established studios and staff within Turkey. Can Dündar, Ayşe Yıldırım, Ahmet Nesin, Hayko Bağdat, Ragıp Duran, Ergun Babahan, Koray Düzgören, Aris Nalcı and Fehim Işık were among the faces of ARTI TV.[55] After a change in management in 2022, ARTI TV relocated its headquarters to Istanbul. As of October 1st, 2023, the channel stopped satellite broadcasts and switched entirely to an internet platform.

ARTI TV and Artı Gerçek receive financial support from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe due to limited advertising revenues. These channels brought together journalists from the left democratic-socialist sector and the Kurdish media. This intersectionality of different positionings, political tendencies, and concerns experienced in Turkey's media is again experienced in the diaspora. From this sense, there is a continuity between Turkey's media and the diaspora. Over the decades, the Kurdish media has established numerous newspapers, magazines, TV channels, and internet platforms, making the diaspora a ready network for 'new exiles'. The network of Kurdish media spread across several European cities, which has

[55] More than one of names worked in ARTI TV and ARTI Gerçek also took part in my thesis interviews.

facilitated the development of their financial and human resources and has become an economic and social capital in the journalistic field. This media thrives on altruism, solidarity, and mutual sharing, enabling them to operate on lower budgets than commercial or professional media. Nevertheless, specific projects aimed at reaching audiences beyond the Kurdish community necessitate the employment of experienced journalists from outside their departments, increasing payment thresholds. The emergence of individual publishing opportunities on the internet, particularly on YouTube, has also provided financial independence to Kurdish journalists.

'The Kurdish question' has long been a contentious issue for Turkey's political landscape and mainstream media. Journalist F. describes the history of the Kurdish media as a journey spanning multiple countries, starting in Egypt, moving to London and Geneva and continuing (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023). Journalist F. attributes the progress of Kurdish media to political factors and technological advancements during that period, stating that:

> Even during the period of Ottoman era, for instance, TV channels and newspapers in Kurdish were still not available in Kurdistan. The technology existed in Beirut and Istanbul then. Only after the 1960s, when the Kurdish movement began to organise itself in Turkey, that media activities were carried out despite the pressures and prohibitions. (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023) (See Appendix B, 2)

F. describes this time as one where the use of the word 'Kurdish' was forbidden, and speaking Kurdish could result in a fine under the law on misdemeanours, with violence escalating during military coups.[56] During the 1990s in Turkey, the Kurdish-

[56] According to F., the Kurdish identity and language were viewed as a significant threat to the Republic of Turkey, resulting in a longstanding policy of prohibition that become increasingly severe after the 1980 coup d'état. This prohibition made any media or journalistic activity related to Kurdish culture and language impossible (Personal communication, June 18, 2023). Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow provide an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. They give the example of the state ban on the Kurdish language in the 1982 constitution, which was later reinforced by Law 2932 in October 1983, banning the use of Kurdish for information dissemination. See Kirişçi & Winrow (2003, p. 111).

oriented media faced a higher level of pressure, censorship, violence, and arrests compared to other media organisations. F. was also a victim of this repressive environment and was imprisoned for two years due to his journalistic activities. Consequently, he had to leave Turkey and experienced exile for the first time in his life. F.'s arrest was not an isolated incident. F. describes the period leading up to it as particularly challenging:

> In the 1990s, a group of friends and I published a monthly magazine with political and cultural content, and after a while that magazine turned into a weekly newspaper. However, the penalties at that time were very severe. There were murders. Nearly 70 of our Kurdish journalist friends were killed by the contra organisation, then called Hizbullah (Hezbollah), or JİTEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence Organisation).[57] All of those killed were young people with whom we had started journalism together. (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023) (See Appendix B, 3)

Due to threats to his life, he left Turkey and sought refuge in Germany in 1992. From there, he relocated to Iraqi Kurdistan, where he lived for three years. This is not a unique story of an individual, but rather exemplifies the challenges faced by the media during a particular era and marks the emergence of diaspora journalism. In the ten-year period immediately preceding the 2000s, Turkish politics was surrounded from widespread arrests to unsolved murderers. Opposition journalists also got their share of these violent state policies.[58] During the 2000s, strict impositions on the press continued within the framework of the 'Kurdish question' or 'the peace' debates. Once again, F. says that he had no choice but to leave the country for the

[57] Although JİTEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence Organisation) has never been officially recognised by state authorities, there are many sources written about the unit and its bloody actions in Turkey. Turkish Gendarmerie Officer Arif Doğan's book titled "JİTEM'i ben kurdum" (I founded JİTEM) provides very detailed information about JİTEM. Doğan (2011). Also see Duran (2006), Kurt (2015), and Çakır (2011).

[58] Enis Berberoğlu (1997) tells about the 1990s and extensive unsolved murders stating that "By 1993, unsolved murders in the Southeast were considered daily police events. It was an open secret that state-sponsored Hezbollah or direct officials were behind these murders" (p. 136). Also, Kirişçi and Winrow give the number of unsolved cases reported in the 1990s as 31 in 1991, 362 in 1992, 467 in 1993, 400 in 1994 and 92 in 1995. (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997).

second time: “In Turkey, especially after 2016[59], at every step we took, we were threatened with punishment. As a Kurdish journalist who had been arrested in the 1990s, I did not want to go through the same ordeal again” (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023). Memories of past exiles were rekindled after being exiled in Europe again for two decades, along with the accumulation of experiences.

Exile is not only experienced by Kurdish media, but also by generations. “The lack of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue as one of Turkey’s macro problems has forced many journalist colleagues of ours to migrate for generations,” states Reporters Without Borders’ Turkey Representative R. (RSF’s Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). Generations of Kurdish journalists have faced political struggle, oppression, and media censorship. R. specifies the date of spring 2015, when the peace process with the Kurdish political movement was dissolved, this put Kurdish journalists at risk of arrest (RSF’s Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). Many had to flee to Europe, joining their colleagues who had left Turkey in the 2000s and continued working in the Kurdish media. Despite the challenges, the existence of these media channels provided a working space for exiled journalists. Kurdish media, in this sense, has not only provided functional spaces in the diaspora but also built an organised community of Kurdish journalists and achieved global recognition. Since the Kurdish movement is widely known in the international area, Kurdish media is also recognised on a global scale and takes strong international support. Many exiled journalists from the Kurdish media outlets attend conferences, seminars, and panels in various countries such as Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, France, the

[59] The significance of the date lies in the fact that it marked the escalation of the ongoing conflict between the AKP and the Gülen movement, particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt. As a result, the government adopted more severe measures, and authoritarianism and oppression became more prevalent across various domains.

Netherlands, etc., organised by international press organisations, and have the opportunity to speak on Turkey's agenda. Journalist F. states that he has received invitations and participated in these events many times (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023). These events provide an excellent platform for journalists to voice their opinions and enhance their professional network. Becoming a member of press unions and holding the Belgium yellow press card helps them continue their journalistic activities. Upon arriving in Belgium, F. wasted no time in becoming a member of press unions and obtaining his Belgium yellow press card, which made him a 'professional journalist' from the first year onward. Furthermore, he joins press organisations formed by refugees, which include journalists from various nationalities (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023).

Moreover, foreign press organisations have shown solidarity during the detentions and arrests of the press in Turkey, and those organisations have shown solidarity in their own parliaments and governmental bodies on such issues concerning Turkey. It can easily be said that Kurdish media internationally receive solidarity and support from press organisations. In addition to external support like international press-media organs and political pressures by European governmental tools, solidarity and communication networks are also strong inside. Exiled journalists can benefit from the Kurdish media's international recognition and network opportunities, making the residence permit and asylum processes faster and easier. Journalist M. shares that while in Europe, she was contacted by Kurdish media who had already learned of her arrival and expressed interest in working with her (Journalist M., personal communication, October 25, 2023). The foreign press was intrigued by Journalist M.'s exile story and had already written about her while she was still in Turkey. M. notes that journalists who have recently relocated to

Europe due to investigations and legal issues in Turkey have been granted expedited residence permits; accordingly, exiled journalists can leverage the international recognition and networking opportunities offered by Kurdish media, which can make the asylum and residence permit processes smoother and quicker (Journalist M., personal communication, October 25, 2023). Here, Kurdish media possesses cultural and social capital and symbolic capital due to its international recognition since it "is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in the position to impose recognition" (Steinmetz, 2013, p. 116). This recognition positions the exiled Kurdish media in a legitimate and influential status in the journalistic field. The acknowledgement of the exiled Kurdish media has elevated its status to a legitimate and influential player in the journalistic arena. Within any given field, capitals can differ not only in type, such as economic, social, or cultural, but also in their degree of value (Swartz, 2013, p. 28). Symbolic capital, or the recognition and authority granted to capital within a field, can vary greatly. It is worth noting that the Kurdish media has received global recognition and significant symbolic worth. Additionally, the recognition of the Kurdish movement in Europe has bolstered the media's recognisability.

5.1.2 Gülen Islamist journalistic diaspora

The second group in the diasporic journalistic field, The Gülen Islamist community, has unique circumstances that shaped their opportunities differently from other groups. While they have limited experience in publishing abroad compared to the Kurdish media, the community had unparalleled economic and social networks that spanned decades. Gülen-related educational institutions have been operating in Turkey since the 1970s, and their global expansion occurred over two decades (BBC

Türkçe, 2016). With 767 schools around the world, the community has established an enormous network. After the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey used her diplomatic power to transfer some of these schools to Maarif Educational Institutions (Maarif Eğitim Okulları). This is affiliated with the Turkish Maarif Foundation (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı), which has been opened to take over the Gülen movement's schools (International Journalists Media Report, 2022). Graduates from these schools have gained significant influence in their home countries' bureaucratic, political, and economic spheres.

Like Kurdish media, Gülen media have built their own Bourdieuian sense of cultural and social capital through various institutions including channels, newspapers, and schools. Therefore, the Gülen movement could be organised in the journalistic field. So, it is important to highlight the presence of a vast corporate network consisting of offices, financial resources, representatives, educators, and journalists. This network has also functioned as a platform for media services. The Gülen Islamist community, which had close ties with the AKP government until the AKP-Gülen conflict erupted, had established international press channels like Today's Zaman. Prior to 2016, the Gülen Islamist community's media had representative offices in several capitals, including Washington, Brussels, Moscow, Cairo, London, Beijing, and Paris. This network served as a lifeline in the aftermath of the AKP-Gülen crisis. On 27 July 2016, the Gülen movement lost 16 television channels, 3 news agencies, 23 radios, 45 newspapers, 15 magazines, 29 publishing houses and distribution channels under the decree law no. 674. Despite its enormous facilities abroad, Gülen movement was unable to establish conventional media publishing abroad on the scale of Zaman Newspaper, Today's Zaman and Samanyolu TV (International Journalist Report, 2022). The last editor-in-chief of Today's

Zaman, journalist K., says that after leaving the country before the coup attempt on 15 July 2016, there was already a network related to Zaman's journalistic circle abroad and continued to work as an insured employee in Zaman Belçika, in Belgium for a year (Personal communication, October 22, 2023). Also, Gülen community journalists are now present on several platforms such as Tr724, which includes many columnists from Zaman newspaper, Bold Medya and Haberdar. Journalist S., who worked for different newspapers within the Islamist Gülen community, states she was alone when she first fled, but later, exiled journalists came together with people from Turkey, from Zaman journal and other closed newspapers, institutions of the sect (Journalist S., personal communication, October 20, 2023). They established the International Journalists Association (IJA), a network with the aforementioned institutions' participation, linked to the Gülen media.

Journalists A., S. and K., who have worked in Gülen media outlets in Turkey at once, are educated in universities in political sciences, public administration, and journalism. Before pursuing her journalism career, K. served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy at first. In 2012, K. made the decision to leave the civil service and become a reporter for Today's Zaman. By December 2015, K. found herself taking on the role of editor-in-chief after the arrest of former editor-in-chief Bülent Keneş. In March 2016, the newspaper experienced a raid and a trustee was appointed. Due to the potential risk of arrest, K. decided to flee abroad and has since resided in New Jersey. Secondly, journalist S. departed Turkey following the 15 July military coup attempt, in October 2016. Prior to her departure, S. had worked for several reputable publications, including Sabah, Zaman, Yeni Binyıl, and Yeni Hayat. After the coup attempt, all newspapers were closed, which resulted in S. losing her job. Additionally, S. faced investigations due to her reporting on the arrests of her

fellow journalists who were also subjected to violations of their rights during diaspora journalism. Thirdly, journalist A. began his career in journalism at Zaman newspaper in 2000 and remained there until his departure from the country.[60] He served as a correspondent for the Prime Minister's Office in Istanbul and Ankara before briefly transitioning to editorial work in 2009, but ultimately returned to field reporting. In addition to covering AKP headquarters and organisations, he delved into topics such as tender dossiers, smuggling, and corruption allegations. A. was charged with 'making terrorist propaganda' and 'being a member of a terrorist organisation,' leading to his placement on the grey wanted list. He now resides in Sweden with his family and is unable to return to Turkey.

Regarding their conditions in the diaspora, journalist S. talks about struggling to find work as a journalist and mentions having worked in different fields, like in a telephone warehouse, caring for patients, and cleaning houses after arriving in a new country. Despite being an experienced journalist in Turkey, journalist S. had to start over in a new country where her previous work experience seemed to have no value. Later, S. resumes her career as a journalist in the diaspora but notes that there were times when her earnings from journalism were insufficient, prompting her to take on additional work (Journalist S., personal communication, October 20, 2023). Similarly, journalist A. reiterates his desire to make a living and mentions that he is seeking for various job opportunities, ranging from driving a taxi to working as a cashier in a supermarket. He acknowledges that his circumstances require more than

[60] The importance of the Zaman newspaper is that Zaman was previously associated with Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the Gülen Islamist community, and its editorial stance was sympathetic towards both the Gülen community and the AKP government. However, following a falling out with the AKP government and the attempted military coup on July 15th, the newspaper was shuttered via the Decree with Force of Law (KHK: Kanun Hükmünde Kararname). Former staff and contributors were subsequently subjected to legal proceedings related to their alleged involvement in the coup attempt. (Akgül, Bianet, 2017)

just journalism to sustain himself financially (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023). Similarly, although K. still produces content on YouTube within the realm of journalism, she acknowledges that she may no longer be perceived as a journalist. Due to insufficient earnings in the field of journalism, K. made the decision to depart from the profession. She pursued a teaching certificate, underwent training in the United States, and has been fully dedicated to teaching since 2019 (Journalist K., personal communication, October 22, 2023). As clear, the most fundamental concern is the financial difficulties and the absence of means of livelihood. These people are in a position exactly opposite to that of the Kurdish media. These individuals possess a high level of education and maintain strong connections with the political elite. Their significant financial resources allow them to exert considerable influence within local social networks, which is further bolstered by the well-organised Gülen media. This evidence suggests that the Gülen media was once a formidable force in the field of power, even though its position has since been lost. The Gülen movement's relations with the political power media was not merely a friendly one. The Gülen movement held a certain level of status and power in specific areas. It is important to note that dominance is not solely achieved through direct and forceful actions by a group of agents called the 'dominant class' who possess coercive powers. Rather, it is the indirect result of a complicated action network that arises within intersecting constraints. At the final step, Gülen community lost its considerably strong position after political conflicts with AKP government occurred (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 34). Due to a decline in reputation within the journalistic community, these individuals are now having difficulties to continue practising their profession.

In addition, the utilisation of mass media technology via broadcasting channels and social media platforms such as YouTube presents potential financial opportunities. Gülen community's journalists utilise YouTube for video broadcasting, relying on advertising revenue and donations from Patreon followers as one of the primary sources of financial support. As of 4 November 2023, Bold Medya has 426 thousand followers, 1400 videos and 222 million views on YouTube; Tr724 has 142 thousand followers, 4700 videos and 107 million views. In personal publishing on YouTube, Cevheri Güven reached 644 thousand followers and 378 videos with 208 million views, and Erkam Tufan reached 202 thousand followers and 1600 videos with 103 million views.[61] It appears that some journalist had to turn to other works for a living, such as opening a restaurant or becoming a taxi driver like Said Sefa and Abdulhamid Bilici have done, while also pursuing journalism as a secondary occupation. When speaking to a diverse audience, it's important to consider the various groups within the diaspora. For instance, the Gülen community's broadcasts reach a large and established audience. Similarly, press outlets that focus on Kurdish issues have their own dedicated readership. However, it would be inaccurate to assume that these groups do not have any listeners or readers outside their niche audience. As a result, content varies depending on political tendencies and concerns to appeal to different segments of the audience. The intersection of these groups does not follow a consistent pattern.

At this point, I would like to highlight the role of technological advancements in enabling the emergence of exile media. Thanks to both technical and institutional

[61] YouTube channels of Bold Medya: https://www.youtube.com/@BoldMedya, Tr724: https://www.youtube.com/tr724, Cevheri Güven's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/@cevheriguven, Erkam Tufan's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwkGMt3RQ-V3IyhAJaQt-9Q. (Last accessed: November 4, 2023)

transformations in mass media, journalism has evolved into a profession that can be practised independently of specific locations and institutions. Researcher Diana Bossio (2017) offers a simple comparison of two timelines to illustrate this shift: in 1997, a typical day for a journalist involved checking newspaper headlines, joining editorial meetings, and talking to sources on the phone. In contrast, in 2017, a journalist's typical day involves checking their smartphone and social media accounts immediately after waking up, working with a small team or as a freelancer, following multiple stories, and regularly updating their social media accounts (p. 2). This shift reflects a move from traditional print journalism to a more digital and individualistic approach. Many journalists who have been exiled from their own countries have resorted to using their personal social media accounts to share news and information with their audiences. Popular platforms like Twitter and YouTube have proven to be particularly useful in this regard, as they allow these journalists to both generate income and increase their visibility. Some journalists, such as those who work for publications like Gülen media, have created a loyal following and are being watched by many.

