# Governing a Frontier Sancak in the Ottoman Empire: Notables, Tribes, and Peasants of Muş (1820s-1870s)

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## Approvals

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# Abstract

"Governing a Frontier Sancak in the Ottoman Empire: Notables, Tribes, and Peasants of Muş (1820s-1870s)"

Gülseren Duman Koç, Doctoral Candidate at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2018

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This dissertation analyzes the reflections of nineteenth-century administrative, fiscal and social transformations on the sub-province of Muş that was situated on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. It examines the transition from the pre-Tanzimat to the Tanzimat era in a frontier region on a fertile plain surrounded by mountain ranges with its heterogenous population and nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. Collaboration with local power-holders was vital for governing and maintaining order and security in this agriculturally fertile, tribally populated region that bordered Russian and Iranian empires. Thus, the implementation of rule in such a sub-province was based on negotiation among various powerholders. Accordingly, the dissertation first explores the roles and functions of Kurdish notables, whose power stemmed mainly from their inherited control over large plots of lands – called "yurtluk-ocaklık"- as well as their influence over seminomadic and nomadic tribes of the region in the pre-Tanzimat period. Then, the study examines how said notables reacted and adapted themselves to the fiscal and administrative centralization of the Tanzimat. Thus, by focusing on the sub-province of Muş to analyze the implementation of Tanzimat reforms, the study demonstrates how the intermediary role, local knowledge, and experience of local powerholders were important in the fulfillment of reforms with specific concern for reforms' effects on the common people and tribal groups of Muş.

128,000 words

# Özet

"Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bir Sınır Sancağını Yönetmek: Muş'ta İleri gelenler, Aşiret, ve Köylüler (1820'-1870')"

Gülseren Duman Koç, Doktora Adayı, 2018
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Profesör Nadir Özbek, Tez Danışmanı

Bu tez on dokuzuncu yüzyılın idari, iktisadi, ve sosyal dönüşümlerinin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun bir sınır bölgesinde yer alan Muş sancağı üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Dağlık bir coğrafyada verimli bir ova üzerinde kurulu, heterojen bir nüfusu ve göçebe ve yarı-göçebe aşiretleri barındıran bir sınır bölgesinin Tanzimat dönemi öncesinden Tanzimat dönemine geçiş sürecine odaklanmaktadır. Rusya ve Iran imparatorlukları ile sınır, tarımsal açıdan oldukça verimli ve çok sayıda aşiretin yaşadığı bu bölgenin idaresi ve bölgede düzenin ve güvenliğin sağlanması için yerel güç odaklarının işbirliği oldukça elzemdi. Bu nedenle, böyle bir sınır bölgesinin idaresi farklı güç odakları arasındaki müzakereye dayalıydı. Bu çalışma öncelikle, güçlerini ırsi olarak ve geniş muafiyetlerle kontrol ettikleri geniş toprak parçalarından - yurtluk-ocaklıklardan - ve göçebe ve yarı-göçebe gruplar üzerindeki etkilerinden alan Kürt ileri gelenlerinin Tanzimat öncesi dönemde rollerini ve işlevlerini incelemektedir. Daha sonrasında ise, Tanzimat reformları ile gerçekleşen idari ve iktisadi merkezileşmeye bahsi geçen ileri gelenlerin ne tür tepki verdikleri ve nasıl uyum sağladıkları üzerinde durmaktadır. Böylelikle, Muş sancağına odaklanarak Tanzimat reformlarının uygulanmasını inceleyen bu çalışma, özellikle Muş ahalisi ve aşiretleri üzerindeki etkileriyle ilgilenerek bu reformların tamamlanmasında yerel güç odaklarının aracı rolünün, yerel bilgi ve deneyiminin ne derece önem arz ettiğini göstermektedir.

128.000 kelime

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To my parents

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## A Note on Transliteration

Unless otherwise noted, all translations in the dissertation are my own. In the transliteration of the Ottoman Turkish materials, only the ‘*ayn* and *hamza* are kept throughout the text, and circumflexes are used to signify lengthened vowels.

The archival documents are generally cited according to dispatchment dates, yet in the case of huge discrepancies, the dates of the individual documents are cited, instead and noted. The Hicri (Lunar) and Rumi (Julian) dates of the cited documents are presented along with Gregorian equivalents in the footnotes. All the archival documents are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes. The extended versions of them are presented in the bibliography.

All place names are provided with their contemporary equivalents upon their first appearance in the text except for those I could not identify.

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NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, and syntax of this dissertation in compliance with professional, ethical standards for the editing of student, academic work.

# 1

# Introduction

*Among four sub-provinces of the province of Bitlis, Muş is certainly the most important. The importance of the sub-province stems first from natural resources like the abundance of its agricultural land, second from political causes like its multiethnic and multi-religious population. In fact, the plain of Muş extending from the north to the south of the district center, the town of Muş, is a pleasant plain, unique in Kurdistan, which is surrounded by mountains. [Besides] the most important branch of the Euphrates River, the Murat River flows across the plain and waters the plain with various small and big streams emanating from the high mountains all around. Thus, with its ten-hour width and twenty-hour length, the plain is enormously vast. Therefore, there is a saying that "the plain of Muş is the source of gold," referring to its splendid capacity for agriculture. Equal to its famous plain, the foothills of the surrounding mountains are also important with their various fruit trees and wide pastures suitable for the grazing of large flocks of livestock and relatively high population density.*

> *Similarly, the administrative and political significance of the sub-province stems from its being situated in a geography contiguous with the provinces of Erzurum and Van and adjacent to Russia, and its being inhabited mostly by Kurds and Armenians.*[1]

The author of the quotation above is Ahmed Mâcid, the *mutasarrıf* (administrator of a sub-province) of Muş, who penned these lines in 1909. The report of the mutasarrıf is significant in that it indicates the geopolitics, socioeconomic conditions, and peculiarities of a sub-province in an eastern province of the Ottoman Empire from the eyes of an Ottoman bureaucrat. It is also meaningful for the main frame of this study, which attaches importance to the effects of the geography and socioeconomic conditions of a region for the implementation of reforms throughout the nineteenth century. Being in the middle of an agriculturally fertile plain surrounded by high mountain ranges, Muş was also geopolitically situated in a frontier zone contiguous with Ottoman, Russian and Persian empires. Besides, demographically the prominence of Muş in the eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire stemmed not only from its ethnic and religious diversity but also with respect to different life patterns. Armenian and Kurdish peasants constituted the majority of the settled population. On the other hand, nomadic and seminomadic Kurdish tribes spent summers in the mountains surrounding the plain of Muş and wintered in the villages on the plain.

In this demographically and socioeconomically outstanding sub-province, the roles and functions of the local ruling power-holders were also important. The sub-province was governed by a local dynasty known as Alaaddin Pashazades who were *yurtluk-ocaklık* holders. Muş, like many peripheral regions throughout the empire, was in a yurtluk-ocaklık status which refers to hereditarily enjoyed land grants with large fiscal and administrative immunities.

1 Ahmed Macid, "Kürdistân Ahvâli ve Mesele-i Islahât," *Mülkiye*, no. 8 (1 Eylül 1325). See Appendix A, Quotation 1 for the original Turkish. For a transliterated and simplified version of this report see Gülseren Duman and Yener Koç, "Kürdistan Ahvâli ve Mesele-i Islâhât " *Toplum ve Kuram*, no. 6-7 (2012): 181-95.

The characteristics and transformations of such type of land will be explored throughout this dissertation.

Covering a period starting with the pre-*Tanzimat* (literally means re-organization) reforms era, this study scrutinizes the social, economic, and political transformation that the sub-province of Muş went through between the 1820s and 1870s. Focusing especially on the plains of Muş and Bulanık, this study explores the effects of the fiscal, administrative, military and judicial reforms peaked up by the Tanzimat in the sub-province throughout the nineteenth century. On the one hand, the study sheds light on local network relations by uncovering a variety of local actors playing on the ground, like Muslim and non-Muslim notables, governors, tribal leaders, tax farmers, usurers, and peasants. The milestones of this era affected all local groups in different ways. The military and administrative transformations inaugurated by Selim III, the wars with Russia and Iran, tribal conflicts between the Ottoman and Persian empires, and internal developments like the rise of Mehmed Ali Pasha in Egypt set the stage for many local actors to become involved in local politics. Similarly, the fiscal, military, administrative, and judicial reform package that culminated in the Tanzimat with its local councils, abrogation of usufruct rights of large tracts of land under the control of Kurdish notables, new systems of land tenure, taxation, and conscription transformed the locality of Muş as it did around the empire. Lastly, the conjuncture that began with the Crimean War not only led to acceleration in the pace of the reforms but also brought forth the issue of immigrants which deepened with the Ottoman-Russian (1877-8) and Balkan Wars.

One of the main arguments of the study is that although the central government gradually curtailed the power of local dynasties, depriving them of their economic and political power, the administrative, fiscal, and military reforms on the agenda could not be implemented without the collaboration of local power holders. In the case of Muş, although yurtluk-ocaklık holders were exiled a new kind of local actor emerged. These new actors were either the ones who took part in local councils, or tribal leaders who not only became district administrators but also became more influential in the absence of local dynastic families. On the other hand, although their power was curtailed with the eradication of their economic power, yurtluk-ocaklık holders were also

incorporated into the administrative system. With their local knowledge and mediation, local notables continued their intermediary role and combined it with official duties they took up that were necessitated by the reforms. This point also clarifies that local notables were not a uniform, static group, but entailed variations. They also contested, contended and collaborated among themselves. Moreover, the reforms that they undertook were negotiated, shaped and transformed according to local dynamics.

Which of the notables took up the role of intermediary between the central government and the locality varied according to administrative and fiscal transformations. In her examination of Jalilis in Mosul, Dina Rizk Khoury explains how the hegemony of this political household was brought to an end with the help of different sections of Mosuli society, like the gentry and merchants. She further underscores that Tanzimat reforms cannot be regarded only as a project imposed from the imperial center; rather, some parts of Mosuli society had an interest in breaking the power of local households and were involved in the reformation of the provincial administration.[2] In the sub-province of Muş, despite the fact that comparable commercialization leading to the rise of a merchant class did not take place, secondary power holders[3] who had been overshadowed by the yurtluk-ocaklık holders had great interest in the decrease of the power of the local dynasty. Tax farmers, tribal aghas, stewards of former governors, and religious leaders became more influential after the exile of the beys of Muş and the novelties of the Tanzimat, like local councils, became platforms from which they exercised power. Similarly, Tanzimat reforms were harmonious with the demands of these local groups of Muş.

Thus, rather than implying a failure in the implementation of nineteenth century reforms, this argument proves that it was a not a top-down process, but was negotiated, changed and adapted according to the necessities and

2 Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 212.

3 Secondary power holders including ulema, local influential people can be called as "lesser ayans" borrowing the terms of Robert Zens. Robert W. Zens, "The *Ayanlık* and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin in the age of Ottoman Social Change, 1791-1815" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 2004), 31.

peculiarities of different regions. Jens Hanssen, in his piece on center-periphery relations in the Arab East during the Tanzimat era, argues that:

> Focusing specifically on certain imperial strategies of crisis management in the Arab provinces, such as imperial inspection tours, local petitions and councils, and model provinces, there emerged distinct and subtle modes of contestation, appropriation and co-optation in the provincial peripheries that determined the application of *Tanẓīmāt* reforms. Moreover, what have consistently been considered impositions of state power, malicious or benevolent, under closer scrutiny turned out to be attributable to socio-political processes and agencies in the provincial peripheries that were then adopted in Istanbul as imperial legislation.[4]

Along the same lines, Yonca Köksal argues that the implementation of direct rule by the Tanzimat reforms, - that is to say, the increase in "state capacity" - did not occur in a sudden or linear process. Similarly, the implementation of direct rule did not necessarily exclude local intermediaries like notables, religious leaders, and community representatives. Nineteenth-century reforms took place through "a combination of direct and indirect rule."[5] Similarly, Khoury underscores that "the government attempts succeeded in the frontier area because it relied on elites who had successfully struck local roots while maintaining their loyalty to the central state. Where it was unable to do so …,

4 Jens Hanssen, "Practices of Integration: Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire," in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, eds. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philip, and Stefan Weber (Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG, 2002), 74.

5 Yonca Köksal, "Local Intermediaries and Ottoman State Centralization: A Comparison of the Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Ankara and Edirne (1839-1878)" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2002), 55-56. "Indirect rule" broadly means that "the cooptation of local and regional power holders to the state rule without utterly transforming their bases of power." On the other hand, "direct rule refers to unmediated intervention of the state in the lives of local communities, households, and productive enterprises." Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 24-103. Quoted in Köksal, "Local Intermediaries and Ottoman State," 56.

the governors' prerogatives remained limited."[6] Similarly, in Vidin, as Safa Saraçoğlu notes, after the annihilation of *gospodarlık* (the regime of landlordship in the Balkans), the descendants of *gospodars* could exert their influences through the administrative and judicial councils that were products of Tanzimat reforms.[7] The case of Muş was similar, as the mediation and collaboration of Alaaddin Pashazades were required to maintain order, control tribes, and implement reforms. As will be discussed throughout this dissertation, even after the liquidation of the yurtluk-ocaklık system and their exile, the family members continued to participate in provincial politics and administration.

The nineteenth century also witnessed transformations in intercommunal relations, including massacres, demographic changes, and dispossession and property transfers. The commercialization and commodification of land led first to the development of an "agrarian question,"[8] which turned into an ethnic problem when the contours of class and ethnicity overlapped.[9] By focusing on a region populated by Armenian and Kurdish sharecroppers and Kurdish tribes, this study provides a better comprehension of the content of the conflict among them, which left its mark on the last decade of the nineteenth century. By focusing on the role of over taxation, corvée and debt for the migration and dispossession of Armenian and some Kurdish peasants in the pre-Tanzimat

6 Dina Rizk Khoury, "The Ottoman Center versus Provincial Power-Holders: An Analysis of the Historiography," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 143.

7 M. Safa Saraçoğlu, "Resilient Notables: Looking at the Transformation of the Ottoman Empire from the Local Level," in *Contested Spaces of Nobility in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Matthew P. Romaniello and Charles Lipp (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 257-77.

8 For the "agrarian question," see the pioneering study by Janet Klein, Janet Klein, "Power in the Periphery: The Hamidiye Light Cavalry and The Struggle over Ottoman Kurdistan, 1890-1914" (PhD diss., Princeton University 2002). Similarly, Nadir Özbek accentuates the fact that how the taxation policies of the Hamidian era affected the development of the Armenian Question. Nadir Özbek, "The Politics of Taxation and the 'Armenian Question' during the Late Ottoman Empire, 1876-1908," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54, no. 4 (2012): 770-97.

9 For a recent study of the transformation of the Armenian land question, see Mehmet Polatel, "Armenians and the Land Question in the Ottoman Empire, 1870-1914" (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2017).

and Tanzimat eras, this study contributes to the studies of intercommunal relations in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, as most of such studies cover only the late Hamidian era and afterwards.

Finally, the study contributes to the studies of seminomadic and nomadic tribes. Geopolitically, the frontier tribes were always at the core of the politics and socioeconomics of Muş. In the early nineteenth century, the influence of the notables of Muş over frontier tribes constituted one of the main pillars of their power. Nevertheless, the tribes were also actively involved in the politics of the region. Muş was an important pastureland for the tribes of Diyarbakır who spent summers in the mountains to the south of the plain. Similarly, the seminomadic tribes of Muş spent summers in the mountains surrounding the sub-province and spent winters in villages on the plain, that were mostly inhabited by Armenians. The reforms of the nineteenth century more fervently embarked upon the settlement of nomadic and seminomadic groups, not only to turn them into taxpayers and conscripts but also to diminish the burden on the settled population. As those tribes were not accustomed to agricultural cultivation they had to rely on peasants for their subsistence and that of their livestock. Furthermore, the intermediary role of the dynasty of Muş was essential for the settlement of tribal groups. While discussing the relations of tribal groups with central and local authorities, the study also provides insights into the tribal economy and intertribal conflicts.

## § 1.1 The Historical Geography of Muş

The city of Muş[10] neighbors the districts of Patnos, Tutak (in Ağrı) and Ahlat, Adilcevaz (in Bitlis) to the east; Solhan and Karlıova (in Bingöl) to the west;


10 The etymology of the name "Muş" is controversial. In Persian, it means "mouse" or a "small ship" and in Arabic "thin, transparent and brilliant." Nevertheless, its most suitable etymology given its fertile plains was in Hebrew, meaning that "well-watered, grassland territory." Gökşen Yıldırır, Saim Erdem, and Hüseyin Erol, eds., *Muş İl Yıllığı* (Elazığ: Bingöl Matbaası, 1973), 1. In Armenian it is called Taron/Daron. As Robert Hewsen states the name of Taron refers to the plain itself, to an Armenian principality lived on this plain and to a larger area including some other principalities. Robert H. Hewsen, "The Historical Geography of

Hınıs, Tekman, Karaçoban and Karayazı (in Erzurum) to the north; and Kulp (in Diyarbakır), Sason (in Batman) and Güroymak and Mutki (in Bitlis) to the south. Its surface area is 8,196 square kilometers.[11] The contemporary districts of Muş are Bulanık, Malazgirt, Varto, Hasköy, and Korkut. In the nineteenth century, the sub-province of Muş included the districts of Bitlis and Huyut and in some parts of century also Ahlat, Sason, and Genç in addition to Varto, Bulanık, and Malazgirt.[12] For most of the period under study, Muş was a sub-province of the province of Erzurum.

Baghesh/Bitlis and Taron/Mush," in *Armenian Baghesh/Bitlis and Taron/Mush*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (California: Mazda Publishers, 2001), 42.

11 Yıldırır, Erdem, and Erol, *Muş İl* 1.

12 See Naci Okcu and Hasan Akdağ, *Salnâme-i Vilâyet-i Erzurum (1287/1870-1288/1871-1289/1872-1290/1873), Erzurum İl Yıllığı* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 442.




Map 1.1 The Major Administrative Units Neighboring to the Sub-province of Muş (Made with QGIS).

The contemporary city is in the Upper Murat-Van part of Eastern Anatolia, characterized as a vast step plateau surrounded by depressions, among the most prominent of which is the depression of Muş.[13] The city of Muş is situated on the northern slopes of Mount Kurtik, to the south of the city, which is among the most important summits of the Haçres (Karaçavuş, Çavuş) Mountains, which spread out in the southwest as an extension of the South-East Taurus. In the north-west of the Muş Plain are Şerafettin Mountains. The Otluk Mountains also spread out in a northwest-southeast direction to the north of the plain.[14]

The most prominent landforms in the city of Muş are certainly plains, which led to the rise of Muş's prominence in a region dominated by several mountain ranges. The plain of Muş starts from the foothillls of Nemrut Mountain in the east and extends eighty kilometers. Its width is around thirty kilometers, and its surface is around 1650 square kilometers. The plain of Muş shows most suitable thermal conditions of the Upper-Murat region. Its thick, fertile soil led to its being known as an important agricultural area.[15] In addition, the plains of Bulanık, Liz, and Malazgirt are also the important lands on which both agriculture and husbandry are carried out. Irrigation of the plain of Muş facilitated by the Murat River, a branch of the Euphrates, which rises from the Aladağ Mountains to the north of the city of Van and runs around 600 kilometers. Through its journey, the Murat River unites with many small streams, yet the most important one is its branch, the River Karasu (Black Water), which, rising from Güroymak (in Bitlis) and entering the city from south, runs as 68 kilometers.

Furthermore, travelers, consuls, and missionaries who passed through region throughout the nineteenth century describe the plain of Muş as fertile with the possibility of cultivation of a range of products, especially good quality wheat and barley.[16] In addition, rye, millet, lentils, and chickpeas were among the products cultivated. For everyday consumption, peasants preferred

13 Sırrı Erinç, *Doğu Anadolu Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1953), 79.

14 Yıldırır, Erdem, and Erol, *Muş İl* 12.

15 Erinç, *Doğu Anadolu*, 86-88.

16 Ibid., 86.

rye and particularly millet, which did not require too much care, as well as barley for the nourishment of a variety of livestock of the region.[17] Nevertheless, the plain included some stony and arid parts. Moreover, its climate was not as severe as that of Erzurum; despite having the same amount of snowfall, it was not as cold.[18] Nevertheless, the winters lasted five months[19] and the summers were warm, "sultry,"[20] and healthy.[21] The town did not lack of any kind of fruit or vegetable. The entrance of city was densely cultivated, as observed from various vegetable gardens and vineyards.[22] The variety of fruits, pears, apples, cherries, and melons were abundant. In the vineyards on the hillsides, grapes were grown with which non-Muslims made wine.[23] In mountains surrounding the town were oakforests with various kinds of oak like the ones producing gallnut and manna.[24]

As to the scale of products grown, empirical data on commercial activities in Muş is scarce for the first half of the century. Nonetheless, based on traveler accounts, consular reports, especially those on trade in Erzurum, and Ottoman archival documents, it is possible to draw a picture. Moreover, as the archival research conducted for this study demonstrates the sub-province of Muş was a major grain store for the imperial troops deployed in the eastern front during the wars with Russia. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Vital Cuinet emphasized that the plain of Muş and the district of Bulanık were the main places where wheat and barley were cultivated.[25] In addition to grain,

17 Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie: Géographie Administrative: statisque, descriptive et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie Mineure*, 4 vols., vol. 2 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1891), 577-79.

18 James Brant, "Notes of a Journey through a part of Kurdistan, in the Summer of 1838," *The Journal of the Royal Geographic* X (1841): 352.

19 Horatio Southgate, *Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, Kurdistan, Persia and Mesopotamia: With an Introduction, and Occasional Observations upon the Condition of Mohammedanism and Christianity in those Countries*, vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton, 1840), 207.

20 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 352.

21 Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, 2, 575.

22 Southgate, *Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, Kurdistan, Persia and Mesopotamia*, 1, 202.

23 Ibid., 207; Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 352.

24 "Notes of a Journey," 352.

25 Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, 2, 536.

tobacco was also stated to be the principal product suitable for export to Europe.[26] On the banks of the Karasu, a large amount of tobacco was cultivated and some of the product was even taken to the market of Istanbul.[27] In addition, Erzurum, Kars and some neighboring provinces of Persia were principal suppliers of tobacco.[28]

Similarly, the landscape of the sub-province of Muş was also suitable for animal husbandry. Kurdish tribes had a monopoly over this kind of economic activity - sheep and goat farming. Consul Brant mentions that traders bought sheep in Muş and brought them to Syria or Constantinople.[29] In the same vein, tribes coming from Diyarbekir to the summer pastures in the mountains to the south of the town of Muş also brought dairy products and wood to the local market for barter and profit.[30]

American missionary Horatio Southgate reports that there were five hundred horses (for driving caravans) in the town of Muş, used mainly for the trade originating elsewhere.[31] Trade in the town was generally with Erzurum, Bitlis and Diyarbekir – that is to say, it was mainly regional. However, it was possible to observe that there was a transit trade via Erzurum. British Consul Dalyell reports that the neighboring districts of Erzurum also had a share of exports and imports of the province. For instance, grain, sheep and cattle were generally provided from Kars, Van, and the southern districts of the province. Thus, there were regular caravans from Erzurum to Erzincan, Kars, Muş, Bitlis, Van, Harput, and Diyarbakır as well as between Trabzon and Tebriz.[32] Similarly, Cuinet notes that the cultivation of wheat and barley on the plains of Muş and Bulanık normally exceeded the needs of the region. Nevertheless, due to lack of transportation facilities, the surpluses of the villagers rotted in

26 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 352.

27 Richard Willbraham, *Travels in the Trans-Caucasian Provinces of Russia and Along the Southern Shores o the Lakes of Van and Urumiah in the Autumn and Winter of 1837* (London: J. Murray, 1839), 332.

28 FO 78.1669, No: 9, Consul Robert Dalyell, "Report on Eyalet of Erzurum," February 28, 1862.

29 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 352.

30 Southgate, *Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, Kurdistan, Persia and Mesopotamia*, 1, 205.

31 Ibid., 206.

32 FO 78/1669, No:9, Consul Robert Dalyell, "Report on Eyalet of Erzurum," February 28, 1862.

storage from time to time.[33] In the same vein, the time to get from the city of Muş to the city of Erzurum was about thirty-six hours,[34] so it is possible to imagine the transportation difficulties between those cities. Although Ottoman governments implemented various methods for the building of the road between Trabzon and Erzurum, it was an "inconclusive process," some parts of it remained unrepaired even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.[35]

Although it is elaborated throughout the study, a few preliminary notes about the demographic features of Muş are required. In the first half of century, the population of the town, according to Consul Brant, consisted of 700 Muslim families and 500 Armenian ones, and the latter were claimed to be the wealthier part of the population.[36] On the other hand, from the 1840s to the 1860s, one of the main issues for the Armenian peasants of Muş was the decrease of their population. Peasants had to migrate, especially to Russia, for a set of reasons like over taxation, forced labor, and indebtedness. Both consular reports and the collective petitions of the inhabitants of Muş pointed out this vital problem.

Moreover, the whole sub-province had approximately four hundred villages. Armenians were the majority in the plain villages, yet beyond the plain, both Kurdish and Armenian peasants lived either in separate or in common villages. Brant also notes that excluding tent-dwelling Kurdish tribes, Armenian peasants exceeded Kurdish ones in number.[37] The plain of Muş consisted of at least a hundred villages, mostly Armenian villages,[38] which were

33 Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, 2, 536.

34 *Salnâme-i Vilâyet-i Erzurum*, 1290(1873), 136

35 Fulya Özkan, "A Road in Rebellion, A History on the Move: The Social History of the Trabzon-Bayezid Road and the Formation of the Modern State in the Late Ottoman World" (PhD diss., State University of New York, 2012), 174.

36 Brant, "Notes of a Journey." At the beginning of the twentieth century, the population of the town was not less than 20 thousand according to Lynch. H.F.B. Lynch, *Armenia, Travels and Studies*, vol. 2 (London: Longmans, 1901), 172.

37 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 351.

38 According to the report of General Mayevsky, more than half of the villages in the plain of Muş were Armenian. Bayram Bayraktar, *20. Yüzyılın Dönemecinde Rus General Mayevsky'nin*

approximately "a day's ride" from the town of Muş.[39] Those plain villages also sheltered a great many Kurdish tribal families during the winters. However, in 1840, Southgate argues that despite the plain was populous, it had the capacity to sustain a much larger population. Large plots of land were still uncultivated. Less productive parts of the plain could also be appropriate as pastureland for more of the herds which were already scattered all over it.[40]

## § 1.2 Provincial Studies

"A frontier," in Khodarkovsky's terms, "is a *region* that forms the margins of a settled or developed territory, a politico-geographical *area* lying beyond the integrated region of political unit."[41] The sub-province of Muş was a frontier region. Its political and socioeconomic prominence mainly derived from its being at a frontier zone of the Ottoman Empire contiguous with Iran and Russia. Drawing a distinction between "urban centers" and "remote rural areas," Eugene Rogan accentuates the fact that Ottoman administration is largely experienced in urban centers. On the other hand, "remote areas," like Eastern Anatolia and Arab provinces, "are treated as frontiers inasmuch as they represented socio-political orders apart from the institutions of the Empire at large."[42] However, a variety of dimensions, like "the autonomous local elites, the degree of intervention of European interest in a given area and local perceptions of the benefits of Ottoman rule" shaped the "Ottoman experiences" in frontier areas.[43] In the same vein, Kemal Karpat argues that "the Ottoman borderlands cannot be grouped in one single category." Both "internal" and

*Türkiye Gözlemleri: Van-Bitlis Vilâyetleri Askerî İstatistiği* (Istanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 2007), 83.

39 Southgate, *Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, Kurdistan, Persia and Mesopotamia*, 1, 209.

40 Ibid., 209-10.

41 On the contrary, the author continued, a border "is a clearly demarcated boundary between sovereign states." Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of A Colonial Empire, 1500-1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 47.

42 Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire, Transjordan, 1850-1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5-6.

43 Ibid., 6.

"international" reflections determined each borderland's relation with the Ottoman Empire.[44]

Nonetheless, both the "centralist approach," which neglects borderlands, and of the center-periphery dichotomy, which neglects "the great variation of centers and borderlands which had their own 'centers'" can be misleading.[45] In this respect, the concepts of "poly-centricity" and "poly-activity" employed by Jongerden and Verheij are important. "Poly-centricity" proposes that there were "regional centers" in the Ottoman Empire that shaped the social, economic, and political transformations that society went through. Similarly, "poly-activity" points out "a range of actors and dynamics, networks and interactions, not of just one group or class."[46]

The implementation of Ottoman rule in remote areas in Syria, Yemen, and Algeria in the east and south, and Albania and Walachia in the west differed as well as were similar. Hence, the implementation of direct rule in the sub-province of Muş, which was situated in a frontier, was determined by a variety of factors, both internal and external. Being irrigated by the Murat and Karasu rivers, the sub-province of Muş, particularly the plain named after it, had always been fertile and populous, and it had the potential to be principal grain supplier if the necessary infrastructure like transportation facilities were provided. Moreover, Muş was on a frontier that was suitable for transition between the winter and summer pastures of the Kurdish tribes, so it was an appropriate place for their settlement. The fruitfulness of the land together with the human resources, which would be the result of the settlement of nomadic and seminomadic Kurdish tribes, turned the region into a site of struggle over resources between various actors. In this struggle over the man, resources and surplus, a comprehension of the roles and functions of the local beys of Muş is crucial. The functions of the local notables are particularly at the core of the

44 Kemal H. Karpat, "Comments on Contributions and the Borderlands," in *Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes*, eds. Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 1.

45 Ibid., 4.

46 Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij, "Introduction," in *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915*, eds. Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 3.

land politics of the empire before the nineteenth century – that is to say, the large tracts of land under their control.

Especially on the frontier with Iran, the centuries-long Safavid-Ottoman rivalry shaped the policies in Ottoman Kurdistan of which Muş was a significant part. As claimed by Sabri Ateş, "failing to extend their authority on a permanent basis, the competing imperial powers engaged in a continuous process of conciliation and coercion with local elites, which provided ample opportunities for 'localized political autonomy and relative freedom of socioeconomic borderland movement.'"[47] Thus, as a frontier region, Muş had been granted to its mutasarrıfs who were mostly from a local dynasty, the lineage of Alaaddin Pasha, as *yurtluk-ocaklıks* until the second half of the nineteenth century when this type of land were abrogated. Nevertheless, it was a gradual process culminated with the implementation of Tanzimat. *Yurtluk-ocaklıks* and their counterpart *hükûmets* were hereditary land usufruct, yet the latter had more autonomy. In addition, they had been widely used before Ottoman rule was asserted in the Kurdish periphery and were common in Safevids and Turkoman states, as well.

As underscored by Karpat, the central government, "used force, economic incentives and the granting of titles [in the borderlands] to establish control over local rulers, and when possible to integrate them into the system."[48] Thus, the granting of yurtluk-ocaklık lands was neither specific to Ottoman Kurdistan nor a particularity of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this study, the features of the yurtluk-ocaklık status of Muş, its change in the course of time, and finally, its gradual abrogation - first in the first half of the nineteenth century and then with the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in the province of Erzurum - and its aftermath will be scrutinized.

Eugene Rogan argues that during the nineteenth century, "the Ottomans came to place a new premium on their frontier regions as untapped resources

47 Richard Schofield, "Narrowing the Frontier: Mid-Nineteenth Century Efforts to Delimit and Map the Perso-Ottoman Boundary," in *War and Peace in Qajar Persia*, ed. Roxane Farmanfarmaian (New York: Routledge, 2008), 150. Quoted in Sabri Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1-2.

48 Karpat, "Comments on Contributions " 3.

which could contribute taxes and manpower if put under direct rule."[49] In the case of Ottoman Kurdistan, this "new premium" required many detailed reforms ranging from the cooptation and incorporation of Kurdish beys through a myriad of means, to the settling of nomadic and seminomadic Kurdish tribes, to the introduction to a new taxation and land tenure system. It is possible to contextualize the reforms of the long nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire as a development of infrastructural power by the central government. However, this does not mean that infrastructural power of the state increased immediately; rather, it was a gradual process shaped by geographic diversities and local power relations. Nevertheless, the reforms of the long nineteenth century including those during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II were an important phase. The modest attempts at military reform by Selim III, called *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* (New Order[50]), followed the military, administrative, and judicial reforms of the era of Mahmut II.[51] Bureaucratization, the division of labor, and the establishment of ministries and advisory councils were watersheds in the course of reform. Similarly, the nineteenth century was a period during which the central government took responsibility in myriad fields in which it had not previously claimed any responsibility like health, education, and public transport. Thus, the improvement of communication channels - like the establishment of postal services- or developments to reach and obtain the consent of, and penetrate the everyday life of the subjects - like the first official newspaper and the census - were integral parts of the infrastructural power of the Ottoman government.

49 Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 5.

50 However, "new order" was not confined to military reforms. In Carter Findley's words, "the perception that the New Order required planning and regulation marks the transition from 'traditional' towards 'rational-legal authority.'" Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Tanzimat," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 12.

51 For an evaluation of nineteenth century reforms, see Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).

The reformation era called Tanzimat[52] was not only the first solid attempt to provide Muslim and non-Muslim equality and safeguard the lives, property, and honor of all subjects, it was also the most important phase of the development of infrastructural power. Among others, the efforts to ameliorate the taxation system and the administrative innovations inherent to those efforts were crucial. The tax farming system was reorganized, and *muhassıls* (centrally-appointed officials) were dispatched to collect the "tax," a system which was enabled through the register of the incomes, properties, and population of the subjects.[53] The second mission of the muhassıls was to establish local councils, which would become the locomotive for the implementation of reforms in the locality.[54] In the same vein, compulsory military service and fixed terms of service were important parts of the Tanzimat. Furthermore, the Provincial Law of 1864 (*Vilâyet Nizâmnamesi*) and ensuing regulations were important phases of provincial bureaucratization.[55] Although its effects were substantially felt in the 1880s in the region under study, the Land Code of 1858 brought about many changes, especially its contribution to the exclusive ownership of

52 The periodization of the Tanzimat era is controversial. For an evaluation of the historiography of this era, see Yonca Köksal, "Tanzimat ve Tarih Yazımı," *Doğu Batı: Osmanlılar I* 51 (2010): 193-216. Similarly, the reign of Abdülmahit II has led to many debates in the literature with respect to the continuity and discontinuity of reforms. For a discussion of the historiography of this era, see Nadir Özbek, "Modernite, Tarih ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 2, no. 1 (2004): 71-90.

53 For the taxation system of the Tanzimat era, see Abdüllatif Şener, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Vergi Sistemi* (Istanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1990); Nadir Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli: Osmanlı'da Vergi, Siyaset ve Toplumsal Adalet (1838-1908)* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015); Tevfik Güran, "19. Yüzyıl Temettüat Tahrirleri," in *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Bilgi ve İstatistik - Data and Statistics in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Şevket Pamuk (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2000); Coşkun Çakır, "Tanzimat Dönemi Vergi Uygulamalarında Karşılaşılan Güçlükler ve Vergi İhtilalleri," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 51, no. 1 (2001): 71-95.

54 Jun Akiba, "The Local Councils as the Origin of Parliamentary System in the Ottoman Empire," in *Development of Parliamentarism in Modern Islamic World*, ed. Sata Tsugitaka (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2009); Stanford J. Shaw, "Local Administrations in the Tanzimat," in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992).

55 İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880)* (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2011; repr., 2).

land helped to individualize the relations of the state with local groups.[56] All these developments were milestones of the nineteenth century and were important phases of the increase of the infrastructural power of the state.

Michael Mann defines "infrastructural power" as "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."[57] By the same token, James Scott's theory of "legibility" can also be used to understand the transformation Ottoman Empire underwent in the long nineteenth century.

> How did the state gradually get a handle on its subjects and their environment? Suddenly, processes as disparate as the creation of permanent last names, the standardization of weights and measures, the establishment of cadastral surveys and population registers, the invention of freehold tenure, the standardization of language and legal discourse, the design of cities, and the organization of transportation seemed comprehensible as attempts at legibility and simplification. In each case, official took exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social practices, such as land tenure customs or naming customs, and created a standard grid whereby it could be centrally recorded and monitored.[58]

However, it is necessary to take note of the nuances embedded in Scott's analysis. His clear-cut dichotomy between pre-modern and modern statecraft is extensively criticized. Huri İslamoğlu accentuates the fact that Scott's analysis is blind to the "historical context of power relations" and condemns society to "eternal impotence."[59] Similarly, Charles Tilly also lists the "greatest

56 Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "Türk Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) Tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi," in *Tanzimat I* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 321-421; Roger Owen, ed. *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

57 Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1984): 189.

58 James. C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2.

59 Huri İslamoğlu, "Modernities Compared: State Transformations and Constitutions of Property in the Qing and Ottoman Empires," *Journal of Early Modern History*, no. 5 (2002): 354-55.

weaknesses" of the book *Seeking Like a State* "an undeveloped conception of civil society, a thin account of process translating crazy ideas into implemented master plans, and (most surprisingly) near silence on how tyrants and bureaucrats actually work their will at the local level."[60]

Along the same lines, Joel Migdal, offers a "state-in-society approach" as a response to state-centered theories.[61] "States are parts of societies. States may help mold, but they are also continually molded by the societies they are embedded." His argument is important as it falsifies the notion of "large collectivities called states against large collectivities called societies," focusing instead on the relations and variations between "different segments" of both states and societies.[62]

Similarly, Yonca Köksal in her analysis of Tanzimat reforms in Edirne and Ankara provinces, combines a state-in-society perspective with social network analysis.[63] By comparing the similarities and differences among the local

60 Charles Tilly, "Survey Article: Power-Top Down & Bottom Up," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 7, no. 3 (1999): 333.

61 The theoretical tenets of this statist approach is framed in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back in* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

62 Migdal proposes four claims to frame the "state-in-society approach:" "states vary in their effectiveness based on their ties to society; states must be disaggregated; social forces, like states, are contingent on specific empirical conditions; states and other social forces may be mutually empowering." Joel S. Migdal, "Introduction: Developing A State-in-Society Perspective," in *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, ed. Atul Kohli Joel S. Migdal, Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2-4. For more details on the state-in-society perspective, see *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Michael Meeker follows a similar approach in his study on Ottoman province of Trabzon, particularly the district of Of. Emphasizing the "necessity of a theory of a society within, rather than against, the state," he argued that the aghas, mansions, clans, and parties "were country extensions of the imperial military and administrative establishment." Michael E. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 32-3.

63 In the same vein, Christine Phillou proposes social networks as "an operative category" to study nineteenth century "as a locus of change in itself and not just the time of 'proto-reforms' or the 'eve of nationalism'." Christine Philliou, "The Ottoman Empire's Absent Nineteenth

network structures in the provinces of Edirne and Ankara, Köksal scrutinizes how the "density" of the relations between local actors and "brokerage"[64] of the local notables in their role of intermediary between the state and social groups affected the results of Tanzimat reforms. While doing this, she also attaches importance to the roles of political and economic structures and geopolitical location in relations between the state and local groups.[65]

Thus, instead of a binary opposition between state and society, or of a statist approach empowering the state as the only agent and confining society to a static, ineffective position, studies that point out blurred state-society, center-periphery distinctions and emphasize historical contexts, power relations, and negotiations are important to elaborate the "state-in-society" perspective.[66] Furthermore, following the point of departure of Krohn-Hansen and Nustad, "we need to set the construction of states as the outcome of complex sets of practices and processes. A state formation is the result of myriads of situations where social actors negotiate power and meaning."[67] Thus, as Özbek

Century: Autonomous Subjects," in *Untold Histories of the Middle East: Recovering Voices from the 19th and 20th Centuries*, eds. Amy Singer, Christoph K. Neumann, and Selçuk Akşin Somel (London: Rourtledge, 2011), 144.

64 Borrowing Ronald Burt's term "structural autonomy," Köksal defines brokerage as follows: "When two parties are either disconnected or weakly/negatively connected to each other, a third party can take the advantage of the lack of connection between them. This third party is called broker in network literature." Köksal, "Local Intermediaries and Ottoman State," 26.

65 Ibid., 1-41.

66 For instance, Nadir Özbek points out "a dynamic political sphere, yet one not categorically distinct from public authority, but rather in the context of a blurred boundary between state and civil society, public and private" in the context of Second Constitutional Period philanthropic activities. Nadir Özbek, "Defining the Public Sphere during the Late Ottoman Empire: War, Mass Mobilization and the Young Turk Regime (1908-1918)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 5 (2007): 797.

67 Christian Krohn-Hansen and Knut G. Nustad, "Introduction," in *State Formation: Anthropological Perspectives*, eds. Christian Krohn-Hansen and Knut G. Nustad (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 13.

illustrates, one can insist on examining "the state through its particular concrete and material effects in people's lives."[68]

Thus, provincial studies are important and necessary to understand the unique process that each province experienced as well as the encounters at the local context. In the same vein, Nilay Özok-Gündoğan reminds the provincial studies in Ottoman history emerged from scholarly critique of the decline paradigm, modernization and world-system theories that had dominated the examination of Ottoman history.[69] Among others, the study of Dina Rizk Khoury on Mosul is important in that it focuses on the "nature and workings of the Ottoman state in a provincial setting."[70] In doing this, she explores the relations between the Ottoman state and society, challenging binary representation of the two.[71] In the same vein, Khoury also challenges the "unitary explanation for the dynamic of change in the seventeenth and eighteenth century," by focusing on "how specific state policies were determined by state needs, but, more importantly, by the kind of social alliances and resistance to such policies encountered at the provincial level."[72]

A study by Eugene L. Rogan also has seminal place in the Middle Eastern provincial studies. Based on a theoretical framework drawn by Mann, Rogan explores how the Ottoman state established its "infrastructural power" in

68 However, Özbek also accentuates the fact that "one cannot deny the logistical difficulty of studying the local and the everyday without relying, to some extent and by default, on an abbreviated view of the state as a more or less solid and integrated political actor." Özbek, "The Politics of Taxation," 774.

69 Nilay Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery: The Politics of Land and Taxation, 1840-1870" (PhD diss., State University of New York, 2011), 9.

70 Among the provincial studies of Middle East and North Africa, see Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Ussama S. Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

71 Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire*, 2-3.

72 Ibid.

Transjordan through the Tanzimat reforms.[73] Rogan's study is an account of the extension of "administrative apparatus" framed within the legislation and institutions developed by the Tanzimat for frontier zones starting in the mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the author draws attention to the "different results in different parts of the Empire" of the extension of direct rule in frontier societies.[74] Each turning point of infrastructural power varied from region to region.

Apart from studies of Arab provinces, studies of Balkan provinces occupy a significant place in the historiography. In addition to the early contribution by Halil İnalcık and Ahmet Uzun,[75] Yonca Köksal, in her piece on Bulgaria, highlights that nineteenth-century Ottoman centralization differed from region to region depending on the geography, politics, economy, and social structures of the regions. Focusing on the relations between local actors in Bulgaria both before and during the Tanzimat, Köksal explores the effects of

73 Rogan, *Frontiers of the State*, 1.

74 Ibid., 13-15. In the same vein, Ebubekir Ceylan's study of Baghdad was a full-fledged account of Tanzimat reforms. After 1844, when the province of Baghdad was included in the Tanzimat program, a range of reforms were put into practice "aimed at strengthening the ties between the province and center, deconstructing the tribal structures and improving agricultural and commercial potential of the province." The blueprint of these administrative, fiscal, and judicial reforms not only included the establishment of local councils, the implementation of the 1864 Provincial Law and the Land Code of 1858, but also entailed developments in transportation and communication facilities. Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 220-21. Similarly, Gökhan Çetinsaya focuses on Ottoman administration in three Iraqi provinces -Baghdad, Basra and Mosul - during the era of Abdulhamid II. Without intending to provide a detailed history of Ottoman Iraq for the era under study, Çetinsaya explores several peculiarities of Ottoman administration in the said provinces. Taking the peculiarities of each into consideration, the author examines the perceptions of both the center and of provincial authorities of the Iraqi provinces, the extent to which reforms were implemented, the kind of problems were encountered, and the ways those problems were managed. Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908* (London Routledge Taylor, 2006).

75 Halil İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, Doktora Tezleri Serisi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943); Ahmet Uzun, *Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler: Niş İsyanı Üzerine Ayrıntılı Bir İnceleme (1841)* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2002).

Tanzimat reforms in Bulgaria.[76] Similarly, Köksal's comparative study on the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in the core provinces of Edirne and Ankara also sheds light on how the local networks, geopolitical location, and economic prosperity affected the outcomes of the same reforms.[77]

Similarly, Meltem Toksöz explores the making of the Adana-Mersin region from Çukurova with its geographical variations including mountains, lowlands, and highlands. Different mechanisms, like the settlement of nomadic and seminomadic groups, the Egyptian conquest, the reforms of İbrahim Pasha, nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms, the production and commercialization of cotton, and integration into the world economy through a port-city were the milestones for the making of this region.[78]

A review of the full literature on the provinces of nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire is beyond the scope of this study. The purpose here is, first, to clarify the literature to which this study contributes and second, to draw attention to the lacuna in the historiography of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Drawing attention to the exclusion of eastern provinces (contemporary Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia), Nilay Özok-Gündoğan emphasizes that except for a couple of studies, the existing literature "oscillates between hegemonic center-periphery dichotomy and nationalist historical writing."[79] Nevertheless, recently, the studies have started to emerge problematizing the geographical bias, antagonistic center-periphery relations,

76 Yonca Köksal, "Tanzimat Döneminde Bulgaristan: Osmanlı'da Merkezi Devlet Oluşumu," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 83 (Kış 1999/2000): 242-43. In the same vein, the study of Köksal and Davut Erkan on the inspection tour by Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Pasha of Rumelia in 1860, which also provides transliterations of the reports of the tour, presents important insights about the Balkan provinces in the Tanzimat period. Yonca Köksal and Davut Erkan, *Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Paşa'nın Rumeli Teftişi* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2007).

77 Köksal, "Local Intermediaries and Ottoman State." For a study that analyzes Tanzimat reforms in an Anatolian town, Tokat, see John K. Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory Politics: Tanzimat Reform in Tokat, 1839-1876* (London: Routledge, 2014).

78 Meltem Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Making of Adana Mersin Region 1850-1908* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 10-11.

79 Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," 13-14.

nationalist histories and the exclusion of the Ottoman Empire's eastern provinces from provincial studies.[80] Özok-Gündoğan, in her doctoral study, criticized the representation of the Ottoman state and Kurdish notables as two antagonistic sides, claiming that Tanzimat state-making by the empire, used means other than military suppression, like "administrative reorganization" and "economic policies in land and taxation," and was a process of negotiation with provincial elites.[81] Furthermore, the author tries to bring less powerful Kurdish beys – other than Bedirhan Bey or Mir Rewanduz - and also producers, sharecroppers, and small landholders to light, focusing on the transformation that beys of Palu, who were yurtluk-ocaklık holders, experienced during the 1840s.[82]

In the same vein, Uğur Bayraktar also problematizes the exclusion of Kurdish mîrs from the literature on Ottoman provincial notables. Focusing on the transformation of yurtluk-ocaklık lands in the hands of Zirki Beys in Tercil, Hani, and Atak, Bayraktar argues "the Kurdish yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet holders were commensurable to, if not identical with, the provincial notables of the relatively "core" provinces of the empire between the sixteenth and late eighteenth century."[83]

Similarly, Yaşar Tolga Cora underscores the role and participation of Armenian notables in Tanzimat reforms in Erzurum. Instead of scrutinizing the effects of Tanzimat reforms on the Armenian community in general and on the Armenian notables in particular in Erzurum, he offers to look at "the ways in which the central(izing)/modern(izing) Ottoman state and Armenian notables were simultaneously constructed as a result of their continuous

80 For a recent study of "the Ottoman East" that brings together many scholars of the region, see Yaşar Tolga Cora, Dzovaniar Derderian, and Ali Sipahi, eds., *The Ottoman East in the Nineteenth Century: Societies, Identities and Politics* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

81 Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," 2, 23.

82 Ibid., 29-30.

83 Uğur Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks: Land, Politics of Notables and Society in Ottoman Kurdistan, 1820-1890" (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University and École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2015), 21.

interaction over that period."[84] In so doing, he acknowledged the agency of Armenians and especially of Armenian notables not only during the Tanzimat period but also in previous and later periods.[85]

In addition to the studies that scrutinize the transformations of the long nineteenth century at sub-/provincial levels, Ali Sipahi's study offers a different lens to analyze the nineteenth century by looking at the urban transformations in the eastern periphery of the Ottoman Empire. Focusing on Harput region, he investigates "spatial, cultural and inter-ethnic distance in local, regional and transregional encounters."[86] By doing so, he brings the "suburbanization movements" and "short-distance relations" into the discussion.[87]

This study contributes to provincial studies by focusing on a frontier region populated by mostly Armenians and Kurds, which is outstanding given its fertile land in a mountainous zone and given that it is transition zone between the summer and winter quarters of nomadic and seminomadic groups. Similarly, the study depicts nineteenth-century Muş by exploring administrative, fiscal, and military transformations. It emphasizes that these transformations were negotiated, contested, and shaped in the local context. Thus, geopolitical position, geography, the nature of local power-holders, and the tribal and Armenian-Kurdish demography affected not only the course but also the outcomes of the reforms of the long nineteenth century in the locality of Muş.

Focusing on a sub-province in the eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire, the study ended up with a contribution to the studies on the Tanzimat. All along the nineteenth century, the centralizing state sought the ways to control the surplus of the region from which it hardly benefited in the previous eras. The confiscation of hereditarily enjoyed large tracts of lands was a part of this

84 Yaşar Tolga Cora, "Transforming Erzurum/Karin: The Social and Economic History of a Multi-Ethnic Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century" (PhD diss., The University of Chicago 2016), 4.

85 Ibid., 29.

86 Ali Sipahi, "At Arm's Length: Historical Ethnography of Proximity in Harput" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2015), 4.

87 Ibid., 1-17. Also, see, "Suburbanization and Urban Duality in the Harput Area," in *The Ottoman East in the Nineteenth Century: Societies, Identities and Politics*, eds. Yaşar Tolga Cora, Dzovaniar Derderian, and Ali Sipahi (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

aim. While eradicating economic-cum political power of the yurtluk-ocaklık holders, the central authorities both applied to administrative and fiscal transformations and when necessary to the military operations. However, yurtluk-ocaklık holders had a power stemmed not only from the large tracts of lands under their exclusive control, but also from their relations with tribal leaders, with other provincial notables as well as with state and interstate actors. Thus, governing the region was based on bargains between central authorities and provincial power-holders as well as their networks.

## § 1.3 Sources and Methodology

Several materials have been examined for this study. The most important research has been carried out in the Ottoman Archives of the Office of the Prime Minister in Istanbul. The main collections utilized in this study were those of *Hatt-ı Hümâyûn* (imperial orders in the Sultan's own hand), *Meclis-i Vâlâ* (the Supreme Council), *Sadaret* (the Grand Vizirate) and *İradeler* (Imperial Orders). The Hatt-i Hümâyûn collection is important for the narrative of the pre-Tanzimat era, as most of the documents are from the eras of Selim III and Mahmut II. Thus, chapters 2 and 3, which explore the context of the power relations of the notables of Muş in the pre-Tanzimat era, are based on this collection. The documents collected in İradeler serve the same purpose for the period after 1832, offering insight into the process of the discussion of a matter among various administrative bodies and the final opinion of the sultan. Both the documents and books (*defter*) in the collection of Meclis-i Vâlâ, named after the most significant institution of the Tanzimat, are valuable for ascertaining the implementation of the new reform package and the reaction to and reception of it in the sub-province of Muş and its vicinity. In addition, Meclis-i Vâlâ also includes the collected petitions written by both notables and inhabitants of Muş. For the period after the abolition of the Supreme Council, the collection of Şûrâ-yı Devlet (Council of State) serves the same purpose.

In addition to Ottoman archival documents, I have conducted research in the National Archives of the United Kingdom in London. The Foreign Office collections entail reports of the consulates of the British Empire established around the Ottoman Empire. The reports of the Consulate of Erzurum are

detailed for a depiction of the geography, population, economy, commerce, and politics of the province in general and the sub-province of Muş in particular. Limited research was also carried out in the Archive Diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères in Paris. Similar to the British consular reports, the reports of French Consulate in Erzurum and Trabzon provide detailed information about the province under study.

Apart from Ottoman, British, and French archival documents, this study also largely benefits from accounts by British, American, and French travelers and missionaries and the reports of the Ottoman bureaucrats, which are important materials for a depiction of the historical geography, population and socioeconomic situation of the sub-province of Muş. Lastly, although it is impossible to conduct a fieldwork for a study of the nineteenth century, a journey through the region under study to observe the vastness of the plain of Muş helped me to imagine the struggle over its resources almost a century and a half ago. Moreover, several interviews were carried out in Muş with the descendants of notables of Muş. Especially those with the grandchildren of Murat Bey conducted in Istanbul and Muş were helpful in providing details about the family.

## § 1.4 Structure of the Study

Together with this introduction and conclusion, this study consists of eight chapters. The study mainly examines different historical moments from the pre-Tanzimat and Tanzimat eras and their aftermath in the plain of Muş. Thus, the chapters are structured accordingly. Chapters 2 and 3, explore the nature, components, and transformation of the power and influence that a local dynasty of Muş enjoyed. Based on the general literature on provincial notables of the Ottoman Empire, chapter 2 discusses the nature of land usufruct called yurtluk-ocaklık, together with its economic, social and political rights, possessed by the notables of Muş. A local dynasty known as Alaaddin Pashazades had exclusive right over agricultural surplus and great political power over nomadic and seminomadic groups. However, the nineteenth century witnessed the gradual abrogation of this kind of land ownership and the immunities and rights it entailed. The story of Emin Pasha, from the dynasty of Muş,

exemplifies this process. The reforms of Mahmut II were curtailing the power of provincial notables around the empire. Kurdish mîrs were not exempt from this, however, geographical, demographic, and political differences led to different experiences. Through the career of Emin Pasha of Muş, the rise of a provincial notable through collaboration, negotiation, and adaptation to the changing conjuncture will be analyzed.

Nevertheless, collaboration and negotiation did not imply immunity from contention. Emin Pasha rebelled by leaning on the collaboration of notables in the vicinity when his negotiation efforts became deadlocked. Thus, chapter 3 inquires into the revolt of Emin Pasha; the motivations, reasons, and the components of his allies and the league constituted against him. An analysis of the rebellion of a notable in a peripheral zone reveals certain important facts about the power of the yurtluk-ocaklık holders, the influence of the tribal population, and the clash of interests between the yurtluk-ocaklık holders and provincial governors. Second, the chapter will focus on the first phase of the annihilation of the yurtluk-ocaklık lands of the notables of Muş through novel military and administrative reforms, contributing to the argument that the annihilation of such types of land ownership was a gradual process. The second phase of this process took place with the inclusion of the sub-province of Muş in the Tanzimat program.

However, the implementation of Tanzimat reforms – that is, the administrative, fiscal and judicial transformation- was gradual, the account and aftermath of which will be examined in remaining chapters of this study with different thematic focuses. Chapter 4 starts with a depiction of Muş on the eve of the inclusion of the sub-province in the Tanzimat program. Shedding light on local actors, the chapter presents the overtaxation, corvée, and indebtedness that the peasants of Muş endured under an exploitative system of tax-farmers, local administrators, and governors. Thus, the inhabitants of Muş received the news of the promulgation of the Tanzimat with anxiety mixed with fear. However, the geographical delicacy and tribal landscape of the province of Erzurum resulted in population and income surveys - which were the principal steps in the implementation of Tanzimat reforms - being postponed. In the town of Van, reaction to Tanzimat reforms sprouted, creating anxiety about the possible emergence of a revolt around the Kurdish periphery. Thus, the

chapter continues with an account of the employment of the notables of Muş to inspect the gradual implementation of reforms and mediate the revolt which was affecting the region from Cizre-Bohtan to Van. Nevertheless, the subordination of Kurdish notables also took place progressively. In the end, the beys of Muş were exiled, and their lands were confiscated.

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, some Ottoman bureaucrats had been drawing attention to the surplus in eastern provinces from which the imperial treasury never benefited. Thus, the subordination of Kurdish notables through the elimination of their economic and political power and through governance of the region by centrally-appointed officials was supported by various central and provincial authorities and considered to be essential for proper administrative and fiscal transformation take place. Thus, chapters 5 and 6 focus on the aftermath of the second phase of the annihilation of the yurtluk-ocaklık system in Muş. Chapter 5 is an inquiry into the fate of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Emin Pasha and his brothers. The many peculiarities of the yurtluk-ocaklık system in Muş were uncovered during the process of confiscating the villages. From the moment the yurtluk-ocaklık lands of the family were confiscated struggles over its boundaries, revenues, and over the landed properties of the family - like vineyards, orchards, mills, and mansions- triggered off and lasted for a long time. Second, the chapter will explore the struggle of the family members to obtain imperial pardon and their taking advantage of each opportunity to reclaim their rights and properties.

Chapter 6 examines the reflections of the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in the petitions of the local inhabitants of Muş. By analyzing the complaints of the common people, the chapter will shed light on the ways that administrative and fiscal reforms shaped, affected, and transformed the politics, demography and socioeconomic situation of the sub-province with respect to its centrally-appointed *kaimakams* (administrator of a sub-province), local councils, and new tax regime. The grievances of the commoners of Muş can be grouped into two categories; on one hand, the system of exploitation through a coalition including kaimakams, local council members, tax farmers, usurers (*murabahacı*), moneylenders, and Armenian notables, and on the other hand, tribal members, who constitute the focus of chapter 7. Then the

chapter will scrutinize the conjuncture that started with the Crimean War and continued with the *Islahat Fermanı* (Reform Edict) and settlement of immigrants. As most of the complaints were from the plain villages, they present important clues not only about the aftermath of the abrogation of yurtluk-ocaklık villages, but also about the dispossession of Armenian peasants through a system of extortion, over taxation, forced labor, and indebtedness.

Chapter 7 examines one of the most important demographic components of the locality of Muş and its vicinity: the tribes. Although nomadic and seminomadic groups constitute an inherent part of this study, the theme of this chapter deals with the seminomadic tribes of Muş and nomadic tribes in its vicinity whose pasturelands were in the mountains lying to the south of the sub-province. The settlement of nomadic and seminomadic groups was among the main tenets of Tanzimat reforms. Thus, the process of settling the tribes of Muş and its vicinity as well as their relations with governors and peasants will be discussed. Similarly, the chapter will provide important details about the tribal economy, and the agency of tribal members. The chapter underscores the emergence of the *hafirlik* system (taxes and services that settled populations provided to tribes in return for protection), which contributed to the aggravated relations between Kurdish tribes and Armenian peasants towards the end of the century.

# 2

## Emin Pasha of Muş: A Negotiation of Power in the Periphery of the Ottoman Empire

> *… the Serai (palace), situated at a village called Mogiyunk [Mongok], rather more than a mile eastward of the town. It was a large quadrangular building with an irregular tower at each corner, in the same style as the old residence of former Pashas near our camp. This new Serai was built by Emin Pasha a short time since, and Khurshid Beg had a residence close by not yet finished. I was ushered into an elevated Kiosk (Koshk), over one of the corner towers, which was entered by crossing the terrace of the palace: The view from it was extensive, and its height made it accessible to every air that stirred, and very cool and pleasant.*[1]

Consul James Brant thus described the palace of Emin Pasha, the eldest of four brothers of the Muş dynasty, during his visit in 1838. Emin Pasha, the mutasarrıf of Muş, felt the necessity to build a new palace instead of living in the ruined one of the former pashas of Muş in Mongok [Soğucak], a village

1 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 350.

that was green, breezy, and famous for its vineyards and that was close to the center of the city of Muş. The need to build a new and spectacular residence can epitomize Emin Pasha's power, which he had been trying not only to maintain but also consolidate throughout the 1830s.[2] Together with his other brothers, Şerif Bey of Bitlis, Murat Bey of Hınıs, and the youngest Hurşid Bey, Emin Pasha enjoyed remarkable influence in Muş, which was rooted in their lineage, monopoly on the agricultural surplus of the region, and ability to bargain for power at every turning point.

Emin Pasha was from a local dynasty of Muş known as the Alaaddin Pashazades. Bragg makes a distinction between "dynastic" and "non-dynastic" notables, the former "had gained notoriety over generations by acting in concert to run the affairs of the town," and "developed their bases of wealth and power by taking up local military, religious and tax collection posts" and worked "as intermediaries between state officials, local instutions and subgroups."[3] Similarly, Margaret Meriwether argues that "the consistent use of these family names over several generations in official sources is clear evidence that the families were identifying themselves as members of the social notability and that the wider society recognized their 'claim.'"[4] Alaaddin Pasha was a provincial notable (*â'yân*)[5] who enjoyed the heyday of his power during the second half of the eighteenth century in an era that would later be called the "age of the â'yâns."[6] *Â'yânlık*, or â'yânship, has been the focus of a variety of

2 Meeker establishes a correlation between mansions of local notables and those of state officials, where the governmental functions were performed. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*, 194.

3 Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory Politics*, 13. Similarly, Bayraktar also states that "dynasticisation" by attachment of the suffix "-zades," meaning literally "son," also points to the Ottoman government's acknowledgement of provincial notables. Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks," 24.

4 Margaret L. Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770-1840* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 35.

5 The term âyân had been used for influential people in cities, towns, villages, and several layers of the state and army since the early years of the Ottoman Empire and these people were called mostly as "âyân-ı vilâyet," "âyân ve eşraf," "âyân ve vücuh." Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Âyânlık* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), ix.

6 Bruce Mcgowan, "The Age o*f Ayans*, 1699-1812," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge

studies given its socioeconomic, political, and institutional attributes.[7] However, a regional inattention, if not necessarily a bias, has prevailed in the literature with respect to the provincial notables in that they exclusively deal with those of the Balkans and Anatolia.[8]

The socioeconomic transformation that the Ottoman Empire went through, necessitated mainly because of the wars with the Habsburgs and Persia was the main force that triggered the emergence and rise of the â'yâns. The *tımar* (fief) system,[9] "the backbone of both the military and fiscal structure of the Ottoman state" since the early fourteenth century, proved insufficient to subsidize the "new modes of warfare" by mid-sixteenth century.[10] In the same vein, the military constituent of the tımar system, the *sipahi* (cavalrymen),

University Press, 1997). "An Ottoman official of that time," as Suraiya Faroqhi offers, "did not view the Empire as divided into a stable set of regions, distinguished by the services they rendered to the central government. Rather, the Ottoman lands must have appeared as a congeries of domains controlled by different local power holders." Suraiya Faroqhi, "Coping with the Central State, Coping with Local Power: Ottoman Regions and Notables from the Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century," in *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography*, ed. Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 366.

7 Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda*; Ali Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challange: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2008); Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1982).

8 In a recent study, Bayraktar challenges this prevalence and emphasizes the "commensurability" of the provincial notables of the Balkans and Anatolia with the emirs of Ottoman Kurdistan. Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks," 1. Bayraktar further notes that the absence of the yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet holders in the literature on Ottoman provincial notables is the result of the decentralization paradigm that links the rise of ayans to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Ibid., 19.

9 The system in which taxes were collected by sipahis (cavalries) to whom the tımars were assigned in the provinces. "Tımar-holding sipahis" constituted the structure of the Ottoman army during the classical period. Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," *Archivicum Ottomanicum* VI (1980): 311.

10 Zens, "The *Ayanlık* and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin," 14-15. Yücel Özkaya also notes that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, fiefs were granted to everyone regardless of their capability. When fiefs were granted by the local authorities like *kadı* or *naib* , provincial notables and officials took them to profit from them. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda*, 94.

could no longer compete neither with the firearms nor the armies consisted of infantries.[11] The out datedness of the cavalry and the urgency of establishing an infantry in turn led to Ottoman governments to expand the janissary units and use of mercenaries.[12] The need for tax revenues to meet the expense of paying for soldiers together with the devaluation of the *akçe* (coin) at the end of the sixteenth century required a change to the tax-collecting system, and the replacement, the tax farming system quickly spread.[13] Both the expansion of the tax farming system and *mâlikâne* (life-long tax-farms), which was applied after 1695, led to rise of provincial notables.[14] Mâlikâne-*mukatâ'as* (mukatâ'as were revenue units of the Treasury) under the exclusive authority of provincial notables constituted the bases of their material power together with *çiftlik* (large farms) type land ownership.[15]

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11 İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 288; Zens, "The *Ayanlık* and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin," 18.

12 İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 288-92; Musa Çadırcı, "II Mahmut Döneminde Mütesellimlik Kurumu," *DTCF Dergisi* XXVIII, no. 3-4 (1970): 287. Furthermore, protracted wars of the eighteenth century and the assignment of multiple posts to the same official led to the expansion of *mütesellimlik*. Yücel Özkaya, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Mütesellimlik Müessesesi," Ibid.: 371. Ali Yaycıoğlu, in the same line, asserts "three major institutional transformations" in the Ottoman provinces, namely "localization, privatization and communalization of authority." Those three transformations provided a favorable environment for the participation of local actors in provincial administration. Besides, all were closely related to the "consolidation of three major offices": deputy-governorship, intendantship, and ayanship. Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challange," 189.

13 İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 312-13.

14 For mâlikâne, Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000); Erol Özvar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Mâlikane Uygulaması* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2003); Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: Privatization and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society* 21, no. 4 (1993).

15 For a discussion of çiftliks, Halil İnalcık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlords, and Tenants," in *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, ed. Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Gilles Veinstein, "On the Çiftlik Debate," Ibid. See especially chapters 2 and 5 in Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade, and Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Similarly, from the seventeenth century onward given not only the obsolescence of the fief system but also the increasing number of high-ranking officials, many sub-provinces were assigned as *arpalık* (allowance) to high officials who had not necessarily ever set foot there. In those cases, the governor appointed a *mütesellim* (deputy) to administrate in their place. As those mütesellims were among "the men on the spot," the â'yân, the prominence of the latter increased.[16] By the eighteenth century, the most prominent â'yân families in Anatolia, from the Karaosmanoğulları of Manisa to the Nakkaşzadeler and Müderriszadeler of Ankara, consolidated and maintained their power and strength through *mütesellimlik* (deputy-governorship). Overcoming their rivals in the struggle over the mütesellimlik, many â'yân families managed to "hold it on a hereditary basis."[17]

The story of the local dynasty of Muş resembles that of the provincial notables in the rest of the Ottoman Empire. As Hacı Mustafa Agha of the Karaosmanoğulları family was increasing his power by holding the mütesellimlik of Saruhan in the 1740s, Alaaddin Pasha, as will be discussed in the following lines, was also consolidating his power by enjoying the position of the mütesellimlik of Muş.[18] His grandson Selim Pasha, despite being a contemporary of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha did not occupy a similar place in the literature. Kurdish beys, like contemporaneous provincial notables, increased and consolidated their power through exploiting the circumstances created by empire's wars with Russia and Iran, holding tax-collection rights and mâlikâne-mukâta'as, and being mütesellims and mutasarrıfs.

Nevertheless, the similarities do not lead to underestimation of the divergences. Two important and intrinsic points about the provincial notables of Rumelia and Anatolia were the issues of the institutions of "âyânship" and confiscation (*müsadere*). Many seminal studies deal with â'yânlık as an

16 Faroqhi, "Coping with the Central State, Coping with Local Power," 351.

17 Halil İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, Papers on Islamic History* ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 32-33.

18 For a study of Karaosmanoğulları, see Yuzo Nagata, *Tarihte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerine Bir İnceleme* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997).

institution that emerged in the middle of the eighteenth century. As an institution â'yânlık implies an election process. Despite the complexities of the institutional aspects of â'yânlık for Anatolia and Rumelia â'yâns, I have not come across any indication of an electoral process for the Kurdish beys of Muş.[19] This was also the case for the confiscation system - the confiscation by the central treasury of the property of discharged or deceased officials. The central government applied the confiscation system as a means of control over officials. However, the properties of Kurdish notables were not confiscated.[20] Nevertheless, new yurtluk-ocaklık holders were required to pay the *muhallefât* (payment for assets and estates of a late official). It is possible that this stems from the status of the districts and sub-provinces under the rule of Kurdish beys, namely yurtluk-ocaklıks and hükûmets.

The political and economic power of Emin Pasha's lineage, the Alaaddin Pashazades, mainly stemmed from large tract of land under their control. Emin Pasha's ancestors were holders of yurtluk-ocaklık, which, together with its counterpart, hükûmets, is an imperial system of delegating power to notables or chieftains on the frontiers by granting not only land but also fiscal,

19 Studies by Nagata, Özkaya, and Yaycıoğlu were the leading ones. Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa* ; Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda*. Especially Yaycıoğlu differentiates between ayanhood and ayanship, the former of which refers to "natural leadership" and the latter of which to the "office of overseers." He also attached importance to role of the community in the election of ayans despite the existence of power relations. Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challange," 145-6;79.

20 Yet, the cases of executions were not absent. For instance, a former mutasarrıf of Muş and cousin of Emin Pasha, Selim Pasha, was executed in 1827, yet no traces have been found regarding the confiscation of his property. BOA. HAT. 892/39382, 25 Safer 1243 (17 September 1827). Nonetheless, further research and comparative studies of Kurdish notables would be necessary to make certain claims about the availability of the confiscation system to yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet holders. Nevertheless, available sources point out that lands and properties of notables in Muş were not confiscated until the abolishment of yurtluk-ocaklık system altogether. Similarly, Yaycıoğlu in his recent study annotates that except remote areas like Crimea, Caucasus, Kurdistan, Bosnia and Hecaz, the provincial notables did not hold their offices or contracts as "hereditary rights," as their properties could be confiscated and even their lives were put an end. *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 67.

administrative, and judicial privileges and immunities. Nevertheless, the characteristics of yurtluk-ocaklık lands were different from region to region and in different periods.[21] However, the vantage point of most studies on yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet types of land are ideologically-biased and so examine their range of autonomy.[22] Emin Pasha's story in the first quarter of the nineteenth century - which I will focus on throughout this and following chapters - was also a story of his keeping inherited yurtluk-ocaklık lands intact. Therefore, his story contributed to the functioning of yurtluk-ocaklık lands in the particularity of Muş in the nineteenth century during the course of their gradual liquidation.

Similarly, as it sheds light on a periphery of the Ottoman Empire and on the capacity of its elites to negotiate on the eve of the Tanzimat reforms, an account of Emin Pasha also serves to be an introduction to the reforms that implemented during the Tanzimat era. Therefore, the departure point of Huri İslamoğlu is significant for the present chapter. She refutes arguments that the Ottoman state of the nineteenth century excluded any kind of negotiation in contrast with that of the early modern era. Rather she offers "to distinguish the historical context in which negotiation took place."[23] In the same vein, this chapter will focus on center-periphery relations, not by regarding them as binary oppositions, but rather by looking at the coalitions and bargaining for power between them.[24]

As will be discussed throughout this chapter, the source of Emin Pasha's strength also stemmed from his ability to accommodate himself to the transformations that Ottoman Empire was going through during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. While central authorities sought to break the power of the notables in the vicinity of Muş, Emin Pasha applied to a set of strategies

21 Orhan Kılıç, "Ocaklık Sancakların Osmanlı Hukukunda ve İdari Tatbikattaki Yeri," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 11, no. 1 (2001).

22 Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," p.166. However, micro studies have been recently carried out with the aim of exposing the socioeconomic peculiarities of such hereditary land holdings. For instance, Ibid.; Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks."

23 Huri İslamoğlu and Peter C. Perdue, "Introduction," *Journal of Early Modern History* 5, no. 4 (2001): 278.

24 Jongerden and Verheij, "Introduction," 3.

to turn them to his own advantage. The turning points of this era by which Emin Pasha increased his power were the wars with Russia, tribal and frontier issues with Iran, and later, the threat of Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt. Emin Pasha manipulated each of these three matters as well as some regional circumstances (e.g., the revolt of Timur Pasha of Van) to consolidate his power during the first half of the nineteenth century.

The following lines first elaborate the discussion of yurtluk-ocaklık types of land. Second, the family of Emin Pasha will be historicized. Lastly, the rise of Emin Pasha in the 1830s will be discussed given the milestones of the era, namely the Russian-Ottoman War of 1828-9, and the problems related to the seminomadic groups.

## § 2.1 Notables of Muş and the Nature of their Political and Economic Power

The administrative and political status of Muş had changed from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Although the history of Alaaddin Pasha's ancestors before the eighteenth century was not clear, based on the individual petitions of family members and the fact that Alaaddin Bey was appointed as mütesellim of Muş by the Burhan Han of Bitlis, it is obvious that they enjoyed some privilege under the influence of the hükûmet of Bitlis.[25] Since the middle of the eighteenth century, Alaaddin Pasha's sons and grandsons held the mutasarrıflık of sub-province of Muş as yurtluk-ocaklık. Nevertheless, the sub-province also included tımars and mâlikânes, and family members expanded range of their economic autonomy by taking several mukâta'as, such as Hınıs, Tekman, and Malazgirt.[26] To better comprehend what follows will introduce a discussion of the yurtluk-ocaklık system in general and of Muş's status in particular.

25 BOA. C. DH. 270/13478, 13 Cemâziyelahir 1160 (22 June 1747).

26 However, the assignment of tımars and zeamets was implemented under the influence of yurtluk-ocaklık holders, and so, their relatives and supporters were generally assigned these appanages. Mehmet Ali Ünal, "XVI. Yüzyılda Palu Hükümeti," *On Dokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 7 (1992): 1072; Ömer Toraman, "Tanzimat'ın Yurtluk-Ocaklık ve Hükümet Sancaklarda Uygulanması (1839-1864)" (PhD diss., Fırat Üniversitesi, 2010), 9.

### 2.1.1 *The Yurtluk-Ocaklık System*

Yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet types of land were granted to notables of newly conquered, geographically-remote and, politically-delicate places. Such grants mainly targeted the loyalty and collaboration of local power holders. Therefore, as Kılıç states, this type of land was seen in Bosna, Anatolia, Diyarbekir, Van, Kars, Çıldır, Rakka, Damascus, and Baghdad, but it was much more common in Van and Diyarbekir due to the Ottoman-Iranian wars starting in 1578.[27] The encounter of the Ottoman Empire with Safavids in the east and Habsburgs in the northwest shaped its "administrative strategies" on both frontiers.[28] Yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet types of land were an integral part of this administrative strategy. Nevertheless, as Ágoston asserts, one must be cautious about referring to "lands grants" in the legal texts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were, in fact, recognition of the rights of pre-Ottoman rulers over the traditional pastures of Turkmen and Kurdish tribes in region "as a consequence of a political deal that reflected the balance of power and mutual interdependence in the frontier zones."[29]

"Ottoman pragmatism and flexibility"[30] cannot be limited to the conquest methods of the fifteenth century, which were regarded to be effective during their time, Ágoston argues; it continued in the following centuries. Likewise, yurtluk-ocaklıks, with their "special administrative status" were indicators of continuing pragmatism and flexibility.[31] It was a "condominium," Ágoston further argues, "that is, the joint rule of the former power elite and Ottoman

27 Orhan Kılıç, "Yurtluk-Ocaklık ve Hükümet Sancaklar Üzerine Bazı Tespitler," *OTAM*, no. 10 (1999): 124. For this analysis, Kılıç makes use of two lists of sancâks, the one from Kanunname-i Sultan Süleyman and the other from Sancâk Tevcih Defteri dates to 1631-1632.

28 Gábor Ágoston, "A Flexible Empire: Authority and its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers," in *Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Change*, eds. Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 18.

29 Ibid., 19. Bayraktar also draws attention to this point. See Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks," 50.

30 For a critique of using the term "pragmatism" in the Ottoman historiography, see Murat Dağlı, "The Limits of Ottoman Pragmatism," *History and Theory* 52, no. 2 (2013): 194-213.

31 Ágoston, "A Flexible Empire," 18. For a further discussion of the fact that yurtluk-ocaklık system was not a Kurdish peculiarity but a peripheral strategy, see Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks," 59-75.

authorities." Nevertheless, the peculiarities of this joint rule differed according to place and time.[32]

More importantly, such land grants were not specific to Ottoman Empire. İnalcık asserts that "in the states founded by the Turkish and Mongol dynasties in Iran, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and the *Dasht* (the Eurasia steppe region), the *temlîknâme* (a grant showing the freehold) type of land grant was called *soyurghal.*"[33] "Soyurghals always involved full exemption and immunity from administrative control, state taxes and services."[34] In the same vein, based on an analysis of the soyurghal of a ruler of Aqqoyunlu in the fifteenth century, V. Minorsky accentuates the fact that "the document is a typically feudal act by which the suzerain delegates to the grantee a part of his sovereign rights within a defined territory."[35]

The main source that elaborated the specificities of yurtluk-ocaklık lands and clarified their differences from hükûmets was the *Kanunname-i Hümayun* (Imperial Law Book) prepared during the reign of Süleyman I. Based on these sources, Ayn-i Ali Efendi, a custodian of the Imperial Registers (*Defter-i Hakani*), prepared another book of law at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, regarding the province (*eyâlet*[36]) of Diyarbekir,

32 Ágoston, "A Flexible Empire," 23. Similarly, Karen Barkey defines empires as "negotiated enterprises," between the state and social actors. Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 68.

33 Halil İnalcık, "Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States: Temlîks, Soyurghals, Yurdluk-Ocaklıks, Mâlikâne-Mukâta'as and Awqaf," in *History and Historiography of post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East : Studies in Honor of John E. Woods*, ed. Judith Pfeiffer and Sholeh A. Quinn ; in collaboration with Ernest Tucker. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 119.

34 Ibid., 113-14.

35 V. Minorsky, "A Soyūrghāl of Qāsim b. Jahāngir Aq-qoyunlu (903/1498)," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 9, no. 4 (2009): 945. A soyurghal was occasionally in the form of granting an amount of revenue, and not only notables but also religious classes could enjoy this right. See Ann K. S. Lambton, "Two Ṣafavid Soyūrghāls," Ibid.14, no. 1. In this context, Bayraktar links the predominance of the soyurghal system in the Aqqoyunlu and Safavid Empires to the "pragmatism" of Ottomans who recognized "pre-conquest" practices in the Kurdish periphery. Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks," 51.

36 According to Ömer Toraman "eyâlet" was used instead of beylerbeyliği (governorship) to denote the regional autonomy of Kurdish beys. Toraman, "Tanzimat'ın Yurtluk-Ocaklık ve

states that when the lands were conquered they were assigned to Kurdish beys as yurtluk-ocaklık. He emphasized that unlike other kinds of official post, the beys could not be discharged and reappointed (*azl ve nasb kabul eylemezler*), and their lands were handed down from father to son. No one from outside could be appointed in their place. Yet, like other sub-provinces, their incomes were registered. They included fiefs (*tımar*) and *zeamet* (large fiefs). He then continues by describing the responsibilities of yurtluk-ocaklık holders: In the case of a war, they should join in like the beys of other sub-provinces. If Kurdish beys did not obey this rule, their sub-provinces would be taken from them and assigned to their sons or other relatives. Then he clarified the difference between yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet sancâks: In hükûmet sancâks, there were no tımar or zeamet. They were regarded and used as freehold property (*mülk*) and were *mefruz'ul kalem and maktu'al kadem*,[37] emphasizing the autonomous status of hükûmets and literally translated by Rhoads Murphy as "separated from treasury account" and "off limits to all trespass."[38]

Along the same lines, referring to the law book of Ali Çavuş of Sofya, Midhat Sertoğlu states that *ocaklık* was a kind of land tenure system and if the revenues of a place were granted to someone for life, it was then called *yurtluk* (family property). In addition, if this right was handed down from father to son, it was called *ocaklık* (hereditary family estate[39]) or yurtluk and ocaklık. As Sertoğlu was mainly interested in the issue of autonomy, he argues that those granted with the yurtluk-ocaklıks were not owners or proprietors of those places. In other words, they could not sell, donate, or endow their yurtluk-ocaklık lands. They only had the fifth provision of ownership: the

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Hükümet " XXI. In the same vein, Metin Kunt emphasizes that "eyâlet" entails more regional autonomy than "sancâk" and "vilâyet." Metin İ. Kunt, *Sancaktan Eyalete: 1550-1650 arasında Osmanlı Ümerası ve İl İdaresi* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1978), 28.

37 Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, *Kanunname-i Âli Osman: Osmanlı Devleti Arazi Kanunları*, trans. Hadiye Tuncer (Ankara: Resimli Posta Matbaası, 1962), 6-7.

38 Rhoads Murphey, ed. *Kanûn-nâme-i Sultânı li Aziz Efendi = Aziz Efendi's Book of Sultanic Laws and Regulations : An Agenda for Reform by a Seventeenth-century Ottoman Statesman* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 58.

39 For the English versions of "yurtluk" and "ocaklık," see Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, 39.

right to legate. Nonetheless, they had right over*şer'î* (Islamic) and *örfi* (customary) taxes on those lands. Yurtluk-ocaklıks' difference from fiefdoms or other land types was the fact that they were not necessarily granted in return for a service and they persisted and could not be taken back until no heir remained. Furthermore, the holders of yurtluk-ocaklık lands had some administrative and judicial rights.[40] They also had *tabl-u alem* (drum and flag), signifying a *beylik* (principality) not only among the Ottomans but also the Seljuks.[41]

Evaluations of the lawbooks of the seventeenth century only shed light on the theory and logic of the land tenure system. They neither explain the practical outcomes and regional differences nor continuities and discontinuities in time. It is possible to invalidate rights of yurtluk-ocaklık holders – which were strictly defined in these lawbooks - with respect to whether they could sell, donate, or endow their villages. As an example, Fatih Gencer argues that there were instances in which Kurdish beys sold their yurtluk-ocaklık villages. For instance, in the early nineteenth century, Musa Bey among the Mahmudi beys disposed of some of his villages in the sub-district (*nahiye*) of Kotur, giving them to Iranians because of his debt. Musa Bey used the imperial order as a proof of his proprietorship, yet his act led to a cross-border problem.[42]

Moreover, the status of yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet lands changed over time. As Tom Sinclair argues, the Ottoman Empire's attempts "to marry the sancak system with the tribal principalities and their hereditary institution resulted in something unstable and difficult to control."[43] In addition, the

40 Midhat Sertoğlu, ed. *Sofyalı Ali Çavuş Kanunnamesi: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Toprak Tasarruf Sistemi'nin Hukukî ve Malî Müeyyede ve Mükellefiyetleri* (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1992), 15.

41 Ibid., 32-33.

42 Fatih Gencer, "Merkezileşme Politikaları Sürecinde Yurtluk-Ocaklık Sisteminin Değişimi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 30, no. 49 (2011): 79.

43 Tom Sinclair, "The Ottoman Arrangements for the Tribal Principalities of the Lake Van Region of the Sixteenth Century," in *Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Change*, eds. Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 142.

provision that in hükûmets tax and population surveys could not be carried out was also challenged by the example of the Bitlis hükûmet which was surveyed a few times between 1535 and 1578.[44]

Similarly, there were examples where the term yurtluk-ocaklık was used to define both hükûmet and yurtluk-ocaklık lands in the course of time. In Palu, as Nilay Özok-Gündoğan discusses, the term yurtluk-ocaklık was used to identify the hereditary lands of the Palu Beys in the nineteenth century, but it was known that they had been granted as hükûmets in the sixteenth century. The reason for this preference, according to her, "what the central Ottoman state was seeing as a problem in the nineteenth century was the broad category of yurtluk-ocaklık type of land ownership, that is hereditary ownership of the Kurdish emirs."[45]

The discussion on the autonomy of yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet types also concerns their place in Ottoman land tenure, in other words, whether they were *mülk* (freehold property) or *mîrî* (the state-owned lands only the usufruct rights of which are possessed by the holder). What was the essence of freehold property? Was it the land or the right to collect taxes?[46] Based on the temlîknâmes given to the beys of Palu during the sixteenth century, Özok-Gündoğan argues that they enjoyed the lands granted to them as mülk, or freehold property.[47] Bayraktar also argues that the status of the lands of the Zirki Beys were between mîrî and mülk, yet closer to the latter. [48] These

44 Ibid., 124. Sinclair also acknowledges that except for this difference, all hükûmets in the Van region (those of Bitlis, Hakkari, Mahmudi, and Hizan) enjoyed "the same rights and responsibilities." Ibid., 138.

45 Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," 104-05. Similarly, throughout this study, the term yurtluk-ocaklık was used for hereditary land holdership in general in the context of the nineteenth century.

46 For instance, Ömer Toraman was certain that although hükûmets were granted by the way of freehold, the rakabe of this type of land belonged to the state. Freehold was exclusive of the tax revenues which were supposed to be collected by the state. Toraman, "Tanzimat'ın Yurtluk-Ocaklık ve Hükümet " 8.

47 Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," 169. Nevertheless, she also emphasized that further research is needed to draw a "definitive conclusion" about the change in the status of the lands of the Palu Beys in the course of time.

48 Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks," 241.

examples show that there were variations within categories of yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet lands. It is also certain that their political and economic autonomy changed over the course of time. In fact, as will be discussed in chapter 5, neither central nor provincial authorities thoroughly knew the revenues and worth of yurtluk-ocaklık lands in Muş in the second half of the nineteenth century. This both blurs the distinction made in the lawbooks between hükûmet and yurtluk-ocaklık lands – which emphasize the absence of land surveys for the former and their existence in the latter - and calls for more local studies that cast light on what happened in practice. For instance, the yurtluk-ocaklık status of Muş changed over the course of time. However, as Bayraktar also emphasizes, regardless of the property relations, the survival of yurtluk-ocaklık system into the nineteenth century shows that it was a hereditary family estate and the existence of "landed provincial elite" on the eastern periphery of the Ottoman Empire.[49]

#### 2.1.1.1 Historicizing the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Status of Muş

In *Sharafnama*, Şeref Han, the hereditary governor of Bitlis, states that the khanate of Bitlis was composed of Bitlis, Ahlat, Hınıs, Muş and their environs.[50] However, the administrative situation of Bitlis was volatile in those times, as Mehmet Öz argues. Although, after the incorporation of the eastern provinces during the campaign of Selim I, Bitlis had the status of eyâlet and was later termed as a hükûmet, when members of the hereditary ruling family left Bitlis and took the side of the Safevids in 1530s "it became an ordinary Ottoman district or sub-province." The province of Van was established in 1548, and Bitlis became a district of it. However, after 1579, the district was granted to Şeref Han as an ocaklık, thus regaining its hereditary status.[51] Also, in 1584, the sub-district of Muş together with some of its *has* (appanage)

49 Ibid., 59.

50 Şeref Han, *Şerefname*, trans. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan (Istanbul: Yöntem Yayınları, 1975), 485.

51 Mehmet Öz, "Ottoman Provincial Administration in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: The Case of Bidlis in the Sixteenth Century," in *Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities, and Political Changes*, eds. Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2003), 151.

villages were annexed to Bitlis in return for 200 thousand piasters (*akçe*). The khan kept the half of the taxes collected in Bitlis and the other half was sent to the bey of Van. In 1635, the khan of Bitlis was allowed to keep poll taxes levied of the plain of Muş.[52] In the seventeenth century, Evliya Çelebi emphasized that "the kharac on the Muş plain is entirely the Khan's private estate and provides him 26.000 piasters annually."[53]

Besides the accounts in *Sharafnama* and *Seyahatname,* it can be inferred from the phrase "our four-hundred-year dynasty" which was widely used by Emin Pasha and his brothers in their letters and petitions that the beys of Muş enjoyed rule under the governance of the khans of Bitlis for a while. However, by the eighteenth century, the khans of Bitlis were not as powerful as they used to be. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Alaaddin Pasha, the grandfather of Emin Pasha, was recorded as the man who consolidated the autonomy of the beys of Muş in the eighteenth century.

The well-known story about Alaaddin Pasha concerned his resistance to central authorities while he was the mütesellim of Muş. It is reported that there were seven fortresses under the administration of Alaaddin Pasha.[54] Near an Armenian village in the plain of Muş, called Sakavi [Mercimekkale], there was a small hill, which, according to Consul James Brant, was called Osp-polur in Armenian, meaning "the mountain round as a lentil."[55] It was at the strongest fortress, Mercimek Kale, where Alaaddin Pasha had resisted Ottoman forces and maintained his autonomy in the 1750s.[56] After this event, the hill got its name: Mercimek Tepesi.[57] As Brant points out, after this event the relatives of Alaaddin Bey maintained the *pashalık* (used for provincial and sub-provincial governorships) of Muş with few interruptions and with "greater or less independence."[58]

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52 Han, *Şerefname*, 579.

53 Robert Dankoff, *Evliya Çelebi in Bitlis: The Relevant Section of the Seyahatname/edited with translation, commentary and introduction* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 61.

54 BOA. C. DH. 65/3220, 22 Zilkade 1163 (23 October 1750).

55 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 348.

56 BOA. C. DH. 65/3220, 22 Zilkade 1163 (23 October 1750).

57 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 348-49.

58 Ibid., 350.

The sons and grandsons of Alaaddin Bey maintained rule in Muş from that time onward. However, the phrase "our four-hundred-year dynasty" or "our four hundred years of servitude to the Ottoman Empire" are common in the scripts by Emin Pasha and later in those of his brothers. Therefore, it is possible to infer that before Alaaddin Bey reinforced his power in the 1750s, his relatives had posts in Muş under the influence of the khans of Bitlis. However, the successful resistance of Alaaddin Bey at Mercimek Hill paved the way for the consolidation of power in the hands of his dynasty. From this time onward, it is unsurprising that while Alaaddin Bey's dynasty enlarged its power over the domain, surrounding notables being subordinated to the growing power of this family. For instance, by the nineteenth century, Selim Pasha, the grandson of Alaaddin Bey and cousin of Emin Pasha,[59] gained power over the beys of Bitlis who were already in decline in the eighteenth century. Selim Pasha subdued the beys of Bitlis and attached the beylik to Muş.[60]

## § 2.2 The Rise of Emin Pasha

The story of Emin Pasha dates back to Alaaddin Bey's aforementioned resistance. Both consular reports and Emin Pasha's references to his own dynasty unfold a story of a powerful family that had negotiated its power in the framework of the socioeconomic and political circumstances and transformations of the era. The first occasion, which brought Emin Pasha and his brothers to the stage in Muş during the late 1820s was an intrafamilial- but at

59 James Brant claims that Selim Pasha was the father of Emin Pasha; however, many archival documents state that Yusuf Pasha was his father. Furthermore, in my personal interviews with the grandsons of Alaaddin Bey it was clear that Yusuf Pasha was the father of Emin Pasha.

60 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 380. From some archival documents it can also be understood that Selim Pasha extended the range of his power by eliminating some of his relatives. For instance, although it was recorded that Hınıs and Tekman had been yurtluk-ocaklık lands of Ali Bey's father, Selim Pasha managed to get rid of him (pederinin üzerinden def' itdirmiş olduğundan). BOA. HAT. 819/37339C, 3 Safer 1237 (30 October 1821). Fatih Gencer also noted that Selim Pasha attacked the administrator of Ahlat and Adilcevaz, Şeyh Ahmet, who was said to have been his enemy, and took control over his lands. Lastly, he attacked Şirvan and plundered the villages. See Gencer, "Merkezileşme Politikaları Sürecinde," p. 80.

the same time a political- murder.[61] Although being part of the dynasty of Muş, it seemed that Emin Pasha did not take a turn as mutasarrıf until the late 1820s. Yet he used his own means - which were deeply-rooted in the political relations of the region - to take the reins of the power.

In 1828, the cousin (*emmizade*) of Emin Bey, Abdurrahman Pasha, was the mutasarrıf of Muş, and Emin was his *kethüda* (steward). Abdurrahman Pasha dismissed his cousin from this post though the reason was not clarified.[62] Soon afterward, the current governor of Erzurum, Galip Pasha, informed the *Sadaret* (Vizirate) about the murder of Abdurrahman Pasha by his cousin Emin Bey and his brothers on his way from Bitlis to Muş. Upon Abdurrahman Pasha's death, Galip Pasha suggested that the sub-province of Muş be governed as a mütesellimlik for a time, and he searched for proper candidates, all of whom were family members, as was the peculiarity of the yurtluk-ocaklık system.[63] Galip Pasha's evaluation of each candidate is significant for underlining the deep-rooted power relations in the region.

The first and most powerful candidate for mütesellimlik was Mehmed Bey, the brother of a former mutasarrıf of Muş, the deceased Selim Pasha. Mehmed Bey was the kethüda of the khan of Bitlis at the time, which also points to the strong relations between the khans of Bitlis and the mutasarrıfs of Muş.

The other two candidates were İbrahim Bey among the Maksud Pashazades who was in Istanbul and Hacı Ahmed Bey who was in Halep. However, the former was the uncle of the "murderers," and the latter was their eldest brother. Both were notorious. Furthermore, the brother of Abdurrahman Pasha, Abdülfettah Bey, had died of natural causes. Therefore, the best candidate, according to Galip Pasha, was Mehmed Bey, whom the sheikhs of Bitlis also supported. As seen, the circle of coalitions of each candidate would pave the

61 Among the four brothers, Emin Pasha was described as the most commanding figure, yet the other three brothers also shared a great role in the region. Murad Bey resided in Hınıs which was defined as part of the *pashalık* of Muş in 1838. Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 345. Furthermore, Şerif Bey was defined as the *mütesellim* of Bitlis, and under his command there were eighty villages. He had also built a new residence in Bitlis two years earlier, as Emin Pasha had in Muş. Ibid., 381.

62 BOA. HAT. 1088/44264 B, 29 Şevval 1243 (14 May 1828).

63 BOA. HAT. 1087/44245, 01 Zilkade 1243 (15 May 1828).

way for their coming to power. As argued by Zens, "a coalition of lesser notables including members of the *ulema* and other locally influential people, and government officials, such as *kadı*s and *ağa*s from the local janissary garrison," could suppor their candidate ayan to be mütesellim either through "issuing recommendations" or through pressure.[64]

The crucial question is why a mütesellim from outside was not appointed given that the family members had a bad reputation. According to Galip Pasha, abolishing the yurtluk-ocaklık and appointing a mütesellim from outside was an option. Yet the pasha further argued that yurtluk-ocaklıks were a long-standing tradition and that Muş was part of Kurdistan where maintaining control (*taht û rabta idhâli*) was a long, thorny process. The second obstacle was the war with the Russian Empire and the need for soldiers.[65] Therefore, it was the best to choose the mütesellim from among the family members. Galip Pasha's explanation contains two nuances regarding Muş and its rulers. On the one hand, situated on the borderlands of the empire, Muş was a source of human power during the wars with the Russians and Persians. On the other hand, his explanation points to the struggle of the notables of Muş to maintain and consolidate their autonomy during the nineteenth century. The oscillation between mütesellimlik and mutasarrıflık was a formulation of this struggle. As discussed above, provincial notables increased their influence by securing the post of mütesellimlik. However, the post of mütesellimlik was responsible to provincial governors. In mutasarrıflık, which was used for administration of sub-provinces,[66] it was possible to enjoy a greater range of autonomy. Therefore, as discussed throughout this chapter, mütesellimlik was a phase for Emin Pasha; his real aim was a mutasarrıflık. In the particular situation of Muş, the latter meant that the sub-province was granted as yurtluk-ocaklık by the way of a mutasarrıflık. To put it differently, the sub-province of Muş, which consisted of approximately four hundred villages and included the districts of Malazgirt, Hınıs, and Tekman, had once been granted to its mutasarrıfs as

64 Zens, "The *Ayanlık* and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin," 31-32.

65 Ibid.

66 Orhan Kılıç, *18. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdari Taksimatı: Eyalet ve Sancak Tevcihatı* (Elazığ: Şark Pazarlama, 1997), 25.

yurtluk-ocaklık. Moreover, local, and central authorities used mütesellimlik for a trial period. For instance, when Mehmed Bey was appointed as the mütesellim of Muş, it was justified as provisional to understand his behavior and ability to govern.[67]

### 2.2.1 *The 1828-29 Ottoman Russian War*

While the governor of Erzurum was trying to find a proper mütesellim for Muş and in the end decided on Mehmet Bey, Emin Bey, who had escaped to Diyarbekir with his brothers after having killed his cousin, looked for opportunities to be forgiven. His ultimate goal was to be the mutasarrıf of Muş. According to Mehmed Salih Pasha, the new governor of Erzurum, Emin Bey promised one thousand five hundred purses (*kese*)[68] to the treasury in return for his forgiveness and nomination as mutasarrıf of Muş. He also guaranteed that he would let his brothers and children be held as hostages. Emphasizing his connections with tribal leaders and the notables of Muş, Emin Bey also promised that he would support the army with a great number of cavalrymen if summoned for the war (the 1828-9 Ottoman-Russian War) and would go to wherever he was commanded.[69]

This would not be the last time for Emin Bey would bargain with Ottoman governments by taking advantages of the delicate moments. His efforts yielded results at such conjunctures. The war with the Russian Empire was the determining factor in Emin Pasha's pardon.[70] As the Ottoman Empire was mobilizing all its resources and energy to fight the war against Russia, it could not deal with additional trouble that was on the frontier of another rival empire. Meanwhile, Emin Bey allied with the Silvanlı tribe in Diyarbekir, the leaders of which also penned a solicitation (*ricânâme*) for Emin Bey's pardon. The

67 "… bir müddetcek harekâtı sûret-i idâresi anlaşılmak üzere Muş sancâğının mütesellimlik vechile zabtı …" BOA. HAT. 1087/44245, 01 Zilkade 1243 (15 May 1828).

68 One kese equals 50,000 akçe. See footnote 21 in Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 97.

69 BOA. C. DH. 142/7060, 29 Zilkade 1243 (12 June 1828).

70 Similar to the rise to power of the Karaosmanoğlu family which benefited from circumstances created by the Ottoman-Russian Wars of 1768 and 1787. Nagata, *Tarihte Âyânlar*, 33.

governor of Erzurum was anxious as that tribe was neither trivial nor totally under control. The best choice was to negotiate terms with Emin Bey's terms; otherwise his subordination would require a set of precautions.[71]

Together with concerns about Emin Bey's alliances, the need for soldiers and, most importantly, the closeness of the region to the frontiers of the Empire paved the way for his pardon and his appointment as the mutasarrıf of Muş. P.İ. Averyanov describes the attitudes of the Kurdish beys during the war. He argued that although the emir of Hakkari announced his neutrality when the war started in 1828, the pashalıks of Van, Erzurum, and Muş as well as the Kurds of Bayezid later had to support the Ottomans.[72] In addition, as Ottoman archival documents point out, when the Russian army attacked from Eleşgird, it was Emin - now a pasha and the mutasarrıf - along with the mütesellims of Hınıs, Tekman and Hısn-ı Mansur, who counter-attacked with about four or five thousand soldiers.[73]

Based on military reports submitted to the czar, Averyanov also describes how Emin Pasha played both sides during the war. He also highlights General Paskoviç's efforts to gain the support of Kurds in the region. Emin Pasha, while bargaining with Ottoman authorities for the mutasarrıflık of Muş, also contacted Russian authorities to achieve the same goal. It was reported that in 1828, before the war began, Emin Pasha sent an Armenian mediator to Tbilisi to General Paskoviç, who pledged to him, in return for his full support against the Turkish troops, the rank of pashalık and financial aid for troops that Emin Pasha promised to recruit from among the Kurdish tribes. Allegedly, Emin Pasha reached a deal with Paskoviç. However, it turned out that he did not provide the Russian army with the promised Kurdish cavalries. Nevertheless, Averyanov argued that his hesitance and passiveness at critical moments during the war was for the good of Russia.[74] Similarly, British Colonel Francis Chesney also notes that the pasha of Muş was persuaded with the offers of the

71 Ibid.

72 P. İ. Averyanov, *19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İran Rus Savaşlarında Kürtler*, trans. İbrahim Kale (Istanbul: Avesta, 2010), 54-5.

73 BOA. HAT. 1011/42437A, 5 Rebiülevvel 1244 (15 October 1828).

74 Averyanov, *19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı* 65-7.

Russian general, which led to a loss of 12,000 Kurdish cavalry for the Ottoman troops.[75] Yet, as stated above, Emin Pasha eventually fought against the Russian troops that attacked Eleşkirt. Upon this, according to Averyanov, General Paskoviç decided to punish Emin Pasha for his double-dealings by invading Muş in 1829.[76]

In this story, Emin Pasha's effort to take advantage of the war between two empires is not extraordinary. Bargaining for power by utilizing their location at the frontiers of Russian, Ottoman and Iranian empires was at the core of the Kurdish Beys' functions. In the case of Emin Pasha, he changed his alliances in the course of the war, not because he was changing his mind but because he was meticulously evaluating and manipulating each new development. When he decided not to help Russia by providing a Kurdish cavalry, rumors about a peace agreement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire had already spread in the region.[77] Besides, he might use a possible coalition with Russian authorities as trump card against Ottoman authorities, strengthing his hand later on.

During the war, neither Ottoman central authorities nor the governors of Erzurum Province were content with the services of Emin Pasha. The successor of Galip Pasha, Salih Pasha wrote to the imperial center that although Muş was expansive and significant (*cesim bir mahal*), it could not be governed properly. During the governorship of his predecessor, three mutasarrıfs came and left Muş in three years time; finally, Emin Pasha came to rule it. However, he reported the misbehavior of Emin Pasha, stating that the pasha trusted in the Kurds (that is to say, Kurdish tribes) and thought that they were the guarantors of his future in the region. Therefore, the governor of Erzurum claimed that Emin Pasha acting on such a belief, behaved improperly, and therefore, his governorship in Muş was unfavorable.[78] Although Salih Pasha suggested other candidates, Emin Pasha managed to keep his post in Muş.

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75 Francis R. Chesney, *The Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828 and 1829: With a View of the Present State of Affairs in the East* (New York: Redfield, 1854), 204.

76 Averyanov, *19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı* 75-6.

77 Ibid.

78 "… kendünün bekâsı ekrâdın iânesine mahsûsdur zannıyla uygunsuz harekete ibtidâr ve mûmâileyhin bu hâl ile Muşda bekâsı muzırr görünûb ..." BOA. HAT. 1016/42520, 17

It was not only provincial governors that complained about local power holders. For instance, in 1830, the representative of Russia in Istanbul informed the central government that some Ottoman officials in the eastern provinces were provoking revolts in the region. After investigation, the commander in chief of the east (*Şark Seraskeri*), Osman Pasha, stated it could not be no one other than Emin Pasha who would dare to do such a thing. Although such allegations could not be proved, the exile of Emin Pasha to Erzincan or Karahisar for a while was discussed.[79] Nevertheless, even this discussion did not diminish Emin Pasha's power. This is mainly because of the aforementioned peculiarities of the geography, which prevented the abolishment of land tenure system, yurtluk-ocaklıks. Such an obstacle disables the local and central authorities to appoint an administrator apart from long-established Muş dynasty.

Apart from the Russian-Ottoman War of 1828-1829, two other developments stemming from the geopolitical location of Muş shaped Emin Pasha's sphere of influence. The first one was his service in the suppression of the revolt Timur Pasha, the *muhafız* (guardian) of Van. As it occurred at border with Iran, the possibility of the spread of the revolt caused anxiety among both central and provincial authorities. Emin Pasha, in return for his services, was granted with the *berat* (imperial certificate) of Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık. The second development was not a specific event; rather, it stemmed from the tribal landscape of Muş. Emin Pasha would play the card of the settlement of the nomadic and seminomadic tribes and conscription of the tribesmen for the *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediyye* (Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad; hereafter, Mansure Army) to extend his domain of power. Specifically, he

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Cemaziyelevvel 1244 (25 November 1828). However, the struggle between the two pashas did not last. Emin Pasha asked for a *kapukethüdası* for himself, but the governor of Erzurum stated that the mutasarrıfs of Muş did not have important missions in Istanbul, so it was unnecessary. Claiming a kethüda shows Emin Pasha's vision of himself and how he cared about his role in the region. BOA. HAT. 724/34457, 18 Şevval 1244 (23 April 1829).

79 BOA. HAT. 1023/42698 F, 6 Zilkade 1245 (29 April 1830). Kemal Beydilli also accentuates the fact that Emin Pasha should have controlled Kurdish tribes in Muş and Hınıs during the war. However, his ignoring the warnings resulted in the complaints of Russian authorities. Kemal Beydilli, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşında Doğu Anadolu'dan Rusya'ya Göçürülen Ermeniler* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 385-6.

requested to being contracted with the mukâta'as of Hınıs, Tekman and Malazgirt, which would be a longlasting matter of debate between the provincial authorities of Muş and Erzurum.

#### 2.2.1.1 The Revolt of Timur Pasha and the Consolidation of the Power of Emin Pasha

Meanwhile, Emin Pasha was not the only Kurdish notable who sought to strengthen his power. The muhafız of Van, Timur Pasha had previously demanded to be part of the Mansure Army, which the commander in chief considered appropriate.[80] However, Timur Pasha, a year after his dismissal from the *muhâfızlık* (guardianship) of Van, was provoking Kurds and some tribes around Van with the help of his brother, Fazıl Bey, with the aim of being granted the province of Van. Ottoman authorities were alarmed about this revolt, as they were worried about cross-border troubles. Therefore, they formed coalitions in the region, appointing other pashas of the Kurdish region to suppress the revolt. Emin Pasha was among them. In line with this, the suppression of Timur Pasha's revolt - or "issue of Van" (*Van maddesi*) - resulted in the promotion of Emin Pasha's rank.

The issue of Van is important as it not only led to the rise of Emin Pasha but shows the different kinds of alliances in the region, variously comprised of Kurdish tribes, notables, and Ottoman and Persian authorities. While central authorities constituted a coalition against Timur Pasha, he had a rendezvous with Cihangir Mirza, the son of crown prince Şehzade Abbas, near the border. The Pasha allegedly offered gifts to Cihangir Mirza, and some correspondence were exchanged between them. Ottoman authorities warned the Iranians about Timur Pasha, reminding them not to infringe on the cordiality and tranquility between the two states and especially to prevent tribal involvement in his revolt. However, Timur Pasha did not step back and kept on "provoking tribes and spreading news from Bagdad to Rumeli." The biggest fear was the possibility that the revolt would spread in the region.[81]

80 BOA. HAT. 308/18189, 29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830).

81 BOA. HAT. 703/33795, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1247 (24 October 1831).

In line with this apprehensiveness, the situation of Emin Pasha became significant, as his collaboration with Timur Pasha was possible and therefore a matter of concern. Therefore, central and provincial authorities agreed that Emin Pasha should be treated well and granted the berat of Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık, which he had long demanded. In return, Emin Pasha was charged with helping the new *kâimakâm* (administrator of a sub-province) who had been appointed to Van, Adil Bey. Emin Pasha would join him in Malazgird with four to five thousand troops constituted of the tribes of Muş. The coalition of Timur Pasha was about the same size, and a crucial part of it was the tribe of Haydaran together with some others. Therefore, it was important to break this coalition by persuading some tribal members to join the other camp. This aim was realized; the brother of Kasım Ağa of Haydaran defected to the side of Emin Pasha and Adil Bey together with four hundred families (*dört yüz hâne)* and the armed men of the tribe.[82] As will be discussed throughout this chapter, seminomadic groups would provide manpower for both rebelling local actors and for the imperial forces.

Through the mediation of Emin Pasha, finally, the coalition of Timur Pasha was broken. The last blow to the revolt came from Şerif Bey, the brother of Emin Pasha, with the help of the son of Haydaran tribe's leader. Therefore, with the help of Emin Pasha and his brothers, the revolt of Van was suppressed. Upon this, Timur Pasha left his brother Fazıl Bey in Van and took shelter in the Castle of Hoşap (Mahmudi), which involved the beys of Müküs in the event.[83]

Upon the suppression of the Timur Pasha's revolt, it was renounced to appoint a kaimakam from the center, so Adil Bey was dismissed. Instead, Ishak Pasha of Hakkari was asked to take upon the mission. The reason for this change also includes some important clues regarding administrative practices in Ottoman Kurdistan. The appointment of a kaimakam from the center was not preferred given the Kurdish and tribal landscape of the region, and so a great number of soldiers were needed to maintain security and order in the region. Otherwise, the unrest in the region would continue. Yet such security

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

precautions were an extra financial burden on the treasury.[84] Therefore, someone with knowledge of the locality was chosen. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, many central and provincial authorities were aware that although the best way of governing Ottoman Kurdistan was direct rule, the issue of security and control were major obstacles to realize it. Therefore, until the source of the power of local beys was transformed, the region would be governed as it had been. Such a transformation became partially possible with the application of Tanzimat reforms in the eastern provinces in the 1840s.

Upon suppressing the revolt, Emin Pasha was granted with arms, robes of honor (*hil'ats*), and with a rank lower than that of *ferik* (major-general) and higher than *miralaylık* (colonel).[85] Most importantly, he was granted with the berat of the sub-province of Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık.[86] The governor of Erzurum, Esad Pasha, reported that the sub-province of Muş had been granted to Emin Pasha during the reign of Salih Pasha, his predecessor, during the war with Russia. By being provided with the berat, Emin Pasha guaranteed his usufruct. As the sub-province had always had the status of yurtluk-ocaklık *(livâ-i mezbûr öteden berû bervech-i yûrtluk-ocâklık tevcîh olunagelmiş)* and as the services of Emin Pasha during the Van revolt were appreciated, he was entitled with the berat of yurtluk-ocaklık. Esad Pasha highlighted two significant peculiarities of the yurtluk-ocaklık land in Muş: First the berat of yurtluk-ocaklık was renewed for each candidate for the mutasarrıflık of Muş, who must be from the dynasty of Muş. Second, the governors of Erzurum carried out the proposition and declaration (*arz ve inha*) of granting Muş as a yurtluk ocaklık.[87] As will be elaborated throughout this chapter, the granting of yurtluk-ocaklık lands was also an object of struggle among family members in particular and a dimension of the negotiation among provincial authorities in general.

84 "... havâlî-i mezkûre ekrâd ve 'aşâir yatağı yerleri olduğundan hâricden kâimakâmla idâresi kâimakâm bulunanların külliyetlû 'asker istishâbına tevkîf ideceğine ve bu sûret masârîf-i külliyeye icâb ideceğinden başka yine sızıldısı kesmeyeceğine ..." Ibid.

85 BOA. HAT. 703/33819, 29 Zilhicce 1247 (30 May 1832).

86 Ibid; BOA. HAT. 659/32173 C, 6 Şaban 1247 (11 December 1831).

87 BOA. HAT. 659/32173 C, 6 Şaban 1247 (11 December 1831).

## § 2.3 Utilization of Frontier Tribes

If the first step for Emin Pasha's promotion was the suppression of Timur Bey's revolt, the second one was his use of the issue of conscription as leverage. Conscription was seen as a significant part of the imposition of order in the region (*silk-i nizâma idhâli*). In this instance, Emin Pasha made two demands: the contracts of mukâtaʿas of Hınıs, Tekman, and Malazgird and immunity from the intervention of neighboring governors. In return, he promised to enlist tribesmen for the Mansure Army. Emin Pasha struggled for immunity from the control of the governors of Erzurum. One of the best examples was his direct request to the commander-in-chief about his wish to take part in the Mansure Army and his demand to be exempt from the intervention of the governors of Erzurum. Although the willingness of the pasha to provide conscripts was appreciated, his demands for immunity from the control of Erzurum's governors were seen as improper.[88]

The issue of military conscription is related to human resources. In the case of the eastern provinces, these resources were mainly drawn from the tribal populations - nomadic and seminomadic groups. Therefore, Emin Pasha's suggestion of enlisting tribesmen into the new army went hand-in-hand with the settlement of the tribes.

### 2.3.1 *The Case of the Tribe of Sıpkî*

The settlement of the Sıpkî tribe corresponded to the aims of Emin Pasha. The sub-provinces of Hınıs, Tekman, and Malazgirt were contracted to Emin Pasha, and in return he offered to carry out the settlement of the Sıpkî and to occupy them with agriculture (*hayme-nişinlikten ferâgat iderek zirâaʿt ve harâset ile meşgûl*). However, Emin Pasha did not immediately perform his promise with the excuse that he could still not sort out the matter financially. The question was whether the expense of new conscripts would be covered by the three mukâtaʿas contracted to him or directly by the central state.[89] This was the financial side of the issue.

88 BOA. HAT. 308/18189, 29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830).

89 BOA. HAT. 309/18264, 29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830).

The other side was about the willingness of the Sıpkî to settle. Some people who knew region argued that it was impossible to settle the Sıpkî without coercion. As will be discussed in chapter 7, during the nineteenth century, especially with the Tanzimat reforms, Ottoman authorities applied a set of strategies to settle tribes across the empire. Yonca Köksal, in her article on settlement practices in Ankara, states that the "geopolitical location" of a tribe was a key factor for determining state-tribe relations, especially whether the state used mediation, coercion, or a mix of both.[90] Therefore, the best way for governmental circles to proceed was to search for "mediators" to settle tribes on the frontiers.

Meanwhile, Emin Pasha was regarded as an appropriate mediator. In one report, he argued that Muş was in the middle of Kurdistan and that the Kurds and tribes of the sub-province would not act without his support or consent. More importantly, the pasha stressed and governmental authorities did not deny that the family of Emin Pasha, the dynasty of Muş, had always been in the service of the empire (*ebâ-'an-cedd devlet-i aliyyenin hizmetinde*). Emin Pasha justified his most important aim from the beginning – joining the Mansure Army by enlisting Kurdish tribesmen - with such a family history. Such a desire underscores that local actors in a frontier region of the empire had appropriated and addressed military reforms - the constitution of a brand-new army - after the abolition of the Janissaries. Emin Pasha even manipulated the Mansure Army to consolidate his power.

Thus, Emin Pasha's aim to settle the Sıpkî tribe was a part of his wish to join the Mansure Army and he was partially successful at the settling the tribe. The Ottoman authorities were persuaded by his partial success and so the alliance between Emin Pasha and the government reached one of its golden moments, at least for a while.[91] As aforementioned, in return for settling the tribes in the region, he obtained the contracts of Hınıs, Tekman, and Malazgird.

Sıpkî was one of the tribes in question and it had long been a matter of debate between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. To understand the contentious

90 Yonca Köksal, "Coercion and Mediation: Centralization and Sedentarization of Tribes in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (May 2006): 472.

91 BOA. C. ML. 269/11018, 13 Zilkade 1246 (25 April 1831).

situation of the tribes between Iran and the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to recall the terms of the first Erzurum Treaty of 1823. As Sabri Ateş puts it:

> Because the *casus belli* for Iran was the Haydaran and Sıpkî migration to the Ottoman side, the treaty's third article - the so-called *Ekrâd maddesi* or "Kurdish article"- was especially contentious. ... It was finally concluded that the populations in question could remain where they were but should be prevented from raiding territory and allowed to return permanently to Iran. If they choose the latter option, Ottoman authorities would refuse them if they tried to return, whereas Iranian authorities would prohibit them from raiding or crossing back over. The fourth article stipulated that in line with previous treaties, neither party would protect fugitives or tribes that crossed the frontier.[92]

However, even after the treaty, debate over those tribes continued, making control and surveillance of crossborder movements difficult. Therefore, one of the dynamics of the bargaining of Emin Pasha was the settlement of the Sıpkî, a tribe on the frontier. In fact, the family of Emin Pasha had played crucial roles in the migration and settlement of tribes on the frontier. For instance, his cousin Selim Pasha, the mutasarrıflık of whom coincided with the 1821-23 Ottoman-Iranian Wars,[93] played a crucial role in the settlement of the Haydaran and Sıpkî.[94] As Sabri Ateş states, Selim Pasha, together with the governor of Erzurum, Celaleddin Pasha, was responsible for the continuing migration of the Haydaran and Sıpkî tribes to Ottoman lands, which resulted in complaints from Iranians.[95] The Sıpkî tribe would be a matter of discussion between Ottoman and Iranian authorities "again" in the early 1830s.[96] The Iranians demanded the return of the tribe who had crossed the border to reside in Ottoman lands. The Ottomans did not approve of the return of the tribe,

92 Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, 56-7.

93 Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, trans. Dündar Günday, 6 vols., vol. 6 (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1983-1984), 2652-3.

94 BOA. HAT. 802/27108, 13 Cemaziyelevvel 1239 (15 January 1824).

95 Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, 50.

96 Ibid., 56-7.

claiming that no matter the reason, the Sıpkî had come to Ottoman lands and did not want to go back; sending them back could only be realized by means of force and violence. Therefore, the Ottoman government asked for this excuse to be accepted. However, Iran objected to this argument. If the Sıpkî remained in Ottoman lands, it would cause rumors among other tribes in Iran. In other words, the authority of Iran over the Kurdish tribes would be shaken, and it could be deprived of the necessary tools to prevent them from going beyond the frontiers.[97] It is clear that for both Ottoman and Iranian authorities, the tribes were sources of manpower, and therefore their mobility had to be controlled.

The project of Ottoman governments concerning the Sıpkî was clear: settling the tribe and, in so doing, securing a source of troops. This plan was even negotiated with Süleyman Agha, the leader of the tribe. After the negotiation, it was decided that the tribe should be protected from the intervention of Iranian authorities, as the importance of the tribe was once again realized during the Van issue (that is, the revolt of Timur Bey). Süleyman Agha proved his loyalty to the Ottoman state (*ibrâz-ı sadakat*) when he collaborated with Emin Pasha to suppress the Van revolt. However, on his return, he allegedly had trouble with Emin Pasha. Then, Süleyman Agha appeared before Esad Pasha and described his situation without complaining about Emin Pasha. After repeating his words of loyalty and his readiness for the service, Süleyman Agha recalled the terms of the previous negotiation, about which Emin Pasha had also informed Esad Pasha. According to these, when the Sıpkî tribe was saved from the intervention of Iran and came to be protected by the Ottoman government, the tribe was to be settled in parts of the Hınıs, Malazgird, and Tekman districts (*kazâ*) that remained within the province of Erzurum and were contracted out to Emin Pasha.[98]

However, relying on his role in the suppression of the Van revolt, Süleyman Agha of the Sıpkî sought to strengthen his hand by renegotiating the terms of their settlement. This was the source of debate between Emin Pasha and Süleyman Agha, as the latter claimed parts of Hınıs and Tekman, which

97 BOA. HAT. 794/36840 G, 28 Zilhicce 1247 (29 May 1832).

98 Ibid.

remained in Erzurum, as well as the mukâta'a of Malazgird, which had already been contracted out to Emin Pasha. If he was awarded the contracts of these mukâta'as, Süleyman Agha promised that after his tribe abandoned their tents and became engaged in agriculture, he would comprise within four to five months a battalion (*tabur*) for the Mansure Army, the salary, uniforms and expenses of which would be covered by the government. For the training of the battalion, he also asked for a mentor from Istanbul, yet officers (zâbitân) would be chosen among the agha's relatives. As a second option, Süleyman Agha offered that his tribe settling in Adilcevaz or Erciş in the sub-province of Van, yet in this case he would form only half a battalion. Consequently, Esad Pasha, not wishing to offend Emin Pasha, who was also instrumental in the suppression of the Van revolt, was of the opinion that other places in Van, Adilcevaz, or Erciş should be allocated to the Sıpkî.[99] By demanding the contracts of the mukâta'as - whether in Erzurum or Van – and by offering to form a salaried battalion from among his tribesmen, Süleyman Agha claimed a place in the web of power relations during the first half of the nineteenth century.

The contracts of the mukâta'as of the parts of Hınıs and Tekman in Erzurum and also Malazgird were awarded to Emin Pasha in exchange for the settlement of the Sıpkî and some other tribes at the end of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1828-1829. However, the settlement of the tribes was thorny due to two main problems. The first problem stemmed from the power relations between the tribes and local pashas, and the second concerned the financial burden of the settlement process. Although Esad Pasha, the governor of Erzurum and commander-in-chief of east, reported that a debate arose between Emin Pasha and Süleyman Agha of the Sıpkî after the suppression of the Van revolt, the relationship between two actors was actually strong. He even argued that because of his close intimacy with Süleyman Agha, Emin Pasha played a central role in the settlement of Sıpkî. Although the settlement of frontier tribes was not a new tendency for the beys of Muş, it is necessary to understand Emin Pasha's specific motivations. For the case of the Sıpkî, through their settlement, Emin Pasha both sought a position in the army through the

99 Ibid.

conscription of tribal members and, as mutasarrıf of Muş, to easily collect taxes from the settled tribe. However, the tribe, as Esad Pasha reported, created trouble. In the previous year, Emin Pasha allowed the tribe to settle in Malazgird as their winter quarters. Upon this, peasants started to send petitions complaining about the burdens and cruelty created by the tribe.[100] Upon hearing about the situation, Emin Pasha claimed that he would carry out what was necessary, punish them and send them back. Yet the pasha never performed such a promise. At this point, initial doubts that the Sıpkî tribe could not be settled without a degree of force were recalled. The Sıpkî was said to be notorious for brigandage, and its current behavior proved that it was difficult to keep them under the control.[101] This also reinforced the idea that the reason of Emin Pasha's claiming of the Sıpkî from Iran was only to strengthen his position.

The second part of the problem was the financial dimension of tribal sedentarization, bringing the issue of Hınıs, Tekman and Malazgirt mukâta'as back to the agenda. Esad Pasha was also confused about covering the expenses of the troop that would be constituted from among the Sıpkî. Would they be met from these mukâta'as, which had been contracted out to Emin Pasha, given that they would be a part of the Mansure Army, would the salaries and expenses of the troop be covered by the center, like in other places in the empire?[102] The confusion of the governor of Erzurum was a sign of an in-betweenness or a transition from the ancien regime to the new order.

In order to solve the problem of the expense of the troop, Esad Pasha summoned the regiment master (*alay beyi*) of Hınıs, Abdülkadir Agha, to get a detailed information about the revenue of the mukâta'as of Hınıs and Tekman. The mukâta'as of Hınıs and Tekman were composed of eight sub-districts -

100 "… 'aşîret-i mezkûre her ne kadar kazâ-i mezkûre olvechile yerleşdirilmiş ise de bunlar bütün bütün kazâ-i mezkûr fukarâsına tahmîl-i bâr iderek envâ'-i ta'addiyâta ibtidâr itmekde olduklarından kazâ-i mezbûr fukarâsı tarafından tazallüm-i hâl siyâkında..." BOA. HAT. 718/34245 D, 29 Zilhicce 1247 (30 May 1832).

101 "... 'aşîret-i mezkûrenin mine'l-kadîm ma'rûf oldukları şekâvet ve el-hâletü hâzihi meşhûd olân etvâr ve hareketlerine nazaren usûl-i nizâm üzere rabtı kabûl itmeleri me'mûl olmadığından ..." ibid.

102 Ibid.

namely, nıfs-ı Hınıs, Göksu, Dağönü, Tekman, and Suşehri in Erzurum and Varto, Henderesi, and Amber were in Muş. Emin Pasha had seized the sub-districts in Muş asserting the title of *pasha of Muş (Mûş pâşâlığı cihetiyle zabt û rabt itmekde olduğuna)*. To put it differently, as Muş had been granted to Emin Pasha as a yurtluk-ocaklık, said sub-districts were automatically under his control. The parts remaining in Erzurum were contracted out to Emin Pasha, who was paying fifty thousand *guruş* (piasters) annually in return.[103] Esad Pasha's choice of words - *zabt û rabt* (seizure) – to define landholding practices in Muş are remarkable, in showing the perception of provincial officials about these hereditary landholdings.

Accordingly, to understand the debate over the Hınıs and Tekman mukâta'as, it would be beneficial to spare a few sentences about their situation at the beginning of the nineteenth century. During the reign of Selim III, in 1804, Hınıs and Tekman were granted to Murad Pasha, the uncle of Emin Pasha, as a yurtluk-ocaklık.[104] After him, the father of Emin Pasha, Yusuf Pasha was granted the sub-province of Muş, and the sub-provinces of Hınıs and Tekman were annexed (*ilhak kılınmış*) to it.[105] The governor of Erzurum also argued that these mukâta'as had been awarded as mâlikâne to the family members of Emin Pasha for twenty to thirty years.[106] In line with this, it can be inferred that although Hınıs and Tekman at first were granted as yurtluk-ocaklıks, in time they were contracted out to members of Muş dynasty as mâlikâne. Furthermore, it can be inferred that with the establishment of the Mansure Army, some portions of these mukâta'as were confiscated by the treasury and spared for the expense of the new army. For instance, the moiety of Abddurahman Pasha and Abdülfettah Bey was confiscated in 1243 (1828) once both passed away.[107] However, after the end of the Ottoman-Russian War (1828-1829) the mukâta'as of Hınıs and Tekman together with Malazgird were granted to Emin Pasha who in return, as stated, would settle the Sıpkî and some other tribes and work for their conscription.

103 BOA. HAT. 718/34245 D, 29 Zilhicce 1247 (30 May 1832).

104 BOA. HAT. 175/7583 E, 29 Zilhicce 1218 (10 April 1804).

105 BOA. C. DH. 133/6650, 29 Ramazan 1223 (18 November 1808).

106 BOA. HAT. 718/34245 D, 29 Zilhicce 1247 (30 May 1832).

107 C .ML. 269/11018, 13 Zilkade 1246 (25 Nisan 1831).

Moreover, the sub-districts of Hınıs and Tekman were administratively divided between Erzurum and Muş and were contracted out to Emin Pasha. To put it differently, as the mutasarrıf of Muş, Emin Pasha had control over the sub-districts of Hınıs and Tekman remaining within the borders of Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık. For those remaining in Erzurum, he was paying fifty thousand guruş annually. However, the question of whether the mukâta'as should be united and the sub-districts in both Erzurum and Muş be confiscated and governed by the Mukâta'at Treasury was still valid.[108] The main argument about the unity of the mukâta'as is that the other three sub-districts in Muş were so extensive and productive as to be worth as fifty thousand guruş. Emin Pasha's annual payment of fifty thousand guruş was just for the sub-districts in Erzurum. Briefly, if the whole mukâta'as of Hınıs and Tekman, with its eight sub-districts, were confiscated and administered by the Mukâta'at Treasury, the gain would be one hundred thousand guruş.[109] This meant that the treasury was losing around fifty percent.

Yet the problem was not only a financial loss. Esad Pasha emphasized that the nomination of an official from the Mukâta'at Treasury and the central administration of the mukâta'as would create problems. It would not be a problem in the sub-districts in Erzurum; they would be well governed. However, if an official were to be appointed to govern the sub-districts remaining in the sub-province of Muş, it would be risky. He emphasized that these sub-districts were not only in Kurdistan but specifically in Muş, where Emin Pasha could provoke the Kurds (referring to Kurdish tribes). This would result in great difficulties for the administration of the mukâta'as.[110] Therefore, the idea of the confiscation and administration of the mukâta'as of Hınıs and Tekman by the Mukâta'at Treasury was renounced, and Emin Pasha continued to hold them.

108 The Mukâta'at Treasury was established in 1826 for the expenses of the new army, and it was then called the Mansure Treasury. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976-77), 42.

109 BOA. HAT. 718/34245 D, 29 Zilhicce 1247 (30 May 1832).

110 "... nevâhi-i mezkûre Kürdistân içinde ve bi'lhusûs Muş dâhil-i hükûmeti olan mahallerle ihtilâtda bulunduğundan nevâhi-i mezkûrenin mukâta'ât tarafından müdir ile zabt ve ta'şîri takdirinde pâşâ-yı mûmâileyh ekrâdı tahrîk iderek idâresine ..." Ibid.

After a while, he was promoted to the rank of *mîr-i mirânlık*.[111] It is important that the governor of Erzurum characterized Muş as a specific, fragile place within Kurdistan, emanating from its being at the frontier and from the strength of local dynasties. It also shows that the debate about administrating Ottoman Kurdistan from the center had already begun in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, yet it was opted not to do so due to geopolitical and socioeconomic circumstances.

In the aftermath of the decision regarding Emin Pasha's administration of the mukâta'as of Hınıs and Tekman, his *haznedar* (treasurer) was questioned about the number of conscripts and their expenses. The haznedar put forward that including the Sıpkî and some other nomadic (*hayme-nişin*) tribes in Muş, the number amounted to four to five thousand. Their settlement would commence in winter, and in summer, new villages would be established in proper places. They would be exempt from taxes for a time during their settlement. After that, they could be compelled to pay taxes; and more importantly, if they attempted to resist, their locations would be known (since they would have abandoned their tents), and they could be easily suppressed.[112] These are more or less similar to the strategies of sedentarization that Ottoman authorities had applied for other nomadic groups all over the empire. For instance, Köksal argues that during the Tanzimat, tax exemption continued to be a strong "incentive" for settlement, as it had been prior to that.[113] It is also remarkable that Emin Pasha's treasurer portrayed a sedentary tribe as one more easily suppressed in case of unrest, showing the dimension of control which was an aim of their settlement. By such arguments, Emin Pasha appealed to the aims of the state that in the end, overlapped with his own. Therefore, the pasha asked that the expenses be covered by the center claiming that he could not afford it. With such arguments, Emin Pasha intended to benefit from the lacunas in the establishment of a modern army. Although the mukâta'as of Hınıs, Tekman and Malazgird had been awarded to him in return for the settlement and

111 BOA. HAT. 727/34640, 29 Zilhicce 1248 (19 May 1833).

112 "… olvakt muhâlefet sûretine düşseler bile çadır altından çıkmış ve yerlu yurdlu bulunmuş olacaklarından icrâ-yı idâre mümkün olunacağına ..." BOA. HAT. 718/34245 D, 29 Zilhicce 1247 (30 May 1832).

113 Köksal, "Coercion and Mediation," 479.

recruitment of the Sıpkî, he tactically tried to dispense with the expenses of military concripts since he was aware of the fact that central treasury was covering the expenses of the new army.

#### 2.3.1.1 The Cases of the Tribes of Cemaldini and Haydaran

In the Ottoman archives, local authorities describe Emin Pasha as the kind of man who could clear himself of any allegations with various tricks. No matter how much he was warned, he took his own way. Esad pasha reported that Emin Pasha was again involved in a tribal issue, which would danger the relations with Iran. Having been offended by Cihangir Mirza, Koro Agha of Cemaldini [Cemaleddin, Cemadanlı] tribe had come to Muş with a hundred and fifty families and Emin Pasha gave shelter to his tribe. Upon this, the prince of Khoy, Cihangir Mirza, sent an envoy (*elçi*) to submit a letter to the governor of Erzurum. Referring to the good, strong relations between the two states, the prince demanded the return of Koro Agha and his tribe accompanied by some men of Esad Pasha. When Emin Pasha was informed of this request, he replied that refraining from causing a trans-border problem he did not let the agha to stay longer in Muş. Thus, Koro Agha went to Köroğlu Plateau in Kars, which was on the border with Russia. Cihangir Mirza was informed that once Koro Agha was summoned from Kars, he would be returned to Iran. However, Esad Pasha believed that Emin Pasha was somehow responsible for this trouble.[114]

Yet, the Cemaldini was not the only tribe over which Emin Pasha had claimed control. Apart from the aforementioned Sıpkî tribe, two thousand families from the Haydaran tribe, which was disputed (*münâzaün-fih*) between two states, had been spending their winters in Muş. However, the issue became more complicated when the Prince of Khoy went to the tent of Kasım

114 BOA. HAT. 721/34364 L, 29 Zilhicce 1248 (19 May 1833), BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiülahir 1249 (6 September 1834). Later, Esad Pasha called Koro Agha to Erzurum with the aim of sending him back to Iran accompanied by a few men. Yet allegedly, Cihangir Mirza sent a letter to Koro Agha threatening that if he had arrived with the men of Esad Pasha, he would have been executed. Although Koro became afraid of going to Iran, Esad Pasha managed to persuade him. BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiülahir 1249 (6 September 1834).

Agha, the leader of the tribe, to persuade the agha to return with him to Iran. Kasım Agha accepted the prince's offer, yet the younger brother of the agha, Sultan Agha stayed in Muş with a thousand families. The other thousand families migrated with Kasım Agha to Iran.[115]

The meeting and bargaining of an Iranian prince with a tribal leader provides significant clues about the function of these tribes for Iran. Lois Beck emphasized that tribes in Iran were "constant," as the states in Iran needed the power of the tribes for "levies, revenues and regional security."[116] Beck's remarks also explain the perception of these tribes in the Ottoman Empire; not only did government authorities regard the tribes as sources of recruitment and taxation, local actors pursued opportunities to secure and reinforce their negotiating positions in power struggles via utilizing the tribes.

In the same vein, Emin Pasha, given his support of the Sıpkî tribe, was accused of pursuing only his own interests from the beginning. This so-called "interest" was concretized when Emin Pasha collected twelve hundred purses of guruş from Sultan Agha of the Haydaran in the name of *kışlakiye* (the tax for winterquarters) in return for the tribe's having spent winters in Muş. As Esad Pasha reported that as it was winter, the tribe could not have the power and opportunity to oppose him and Emin Pasha manipulated this situation.[117]

The tax of *kışlak* or *kışlakiye* was collected from nomads and seminomads during the classical period.[118] As Ahmed Akgündüz emphasizes, the *resm-i kışlak* (the tax for winter quarters) was taken from *re'âyâ* (commoners) who came to a specific land from outside, not from those re'âyâ who were already paying the sheep tax (*resm-i ağnam*), tithe (*a'şâr*) and some other taxes.[119] In addition, consular reports from the nineteenth century described kışlakiye as

115 BOA. HAT. 721/34364 L, 29 Zilhicce 1248 (19 May 1833).

116 Lois Beck, "The Tribes and the State in Nineteeth and Twentieth Century Iran," in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, eds. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press 1990), 202.

117 BOA. HAT. 721/34364 L, 29 Zilhicce 1248 (19 May 1833).

118 Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskânı* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1987), 24.

119 Ahmed Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Fey Vakfı, 1990), 186-7.

an imposition on villagers. For instance, in Hınıs, where the brother of Emin Pasha, Murad Bey, enjoyed power, peasants were paying a kışlakiye, which was depicted as the heaviest tax.[120] To put it differently, tribes had to pay the tax of kışlakiye paid to local authorities in return for sheltering and provisioning of themselves and their livestock during the winters. They were the peasants who performed this duty. However, the problem here is that local authorities, who were generally notables, did not share this tax with peasants, who were the actual providers and so it became a burden on them.

In this case, Emin Pasha later would defend himself by arguing that although it was true that he had taken six hundred purses from the Haydaran, it was a long-standing rule for the mutasarrıfs of Muş to take *sâlyâne* (annual tax) from said tribe (salyane here refers to kışlakiye). In addition, according to his defense, the Haydaran had long been troublesome, so he could not levy taxes on them. Instead the common people (reʿâyâ *and berâyâ*) were obliged to pay taxes. To put it differently, the taxes that could not be collected from the Haydaran had been imposed on local inhabitants of Muş. Emin Pasha clarified himself by arguing that, in this case, he had collected the sâlyâne from Haydaran and thus rescued the poor inhabitants from this obligation. He also added that if he had been informed about the abolishment of the sâlyâne, he would not have taken even a single piaster.[121] It can be inferred that although the tax called kışlakiye had not been abolished, it was not allowed to levy it on frontier tribes like the Haydaran as they were among the disputed tribes between Iran and Ottoman Empire. However, Emin Pasha insisted on being exempt from compensating for the kışlak tax with the excuse that the Haydaran

120 Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 348.

121 "... Hayderânlûdan altı yüz kise alındığı vâkiʿ ise de eslâfımız olân Muş mutasarrıfları dâhi ʿaşîret-i merkûmeden olvechile sâlyâne aldıkları usûl-i sabikadan idüğü ve ʿaşîret-i merkûme sinîn-i vefîreden berû fermânber olmayub kutta-üt-tarîk olduklarından reʿâyâ ve berâyâ kullarının üzerlerine muʿtâd olan sâlyâne ..." BOA. HAT. 722/34418 D, 29 Zilhicce 1249 (9 May 1834). Although at the beginning the amount of kışlakiye taken from Haydaran was specified as 1,200 kese, later documents mentioned an amount of half that. However, the reason of the discount was not specified.

had paid it to him in return for winterquarters and income of certain villages in Muş.[122]

Emin Pasha's interest in the settlement of the Haydaran in Muş became clear with the imposition of a tax on the tribe, yet he got into trouble when Sultan Agha informed his brother Kasım Agha - who had already left for Iran with Cihangir Mirza - about the money issue. Upon Kasım Agha's complaint, Cihangir Mirza sent a letter to Esad Pasha demanding both the repayment of the tax and the return of Sultan Agha to Iran, claiming that the Haydaran were in fact a tribe of Iran and that the eldest brother, Kasım Agha, who was the chief of the tribe, was already there.[123] Upon receiving the correspondence, Esad Pasha wrote a letter to Emin Pasha emphasizing that the situation of the Haydaran was still a dispute between the two states. Once it was decided whether the tribe would stay in Iranian or Ottoman lands, necessary steps would be taken regarding the repayment of the tax. More importantly, Emin Pasha was warned to avoid giving rise to a problem between the two states and to be careful about his deeds. However, according to Esad Pasha, Emin Pasha was not leaving his habit of deceitfulness and ignoring any advice.[124]

Esad Pasha further added that Emin Pasha sent a letter in the name of Sultan Agha with his treasurer along with a notable (*torun*) of the Haydaran to Esad Pasha informing him that Sultan Agha had voluntarily given Emin Pasha six hundred purses, not twelve hundred, in the name of kışlakiye. In return, the pasha provided the tribe with villages to inhabit and, ceremonial robes, and grain. Emphasizing that although Kasım Agha had gone to Iran, the Haydaran were a tribe of the Ottoman state; thus the letter argued, Iran did not have the right to interfere in it.[125] However, it turned out that the situation was more complicated. While Emin Pasha was sending a letter allegedly from Sultan Agha to Esad Pasha, the agha at the same time had a letter delivered by one of his men to Esad Pasha, claiming that he had given that letter to Emin Pasha unwillingly. The agha also informed the envoy of Iran that he

122 Ibid.

123 BOA. HAT. 721/34364 L, 29 Zilhicce 1248 (19 May 1833).

124 "… mu'tâd olduğu hilekârlıkdan bir vechile ferâgat ve bir sûretle kabûl-i nasihat itmeyerek …" Ibid.

125 Ibid.

should not trust the letter, which he had forcefully penned. Furthermore, Sultan Agha stated that if Esad Pasha called him to his presence and supported him, he would say that his was a tribe of the Ottoman state and Iran did not have any right in that regard. And he would want compensation of the money from Emin Pasha. To grasp the details of the situation, Esad Pasha called for Sultan Agha and other influential tribal members.[126]

Two important points are revealed in this case. First, Sultan Agha, by sending letters to both Esad Pasha and the envoy of Iran, did not want to risk his situation in either of the states. He did not dare do this in the presence of Emin Pasha, either. After guaranteeing the support of Esad Pasha, he could ignore the role of Emin Pasha. Second, this story points out how the tribes were not passive objects over which government authorities bargained and implemented their policies. Rather, they had an active, decisive role in the policies of the region. As Sabri Ateş states, their "indigenous agency" should be brought back into history.[127]

The concerns of the governor of Erzurum came out true, the deeds of Emin Pasha resulted in a crisis on the frontier, leading to a furious conversation between local authorities, Esad Pasha, and the Iranian envoy. Emphasizing the unpleasant acts of Emin Pasha in this interstate matter, the Iranian envoy implied that neither the central nor local authorities had the capability to control this subject of the imperial state. Herewith, he offered that the Iranians could deal with Emin Pasha, and take both the money and the tribe from him if Ottoman authorities committed not to become involved.[128] The speech of the envoy clearly pointed out the delicacy of the issue.

Having become irritated by the attitude and tone of the Iranian envoy, Esad Pasha emphasized that the situation of the Haydaran was still uncertain – that is, it had not been decided whether it was a tribe of the Ottoman Empire or of Iran. Thereafter, he warned Emin Pasha again, stating that his disobedience was becoming clearer day by day and so his being brought into line was becoming more and more necessary. Therefore, Esad Pasha ordered Emin

126 Ibid.

127 Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, 6.

128 BOA. HAT. 721/34364 L, 29 Zilhicce 1248 (19 May 1833).

Pasha to send him both Koro Agha of the Cemaldini and Sultan Agha of the Haydaran along with some tribal elders. If he did not obey, the attack of Muş by Iran would be unavoidable.[129] Such an order points out the control and influence of Emin Pasha over the frontier tribes. Despite being the governor of Erzurum, Esad Pasha needed the mediation of Emin Pasha to control nomadic and seminomadic Kurdish tribes. Emin Pasha was manipulating the mobility and uncertain situations of those tribes.

## § 2.4 Conclusion

The beys of Muş, like provincial notables all over the Ottoman Empire, enjoyed tremendous political and economic power especially during the eighteenth century. Large tracts of hereditary lands from which they benefited and the great immunities of yurtluk-ocaklıks - the right over agricultural surplus and to tax nomadic groups - constituted the main contours of their power. Although it was a part of imperial pragmatism and not peculiar to Ottoman Kurdistan, the yurtluk-ocaklık type of land usufruct provided great autonomy to such provincial leaders. Especially the wars with Russia and Iran and the porous nature of the frontier, provided Kurdish notables with the ground to negotiate and consolidate their range of political and economic power.

Nonetheless, both the power of Kurdish notables and the status of yurtluk-ocaklıks changed in the course of time. The Khanate of Bitlis enjoyed its heyday during the sixteenth century due to the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry, but started to falter in the eighteenth century. Therefore, it was no coincidence that Alaaddin Bey of Muş consolidated his power by assuming the deputy-governorship of Muş in the mid-eighteenth century. Despite the scarcity of sources about Alaaddin Bey's lineage pre-eighteenth century, it is possible that they were a local family enjoying either yurtluk-ocaklık lands or mâlikâne-mukatâ'as, yet overshadowed by the khans of Bitlis.

However, starting with the deputy-governorship of Alaaddin Bey, his sons and grandsons held the sub-province of Muş through mutasarrıflık and increased their range of power by extending those lands - taking for instance the

129 Ibid.

mukâta'as of Hınıs, Tekman, and Malazgirt as either mâlikâne or as yurtluk-ocaklıks. Thus, the boundaries of yurtluk-ocaklıks also changed during this time. As will be discussed in chapter 5, neither the boundaries nor the revenues of the villages held by Emin Pasha and his brothers in the second half of the nineteenth century can be accurately known.

Emin Pasha might be the last member of his family to enjoy the political and economic autonomy in a frontier zone of the Ottoman Empire. Although the abolishing of the yurtluk-ocaklık type of land usufruct and the economic and political privileges it entailed were accelerated after the promulgation of Tanzimat reforms, this process was gradual and actually started in the first half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the story of Emin Pasha was important for the assertion of Ottoman state control over these lands on its eastern frontier and the strategies and maneuvers of local notables to keep these lands intact. To achieve this primary aim, Emin Pasha benefited from inter-imperial wars, manipulated the status of frontier tribes, took advantage of local uprisings, took part in the century's military and economic reforms, and when necessary did not hesitate to rise up. The next chapter will introduce the story of Emin Pasha's revolt and his fall in power, albeit temporary.

# 3

## The Revolt of Emin Pasha: Punishment and Cooptation

Spring and summer of 1833 were eventful for Emin Pasha and his brothers. The governor of Erzurum, Esad Pasha, was clear in presenting two options for Emin Pasha: either obey the rules or bear the results of his disobedience. Emin Pasha chose the second when ordered to leave Muş and settle in another place from which he would not be able to get in contact with his homeland. It was no exception for Ottoman central authorities to resettle a local actor in a place far from his sphere of power as a means of control and surveillance. Likewise, it was no exception for provincial notables to pursue alliances and to revolt to negotiate and accomplish their aims. Nevertheless, the rebellion of Emin Pasha is important to contextualize yurtluk-ocaklık holders of Muş in the web of rebel provincial notables.[1]

This chapter will focus on Emin Pasha's rebellion and his search for allies, which even spanned borders. Similarly, Esad Pasha sought coalitions benefiting from the tribal landscape of the region and the rivalry within the family of Muş. Provincial authorities interpreted Emin Pasha's behavior as "trouble," (*gaile*), an "inappropriate attitude" (*harekât- nâmarziye*), and as an action to "conquer" (*zabtetmek*) Muş and they described the pasha as a traitor to

1 For a study of the career of a bandit/rebel, Kara Feyzi, towards being an imperial official and then a recognized a'yân, see Tolga U. Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790-1808" (PhD diss., The University of Chicago, 2009).

religion and the state (*hain-i din û devlet*) Did Emin Pasha really intend to "conquer" Muş or just aim to maintain the rights from which his ancestors had benefited? For a better comprehension of the claims, it would be beneficial to keep in mind the practice of rebellion in the pre-Tanzimat context. Hamit Bozarslan argues, "the Ottoman state tradition conceived of rebellion, or at least resistance as a means of bargaining or negotiation by the subordinate peripheral groups for improving their status within the state."[2] In the similar vein, Karen Barkey argues that if early seventeenth-century Ottoman elites rebelled, "they did so to demand that they be incorporated into the state's privileged structure once again."[3] In line with such arguments, Emin Pasha and later his brothers employed the expression of their being at the servitude of the Sublime Porte for generations (*eba'an ced devlet-i aliyyenin hizmetinde*) while negotiating their interests. It is possible to interpret such a statement as a reminder of their status instead of as breaking with imperial center, even if they were not obeying orders.

Therefore, the objection of Emin Pasha to the decision requiring him to send the tribal elders of the Haydaran and Cemaldini to Esad Pasha, to recompense the money taken from the Haydaran, and to leave Muş as well as his subsequent taking shelter in the Atak emirs of Diyarbekir became a platform of power negotiation and a reminder for their old status. In the following lines, the peculiarities of the coalitions of both sides - the one of Emin Pasha and the one constituted against him- will be introduced first. Then, Emin Pasha

2 Hamit Bozarslan, "Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contrat to Rebellion (1919-1925)," in *Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism* ed. Abbas Vali (Costa Mesa: Mazda 2003), 186. Bozarslan explains this tradition of rebellion, borrowing from Şerif Mardin, in terms of "tacit contract" (zımnî sözleşme) between the sultan and his subjects. The former had to abide by the contract to protect his reign. In the same vein, rebellions by subjects generally were based on the belief that the ruling class was not standing by their promises. For tacit contract, see Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 22 ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 106-20.

3 Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route State Centralization* (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1997), 55-6. Nevertheless, Barkey's approach was also criticized as approaching the Ottoman Empire "as an omnipotent manipulator of the society." Tolga U. Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," *Past & Present* 224, no. 1 (2014): 172.

and his brothers' forgiveness will be elaborated upon the respective appointments of Reşid Mehmed and Hafız pashas to the *müşirlik* (military governorship) of Sivas. The submission of many provincial notables of the Balkans and Anatolia in the 1810-1820s enabled the central government to deploy talented officials to subdue Kurdish beys. In this process, one eminent strategy was to employ notables in the vicinity of the region where operations were initiated. The pardon of Emin Pasha and his brothers can be understood in this context, as well.

The military operations and reforms of both Reşid Mehmed and Hafız pashas also brought a significant transformation to the yurtluk-ocaklık status of Muş. Disclaiming or being compelled to disclaim over the sub-province of Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık, Emin Pasha sought to secure for himself and his relatives twenty-four villages in the most productive parts of the sub-province. Nevertheless, his situation fluctuated and was shaped by the regional developments, as well. Even his participation in the forces sent to fight Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt did not rescue him from his exile in Vidin at the end of the defeat at Nizip. Nevertheless, he managed to return after two years.

## § 3.1 Preparation for the Revolt: In the Pursuit of Allies

While the discipline of Emin Pasha was being discussed, precautions were taken against any turmoil in Muş that could spread to the provinces in its environs, especially to Van - where it could easily turn into a border matter with Iran. The preliminary measure was to determine another mutasarrıf who would be chosen among Emin Pasha's relatives. As discussed in the previous chapter, in spite of awareness of the necessity of appointing an administrator other than local notables, because of the peculiarities of the region (its being on the frontier, land tenure practices, and tribal landscape) the required infrastructure for such an option did not exist. Moreover, a mutasarrıf from the local family with a refined knowledge of the region and influence over the tribes and other notables could also be helpful in constituting a coalition against Emin Pasha.[4]

4 BOA. HAT. 790/ 36808 B, 3 Rebiülahir 1249 (20 August 1833).

For local authorities, who were certainly afraid of new troubles in a frontier region, the only good news was overcoming the "trouble of Arabistan" (the revolt of Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt, which was delayed for a while with the Agreement of Kütahya in 1833). With such an opportunity, Esad Pasha argued that Emin Pasha could no longer get away with it as it was then possible to allocate every means to pacify him. The only option was for him to settle in a place determined by the governor of Erzurum.[5]

However, Emin Pasha had no thought of submitting easily; rather, he applied to a variety of strategies to sustain his position. On one hand, he tried to consolidate his power; on the other, he contacted to local authorities to request their pardon. Hitherto, the pivotal pillar of his power had been the tribes of Muş. Therefore, having arranged a meeting with some tribal leaders in Hınıs, Emin Pasha offered them financial aid and villages in return of their collaboration. His revolt was partially motivated by tribal issues. And due to the geopolitical location of Muş, the pasha could pursue trans-border allies, as well. He crossed the border, came together with Cihangir Mirza, the governor of Khoy, and allegedly said him that he would conquer lands as far as Sivas for rule by Iran in return for their backing.[6] The framework of this meeting was not known definitely, yet he must have secured the support of the prince, as he felt comfortable bargaining with Ottoman authorities. Accordingly, he delivered a letter to Esad Pasha containing two options. He affirmed that he would be at the service of the Sublime Porte upon his pardon and the grant of a robe of honor. Otherwise, he threatened to create trouble in the region with the help of his allies, the tribes and mîrs of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, Emin Pasha allegedly deployed more than five thousand soldiers to Hınıs, where he had already gone.[7]

Provincial authorities were cautious about this coalition, especially about the involvement of Cihangir Mirza. Refraining from causing a trans-border problem, the governor of Erzurum carefully tried to dispel this alliance of Emin Pasha. He believed that only then would his dismiss and discipline be possible. The plan was to secretly contact the tribes of the region to win them

5 Ibid.

6 BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiülahir 1249 (6 September 1833).

7 BOA. HAT. 790/36808 B, 3 Rebiülahir 1249 (20 August 1833).

over. In line with this cautious plan, Esad Pasha did not step back vis-à-vis Emin Pasha's threats. Rather, he set the conditions for his pardon: recompensing the money (kışlakiye) taken from the Haydaran and sending the fugitive Koro Agha (of the Cemaldini) back to Iran. Thus, Esad Pasha challenged Emin Pasha's previous statement that he had not allowed the Koro Agha to remain in Muş. The insistence of local authorities to send back fugitive tribal members was because of their concern of causing interstate trouble. For Emin Pasha, a local actor whose subsistence was based on the extraction of surplus from the people over whom he claimed control and influence, tribes were resource through which he could consolidate both political and economic power. Therefore, it is possible to speculate that the pasha levied taxes on Koro Agha as he had on Sultan Agha of the Haydaran.[8]

Emphasizing that Emin Pasha should give up cruelty and his oppression of the people and acquire good manners, Esad Pasha - as a final condition - warned him to pay the money he had committed to the Armenian *karabaşı* (priest) for the Çanlı (Surp Garabet) Monastery that he had plundered during "the invasion."[9] Despite a lack of information about the "invasion," it is possible he was referring to the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828-9. Afterwards, Emin Pasha promised to pay the loss, which totaled a few thousand purses, in installments. However, as stated above, the pasha had not yet paid any installment.

Instead of fulfilling the demands of Esad Pasha without laying down conditions, he sent only eighty thousand guruş to the Armenian karabaşı. Emin Pasha declared that he would recompense the Haydaran after his pardon and grant of a robe of honor. Apparently, he sought to first guarantee his position. However, such a demand drew suspicion as Emin Pasha, together with his three brothers, were amassing men and preparing for a revolt. Thus, for Esad Pasha, acceptance of Emin Pasha's clauses would just play into his hands. Emin Pasha had already allegedly spread rumors in the region that he would take robes of honor and a promotion from Esad Pasha by force. From the perspective of the governor of Erzurum, if Emin Pasha received what he

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

requested, he would be feeling a more spoiled. Similarly, he would continue to fabricate news that although commander-in-chief was going to discharge him, he did not dare to do it. Furthermore, Esad Pasha's efforts to contact with tribal members from Muş could run aground, if Emin Pasha were forgiven without punishment. At this point, the contest between the two actors should also be emphasized. As governor of Erzurum and general commander of eastern front, Esad Pasha was concerned about any harm to his influence and honor vis-à-vis Emin Pasha's challenge.[10] Needless to say, Esad Pasha was also a local actor guarding his own interests in this play.

In line with this, Esad Pasha emphasized the necessity of the strengthening the bond with tribes with whom they had been in confidential contact for a while. After guaranteeing their support, the sub-province of Muş would be granted to Hüseyin Bey, a cousin of Emin, along with the rank of mîr-i mîran. For the voivodeship of Hınıs, cavalryman Mirza Bey from among the Murad Pashazades was seen as appropriate. Furthermore, propaganda was also carried out among the inhabitants of Muş. Men were recruited from among the districts neighboring Muş; fifteen hundred soldiers were constituted at the command of the beys of Kığı. The brother of Hüseyin Bey, Sadık Bey led the troop that was deployed in Muş, instead of Hınıs where Emin Pasha had already been positioned along with his forces, because it was known that, the ultimate aim of Emin Pasha was Muş.[11] The striking point is the composition of the coalition against Emin Pasha and his allies. All of the people whom Esad Pasha contacted were the members of the Muş dynasty; the Ibrahim Pashazade Hüseyin and the Sadık beys as well as the Murad Pashazade Maksud and the Mirza beys. All were cousins of Emin Pasha looking for opportunities to rise to power.