Diversity within diasporic communities is evident in the range of political stances taken by various groups. The media associated with Gülen is confronted with a distinct challenge that of left-socialist or Kurdish diaspora journalism: the issue of credibility. Engaged-advocacy journalism carries the risk of losing credibility, which is a major concern. Journalists, who previously maintained cordial relations with the AKP government, but later became opponents due to the AKP-Gülen conflict, are being scrutinised by both the opposition and pro-AKP media. The Gülen diasporic media has redirected its attention towards human rights violations, with many of them transitioning from a statist to a more human rights-focused activism stance.

Journalist S. expresses disappointment in those she once considered her colleagues, who have now labelled her as a terrorist: “I used to have close connections, had a lot of friends in the ruling AKP media including Yeni Şafak, Sabah, Star... However, they have chosen to smear our reputation by branding us as enemies, despite knowing us well” (Journalist S., personal communication, October 20, 2023). On the other hand, “Kurdish journalism boasts a rich history and tradition in the diaspora, particularly when compared to the exiled Gülen community,” F. states (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023). F. explains that the media of the Gülen community turned into very large media organisations in a very short period of time with the aid of state facilities; however, they failed to anticipate potential conflicts of interest, ultimately resulting in a challenging and unpredictable exile experience for affiliated journalists (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023). It is seen that the Gülen media has not reached the international recognition and status that the Kurdish media have. From this sense, apart from the inner crisis of activism, there is a problem of reputation as well. Despite possessing social and economic capital and its own audience, Gülen media is presently grappling with a reputation crisis. This reputation and prestige crisis results in a dearth of symbolic capital in the diasporic field (Barnard, 2018, p. 35).

5.1.3 Social democrat-left journalistic diaspora

The group of left-wing democratic-socialist exiled journalists, the third complex diaspora, did not have the same level of established social or economic capital in the Kurdish or Islamist diasporic mediascape. Although there is some elbow contact with the Kurdish media, this group does not have a direct relationship with it, leading to a lack of social and economic capital. The economic capital of this group is possible

through more individual efforts. Some exiled journalists have found individual success through YouTube publishing; others have received funding from European institutions. The #Özgürüz platform founded by journalist Can Dündar receives support from Correctiv. Some journalists continue to work for media outlets they were previously employed by in Turkey, like Fehim Taştekin, who contributes to Al-Monitor and BBC Türkçe in addition to Gazete Duvar. On the other hand, one of the most important financial resources for journalists who have been granted refugee status is the minimum subsistence allowance and rent subsidy they receive from the state. For those granted refugee status, the minimum subsistence allowance and rent subsidy from the state are crucial financial resources.

In addition to the channels established by exiled journalists across various platforms, a number of international media outlets that broadcast in Turkish, such as Deutsche Welle (DW), WDR (Westdeutscher Rundfunk), Die Tageszeitung (TAZ), and Die ZEIT have also employed journalists. Faced with pressure and censorship, some journalists who were unable to secure positions with national Turkish channels and newspapers have turned to international media outlets, including Turkish bureaus like BBC News Türkçe based in Turkey. Compared to national newspapers, international media outlets like BBC News offer International media outlets like the BBC News have better space for manoeuvre and an autonomous journalistic principle compared to national newspapers.

For instance, journalist D. is one of the journalists from Turkey who works most frequently with the German press, this includes a regular documentary series with DW television and being one of the authors of the Gorky theatre. However, D. has not applied for asylum, nor has he applied for state support, but continues his journalistic activities in Germany with his own efforts and the support he receives,

like #Özgürüz's funding by Correctiv (Journalist D., personal communication, November 2, 2023). Journalist T. has the same conditions as journalist D. As T. is not a political asylum seeker, he does not receive any state aid, rent or financial support. T. does not write regularly for the French media, but he continues to work for other international organisations like BBC and Al-Monitor. He continues to attend conferences, interviews and book signings in European countries (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023). It is evident that journalists in the third group rely on their personal efforts and social networks to provide for themselves. Journalist B. states that:

> I was at a time when my popularity in Turkey was high, so I was a bit lucky. With this advantage, I was able to continue my journalism profession. Not everyone could do this. Many had to quit journalism because of not maintaining their lives. (Journalist B., personal communication, April 8, 2023) (See Appendix B, 4)

Some exiled journalists have a better reputation than others in continuing their profession abroad since the ability to sustain their profession varies depending on their individual backgrounds and social connections. As Journalist B. acknowledged, many of his colleagues had to leave journalism due to difficult living conditions and seek different jobs, as mentioned above in the case of Gülen diasporic space. Journalist B. himself has been able to continue with his stand-up show, television program, columns, and screenplay to maintain a standard of living for his family. Accordingly, popularity and recognition here become highly advantageous in the journalistic field for good positions.

The third group of journalists has a more complex structure compared to the other two. They do not fit into either the Gülen Islamist media or Kurdish media and remain in a more individualistic and disorganised position. Most of these journalists have been educated in well-established schools, have had the opportunity to go

abroad, and are recognised by national and international media outlets. Journalist T. has an extensive background in journalism, having worked as a reporter, columnist, editor, and foreign news director for various reputable newspapers including Yeni Şafak, Tercüman, Radikal, Hürriyet, and Al-Monitor. However, his tenure at Radikal was cut short when the publication ceased operations, and his employment at Hürriyet was also terminated. He was subjected to various investigations stemming from his critical writings and books on Turkey's foreign policy. In light of threats to his personal safety by far-right Islamist jihadist groups, T. was forced to leave the country, with his book subsequently being banned and confiscated. Despite the confidential nature of ongoing investigations against him, T. still continues to write for Al-Monitor, Gazete Duvar, and BBC News Türkçe while residing in Paris for the past more than 6 years. Secondly, journalist E. began his journalism career in 1984 at Yeni Asır in İzmir. He went on to hold various positions including editor-in-chief at Sabah newspaper, Ankara Representative at Akşam newspaper, and general coordinator, editorial director, and columnist at numerous other newspapers such as Hürriyet, Karar, Millet, and Bugün. E., along with Yavuz Baydar and İlhan Tanır, established Ahval as a branch of Al Arab newspaper in London, where he served as editor-in-chief for three years before joining Artı Gerçek. For the past year, he has been publishing exclusively on YouTube. E. and his family were prepared for their departure from Turkey, and there were no legal proceedings against him prior to his exit. He is currently residing in Canada and is unaware of any ongoing investigations. Thirdly, journalist B. is working in the media with almost two decades of experience in various roles, including hosting radio and television programs, writing columns, providing commentary, and moderating discussions. He has faced persecution for his work that has delved into sensitive subjects such as the Armenian

genocide and the Kurdish issue, which are considered ‘red lines’ by the Turkish state. As a result, he was forced to leave Turkey in the face of legal action against him and, more importantly, direct threats to his safety. Currently, he resides in Germany. Lastly, journalist D., who served as the editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet newspaper, has been involved in several trials in the past, including the Gezi Trial, the Cumhuriyet Trial, the Özgür Gündem Trial, the 2014 MİT’s rigs case (MİT: National Intelligence Organisation of Turkey), which resulted in prison sentences. Following the events of July 15th, his name was added to the list of journalists to be arrested, and he was unable to return to the country while vacationing abroad. Currently, he resides in Berlin. The gathering of cultural and social capital has enabled diaspora journalists to persevere in their work in the face of difficult political conditions. As emphasised by Bourdieu, symbolic power and capital play a crucial role in creating and maintaining social hierarchies (Swartz, 2013, p. 21). In the diasporic sphere, all members of the third group of journalists are skilled in multiple languages and experienced in navigating diasporic contexts. These cultural resources and symbolic classifications assist them in adapting to the unique challenges of diasporic journalism.

Accordingly, in order to attain an internationally recognised status as a journalist and be well-respected within a specific community, one must possess not only the necessary skills and knowledge but also a certain degree of *social* and *cultural* capital, which requires more than being a regular reporter. It is because the ability of newsagents and organisations to establish and uphold different forms of capital, such as social connections, educational background and qualifications, finances, and status, greatly influences their position within this field (Barnard, 2018, p. 178-179). Being an analyst at a globally recognised broadcasting organisation like the BBC, serving as the editor-in-chief of a popular national newspaper in Turkey, or

being a renowned television programmer are all significant accomplishments that can enhance one's reputation and hold considerable prestige within the journalistic field. This capital is a valuable asset for journalists, helping them to establish credibility and trustworthiness among their audience or readers. Without this capital, it can be difficult for journalists to gain access to certain sources of information or to build relationships with key stakeholders in their field. Therefore, cultivating and utilising social and cultural capital is an essential component of being a respected journalist in today's global media landscape. Although journalists from the social democrat-left wing do not have an organised power like Gülen media or the Kurdish media, a few of them have that form of capital. For the vast majority, however, it is not possible to fulfil these criteria. This is why most people do not go beyond being refugees after crossing the border.

In conclusion, it is noticed that exiled journalists who are not associated with Kurdish or Gülen Islamist media operate independently and through their own networks. The diasporic field of journalism is diverse, with various opportunities and challenges. Kurdish media is established with a long-standing background. The Gülen Islamist media also has its own capital already established: In the past, they held considerable power to shape politics and media in Turkey. While still present today, it is notably smaller and weaker and turned to an opponent position. The structure of the leftist-socialist media diaspora is not fixed either; rather, journalists often rely on their personal networks and symbolic capital to maintain a presence in the media. While these groups may occasionally interact within the diaspora, particularly within Kurdish and leftist circles, they tend to remain largely separate and operate within existing paradigms. It is not feasible to classify the various voices in the diaspora as 'exile journalism' under a single label. Journalists in exile hold

different positions within the same journalistic field, and some have more advantageous positions than others.

5.2 The ethics in journalism: Living conditions in the diaspora

The field of journalism operates under a set of established norms as well, and diasporic journalism is no exception. Essentially, the journalistic field operates under specific rules that new players must learn alongside basic skills when starting out (Thomson, 2008, p. 68). The diasporic field establishes its ethical journalistic rules based on acceptable standards of journalism. Fluency in a foreign language is a prerequisite for securing a coveted role in this journalistic sector. Also, having prior international experience and a well-established network of professional contacts are essential requirements, as mentioned in the previous section. Having reputable and international recognition makes it simpler for exiled journalists to live and work abroad. However, starting a new life in a foreign land is a challenging process, particularly if censorship and repression are still prevalent. Living in the diaspora entails following the laws and regulations of other states in different geographies, each with its own unique conditions, standards, and procedures. Adapting to a new country often requires integration, which may be mandatory for some and voluntary for others. Learning the language spoken in the country and attending courses are part of this process. Residence permits and asylum applications can vary from country to country. Journalists in exile are spread out across different countries and cities, from France to Switzerland and from the USA to Canada. This demonstrates that each diasporic space is subject to different legal procedures and policies in its integration and adaptation process.

Journalists seeking refuge in foreign countries are often acknowledged by local authorities. RSF has established specific criteria for evaluating these journalists, resulting in some being recognised as reputable professionals on the global stage, while others remain classified as refugees. RSF provides essential aid to journalists who have been forced into exile and are seeking asylum in foreign countries, as well as those who require other forms of assistance. The reports that RSF compiles on these journalists are closely monitored by government agencies, which is especially crucial during the asylum application process. This documentation serves as proof of the journalist's professional work and adherence to ethical journalism standards. These administrative steps are meant to streamline legal procedures for journalists. According to RSF's Turkey representative R., asylum applications in France and Germany are handled by specialised units dedicated to assisting international journalists. These units meticulously verify all information, responses, and supporting documents submitted with the applications (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). According to R., states want to verify whether journalists seeking asylum or temporary protection have a serious enough case to justify their request by legal experts and regional representatives. RSF plays a crucial role in this process. RSF uses various criteria to determine if the documentation sent by the journalist belongs to the court, what it means, whether the court decision is of the nature mentioned in the documents, and whether it is of such a dimension that it threatens the journalist's security and livelihood in that country. Based on these criteria, RSF develops arguments to protect the journalist. However, there are sometimes weak cases that RSF has to put aside. Additionally, there are situations where RSF is not able to provide support to journalists. In that sense, RSF only provides support to individuals who meet journalist criteria. According to R., it

is important to uphold ethical journalistic principles in order to protect exiled journalists and ensure smooth verification processes. These principles of journalism involve avoiding xenophobia, violence, terrorism, propaganda, and blasphemy. “As journalism professionals, our aim is to prevent any further harm to journalistic principles,” R. mentions (RSF’s Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). RSF is involved in matters that are sensitive to life safety. The journalistic criteria underlined by RSF are international ethical standards for objective journalism. These norms are widely accepted within the field as essential for journalistic objectivity. Failure to meet these criteria raises concerns about journalistic professionalism, which will be further explored in the following pages.

When Turkish passports are cancelled, exiled journalists are often left with no status abroad, forcing them to seek asylum. While some journalists apply for asylum right away, others seek alternative legal options. For example, when journalist F.’s Turkish passport was cancelled due to ongoing court cases in Turkey, he applied for asylum while his residence permit in Germany was still valid, and eventually received migrant status. Despite having worked abroad for seven years and paying taxes like any other citizen, F. states that he does not receive any financial support or subsidies (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023). Similarly, journalist S. and journalist K. had to apply for asylum when their Turkish passport expired and were not renewed due to lawsuits against them (Journalists S. and K., personal communications, October 20 and 22, 2023). K. was at the airport, ready to fly to the USA, when she received the news that her passport had been cancelled. She had planned to stay in America for a year, but the cancellation caused her to be removed from the plane. Fearing for her safety, she decided to apply for asylum in Brussels instead of returning to Turkey, where she was asked to go. Later, she

applied for a visa and eventually made it to the USA (Journalist K., personal communication, October 22, 2023). Differently from passport cancellations, journalist A. and his family immediately applied for asylum in Sweden along with his family upon their arrival at Stockholm airport. A. received financial support from the state as an asylum seeker and participated in mandatory two-year language courses. Scholarship support was also available for those who wished to continue their education beyond two years. Once asylum seekers were deemed capable of finding employment, these forms of support were discontinued. A chose to waive this right after generating income through his writing, YouTube broadcasts, and Patreon donations.

Some journalists, like T., reside in France with a professional residence permit, rather than seeking asylum. As a non-asylum seeker, T. has not received any government assistance or social support but continues to support himself and his family through writing in multiple locations. Despite the challenges, T. prefers to stand on his own and not rely on state support. He has found additional sources of income through YouTube broadcasts, book sales, and conference invitations. These have been sufficient for both his family in Istanbul and himself to sustain their seven-year exile. While he is able to earn enough as a journalist, T. acknowledges that his inability to renew his Turkish passport means he has reached a dead end in terms of his residence card (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023).

Journalist B. faced unique circumstances due to holding citizenship in multiple countries, including Turkey. However, B. was fortunate to have unlimited residence in Germany thanks to his Armenian citizenship, meaning he did not need to seek asylum. Thanks to the Armenian state's policy of issuing passports to anyone with Armenian heritage, B. was able to live in Berlin with unlimited residence rights

as a journalist and artist. B.'s wife and children were also able to obtain German citizenship due to their circumstances. Despite these benefits, B. notes that Turkish citizens facing arrest warrants are often unable to obtain or renew passports, leaving them with no choice but to apply for asylum. B.'s children even faced difficulties obtaining passports, which limited their ability to travel for several years (Journalist B., personal communication, April 8, 2023).

Journalists abroad sometimes face restrictions in receiving consular services in addition to passport cancellations. These restrictions are often imposed for political reasons without a legal basis. RSF's representative R. describes this as a form of oppression that extends beyond the borders of Turkey, affecting journalists in exile as well (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). RSF issued a press release to draw attention to this issue, characterising limitations on diplomatic services as a threat and pressure. The release also highlighted the case of journalist Fehim Taştekin, whom R. had followed closely during his time abroad. Recent incidents, such as the stabbing of journalist Erk Acarer in Germany, the ongoing trials of journalist Can Dündar in Turkey, and the detention of journalist Akın Ongun through Interpol in Greece, further illustrate the pressing need for support and protection for journalists working abroad. RSF characterises this as one of the most unique and worrying types of pressure that has emerged in recent years and interprets that this example sheds light on the situation of many exiled journalists abroad. R. followingly says,

> If your passport expires while abroad and there are legal proceedings against you in Turkey related to your writings, signed books, or interviews, consulates may not take action on your passport. This can force journalists to either live illegally or seek asylum, potentially against their wishes and face the legal process. Limitations on consular services are another concerning example of this type of pressure. (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023) (See Appendix B, 5)

The challenge starts prior to arriving in a new place. The journey of journalists transitioning to their new home countries is often fraught with challenges and heartache. Journalist A.'s experience was no exception. Before finally seeking asylum in Sweden, he and his family had already endured numerous obstacles. Initially, they travelled to the Philippines but found it lacking in democracy and the rule of law and did not feel safe either. Ultimately, their move to Europe was a last resort, driven by their desire for a better life (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023). "I left the country and travelled to the Philippines at the end of November. Even before the elections on November 1, 2015, I had already decided that I would leave Turkey if the *AKP* remained in power," says journalist A.:

> At that time, my wife was on maternity leave, and our daughter was only three months old, while my son was five years old. We did not have enough money to live in any other country, and we also did not have visas for England, Canada, or America. Later, my wife and children joined me, and we planned to return to Turkey within two months since we could not afford to stay any longer. My wife was going to start working, and I was going to look for a new job to take care of the children. (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023) (See Appendix B, 6)

Shortly afterwards, the 15 July coup attempt took place, and among many journalists, his name was on the list on Twitter as a potential arrest target. On 25 December, his house in Ankara was raided twice a day by terror police with heavy machine guns. The possibility of returning to Turkey has completely disappeared. A. says that it is a government policy to keep silence and intimidate journalists by putting them in prison: "I had to leave the country and continued to write and speak in order not to be buried in silence, not to disappear in that darkness" (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023).