10 Ibid. Esad Pasha's treatment of Emin Pasha and of his other brothers, as will be discussed in the following chapters, cannot be interpreted merely as a reflection of central state's position. As also emphasized by Özok-Gündoğan, despite being state agents in the locality, provincial governors had their own agendas as they became prominent parts of local power relations. Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," 32.

11 "… mukaddemen mühürmân-i mekâtibe vuku' bulan umerâ-yı 'aşâirle bigâyet hafî olarak mukâvele-i sâbıkaya istihkâm virildikden sonra …" BOA. HAT. 790/36808 B, 3 Rebiülahir 1249 (20 August 1833).

Having constituted a coalition from among Emin Pasha's intrafamilial rivals, Esad Pasha sent one of his men to him calling on him to surrender, yet having understood the situation, Emin Pasha kept and jailed the man. Emin Pasha came to Erzurum with more than five thousand men (whom the governor of Erzurum described as *haşerat*, insects). Murad Bey also approached Erzurum with some tribal members. Allegedly, both brothers were claiming that they would conquer the lands from Erzurum to Sivas. With such claims, as Esad Pasha stated, they sent "mischievous" (*fesadengiz*) letters to the *miralay* (colonel) of the Mansure Army, Salih Bey and some other local notables and aghas.[12] Emin Pasha, thus, tried to gain the support of the Mansure Army in Erzurum by offering financial support to the Miralay.

In their letters, Emin Pasha and Murad Bey suggested that if the Miralay Salih Bey left Erzurum and joined Emin Pasha with the soldiers under his command, they would have given each recruit two hundred guruş and the Miralay himself five thousand guruş.[13] Yet Salih Bey, as Esad Pasha emphasized, did not accept this appealing offer. Appreciating the loyalty of the Miralay who submitted said letters to him, Esad Pasha described the repelling of Murad Bey from Erzurum and the fracture of the alliance of Emin Pasha. After Murad Bey was driven back, he escaped to Pasinler. More importantly, after his defeat the tribal cavalries under his command started to disperse and went piecemeal to Esad Pasha to ask for mercy. Thus, grabbing power in Muş became easier. When the men collected under the command of Kığı's Bey approached Muş, they united with those of Maksud Bey from among the Murad Pashazades to whom a letter was secretly sent in advance. Maksud Bey had also established confidential relations with some tribal people and villagers. They together attacked the residence of the mutasarrıfs of Muş, outside of the city itself where the brother of Emin Pasha, Hurşid Bey, resisted with a few hundred men. In the end, Hurşid Bey could not keep resisting and fled to Hınıs. Having heard of this failure, Emin Pasha, who had been in an alliance with the Kurds of Iran and Diyarbekir wanted to send some armed men to Muş and then run to Hınıs.[14]

12 Ibid.

13 BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiülahir 1249 (6 September 1833).

14 BOA. HAT. 790/36808 B, 3 Rebiülahir 1249 (20 August 1833).

The correspondence and contacts of Esad Pasha with local tribes and notables was effective. The principal actor who broke this coalition was Faris Agha of the Hasenan tribe. As Esad Pasha stated, Faris Agha came out and said to Emin Pasha that if they moved together, became involved in inappropriate acts without the consent of the commander-in-chief, and revolted against the state, then they would be in trouble not only in this life but also in the afterlife. The agha continued by emphasizing that Hüseyin Bey had been granted Muş, and Emin Pasha was warned and was ordered to surrender. Therefore, what was essential for the pasha was to pull himself together and to obey the rules. Otherwise, the results would be dreadful for both the pasha and the people who had allied with him. The other tribal leaders approved this statement by Faris Agha and so, as argued, the alliance of Emin Pasha was peacefully dissolved.[15]

Having lost a huge part of his support, Emin Pasha attentively took the side of Faris Agha and called his brothers to him - Şerif Bey from Bitlis and Murad Bey from Pasinler. Upon his brothers' arrival, the pasha emerged from Hınıs and spent a night in the house of Faris Agha near Muş. Afterwards, with his three brothers and a hundred of his subjects, he escaped to the houses of Telli Bey, Hüseyin Bey, and Melik Bey in the districts of Lice, Hazro, and Hiyan which were in Diyarbekir and, as described, long known for their "insurrectionism and banditry."[16] Following the escape of Emin Pasha, his men who had been left behind in Erzurum were easily driven back. Yet Emin Pasha continued to be trouble for local authorities.

From the beginning, it is necessary to spare a few words for the composition of Emin Pasha's coalition. Mostly referred to as the notables of Diyarbekir, the beys of the Zirki, Hüseyin, Telli, Receb, and Behram Beys as well as Mirza Agha were influential figures in Emin Pasha's revolt.[17] It was no coincidence Emin Pasha escaped to Diyarbekir; when he killed Abdurrahman Pasha he had run there, too. As stated often in the Ottoman archival documents, the

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 C, 5 Cemaziyelevvel 1249 (20 September 1833). For the beys of Zirki, Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks."

misconduct of these aghas had remained unpunished for twenty to thirty years.[18] Furthermore, provincial authorities described the notables of Diyarbekir as the "equivalents" of Emin Pasha, as they all collaborated with the dream of "conquering Muş."[19] Confirming these suspicions, Emin Pasha and Şerif Bey at first harbored at the places of their reliable friends and then they started to enhance their network of alliance.

## § 3.2 Between Negotiation and Contest

Having sheltered in Atak, Emin Pasha searched for new channels to guarantee his pardon. In order to succeed, he tried to bypass regional governors, writing directly to the Ottoman center. His tone shows that he was capable of using minute details to legitimize himself. Having stated that he had received the letter ordering him to leave Muş when he was still there, Emin Pasha emphasized that upon receiving this order he disbanded the armed men around him and left for Atak. As the place to which he was required to go was not specified in the order, he came there other than any other place as he had deep-rooted relations with the Atak beys. In other words, Emin Pasha tried to justify his departure for Atak as if he were obeying the order to leave Muş. Furthermore, according to the pasha, even if he had accepted the offer of Esad Pasha and inhabited a place in Diyarbekir, Keban, or Malatya, the pasha was angry with him, and it would not have changed the results. Esad Pasha would have again wanted to exile him further, which would have led not only to his own misery but also to that of his brothers. Emin Pasha also added that to allow him to remain in Atak, Hüseyin Bey, the bey of Atak, had paid a huge amount of money. Having emphasized that the money had been donated for their pardon, not for their exile, Emin Pasha demanded the return of the money.[20] Furious with Emin Pasha because he still used signature "mutasarrıf of Muş"

18 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 D, 5 Cemaziyelvel 1249 (20 September 1833), BOA. HAT. 450/22351 E, 5 Cemaziyelevvel 1249 (20 September 1833).

19 "... Muş mutasarrıf-ı sâbık Emin paşa dinilan hayinin mu'âdili olan Diyârbekir ekrâdı ..." BOA. HAT. 446/22291, 9 Cemaziyelahir 1249 (24 October 1833).

20 BOA. HAT. 790/36808 K, 15Rebiülahir 1249 (1 September 1833).

despite having been dismissed, Esad Pasha reminded him his existing debts regarding kışlakiye and compensation for the Çanlı Monastery.[21]

Although Emin Pasha was forced to leave Muş, provincial authorities always emphasized that as long as he stayed in Atak, Muş and its environs would not recover from trouble and conflict, as he was still in contact with the region. This turned out to be true. Correspondence between Emin Pasha and his brothers, which was caught and sent to the new mutasarrıf of Muş, Hüseyin Pasha, pointed out that the brothers were trying to ally with the beys of Diyarbekir in various ways. Furthermore, the brothers were sending letters to tribal people to secure their assistance once they took power again in Muş with the help of the beys of Atak. These letters were rare historical documents including significant clues about not only the family members' seeking for alliances but also their perception of their power. For instance, Şerif Bey in a letter dated July 1833 informed various Kurdish aghas about their preparations for an attack and the components of their coalition. He further stated that he was in the fortress of Boşat (to the north of contemporary Silvan, Diyarbekir), in the house of Mirza Agha of Silvan, and that Emin Pasha was in Atak, in the house of Hüseyin Bey. Emphasizing the tribal components in their front, Şerif Bey tried to convince other tribes to join their alliance. He stated that all these tribes were sending countless men with the aim of returning their government (hükûmet) to the way it used to be. It is significant that Şerif Bey used the term hükûmet to refer to their land. As discussed in chapter 2, hükûmets were more autonomous compared to yurtluk-ocaklıks. The members of the family used hükûmet and yurtluk-ocaklık interchangeably, saw no categorical difference between these two types land tenure, or intentionally used "hükûmet" to emphasize their autonomy. Şerif Bey was describing Muş as their hükûmet to make the tribal leaders believe in their power.

The details of the letter of Şerif Bey are important in depicting the scope of the revolt and the nature of local relations. Apart from the above-mentioned Kurdish tribes, the beys of Atak, Hiyan, and Kırçıl, the voyvoda of Diyarbekir, the aghas of Silvan, and the *emin* (superintendent) of Ma'den-i Hümâyûn were

21 BOA. HAT. 790/36808 J, 3 Rebiülahir 1249 (20 August 1833).

in alliance with them.[22] Şerif Bey sent the same letters to Resul, İsmail, Şakir and Bozu aghas, too, claiming that from Diyarbekir to Ma'den-i Hümâyûn they had extensive support.[23] Technically the tone of the letters fabulously overemphasized their power with the aim of persuasion; for instance, in a letter to a certain Hamza Agha he claimed support from Diyarbekir to Musul and from the tribes of Muş and Bitlis; the Rojki, Hasenan, and Cibran tribes were also among their allies.[24]

Although his brother was spreading news around Ottoman Kurdistan that they were preparing for widespread revolt from Diyarbekir to Muş, Emin Pasha, at the same time, was sending letters, asking for mercy with reference to his service to the Ottoman state and to how he was ready to compensate for his mistakes. He emphasized that he took shelter in the house of the bey of Atak because of the attacks on him and difficulties he was going through.[25] However, his demand of mercy does not mean that he was willing to break up the alliance that he had circumspectly constituted, given the fact that both he and his brothers continued to write letters. Rather, he must keep on consolidating his alliances in order to reinforce his hand in bargaining with both central and local authorities.

In line with this aim, Murad Bey, another brother of Emin Pasha, tried to get in touch with Rıdvan Agha, expecting to exchange news. Rıdvan Agha was the nephew of the aforementioned Faris Agha of the Hasenan who would break their coalition. In fact, Murad Bey had not heard anything from the agha for a while, as he expressed his reproach with the words that if someone was out of sight, he was also out of mind.[26] Yet, Rıdvan Agha did not send the expected response to the brothers in Atak. After a while, Emin Pasha himself wrote a letter addressed to Rıdvan Agha including many requests. First, he asked why Hüseyin Pasha, the new mutasarrıf of Muş, had met with the leader of the Cibran. Second, he asked to be informed about the tinniest matters

22 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 H, 13 Rebiülevvel 1249 (31 July 1833).

23 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 I, 19 Rebiülevvel 1249 (6 August 1833).

24 BOA. HAT.450/22351 J, 19 Rebiülevvel 1249 (6 August 1833).

25 BOA. HAT. 790/36808 O, 27 Rebiülevvel 1249 (14 August 1833).

26 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 U, 1 Rebiülahir 1249 (18 August 1833).

concerning Muş, Hüseyin Pasha and other tribesmen like Süleyman Agha of the Sıpkî or the Haydaran, as well as anything about Bitlis.[27] By firing off questions, Emin Pasha intended to ascertain the strength of his coalition. However, these efforts to get news from Rıdvan Agha were in vain, as it would turn out that Rıdvan Agha would take part in the league against Emin Pasha.

Unable to get the support of the Hasenan, Emin Pasha sought other mediators. Ishak Pasha – who was both the governor of Diyarbekir and the emin of Ma'den-i Hümâyûn - sent a letter to Esad Pasha requesting Emin Pasha's pardon and his reappointment to Muş. However, Esad Pasha insisted that Emin Pasha to settle in Keban-Maden-i Hümâyûn, Diyarbekir, or Malatya. Later, he could also be nominated to a post if he behaved properly and did not get involved in any trouble.[28] Having failing to get the consent of Esad Pasha, Ishak Pasha wrote the same demands directly to Istanbul. Yet he was replied to in the same way.[29] In addition, Ishak Pasha was ordered to surrender Emin Pasha as he was being sheltered in territory under his governance.[30] If Emin Pasha remained in Atak and created trouble in Muş, Ishak Pasha would also be held responsible.[31]

Emin Pasha also reached out to Timur Pasha of Van. He sent letters to Timur Pasha through the leader of the Sıpkî. However, Timur Bey submitted the letters to Esad Pasha, which the latter regarded as a sign of loyalty.[32] In these letters, Emin Pasha tried to persuade Timur Pasha with the promise of the return of his brother, Fazıl Bey, who was being kept in Erzurum due to his participation in the Van revolt.[33] As discussed before, Emin Pasha had played a key role in the suppression of Timur Pasha's revolt and refrained from helping him. Thus, Timur Pasha, probably, used this matter to transform into a chance for himself like did Emin Pasha.

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27 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 T, 2 Rebiülevvel 1249 (19 August 1833).

28 BOA. HAT. 790/36808 B, 3 Rebiülahir 1249 (20 August 1833). Ishak Pasha was from Çötelizades, a local family of Harput. For details, see Sipahi, "At Arm's Length."

29 BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiüahir 1249 (6 September 1833).

30 Ibid.

31 BOA. HAT. 790/ 36808 B, 3 Rebiülahir 1249 (20 August 1833).

32 BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiüahir 1249 (6 September 1833).

33 Ibid.

While Emin Pasha was ceaselessly trying to enhance his strength ask for mercy, efforts to expel him from Atak yielded no results. He did not agree to dwell elsewhere in Malatya, Keban, or Diyarbekir. Moreover, the beys of Atak emphasized that their doors were open and that they could not send anyone away who was in need of help. Therefore, they also requested the pardon of Emin Pasha and his brothers. However, provincial authorities interpreted such appeals as tactics to gain time and to gather strength.[34]

These kinds of doubts turned out to be right; it was reported that Emin Pasha had gathered around eight to ten thousand men. The basis of this information was the caught letters. Upon this, the new mutasarrıf of Muş took precautions, and in the end, two sides confronted each other in a place called Bükilân. In this confrontation, which was a death blow to Emin Pasha's defeat, Sultan Agha of the Haydaran and Faris, Rıdvan and Kulihan aghas of the Hasenan supported the new mutasarrıf Hüseyin Pasha. The Cibran and the Zirki Beys took side of Emin Pasha.[35] It can be inferred from such a polarization that Sultan Agha probably took sides against Emin Pasha due to the kışlak tax which Emin Pasha had previously taken from him. Besides, the Hasenan was one of the tribes with whom the new mutasarrıf of Muş, Hüseyin Pasha, had been in secret contact. Although the terms of their negotiation are not definitely known, Hüseyin Pasha persuaded them.

After the defeat, the beys of Atak and Hani, which comprised a significant part of Emin Pasha's coalition, wrote to the governor of Diyarbekir claiming that they had no intent to launch an assault on Muş yet they were trapped by its new mutasarrıf. As proof, they first emphasized that they went to Bükilan with just a few hundred cavalrymen, as if they were peacefully going to a feast. Second, they emphasized that they went for peace and fellowship and that they wanted to carry out trade, but their money was plundered during the clash. Third, they claimed that Bükilan was within Diyarbekir. In other documents, both of Esad and Hüseyin Pashas, Bükilan was said to have be a village of Muş.

34 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 A, 25 Rebiülahir 1249 (11 September 1833).

35 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 D, 5 Cemaziyelevvel 1249 (20 September 1833); BOA. HAT. 450/22351 B, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1249 (2 October 1833); BOA. HAT. 450/22351, 25 Cemaziyelevvel 1249 (10 October 1833).

With such claim, the beys of Atak meant that they did not have any purpose of attacking Muş, as they had met in a village of Diyarbekir.[36]

In archival documents, it was interpreted that despite his defeat, Emin was traitor and deceiver, and would use any opportunity to launch an assault on Muş. In the same way, the beys of Atak were long known for their disobedience to the governors of Diyarbekir. Therefore, as a precaution, the emin of Maden, Ishak Pasha, the muhafız of Kars, Ahmed Pasha, and the mutasarrıfs of Muş and Bayezid, Hüseyin and Behlül Pashas were employed to be prepared in the case of any assault of Emin Pasha and his alliances.[37] However, with a decree of *Meclis-i Şûra* (Assembly of Consultancy) it was stressed that unless Emin Pasha and the beys of Atak attacked, no operation should be carried out against them. Otherwise, it would lead to new expenses that the treasury could not afford at the time. Furthermore, as winter in Erzurum was harsh, it was impossible to deal with new problems.[38]

### 3.2.1 *The Tribes and the Pashas*

It is impossible to separate the revolt of Emin Pasha from the tribal networks in which he engaged and the possible benefits that he hoped to acquire from this network. It is necessary to recall that at the core of Emin Pasha's revolt was his reluctance to recompense what he had taken from Sultan Agha of the Haydaran in the name of kışlakiye. Furthermore, Esad Pasha commanded him to return Koro Agha of the Cemaldini back to Iran. Emin Pasha had no intention to lose his financial and military power, which was based on tribal networks. As stated before, the tribes causing problems between the Iranian and Ottoman Empires were the nomadic tribes of the Haydaran, Sıpkî, Zilân, and Cemaldini who were mobile throughout the Ottoman-Iranian borderland. As Sabri Ateş argues, the mobility of those tribes was restricted in time due to a transformation of a borderland into a border.[39] In the Treaty of Erzurum of

36 BOA. HAT. 450/22351 G, 1 Cemaziyelevvel 1249 (16 September 1833).

37 BOA. HAT. 450/22351, 25 Cemaziyelevvel 1249 (10 October 1833); BOA. HAT. 446/22291, 9 Cemaziyelahir 1249 (24 October 1833).

38 BOA. HAT. 446/22291, 9 Cemaziyelahir 1249 (24 October 1833).

39 Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, 122.

1823 although it was stated, that "neither party would protect fugitives or tribes that crossed the frontier,"[40] but the mobility of tribes was not totally prohibited. Besides, in archival documents the nomadic Haydaran and Sıpkî tribes were described as "*münâziün fih* (contentious)" tribes between the Iranian and Ottoman Empires.

Indeed, Emin Pasha managed to gain the support of some of these tribal leaders in his revolt, including Süleyman Agha of the Sıpkî, a large nomadic tribe of the northeastern borderland. Yet not all borderland nomads supported him. Hüseyin Agha of the Zilan and Kasım and Sultan aghas of the Haydaran did not become part of his coalition; rather, they opposed the pasha's regional power. Therefore, the "issue of Muş" and the matter of Iran were discussed together in the Meclis-i Şûra, which provided many significant details about the revolt of Emin Pasha.

To start with the coalition of Emin Pasha, the Sıpkî - as a borderland tribe - was a crucial part of it. Süleyman Agha of the Sıpkî participated together with Emin Pasha in the suppression of Timur Pasha's previous revolt. Although his efforts were appreciated, peasants in their winterquarters were complaining about the tribe's assaults. Despite the need by the local authorities to interrogate him, it could not be carried out as the Muş revolt began. Fear of interrogation might be the reason Süleyman Agha joined the coalition of Emin Pasha. Similarly, Mirza Rıza, the Iranian envoy, allegedly frightened Süleyman Agha by implying that Esad Pasha would scourge him. Therefore, he advised him to join Emin Pasha, and after helping, he could return to the Iranian side and also get financial support. Having been persuaded by the offers of Mirza Rıza, Süleyman Agha took permission from Esad Pasha to leave Erzurum on the pretext that he would welcome the new mutasarrıf of Muş, Hüseyin Pasha. Yet he went directly to Emin Pasha. Furthermore, with the aim of mustering for Emin Pasha, Süleyman Agha spread news that the dismissing of Emin Pasha was only a means of bringing Kurdistan under control. Süleyman Agha was also said to have become the spokesperson of Emin Pasha

40 Ibid., 57.

during his meeting with Cihangir Mirza.[41] This point also exemplifies the trans-border agency of tribes, indicating that how they could be mediators between authorities of two different states.

As a vital component of the coalition against Emin Pasha, the Haydaran was motivated by the kışlak tax, which Emin Pasha had taken from Sultan Agha who had remained in Muş though his elder brother, Kasım Agha had crossed into Iran. Sultan Agha informed his brother about the tax which turned into an interstate affair and became a significant factor in Emin Pasha's revolt. Having declared in the presence of the Iranian *müdir* (administrator) Ağa Hasan and the envoy Mirza Rıza that the Haydaran were a tribe of Ottoman Empire, Sultan Agha took part in the league against Emin Pasha.[42] Moreover, his brother, Kasım Agha, having become angry with Cihangir Mirza, would fall on the Ottoman side during the contest with Emin Pasha. As all energy was spent on confronting Emin Pasha and his coalition, no time remained to deal with Kasım Agha. Furthermore, the agha would also participate in the suppression of the revolt.[43]

In addition to the crossing of the Haydaran brothers to the Ottoman side, the recompense of the kışlakiye was still a matter of debate. Iranian officials Ağa Hasan, and Mirza Rıza, argued that if Sultan Agha remained in the Ottoman territory, the tax would be taken from Emin Pasha and be shared between the Iranian and Ottoman states, or else given to the tribe in full. Yet if Sultan Agha returned to Iran, they would demand all the money from the Ottoman state.[44] After the defeat of Emin Pasha's forces in Bükilân, the matter of the Haydaran was still unsolved. Esad Pasha, upon the warnings and petitions of

41 "... Erzurumda olan İrân müdiri ağâ Hasan ile sefîr-i İrân Mirzâ Rıza merkûm Süleymân ağâya Erzurum vâlisi sana şöyle böyle idecektir hemân Emin Pâşâ tarafına firâr ile icrâ-yı mu'âvenetden sonra İrâna gider isen sana şu kadar bu kadar akçe i'tâ olunur diyerek iğfâl ..." BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiülahir 1249 (6 September 1833).

42 "... akçe mâddesini İrânda olan karındâşıma yâzmış isem de maksadım şikâyet değildir ve 'aşîretimle İrâna gitmeyeceğimi 'alem bilûr ve mevsim-i bahâr gelmeksizin Emin pâşânın şerrinden işbu akçenin iddi'âsına teşebbüs idemedim şimdi Erzuruma gelmiş olduğumdan vâli ma'rifetiyle iddi'â iderim ..." Ibid.

43 BOA. HAT. 461/22617 B, 25 Zilkade 1249 (5 April 1834).

44 BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiüahir 1249 (6 September 1833).

the Iranians, called Kasım Agha to discuss the issue, yet he did not show up. As the final straw, the Ottoman state apparently would be responsible with the compensation of the kışlakiye as Emin Pasha was reluctant to redress the amount.

As tribes were regarded as a source of manpower during uprisings, their importance became more apparent for central and local authorities as for the rebels themselves. The Zilân, who "live at the intersection of Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Iran,"[45] were among the coalition opposing Emin Pasha. After his defeat in Bükilân, the governor of Erzurum asked that the tribe not to be returned to the Iranian state. He argued that Hüseyin Agha of the Zilan was of great use. Despite the claims of Iran to the tribe, Esad Pasha was of the opinion that once the tribe was out of Iranian hands, it would be to the benefit of the state if they remained in Ottoman lands. Upon Hüseyin Agha's alleged statement that if his tribe were not protected by the Ottoman state, they would migrate to Russian territory, not to that of Iran, Esad Pasha argued that the Iranians would also consent.[46] However, as latter correspondence demonstrates, Iranian authorities complained, blaming Esad Pasha of infringing the act (*hilâf-ı ahd*) between the two states. Therefore, Esad Pasha called for Hüseyin Agha together with Koro Agha.[47] In the end, although the tribes were not allowed to remain permanently (*kabul ve sahabet*), they could spend winters in Kars with the consent of the Iranian müdir.[48]

As Muş was located in a tribal landscape, the account of Emin Pasha was part of Ottoman-Iranian border making during the 1830s. This account displays how local notables made use of lacunas in the web of the power relations. Emin Pasha's role in the settlement of tribes was pivotal, using it as a way of bargaining for promotion. Besides, as these tribes were frontier tribes, Emin Pasha's role stretched beyond the border, involving not only central and local authorities of both the Iranian and Ottoman states, but also tribal leaders. At the same time, the preparation of a map of the Ottoman-Iranain border was at issue; there was demand for both states to send engineers for that mission.

45 Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*.

46 BOA. HAT. 446/22291, 9 Cemaziyelahir 1249 (24 October 1833).

47 BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiülahir 1249 (6 September 1833).

48 BOA. HAT. 461/22617 B, 25 Zilkade 1249 (5 April 1834).

Esad Pasha complained that the border issue had not ben resolved in three years, blaming Iranian officials. Each state accused officials of the other. On one hand, Esad Pasha was threatened by Mirza Rıza and Ağa Hasan because of the non-payment of the kışlakiye and non-return of said tribes. They threatened that if these steps were not taken, Cihangir Mirza would come with a huge number of soldiers. In addition, they emphasized that since being in his post in Erzurum, Esad Pasha behaved contrary to the orders of the two states (*hilâf-ı rıza-i devleteyn*). They argued that the Ottoman state had already acknowledged that said tribes were those of Iran.[49]

On the other hand, Esad Pasha complained about the müdir of Iran, Ağa Hasan, who had held that title in Erzurum for more than twenty years. He accumulated wealth by acquiring lands and çiftliks. Moreover, he had had a grasp of each detail of the region. He also protected the vagrant, shameless (*derbeder ve bî edeb*) people who had fled Iran and become involved in theft and drunkenness. When those vagrants needed to be disciplined, Ağa Hasan prevented the governor from doing it, claiming he would do it himself. According to Esad Pasha, due to his long stay in Erzurum, the agha had learned to use each opportunity to create disturbances from Erzurum to Muş and from Bayezid to Kars. Therefore, Esad Pasha emphasized that with such officials there was no way to resolve frontier matters.[50] Thus, the trouble in which Emin Pasha was involved was part of a broader picture in which local actors such as provincial governors and interstate agents were playing roles.

## § 3.3 The Contours of Negotiation

As stated above, Emin Pasha and the beys of Atak were to be left untouched unless they attacked Muş. This was necessary not only because of financial reasons but also because of climatic difficulties.[51] Therefore, in the last months of 1833 and the early months of 1834, Emin Pasha had the opportunity to search for channels for his pardon.

49 BOA. HAT. 789/36774, 20 Rebiülahir 1249 (6 September 1833).

50 Ibid.

51 BOA. HAT. 446/22291, 9 Cemaziyelahir 1249 (24 October 1833), BOA. HAT. 461/22617 B, 25 Zilkade 1249 (5 April 1834).

As time passed, Emin Pasha, was away from his house, changed the scope of bargaining. In a letter addressed to Ishak Pasha, the governor of Diyarbekir, Emin Pasha asked that his debt to the Haydaran tribe, which was six hundred purses be written off. As an explanation, he argued that when he was nominated to Van with the mission to suppress the uprising of Timur Bey, he had spent the money for his expenses and for other debts. Moreover, he added that if he was granted with and allowed to return to Muş, he could donate to the treasury a thousand purses, to which he was ready to commit by sending his moneylender. The pasha argued that after the suppression of their revolt, not only he but also his brothers Şerif, Hurşid, and Murad Beys had to leave their houses. Their properties, belongings, grains, and cultivated lands had been captured; their families were left behind in misery upon the orders of Esad Pasha, the governor of Erzurum.[52] If he were allowed to inhabit one of his villages in Muş, he could work for the settlement of the Kurds, bringing them under control and levying taxes on them. If he and his brothers were allowed to return, they would not become involved in the affairs of Muş; they would live in their houses not become involved in anything. Moreover, Emin Pasha asked for a guarantee against any kind assault or intervention on the part of Esad Pasha."[53]

Ishak Pasha thus arbitrated for Emin Pasha's requests. He was of the opinion not to object to the request of Emin Pasha regarding his debt to the Haydaran tribe. However, Ishak Pasha did not affirm his request of being granted Muş again. As there had been a conflict between Esad and Emin Pashas and as it had resulted in the latter's revolt, the re-nomination of Emin Pasha to Muş would lead to the diminishing of Esad Pasha's influence. Meanwhile, Ishak Pasha saw no harm in Emin Pasha's settlement in a village three or four hours from Diyarbekir.[54] Moreover, Esad Pasha absolutely opposed to Emin's reappointment to Muş, as it would challenge his influence. Although he agreed to Emin Pasha's staying in the environs of Diyarbekir, Esad Pasha was strongly

52 BOA. HAT. 625/30883, 3 Şaban 1249 (16 December 1833).

53 "... hırkamızı başımıza çekub hânemizde ikâmet üzere ..." BOA. HAT. 722/34418 A, 27 Cemaziyelahir 1249 (11 November 1833).

54 BOA. HAT. 625/30883, 3 Şaban 1249 (16 December 1833).

of the opinion that Emin Pasha and the beys of Atak be brought into line. He argued that after their defeat and due to their habit of banditry and disobedience, they were seeking revenge. If they attacked Muş again and caused another conflict, it would result in disorder and chaos in the region.[55]

Esad Pasha's doubts turned out to be right with some recent developments regarding Emin Pasha and his brothers. Having been honored with the patronage of Ishak Pasha, Emin Pasha was allowed to stay in a village near Diyarbekir. Although he was required to inhabit the determined place with "honor and civility," Emin Pasha had allegedly sent his brothers to Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt three months before and asked his help. Esad Pasha condemned this rapprochement, yet, added that how they were treated by İbrahim Pasha was not properly known. However, upon their return to Atak, Emin Pasha this time sent his brothers to Reşid Pasha, the governor of Sivas. Allegedly, Reşid Pasha gave robes of honor to his brothers and promised to grant Muş to Emin Pasha.[56] As Esad Pasha reported, this promise resulted in an increase of provocations and riots in Muş because of the deeds of some tribes. He further argued that Mehmed Halil of the Cibran tribe, a supporter (*hevâ-dâr*) of Emin Pasha with a thousand cavalry and infantry "insects," was spreading fabricated news that Muş had been given to Emin Pasha who would be back soon. With such claims, it was reported that some tribal members of the Cibran went to the district of Varto and occupied a few villages, leading to disorder. Upon this, Hüseyin Pasha, the new mutasarrıf of Muş, sent his brother Sadık Bey to defend it and upon his request, Esad Pasha sent help. Moreover, as a precaution, letters were sent to some notables requesting their help. Having described the situation, Esad Pasha argued that, Emin Pasha was a traitor to religion and the state (*hain-i din û devlet*), and he was not among the men of honor and decent, so there was no way for him to behave properly. He would cause these kinds of provocations in Muş from time to time, which would result in harm to and the misery of the people. Moreover, Esad Pasha was of the belief that Emin was preparing a revolt for the end of spring as even news of his brothers'

55 BOA. HAT.461/22617 B, 25 Zilkade 1249 (5 April 1834).

56 Ibid.

going to Sivas and contacting with Reşid Pasha had led his supporters to create trouble.[57]

## § 3.4 The Reappointment of Emin Pasha

Emin Pasha's reappointment to Muş as mütesellim coincided with a time when the sub-province was temporarily granted to the governor of Sivas, Reşid Mehmed Pasha, in 1834. To put it differently, Emin Pasha was in Muş again thanks to his negotiations with Reşid Pasha. As discussed before, Emin Pasha's contact with Reşid Pasha dated back to the period when he was sheltered in Atak and in which he had sent his brothers to him. Allegedly, Reşid Pasha promised that Emin Pasha would be granted Muş.[58]

Remarkably, the reappointment of Emin Pasha to Muş also corresponds to a period in which pacification of Kurdish beys was on the agenda of the central administration. Reşid Pasha, with the aims of settling nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, recruiting their men into the army, and providing "security and order" in Diyarbekir and Ma'den-i Hümâyûn, engaged in several military expeditions. As known, this was part of the centralization policies of Mahmud II. Martin van Bruinessen argued that Sultan Mahmud was determined to bring about centralization and became successful after the 1806-1812 Ottoman-Russian War. He further emphasizes that by 1826, the *derebeyis* (used for rebels and autonomous provincial notables) of Anatolia had been subordinated, allowing the "pacification of the Kurdistan" to begin.[59]

The governor of Sivas and the emin of Ma'den-i Hümâyûn, Reşid Pasha, was charged with this mission. In his letter to the central administration, Esad Pasha explained the reasons why the sub-province of Muş was given to Reşid Pasha. Accordingly, it was emphasized that the tribes were not organized in a few groups; rather, they were dispersed in every part of the region. Therefore, not bringing all of them under control at once would result in corruption of

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Martin Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992), 176.

the order again. Then, as the tribes of Diyarbekir and Muş had mixed, and nomads utilized both as their winter and summer quarters, it was proper that both regions be placed under the responsibility of a single person to accomplish the mission.[60]

Esad Pasha, despite his former oppositions to Emin Pasha and his attempts to keep him from Muş, stated that the important issue was to finalize Kurdish issue with facility. Therefore, despite his former wrongdoings, he emphasized that Emin Pasha would carry out whatever he was ordered.[61] Therefore, in 1834-5 Emin Pasha served in the army under the command of Reşid Pasha and then of Hafız Pasha for the discipline and punishment of the Garzan Kurds. For a while, earlier disputes about the deeds of Emin Pasha were ignored, and he joined in military operations with three hundred cavalrymen from Muş.[62]

Meanwhile, reportedly, the beys of Diyarbekir - for instance Timur Bey - were spreading news about the operations of Reşid Pasha, claiming that the purpose of the operations was to conscript all men to the Mansure Army and so no one would be left behind. Therefore, the Kurds from Hani to Yezidhan united, and a state of turmoil came to pass. German field marshal Helmuth von Moltke, who accompanied the army of Hafız Pasha, narrated that Kurds were mainly resisting conscription. He described the desertion of the villages and running away of their inhabitants.[63] Muş was in the middle of such a region and full of tribesmen. It was at that point that Emin Pasha was reemployed. As he knew the region thoroughly, he was ordered to do what was necessary.[64] However, as Moltke notes, the reliability of Emin Pasha was also questionable. It was possible that the unrest in Garzan would spread to Muş, and Emin Pasha may not serve the imperial army.[65] Therefore, the pardon of Emin Pasha stemmed from operations against Kurdish notables and tribes in

60 BOA. HAT. 1315/51270 Ç, 21 Cemaziyelahir 1250 (25 October 1834).

61 Ibid.

62 BOA. HAT. 447/22311 A, 10 Şaban 1251 (1 November 1835). However, Reşid Pasha noted that as those places were steep and hilly (*sarb ve sengistan*), it was not possible to fully succeed. Ibid.

63 Helmuth Von Moltke, *Moltke'nin Türkiye Mektupları*, trans. Hayrullah Örs (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969), 190-92.

64 BOA. HAT. 449/22346 F, 27 Şevval 1250 (26 February 1835).

65 Von Moltke, *Moltke'nin Türkiye*, 194.

Garzan and from securing his support in case of an uprising in Muş, as well. Yet Muş, as home for the tribes, was just the next place for such kind of reforms and operations.

The usefulness of Emin Pasha was also observed in his provision of men for the army. As reported he, along with his brothers Şerif and Murad Beys constituted five thousand cavalrymen, having recruited them from among their families and relatives and from tribes over which they had influence. This was appreciated. The amount of cavalrymen provided by the family was also important to show the continuing influence of the family in the region regardless of their conflicts with provincial governors.

Meanwhile, Emin Pasha also took the opportunities to expand the range of his economic power. The matter was again the mukâta'a of Hınıs, of which Esad Pasha was making use as governor of Erzurum. Nonetheless, Emin Pasha challenged the usufruct of Esad Pasha by arguing that Hınıs used to be contracted out to them - to the mutasarrıfs of Muş (*öteden berû uhdelerine ihâle*). Emphasizing that Hınıs should be granted to the mutasarrıfs of Muş as it used to be, he argued that if tribes in Hınıs were separated from those in Muş, turmoil would be inevitable on both sides given that two regions were very close. Besides, the people who were required to be punished in Muş could pass over to Hınıs, and their discipline would fail. In addition, soldiers under their responsibility could escape to Hınıs and not be recalled. Such a situation endangered the constitution of the necessary cavalry.[66] The efforts and arguments of Emin Pasha worked. After an investigation, it was understood that Emin Pasha was right that Hınıs had always been held by the mutasarrıfs of Muş. Although Esad Pasha would be offended by such a decision, it was an obligation to perform the affairs of the state, and thereby Reşid Pasha asked for being awarded Hınıs, as he was the new mutasarrıf of Muş.[67]

Meanwhile, having been offended from the reappointment of Emin Pasha to Muş, Esad Pasha claimed that his power diminished and affairs in the east (*havâlî-i şarkiye mesâlihi*) were interrupted. However, the real reason for his discontent was the appointment of Emin Pasha as the mütesellim of Muş.

66 BOA. HAT. 377/204876, 29 Şevval 1250 (28 February 1835).

67 Ibid.

Moreover, it came out that due to previous conflicts between them, Emin Pasha was ignoring Esad Pasha; in other words, he did not act in compliance with administrative hierarchy. However, Esad Pasha emphasized that, as commander-in-chief of the eastern front, he had to maintain his power. Therefore his consent should be taken in every issue and in this line, Emin Pasha should be warned.[68]

Reşid Pasha seemed to be of the same opinion, yet he had his own reasons to stay on the side of Emin Pasha. He stated that it was obvious that unless those regions were freed of the partisanship of the tribes and Kurds, reforms could not be fulfilled. Moreover, unless people like Emin and Hüseyin Pashas were eliminated from Muş and an official from outside was charged with the responsibility, the sub-province would not be brought under control. However, the inhabitants of Muş wanted Emin Pasha, and as they were carrying out beneficial reforms (*maslahat-ı hayriyye*) began, a great numbers of irregular cavalrymen (*başıbozuk süvâri*) were necessary. Moreover, there were useful and plentiful cavalries in Muş, a result of its tribal landscape. Therefore, the reappointment of Emin Pasha was a necessity rather than a preference.[69] As will be discussed later, when the proper time came, Emin Pasha would be eliminated, which was clear in the words of Reşid Pasha.

Nevertheless, as Reşid Pasha reported, the "trouble" created by Kurds and tribes could not be resolved in a few months or even in a year. In operations in the environs of Diyarbekir, the help of Emin Pasha was crucial. Most of the correspondence mentions that for two or three hundred years, Diyarbekir could not be properly controlled and that notables of the region had become accustomed to doing whatever they wanted without any surveillance. Therefore, the issue could not be handled with the execution of a few or the summoning of some others to Istanbul. It was claimed, for instance, that the removal of the beys of Zırkî, the former allies of Emin Pasha, had not ended the

68 BOA. HAT. 450/22347 D, 3 Rebiülahir 1251 (29 July 1835).

69 "... bu ekrâd ve 'aşâir gürûhi tarafgirliğinden kurtarılmakdıkça mesâlih-i mülkiyye lâyıkıyle usûlüne girmeyeceği derkâr olduğu misillû bu Muş sancâğı dâhi Emin Pâşâ ve Hüseyin Pâşâ takımlarından bütün bütün tasfiye ve tathîr olunub ahere ya'nî yabâncı me'mûre verilmedikçe matlûb vechile taht-ı zabtiyeye girmeyeceği emri aşikârdır ..." Ibid.

trouble; rather, there were plenty of similar "insects" (*haşerats)*. In line with this belief of central and local authorities, a series of operations in Ottoman East[70] - from Garzan to Revanduz – took place in the second half of 1830s, first under the command of Reşid Pasha and then of Hafız Pasha. And Emin Pasha was among the other Kurdish notables who fought against the Kurds of Garzan with irregular troops in 1835.[71]

## § 3.5 Muş in the Course of Centralization Efforts: The First Phase of the Abolition of Yurtluk-Ocaklıks

Emin Pasha not only took part in operations against the Kurds in Diyarbekir but was also involved in military reforms of the era. The new reforms brought together administrative transformations that affected Muş and thus the power of Emin Pasha and his family. As an extension of the military reforms of the era of Mahmud II, a *redif* (reserve) army was decided to be established in 1834. Emin Pasha, as the mütesellim of Muş, prepared a report detailing the potential of Muş for the constitution of the Redif. It was a policy affected all the empire. As stated by Erik J. Zürcher, ten to twelve battalions of the Redif were established per province. The recruits were between twenty-three and thirty-two years of age and trained twice a year. They joined the regular army during times of war. Moreover, the main task of the Redif in the early nineteenth century was to maintain order in the countryside.[72]

Although recruitment was regarded as beneficial, collecting *iane* (supplementary taxes collected during extraordinary times) in Muş, as in many other

70 The term "Ottoman East" was formulated by Cora et al. to refer to a geography, "roughly south of the Black Sea Cost, north of the Levant and east of the centre of the Antolian plateau, extending to the Ottoman borderline with Russia and Iran." Yaşar Tolga Cora, Dzovaniar Derderian, and Ali Sipahi, "Introduction: Ottoman Historiography's Black Hole," in *The Ottoman East in the Nineteenth Century: Societies, Identities and Politics*, eds. Yaşar Tolga Cora, Dzovaniar Derderian, and Ali Sipahi (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), 1. When the term used in this dissertation, it used in accordance with this definition.

71 BOA. HAT. 451/22359, 1 Cemaziyelahir 1251 (24 September 1835).

72 Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Ottoman Conscription System, 1844-1914," *International Review of Social History*, no. 43 (1998): 438.

places, was also necessary. Musa Çadırcı argues that beyond a budget for the expenses of the Redif (*Redif Mansure Hazinesi*) that covered costs like salaries and clothes, expenses during training, like food and other necessities, were collected from the people of the sub-provinces where the training of recruits was being carried out.[73]

The issue of funding the Redif organization resulted in many administrative reforms in Muş concerning both its tribes and landholding practices. First, a population census needed to be carried out, and second, besides those tribes, the status of which was still contested with the Iranian state, other tribes of Muş should be settled.[74] However, both those matters could only be tackled in the long term. More importantly, the following quotation from a report of Reşid Mehmed Pasha is important for the elaboration of land tenure system of Muş:

> Both Muş and some other places in its environs have been contracted out as yurtluk-ocaklık since time immemorial to some groups called local dynasties. Their allies and relatives seized some villages and places, treated them as their private property, and devoured their revenues and appropriations as they wanted. The central treasury did not benefit one piaster from those places until then. [Moreover] allying with them or employing them through decorations and promotions are not possible due to their characters, so they cannot yet serve a purpose. It is not the proper time to take back the places that they have been treating as their own properties and govern them otherwise. It is a requirement for state affairs to expel some of them and to remove the ones who deserve it, [yet] instead of an outsider, if need be, the available ones can be used as they are already local. Briefly, the sub-province of Muş has also been governed with the mentioned ancient system. Some have argued that if its revenues are collected properly, the annual income for the treasury would be four thousand purses. Based on my

73 Musa Çadırcı, "Anadolu'da Redif Askeri Teşkilatının Kuruluşu," *DTCF Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* VII-XII, no. 14-23 (1975): 69-70.

74 BOA. HAT. 329/19070, 18 Cemaziyelahir 1251 (11 October 1835).

> investigation, I can ensure that the central treasury would benefit from an amount of two thousand kese. I do not have any information about the revenues of the sub-province except for the *cizye* (poll tax). Nevertheless, it is apparent that the revenues can be collected properly if the necessary steps are taken thanks to His Majesty.[75]

The words of Reşid Mehmed Pasha are the best depiction of the loss to the treasury from the yurtluk-ocaklık type of land ownership. He was also dissatisfied with the freehold status of such types of lands in practice. However, as will be thoroughly discussed in the following chapters, the abolishment of yurtluk-ocaklıks in Erzurum would only be carried out some ten years after this discussion. More dramatically, unlike the potential revenue from the sub-province of Muş, Reşid Pasha argues that if the iane were to be collected from Muş for the expenses of the Redif organization, at best a hundred and fifty guruş would be collected, and this would be a burden on the shoulders of the poor. This point turned out to be true to a great extent. Çadırcı argues that mütesellims and military officers started demanding double and threefold taxes in the name of the redif, benefiting from the situation as much as possible.[76] Therefore, Reşid Pasha suggested first recruiting the redifs. He believed that in the course of time, those recruits would be helpful in the control of those revenues by the imperial treasury. Afterwards, their expenses could be covered from the revenues of those places, and the issue of iane could also be settled.[77]

However, when new regulations regarding the functioning of the Redif organization were determined in September 1834, it entailed transformations to the administrative situation of Muş. According to the new decision, the sub-provinces in which the redif were already established would be unified in appropriate administrative units, which were in turn called "*müşirlik*" (military governorship). One of the müşirliks was that of Erzurum, which consisted of

75 BOA. HAT. 533/26254 A, 15 Ramazan 1251 (4 January 1836). See Appendix A, Quotation 2 for the original Turkish.

76 Çadırcı, "Anadolu'da Redif " 70.

77 BOA. HAT. 533/26254 A, 15 Ramazan 1251 (4 January 1836).

Bayezid, Van, and Erzurum. And Esad Pasha became the müşir.[78] Therefore, after a while, despite the objections of Reşid Pasha who claimed that Muş should remain under his control as reforms had not yet been fulfilled there, the sub-province of Muş was granted to Esad Pasha.[79] The reason for this change of post was the fact that the revenue from Muş was allocated directly to the Mansure Treasury.[80] Similarly, Çadırcı argues that many sub-provinces around the empire were allocated to the Mansure Treasury in 1832.[81]

After being granted Muş, Esad Pasha emphasized that the revenue of the sub-province, the annual amount of which would hopefully be high, would be transferred to the treasury of the Mansure Army. Another issue was the matter of the mütesellimlik of Muş. Having no intention to lose power, Emin Pasha bargained with Esad Pasha, to whom he had already sent his brother Murad Bey as signs of respect and regret for his previous, unpleasant acts.[82] Then Esad Pasha called for Emin Pasha to obtain information about the revenues (temettuat) of Muş and to determine its annual revenue. At this meeting, Emin Pasha expressed sorrow for his previous acts, emphasizing that he would put his heart and soul into state affairs.[83] Furthermore, because of the significant tribal population of Muş (*aşiret yatağı*), he wanted to recruit redifs, yet as the winter was severe he could not begin. Finally, with the promise of submitting a record book about the revenues of Muş and about the constitution of the three squads (*bölük*) of redif from Muş, Emin Pasha remained as mütesellim of the sub-province.[84] Except from tithe and some other ancient taxes, Emin

78 Çadırcı, "Anadolu'da Redif " 70-71.

79 BOA. HAT. 637/31417, 24 Cemaziyelahir 1252 (6 October 1836).

80 BOA. HAT. 314/18497 D, 19 Ramazan 1252 (28 December 1836).

81 Çadırcı, "II Mahmut Döneminde," 288.

82 BOA. HAT. 314/18497 D, 19 Ramazan 1252 (28 December 1836).

83 However, a few years later Emin Pasha brought a bribery case against Esad Pasha and told a different story. Emin Pasha accused Esad Pasha of taking forcefully nineteen hundred purses akçe from him in a year. Two pashas were interrogated in Dâr-ı Şûrâ-yı Bâb-ı Âli (Consultative Assembly of Sublime Porte). BOA. HAT 1242/4891, 29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839).

84 "... livâ-i mezkûr 'aşaîr ve kabail yâtâğı yerler olduğu münâsebetiyle livâ-i mezkûrde dâhi birâz redif 'asker-i mansure tahrîr itmek gibi hidmetlere ezhâr-ı hevâhiş eylemiş ..." BOA. HAT.

Pasha was allowed to keep the kışlak tax as well as some other taxes as the mütesellim of Muş. However, Emin Pasha and his family were still held responsible for the collection and tax farming of tithe and other taxes. In return for them, Murad Bey ensured that they would pay six hundred purses to the imperial treasury and two hundred purses to governor-generals of Erzurum himself yearly starting from March 1252 (March 1837). Morover, voivodeship of Malazgirt and Hınıs was contracted out Murad Bey.[85]

As a part of powerful local dynasty and as a provincial notable, Emin Pasha could guarantee his position as mütesellim even if the sub-province of Muş was being administered by the governor Erzurum. Esad Pasha had no choice but to collaborate with a local power holder to get information about the revenues of Muş, to manage the settlement of tribes, and to make them part of the regular army. Alliances were changing in the course of the time, bringing former rivals together. In this new coalition between Emin and Esad Pashas, the müşir of Sivas, Reşid Pasha was excluded. Having been asked about the mütesellimlik of Emin Pasha, Reşid Pasha stated in a report that Emin Pasha's being mütesellim was neither desirable and nor essential (*matlûb ve mültezem*), therefore it did not matter if he remained in his post or not. He further added that everyone knew that his mütesellimlik was a necessity (*hasbe'l-îcâb*) and it was simple as this.[86]

Nevertheless, the letter of Reşid Pasha is important as it depicts the situation of Muş in the 1830s. Order had not been yet restored in Muş, where taxes could not be collected properly. In line with this, the settlement of tribes like the Haydaran and Sıpkî that had been a matter of debate between the Ottoman and Iranian states, and of the Cibran had not been resolved. The escape of settled tribes could not be prevented. Furthermore, there was trouble in the vicinity of Muş, too. For instance, problems related to the beys of Van and the

314/18497 E, 19 Ramazan 1252 (28 December 1836), BOA. HAT. 314/18497, 29 Zilhicce 1252 (6 April 1837).

85 BOA. HAT. 1242/48291 E 29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839).

86 BOA. HAT. 637/31417 A, 29 Zilhicce 1252 (6 April 1837). This document is probably misdated, as Reşid Pasha passed away in Diyarbekir in October-November 1836. Mehmet Süreyya Bey, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, 6 vols., vol. 5 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), 1381.

issue of Garzan, which had not been handled because of the revolt in Revanduz, were still significant. Therefore, once said problems were straightened out, it would not matter who governed Muş.[87] However, all of these problems would be taken over by his successor, Hafız Pasha.

After the decease of Reşid Pasha, Hafız Pasha replaced him as the müşir of Sivas. At the time, Esad Pasha was also dismissed from the governorship of Erzurum.[88] During Hafız Pasha's mission in Sivas, Muş was again annexed to Sivas. He was charged with continuing reforms where his predecessor had left off. With the new müşir, the position of Emin Pasha was also about to change. Hafız Pasha in a report stated that compared with Emin Pasha, Hüseyin Pasha, his cousin, was more loyal. The latter promised to reveal the revenues of Muş, which was said to be four to five thousand purses. In addition, Hüseyin Pasha had also intended to help Hafız Pasha with four or five thousand soldiers in his aim to restore order from Garzan to Muş. Hafız Pasha, thus, suggested sending Emin Pasha away to Istanbul and that necessary steps should be taken to prevent any kind of trouble in the region. Here again a rivalry arose between two members of the Muş dynasty over power in the region. However, Hafız Pasha warned Osman Pasha, the new governor of Erzurum, not to disclose the idea of replacing of Emin Pasha with Hüseyin Pasha until he started to carry it out. As a part of his plan, Hafız Pasha called Emin Pasha to Istanbul.[89]

At this point, Emin Pasha sought to guarantee twenty-four villages in Muş for himself and his brothers. As previously emphasized by both members of the family and provincial authorities, the sub-province of Muş, including about four hundred villages, had been under the control of the mutasarrıfs of Muş as yurtluk-ocaklıks. Furthermore, the family of Emin Pasha had been the mutasarrıfs for generations (*eba'an ced*). However, with the operations against local Kurdish families, the sub-province of Muş was first granted to Reşid Pasha and then with the reason of the redif organization to the müşir of Erzurum, Esad Pasha, and lastly to Hafız Pasha, who replaced Reşid Pasha. Having lost full sovereignty in Muş, and being aware of the future of the yurtluk-

87 Ibid.

88 BOA. HAT. 1322/51635 B, 1 Şaban 1253 (31 October 1837).

89 "... kimesneye ifşâ olunmamak üzere mektûm tutulmuş olub ..." BOA. HAT. 1248/48350 C, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1254 (17 August 1838).

ocaklık system, Emin Pasha appealed to secure his twenty-four villages in Muş for him or his three brothers. The debate on the yurtluk-ocaklık status of Muş, as well as many other places in Ottoman Kurdistan, had already started before 1839, namely before the Tanzimat reforms. Indeed, Esad Pasha, in a different context, argued that when the sub-province of Muş was granted to him, the confiscation of the yurtluk-ocaklıks of Muş and of Bitlis khanate had been decided.[90] Therefore, it is possible to argue that the confiscation of yurtluk-ocaklık lands was gradual. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the yurtluk-ocaklık lands of Emin Pasha and his brothers were totally confiscated in 1849.

Nevertheless, as yurtluk-ocaklık status of Muş became oscillating for the sake of the Mansure Treasury, it seems that Emin Pasha wanted to guarantee the grant of at least twenty-four villages as yurtluk-ocaklıks to his family and relatives.[91] In order to realize this aim, Emin Pasha left his brother as his deputy and launched forth to Istanbul to talk to Hafız Pasha.[92] Having argued that Emin Pasha should be moderately rewarded (*ne pek aşûri iltifât ve ne de derûn taltifât*), Hafız Pasha was of the opinion that the request of Emin Pasha be satisfied. Although Hafız Pasha did not favor Emin Pasha, claiming such men were notorious for being liars, he accepted the fact that Emin Pasha could serve up significant numbers of soldiers to carry out the reforms for which Hafız Pasha was responsible.[93] In the end, the villages were granted to Emin Pasha and some members of his family as yurtluk-ocaklıks.[94] In spite of not being the mutasarrıf of Muş, which was allegedly constituted of four hundred villages, Emin Pasha held onto the twenty-four villages as yurtluk-ocaklıks with the title of mütesellim of Muş. The boundaries and revenues of the

90 BOA. HAT. 1242/48291 E 29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839).

91 Hafız Pasha emphasizes how Muş was an extensive sub-province consisting of four hundred villages, yet it remained under the exclusive control of its mutasarrıfs as yurtluk ocaklık. His choice of the term "seizure" for such a type of land tenure is also important. "... Muş sancâğı dört yüz kadar kurâya müştemil bir cesim sancâk olarak şimdiye kadar sâye-i zılliyyet-vâye-i hazret-i tâcdârîde yûrtluk ve ocâklık vechile Muş mutasarrıfı bulunanlar taraflarından zabt ve idâre altına gelmiş ..." BOA. HAT. 634/31307 A, 3 Cemaziyelahir 1254 (24 August 1838).

92 BOA. HAT. 634/313307 C, 27 Cemaziyelahir 1254 (17 September 1838).

93 BOA. HAT. 634/31307B, 29 Cemaziyelahir 1254 (19 September 1838).

94 BOA. HAT. 381/20579, 29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839).

villages would be a matter of discussion in the following years when the yurtluk-ocaklık lands were finally confiscated after 1845. The nephews of Emin Pasha would keep bringing the revenue of those villages onto the agenda even in the 1870s.

This decision brought an end to the control of the emirs of Muş over the whole sub-province of Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık. The difference between yurtluk-ocaklık sancâks (sub-province) and yurtluk-ocaklık villages is clarified with this example. Despite the loss of the sub-province of Muş, Emin Pasha and his brothers kept certain villages as yurtluk-ocaklık lands. Emin Pasha and Şerif Bey kept the mütesellimlik of Muş and Bitlis respectively. Murad Bey held the voivodeship of Hınıs and Malazgirt, as well.[95] In addition, as will be elaborated in chapter 4, those who were tax farming the villages of Muş and Bitlis were relatives and men of the family. The kethüda of Emin Pasha, İbrahim Efendi, would become the target of the Tanzimat state because of his misdeeds while purchasing tax farm contracts of the villages of the sub-province, like over taxing. Briefly, the case of Muş clarifies the difference between the yurtluk-ocaklık status of a sub-province and of certain plots of land.

On the other hand, the power of the family was only curtailed when they were totally uprooted from the region towards the middle of the century. This also sheds light on the gradual transformation of yurtluk-ocaklık lands. In fact, the status of the sub-province Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık had been fluctuating since the sixteenth century, yet the family of Alaaddin Pasha managed to assert control during the first half of the eighteenth century. The struggle of Emin Pasha was to keep the sub-province of Muş intact as a yurtluk-ocaklık through holding its mutasarrıflık, which his ancestors had enjoyed. Thus, he strived to hold the mutasarrıflık of Muş for the entirety of his career.

### 3.5.1 *The exile of Emin Pasha to Vidin*

According to a report of the Dâr-ı Şûrâ-yı Bâb-ı Âli (Consultative Assembly of the Sublime Porte), because of the attitudes and characters of both Emin and Hüseyin Pashas, it was decreed to take them out of Muş. In other words, Emin Pasha's turn came. However, at that point, the governor of Sivas, Hafız

95 BOA. HAT. 1242/48291 E, 29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 Mart 1839).

Pasha requested the same as what his predecessor Reşid Pasha had demanded: to employ Emin Pasha with a great number of soldiers under his command. Although Emin Pasha's "criminal past" was not "as clean as" desired,[96] Hafız Pasha demanded Emin's stay and also granted him the twenty-four villages for which he had asked before.[97] However, as known, Hafız Pasha was actually not very keen about Emin Pasha, and when the time came, he was the one who demanded the pasha be tried. Concisely, Hafız Pasha aimed to bypass Emin Pasha after having benefited from his influence, just as his predecessor Reşid Pasha had done.

However, the involvement of Hafız Pasha only delayed the process a few months. Two important events that took place in 1838 and 1839 were the most probable reasons for the postponing of Emin Pasha's dismiss. The first was the revolt of Han Mahmud of Müküs in 1838,[98] and the second was the "issue of Egypt," namely the troubles the Ottoman Empire suffered because of the powerful, and charming governor of the Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha, and most importantly the defeat in Nizip in 1839.

Han Mahmud benefited from being in strategically significant and as well as delicate place on the frontier with Iran. Having taken control of the castle of Hoşap, Han Mahmud was governing Müküs, Westan (Gevaş). Not only Mir Bedirhan of Cizre and Nurullah Bey of Hakkari but also the beys of Muş were discontent and suspicious about Han Mahmud's rise to power (which would result in fail of his revolt). Therefore, it was Emin Pasha who was called to the Sublime Porte to present information about the range of the power of Han Mahmud.[99] This collaboration would result in the surrender of Han Mahmud and his exile in Istanbul (this would be his first exile - as will be elaborated

96 "... pâşâ-yı mûmâileyhüma her ne kadar te'mîn ve iltifât olunsalar bunların öteden berû mücerreb olan mizâçlarına göre işe yarar adamlar olmadıkları derkâr ..." BOA. HAT. 1248/48350 A, 29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839), BOA. HAT. 1248/48350 B, 29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839).

97 BOA. HAT. 381/20579 A, 29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839).

98 In the same year, İsmail Pasha of İmadiye (Bahdinan) in the south also revolted. See Sinan Hakan, *Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde Kürtler ve Kürt direnişleri (1817-1867)* (Istanbul: Doz 2007), 88.

99 Ibid., 100.

upon in the next chapter, the power of Han Mahmud would be eradicated to a great extent in 1847).

Nevertheless, the developments regarding Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt altered the situation. The first phase of Mehmet Ali Pasha's revolt (1831-33) resulted with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in Konya and the Kütahya Agreement in 1833.[100] Mahmud II, in order to overcome the effects of the previous defeat and to reclaim Syria relied on military reforms and prepared an army to enter Syria. This army was not only constituted of Asakir-i Mansure, but also of Kurdish and Turkish tribesmen. As Consul Brant stated, Emin Pasha together with his brother Şerif Bey and 2,500 cavalrymen comprised of the Kurdish tribes who joined the army. Moreover, his other brother, Murad Bey also joined with 600 cavalrymen from Hınıs, and 300 more cavalrymen were about to join.[101] Yet the army of Egypt under the commandership of Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmet Ali Pasha, once again defeated Ottoman troops in June 1839 in Nizip.[102] The battle with Mehmet Ali Pasha once again required the collaboration with Kurdish beys. This not only delayed the removal of Emin Pasha from Muş, but also led to the return of Han Mahmud to the region.[103]

However, these developments delayed the exile of Emin Pasha only up to the end of the battle of Nizip. At the end of war, Emin Pasha and his brothers were arrested and accused of "treachery."[104] Hafız Pasha demanded the prosecution of Emin Pasha and his brothers, Miralay Murad Bey and Kaimakam Şerif Bey, who had been under his command during the battle. Upon being accused of certain crimes by Hafız Pasha, their trials were handed over to *Dâr-ı Şûra-yı Askeri* (Deliberative Council of the Army) and were handled in the framework of the code of *Divan-ı Harb* (Military Court). Yet Emin Pasha managed to defend himself against the accusations, and so, they could not be punished with the related provisions of criminal law. Nevertheless, it was not

100 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2, 33-4.

101 FO. 78/366, No: 9, Brant to Palmerston, Erzurum, May 13, 1839

102 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2, 50.

103 Hakan, *Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde Kürtler*, 115.

104 FO. 78/366, No: 20, Brant to Palmerston, Erzurum, July 20, 1839,

deemed appropriate to send them back to their hometowns, so due to their "inappropriate behaviors" (*harekât-ı nâmarziye*) they were settled in a different place, Vidin, for a while. Furthermore, their families were allowed to go with them, and for this duration, their properties and goods in their hometowns and some other places were not to be attacked or intruded.[105] Thus, Emin Pasha and his brothers, having been deprived of their medals and swords, were sent to Vidin directly from Birecik together with their twenty-two subjects.[106] As they could not afford it, the expense of the journey from Istanbul to Vidin which was eleven thousand and four hundred forty five guruş, was covered by the treasury.[107]

After a year of stay in Vidin, Emin Pasha wrote a petition explaining how he and his brothers were in misery and poverty and demanded to live in Istanbul. However, although his misery and poverty had been noted, his coming to Istanbul was not deemed appropriate, though he might be transferred to Edirne.[108]

#### 3.5.1.1 Struggle for the Power to the Bitter End

Around two years after his demand that his place of exile be changed, Emin Pasha submitted a report both explaining his situation and coming up with new suggestions. In this report, Emin Pasha explained how he together with his three brothers had performed in the imperial army with two thousand regular and irregular soldiers. He sacrificed life and property for the service of the state – almost fifteen hundred soldiers were killed and his property was

105 BOA. HAT. 1648/15, 29 Zilhicce 1278 (27 June 1862). This document is misdated as the event occured in late 1839.

106 BOA. C. AS. 469/19549, 29 Ramazan 1255 (6 December 1839). Meanwhile, some people from Muş were talking about the exile of Emin Pasha in the coffeehouses of Istanbul. Apparently, certain Musa Agha from Muş and Kadri from Erzincan were blaiming Hafız Pasha for the exile of Emin Pasha. Cengiz Kırlı, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde "Havadis Jurnalleri" (1840-1844)* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), 123.

107 BOA. HAT. 1623/33, 10 Şevval 1255 (17December 1839), BOA. C. DH.279/13922, 15 Zilkade 1255 (20 January 1840), BOA. İ. DH. 7/298, 5 Zilhicce 1255 (9 February 1840), BOA. C. ZB. 27/1344, 29 Zilhicce 1255 (4 March 1840).

108 BOA. İ. DH. 27/1305, 18 Şevval 1256 (13 December 1840).

destroyed during the battle of Nizip against the forces of Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt. Despite this, they were exiled in Vidin. Finally, after two years and despite the earlier decision regarding their resettlement in Edirne, they were forgiven and allowed to come to Istanbul.[109]

Emin Pasha's report includes not only crucial details about the gradual transformation of the yurtluk-ocaklık lands in Muş, but also about the accommodation of a local actor to this transformation. The pasha starts with the statements recalling his dynasty's status in the Ottoman administrative practice: the sub-province of Muş, consisting of around four hundred villages, had been granted to the family of Emin Pasha since generations (*bâ berât-ı âlişân ebâ-'an-cedd fâmilyamıza rahmen 'inâyet ve ihsân)*. However, in time, twenty-four of said villages were separated out and granted to the pasha, his family, and their subjects as a salary, while the revenues of the others, no matter how much they were, were allocated to the Mansure Army. Besides, Emin Pasha had been asked about the revenues of Muş and recruitment. However, at the same time he was appointed to the army and during the confusion, the remaining villages were granted to forty-fifty people, some local and some from outside. To put it differently, they had been determined to be granted to cavalrymen as fiefs (*ya'ni süvâri-i 'askeriye tevcîh gibi).* However, Emin Pasha argued, as these cavalrymen were generally living in Istanbul, they were keeping said revenues undeservedly.[110]

After having explained the situation, Emin Pasha emphasized that the revenues of the twenty-four villages granted to him together with those of said fiefs, the other villages given to cavalrymen, was enough to constitute a regiment. Furthermore, if the fiefs in Kars and Bayezid were ascertained and united with those of Muş, if these were contracted out to Emin Pasha and his brothers, and if they were honored with the appropriate ranks and if there was no intervention by the governors of neighboring provinces, a battalion of cavalrymen could be constituted from Van, Bayezid, Hınıs, and Malazgirt. Day by day, it would grow. In other words, Emin Pasha was meticulously reclaiming for the yurtluk-ocaklık lands of his family which had been confiscated. By

109 BOA. İ. DH. 51/2557, 29 Zilhicce 1257 (11 February 1842).

110 Ibid.

claiming that the real revenues of Van and Bayezid had not been properly determined, Emin Pasha was asking to be made responsible for determining the value and revenue of those districts. In this way, the re'âyâ of the region, who had been in poverty until that time, could be brought together and the revenue of the region would no longer be concealed. Moreover, the inhabitants of those regions could be saved from poverty and suffering, and security could also be maintained.[111]

Another point in Emin Pasha's report was about the conditions of the frontier tribes. He argued that a few thousand common people from Muş and its environs had crossed the frontier and become the subjects of Iran. Moreover, Kurdish tribes had also dispersed, and the security of the region was damaged. However, they wanted to come back to their hometowns (*vatan-ı asliye*) and hoped to get fields, properties, vineyards, and orchards. To put it differently, Emin Pasha implied that he had influence over Kurdish tribes and common people of Muş. In addition, appropriating the concepts of the Tanzimat, the pasha argued that, if those people came back and tribes were settled, the taxes could be allocated justly, according to everyone's affording. Furthermore with a population growth, more people could be engaged with agriculture and husbandry, which would result in development and an increase in regular soldiers *(i'mar-ı mülk farizası ve tezâyüd-i 'asâkir-i muntazamma)*. Emin Pasha also referred to the previous efforts of him and his brothers to prevent the intervention of Kurdish tribes. Moreover, redif soldiers, whom they had also previously comprised, had dispersed, and if they were recharged it became possible to bring them together in the course of time.[112]

Emin Pasha, who was in Istanbul, demanded to be transferred to Erzurum along with his brothers. The new governor, Halil Kamili Pasha, argued that since his official post in Erzurum, the people who were saying the good behaviors of Emin Pasha were more than those who were saying his misbehaviors.[113] Therefore, argued Kamili Pasha, given Emin Pasha's regret and his having been pardoned, he would not object to his return to Erzurum. Rather,

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 "... hüsn-i hâlini söyleyenler sû-i hâlini ifâde idenlerden mütecâviz bulunmakdan nâşi ..." Ibid.

Emin Pasha would be helpful to deal with the "wicked conditions" (*ahvâl-i şeytaniyet*) of the Kurdish tribes in the region.[114]

As the points Emin Pasha had introduced in his report were seen important, he was called to Erzurum with his brothers to discuss the situation thoroughly. As stated in his report, Emin Pasha wanted being awarded Van, Kars, Muş, and Bayezid, yet also emphasized that the reforms he had promised would take time. Furthermore, the governor of Erzurum thought there could be some drawbacks to placing the responsibility for all of these places on the pasha. For instance, while Emin Pasha was respected and liked in Bitlis and Muş, but Ishak Pasha was respected in Van. As for Kars, it was far from Muş and also situated in a delicate place on the borderlands with Russia. Furthermore, Halil Kamili Pasha had the impression from Emin Pasha and his brothers that although they made promises about Muş, Van, Kars, and Bayezid, their real aim was to be granted the mutasarrıflık of Muş. He suggested that instead of separating Muş from Erzurum and granting it to Emin Pasha, it would be more proper to appoint the pasha as mütesellim of Muş. In other words, although Emin Pasha had aimed to expand his power, he was just appointed as mütesellim of Muş after three years of exile.[115] Nevertheless, it can be argued that Emin Pasha reformulated his old wishes with new terms in accordance with the spirit of the era. Indeed, as the governor of Erzurum emphasized, Emin Pasha was seeking for the channels to continue to enjoying yurtluk-ocaklık system as the way it used to be.

Although Emin Pasha struggled hard to regain power, he did not enjoy it long as he passed away within two years. Upon his death, his brother Şerif Bey became mütesellim of Muş. Emin Pasha's yurtluk-ocaklık villages were confiscated by the treasury, as he had passed away without any children. Şerif Bey, who inherited his elder brother's struggle for the negotiation of power, objected harshly to their confiscation.[116] Furthermore, the term of office of Şerif Bey in Muş corresponded to a time when the sub-province of Muş was included in the Tanzimat package.

114 Ibid.

115 BOA. İ. DH. 59/2950, 13 Rebiülahir 1258 (24 May 1842).

116 BOA. C. ML. 585/24051, 4 Cemaziyelahir 1260 (21 June 1844).

## § 3.6 Conclusion

Not only the motivations and reasons for Emin Pasha's revolt, but also his coalitions and maneuvers reveal significant points, about both the region and the rebellion itself. The revolt mainly stemmed from tribal issues and taxation. In addition, behind the scenes, it is possible to observe the opposition of Emin and Esad Pashas to each other. In the course of their careers, they never got along with each other. It was obviously a clash of interests: Emin Pasha sought to be exempt from the intervention of the governor while the governor reasserted his control at every opportunity. Nevertheless, the peculiarities of the region required the employment of Emin Pasha. Similarly, Emin Pasha's intentions did not seem to challenge central authorities. He reclaimed for his status, negotiated it and rise up for it when necessary, yet he never intended to break ties with the Ottoman state. Therefore, Emin Pasha revolted with the same motivations as his counterparts - to reclaim or enhance his authority.

In the same vein, both coalitions, the one of Emin Pasha and the one against him, were constituted of tribes of the region. Emin Pasha sought transborder allies, as well. Besides, the governor, Esad Pasha made use of intrafamilial rivalry, appointing Hüseyin Pasha, the cousin of Emin Pasha, as the new mutasarrıf of Muş. Therefore, the dissolution of the front of Emin Pasha took place thanks to the efforts of Esad and Hüseyin Pashas who had secretly contacted tribal leaders. Nevertheless, Emin Pasha never declined to negotiate. Thus, the reforms and military operations of Reşid and then Hafız Pasha led to his pardon and reappointment to Muş. After pacifying the notables of Rumeli and Anatolia, Reşid Pasha headed towards the Ottoman Kurdistan. Muş was no exception.

Although the pacifying of the beys of Muş would take time and was realized towards the middle of the century, their economic power diminished slowly. Military reforms and operations changed the status of the sub-province, as well. With the reforms of and military operations under Reşid Pasha, the governor of Sivas, Muş was granted to him. Then, after the constitution of müşirliks, the sub-province was annexed to the müşirlik of Erzurum, and its revenues were spared for the Mansure Army in 1836. With this, the yurtluk-ocaklık status of whole sub-province changed. Emin Pasha, who had sought

to keep the inherited lands his ancestors had enjoyed intact over the entirety of his career tried to guarantee the rights to twenty-four villages in the sub-province of Muş for him, his brothers, and his relatives. Here, the difference between yurtluk-ocaklık sub-provinces held through mutasarrıflık and yurtluk-ocaklık villages is clarified. That is why Emin Pasha's career hovered between mütesellimlik and mutasarrıflık throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it was the annexation of Muş by Reşid and then Hafız Pasha prompted Emin Pasha to separate some productive villages for his family.

The family's joining forces against İbrahim Pasha of Egypt delayed their prolonged punishment only for a while. In the aftermath of the defeat of Nizip, Emin Pasha and his brothers were tried and exiled to Vidin. However, circumstances, ranging from the family's knowledge of the region, influence over the tribes, and relations with notables in its environs led to the rise of the family to power once again. Şerif Bey became mutasarrıf of Muş after his elder brother's death. However, his term of office was shaped by transformations taking place in the name of the Tanzimat.

# 4

## The Tanzimat State in Muş: Collaboration with and Punishment of Local Actors

> *The province of Erzurum is situated in a delicate location, as most parts of it border Russia and Iran. Besides, its population is partially composed of Kurds and tribes that have already migrated to their summer-quarters. At present, on the one hand, the auspicious reforms of the Beneficent Tanzimat are gradually being implemented, [and] on the other hand, in accordance with the imperial order, the surveys of real estate and incomes are being carried out. Besides, apart from the expenses of the country between November 1260 and March 1261, it has become successively necessary to collect more than two thousand purses from the sub-provinces and districts of the province. Therefore, it would be difficult to carry out a census properly and according to the imperial order. Moreover, as said tribes have gone to their summer pastures, the census cannot be carried out at present. Therefore, it would be proper to delay the census of the province of Erzurum for a few months.*[1]

This quotation is taken from a decision of the *Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye* (Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, hereafter Meclis-i Vâlâ), which having been established in March 1838 was the most critical institution of the Tanzimat era as it was responsible for the legislation, execution, and supervision of the reforms of the era.[2] The Meclis-i Vâlâ penned this report in 1845, a few months after the inclusion of the province of Erzurum together with Diyarbakır, Maden-i Hümâyûn, and Sivas under the Tanzimat.[3] With the promulgation of the Gülhane Rescript in 1839, the application of Tanzimat reforms harbingered a set of reorganizations in the administrative, fiscal, military and judicial spheres of the Ottoman Empire.[4] However, these reforms were not implemented throughout the empire simultaneously; first pilot regions were chosen, and then reforms were expanded gradually.

During the Tanzimat era, a set of reforms were inaugurated to increase the infrastructural power of the central government. However, the issues of taxation and conscription were the main tasks of this era. Thus, "the Gülhane Rescript"[5] centered on a just tax-collection system by evoking the ills of tax

1 BOA. MVL. 2/18, 3 Cemaziyelahir 1261 (9 June 1845). See Appendix A, Quotation 3 for the original Turkish.

2 The Meclis-i Vâlâ, which occupies an important place in the reforms of Mahmud II, was acting as a legislative and judiciary body, yet experienced a division of labor in the course of time. In 1854, it was divided into two – the Meclis-i Tanzimat and the Meclis-i Vâlâ - and the former took up the legislative duties of the institution. Then, in 1861, the two organs were reunited. In 1868, it was again divided into two under the names Şurâ-yı Devlet and Divân-ı Ahkâm-i Adliye. For more detail about the historical development of the institution, see Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat Devrinde Meclis-i Vâlâ, 1838-1868* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994).

3 BOA. İ. DH. 97/4852, 14 Muharrem 1261 (23 January 1845).

4 For a brief discussion on the context in which the Tanzimat emerged and its peculiarities, see Halil İnalcık, "Tanzimat Nedir?," in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 29-56; Findley, "The Tanzimat," 11-38.

5 The Rescript also promised equality among Muslim and other communities and the security of life, property and honor for all subjects. For an analysis of the Tanzimat Rescript, Yavuz Abadan, "Tanzimat Fermanı'nın Tahlili," in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür

farming system and a new tax based on the incomes and property of subjects.[6] Similarly, the duration of military service was fixed at five years, became compulsory for all male subjects, and conscripts were chosen by lottery.[7] The preliminary step to apply the reforms was to make a population and income survey (*tahrir ve temettu*) which would enable the Tanzimat state to collect taxes and recruit men for the army. In order to realize this aim, tax collectors (called *muhassıl*) were centrally appointed to the regions included in the Tanzimat program. Second, muhassıls established councils at the provincial, sub-provincial (called *büyük meclis,* large council), and district levels (as *küçük meclis*, small council). These councils were composed of local administrative, religious, fiscal, and security authorities, community representatives, and members chosen from among inhabitants. With these councils, the authority of governor was curtailed; he became responsible for just administrative duties.[8] Local councils not only enabled local notables to continue their intermediary

Yayınları, 2012), 57-88; Ibid.; Şerif Mardin, "Tanzimat Fermanı'nın Manâsı: Yeni Bir İzah Denemesi," Ibid., eds. Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, 145-65.

6 Upon a decision in 1840, the treasuries of Mansure, Redif and Amire were annihilated, and the Finance Treasury, under the Ministry of Finance, became the only institution administrating the revenues and expenditures of the empire. Tevfik Güran, *Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Maliyesi: Bütçeler ve Hazine Hesapları (1841-1861)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), 7. For the fiscal reforms of the Tanzimat, see among others, the studies of Şener, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı*; Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli*; Çakır, "Tanzimat Dönemi Vergi Uygulamalarında."

7 The military reforms were announced in 1843 and implemented starting in 1844. Meanwhile, the army was renamed "Asâkir-i Nizâmiye" (the regular army). Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Türkiye: Askerlik* (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2008), 66-67. Nevertheless, the non-Muslim male population was not conscripted under the Tanzimat and continued to pay a cizye (poll tax). With the Islahat Fermanı of 1856, the cizye was abolished and the military duties of non-Muslim males were clarified. Nevertheless, they could be exempted from military service by paying a tax called *bedel-i askeri* which was a reformulation of the cizye. Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2, 100.

8 However, with a regulation issued in 1842, the authority of the governor increased. Shaw, "Local Administrations," 36.

role through such institutions but also left a legacy of election and participatory politics.[9]

In addition to these permanent councils established by muhassıls, temporary councils were established in places where the implementation of reforms required further supervision. These councils called *İmâr Meclisleri* (Councils of Public Works) were established in 1845 and were constituted of officials directly sent from the Meclis-i Vâlâ accompanied by Muslim and non-Muslim representatives from each region.[10] Administrative reforms were gradual, and with Provincial Law of 1864, provincial administration was reshaped to be more hierarchical and to define and determine the responsibilities of each official, preventing "overlapping and conflicting authority." Similarly, the Provincial Law restituted the authority of the governor.[11]

However, the application of the reforms did not prescribe a formula that was valid throughout the empire; rather, it was determined by the peculiarities of the region, as clearly explained in the decision of the Meclis-i Vâlâ, which approved the postponement of the census in Erzurum and suggested the Tanzimat reforms be applied gradually (*refte refte).* Two preliminary features of the province of Erzurum determined this decision: its location on the eastern borderlands of the Ottoman Empire and its tribal landscape.

The delicacy of Erzurum stemmed from its being on Ottoman-Russian and Ottoman-Iranian borders, which meant that any turmoil on the Ottoman side of the border could lead to cross-border chaos. Moreover, tribal and frontier issues with Iran were not yet resolved. The modus vivendi of the same Kurdish tribes also created great difficulties for carrying out a census. Finally, government authorities on one hand were carrying out tax-surveys, and on the other, were in need of financial support to cover their costs, and so they

9 To name a few pioneering studies on local councils: Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı*; Akiba, "The Local Councils," 176-204; Shaw, "Local Administrations," 33-49; Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerini'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı*, 2 ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997); Elizabeth Thompson, "Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces: The Damascus Advisory Council in 1844-45," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 3 (1993): 457-75.

10 Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Tanzimat Dönemi İmâr Meclisleri," *OTAM*, no. 3 (Ocak 1992): 325-26.

11 Shaw, "Local Administrations," 42-45.

levied a cash tax. As the central government was deprived of the necessary mechanisms to realize all these aims at once, it became necessary to take gradual, cautious steps. In fact, it was the main motivation of the Tanzimat state to establish those mechanisms by carrying out income surveys and a census, settling the tribes, and breaking the power of the local notables and administrative elites.

These peculiarities behind the delay of the census of Erzurum have shaped this chapter, which introduces an account of the gradual implementation of Tanzimat reforms in the province of Erzurum in general, and in the sub-province of Muş in particular. Together with the following chapter 5, this chapter will focus on the transformations of provincial administration, taxation, and land tenure politics that the Tanzimat state envisaged. The main concern of the chapter is to shed light on dynamics that both enabled and disabled reforms from taking place in Muş. It also questions whether the aims of the executors of Tanzimat reforms coincided with those of local actors - notables, administrative elite, and peasants. If they did, how did these actors accommodate themselves to this new organization?

When the province of Erzurum was brought under Tanzimat, the local dynasty of Muş was still occupying crucial roles in the administration of the sub-province, yet they were working harder to keep their position intact. In effect, during the first phase of the implementation of the reforms those local families were employed. Despite the pacification of the emirs of Soran, Baban, and Rewanduz and partially of Diyarbekir in the 1820s-30s, Han Mahmud in Van, Bedirhan Bey in Cizre-Bohtan, Nurullah Bey in Hakkari, and Şerif Bey, the brother of Emin Pasha, in Muş were still in power. They first negotiated and then challenged the implementation of Tanzimat reforms, which would eventually bring about their end. This chapter will focus on the elimination of those mîrs, putting the local dynasty of Muş at the center.

Similarly, the socioeconomic situation on the eve of the Tanzimat reforms is crucial to understand the postponement of reforms and the employment of local notables in their execution. In effect, depicting the socioeconomic situation of Muş immediately before the Tanzimat also casts light on the local actors whose power stemmed from their exploitation of the rural population in myriad ways. In this discussion, the case of kethüda (steward) İbrahim Efendi

is prominent as he established a long-standing relationship with the governors of Muş mainly based on the exploitation of the inhabitants. Second, İbrahim Efendi would be punished first upon application of Tanzimat reforms in Muş. Third, the case of the kethüda is also significant to demonstrate how the inhabitants of Muş were not passive receptors of the reforms; rather, they used the channels of the Tanzimat state to make their voices heard, utilizing the language and vocabulary of the Tanzimat.

Thus, in the following lines, the case of İbrahim Efendi will first be introduced as a means of illustrating the political and economic networks in the region. Then, the employment of Şerif Bey in the implementation of the reforms in Muş will be discussed, pointing out how the mediation of local notables was required for the fulfillment of the reforms. Finally, the role of the mîrs of Muş in the revolt of Bedirhan Bey, which attracts the most attention in the literature on Kurdish notables, will be discussed. Together with his family and brothers Şerif Bey, despite his defection from the coalition of Bedirhan Bey, was exiled, which was certainly the determining factor in the eradication of the dynasty's political and economic power in the region

## § 4.1 On the Eve of the Application of Tanzimat Reforms: A Network of Exploitation

> Hussein Pasha is paid a salary, but has no direction of affairs in Moosh, all being managed by İbrahim Effendy. The Cadi, a thorough bigot, is the intimate ally of the Effendy's, and acts in concert with him. Zachariah Vartabet, the head of the Armenian portion of the population, assisted by Ussep, the Millet bashee, or head of the nation. The Vartabet (Bishop) takes care to enrich his Convent, and Ussep, himself. ...
>
> Thus, the poor inhabitants of Moosh are completely enthralled, the Mohamedans by İbrahim Effendy and the Cadi, and the Armenians by Zachariah Vartabet and Ussep, and they are perfectly understood among themselves. If these persons wish to get up a petition in favor of, or against, any Governor, they pen it themselves; the Mohamedans are made to sign it by the Cadi and the Armenians, by the Bishop; but neither know to what they are affixing their seals. Memorials of the

> most contrary nature are continually coming from Moosh. They have come, both in favor, and against Sheriff Beg, as also in favor of Hussein Pasha, as well as against him. In short, these papers mean nothing more than that the four rulers have some temporary purpose to answer, by bringing them forward.[12]

This passage from a memorandum of the British Consul of Erzurum, James Brant, on the situation of Muş was penned in 1844, a few months before Muş was included in the Tanzimat program. The passage is important first because it sheds light on the system of exploitation led by İbrahim Efendi, second because it shows how both Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Muş were oppressed by their representatives, and third because it highlights how the present mutasarrıf, Hüseyin Pasha was not competent enough to eliminate the oppression and to govern the region properly. Thus, this part will start with a few details regarding the nomination of the mutasarrıfs and mütesellims of Muş and continue with a discussion of the socioeconomic conditions of Muş on the eve of the Tanzimat.

As discussed in the previous chapters, the local dynasty of Muş, whose power stemmed from its lineage, its large land holdings, called yurtluk-ocaklık, and its influence in the network of the region, had long been involved in the government of the region. This situation continued, like in other peripheral regions of the empire, until these powerful local actors were deprived of their sources of power with the introduction of new tax and land tenure politics. After the passing of Emin Pasha, his brother Şerif Bey struggled to be the mutasarrıf of Muş. He had a few rivals except for his cousin, Hüseyin Pasha, who had been also a rival of his brother. The government authorities replaced one with the other one on many occasions before both were eventually exiled.

In 1844, Şerif Bey had trouble with the governor of Erzurum, Halil Kamili Pasha, concerning the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of his deceased brother Emin Pasha. As the latter had died without a child, his yurtluk-ocaklık villages were

12 FO. 195/227, No:21, "Memorandum regarding the state of Moosh" Brant to Canning, Erzurum, December 9, 1844.

legally passed to the Imperial Treasury. However, Şerif Bey demanded that the villages be granted to his own sons. Upon being rejected, he tried to resist and sought the assistance of his followers; however, he did not succeed and was dismissed from the mütesellimlik of Muş.[13] Although Emin Pasha's villages were confiscated by the treasury based on absence of any descendant, the interpretation of "heir" was not the same for all yurtluk-ocaklıks. In the Mahcil district of Lazistan sub-province, a certain Osman Bey appealed for the salary paid for the confiscated yurtluk-ocaklık villages of his deceased brother who died without a child. The Meclis-i Vâlâ accepted his appeal claiming that "descendant" also included brothers.[14] Thus, the treatment of yurtluk-ocaklık holders changed from region to region, and in the case of Şerif Bey, the rejection of his claim to his brother's villages was the result of anxiety and designed to prevent further strengthening of the family.

Therefore, when Hüseyin Pasha was appointed in his stead, Şerif Bey tried to obstruct his entry to Muş but failed. As Mr. Brant reported, he took shelter in the house of Han Mahmud with his brother Murad Bey.[15] Whereas, Hüseyin Pasha was regarded as the lesser of two evils, a few years earlier the people of Muş had complained about him alleging that he had collected money from the people with various grounds and besides, he had no talent for governing the sub-province.[16] Having heard that Hüseyin Pasha would be the new governor of Muş, the people appeared before Kamili Pasha, the governor of Erzurum, expressing their dissatisfaction. The reason for this complaint was that the people viewed Hüseyin Pasha as an oppressive governor and a debtor, so they were afraid of being overtaxed because of his debts. Therefore, the common people wanted Şerif Bey to remain, even though, according to Kamili Pasha, he was also cruel towards the inhabitants.[17]

13 BOA. C. DH. 117/5810, 20 Rebiülahir 1260 (9 May 1844).

14 Ömer Toraman, "Trabzon Eyaletinde Yurtluk-Ocaklık Suretiyle Arazi Tasarrufuna Son Verilmesi (1847-1864)," *Uluslararası Karadeniz İncelemeleri Dergisi*, no. 8 (2010): 65.

15 FO. 195/227, No:7, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, July, 15, 1844. The French Consul of Trabzon also reports that Şerif Bey sought the support of Bedirhan Bey at the same time. MAE. 69CCP, vol. II, Clairamboult to Guizot, Trabzon, June 24, 1844.

16 BOA. İ. MVL. 10/154, 8 Şaban 1256 (5 October 1840).

17 FO. 195/227, No: 6, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, May 29, 1844.

It is possible that the people who oppose the nomination of Hüseyin Pasha were the supporters of Şerif Bey and did not represent the common view of the inhabitants of Muş. Indeed, after a short while, a mutual petition signed by both Muslim and non-Muslim populations of Muş was submitted to the governor of Erzurum. This new petition rejected the previous one, which favored Şerif Bey, and claimed that the people had signed it under duress. Having expressed their satisfaction with the discharge of Şerif Bey, whom they accused of "extortion" and "treachery," the people claimed that if he had remained in his post all the re'âyâ would have left Muş.[18] Nevertheless, this also did not reflect everyone's views. After a short while, when the cruelty of İbrahim Efendi increased and when Hüseyin Pasha could no longer wield power, even Kamili Pasha claimed that Şerif Bey would have been less oppressive.[19]

However, the preference for Şerif Bey over Hüseyin Pasha was not simply a matter of "who was more cruel." If the way the petitions were penned taken into consideration, the matter was who was more skillful at controlling other power groups - like the kethüda and tribal leaders - and conciliate their interests. Şerif Bey would be nominated to execute Tanzimat reforms in Muş, not because he was less cruel but because he could manipulate every opportunity to negotiate the range of his power. He would benefit from the alliance with the surrounding beys of Van and Hakkari and from his influence over the Kurdish tribes, as well.

Despite uncertainty regarding the issue of whether the peasants of Muş would have preferred Hüseyin Pasha or Şerif Bey, it is undeniable that these peasants were dissatisfied and miserable before the region was brought under the Tanzimat. The primary reason for this miserable situation was over taxation, as can be understood from the main accusations against the two governors of Muş. For the Muslim portion of the population, an equally significant problem was the conscription.

18 Ibid. No: 7, 10 June 1844. However, both cousins continued to claim the administration of Muş and accused each other of injustice. BOA. MVL. 11/4, 29 Safer 1263 (16 February 1847).

19 FO. 78/572, No:10, Brant to Aberdeen, Erzurum, 9 December 1844.

On the issue of taxation, the main problem was the common people's inability to pay the regular taxes due to a decrease in the population. Consular reports point out that the population of Muş had diminished by almost a third compared to six years earlier due to famine and plague.[20] Yet it was demanded of the people to pay the same amount of taxes despite the population decrease.[21] In the same vein, the French Consul of Erzurum, Thedore Goepp, reports that districts of Muş and Bitlis were suffered from unrest; people were refusing paying taxes, and men were objecting to conscription, as well. The inhabitants of both districts claimed that plague and famine had decimated them and it was not fair they had to pay the same amount of taxes regardless of the population decrease.[22]

Although it is difficult to obtain sound information regarding the amount of the regular taxes levied on the inhabitants of Muş in the pre-Tanzimat period, Consul Brant's memorandum about the situation of Muş sheds light on the regular and irregular taxes. According to his report, regular taxes levied on the population included *sâlyâne* (annual tax), *öşr* (tithe), and *haraç* (*cizye*, poll tax). The most demanding one was sâlyâne, which had doubled in a year, from 500 to 1100-1200 guruş. The same amount was levied as a poll tax. The main problem was the decrease of the population while the same or increased amount of the taxes was levied.

However, the worst were the irregular taxes, which brought forth the exploitative politics of local actors. On top of their inability to recover even regular taxes, local authorities forced peasants to pay taxes both in cash and in kind. Here, local representatives played crucial roles, as they levied these irregular taxes as much as they wished. For instance, the taxes that İbrahim Efendi took each month from each village point to how local power-holders enriched themselves at the expense of the dispossession, indebtedness, and suffering of the peasants.

20 As stated by Donal Quataert, the plague remained a significant event in Ottoman society until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 114.

21 FO. 195/227, No: 6, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, May 29, 1844.

22 MAE. 69CPC, Vol. II, Goepp to Guizot, May 24, 1844.

The inhabitants of every village were bound to supply İbrahim Efendi monthly with one somar of barley (equivalent to nineteen imperial bushels, ibs),[23] two to three batmans of butter (equivalent to 31,4 to 47 ibs), three to five cart-loads of straw, twenty to thirty trusses of hay, and two sheep supposedly to be delivered to Hüseyin Pasha. According to Brant, probably a small amount of these products were sent to the palace of Hüseyin Pasha. İbrahim Efendi and the kadı, his collaborator consumed the largest portions or even sold them for profit.[24]

Beyond over taxation, İbrahim Efendi was also indirectly worsening the living conditions of the inhabitants. First, he forced bakeries in Muş to buy wheat from him at an above-market price. In return, he allowed the bakeries to sell their bread at higher prices. Similarly, the village headmen *(muhtar)* were replaced for trivial reasons every three or four months. Actually, the main reason was the requirement that every new headman present an amount of money to İbrahim Efendi. This amount was added to the annual taxes of the village. By these means, a small portion of the population was becoming rich and powerful at the expense of the labor of the majority.[25]

In order to understand this system of exploitation led by İbrahim Efendi, it is necessary to analyze the constituents of his power. The power of İbrahim Efendi for the most part stemmed from the network he had established through the years. That network was composed of local actors who had direct control over resources. He had been the kethüda or kahya of the mutasarrıfs and mütesellims of Muş since the time of Emin Pasha. Besides, he could obtain the assistance of the influential local actors, like the kadı, the bishop, and the *milletbaşı* (the representative of the non-Muslim community) in the exploitation of the inhabitants. When the specificities of the population of Muş are taken into consideration, it can be noticed that a significant part of the alliance of İbrahim Efendi was composed of Kurdish tribes. Tribal members or chiefs

23 A standard imperial bushel (*kile*) was equivalent to 25,659 kilograms. However, as seen here, there are regional variations. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1600*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xl.

24 FO. 195/227, No: 21, Brant to Canning, December 9, Erzurum, 1844.

25 Ibid.

who showed loyalty to İbrahim Efendi could also take products ranging from barley to cheese from villagers either on behalf of İbrahim Efendi or just for themselves. Besides as a part of the corvée, when the Kurdish chiefs arrived in Muş, İbrahim Efendi sent their servants and horses to the houses of Armenians who would host them. In the same way, Brant claimed, winter-quartering (*kışlakiye)*, which means the requirement for the villagers to cover the needs of Kurdish tribes – that spent winters in their villages - like sheltering and feeding was abrogated by the Porte (as a result of the Tanzimat). However, it was still in effect in Muş, as well as in many other places.[26]

Therefore, İbrahim Efendi applied to myriad ways of exploitation both to enhance his network and to enrich himself. The disgruntlement of the people was barely alleviated by the local governors. When the people could not reach the Porte the best option remained to emigrate. Nevertheless, the complaints about İbrahim Efendi would only be responded to after the Tanzimat reforms were scheduled to be applied in the region, as will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

If the cruel application of taxation was the main source of the complaints and suffering of the Armenian population of Muş, the Muslim population was tired of conscription. Although it only concerned Muslims, the inhabitants claimed that conscription dreadfully affected the harvest.[27] Indeed, when Hüseyin Pasha was required to collect two thousand men for the army, he only managed to recruit thirty men. To avoid service, as argued by Brant, male Muslim inhabitants applied to a set of strategies ranging from emigration to Iran or Russia to deliberately mutilating themselves. Another option was to take refuge among Kurdish tribes that were not easily accessible.[28] Although it is necessary to take the numbers stated by Consul Brant with a grain of salt, it is significant that the inhabitants of Muş took advantage not only of its being situated in a frontier region but also its tribal landscape in order to struggle with over taxation and hard conscription policies. Moreover, lacuna in the supervision for conscription as well as lack of security in the region led to tribalization.

26 Ibid.

27 FO. 195/227, No: 6, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, May 29, 1844.

28 Ibid. No: 9, 25 July 1844.

Briefly, the common people of Muş suffered from the struggle of different actors over revenue. The only solution for them was to leave their homes, which in return diminished the population and so left the sub-province's fertile lands uncultivated.[29] In such circumstances, when the imperial edict of the Tanzimat was read publicly in a village of Muş, it was engraved in the mind of a local peasant as the introduction of a new tax and the annihilation of the corvée labor (*angarya*).[30] Thus, the villagers of Muş perceived the Tanzimat as the abolishment of over taxation and forced labor, most probably similar to the way peasants perceived it throughout the empire. Many scholars share the argument that the focus of the Tanzimat was tax reform[31] it first appeared as "agricultural reform" in consular reports of the era, as well.[32] However, the Tanzimat was also the precursor of a new era in which reformers were determined to apply a new way of governing by eliminating local power holder which they held responsible for the misery and dissatisfaction of the inhabitants.

In line with this, the first step once Muş was brought into the Tanzimat program was to take precautions against Şerif Bey and his brothers together with their rival and cousin, Hüseyin Pasha and the notorious kethüda, İbrahim Efendi. The focus was on their cruel and extortionist ways of

29 For further discussion of the decrease of the population of Muş in the nineteenth century, see chapter 6 of this study.

30 Ibid. No: 23, 17 December 1844. In the same vein, Halil İnalcık emphasized that the issue of angarya was important as even before the promulgation of Tanzimat, in August 1838, imperial orders were sent to the governors of Rumeli about the angarya, causing the revolts of the re'âyâ. Halil İnalcık, "Tanzimatın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkiler," in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu: Toplum ve Ekonomi*, ed. Halil İnalcık (İstanbul: Eren, 1993), 367. Uğur Bayraktar also argues that in the Ottoman Balkans, the abolishment of angarya did not actually take place despite continuous warnings from the Sublime Porte. Uğur Bayraktar, "The Political Economy of Çiftliks: The Redistribution of Land and Land Tenure Relations in the Nineteenth Century Provinces of Ioannia and Trikala" (master's thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2009), 111-12. In addition, see chapter 6 of the study for the continuance of forced labor and the implementation of winter-quarters in the plain of Muş.

31 See İnalcık, "Tanzimatın Uygulanması."

32 FO. 78/614, "Report on the Trade of Erzeroom, and the State of the Pashalık for the Year 1844," Brant to Aberdeen, Erzurum, January 28, 1845.

governing which, as stated in a Meclis-i Vâlâ report, would be eliminated with the "Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye." The report emphasized that the inhabitants were scared of them. Furthermore, the ongoing dispute between Şerif Bey and Hüseyin Pasha influenced their relatives in Muş, and this resulted in divisions and conflict among inhabitants, too. Therefore, in order to maintain order and safety and enhance the welfare of the inhabitants, those local elites should no longer be employed in Muş.[33] Yet this struggle between the allies of Şerif Bey and those of Hüseyin Pasha continued for a while after their exile.

Nevertheless, breaking the power of local notables was definitely a result of the aim to govern the periphery with centrally appointed officials, which had actually been discussed for a few decades. Nonetheless, it might also be the result of a reflection that the Tanzimat was the harbinger of new era and that those notables were reminders of the old system that the people associate with heavy tax burdens and the assaults of Kurdish tribes who were encouraged and protected by local notables. However, the elimination of the relics of the "old system" was a tough, challenging process; indeed, the implementation of reforms became impossible without their cooperation. As will be discussed in the following lines, although some local actors like Şerif Bey maintained and negotiated their positions in the new system, the less charming, if not less powerful ones, like İbrahim Efendi, were easily punished.

## § 4.2 The Tanzimat State in Muş

Immediately after the promulgation of the Gülhane Rescript, tax farming system was reorganized in the places brought under the Tanzimat, and muhassıls were dispatched instead with duties ranging from tax collection to the

33 "... kâffe-i sekenesinin mûmâileyhden gözleri korkmuş olmasıyla mücerred-i âsâyiş ve refâh-i hâl-i re'âyâ zımnında mûmâileyhümanın fîmâba'd livâ-i mezbûr imârâtında istihdâm olunmamakla ve bunların beynlerinde derkâr olunan mübâyenet Muş'da bulunan akrabâ ve müteallikatına dâhi sirâyet iderek memleket ahâlisi dâhi birkaç taraf olduklarından ..." BOA. MVL. 2/26, 26 Cemaziyelahir 1261 (2 July 1845).

establishment of local councils.[34] The Tanzimat also heralded the abolishment of forced labor and scheduled to collect a single tax (*virgü, vergi*) according to the income, agricultural land, and livestock of the taxpayer. Therefore, in order to put this into practice, the first duty of the muhassıls together with scribes (kâtib) was to begin an income (*temettuat*) survey. The appointment of muhassıls was abrogated in 1842, and afterwards, reforms were carried out by existent administrative elites in provinces included in the Tanzimat.[35] Therefore, the inclusion of the province of Erzurum in the Tanzimat system started with a few novelties: nomination of a "proper agent" to introduce the new tax, the determination and dispacth of representatives from Erzurum to Istanbul to specify the problems of the province, and the nomination of a new kaimakam, Ahmed Kaşif Agha to Muş to replace the local dynasty.[36]

The new official was a *defterdar* (provincial treasurer), the reception of him by the inhabitants was noteworthy. As narrated by Consul Brant, the inhabitants of Erzurum were hopeful about the arrival of the defterdar. Nevertheless, the consul worried about the fact that the official would reside near the building of the governor of Erzurum, Halil Kamili Paşa, which meant that they would get along well. That is to say, their dialogue could lead them to pursue their own interests at the expense of the people's misery.[37] In the same line, soon after the defterdar embarked on the income survey, rumors spread that a new cattle tax (*ağnam*) and a new annual tax would be imposed; moreover, the mineral springs which the people used in common would be auctioned off and tax-farmed and so they could not make use of them anymore without

34 Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli*, 46. Except for Bosnia, Albania, Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, Kars, Diyarbekir, and Baghdad, it was decided to implement the system of muhassıllık in 1840. Ibid. For a discussion of muhassıllık, also see Ayla Efe, "Muhassıllık Teşkilatı" (PhD diss., Eskişehir Anadolu Üniversitesi, 2002).

35 Güran, "19. Yüzyıl Temettüat," 76.

36 FO. 195/227, No: 34, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, October 8, 1845.

37 Ibid. No:1, "Report on the Trade of Erzurum and the Situation of the Pashalık for the year 1844," January 16, 1845. Consul Brant added that Kamil Pasha was uncomfortable with the centrally-appointed official even if he did not let it be known. Yet soon after Kamil Pasha was replaced with Bekir Sami Pasha. Ibid., No: 5, February 20, 1845.

paying the proper amount.[38] Despite this initial report by the consul, he would later note that all of this news turned out to be false. Neither a new cattle tax nor a new annual tax was imposed. All the defterdar did was to register the livestock in subjects' possession and collect the arrears from the prior six months. The tax farming of mineral springs was not even a matter of discussion. According to the defterdar, Muslims were not content with the new tax regime, and spread such news.[39] This was not specific to the province of Erzurum; rather, it was commonly observed in all the places where Tanzimat reforms were applied.[40]

Although it is questionable to what extent the defterdar succeeded in the income registration (*temettuat sayımı*) in the province of Erzurum, it is important to understand the anxiety of Muslims regarding the new tax ratios stated by Consul Brant. Nevertheless, even if not in all the sub-provinces and villages of the province, it is apparent that the income registration was carried out in some parts of Erzurum. As narrated in the town of Erzurum, the properties of the inhabitants were accounted for three or four times, yet inhabitants rejected the results each time, arguing that they were unfair. The problem was resolved by asking both Muslims and Christians what they could "bear."[41] This case of Erzurum is in line with the main tenet of the new tax regime, which was that taxes were supposed to be collected according to the economic ability of the taxpayer, expressed as *komşuca* (neighborly) or *hoşnud-i umûmî* (to the contentment of all).[42]

Despite the fact that income registers which would determine the amount of the tax each house was able to pay were only partially successful in the province of Erzurum, as will be discussed thoroughly in the following lines, equality regarding taxation had been heralded with the Tanzimat at the beginning. As Nadir Özbek argued Tanzimat reformers did not schedule a detailed

38 Ibid. No: 10, April 9, 1845.

39 Ibid. No: 11, April 19, 1845.

40 For seminal studies on the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in Balkan provinces, see Uzun, *Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler*; İnalcık, "Tanzimatın Uygulanması."

41 FO. 195/227, No: 7, Brant to Canning, February 11, 1846.

42 Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli*, 41; Şener, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı*, 95.

program to frame a just taxation regime, but it created expectation among a large part of the population.[43] As described above, villagers in the plain of Muş perceived the Tanzimat foremost as the abolition of forced labor.[44] Second, it meant the prohibition of the burden of quartering Kurdish tribes in winter on peasants who had been obliged to provide them with hay, straw, and shelter. Complaints about forced labor and winterquarters would continue in the years to come, but the consideration of Tanzimat reformers about their abolishment was still significant. As a third factor, the equal taxation of Muslims and non-Muslims also became a matter.[45] The taxes collected on agricultural produce - in other words tithe (*a'şâr*) - was fixed at one-tenth of production by the Tanzimat.[46] According to Brant, previously, non-Muslims had generally been paying twenty percent and Muslims not more than five in the province of Erzurum.[47] In fact, the numbers given by the consul can be misleading, yet the distribution of the tithe was largely unequal. The emphasis on equality under the Tanzimat mainly derived from this reality.[48]

With the inclusion of the province of Erzurum in the Tanzimat program, two methods of tax allocation were followed. In places where income surveys were accomplished, which were few in the beginning, taxes were determined according to those surveys. In other places, where the income surveys had not yet been completed, taxes were allocated according to previous amounts

43 Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli*, 40.

44 For a discussion of similar expectations of provincial Armenians from Tanzimat reforms, see Masayuki Ueno, "'For the Fatherland and the State': Armenians Negotiate the Tanzimat Reforms," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 45 (2013).

45 FO. 195/227, No: 7, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, February 11, 1846 "Report on the Trade of Erzurum and the Situation of the Pashalık for the year 1845"

46 Şener, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı*, 129. However, during financial crises it was raised as high as one-fifteenth percent. Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 130. For details concerning the tithe, its collection and relationship between tax farmers and peasants in the Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat contexts, see Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli*, 39-112.

47 FO. 195/227, No: 48, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, December 12, 1845

48 Küçük also notes that before the Tanzimat, a one-fifth tithe was collected in the province of Erzurum. Cevdet Küçük, "Tanzimât Devrinde Erzurum" (PhD diss., İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1975), 251. Nevertheless, regional variations were certainly inevitable.

(*ale'lhesâb*). Muş was among the latter.[49] Accordingly, the amount of taxes the inhabitants of Muş had been paying before the Tanzimat was two thousand two hundred purses, twenty-eight guruş. However, peasants had dispersed for the variety reasons mentioned above that led to their misery on the eve of the Tanzimat, so with the request of Governor Esad Pasha, the amount was diminished to fifteen hundred purses starting in 1261 (1845).[50] However, with the Tanzimat, the dispersed inhabitants of Muş gradually returned to their homes, and seminomadic tribes were being settled there, as well. Thus, starting in 1265 (1849), the tax of Muş was increased to two thousand purses. However, the tax was still some three hundred purses less than the amount before the Tanzimat. Nevertheless, the Meclis-i Vâlâ emphasized that the reforms would be fully succeed in the course time; the tribes would be settled and the people would be prosperous, then, taxes would be raised according to the incomes of taxpayers.[51]

The second issue upon which Tanzimat bureaucrats embarked was the dispatching of "competent" persons from the provinces to the capital of the empire to determine both the necessities and problems of their regions.[52] As Tanzimat reforms had not yielded important successes by 1845, the Meclis-i Vâlâ decided to summon two representatives from each province to obtain better regional knowledge.[53] Those representatives, whose travel expenses were covered by the local treasury, were welcomed in the imperial capital city.[54] After providing information about the peculiarities and problems of their regions, those representatives returned to their provinces along with İmâr Meclisleri,

49 BOA. C. ML. 299/14949, 15 Rebiülâhir 1261 (23 April 1845).

50 BOA. C. ML. 654/26778, 29 Cemâziyelâhir 1266 (12 May 1850).

51 BOA. İ. MVL. 162/4718, 10 Rebiülevvel 1266 (24 January 1850).

52 FO. 195/227, No: 8, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, March 7, 1845.

53 Tevfik Güran, "Temettuat Registers as a Resource about Ottoman Economic and Social Life," in *The Ottoman State and Societies in Change: A Study of the Nineteenth Century Temettuat Registers*, eds. Hayashi Kayoko and Mahir Aydın, Islamic Area Studies (London: Kegan Paul, 2004), 5. Also"19. Yüzyıl Temettüat," 76.

54 Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı*, 44.

which were constituted temporarily to inspect and solve problems regarding implementation of the reforms.[55]

Along the same lines, after the province of Erzurum was brought under the Tanzimat, one of the first things was to dispatch representatives to the capital of the empire.[56] Taking demographic specificities of the province into consideration, Cennetzade Abdullah Efendi and Mustafa Agha as representatives of Muslims and Köseoğlu Kivork and Muradoğlu Mattos, both Armenians, as representatives of non-Muslims were nominated and sent to Istanbul. After providing information about the province of Erzurum and the reforms it needed, these four representatives returned with the İmâr Meclisi delegated by the Meclis-i Vâlâ.[57]

As discussed by Brant, it was an advantage that all four men were capable of giving correct information regarding the revenues, problems, and the requisites of the population. Yet the matter was whether giving correct information would be in line with their interests. To put it differently, the consul implied that in spite of being accurate sources for better comprehension of the region, these men were also part of the very system from which the common people suffered.[58] For instance, the Cennetzades were influential actors in

55 Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Tanzimat Dönemi İmâr " 327.

56 Cevdet Küçük also notes that, in 1839, after the promulgation of the Tanzimat, Istanbul ordered the dispatch of representatives from the provinces to the capital city. The müşir of Erzurum, Hafız Pasha, delegated this responsibility to a notable of Erzurum, Hacı Abdullah Bey, the bey of Kığı, Mehmed Bey, and a notable from Kars, Hacı Ahmet Bey. Despite the absence of documents detailing the mission of those delegates, Küçük argues that based on the views of the representatives dispatched from each province, it was decided to implement the Tanzimat first in the provinces proximate to Istanbul. Küçük, "Tanzimât Devrinde," 160-61.

57 BOA. A. MKT. 25/5, 17 Cemâziyelâhir 1261 (23 June 1845). As stated by Cevdet Küçük, the inspection of the Council of İmâr lasted seven to eight months, and they prepared reports that were examined in the Meclis-i Vâlâ. One of the main issues was the repair of the road between Erzurum and Trabzon for which engineers were employed. Ibid., 220-21.

58 FO. 195/ 227, No: 9, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, April 8, 1845. This point is parallel with the argument of Phillou who underscores that Muslims and non-Muslims were part of the same "overlapping" social networks at the turn of the nineteenth century. And, they both "were using the same operational logic to augment their wealth and their share in sovereignty." Philliou, "The Ottoman Empire's Absent Nineteenth Century," 145. Similarly, Cora demonstrates

Erzurum who controlled revenues of the region through tax farming and became members of the council under the Tanzimat.[59] In addition, Ortaylı emphasizes that the people dispatched to Istanbul were actually representatives of influential actors in the region, so they could not provide satisfying information about the problems of the provinces.[60]

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, one of the first duties of the muhassıl was to establish muhassılık councils (Muhassıllık Meclisleri and then Memleket Meclisleri) as soon as he arrived in a region. These councils would assist the muhassıls in the execution of reforms. The determination of the revenues of inhabitants and the allocation and collection of taxes were carried out through those councils. In that sense, the muhassıllık council was the first example of the local administrative institution in the strict sense.[61] As discussed by Jun Akiba, although the muhassıllık system was abolished in 1842, local councils were established in places where the Tanzimat reforms were later applied.[62] However, it was inevitable for local notables to take part in those councils, as the election procedures clearly stated that the members of the councils should be chosen from among sensible, distinguished, wealthy inhabitants.[63] Indeed, as discussed in the following chapters, these councils became platforms for local actors to increase their power. Nevertheless, these councils would play a key role not only as an "intermediary between the central governments and local residents,"[64] but also as channels for local people to submit their complaints.

The third part of novelty with the application of the Tanzimat in Erzurum specifically concerned Muş. A new kaimakam other than Şerif Bey and Hüseyin Pasha was appointed to Muş - as described by Brant, a stranger who

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that Armenian notables were not different from their counterpart Muslim notables in the mid-nineteenth century. Cora, "Transforming Erzurum/Karin," 47.

59 Küçük, "Tanzimât Devrinde," 325.

60 Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı*, 44.

61 Ibid., 33.

62 Akiba, "The Local Councils," 178-79. Similarly, Şener states that after the annihilation of the muhasıllık, the councils continued to exist. Şener, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı*, 98.

63 For more details about the election system, see Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı*, 35-37.

64 Akiba, "The Local Councils," 176.

had no connections in the region.[65] The appointment of a new kaimakam, shortly after the application of the Tanzimat in the region was a sign of the determination of the central state to cut some of the disorder in Muş stemming from the rivalry between Hüseyin Pasha and Şerif Bey. Besides the cruelty of İbrahim Efendi was revealed regarding his tax farming in the villages and sub-districts of Bitlis in 1844. Therefore, it was İbrahim Efendi who was punished in the end, although his exile to Kayseri was discussed together with the ones of Şerif Bey, his brothers, and Hüseyin Pasha.[66] In what follows, the revelation of the oppression of İbrahim Efendi during his tax farming will first be briefly explained, and then the circumstances that allowed Şerif Bey to govern Muş for the last time will be discussed.

As described above, the inhabitants of Muş had been exposed to the great extortion and oppression of İbrahim Efendi and his allies on the eve of the application of the Tanzimat reforms in the district. The complaints and petitions of the people, which had been submitted to the Catholic clergy of Erzurum, finally reached central authorities through the Catholic Patriarchate in Istanbul.[67] However, in the examination of the issue, the apparatuses of the Tanzimat state, like district and provincial councils, came forth; the petitions of the people, although initially were sent to the Meclis-i Vâlâ, started to be discussed first in the Provincial Council of Erzurum.[68]

The allegations against İbrahim Efendi and his allies, the milletbaşı of Bitlis, Oseb, two Armenians Hacı Manok and Simon, and Hamparsum from Köseoğulları and Kivork, culminated in the allegations of abuse regarding tax farming in 1844. It was reported that İbrahim Efendi tax farmed the sub-province of Muş together with district of Bitlis (with its sub-districts and villages) for a lump sum (*maktuan*) of three thousand purses. However, together with his allies he arbitrarily levied taxes amounting to more than seven thousand purses (in some later documents, the amount indicated is six thousand) on the inhabitants. Upon the submission of the issue to the Meclis-i Vâlâ, it was

65 FO. 195/227, No: 34, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, October 8, 1845.

66 BOA. MVL. 2/26, 26 Cemaziyelahir 1261 (2 July 1845).

67 BOA. A. MKT. 28/84, 6 Şevval 1261 (8 October 1845).

68 BOA. A. DVN. 17/62, 23 Şaban 1262 (16 August 1846).

decided it would be investigated, and the opinions of Kamil and Bekir Sami Pashas, the former and current governors of Erzurum, were asked.[69]

In his report, Kamil Pasha narrated the allegations against İbrahim Efendi and his allies, which he had heard from certain peasants of Muş. Accordingly, İbrahim Efendi and his collaborators used every method of extortion on peasants who could not pay the demanded amount, from making people sell their houses to threatening to injure their children and wives. In some cases, they physically tortured people; by hanging even pregnant women upside down and exposing them to smoke that the unborn children were also injured. The suggestion of Kamil Pasha was that an official be appointed to investigate both the cruelty and the amount of money extorted.[70]

As mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, with the promulgation of the Tanzimat, the newly established provincial and district councils were a recourse to which local people brought their issues. In a later petition by the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Muş submitted through Catholic Patriarchate, the embezzlement of İbrahim Efendi and Hüseyin Pasha was accounted for by the Erzurum Provincial Council, and the related records were submitted to Istanbul. Accordingly, their debt turned out to be six thousand purses; however, Hüseyin Pasha and İbrahim Efendi admitted to only half of the debt and denied the other half. The petitioners were certain of the amount in spite of the denial.[71]

Besides excessive taxation, according to the petition of the inhabitants, the former mutasarrıf of Muş and the kethüda still caused trouble for the people by provoking their network of allies in the province. The *sarraf* (money lender) Köseoğulları of Erzurum were supporting some houses among the Kurdish tribes, known as Hacı Mahmud, Beyzadelu, İsâlu, Süvar and Bölükbaşı, in their assaults on the villages of Muş during which they plundered products and houses and killed and injured the people. Even worse, peasants were paying to those Kurds annually four times more than the regular tax as they were afraid of their cruelty.[72] The inhabitants claimed, said Kurds were patronized

69 BOA. A. MKT. 30/13, 6 Zilkade 1261 (6 November1845).

70 Ibid.

71 BOA. A. DVN. 17/62, 23 Şaban 1262 (16 August 1846).

72 Ibid.

by Ferik Bahri Pasha, who refused all their complaints instead of protecting them against those kinds of encroachments. With an emphasis on the requirements of the Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye, the inhabitants demanded that their disgruntlement be resolved so that they can be occupied with their work and pay annual taxes according to their possessions and incomes without fear for security of their lives and property.[73]

The preliminary effect of the Tanzimat on the inhabitants of Muş was that they used its terminology and utilized newly established mechanisms like provincial councils to make their voices heard. Similarly, the volume on the case of İbrahim Efendi in the Ottoman archives suggests that the Tanzimat reformers were wary about the resolution of the problems of the inhabitants. For instance, they were worried that although most of the signatories of the petition were Muslim, the people preferred to send them through patriarchate.[74] Emphasizing that Muş was located on the frontier with Iran and Russia, the central authorities were of the mind to resolve the discontent of the people "against friends and foes."[75] Nevertheless, the problems of the inhabitants of Muş needed to be solved not only because of delicate border issues, but also because of the urgent situation of the welfare of the region. The British Consul in Erzurum perfectly depicted its situation in the first half of the nineteenth century as follows:

> The soil and climate are excellent, and the province ought to be rich and to yield a great revenue, but it is verging to the state of an uncultivated waste, frequented by a scanty population of wandering tribes, uniting the characters of shepherds and robbers. The continuing in power of any native whatever, will only involve the province in irrecoverable anarchy and ruin. It requires a disinterested, intelligent and

73 Ibid.

74 "… mahâzır-ı mezbûrde olan yüz kırk dokuz 'aded mührün seksân bir 'adedi ahâlî-i islâm ismine iken mahâzırın patrik tarafına gönderilmesi emr-i müstagreb görülmüş …" Ibid.

75 "... her nasıl ise livâ-i mezbûr Erzurum eyâleti dâhilinde bulunmuş olduğundan ve oraların İrânlu ve Rusyalu hudûduna karâbeti cihetiyle re'âyânın müteâ'kıben vâki' olan sızıldılarının yâr ve agyâra karşu ber-taraf edilmesi ..."Ibid.

> courageous Governor, who will sacrifice his comfort and interest to its improvement.[76]

Not only consular reports but also central and provincial ones mostly acknowledged the necessity of the region's being governed by someone other than the local gentry. However, the nomination of Ahmed Kaşif Agha to Muş did not ameliorate the conditions. Thus, Şerif Bey became the kaimakam of Muş for the last time until his ultimate exile. As thoroughly discussed in what follows, two factors paved the way for Şerif Bey to again be the kaimakam of Muş. On one hand, there was the difficulty of applying Tanzimat reforms in Muş with a governor who did not have knowledge about the specificities of the region; on the other, there was turmoil in Van, which was grounded on reactions to the Tanzimat reforms.

## § 4.3 Old Agents and the New Regime

In spring 1845, when the defterdar (provincial treasurer) of Erzurum, Ali Tevfik Efendi, reported the difficulties in carrying out the income and population surveys in Muş together with Kars, Çıldır, and Erzurum, the kaimakam of Muş was Kaşif Agha, a stranger to the region. According to his report, Muş was one of the places where they could not carry out an income survey. As the region was close to Van, turmoil there could easily affect Muş, which was mostly inhabited by tribes and clans (*aşair ve kabail taifesi*). Although, the official stated, Kaşif Ağa promised that Tanzimat would be applied soon in Muş, the central authorities needed to choose someone who was accustomed to the region, had influence over the tribes, and could be a mediator vis-à-vis the chaos in Van.[77] Therefore, although his exile was discussed previously together with those of Hüseyin Pasha and İbrahim Efendi, Şerif Bey was appointed as kaimakam of Muş. In the same way, Hüseyin Pasha was nominated as district governor (*müdir*) of Ispir and Bayburd. The incorporation of Kurdish notables in the administrative system after the Tanzimat was not specific to Muş. By this means, central authorities tried to diminish, if not prevent, the anxiety of

76 FO. 195/227, No: 17, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, March 24, 1846.

77 BOA. C. DH. 299/14949, 15 Rebiülahir 1261 (23 April 1845).

the provincial gentry regarding reforms. This precaution was also in line with the gradual (*refte refte*) implementation of the reforms.

The initial anxiety of Kurdish notables stemmed from the transformation of land politics under the Tanzimat reforms. To put it differently, when the matter of the abrogation of yurtluk-ocaklık lands was discussed as a means of increasing the share of the central treasury in the struggle over revenues, softening the reactions of the holders of this kind of inherited land became crucial. Hence, putting them on salary and appointing them as district governors were two means of incorporating of these uneasy notables. Similarly, after the provinces of Erzurum and Diyarbakır together with the district of Maden-i Hümâyûn were brought under the Tanzimat, the abrogation of yurtluk-ocaklık lands in the districts of Palu and Eğil was added to the agenda. The motivation was to triple the revenues of the central treasury. In return, proper salaries would be assigned to the possessors of these lands and some, if thought to be appropriate, be nominated as district governors.[78] However, the problem was that most of the yurtluk-ocaklıks was in the province of Erzurum, which was exempted from this decision due to its location on the frontier. The problem was that when other yurtluk-ocaklık holders heard about the enforcement of this decision in the districts of Diyarbakır, the rumors would spread which in turn led to a general disorder and an insurrection.[79]

These fears were not groundless. The eastern borderland of the empire was in turmoil. The reason for Van's rebellion was opposition to the implementation of the Tanzimat. The revolt in Van influenced its neighbors, especially felt in Çıldır, Kars, Erzurum, and Muş. Nevertheless, the logic of the uprisings was simple and obvious to both Tanzimat reformers and foreign observers: it was not common people but notables whose interests clashed with the new taxation and land politics that were causing the unrest. The local notables whose

78 BOA. MVL. 2/24, 11 Cemaziyelahir 1261 (17 June 1845).

79 "... bu misillû vâridâtın çoğu Erzurum eyâletinde bulunmuş ve eyâlet-i merkûme ser-haddânı hakânîyeden olmak mülâbesesiyle müstesnâ tutulduğu hâlde zikr olunan kazâlar ahâlîsinin mesmû'ları olarak kîl û kali mûceb olacağı zâhir görünmüş olduğundan ..." Ibid.

power alliances were deeply rooted in the region could manipulate news and spread rumors.[80]

In the province of Çıldır in 1845, as a part of Tanzimat, the tithes of all fiefs, yurtluk-ocaklıks, and mâlikânes (life term tax-farms) were decided to be collected by the central treasury. Yet this was only to ascertain the worth of those lands; the revenues would be returned to their holders. Nevertheless, this led to anxiety among the notables. Some even went to Sublime Porte. Fearing that all of their lands would be confiscated by the central treasury, they asked how they could maintain their families' survival. Upon this, the former governor of Çıldır was blamed for his inability to properly explain the aims and benefits of the Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye.[81]

Therefore, the Tanzimat state required capable agents to convey the objectives of the reforms to the people. In Muş, the appointment of Şerif Bey can be analyzed in this context. Kamil Pasha - who was appointed to supervise the implementation of reforms in Ottoman Kurdistan - depicted Ahmed Kaşif Agha, the previous governor of Muş, as a person who pursued only his interests and who, as a "foreigner" could not carry out the tasks of the region.[82] Similarly, the British Consul of Erzurum argued that the agha had neither friends nor connections in the region and trusted in Oseb, the milletbaşı for every matter.[83] This was the first example of a centrally-appointed administrator relying on provincial leaders to carry out business in Muş. In the same vein, the inhabitants complained that given the power vacuum, the oppression and extortion by Kurdish tribes had increased.[84]

At this conjuncture, despite his unpunished crimes, Şerif Bey was appointed first due to his familiarity with the region and his network of allies. He had influence not only over the tribes of Muş but was also kin to Han

80 In Muş, as mentioned before, when the newly appointed defterdar was carrying out his duties, rumors spread that a new cattle tax was to be imposed and that the mineral springs that the people were using in common were to be put up for auction and given to tax-farmers. All turned out to be false. FO 195/227, No: 10, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, April 9, 1845.

81 BOA. İ. MSM. 49/1233, 17 Ramazan 1261 (19 September 1845).

82 Ibid.

83 FO. 195/227, No:34, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, October8, 1845.

84 BOA. İ. MSM. 49/1233, 17 Ramazan 1261 (19 September 1845).

Mahmud of Van and Nurullah Bey of Hakkari. He had mediated between Han Mahmud and the central authorities before and could encourage him to pay the required taxes and obey the orders of the Ottoman government. Moreover, to justify the appointment of Şerif Bey, his previous services for the Imperial Army, during the eras of Reşid and Hafız Pashas was recalled.[85]

Second, as the rebellion in Van had already created troubles on the frontier, central and provincial authorities came to a consensus on the idea that the discipline and removal of local notables should be delayed until Tanzimat reforms were implemented in order to prevent further turmoil in the region. Briefly, the appointment of Şerif Bey was formulated as urgent so that the Tanzimat could be applied.[86] Thus, his nomination was temporary. As clearly stated in official documents, once the revolt of Van was suppressed the region would again be governed by centrally-appointed kaimakams and müdirs who "proved" themselves.[87]

Meanwhile, the governor of Erzurum summoned Şerif Bey and his brother Murad Bey, declaring the appointment of the former to Muş. Importantly, the governor warned Şerif Bey about giving or receiving presents while in his official post. Due to the Tanzimat, he did not need to submit presents to anyone. Otherwise, it would be contrary to the consent of the sultan if he accepted any presents.[88] Halil Kamili Pasha, the former governor of Erzurum who was then entrusted with the implementation of the Tanzimat in Ottoman Kurdistan, warned Şerif Bey himself concerning the issue of presents.[89] Along the same

85 Ibid.

86 "... Van ihtilâli henüz bitişmemiş ve nizâmât-ı cedîde icrâ ve te'sîs olunmamış olduğu hâlde bu misillû erkân-ı eyâletin tard ve teb'îdleri sâir vücûh ve mu'teberân-ı eyâletin tevhîşiyle izâle-i emniyetini istilzâm iderek tahrîkât ve ifsâdâtın vuku'una sebeb vireceği ..." Ibid.

87 "… ihtilâl-i mezkûrun indifâ'ından sonra oralara bendegân-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeden mucerreb kâimakâm ve müdirler nasb ve ta'yîni tasavvurâtına göre bunların me'mûriyyetleri muvakkat hükmünde bulunacağına mebnî ..." Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 FO. 195/227, No: 32, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, September 9, 1845. Consul Brant heard speculation about Şerif Bey's giving money to Sami Bekir Pasha and Enveri Efendi, Ottoman representatives in frontier negotiations with Iran to be nominated to Muş. The consul stressed how deeply the system of bribery was rooted in that region. Ibid.

lines, the existing governor of Erzurum, Esad Pasha also stressed that system had changed. The only thing Şerif Bey should do to keep his position and be promoted was to perform his duties decently.[90] These warnings point to the change in the administrative practice, in which present exchange was started to be deemed as corruption and so was forbidden.[91]

When Şerif Bey became kaimakam of Muş, two urgent topics were on the agenda. As mentioned above, one was the revolt of Van. The other one was the disobedience of Kurdish tribes in Muş; the commoners constantly complained of their cruelty. As mentioned before, the predecessor of Şerif Bey, Ahmed Kaşif Agha, had not effectively dealt with the encroachment of the tribes, which in turn increased both the suffering and complaints of the people. The network that Şerif Bey's family had established with the Hasenan and Cibran and also the Haydaran and Zilan were depicted in the previous chapter. Therefore, the belief that Şerif Bey could be influential in controlling the Kurdish tribes – and bring about their settlement, taxation and conscription in the context of the Tanzimat - was one of the factors that enabled him to become kaimakam of Muş. Although the Tanzimat reforms in respect to tribal population of Muş will be thoroughly discussed in chapter 7, it is necessary to spare a few lines for tribal matters to comprehend both the role of Şerif Bey and to grasp the situation of a neighbor of Van, where the people were rising up against the Tanzimat.

As described by Esad Pasha, the governor of Erzurum, in summer most Kurdish tribes dwelled in tents in the pastures of Muş, and they spent winters in some of its villages where they terrorized villagers, attacked them, and plundered their property like fodder.[92] Şerif Bey was employed for almost a year to settle some of these tribal families in empty houses, prevent their attacks on

90 FO. 195/227, No: 47, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, December 12, 1845. As paraphrased in a report of Consul Brant, the words of the Pasha were as following: "The pasha told the Bey he had been very foolish in feeing so many people who would do him no good, but as the system was now changed, he need not give a single piastre to anybody, but he was required to act uprightly and fairly, which would do more to keep him in his post than the largest bribes." Ibid.

91 Cengiz Kırlı, "Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi," *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar* 4 (2006): 52.

92 BOA. MVL. 8/38, 15 Ramazan 1262 (6 September 1846).

the livelihood of the villagers, and tax them. Consequently, the oppression of the people was partially diminished. However, the governor was certain that the inhabitants could be definitely relieved by the settlement of the tribes, which could only be carried out slowly. Nevertheless, the most urgent issue was to deal with five families of the tribes about which both the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of Muş complained. Şerif Bey was authorized to send these families to Erzurum on the pretext of determining the amount of taxes they could pay. Therefore, they would be settled in appropriate districts in Erzurum. If they did not depart willingly, Şerif Bey was given the authority to dispatch them forcefully.[93] Said tribal families were from the Hasenan and Cibran tribes. Şerif Bey was also charged with capturing tribesmen involved in murder and theft and sending them to the governor of Erzurum.[94]

Meanwhile, Şerif Bey was also responsible for the capture of the famous Rıdvan Agha of Hasenan, whose story will be elaborated upon in chapter 7.[95] Having plundered the sub-district Bulanık of Muş, Rıdvan Agha first fled to the Castle of Malazgirt, then sheltered in the house of Han Mahmud and later became part of the coalition of Han Mahmud and Bedirhan Bey.[96] The sheltering of Rıdvan Agha by Han Mahmud exemplified the fears of both central and provincial authorities regarding the possibility of joining of neighboring Kurdish tribes in the turmoil in Van. In his report, Bahri Pasha specifically stressed that until the problems in Van were solved, Şerif Bey was fully authorized to deal with disaffected tribes.[97]

No matter the provisional nature of Şerif Bey's governorship in Muş, he sought to settle old scores with rivals in the region. One was with famous Hüseyin Pasha, his cousin. The other one was with the new milletbaşı of Muş and Bitlis, Simon. These cases are important in depicting the networks and

93 Ibid.

94 BOA. MVL. 9/38, 4 Zilhicce 1262 (23 November 1846).

95 BOA. A. MKT. 59/80, 7 Muharrem 1263 (26 December 1846).

96 Ahmet Kardam, *Cizre - Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan: Direniş ve İsyan Yılları* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2011), 322.

97 BOA. MVL. 9/38, 4 Zilhicce 1262 (23 November 1846).

conflicts of interest of local power holders in Muş and their struggle over its revenues.

### 4.3.1 *The Settlement of Accounts*

The competition between Emin Pasha (and later Şerif Bey) and Hüseyin Pasha affected local power holders and tribal leaders in Muş and its vicinity. Thus, Şerif Bey had his own agenda when he was employed to supervise the implementation of Tanzimat reforms.[98] In the same vein, Hüseyin Pasha was right in arguing that Şerif Bey was determined to take revenge on people and tribes who had previously crossed his family. Those people consisted of almost five thousand houses, among which were those of Şerafeddin Bey of Hizan, Halil Bey of Huyut, Süleyman Agha of the Cibran, and Rıdvan Agha of the Hasenan.[99] The pasha appealed for justice by using the language of the Tanzimat, emphasizing that Şerif Bey's behavior was contrary to the Tanzimat (*mugayr-ı usûl-i Tanzimat*).[100]

Şerif Bey sought to deprive his rivals of their material wealth benefiting from the strength which stemmed from his official duties in the provincial administration of Muş. A certain Salih, the treasurer (haznedar) of Hüseyin Pasha and former administrator of Bulanık, claimed that he was guarantor of

98 Consul Brant also emphasizes how Şerif Bey implemented reforms only if they were in line with his interests: "The Government of Sheriff Bey is one of terror, he shows not the least intention of fulfilling the promises given to Essat Pasha. He enforces the Tanzimat, where it is favorable to his interest, and where it is not, he disregards it. He lives by supplying every want from the villages without payment, and, in short, the country was never more oppressed than at the present moment, the people are reduced to the lowest state of misery, and there is neither commerce, nor personal security." FO. 195/227 No: 17, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, March 24, 1846.

99 As reported by Osman Pasha, the müşir of the Anatolian Army, Şerif Bey also dismissed Şerafeddin Bey from Hizan, which his family had been holding as hükûmet with a berat-ı alişan (imperial certificate). Instead, he allegedly appointed his brother. The müşir confirmed that Şerafeddin Bey had the right and following correspondence with Istanbul, Osman Pasha was authorized to decide. Accordingly, Şerafeddin Bey was reappointed. BOA. İ. MSM. 50/1278, 8 Ramazan 1263 (20 August 1847).

100 BOA. MVL. 11/4, 29 Safer 1263 (16 February 1847).

the pasha's debt to a merchant called Ayvazoğlu Mıgırdıç. To pay his debts, Hüseyin Pasha mortgaged his house in Muş and the properties around it.[101] However, Şerif Bey intervened, evacuating the tenants of Hüseyin Pasha and forcefully seizing and destroying their properties. On top of it, he usurped three thousand guruş, the revenue from Hüseyin Pasha's landed property. Referring to the rule of Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye, Salih asked for an imperial decree for investigating the case and securing justice. Nevertheless, Şerif Bey legitimized his acts by saying that this land was needed for the settlement of troops of the Imperial Army. Moreover, Esad Pasha defended Şerif Bey, arguing that the land and the house of Hüseyin Pasha were held as the place for troops upon a decision of the council of Muş, and its rent was being paid, contrary to the claims of Hüseyin Pasha and Salih.[102]

A similar case in which Şerif Bey was cleared of blame took place with the representative of the non-Muslim inhabitants of Muş, Simon. As reported by the governor of Kurdistan in a petition dated 22 December 1847, the milletbaşı of Bitlis and Muş, Simon, accused the kaimakam of Muş, Şerif Bey, and his brother Hurşid of usurping his property, valued at two hundred thousand guruş. Both brothers sold them for forty-seven thousand guruş and took the money. Furthermore, they threatened him to execute him, so he had to flee Muş, come to Istanbul, and ask for justice [*ihkâk-ı hak*]. Upon this, the governor of Erzurum was ordered to investigate the details of the accusation. He interrogated both openly and confidentially the members of both the Muş and Bitlis councils as well as the representatives of both the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants. At the end of the investigation, it was reported that Simon was imprisoned by Şerif Bey because he had embezzled taxes collected from peasants, in the amount of nine thousand guruş. After a while, having guaranteed that he would repay the money, he was released. Yet he escaped without paying his debt. Adding that they had no information about whether Şerif Bey took

101 BOA. MVL. 29/29, 26 Zilkade 1264 (24 October 1848).

102 BOA. A. MKT. 168/35, 15 Safer 1265 (10 January 1849). Nonetheless, Consul Brant also reported that Şerif Bey took all the property in the house of Hüseyin Pasha, where his wife - the sister of Şerif - was living, claiming that her husband had debts. FO. 195/227 No: 23, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, April 24, 1846.

anything from Simon, witnesses from the councils of Muş and Bitlis expressed that Simon was not the kind of person who would have property valued at two hundred thousand guruş. Thus, their testimonies were in line with the statement of Şerif Bey. Therefore, emphasizing the bill of debt and acts of Simon, Esad Pasha argued that it was hard to say that Simon had not been involved in embezzlement. His words were most probably the results of his grudge against Şerif Bey, so they were just lies [*tezvîrât]*. Therefore, the governor demanded that Simon pay the debt and also be punished for his lies. Similarly, Esad Pasha pointed out that although Şerif Bey was not the kind of kaimakam who governed justly or and who could be trusted, in this case, based on witness' testimonies, he was innocent.[103]

No matter whether the testimonies of the council members from Muş and Bitlis were under influence by fear of Şerif Bey, this interrogation importantly showed the relations between the kaimakam of Muş and the tax collectors. Şerif Bey had also had a symbiotic relationship with the previous milletbaşı of Muş and Bitlis, Oseb. Consul Brant reported that Şerif Bey was even suspected of killing Oseb when their interests clashed.[104] Moreover, Şerif Bey obviously had a deep-rooted network in the newly established council. Regardless Şerif Bey's role with regard to the allegations, not only the local councils but also the provincial governors clearly took his side. It was possible that fear that the turmoil in Van could spread to Muş and the role of Şerif Bey in the suppression

103 "… mîr-i mûmâileyh kâimakâmlık umûrunu usûl-ı muâʿdelet şumûle tatbîken tesviye ve rü'yet ve iltizâm-ı hüsn-i hareket ider takımından olmıyarak …" BOA. MVL. 24/56, 11 Cemaziyelahir 1264 (15 May 1848).

104 FO. 195/227 No: 38, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, October 31, 1845. Oseb was found dead in prison due to apoplexy. The doctor of quarantine in Muş suspected either poisoning or torture. Yet as he could not do an autopsy on the body, he could not assert it with certainity. Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Muş believed that Şerif Bey was behind the death of Oseb but could not say it aloud. Ibid. Istanbul decided to investigate the case, yet the doctor did not dare declare his opinion. In addition, Brant states that two hundred people, none of them ever saw the body of the deceased, attested that Oseb died of natural causes. Ibid., No: 17, March 24, 1846.

of Bedirhan Bey's revolt - or in the words of Sabri Ateş, his leaving the "league of notables"[105] - were key factors for ignoring his part in the described offenses.

## § 4.4 Şerif Bey as Mediator: The Beginning of the End

As Ahmet Kardam put it, tensions in Van started when the province of Erzurum was brought under Tanzimat at the beginning of 1845, turned into an open rebellion towards spring, and ended in July 1847 with the suppression of Bedirhan Bey's revolt.[106] The documents and reports concerning turmoil in Van were copious in both Ottoman and British Consulate records. Accordingly, the inhabitants of Van sought to prevent the implementation of the Tanzimat there by not letting the newly appointed kaimakam, Sırrı Pasha, and a battalion of soldiers enter the city. Consul Brant stressed that the reason for the people's resistance to the Tanzimat was that they were not aware of its content; or more correctly, those whose interests clashed with the reforms were misguiding the common people.[107] Although this perception regards the common people as passive receptors, opposition to the Tanzimat was indeed strong among the privileged - the holders of mâlikânes and yurtluk-ocaklıks. As mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, the anxiety of those elites was strongly felt in the Kurdish periphery of the empire.

Similarly, in Van, people were determined to prevent the implementation of the Tanzimat. Reportedly, instead of Sırrı Pasha, the officially appointed kaimakam who was not allowed to enter in the city, Timurzade Mustafa Bey, a person from the local dynasty, was chosen as the kaimakam of Van. Upon that, the governor of Erzurum dispatched two men to Van to investigate the issue and advise the rebels. However, the people of Van sent a petition sealed by ten persons to be submitted to governor himself. They demanded the approval of the nomination of Mustafa Bey as kaimakam of Van and insisted

105 Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, 87-89.

106 Kardam, *Cizre - Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan*, 219.

107 FO 195/227, No: 13, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, May 16 1845., Ibid., No: 15, June 6, 1845.

they would not accept the Tanzimat.[108] In fact, the situation continued as such for a while: submitting petitions and discussing terms of agreement.

Nevertheless, the significance of the issue of Van stemmed from its being part of the alliance of Bedirhan Bey, which would broken apart in summer 1847. The motivations and objects of Bedirhan Bey are beyond the scope of this study.[109] Notwithstanding, as its sphere of influence also included Muş, the attitude of the beys of Muş will be briefly discussed in this part. The consular reports emphasized that the Porte suspected a "plot" had taken place between Han Mahmud and Bedirhan Bey even before the revolt of Van began. They were also aware that Şerif Bey was part of it.[110] Şerif Bey was appointed as kaimakam once gain to mediate in the Van revolt and to implement Tanzimat reforms in Muş, yet his appointment can be thought of as a a precautionary measure to nullify the coalition of Bedirhan Bey.

Meanwhile, aware that his position in Muş was not certain, Şerif Bey complied with the rules, trying to garner the approval and appreciation of the governors of Erzurum. The governors of Erzurum employed him to Van to convince the rebels to give up with their opposition.[111] Hence, his efforts brought about results. In a report, the late governor of Erzurum, Süleyman Bahri Pasha, spoke highly of him. Stressing the influence of the bey in the pacification of Kurdish tribes in Muş, as discussed above, Bahri Pasha claimed that Şerif Bey worked hard to apply Tanzimat reforms, and until then, he did not act against the orders.[112]

However, both in the revolt of Van and in his relations with Bedirhan Bey, Şerif Bey arguably played both sides. Although he sent men to suppress the Van revolt, both central and provincial authorities knew that he join Han

108 Kardam, *Cizre - Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan*, 219.

109 For Bedirhan Bey, see Hakan, *Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde Kürtler*; Kardam, *Cizre - Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan*; Mehmet Alagöz, "Old Habits Die Hard, A Reaction to the Application of Tanzimat: Bedirhan Bey's Revolt" (master's thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2003); Yener Koç, "Bedirxan Pashazades: Power Relations and Nationalism (1876-1914)" (master's thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2012).

110 FO. 195/227, No: 21, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, December 9, 1844.

111 Ibid. No: 60, November 27, 1846.

112 BOA. MVL. 9/38, 4 Zilhicce 1262 (23 November 1846).

Mahmud and Bedirhan if it became certain that the rebels would be successful.[113] In other words, although neither central nor provincial authorities completely trusted Şerif Bey on this issue, his alliance was vital for the suppression of the revolt as the main strategy was to break the coalition that Bedirhan and Han Mahmud had established.

Therefore, Şerif Bey refrained from openly supporting Han Mahmud or Bedirhan Bey and was praised and rewarded by the central government upon the appreciation of local actors like the defterdar of Erzurum and the Ottoman representative in the border negotiations with Iran, Enveri Efendi.[114] In the course of preparing military operations to subdue Bedirhan Bey and his alliance, Şerif Bey, like many other beys and aghas in Ottoman Kurdistan, clarified his alliance with the government. For this, central authorities applied to myriad means to convince and win back the Kurdish notables and tribal and religious leaders around Bedirhan Bey.[115]

In the same vein, with the aim of guaranteeing Şerif Bey's support of the Imperial Army in the planned operation against Bedirhan Bey, Osman Pasha, the *müşir* (marshal) of the Anatolian Army, granted him the rank of *Istabl-ı Amire*.[116] Osman Pasha, in a letter addressed to Şerif Bey, clearly expressed first the determination of central authorities to eliminate Bedirhan Bey, who insisted on opposition and rebellion. Second, the letter charges Şerif Bey and his brothers, who were awarded with knifes and swords, to act in accordance with the demands of Ahmet Pasha who would command the troops from Muş and

113 In the same vein, Consul Brant noted in February 1846 that in the case of any mistake in the suppression of the Van revolt, both Bedirhan and Şerif Beys would declare their support with for rebels. FO. 195/227 No: 23, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, July 1, 1845.

114 BOA. A. MKT. 64/72, 15 Safer 1263 (2 February 1847).

115 For a detailed account of Bedirhan Bey's pacification and the dispelling of his alliance, see Kardam, *Cizre - Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan*, 299-366.

116 "...'arz ve beyân olduğu vechile lüzûm ve icâbına mebnî ıstabl-ı 'amire pâye-i refî'esine mahsûs bir kıta' nişân Muş kâimakâmı Şerif beğ bendelerine virilmiş ..." BOA. A. MKT. 79/82, 16 Cemaziyelevvel 1263 (28 April 1847). Meanwhile, Hurşid Bey was ranked as *dergâh-ı âli kapucubaşı*. BOA. A. MKT. NZD 93/37, 29 Zilhicce 1267 (25 October 1851). And Murad Bey had already been a *Miralay*. BOA. HAT. 634/313307 C, 27 Cemaziyelahir 1254 (17 September 1838).

Bitlis against Bedirhan Bey. Moreover, the müşir ordered Şerif Bey to inform him about people who being forced to support Bedirhan Bey out of fear as well as about those who thought it was too late to be forgiven. Thus, the main scheme in the dissolution of Bedirhan Bey's revolt was to isolate him, and Şerif Bey played a crucial part.[117]

Similarly, the promotion of Şerif Bey to a higher rank was a sign of his submission to the Sublime Porte and it was used to encourage other beys to leave the alliance led by Bedirhan Bey. In spring 1847, Osman Pasha dispatched a great many letters to Nurullah Bey and Han Mahmud through Şerif Bey. These mostly concerned the reward of Şerif with imperial gifts in return of his loyalty, and his case was thus depicted as an example to the beys being addressed. For instance, Osman Pasha asked both Nurullah Bey and Han Mahmud to trust in Şerif Bey and ordered them to immediately submit to the central authority. It was portrayed as being in their best interest to benefit from this opportunity.[118]

Although Han Mahmud maintained his relationship with Bedirhan Bey, but because of these persuasive messages, Nurullah Bey of Hakkari left the coalition, as Şerif Bey had done. However, his son-in-law Yezdanşer (İzzeddin Şîr), who was also the nephew of Bedirhan Bey, was influential in the defection of Nurullah Bey. Yezdanşer also departed Cizre and took shelter with Esad Pasha in Mosul. Thereupon, he became effective in the dissolution of Bedirhan Bey's alliance.[119] In the same vein, Han Mahmud's allies were also dispersing. His brother Han Abdal, promising to surrender the castle of Hoşap, also submitted to the governor of Erzurum's calls to surrender.[120] Losing control of such a strategic castle tremendously affected the result of the revolt.

117 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 2/103, 27 Cemaziyelevvel 1263 (13 May 1847).

118 "... mûmâileyh Şerif beyin ifâdesine itimâden hiç kimesnenin sözlerine aldanmıyarak hakkında olacak ni'met ve taltîfâtı beyhude elden çıkarmıyarak hemân tarafımıza muvâsalat eylemeniz ..." Ibid.

119 Kardam, *Cizre - Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan*, 329.

120 Ibid., 333.

The alliance of Bedirhan Bey thus was broken quickly, within a month.[121] Kardam emphasized that the period between the call to surrender and the resignation of Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud was sixty-seventy days. Furthermore, combat between the Ottoman Army and the forces of Bedirhan and Han Mahmud continued at intervals thirty-seven days.[122] Hence, the crucial point was to negotiate with and win the components of Bedirhan Bey's allies over, among whom Şerif Bey and his brothers' roles were critical. Hereafter, the revolt was easily and quickly suppressed. Nurullah Bey of Hakkari and Yezdan Şer of Cizre were among those who left Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud.

Finally, Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud surrendered themselves in July 1847, the former in the Castle of Evreh and the latter in Tatvan. Together with their families and some of their allies they left for Samsun where they took a ship to Istanbul.[123] Thereafter, neither Bedirhan Bey nor Han Mahmud was allowed to return to their homelands. Furthermore, by eliminating power-holders like Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud who were influential among the Kurds, the major source of resistance against Tanzimat reforms was removed. Hence, through transforming the administrative units and most importantly depriving notables from their sources of power - both from their hereditary lands and network of allies - by exiling them, central and provincial authorities considered that the implementation of the reforms were smoothly realized.

After the pacification of Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud, which is generally referred to as the "conquest of Kurdistan" in official correspondence, the first administrative reorganization undertaken at the end of 1847 was to constitute the province of Kurdistan which included Diyarbakır, Van, Muş, Hakkari, Cizre, Bohtan, and Mardin. Reportedly, this decision stemmed from the necessity of providing for the prosperity and security of the inhabitants of

121 Ibid., 370.

122 Ibid., 342.

123 Ibid., 360.

Ottoman Kurdistan by governing it properly and bringing it under control.[124] Therefore, the governor was to be an experienced, well-known official in the region, Mehmed Esad Muhlis Pasha, who had long been at the governorship of Erzurum Province.[125]

Although with the elimination of Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud a significant part of the Kurdish coalition was pacified, central and provincial authorities had to incorporate those who had left Bedirhan Bey's league for a while. Among them was Yezdanşer, the nephew of Bedirhan, who became the mütesellim of Cizre upon the exile of Bedirhan Bey. Nurullah Bey became the administrator of Hakkari. In addition, Abdal Bey, the nephew of Han Mahmud (not Han Abdal, his brother, who was exiled together with Han Mahmud), was appointed to Müküs.[126] Similarly, Şerif Bey and his brothers kept their positions. Nevertheless, the situations of Şerif, Nurullah, and Abdal Beys and Yezdanşer were temporary. Although they had coordinated with Ottoman authorities against the coalition of Bedirhan Bey, they were also regarded as potential obstacles to the implementation of the new regime in the current context. The blueprint for the new land tenure politics targeted the abrogation of their yurtluk-ocaklıks, which had been taking place gradually since the 1830s.

## § 4.5 Exile of Alaaddin Pashazades from Muş

Therefore, soon after Bedirhan and Han Mahmud's exile, in October 1847, the governor and defterdar of Erzurum emphasized in a joint report that as long as Şerif Bey and his relatives remained in the region it would be impossible to bring the revenue of the region to light. However, conditions were not yet

124 "Havâlî-i Kürdistânın bir idâre-i muntazama ve zâbıta-i hüsn-i tahtına konularak tesîs-i nizâmât-ı dâimiyesiyle ahâlînin husûl-i sa'âdet ve âsâyiş-i hâlleri lâzımeden olmasıyla ..." BOA. İ. MVL. 122/3116, 27 Receb 1264 (29 July 1848).

125 Esad Pasha remained as the governor of Kurdistan Province until his death in March 1851. Mehmet Süreyya Bey, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, 6 vols., vol. 2 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), 495.

126 Kardam, *Cizre - Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan*, 379-81.

suitable, as the pacification of the tribes of Dersim continued.[127] These remarks importantly show that time for the disciplining of Şerif Bey and his family was arriving and that his collaboration for the suppression of revolts in Cizre and Van had only delayed this process. Therefore, almost a year later, after preliminary steps like the constitution of a new province of Kurdistan were taken, the disciplining of Şerif Bey was again put on the agenda. Esad Pasha, the governor of Kurdistan, penned an evaluation of Şerif Bey's situation about which he had been asked. Having established order to some extent by eliminating resistance in Van and Cizre-Bohtan, central authorities were questioning the necessity of keeping Kurdish notables with whom they had previously collaborated. Since order had been established there (*elhâletü hazihi bu havâlî usûlüne girmiş*) and since Şerif Bey was a native (*yerlûsundan*), his attitude toward the new regime and his rule was questioned in order to determine whether it was necessary to keep or punish him. Recalling his experience during his governorship in Erzurum, Esad Pasha felt certain that Şerif Bey and his brothers should be dismissed. Therefore, he asked to keep Şerif Bey in custody in Diyarbekir or that he be sent to Istanbul for reckoning (*ihkâk-ı hak*) with his complainants.[128] The reasons for the position of Esad Pasha are important both to grasp the details of the implementation of reforms in Muş and to shed light on local actors in the context of the Tanzimat.

The main obstacle to the application of Tanzimat reforms in Muş was the deeply rooted power networks in the region. The political economy of the region – land tenure system and the right to levying taxes - was the main platform on which this network consolidated itself. As stated in the report of Esad Pasha, the tithe and some other taxes in the region were mostly undertaken by relatives of Şerif Bey. Additionally, it was discovered by the property clerk (*mal kâtibi*) in Muş, Mustafa Efendi, that in addition to taxes determined by the center, many other taxes were collected arbitrarily on the various pretexts. On the top of that, it was reported that Şerif Bey, as kaimakam of Muş, was collecting taxes (*virgü*) higher than the determined rate (*biraz*

127 BOA. A. MKT. 100/13, 19 Zilkade 1263 (29 October 1847).

128 BOA. İ. MVL. 122/3116, 27 Şaban 1264 (29 July 1848). Among them was his cousin Hüseyin Pasha.

*zammiyeluce*).[129] However, it could not be proved, as all administrators of the sub-districts of Muş were relatives of Şerif Bey.[130]

However, not only governors and tax farmers of the sub-province but also community leaders were involved in over taxation. For instance, the *karabaşı* (bishop) of Çanlı Church in Muş, called Zakar was along with Şerif Bey accused of pursuing their own interests in collection of the *emval-i miri* (imperial taxes) and the *cizye-i şerri* (poll-tax) from some parts of reʿâyâ of Garzan who were dwelling in Muş.[131] These remarks depict the implementation of tax reforms, in regions where the networks of interest groups were deeply rooted. Although the Rescript of Gülhane promised the abolition of taxes other than one determined according to one's possessions and income, this case exemplifies how local actors still had great authority in practical fulfillment of this reform. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in chapter 6 of this study, even after the exile of influential Kurdish families far from their hometowns, the implementation of just taxation did not immediately take place.

Apart from taxation issues, Christian inhabitants of the region were especially disgruntled about Şerif Bey because of the tribes that were settled in Armenian villages. During the time of Kaşif Ömer Efendi, the previous administrator of the sub-province of Muş, the Kurds called Rizko,[132] consisting of a thousand houses, had petitioned to settle and engage in agriculture in specific places called Göksu and Patnos. Halil Kamili Pasha and the Provincial Council of Erzurum jointly accepted the request of the tribe. However, Şerif Bey became responsible for tribal settlement upon his appointment to the post. Afterwards, with provocation and encouragement (*tahrik ve teşvikleriyle)* of Şerif Bey and his brothers stemming from their ambition (*nefsaniye*t) – and with the approval of Esad Pasha - said tribe was divided among and settled in

129 With the Tanzimat, all the customary duties (*tekâlif-i örfiye*) were combined into just one tax, which was called the special tax (*vergi-i mahsûsa*) or simply *vergi* (tax). See Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli*, 40.