Another challenging route belongs to journalist M. After being released from prison for the second time, M. illegally goes to Greece. After staying in Greece for

seven months, she travels to Romania and then to Switzerland, where she finally applies for asylum. M. has to walk from Greece to Romania:

> I was on my own. I was with another group of refugees, but I did not know anyone who came with me. Kilometres of road... As I was walking towards Albania, I looked back once at the mountains and hills we passed over... I do not remember how many hills I left behind. Along the way, there were moments when I felt out of breath, weak, and lonely, but I kept going. When I reflect on it now, I find it hard to believe that I actually did it. I often wonder how I was able to accomplish such a feat. (Journalist M., personal communication, October 25, 2023) (See Appendix B, 7)

As a woman, undertaking this journey brings about certain challenges. M. says that there were women who came to Europe after her, but she did not recommend this path to any of them. On the road, they were hearing stories of refugees who were caught between Serbia and Romania, who were beaten by law enforcers and sent back, or of women who were raped. Journalist M. states that she felt a huge fear of something like this happening to her:

> Besides these horror stories, we were around 15 to 20 people on the road, and sometimes we were coming across other refugee groups. One of them was a group of maybe 70-80. I saw a woman among them breastfeeding a baby in her arms… I remember I felt more lucky when I saw that woman with her baby. (Journalist M., personal communication, October 25, 2023) (See Appendix B, 8)

After enduring a challenging journey, journalist M. managed to obtain her residence permit in a remarkably short time. Additionally, she receives both moral and material support from the municipality and is currently attending a language course in Switzerland. Just like A.'s unwavering determination towards journalism, M. is persistent in pursuing her passion for journalism no matter what obstacles she may face:

> I have always maintained that I will continue writing no matter where I am, my dedication to journalism will never falter. This has been my lifelong motto. I held onto this belief even during my time in prison... Although our access to news was limited and newspapers were not permitted, I never lost my passion for journalism. I made sure to keep that flame burning within me. Now, it has been almost two years since my arrival here and I have been

> working for a television channel. I have been working in Kurdish media in exile for the past two years and will continue to do so. (Journalist M., personal communication, October 25, 2023) (See Appendix B, 9)

The practice of journalism in the diasporic space presents a number of obstacles. A field of diaspora journalism is formed and institutionalised within certain acceptances, proficiency in multiple languages, exposure to foreign cultures, a solid reputation within the journalistic field, and a strong social network are all essential to navigating the diaspora of journalism. "Journalistic field is an ongoing battle of legitimisation" and norms of the field play a significant role in determining one's status as a journalist (Barnard, 2018, p. 44). When these conditions cannot be met, it becomes difficult to maintain international journalistic standards and be accepted as a 'reputable' journalist, leading to some ethical problems in journalism. In the following section I will critically analyse the ethical and objective journalism approach and activism within the emergence of diasporic journalistic field.

5.2.1 The potential risks of transitioning towards activism

It is evident that some journalists working in diasporic media operate within recognised journalism ethics, while others operate outside these boundaries and shift towards activism. Considering the above, it is essential to examine the reasons and consequences of such a shift and its impact on journalistic ethics. By doing so, we can gain a better understanding of the complex nature of journalism in the diasporic space and the challenges faced by journalists working outside their home country.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bourdieu's perspective on professions suggests that they develop inherent rules that distinguish them from other occupations. Just as with any other profession, the field of journalism also has distinct rules. Bourdieu is particularly interested in the autonomy of these fields,

which refers to their limited ability to develop independently of external pressures from the state or capital (Bourdieu, 2005). It is common sense that journalism has the particular aim to serve the public (Conboy, 2004; Berry, 2008). For a journalistic practice to be more independent, it needs to have "relatively few formal ties to the political and economic fields, little to no institutional oversight, lower standards for objectivity, and a distinctly different habitus" (Barnard, 2018, p. 41). However, achieving this is difficult for a weakly autonomous journalistic field, as Bourdieu illustrates (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 33). Concordantly, in the second chapter, I explained how and why establishing an autonomous journalistic field in Turkey could not be possible due to constant interventions by the state and capital to the press and the media. My claim is that no journalistic practice can be positioned independently of any political and sociological debates by being capable of getting rid of subjectivity and cultural-social biases and by eluded power relations as well as economic pressures. However, in terms of ethics, the field of journalism is highly reliant on the principles of ethics, which include critical thinking, accuracy, fairness, and balance. In a word, the aim of ethics in journalism is accountability (Glasser & Ettema, 2008, p. 512).

Throughout its evolution within the context of media ethics and objective standards, journalism has pursued various aims. These include reporting and sharing information, interpreting events, educating the public, shaping public opinion, promoting reform or revolution, championing specific causes, and, serving the public, a political party, or a state (Ward, 2011, p. 71). During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the field of journalism saw the emergence of a modern professional code of ethics. This was largely due to the efforts of journalists organising themselves into professional associations. These groups, both at the state and

national level, including organisations such as the Society of Professional Journalists, developed codes of ethics that emphasised professionalism, independence, truth-seeking, and objectivity (Ward, 2011, p. 101). The prevailing belief regarding journalism is that the established ethical guidelines and professional codes of conduct remain relevant and applicable today. In terms of ethics in journalism in the diasporic field, journalist D. raises valid concerns about the quality of diasporic journalism and its ability to uphold international standards of journalism (Journalist D., personal communication, November 2, 2023). D. notes the challenges of accessing reliable news sources, the shortage of qualified personnel, the difficulty in verifying information from government officials or lawful authorities, and limited opportunities to reach audiences directly: "This is like there has been an earthquake, there is no electricity, no water, the possibilities are very limited, and we are trying to do something by groping" (Journalist D., personal communication, November 2, 2023). These obstacles have resulted in what D. describes as a state of emergency journalism. As D. observes, many broadcasting organisations lack transparent financial sources, which raises questions about their reliability. D. acknowledges that emotions and biases can sometimes cloud judgment and blur the line between journalism and activism. Ultimately, D. questions whether the work being done in the name of journalism truly meets the standards expected of the profession.

Journalist T. and journalist B. also both agree that being in exile or physically distant from news sources can detract from the quality of journalism. In foreign policy writing, like in other forms of journalism, it is important to familiarise oneself with the texture of the region being written about. Journalist T. emphasises the importance of being in the local environment and directly interacting with the people to truly understand the habits, routines, and relationships with society. Although

writing about foreign policy from afar is possible, it can be a disadvantage when it comes to truly understanding the nuances of the region:

> Whether you write about Turkey, Syria, Egypt, or Lebanon… I know what it means to be there in person. I have first-hand experience of being in these places and interacting with the locals. Therefore, I have a deeper understanding of the people, their routines, relations… Even when I write about these places from a distance, my knowledge and familiarity with these regions enable me to convey their realities accurately. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 10)

The issue of deficient journalism certainly extends beyond just physical distance. For some, writing from a distance significantly shifts their work, resulting in either more restrained or bolder writing. Journalist D. notes one benefit of remote writing: it allows one to rest easy knowing that "law enforcement will not come knocking at the door the next day" (Journalist D., personal communication, November 2, 2023). On the downside, there is a common ground; writing remotely means being far removed from news sources and colleagues. As journalist T. put it, "writing about a place where you cannot feel, see, hear, or breathe creates a feeling of alienation and living in a bubble" (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023). Meanwhile, journalist B. says they "do not have a finger on the pulse of the people in Turkey" (Journalist B., personal communication, June 18, 2023). While T. admits to writing more cautiously, M. and F. claim that their writing is now bolder and more incisive. B. and E., for example, have similar views and state that they have not felt any change and have continued as before. Each has their own reasons. M. feels that censorship has been a major issue for her. She notes that in Turkey, she felt as though she had to hold back, but now that she is in a more open environment, she is able to express herself more courageously. F. also notes that he is able to speak more freely now, but he still uses certain words that were once considered 'forbidden' in Turkey.

He refused to compromise his principles, and even when he was invited to speak on mainstream media channels in Turkey, he refused to tone down his language:

> When I was invited to appear on mainstream media channels in Turkey, I was politely asked to avoid using certain terms like 'Kurdistan'. However, each and every time, I refused to appear on those broadcasts each and every time and made no concessions. (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023) (Appendix B, 11)

Journalist T. notices a shift in the way he approaches writing. Now, he strives for more control. He explains that he does not want his family or the newspaper he worked for to suffer the consequences of his words. "I have become more cautious," he says,

> The thought of others paying for my writing forces me to hold back. In Turkey, the police would take me, but now my loved ones could be in danger. My newspaper is in a precarious position, while I am relatively safe. I have had to reign myself in to avoid using the newspaper or my family as a shield. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 12)

T. admits that this approach is not ideal for a journalist, as it goes against their instinct, but he feels it is necessary to avoid imposing on others.

The high level of emotional intensity also poses a challenge for professional journalism. According to Nel Ruigrok (2010), there are various situations where journalism can become activism, such as when it takes a partisan stance in politics, advocates for a specific cause in a social context, or takes sides in a conflict (p. 86). Exiled journalists often become the subject of their own reporting, resulting in more emotionally charged interpretations, comments, and criticisms in their work, whether deliberate or unintentional. When one infuses their writing with ideas and emotions, such as expressing anger and sadness, and becomes more invested, it can lead to a shift from journalism to activism. While some journalists have maintained a professional distance, others have become active participants in debates (Ruigrok, 2010, p. 85). Journalist M. explains that after moving to Switzerland, she has focused

more on exposing the AKP's authoritarian policies and her thoughts have become more hardened and radicalised. She now adds her comments and thoughts much more frequently:

> In Turkey, when I wrote something on social media, I would remind myself that I was a journalist working for a press agency, and therefore, I should only share news and refrain from including my own opinions. However, here it is the opposite. I have started to express my thoughts and add comments much more frequently. Distance has created this change. On the one hand, I write more boldly, but on the other hand, I am not in touch with the news. I am unable to talk to people in person or walk around neighbourhoods, which is killing the reflex of journalism, and this is what I regret the most. (Journalist M., personal communication, October 25, 2023) (See Appendix B, 13)

According to the Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the division between journalism and activism among exiled journalists can be seen as an exaggerated representation of the media polarisation in Turkey (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). RSF's representative R. states that during the 20 years of AKP's government rule, they have made efforts to own and control the capitalist media through the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF: Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu) and have been successful in doing so. As a result, only one-fifth of the media has managed to survive, but under difficult circumstances such as advertising bans, judicial harassment, and exclusion by public institutions. Additionally, it has become increasingly challenging for journalists to work abroad because of factors such as the lack of transparency, news channel blockage from Turkey, difficulty accessing reliable information from the public or private sector, and the fact that journalists' agenda is often distracted only with advertisements or ideological bulletins. Under such conditions, R. highlights the importance of maintaining professional ethics in journalism and activism:

> In highly polarised political environments, the lines between journalism and activism can become blurred. This becomes a struggle for existence. For instance, when journalists lack other platforms to write on, social media may become their only means of existence. Furthermore, in Turkey, objective

> information is often buried so deeply that even journalists who have embraced activism may be commended for exposing the truth to the public. (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023) (See Appendix B, 14)

As oppressive regimes increase censorship and repression, journalists tend to rely more heavily on social media, leading to more frequent and provocative commentary. This shift often results in an increase in sensationalist posts and a more activist perspective. These debates are particularly pronounced in exiled journalism practised in the diaspora, where they can be more frequent and harshly expressed. It is also accepted as a risk for professional journalism. It is common sense that when an exiled journalist becomes an activist, they may lose objectivity and credibility, as this move can damage the professional standards of journalism (Skjerdal, 2010). However, the role of journalists has recently been a subject of academic debate as well. In a traditional sense, journalists were seen as passive information transmitters; however, the idea that they should be more interventionist in their profession is gaining attention, and this is discussed under the passive-active dimensions of journalism. The passive-active and neutral-advocate dimensions reflect the extent to which journalists act independently and take a stand on an issue (Hanitzsch, 2007, p. 372). The traditional institutional roles of journalism are being redefined with the concept of interventionism: Journalists can either follow a passive agenda based on objectivity or embrace a more proactive approach to promote values (Budivska & Orlova, 2017, p. 144). Given the challenging circumstances under which journalism is practised in the diaspora, it is important to recognise these unavoidable conditions and embrace a proactive approach. From this sense, rather than discrediting the journalism practised in these conditions as illegitimate, I would argue it is more accurate to acknowledge that diaspora journalism is being carried out under extraordinary circumstances and with significant effort.

5.2.2 Crisis of legitimacy

Facing political persecution can lead journalists down a path of more radicalisation and politicisation in the emergence of the journalistic diaspora. This intensity of emotions can result in a more defensive, militant, and propagandist approach to journalistic practices. In the case of Kurdish media, this tendency manifests as more militant and propagandist reflexes as they mentioned in the previous section, whereas for *Gülen* media, it can lead to a crisis of legitimacy. Upholding journalistic integrity becomes increasingly difficult under these circumstances. Maintaining credibility is a problem which advocacy journalism carries. Advocacy journalism abandons the principles of objectivity, is more interventionist and advocates for a certain cause (Ginosar & Reich, 2022, p. 665-666). Journalists who previously had cordial relationships with the AKP government but later became opponents due to the AKP-Gülen conflict are under scrutiny from both opposition and pro-AKP media, as previously mentioned. Critical and opposition groups accuse the Gülenist media of being insincere because they were once on the same side as the political power. Meanwhile, those who support the AKP government view these journalists as 'traitors'. This conflict also led to divisions not only outside but also within the Gülenist group, as exemplified by Journalist A.'s poignant words: "I live in exile within exile, migration within migration, loneliness within loneliness" (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023). Then, the question is how Gülenist media outlets evolve from a state-dominated journalistic practice to one that emphasises human rights activism. The transformation began prior to the diaspora with the polarisation between the AKP and the Gülen community, particularly regarding

issues like the closure of dershanes (private teaching institutions) and corruption operations in 2013.[62]

Accordingly, in his book 'Ten Percent - From Fair Order to Pool Order,' journalist A. states that he exposed "a 20-year corruption record of President Erdoğan, dating back to his time as the mayor of Istanbul in 1994" (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023). A. has a background within the Gülen Islamist community and worked for Zaman newspaper until leaving the country. His career history indicates that he has maintained a close working relationship with the AKP government. When questioned about the delay in documenting the events, he clarifies that the close ties between Zaman newspaper and the government made it impossible. It is worth noting that A. was not only in disagreement with the AKP government but also at odds with the Gülen movement: He wrote articles and broadcasts where he questioned and harshly criticised the Gülen Islamist movement. In his own words, he was going through a period of internal breakdowns, both in terms of faith and professional ethics of journalism and experienced confrontations and internal feuds:

> I was not one of those journalists who became a journalist because they were told to. Journalism was important to me; it was my preference, my dream. I used to criticise and argue, and we had disagreements with the newspaper management. For example, on the Deniz Feneri[63] issue... But we shared some goals (with Gülen community), we had things in common, and I was involved in it. The real confrontation (with the Gülen movement) started for me after I went abroad. There were things that were told to us, but there were also

[62] The announcement of a new draft law regarding dershanes by the AKP government sparked significant controversy in the Gülen-aligned Zaman newspaper. This tension between the AKP and the Gülen sect was widely reported in the media. See "Dershane Tartışması Medyada" (Classroom Debate in the Media), Bianet, 2013, November 15, https://bianet.org/haber/dershane-tartismasi-medyada-151319 (Last accessed: November 18, 2023)

[63] The trials of Deniz Feneri e.V. began in Germany, where it was discovered that millions of euros collected by the association operating in Germany had been misused. After the case was concluded in Germany, it was sent to Ankara for investigation of the Turkish side of the case. A large number of people, including many from the media, were detained on charges of irregularly transferring money to Turkey. Four people, including Zahid Akman, a member of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), were sent to prison. In the investigation carried out in Turkey, a decision of non-prosecution was issued against all executives of the Deniz Feneri Association. (BBC Türkçe, 2011)

> things behind closed doors that were not said, that were not based on consent or approval, and that you were never asked about. Realising these turns me upside down. I had serious psychological breakdowns, nights when I was depressed, could not sleep, had nightmares. (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023) (See Appendix B, 15)

Journalist A. suggests that organisations with strict hierarchies and strong motivation may conceal actions that contradict their public principles. Consequently, A. felt compelled to share his experiences and criticisms of Gülen's sect with others.