130 BOA. İ. MVL. 122/3116, 27 Receb 1264 (29 July 1848).

131 BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 6/63, 19 Muharrem 1264 (27 Aralık 1847).

132 I have not come across a tribe section called Rizko that were settled in Muş. It is possible that said Kurds were the tribe households under the leadership of Rıdvan Agha of the Hasenan, as the agha himself was called as "Rizko" from time to time.

Armenian villages, and they were allowed to engage in agriculture on the villagers' lands.[133]

Nevertheless, this decision was mainly justified that despite the fact that seminomadic groups' oppression of the peasants of Muş was known to provincial authorities, this tribe was settled in small groups, just three to five houses in each Armenian village. And it was believed that as villagers would outnumber tribe members, they would not be oppressed. However, Armenian villagers complained that the tribe members insulted and tyrannized taking their churches and using them as barns. In addition, the suffering peasants were so exhausted that they could not cope with the attacks about which they had long been resentful. All of this hatred culminated in reaction against Şerif Bey. Besides, provincial and central councils discussed settling the Rizko Kurds in Muslim villages or sparing some other places for their resettlement.[134]

With such allegations and in line with the opinion of Esad Pasha, the Meclis-i Vâlâ decided and the sultan approved the dismissal of Şerif Bey. Accordingly, Şerif Bey was kept in Diyarbekir, the center of the province of Kurdistan, and Esad Pasha would nominate a new kaimakam to Muş who would be able and competent and work for the previous salary of the kaimakamlık, which was four thousand five hundred guruş, or less. The kaimakam could have been appointed from the center, yet it would have resulted in a delay in the arrangement of the affairs of the region, especially in the auction of tax farms, which had been already held in Diyarbekir.[135]

Whether the complaints of the Armenian peasants of Muş were the real reasons for Şerif Bey's dismissal or just pretexts is debatable. As the governor of the newly established Province of Kurdistan and because of his long experience with the notables of Muş, Esad Pasha's opinion played a key role in their dismissal.[136] However, relations between local notables and provincial

133 BOA. İ. MSM.52/1343, 12 Şevval 1264 (11 September 1848).

134 Ibid.

135 BOA. İ. MVL.122/3116, 27 Receb 1264 (29 July 1848).

136 "… Şerif beğ ve birâderlerinin mukaddemâ Erzurumda sebkât iden me'mûriyyet-i çâkeride meşhûd olân mişvâr ve girdârlarına nazaren bunlardan hüsn-i hidmet me'mûl olmıyacağına ve ahâlî ve fukarâ dâhi kendülerinden hoşnûd olmadıklarına binâen bunların fâmilyâca burâdan kaldırılmaları…" BOA. İ. MSM. 52/1346, 4 Zilkade 1264 (2 October 1848).

authorities had been volatile and included both conflict and collaboration. Thus, as emphasized before, provincial authorities also pursued their own interests; they were also "locals" in the struggle over resources. One of the fundamentals of nineteenth century reform was to maintain a direct role in provincial administration. Thus, from the beginning, the elimination of local yurtluk-ocaklık holders was crucial to achieving of such rule in the Kurdish periphery. Nevertheless, it was a gradual process; the same local actors were also essential for the application of the reforms. Similarly, even after the uprooting of the most influential figures from their areas of economic and political power, their relatives and allies in addition to less powerful local actors took part in provincial administration, as council members or tax collectors. In the same vein, members of the dynasty of Muş would be reincorporated into the administration of the sub-province in the course of time.

Although the dismissal of Şerif Bey was at first seen as appropriate, a difficulty stemmed from the fact that his sons and brothers had also been charged with posts in the sub-province of Muş.[137] Therefore, the elimination of Şerif Bey and his family and relatives took approximately a year and half. After the elimination of Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud their exile together with those of local actors in Van and Hakkari was the second phase in the elimination of Kurdish notables. Taking place on a frontier, this story includes tribal issues, affairs with Iran, and the last attempts of Kurdish emirs to seek power in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Following the suggestions of Esad Pasha, the removal of Şerif Bey from the governorship of Muş became definite with a decree dated 13 Ramadan 1264 (13 August 1848), and he was ordered to settle in Diyarbekir as a precaution against his creating turmoil in Muş. Şerif Bey was circumspectly informed of his dismissal from the post on the pretext that the constitution of the Province of Kurdistan required a change in the kaimakamlık of Muş. Nevertheless, due to their agreeable (*rızacuyane*) behaviors and with a concern for not alarming Nurullah Bey of Hakkari, Esad Pasha kept Şerif's son Mehmed Bey as the administrator of the district of Muş, and Murad Bey as the one of Bitlis, as well as Hurşid Bey as the one of Hınıs, Malazgird, and Bulanık. Şerif Bey also began

137 BOA. A. MKT. 143/66, 11 Ramazan 1264 (11 August 1848).

from time to time to reside in Bitlis (contrary to the initial decision to keep him in Diyarbekir). Moreover, Murad and Hurşid Beys accompanied officials who charged with the settlement of Kurdish tribes in Muş. Therefore, although neither Şerif Bey's nor his sons and brothers' employment in the region was desired, Esad Pasha, who was charged with nominating a proper kaimakam in Muş, suggested keeping those beys for a while until the trouble in Hakkari ended, contrary to his previous proposition.[138] The exile of Şerif Bey with his extended family was took place circumspectly in order to prevent unrest from spreading from Hakkari to Muş. Meanwhile, Şerif Bey and his brothers were busy with the settlement of the tribes. The settlement of tribes was at the top of the agenda, as can be understood from the willingness of Esad Pasha to keep Şerif and his brothers on for a while longer.

If settlement of tribes was one side of the coin in the postponement of Şerif Bey's dismissal, the other side concerned disturbances in Hakkari and Van where problems with Nurullah Bey and Abdal Bey respectively coincided with tribal and frontier issues with Iran. Both those beys together with Şerif Bey had left the alliance of Bedirhan Bey and were thus rewarded with posts in the administration of their hometowns in return for their services. However, this situation was not permanent, and they were regarded as the kind of people who would disrupt the continuity of security and order in Ottoman Kurdistan. In order not to destroy the results having been obtained in the region and in order to implement the Tanzimat, these notables need to be expelled from the region together with their families.[139]

Nevertheless, after benefiting from inter-frontier and tribal issues to delay his surrender,[140] Nurullah Bey surrendered to Reşid Pasha, the müşir of Anatolian Army in April 1849, and he was dispatched to Istanbul through

138 BOA. İ. MSM. 52/1346, 4 Zilkade 1264 (2 October 1848).

139 Ibid.

140 As stated in a British consular report, by February 1849 Nurullah Bey had taken refuge in Iran, which led to a great diplomatic problem between the two states. However, Nurullah Bey was so cautious that he claimed that as snow had closed the roads, he could not leave Berdasor, a castle in Iran. FO. 78/797, No: 5, Brant to Palmerston, Erzurum, February 16, 1849 and ibid. No: 13, Brant to Canning, Erzurum, March 13, 1849.

Trabzon.[141] Meanwhile, Şerif Bey and his brothers were arrested by Esad Pasha, as their exile had been delayed until the end of the trouble in Hakkari.[142] When the order demanding their arresting was reached, Şerif and Hurşid were in Van with Esad Pasha, and Murad Bey was in Muş. Having heard the news, Murad Bey surrendered to Esad Pasha, as well.[143] The order at first was to send them to Istanbul along with Nurullah Bey, yet later this decision was renounced. After they were allowed to settle their matters in Muş for seven or eight days, the three brothers went to Istanbul accompanied by a proper official.[144]

Not being sent with Nurullah Bey meant that Şerif Bey and his brothers would be handled differently. Indeed Reşid and Esad Pashas, in a joint report, emphasized that as Şerif Bey and his brothers had not been involved in an open revolt as Nurullah and Bedirhan had been, it was not necessary to send them far away (*mahal-i baʿîde*), yet it was not also acceptable to keep them nearby (*bu havâlîye takrîbleri*) as they had involved in a series of atrocities in the region. Nevertheless, both the governor and the müşir emphasized that Şerif Bey and his brothers were not so different from Bedirhan and the others. as their previous acts, disposition, and manners proved.[145] They were not alone in their perception of Kurdish notables; consul Brant penned the following lines upon their exile:

> The measure is a prudent one, for, while they remained in the country neither tranquility nor security could be hoped for: I do not believe that in any country with the slightest pretensions to civilisation, such criminals were left unpunished; they have been guilty of more numerous and more heinous crimes than can be easily imagined. Some other

141 Ibid. No: 15, Brant to Palmerston, April 16, 1849.

142 Ibid. No: 14, Brant to Palmerston, April 12, 1849, BOA. HR. TO. 212/11 (14 April 1849).

143 BOA. MVL. 226/61, 17 Şaban 1265 (8 July 1849).

144 BOA. İ. DH. 197/11181, 12 Şaban 1265 (3 July 1849).

145 Ibid.

> Koordish beys have also been seized and will be sent out of the country, and I hope this long ill-governed province will now begin to flourish.[146]

Eventually, Şerif, Murad, and Hurşid Beys were dispatched to Istanbul from where they would be sent to settle in Damascus.[147] For their remaining relatives and friends, who were numerous (*kesirü'l mütea'likât)*, Esad and Reşid Pashas emphasized that although they can no longer dare create trouble and disturb the region, an order was required to catch and exile them immediately in any case of their improper behavior.[148] Breaking the Kurdish beys' connection to their areas of influence eliminated the basis of their political power, which stemmed from their yurtluk-ocaklıks.

It was initially decided to send Şerif Bey, his brothers, and all of their relatives (*taallukat*) to settle permanently in Damascus in order to cut all their relationship with their former countries.[149] In Damascus, according to Brant, a quarter called Salahiyeh (Salihiye) was allocated to Kurds, so Şerif Bey and his family would feel at home.[150] All three brothers and their families, except one of Murad Bey's three wives, and the wife of his son, Selim Bey's wife, who were ill, were exiled. Those already in Istanbul would take a biweekly ship to Izmir where they would transfer to the ship to Beirut. From there, they would continue on their journey with the help of the governor of Sayda.[151] Those still in Muş would be sent directly to Damascus. In the reports of both the Grand Vizierate and the governor of Kurdistan, it was clear that orders had been sent to the müşir of Zaptieh, to the governor of Damascus, and the officials who

146 FO. 78/797, No: 14, Brant to Palmerston, Erzurum, April 12, 1849.

147 BOA. MVL. 226/61, 17 Şaban 1265 (8 July 1849). Meanwhile, their other brother, Hacı Ahmed Bey, who had long been dwelling in Ahlat and had no relation with his brothers and was not involved in any of their actions, was allowed to continue his life in Ahlat on the condition that he never go to Muş. Ibid.

148 BOA. İ. DH. 197/11181, 12 Şaban 1265 (3 July 1849).

149 "… eski vatanlarında bi'l-külliye kat'-ı 'alâyık ile dâimi sûretle Şam-i Şerifde iskân olunmaları …" BOA. A. MKT. 213/51, 24 Şaban 1265 (15 July 1849).

150 FO. 78/797, No: 30, Brant to Palmerston, Erzurum, August 9, 1849.

151 BOA. A. MKT. 213/51, 24 Şaban 1265 (15 July 1849).

would accompany the family from Kurdistan to Damascus to pay special attention to their safety and comfort on their journey.[152]

Meanwhile, Şerif Bey and his brothers were writing petitions to be allowed to settle in Istanbul, and in the end this request was accepted with the justification that they could be more easily guarded (*daha ziyâde dâire-i mahfûziyette bulunacakları*) in the capital city.[153] However, the part of the family in Muş had been compelled to sell their immovable properties and had been expelled from Muş (*ihrâc kılınmış*). According to Esad Pasha, by the time the order about the change to the place of their exile was received by messenger, they would have already arrived in Halep or traveled even further. Thus, the pasha suggested either sending them to Istanbul from Beirut or settling them there. The details of the sale of their properties were and would be a matter of discussion. The family mainly complained about the sale of their properties for less than their value and in some cases without their consent.[154] This matter together with the fate of the family's yurtluk-ocaklık villages will be the focus of next chapter.

## § 4.6 Conclusion

On the eve of inclusion of the sub-province of Muş into the Tanzimat program, its inhabitants were burdened by over taxation, forced labor, and indebtedness due the exploitative rule of local administrators, tax farmers, Armenian notables, and provincial authorities. Therefore, when the Tanzimat was declared in Muş, villagers understood it as tax reform. Notably, both the common people and the notables of Muş applied the language of the new regime to fulfill their requests. Nonetheless, the rest of the reforms were difficult to implement, as the frontier situation and tribal landscape of the region required first a suspension of the reforms and then their gradual execution.

152 "... esnâ-yı râhde bir güna sefâlet ve meşakkate düçâr olmayacak sûretle yanlarına kazâ be kazâ mücerreb ve mu'temed adamlar terfîkiyle ... " BOA. A. MKT. 225/82, 3 Zilkade 1265 (20 September 1849), BOA. A. MKT. 236/69, 29 Zilhicce 1265 (15 November 1849).

153 BOA.A. MKT. 229/50, 24 Zilkade 1265 (11 October 1849), BOA.İ.DH.202/11557, 18 Zilkade 1265 (5 October 1849).

154 BOA. MVL. 229/37, 27 Zilhicce 1265 (13 November 1849).

Harbingering a set of transformations in the fiscal, administrative, and judicial spheres, Tanzimat reforms aimed to establish a direct rule in peripheral provinces. Thanks to their rights over large tracts of lands called yurtluk-ocaklıks, their control over nomadic and seminomadic tribes, and their deep knowledge of the region, Kurdish notables enjoyed a great autonomy that began to be challenged in the early nineteenth century and more determinedly with the Tanzimat. The reforms aimed to take control over the agricultural surplus of the region which had remained up to then at the disposal of notables. Such an aim also entailed the administration of the region through officials other than local notables. Thus, the struggle over the revenues of the region again reframed the terms of negotiation.

The socioeconomic peculiarities of Muş in particular shaped the fate of its local dynasty. Both developments in its vicinity and its tribal landscape required the employment of Şerif Bey to fulfill the reforms. Resistance to reform in the city of Van, the revolt of Bedirhan Bey, and the settlement of the Kurdish tribes, who had been a burden on the settled inhabitants and damaged to the agricultural production - were the main facors that delayed the family's exile. Having been incorporated into the new regime with the posts and promotion Şerif Bey left the alliance of Bedirhan Bey and mediated for the dissolution of the rebellion. Nevertheless, the existence of Şerif Bey and his brothers in the region was regarded as contrary to the implementation of Tanzimat reforms by certain provincial authorities. However, their exile resulted in an ongoing debate over their yurtluk-ocaklık lands. Moreover, with their exile the idealized rule could not be established. The following two chapters will focus on the story of Muş after the exile of the Kurdish notables and annihilation of a land tenure system that had persisted for centuries.

# 5

## Aftermath of the Exile of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Holders

The defection of Şerif Bey from the coalition of Bedirhan Bey and his incorporation into the Ottoman army by being promoted with several ranks did not prevent him from suffering the same fate as those Kurdish notables. The mediation of Şerif Bey was temporary, not constant. He was initially employed to implement Tanzimat reforms, yet the opportunity created by the suppression of Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud made it possible to eliminate remaining local power holders like him. To put it differently, several Ottoman bureaucrats had advocated breaking the power of the notables in Ottoman Kurdistan since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Their main motivation was direct control over provincial revenues. The reflections of the implementation of this long-desired direct rule will be elaborated upon in chapter 6, yet the present chapter will focus on the establishment of a new land policy by completely annihilating the yurtluk-ocaklık system.

Before unfolding the details of the debate that started with the confiscation of the yurtluk-ocaklık lands of Şerif Bey and his family immediately after their exile, two points argued in the previous chapter should be recapitulated. First, the abrogation of such types of land ownership in Ottoman Kurdistan had occupied the minds of some Ottoman bureaucrats since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Emphasizing the yurtluk-ocaklık status of the sub-province of Muş, the governor of Erzurum complained as early as 1836 that taxes other than the poll tax were not being transferred from the sub-province to

the central treasury. As argued, although the best option was to confiscate lands that were being treated like private property (*mülk ittihaz itdikleri*), the conditions were not suitable.[1] Deprived of the necessary technologies to establish a direct rule in its Kurdish periphery, the Ottoman state required the collaboration of local notables in wars with Russia and Iran as well as with tribal and border issues with the latter. These dynamics had provided Emin Pasha, the eldest brother of Şerif Bey, with the necessary channels to increase his power in the 1820s.

Second, as argued, the abolishment of yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet lands was a gradual process. The Muş Beys of the nineteenth century probably exerted themselves much more than their ancestors had in order to keep their political and economic power. The account of Emin Pasha was as such. Although the sub-province of Muş was granted to its mutasarrıfs who were from the lineage of Alaaddin Pasha as a yurtluk-ocaklık, the sub-province started to be governed consecutively by Reşid Mehmed and Hafız Pashas during the operations against Kurdish notables in the 1830s. Then in 1836, it was attached to the müşirlik of Erzurum and its revenues were allocated to the Mansure Treasury. In other words, Muş was no longer a yurtluk-ocaklık sancâk, yet this did not preclude the existence of yurtluk-ocaklık villages and mâlikânes. As the mütesellim of Muş whose brothers, relatives, and men were appointed as administrators and tax farmers in the sub-province during that period, Emin Pasha bargained with central authorities to keep twenty-four villages along with his brothers. In a report dated to 1842, Emin Pasha argues that

> around four hundred villages of the sancâk of Muş were granted to our family from generation to generation with *berât-ı 'alişân*. However, as a requirement of servitude and as a sign of service and loyalty, it was suggested by your humble servant that of the four hundred villages twenty-four ones be separated out and granted to us as a salary, and

1 BOA. HAT. 533/ 26254 A, 15 Ramazan 1251 (4 January 1836).

the rest would remain and their revenues would be allocated for the expenses of the cavalry.[2]

In addition to the petition of Emin Pasha, the subsequent petitions of his brothers emphasized that it was "their own" decision and a sign of loyalty that they gave up the sub-province of Muş. The confiscation of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages became a platform of struggle. To improve their conditions, the lineage of Alaaddin Pasha consistently resorted to reminding the Ottoman state of the former yurtluk-ocaklık status of the sub-province of Muş and emphasized how they had left it voluntarily to the treasury as a service to the state.

The family was at first to be exiled to Damascus, but that idea was rescinded and they were allowed to remain in Istanbul. This decision was justified by arguing that their custody would be easier.[3] Nevertheless, the exile of the Kurdish notables of Muş brought about new dynamics in the negotiation of their power. Being far from their homelands the family members resorted to petitioning much more than before. Family members petitioned to reclaim their yurtluk-ocaklık villages, for an imperial pardon, and for more privileges in the Ottoman bureaucracy. While the discussion over yurtluk-ocaklık lands and the sale and situation of their immovable properties, at least for a while, became a field of struggle, they were also seeking positions in the bureaucratic system of the empire.

The position of central and provincial authorities was not always affirmative with respect to those petitions. Despite their determination regarding the boundaries, revenues, and restitution of yurtluk-ocaklık villages and the prohibiton of the family's return to Muş, demands for posts in the capital city

2 "… Muş sancâğında vâki' dört yüz kadar kurâhâ bâ berât-ı âlişân ebâ-'an-cedd fâmilyâmıza rahmen 'inâyet ve ihsân buyrulmuşken vâcibe-i zimmet-i 'ubûdiyyet olacağı üzere mücerred-i ibrâz-ı hüsn-i hidmet ve sadâkat emel-i hayriyyesiyle fakat yirmi dört pâresi kurâhâ-i mezkûreden bi'l ifrâz medâr-ı ma'âş olarak çâkerlerine 'inâyet ve ihsân ve mütebâki kalan kurâları terk ile hâsılât-ı vâki'aları ne mikdâra bâliğ olur ise de idâre olunacak mikdârı süvâri 'askerinin tahrîr buyrulmak husûsu taraf-ı çâkerânemden istida'â olunmuş …" BOA. İ. DH. 51/2557, 29 Zilhicce 1257 (11 February 1842).

3 BOA. A. MKT. 229/50, 24 Zilkade 1265 (11 October 1849).

were more appreciated. For instance, the son of Şerif Bey, Mehmed asked to be employed in one of the government offices soon after their resettlement in Istanbul. It was decided to employ him in the *Hariciye Mektubi Kalemi* (Foreign Correspondence Office) with the assumption that the more the family members were occupied in Istanbul, the more they would break off material and moral relations with their homelands.[4] Such employment was in fact an important part of the imperial strategy to incorporate notables and not specific to Muş.[5]

On the other hand, family members were gradually allowed to return to Erzurum, if not Muş. During their time in Istanbul, they continuously petitioned to return. Hurşid Bey was among the first who managed to do so, albeit by distinguishing himself from his brothers. He was allowed to return on the condition that he not get in contact with Muş, and he was appointed to the administration of certain districts in the province of Erzurum. Then Murad Bey together with the women and the children of the family were allowed to settle in Erzurum. Left alone in Istanbul, Şerif Bey was pardoned last and allowed to return in the 1860s. Despite not being allowed to be involved in the affairs of the sub-province of Muş, family members waited for an opportunity to reclaim power in their homelands.

Accordingly, in the following lines, the debate over the yurtluk-ocaklık villages, assets, and immovables of Şerif, Hurşid, and Murad will be introduced. Second, the imperial pardon of family members after a long process of repeated petitioning and the effect on the administration of Muş will be discussed. Then, in the 1870s, when the effects of the Land Code of 1858 finally were felt in the region, the debate over the confiscated villages of Emin Pasha will be elucidated. The chapter will end with discussion of the future for the salaries assigned in return of confiscated yurtluk-ocaklık villages.

4 "... bunların bu tarafca revâbıtı çoğalması memleketlerinde olan ʻalâik-i mâddiye ve maʻneviyyelerinin azalmasını istilzâm ideceği ..." BOA. İ. DH. 211/12262, 10 Cemaziyelevvel 1266 (24 March 1850)

5 For instance, the sons and grandsons of Bedirhan Bey were educated in the Tanzimat schools and were employed in the bureaucracy, even if not in higher ranks. Koç, "Bedirxan Pashazades," 51-52.

## § 5.1 Confiscation of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Villages of Şerif Bey and his Brothers and its Implications

From the moment they were dispatched to Istanbul, family members initiated debate not only over the yurtluk-ocaklık villages but also landed property and assets. Family members complained about the process of the sale of their properties in Muş just before their displacement. By the same token, Hurşid Bey, the youngest brother of Şerif Bey, submitted a petition shortly afterward about this problem. Hurşid Bey started by referring to his services to the empire, emphasizing that since he was fifteen he had worked and fought wholeheartedly and with loyalty for "His Excellency." Emphasizing his role in the suppression of various rebels like Han Mahmud, Hurşid Bey argued if governors and officials in Erzurum and Diyarbakır were to be asked, it would come out that he had been ready to work day and night and even give his life for the empire. Yet he was exiled.[6] He then continued by complaining about Esad Pasha, who, he claimed, had sent his family to the Arabian desert without his knowledge. Then, he claimed that the governor had sold his properties for well under their values (*yüz gurûşluk eşyâmı on guruşa firoht itdirmiş*). Similarly, he accused Esad Pasha, who was then carrying out the process of tithe collection in his yurtluk-ocaklık villages, pointing out that he had not the slightest idea who was keeping the revenues of his villages. On top of it, he was uninformed about properties like mansions, mills, and vineyards that, in his opinion, were unprotected and could be ruined in his absence.[7]

6 "... On beş yaşımdan bu ana kadar cânsiperâne ve sadâkatrâne hidmet-i şâhânede bulunduğum ve nice defa' Han Mahmud ve gibi tuğyân-ı devlet olan kimesne ile ve gerek sâir tuğyânlar ile uğûr-ı şâhânede cenk ve cidâl ve bezl-i vücûd ve cevr itdiğimi isbât iderim ve çâkerlerinden i'timâd olunmaz ise Erzurum ve Diyarbekir ve ol havâlîde bütün vâlîler ve me'mûrlardan isti'lâm buyrulsun ol vaktde ma'lûm olur ve şeb û rûz iktizâ ider ise cânımı hizmet-i şâhânede bezl ve fedâ itmek hülyasında iken Kürdistân eyâleti vâlîsi devletlû Esad pâşâ hazretleri kullarınızı ihzâren Dersa'âdete gönderûb ..." BOA. A. MKT. UM 7/39, 16 Rebiülevvel 1266 (30 January 1850).

7 "... yûrtluk taht-ı tasarruf-ı çâkerânemde bulunan kurâlarımı müşârünileyh hazretleri ta'şîr itdirub ya'ni yüz kile ta'şîrinden on kile husûle getürülmiyerek ve husûle gelan mikdârı dâhi kimler yeddinden kaldığını bilemiyerek ve konaklarım ve değirmen ve bağ misillû

The petition of Hurşid Bey proposes crucial points about the confiscation process of yurtluk-ocaklık lands. Although Hurşid Bey stated clearly his concerns regarding his property in his homeland, it was decided that the tithes of the villages that they had been holding as yurtluk-ocaklıks would be granted to them as salaries in the order of their exile.[8] In other words, landed property (*emlâk*) under their exclusive authority as yurtluk-ocaklıks would be confiscated by the treasury and the annual revenues would be granted them as monthly salaries.[9] Although the salaries would be equivalent to the annual income of their villages, it was sometimes described as a "boon" (*ihsân*).[10] Whether the salary was the value of their landed properties or it was a question of the sultan's beneficence was a matter of discussion.[11]

In addition, Hurşid Bey's emphasis on the decrease of their revenues importantly shows the economic rights the family had been enjoying under the yurtluk-ocaklık system. They had been entitled to collect the taxes including the ones paid by tribes in return for winter quarters, and they had been exempt from taxation themselves. Now, the holders of the yurtluk-ocaklıks of Muş had to be content with the tithe from those lands which was paid to them as salaries. Similarly, Hurşid Bey made a distinction between yurtluk-ocaklık villages and properties like vineyards, orchards, mills, and mansions. The bey was aware of the distinction between mîrî and mülk lands, yet a distinction that stemmed from the fact that while the yurtluk-ocaklıks were confiscated by the

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emlâklarım dâhi bilâ sâhib kaldığını ve onlar dâhi bu sene bütün bütün virâne olacakları derkâr ... " Ibid.

8 "...yûrtluk ve ocâklık vechile 'uhdelerinde bulunân karyeler bedel-i 'aşârı kendülerine virilmek üzere ..." BOA. İ. DH. 197/11181, 12 Şaban 1265 (3 July 1849).

9 "...yûrtluk ve ocâklık vechile 'uhdelerinde bulunan emlâkın dâhi hazîne-i celîleden zabtıyla bedelât-ı seneviyyesinin kendülerine ma'âş sûretiyle tahsîs ..." BOA. İ. DH. 202/ 11557, 18 Zilkade 1265 (5 October 1849).

10 BOA. A. MKT. 225/82, 3 Zilkade 1265 (20 September 1849).

11 In fact, putting Kurdish notables on salary was common after uprooting them from their areas of influence. For instance, 19 thousand guruş was paid per month to the family members of Bedirxan Pasha. Yener Koç argues that the salary became a matter of discussion between the state and the family members. The question was whether the salary was aid from the sultan or if it was compensation for confiscated land. See Koç, "Bedirxan Pashazades," 50-51.

treasury, but the remaining lands were not. As in the empire's classical land classification, lands on which houses were built and trees were planted were private property.[12]

The mîrî/mülk status of yurtluk-ocaklık lands are the subject of many studies. However, as emphasized throughout this study, ideological biases and acceptance of the clear-cut definitions in the law books have veiled not only practical outcomes but also regional and temporal differences. For instance, Mehmet Ali Ünal, in his piece on the hükûmet of Palu, claims that the hükûmet was granted as property, yet what was meant by property was not the land itself, but the right to collect taxes. This is an overinterpretation of the distinction between "rakabe" (state ownership) and "usufruct" rights in the Ottoman land tenure system.[13] Nevertheless, recent microstudies have unearthed peculiarities of yurtluk-ocaklık lands in Ottoman Kurdistan. Based on her study of the hükûmet of Palu, which was still designated as a yurtluk-ocaklık in the nineteenth century, Özok-Gündoğan accentuates the fact that the yurtluk-ocaklıks in Palu had a mülk status. "Palu Beys were granted not only the revenues but also the ownership of these lands."[14] She further asserts that the confiscation of yurtluk-ocaklık lands in the second half of the nineteenth century was a way of granting mîrî status to those lands. That is, the confiscation of yurtluk-ocaklık lands signifies the mülk status of that type of hereditary land ownership.[15] On the other hand, focusing on the yurtluk-

12 Halil Cin, *Mirî Arazi ve Bu Arazinin Mülk Haline Dönüşümü* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), 22.

13 Ünal, "XVI. Yüzyılda Palu," 251. On the other hand, Huricihan İslamoğlu asserts that raqaba "does not represent a title of ownership in the modern sense but an ability on the part of the ruler, or the central government, to distribute rights to revenues from land ." Huri İslamoğlu, "Property as a Contested Domain: A Reevaluation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858," in *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East*, ed. Roger Owen (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), 17. Similarly, Özok-Gündoğan challenges Ünal's proposition regarding the hükûmet of Palu by arguing that he did not look at what was really happening in Palu territory, how the beys controlled agriculture, and to what extent and with what means the state regulated these rights of the Palu Beys. Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," 167.

14 "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," 169.

15 Ibid., 171.

ocaklık lands of the Zirki Beys in Hazro and Mihrani, Bayraktar describes such lands as something between mîri and mülk, yet more akin to the latter.[16]

When it comes to Muş, or more specifically to the yurtluk-ocaklık lands of the Alaaddin Pashazades, it is necessary to clarify a few points. First, the family members used terms "yurtluk-ocaklık," "hükûmet," and even "mâlikâne" interchangeably to define the lands they held. In correspondence, Ottoman bureaucrats used the term "mülk" to define the lands of yurtluk-ocaklık holders, as well. However, it is necessary to recall that in the official documents unlike for hükûmets, the yurtluk-ocaklıks was not defined as "possessed as private ownership" (*mülkiyet vechile uhdelerinde*). Hence, it is possible to argue that the mutasarrıfs of Muş, who had been granted the sub-province, had almost exclusive rights over the tax-revenues of their yurtluk-ocaklık lands, which together with their control and influence over tribes of the region enabled them to maintain partial autonomy. While the mutasarrıfs of Muş paid a down payment (*muaccele*) for the contraction of mâlikâne, I have not come across evidence of any payment for the renewal of their yurtluk-ocaklıks. Moreover, in the report of the provincial officials of the era, it was often complained that the yurtluk-ocaklık holders were treating these lands/villages as private property. Thus, it is possible to argue that no matter these lands were officially mirî, they were used like private property in practice. Likewise, there were fluctuations in the status of these lands in the course of time, as observed in the case of Muş.

Moreover, neither the exact boundaries nor revenues of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages were known when central treasury confiscated them. This fact shows how the central government's knowledge regarding the region was limited as late as 1850s and once more again underscores the exemptions and autonomy yurtluk-ocaklık holders enjoyed. On the other hand, the vagueness about the boundaries established a platform upon which the exiled beys of Muş could negotiate the revenues of their lands through the new institutions of the era, the most popular among which was the Supreme Council. In addition, the berats, which were last renewed after the enthronement (*cülus*) of

16 Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks," 241.

Abdülmecid I would be used as proof in the discussion regarding the boundaries and revenues of their villages.

### 5.1.1 *Debate on the Revenue and Boundaries of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Villages of the Family*

When the governor of the province of Kurdistan sent the beys of Muş to Istanbul in spring 1849, two deputies were appointed, one by the governor and the other by Şerif Bey, to carry out an investigation regarding the revenues of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages. Accordingly, the villages would thereupon be governed by the treasury by means of *emanet* (through appointed officials called *emin*, trustee).[17] This reinforces the fact that until the confiscation of these hereditary lands, the central government had not known their real value. Moreover, appointing deputies from both sides also points to the fact that the beys of Muş still had the power to claim rights over their hereditary lands.

Afterwards, having prepared and submitted a register showing their villages, properties, and their worth and revenues, Şerif Bey asked to be put on salaries accordingly. However, the governor of province of Kurdistan, Esad Pasha, argued that the registers were arranged from the vantage point of the beys (*kendi kavl-i hodlarıyla*) and that they should not be respected. Instead, the boundaries, annual revenues, and forms of possession of their villages and properties should be investigated in detail. Accordingly, the registers, bills (sened) and imperial orders (*evâmir-i aliyye*) should be sent from the subprovince. Then a sound result could be achieved.[18]

Thus, under the supervision of Ahmed Naim Efendi, the ad interim kaimakam of Muş, the tithes from their yurtluk-ocaklık villages for the year of 1265 (1849) were collected and grain was taken from its stores carefully without concealing anything (*asla ketm ve ihfâ sûretleri vukû'a getürülmeyerek*). Then, the grain was auctioned by means of the local council according to the

17 "...yûrtluk ve ocâklık vechile 'uhdelerinde bulunân emlâkın cânib-i mîrîyeden zabt sûretiyle emâneten idâre olunmak üzere taraf-ı çâkeriden ve kendü taraflarında birer nefer me'mûr ta'yîn olunarak hâsılât ve vâridâtı meydâna çıkârılmakda bulunmuş olduğu ..." BOA. A. MKT. 225/82, 3 Zilkade 1265 (20 September 1849).

18 BOA. MVL. 231/57, 6 Cemaziyelevvel 1266 (20 March 1850).

local rate (*mahalli râyicine*). According to the report prepared by the council and submitted to the governor of the province of Kurdistan, the amount came out to be 52,299 guruş and two para which was kept and protected in the local treasury (*mal sandığı*).[19]

The report of Esad Pasha details the administration of confiscated yurtluk-ocaklık villages, which in the end would be the basis for determining the salaries to be paid to Şerif Bey's family. However, the limits and the forms of possession of those villages and properties were still undetermined contrary to Esad Pasha's first order. Therefore, the pasha rewrote Ahmed Naim Efendi about the issue. Moreover, he asked for copies of related documents (s*eneds, evâmir-i aliyyes*) that Şerif Bey and his relatives had taken along with them when they moved out of Muş.

In spite of the absence of bills and registers concerning the boundaries and revenues of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages, with the help of delegates from both sides, and probably by means of witnesses, the revenues of the villages were auctioned and the amount was calculated. However, at this point, Esad Pasha brought up the debts of the family, which was twofold. First, the families of Şerif, Murad, and Hurşid Beys had borrowed money from the local governments of Muş and Diyarbakır to cover the expense of their journey from Muş to Damascus in return for bills of debt. The second debt highlights the political and economic power of the beys of Muş before their exile. The governor of Kurdistan argued that taxes imposed upon certain tribes in the sub-province of Muş in the year 1262 (1846) had been collected, but not delivered to the local treasury. As the kaimakam of Muş at the time, Şerif Bey was accused of the embezzlement of these taxes imposed on the tribes. In the end, the total debt of the family was determined to be 50,454 guruş and twenty-seven para. As Şerif Bey and his brothers had settled in Istanbul and were not allowed to return, collection of the debt would be difficult. Therefore, Esad Pasha asked that the debt be covered by the money – the monetary equivalent of the revenues of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages – being kept in Muş's local treasury. It would be easier for brothers thus settle their accounts among themselves. According

19 Ibid.

to this calculation, the money remaining for their salaries was 1,844 guruş and four para.[20]

Having been informed of the registers showing the worth of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages, Şerif Bey and his brothers objected by means of a joint petition both to the calculations and partially to their debt. Accepting some parts of the debts, Şerif Bey objected to the charge of embezzlement regarding taxes collected from the Hasenan and some other tribes during his governorship in Muş.[21] According to him, the amount of the tax imposed upon the tribe was fifty thousand guruş and he had collected around thirty-four thousand, which he had delivered to the local treasury. The details concerning the remaining amount were recorded in registers left behind in the sub-province.[22]

This discussion over the debt indicates two important issues. First, it reinforces the point argued throughout this study that the right to collect taxes was an important part of the power that the beys of Muş had enjoyed. Therefore, upon being exiled they lost their political and economic authority over the tribes together with their loss of exclusive control over revenues and the land itself. Second, the discussion of embezzlement can be read in a framework, pointed out by Cengiz Kırlı, in which the distinction between the personal revenues of administrative elites and the revenues of the region or institution over which they governed had been blurred in the politics of early modern period. However, along with changes to the administrative mentality that started in the nineteenth century with the Tanzimat reforms and continued with the Penal Code of 1840, the demarcation between personal income and the revenues of the administrative region was crystallized.[23] Therefore, this was probably the first time Şerif Bey was questioned about the embezzlement of tribal taxes. Tribal taxes had once been part of the revenues of the mutasarrıfs of Muş, and only with the judicial transformations in the middle of the nineteenth century did they become an issue for which they had to

20 Ibid.

21 BOA. A. MKT.M VL. 33/4, 26 Zilkade 1266 (3 October 1850), BOA. C. ML. 410/16784, 19 Rebiülevvel 1269 (31 December 1852).

22 BOA. İ. MVL. 181/5442, 8 Zilkade 1266 (15 September 1850).

23 Kırlı, "Yolsuzluğun İcadı," 50-51.

account. Hence, this issue demonstrates the transformation in the rights of the yurtluk-ocaklık holders.

Apart from the issue of debt, family members objected to the calculated revenues of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages. Emphasizing that they had submitted registers concerning the tithes and revenues of their villages for the year 1848 about five months previously, they contested the accounting of the year 1849 which had been carried out by the order of Esad Pasha.

> The total revenue [stated in the register] can only be the revenue of a single village. Just as Esad Pasha first moved us and then our families from Muş and appointed an official [*mübaşir*] to sell our properties and assets at very low prices, like plunder, he also appointed an official to collect the tithes from our villages, and although the local rate is twelve and a half guruş per *şinik*,[24] in that register it is recorded as nine and a half guruş.[25]

Therefore, the family members demanded the register that they had submitted previously be taken into consideration while calculating the salaries to be paid to them, not the register sent by Esad Pasha. In the meantime, they continued on filing numerous petitions claiming rights to their confiscated lands and their surplus. Because of their restricted influence over the determination of the salaries and their belief that the process was negotiable, the brothers reclaimed their yurtluk-ocaklık villages. Emphasizing that they were part of an ancient dynasty (*şu kadar yüz senelik hânedan*) and that their ancestors had given their lives in service to the empire, Şerif, Hurşid, and Murad Beys once again pointed out how their lands had been much more vast than the villages

24 A unit of measurement for grain. It is equivalent to 0.5 or 0.25 kile. A kile is 24, 215 kilograms, yet with many regional variations. In Diyarbakır, a kile was equivalent to 12, 829 kg. İnalcık and Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, xl-xlii.

25 " ... hâsılât-ı mezkûr ancak bir karyenin hâsılâtı çünki sene-i mezkûrede müşârünileyh Es'ad pâşâ evvelen kullarını sonra fâmilyâlarımızı ne vechile hitâb ile memleketden ihrâç idub emvâl ve eşyâmızı yağmâ ider misillû mübâşir ta'yîn idub dûn bahâ ile firoht itdirmiş olduğu gibi karyelerimize mahsûs mübâşir ta'yîn iderek ta'şîr itdirmiş ve râyic-i belde hıntanın şiniki on iki biçuk gurûş iken defter-i mezkûrda dokuz biçuk gurûşa kayd olmuş ... " BOA. MVL. 87/41, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1266 (31 March 1850).

in question. Emphasizing that all of the mâlikânes granted to their ancestors as rewards (*mükâfaten*) in return of their services which had been under the family's control for generations had been bequeathed to imperial treasury, the brothers had been granted the villages in question as beneficence and boun of the sultan.[26] As emphasized, the strategy of the family in this debate was to remind the state that the abrogation of the yurtluk-ocaklık status of the subprovince of Muş had been their own decision and a sign of loyalty to the state.

Thus, the brothers demanded to keep their hereditary villages. If their demands were accepted, they would send delegates to collect the tithes of the villages, and they would be satisfied with the remaining revenue. To put it differently, instead of salaries determined without their control, the brothers asked to maintain exclusive control over the revenues of their villages. In the same way, they demanded repayment to their deputies of the tithes on the production from the year 1265 (1849) and for the properties that had been sold at allegedly low prices. They were also ready to repay the money to whomever their properties were sold.[27] Thus, they rejected both the sale of their properties immediately after their exile and the calculation of the value of their landed properties. In objecting to the revenues for the year 1849, their argument was actually based on reports that had been sent from the region, according to which the total revenues of their lands were upwards of 103 thousand guruş.[28] Despite their exile, the family members still had relatives in the region who could inform them about the developments there.

Concern about losing control over their hereditary lands lay behind this demand. In the determination of salaries, the debate was around revenues, not their other rights that were inherent to the yurtluk-ocaklık sytem. Thus, the power of the family would be curtailed no matter how high the salary was set. Exiled far from their lands, Şerif Bey and his brothers were aware that not only they would be put on salaries below the actual worth of their villages, but they would also be deprived of the tools to make claim about the boundaries of their lands. This concern was obvious in their argument that the *raiyyet* (commoners) of the villages had started to farm their lands and use meadows and

26 BOA. MVL. 88/98, 20 Cemaziyelevvel 1266 (3 May 1850).

27 Ibid.

28 BOA. MVL. 87/40, 11 Şaban 1266 (22 June 1850).

fields that had once belonged to them. In doing so, these villagers claiming that that land and those fields and meadows were part of their villages. Therefore, the brothers claimed that it was probable that the boundaries of the villages had been incorrectly calculated and that there were parcels that were not included among their landed properties. In order to accelerate the determination of the boundaries and revenues of their yurtluk-ocaklık lands, Şerif Bey and his brothers asked that Esad Pasha be given orders about the issue again and that an official be dispatched to Muş together with their own delegates, the travel expenses of which they proposed to cover. In their company, they also wanted to send Selim Bey, the son of Murad Bey, with the pretext of moving his family from Muş - but also to take care of these issues.[29]

On the other hand, it is apparent that they already had agents in the region. For instance, a certain Süleyman Agha had been appointed to supervise the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Şerif Bey, and he was paid fifteen hundred piasters per month from the revenues of the villages themselves.[30] In the same vein, the fields and vegetable gardens of Hurşid Bey in the village of Mekrak and his clover field in the village of Çiriş were the responsibility of his man, named Ceylan Agha. Upon a complaint of Hurşid Bey about an encroachment in his fields in Çiriş, the kaimakam of Muş, Habib Efendi, was questioned.[31] As mentioned before, yurtluk-ocaklık villages were differentiated from orchards and vineyards. Despite the confiscation of the former, the latter remained untouched.

Nevertheless, delivery of the imperial orders, berats, bills, and receipts proving both the limits of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages and also the debts of the family took a long time. Thus, the salaries to be paid to them could not be determined. Besides, since their departure from Muş, members of the family survived on daily wages, that, after a while, were also cut. Thereupon, having

29 "…kurâhâ-yı mezkûreler ʻuhde-i ʻacizânemizlerimizde ihâle olunmazdan mukaddem mezkûr kurâlar sekenesi bulunân raiyyet mahalli karyemizin sinûr ve hudûdur diyerek zirâʻat itmişler ve tarla ve çayırımızdır deyu tasarruf itmişler…" BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 7/39, 3 Şaban 1266 (14 June 1850).

30 BOA. MVL. 81/37, 15 Şaban 1266 (26 June 1850).

31 BOA. A. MKT. UM 85/46, 25 Muharrem 1268 (20 November 1851).

argued they were numbered about seventy, the brothers asked to be paid enough to live on and to cover the expenses of their families' journey from Damascus to Istanbul and they ensured that the amount could be deduced from the salaries when they were determined.[32] In spite of the fact that the debate over the boundaries and revenues of the villages would continue for years, the one over the amount of the salary ended – for a while - at the beginning of 1851.

## § 5.2 Boundaries of the Villages and the Determination of Salaries

Şerif Bey and his brothers explored every avenue to increase their power vis-à-vis provincial and central authorities who were ever more determined to keep them away from the region. The main strategy was to keep on filing petitions and these petitions of the three brothers shed light on the fate of their confiscated yurtluk-ocaklık villages. The yurtluk-ocaklık villages of the three brothers were tax-farmed in later years.[33] These villages were mainly in the plain of Muş and Bulanık and were mostly inhabited by Armenians. The beys of Muş accused these commoners of violating their rights by claiming rights to land and meadows that were once part of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages. In addition, upon their exile, as will be discussed in chapter 6, they were the inhabitants of those villages who complained about over taxation, corvée, indebtedness, and the cruelty of local actors including governors, tax farmers, council members, moneylenders, and community leaders.

Nonetheless, the proposition of Şerif Bey and his brothers to re-examine the revenues and limits of the villages was declined. Based on the investigation and auction carried out by the governor of the Kurdistan Province, the total revenue of the yurtluk-ocaklık lands of the brothers minus the expense of collecting the tithe (*gayr-ı ez-i masârif-i ta'şîriyye*) was determined as around 52

32 BOA. MVL. 81/37, 15 Şaban 1266 (26 June 1850); BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 22/42, 9 Şaban 1266 (20 June 1850).

33 As will be discussed in this chapter, some of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Emin Pasha, despite the initial decision to confiscate them, were held by certain zawiyahs in Bulanık.

thousand guruş for the year 1265 (1849). Upon the appeal of the brothers, the Meclis-i Vâlâ, in consultation with the governor of the province of Kurdistan, decided that given that the price of grains had been low that year that even if a new official was appointed to conduct a reinvestigation, the result would not change. Moreover, the demand that Selim Bey be sent to Muş to accompany some parts of the families was not seen as appropriate.[34] Probably, this was because of the aim to cut their connections with their homeland. Therefore, the salaries were based on the amount determined by the initiative of the governor, Esad Pasha, in the end. However, a year passed after this discussion and new harvest season came. Accordingly, the villages of the brothers were auctioned at an amount of 100 thousand guruş and the tax farmer made a profit.[35] The three brothers complained that although the prices increased in a year's time and the tax farmer made profit, they had not been paid yet.

Although the villages were contracted out by the means of emanet in 1849 (1265),[36] in ensuing years they were contracted out tax-farmers on a lump sum basis (*maktuan*).[37] The revenues of the villages of Şerif Bey and his brothers for the year 1850 were as follows:

34 BOA. İ. MVL. 198/6184, 25 Rebiülevvel 1267 (28 January 1851).

35 "...yûrtluk ve ocâklık nâmıyla mutasarrıf oldukları karyeleri giçen altmış beş senesinde elli iki bin ve altmış altı senesinde yüz bu kadar bin gurûşa firoht olunmuş ve mültezimleri dâhi kırk elli bin gurûş ticâret itmiş ..." BOA. MVL. 93/62, 29 Şevval 1266 (7 September 1850); BOA. A. MKT. UM 30/89, 2 Zilkade 1266 (9 September 1850)

36 BOA. A. MKT. 225/82, 3 Zilkade 1265 (20 September 1849).

37 For the development of the methods of tithe-collection during the Tanzimat (1839-1876) and Hamidian (1876-1908) periods, see Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli*, 45-91.

Table 5.1 The Values of Yurtluk Ocaklık Villages of the Three Brothers in 1850

| | Amount (guruş) |
|---|---|
| Şerif Bey | 43,145 |
| Murad Bey | 25,870 |
| Hurşid[38] Bey | 31,010 |
| Total | 100,025 |

SOURCE: BOA.İ. MVL 198/6184, 25 Rebiülevvel 1267 (28 January 1851)

In the determination of the salaries, it was argued that the revenues of the villages changed from year to year and the tithes of the villages were sometimes collected by the means of emanet. Therefore, the revenues for two years were combined and compared, and the salaries were determined accordingly.[39] Apart from pragmatic reasons, this methodology was a precaution against future claims by Şerif Bey and his brothers over the boundaries and revenues of the lands. Accordingly, the names and revenues of the villages of three brothers and the method used to determine of the salaries were as follows:

38 In the document, the name of Hurşid Bey was confused, stated as "the other brother Şerif," yet the name of Şerif Bey, as seen, was already stated at the beginning. BOA. İ.MVL 198/6184, 25 Rebülevvel, 1267 (28 January 1851).

39 "…bu makûle bedelât-ı aʻşârının senesi senesine uymıyarak baʻzen noksân tutacağı cihetle hasbe'l usûl iki seneliğin mukâyesesi icâb-ı maslahatdan bulunduğuna …" Ibid.

Table 5.2 Two-Year Revenues of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Villages of Şerif Bey

| Name of the village | The revenue of the year 1265 (1849) | The revenue of the year 1266 (1850) |
|---|---|---|
| Hars [Güneyik][40] | 7,632.20 | 12,055.00 |
| Zinyaret [Ziyaret] | 5,267.20 | 9,400.00 |
| Salorik (?) | 6,501.00 | 10,610.00 |
| Tebavenk [Güzelsu] | 4,534.20 | 7,100.00 |
| Alizurum [Tandoğan] | 1,814.20 | 3,980.00 |
| Total | 25,750.00 | 43,145.00 |
| Cost of collecting the tithe[41] | 2,575.00 | 4,314,.20 |
| Net amount | 23,175.00 | 38,830.20 |

SOURCE: BOA. ŞD. 374/27, 14 Şaban 1315 (9 December 1897).

Accordingly, the total for two years was 62,005 guruş twenty para and the mean (*bi'l münasafa-i seneviyesi*) was 31,002 guruş thirty para, which amounted to 2,583 guruş per month.[42]

Table 5.3 Two-Year Revenues of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Villages of Murad Bey

| Name of the village | The revenue of the year 1265 | The revenue of the year 1266 |
|---|---|---|
| Orginos (Çukurbağ) | 6,081 | 8,060 |
| 'Arus, aka, Kiravi [Şenoba] | 5,053 | 7,000 |
| Ardonk [Konakdüzü] | 4,621 | 5,100 |
| Oşnam, aka, Üçdam [Yukarı Üçdam-aşağı Üçdam] | 2,805 | 5,710 |
| Total | 18,560 | 25,870 |
| Cost of collecting the tithe | 1,856 | 2,587 |
| Net amount | 16,704 | 23,283 |

SOURCE: BOA. ŞD. 374/27, 14 Şaban 1315 (9 December 1897).

40 According to Mayevsky it was one of the richest villages in Muş. Besides, in Zinyaret there were vast gardens and pastures. Bayraktar, *20. Yüzyılın Dönemecinde Rus General Mayevsky'nin Türkiye Gözlemleri*, 404-07.

41 *Ber mûceb-i nizâm masârîf-i ta'şîriyesi*

42 BOA. ŞD. 374/27, 14 Şaban 1315 (9 December 1897).


Accordingly, the total for the two years was 39,987 guruş, so the mean was 19,993 guruş twenty para, which amounted to 1,666 guruş per month.

Table 5.4 Two-Year Revenues of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Villages of Hurşid Bey

| Name of the village | The revenue of the year 1265 | The revenue of the year 1266 |
|---|---|---|
| Uruk, aka, Arak [Sarıbahçe] | 6,689.20 | 15,010.00 |
| Argevank [Umurca] | 2,625.20 | 6,000.00 |
| Salbak ? | 4,483.00 | 10,000.00 |
| Total | 13,798.00 | 31,010.00 |
| Cost of collecting the tithe | 1,379.00 | 3,101.00 |
| Net amount | 12,419.00 | 27,909.00 |

SOURCE: BOA. ŞD. 374/27, 14 Şaban 1315 (9 December 1897).

Accordingly, the total for the two years was 40,328 guruş. The mean for the two years was 20,164 guruş, which amounted to 1,680 guruş per month.




Map 5.1 The Locations of some Villages which the Family Controlled after the Abrogation of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Status of Muş (Made with QGIS)

Thus, the imperial treasury had to pay an amount of around six thousand guruş per month to the three brothers in return for their confiscated yurtluk-ocaklık villages in Muş. However, some villages were missing from these lists. In the beginning, the brothers mentioned "twenty-four villages" that had been granted to them. Yet if the five villages of Emin Pasha - Yoncalı, Liz [Erentepe], Bostangend [Bostankent], Kömüs/Goms [Bozbulut] and Norşen [Sungu] - are added to the total, the villages number only seventeen. Moreover, in a report dated 1837, the number of villages granted to Emin Pasha and his brothers were stated as seventeen or eighteen.[43] Nevertheless, certain documents refer to contended villages, which hints at the decrease in the number of the villages.

The villages of Vartinis [Altınova], Tevnig [Durugöze], and Erişter [Eşmepınar] which included the fiefs of Makrak and Gebre had been initially granted to the brothers together with twenty-one other villages as yurtluk-ocaklıks. However, a certain Tahir Agha, Abdullah, and Edhem among the cavalrymen in Erzurum claimed that said villages were among their fiefs. The case could not be resolved in the local councils, so it was transferred to the Meclis-i Vâlâ. Accordingly, two of the three villages were deemed to be among the escheated property of Şerif Bey's father, and the third was also granted to the brothers. However, during the granting of the twenty-four villages, the berats of the three that Tahir et al. had claimed were not prepared properly. Thus, the registry was corrected, and an order was prepared to grant control of the villages to Tahir Agha and the others.[44] To put it differently, although berats had not been provided for the villages of Vartinis, Tevnig, and Erişter, Şerif and Hurşid Beys benefited from them until said members of the cavalry objected. Similarly, upon the exile of three brothers, the debts of them were also unveiled. Thus, for four years Hurşid Bey had collected the revenues of the harabe of Makrak, one of the above-mentioned three villages, without a berat,

43 BOA. HAT. 637/31417 A, 29 Zilhicce 1252 (6 April 1837).

44 "...mukaddemâ yûrtluk ve ocâklık vechile mîr-i mûmâileyhüma yirmi dört 'adet karyenin tevcîhi esnâda mûmâileyh Tâhir ağâ ve 'Abdullah ve Edhemin iddiâsında olduğu kurâ-i sâlise-i merkûmenin berâtları mâliye hazînesinden tanzîm olunarak usûli vechile tahvîl kalemine tahvilât vürûd itmemiş olduğundan kayıdları açık kalarak bu cihetle tevcîhâtı tekerrür eylemiş idüğü ..." BOA. İ. MVL. 27/430, 4 Receb 1257 (21 September 1841).

so he was obliged to compensate the amount. Hurşid Bey claimed that Makrak was within the boundaries of his villages, but the treasury refuted this claim emphasizing the absence of any registry.[45] Apart from these three villages, four others were apparently also taken out from the control of Şerif Bey and his brothers. It is possible that during the investigation of the limits of the villages, fields that they had added to their villages in the course of time were separated out. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the brothers had their relatives or subjects be granted some other villages.

In the same vein, after the arrival of the registries, the brothers continued to negotiate the limits and number of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages for a while. For instance, Murad Bey held up the berat that was renewed during the reign of Abdülmecit I as proof to claim his rights over a village called Oşnam. Stating that the village consisted of two quarters, one Muslim the other non-Muslim, Murad Bey argued that the Muslim part had been separated out and auctioned separately and was not included in the revenues that ought to have been granted as salary. He proposed to confirm in Imperial Registry (*Defterhâne-i Amire*) whether there were two villages called Oşnam in the district of Muş or just one. If it turned out to be one, he would ask for the revenues of the quarter that had been separated out.[46]

Moreover, the brothers claimed that the hamlets (mezra) of the villages had also separated out. Şerif Bey and his brothers had previously objected to the revenue calculation for the year 1849 claiming that the boundaries of the villages had not been carefully determined. Moreover, they put forth that inhabitants of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages had claimed rights over their villages. Therefore, they repeatedly asked for the dispatch of special officials, their delegates, and someone from among their families to investigate and determine the limits of their lands. In the end, Esad Pasha put an end to debate by asserting that the beys had begun in time to control and take tithes from fields that were state property, like those of both the cultivated and the unused lands in the vicinity of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages. As this was unveiled during

45 BOA. C. ML. 410/16784, 19 Rebiülevvel 1269 (31 December 1852).

46 "... hâlbuki karye-i mezbûr Oşnâm nâmıyla bir olub yedd-i 'âcizânemizde olan berevât-ı şerîfe münderiç olduğu ..." BOA. İ. MVL.198/6184, 25 Rebiülevvel 1267 (28 January 1851).

the investigation, these lands that the brothers had annexed to their yurtluk villages in the course of time were separated out and returned to the Treasury.[47] Similarly, the above-mentioned case of the harabe of Makrak also consolidated Esad Pasha's argument. Nevertheless, the absence of Muş Beys in the region hindered them to assert control during the investigation.

Finally, although the demands and objections of Şerif Bey and his brothers would continue, the salary granted to them for life (*kayd-ı hayat*) was based on an amount determined by combining the revenues of the years of 1849 and 1850. Minus the expense of collecting the tithe (*masârîf-i ta'şîriyesi*), the amount came out to be seventy-one thousand piasters each year. Accordingly, the salaries to be paid per month to Şerif Bey and his brothers starting in March 1851 was as follows: 2,583.50 piasters to Şerif Bey, 1,666.00 to Murad Bey, and 1,680.00 piasters to Hurşid Bey.[48]

Similar examples provide a better comprehension of the method followed in the confiscation of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Şerif Bey and his brothers. To begin, in 1857 Hüseyin Pasha, their cousin and rival, petitioned that the district of Bulanık was his yurtluk-ocaklık, but with the Tanzimat, it had been confiscated and nothing had been paid in return.[49] Moreover, the district of Hizan in the sub-province of Muş, consisting of around sixty prosperous villages, was under the exclusive control of Şerafeddin Bey and his two brothers as a yurtluk-ocaklık. The governor of Erzurum, Bekir Sami Pasha and defterdar Selim Efendi in a joint report complained that despite the prosperity of the district nothing other than poll tax could be collected there. The Tanzimat could not be applied there due to the intimacy between Şerafeddin Bey and Bedirhan Bey.[50] Finally, the yurtluk-ocaklıks of Şerafeddin Bey were confiscated together with those of Şerif Bey and his brothers. Şerafeddin Bey was paid 2,000 guruş and his other brothers 750, based on the revenues of their

47 "... Muşda bulundukları avânda 'uhdelerinde bulunân yûrtluk ve ocâklık karyelerine hemcivâr bulunân birtakım arâzî-i mîrîden olan harâbe ve mezârî'yi dâhi karyeleri arâzîsine 'ilâveten zabt ve ta'şîr idegeldiklerinden (...)" Ibid.

48 BOA. İ. MMS. 14/600, 8 Şaban 1275 (13 March 1859).

49 BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 230/65, 5 Zilhicce 1273 (27 July 1857).

50 BOA. İ. MVL. 66/1254, 26 Cemaziyelahir 1261 (2 Temmuz 1845).

villages.[51] Furthermore, despite the initial order that Şerafeddin Bey be settled in Erzurum, his request to live in Muş was later accepted.[52] Similarly, the Zirki Beys of Diyarbekir had also been assigned monthly salaries since 1836 as recompense for their confiscated lands.[53] However, in Palu, a different practice was in place. The beys and aghas of Palu kept one-third and one-fifth of their lands, respectively, on the condition that they paid the tithe and other taxes. The rest of the land was offered for sale.[54]

Emphasizing that they were from a well-established family with an eight-hundred year legacy, the family members did not cease sending petitions claiming that their salaries did not accurately reflect the income of the villages, the ownership of which they enjoyed for generations. For instance, Şerif Bey claimed that his revenue should have been around three hundred purses.[55] Therefore, in the end, the salaries were raised according to revenues from the year 1857.[56] Their insistence concerning the salaries was an outcome of their loss of financial privileges. In the case of Şerif Bey, he was not only paid a salary of around five thousand piasters as the kaimakam of Muş in the 1840s but he also had control over both the land and the revenues of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages.[57] Moreover, enjoying long-established agreements with the central state and the power of negotiation as yurtluk-ocaklık holders, the beys of Muş dominated the surplus of the region and even enlarged their landed property holdings by seizing neighboring lands.

Therefore, despite the fact that being far from their homelands limited their capacity to negotiate, they still had the ability to make use of any chance to improve their situations. On one hand, they constantly appealed for an imperial pardon to go back to their homelands until their demands were accepted. On the other, their demands regarding the yurtluk-ocaklık lands took

51 BOA. MVL. 90/65, 22 Receb 1266 (3 June 1850).

52 BOA. İ. MVL. 219/7325, 29 Şevval 1267 (27 August 1851).

53 Bayraktar, "Yurtluk-Ocaklıks," 142.

54 Özok-Gündoğan, "The Making of the Ottoman Modern State in the Kurdish Periphery," 196.

55 BOA. MVL. 180/9, 27 Cemaziyelevvel 1273 (23 January 1857).

56 BOA. İ. MMS. 14/ 600, 8 Şaban 1275 (13 March 1859).

57 In 1853, the salary of the kaimakam of Muş was registered as four thousand and five hundred guruş. BOA. İ. MVL. 277/10796, 10 Şevval 1269 (17 July 1853).

on a different dimension in the 1870s after the respective deceases of Murad and Şerif Beys. Hurşid Bey together with his son, who was employed in the Şûrâ-yı Devlet, began to reclaim the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Emin Pasha. Thus, the following lines first explain the process by which Şerif Bey and his brothers reestablished relations with the region. Then, the debate over the late Emin Pasha's yurtluk-ocaklık lands, which again became an issue in 1876, will be introduced.

## § 5.3 Struggle for Forgiveness

Immediately after their settlement in Istanbul, Şerif Bey and his brothers penned petitions to be allowed to return at least to Erzurum, if not to Muş.[58] Especially after the determination of the yurtluk-ocaklık salaries, the family complained about the difficulties surviving not only in the expensive circumstances of Istanbul but also in its climate. Not only the men but also the women of the family engaged in this mechanism of petitioning. After a while, petitioning by the family yielded the results. Upon a petition by Hurşid Bey's wife, their family except for Hurşid Bey himself and and their eldest son, was allowed to settle in Erzurum together with her younger children at the end of the year 1851.[59]

Nevertheless, after his family's departure, Hurşid Bey himself asked to go to Muş temporarily himself to sell properties that had been allegedly seized by strangers in order to purchase a house for his family in Erzurum. In this way, he claimed, he would completely cut his relations in Muş.[60] Permission depended on the consent of the governor of the Kurdistan Province who could determine whether such permission could be harmful or not.[61] Upon a report of the Council of Erzurum, which clarified that Hurşid Bey was different from his brothers and that his settlement in Erzurum was appropriate, the Meclis-i

58 BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 93/37, 29 Zilhicce 1267 (25 October 1851).

59 BOA. İ. MVL. 225/7675, 9 Safer 1268 (4 December 1851); BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 48/46, 23 Safer 1268 (18 December 1851).

60 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 113/25, 1 Safer 1269 (14 November 1852).

61 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 113/69, 4 Safer 1269 (17 November 1852).

Vâlâ decided to permit Hurşid Bey to settle in Erzurum on the condition that he would never go to Muş. However, after being submitted for the sultan's approval, the decision was renounced (*sarf-ı nazar*).[62]

Nevertheless, Hurşid Bey was not alone in his demand. Having argued that some members of his family had passed away as they could not adjust themselves to the climatic conditions of Istanbul (*buraların âb ve havâsıyla 'adem-i imtizâcları*), Şerif Bey proposed sending his family to Muş while he, his eldest son Mehmed Bey, and his brother Murad Bey remained in Istanbul.[63] Hurşid Bey - believing that his request to settle in Erzurum was rejected because of the same demand of Şerif Bey - penned a petition discrediting his brother. Interestingly, he argued that unlike himself, Şerif Bey had not complied with the orders of the state, oppressed the people, extorted and plundered their properties, and pursued his own interests.[64] In a word, Hurşid Bey differentiated himself from his brother in order to be allowed to live with his family in Erzurum. Around the beginning of 1854, Hurşid Bey achieved his objective and was allowed to reside in Erzurum.[65]

Şerif Bey increased the frequency of his petitions to settle in Erzurum together with his family upon the permission given to Hurşid Bey. According to a report of the Meclis-i Vâlâ, Şerif Bey and his brothers had been exiled because of the administrative necessities of the time during the governorship of Esad Pasha. However, those regions were currently under control and their security was relatively ensured, as well. Therefore, the family members could not create trouble even if they wished to do so. Moreover, since Hurşid Bey's arrival in Erzurum, he had not been involved in any trouble. Thus, it was decided to allow Şerif Bey to settle in Erzurum like his brother, but without any contact with Muş. However, this decision failed to receive imperial approval.[66]

62 BOA. İ. MVL. 277/10774, 6 Şevval 1269 (13 July 1853).

63 BOA. MVL. 121/ 24, 28 Zilkade 1268 (13 September 1852).

64 "... evâmir-i 'aliyye-i cenâb-ı mülkdârilerine 'adem-i itâ'atle birâber dâima fukarâyı tecrim ve herkesin emvâl ve eşyâsını gasb ve garât itmekde ve zâten dâhi hevâ ve hevesine tâbî'iyyet ider takımdan bulunduğu ..." BOA. İ. DH. 283/17817, 7 Safer 1270 (9 November 1853).

65 BOA. A. MKT. MHM 757/67, 14 Safer 1271 (6 November 1854).

66 BOA. İ. MVL. 318/13462, 16 Safer 1271 (8 November 1854).

However, after a long period of negotiation, except for Şerif Bey the rest of his family and Murad Bey together with his family were allowed to settle in Erzurum.[67] Alone in Istanbul, Şerif Bey continued to complain about the difficulties subsisting on the salary paid to him in return for his confiscated yurtluk-ocaklık villages, as he also had to support his family in Erzurum. Therefore, he asked either to be allowed to settle in Erzurum or that his family be returned to Istanbul.[68] It was a part of the politics of notables that no matter the decrease of their economic and political power upon the confiscation of their hereditary lands, they did not give up bargain with the state. In this case, requesting allowance of women and children for returning their homelands was a tactic to gain the eventual forgiveness of the notables. Besides, the forgiveness of Hurşid Bey encouraged the rest of the family to pursue forgiveness in the same way.

In their petitions, the brothers asked for permission to settle in Erzurum where they would be occupied with sharecropping (*ortakçılık*). This request can be interpreted that the family would not claim their traditional rights. Moreover, it is possible to trace the situation of Hurşid and Murad beys after their settlement in Erzurum. Hurşid Bey was appointed as administrator in the districts of the province of Erzurum, and Murad Bey requested a similar post, as well.[69] The murahhasa (bishop) of the Catholic Community in Erzurum filed a petition that the district of Hınıs be administered by Murad Bey, who, he believed, was capable and equipped with the necessary qualities to govern that district, which was inhabited by forty-fifty Christian families and surrounded by Kurdish tribes. Moreover, the inhabitants of Hınıs emphasized in their petitions that they would be pleased by the administration of Murad Bey. [70]

The request of the inhabitants of Hınıs is understandable, as will be elaborated upon in chapter 6, the commoners of Muş demanded a capable governor

67 BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 132/22, 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1271 (11 February 1855), BOA. A. MKT. UM. 183/20, 3 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (21 February 1855).

68 BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 206/80, 29 Rebiülahir 1273 (27 December 1856).

69 BOA. A. MKT. UM 330/1, 13 Rebiülevvel 1275 (21 Ekim 1858).

70 BOA. MVL. 577/47, 15 Rebiülevvel 1275 (23 Ekim 1858).

to control especially the deeds of Kurdish tribes. Similarly, upon the continual requests of Şerif Bey, the governor of Erzurum Arif Pasha was asked whether it would be appropriate to send Şerif Bey to Erzurum.[71] The response of the governor points to the reception of the returns of Hurşid and Murad Beys to the region and sheds light on their actions. The Pasha stated that since their arrival, both beys were appointed to posts in the administration of certain districts. He added that they had joined in the Imperial Army "in the latest issue" (*mesele-i zâile esnasında*) - referring most probably to the Crimean War. Moreover, Hurşid Bey took part along with his Kurdish cavalrymen in the capturing of the fugitives who became involved in highway robbery in Trabzon-Bayezid road.[72] As the governor of Erzurum, Arif Pasha elucidates that Hurşid Bey was capable of finding and capturing such fugitives, it is possible to conclude that the bey performed similar services in the region. Arif Pasha was even in the opinion that Hurşid Bey should be granted an imperial gift in return for his services and expenses that he was incurred during his looking for the fugitives.[73] As a result, the governor of Erzurum did not object to the return of Şerif Bey.[74]

Nevertheless, the returns of Murad Bey and the family of Şerif Bey to Erzurum created suspicion in the beginning. When they arrived, it was in the middle of the Crimean War. After a while, it was reported that Murad Bey had provoked his supporters in Muş to delay the transfer of the grain to the army. Even the former kaimakam of Muş, Ömer Pasha, argued that as long as the brothers of Şerif Bey were there, he could not perform his job properly. After that, it was again asked whether the residence of Murad Bey and the family of Şerif Bey in Muş was appropriate or not.[75] Therefore, given the report of Arif Pasha praising Hurşid and Murad Beys, the complaint of Ömer Pasha was not effective to discredit them. No matter whether Murad Bey was involved in any

71 "... Erzurumda ortâkçılık usûlüyle zirâa't ve hırâset itmek üzere ..." BOA. A. MKT. UM. 326/3, 8 Safer 1275 (17 September 1858).

72 Özkan, "A Road in Rebellion, A History on the Move," 351-52.

73 BOA. MVL. 568/83, 16 Ramazan 1274 (30 Nisan 1858).

74 BOA. MVL. 577/55, 26 Rebiülevvel 1275 (3 November 1858).

75 BOA. A. MKT. UM 229/68, 16 Şaban 1272 (23 March 1856), BOA. A. MKT. MHM 86/75, 19 Şaban 1272 (25 April 1856).

trouble those employed in the administration of Muş upon the exile of the local dynasty would not welcome the return of these exiled notables.

Nevertheless, Hurşid and Murad brothers watched for opportunities to become influential in Muş. Thus, Ömer Pasha is partially right in his accusations against Murad Bey, who was involved in the politics of Muş. Similarly, some documents also point out that Hurşid Bey together with his followers disturbed the tax farming of the villages in the plain of Muş. Although the contract with local tax farmers for the villages of Muş was renewed in 1856, Hurşid Bey and his followers offered a higher bid in the province of Erzurum and so the right to tax farm was contracted out to them. However, local tax farmers had already collected the harvest and contention arose between the two groups. To solve the conflict, the case was taken up in Erzurum. Local tax farmers in Muş delegated a certain Yakub and Halil Aghas and signed empty sheets to fully authorize them. However, Hurşid Bey allegedly bargained with those agents and filled the empty sheets with accusations against the kaimakam of Muş, Emin Pasha. Upon a complaint by the local council of Muş, the case was transferred to the Meclis-i Vâlâ.[76] Unfortunately, it is not certain how the case ended. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, the beys of Muş were suspected to have had a hand in the petitions filed against the kaimakams of Muş.

Nevertheless, a few years after settling in Erzurum, Murad Bey passed away. Emphasizing that his family in Erzurum was desolated Şerif Bey asked either to settle in Erzurum, where he could be occupied with agriculture, or to be granted the revenues of his villages as before. According to reports from Muş, the revenues of his villages were 103,920 guruş and that of his late brother Murad's were 54,599 guruş in 1856.[77] However, both options were rejected. Rather, as his main problem was financing both himself and his family, it was decided to send his family back to Istanbul[78] and increase his salary according to increase in revenues of the villages.[79]

76 BOA. A. MKT. UM.287/24, 16 Zilkade 1273 (8 July 1857).

77 BOA. İ. MMS. 14/600, 8 Şaban 1275 (13 March 1859).

78 BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 106/ 25 23 Şaban 1275 (28 March 1859).

79 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 155/9, 23 Şaban 1275 (28 March 1859).

Two years later, in November 1861, permission to settle Şerif Bey together with his family in Erzurum was approved by the sultan.[80] However, there are no details about the deeds of Şerif Bey in Erzurum. Whether he was appointed to an official post like his brothers is unclear. However, his rank was increased from *Istabl-ı Amire* to *Mîr-i Miran* in 1863, for which he had been waiting a long time.[81] Hereafter, he was a "pasha." Nevertheless, he never gave up bringing up his landed property until his passing in September 1868.

In January 1864, Şerif Pasha aired grievances about his *kargir* (stone) mansion in Bitlis of more than fifty rooms. He argued during the time of Reşid Pasha there was a demand to rent his mansion for the Imperial Army for fifteen hundred purses, yet its value had been five thousand. Nevertheless, he claimed that if it had been necessary he would have granted access to the mansion for free as a sign of his family's four-hundred-year loyalty to the state. Yet, the demand was not realized, and after his exile he could not take care of his mansion. Meanwhile, he claimed, his mansion was destroyed and its grounds used as fields by the people who thought that nobody would question them. Thus, he asked for identification of the perpetrators and compensation for damages.[82]

Besides the mansion, Şerif Pasha argued that shops that had been part of the mosque's waqf, which he had built, had also been damaged according to the information given by the waqf's trustee.[83] Upon this petition, an investigation was carried out by the councils of Muş and Bitlis. After questioning Muslim and non-Muslim population of the region, both councils reported that the mansion was destroyed not because of the intentional acts of the inhabitants. Rather, as it was located on the top of a hill and had not been used for a long time, the house was ruined as a result of seasonal changes - rain, snow, and wind.[84] Nevertheless, Şerif Pasha continued to claim that his mansion was not outside the city and that it was not destroyed in the way described.

80 BOA. İ. MVL. 458/20546, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (29 November 1861), BOA. A. MKT. UM. 523/9, 7 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (10 December 1861).

81 BOA. İ. DH. 514/34990, 2 Rebiülahir 1280 (16 September 1863).

82 BOA. MVL. 435/12, 10 Şaban 1280 (20 January 1864).

83 BOA. MVL. 681/8, 18 Rebiülevvel 1281 (21 August 1864).

84 Ibid.

At the end of an investigation in which officials from the Erzurum and Muş Councils were sent to Bitlis, the decision regarding the destruction of the mansion did not change. Nevertheless, it was accepted that timbers from and some other equipment in the mansion had been stolen, but due to the location of the mansion it was difficult to ascertain the thieves. Moreover, the council of Bitlis reported that in the case of the shops, leaseholders had not evacuated the shops by force. Upon the petition of the waqf's trustee, the leaseholders were summoned to the government office and kept in custody. However, it would come out that as the market with shops of the pasha was not lively, these tradesmen became in financial loss. Thus, they evacuated their shops voluntarily in order to rent some others in the other market.[85]

Regardless of the result of the debate over Şerif Pasha's mansion and waqf shops, this debate provides a better comprehension about how notables, who mainly took their power from their lineages and hereditary lands were also deeply involved in the market economy of the city-centers through endowments.[86] Thus, it enables us to imagine more clearly the power they wielded and the loss they incurred after being uprooted from their spheres of influence. Therefore, they struggled for a minute change by which they could reach their previous statues.

In the same vein, the reclaim of Şerif Bey's mansion and pious foundation can also be regarded as a reflection of the Land Code of 1858. Although the code did not stipulate directly about waqf and mülk lands, Şerif Bey regarded it as an opportunity to restore his property. Similarly, Hurşid Bey, having lost his elder brothers Murad and Şerif, struggled for the confiscated villages of his eldest brother Emin Pasha in the 1870s. He was not alone in this pursuit; his son Süleyman Bahri Pasha, a part of Şûra-yı Devlet, helped him. The incorporation of family members in the Ottoman bureaucracy provided them with new channels to claim to their hereditary lands even decades after their confiscation.

85 BOA. MVL. 694/48, 16 Şaban1281 (14 January 1865).

86 For further details about the pious foundations in Muş, including those of Alaaddin Pasha, see Bilal Yılmaz, "Muş Vakıfları" (master's thesis, Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi, 2009).

## § 5.4 Debate over the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Villages of Emin Pasha

In 1876, the heirs of the pious foundation of Sheikh Abdülmelik, who was entombed in a village of Bulanık called Abri, asked the Ministry of Pious Foundations (Evkâf-ı Humâyun Nezâreti) for the renewal of their berats for two villages of Muş called Liz and Bostangend. However, Süleyman Bahri Pasha, the son of Hurşid Bey, objected claiming that said villages were among the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of his deceased uncle Emin Pasha. Therefore, he asked for a delay in the renewal of the berats of those villages until after the arrival of the necessary documents from the Imperial Registry, the Finance Ministry and the Erzurum Provincial Council.[87]

In fact, Liz and Bostangend - together with Norşen, Yoncalı, and Kömüs - had been granted as yurtluk-ocaklıks to Emin Pasha in 1254 (1838) after the abrogation of the yurtluk-ocaklık status of sub-province of Muş. Upon Emin Pasha's death without an heir, these villages were confiscated by the central treasury, yet it would turn out that some of them were not. For a while Şerif Bey also struggled to have those villages granted to his son Mehmed Bey and his nephew Selim Bey.[88] However, this demand was rejected on the pretext that when yurtluk-ocaklık holders died without a child, their lands would be confiscated by the central treasury. By the nineteenth century, as discussed before, the abrogation of such hereditary land ownership was a significant part of the fiscal and administrative reforms. The death of Emin Pasha without a heir presented the necessary excuse to confiscate his lands. As narrated before, Şerif Bey led to a small uprising upon the rejection of his demand and was thus discharged and replaced by Hüseyin Pasha.[89]

The subject of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Emin Pasha came up again approximately thirty years later because of conflicting claims by the heirs of the Sheikh of Abri's foundation and the relatives of Emin Pasha. In order to clarify the multiple claims to the villages, the berats, waqf charters and official registers were investigated by the Provincial Council of Erzurum, the Imperial Registry and the Ministry of Finance. The results were important not only for

87 BOA. ŞD. 261/16, 2 Rebiülevvel 1293 (28 March 1876).

88 BOA. ŞD. 2881/40, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1293 (28 June 1876).

89 BOA. C. DH. 117/ 5810, 20 Rebiülahir 1260 (9 May 1844).

verifying or nullifying the claims. They also reveal the means through which the beys of Muş consolidated their material power.

In the report of the *Divan-ı Muhasebat* (Court of Exchequer), a disparity between the claims of the heirs of the sheikh and the original documents was highlighted. Accordingly, the village of Liz was named in a berat, dated 1733, of the zawiyah-keepers (Islamic convent) of Sheikh Abdülmelik. In the same vein, Bostangend was among the villages in the berat of the heirs of Sheikh Burhaneddin. However, it also noted that the revenues of those villages had been taken by these religious endowments only since 1262 (1845), immediately after the decease of Emin Pasha. If they were granted the revenues of these two villages only after 1845, how could they possess berats dating to 1733 at the same time? Therefore, a detailed investigation through the early registers was carried out.[90]

Accordingly, it is possible to understand how the villages of Emin Pasha were handed down since the eighteenth century. While the villages of Yoncalı and Liz were at the disposal of tribal beys called Abdi and Mustafa, the villages were annexed to Erzurum Customs Office from 1238 (1822). Similarly, while the village of Norşen was part of Bitlis, it had been granted to Maksud Pashazade Murad Bey (the grandfather of Emin Pasha) as a yurtluk-ocaklık in 1213 (1798) when Muş became a separate sub-province. Moreover, Bostangend had been granted as a fief to Süleyman and Kömüs to Ali in 1129 (1716) and 1171 (1757), respectively. However, it was emphasized that as time passed, those villages began to be controlled by Emin Pasha, and finally, in 1254 he was granted them as yurtluk-ocaklıks.[91]

This point is important in showing that the power yurtluk-ocaklık holders exercised was expansionist. Therefore, no matter how many villages they were granted as yurtluk-ocaklıks, they could easily dominate nearby villages as they held the mutasarrıflık of Muş. In the case of Emin Pasha, his yurtluk-ocaklık villages were confiscated upon his death, which means that after 1260 (1844), the governorship of Erzurum was supposed to take the control of those villages. However, it failed to do so and trustees of certain pious endowments

90 BOA. ŞD. 2881/40, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1293 (28 June 1876).

91 Ibid.

enjoyed the revenues of some of these villages in the meantime. Therefore, after a detailed investigation, it was revealed that Liz and Bostangend were not originally among the waqf villages of Sheikh Burhaneddin and Sheikh Abdülmelik and that they had forged the berats.[92]

Moreover, Hurşid Bey's choice of language enables us to speculate about the influence of the Land Code of 1858 in the reopening of the case of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Emin Pasha.[93] Hopeful about getting rights to those lands, Hurşid Bey travelled from Erzurum to Istanbul. He argued that the sheikh of Abri had seized the villages of Liz and Bostangend and for fifteen years had collected revenues worth seventy-eight thousand annually by means of counterfeited berats. Thus, having specified his role in uncovering the facts regarding the villages of Liz and Bostangend, Hurşid Bey argued that those villages were his hereditary right, as both Murad and Şerif Bey had already passed away and Emin Pasha had left no child behind.[94] Besides, he wanted to be rewarded in return for denouncement (*ihbariyye*) – that is, thanks for his help uncovering the reality about the villages of Liz and Bostangend. However, in a report of the Şûra-yı Devlet it was emphasized that Hurşid Bey had neither the right to these villages and nor an award for denouncement. Nevertheless, it was decided to be appropriate to appoint him to a mutasarrıflık.[95]

No matter that Hurşid Bey's claim to his late brother's villages bore no results, his use of a new terminology brought a new dimension to negotiations

92 Ibid.

93 The effects of Land Code of 1858 were more drastically felt after the 1870s in the sub-province of Muş. Thus, discussion of the Land Code is limited in the present study, as the period under study does not warrant a full-fledged discussion. Nevertheless, for the historiography on the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire and particularly in the Middle East, see, Owen, *New Perspectives on Property*; Martha Mundy and Richard Saumarez Smith, *Governing Property, Making the Modern State: Law Administration and Production in Ottoman Syria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994). For literature review E. Attila Aytekin, "Hukuk, Tarih ve Tarihyazımı: 1858 Osmanlı Arazi Kanunnamesi'ne Yönelik Yaklaşımlar," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 3, no. 5 (2005): 723-44.

94 "… ırsen hak-ı 'ubeydânem olduğu hâlde âhere i'tâsı gadri mûcib olunduğu …" BOA. ŞD. 2886/54, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1293 (28 June 1876).

95 Ibid.

with the central government. Hurşid Bey and his son expected to benefit from new codifications concerning state lands. On the other hand, villages that were supposed to have been confiscated by the treasury were being controlled by pious foundations and unnoticed for fifteen years. Thus, the process confiscating yurtluk-ocaklık lands and their control by the treasury were far from perfect. Local actors, in this case religious leaders, benefited from the power lacuna created by the exile of yurtluk-ocaklık holders and annexed the some yurtluk-ocaklık villages in their waqf lands.

By the same token, for the beys of Muş, the only thing that remained of their yurtluk-ocaklık lands was the salaries paid to them in return. Thus, the continuation of yurtluk-ocaklık salaries from parents to children was also an object of struggle.

## § 5.5 Future of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık Salaries

The base of yurtluk-ocaklık salaries granted to Şerif Pasha and his brothers were initially calculated by combining the revenues of the years 1265 (1849) and 1266 (1850) and then halving the result. In other words, as the revenues of the two years were different, they were equalized. Later, this amount was paid to them as lifelong (*kayd-ı hayat*) monthly beginning in March 1267 (March 1851).[96] However, upon the passing of Murad Bey in early 1859, Şerif Bey asked Murad's salary be assigned to his family as a charity of the sultan (*sadaka-i seniye*).[97] It was decided and approved by the sultan that these salaries would be passed to his children according to law (*nizamî vechile*).[98] Thus, with a four hundred guruş increase, the salary of Murad Bey was allocated among his sons Yusuf, Selim, Abdülkerim, Nuri, and Said.[99]

96 BOA. ŞD. 374/27, 14 Şaban 1315 (9 December 1897).

97 BOA. İ. MMS. 14/600, 8 Şaban 1275 (13 March 1859).

98 Ibid.

99 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 155/9, 23 Şaban 1275 (28 March 1859).

Although what is meant with "nizamî" is vague, later on it was specified as the Land Code.[100] As specified, such salaries should be distributed equally among the daughters and sons of the deceased. However, daughters were not regarded equal to sons in the allocation of inheritance because of their marriages. Yet daughters could not be deprived of such salaries altogether, so it was decided by the Şûrâ-yı Devlet to apply the method of partition of inheritance.[101] Accordingly, sons received two shares while the daughters received only one.[102] Thereupon, it is possible to trace the transition of the yurtluk-ocaklık salaries to the granddaughters and grandsons of Şerif Pasha and of his brothers in particular, and the possessors of such salaries in general.[103]

In later years, two important developments concerning yurtluk-ocaklık salaries were observed. The first is a deduction in the salaries. In a petition,

100 As those salaries were initially compensation for confiscated lands, it was decided to be evaluated within the Land Code. The related article was number 54: "When the owners of Arazi-i Miriye and mevkufe die, their lands are freely inherited by their sons and daughters without price no matter if they are in the place where the land is." Kanunnâme-i Arazi in Mustafa Budak, Önder Bayır, and Mümin Yıldıztaş, eds., *Tanzimat Sonrası Arazi ve Tapu* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2014), 113.

101 "…bu makûle ma'âşların arâzî-i kanunnâme-i humâyun ahkâmına tatbîken evlâd ve zükûr ve inâsa müsâveten tahsîsi evvelce karârlaşdırılmışdır ise de evlâd-ı inâs izdivâcda bulunarak evlâd-ı zükûrun anlara kıyâsı olamıyacağı gibi evlâd-ı inâsın bu ma'âşlarında külliyen mahrûmiyeti dâhi tecvîz olunamıyacağından ba'dezîn hâl-i vukû'ında a'del-i usûl olân taksîm-i mirâs kâi'desine tevfîken tahsîs olunmasının …" BOA. ŞD. 308/26, 29 Zilkade 1302 (9 September 1885)

102 "… müteveffânın evlâdlarına a'del-i usûl olân taksîm-i mirâs kâ'idesine tevfîken evlâd-ı zükûra iki ve inâsa bir olarak tahsîsi …" BOA. ŞD. 301/28, 24 Ramazan 1301 (18 July 1884)

103 Those salaries became so important that upon her father's passing, the daughter of Şerif Pasha, Nigar Hanım complained about her uncle, Hurşid Bey, who wanted to forcefully marry her to his son, Süleyman Bahri. BOA. ŞD. 2855/2, 3 Şaban 1286 (9 October 1869). As an example of the transition of yurtluk-ocaklık salaries to children: when Hurşid Bey passed away in December 1883, his salary was apportioned among his sons İbrahim Ahid, Hasro, and İzzet Beys, and Bahri Pasha, and his daughters Naile and Gülbeyaz. BOA. ŞD. 301/28, 24 Ramazan 1301 (18 July 1884); In the same line, when Şerif Pasha's son Mustafa Fazıl died, his salary passed on to his only heir, Mehmed Emin Bey. BOA. ŞD. 316/27, 7 Zilkade 1304 (28 July 1887); Similarly, after her passing, the salary of Nigar Hanım passed to her children. BOA. ŞD. 358/16, 20 Cemaziyelahir 1312 (19 December 1894).

Hurşid Bey claimed that in September 1879 and March 1880, his salary, which was two thousand guruş, had been reduced one-tenth and one-fifth respectively. Arguing that this salary was not of the kind being paid to officials and retirees, but rather compensation for his confiscated property, Hurşid Bey reclaimed the amount that was deducted.[104] The opinions of the family members concerning their salaries changed according to their demands. Sometimes they regarded them as a "gift" and, at other times, as in this case, as compensation for their hereditary lands. Nevertheless, after correspondence between the Ministry of Finance and the Şûra-yı Devlet, it was decided to repay the deduction as these salaries paid as compensation for confiscated property, like yurtluk-ocaklık villages, and they could not be deducted even if the owners were also officials – so they were put on two separate salary.[105]

However, in the course of time as yurtluk-ocaklık salaries were divided among heirs, it became a matter of complaint. The children of Şerif Pasha and his brothers complained that their shares had become insufficient for their living costs. In a joint petition by the cousins, they emphasized that the yurtluk-ocaklık lands of their ancestors had been passed from generation to generation; to consolidate their claims to those lands they referred to the *Sharafnama*, which accounted for the collaboration between the Kurdish Beys and Sultan Selim I after the Çaldıran War.[106]

Then with the Second Constitutional Period, beginning in September 1908, the payment schedule of yurtluk-ocaklık salaries became a matter of discussion in the Meclis-i Vükela (Council of Ministers). Emphasizing that the recipients of yurtluk-ocaklık salaries had already been employed in official posts they were being paid twice and because monthly cost was thirty-forty thousand guruş, it was discussed to pay the yurtluk-ocaklık salaries for the

104 BOA. ŞD. 295/35, 7 Rebiülevvel 1300 (15 February 1883).

105 BOA. İ. ŞD. 64/3763, 20 Şaban 1300 (26 June 1883).

106 "… Bi'l-umûm tevârih-i saltanat-ı seniyye ve kuyûdât-ı hakânîyede ve husûsen ünvân'ül-şeref nâm tarîh-i kadîm Farsi'ül ibâre mufassal ve sarâhatle mebsût olduğu üzere cennetmekân Sultan Selim hân-ı evvel hazretlerinin Çâldırân sefer-i zafer rehber-i hümâyunları esnâsında bi'lcümle ümerâyı ekrâd devlet-i ebed müddet-i 'aliyyeye arz-ı etba ve inkıyâd ile …" BOA. ŞD. 374/27, 14 Şaban 1315 (9 December 1897).

next ten years in advance and thus to remove them from the budget.[107] The yurtluk-ocaklık salaries became a burden on the budget in the course of time, yet payment of yurtluk-ocaklık salaries continued to as late as 1913.[108] Based on interviews with family members, those salaries were paid up until the First World War. During the war and the occupation of eastern provinces by Russian forces, it is difficult to imagine that the salaries were paid regularly.[109]

## § 5.6 Conclusion

Although the yurtluk-ocaklık status of the sub-province of Muş was annulled in the mid-1830s due to administrative changes required by the establishment of the Redif Army and respective military operations of Reşid and Hafız Pashas, the final blow to such hereditary land-holdings was accomplished with the exile of Alaaddin Pasha's lineage from the region. Nevertheless, the struggle over the boundaries and revenues of yurtluk-ocaklık villages and over the landed property, vineyards, and orchards of the family continued for a long time. To determine the revenues and limits of the family's yurtluk-ocaklık villages, an official together with an agent appointed by the family were employed. The beys were already in a disadvantaged position as they were far from the stage of this struggle. However, they tried to benefit from the lack of detailed surveys and records about their yurtluk-ocaklık lands. Nevertheless, Esad Pasha, the governor of the province of Kurdistan, was determined to refute the claims of the exiled beys over their yurtluk-ocaklık lands. Thus, by claiming that Şerif Bey and his brothers had commandeered lands near their real yurtluk-ocaklık villages in the course of time, Esad Pasha rejected the registries that the beys provided. Thus, the salaries paid for the compensation of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages were determined by averaging the revenues from two years based on an investigation carried out by the governor.

The investigation process revealed important points about the peculiarities and the aftermath of the yurtluk-ocaklık lands. By exercising the right of

107 BOA. MV. 120/74, 23 Şaban 1326 (20 September 1908).

108 BOA. BEO. 4232/317336, 4 Zilhicce 1331 (4 November 1913).

109 Interview with Abddurrahman Yıldırım, Muş, 23th July 2014

mutasarrıflık of the sub-province of Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık, the line of beys of Muş had maintained exclusive control over the revenues of the sub-province. However, after being granted just certain villages as yurtluk-ocaklıks upon the abrogation of the yurtluk-ocaklık status of Muş as a whole, family members extended the boundaries of their villages. Thus, upon their exile and the confiscation of these yurtluk-ocaklık villages, the commoners of those villages reclaimed those lands. Their confiscated villages were supposed to be controlled and tax farmed by the treasury. Yet as uncovered in the 1870s, other local notables of the region like religious leaders benefitted from the exile of the Muş dynasty and took control of the revenues of some of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages for years.

However, negotiation did not end with the exile of the Kurdish notables. Şerif Bey and his brothers did not renounce their claims about the boundaries and revenues of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages and their properties. Similarly, family members continued to file petitions for forgiveness and permission to return to Muş. In the course of time, they reformulated their demands. First, women and children were allowed to return, and then, Hurşid, Murad, and Şerif beys were allowed to return to Erzurum in the 1850s and 1860s, in turn, as long as did not become involved in the affairs of Muş.

Hurşid and Murad Beys were appointed as administrators in certain districts in the province of Erzurum upon their pardon and Hurşid Bey served the Imperial Army during the Crimean War. Despite limited information about the repercussions of the return of the exiled beys, there are some clues. As will be elaborated in the following chapter, the inhabitants of Muş often petitioned for the reappointment of the exiled Kurdish beys to the region. Thus, the inhabitants of Hınıs, who were mostly Armenian and surrounded by Kurdish tribes, requested the appointment of Murad Bey as their administrator after hearing of his return. Similarly, despite of the prohibition of becoming involved in the politics of Muş, Hurşid Bey became involved in the tax farming auction for the revenues of the villages of Muş.

Nevertheless, family members seized every opportunity to improve their conditions. The struggle of Şerif Bey in the middle of 1860s concerning his ruined mansion and pious foundation in Bitlis and that of Hurşid Bey for the confiscated yurtluk-ocaklık villages of his deceased brother Emin Pasha can

be interpreted within the framework of the Land Code of 1858. Although they failed in regaining the ownership of these lands, it is certain that they continued receiving their salaries and handed the right down to their descendants until the outbreak of the First World War. In addition, they were incorporated in provincial administrations, though of small districts. Their sons were employed in the bureaucracy in the imperial center, as well. Moreover, although it is uncertain when and by what means they returned to Muş, further generations of the family still live in some of the villages that were once among their yurtluk-ocaklık lands.

With the exile of the Kurdish notables of Muş, the implementation of administrative and financial reforms that the nineteenth century bureaucrats envisaged and that peaked with the promulgation of Tanzimat Edict entered a new phase. The most important tenet of this reform program was to increase state revenues by annihilating the centuries-old land tenure system in Ottoman Kurdistan. The establishment of the province of Kurdistan after the suppression of the revolts of Bedirhan and Han Mahmud finally heralded the implementation of Tanzimat reforms that had been delayed several times. In the case of Muş, like in other places of the empire, central and provincial authorities initially had to rely on local notables to implement the reforms, but in the end, especially the regional governors' opinion was to eliminate these local power holders. Therefore, despite their defection from the coalition being led by Bedirhan Bey, Şerif Bey and his brothers were exiled and eliminated from the administration of the region. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the pacification of local notables also brought about a range of difficulties and proved that they were required for the implementation of reforms.

# 6

## The Post Tanzimat Era: Evaluation of the Reforms through the Petitions of Ordinary People

*The sub-province of Muş, consisting of twenty-eight districts and more than eight hundred villages,1 is surrounded by eighty Kurdish tribes, each of which consists of one to two thousand families, so they are huge in number. The previous kaimakams had thoroughly understood the peculiarities of these tribes and locations of those Kurds, so in the case of plunder of the properties, goods, and livestock of the poor inhabitants, they embarked on their recovery. Thus, during the governance of Şerif Bey of Muş, we were well-off thanks to His Majesty. [However] the present kaimakam of Muş, Habib Efendi, is not capable of governing the sub-province, and so the Kurdish tribes always attack us, take our property, kill [our] people, and up to now they have stolen more than seven hundred sheep. As they are involved in such acts, there is*

1 The numbers were exaggerated to some extent. According to the yearbooks of the vilayet of Erzurum in 1871, 1872, and 1873 the villages of the sancâk of Muş were given as 574, 615, and 618, respectively. *Salnâme-i Vilâyet-i Erzurum* 1288, 145, ibid., 1289, 145, ibid., 1290, 146.

> *no safety of life and property. Thus, as the region is on the frontier, a few thousand people migrate to Russia annually, so the inhabitants are dispersing. This time around, thirty people from the region have come especially to explain the situation. Şerif Bey, who has been in Istanbul a few years, is well-informed [about the region] and knows the peculiarities of these tribes, and has been employed in our region since time immemorial, and should be sent back to Muş and granted its mutasarrıflık. As the bey is from Muş, he knows about all those bandits, who would not dare to commit such acts as they are afraid of him. Thus, undoubtfully, our safety of life, honor, and property would be maintained, and we would be spared from all of these attacks.*[2]

This excerpt is from among the dozens of the petitions penned by both Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Muş, submitted to the central government, and discussed in the Meclis-i Vâlâ throughout the 1850s and 60s. In this petition, signed by "the poor inhabitants of Muş," two important points emerge. First is the oppression and extortion of the Kurdish tribes. Second, the complaints about the incapacity of the existing kaimakams of Muş which was a formulation of a demand for the restoration of the exiled beys of Muş, who were described as accustomed to the region, possessing good knowledge of its aspects and having great influence and control over the Kurdish tribes. As a result, local inhabitants were migrating and dispersing, a situation that would continue and even aggravate in upcoming decades. In the ensuing years, despite the fact that the call for the return of the local beys did not materialize, the people continued to submit petitions with complaints about the administrators of Muş. The deprivation of producers of their surplus through over taxation, extortion, and corvée as well as their dispossession through

2 BOA. İ. MVL. 227/7731, 22 Safer 1268 (17 December 1851). This file consisted of four different petitions on the same issue. See Appendix A, Quotation 4 for the original Turkish.

indebtedness in the post-Tanzimat context will be discussed in this chapter via an analysis of the petitions of the ordinary people of Muş.

Petitions (*istidʿa, ʿarz-ı hâl)* are particular and indispensable documents that shed light not only on the demands and grievances of ordinary people but also their negotiation and discursive strategies. The literature on petitioning agrees that petition-writing includes important nuances about the relationship of the ruler and the ruled. According to Eyal Ginio, "one of the main legitimate devices that was at the disposal of people from all strata of society, including commoners, was the submission of a petition to the sultan asking for a redress of grievances."[3] By the same token, petitioning served to maintain the notion of "justice," the underlying legitimacy tool of monarchies. Lex Heerma van Voss argues that "as the distribution of justice and largesse are important parts of ruling, rulers can hardly deny their subjects the right to approach them to implore them to exercise justice, or to grant a favor."[4] In the same vein, Halil İnalcık argues that the notion of justice (*adâlet*) is an important principle in the ruling system of Middle Eastern states, and petitions enable rulers to identify and alleviate the grievances of their subjects.[5] Likewise, Michael Ursinus also points out the functioning of the *Divân-ı Hümâyun* (Imperial Council) as a "court of appeal," to provide "a link between the ruler and the ruled" without the need for intermediaries.[6]

Nevertheless the "useful myth" that "a good person heading the state" is the ultimate authority to whom one must apply for justice has limitations, as

3 Eyal Ginio, "Coping With the State's Agents "from below": Petitions, Legal Appeal, and the Sultan's Justice in Ottoman Legal Practice," in *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi*, eds. Eleni Gara, Christoph K. Neumann, and M. Erdem Kabadayı (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2011), 41.

4 Lex Heerma Van Voss, "Introduction," in *Petitions in Social History*, ed. Lex Heerma Van Voss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1.

5 Halil İnalcık, "Şikayet Hakkı: 'Arz-ı Hâl ve 'Arz-ı Mahzar'lar " *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi* 7-8 (1988): 33.

6 Michael Ursinus, *Grievance Administration (Şikâyet) in an Ottoman Province: The Kaymakam of Rumelia's 'Record Book of Complaints' of 1781-1783* (London: Routledge, 2005), 3. About the role of Divân-ı Hümâyun, see also İnalcık, "Şikayet Hakkı," 33-51.

argued by Eleni Gara.[7] Although this "paternalistic image" of a "just and benevolent ruler" fomented a "protest culture" in the Ottoman Empire by providing an opportunity "for all kinds of popular protest," the success or failure of each such protest did not depend on the benevolence of the ruler so much as "on the constellation of power relations and on the leverage of protesters." To put it differently, if officials who were considered to be fully authorized to implement the justice of the sultan failed to respond the expectations of the people, not only the notion of "justice" but "the legitimacy of Ottoman rule" would be harmed.[8] In this chapter, it will also be discussed how the peasants of Muş appealed to the "justice" of the sultan while drawing attention to how his agencies were failing to realize it.

Likewise, petitions provide detailed, vivid images about the social and economic conditions of the region being studied.[9] Thus, the contribution of the petitions of the ordinary people of Muş to this study is crucial allowing the study to move beyond the interpretations of local power holders, administrative authorities, central governments, and higher councils. Therefore, petitions enable us not only to elaborate upon the tribal landscape, the struggle over resources, power relations, and the negotiations and tensions among different power holders in a region at the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, but they also depict the post-Tanzimat era and trace the fate of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages once held by Emin Paşa and his brothers.

In this framework this chapter depicts the effects and reception of Tanzimat reforms in Muş by utilizing the petitions of inhabitants, the reports of local authorities, and documents related to the cases of the kaimakams of the sub-province who were questioned about corruption and tyranny. From the 1850s onwards, state archives were filled with documents that point out the

7 Van Voss, "Introduction."

8 Eleni Gara, "Popular Protest and the Limitations of Sultanic Justice," in *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi*, eds. Eleni Gara, Christoph K. Neumann, and M. Erdem Kabadayı (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2011), 102-04.

9 As an example of a study scrutinizing nineteenth-century developments in a locality through an analysis of petitions, see Yuval Ben-Bassat, *Petitoning the Sultan: Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013).

reflections of the new tax regime, the role of local councils and coalitions, and tensions with local authorities. Although petitioning was a practice among ordinary people of the empire long before the Tanzimat,[10] this chapter will demonstrate how the commoners of Muş conspicuously adopted the language of the Tanzimat, and sought their rights within the terms of its fundamental tenets and through its newly established institutions. Milen Petrov, writing on the case of legal reforms in the province of Danube, conceptualizes the attitudes of the ordinary people in the face of reforms as "compliance": "the willingness to modify discourse and behavior in accordance with what political power expected (or assumed) an individual to say and do in order to demonstrate his or her *bona fide* status as trustworthy suspect, witness and 'subject' in general."[11]

By the same token, John Chalcraft challenges the arguments that considered the state and the peasantry to be two opposite, mutually-exclusive entities. Instead, he points out "the possibility of more complex, differentiated and mutually constitutive political relationship between peasants and the state," based on his study of the petitions of the Egyptian peasantry during the 1860s and 1870s.[12] In this relationship, he further argues, peasants "evoke not passivity, silent subversion, or outright revolution, but surprisingly, sophisticated engagement and negotiation with state practice and discourse."[13]

In the same vein, in everyday practices of the peasantry or the people in general, neither the state nor the peasantry was a "homogenous" entity.[14] While everyone from a tax-collector to the provincial governor was officially a representative of the state, or rather of the central government, they did not necessarily reflect the state's agenda, and they pursued their own interests. As

10 İnalcık points to archival collections like *şikâyât defterleri, 'arz-ı mahzarlar*, and *ma'ruz* to emphasize the tradition of submitting of petitions and their importance in a system of rule based on the notion of "justice." İnalcık, "Şikayet Hakkı," 34.

11 Milen V. Petrov, "Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864-1868," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46, no. 4 (2004): 758-59.

12 John Chalcraft, "Engaging the State: Peasants and Petitions in Egypt on the Eve of Colonial Rule," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 3 (2005): 303.

13 Ibid., 304.

14 Ibid., 305.

emphasized by Chalcraft, "peasants did not relate to these often heterogeneous agencies in the same way, and these relations cannot always be characterized as those of violent opposition on the one side or quiet avoidance on the other."[15] In this chapter also it is possible to argue that by referring to the Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye, the commoners of Muş appealed to the sultan as the "benevolent ruler" who guaranteed their rights and well-being would be maintained, on one hand. On the other they negotiated for the amelioration of their conditions by presenting complaints about other agencies of the sultan, like the kaimakam or council members, and pointed out possible outcomes in the event that necessary steps were not taken - like decreases in revenues or in the population.[16]

Recalling the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, the grievances of the commoners of Muş largely stemmed from the novelty of the Tanzimat reforms and governance of the region with administrators other than local dynasties. In what follows, the comparison the people made between their former and current governors, the reasons for their dissatisfaction, and also its hints for the extent Tanzimat reforms reached will be discussed first. Such an introduction is helpful not only to comprehend in which ways centrally-appointed administrators were unable to redress the grievances of the inhabitants but also to include the characteristics of one of the Tanzimat's new institutions - the local councils - in the discussion.

The second part of the chapter will deal with the case of a kaimakam of Muş, Ömer Pasha, who governed the sub-province during some of the turbulent years of the Crimean War. The complaint of the people about the Pasha led to a trial in which he was accused of being involved in corruption together with district council members and of exploiting the state of emergency during the war by embezzling money paid for grain supplied by the peasantry for the army. The Crimean War resulted in the promulgation of the *Islahat Fermanı* (Reform Edict) which aimed further to consolidate equality between Muslim

15 Ibid., 306.

16 Analyzing the role of the petitions of the peasants of the Vladimir region, Andrew Verner also regards petitions "as integral parts of complex negotiations among as well as between the peasants and outside." Andrew Verner, "Discursive Strategies in the 1905 Revolution: Peasant Petitions from Vladimir Province," *The Russian Review* 54, no. 1 (1995): 67.

and other communities all over the Ottoman Empire. However, in the middle of the 1860s the peasants of Muş were still seeking the money embezzled by a network of moneylenders, kaimakams, community leaders, and council members. Likewise, as the complaints about Ömer Pasha mostly came from Armenians from the villages on the plain Muş, which were once the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Emin Pasha and his brothers, it is possible to draw a picture of those villages of the beys of Muş following their confiscation by the central treasury through an analysis of peasants' petitions.

The chapter deals in the end with the issue of "migration." On one hand, it will focus on how both central and local authorities responded to the decrease in the population of Muş and also the connotations of both migration and forced evacuation. On the other hand, it emphasizes how the province of Erzurum and the sub-province of Muş became places for the settlement of Crimean and Circassian immigrants.

## § 6.1 Conflicting Viewpoints Regarding Governors

One of the main topics of the previous chapters was the inclusion of Muş into the Tanzimat reform program and the liquidation and exile of the Kurdish notables in the summer of 1849. Hereafter, the inherited governance of Muş by the line of Alaaddin Pasha came to an end. Actually, as emphasized in previous chapters, the necessity of centrally-appointed governors other than local dynasties have been articulated since the beginning of the nineteenth century by many statesmen.[17] However, it became possible only after the inclusion of the province of Erzurum in the Tanzimat program and after the exile of local notables. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this ideal of the provincial authorities conflicted with the demands of the local people, in other words, the kaimakams -appointed after the exile of local notables – had little knowledge and experience about the peculiarities of the region, leading to a multifaceted problem.

Such a stance was neither nostalgia for the old days nor a eulogy for the governance by the local notables - the oppressiveness of and complaints about

17 BOA. HAT. 1087/ 44245, 1 Zilkade 1243 (15 May 1828).

Şerif Bey's rule have already been discussed in the previous chapter. Rather, such a stance lays the groundwork to analyze not only how the conditions were aggravated for the inhabitants of Muş since the exile of local beys, but also the effects and reception of Tanzimat reforms that preluded to a "new organization." Thus, the preference of the ordinary people of Muş for local rulers over centrally-appointed kaimakams parallels Martin van Bruinessen's argument pointing out how the influence and power of Kurdish rulers over the tribes enabled them to solve conflicts among them.[18] Thus, the rule of the local notables can be defined as the best of a bad bunch.

As follows from the petitions of the ordinary people of Muş, their complaints regarding their kaimakam had been already brought to the local and central authorities' attention by the beginning of 1851. Emphasizing the protection of its subjects from any kind of cruelty by officials, the Tanzimat state placed importance on the investigation of the matters in the petitions.[19] In the beginning, the main demand of the collective petitions was the reinstatement of Şerif Bey. Having emphasized that Şerif Bey was from a well-established family, the petitioners argued that he had guarded their agriculture (*hıfz-ı haraset*) and have been respectful of their rights (*hakkımıza hürmet*). Nevertheless, during the revolts in the region (that is, the turmoil during Bedirhan Bey's revolt) he was exiled with his family, they argued. The petitioners' statement importantly sheds light on local relations, as they argued that the *karabaş* (priest) in Çanlı Monastery, Zakar, had played a role in Şerif Bey's exile. Having collaborated with members of the district council of Muş, Zakar allegedly filed a petition via the patriarchate in Istanbul without the consent of the inhabitants of Muş claiming that Şerif Bey was tyrannizing the people. The petitioners stated that they became upset and worried having heard such news and immediately dispatched their delegates to Istanbul. Having judged the karabaş and the delegates a few times, the patriarchate acknowledged that the inhabitants' accusations were right and decided to exile Zakar.[20]

18 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, 69.

19 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 50/64, 1 Cemaziyelevvel 1267 (4 March 1851).

20 BOA. MVL. 108/25, 13 Muharrem 1268 (8 November 1851). Despite insufficient hints about the conflict between Zakar and Şerif Bey, it is necessary to point out that a few years earlier, there

More importantly, contrary to the karabaş's allegations, a common petition of the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants argued that, after the uprooting of Şerif Bey and his relatives, tyranny increased. Having become tired of the theft and murder committed by the Kurdish tribes, the over taxation and extortion by council members, and the forced conversions to Islam, they claimed that they had no more strength to stand. Besides, they were stonewalled by members of the district council while trying to petition the Sublime Porte. As a consequence, more than a thousand households had no choice but to emigrate to Russia and Iran. Thus, the petitioners concluded with a strong opinion that their emancipation depended on the return of Şerif Bey to Muş.[21]

Hereafter, successive petitions were filed and delegates were dispatched to the Sublime Porte, to complain that their previous petitions had not been taken into consideration. Signed "the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Muş and Bitlis," the following excerpt will exemplify on one hand how the inhabitants of Muş were suffering from extortion, over taxation, and corvée, and on the other hand how they sought justice by utilizing the language of the Tanzimat:

> Twenty-four Kurdish tribes of the region have been attacking our districts, plundering and ruining our properties and goods, and raping. In a few months time, they injured and ravaged twenty-thirty poor people and in the summer quarters they also mutilated cows by cutting their feet, as well. They also set fire to the fodder of and at the same time stole seven to eight thousand sheep. On top of this, when we informed the council about our situation, as they had also set fire to our harvest of grain, the governor employed an amount of three to four thousand soldiers and officials whom we had to host in our houses without payment together with their livestock for a month. Although we want the restitution of our stolen property thanks to His Just

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were some complaints about both of them because of the collection of taxes and the poll-tax on non-Muslims in Garzan, most of whom were visiting Çanlı Monastery. Allegedly, both of them were seeking their own benefit and manipulating the tax-collection process. BOA. A. MKT. MVL 6/63, 19 Muharrem 1263 (7 January 1847).

21 BOA. MVL. 108/25, 13 Muharrem 1268 (8 November 1851).

> Majesty, when those employed officials returned, each of the officials of the council seized a large amount of money and mule carts. Thus, this council of officials did not supervise and just looked after their own interests. Every year they add two hundred thousand piasters in our regular tax and allocate and collect it forcefully. [In the same vein] they employ special officials to search those who are dispatched to the imperial center, and if they are carrying petitions or similar documents they are sent back and jailed, tortured, and oppressed. Thus, our representatives who have already been in the Sublime Porte together with the ones have arrived dared to explain our condition. As told, around two thousand families emigrate to foreign lands annually. [Thus] as mercy and as a requirement of the Auspicious Tanzimat, the poor inhabitants shall be saved, and it would be the kindness, grace, and favor of His Majesty if Şerif Bey, who is from local dynasty, acquainted with the region, and competent to govern, is appointed and authoritized.[22]

Although the number of households that had emigrated, livestock usurped, and people killed changed from one petition to the other, the main point - the incapacity of the existing kaimakam, Habib Efendi - was invariable. The petitioners argued that Şerif Bey and his elder brother Emin Pasha had often governed Muş; understood state business; protected the properties, lives, and honors of the people; and were ready to sacrifice their lives if required. On the other hand, the new kaimakam was not familiar with the region and not well informed about the peculiarities of the Kurdish tribes. He failed to manage the tribes, protect the inhabitants, and govern the region.[23] Therefore, the petitioners argued that since the displacement of Şerif Bey, three years since, banditry had not been brought under control.[24]

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22 BOA. İ. MVL. 227/7731, 22 Safer 1268 (17 December 1851). See Appendix A, Quotation 5 for the original Turkish.

23 BOA. MVL. 108/52, 18 Muharrem 1268 (13 November 1851).

24 BOA. MVL. 108/82, 29 Safer 1268 (24 December 1851). Also, phrases as such were used to define Şerif Bey's rule: " … mîr Şerif ehl-i dirâyet ve müdebbir ve fukarâ-i zuafâ hakkında mutasarrıf ve mütedebbir olub ..." BOA. İ. MVL 227.7731/ 22 Safer 1268 (17 December 1851).

In the petitions introduced hitherto, Şerif Bey and his ancestors who had governed Muş for a few centuries were depicted as capable unlike newly appointed administrators who were outsiders and could not protect the inhabitants. Although such local notables were not blameless, based on the many petitions submitted from Muş, the conditions of inhabitants had gotten worse after their exile.[25] As will be clarified with the case of Ömer Pasha, petitioners were mostly from villages on the plain of Muş which had once been in the possession of Şerif Bey's family as yurtluk-ocaklıks. Besides, as discussed thoroughly in chapter 2, control over the tribes was an integral part of the notables' influence and negotiations. As will be discussed partially in this chapter and thoroughly in chapter 7, the striking result of the power vacuum that emerged after their exile was the lack of control over the nomadic and semi-nomadic groups.

Nevertheless, Tanzimat bureaucrats were determined to establish a new regime curtailing the power of local notables. Therefore, although central authorities paid great attention to the petitions of the inhabitants of Muş – sending orders to kaimakams to alleviate the grievances, appointing officials to investigate the allegations, and hearing out the petitioners in the Meclis-i Vâlâ, the demand for Şerif Bey's return was disapproved. Questioning that such kind of petitions might be written down regardless of the grievances of the people and with the indoctrination of Şerif Bey the Meclis-i Vâlâ decided that it was not appropriate to restore such officials as they had been discharged and exiled for their abuses.

However, despite Tanzimat bureaucrats' firmness and caution with respect to not reappointing members of local dynasties was implemented at the level of kaimakams to a great extent, one can argue that this firmness could not be maintained for smaller administrative units like districts (*kazâ*). For instance, in 1861, in a correspondence beween the central state and governor of Erzurum it was stated that there were lots of complaints about the müdirs (district administrators) of the sub-districts of Erzurum Province and the central government emphasized the necessity of placing them with centrally-appointed

25 BOA. MVL. 119/58, 15 Şevval 1268 (2 August 1852).

ones.[26] Thus, the insistence of the inhabitants of Muş on the return of Şerif Bey does not mean that the inhabitants were content with local notables. However, the inhabitants preferred them to the "outsiders." In a petition dated 1852, inhabitants argued that although müdirs in some districts were locals, they did not protect them as if they were outsiders.[27] This points to how commoners identified officials other than local notables as "outsiders" who did not have any interest in the protection of the people. Similarly, although yurtluk-ocaklık holders were exiled to realize fiscal transformations, the implementers of the reforms were nonetheless local notables who had been incorporated into provincial administration.

Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Muş continued filing petitions, yet the central government's initial responses did not go beyond replacing the kaimakam. Noting that Habib Efendi, the present kaimakam of Muş, did not contradict the imperial commands, yet, as he was indifferent *(gevşekliğinden)*, it was decided not to punish but to discharge him. Having drawn attention to the Kurdish and tribal population of Muş, it was emphasized in the Meclis-i Vâlâ decision that an experienced governor was required. Therefore, the previous kaimakam of Van, İshak Pasha, was appointed as the new kaimakam of Muş with a salary of four thousand five hundred guruş.[28]

## § 6.2 New Administrators, Old Habits

Soon after the appointment of Ishak Pasha, contradictory correspondence arrived from Muş. On one hand, the council of Muş was busy praising Ishak Pasha, emphasizing his insight into the proceedings of the Tanzimat, his industriousness, his ability to collect taxes, and his coordination with the council itself.[29] On the other hand, in a petition in the name of "all the inhabitants of

26 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 509/74, 18 Rebiülahir 1278 (23 October 1861).

27 BOA. MVL. 119/58, 15 Şevval 1268 (2 August 1852).

28 BOA. İ. MVL. 227/7731, 22 Safer 1268 (17 December 1851), BOA. A. AMD. 34/38, 17 Safer 1268 (12 December 1851).

29 "… Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye-i usûl-i mehâsin-şumûlune…" BOA. MVL. 251/64, 1 Zilkade 1268 (17 August 1852), BOA. MVL. 252/87, 25 Zilkade 1268 (10 September 1852).

Muş," it was stressed that Ishak Pasha was failing to control the region and protect people due to his old age, his skillfulness notwithstanding. They further reproached that if the Sublime Porte was forsaking the people of Muş by turning a deaf ear to their grievances, they preferred to be thrown into the sea.[30] Actually, pointing out grievances and their results if they were not ended was a discursive strategy often used in the petitions.[31] Nevertheless, the council pointed out that the Kurdish tribes' misdemeanors had increased, not because of the inability of the pasha but because of turmoil in Mutki and Sason. As the Council of Muş reported, the inhabitants of both districts refused to pay their taxes and enlist in the army.[32]

Opposition to taxation and conscription in Mutki and Sason troubled central and local authorities in ensuing years, as well. However, the petitioners drew a conspicuous analogy between the rule of the previous kaimakam of Muş, Hüseyin Pasha - the account of whom was elaborated in chapter 4 - and the current one. İshak Pasha was performing the state affairs with the notorious kethüda of Hüseyin Pasha, İbrahim Efendi. The efendi was feathering İshak Pasha's and his own nests. Furthermore, they released people who had been jailed by Esad Pasha, the deceased governor of the province of Kurdistan. These people in turn were troubling, injuring, and devastating poor inhabitants of the region. The petitioners pointed out that although their ruler was concerned for the safety and welfare of his subjects, officials were oppressing them believing that this situation would not be heard in remote regions like Muş.[33] This also shows the differentiation commoners lie between the "just ruler" on the one hand and "unfair," "corrupt" officials on the other.[34]

Similarly, the charges against İshak Pasha and İbrahim Efendi included nuances regarding the implementation of Tanzimat reforms. Keeping his

30 BOA. MVL. 121/63, 28 Zilkade 1268 (13 September 1852).

31 Eyal Ginio points to Suraiya Faroqhi's remarks about this strategy: "Faroqhi brings ample evidence of the ability of commoners to successfully challenge local officials and to put an end to what they subjected as injustice and misdemeanors to which they were unfairly subjected." Ginio, "Coping With the State's Agents "from below"," 41.

32 BOA. MVL. 252/87, 25 Zilkade 1268 (10 September 1852).

33 BOA. A. DVN. 82/99, 13 Safer 1269 (26 November 1852).

34 Emphasizing that states are constituted of heterogeneous agencies, Chalcraft points out that the peasantry relates to these agencies in different ways. Chalcraft, "Engaging the State," 306.

hands out of state affairs, İshak Pasha employed İbrahim Efendi who in turn administered these affairs as he was accustomed to do. Therefore, the people complained that cruelty and extortion had increased to a level even more than in the previous era. Receiving bribes while hearing and settling the cases, and employing Kurdish tribes for tax collection were among the many accusations against the İbrahim Efendi. Especially the complaint about taxation is noteworthy as it points out the difficulty of maintaining the rate of the tithe, which had been set as ten percent by the Tanzimat. Tribal members, taking courage from İbrahim Efendi, threatened to burn villager's grain and fodder if they did not pay an additional three percent on top of the tithe. For instance, they burned grain and grasses in the village of Argevanik, which was once among the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Hurşid Bey. Although burning grain and straw used to occur in Muş, they were happening ten times more often than before.[35] Consul Brant stated that Armenian peasants were in a great distress as most of their stocks of hay that had been been stored for winter had been set alight. Besides, their grievances about plunder and ill-treatment had not been redressed. The consul emphasized that Kurdish tribes ignored the orders of İshak Pasha, whose old age led to his inability to administer the region.[36]

İshak Pasha was mainly charged with employing İbrahim Efendi, who was the actual center of the complaints. The extortionist governance of Hüseyin Pasha along with İbrahim Efendi in the pre-Tanzimat period was discussed in chapter 4. As a harbinger of the Tanzimat, they had been punished and exiled when the complaints about them reached a peak. Although it is not certain by which means and by whom İbrahim Efendi was released, it is noteworthy that he was entrusted by İshak Pasha to carry out state affairs. The inhabitants of Muş identified İbrahim Efendi with the arbitrary taxation, corvée, bribery, and tyranny of the previous era that the Tanzimat proclaimed to eradicate. As a consequence, the people appealed to the Sublime Porte using the language of Tanzimat to remind it of the principles of security of life, property, and honor.

Having complained about the rule of İshak Pasha, the inhabitants of Muş asked for the return of Şerif Pasha. Emphasizing that the sub-province of Muş

35 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 42/94, 17 Zilhicce 1267 (13 October 1851).

36 FO. 708/906, No: 45, Brant to Hugh Rose, Erzurum, December 6, 1852.

included more than five hundred villages inhabited by two hundred-fifty thousand people, the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of Muş argued in one petition that they would soon leave their lands as they could no longer bear the assaults of the Kurdish tribes. Accordingly, given the absence of Şerif Bey, the tribes taken the opportunity to increase their oppression, they were stealing and spoiling people's property, and were attacking, violating and murdering them. More importantly, five or six kaimakams had been appointed since the exile of Şerif Bey, yet none could govern the Kurdish tribes as they were not accustomed with them.[37] On the top of this, they underlined that - ganging up with the tribes - İbrahim Efendi had seized their seals and filed petitions praising İshak Pasha's rule. As he was deluding the central government with misinformation, he impeded the security and welfare of the region.[38] Therefore, the milletbaşı of Muş, Simon, argued that the whole population was ready to guarantee for Şerif Bey as they had enough suffered all of these assaults.[39]

Consul Brant also drew attention to results of the rule of İshak Pasha and İbrahim Efendi. He emphasized that some part of the population had already left for Kars and Georgia, and if the situation continued, "not a single family of the agricultural population," would remain. Not only Christians but also Muslims would emigrate, leaving the area to become the Kurdish tribes' pasturelands. However, the consul also was skeptical about the reappointment of Şerif Bey:

> Were he to be restored, as the people asked, the present part in power would flee; but the Beg would then take their place, and oppress and despoil the people, as he always has done, and thus, the existing evils would be perpetrated. It would be a fatal step to restore Sheriff Beg, but İbrahim Effendy, Leshgo,[40] and the Koordish Chiefs should be exiled, and then with a vigorous and independent Pasha, or even a good Caimakam under Erzeroom, tranquility and confidence would be

37 BOA. MVL. 131/116, 29 Rebiülahir 1269 (9 February 1853).

38 BOA. MVL. 134/49, 28 Cemaziyelevvel 1269 (9 March 1853).

39 BOA. MVL. 133/55, 15 Cemaziyelevvel 1269 (24 February 1853).

40 I have not come across an influential Kurdish chief called "Lesgho" or "Lezgo." It is most probably "Rızko," an abbreviation for Rıdvan Agha of the Hasenan tribe.

> restored, but nothing short of this will be of any avail. I formerly stated that Ibrahim Effendy had got up the memorial in favor of Sheriff Beg. I knew he was his Kiahia, and his strenuous supporter, but I did not know that they afterwards quarreled and are now sworn enemies. The Memorial was really the petition of the population, urged on by Sheriff Beg's friends. There people, are, however, very short-sighted, and do not know their own interest. They forget, under their present intolerable sufferings, what they bore under Sheriff Beg.[41]

The remarks of Brant are important: the sufferings of the commoners of Muş were so great that they ignored what they had suffered under the rule of local beys. Similarly, although both local and central authorities were determined to break the influence of local notables, the new kaimakams of Muş were obliged to collaborate with some of its remnants to govern the sub-province. For instance, one reason for the employment of İbrahim Efendi by İshak Pasha was his acquaintance with the region. Moreover, coalitions quickly changed in the region, in spite of their previous amity, Şerif Bey and kethüda İbrahim Efendi became enemies. By the same token, despite their exile along with their families, Şerif Bey and his brothers maintained their power in the region - and more importantly in the district council - to some extent.

The extension of the influence of Şerif Bey to the local council was clear in accusations that he was provoking Kurds and tribes of the region in order to again become kaimakam of Muş.[42] İshak Pasha emphasized the role of the followers of Şerif Bey, some of whom were local council members, in petitions submitted in the name of the inhabitants of Muş. The former registrar, Çerko, Hasan, and Ahmed, who had been dispelled from the council because of their offenses during the conscription lottery (*kurʿa-i şerri*), were the supporters of Şerif Bey. They collaborated with Sheikh Abdullah, an ally of Şerif Bey, to influence and provoke people to have Şerif Bey appointed as kaimakam. Accordingly, they prepared petitions and had them signed by circulating them in the

41 FO. 78/955, No: 1, Brant to Hugh Rose, Erzurum, January 5, 1853.

42 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 114/77, 11 Safer 1269 (14 November 1852), BOA. A. MKT. UM. 42/94, 17 Zilhicce 1267 (13 October 1851).

marketplace.[43] They gathered in the house of the sheikh and used his influence to send for each council member and get the petitions they had prepared sealed.[44]

İshak Pasha further argued that as the turmoil in Mutki and Sason was disturbing, such behaviors created further troubles, preventing the collection of taxes and maintenance of control in the region. Emphasizing that the sheikh was being paid from Muş's local treasury (*mal sandığı*) and that he should not intervene in government affairs, İshak Pasha argued that the sheikh had been involved in filing petitions and leading the way for insurrection in the region since the time of Habib Efendi, his predecessor.[45] The emphasis on the role of a local sheikh in local affairs corroborates van Bruinessen's regarding the rise in both the number and political gravity of sheikhs in Ottoman Kurdistan between 1820 and 1860.[46]

In the same vein, İshak Pasha argued that partisanship *(meyyal ve tarafdârlık*) played a crucial role in Muş and that people were accustomed to the nomination and removal of kaimakams by filing petitions. Having emphasized the necessity of breaking this pattern, he argued that as long as the sheikh together with said once council members were not punished and exiled, provocations would not cease in the sub-province and it would not be properly governed.[47]

İshak Pasha also indicated the role of Armenian population of Muş in petitions favoring Şerif Bey. He argued that although they resented Şerif Bey - as they had neither security of life and property nor the protection of their honor during his rule - Armenian peasants were now asking for his return. They convinced priests sent from the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul to Çanlı Monastery in Muş to certify their petitions by offering money if Şerif Bey was allowed to return.[48]

43 BOA. İ. MVL. 263/9985, 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1269 (5 March 1853).

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, 69.

47 BOA. İ. MVL. 263/9985, 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1269 (5 March 1853).

48 Ibid.

These remarks by the pasha imply two important points about the petitions by commoners. On one hand, petitions signed "poor Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Muş" are not clear of the suspicion that they were counterfeited by local notables. They might be counterfeited, especially when petitions favoring or disfavoring existing and previous administrators of Muş were taken into consideration. Nevertheless, even if influential people were manipulating the peasantry's discontent, as Chalcraft puts forward, the claims of peasants were regarded as "politically relevant; otherwise there would be no need to mobilize them."[49] Thus, petitions show the influence and discursive strategies of the peasantry in local politics as they were negotiating the terms of the appointment and discharge of kaimakams. It is noteworthy that petitioners often emphasized that unless their grievances were redressed, the population would decrease and tax collection would be interrupted.[50] Furthermore, that petitions only show elite interests cannot be generalized, as most of them weredelivered in person to the imperial capital by agents whom the inhabitants of Muş had chosen from among themselves.[51]

As for İshak Pasha, in a nutshell he denied all the accusations against him and underscored Şerif Bey's and his supporters' provocations in the petitions disfavoring him. However, the governor of the province of Kurdistan was informed from Istanbul that Şerif Bey was interrrogated and he rejected his role in these petitions by swearing.[52] Moreover, in those days Şerif Bey and his brothers were also directly petitioning to be pardoned and to be allowed to return. They even negotiated a deal that the women and children be allowed to return on the condition that Şerif Bey and his elder son remained in Istanbul. Besides, Hurşid Bey was asking for a temporary permission to carry out

49 Chalcraft, "Engaging the State," 308.

50 Chalcraft also emphasizes that "there was no surer way to attract government intervention than to note that cultivation was in danger of being disrupted." Ibid., 310. In the same vein, Cengiz Kırlı points out that the tone of the common people of Ivranya in their petitions became reproachful and threatening when complaints about the governor, Hüseyin Pasha, were not redressed. Cengiz Kırlı, "İvranyalılar, Hüseyin Paşa ve Tasvir-i Zulüm," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 195 (2010): 9.

51 Chalcraft also emphasizes that "these petitions were more than simply the bogus products of powerful notable schemes."Chalcraft, "Engaging the State," 308.

52 BOA. A. MKT. UM 42/94, 17 Zilhicce 1267 (13 October 1851).

businesses in Muş. Whether Şerif Bey really mobilized his followers in Muş and had them counterfeit such petitions did not come to light. Nevertheless, this possibility damaged their demands to return to their homelands.

Accordingly, neither the petitions of inhabitants insisting on the reappointment of Şerif Bey as kaimakam of Muş nor the ones of the family claiming their rights to lands were recognized. Far from again appointing Şerif Bey as kaimakam of Muş, central authorities did not even give temporary permission to family members to return. The reason for this caution was the possibility of further trouble in the region given that the family's supporters had played principal roles in filing the petitions. Nevertheless, grumbling among the commoners of Muş about practices against "the soul of the Tanzimat" was heard. It was decided to punish İbrahim Efendi and never employ him in the affairs of the country again due to complaints about his tyranny and extortion.[53]

Similarly, the governor of Kurdistan, Mehmed Ragıb Pasha, noted that as İshak Pasha did not get along with the inhabitants and that they bore grudges against each other, his rule in Muş had become controversial. In addition to the petitions of locals, the Armenian Patriarchate and the director of the quarantine in Van also reported the occurrence of certain kinds of events that proved that İshak Pasha was failing to control the sub-province and provide security. Thus, it was obvious that as long as the pasha maintained his post, the inhabitants would keep on petitioning. Therefore, İshak Pasha was replaced by Mesrur Bey, the *müderris* (professor of religious education) of Lofça.[54]

Hereby, the kaimakam of Muş changed several times after the exile of the dynasty of Muş. However, reactions against the inability of appointed kaimakams to control Kurdish tribes, prevent over taxation, and keep order and security resulted in the necessity of further solutions. In a report, the murahhasa of the Armenians drew attention to difficulties and problems stemming from the distance between Muş and the center of the province of Kurdistan, Diyarbekir, which was sixty hours away. Such remoteness not only

53 BOA. İ. MVL. 263/9985, 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1269 (5 March 1853).

54 Ibid., BOA. A. MKT. UM 131/19, 29 Cemaziyelahir 1269 (9 April 1853).

encouraged Kurdish tribes to increase their oppressiveness - stealing and burning goods, killing people, and violating honor - but it also prevented the carrying out of government affairs. Therefore, he suggested Muş be attached to the province of Erzurum, which was only twenty hours away. Hereby, he emphasized, the security of life and property and the protection of honor along with the principles of the Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye would become a reality for the inhabitants of Muş.[55] This demand was found reasonable as the sub-province of Muş was detached from Kurdistan Province and attached to Erzurum effective March 1269 (March 1853).[56]

The governance of İshak Pasha importantly shows the limits of centrally-appointed governors in a region situated on the frontier and characterized by the assaults of nomadic and semi-nomadic groups. İshak Pasha, in spite of being an experienced bureaucrat, failed to control the tribes to a great extent. More importantly, as a statesman nominated to implement Tanzimat reforms, he collaborated with individuals like İbrahim Efendi who continued the regime of over taxation, corvée, extortion, and oppression that had been banned by the Tanzimat. Therefore, it is possible to imagine the desperation of the inhabitants of Muş while filing petitions, dispatching delegates to the imperial center, and asking for the return of exiled local notables. It is possible that some petitions were penned under the indoctrination of the allies of Şerif Bey. It was not extraordinary to file petitions favoring or disfavoring an official, too. Yet the contents of these documents significantly portray the oppression, over taxation, extortion, and corvée that the inhabitants suffered. In the same vein, desperately requesting the return of their traditional leaders does not mean that they had lived in harmony free of any abuse under their earlier rule; rather, it implies that the conditions had become aggravated in their absences.

55 "… Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye usûl-i mu'adelet-şümûlunun es-i esâsı olan mâl û cân ve 'ırzlarından tamâmen husûl-i emniyyet ve maslahatca dâhi ..." BOA. İ. MVL. 263/9985, 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1269 (5 March 1853).

56 Ibid., BOA. A. MKT. UM. 136/65, 23 Şaban 1269 (1 Haziran 1853). Similarly, it was reported that following petitions of its Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants, Hınıs was separated from the province of Kurdistan and attached to Erzurum, as it had formerly been. BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 60/33, 16 Rebiülevvel 1269 (27 January 1853).

Although the local people of Muş's demands were recognized, İbrahim Efendi was punished, İshak Pasha was discharged, and Muş was attached to Erzurum, the grievances did not dissipate. The newly appointed governor, Mesrur Bey, soon passed away and was replaced with Veli Agha.[57] Paying attention to the tension (*galeyan*) between the Kurds and Armenian peasants in Muş, the Meclis-i Vâlâ discussed that despite his knowledge about the locality, Veli Agha was not a pasha. Rank as such was important to be influential over the inhabitants of the region – so it was necessary to appoint a higher-ranking person to Muş. Thus, Kenan Pasha, the son-in-law of the late Esad Pasha, was seen as proper to be the kaimakam of Muş.[58]

However, the grievances of the people reached to another phase soon after. With the outbreak of the Crimean War, Muş became one of the main suppliers for the army assembled in Kars.[59] The fact that being on the frontier, Muş's geographical peculiarity greatly shaped the policies of both central and local authorities as well as notables has been emphasized throughout this study. In the second chapter it was argued that this peculiarity affected the negotiation terms of local notables. Benefiting from the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828-9 Emin Pasha strengthened his power. In this chapter, the petitions of the inhabitants of Muş shed light on the effects of the Crimean War on the locality of Muş more broadly. Especially the accusations against Ömer Pasha, the kaimakam of Muş during part of the war, depict the suffering of the people which doubled with the requirement that they supply provisions for the army.

57 BOA. MVL. d. 2, 26 Ramazan 1269 (3 July 1853), p. 59

58 BOA. MVL. d. 2, 21 Şevval 1269 (19 July 1853), p. 90. However, soon after, with the breaking out of the Crimean War, Kenan Pasha was asked to return to Siird, and Osman Pasha, the former governor of Kars, was appointed to Muş with an increase in salary amounting to ten thousand guruş. BOA. MVL. 265/36, 5 Rebiülevvel 1270 (5 January 1854).

59 BOA. MVL. 265/36, 5 Rebiülevvel 1270 (5 January 1854).

## § 6.3 Socio-Economic Results of the Crimean War for Muş's locality

Ottoman society was informed of the empire's declaration of war against Russia in an article of news published in *Takvim-i Vekayi*, the official newspaper, on 4 October 1853.[60] The main reason for the declaration was Russia's invasion of the Danubian Principalities under the command of General Gorchakov in July 1853 and its rejection of an ultimatum to evacuate presented by Ömer Pasha, the commander-in-chief of the Rumelian Army. The war started on one hand in Rumeli, where troops had crossed the Danube, and on the other in Erzurum and Kars where provincial troops were transferred to the southern Caucasus. At the same time, the Ottoman fleet sailed along the Black Sea and anchored in Sinop. Thus, the war continued along Danube, in Black Sea and in the Caucasus. France and Britain allied with the Ottoman Empire, declaring war against Russia in March 1854.[61]

The battle on the Caucasian Front is significant for this study as its socio-economic results determined the politics of the province of Erzurum. Especially, financing the war laid a burden on poor inhabitants of the region. Consul Brant describes the situation of the villages near army headquarters as miserable and deserted. Grain and agricultural equipments were collected for the army. If any peasants left behind in these villages, they had scarce ox to plough their lands or seed to sow them. When an amount of grain required by the authorities, agents who sent to the villages to collect it demanded double the amount from the peasants. And the ones who bribed the agents could be exempt from providing their share in the contribution of grain.[62] Similarly, Candan Badem argues that the burden of the war was shouldered by poor villagers rather than the well-off. Accordingly, in Erzurum, soldiers quartered in poor villages as the rich offered bribes to be exempted from this obligation.[63] By the

60 Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856* (Boston: Brill, 2010), 99; Fuat Andıç and Süphan Andıç, *Kırım Savaşı Ali Paşa ve Paris Antlaşması* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2002), 13.

61 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2, 138.

62 FO 78/1115, "No: 20, "Report on the Pashalık of Erzurum for 1854" Erzurum, April 22, 1855.

63 Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 292.

same token, the conditions of soldiers themselves were dreadful as described by Badem.

> The Ottoman armies in Kars, Erzurum and Batum spent the winter of 1853-1854 in very unhealthy conditions. They were scarcely fed and badly clothed, quartered in poorly heated, unventilated, filthy, crowded inns (khans) or houses in conditions ripe for the spread of contagious diseases like typhus. Therefore 18,000 to 20,000 soldiers died from diseases and malnutrition.[64]

### 6.3.1 *The Case of Ömer Pasha*

Gevranlızâde Ömer Pasha's rule in Muş during this turmoil later led to an investigation, so his story serves as an example of the socio-economic effects of the war on inhabitants on the eastern periphery of the empire. Ömer Pasha was from one of the local families of Diyarbekir. As kaimakam of Dersim when the Crimean War broke out, Ömer Pasha was called to serve in the Imperial Army.[65] After two years, he was charged with the discipline of Kurdish groups in Muş, the assaults and tyranny of which local people suffered heavily. His efforts during the suppression of the turmoil created by Mirza Agha of Huyud were greatly appreciated. Mirza Agha, the father of the notorious Musa Bey, assaulted certain villages of Huyud, killing people and seizing property. Ömer Pasha successfully captured and sent him and his men to Istanbul. In return, as a reward, he was appointed as the new kaimakam of Muş.[66]

Not surprisingly, the nomination of Ömer Pasha to Muş was at first appreciated in a petition signed in the name of all the *ulema* (Muslim scholars), *meşayih* (sheikhs) and "poor inhabitants" of Muş. It was argued that he successfully undertook and implemented all the requirements of the Tanzimat, tax collection, and the transport of provisions demanded by the army fairly

64 Ibid., 190.

65 BOA. MVL. 304/49, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1273 (30 December 1856).

66 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 240/98, 21 Şevval 1272 (25 June 1856), BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 72/36, 8 Şaban 1271 (26 April 1855).

and without oppressing people. Another emphasis concerning his administration was his ability to control the region and discipline the Kurdish tribes.[67]

In fact, such a report praising the rule of Ömer Pasha was the same as ones penned for previous kaimakams of Muş. In the same vein, news of discontent would arrive immediately afterward. Meanwhile, the Consul of Erzurum, Mr. Brant, defined Ömer Pasha - who bribed the governor of Kars, İsmail Pasha, in order to be appointed as the kaimakam of Muş - as "rapacious." Besides, the consul described the pasha as someone able to make use of every opportunity to extort, so the inhabitants were disgruntled about him.[68] It did not take long for the pasha to be summoned to Erzurum to be questioned by the *Meclis-i Kebir* (Grand Council) about the complaints of local people. Meanwhile, Ziya Bey sat in for him to continue the supply of provisions to the army, as the war was continuing.[69]

According to a register prepared and submitted by nine informants (*muhbir*), Ömer Pasha was accused of not paying for supplies and other commodities the inhabitants of Muş had provided. The pasha denied the allegations arguing that he had paid for some, and for the arrears he had provided owners with bills of debt. However, the informants rejected Ömer Pasha's defense, arguing that he had not distributed any bills at all. Therefore, it was decided to confront the parties and examine the issue in detail through local councils. Nevertheless, in Muş, more immediate duties remained like supervising the transportation of provisions to the army and dealing with cavalry regiments that had already arrived in Muş. Ömer Pasha was not allowed to return to carry out such duties as he was on trial, so İsmail Pasha, the mutasarrıf of Kars, was employed both to temporarily govern Muş and carry out a fair investigation of the case of Ömer Pasha.[70] Needless to say, the inhabitants of Muş, meanwhile, were demanding the replacement of Ömer Pasha with

67 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 200/26, 19 Şevval 1271 (5 July 1855).

68 FO 78/1115, "No: 20, "Report on the Pashalık of Erzurum for 1854" Erzurum, April 22, 1855.

69 BOA. MVL. 294/75, 16 Rebiülevvel 1272 (26 November 1855).

70 BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 78/70, 3 Receb 1272 (9 April 1856).

Şerif Bey.[71] As will be discussed, the impact of the local beys of Muş on the case would be an important part of Ömer Pasha's defense.

The continuation of flow of the supplies to the army and the thorough investigation of the accusations against Ömer Pasha were İsmail Pasha's two main tasks. The pasha was also entrusted with the discipline of Kurdish tribes, especially that of the Hasenan, which will be elaborated upon in the chapter 7. However, the foremost task of İsmail Pasha was to finish the investigation of Ömer Pasha before he returned to Kars.[72] Therefore the pasha assembled a special council (*meclis-i mahsus*) to examine the allegations against Ömer Pasha and his collaborators.

As reported by İsmail Pasha, the poor, and oppressed inhabitants of Muş who had suffered from the extortion of Ömer Pasha appeared before him to demand justice. The claims against Ömer Pasha ranged from his forcibly taking food and beverage for his own house without paying for to embezzlement of money while settling debts among persons. Moreover, İsmail Pasha argued that mismanagement and wrongdoings of Ömer Pasha deteriorated the conditions in which the people of Muş were living in as he left the ground to the leaders of Kurdish tribes and administrators of the some sub-districts.[73]

Notwithstanding, Ömer Pasha filed petitions arguing that the sub-province of Muş was close to the army barracks, was the first store (*birinci anbarı*) of the army, and that the money (namely *iane-i cihadiye*, supplementary tax for the war) collected from inhabitants was substantial. He emphasized that he paid utmost attention not to harass people while carrying out government tasks. All the complaints were from the people who held grudges against him (*ashâb-ı ağrâz*), so the colonel Salih Zeki Bey, who was in the second regiment of the regular cavalry in Muş should be consulted to get sound information about his deeds.[74]

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71 "… pâşâ-yı mûmâileyhin 'azliyle yerine Muşlu Şerif beğin kâimakâm ta'yîn olunması ahâli-i merkûme tarafından bi'l-i'lâm ve mahâzır inhâ ve istida' kılınmış olmasıyla …" BOA. A. MKT. 231/15, 24 Receb 1272 (30 April 1856).

72 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 241/25, 23 Şevval 1272 (27 June 1856).

73 BOA. A. MKT. UM 236/24, 2 Ramazan 1272 (7 May 1856).

74 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 240/98, 21 Şevval 1272 (25 June 1856).

Nevertheless, İsmail Pasha and in the case he returnd to Kars, the governor of Erzurum were ordered to carry out and conclude the investigation of Ömer Pasha.[75] Finally, Ömer Pasha and his complainants were confronted and heard in the presence of İsmail Pasha; consequently, a report was submitted by the Council of Muş consisting of twenty-five clauses describing the Ömer Pasha's offences and listing the items he had unjustly received or embezzled.[76]

Examining the allegations against Ömer Pasha enables us to generally depict the peculiarities of embezzlement or corruption in which administrators could become involved in the nineteenth century. In the register attached to the report, the grain and other items Ömer Pasha had taken, the amount he had paid, and the arrears were shown village by village. His total debt was sixty-three thousand one hundred five guruş. Moreover, registers based on claimants' accounts were compared with the register submitted by the pasha himself. Most of the debt was from grain and other goods taken either for the army or for his own house. Actually the main accusation against him was extortion. It was argued that unlike all of other kaimakams of Muş who had bought their supplies in the market where all kinds of goods were available, Ömer Pasha bought nothing from the market and sent *zaptiehs* to the villages to take his supplies from the inhabitants.[77] Similarly, bills of debt villagers were provided by Ömer Pasha were falsified; either the numbers of the villages or the amounts of the supplies were registered below their real number or value. As the claimants alleged, zaptiehs typically delivered the bills to the pasha instead of giving them to the suppliers. It was reported that the testimonies of zaptiehs during their interrogation proved the claims of the inhabitants unlike Ömer Pasha's denial.[78]

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75 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 241/25, 23 Şevval 1272 (27 June 1856).

76 BOA. İ. MVL. 433/19083, 15 Şevval 1272 (19 June 1856).

77 For the collection of the taxes with the aid of military forces and its results, see Nadir Özbek, "Policing the Countryside: Gendarmes of the Late-Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire (1876-1908) " *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 40 (2008): 47-67; Nadir Özbek, "'Anadolu Islahatı,' 'Ermeni Sorunu,' ve Vergi Tahsildarlığı," *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 9 (2009): 59-85.

78 "... lede'l suâl merkûm zabtiyeleri dâhi ahâlî merkûmenin ifâdât-ı vâki'sini ba'dehâ (…) tasdîk ve temhîr ..." BOA. İ. MVL. 433/19083, 15 Şevval 1272 (19 June 1856).

Furthermore, Ömer Pasha employed the Ilıcanlu tribe from his homeland to transport provisions from the villages to army headquarters, despite the sufficient number of zaptiehs. Besides, the pasha together with zaptiehs and armed tribal members in his company spent nights in the houses of the villagers of Muş and provided the households with bills that were far below the real costs of their stay.[79] Apart from pointing out Ömer Pasha's corruption, such accounts emphasized the continuation of forced labor that was supposed to have been abolished with the Tanzimat and showed the extent of the reach of the reforms. However, complaints like forced labor and the involvement of Kurdish tribes in tax collection were not specific to Ömer Pasha; the previous kaimakams of Muş were accused of similar acts.

On top of that Ömer Pasha continued to collect extra taxes in murder and pecuniary cases with the title of the kaimakam of the sub-province; in other words, people alleged that he extorted them at every possible opportunity. Moreover, he appointed his men or relatives as administrators of sub-districts or registered them as zaptieh, like he did for his son. Consequently, due to his atrocities the peasants of twenty-three villages had dispersed and the decrease in the population in turn led to financial loss of the imperial treasury. According to the report of the council, however, some villagers were persuaded to return to their lands under the influence of İsmail Pasha.[80]

The interrogation of Ömer Pasha and his confrontation with claimants against him were carried out by a special council constituted and led by İsmail Pasha along with the members of Muş's local council, who were also among the witnesses. The report and attached register were prepared and submitted to the Sublime Porte demanding a decision that Ömer Pasha pay his debts to the inhabitants of Muş.[81] Although it was reported that Ömer Pasha, who was held in Erzurum during the investigation of the case, remained silent when

79 Ibid.

80 "... pâşâ-yı mûmâileyhin mugâyir-i mu'adelet-i seniyye olarak vâki' olan envâ'i zulm ve ta'addîsine mebnî Muş kazâsına tâbi' yirmi üç pâre kârye ahâlî-i meskûnesi kadertâb olamıyarak ahâlî-i merkûme herbiri bir tarafa nakl ve firâr iderek kurâ-i ahâlî-i muharrere hâli ve emvâl-i matlûbe-i seniyye mua'ttal kâlmış olduğu ..." BOA. İ. MVL. 433/19083, 15 Şevval 1272 (19 June 1856).

81 Ibid.

the accusations were read to him during the interrogation or denied them, immediately afterwards he filed many petitions nullifying the report and register of the local council and justifying himself.

Accordingly, Ömer Pasha argued that the allegations were arranged by members of the Muş Council who nursed grudges against him. More importantly, he emphasized the role of the notables of Muş, namely the family of Şerif Bey, in the case against him. Emphasizing that his duty was hard as Muş was inhabited by tribes and that he had been careful while collecting provisions for the Imperial Army without pressuring the common people, Ömer Pasha asserted that his success bothered the notables of Muş who had been discharged a short time before. Those notables were of the opinion that their existence in the region was indispensable – that without them the sub-province could not be administered.[82] Murad Bey had been allowed to settle in Erzurum with his family in the early months of 1855,[83] and Ömer Pasha drew attention to the fact the return of Murad Bey encouraged the family's networks which had already reached the local council. Those local members, Ömer Pasha argued that, were hateful of him as they could not find opportunities to be involved in extortion during his term of office as they were accustomed to.[84]

Therefore, Ömer Pasha accused council members, namely, İbrahim Efendi, the registrar, and Bayram, Cergü, Hasan, Selim, and Halid Aghas of plotting against him. Having collaborated with some village headmen (*muhtar*) said council members arranged informants from villages, as they had wanted to avoid suspicion, and sent those informants to İsmail Pasha immediately after his arrival in Muş to complain about Ömer Pasha. Thus, the report and register sent by the Council of Muş were not the outcome of a trial

82 "... aşâir ve kabâilden 'ibâret olan mahalin bu vechile hüsn-i idâresine muvaffakıyet-i bendegânem livâ-i mezbûrun idâresi birâz vaktden berû ellerinden nez' olunmuş ve dâimen oraca kendülerinin lüzûm-ı vücûd-ı me'mûriyyetleri esbâbının taharrîsinde bulunmış olan Muş ümerâsının efkâr-ı zâtiyelerine mugâyır ..." BOA. MVL. 301/93, 28 Muharrem 1273 (28 September 1856).

83 BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 132/22, 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1271 (11 February 1855), BOA. A. MKT. UM 183/20, 3 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (21 February 1855).

84 BOA. MVL. 304/10, 18 Rebiülahir 1273 (16 December 1856), BOA. MVL. 306/44, 12 Cemaziyelahir 1273 (7 February 1857).

but rather just the testimonies of said informants, claimed Ömer Pasha. Therefore, the pasha urgently requested that the case be reheard by the Erzurum Provincial Council (*Meclis-i Kebir-i Eyâlet*) and the Temporary Military Council (*Meclis-i Muvakkat-i Askeri*).[85]

As to the allegations, Ömer Pasha emphasized that the market of Muş did not always store sufficient goods, contrary to statements in the report, and that therefore he had to purchase some goods from the villages. He also added that as he had been in a financial difficulty because of the war, he had paid for some goods through moneylenders and provided suppliers with bills of debt for the arrears. However, the pasha stressed that the values of the items in the register were indicated four times higher than they really were. Moreover, the goods were bought in the harvest season and when such goods were abundant and the prices were lower. His debt had been fixed according to current market rate (*rayiç-i belde*) at that time. However, his debt in the register had been based on calculations when the goods were rare and the prices were higher.[86]

Along the same lines, Ömer Pasha complained that goods that the zaptiehs had taken for themselves were also charged to him. The pasha argued that if anyone had complained about such abuse by the zaptiehs, he could have prevented it. He also added that he had warned officials several times not to take goods without payment (*meccânen*), so he could not be held responsible for the debts of the zaptiehs. Thus, rather than the sixty thousand guruş registered to him as arrears Ömer Pasha argued that his total debt was just four thousand guruş.[87]

Ömer Pasha also consolidated his arguments by attaching the documents provided by the revenue officer (*serkâtib-i mal*), Hasan, and moneylenders of Muş (*sarraf-ı sandık*), Ovannes and Bedros, indicating that he had no debt. However, Ömer Pasha also needed the affirmation of the Council of Muş that he had no debt in order to submit to central treasury and prove his innocence. Due to the aforementioned council members who were supposedly the advocates of the notables of Muş, he could not get it.[88]

85 BOA. MVL. 302/21, 15 Safer 1273 (15 October 1856).

86 BOA. MVL. 302/29, 16 Safer 1273 (16 October 1856).

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

Claiming that he was aggrieved and insulted, Ömer Pasha asserted that what he was going through had happened to all the other kaimakams of Muş for many years. Council members, upon the provocation of Muş's notables, had been striven to create the impression that no one other than those notables could govern Muş. However, the pasha argued, if said council members did not stir up trouble, the sub-province could be governed. Therefore, Ömer Pasha concluded with the warning that the region would get out of control if those council members were not disciplined.[89]

The insistence of Ömer Pasha resulted in a rehearing of the case. The previous report and register, prepared during the time of İsmail Pasha, were sent to Arif Pasha, the current governor of Erzurum, to be reinvestigated. For the reexamination, claimants were summoned to Erzurum. However, reports indicate that the claimants were reluctant to show. In the end, their deputies, the deputy-murahhasa of Çanlı Monastery, Agob, and the informants for certain villages - the *kahya* (stewards) of the villages of Norşen, Kömes, Argevanik, and Ziyaret - arrived in Erzurum where Saroyan, the murahhasa of Catholic community, joined them. According to the report of Provincial Council of Erzurum, the deputies could provide no proof when the content of the previous report was read to them clause by clause. Instead, after negotiation, these deputies declared that they would give up their claims if Ömer Pasha would not file a complaint of honor and expenditure against them,[90] (the pasha had arguing that he had incurred costs as he had been in Erzurum for many years in vain and he was insulted because of accusations, as well).[91]

Consequently, both parties were reconciled and their representatives certified that the villagers were withdrawing all their claims about Ömer Pasha.[92] Both the Provincial Council of Erzurum and the Temporary Military Council underscored that not all among the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 BOA. MVL. 314/42, 23 Muharrem 1274 (13 September 1857).