The impact of these divides extends beyond emotional isolation and into the realm of financial struggle. A.'s income from Patreon and YouTube has noticeably decreased due to losing followers and supporters from the Gülen community. As he shares,

> These earnings are no longer enough to sustain me. On one hand, leaving Turkey led to accusations of selling out and betraying my homeland from supporters of the current regime. On the other hand, my past involvement with the Gülen movement has also resulted in accusations of betrayal. I became completely alone. (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023) (See Appendix B, 16)

The experience of loneliness has impacted the entire family. A. acknowledges that the loneliness extends beyond the absence of Patreon or YouTube donations and includes a sense of being cut off from a community. Living abroad can present a unique set of challenges related to belonging, and exclusion from networks can lead to social and political isolation. This isolation gets deeper when the solidarity from the community is lost:

> When in that particular situation, it is common to search for secure havens and strive to minimise any negative consequences for one's family. In a true community, there is solidarity: When searching for a home, everyone rallies to help find a suitable one. When seeking employment, everyone lends a hand to find the right job. This support system in sect creates a culture of sharing and care where challenges can be overcome with ease. Children become friends with one another, and spouses bond over shared experiences. However, when I took the risk of experiencing loneliness during my exile, I faced serious challenges. Despite the difficulties, I do not regret my decision and believe it was the right thing to do. (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023) (See Appendix B, 17)

Journalist K. also had worked in state institutions and for a newspaper that had good relations with the government before the AKP-Gülen conflict erupted. She shares her transformation story on her YouTube channel; she explains why she previously liked the Gülen community and why she is now criticising them. She states that she felt a moral responsibility to share her experience with others (Journalist K., personal communication, October 22, 2023). Like journalist A., K. previously had close ties to the AKP government, but her perspective changed after experiencing a major trauma due to the conflict:

> I am Turkish. I have never experienced discrimination until now. I knew what discrimination meant in theory, but experiencing it first-hand is entirely different. Now I have gained a better understanding of how a Kurd or an Armenian might feel when they see the Turkish flag, it is like a Palestinian sees an Israeli flag… I once possessed a diplomatic passport, but now I have no passport at all. I do not prefer to do an analogy of state-father but it felt like being betrayed by a trusted family member, such as a father. (Journalist K., personal communication, October 22, 2023) (See Appendix B, 18)

However, K. does not discuss a complete severance or drastic split from the Gülen Islamist community, as A. discusses. While recounting this separation, K. notes that being compelled to leave one's home country, can have a powerful psychological impact:

> During the initial period of my exile, I found myself listening to Ahmet Kaya's 'Siz benim neler çektiğimi nereden bileceksiniz?' (How will you know what I went through) and I could not help myself but cry... I mean, I had never even listened to the song before, and it never really appealed to me. It is just that my psychological state was so fragile. (Journalist K., personal communication, October 22, 2023) (See Appendix B, 19)

Journalist S. became a dissident following the Gülen movement's falling out with the government. Despite her non-political journalistic background in Turkey as a culture and arts reporter for more than two decades, S. had previously worked closely with the Gülen Islamist community and government-ally press organisations. After fleeing Turkey due to the 15 July military coup attempt and fearing unemployment, S. began

reporting on human rights to support her incarcerated friends and make their voices heard. Previously, there was no record of any charges against her. S. primarily covers instances of human rights violations against those who were terminated under Turkey's Decree with Force of Law (KHK: Kanun Hükmünde Kararname) while residing outside of the country. She maintains that she, too, was impacted by the turbulence in Turkey and became a journalist in exile (Journalist S., personal communication, October 20, 2023). Despite being an unremarkable reporter with no political affiliations, she was labelled as a 'terrorist' and compelled to depart from her homeland due to her association with the last newspapers she worked for, the Gülen media outlets. When asked about how this change has personally affected her, S. states that Turkey has remained a big wound in her heart. She clarifies that she has never been an enemy of Turkey, nor did she ever want to be, she has no problem with Turkey:

> I am listed on the same grey list as journalist Can Dündar and wanted by the authorities. There is a photo of me standing alongside PKK members; there is a kid next to me labelled as a 'PKK terrorist'. I stand out like a sore thumb; everyone who sees it mocks me. A state should not tarnish its reputation like this. As a journalist, I am not interested in politics. I have never done. However, my situation shows that even I was affected by this political situation and became a target. (Journalist S., personal communication, October 20, 2023) (See Appendix B, 20)

However, S. emphasises that her exile did not result from any ideological shift or political rupture. She notes that she had been critical of the editorial policies within media outlets associated with the Gülen sect prior to her departure, consequently, she was occasionally excluded from these organisations for her dissenting views:

> I have never been in such a confrontation before. But why would I? Ever since I can remember, I have been sensitive to injustices. I am aware of the atrocities committed against the Kurds, leftists, and Alevis. My conscience is clear. People started criticising the Gülen community only after they became weak following the events of July 15th. However, I have been critical of them even when they were strong. For the first time as a religious person, I have been declared an enemy of the state, but I have always been among the

> people who were declared as enemies. (Journalist S., personal communication, October 20, 2023) (See Appendix B, 21)

Journalist A.'s example is an exception here regarding an ideological and political shift in the diasporic journalistic field, first in admitting his radical change and second in embracing this. Other than that, it is incident that they more commonly act within their small groups rather than in solidarity within different diasporic spaces. Although journalist K. and journalist S. partially criticise the Gülen movement, it is not possible to observe that they have not undergone a radical transformation as journalist A. experienced.

The challenges faced in diaspora journalism include potential reputational crises and the risk of activism, both of which contradict the values of ethical journalism. However, the question of whether journalistic ethics are being upheld in the diasporic space is uncertain, as journalists in exile are subject to power dynamics. Those in positions of power often refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of these journalists, as demonstrated by President Erdoğan's claims that imprisoned journalists are not detained for their journalistic pursuits. One of the most serious accusations that the Kurdish media faces in this context is that these journalists in the Kurdish media are not carrying out journalistic activities but are instead engaging in militant and propagandist journalism, which violates ethical journalistic principles. Nonetheless, the determination of which journalists are perceived as 'reputable' and 'legitimate' within the exile media is not solely influenced by political forces. Beyond the obvious power of the state, the journalistic field itself also lays the groundwork for this legitimisation[64] (Barnard, 2018, p. 44). Diasporic communities

[64] Barnard discusses that symbolic power goes beyond the obvious power of the state, as it involves the ability to create and communicate symbols. It is acquired through the accumulation of significant symbolic capital and field position, as described by Thompson (1995), Bourdieu (1991), and Tang and Yang (2011). Typically, symbolic power is wielded by elite actors in institutions such as media, government, and corporations to shape the beliefs, values, and norms of specific groups. In this

establish their own rules that pave the way for legitimisation through the accumulation of a Bourdieuian sense of forms of capital by individual journalists or groups. In the diasporic journalistic field, accordingly, inherent rules shape the norms and values of the field as well. This is how many exiled journalists who were not recognised as legitimate by the Turkish state are now internationally respected figures in the diasporic field.

In summary, the journalist's personal experience of exile, their newfound status as a news subject, and the emotional gravity of their situation all contribute to a nuanced and varied impact on their professional work. It is important to acknowledge the shift in journalistic practices within the exiled diaspora, where emotional intensity, vulnerability, and ideological and political concerns are increasingly prioritised over objective reporting. However, it is equally crucial to identify the root causes of this shift and hold accountable those responsible for it. D.'s reproach that "If this is an activism, we are not responsible for it" draws attention to a very valid point:

> I wished I had the opportunity to confirm the news about the MİT trucks by calling the head of the Turkish National Intelligence (MİT) before it was published. Unfortunately, in Turkey, attempting to do so would result in arrest and the confiscation of all equipment, including the news, computer, and camera. It is a difficult situation, and many of us have turned to activism out of concern for defending our country, profession, and democracy. It is not a choice we made willingly, nor have we ever said, 'I should quit journalism and become an activist.' When freedom is threatened, and space is limited, we must defend it, and some call this activism. (Journalist D., personal communication, November 2, 2023)

According to RSF's representative R., political decisions and interferences are influencing the institutions that govern the media and other areas, resulting in a loss of institutional function (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October

context, it is a tool that determines what constitutes legitimate journalistic practices. (Barnard, 2018, p. 44).

25, 2023). Therefore, it is crucial to address ethical considerations for journalists in the context of these broader issues, particularly in a time when censorship and polarization are pervasive in society. From now on, it is now the question of to what extent is state intervention effective in this journalistic field.

5.3 No escape from political hegemonic power: Continuity in state surveillance

In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the perils and difficulties confronted by journalists, it is imperative to take into account the multifaceted political, sociological, and structural factors that play a role in creating these challenges. Instances of journalistic ethics discussions, propaganda, and militant journalism can skew perceptions of the profession and lead to hazards and threats. Yet, it is equally critical to acknowledge the societal and structural components that contribute to these dangers. Journalists in Turkey are often subjected to physical assaults, unfair trials and imprisonments, and a lack of recourse when targeted. These circumstances often persist even after the onset of exile. This section of the thesis will examine instances of state surveillance and violence against exiled journalists, both before and after the exile, regarding the Gramscian concept of hegemony and counterhegemony.

RSF's representative R. aptly points out that Turkey's institutions are gradually losing their functionality, as they are being guided by politics and ideology. R. gives examples of institutions, such as the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), Press Advertising Agency (Basın İlan Kurumu), and the Press Card Commission (Sarı Basın Kartı Komisyonu), that are engaging in actions that can only be explained by political decisions and interference (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). In light of this situation, where

pressure, intervention, and censorship against the press and journalists are increasing, and polarisation has permeated every aspect of society, it is vital to consider discussions on journalistic ethics along with political, sociological, and structural conditions. Amidst political oppression, censorship, and harassment, journalists are forced to flee their country, but the question is whether they find any safety abroad. This mistrust extends beyond physical attacks from nationalist and right-wing groups, as they are also under state surveillance even when abroad. As RSF's representative R. rightfully states, journalists from left and Kurdish media have gone through very similar processes for decades: Impunity in incidents targeting journalists, physical attacks on journalists, arbitrary lawsuits, detentions and arrests, internet censorship, and systematic banning of public opinion-forming news on online media on the grounds of personal rights present very calamitous data on press freedom and democratic journalism in Turkey (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). Journalists are not immune from state interference even after leaving the country.

There are many cases of Turkish journalists being verbally assaulted and physically attacked. Erk Acarer, a journalist living in Germany, was targeted in a knife attack in the communal courtyard of his home in Berlin on 7 July 2021 (DW Türkçe, 2021). After this attack, on 19 July, he was again threatened with a paper written on "You wait" and a boiled egg thrown into the garden of his house (Artı Gerçek, 2021). The German police informed Celal Başlangıç, editor-in-chief of Artı Gerçek and ARTI TV, that his name was on an 'execution' list of 55 people and warned him that his safety was in danger. According to the police statement, the list consisted of 55 names of President Erdoğan opponents living abroad (Gazete Duvar, 2021). In addition to journalist names of Can Dündar, Erk Acarer, Cevheri Güven,

Fehim Işık and Celal Başlangıç, so on and so forth, the list also included Turkish politicians and artists, living in abroad. Later, writer Gökhan Yavuzel, one of the names on the list, was physically attacked by four people (Evrensel, 2021). A year later, former Zaman daily reporter Ahmet Dönmez was physically assaulted in Sweden in March 2022 and taken to intensive care. And once before this, he was also threatened with the words "I will rip your head off" (T24, 2022). These 'execution lists' -I intentionally call plural here since there were different lists came to light at that time[65]- was brought to the parliamentary agenda in Turkey. Deutscher Journalisten-Verband (DJV: German Federation of Journalists) also called on the German government to take action in the face of increasing threats, harassment and attacks against journalists and the execution list of 55 people targeting Turkish dissidents (Artı Gerçek, 2021). These examples of attempts and attacks against dissident journalists can be enlarged. In addition to physical attacks, journalists are reporting on their social media accounts that from time to time they continue to receive verbal threats from ultra-Turkish nationalist and right-wing groups on the streets in Europe as well. With the words of RSF's representative R., "The problem of life safety there is added to the difficulty and fragility of living in exile at the diplomatic and official level" (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023).

Journalist A. tells how he was attacked in the street of his home, with her daughter in tow, in Sweden. A. states that he had received many death threats for publishing about mafia groups that were in contact with Interior Minister of Turkey,

[65] To see news about different lists, see "21 kişilik 'infaz listesi' Meclis gündeminde: Saldırının arkasında hükümetin olduğu doğru mu?" (The 21-person 'execution list' is on the parliamentary agenda: Is it true that the government was behind the attack?), Artı Gerçek, 2021, July 13, https://artigercek.com/guncel/21-kisilik-infaz-listesi-meclis-gundeminde-saldirinin-arkasinda-hukumetin-oldugu-171204h (Last accessed: November 15, 2023)

Süleyman Soylu, at the time, and that he knew he had already received a lot of reactions from the AKP and the MHP due to these publications. A., who had previously been threatened by a mafia in Ankara, does not remember the moments of the attack. After his daughter's testimony and the doctors' diagnosis, he learns that he was hit on the head with a hard object and lost consciousness completely. A skull fracture occurred, and there was a risk of internal haemorrhage. That is the main reason why he could not remember those moments. While he was lying unconscious on the floor, the attackers took his photograph. Afterwards, the photo was posted on Twitter through different social media accounts with threatening content like "Your turn will come". He was hospitalised for three weeks, the first week in intensive care. A. also adds that these similar threats existed while he was in Turkey. Among many others, he had once been subjected to verbal insults and threats from several Erdoğan supporters while he was with his son in a shopping centre. He was targeted not only by Erdoğan supporters but also by Erdoğan himself:

> During a joint press conference with the Spanish prime minister in February 2014, I asked the then-prime minister of Turkey, Tayyip Erdoğan, about certain audio recordings that had surfaced on the internet after 17 December. The questions were related to Erdoğan's visit to North Africa during the *Gezi* protests, his order to Habertürk in Morocco to remove a subtitle about Devlet Bahçeli, and the allegations that the media changed hands on Erdoğan's orders. However, in response to my questions, Erdoğan insulted me harshly during the live broadcast, and the incident's aftermath was severe. I became unable to walk on the road because of people's reactions against me. (Personal communication, June 16, 2023) (See Appendix B, 22)

AKP government's smear campaign against opponent journalists abroad, such as 'fugitive,' 'terrorist supporter,' 'agent' and 'collaborator,' has been actively discrediting journalists who oppose them in foreign countries. RSF's representative R. explains that a journalist who has been forced into exile and is being targeted by a political official or government spokesperson in Turkey is similarly at risk in their country of refuge. This is due to the fact that other communities residing in those

nations, originally hailing from Turkey, may also be impacted by the political climate and official rhetoric prevalent in Turkey (RSF's representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). R. states that,

> Exiled journalists are facing a new and concerning threat. There are individuals from Turkey living in the same countries as these journalists who have been influenced by the official political discourse of Turkey. This discourse may spread to these individuals and lead them to pose a threat to exiled journalists. Despite taking precautions, these journalists may unfortunately not be able to trust the law enforcement or police of the country they are in. (RSF's representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023) (See Appendix B, 23)

Journalist A. contends that he was not provided with the necessary precautions from the onset and that the Swedish police failed to give sufficient attention to the matter by not offering any form of security or protection:

> Subsequently, I received inadequate protection from the police following the attack. We were essentially left to fend for ourselves. The case was promptly closed due to a 'lack of evidence', as is typical of the Swedish bureaucracy. To this day, there has been no security or protection provided. (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023)

Journalist B., on the other hand, says that he is under serious protection by the state in Germany. He admits that he survived a serious assassination attempt and was put under heavy protection by German official authorities:

> We have been informed that three hitmen, organised from Ankara, had come here in the process. The high-security protection lasted for about a year. Different levels of protection are still continuing. I was attending my programmes, tours, and conferences with steel vests under the protection of ten policemen… I travelled around Europe like the Pope. It was very harsh, something like Interpol protection. (Journalist B., personal communication, April 8, 2023) (See Appendix B, 24)

He tells his conditions of threats and the assassination attempt on him with a half-smile. He mentions how challenging the process was for him and his work and his family, especially his children. He faced multiple lawsuits and prior to leaving the country, he was under police protection in Turkey for four years due to threats to his life. In his words:

> Since the murder of Hrant Dink[66], we have been on a knife edge… It is difficult to be a Christian in Turkey. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim-populated country with the smallest Christian population in the Middle East, whereas 100 years ago one-third of the population was Christian. This tells us that Turkey is a country where most Christians have been killed, exiled, or had to leave in 100 years. [67] It is difficult to talk about the genocide in this geography; and if you dare, you will be pressurised and threatened. Even the person assigned by the state to protect you can make you feel uncomfortable. (Journalist B., personal communication, April 8, 2023) (See Appendix B, 25)

In this context, it is possible to see that the life he fled from Turkey found him again in the diaspora. Here, it is seen that state surveillance continues even beyond Turkey's borders. According to journalist B., Germany can be a tricky place to navigate as a member of the Turkey diaspora, "Berlin is like almost a city of Turkey," he says (Journalist B., personal communication, April 8, 2023) With both friends and enemies in the city, it is important to be cautious when taking taxis or walking on the streets. However, one advantage is that German officials are knowledgeable about Turkey and its political situation, making it easier to seek help if needed (Journalist B., personal communication, April 8, 2023). Journalist D. confirms that not much has changed for the diaspora. Despite leaving Turkey with several court cases pending, D. still experiences threats and surveillance in Germany. He notes that the Turkish community in Berlin is particularly dense, but believes that anyone who challenges the government in Turkey can face similar treatment anywhere in the world. As he puts it, "a small mirror of Turkey" has been produced in Germany (Journalist D., personal communication, November 2, 2023).

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[66] Hrant Dink was an Armenian journalist assassinated with a bullet of his back in front of the newspaper's building, Agos, where he was the founder and editor-in-chief. Dink's murderer, Ogün Samast, was released after 16 years in prison on 15 November 2023. According to official records, Dink became the 62nd journalist killed in Turkey since the year 1909. (Milliyet, 2007; Çetin 2013; BBC Türkçe, 2023).

[67] The 2022 report on hate crimes categorised Christians and Alevis as the two groups most frequently targeted. The report outlines various forms of hate crimes, including threats, property damage, defamation, physical assault, harassment, and verbal abuse. In addition, the report considers attacks on religious institutions, such as schools, cemeteries, and places of worship. It is worth noting that hate crimes are often unreported, meaning the numbers presented in the report likely underestimate the true extent of the issue. (Yıldırım & Tekin, 2023)

The issue of state surveillance is of utmost importance here, as it extends beyond the borders of Turkey and its laws. The Gramscian concept of ideological and cultural hegemony is a valuable lens through which to analyse this surveillance, as it sheds light on the underlying factors that shape political power and cultural ideology. Given that state surveillance can be viewed as a mechanism for control of society, it is essential to explore how this control manifests itself in a diasporic context. Even in exile, journalists are subject to state surveillance, as evidenced by examples of exiled journalists. Furthermore, the dominant ideology of the state has an impact on Turkish citizens living in Europe who remain loyal to Turkey's hegemonic discourse. This influence is so pervasive that it creates an environment in which exiled journalists feel insecure. An exiled journalist targeted by political power does not feel safe even in the country where he has gone into exile. Such a situation highlights the far-reaching impact of dominant ideologies, which can extend beyond physical boundaries. It is worth noting that the state's control is not limited to violent tactics but can also manifest through subtler means. In a Gramscian sense, seizing the state power is only possible with the hegemonic instruments; these hegemonic tools encompass more than just physical force, but also include consent versus coercion, spontaneous action from the masses versus deliberate control from those in power, and democracy versus dictatorship (Shandro, 2004, p. 4-6). For Gramsci, this type of hegemony extends beyond just political control and also encompasses ideological and cultural influence, both from the top-down and bottom-up. It is precisely because of this ideological hegemony that the Turkish state has the power to infect its citizens in Europe and threaten exiled journalists. Although the state may not employ direct force through police or law enforcement to threaten these individuals, the dominant ideology still instils a sense of threat in them.