92 BOA. MVL. 313/40, 14 Muharrem 1274 (4 September 1857). "...'umûm de'âvîden birbirlerinin zimmetlerini ibrâ-i 'âmm ile ibrâ ve iskât itmiş olduklarını ..." BOA. MVL. 314/72, 14 Safer 1274 (4 October 1857).

Muş had complained about Ömer Pasha. Rather, it had mostly been Armenian villagers in the Muş Plain who were exhausted from supplying provisions to the Imperial Army during the Crimean War.[93] In line with this, Ömer Pasha had been very strict about supply and transportation of the provisions, so the villagers had become aggrieved and offended, and complained about the Pasha.[94] Therefore, as reported, the claimants' allegations were groundless. They had acted upon the provocation and persuasion of persons who nursed grudges against the pasha.[95] In a nutshell, it was argued that all of the complaints stemmed from the exhaustion and hatred of the villagers of the plain, which council members turned into an opportunity to dismiss Ömer Pasha and ensure the return of Muş's notables.

The case of Ömer Pasha continued for almost two years, and in the end he was cleared of all accusations. Nevertheless, the exculpation of the pasha was controversial. It is possible to consider that the Pasha was cleared partially because people withdrew their claims against him as they probably dreaded that the pasha would file complaints against them. Furthermore, the bills taken from the moneylenders of Muş proving that he owed no debt to the local treasury not mean that he had not taken goods from the peasant without payment or by the force of zaptiehs. His spending nights in the villages with his men and horses was a burden, showing the continuation of corvée. Thus, while his opponents on the Council of Muş were influential in distorting the facts, not all of the accusations were groundless.

However, this case has further implications for the post-Tanzimat situation in Muş. The prominence of provincial and district councils in the frame of the Tanzimat reform program has already been discussed in the previous chapters. As highlighted before, the collaborators of exiled traditional rulers

93 BOA. MVL. 315/46, 7 Rebiülevvel 1274 (26 October 1857). "... da'va-yı mezbûrenin mücerred tarafeynin yekdiğere incinmesinden neş'et itmiş bir şey olduğu livâ-i mezbûrun sâir kazâsı ve kurâsı ahâlî-i İslâm ve re'âyâsı taraflarından ednâ bir iddiâ' vâki' olmıyarak yalnız mezkûr ova kurâsında mutavattın olan Hristiyân taraflarından vuku' bulmasıyla dâhi bedîhî ve meczûm bulunmuşdur ..." BOA. A. MKT. UM 254/2, 21 Muharrem 1273 (21 September 1856).

94 BOA. MVL. 313/40, 14 Muharrem 1274 (4 September 1857).

95 BOA. MVL. 315/46, 7 Rebiülevvel 1274 (26 October 1857).

served on the district councils which were the principal institutions "in charge of local administration including supervision of taxation, maintenance of public order, conscription, land survey, waqf administration, and public works."[96] Furthermore, local councils worked as the places of "dispute resolution" where both the abuses of the local officials were resolved - until the establishment of *Nizamiye Mahkemeleri* ('secular' courts) - criminal cases were heard.[97] Therefore, with their exclusion from local politics the power of the Kurdish beys was curtailed to a great extent, others among the local notables – that is, less influential aghas, some of whom were the relatives of the exiled beys, took part in the Tanzimat's institutions.

Likewise, the case points to peculiarities about the social landscape of Muş. It is a fact that the villages in the plain were more productive. Not only were they the principal source of supplies during extraordinary circumstances like war, but they also suffered from extortion. It is noteworthy that the deputies sent to Erzurum to testify were from the villages that Muş's notables had held as yurtluk-ocaklık. This shows the material power of the exiled beys, as these were the most fertile lands in Muş. But the fact that these villages were mostly inhabited by Armenians also provides clues about tensions between the Armenian peasantry and the Kurdish aghas in Muş, which would become more tangible in the following years. In fact, reports from the region dated in the 1850s drew attention to the fact that the inhabitants of Muş - especially the Christian population - were being oppressed to a great extent.[98] Although in the beginning the local authorities intended to calm the Sublime Porte by emphasizing that they had received no complaints about oppression from non-Muslim subjects, district administrators, council members, and Muslim and non-Muslim notables would be at the top of the agenda in ensuing years due to their assaults on the Armenian peasantry.[99]

96 Akiba, "The Local Councils," 179.

97 Ibid.

98 BOA. MVL. 300/89, 29 Şevval 1272 (3 July 1856).

99 For instance, the general-in-chief of the Anatolian army argued that despite news that non-Muslim populations in Muş and Bitlis were being oppressed, he had heard no complaint about the issue. BOA. A. MKT. UM 157/38, 21 Şaban 1270 (19 May 1854).

Meanwhile, having heard that a new kaimakam had been appointed, the local council, the *meşayih* and the *ulema*, and the Muslim and non-Muslim notables of Muş filed a petition to extend the term of İsmail Pasha in lieu of a new kaimakam. Depicting a picture of Muş of post-Tanzimat, the petitioners argued that the sub-province had not been yet been brought under control and that it was a part of Kurdistan (emphasizing its sensitive geography). On top of that, the tribes living there were numerous and scattered, so it was impossible to successfully govern the sub-province through the kaimakamlık, as the cases of previous kaimakams, including Ömer Pasha, demonstrated. Besides, this petition is significant in showing how the depicted situation in Muş resembled the pre-Tanzimat period.

> Honorable people, poor inhabitants, and commoners have been tormented and have suffered extreme troubles for a long time. Before the Tanzimat, they were exposed to all kinds of atrocity and torture, [yet] in 1266, the late Esad Pasha also dropped by here and, in fact, carried out many reforms in the sub-province of Muş. And the vicious tribes were restrained and thanks to His Majesty our well-being was largely provided for. Nevertheless, the pasha did not stay long and as soon as he departed, whether because of the incapability of the kaimakams or not, the previous situation was restored. Thus, due to the trials and judgments carried out during the governance of Esad Pasha, certain tribal leaders and bandits [were offended] and bore grudges and wanted to take revenge, so much more mischief occurred than before. In the end, the kaimakams also could not discipline them and so the kaimakams have been changed several times and this situation resulted in the increase of the torture and banditry. Everyone is tired of life and all the sub-province is in a tumultuous situation.[100]

Therefore, the rest of this chapter will focus on two interrelated issues. On one hand, the financial matters of the Crimean War continued, and on the other, oppression by a coalition of council members, kaimakams, müdirs,

100 BOA. MVL. 300/89, 29 Şevval 1272 (3 July 1856). See Appendix A, Quotation 6 for the original Turkish.

moneylenders, and tax-farmers of the peasants of Muş increased day by day, which in turn resulted in depopulation especially among Armenian peasants. However, first, it is necessary to recall one of the significant results of the Crimean War, the Islahat Fermanı (Reform Edict), which heralded an important phase in the reform era of the Ottoman Empire, targeting the equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim populations.

#### 6.3.1.1 The Islahat Fermanı and its Results for the Armenian Population

The concern of European powers regarding the situation of non-Muslim communities of the empire had partially determined Ottoman bureaucrats' reform efforts for the amelioration of the conditions of the empire's subjects. Therefore, the issue of reform occupied Ottoman bureaucrats both before and during the Crimean War. Although it was the Islahat Fermanı that formulated Muslim and non-Muslim equality in the empire, the issue of the rights and privileges of the non-Muslim population was already among the four articles discussed at the Vienna Conference, which had been held in March 1855 to discuss the peace protocol.[101] In the same vein, the Ottoman Empire declared Islahat Fermanı on 18 February 1856, and the issue of reform also constituted of the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris ratified on 30 March 1856, despite the reluctance of Ali Pasha, the Ottoman delegate during the peace negotiation that ended the Crimean War.[102] This article emphasized that the signatory parts would support and be respectful to the Islahat Fermanı that had been promulgated by the Ottoman bureaucrats immediately before the peace negotiations.[103]

Promising Muslim and non-Muslim equality, the Islahat Fermanı was one of the milestones of the long nineteenth century. Especially amendments

101 Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 335.

102 Andıç and Andıç, *Kırım Savaşı Ali Paşa*, 80. The concern of the Sublime Porte regarding including the reform in the peace agreement was that the non-Muslim population might think that it was included as a result of the efforts of European powers, so it would be grateful to them, not to the Porte. Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 337.

103 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2, 140; Murat Bebiroğlu, *Tanzimat'tan II.Meşrutiyet'e Ermeni Nizamnameleri* (Istanbul: Ohan Matbaacılık, 2003), 40.

about the poll-tax (*cizye)*, highlighting the zımmî status of non-Muslims and their conscription in the army were noteworthy. The poll-tax was abolished, though the point that anyone who could not serve in the army would pay a tax called the *iane-i askeriyye* or *bedel-i askeriyye* was a reformulation of the poll-tax. The problems regarding the recruitment of non-Muslims would continue until the downfall of the empire. Similarly, the admission of non-Muslims to civil and military schools was a novelty of the edict. The abolishment of the use of insulting titles for non-Muslims was equally important.[104] The repair and construction of churches, schools, and hospitals were facilitated. Previously, construction or repair required the permission of the sultan; with the edict, churches, and cemeteries were allowed to be repaired without permission, permission was still necessary for new construction.[105] Besides, the representation of non-Muslims in provincial and district councils was strengthened through amendments to the regulations. The most important among them was the Provincial Law of 1864, which as underscored by Roderic Davison improved the "representative quality" of local councils.[106]

On the other hand, Cora rightly notes that these reforms like admission of non-Muslims to the provincial councils were not parts of a top-down decision by the Ottoman "center" to promote equality between its subjects. Rather, it was an acknowledgement of rights and power of local Armenian notables and need of Ottoman government for them in the provinces.[107] Similarly, the articles of the edict concerning building and repairment of churches can also be

104 In fact, preliminary steps concerning this issue were taken with the Tanzimat Fermanı. Candan Badem states how the name of *Gavur Dağı* in Maraş had been already changed to *Bereket Dağı* by an irade dated to February 1854. Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 343.

105 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2, 124-25; Bebiroğlu, *Tanzimat'tan II.Meşrutiyet'e*, 36-37.

106 Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 142. In the same vein, the regulation changed the names of the councils first as known "Muhasıllık Meclisleri." Accordingly, in the provinces, Vilayet İdare Meclisi; in the sub-provinces, Liva İdare Meclisi; and in districts Kazâ İdare Meclisleri were established. Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerini'nin*, 252.

107 Cora, "Transforming Erzurum/Karin," 11.

regarded as "concessions" to the non-Muslim subjects as a reward for their services and assistance during the Crimean War.[108]

In line with the aforementioned novelties, the Islahat Fermanı laid the groundwork for amendments to the administrative functioning of the communities (*millet*).[109] The transformation of the millet system first started with the Armenians and was followed by Greeks and Jews. Shaw and Kural define this process as an increase in the secularization of the Ottoman society, as this movement framed the authority of the clergy.[110] A combination of internal conflicts and external factors led to the transformation in the Armenian community's political structure.[111] On one hand, the power of religious institutions and Armenian notables called *amiras* was challenged in the nineteenth century by middle class, like artisans and young Armenian intellectuals who demanded more participation of the laity in the administration of the community.[112] On the other hand, both the Tanzimat and Islahat edicts contributed to limiting in the power of ecclesiastical-feudal authorities in Armenian community.[113] The process, especially after the separation of two councils for civil and spiritual administration of the community, respectively, in 1847 culminated with a National Constitution, *nizâmname* in 1860 (which was finalized in 1863

108 Ibid., 222.

109 For an evaluation of the Islahat Fermani and its reception, see chapter 2 in Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*.

110 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2, 124. They argue that the preliminary signs of secularization of Muslims began with the promulgation of the Tanzimat when the power of the religious authorities was controlled and they were assigned salaries instead of foundation revenues. Ibid.

111 Hagop Barsoumian, "The Eastern Question and The Tanzimat Era," in *Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times*, ed. Richard G. Hovanissian (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

112 Amira was an honorary title used in Armenian community which first emerged in the sixteenth century, yet it was mostly used in the eighteenth century. Amiras were mostly money-lenders. Thus, with their financial capability stemming from their profession, they were influential in the Ottoman bureaucracy and could play an intermediary role between the Armenian community and Ottoman bureaucracy. Aylin Koçunyan, "Nizâmnâme-i Millet-i Ermeniyân Anayasa mıydı?," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 216 (Aralık 2011): 47.

113 Vartan Artinian, *The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire 1839-1863: A Study of Historical Development* (Istanbul1988), 52-53.

followed the amendments demanded by the Porte) and the Armenian National Assembly.[114]

Nevertheless, it is legitimate to question the extent to which the transformations presented above affected the daily lives of inhabitants in the provinces. This would not undervalue the constitutionalizing and democratization of the Armenian community, yet would highlight the daily experience of the peasantry in eastern provinces in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Lillian Etmekjian states that in 1869 the Armenian National Assembly "for the first time decided to push for a solution" to the problems of provincial Armenians, and the newly elected patriarch Bishop Khrimian met with Grand Vizier Ali Pasha to discuss conditions of not only Armenians but also Muslims in the provinces.[115] As will be discussed in the following lines, in an era when the Armenian National Constitution was being promulgated and when consular reports were pointing out that central rule was increasing in the eastern provinces,[116] the Armenians in Muş were claiming their right to be reimbursed for financing the corps during the Crimean War through petitions.[117]

114 For a detailed discussion of the Armenian National Constitution, see Ibid.; Barsoumian, "The Eastern Question."; Bebiroğlu, *Tanzimat'tan II.Meşrutiyet'e*.

115 Lillian Etmekjian, "The Armenian National Assembly of Turkey and Reform," *The Armenian Review*, no. Spring 29 (1976): 38. Accordingly, the Armenian National Assembly prepared two reports concerning the oppressions in the provinces in 1872 and 1877, successively. Ibid., 38-52.

116 FO. 78/1669, No: 9, Consul Robert Dalyell, "Report on Eyalet of Erzurum," February 28, 1862.

117 Dzonivar Derderian demonstrates how the editor of journal *Artzvik Taronoy*, Garegin Srvandztiants encouraged the Armenians of the Ottoman East to reach their complaints to the Sublime Porte as a way of improving their conditions in the early 1860s. Dzovaniar Derderian, "Shaping Subjectivities and Contesting Power through the Image of Kurds, 1860s," in *The Ottoman East in the Nineteenth Century: Societies, Identities and Politics*, eds. Yaşar Tolga Cora, Dzovaniar Derderian, and Ali Sipahi (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 99.

## § 6.4 Council Members, Tax Farmers, Moneylenders and Peasants

In a petition dated August 1863 certain Haci Ohan, Kirkor, and Parsih stated that the peasants of Muş and Bitlis had provided the Anatolian Corps with cereal worth 3,700,000 (thirty-seven yük) guruş during the previous event (*mesele-i maziye*), implying the Crimean War. Although the central treasury had granted money for the suppliers, the members of Muş's council appropriated money, resulting in the misery of the people.[118] In subsequent petitions, it appeared that together with the embezzlement of their money paid for provisions during the Crimean War, the people of Muş suffered from the cruelty of not only Kurdish tribes but also moneylenders, tax farmers, council members, and the kaimakam of Muş.

As argued, the inhabitants of Muş were vacating their houses (*nakl-i hâne*) due to atrocities by Kurdish tribes, the tax farmer Hacı Esad Agha (who had also been a member of Muş's council), Kürkçübaşı Agob, his son-in law Minas, the former treasurer Ohannes, and the çorbacı (non-Muslim notable) Vartan and the council members.[119] It can be understood that the Crimean War aggravated situations of Muş. For instance, Kürkçübaşı Agop, who provisioned the army during the war, hoarded a huge amount of grain before and during the war in Erzurum.[120] Similarly, he purchased grain from the Armenians of Muş during the war and he did not pay in return.[121] The representatives of the inhabitants claimed that the population of Muş had previously

118 BOA. MVL. 425/136, 3 Rebiülevvel 1280 (18 Ağustos 1863). The petitioners also demanded that the center of the *kaimakamlık* of Muş remain in Bitlis to which it had been transferred a few years earlier. The issue of the center of the kaimakamlık was a matter between the districts of Muş and Bitlis.

119 BOA. MVL. 694/7, 21 Receb 1281(19 January 1865), BOA. MVL. 707/57, 6 Muharrem 1282 (1 June 1865). Cora accentuates the fact that Kürkçübaşı Agob emerged as a notable in Erzurum in 1850s by taking advantage of tax farming and army provisioning during the conjuncture of the Crimean War. Cora, "Transforming Erzurum/Karin," 155-227.

120 Ibid., 196.

121 Ibid., 202.

been eighty thousand and it had decreased to twenty-five thousand.[122] In the same vein, migration became an integral part of the daily lives of the peasants of Muş during the nineteenth century. The reasons and patterns of migration were intrinsic to the system of exploitation by tax farmers, moneylenders, council members, and Armenian notables.

In the middle of the 1860s, the peasants of Muş continued to file similar petitions, sending them in person through representatives. By the same token, representatives Hüdaverdi and Halil Aghas submitted a common petition signed by more than one hundred fifty inhabitants of Muş to the Meclis-i Vâlâ itemizing the offenses of the tax farmers, moneylenders, non-Muslim notables and council members. Consequently, the governor of Erzurum decided to appoint a certain Yusuf Bey from Erzurum's provincial council to examine the basis for the grievances.[123]

However, as reported by Halil, Hüdaverdi as well as Mıgırdıç, the representatives who were still in Istanbul, Yusuf Bey aligned himself with the council members instead of pursuing the rights of the claimants or investigating their allegations. Thus, they reported, the people were filing a petition with two thousand fifty signatures to be submitted to Istanbul through their representatives, Hacı Tayyib Efendi (from the Nakşibendi sect), Osman Efendi,[124] Hafız Abdülaziz Efendi (from the Kadiri sect), Eyyüb Agha and the deputy-murahhasa of Çanlı Monastery, Kocabaşı Mahitar. These representatives informed Halil, Hüdaverdi and Mıgırdıç by a telegraph that they had appeared before the governor of Erzurum to take permission for their leave for Istanbul, yet he said nothing. However, when they left to deliver the petition to Istanbul, the governor sent four zaptiehs to take them back to Erzurum.[125] The telegraph

122 BOA. MVL. 462/55, 16 Şaban 1281(14 January 1865). "Muş sancâğının giçen altmış dört senesinde seksan bin nüfûsı mevcûd iken mahal-i meclis a'zâsıyla eşkiyâ-yı ekrâdın ve Kürkçübaşı, Ohannes ve Minas nâm kimesnelerinin mezâlim ve ta'addiyâtı cihetiyle dâğılûb şimdi yirmi beş bin nüfûs kalmış olduğu ..." BOA. MVL. 694/7, 21 Receb 1281(19 January 1865).

123 BOA. MVL. 706/1, 5 Zilhicce 1281 (1 May 1865).

124 The name of Osman Efendi was absent from other petitions.

125 "Halil ve Hudaverdiye: Bâ mahzar-ı 'umûmi oltarafa gelur iken Bayburddan vâlî Erzuruma aldırdı bizi oltarafa telgrafla matlûb itdiresiniz." BOA. MVL. 469/64, 29 Zilkade 1281 (25 April 1865).

of Hacı Tayyib and the other representatives was influential as they successfully arrived in Istanbul to deliver the petition in the end. This account exemplifies how the spread of telegraph lines throughout the Ottoman Empire from 1860s onwards contributed not only to the infrastructural power of Ottoman government but also facilitated the filing of petitions.[126]

Nevertheless, the council of Muş submitted a report at the same time informing about the process of the investigation. Certainly, this report did not mention about the wrongdoings of Yusuf Bey, the official appointed to conduct the investigation; rather, it brought the claimants into disrepute. The council pointed out the difficulty of the case as the claimants were plenty, the accused numbered five, and the subjects of the complaints were manifold. Therefore, the council invited petitioners to specify whom they were accusing and for what they were accusing them of in individual petitions. Allegedly, despite the fact that petitioners agreed to this in the beginning, the following night (as it was the holy month, the council was carrying out business in the evenings) at around half past two o'clock four to five hundred people gathered before the council, leading to an uproar (*arbede*). The crowd demanded to be questioned collectively although the council had previously required them to specify the accused and to clarify the alleged points (*ta'yîn hasm ve tasrîh-i müdde'a*).[127]

The kaimakam of Muş Abdi Pasha and the council emphasized that no matter if the people were right in their accusations, such gatherings and associations (*hey'et-i cumhûriyyet ve tarz-ı cem'iyyet*) were dangerous. Moreover, according to the council of Muş, people's appeal to the language of banditry (*lisân-ı şekâvet*) was the result of provocation and sedition of the people who signed the petition against the council member and some other local actors.

126 From the documents, it can be determined that the lines between Erzurum-Muş, Muş-Bitlis, and Van-Bayezid were completed after 1865. BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 367/96, 6 Receb 1283 (14 Novermber 1866), BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 391/8, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1284 (10 September 1867). Yuval Ben-Basat also points out that the advent of the telegraph both reduced costs and shortened the distances. Also "payment per word" on the telegraph led to discursive changes in the petitions; namely, they became shorter and "normative blessings and embellishments" were excluded. Ben-Bassat, *Petitoning the Sultan*, 181-82.

127 BOA. MVL. 705/62, 29 Zilkade 1281 (25 April 1865).

These remarks by the kaimakam importantly show the limits of popular protest from the viewpoint of local authorities. As Eleni Gara also argues, "the legitimacy [of] contentious forms of popular protest" on the part of the empire's subjects was questionable to a great extent in the eyes of Ottoman government.[128] In this case the gathering of the inhabitants of Muş offended local authorities. On the other hand, local authorities tried to draw the attention of the central government to the questionability of the legitimacy of this act to cast a shadow on the rightfulness of the petitioners.

Persuaded that hearing their cases individually was difficult and that a gathering as such was also improper, the crowd dispersed and agreed to send their representatives the following day. The next day, according to Abdi Pasha, the people repented for their act the previous night and agreeed to be heard individually. As it was difficult for them to appear one by one, they asked for the nomination of four deputies among them. Moreover, they demanded the presence of four people from Muş's *ulema* to follow the case while it was being heard by the Council. Abdi Pasha interpreted this demand as a lack of confidence in the council, yet the council accepted people's demand to avoid any doubts. Claiming that the people's petition was partly unreadable and incomprehensible, the council had the correspondence clerk rewrite the report and narrate the case and complaints of the people in front of the representatives and said ulema. They were allowed to keep the report for twenty-four hours. However, the representatives later notified the chief clerk that the inhabitants of Muş refused to sign the report prepared by the council and insisted on the submission of their own, original draft. Thereupon, the kaimakam and council members of Muş declared that they would not help the petitioners in their case thereafter and as they did not trust the local government, they should apply to either the provincial council or to Istanbul.[129]

Nevertheless, the petitioners' reservation about the council of Muş shows not only the extent of the corruption of council members and the

128 Gara, "Popular Protest and the Limitations " 91. Gara further argues that the Ottoman state's attitude toward popular protests was "ambivalent" and "pragmatic." The punishment of protesters depended on various factors from the political situation to local power relations. Ibid., 93.

129 BOA. MVL. 705/62, 29 Zilkade 1281 (25 April 1865).

deterioration of the institution, but also the tensions between the peasants and the local government. Although the main issue was the nonpayment of money for provisions during the Crimean War, claimants specified many similar examples of extortion. For instance, council members neither paid for nor returned provisions collected and stored in certain villages of Muş for the corps when there was no longer such a necessity. In a similar vein, the petitioners complained about over collection of the tobacco tax (*duhan*), double taxation, and practices of forced labor.[130] Similarly, while kaimakam Abdi Pasha was accused of not paying for fuelwood and coal, the council prepared a report – without the consent of the people – to argue that the kaimakam had paid all his debts. On top of that, petitioners argued that the tribes around Muş would not dare steal and murder if they did not have the tacit consent of council members.[131]

On the other hand, the kaimakam of Muş, Abdi Pasha, argued that he had witnessed no abuse or atrocities on the part of council members during his term of office and that the claimants did not specify their allegations against council members. However, greatly emphasizing the assaults on and persecution of villagers by the Kurdish tribes, he argued that this was the main reason for the emigration of villagers. Yet the kaimakam further stated that unless the inhabitants of Muş believed that the government would get those tribes under control they would not specify the individuals they were accusing. To put it

130 Fehmi Yılmaz notes that the cultivation of tobacco increased in the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century. Among the eastern provinces Muş and Bitlis became important districts where tobacco was cultivated. Fehmi Yılmaz, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Tütün: Sosyal, Siyasî ve Ekonomik Tahlili (1600-1883)" (PhD diss., Marmara Üniversitesi, 2005), 36. In the same vein, increase in the cultivation of tobacco led to increase in its export in the empire throughout the nineteenth century. Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 847-52. For a study of tobacco workers as a result of this expansion of tobacco cultivation and export, see Can Nacar, "Tobacco Workers in the Late Ottoman Empire: Fragmentation, Conflict, and Collective Struggle" (PhD diss., State University of New York, 2010).

131 "... ancak meclis-i mezkûrun hafiyyen ruhsat vukû'una istinâdından iktizâ eylediği ..." BOA. MVL. 707/57, 6 Muharrem 1282 (1 June 1865).

differently, the people were afraid of further assaults by the Kurdish tribes should they openly accuse them and the government not successfully discipline them. For instance, Abdi Pasha argued, the Armenians of the village of Hars petitioned that they had suffered all kind of assaults by the Kurds of the neighboring village of Marinek, yet sexual assaults were the last straw. A certain Süleyman from the village of Marinek arrived in Hars with around fifty armed men for abduction of a woman. Despite the fact that some of the armed Kurds were caught, Süleyman had managed to escape. However, upon being demanded to submit a register of assaults by the Kurds of Marinek, the Armenians of Hars emphasized that they did not want to bring up the past events; their wish was to prevent further assaults.[132]

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioners of Muş against local council members, tax farmers, moneylenders, and the kaimakam, both the council and the kaimakam's reports emphasized that the source of the people of Muş's grievances and the reason for depopulation were atrocities by Kurdish tribes, denying their own involvement. However, the following petition of Halil and Hüdaverdi, representatives of the commoners of Muş, summarizes how the people of Muş were greatly suppressed not only because of assaults by Kurdish tribes but also because of a system of debt and dispossession established by the usurers (*murabahacılar*) that were, as the representatives alleged, protected by the council members:

> In the case one of our inhabitants needs a few hundred guruş, certain moneylenders and greedy usurers, who have been appearing in our region for a while, departing from sharia and contrary to the rule of His Majesty, add forty or fifty guruş for each hundred guruş in the name of inflation and they prepare bills of debt to be paid in kind. Within a decade, our inhabitants have become miserable and have migrated to other places. Today, in Istanbul, there are more than ten thousand [of our] people. Although they are busy with trade thanks to His Majesty, they could not escape the clutches of these cruel, ferocious people, and so they are in misery. It is obvious that this issue will subsequently impede imperial revenues because most of these usurers are influential

132 BOA. MVL. 706/1, 5 Zilhicce 1281 (1 May 1865).

> people and the members of the local council, the kaimakam, and other officials are backing them instead of protecting poor inhabitants. When a poor inhabitant falls into the hands of the local government, he is not protected and is imprisoned for two months because of a few hundred guruş. And then all his property is sold off to pay it off. Thus, our poor inhabitants are exhausted and dare not apply to the government. Thus, a hundred guruş debt can exceed a thousand guruş in the course of time.[133]

The emergence and expansion of usury system was highly related with monetization of economy and people's increasing need for cash to adapt to the transformation in tax collection of system.[134] This issue of indebtedness through usury is important as it aggravated the situations of sharecroppers in Muş as discussed in *Envar-ı Şarkiyye*.[135] Not only usurers but also landowners were lending money to the sharecroppers with high interest rates. This led to endless debt relations for the sharecroppers who became deprived of their money, lands and livestock at the end. To be saved from the assaults of creditors during the harvest time, the villagers had no option but leave sharecropping. Thus, it was decided to establish a commission to fix interest rates at one percent per month and to protect the rights of sharecroppers against creditors, landowners and usurers. Another important step was to disseminate *memleket*

133 BOA. MVL. 476/77, 7 Rebiülevvel 1282 (31 July 1865). See Appendix A, Quotation 7 for the original Turkish.

134 In the later periods, this sytem was called as "selef/selem" system. Polatel, "Armenians and the Land Question " 138. As Pamuk states both small peasantry and sharecroppers were constantly indebted to usurers because of a set of reasons; like agriculture's being depended on weather conditions, low productivity, taxes and pressures of tax farmers. Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık*, 130-31.

135 *Envar-ı Şarkiyye* was the provincial official newspaper of Erzurum and published first in 1867. It was in Ottoman Turkish and also in Turkish in Armenian alphabet. Muammer Yaşar, *Anadolu'da İlk Türk Gazetesi (Envar-ı Şarkiyye)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1971). Unfortunately, I could not find the first issues concerning the scope of this dissertation. Yet, the study of Muammer Yaşar – that I have consulted here - provides both transliterations and original texts. The incomplete but available issues are for later periods.

*sandığı* (homeland boxes)[136] that were already established in Muş to other sub-provinces and districts to alleviate moneylending issue.[137] In spite of these precautions, this issue of indebtedness became aggravated in the following decades.[138] Furthermore, it sheds light on the reasons behind the dispersion of the population of Muş. Having been dispossessed because of their debt, the inhabitants of Muş had to face migration. On the other hand, it shows how council members and the kaimakam were involved in the misery of the inhabitants of Muş, collaborating not only with tax farmers and moneylenders but also usurers.

Meanwhile, as understood from the anxiety of the kaimakam, Abdi Pasha, the governor of Erzurum had not replied to his correspondence for a few weeks.[139] The reason for the lack of communication came out in the governor's report to the grand vizier about the misgovernment of Abdi Pasha. Accordingly, during the pasha's term of office, the order and control in the sub-province was not maintained and turmoil among Kurdish tribes increased. Thus,

136 Memleket sandıkları that were the first examples of agricultural credit organizations in the Ottoman Empire emerged in the nineteenth century with initiatives of Midhat Pasha during his governorship in Niş, in 1863. It was a precaution against usurers and landowners who were lending money to the peasants with high interest rates. Sertaç Dokuzlu, "The Agricultural Credit System in the Ottoman Empire between 1863 and 1888," *Rural History* 28, no. 2 (2017): 179-80.

137 *Envar-ı Şarkiyye*, no. 105, 25 Rebiülahir 1286 (23 July 1869) in Yaşar, *Anadolu'da İlk Türk Gazetesi*, 59-60.

138 A report of the kaimakam of Muş at the beginning of the twentieth century points out the extent of the indebtness of the inhabitants of Muş under the selem system. Macid, "Kürdistân Ahvâli ". In the same vein, Mehmet Polatel argues that "the commodification of land and expansion of debt relations were significant contributors to the erosion of small-scale Armenian peasantry and the transformation of agrarian relations." Polatel, "Armenians and the Land Question " 201. Furthermore, such forms of indebtness became mechanisms to bind the cultivators and sharecroppers to the soil in the other parts of the empire. Alp Yücel Kaya, "On the *Çiftlik* Regulation in Tırhala in the Mid Nineteenth Century: Economists, Pashas, Governors, *Çiftlik*-Holders, *Subaşıs* and Sharecroppers " in *Ottoman Rural Societies and Economies: Halcyon Days in Crete VIII A Symposium Held in Rethymno 13-15 January 2012*, ed. Elias Kolovos (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2015).

139 BOA. MVL. 711/11, 25 Muharrem 1282 (20 June 1865).

the governor suggested discharge of Abdi Pasha and the appointment of Osman Bey a member of Grand Council of Erzurum, by proxy.[140]

As the report on Abdi Pasha did not mention anything about the corruption of council members and tax farmers, it can be assumed that none were punished seriously. As a common precaution, the grievances of the petitioners were alleviated through the dismissal of the kaimakam. However, the problems concerning tax farmers, local notables or usurers did not diminish and reflected also on the official newspapers in later years. An issue of *Envar-ı Şarkiyye*, dated 1869, separated partially to the condition of the sub-province of Muş. One of the urgent issues was misdeeds of tax farmers. Officials (*şahne*) sent to villages by tax farmers to inspect the harvest became involved in corvée and overtaxation. It was stated in the newspaper that officials should not take anything without pay from the villagers except tithe, water and maximum bed. Otherwise, they would be punished. Moreover, it was required to inform the villagers about this fact. Similarly, it was reminded that councils of elders were established according to the Provincial Law in the villages and so people with the title of *kahya, kocabaşı, muhbir, and melik* – who were collecting money and grains for both their guests and livestock – should not be employed in village affairs and even these titles should be annihilated.[141]

Hence, as the rest of the chapter will elaborate upon, the problem of the depopulation of certain villages of Muş was part of the abuse and corruption of council members, moneylenders, and tax farmers.

### 6.4.1 *The Migration and Depopulation*

As emphasized above, one of the issues was the decrease of the population of Muş due to atrocities by Kürkçübaşı Agob, Minas, Vartan, council members and Kurdish tribes.[142] It was emphasized both in the petitions and official reports that the population of the sub-province had decreased from eighty thousand to twenty-five thousand. It is necessary to consider these numbers with

140 BOA. MVL. 708/38, 23 Muharrem 1282 (18 June 1865).

141 Envar-ı Şarkiyye, no. 105, 25 Rebiülahir 1286 (23 July 1869) in Yaşar, *Anadolu'da İlk Türk Gazetesi*, 58-59.

142 BOA. MVL. 706/1, 5 Zilhicce 1281 (1 May 1865), BOA. MVL. 462/55, 16 Şaban 1281(14 January 1865).

caution. The existence of some population data in Ottoman records, consular reports and traveler accounts allows comparison despite its difficulty. For instance, in a record dated 1854, the non-Muslim population of the sub-province of Muş - including districts of Muş, Bitlis and Malazgird and the sub-districts of Bulanıklar, Vartolar, Huyut, Mutki, Çukur, and Ahlat - was registered as 32,149 (31,030 Armenians and 1,119 Catholics).[143] If women are included by simply duplicating this number, it comes to 64,298. In the same vein, in the yearbook of the province of Erzurum of 1871, non-Muslim men were recorded as 29,104, and doubling this would be a population of 58,208.[144] Over these fifteen years, it can be seen that the non-Muslim population of the sub-province had decreased. If the unit of analysis is kept smaller - for instance, if the district (*kazâ*) of Muş is taken into consideration - it is also possible to observe a decrease in the non-Muslim population of Muş. The total non-Muslim population of Muş in 1854 was registered as 23,064.[145] In 1871 it was 9,238, after the inclusion of women.[146] The number given by British Consul of Erzurum, Robert Dalyell, for the total non-Muslim population of the kazâ of Muş in 1862 was even lower at 6,090.[147] Although these numbers are not completely reliable, they contribute to the claims of the inhabitants of Muş that the population was decreasing.[148]

Meanwhile, kaimakam Abdi Pasha, despite putting all the blame on the Kurdish tribes, argued that a thousand and two hundred households had left

143 BOA. NFS. d. 3868, 29 Zilhicce 1270 (22 Eylül 1854).

144 *Salnâme-i Vilâyet-i Erzurum,* 1288 (1871), 145.

145 BOA. NFS. d. 3868, 29 Zilhicce 1270 (22 Eylül 1854).

146 *Salnâme-i Vilâyet-i Erzurum,* 1288 (1871), 145.

147 Mr. Dalyell stated that the total population of the kazâ of Muş was 13,790 (7,700 Muslim and 6, 090 non-muslim). FO 78/1669, No:9, Dalyell, "Report on Eyalet of Erzurum," Erzurum, February 28, 1862. In the same vein, the account of Vital Cuinet penned in 1890-95 states the total population of Muş as 123,459. Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, 2, 573.

148 In consular reports the continuing decrease in the population of Muş was highly emphasized. FO. 195/227, No:6, Brant to Stratford Canning, Erzurum, May 29, 1844. Besides, Cevdet Küçük also notes that in 1841, around eleven thousand Muslim and non-Muslim households of the province of Erzurum had dispersed due to famine and high costs. Cevdet Küçük, "Tanzimât Devrinde Erzurum'un Nüfus Durumu," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no. 7-8 (1976-1977): 187.

over three years, but five to six hundred households from neighboring subprovinces and districts had settled in their stead. The kaimakam was struggling to show the continuity of tax revenues rather than scrutinize the reasons for emigration. Abdi Pasha strikingly argued that, contrary to the claims, emigrated households were not be described as the traditional people of Muş; rather, they were those who had a tendency to migrate, leaving their houses for petty reasons and returning soon after.[149]

The migration pattern described by Abdi Pasha might have been true to some extent for the eastern provinces of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. For instance, the migration of Armenian peasants to Russia was typical.[150] However, cases from certain villages in Muş also point out that in addition to migration to other countries, there were examples of being forced to settle in nearby villages. Thus, for the purpose of the current chapter and as an attempt to constitute a link with the following chapter, it is necessary to discuss the multiple reasons for migration and for being forced to leave one's villages in the 1850s and 60s.[151]

The migration of the inhabitants of Muş stemmed on one hand from a network of kaimakams, council members, tax-farmers, money lenders, and usurers and on the other from assaults by Kurdish tribes. To begin with the story of corruption – that is, abuse by the council members, moneylenders, tax-farmers, and usurers - it was argued that the population of Muş had decreased by two thirds as a result. In fact, the issue of migration had aroused anxiety three years previously, as the former kaimakam of Muş, Abdi Pasha, had argued. The governor of Erzurum Mehmed Hayreddin Pasha informed the Sublime Porte that around six hundred inhabitants consisting of village

149 "... ahâlî-i kadîme hükmüne giremiyerek hoşnişîn makûlesinden oldukları cihetle bir 'ariza-i cüziye ile terk-i vatan ve ba'id müddete yine mevâ-yı kadîmilerine 'avdet itmek 'adet-i me'lûfiyeleri ..." BOA. MVL. 706/1, 5 Zilhicce 1281 (1 May 1865)

150 Wars between Ottoman and Russian Empires also triggered the migration of especially Armenian community. For the migration of Armenians to Russia during and after 1828-1829 Ottoman-Russian War, see Beydilli, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşında*.

151 For a discussion of migration from the Ottoman East to United States and Canada from the 1880s to the 1910s, see David Edward Gutman, "Sojourners, Smugglers, and the State: Transhemispheric Migration Flows and the Politics of Mobility in Eastern Anatolia, 1888-1908" (PhD diss. , Binghamton University, 2012).

kahyas and wealthy people (*ashâb-ı servet*) of Bulanık, a sub-district of Muş, had departed for Russia to perform a pilgrimage to Üç Kilise. However, the governor had received intelligence that this visit was a pretext for becoming subjects of Russia. After getting the necessary passports, they supposedly intended to return and dispose of their property as before (*emlâklarını kemâfi's-sâbık tasarruf itmek niyetinde*). Having been informed about this issue, the governor of Erzurum stated that in the case these people returned holding passports of another country, it would be required of them to cut relations with either the Ottoman Empire or Russia. As a precaution, he immediately corresponded with the patriarch of Üç Kilise, demanding that these people should neither be granted Russian subjecthood nor provided with passports.[152]

Hereupon, the patriarch consulted with notables among the group that had arrived and responded to Hayreddin Pasha that theirs was just a visit; they would return after a few days. Not convinced by the answer of the patriarch, Hayreddin Pasha called for said notables after their return. When questioned about the reasons they felt obliged to obtain Russian subjecthood, it came out that the main cause was the above-mentioned embezzlement of money paid by the central treasury in return for provisions supplied by the people during the Crimean War by council members, certain officials, and notables. However this was only a part of the story. The reasons for emigration and depopulation were actually a combination of practices that pointed to the continuation of pre-Tanzimat forced labor, over taxation, and indebtedness.

> Local tax farmers together with the members of the Council of Muş and notables assumed the collection of the revenues of tithe and tax through a secret partnership. [Similarly], they appoint officials to take subsistence and fodder without payment [from the villagers] and also they seize half or even more of the revenues like a shareholder and sharecropper. Likewise, council members and notables collect oil, cracked wheat, and milk from the villagers without payment for their own use by sending officials and transferring these goods to their houses by loading them on the animals and cars of the people without

152 BOA. MVL. 629/41, 20 Zilkade 1278 (19 May 1862).

> pay. Besides, the appointed zaptiehs and others take goods and fodder from the villages without payment, and also take fifty-a hundred guruş from each village in the name of a fee of the supervision. In addition, the various provisions required for the regular troops in Muş are levied on and collected from the villagers. Although the imperial army pays for them, a penny is not paid to the suppliers. When they appeal to the government, they are jailed and are not heard. Thus, they declared and replied that the atrocities and torment to which the inhabitants of Muş are exposed are extreme, and so they had to obtain the subjecthood and protection of the Russian state.[153]

In addition to the statements of the notables of the non-Muslim population of Muş, the governor of Erzurum emphasized the role of provisions taken for the Anatolian Corps in the suffering of the people. The governor pointed out how villagers had to transfer their surplus to the army instead of selling them and satisfying their necessities. When villagers were not paid in those days due to a shortage of cash, the governor argued, most among the non-Muslim population were migrating and considered settling in Russia and Iran given the provocation and instigation of those countries.[154]

Although the flow of the supplies to the corps could not be cut, local officials looked for other measures to prevent the migration of Armenian inhabitants. On one hand, the center of the kaimakamlık was transferred from Muş to Bitlis to facilitate reforms, and on the other, the kaimakam of Muş worked for the return of people who migrated to Russia and Iran and succeeded in arranging the return of a hundred and fifty houses to Ahlat, Çukur, and Bitlis.[155] Moreover, in Bulanık, a commission was constituted to investigate the allegations of Armenian peasants regarding tax-collection.[156]

The emigration of peasants on the periphery of Ottoman Empire was not specific to Muş. For instance, in other districts and sub-districts of the

153 BOA. MVL. 629/41, 20 Zilkade 1278 (19 May 1862). See Appendix A, Quotation 8 for the original Turkish.

154 Ibid.

155 BOA. MVL. 410/43, 7 Receb 1279 (29 December 1862)

156 BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 146/9, 8 Zilkade 1278 (7 May 1862).

province of Erzurum, emigration - especially of non-Muslim peasants – was already on the agenda in the early 1850s. In the summer of 1852, it was reported that some villagers in the vicinity were considering migrating to Georgia.[157] In the same vein, in the sub-district of Pasin, about three hundred Christian families together with some Muslim inhabitants were preparing to migrate to Russia. The route of the villagers was first to move to Kars, and if they could not live there, they fought to migrate to Georgia. The grievances of the villagers of Pasin were in line with those of Muş: unjust treatment, taxation, and oppression by Kurds such as plundering and burning loads of hay, which in turn led to the perishing of livestock.[158]

However, not all mobility was cross-border; people frequently moved to neighboring villages or provinces. In the village of Bazigan in Varto, it was reported that people left the village because of atrocities by tax farmers and council members. Accordingly, in Bazigan, the tithe previously imposed by the tax-farmer was demanded in cash by the administrator of Varto, and council members oppressed the peasants during its collection. Some villagers were persuaded to return back half way to Kars, yet the others reached their destination. Similarly, Armenian villagers of Hamza Şeyh and Şirvan Şeyh moved to Eleşgird, a district of Bayezid, due to oppression by tax farmers and some Kurdish tribes.[159] Nevertheless, migration and complaints about tax farmers and tribes was not specific to Muş. At the same time, in a dispatch from Istanbul to the governor of Erzurum, it was argued that in Çıldır and other subprovinces of Erzurum there was unease and a great many complaints about the administrators.[160] In the same vein, the commander-in-chief of the Anatolian Corps reported in correspondence with the patriarch of the Assyrian Yakubi and the murahhasa of the Armenians in Ottoman Kurdistan about the

157 FO. 78/906, No: 19, Brant to Malmesburry, Erzurum, 2 June, 1852

158 FO. 78/906, No:19, Brant to Redcliffe, Erzurum, May 31, 1852

159 "Muş sancâğında kâin Varto kazâsına muzâfe Bazigan karyesi mülteziminin ahâlî-i karyeye tevdi' eylediği hâsılât-ı 'öşriyenin muahharen kazâ-i mezbûr müdiri ma'rifetiyle akçesi taleb olunmasından ve Muş meclis a'zâsı tarafından ahâli-i merkûmeye mu'amele-i gadriye icrâ kılınmasından nâşi ahâlî karyeyi terk …" BOA. A. MKT. UM 494/92, 20 Safer 1278 (27 August 1861).

160 BOA. A. MKT. UM 509/74, 18 Rebiülevvel 1278 (23 October 1861).

disappointment of their communities. As their complaints about the oppression and injustice of tax farmers and Kurdish tribes was not heard by the central government, some left their homelands and others were considering emigrating.[161] Likewise, Armenians often demanded to move to villages with churches in order not to be deprived of their religious rites.[162] Nevertheless, such a requirement was generally followed by a complaint about either tax farmers or neighboring Kurds.[163]

The petitions discussed up to now bring forth the complaints of the peasants of Muş about murder, expropriation, and damage done by Kurdish tribes since the 1850s.[164] However, in certain villages assaults were intended to result in the evacuation of the Armenian population. According to a report of the Council of Armenian Community, Kurds occupied a few houses in the villages of Şeyhveli [Okçular], Purkaş [Oğlakkaya], Aryincek [Bostancılar], and Fındıklı in the sub-district of Lower Bulanık, and the situation was the same in the villages of Upper Bulanık, called Haçlu [Gölyanı], Pirane [Göztepe], and Kereğil [Karaağıl]. However, those Kurdish households were attempting to oppress the Armenians of those villages in a myriad ways, confiscating their properties and churches in order to forcefully make them leave their villages.[165] On the other hand, the Kurds in the villages of Şahyolu, Aryincek, Haçaveh, Pirane and Kereğil, it was argued, were not natives, and they forced some native Armenians to leave and move to Porkaş and Fındıklı by seizing

161 BOA. A. MKT. UM 544/53, 28 Şaban 1278 (28 February 1862).

162 BOA. MVL. 116/86, 5 Ramazan 1268 (23 June 1852).

163 BOA. MVL. 634/41, 9 Safer 1279 (6 August 1862).

164 For instance, the governor of Kurdistan also reported that in addition to extortion and murder, the hay bales of inhabitants were being burnt down in Muş. In the village of Varto, a certain person called Arab had burned the hay and straw bales of the headman of the village, Süleyman. In order to prevent further occurrence of such acts, the Provincial Grand Council decided to sentence him to chains for a year. However, it is questionable to what extent such punishments were effective deterrents. BOA. MVL. 249/51, 13 Receb 1268 (2 June 1852).

165 BOA. MVL. 261/15, 15 Zilhicce 1269 (19 September 1853). "... üçer beşer hâneden 'ibâret olan tâife-i ekrâd mevcûd olan re'âyâ ve berâyâ kullarını kurâ-i mezbûreden tard ve ihrâç itmek kasdıyla haklarında envâi' zulm ve ta'addî icrâsına ve kilisâ ve emlâkının tegallüben zabtına cür'et itmekde ..." BOA. MVL. 261/15, 15 Zilhicce 1269 (19 September 1853).

their properties and churches. The Council of Armenian Community demanded that the Kurds in Şahyolu be removed and settled in Porkaş and that those in Haçaveh, Pirane, and Kereğil also be expelled.[166]

Nevertheless, in the 1860s, the province of Erzurum in general and the sub-provinceof Muş in particular experience not only the depopulation especially of its non-Muslim inhabitants but also the immigration of thousands of Muslims into the Ottoman Empire.

### 6.4.2 *Migration from Crimea and Caucassia*

In addition to hardships endured during the war, one of the most important socioeconomic results of the war was the mass migration of Crimean Tatars into the Ottoman domain. Drawing attention to the population scarcity in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Kemal Karpat argues that the state regarded immigrants as human resources to cultivate large fields of land.[167] In the same vein, the migration of Crimean Tatars in 1783/4, which began immediately after the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, was the first wave of Muslim migration to the Ottoman Empire.[168] Although the numbers can sometimes be misleading, Karpat states that the number of Tatars that migrated to Ottoman lands between 1783 and 1922 was 1.8 million.[169] However, it was not only Crimean Tatars who migrated to the empire. By 1908, Muslim immigrants from Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Balkans in the Ottoman Empire were estimated at about five million.[170]

Aftermath of Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 was a drastic phase in the migration of the Muslim population from Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. However, the effects of migration from the Caucasus started with the Crimean War and accelerated in the 1860s, and especially the effects on the province of Erzurum and the sub-province of Muş will be dealt with in this

166 BOA. MVL. 261/15, 15 Zilhicce 1269 (19 September 1853).

167 Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 61-62.

168 Ibid., 65.

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid., 55.

part.[171] At first issues like the transportation, expenses, and settlement of immigrants were carried out through the ministries of commerce, the zaptieh, and municipalities (*Şehremaneti*). Then a separate council, the Muhacirin Komisyonu (Commission of Immigrants) was established in 1860.[172] Moreover, immigrants were exempted from all taxes, including the tithe, as well as from conscription for twenty years.[173]

As indicated in the archives, a group of immigrants were already settled in Erzurum, Kars, Muş, and Van by 1860, though the process accelerated throughout the 1860s. Muş was among the important places for the settlement of immigrants thanks to its large area. The immigrants who gathered on the coast of the Black Sea were transferred to these vast lands. In June 1861, it was reported that seven hundred immigrant households were transported to Samsun for settlement. However, due to the lack of land, their settlement in Samsun became difficult, and also upon the petition of some to be settled in the province of Erzurum, it was decided Muş would be suitable for their

171 In 1859-60, 300 thousand Crimean Tatars migrated to the Ottoman lands. See Nedim İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler* (Trabzon: Serander Yayınları, 2006), 40. The number for the years 1861 to 1864 was 227,627. See Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914*, 65. For further details about Muslim emigration from Russia after the Crimean War, see Alan W. Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years After the Crimean War," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 35, no. 3 (1987): 356-71.

172 Abdullah Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), 105. Yet the council was abrogated in 1865. However different councils for the same aim would be established later. For details, Ibid.; Ahmet Cevat Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri: Tanzimat Devri, İlk Kurulan Göçmen Komisyonu, Çıkarılan Tüzükler* (Istanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1966); David Cameron Cuthell, "The Muhacirin Komisyonu: An Agent in the Transformation of Ottoman Anatolia, 1860-1866" (PhD diss. , Columbia University, 2005).

173 Kemal H. Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the Founding of Mecidiye, 1856-1878," in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill 2002). In the same vein, Selim Deringil argues that immigrants arriving in the 1880s did not enjoy such exemptions from taxation and conscription as governments began to regard immigrants not only as potential agriculturalists, but also as military forces. Selim Deringil, "19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na Göç Olgusu Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler," in *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na Armağan-Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Araştırma Merkezi* (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991), 437.

settlement.[174] Besides, some Nogai and Circassian families had been sent to Muş from Karahisar-ı Şarki in 1862.[175] Likewise, some immigrants settled in Biga petitioned to be settled in Muş or Kars due to climate and the fact that most of their relatives had been settled there previously.[176]

However, not all of these settlement decisions were realized or took place smoothly. In 1863, it was decided to send 222 immigrant households previously settled in Muş to Pasin-i Ulya and Sivas. The reason was for this change was not specified, yet, another report of the provincial council of Erzurum that was transferred to the Immigrants Commission provides an interpretation of the problems of the settlement of immigrants. It was reported that during the settlement of Circassian immigrants in the sub-provinces of Kars, Muş, and some other districts, the inhabitants helped by offering use of their carts. However, some of the immigrants returned to Russia and some did not stay in the places allocated for them. Rather, they were wandering about from village to village being a burden on the local people, and doing harm to their livestock. Furthermore, the governor Hayreddin Pasha and the council members emphasized that those immigrants were disobedient and did not heed any warning, which led to their being a burden on the native people. Similarly, the province of Erzurum was a frontier region and consisted of tribal populations, so its situation was delicate and the security and contentment of the local people was important. In another case, the provincial council emphasized that local people who had been living there for thousands of years, fulfilling their duties to the state, and paying their taxes would be obliged to leave their lands and disperse. Therefore, they demanded that the immigrant groups who had already left or would depart from Trabzon no longer be sent to Erzurum.[177]

174 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 221/10, 22 Zilkade 1277 (1 June 1861).

175 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 238790, 18 Zilkade 1278 (17 May 1862).

176 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 237/74, 16 Rebiülevvel 1278 (21 October 1861).

177 BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 385/59, 14 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (17 December 1861).

In May 1865,[178] Nusret Pasha from Dar-ı Şura-yı Askeri was appointed to transfer the five thousand Chechen immigrant households in Muş and Van.[179] However, by autumn the same year, there were still problems regarding their settlement. It was reported that immigrants who had gathered in Muş and Erzurum refused to depart for places allocated for their settlement. However, the order was to collect their guns and send them to their places of settlement.[180] In a report by newly appointed governor of Erzurum, Mehmed Reşid Pasha, the details came to light. The pasha's report highlighted that most of the zaptiehs in the province of Erzurum were deployed for transport and settlement of Chechen immigrants. He implied that this matter left other issues of the region in disarray; likewise, cases of banditry had increased. It was first decided the Chechens would be settled in Van and Muş, yet upon the objection of Russia, it was decided to settle them in Diyarbekir and Harput.[181] Russia laid down the condition that immigrants should not be settled on frontier regions.[182] As the oxen and carts of the immigrants were not sufficient, necessary equipment was collected from the districts and villages of Erzurum Province by the zaptiehs. This matter also points to how the transport and settlement of immigrants were great burdens on local residents.[183]

Content with the previous decision concerning their settlement in Muş and Van, the immigrants - who amounted to eight thousand in Erzurum and fifteen thousand in Hasankale and Muş - refused to be dispatched to any other place. They caused difficulties and made up excuses. Upon the insistence of the immigrants, local inhabitants began to complain and demand that the immigrants be settled in other, distant places. Governor Mehmed Reşid Pasha argued that if the immigrants were not sent to their places of settlement before

178 In 1864, after Russia annexed the Caucasses, a huge number of Caucassian peoples migrated to Ottoman lands. İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete*, 40. Also for an edited book, see Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, ed. *1864 Kafkas Tehciri: Kafkasya'da Rus Kolonizasyonu, Savaş ve Sürgün* (Istanbul: BALKAR & IRCICA, 2014).

179 BOA. A.MKT. MHM. 331/86, 17 Zilhicce 1281 (13 May 1865).

180 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 345/63, 23 Cemaziyelahir 1282(13 November 1865).

181 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 344/94, 10 Cemaziyelahir 1282 (31 October 1865).

182 İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete*, 41.

183 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 344/94, 10 Cemaziyelahir 1282 (31 October 1865).

winter and it became necessary to settle them in their current location, a great many problems would arise. Successive reports had already arrived from Muş complaining about strife and dispute between the immigrants and the Kurds. The governor stated that unless necessary precautions were taken, such small disputes would result in greater troubles.[184]

Local authorities were not enthusiastic about the settlement of Muslim immigrants in the province of Erzurum in the 1860s. For the particular locality of Muş, which was already depressed because of the pressures introduced in this chapter, the settlement of immigrants was considered an extra burden for the inhabitants.

## § 6.5 Conclusion

By looking at the locality of Muş in the 1850s and 60s through the petitions of commoners, this chapter examined reflections of the Tanzimat reforms. Although the first half of the nineteenth century, as discussed via the entire and partial careers of Emin and Şerif Pashas, respectively, was an era in which the employment of local notables for the implementation of reforms, the most influential notables were actually seen as obstacles to establishing a direct control over revenues in Ottoman Kurdistan. Thus, upon the first opportunity they were exiled from the region. Nonetheless, the primary outcome was that their elimination did not contribute to the implementation of reforms. To put it differently, centrally-appointed administrators, deprived of the necessary knowledge of the region and influence over other local actors, failed to maintain security and order in the region. Thus, for two decades after the inclusion of the sub-province of Muş in the Tanzimat program, inhabitants filed petitions for the return of its historical administrators.

Such a wish on the part of local inhabitants does not necessarily mean the times when the dynasty of Muş was ruling for a "golden age." Rather, it emphasizes that the situation had aggravated in their absences. The main source of the displeasure of peasants consisted of two pillars. On one hand, extortion and the indebtedness of the peasants of Muş by a coalition of local councils,

184 Ibid., BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 346/1, 29 Cemaziyelahir 1282 (19 November 1865).

tax farmers, kaimakams, moneylenders, and local notables. On the other hand, atrocities by Kurdish tribes that increased due to the insufficiency of centrally-appointed kaimakams. As complaints mainly consisted of extortion, over taxation, and forced labor, it is possible to argue that the practices that Tanzimat reforms sought to eradicate were still prevalent.

Especially when the sub-province of Muş became one of the suppliers for the Imperial Army during the Crimean War, its peasants frequently petitioned about over taxation, extortion, and corruption by the kaimakams and council members. In fact, complaints about a range of local actors - not only kaimakams and council members but also tax farmers, moneylenders and Muslim and non-Muslim notables – continued for nearly a decade after the war. Thus, even though a reform edict, the Islahat Fermanı, was promulgated after the Crimean War to ensure the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims and to improve the conditions of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire, and even though there were important developments within the Armenian community, the Armenian peasants of Muş still sought for justice which had been seized by a network of local actors.

Complaints arrived mostly from the villages on the plain of Muş – the former yurtluk-ocaklık villages of the beys of Muş. Thus, these complaints also told of the fate of those villages and the economic power the notables of Muş once enjoyed. By the same token, petitions by local inhabitants shed light on the one of the main mechanisms of the dispossession of peasants: The monetization of the economy led to the emergence of *murabahacılık* (usury) in the 1860s highlights the dispossession of the commoners of Muş through indebtedness that increased day by day. In this context, desperate peasants who were deprived of a competent, impartial governor could do nothing other than migrate. Thus, the native population of Muş decreased because of misery the people went through. Nevertheless, the emigration of local inhabitants was not the only population movement in those years. An important number of Muslim immigrants happened to settle in the sub-province of Muş after the Crimean War. Although the issue of immigration would become aggravated at the end of 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, the issue is foreshadowed in the 1860s.

At the end of 1860s, complaints about Muş's governance were not yet resolved. The inability of kaimakams especially to control the Kurdish tribes resulted in the continuation of atrocities against peasants and the emigration of especially the Armenian population. Therefore, in 1869, drawing attention to the incapability of the kaimakams and their misconduct in the administration of the sub-province of Muş, provincial reports emphasized that Muş needed urgent reforms for which a competent kaimakam was essential. In search for a proper candidate, the chief treasurer (*defterdar*) of Erzurum even suggested someone from the dynasty of Erzurum, neither because of his administrative experience nor his knowledge of the area, but because he had always farmed the taxes of Muş. While correspondence between local and central authorities continued to debate an appropriate administrator for a region like Muş which was not only sensitively situated but were also the most suitable, fruitful sub-province of the province of Erzurum, it was reported that four to five hundred families of Armenians were considering emigrating to Russia.[185] The present chapter has focused on the one of the two pillars of discontent among the peasants of Muş and their migration; the following chapter will focus on the second pillar, the tribes of Muş.

185 BOA.İ.ŞD. 12/567, 22 Şevval 1285 (5 February 1869).

# 7

## Governors, Tribes, and Peasants

As discussed in the previous chapter, the grounds for the grievances of the common people of Muş were twofold. On one hand, the coalition of kaimakams, moneylenders, usurers, tax farmers, and council members devastated the peasants of Muş with extortion, over taxation, indebtedness, and corvée, the account of which was elaborated in the previous chapter. On the other hand, atrocities by both the seminomadic and nomadic tribes of Muş were equally disastrous for the peasants of Muş. This chapter will focus on this matter of tribes in the context of the Tanzimat reforms, yet their role in the locality of Muş has been emphasized throughout this study. Thus, the discussion on tribes is not limited to their assaults on settled inhabitants. It is necessary to question the implications of the attacks by the tribes on the settled population to seize hay, straw, and similar goods for the tribal economy. Was the tribal economy – that is to say pastoral economy - self-sufficient? Were tribal members engaging in commerce with goods usurped from settled villagers? Or were they just to meet their own needs? These questions will be elaborated upon if not fully answered in this chapter.

Moreover, tribes were human resources in terms of both manpower and prospective agriculturalists. Thus, the tribes of the frontier were the target of the notables of Muş who were manipulating their influence over the tribes as leverage in the negotiation with the central and provincial governments to consolidate their power. Likewise, provincial and central authorities

considered notables as the main controlling force over the tribes. The case of Emin Pasha and his brothers was such a story.

Similarly, as a paramount part of nineteenth century reforms designed to strengthen the central government's rule in the periphery, the notables of Muş were abrogated along with those of Bohtan, Van, and Hakkari. However, pioneering works on Kurdish emirates and tribal organizations are generally unanimous concerning the "chaos" and "insecurity" in Ottoman Kurdistan after the liquidation of the emirates.[1] Nonetheless, this point requires some refinement. In the case of Muş, as discussed in the previous chapter, after the exile of Şerif Pasha together with his extended family, centrally-appointed administrators had difficulty in governing the region, controlling the tribes as reflected in the petitions of the commoners of Muş. However, such a point of departure does not mean that the rule of the emirs were "peaceful" and "harmonious."[2] Even before the nineteenth century reforms, tribes were no passive actors subordinated and controlled by the Kurdish emirates. Cases of extortion, usurpation, murder, and injury certainly occurred during the rule of the mîrs, as well. The difference lies in the negotiation, dialog, and coalition and/or contention between Kurdish notables and tribes. Yet, it is a fact that in the absence of the notables, the tribes found more opportunities to be influential.

In the same vein, another dilemma is about the nature of the rule that Tanzimat state sought to establish after the annihilation of the Kurdish emirates. As Bruinessen argued, the increasing control of the Ottoman central government and its successor states in the Kurdish periphery and the "breaking [of] the power" of Kurdish mîrs did not necessarily translate into "detribalization"

1 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*; Wadie Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

2 By the same token, Stephan H. Astourian emphasizes that although, Armenians peasants "had not enjoyed a good life" under the rule of Kurdish emirates, "things had been predictable, fairly peaceful, and taxes [were] only due to the Kurdish lords." With their removal, he argues, "a free-for-all occurred." Stephan H. Astourian, "The Silence of the Land: Agrarian Relations, Ethnicity, and Power," in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the end of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 63.

and "simply" replacing "direct rule" with "indirect rule." On the contrary, the process was more complicated, and as he argues, it can be defined as "re-tribalisation."[3]

> Thus, in a few generations, tribal organization in Bohtan has shown a rapid devolution from complex, state-like to much simpler forms of social and political organization-as if it has taken a few steps back on the evolutionary ladder. In this case it is clearly a response to central government interventions. The denser the administrative network of the state became, the smaller and simpler the tribes. The state did not give up indirect rule altogether, but this took place at increasingly lower levels. After the mirs, some government authority was delegated to tribe aghas, and later qabile aghas, village aghas.[4]

With regard to terminology, Bruinessen draws attention to the fact that it is "misleading" to designate all Kurdish tribes with a single term when their variety "in size and forms of internal organization" is taken into consideration.[5] Despite its "notorious" ambiguity,[6] the term "tribe" has generally been employed in this study to describe nomadic and seminomadic groups in the eastern periphery of the Ottoman Empire. While doing this, it is necessary to emphasize that the tribes were "historically and situationally dynamic" rather than "static," and they were inclined to be both "centralizing and egalitarian" and "inegalitarian and hierarchical."[7]

One of the main approaches to theorize the tribes and state formation is an evolutionary perspective which simply envisages a development from small tribes to chiefdoms that eventually result in state or state-like formations. As Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner put forward, the main postulate of this

3 Martin Van Bruinessen, "Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The Case of Simko's Revolt," in *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, ed. Richard Tapper (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 371-2. Also Richard Tapper, "Introduction," Ibid., ed. Richard Tapper, 61.

4 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, 181-2.

5 "Kurds, States, and Tribes," in *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, eds. Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod (London: Saqi, 2003), 178.

6 Tapper, "Introduction," 6.

7 Beck, "The Tribes and the State," 190.

approach is the view that chiefdoms are rooted in a "segmentary division of society in which tribes or tribal segments are bound together by a common identity based on kinship."[8] However, they rightly argue, kinship alone is not enough to understand chiefdom.[9] Albert Hourani also argues that tribes are not bound together by genuine kinship, rather "a myth of [a] common ancestor" held tribes together. In some cases "even this myth may not exist," he further argues.[10] Similarly, Bruinessen emphasizes that for Kurdish tribes, particularly larger ones what is more relevant than the significance of kinship is "political affiliation and loyalty to a common chieftain or chiefly lineage."[11]

Nonetheless, as argued by Richard Tapper, "a better understanding of the nature of tribal political organizations, and of relations between tribal and non-tribal society, must be sought in a closer examination of the social and economic basis of the tribal system."[12] While focusing on the tribes of the subprovince of Muş in the framework of the Tanzimat reforms, this chapter will partially deal with the social and economic organizations of tribes of Muş. However, a comprehensive historical analysis of the social, economic, and political bases of tribal societies is a subject for a further study.

In terms of state-tribe relations, Bruinessen argues, "neither the Kurdish emirates nor the large nomadic tribes were the creations" of the Ottoman Empire, as they predated the empire's influence in the region. However, the Kurdish emirates and tribes' "recognition and [the] delegation of powers to them by the Ottoman center fixated the state of affairs in the Kurdish periphery and

8 Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, "Introduction," Ibid., eds. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (University of California Press), 8.

9 Ibid. The main tenet of the argument of kinship is embedded in the concept of "asabiyya" provided by Ibn Khaldun. Accordingly, tribal unity stems from asabiyya, "tribal bonding or the sentiment of group solidarity that results from kinship, blood ties, and common descent." Ira M. Lapidus, "Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History," Ibid., eds. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley ), 28.

10 Albert Hourani, "Conclusion: Tribes and States in Islamic History," in *Tribes and States in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 304.

11 Van Bruinessen, "Kurds, States," 166.

12 Tapper, "Introduction," 7.

solidified them as political units."[13] By the same token, Lois Beck underscores that states and tribes were "interdependent" throughout the history of Iran. They "maintained each other as a single system" and "did not function as two separate, opposing systems."[14] States required tribes for "military power, revenue, and regional security."[15] In the same vein, tribes "depended on state intervention in the case of regional competition and conflict, and their leaders drew sources of power, authority and wealth from their connections with states."[16] Beck's point is in line with Lisa Anderson's proposal in her piece on Libyan tribes and the Libyan state. She also argues that "tribe and state are not mutually exclusive analytical categories but rather summaries of characteristics more or less present in any society at any moment."[17]

Based on this literature of Middle Eastern tribes, this study partly contributes to the discussion on Kurdish tribes in the nineteenth century. An examination of the relations of the tribes of Muş with the local authorities, notables, and peasants in the nineteenth century is crucial to better understand the locality of Muş. In this framework, the following passage best exemplifies how both central and local authorities related to tribes in the sub-province of Muş:

> Thirty years ago, the deceased commander-in-chief of the Anatolian Army, Gözlüklü Reşid Pasha, together with the late governor of Kürdistan, Esad Pasha, collected the present inhabitants of Malazgirt in Muş from the mountains and settled us in the district of Malazgirt. Thanks to the Sultan we received oxen and ploughs and have been busy with agriculture. We paid our taxes and performed our duties by fulfilling all the orders of the exalted state. The tribal chiefs of your humble servants joined in the past event [the Crimean War] with a thousand cavalrymen. They also served the state and the religion in the company of the governor of Diyarbekir, İsmail Pasha, in the Kozan war with seven to eight hundred cavalrymen and one of our influential

13 Van Bruinessen, "Kurds, States."

14 Beck, "The Tribes and the State," 192.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 192.

17 Lisa Anderson, "Tribe and State: Libyan Anamolies," Ibid. (University of California Press, 1990 ), 289.

> aghas even passed away during this event. [Although] our services to the state were such, four to five months ago a few of our influential aghas were summoned to Erzurum and jailed in the army barracks since then without [having committed any] real offenses. Not only they but also the poor inhabitants of our districts have become destitute and miserable. We ask for our merciful majesty to rescue our aghas from jail and so rescue us from oppression and torment.[18]

The quotation is from a petition of the headmen of the villages of Malazgirt dated 1875. Having described the account of their settlement and their services to the state, they resented the imprisonment of the aghas of their tribe. Their tribe was the Hasenan, a seminomadic tribe of Muş that had already been settled in villages of district of Malazgirt by the 1870s to a large extent, if not completely. Although many frontier tribes like the Haydaran, Sıpkî, and Zilan had come to Muş mostly upon the effort of the beys of Muş at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the existence of the Hasenan was most openly felt in Muş during the second half of the century. Again, the nomadic tribes of Diyarbekir - namely the Reşkotan, Pençnar, Bekiran – and the tribes of Siird – Suluki - were still traveling to the mountains of Muş which were their summer quarters in the second half of the century. Central and local authorities not only embarked on accelerating the sedentarization of tribes like the Hasenan, but also tried to prevent passage of others about which locals were complaining throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.

Thus, this chapter will focus on two separate categories of tribes of Muş: local tribes and nomadic tribes from neighboring provinces who preferred the mountains of Muş as summer quarters. The local and central authorities applied to a range of policies to maintain control over and ensure the sedentarization of these nomadic and seminomadic groups.

After a brief introduction to Tanzimat reforms regarding tribal entities, the case of nomadic groups coming to Muş from Diyarbekir and Siird, like the Bekiran, Pençnar, Alikan, Reşkotan, and Suluki - whose story of settlement is more complicated as they long insisted upon keeping their summer quarters

18 BOA. ŞD. 2884/54, 2 Zilhicce 1292 (30 December 1875). See Appendix A, Quotation 9 for the original Turkish.

in Muş - will be discussed. Then the chapter will continue with the story of the Hasenan, which was the most important local tribe of Muş and which, as noted above, were settled to a great extent by the end of the century. The account of the sedentarization of the Hasenan tribe, their confrontation and collaboration with central authorities, and their relations not only with peasants but also with other tribal groups in the vicinity of Muş, like the Sıpkî, and Haydaran, will be the main focus of this chapter.

## § 7.1 Implications of the Tanzimat Reforms for the Nomadic Groups

The inclusion of the province of Erzurum in the Tanzimat reform program envisaged a range of transformations not only concerning the provincial administration of the empire - from a new taxation system to the establishment of provincial and district councils - but also concerning nomadic and semi-nomadic entities. Despite the fact that the priority with respect to nomads was sedentarization, important novelties were carried out concerning their inclusion in the new taxation system. For instance, in Muş, like in other regions included in the Tanzimat program, the customary taxes peasants had been paying for centuries were abolished. In a report sent from Istanbul to the governor of Kurdistan, the *yaylakiye* tax, paid by the tribes for their summer quarters, was also described as "an ancien regime."[19] Thus, the yaylakiye tax, which amounted to seventy-four hundred guruş, was abolished for nomads settled in the villages of Muş.[20] Instead, the settled tribes were to pay the "tax" having been imposed on them – which amounted to fifty thousand guruş in1261 (1845) - according to their ability to pay, just like the sedentary inhabitants of Muş.[21] This modification to the taxation of the tribes is significant as a part of the new tax regime of the Tanzimat, yet it also suggests that the economic power of Muş's notables was gradually being curtailed, as they had been collecting the yaylakiye tax from the tribes.

19 BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 25/8, 25 Rebiülahir 1266 (10 March 1850).

20 Ibid.

21 BOA. MVL. 8/38, 15 Ramazan 1262 (6 September 1846).

However, the inclusion of Kurdish tribes in the new taxation and conscription system could only be realized after their settlement. Thus, the settlement of tribes was the priority. The idea behind the settlement of nomadic groups was multifaceted. Sedentarization was idealized as a project to transform tribes from "bandits" who troubled the settled population into "civilized" peasants and conscripts. This view of local and central authorities was in line with the perception of nomads put forward by Richard Tapper,

> While the city was the source of government, order and productivity, the tribes had a natural tendency to rebellion, rapine and destruction, a tendency which might be related to the starkness of their habitat and its remoteness from the sources of civilisation, and also to the under-employment inherent in their way of life.[22]

Such an argument, Tapper further argues, might have some "justifications," yet "it is superficial and over-simplified."[23] In his piece on Ottoman colonialism, Selim Deringil also emphasizes how nomadism was regarded as "an anathema for modernity." This perception of nomads included both "enmity" and "mild paternalism" to certain degrees. "Savagery," "wild nature," and "ignorance," were the most popular adjectives used to describe of nomadic groups. Nevertheless, what is unavoidable is to "gradually include them in the circle of civilization (*pey der pey daire-i medeniyete idhal*)."[24]

In the same vein, according to the governor of Erzurum, Mehmed Hamdi, tent-dwelling Kurds and tribes did not deal with agriculture and trade, so they were busy with thievery and similar mischief to survive. He emphasized that there were a great many tent-dwelling Kurds and tribes in the province of Erzurum and its neighborhood who not only made no contribution to the

22 Tapper, "Introduction," 6.

23 Ibid.

24 Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery' : The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (2003): 317.

treasury, but were also a great burden on local inhabitants.[25] Furthermore, the settlement of nomads and their occupying with agriculture were depicted as their introduction to "the honor of civilization." In correspondence with İsmail Pasha, the temporary governor of Muş, the governor of Erzurum argued that they agreed that the reforms and the settlement of tribes in the sub-province would not only save the people from the assaults by nomads but also that the tribes would abandon their savage ways, and become a part of "the circle of desired humanity" (*hey'et-i mergube-i insaniyet girub*), occupy themselves with agriculture and trade, and no longer need to steal or be involved in other kinds of mischief.[26]

Thus, with their settlement, seminomadic tribes would become engaged in either agriculture or trade and thus become productive subjects contributing to the treasury, on one hand. On the other, peasants of the province would be saved from the assaults by those nomadic groups to whom not only were they forced to provide winter quarters and hay and straw for their livestock, but because of whom they were exposed to murder, injury, and extortion.[27]

Acknowledging the relationship between the settlement of nomads and state centralization, Yonca Köksal, in her case study of the tribes of the province of Ankara, argues that "sedentarization shows how top down state policies of coercion or bottom up strategies of mediation with local authorities can

25 "Her tarafda hayme-nişîn olan ekrâd ve ʿaşâirin zirâʿat ve ticâretde behereleri olmayub kendülerine idârede lazım olduğu cihetle hırsızlık ve uygunsuzlukla idâreye alışmış ve şu hâl ile külliyen mugâyır-ı rızâ-yı badi ve ʿali bulunmuş olduğuna ve Erzurum eyâletinde ve civârı mahallerde pek çok hayme-nişîn ekrâd ve ʿaşâir olub bunların hazîne-i celîleye bir güna menfʿaatleri olmadığından başka ahâlî ve fukarâ ve ebnâ-yı sebil haklarından muzıratları başdan aşmış ve böyle hayme-nişînlik sûretinde kaldıkça zabt ve rabtlarıyla defʿ-i muzıratlarının istihsâli düşvâr olacağı derkâr bulunmuş …" BOA. A. MKT. UM. 239/26, 7 Şevval 1272 (11 June 1856)

26 "hem ahâlî ve fukarânın dest-i taʿaddîlerinden halâs olması ve hem de kendüleri tavır-i beyâbânîden çıkub hey'et-i mergûbe-i insâniyyete girub zirâʿat ve filâhet ve ticâretle meşgûl olub hırsızlık ve uygunsuzluklarına meydân kalmaması." BOA. A. MKT. UM. 239/26, 7 Şevval 1272 (11 June 1856).

27 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 293/10, 13 Ramazan 1280 (21 February 1864).

be combined in state centralization."[28] As will be discussed in this chapter, the settlement of tribes was not only encouraged through the granting of salaries and exemption from taxes but was also imposed with military power when necessary. Yet, "coercion was employed only when mediation failed."[29] Along the same lines, "geopolitical location," "geographical boundedness," "tribal hierarchy," and the possibilities of trade between tribal and sedentary groups were factors that determined the degree of coercion and mediation employed for the settlement of the tribes.[30]

According to Köksal, the Tanzimat project of the sedentarization of seminomadic and nomadic groups differed in many ways from previous efforts. At first, sedentarization was embarked upon widely from Anatolia to the Kurdish and Arab provinces. Then, among the previous strategies implemented there was settlement option when tribes created troubles for sedentary groups. The main method was to exile them to distant places like Rakka instead of intervening in tribal structures.[31] For instance, efforts to settle them did not drastically change seminomadism, as many tribes maintained their migratory routes. With the Tanzimat, not only was the seasonal migration of the nomads more determinedly prohibited, but there was a great effort to keep their property and population registers. Nevertheless, the settlement policies of the Tanzimat era were a combination of the state's "experience" with the tribes and new methods - among which "negotiation" was "the oldest" strategy.[32]

28 Köksal, "Coercion and Mediation," 469.

29 Ibid., 487.

30 Ibid., 472-73.

31 For early attempts to settle nomadic and seminomadic tribes, see Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda*; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 1-20.