Journalist T. speaks of similar experiences of state surveillance that continued both while he was still living in Turkey and later in Paris. T. illustrates the scale of the censorship by explaining how journalists were subjected to a serious blockade not only in the print media but also on television: “There was a blacklist; first we were prevented from appearing on government-controlled channels, then our names were crossed off on channels that could be considered ‘opposition’ like CNN Türk” (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023). During his last appearance on a CNN program to discuss Turkish foreign politics, journalist T. informed the editor that he was no longer employed and requested that his title not be listed as a writer at Radikal or Hürriyet. T. claims that the half-hour program was abruptly cut short, with only one or two questions asked before the broadcast was terminated due to a supposed live connection. Following this incident, T. was not invited back to appear on CNN: “That was the last time I left the CNN studio. I was never invited to another broadcast by CNN after that. It was then that I realised the Hürriyet media group had completely closed their doors to us” (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023). According to T., the ‘Arab Spring’ and the government’s Syria policy afterwards are the periods when the sanctions against those who write on these subjects in foreign politics have sharpened significantly:

> In recent years before leaving Turkey, I have been receiving a lot of threats because of my writings on Syria. People were calling the newspaper by saying I am going to be beheaded, some were leaving threatening messages like ‘We will ring your bell’ or ‘We will blow your head off’. I could no longer walk safely on the street. People were waylaying me, shouting at me, taunting me, and I experienced a few actual incidents during that period. On the one hand, there was huge pressure from the government, and on the other hand, there were threats. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 26)

However, his articles were published in Radikal and Hürriyet at the time and no investigation was opened against him, even though they would later become a

problem for him. The pressure on the newspaper was coming from various sources including the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sometimes, the minister himself would make direct complaints, and there were instances of direct intervention, such as the minister sending his deputy to the newspaper. All of these efforts were aimed at getting T. dismissed from his job:

> The editor-in-chief of Radikal once told me to write something that pleased former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. I said you can fire me if you want, but I cannot write that. And the next day I wrote a harsher article to show my attitude to the editor-in-chief. But these articles of mine were not the subject of a lawsuit at that time. What really made me nervous were the threats against my life and my family. I was checking the car tyres and the engine before I got in the car. It was strange, while I was checking the car on the street and getting in, my wife was watching me through the window. The possibility of the car being blown up... This psychology is very hard and bad. When planning to travel to Syria via Beirut for work, I left and eventually decided not to return. Upon arriving in Beirut, my wife sent me a text message saying, 'I slept well last night for the first time.' She had been worried that something might happen to me in Turkey; she could not was not able to sleep at nights. Due to these threats, I continued to live cautiously for several years. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 27)

The series of surveillance and threats did not abate after leaving the country for journalist T. and continued in exile as well:

> When I moved to Paris, I kept this to myself, only my family knew the situation. Nevertheless, I received a note that 'Do not think you are safe just because you live in Paris'. I still receive threatening messages from time to time, some of which are directed towards my family. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 28)

Later, someone he used to know from the Turkish Foreign Office advised him not to go to the Turkish Embassy in Paris, saying it was better if they did not know his address. During his stay at the house in Paris, the owner informed him that someone was coming to view the property. The individual addressed F. by name and mentioned that they had read all of T.'s writings:

> When I asked him what he did for a living, he replied, 'I work at the Embassy.' I was taken aback and a little suspicious. Despite our efforts to keep the address of the house confidential, an embassy employee

> unexpectedly arrived at my door and entered my home. However, he did not rent the house. Even after I went to Beirut and stayed there for six months, the house remained unoccupied upon my return to Paris, so I rented it again. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 29)

T. has reported receiving four 'friendly' warnings, which he believes were from the Turkish Foreign Ministry or intelligence. The nature of these warnings involved statements like 'Look, we appreciate your journalism, your family members are safe in Turkey, you should appreciate this too,' and T. was advised to avoid certain topics, such as discussing the Kurds in Syria (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023). RSF's representative R. states that the Turkish authorities continue to target journalists and intellectuals whom they deem politically dangerous, whom they cannot silence in Turkey but want to continue to harass in Europe (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). These journalists do not have the security of being away from Turkey in the countries where they are based.

State surveillance is a type of harassment that journalists experience first-hand. When a journalist is living abroad, one must navigate the complicated task of adapting to local living conditions, complying with local laws, and simultaneously ensuring one's own safety. According to RSF's representative R., there is no one form of harassment, and in addition to Turkey's aggressive language, RSF has observed Turkey's widespread use of Interpol as a means of coercion. Turkey has employed Interpol to arrest journalists in foreign countries and extradite them to Turkey while also seising their assets or portions thereof through Turkish courts and prosecutors' offices. The issuance of arbitrary arrest warrants has reached concerning levels (RSF's Representative R., personal communication, October 25, 2023). Journalist S. provides another compelling example of the challenges faced by those living in exile:

> My assets were frozen in Turkey, but I did not even have much to freeze. I only had one house, and no car or other belongings. The document was signed by former Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu. It is clear that they did this to make my life in exile more difficult. (Journalist S., personal communication, October 20, 2023) (See Appendix B, 30)

For someone already living with the stress of being in exile, factors such as state surveillance, harassment, and threats can be incredibly damaging to their sense of security and well-being.

Journalists B. and T. both express concerns that the threats against journalists extend beyond just themselves. All of the journalists note that their families had also been threatened in various ways. For example, D.'s wife had her passport confiscated for no apparent reason and was unable to obtain a new one for over three years. Similarly, journalist A.'s wife was fired from her teaching position on the grounds of being associated with the Gülen community. A. believes this was done to punish him for his work. T. provides further evidence of police harassment and counter-terrorism units frequently visiting his home and questioning his whereabouts, despite authorities knowing he was not in Turkey. T. also reveals that his family was subjected to both physical and technical surveillance by the state: T. notes that the officers were even comfortable enough to reveal his identity and show his photograph to a neighbour in public. T. believes these actions were designed to pressure him into changing his reporting. He has received numerous warnings from seemingly friendly sources, urging him to steer clear of controversial topics such as the Kurds or Armenians, often concluding with the ominous statement, "Think about your wife and children" (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023.) T. interprets these messages as a threat.

The act of intimidation is also used to influence the political views and writings of exiled journalists. Journalist M. has personally experienced direct

surveillance by the state and received phone calls from police officers. M. says that her father received a phone call from gendarmerie intelligence and anti-terror unit. The caller requested a meeting with him regarding M., but her father was unsure of the subject matter: “This meeting is not registered or official. It is unrecorded. The intentions or potential offers remain unknown. Learning of this made me feel uneasy, as it deviated from the usual protocol of official calls and visits to our home” (Journalist M., personal communication, October 25, 2023).

According to journalists, the threats faced by those sharing their stories extend beyond the borders of Turkey. Ultra-Turkish nationalists, right-wing groups in the diaspora, and even state surveillance continue to pose a risk. As a result, the political climate in Turkey, its penalisation system, and the practice of journalism itself have continuity in the diaspora, creating an environment that is all too familiar in that sense.

5.3.1 Censorship and restrictions on what to report

These journalists abroad are not able to escape from threats or state surveillance, but what about their relations with the political and ideological hegemonic powers in their new countries? Is there no censorship in the media they live in? While journalists in exile are striving to raise awareness among their diasporas about the violations of press freedom in Turkey, foreign journalists are keen on the stories of exiled journalists and amplify their statements on their national platforms. However, it is important to note that these stories are not coincidental. According to T., when Turkish journalists live abroad, they are often viewed as individuals who can criticise the Erdoğan administration without any reservation:

> It can be frustrating when international journalists only reach out to you for negative commentary about Erdoğan. Though we are already in exile for our

> criticisms, we are not responsible for providing fodder for the French press by settling scores with Turkey and its government. We should not put ourselves in such a compromising position. The expectation that we will ignite a powder keg from afar during Macron's conflict with Erdoğan is unfair. They expect me to throw a gunpowder from here during Macron's showdown with Erdoğan. But journalists in France do not do it for their own government. French journalists do not attack Macron as they expect from us to want us to do to Erdoğan. I have declined multiple invitations to participate in such broadcasts in France because of this. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 31)

It is unsurprising that states use such situations as leverage in their inter-state relations and bureaucracies. Occasionally, a journalist who leans towards activism may be seen as a 'useful pen' for the foreign press, making their writing easier to digest. However, journalist T. objects to this notion of becoming an easy and compliant writer who is willing to say whatever the foreign press asks for:

> While it is true that I have encountered significant challenges and problems with Turkey's government due to my writings, I am a journalist who adheres to international standards of journalism. My work is published on internationally recognised channels. I am not neither an activist nor a tool for the French press. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 32)

With this example, once again, it worth to note that journalists can create an autonomous space to take an oppositional position against dominant ideology, despite severe pressure. In other saying, there is an autonomous space where journalists can take an oppositional position against dominant ideologies exist in the journalistic field, regardless of the pressure journalists face. The media plays a fundamental role in disseminating information, conveying the truth to the public, and holding decision-making authorities accountable. While the mass media can contribute to ideological dominance and control, it also possesses the means to challenge it. This capacity is what makes mass media outlets strong. Alternative media outlets like diasporic space emerge as a result, where exiled journalism can thrive and exercise its capacity to prioritise issues, determine in a certain extent that

what is worthy of publication, set limits on reporting, and present arguments within an acceptable framework.[68] This concept of partial autonomy is similarly defined by Bourdieu's theory of fields, as discussed earlier. However, the red lines imposed by states serve as a reminder of the limits of this autonomy. An example of this can be seen in the media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Europe. "I know what I cannot write in the French media," Journalist T. also says, "You know that if you write about the Israel-Palestine conflict in a way that does not favour Israel, your name will be quickly crossed out" (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023).

It is easy to notice this self-censorship in the European press. Following his physical assault in Sweden, Journalist A. speaks with the Swedish press and expresses his belief that the police and prosecutor's office did not take his case seriously enough. However, he later realises that these comments were not typically included in the published interviews. A. notes that while Sweden has freedom of the press, there is a tendency towards self-censorship when it comes to topics that could disrupt state policies (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023). Journalist T. shares an experience about how Le Monde excluded portions of an interview where he criticised the French government. During the interview, T. is asked a range of questions about Turkey's Syria policy and relations with jihadist groups:

> During the interview, I was asked various questions regarding Turkey's Syria policy and relations with jihadists and ISIS. I mentioned that Turkey's Syria

[68] Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky define "the propaganda model" as an analytical framework to illustrate the relationship between media policy and the political economy and give examples of case studies in which United States' mediatic interventions studied in Salvador, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Bulgaria, etc. When Herman and Chomsky describe the propaganda power of the media, they do not treat this power as a monolithic force, instead remark on financial support and relations with power since "The media serves and propagandises on behalf of the powerful societal interests that control and finance them" (p. intro xi). Accordingly, the selection of editors', journalists' internalisation of priorities or deciding newsworthy topics are needed to be considered within this framework of ownership and state control. To see the discussion of media propaganda, Herman & Chomsky (1988).

> policy was not solely Erdoğan's doing, but rather a joint effort with Western countries. Additionally, French, British, and American intelligence agencies collaborated with Turkish intelligence (MİT). While addressing Erdoğan's actions in his own neighbourhood, it should be noted that other governments shared the blame. Surprisingly, I was only then asked for evidence regarding the French government's involvement, even though I had spoken about Erdoğan's relations with jihadists without being questioned. It was disappointing to see that the French journalist only published the parts about Erdoğan and not the ones about the French government. This kind of selective publishing is censorship. (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023) (See Appendix B, 33)

Interestingly, Pierre Bourdieu's book 'On television' highlights very similarly how power relations within the journalism field affect the positions held by journalists. To fully grasp the boundaries and limitations of what a reporter for a particular media outlet can write, one must consider both the outlet's position and the journalist's position within it. In Bourdieu's words,

> We have to consider the position of the various media that these journalists represent and their position within those media if we want to understand what a reporter for Le Monde can and cannot write. What are actually positional pressures are experienced as ethical interdictions or injunctions: 'that's not the practice at Le Monde' or 'that doesn't fit with Le Monde's culture,' or again, 'that just isn't done here,' and so on. All these experiences, presented as ethical precepts, translate the structure of the field through an individual who occupies a particular position in this space. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 49).

It is clear that certain spaces are held by certain hegemonic ideologies and the people who carry out these ideologies. Those who work within them are expected to adhere to certain rules. It is difficult for someone who cannot adapt to these norms to find success in the journalism field.

This example gains meaning especially when considering the presence of an internalised sensor mechanism in Western societies. Western countries tend to have a more subtle approach to foreign policy, compared to the more aggressive tactics often seen in media in Turkey. Even when journalists criticise the state's policies and boundaries, there is generally no harsh intervention. However, it is possible to observe that these policies are capable of changing very rapidly, especially under

crisis conditions. The harshness of state intervention in the Western media has been evident from the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October 2023. In the aftermath of the Hamas attack on 7 October, it has become very difficult to publish critical coverage of Israel's war in Gaza. Pro-Palestinian comments were dismissed as 'Hamas suppertiveness' and 'anti-Semitism,' and journalists started to get into trouble. Pascal Praud, a well-known CNEWS programmer, sparked controversy when he told his journalist guest at the end of the programme, while the cameras were still rolling, "It would have been nice if you had stopped defending the Palestinians on air" (Radio M, 2023). TV5Monde presenter Mohamed Kaci got in trouble for his questions to Israeli army spokesman Olivier Rafowicz. The channel's management accused Kaci of failing to comply with journalistic standards and apologised for the broadcast (L'Expression, 2023). Comedian Guillaume Meurice, who satirised Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu as a "circumcised Nazi" on France Inter, received a warning from the management and had to give a statement to the police (La Dépêche, 2023). It is important to note that journalists in exile are not able to practice completely 'objective journalism' free from the influence of dominant ideologies in their new home countries, as mentioned. Journalist T. has another experience with slate.fr, a French news website, where they removed sections of his article that criticised France and the West before publishing it. T. had already confirmed the original text prior to publication, but later discovered that the sections critical of France and the West were removed. When he asks why, they claim it would be published as a second part, which turns out to be false. T. also highlights the existence of self-censorship mechanisms in relation to state policies, providing examples to support his claim. He acknowledges that censorship exists everywhere but notes that the scale and nature of censorship in Turkey is much more

crude and systematic, while in France, it is more implicit and professional (Journalist T., personal communication, April 11, 2023). It is notable that French foreign policy is criticised in a more measured manner, with less polarising views expressed. This indicates that while criticism of the government is permitted in France, it is done within certain boundaries. The existence of such boundaries demonstrates that the state's red lines are more internalised in France compared to Turkey.

5.3.2 Conflict of interest, organisation and solidarity among journalistic groups

Given the complexity and diversity of the field, there is potential for conflicts of interest, organisation, and solidarity among three groups of exiled journalists. Thus far, I have examined the inner workings of three diasporic groups and how they form within the field of journalism. I have explored the various types of capital at play and the challenges that these groups encounter, including ethical and legitimacy issues and crises of activism. At this point, I aim to further examine the relations among three closely related groups within the framework of conditions of solidarity and conflict. When looking at the relationship of three different groups with each other in the journalistic field, I find it important to include Gramsci's counterhegemony notion. While Bourdieu's work offers insight into the emergence of the journalistic field, its internal dynamics and the interactions of groups with each other, it falls short of addressing how these groups have the potential for counterhegemonic power. I will examine the conditions that give rise to both solidarity and conflict, as well as various political alliances. By analysing the potential for these groups to form alliances and act as a counterhegemonic force, I hope to shed light on the role of journalism in diasporic communities. As previously discussed, those in political power often aim to silence journalists who challenge their political and ideological

hegemony and push against dominant political ideologies. Nevertheless, a number of journalists who have been exiled to other countries continue their work and forge alliances to challenge such power structures. The role of this exiled media becomes an effort to "disrupt the silence" (Downing, 2001, p. 15). Their dissenting perspectives offer a counter-narrative, prompting us to consider the level of organisation involved in their journalistic efforts.

Gramsci posits that politics and ideology are the arenas where struggles and alliances are formed (Burawoy, 2019, p. 68-71). Gramsci's civil society embodies both hegemonic and counterhegemonic qualities, representing the civil society that supports political-ideological power while also giving voice to groups that challenge it. In this sense, civil society is the space where capitalist hegemony is exercised and where subaltern classes can come together to form alliances and challenge that hegemony in modern societies (Munck, 2004, p. 13-26). Accordingly, civil society is a multifaceted area in which different kinds of dominations, power relations, and classes struggle for hegemony at both economic, political, and ideological levels.[69] Gramsci's definition of civil society includes partial autonomy, as seen in Bourdieu's fields.[70] For Bourdieu, the culture masks the class stratification and hierarchy. In other words, "The practices of dominant -'legitimate'- culture hides the class-based

[69] Although Gramsci is known for his understanding of complexity and structural diversity, some critics have argued that he remained centralised, statist, and essentialist in his approach, as seen in debates by Laclau, Mouffe, and Foucault. On the other hand, Althusser criticised Gramsci for not addressing the importance of the state in its full concrete reality and introduced a more structural and state-centred perspective. Therefore, criticisms of Gramsci have come from different perspectives and at various scales.

[70] The Gramscian 'autonomy' is crucial to emphasise that there is no complete domination, as domination eliminates any possibility of resistance. Foucault's presupposition inspires this idea that sovereignty inevitably leads to resistance. Foucault discusses that where there is sovereignty, there will be resistance. Foucault describes power relations not as sharp dominance but as existing within a space of resistance and freedom. In other words, power struggles involve a coexisting relationship with a possibility for action. According to Foucault, "There are no relations of power without resistances… The latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised" (Foucault, 1980, p. 142). This is where power struggles become mutable and changeable and not just about dominance over another. These power relations and struggles can be transformed and altered. For more information, see Foucault (1980).

cultural resources that makes these practices possible" (Burawoy, 2019, p. 66). However, what distinguishes Bourdieu from Gramsci here is that Bourdieu views the struggle for cultural dominance as a struggle within cultural fields or within dominant classes, whereas Gramsci views it as a struggle between classes. Bourdieu focuses on classification struggles within the dominant class, rather than on struggles between classes. Interestingly, Bourdieu does not define civil society, despite being a sociologist. Instead, he highlights leaders in different fields and "focuses on classification struggles, that is, struggles within the dominant class about dominant classifications" (Burawoy, 2019, p. 68). On the other hand, Gramsci defines civil society as having partial autonomy, similar to those in Bourdieu's fields.[71] Gramsci recognises the authority of civil society groups such as parties, trade unions, and cultural associations in gaining hegemony of the dominant class (Gramsci, 1992, p. 54). Thus, it becomes imperative to analyse media outlets, taking into account their autonomy as well as the political constraints they operate within. Recognising the independence of the media provides a platform to examine it as a space of resistance to the prevailing ideology. This presents an opportunity to establish a counter-hegemonic influence in diasporic media by means of journalistic independence, as expounded upon by Bourdieu and Gramsci. Accordingly, the journalistic field also displays this dialectical characteristic of hegemony and counterhegemony. The dominant power is often reinforced by mass media, while alternative media can provide a means of resistance and the construction of an alternative narrative. Notably, media outlets of exile tend to exhibit pronounced counterhegemonic

[71] Althusser criticised Gramsci for failing to develop a theory that systematises the institutions that make up civil society, such as churches, schools, trade unions, civil society organisations, newspapers, among others. According to Althusser, the distinction between public and private is simply a matter of bourgeois law, which is exercised by the bourgeoisie's authorized autonomy. For a detailed discussion: Althusser (2008, p. 28).

tendencies, serving as they serve as a platform for people already in conflict with political power.

Gülen media founded the International Journalist Association (IJA). The Kurdish media in exile is strategically using the foreign press to apply public pressure on an international level. Additionally, foreign press organisations show solidarity with exiled journalists by advocating for their rights in their parliaments and governmental bodies. (Refer to Part 1.2 and 1.3) The exile media can gain limited visibility in this manner. However, journalist D. remarks that he hardly believes that there is such a general thing as 'the media in exile.' In terms of the communication among different groups, D. says, "Everyone is trying to publish on their own. We meet from time to time, come together, and I try to follow different publications and works in the diaspora, but still, each of us continues on our own publication lines" (Journalist D., personal communication, November 2, 2023). The left democrat-socialist journalistic diaspora is already quite fragmented, and there is not any sort of collective media outlet that they have organised. They do communicate with each other on occasion, for the most part, each journalist is on their own. The other two groups are more organised. However, there is no solid organisation and solidarity among the three groups here either. Regarding this, journalist B. adds that the exile media is mostly located around Germany and that there are contacts among, although there is no specific organisation: "We come together with many of our colleagues in different political fields and in many activities abroad. But an institutional organisation is not very easy anyway. Only academics have been able to do this" (Journalist B., personal communication, April 8, 2023). Journalist E. also confirms what B. discusses about the lack of organised Turkish media groups in the region where he is involved, saying,

> Liberals like me have nothing to rely on in the diaspora. A notable portion of the Turkish population here follows the CHP tradition, but you cannot get along with Kemalists… The rest of the diaspora is less here, but I know there is the Kurdish and Gülen diaspora in Canada. (Journalist E., personal communication, June 16, 2023)

While a number of journalists who have been exiled are still able to write for foreign media outlets and maintain a public profile, there is no cohesive effort among them to produce a collective body of work from their shared experience of exile. This lack of unity underscores the absence of a clear political opposition that could effectively challenge hegemonic power. It is because in a Gramscian sense, without a strong degree of political organisation and collective action among opposing forces, the formation of significant political alliances remains difficult (Forgacs, 2000, p. 190). In this context, it is a matter of how exiled journalists can best organise themselves. However, the current conditions for solidarity are not yet fully developed. Yet, in general, two particular groups have successfully established a more natural sense of solidarity within the three diaspora groups – namely, the left-socialist media and the Kurdish media. A good illustration of this is the channels of ARTI Gerçek and ARTI TV initiative by the Kurdish media, which serves to broaden and diversify the media landscape, resulting in a more comprehensive and inclusive audience. It is worth mentioning, however, that this achievement has been somewhat restricted in scope.

Apart from a lack of solidarity, ideological and political conflicts occasionally arise between the groups. The Gülenist and Kurdish media have shown to be more structured and organised than the left-socialist diasporic group. Despite their structured nature, the relationship between them is not necessarily stronger. Journalist F. points out that:

> Many [from the Gülen community] who expressed at every opportunity that they were on the side of the state, that they had no conflict with the state, were imprisoned. Many of them received heavy imprisonment for years. But the Kurdish media was ‘syruped.’ They already knew that this state would

> never be conscientious towards them. (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023) (See Appendix B, 34)

Additionally, journalist F. adds that Kurdish journalists have paid a high price, and conditions have not been the same for long with Gülen Islamist media. In the realm of media, circumstances vary, according to F.,

> Compared with Gülen media, the conditions are very different. While carrying out his endeavour in journalism, Kurd sees this as a part of the struggle for freedom. Kurds and Kurdish media always call by name: They call the oppressors an oppressor, call the fascists a fascist, and call Kurds a Kurd. If this geography's name is Kurdistan, they call it Kurdistan. And they survived. It is not like the Gülen Islamist media. (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023) (See Appendix B, 35)

However, when it comes to solidarity with the left-socialist media, F. says that these relations are better established: "The leftist-socialist media and Kurdish media have gone through similar struggles and resistance, which has resulted in their current state" (Journalist F., personal communication, June 18, 2023). As different groups interact in the diaspora, their opinions and judgments of each other become visible, demonstrating disagreements and conflicts among various subfields of journalism in the diasporic space. Journalist B. also criticises the Gülen movement as saying:

> Rightists do not recognise the Turkish state very well. We have always known, heard, felt and experienced what we were fighting against, what history we came from and what the state could do. The person who was the head of the intelligence branch yesterday (pointedly Gülen community) says today that he understands the Turkish state's brutality… An early word. He understands but only because he was punished? But I hope no one will have to understand anymore. (Journalist B., personal communication, April 8, 2023) (See Appendix, 36)

It is possible to see that the Gülen Islamist media has been subjected to criticism from many angles.

However, there are similar criticisms within the Gülen media as well. According to journalist S., there has not been sufficient solidarity in the diaspora from other groups:

> Kurdish community is in a unique position to understand the injustices and violations of rights that the Gülen community has faced. However, they have not provided enough support to the Gülen media. I expected more support from them. Kurds have taken a revanchist attitude that I was surprised, they said you deserved it. But I did not do it, why do they blame me? I know, no one has stood by them; but what is my fault? The fact that the Kurdish community has also suffered a lot over the years, but it is important to change this mindset and work together towards a better future for Turkey. (Journalist S., personal communication, October 20, 2023) (See Appendix B, 37)

Within the Gülen media outlets in diaspora, the examples of S. and K. is more a loss of trust in the state, but not directly to the Gülen community, while A.'s story differently points to complete isolation.

In the Gülen media, the cases of S. and K. reflect a greater loss of trust in the state rather than in the Gülen community. A.'s experience is a clear example of being excluded from various social circles, even among dissident journalists living in exile. Despite undergoing a radical ideological and political transformation and breaking away from the Gülen movement, A. still carries the label and faces rejection from their former community. In his words,

> Even though you have gone through a process of self-reflection and have confronted yourself, and even though you have now distanced yourself from the Gülen movement and are now walking your own independent path, the label of being associated with them may still stick with you. Although some might agree with what you write and even praise you, they still do not want to associate with you. This is not only limited to Turkey, but even in Sweden, some journalists or professional organisations hesitate to stand by your side. While other exiled journalists can find funding or support, unfortunately, I cannot. This makes me feel excluded from everywhere, and it is an overwhelming sense of loneliness. When even exiled journalists who have experienced similar challenges refuse to join you, it highlights how successful the demonisation and witch-hunt campaign has been. It makes you feel like you are being treated like a leper to your bones. (Journalist A., personal communication, June 16, 2023) (See Appendix B, 38)

All in all, disengaging from a sectarian community is no easy feat. Even though one has broken ties with the community, he could still be associated with them.

The complexities of Turkey's politics and ideologies follow its diaspora, posing challenges for exiled media outlets attempting to publish under extraordinary

circumstances. Despite their efforts, Turkish authorities frequently censor and prohibit their work. However, it appears that forming a strong counterhegemonic bloc, as theorised by Gramsci, is not currently a viable option in this context. While Gramsci's concept involves forming political alliances through various tactics and strategies, building such an alliance in the diasporic sphere presents significant difficulties.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Diaspora journalism encompasses various nuances and complexities. It is not a monolithic entity but a diverse field with political, sociological, and economic distinctions. Through the analysis of diaspora journalism across three distinct groups -the Kurdish journalistic diaspora, left democrat-socialist journalistic diaspora, and Gülen Islamist-sectarian journalistic diaspora- we have gained insight into their political and sociological tendencies, their symbolic and economic capitals, and their varying conditions, possibilities, and dilemmas within diasporic spaces. Being an exiled journalist does not absolve one from power dynamics, and writing from abroad presents its own unique opportunities and challenges. Journalists in this field come from diverse traditions and possess different forms of capital, with some shared and others divergent interests. In general, I have tried to analyse diaspora journalism's sociopolitical and technical aspects, exploring various challenges, such as the difficulties of reporting on Turkey from afar, ongoing threats of state surveillance against journalists abroad, and the danger of activism. While some diasporic journalists adhere to recognised journalistic standards, others may operate outside of these boundaries. Additionally, I included the debates on engaged, militant, and propagandist journalism within the framework of journalistic ethics in my study. Concerns such as asylum applications, residence permits, social benefits from European states, passport cancellations, and consular service problems are significant issues that continue to affect exiled journalists. These concrete problems remain pressing within the journalistic field.

From the beginning of my research, I have been deeply interested in exploring the professional and political perspectives of journalists who work within different diasporic communities. I intended to investigate how these individuals organise themselves, the internal dynamics of their journalistic groups, and the factors contributing to their sense of solidarity or potential conflicts of interest within this unique field. Specifically, I expected to discover areas of both agreement and disagreement among journalists with diverse political ideologies, cultural backgrounds, and other defining characteristics within the diasporic journalism landscape. While I was able to achieve most of my research goals, I could not confirm some of my preconceptions during my fieldwork. I do feel that my work successfully illustrated the heterogeneous nature of diaspora journalism, which operates under its own unique set of journalistic norms and is influenced by factors such as technology or distance from imprisonment, and the inherent difficulty of remote writing or continuity of state surveillance. However, despite its fragmented structure, I had hoped to find a more united and cohesive journalistic field. Although I observed the influence of some media organisations and exiled journalists on Turkish politics, I was unable to identify any concrete conditions that would enable journalistic activity to be seen as a form of resistance/counterhegemonic resilience. No collective or strong political alliance exists among dissident and critical journalists within the diaspora. As I explained in the earlier chapter, this is due to various factors, including exiled journalists' efforts to survive under different opportunities and conditions, ongoing conflict areas within different journalistic groups, and their clustering of politically and ideologically differentiated groups.

6.1 What has been achieved so far?

While examining the historical background of Turkish media and the press, in Chapter 4, I sought the multifaceted roles of journalism throughout history. It became apparent that journalism has been utilised as a tool by political forces and as a potent force for resistance. My focus shifted towards exploring how journalists who have faced censorship, regime pressure, arrest, or threats have found ways to resist despite being silenced. I aimed to highlight the challenges and pressures that these journalists have historically faced from the Turkish state. With the advent of conglomerates and changes in ownership, Turkey's media also experienced a new era. I pointed out that specific media organisations from the Islamist wing were established due to the distribution of capital in the hands of specific groups or families. The disruption of this media tradition and the concentration of capital in circles close to the government increased pressure on the critical press. During my examination of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) period, I discovered numerous actions taken to control journalists and media organisations, such as cancelling oppositionists' press cards and manipulating media organisations' advertising revenues. As noted in Chapter 4, I also highlighted the difficulties that journalists and the press encounter worldwide, particularly in nations such as Afghanistan, Russia, and Iran, where state influence, censorship, and penalties are widespread. This underscores the fact that Turkey's legacy of censorship and oppression is not unique, as many other authoritarian regimes have similar accounts of exile.

The harsh measures of censorship, legal consequences, arrests, and even torture have compelled journalists to seek refuge in other countries, but even this does not guarantee complete safety. Within Chapter 5 of my thesis, I carefully detail

the specific threats that exiled journalists face. As part of my fieldwork, I researched the experiences of journalists who left Turkey for various reasons since the mid-2000s. My research focused on the many challenges encountered by these individuals, including obtaining residency and financial stability and ensuring the safety of their loved ones left behind. Factors such as economic instability, lack of institutional support, and the struggle to obtain necessary permits and find adequate housing within their new countries of refuge leave exiled journalists vulnerable. Furthermore, the attitudes of host nations towards exiles can change depending on the state of bilateral relations, leading to further censorship and oppression. Governments that oppress their journalists do not relinquish their control even when individuals flee, and those who do escape often find themselves followed and attacked. Though they may be relatively safer in their new homes, exiled journalists still feel constrained by the need to self-censor, as their families left behind are often treated as hostages or subject to sanctions. Even within the diasporic community, journalists do not feel secure, as polarisation within the country often extends to these groups. This lack of safety and solidarity destroys opportunities for socialisation and support that should be present.

I have divided my fieldwork chapter into three distinct sections: diversity in the diaspora, ethics in journalism, and state surveillance in the diaspora. I delved into the complex nature of the diasporic space. Specifically, I identified three subgroups within this space, encompassing various ideological, political, and cultural orientations. I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 10 journalists, including one Reporters Without Borders (RSF) representative. My objective was to examine the emergence of exile journalism within the Bourdieuian conceptual framework of the *journalistic field*. I also studied the norms and dynamics that shape

this journalistic space and the potential and limitations of exile media. Unlike other theories, Bourdieu's framework considers not only economic factors but also social and cultural values. This retrospective approach takes into account some issues like the distribution of socio-economic roots, educational backgrounds of the individuals, and different forms of capital in the journalistic field in question.

Based on fieldwork findings, Kurdish journalists in exile have a rich history in Europe and have been able to leverage their social capital to find solidarity opportunities. Similarly, Gülen media has established its capital thanks to past government opportunities and has built institutions in various countries that share cultural and social advantages, as emphasised by Bourdieu. Despite these extensive networks, it is evident in the fieldwork that the Gülen group has not been able to rebuild the media power they lost in Turkey in 2016. Additionally, individual journalistic efforts also play a significant role in Gülen media. While many journalists are unable to continue their work in exile, some of those who insist on remaining in the field are forced to engage in non-journalistic work in order to survive financially. The Gülen group and Kurdish journalists have no difficulty in reaching their own grassroots followings. However, the leftist democratic-socialist group of exiled journalists does not have as much established social or economic capital as the Kurdish or Islamist diasporic media. In addition to their cultural capital, this group tries to maintain its own appeal through individual efforts and social networks.

Additionally, one of the most challenging issues I found in diasporic media is reliability and credibility. For Gülen media, this is due to their past relationship with the AKP government and its intense propaganda, which is now resulting in a crisis of reputation and legitimacy. In a theoretical framework, this crisis of legitimacy causes

a decrease in symbolic capital for Gülen community. The decline of symbolic capital in the diasporic sphere means that the messages of exiled journalists reach their targets but, paradoxically, do not have the desired impact. There is an inverse proportion between agenda-setting and interaction: it means that being abroad is met with scepticism even among those with whom journalists have an ideological affinity, whom they normally address or to whom they feel a sense of belonging, let alone those who favour political power.

6.2 Looking into the future: Achievements, shortcomings, limitations

Through my field research, I analysed the social subjects of this field, including their conflict of interest and conditions of solidarity. I attempted to go beyond Bourdieu's sociology and seek possible political alliances established in the diasporic journalistic field among different media groups. While discussing the potential of exile media as a counterhegemonic space, I borrowed Gramsci's concept of hegemony. I figured out that due to the influence of past conflicts and ideological differences, these subgroups do not typically cooperate towards a common goal. My fieldwork concluded that no strong organisation in the exile media could establish such a political alliance bloc against the political hegemony of the state. I found a fragmented and disorganised diasporic journalistic space, contrary to what I expected to see when imagining the exile media as a counterhegemonic political bloc in the field, as I previously mentioned. Gramsci's concept of counterhegemonic could not be established as a means of resistance against ideological and political hegemony because journalists living in exile are very dispersed, including different ideological groups, socioeconomic environments, and different cultural backgrounds. While journalists on the same ideological track may create common publications and

platforms, their struggles against political authority remain disconnected or individual. According to Gramsci, individual efforts are insufficient in the construction of counterhegemony, and alliances must be established. But I chose the three different circles -the Kurdish journalistic diaspora, the left democratic-socialist journalistic diaspora and the Gülenist journalistic diaspora- as fieldwork cannot achieve any form of common counterhegemonic diaspora in this sense. To comprehend the reasons for the lack of solidarity and political alliance, I believe further research is necessary beyond the scope of this thesis due to limitations.

Another limitation of this thesis is that while it explores the diverse diasporic space through the analysis of the three groups in comparison with each other, it does not delve into the intricate relationships within each group inside. For a more comprehensive examination, it is necessary to consider the periodicities and transformations of all three groups -Kurdish media, Gülen Islamist media, and social democrat-left media- including their evolving political situations and the individuals who join or depart from these groups. Such a study would require a more historical and periodised approach. Although I highlighted the differences and similarities between these three groups in my thesis, I do not give priority to the complex relationships within each group. However, one of the exceptions I found in fieldwork was the complete separation of journalist A. from Gülen media and community. This case served as a compelling example of ideological and political transformation within the diasporic journalistic field.

Being away from news sources and the field or not being able to touch society creates a sense of alienation among journalists. Exiled journalists inevitably weaken their reporting reflexes and risk losing touch with reality: psychological pressure and emotional intensity foster tendencies towards politicisation,

radicalisation and militancy in language and perspective. Government restrictions on broadcasts made abroad serve to reinforce barriers to counterhegemony formation. By applying the perspectives of Bourdieu and Gramsci, it becomes clear that independent and free journalism within the diaspora can generate a counterhegemonic sphere of influence. Nonetheless, the government's measures, including censorship and punishment, as well as journalists' own dilemmas, highlight the challenges of establishing a robust counterhegemonic bloc.

As a final word, despite living and working abroad, the majority of journalists still focus their writings on Turkey's agenda. The language used in diaspora journalism also remains primarily Turkish, indicating that journalists' minds are still preoccupied with the issues of their homeland even as they try to adjust to a new environment. It is a unanimous sentiment among exiled journalists that establishing a new order is no simple feat – bureaucratic and legal obstacles and adjusting to a new way of life require significant effort and energy. Additionally, the bond with Turkey remains strong, as it is difficult to leave behind one's roots entirely, even when adapting to new cultures, people, and customs. As journalist M. once said, "Certain sights, sounds, or smells can painfully remind them that they do not belong in a certain place" (Journalist M., personal communication, 2023). For many, the hope of returning to Turkey arose with the possibility of a new government during the elections. However, that hope was short-lived as the elections came and went. Some journalists have expressed willingness to return if the political climate changes, while others feel a permanent return is unlikely. Regardless, these journalists remain committed to the struggle in Turkey, perhaps even more than their profession demands.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF RESEARCH INTERVIEWS

ID	Interviewee	Date	Place
Interview 1	Journalist B, journalist, artist, author	April 8, 2023.	Online
Interview 2	Journalist T, journalist, author, streamer	April 11, 2023.	Paris
Interview 3	Journalist E, journalist, columnist	June 16, 2023.	Online
Interview 4	Journalist A, journalist	June 16, 2023.	Online
Interview 5	Journalist F, journalist, author	June 18, 2023.	Online
Interview 6	Journalist K, journalist	October 20, 2023.	Online
Interview 7	Journalist S, journalist	October 20, 2023.	Online
Interview 8	Journalist R, RSF's representative	October 25, 2023.	Online
Interview 9	Journalist M, journalist	October 25, 2023.	Online
Interview 10	Journalist D, journalist, author, streamer	November 2, 2023.	Online

APPENDIX B

LONG QUOTES IN TURKISH

1. ARTI TV ve ARTI GERÇEK için Türkiye medyasının prototipi denebilirdi. Aslında bunun temel gerekçesi de şuydu, ARTI GERÇEK ve ARTI TV'yi kurduğumuzda Türkiye'de gazeteciliği özgür koşullarda sürdürebilmek mümkün değildi. Ama gazetecilik faaliyetini sürdürüp bu faaliyet üzerinden Türkiye ve Kürdistan kamuoyunun haber alma hakkını savunmak gerekiyordu. O bir şekliyle bizim gazeteci refleksimizin ortaya çıkardığı bir sonuçtu.
2. Daha sonra Osmanlı'da kısmi iyileşmelerin olduğu dönemde yine Kürdistan coğrafyasında değildi bu TV ve gazeteler. Ama tabii o zaman teknolojiyle de yakından ilgisi vardı. Teknoloji daha çok Beyrut ve İstanbul'daydı o dönem, yani 19. yüzyılın başlarında. 1960'lardan sonra Türkiye'de yeniden Kürt hareketi bir şekliyle örgütlenmeye başladığında, Kürtler siyaset alanında yeniden kendi illegalde olsa partileri aracılığıyla boy göstermeye başladıklarında, çok ciddi yasaklar vardı. Yani Kürt kavramı bile yasaktı. Bir insanın kendine "Kürdüm" demesi hatta Kürtçe konuşması bile ceza gerekçesiydi. O yıllarda Kürtçe konuşana zabıta kabahatler kanununa göre ceza keserdi.
3. Bir grup arkadaşımızla birlikte bir aylık dergi çıkardık. Siyasal ve kültürel haber içerikli bir dergi. O dergi bir müddet sonra haftalık gazeteye dönüştü. Daha sonra o dönemki cezalar ve baskılar sebebiyle çok ciddi mağduriyetler yaşadık. Çünkü o dönem Kürt gazeteciliği farklı biçimlerde kendini göstermeye ve etkin olmaya başladı. Ve çok ciddi cinayetler de işlendi. 70'e yakın Kürt gazeteci arkadaşımız o dönem adı Hizbullah olan bir kontra yapılanma ya da JİTEM tarafından sokak

ortasında öldürüldü. Öldürülenlerin tümü birlikte gazeteciliğe başladığımız genç insanlardı.

4. Ben şanslıydım biraz Türkiye'den çıkmadan popülerliğimin yüksek olduğu bir dönemdi, onun da avantajıyla mesleğime devam edebiliyorum. Bunu herkes yapamıyor. Buraya gelen pek çok meslekten pek çok insan bunu yapamadı. İnsanlar bambaşka işlerle hayatta kalmaya çalışıyorlar.
5. Eğer pasaportunuzun süresi yurt dışında bitiyorsa ve siz de Türkiye'de aranıyorsanız, yazılarınız nedeniyle, imza attınız kitaplar nedeniyle ya da verdiğiniz röportajlar nedeniyle hakkınızda işlemler varsa, sizi Türkiye'ye dönüşe zorlamak için pasaportunuzla ilgili herhangi bir işlem yapmaktan geri duruyor konsolosluklar. Dolayısıyla sizi de belki hiç istemediğiniz halde kaçak yaşamak ya da iltica talebinde bulunmak gibi yollara zorlayan bir süreçle karşı karşıya kalıyorsunuz. Sözünü ettiğin örnek yeni tür baskılara işaret eden bir olumsuzluk. Bizim için tabii ki son yıllarda ortaya çıkan en özgün ve en endişe verici şeylerden baskı türlerinden birisi bu.
6. O zaman kızım yeni doğmuştu, daha üç aylık bir bebekti. Oğlum beş yaşındaydı. Eşim doğum iznindeydi. Daha sonra onlar yanıma geldi. Yeterli param yoktu, ne İngiltere ne Kanada ve Amerika vizem vardı. Bu ülkelere gitmeyi geçim açısından çok fazla sürdürülebilir görmedim. Şöyle konuştuk kendi aramızda… 1-2 ay daha burada bekleyelim, daha sonra olmazsa beraber döneriz diye. Çünkü param bitmişti artık ve iki aydan fazla geçinemezdik. Döneriz, sen çalışmaya başlarsın, ben de iş ararım ve bu arada çocuklarla ilgilenirim evde demiştim eşime.
7. Tektim. Başka mülteciler de vardı benimle ama ben tektim. Yunanistan'dan bir mülteci grubuyla yola çıktım, yürüyerek gidiyoruz. Arnavutluk'a doğru

gidiyorum, kaç tane tepeyi ardımda bıraktığımı hatırlamıyorum. Bazen böyle dönüp bakıyordum, bana çok enteresan geliyordu, şu an yani böyle hayal meyal, o dağlar, o tepeler gözlerimin önünde. Böyle nefesimin kesildiğini, artık gücümün kalmadığını, yetmeyeceğini hissettiğim ya da yalnız olduğumu hissettiğim o anlar çok oldu yol boyunca. Çok zorlandım. Çok çok zorlandım. Şu an baktığımda inanılmaz geliyor bana. Ben böyle bir şeyi nasıl yaptım, nasıl başardım, diyorum.

8. Çok kötü hikâyeler duyduk. Yolda başka mülteci kafilelerine denk geldik. Biz 15-20 kişilik bir gruptuk ama onlar böyle 60-70-80 kişilik gruplardı. Başka kadınlar vardı mesela, bir kadını gördüm, kucağında çocuğunu emziriyordu. Öyle kadınlar yollardaydı… Onlar açısından düşününce çok çok daha zor, o anda sen kendini biraz daha şanslı hissediyorsun.
9. Ben zaten çalışmaya devam etmek istiyordum. Türkiye'den çıkarken de hep onu söylemiştim. Nerede olursam olayım yazmaya devam edeceğim, diye. Hatta ben bunu cezaevindeyken de hep söylüyordum, cezaevindeyken imkanlar ne saha çalışması gibi ne de ajanstaki gibi… Bilgiye ulaşmak çok geç oluyor. Ama sloganım buydu benim: Nerede olursam olayım yazmaya devam edeceğim. Geleli yaklaşık iki yıl geçti. İki yıldır bir televizyon kanalında çalışıyorum, Kürt medyasında devam ediyorum.
10. Psikolojik olarak sahada olmanın ne kadar önemli olduğunu biliyorum. Sahada olmak, sahayı hissetmek, yerelden dinlemek, Türkiye'den uzakta Türkiye'nin gündemini yazmak bir handikap. Her şey için geçerli. Uzaktan Mısır'ı yazmak, uzaktan Suriye'yi yazmak, hissetmediğin, görmediğin, duymadığın, teneffüs etmediğin bir yeri yazmak, bu insanda yabancılaşma hissiyatı yaratıyor. Diyeceksin ki zaten dış politika yazarısın, zaten uzaktan yazmaya mecbursun.

Evet bu yetenek zamanla gelişiyor. Ama en azından yazdığım yerleri hayatımda bir kez, iki kez, üç kez görmüşlüğüm var. mesafeleri bilmek, alışkanlıkları bilmek, toplumla ilişkileri anlamak, toplumsal dokuyu çözmek, tüm bunlar uzaktan yazsak da bilmediğimiz ya da geçmişte tecrübe etmediğimiz şeyler değil. ben Suriye'ye defalarca gittim. Gitmeden de o ilişkileri anlıyorum. Zorlanmıyorum. Geçmişten tecrübelerim var. Bu açıdan daha rahatım. Sonuçta Türkiye'nin iç siyasetini yazmıyorum. Yine de bir yabancılaşma hissinin insanı etkilediğini söyleyebilirim.

11. Türkiye'deyken de zaten yasaklı kavramları hiç bir zaman imtina etmeden kullandım. Yani Kürt ve Kürdistan kavramları yasaklıyken mahkemede Kürt ve Kürdistan kavramlarını kullandım. Bunun için ceza aldım. Sonrasında da tüm yazılarımda yeri gelmiştir hiç çekinmeden bu kavramları kullanmışımdır. Türkiye'de ana akım medyada ya da başka yayın organlarında konuk olduğumda nazik bir dille 'Bazı kavramları kullanmayalım' dediklerinde o zaman yayına katılmayacağımı belirttim, imtina etmedim.
12. Daha çekingen hale geldiğimi düşünüyorum yazarken. İki nedenle, bunun bedelini benim değil de gazetemin ya da ailemin ödediği bir durum oluşuyor. Bu bende psikolojik bir etki bırakıyor. Kendimi daha fazla frenleme ihtiyacı hissediyorum. Türkiye'de olsam bedelini ben ödeyeceğim, polis gelse beni alacak, ama şimdi polis geliyor, eşim ya da çocuklarım karşısında. Bunun bende olumsuz bir etkisi oldu. Gazetemin ben korunaklı bir alandayken ateş çemberi içinde olduğunu düşünerek onlara da haksızlık yapmak istemiyorum. Ben yazayım, bedelini gazete ödesin, ben yazayım bedelini ailem ödesin gibi kolaycı bir yaklaşıma kapılmamak için kendimi daha kontrollü hale getirdim. Bu iyi bir

şey değil. Bir dayatma. Bir iç hesaplaşma. Ben sürgündeyken özgürüm, rahatım, o yüzden rahat yazıyorum diyemiyorum.

13. Türkiye'de iken sosyal medyada bir şey yazdığımda kendime ben bir ajansta çalışıyorum gazeteci olarak, sadece haber paylaşayım, hiç yorum yapmayayım diyordum. Kendi görüşümü içine katmıyordum. Burada tam tersi oldu. Daha çok yorumlarımı katar oldum, düşüncelerimi daha çok ifade etmeye başladım. Böyle bir değişim yarattı. Radikalleştim. Buraya geldikten sonra çok daha cesurca yazmaya başladım ama haberlerle iç içe de değilim. Sokakta haber arayamam mesela. Türkiye'de biz gidiyorduk sokağa çıkıyorduk, mahallelerde geziyorduk, haber arıyorduk veya hikâyeler buluyorduk. Çok da güzel haberler çıkıyordu ortaya. Burada bunu yapamıyorsun. Bu da gazetecilik refleksini öldürüyor. Benim en çok üzüldüğüm şey o.
14. Mesleğin politik zeminde ne kadar kutuplaştığı göz önüne alındığında gazetecilik ve aktivizm arasındaki fark görece silikleşiyor. Dolayısıyla bu bir var olma mücadelesine dönüyor. Eğer bir gazetecinin yazacak bir mecrası yoksa, o kişinin sosyal medya hesabı bir var olma biçimine dönüyor. Fakat Türkiye'de gerçeklik dediğimiz, nesnel bilgi dediğimiz şey o kadar derine gömülü ki kendisini aktivizme bırakmış bir gazeteci bile o gerçeği bulup kamuoyuna ulaştırdığı için çoğu kez alkışlanıyor.
15. Geçmişte de gazetecilik benim için önemliydi ve ben ol denildiği için olan gazetecilerden değildim. Kendi tercihimdi, hayalimdi. Kamu yönetimi mezunuyum. İçeride eleştirilmesi gereken konuları hep eleştirdim, bunları dile getirdim, o zaman gazete yönetimi ile bazı konularda kavgalar da yaşadım. Mesela Deniz Feneri konusunda, çünkü bazı yolsuzlukları biliyordum ama yayımlanmıyordu. Tartışıyorsunuz ama bir yere kadar. Önceden de eleştirirdim,

tartışırdım, gazete yönetimiyle kavgalarımız da oldu. Ama bazı hedefleri paylaşıyorduk, ortaklaştığımız, hoşuma giden yanları vardı, içindeydim de. Asıl yüzleşme benim için yurt dışına çıktıktan sonra başladı. Bize söyleyen bir şeyler vardı ama kapalı kapılar ardında, söylenmemiş, rızaya dayalı olmayan, onaya dayalı olmayan, size hiç sorulmamış şeyler de vardı. Bunları fark etmek sizi altüst ediyor. Benim ciddi psikolojik kırılmalarım oldu. Depresyona girdiğim, uyuyamadığım, kabuslar gördüğüm gecelerim oldu.

16. Şu an kazancım geçinmeme yetmiyor. Bir yandan siz zaten Türkiye'den çıktığınız için ülkedeki mevcut hükümetin veya rejimin taraftarları tarafından vatansızlıkla suçlanıyorsunuz. Vatanını satmakla, ihanetle suçlanıyorsunuz. Bir taraftan da bu bahsetmiş olduğum yazılar ve yayınlar sonrasında geçmişte içinde yer aldığım hareket tarafından da ihanetle suçlandım. Bir taraf vatana ihanetle diğer taraf da camiaya ihanetle sizi suçluyor. Çok çeşitli yaftalamalarla karşılaştım. Tamamen yalnızlaştım.
17. Ben bunu yaparken bu yalnızlaşmayı göze almıştım. Ki bir de sürgünde bu kararı almak daha zordu. Türkiye'de iken bu daha kolay olabilir ama zaten yurtdışına çıkmışsın, zaten çok büyük bir aidiyet sorunu yaşıyorsunuz, bu tür durumlarda genellikle insanlar güvenli sığınaklar ararlar; o korunaklı bir mahalle içerisinde hem ailesi, çocukları hem de kendisi için mümkün olan en az hasarla o süreci atlatmayı isterler. Çünkü bu bir dayanışmadır; ev aradığınızda ev bulmak için herkes seferber olur; iş aradığınızda iş bulmak için herkes seferber olur; herkes birbirine destek olur, birbiriyle paylaşır, bazen bir zorluk çektiğinizde birileri size destek olur, çocuklarınız diğerlerinin çocukları ile arkadaşlık eder, böylelikle yalnızlık sürecini kolay atlatırsınız. Eşler bir araya gelir, sosyalleşme yaşar ve birbiriyle duygudaşlık kurma gibi artıları olur… Ama bir de bu sürgünün içinde

yalnızlaşmayı da göze alarak buna böyle bir işe kalkışınca bunun ciddi zorluklarını yaşadım ama pişman değilim, doğru yaptığımı düşünüyorum. Ama hesaplaşma her anlamda oldu. Tabii ki bir bütün olarak her şeyi inkar etmek ya da büsbütün bir çözülme gibi değil bu. Ama evrensel ilkeler, doğrular var.

18. Türküm, Türkiye'nin asli unsurlarından biriydim, hiçbir zaman öyle ayrımcılığa uğramadım bu zamana kadar. Teoride biliyordum ama pratikte yaşamak bambaşka bir şey. Şöyle örnek vereyim; benim diplomatik pasaportum vardı. Bir anda pasaportsuz kaldım. Çok büyük bir kırılma. Devletle ilgili, güvendiğiniz bir aileniz, babanızın sizi taciz etmesi gibi bir şey. Şimdi bir Ermeni ya da Kürtün o bayrağı nasıl gördüğünü anlıyorum. Bir Filistinlinin İsrail bayrağı görmesi gibi.
19. Mecburi çıkmak farklı bir psikoloji. Ahmet Kaya'nın "Siz benim neler çektiğimi nereden bileceksiniz"ini dinler ağlardım. Daha önce dinlemezdim hiç. Hitap etmezdi bana. Bir iki kulağıma çalınan şarkısını bilirdim. Ahmet Kaya dinliyorum, ağlıyorum. Şebnem Ferah dinliyorum, ağlıyorum. Çok zor zamanlardı benim için.
20. Can Dündar mesela gri listede, ben de listedeyim, PKK'lilerle yan yana fotoğrafım var, kabak gibi bembeyaz ben duruyorum, yanımda PKK'li bir çocuk var, onu da tam bilmiyorum, yani PKK'li yazdıkları için söylüyorum, o kadar komik ki gören herkes dalga geçiyor. Bir devlet bu kadar da itibarını ayağa düşürmemeli. Ben siyaset gazeteciliği hiçbir zaman yapmadım, siyasetle ilgilenmedim, ben kültür sanat gazetecisiyim. Ben bile Türkiye'de esen rüzgardan etkilendim ve hedef oldum, sürgün gazetecisi oldum.
21. Ben böyle bir yüzleşme yaşamadım. Niye yaşayayım ki? Ben zaten kendimi bildim bileli böyle haksızlıklar konusunda hassasiyetleri olan biriydim. Vicdanım rahat. Kürtlere yapılanlar konusunda da tavrım belli. Hiçbir zaman ben bunların

yanında durmadım, resmi söylemin yanında durmadım. Ben Zaman'da çalışırken sıradan bir muhabirdim ama yayın politikasını eleştiriyordum. Eleştirdiğimiz için de dışlanıyorduk. Cemaati herkes 15 Temmuz'dan sonra eleştirdi, düşene bir tekme de biz vuralım diye. Ama ben güçlü iken de eleştirebiliyordum. Ben Kürtlere yapılanları da iyi biliyorum, solculara yapılanları da iyi biliyorum, Alevilere yapılanları da iyi biliyorum. Ben Artvin'de büyüdüm, Artvin solcu bir şehirdir. Bizim ailemiz solcudur. Dolayısıyla belki ilk defa dindar biri olarak devletin düşman ilan ettiği biri oldum ama önceden de düşman ilan ettikleri insanların içinde idim.

22. 2014 yılının Şubat ayında bir canlı yayında, hem İspanyol gazetecilerin hem Türkiye'deki gazetecilerin olduğu İspanya başbakanı ile düzenlenen ortak bir basın toplantısı sırasında, dönemin başbakanı Tayyip Erdoğan'a 17 Aralık sonrasında internete düşen ses kayıtlarıyla ilgili olarak sorular sormuştum. Erdoğan'ın Gezi eylemleri sırasında Kuzey Afrika'ya yaptığı ziyaret, Fas'ta Habertürk'ü arayıp Devlet Bahçeli ile ilgili bir altyazıyı kaldırması talimatı, bir de Erdoğan'ın talimatıyla medyanın el değiştirmesi iddiaları hakkındaydı. Erdoğan basın toplantısında çok sert bir cevap vermişti bana, hakaret etmişti. Sonrasında çok tepki çektiğim için yolda yürüyemez hale geldim.
23. Bugünkü konjonktürde sürgündeki gazetecilerin karşılaştıkları en yeni ve endişe verici boyut bulundukları ülkelerde de Türkiye'den giden toplum kesimlerinin Türkiye'nin politik atmosferinden etkilenen ve resmi söylem üzerinden bulundukları ülkede de kendileri gibi insanlar üzerinde de tehdit oluşturabilecek etkilerinin olması. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'de bir siyasi yetkilinin, iktidar sözcüsünün hedef gösterdiği bir sürgündeki gazeteci, bulunduğu ülkede de savunmasız durumdadır. Bulundukları ülkenin kuvvetlerine veya polisine

güvenebilecek bir durumu olmuyor ne yazık ki. Sürgünde yaşamanın onca diplomatik onca resmi düzlemdeki zorluğuna, kırılganlığına bir de oradaki can güvenliği sorunu ekleniyor.

24. Buradayken ciddi bir suikast girişimi atlattım. Her yerden tehdit geliyor. Fakat suikast ihbarının detayı öyle değildi. Ankara'dan örgütlenmiş ve üç tane tetikçinin buraya geldiğinden süreçte haberimiz oldu. Bu girişim sonrasında da çok ağır koruma altına alındım. Bir yıla yakın sürdü. Bütün turnelerimi çelik yeleklerle, on polisle yaptım, Papa gibi gezdim Avrupa'da İnterpol koruması oldu. Bu başka bir düzeydi. Hâlâ da tedbirlerden bahsedemiyorum ama farklı düzeylerde dönem dönem değişen tedbirler devam ediyor, hala tehdit altında bir gazeteciyim.
25. Türkiye'de Hrant Dink cinayetinden sonra diken üstündeyiz. Ben ve benim gibi bu konunun herhangi bir alanında faaliyet gösterenler ekstra tehdit altında. Türkiye'de Hristiyan olmak zor bir şey. Türkiye Ortadoğu'da en az Hristiyan nüfusa sahip Müslüman ülke. Bundan 100 yıl önce üçte biri Hristiyandı. Bu demek oluyor ki Türkiye 100 yıl içinde en çok Hristiyan öldürülmüş ülkedir. Kadim halklardan bahsediyorum… Dolayısıyla bu arka planda, soykırımlar meselesinde, onlarla ilgilenmek çok zor konular. Ekstra bir tehdit ve baskı konusu. Seni koruyan polisten bile tedirgin oluyorsun.
26. Türkiye'deki son yıllarımda, Radikal zamanında da vardı, çok sayıda tehdit alıyordum. Bu tehditler Suriye bağlantılı yazılarımdan dolayıydı. Gazeteyi arayıp öldürüleceğime dair ihtarlar ya da başını uçururuz gibi tehditlerin bırakıldığı mesajlar oluyordu. Sokakta da çok güvenli bir şekilde yürüyemediğimi anladım. Artık insanlar önüme geçiyor, laf atıyor, sataşıyordu, birkaç fiili durum yaşadım. Bir tarafta hükümetin baskıları vardı bir tarafta tehditler vardı.

27. Ama işin doğrusu benim daha sonra başıma bela olan yazılarım daha önce Radikal'de, Hürriyet'te yayımlandılar, o dönemde hiçbirisi hakkında soruşturma açılmamıştı. Sadece işten attırmaya yönelik bir baskı söz konusuydu. Radikal yayın yönetmeni bir seferinde, bir sefer de Davutoğlu'nu memnun eden bir şey yaz dedi, ben de istiyorsan beni kovabilirsin dedim, ama bunu yazamam dedim, ertesi gün daha sert bir yazı yazarak yayın yönetmenine tavrımı gösterdim. Ama hiçbirisi dava konusu olmadı. Bu gelen tehditler nedeniyle son 2 yılda tedbirli yaşadım. Arabaya binmeden önce lastiklerini, motorunu kontrol ediyordum. Tuhaftı. Sokakta arabayı kontrol edip binerken eşim camdan beni izliyordu. Bu psikoloji çok kötü bir şey, arabanın patlatılma ihtimali… Ben birkaç yıl tedbiri yaşamaya devam ettim tehditler yüzünden. Yurt dışına çıkarken hakkımda soruşturma yoktu. Çıktıktan sonra Paris'e geldim, ardından Beyrut'a gittim. Ben Beyrut üzerinden Suriye'ye gitmek üzere Türkiye'den iş için ayrılmıştım. Ancak Paris'e geldikten sonra dönmememin iyi fikir olduğuna karar verdik ailecek. Çünkü eşim de artık ben İstanbul'dayken bana bir şey olacak diye uyuyamıyordu, rahatsızdı. Beyrut'a inince eşim ilk kez dün gece rahat uyudum diye mesaj atmış bana, sen güvendesin diye. O ana kadar işin bu boyutunu hiç düşünmemiştim. Ailem üzerinde oluşturduğu baskıyı pek dikkate almamıştım. Bunun üzerinde sonra düşünmeye başladım.
28. Paris'e yerleştiğimde aile dışında bu durumu kimse ile paylaşmamıştım. Buna rağmen bir tehdit mesajı aldım, "Paris'te yaşıyorum diye kendini güvende sanma" diyordu mesajda. Tehdit mesajları zaman zaman hâlâ devam ediyor. Bunların bazısı aileme yönelik.
29. "Siz ne iş yapıyorsunuz?" diye sordum. "Ben Büyükelçilikte çalışıyorum" dedi. Şaşırdım biraz. Biz evin adresini kimseye vermeyelim derken eve elçilik çalışanı

geldi. Biraz şüphelendim tabii. Evi kiralamadı. Ben Beyrut'a gittim, altı ay kaldım. Paris'e dönerken ev hâlâ boştu ve tekrar aynı evi kiraladım.

30. Olmayan mal varlığım dondurulduğu. Benim mal varlığım yok biliyor musunuz, bir tane evim var Türkiye'de, ne arabam ne başka şeyim, hiçbir şeyim yok. Sırf sürgünde hayatımızı zorlaştırmak için bunu yaptılar. İçişleri Bakanı Süleyman Soylu'nun imzası var olmayan mal varlığımı dondurduklarına dair, devletin resmi belgelerinde var bu.
31. Sadece Erdoğan eleştirisine ihtiyaç olduğunda sizi aramaları sinir bozucu. Biz hep buradayız. Fikirlerimiz var. Zaten eleştirdiğimiz için, muhalif bir tarafa düştüğümüz için sürgün yaşıyoruz ama benim Türkiye ve hükümetle olan hesabım onlar için kullanışlı bir malzeme olmamalı. Kendimizi o pozisyona sokmamamız gerekiyor. Macron'un Erdoğan'la hesaplaşması sırasında benim de buradan bir barut atmamı bekliyorlar. Kendileri kendi hükümetleri için bunu yapmıyor. Erdoğan'ın omzundan Macron'a ateş açmıyorlar. Ama senin bunu yapmanı bekliyorlar. Bunu birkaç kez hissettim ve bu yayınlara katılmadım.
32. Ben aktivist değilim. Fransız basını için kullanışlı bir kalem de değilim. Evet Türkiye'de sorun yaşıyorum, evet yazılarım çok rahatsızlık yaratıyor, ama bir taraftan da uluslararası standartlarda gazetecilik yapmak zorundayım. BBC ya da Al Monitor gibi kanallarda bir aktivist olarak gazeteciliği sürdüremezsiniz.
33. Le Monde gazetesinin röportajı sırasında Türkiye'nin Suriye politikası, cihatçılarla ilişkiler, IŞİD gibi konular konuşuldu. Ben rahatlıkla soruları yanıtladım. Ancak Türkiye'nin izlediği Suriye politikasının sadece Erdoğan'ın politikası olmadığını, Batı'yla birlikte bu yola girdiklerini, haliyle Fransız hükümetinin de sorumluluk taşıdığını söyledim. Eğer bugün İslamcı örgütler Suriye'de egemen oldularsa bu sadece Erdoğan'ın marifeti değil, dedim. Erdoğan

bunu kendi komşusuna yaptığı için bu operasyonları kendi topraklarından yürüttüğü için büyük ölçüde sorumludur ancak bu konuda Fransız istihbaratı, İngiliz istihbaratı ve Amerikan istihbaratı MİT'le birlikte çalıştılar dedim. Bunun üzerine bununla ilgili delilleriniz var mı diye sordular. Dedim ki az önce Erdoğan'ın cihatçılarla ilişkilerini anlatırken bana delil sormadınız ama Fransız hükümetinin ilişkilerini anlatınca delil sordunuz. Tabii ki Le Monde Fransa hükümetine yönelik eleştirilerimin olduğu bölümleri yayımlamadı. Sadece Erdoğan'la ilgili bölümleri yayımladılar. Bu da sansür.

34. Cemaat medyası Türkiye'de devlet olanağıyla çok kısa sürede çok büyük medya kuruluşlarına dönüştü ama hiçbir zaman kötü günleri hesaplamamışlardı ki darbe sonrasında çok ciddi bir savrulma oldu bu kesimde. Biz devletin yanındayız, devletle biz hiç çatışmadık diyen çok sayıda insan hapsedildi ve devlet onlara çok düşmanca yanaştı. Önemli bir bölümü çok uzun yıllar hapislerde kaldı. Hâlâ hapiste olup çok ciddi cezalar alanlar var. Ama Kürt medyası şerbetliydi. Bu devletin hiçbir zaman kendilerine karşı vicdanlı olmayacağını biliyorlardı.
35. Cemaat gazeteciliği ya da medyasıyla kıyasladığımızda aynı koşullara sahip olmadığımızı ifade eden temel noktalardan birisi Kürtlerin bu mesleği bir çaba olarak yürütürken aynı zamanda bunu Kürt özgürlük mücadelesinin bir parçası olarak görmesindendir. Zorbaya zorba dedi, baskıcıya baskıcı dedi, faşiste faşist dedi, Kürte Kürt dedi. Bir coğrafyanın adı Kürdistan ise ona Kürdistan dedi. O nedenle Kürt medyası özgür ve kendisi olabildi. Yaptığı işi saklamadı, çekinmedi, açık açık savundu. Gülen medyasıyla aynı değil.
36. Kalemimde, fikirlerimde asla bir değişiklik olmadı. Neyle kavga ettiğimiz, hangi tarihten geldiğimiz, karşımızdakinin neler yapabileceği, her zaman bildiğimiz, duyduğumuz, yaşadığımız, hissettiğimiz şeylerdi. Bugün Gülenciler şimdi

anladık Türkiye'nin ne olduğunu diyorlar, çok iddialı bir laf. Hiç anlamadılar. Çünkü sağcılar Türk devletini çok tanımaz. Asıl onunla karşı karşıya gelenler onun ne olduğunu iyi bilir. Dün istihbarat şube başkanı olan bir adam bugün muhalefeti, Türk devlet politikalarını anladığını söylüyor; çünkü kendisi bugün sürgün. Biliyorum, şimdi anladım diyebilmeleri için çok erken. Umarım daha fazla anlamak zorunda da kalmaz hiçkimse. Daha iyiye gider her şey.

37. Gülen cemaatine yapılanları en iyi anlayacak, onlarla empati kuracak, uğradıkları haksızlıkları, hak ihlallerini anlayacak olanlar Kürtlerdir biliyor musunuz… Gerçekten uzun yıllardır yaşamadıkları şey kalmadı. Kürtlere de ben biraz kırgınım. O kadar intikamcı tavır takındılar ki ben şaşırıp kaldım, siz bunu hak ettiniz, siz şöyle yaptınız, siz böyle yaptınız… Diyorum ki ben yapmadım, beni niye suçluyorlar ki? Ve bir sürü bu konuda suçsuz olan insan var. Geçmişte haksızlığa uğramış bir insansın Kürt olarak, benim uğradığım haksızlıkta benim yanımda durman lazım, bana yardımcı olman lazım, yol göstermen lazım. Hak veriyorum evet yaşadıkları için, bugüne kadar kimse anlamadığı için, yanında durmamış da kimse. Ama benim ne suçum var kardeşim. Ben sıradan bir ev hanımıyım, niye benim yanımda durmuyorsun. Korkunç bir şekilde hamileyken tutuklanıyorum, bebeğim ve tutuklanıyorum, hastasın cezaevinde, kansersin tedavi edilmiyorsun desteğine ihtiyacım var neden bana destek olmuyorsun? Sürekli siz bunu hak ettiniz siz şöyle yaptınız siz böyle yaptınız. Ya bu kafanın değişmesi lazım, bu kafa belki değişirse hep birlikte biz bir araya gelirsek eğer verirsek belki Türkiye için umut verici bir ortam olur. İnşallah, bilemiyorum. Ben biraz bu konuda üzgünüm. Ben açıkça söyleyeyim Kürtlerden daha fazla destek beklerdim.

38. Her ne kadar kendi içinizde bir iç hesaplaşma, yüzleşme yaşamış olsanız bile, artık belli köprüleri atıp tamamen bireysel ve bağımsız bir yol yürümeye başlamış olsanız bile, kendi mahalleniz tarafından bile taşlanmış olsanız, bu etiket sırtınızdan çıkmıyor. Kendi meslektaşlarım içinde bile hala 'Fetöcü', firariyim ben. Sizinle aynı kareye girmek istemezler. Aslında sizi alkışlasalar, Türkiye'de sizin yazdığınız yazıları çok haklı bulsalar, beğenseler bile, hatta atıf yapsalar bile mahcup, utangaç bir şekilde bazen adını zikretmeden yaparlar, gizlerler. Günün sonunda yan yana gelmek istemezler. Aynı kareye girmek istemezler.

    Başka gazeteciler farklı farklı ülkelerden fon bulabilirken, bulundukları ülkelerde iktidarlar, siyasi elitler, sivil toplum kuruluşları, meslek örgütlerinden destek alırken ben hem bireysel olarak hem de Gülen hareketi içerisinde yer almış olan isimler olarak burada da bir yalnızlaşma yaşandığını gördüm. Hele ki ben cemaatten de dışlanmış biri olarak büsbütün bu anlamda yalnızlık yaşadım. Şunun özellikle altını çizmek istedim; muhalif gazetecilerin, hatta yer yer sürgün gazetecilerin bile sizinle yan yana gelmek istememesi, o şeytanlaştırmayı ve cadı avını, cüzzamlı muamelesini iliklerimize kadar hissettiriyor size.

APPENDIX C

APPROVAL OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 02.03.2023-115798

T.C.
BOĞAZİÇİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER YÜKSEK LİSANS VE DOKTORA TEZLERİ ETİK İNCELEME KOMİSYONU
TOPLANTI KARAR TUTANAĞI

Toplantı Sayısı	:	40
Toplantı Tarihi	:	08.02.2023
Toplantı Saati	:	14:00
Toplantı Yeri	:	Zoom Sanal Toplantı
Bulunanlar	:	Prof. Dr. Feyza Çorapçı, Doç. Dr. Arhan S. Ertan, Doç. Dr. Senem Yıldız, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ayşegül Metindoğan
Bulunmayanlar	:	

Akanda Taştekin
Sosyoloji

Sayın Araştırmacı,

"Journalism in Exile: Critical Journalism of Diaspora From Turkey in The European Mediascape / Sürgünde Gazetecilik: Türkiye'den Avrupa'ya Sığınan Gazetecilerin Eleştirel Yayımcılık Deneyimleri" başlıklı projeniz ile ilgili olarak yaptığınız SBB-EAK 2023/21 sayılı başvuru komisyonumuz tarafından 8 Şubat 2023 tarihli toplantıda incelenmiş ve uygun bulunmuştur.

Bu karar üyelerin toplantıya çevrimiçi olarak katılımı ve oy birliği ile alınmıştır. Onay mektubu üye ve raportör olarak Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen tarafından toplantıya katılan bütün üyeler adına e-imzalanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla, bilgilerinizi rica ederiz.

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin
SOHTORİK İLKMEN
Öğretim Üyesi

e-imzalıdır
Dr. Öğr. ÜyesiYasemin Sohtorik
İlkmen
Öğretim Üyesi
Raportör

SOBETİK 40 08.02.2023

Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

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