32 Köksal, "Coercion and Mediation," 477-78. Cengiz Orhonlu also argues that the difference with the Tanzimat lies in dealing with the matter of summer and winter quarters. Tribes no longer migrated to different places in summer and winter; instead their need for summer and winter quarters would be satisfied in the wastelands of districts and sub-provinces. In other words, they would be settled in their winter quarters. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda*, 114.

## § 7.2 Peasants and the Nomads: Settlement of the Tribes

Before introducing the specificities of the settlement of the tribes in the province of Erzurum, it is necessary to spare a few lines for the methods and motivations for persuading the tribes to settle voluntarily, keeping in mind that resorting to military force for their settlement was also not unusual. For instance, in 1861 the governor of Erzurum received an order that either he or the commander-in-chief of the Anatolian Army should go to Muş in order to perform the settlement of the tribes with as little force as possible.[33] Hence, the most widely-used strategy was exemption from taxes and conscription for a certain period of time. For instance, it was reported in 1851 that five hundred households of certain tribes were settled in the sub-province of Bayezid, and they were exempt from taxes for two years. Although the Meclis-i Vâlâ was asked to provide these tribal families with grains for a time - as the villages in which they were settled were in ruins – this request was turned down because of financial problems. In the same vein, one hundred families of the Zilan were among the sedentarized tribes in Bayezid, and salaries were granted to some tribal aghas and even to the mother of one tribal leader, Kasım Agha.[34] Taking the Zilan's controversial situation between the Ottoman and Iranian states into consideration, it is possible to argue that incorporating of tribes changed according to their prominence.

Similarly, one of the most important methods was to seek for the "mediation" of tribal leaders by appointing them as administrators in the districts. As will be discussed in the following lines, the notorious Rıdvan and Kulihan Aghas of the Hasenan were the müdirs (district governors) of Malazgirt and Bulanık, respectively.[35] Moreover, inclusion in provincial administration was

33 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 279/36, 20 Rebiülahir 1280 (31 December 1863).

34 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 59/97, 18 Receb 1267 (19 May 1851).

35 Ahmet Cevdet Pasha also focused on how tribal elders were granted official posts as a part of the mission of Fırka-i Islahiyye. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Ma'ruzat*, ed. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, 4 vols., vol. 4 (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980), 136. Fırka-i Islahiyye was a military operation which was a part of the reform movement of the nineteenth century carried out in the Çukurova, Gavurdağı, Kürt Dağı, and Kozan mountains between 1865 and 1866. See Yusuf Halaçoğlu, "Fırka-i İslahiye ve Yapmış Olduğu İskan," *Tarih Dergisi*, no. 27 (1973): 1-20.

also used as a method of reward in return for tribes' militarily contribution during wars. In this era, for instance, the members of the Hasenan and Cibran were rewarded with administrative positions for their participation in the army during the Crimean War.[36]

Although the sedentarization and incorporation of the tribes were realized through tax exemptions, salaries, and positions in the provincial administration, other previously applied methods were abrogated. With the implementation of the Tanzimat, it was argued that tribal leaders should no longer be granted ceremonial robes (*hilʿat*) and that their expenses should not be covered by the treasury. Instead, they should be encouraged and honored through compliments (*taltifât-ı lisâniye*).[37] In the same vein, the acceptance of gifts from the tribes was also forbidden,[38] which was actually the extension of the legal code which treated gift taking as bribery to tribe-official relations.[39]

It is controversial to what extent the settlement of the nomads was carried out, especially in the frontier regions of the Ottoman Empire. It can be argued that from the 1840s onwards, local and central authorities zealously attempted to settle as many tribes as possible. The first governor of the province of Kurdistan, Esad Pasha, together with the commander-in-chief of the Anatolian Army, Mehmed Reşid Pasha, arduously embarked upon the sedentarization of nomadic and seminomadic groups in Muş as in other places. However, this was not a trouble-free process; rather it was uneven, complicated, and certainly gradual. In the case of Muş, the collaboration with the notables had always been crucial for maintaining control over Kurdish tribes, as has been emphasized throughout this study. Therefore, before his exile in 1849, Şerif Bey was nominated as the kaimakam of the sub-province to deal with the settlement of the tribes in Muş. Similarly, upon Şerif Bey's exile together with his immediate family, the search for a capable kaimakam stemmed from the necessity of maintaining control over nomadic groups, as discussed in chapter 6.

36 BOA. MVL. 646/81, 27 Şevval 1279 (17 April 1863).

37 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 75/1, 14 Zilkade 1267 (10 September 1851).

38 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 229/54, 15 Receb 1272 (22 March 1856).

39 For a discussion on the Penal Code of 1840 in terms of bribery, see Kırlı, "Yolsuzluğun İcadı," 45-119.

In a report by Esad Pasha during his governance of the province of Erzurum, the tribes of Muş were depicted as mostly tent-dwellers who spend their summers in tents on the mountains and who had become accustomed to haunting certain villages of Muş in winter - assaulting the inhabitants and forcibly taking their hay and straw. Şerif Bey had been charged with preventing the tribes from usurping anything like fodder from the villagers without payment. Nevertheless, in order to save the inhabitants of Muş from such habits of the tribes, their sedentarization was thought to be vital.[40]

The settlement of the nomads of Van and Muş was decided simultaneously and in Muş and Bitlis their settlement had already embarked upon. As stated by Esad Pasha, the aghalıks of the tribes were abolished and the tribes were divided into four or five households and, if necessary, in even smaller units, they were settled in Muslim and non-Muslim villages. Places for them to build houses and engage in agriculture were allocated and they were registered in the population records of the villages where they were settled. Thereupon, they were regarded as settled populations, and in time they would be taxed as much as they could bear (*hal-i tahammüllerine göre*).[41] Besides, as they were not accustomed to settled life, they would have difficulty maintaining a livelihood. Yet if the circumstances of Kurdistan were taken into consideration, it was enough if they started to get used to it. In the long run, once frontier matters and the Hakkari trouble (refers to the rebellion of Nurullah Bey) were settled down, the plan was to settle tribes in the vast fields and abandoned villages of Muş, Bayezid, and Hakkari, equip them with the necessary tools for farming and building houses, and also put some tribal leaders and aghas on salary. Hereby, both the abandoned places would be improved and the revenues of the central treasury would be increased.[42]

40 "livâ-i mezbûrde kâin ekrâd ve 'aşâirin ekseri hayme-nişîn olub eyyâm-ı sayfde çadırlarla sahrâda ve mevsim-i şıtâda livâ-i mezbûrun hâvi olduğu münâsib karyelerde eğlenmekde olarak ahâlî-i fukarânın mine'lkadîm ot ve samânlarını almak misillû cebr ve taa'ddiye ibtidâr itmeği 'adet hükmüne koymuşlar." BOA. MVL. 8/38, 15 Ramazan 1262 (6 September 1846)

41 BOA. İ. MSM. 52/1343, 12 Şevval 1264 (11 September 1848).

42 BOA. İ. MSM. 52/1346, 4 Zilkade 1264 (2 October 1848).

However, initial reactions proved that the settlement would not be an easy process. Some local authorities objected to the settlement of the tribes in the Armenian villages of Muş. Among them was the bishop of Çanlı Church, Zakarya. The governor of Kurdistan criticized him for being unreasonable to oppose to the settlement of the tribes which would please and comfort the settled population. Besides, as the priest was a local, his replacement might be required in order to prevent any provocation in the region.[43]

Accordingly, it was reported that the settlement of the Elmanlı tribe was carried out with the help of Şerif Bey in 1845 and 1846.[44] The tribe was generally settled in the villages of Muş. Forty-two families of the tribe, the leader of which was Şaro Agha, were likewise settled in the village Kasor [Suvaran] in Muş.[45] However, in a few years, complaints from the inhabitants of the village of Kasor reached the imperial center through a petition of the Armenian Patriarchate. The tribal leader Şaro Agha was attacking Christian inhabitants on various pretexts. It was emphasized that as long as the agha remained, the inhabitants would have no peace and could do nothing but abandon their villages.[46] An investigation was carried out to warn him and in case he disobeyed, to exile him.

According to a report of Muş's council, when Elmanlı tribe was settled in Kasor, the re'âyâ (referring to Armenian population) of the village moved to neighboring re'âyâ villages on the grounds that they would not get along with the tribe. Nevertheless, the previous year, while the settlements of other tribes were being carried out, the Elmanlı tribe was transferred from re'âyâ villages to other, more appropriate or abandoned (*harabe*) villages. However, Elmanlı Şaro was allowed to remain in Kasor with permission of the murahhasa of the Armenians. Thus upon receipt of the complaint, Şaro Agha was called before

43 BOA. İ. MSM. 52/1343, 12 Şevval 1264 (11 September 1848). It is possible that collaboration with Şerif Bey and his brothers was required to calm such reactions, as their exile had been suspended for a while.

44 In the meantime, it is necessary to emphasize that the family members describes relations between the tribe of Elmanlı and the Alaaddin Paşazades as intimate. Personal interview with Abdurrahman Yıldırım, Muş, 23 July 2014.

45 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 15/44, 5 Receb 1266 (17 May 1850).

46 BOA. A. MKT. 226/10, 5 Zilkade 1265 (22 September 1849).

the council, and in the presence of the murahhasa, he argued that although his tribe had been involved in the described acts before the Tanzimat, they no longer dare by virtue of the implementation of the Tanzimat in Muş. The agha continued that as they had become *meşta-nişin* (means that they had winter-quarters) they made peace and security due to the "auspicious rule" (*usûl-ı mehasinşumûl*) [of the Tanzimat]. Hereafter, he had not attacked anyone so that he could not be held responsible for any kind of misdeed.[47]

Moreover, it was reported that both the murahhasa and the re'âyâ confirmed the remarks of Şaro Agha. They also emphasized that although some tribal members continued to steal for a few years they were being disciplined by officials. It is thus reasonable to question why the inhabitants of Kasor complained about the Elmanlı. It came out that despite the fact that Kasor was a Christian village and it had a church of its own when the tribe was settled there in 1845/6 the Armenians had had to leave their village. Thus, the council of Muş emphasized that the complaint of the re'âyâ about the tribe stemmed from their wish to remove the tribe from their village so that they could return. Having confirmed that the village of Kasor was a re'âyâ village, the council of Muş employed Emrah Agha to resettle the Elmanlı tribe. In fact, an exchange of villages occured. Şaro Agha and his tribal households would be resettled in the villages of Petar, Şeyh Bayram, Zorade, and Permuk to which the villagers of Kasor had emigrated previously. Thus, the latter could come back to Kasor. The tribe and the villagers of Kasor also settled financial issues among themselves.[48]

The settlement of the Elmanlı tribe was carried out more smoothly in comparison to that of tribes like the Hasenan, Sıpkî, and Haydaran. Certainly, the size and area of influence of the tribes played a crucial role in their settlement. Nevertheless, throughout the 1850s, there was a great effort to settle those tribes. In 1856, the decision was reported to settle the tribes of the Hasenan, Haydaran, and Sıpkî in five villages improved and ameliorated by the Şekaki tribe of Van as well as four ruined neighboring villages.[49] Although it is

47 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 15/44, 5 Receb 1266 (17 May 1850).

48 Ibid.

49 BOA. İ. DH. 358/23641, 28 Safer 1273 (28 October 1856).

difficult to determine the extent to which the settlement of those tribes in those villages was accomplished, the settlement process was modest and gradual.

Similarly, in the same year, the governor of Erzurum, Mehmed Hamdi, informed the Sublime Porte that the Sıpkî tribe, consisting of more than seven hundred families,[50] was relatively honorable (*ehl-ı ırz*) and was willing to settle down if they were given proper reassurances. The villages suggested for the settlement of the Sıpkî were twenty-six ruined ones in the districts of Malazgird and Bulanık in Muş. However, the Hasenan had already been settled in some of those villages. It was argued that those families of the Hasenan consisted of one or two hundred households, so it was possible for the two tribes to share the villages. Thus, after reassuring the administrators of both districts and the tribal leaders with necessary letters, Colonel Ali Bey from the Anatolian Army and Nuri Bey from the Grand Council of Erzurum accompanied by necessary troops were entitled to allocate the twenty six ruined villages between the Hasenan and Sıpkî. The villages where each tribe was settled would be specified and their populations be registered. If any empty villages remained, they would be reserved for the settlement of other tribes.[51] However, the settlement of the Sıpkî in the districts of Muş was temporary; in later years they were generally settled in neighboring sub-provinces like Bayezid.

The Suluki (Silukan) tribe[52] was also among the nomadic groups partially settled in Muş in 1850. Mark Sykes described this tribe, which consisted of 900 families, as both "cultivators and nomads" who "migrate[d] in the summer to the Muş plain" at the beginning of the twentieh century.[53] The settlement of the tribe in Muş began with the opposition of Ferho Agha, the leader of the tribe who had been a tent dweller near Bitlis, to conscription lots. The Agha was accused of misinforming officials about the number of his tribesmen by

50 According to Sykes, the Sıpkî tribe consisted of 3000 families in total. Mark Sykes, "The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 38 (1908): 477.

51 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 239/26, 7 Şevval 1272 (11 June 1856)

52 The Suluki tribe was also among the tribes coming from provinces in the vicinity of Muş.

53 Sykes, "The Kurdish Tribes," 460.

hiding them. It was decided in the Meclis-i Vâlâ to send him together with his family to Erzurum and to appoint a new agha to the tribe in his place.[54] However, during Ferho Agha's journey to Erzurum in the company of the commander-in-chief of the Anatolian Army, he was left in Muş as the route of the commander had changed. Upon the suggestion of Esad Pasha, Ferho Agha and his family were settled in Muş as the agha was of old age.[55] The ad interim kaimakam of Muş, Naim Efendi, was ordered to take all precautions to prevent his escape.[56]

The maintenance of harmony between the sedentary population -the peasants of the sub-province of Muş - and the newly settled itinerant groups proved to be hard. In the following lines, some other cases of settlement will be discussed to better understand the reactions of the inhabitants of Muş to this process of settlement and their relations to the nomads.

In a petition dated 1853, the inhabitants of Muş emphasized that despite relief they enjoyed thanks to the reforms of the Sublime State, they have become helpless due to more than fifteen hundred "black tent-dwellers" settled in the sub-province.[57] Although some other tribes like the Sıpkî and Elmanlı were settled in the villages of Muş, it was primarily the Hasenan who were settled there and could be regarded as a "local" tribe. Thus, the "black tent-dwellers" in question in this petition most probably referred to the Hasenan. This phrase was a formulation of the conflict between local peasants and nomadic groups. Although the settlement policy concerning the nomads was to settle them primarily in the ruined or abandoned wastelands, it could not prevent them from attacking on neighboring villages, stealing goods, and burning houses and haystacks.

Accordingly, some Muslim families from the village of Sipanun in the district of Kasor migrated to Bayezid. The kaimakam of Bayezid, Pertev Efendi, argued that there were even more reʿâyâ coming to live in Bayezid from certain villages in Muş, and in the case it was disallowed, to immigrate to Russia. The Hasenan tribe from Malazgird, with the inducement of their headman

54 BOA. MVL. 227/38, 11 Ramazan 1265 (31 July 1849).

55 BOA. İ. MVL. 157/4486, 26 Muharrem 1266 (12 December 1849).

56 BOA. İ. DH. 212/12312, 5 Cemaziyelevvel 1266 (18 March 1850).

57 BOA. MVL. 131/20, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1269 (20 February 1853).

(*muhtar*) Rızko (Rıdvan Agha) and his relatives Kulihan, Derviş, Umo, and Beyzade perpetually attacked on mostly non-Muslim but also Muslim villages. After one group of them went to the villages to forcefully take wheat, barley, cattle, money and other goods, another group would stop by the same villages twenty days or a month later with the same demands. The grain remaining after such extortion neither covered the needs of the villagers nor their livestock. Moreover, in the case of the slightest resistance to fulfilling the demands of tribal members, the stacks of hay and fodder which they had labored to collect in summer to feed their livestock in winter and even the houses were being burnt down. The tribal members were sharing the goods seized from the villagers as if they had traded them. In a similar line, burglary often occurred along the roadsides and village streets it was argued that the atrocities by Rızko and his relatives were similar or even worse than those by Han Mahmud who had tyrannized Van and been exiled to Rusçuk.[58] The allegory between Han Mahmud and Rıdvan Agha of the Hasenan importantly depicts the afterwards of the exile of Kurdish notables.

Apart from general complaints about assaults by nomadic and semi-nomadic groups on settled habitants, other problems arose due to the discrepancy between settled and nomadic lifestyles. The relationship between the houses of the Hasenan and the peasants of Kuştiyan [Şehittahir], a village of Malazgirt, best exemplifies this. The Kuştiyaners primarily complained that the families of the Hasenan who began living in their villages, namely Şero, Havzi, and Ferho, had a many livestock that trespassed on and ruined the fields of the villagers. They demanded the removal of the three households from their villages and that they be resettled in other, ruined villages to open them to agriculture. Otherwise, they would themselves emmigrate.[59]

However, both the council of Muş and Esad Pasha emphasized that those three to five households were from among the Hasenan that had been settled in the villages of Muş with the help of council members and notables in 1264 (1847-8). They were busy with agriculture, were no longer oppressing other villagers, and were considered locals (*yerli*). Thus, it would be wrong to remove

58 BOA. İ. MVL. 269/10320, 1 Receb 1269 (10 May 1853).

59 BOA. MVL. 92/98, 17 Şevval 1266 (26 August 1850).

them from Kuştiyan.[60] The case of Kuştiyan highlights two important points. On one hand, it points to the challenges of settling nomadic groups. Whether the sedentarization of the tribes was willing (by use of exemptions and privileges) or forced, the process thereafter was not trouble free. The transition of the tribes from nomadic modus vivendi to agricultural life did not happen overnight. In Kuştiyan, the Hasenan families did not get along with other villagers because of their great amount of livestock.

On the other hand, local and central administrators encountered the complaints of local inhabitants about nomadic groups differently. In this case, the Hasenan families were considered local and their rights were protected. The main policy was to accustom tribes to settled life and not curb their encouragement by exiling or punishing them except in cases of usurpation, burglary, killing, and injuring.

Nevertheless, the villagers of Muş continued to file petitions against the houses of the Sıpkî and Hasenan that had been settled. For instance, the inhabitants of certain villages in Malazgird, namely Hıdır Şeyh, Reis, Kargalıh, Hayalverdi, and Atagel were reported to be in dire straits due to atrocities committed by someone called Yüzbaşı from the Sıpkî. Yüzbaşı together with his friends was attacking the villages, ravaging them, and burning grain mills. The villagers asked for compensation for the damage.[61] In order to protect the villagers and save them from these assaults, it was ordered the perpetrators be captured and questioned to determine proper compensation and the extent of their crimes.[62]

In addition to the atrocities by the Sıpkî, families of the Hasenan not only continued to burgle in Muş but also attacked Ahlat in Van. Although the kaimakam of Muş was informed of the issue, it was reported no precautions had yet been taken. Thus, a *kır serdarı* (an official patrolling in the rurality) was appointed together with regular troops upon the petitions of the inhabitants.[63]

60 BOA. MVL. 235/13, 18 Rebiülevvel 1267 (21 January 1851).

61 BOA. MVL. 182/15, 3 Şaban 1273 (29 March 1857); BOA. A. MKT. UM. 278/48, 16 Şaban 1273 (11 April 1857).

62 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 278/48, 16 Şaban 1273 (11 April 1857).

63 BOA. MVL. 674/61, 16 Zilhicce 1280 (23 May 1864).

The accounts of the settlement of Kurdish tribes in Muş and its vicinity discussed up until now include some crucial points. To begin with, it is important to understand the reasons for the migration of settled peasants to other places in the cases when tribal households were settled in their villages as well as the peasants' insistence that the tribes be settled on uninhabited lands. The peasants, in the case of the villagers of Kasor for instance, believed beforehand that they could not get along with the nomadic way of life, so they dispersed. In the case of Kuştiyan, the primary complaint was harm done to the cultivated lands by the large amount of livestock of the Hasenan. Moreover, local authorities linked the thievery and unruliness of the tribes to their not being acquainted with agriculture. All these points provide important clues about the tribal economy, which is to say, the deficiencies of the pastoral economy.

Despite the abovementioned motivations and efforts to sedentarize nomadic and seminomadic groups, it was a though process that continued until the end of the century. Thus, the following paragraph from a report dated 1863 importantly depicts the details of the settlement of tribes in the province of Erzurum some twenty years after its inclusion in the Tanzimat program:

> It is not necessary to repeat [that] the settlement of said tribes has not been fulfilled completely. Although some have built houses in Muş, Erzurum, and Bayezid, most are tent dwellers. Thus, the Hasenan tribe is migrating to pasturing grounds in the summer and, in the beginning of winters, to the villages of Malazgirt and Bulanıklar in the sub-province of Muş and to the villages of the districts and sub-districts of Ahlat in the sub-province of Van. In the same vein, the tribe of Cibran migrates in winters to the districts of Hınıs, Kığı, and Köynek in the province of Erzurum and plain villages in the districts of Muş and Vartolar. By the same token, the Sıpkî tribe, which was settled in the sub-district of Ayntab in the sub-province of Bayezid, has been coming out of their tents for a few years and in winter migrate to Patnos in the sub-district of Bayezid and to the villages of the sub-district of Malazgirt. The Zırki and Beliki tribes settled in the district of Hınıs and are also dispersing to districts and villages in the vicinity. Until the beginning of spring when the pasturages are sufficient to graze their livestock, some of

> those tribes feed their livestock by means of the inhabitants of said districts and villages without payment. As the inhabitants of those districts and villages were offended and tortured by said tribes, some have gone to the frontier to places like Kars and Bayezid with the intention of passing on to Russia. And the ones who found the opportunity actually did crossover to Russian lands and some of them are currently living there.[64]

In the same vein, the governor of Erzurum commenced a journey in the company of certain number of troops through Hınıs, the districts of Muş, Bulanık, Varto, and Malazgirt, and those of Bayezid, Eleşgird, and Ayntab with the aim of disciplining, settling and also registering the Zırki, Beliki, Mamanlı, Hasenan, Cibran, Seydanlı, Sıpkî, and Zilan tribes in the province of Erzurum. According to a report of the Provincial Council of Erzurum, although 1619 households from these tribes had been settled, they had not yet been recorded in the population registries in their places of settlement. Moreover, among these tribes there were still 1055 households who were yet to be settled. Thus, it was decided to settle said families in the places where their tribes had already been living and the remaining ones in ruined places and in *mevat* (uninhabited wastelands) lands. The land official of Erzurum, Şerif Efendi, was entitled by law to register the lands in the name of settled tribes. Furthermore, they were to be registered in the population records of the places they were settled together with the tribes who had not yet been registered. Moreover, the headmen of the villages where the tribal families were settled would stand as their guarantors in order to prevent their deserting the villages or assaulting the peasants and also to occupy them with agriculture. Hence, the council argued that the lands would be cultivated and that the treasury would get a contribution as high as two yük (200,000) guruş.[65]

Meanwhile, a multifaceted reform project was embarked upon in the subprovince of Muş to discipline the districts of Huyut, Mutki, and Sason which

64 BOA. MVL. 646/81, 27 Şevval 1279 (17 April 1863). See Appendix A, Quotation 10 for the original Turkish.

65 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 293/10, 13 Ramazan 1280 (21 February 1864).

were most ostensibly opposing to the new taxation system, conscription lots, and the surrendering of guns.[66] Thus, the sedentarization of the tribes in the provinces of both Erzurum and Kurdistan was a crucial part of this campaign of discipline. Only after their sedentarization could the tribes be included in the new taxation and conscription systems and their population and lands be registered according to the Land Code.

Nonetheless, while local authorities were busy preventing the tribes of the sub-province of Muş from roaming its villages and assaulting and ravaging the local inhabitants, the other prominent issue was the prevention of assaults by the tribes of neighboring provinces. The following lines were spared for the story of the nomadic tribes of the provinces of Kurdistan and later Diyarbekir that had been taking their herds to pastures in the mountains lying to the south of the Muş Plain in summer.

## § 7.3 Nomadic Tribes in the Vicinity of the Sub-Province of Muş

Having mentioned their fruitless correspondence with the governors of the provinces of Erzurum and Kurdistan in previous years concerning the prevention of the tribes of Kurdistan from coming to Muş's pastures, the desperate council of Muş wrote about the issue again for the coming spring. The council emphasized that they could not provide the peasants of Muş with satisfactory answers if those tribes came again and dared to commit all kinds of assault by spoiling and plundering the inhabitants' properties.[67]

The tribes of the province of Kurdistan, namely the Reşkotan, Bekiran, Alikan, and Pençnar came to the pastures in the mountains to the south of Muş's plain to graze their livestock from spring to autumn. Meanwhile, they attacked the villages of Muş's plain, stealing and seizing their goods, and harassing their honor. However, the most outstanding issue emphasized in the report by Muş's council was *hafirlik*. Hafirlik was roughly a system in which tribal members offered protection to villagers in return for grains and goods. In line with

66 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 50/56, 5 Safer 1269 (18 November 1852); BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 71/19, 8 Rebiülahir 1269 (19 January 1853).

67 BOA. MVL. 276/42, 17 Şaban 1270 (15 May 1854).

this, tribes from Diyarbekir bounded the villagers of Muş to such a system, sending fifteen or twenty armed tribal members to each village to take grain and attack passerby in the name of hafirlik. The lack of information about hafirlik prior to nineteenth century begs the question whether it was a reformulation of kışlakiye, which supposed to have been abolished with the Tanzimat.

On the other hand, tribes proved to be troublesome for persons who had been farming the taxes of the villages. They prevented officials from collecting products in due time and expelled them from the villages by beating them and swearing at them. As tax farmers had suffered a loss, no one dared to farm the revenues of the villages in 1270 (1854), so the council emphasized that this had in turn led to pecuniary damage for the treasury.[68]

The experience of previous years made local administrators of Muş feel obliged to call for authorities to keep the Bekiran, Reşkotan, and Pençnar tribes away from the pastures in Muş and partially if not completely relieve the villagers of the plain of Muş. Thus, the governor of Erzurum emphasized that especially that year - considering that the Crimean War with Russia had already begun – if said tribes were not prevented from returning, the inhabitants would become completely miserable. However, for the same reason, using military force to detain those tribes was also not an option. As described by Muş's council, if regular troops were dispatched to Muş, the tribes would immediately send news to each other and no less than two hundred men would league together and take up arms. Such an armed clash would take long time, which was not desirable during the war. However, both the council of Muş and governor of Erzurum agreed that unless those tribes, consisting of three to five hundred households, were disciplined and chastened, they would not abstain from mischief. The local authorities in Muş were desperate, and the governor of Erzurum suggested that the governor of Kurdistan summon tribal leaders and talk with them, in other case it would be indispensable to dispatch regular troops.[69]

68 Ibid. Astourian also emphasizes that hafir was a continuation of "semifeudal practices" by arguing that it "often exceeded the amount of taxes levied by the government." Astourian, "The Silence of the Land," 60.

69 BOA. MVL. 276/42, 17 Şaban 1270 (15 May 1854).

In the course of time, neither the arrival nor the assaults by the Bekiran and other tribes in Muş was prevented. On the contrary, these tribes did not obey the orders concerning their settlement, and around four hundred families fled to the mountains of Muş in summer 1859. The aim of some was to find places to shelter and that of others was to cross into Iran. Meanwhile, they did not refrain from plundering villages on their way. Although none of the leaders of these tribes came to Muş, they sent men to the members of Muş's council to explain their situation. Heavy taxes were imposed on the tribes in the province of Kurdistan and they were being oppressed, so they came to Muş with the intent of being settled in there. However, as the governor of Kurdistan had not given any instructions on this issue, the best solution the kaimakam of Muş found was to host the tribes for a time and to warn district administrators to prevent the tribes from passing into Iran by deploying some regular troops. However, the kaimakam emphasized, if they emigrated in groups of three to five households, it would be easy to confront them. Otherwise, if they collectively moved from Muş, it would require using force, which depended on a decision of the commander-in-chief.[70]

The main inclination with respect to the settlement of tribes was to use military force as little as possible. This attitude decreased the financial costs, on one hand, and provided for peace and security in the long run when nomadic groups willingly accepted to settle, on the other. Thus, the governor of Erzurum was informed to oppress and torture either the aforementioned nomadic tribes of the province of Kurdistan nor other tribal groups the settlement of which was being considered.[71]

Having been recommended to use force only as a last resort and to refrain from firing and shedding blood, the kaimakam of Muş, İbrahim Edhem, dispatched council members to mediate with the notables of the tribes and to summon them to the local council. Consequently, either the headmen of the Alikan, Reşkotan, and Pencnar themselves or their agents arrived in Muş and were questioned by the council. The tribal notables argued that the climate of the places allocated for their settlement in the province of Kurdistan was not

70 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 361/54, 21 Muharrem 1276 (20 August 1859).

71 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 363/24, 30 Muharrem 1276 (29 August 1859).

suitable in summer; neither they nor their livestock could survive. Thus, they proposed settling in winter, yet in summer they would move to the pastures as they used to. As their arrival in the summer pastures that year took place ten days later than in previous years, both their families and livestock had become sick and not yet recovered. Emphasizing that the summer pastures were a must for them, tribal notables insisted that unless some cool places were assigned for their settlement, to which they were accustomed, they could only choose to migrate to other countries.[72]

The statement of these tribal leaders can neither be considered merely as a condition for settlement nor as a threat. Rather, it provides clues about the nomadic way of life and its habituations. These nomadic tribes were inclined to seminomadic than a complete sedentary life. Indeed, given their large amount of livestock a sudden transition to sedentary life could not be carried out easily.[73] For the same reason, the breezy pastures of Muş were preferable to them over the hot summers of Diyarbekir. Hence, neither the settlement of these tribes nor the prevention of their coming to Muş was ensured. Although the main policy to control the tribes was diplomacy, using military forces was not rare.

The Bekiran tribe was among those controlled by force. In spite of efforts to prevent the Bekiran and other tribes of neighboring provinces from committing assaults in Muş without bloodshed, armed encounters were inevitable.[74] The Bekiran continued wandering around and plundering the villages of Muş despite warnings. Zaptieh soldiers were charged with capturing some of the tribesmen of the Bekiran who were involved in such mischief, yet tribesmen shot and injured some of them as well as their horses. No matter, two criminals called Alo and Meto were arrested, and local forces were informed that around one hundred armed men from the tribe were to come to the plain of Muş. Thus, regular troops and zaptiehs were deployed, some of whom

72 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 367/94, 27 Safer 1276 (25 September 1859).

73 It is difficult to trace the trade activities of tribes with respect to their herds. Nevertheless, Brant states that "dealers come to buy sheep and drive them for sale to Syria, as well as Constantinople." Brant, "Notes of a Journey," 352.

74 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 423/55, 10 Safer 1277 (28 August 1860).

encountered the tribesmen along their way, and clash took place. The encounter resulted in casualties and pecuniary losses, yet some tribesmen were arrested. More noteworthy, the punishment of these tribal members was to be based on the new Criminal Code. With reference to Article 62 of the new code (*kanun-ı cedîd*),[75] it was argued that:

> whoever seizes, pillages the property, assets, and cash of the exalted state or of the property of the people, and leads or has a commanding role in a gang of armed bandits established with the aim of confronting the soldiers of the exalted state who are summoned against such criminals shall be executed. The ones involved in such gangs who do no lead or have a commanding role, if caught at the place of disorder, shall be sentenced to temporary hard labor.[76]

The leaders of the tribal group involved in the strife were already caught dead, and the remaining tribesmen were condemned to hard labor for three years in Erzurum. Moreover, the properties and livestock that they had seized were returned to their owners, and in case their owners did not appear, the state would keep them. Similarly, the criminals also had to pay for livestock perished because of them.[77]

Throughout the 1860s, the Bekiran, Reşkotan and the other tribes abandoned neither coming to Muş for their summer quarters nor plundering the properties of the settled inhabitants of the plain of Muş. Nor did they settle in

75 It refers to the Penal Code of 1858. The code was inspired by French Code of 1810. For details, see Omri Paz, "Crime, Criminals and the Ottoman State: Anatolia between the late 1830s and the late 1860s" (PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 2010); Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

76 "her kim devlet-i ʻaliyyenin emlâk ve emvâl ve nukûdunu veyâ ahâlîden bir cem-i gafir emlâkının zabt ve yağmâ ve garet itmek ve bu misillû cinâyât ashâbının ʻaleyhinde hareket iden ʻasâkir-i devlet-i ʻaliyyeye karşu durmak zımnında teşekkül itmiş olan müselleh eşkiya cemʻiyyetine baş olur veyâhud cemʻiyyet içinde bir kumanda sâhibi bulunur ise anın iʻdam olunması ve bu makûle eşkiyâ cemʻiyyetlerinde dâhil bulunanlardan ol cemʻiyyetlerde söz ve kumanda sâhibi olmıyanların mahal-i fesâdda tutuldukları hâlde muvakkaten küreğe konulması." BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 114/39, 29 Receb 1276 (22 March 1860).

77 Ibid.

the places determined for them in Diyarbakır and Siird. As emphasized above, the main inclination was to control these tribes without incurring costs, in other words, without employing military troops. In this vein, there are examples of "mediation" applied to a subsection of those tribes. For instance, the tribe of Bekiran was composed of three sects, two of which obeyed and asked for mercy and whose leaders were on their way to Muş. Nonetheless, the leader of the third subsection, Hamzo had escaped to Hıyan.[78] Moreover, the tribe had already returned half of the properties they had seized and restitution for the remaining half and the apprehension of the thieves were to be realized with the efforts of the kaimakams of Muş and Diyarbekir.[79]

By the same token, according to correspondence between the provinces of Erzurum and Diyarbekir, it was a long-standing habit of around eighteen tribes of Bohtan and Siird, like the Alikan and Dururi, to come to the sub-provinces of Muş and Van in the summers. In both provinces, the meadows were abundant like the large stocks of the tribes. Nevertheless, a military force of more than two thousand troops was required to make those tribes cease this old habit and settle in the sub-provinces of Siird and Bohtan. However, the operation needed to be considered in detail as the tribes had already left for their summer pastures. Thus, until there were suitable conditions for the deployment of military forces to control those tribes, it was necessary to appeal to influential tribesmen as intermediaries. After necessary warnings to prevent assaults by their tribal people, these tribesmen and leaders were held responsible for the further actions of their tribes via surety bonds.[80]

Despite the precautions to avoid coercion in the prevention of the migration of tribes of the province of Kurdistan to Muş and in their settlement, they were eventually settled with the employment of military force.[81] The 4th Imperial Army reported that the cost of the military operation to prevent the Reşkotan, Bekiran and Pencinar from going to Muş amounted to 20,183 guruş

78 BOA. MVL. 602/32, 17 Safer 1277 (4 September 1860).

79 Ibid., BOA. A. MKT. UM. 425/58, 19 Safer 1277 (6 September 1860).

80 BOA. MVL. 738/29, 25 Safer 1284 (28 June 1867).

81 BOA. İ. DH. 626/43528, 23 Şevval 1287 (16 January 1871).

30 pare, and it was covered by the local treasury as before.[82] However, the military operation neither intercepted sporadic migrations of those nomads to the plain of Muş nor completed their settlement. This was a process that continued up to the beginning of the twentieth century.[83]

The rest of the chapter will focus on the most important local tribe of the sub-province of Muş, the Hasenan, who had become sedentary to a great extent by the beginning of the twentieth century.

## § 7.4 The Hasenan Tribe: The Cases of Rıdvan and Kulihan Aghas

The British envoy and traveler Mark Sykes reported that the Hasenan consisted of 3,300 households in 110 villages in Hınıs, Malazgirt, and Varto at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although some households were seminomadic, they were gradually abandoning their tents in later years.[84] Nevertheless, the settlement of the Hasenan was not a smooth process, just as the ones of the other tribes were not. The story of the Hasenan, especially of the tribal leader Rıdvan Agha and his brothers and cousins sheds light on the fact that tribes, their relationships with governments, local administrators, notables, peasants, and other tribes are significant to depict the region under study.

As mentioned above, the Hasenan were among the first tribes settled in the villages of Muş following the Tanzimat. It was a seminomadic tribe who were tent dwellers in the mountains of Muş in the summers and spent winters

82 BOA. İ. DH. 648/45054, 10 Muharrem 1289 (30 March 1872).

83 Actually, the tribes of Diyarbekir were neither kept from summer pasturing in the mountains of Muş nor were their assaults on peasants prevented. The relations among those nomadic Kurdish tribes and especially the Armenian peasantry was aggravated in ensuing years. Together with the influence of Armenian revolutionary movements that started to be felt in the region, the central government approached the situation differently, which resulted in a series of massacres in the districts of Talori and Sasun, that was widely known as the Sason Massacre. Mehmet Polatel, "The Complete Ruin of a District: The Sasun Massacre of 1894," in *The Ottoman History in the Nineteenth Century: Socities, Identities and Politics*, eds. Yaşar Tolga Cora, Dzovaniar Derderian, and Ali Sipahi (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 179-98; Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The 1984 Sassoun Massacre: A Juncture in the Escalation of the Turko-Armenian Conflict," *The Armenian Review* 47, no. 1-2 (2001): 5-39.

84 Sykes, "The Kurdish Tribes," 476.

in its villages, which was a huge burden on the settled population. In the same vein, the members of the Hasenan were among the important actors of the region, the negotiations, collaborations, and conflicts of which with the beys of Muş were narrated in chapters 2 and 3. With the inclusion of Muş in Tanzimat, one of the main targets was to settle the families of the Hasenan in its villages. The story of Rıdvan Agha started with this settlement phase of the reforms.

A year after the inclusion of Muş in the Tanzimat program, in 1846, the governor and provincial treasurer of Erzurum reported the assaults and misconduct of Rıdvan Agha. Having turned his back on Şerif Bey as an intermediary, the kaimakam of Muş at the time, Rıdvan Agha also turned a deaf ear to the warnings of the Colonel of Regular Troops in Muş, Mustafa Bey, and some other tribal leaders like Mustafa Agha of the Zırki. Then, Murad Bey, the brother of Şerif, was dispatched with a certain number of irregular troops and convinced some tribal elders (*ihtiyar*) among the accomplices (*'avene*) of Rıdvan Agha, if not Rıdvan Agha himself, to surrender. Consequently, Rıdvan Agha with his men and family withdrew to the castle of Malazgirt after plundering the villages of Bulanık on his way. Again, despite the mediation of certain tribesmen and military authorities, he did not submit. After clashing with the members of the Cibran deployed against him, he escaped from the castle leaving his family and relatives behind. After his escape, his family was taken from the castle and sent to Muş, and the properties and livestock he left behind were registered with the help of the local council. Moreover, the properties and livestock seized from the local people were returned by the local council if any claimant appeared, according to the law.[85]

This struggle of Rıdvan Agha's was to avoid settlement in the plain of Muş, for which Şerif Bey and Mustafa Bey from the regular troops, were employed.[86] The agha was assured that he would not be oppressed and punished on the condition that he returned the properties and livestock seized from the

85 BOA. A. MKT. 59/80, 7 Muharrem 1263 (26 December 1846).

86 Recall that Şerif Bey had been appointed as kaimakam of Muş for the last time to deal with the settlement of nomadic groups and to intermediate in the revolt of Han Mahmud. For details, see chapter 4 in this study.

inhabitants and agreed to settle down in the plain of Muş along with the tribal members he had gathered. The agha at first came to terms with local authorities and asked for reliable, impartial officials to carry out this case. Thereupon, two people from Erzurum were employed.[87] However, the process resulted in a confrontation and the escape of Rıdvan Agha. Nevertheless, as emphasized, the settlement of nomadic and seminomadic tribes was a process that involved both negotiation and force, the latter of which was employed as a last resort. Despite precautions to solve the matter of the Hasenan peacefully, Rıdvan Agha ended up sheltering with Han Mahmud after escaping from the castle of Malazgirt.[88] As remembered, this was a precarious time when Han Mahmud was struggling against the inclusion of the sub-province of Van in the Tanzimat. Hence the alliance of a tribal leader like Rıdvan Agha with rebels was undesired. Thus, Şerif Bey was entitled to prevent such collaboration. Şerif Bey, who met with Han Mahmud in Adilcevaz, mediated the issue and the latter promised to send Rıdvan Agha to Muş in a month.[89]

Meanwhile, the properties and goods Rıdvan left behind were registered and the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the sub-districts of Bulanık-ı Ulya and Süfla and Ahlat filed a petition concerning assaults by Rıdvan Agha and his relatives. Having penned following lines, inhabitants asked for exile of Rıdvan Agha's family, who had by then been sent to Muş, to Sivas or Trabzon:

> All the Muslims and non-Muslims of each place sighed in relief thanks to their inclusion in the Beneficent Tanzimat. Although the inhabitants of the sub-province of Muş are willing to relieve from among the tribal aghas of the sub-province, Rıdvan Agha of the Hasenan together with his family, relatives, and ill-humored Kurds whom the agha persuaded with various promises have not accepted the rule of the Beneficent Tanzimat. They have prevented proper implementation of the reforms in our sub-province and overrode the local governments of the kaimakams. Although we have often submitted petitions regarding various kinds of violence, oppression, and assault committed by them

87 BOA. HR. MKT. 16/58, 2 Safer 1263 (20 January 1847).

88 BOA. HR. MKT. 17/41, 17 Safer 1263 (4 February 1847).

89 BOA. İ. MSM. 69/2010, 9 Rebiülevvel 1263 (25 February 1847).

> upon the inhabitants of Muş, particularly those in the district of Malazgirt and the sub-districts of Upper Bulanık, Lower Bulanık, and Ahlat, the governors of Erzurum have turned a deaf ear. These tribal aghas and members are increasing their assaults upon the inhabitants day by day as they are of the opinion that they will remain unpunished whatever they do. In short, we have found no way out.[90]

Having emphasized that they were enslaved together with their families by tribal members of the Hasenan, the inhabitants of those three places determined the products and properties seized by Rıdvan Agha and his relatives in 1261-2 (1845-6) on a village by village basis. Members of the Hasenan had extorted everything ranging from wheat to clothes from the local people. The total debt and damage amounted to 235,085 guruş.[91] In the same vein, the inhabitants of Malazgirt also petitioned regarding the money embezzled by Rıdvan Agha. In fact, this money was the taxes levied on the inhabitants of Malazgirt in the years 1845-6. The following table indicates the details of Rıdvan Agha's debt:

90 Ibid. See Appendix A, Quotation 11 for the original Turkish.

91 Ibid.

Table 7.1 The Amount of Money Embezzled by Ridvan Agha from the Inhabitants of Malazgirt

| | Year | Amount (guruş) |
|---|---|---|
| The imperial taxes Rıdvan Agha took from *zımmî* …. on the night he escaped | 1261(1845) | 9350 |
| The revenues of the sixteen villages, the tax farming of which was contracted to him by Kaşif Agha | 1261 | 12500 |
| The amount he seized from the revenues of the dye house (*boyahâne*) and syrup house (*şurubhâne*) | 1261 | 250 |
| The amount he took from the villages of Sofi in the name of *yaylakiye* | 1262 (1846) | 2309 |
| The amount he embezzled from the revenues of sixteen villages of Sofi | 1262 | 12500 |
| The amount he took in the name of *baç* in Bitlis | 1262 | 100 |
| The amount he took from the *ihtisab* tax[92] | 1262 | 313 |
| Total | | 37322 |

SOURCE: BOA. İ. MSM. 69/2010, 9 Rebiülevvel 1263 (25 February 1847)

Ferik Ahmet Pasha from the Anatolian Army reported that Rıdvan Agha claimed to have submitted all the taxes to the kaimakam of Muş, Şerif Bey, and that he had taken nothing from the inhabitants. The agha added that if he were to be heard and confronted with his complainants, he could prove his innocence. Nevertheless, his case was delayed after the termination of the Van issue.[93] Thus, Rıdvan Agha surrendered in summer 1847, concurrent with the suppression of the revolt of Han Mahmud and Bedirxan Bey.[94] However, the documents indicate that the Hasenan tribe was settled in Malazgirt in 1848.

92 Baç resmi was "market or transit dues taken on goods for sale per container." Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 986. Similarly, ihtisab resmi was a domestic consumption tax, for the details, see Şener, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı*, 155-58.

93 BOA. İ. MSM. 50/1278, 3 Ramazan 1263 (15 August 1847).

94 Kardam, *Cizre - Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan*, 326.

Thus, it took at least three years to settle the Hasenan in Malazgirt. Nevertheless, soon after, new problems occurred. Instead of fulfilling the call of the commander-in-chief of the Anatolian Army, Rıdvan Agha arrived with two hundred families on the border of Iran intending to pass to the other side.[95] However, his cousin Kulihan became afraid and changed his mind while approaching the border. Having failed to deter his cousin, Kulihan left together with about 150 households and reported his cousin's intention.[96] After being informed about this issue, the kaimakam of Van, Mehmed Reşid immediately sent a letter to the agha. Consequently, Rıdvan Agha was persuaded to return to Bargiri, a district of Van, together with the two hundred households accompanying him. The kaimakam talked to Rıdvan Agha in person and convinced him to return and settle in Malazgirt.[97] The loyalty and efforts of Kulihan were rewarded with a stipend of 200 guruş until the issue of the demarcation of the border and the division of tribes (*tahdid-i hudud ve tefrik-ı aşair*) with the Iranian state ended.[98]

This attempt of Rıdvan Agha to crossover to Iran was not an exception for the tribes on the eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire. The "porous"[99] situation of the Ottoman-Iran frontier not only allowed nomadic groups to use either side as summer and winter quarters but became a parameter in their negotiations with both governments. In other words, migration to the other side became a form of threat, as the tribal issue was an important aspect of Ottoman-Iran border-making[100] one one hand and on the other, tribes were

95 BOA. İ. DH. 206/11875, 20 Muharrem 1266 (6 December 1849).

96 BOA. İ. MVL. 185/5579, 17 Zilhicce 1266 (24 October 1850).

97 BOA. İ. HR. 60/2894, 26 Muharrem 1266 (12 December 1849).

98 BOA. İ. MVL. 185/5579, 17 Zilhicce 1266 (24 October 1850).

99 Sabri Ateş, "Empires at the Margin: Towards a History of the Ottoman Iranian Borderland and the Borderland Peoples, 1843-1881" (PhD diss., New York University, 2006), 69.

100 One of the important articles of the Treaty of Erzurum of 1847 was on this "tribal matter:" "The introduction, by both states, of measures to prevent acts of brigandage by nomadic frontier tribes by establishing military posts and taking responsibility for the incursion of tribes into one another's territory; and a mutual agreement that tribes with an ambigious dependency would permanently select their territory of residence, whereas those whose dependency was uncontested would return to their home state." *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, 130.

regarded as an important human resource. In this case, Rıdvan Agha's attempts to emigrate prompted local authorities to take precautions as it would have impeded the demarcation of border and the allocation of the tribes. Despite being persuaded to return, the mere fact of Rıdvan Agha's action created problems. The governor of Erzurum reported that the consul (*şehbender*) of Iran - when demanding the return of the Zilan tribe – referred to the fact that Rıdvan Agha was not accepted on the Iranian side by frontier officials. However, the governor emphasized that the Hasenan had been a tribe of the Ottoman Empire since time immemorial, living in Muş. Also, the return of Rıdvan Agha was the result of the insistence and efforts of Ottoman officials.[101]

Therefore, both the governor of Kurdistan province and the commander-in-chief of the Anatolian Army were warned that such tribes were "savage" and "nomadic" and that they were feared by the previous administration and so they had yet started to understand both the just rule and imperial grace. Therefore, it was necessary to work for accustoming them with civilization (*temdin etmek*) and settlement. Local authorities, meanwhile, were warned to be attentive, not to scare the tribes, to prevent their emigration to Iran, and to maintain control over them.[102]

Hereafter, the migration of Rıdvan Agha and his cousins to Iran was prevented to a great extent. Their settlement was encouraged through their incorporation into the regional administration. Rıdvan was granted the administration of Malazgirt and his cousin Kulihan with that of Bulanık. However, tribal members of the Hasenan under the leadership of Rıdvan Agha and his relatives continued to tyrannize the peasants of Muş by seizing money, wheat, barley, cattle; plundering; and setting fire to stocks of fodder and houses. Besides, they could extort and over tax with an authority stemming from their administrative positions. Due to the senility of İshak Pasha, the kaimakam of Muş at that time, and due to tribal members' collaboration with his deputy, İbrahim Efendi, the control mechanism over the tribe could not be maintained.[103] As discussed in chapter 6, as a result of both assaults by the tribes and the inability of administrators - and of extortion and corruption committed by a league

101 BOA. HR. MKT 29.63/5.Ra.1266 (19 January 1850)

102 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 18/83, 1 Zilhicce 1266 (8 October 1850).

103 BOA. İ. MVL. 269/10320, 1 Receb 1269 (10 May 1853).

that consisted of kaimakams, council members, tax farmers, notables, their Christian counterparts, kocabaşıs, moneylenders, and usurers – Armenian population of Muş in particular had no choice but to migrate.

Consequently, İshak Pasha was discharged and İbrahim Efendi was exiled. Likewise, the punishment of the leaders of the Hasenan was a topic under consideration. Meanwhile, having been appointed to carry out the reformation of Muş in 1855, the mutasarrıf of Kars, İsmail Pasha, also engaged in the questioning of especially Rıdvan and Kulihan Aghas, as the respective inhabitants of Malazgirt and Bulanık had brought charges against them. Apart from assaults and encroachments by tribal members, a register showing the amounts embezzled by both aghas and their tribal members was prepared by the council of Muş and submitted to the Sublime Porte. Rıdvan and Kulihan Aghas were arrested and sent to Erzurum, yet their punishment was delayed due to an urgent development: the Crimean War had broken out.[104]

During the war, Rıdvan Agha and his sons and tribal members served the army which quartered in Kars.[105] The manpower tribes could provide to the army enabled them to negotiate with the central government. In this case, as they were located in a frontier region, the chiefs of the Hasenan remained unpunished thanks to their services to the army. Nevertheless, after the end of war, Rıdvan Agha and his cousins continued be involved in the acts that had been the matters of complaint. Therefore, charges against the tribal members and registers submitted previously resurfaced in 1860. The charges show not only the details of the extortion, double taxation, and authority that the tribal members enjoyed but also provide clues about the extent of the settlement of the Hasenan and their incorporation into the administration system.

The charges by the inhabitants of Malazgirt and Bulanık indicated that Rıdvan and Kulihan had usurped almost everything - from wheat, barley, milk, and butter to fodder, cattle, and cows – from the villagers.[106] Actually usurpation, robbery, murder, and injury were common matters of complaint against nomadic groups. However, the difference lies in the fact that these tribal aghas and tribal members enjoyed the influence of being part of the

104 BOA. İ. MVL. 433/19083, 5 Zilhicce 1276 (24 June 1860).

105 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 205/94, 8 Zilhicce 1271 (22 August 1855).

106 BOA. İ. MVL. 433/19083, 5 Zilhicce 1276 (24 June 1860).

administration of the region. Being entitled to collect and farm the taxes of Bulanık and Malazgirt strengthened the power of the leaders of the Hasenan.

Similarly, according to the charges, Rıdvan and Kulihan aghas had extorted by adding to the taxes and poll taxes allocated to the districts and by over taxing inhabitants by collecting money in the name of their own expenses. Given that they were also tax farming some villages in the districts of Malazgirt and Bulanık, the collection of the tithe provided them with another channel of extortion. They were also accused of embezzling money and provisions collected in the name of the regular army. Among the accusations against Kulihan was the construction of a grain mill in Bulanık, yet imposing corvée on the inhabitants by extorting the expense from the people and making them work there without pay. In the same vein, Rıdvan Agha also was still collecting the tax for winter quarters despite its abolishment.[107]

Consequently, Kulihan Agha admitted the debt amounted to 132,004 guruş, yet he denied responsibility for remaining 67,750 guruş. Moreover, he did not take the responsibility for the debts of other tribal members which amounted to 66,006 guruş by claiming that villagers should demand the amount whomever they had provided with money and goods. Similarly, the former administrator of Malazgirt, Rıdvan Agha, admitted to a debt of 26,185 guruş, yet denied owing 9,753 guruş. Moreover, Rıdvan Agha promised to pay 40,680 that was claimed to have been usurped by his deceased son, Halid Agha, despite uncertainty about whether he had taken it or not. Like Kulihan Agha, Rıdvan Agha also did not accept responsibility for the money and the provisions seized by his tribal members, which was amounted to 25,750 guruş.[108]

In addition to pointing out the extortion that tribal aghas and members were involved in given their privileges as administrators of the region, these accusations indicate the extent to which the settlement of the Hasenan had been accomplished. Tax farming the tithe of villages in Muş and building grain mills in the districts show that the aghas of Hasenan were becoming accustomed to sedentary life. However, they did not abandon their tents completely;

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

when required, the tribal members reverted to and benefited from nomadic life. For instance, in this instance, tribal members who had been accused by the peasants of Malazgirt and Bulanık could not be questioned following the detention of the tribal aghas. As it was summer, they had dispersed and run for the hills.[109]

Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the extent of the trade in which these tribal leaders engaged.[110] Nevertheless, it is likely that they participated in some kind of trade. In the cases of tribal members of the Hasenan, extortion and theft in the simple sense were related to the insufficiency of the pastoral economy. However, in the case of the tribal leaders of the Hasenan who had become part of the provincial administration and tax collection system, their extortion and double taxation cannot be explained only by the limits of the pastoral economy.

As discussed above, not only the local tribe of Muş, the Hasenan, but also those from the province of Kurdistan tyrannized the inhabitants of Muş. Thus, the tribal issue was again discussed in the Meclis-i Vâlâ and it was emphasized that the inhabitants of a sub-province could not be allowed to be left in the hands of a few mischievous, cruel people. Therefore, the exile of Rıdvan Agha and his extended family was required, yet as they were tribal leaders and had many supporters, their exile was depended on local authorities working in concert and taking necessary precautions.[111] In line with this, it was decided that the tribal leaders of the Hasenan - not only Rıdvan and Kulihan but also İsa and Seyfi - should be removed from Muş, taken into custody, summoned to Erzurum, taking all precautions. As the questioning of Rıdvan and Kulihan had already been carried out, they were sent to Istanbul where they would be

109 Ibid.

110 According to the data stated by Cuinet for the late 1880s, twenty thousand goat skins were exported annually from Muş and its environs. However, it is not certain that whether tribal share was included in this amount or not. Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, 2, 580.

111 "bir sancâk ahâlîsinin böyle birkaç eşhâs-ı muzırra ve zalimede bırakılması tecvîz olunamıyacağından bunların oradan kaldırılması icâb-ı hâlde olub şu kadar ki kendüleri 'aşîret rüesası ve taraflı adamlar oldukları cihetle mahallerinden çıkarılmaları hakimâne-i re'y ve tedbîre mütevakkıf idüğünden ..." BOA. İ. MVL. 439/19491, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1277 (21 November 1860)

exiled to Edirne or somewhere in Rumelia. The same procedure would be implemented for İsa and Seyfi after their questioning was finished and their offenses clarified.[112]

Both local and central authorities were meticulous about the removal of Rıdvan Agha and his cousins from Muş. The kaimakam of the sub-province, Mahmut Paşa, was cautious about preparing a plan to arrest all four tribal aghas together. Indeed, the arrest of one would scare the others and cause them to hide. Among the aghas, İsa Agha was already in Muş, so the kaimakam tried to make excuses to summon remaining ones. Resolving the conflict between the Hasenan and Cibran by summoning the parties to the Provincial Council was the pretext. However, Rıdvan Agha refused to appear claiming that as his tribe had many conflicts with the Haydaran and Sıpkî, he could not leave his family alone.[113]

Meanwhile, Kulihan and Seyfi were also visiting villages in Muş and Bitlis to collect their dues from the tithe. It is important to emphasize once again how tribal leaders of the Hasenan were incorporated into the provincial administration. For instance, Kulihan was in the company of Colonel İsmail Bey for the reformation of Mutki and Sason, and he was sent to Erzurum by the colonel on some pretext.[114] In the same vein, the coming of Rıdvan to Erzurum was already realized on the pretext of settling some dues and debts with the moneylender Hoce Minas.[115] Hence, both Rıdvan and Kulihan were eventually arrested without use of force, which was a priority of local authorities. As they were the leaders of the tribe, the capture of the rest became easier. However, at first tribal members thought that the arrest of the two aghas was because of the murder of the Commander Reşid Bey by the brothers of Kulihan in Bulanık.[116] Having benefited from this belief of the tribal leaders, the governor of

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 BOA. MVL. 605/25, 20 Rebiülahir 1277 (5 November 1860).

115 BOA. İ. MVL. 439/19491, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1277 (21 November 1860).

116 The brothers of Kulihan and Seyfi, namely Halef, Mısto, and Aki, had been residents of the village of Heftrenk in Bulanık. Their assaults on the inhabitants of Bulanık and usurpations were frequently complained about, so the commander Reşid Bey with around forty zaptiehs arrived in their houses in order to arrest and question them. Despite the fact that the

Erzurum suggested that calling the families of Rıdvan and Kulihan to Erzurum should be delayed until the capture of Seyfi, so as not to excite them.[117]

Thereafter, the capture of İsa Agha of the Hasenan took place in rapid succession, again without force and in a proper style. İsa Agha was employed to persuade Seyfi Agha to surrender with several letters. As the kaimakam of Muş, Mahmut Pasha was concerned about employing military force for this issue as it might lead to a clash as these aghas were from the same family.[118] When the issue was discussed in the Meclis-i Vala, the employment of troops was ordered to be a second option after all assurances and persuasions failed as climate conditions were also not favorable.[119] In the same vein, the punishment for Rıdvan and Kulihan, according to the questioning carried out in 1855, was determined to be exile, and they would be settled in Edirne and prohibited from setting foot in Muş. Thus, both aghas were sent to Istanbul to which their families would also later be sent. However, this was delayed until spring. The questioning of İsa Agha was also cancelled in order to be carried out together with that of Seyfi once he was captured.[120]

In summer 1861, Seyfi Agha was also captured with his men and family in a wooded, rocky place in the middle of the oak trees on Mount Nemrut while trying to escape with his family to Arabian lands. It was decided to question him in Muş if any claimants showed up and then he was sent to Erzurum.[121] Thus, the chiefs of the Hasenan who were reportedly assaulting, extorting, and plundering especially Bulanık and Malazgirt, were eventually caught.

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commander guaranteed that as long as they surrendered they would be questioned according to the law and would not be hurt, tribal members took up arms. As a result of the clash, the commander was killed and some zaptieh were also injured. Besides, Mısto and his brothers escaped. Therefore, the kaimakams of Van and Bayezid were warned as Hasenan members might have collaborated with the Sıpkî and Haydaran. Despite conflicts among them, in such cases it was possible that they would protect one another. BOA. MVL. 605/8, 27 Rebiülahir 1277 (12 Novermber 1860).

117 BOA. İ. MVL. 439/19491, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1277 (21 November 1860).

118 BOA. MVL. 606/29, 6 Cemaziyelevvel 1277 (20 November 1860).

119 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 441/82, 29 Cemaziyelevvel 1277 (13 December 1860).

120 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 449/81, 7 Receb 1277 (19 January 1861).

121 BOA. MVL. 611/41, 29 Zilkade 1277 (6 June 1861).

However, only Rıdvan and Kulihan Aghas were exiled in Edirne, and neither the rest of their families nor Seyfi and İsa were sent to follow them in exile. Meanwhile, both the aghas in exile started to file petitions about their loyalty and services to the imperial state with reminding the authorities of their employment in the army during the Crimean War.[122] Similarly, they emphasized how they revived the ruined villages of Malazgirt.[123] Drawing attention to the fact they had not been questioned and no claimants against them had appeared, Rıdvan and Kulihan asked to return to their homelands where their families and properties were unprotected.[124]

At first, forgiveness of Rıdvan and Kulihan was refused,[125] yet soon after - based on reports of the councils of Muş and Erzurum – the central government approved that Rıdvan and Kulihan could be allowed to return their homelands as no claimants against them had appeared.[126] Given the abovementioned lists showing the extortion and usurpation of Rıdvan and Kulihan Aghas, the only reason no claimants showed up must have been the fear of local people. Taking the fact that the Hasenan were still a strong tribe in Muş into consideration, the apprehension of the local people was reasonable.

Nevertheless, the reports of the councils of Erzurum and Muş depicting the situation after the exile of Rıdvan and Kulihan provide details about tribal organizations and state-tribe relations. Claiming that Rıdvan and Kulihan were among the most respected aghas of the Hasenan, the councils of Muş and Erzurum reported that the control over the tribe had been interrupted since their exile. Along the same lines, their services to the army and regional administration were appreciated. Besides, the councils argued that their exile had led to anxiety among other tribal leaders who were keeping away from the government (*nazar-ı barid ile bakmakda*). Having pointed out absence of any claimants against them, both councils argued that the presence of men like Rıdvan and Kulihan who had an understanding of good and evil and were

122 BOA. MVL. 934/40, 13 Safer 1278 (20 August 1861).

123 BOA. MVL. 375/77, 14 Rebiülevvel 1278 (18 September 1861).

124 BOA. MVL. 934/40, 13 Safer 1278 (20 August 1861).

125 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 494/78, 19 Safer 1278 (26 August 1861).

126 BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 144/41, 14 Şevval 1278 (14 April 1862).

recognized and influential among the tribes would be beneficial. Thus, local authorities saw no harm in the return of the Hasenan's aghas.[127] Once again, the existence of hierarchy in the tribal organization became the determinant in its management. Consequently, the period of exile of Rıdvan and Kulihan was determined to have been enough for their punishment and they were allowed to return.[128] However, Rıdvan Agha passed away, and only Kulihan Agha managed to return to their homeland.[129]

The case of Rıdvan and Kulihan Aghas indicates the details of the settlement of the Hasenan tribe. Despite their initial anxieties and attempts to cross to the other side of the border, the tribal leaders of the Hasenan were actually incorporated not only by means of imperial grants and employment in the provincial administration and army but by force and punishment when required. Moreover, the internal organization of the tribes played decisive role in this process. The hierarchical importance of the tribal chiefs within the Hasenan tribe enabled government authorities to negotiate with them, so the influence of those tribal chiefs over the tribe facilitated not only control of the tribe but also their settlement.[130] Another factor in the successful settlement of the Hasenan lie in the fact that the journey between the summer and winter pastures of the tribe was relatively short. To put it differently, the Hasenan was already pasturing in the mountains of Muş in the summer and spending the winter in its villages. Hence, all that had to be done was to settle Hasenan

127 BOA. İ. MVL. 463/020917, 6 Şevval 1278 (6 April 1862).

128 Ibid.

129 BOA. MVL. 949/17, 7 Zilkade 1278 (6 May 1862).

130 Köksal also emphasized that "hierarchical organization is the existence of a tribal chief who can coordinate tribal units and place semi-nomadic groups in contact with the state." Köksal, "Coercion and Mediation," 473. Albert Hourani also states that "there were three spheres of radiation from the cities, in particular the capital city" in Muslim states before modern times. First, the city itself and its "dependant hinterland," then there was the intermediate sphere "where the city and the government could exercise control, not through officials but through intermediate powers to which the government gave recognition," and third the "mountains, desert and distant agricultural land." It is the second, intermediate sphere where tribes "with effective leaders" are found. He further argues that "[I]t is generally accepted that the government plays an important part in creating and maintaining tribal leaders in these areas, as the intermediaries through which its authority is exercised, and thus in creating tribes of this kind." Hourani, "Conclusion," 304-5.

families in abandoned, vacant, and uncultivated villages in large groups or in populated villages in small groups by implementing the same methods used in the settlement of other itinerant groups: exemption from taxes and conscription and favoring tribal elders, which proved to be effective in this case. Nonetheless, this process was not trouble-free. As will be discussed in the following lines, the conflict between the Hasenan and neighboring tribes like Sıpkî and Haydaran was regarded as a problem for security by the administrative authorities, and the solutions shed light on the perception of the government about nomadic and seminomadic groups. Furthermore, intertribal conflict provides clues about the social and economic organizations of tribes.

## § 7.5 The Tribes in Dispute: Conflicts between the Tribes of Muş and Those of Its Vicinity

Intertribal conflicts and confrontations mostly stemmed from the struggle over resources, which was a reflection of the modus vivendi of nomadic and seminomadic groups. Nonetheless, for central and local authorities, the reason for this struggle was clear: it was an inherent aspect of savagery and banditry. In this part two cases of disputes with the Hasenan, one with the Haydaran and the other with the Sıpkî, will be introduced, despite the fact that similar cases of murder and thievery occurred within each tribe.[131]

In summer 1861, it was reported that thirty cavalrymen from the Haydaran tribe from the sub-province of Van stole a mare, three horses, and fifteen cattle from members of the Hasenan of Muş secretly at night. Nonetheless, after following the thieves some cavalrymen from the Hasenan retrieved the stolen properties. Yet the story did not end there. About twenty mounted men from among the Haydaran followed the Hasenan members to the village of Develik in Ahlat in Muş where the two groups confronted one another. The clash between the two tribes resulted in deaths and casualties on both sides. Although the fight was ended and the members of both tribes were returned to their homes by means of the local force, the local authorities of Ahlat and the kaimakam of Muş expressed concerns about the recurrence of such incidents

131 BOA. A. MKT. MVL. 112/17, 4 Cemaziyelevvel 1276 (29 November 1859).

emphasizing the longstanding hostility between the two tribes. Once again, central government warned the kaimakam of Van about the discipline of the Haydaran and the need to constrain them from such vicious behavior, as they have been the instigator of this fight.[132] For central authorities, that such tribal groups would attempt to take revenge was certain because of their nature and manner.[133]

The mutasarrıf of Van argued that although it was not appropriate to hold the Hasenan tribe responsible for the misdeeds of the Haydaran in this case, it was undeniable that the Hasenan had also long been assaulting on other tribes. In the same vein, the mutasarrıf emphasized that the imperial state had called the Haydaran tribe from Iran and they settled down for five or six years. The previous year they were included in the allocation of the tax and cattle tax.[134] The mutasarrıf of Van felt it is necessary to emphasize that the Haydaran were also becoming a sedentary tribe who paid taxes like the Hasenan.[135] Nonetheless, reportedly not only the Haydaran but the Sıpkî and Milan tribes were seduced to attack the Hasenan, murdering, stealing, and committing sexual assault.[136]

Hence, the governor of Erzurum and the commander-in-chief of the Anatolian Army corresponded and decided to constitute a special commission to be employed to take precautions against the assaults by tribes on each other.[137] The commission was composed of two members from each council of Muş, Bayezid, and Van as well as aghas and reasonable members from each tribe. Assembling in Patnos, the commission embarked upon ensuring that both the Hasenan and Haydaran would not be involved in the behaviors and acts contrary to the law and not reclaim properties stolen by then, and not take revenge

132 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 487/50, 20 Muharrem 1278 (28 July 1861).

133 "aşâir takımının ma'lûm olan hâl ve tab'iyyetleri iktizâsınca." BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 230/20, 30 Muharrem 1278 (7 August 1861)

134 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 509/79, 18 Rebiülevvel 1278 (23 October 1861).

135 However, as late as 1886 it was reported that unlike the Hasenans, conscription lots could neither be carried out among the Haydarans nor the Sıpkî. BOA. DH. MKT. 1377/62, 13 Safer 1304 (11 November 1886).

136 BOA. A. M. 26/32, 17 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (20 December 1861).

137 BOA. MVL. 410/92, 2 Şaban 1279 (23 January 1863).

for men who were killed. Then tribal elders provided two written contracts (*ta'ahhüd senedi*) including the clause that in the case an offense was committed by a tribal member, the whole tribe would be punished. Moreover, in the case of the deployment of officials or troops to deal with troubles created by either tribe, double the expense would be charged to the tribes themselves.[138]

In a period when the Ottoman government was embarking on modernization not only in the spheres of finance and administration but also in jurisprudence, the methods used to prevent disturbances between the two tribes in this case – which had resulted in deaths and casualties - were archaic. The most important codification immediately after the promulgation of Tanzimat was the Criminal Code of 1840. However, on the periphery of the empire, the central government and local authorities still commonly resorted to old methods like obtaining commitments from tribal notables through contracts. Nonetheless, the tribal members were punished according to legal codes in these cases when their guilt was determined through investigation and questioning. A mixture of old methods and new articles was also commonly applied. Nevertheless, the case of a conflict over brush between the Hasenan and Sıpkî exemplifies the use of archaic methods in tribal disputes rather than standing legal codes. The case also sheds light on the claims of tribal entities over land and property.

In 1868, the strife that stemmed from "brush matter" (*çalı maddesi*) between the Feliki and Hasenan spread to the Sıpkî, resulting in around forty deaths. The dispute was at first between a few members of the Hasenan and Feliki tribes and then evolved into strife between the Hasenan and Sıpkî. The Feliki was apparently a subsection of the Sıpkî, fifteen families of which had been settled in the village of Bane [Muratkolu] in Ayntab, a district of Bayezid the year before. The problem stemmed from the fact that Bane was an hour from the Hasanpaşa village of Malazgirt. When tribal men from the Feliki were cutting brush near a stream called Kesek between Bane and Hasanpaşa, some people from the Hasenan noticed them and a quarrel started. The people of the Hasenan objected to the cutting of the brush by the Feliki, claiming that it had belonged to them for twenty years. To the contrary, the Feliki members

138 BOA. A. M. 26/32, 17 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (20 December 1861).

argued, it had belonged to Ayntab for time immemorial, so they could cut the brush as they wished. This polemic turned into a fight when some Hasenan cavalrymen led by one called Mir Aziz joined them. The fight resulted in six casualties and a death among the Hasenan and four casualties and six deaths on the side of the Feliki. On top of that, the tribal members of the Hasenan raided the tents of the Feliki in the village of Bane and destroyed, seized, and plundered to some extent. The local government of Ayntab sent a mediator, and when it got dark, the fight ended and both parties took their casualties away.[139]

The mutasarrıf of Bayezid was informed about the strife and casualties; consequently, necessary precautions were implemented to maintain security and prevent the spread of the incident to the tribes of the Sıpkî and Hasenan as a whole. Hence, two people, one from the zaptieh and the other from among the notables were sent to Malazgirt to talk to Cezo and Fetho aghas of the Hasenan and to investigate, gain insight into the case, and determine the casualties. At the same time, the remaining tents of the Feliki were moved, to more distant villages as a precaution for their safety after the casualties and financial damages were registered. Similarly, two infantrymen were employed and positioned in the village of Karaağaç between the two tribes. Hence, potential turmoil and a fight between the two tribes were prevented for a month. Nevertheless, the mentioned troops had to return to the center of Bayezid upon being recalled.[140]

Thereafter, the fears came true and conflicts between the Hasenan and the Feliki of Bane village spread to the Sıpkî tribe. The tribal members of the Hasenan and Sıpkî sought for revenge by seizing one another's properties and livestock. Moreover, they attacked villages which resulted in not only pecuniary damage but also casualties. At one night in an attack of the Hasenan on tents in the village of Nuxtili [Dayıpınar] (in Ayntab), Sıpkî members responded with gunfire which ended with deaths and casualties, among whom there were even babies. The following day, upon correspondence among both tribes, they started to gather, and cavalrymen from both tribes confronted

139 BOA. ŞD. 2390/27, 29 Şaban 1285 (15 December 1868).

140 Ibid.

each other in the village of Adakend [Adakent] of Ayntab. They started to attack each other to take their revenge. The fight among continued until the withdrawal of the Sıpkî and resulted in fourteen dead and fourteen injured from among the Hasenan and eighteen dead and fourteen injured from among the Sıpkî.[141]

The Meclis-i İdare-i Vilayet (Provincial Administrative Council) and the Meclis-i Temyiz (Provincial Court of Appeal) of Erzurum submitted a report about the incidents in Bane, Nuxtili and Adakend to the Divân-i Ahkâm-i Adliye (Council of Judicial Ordinances) and issue was transferred and discussed in the Şûrâ-yı Devlet (Council of State).[142] Two important dimensions of this case of murder and injury obstructed the punishment process. On the one hand, facts about the actors directly involved in the incident were ambiguous. Neither their names nor physical characteristics were accurate. On the other hand, given the enmity between the tribes, the reliability of the statements of witnesses was doubtful. As the perpetrators were a group of unidentified people, it was difficult to carry out individual hearings and interrogations. Hence it was argued in the Divân-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye that it was impossible to inflict the punishments of hard labor, retaliation or blood money on the tribes. Nevertheless, temporary precautions were to be taken to settle the disputes and the enmity between the Sıpkî and Hasenan until the reform and discipline of the tribes throughout the whole province was finalized. In the meantime, direct and indirect perpetrators of the incident were to be investigated openly and secretly.[143]

Thus, punishment in this case was not individual but collective. First, the Sıpkî, Hasenan, and Feliki should pay restitution and compensate for each others' previously confiscated livestock, properties, and money. Although the expenses for the treatment of casualties were also deemed to be allocated to each tribe, this was renounced due to difficulty to determine the costs. Nevertheless, the tribes were sentenced to pay blood money - seventy-five Mecidiye

141 Ibid.

142 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 456/35, 6 Zilkade 1285 (18 February 1869).

143 BOA. ŞD. 2390/27, 29 Şaban 1285 (15 December 1868).

golden coins - for each death to heirs with the help of the government. In return, bills of payment would be provided.[144]

Similarly, as implemented previously in intertribal disputes, tribal elders and leaders provided contracts. Accordingly, the tribes of the Hasenan, Sıpkî, and Feliki would not be involved in tyrannous and disagreeable acts against each other. If some tribal members dared to do so, tribal aghas and notables would submit them without hesitation to the government to be questioned and punished by law and the sharia. In the case that tribal leaders harbored, protected, or assisted the perpetrators, all the leaders and notables would also be held as responsible as the culprits themselves. In the same vein, inter or intratribal conflicts and cases should be solved by appealing to local governments through investigations and interrogations; neither of tribes should try to solve them on their own. Again, if some of them attempted to do so they would be surrendered to the government. Furthermore, the expenses of troops dispatched to pacify disputes among said tribes were to be allocated to the tribes involved.[145] Nevertheless, the Şûrâ-yı Devlet decided that as the aggravation of the case partially stemmed from the withdrawal of troops situated between the Hasenan and Sıpkî-Feliki it was not fair to burden the tribes with all the expenses. The tribes were only obliged to pay the blood money as determined previously. Meanwhile, the investigation of the case and the identification of the actors would continue.[146]

The case that stemmed from the "brush matter" between the Hasenan and Feliki and spread immediately to the tribe of the Sıpkî underscores tribal configurations on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the nineteenth century. As discussed above, for local and central authorities this case first of all pointed to the urgency of settling and disciplining all the nomadic and seminomadic groups were also to be incorporated into the circle of civilization. Nevertheless, this case together with other intertribal conflicts sheds light on the influence and power of nomadic and seminomadic groups and on the difficulty of maintaining control over them.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 456/35, 6 Zilkade 1285 (18 February 1869).

Furthermore, despite the attempts to modernize jurisprudence, the local government and central institutions had no choice but to implement old methods of punishment for intertribal crimes. Physical accessibility was a factor in the difficulty in revealing the facts and actors of crimes. The social organization of the tribes which protected tribal members, bore false testimonies against enemy tribes, and eventually solved intertribal disputes using their own methods forced officials to seek the mediation of tribal notables and binding contracts to solve intertribal disputes.

Nonetheless, by the end of 1869, according to reports of the province of Erzurum submitted to the Council of Judicial Ordinances, some tribal members of the Hasenan together with those of the Cibran, including a few members from other tribes, were sentenced to hard labor and temporary or permanent exile.[147] The governor of Erzurum, İsmail Hakkı, emphasized that despite ambiguity about their relation to the above-discussed dispute between the Hasenan and Sıpkî-Feliki, the tribal members from the Hasenan who had been captured and arrested had been assaulting the inhabitants of Muş for a long time. He argued that the atrocities, usurpations and sexual assaults could not be described with pen and paper. Hence, it was necessary to expel them and punish said tribal members; if not, they would increase their assaults upon their return, as experience had proven.[148]

The governor emphasized that the punishment of the specified tribal members could be implemented in three categories relative to their crimes once their interrogations were completed in Erzurum. The first should be sent into temporary exile in Sinop, then the second should be banished to Rumeli by cutting and have all their connections to the region cut and the last should be sentenced to hard labor in the Tersane-i Amire (Imperial Shipyard). Moreover, tribal members not yet captured should be punished in the same way. According to lists prepared by a special commission consisting of the governor

147 The Cibran tribe was consisted of approximately 2,000 families. As argued by Sykes, it was during the governorship of Esad Pasha that the tribe was transferred from the south to near Bingöl and Muş and rapidly became sedentary like the Hasenan. Sykes, "The Kurdish Tribes," 476-7. As known, they were also settled in Erzurum.

148 BOA. İ. MMS. 38/1574, 16 Ramazan 1286 (20 December 1869).

of Erzurum and top officials of the province which dealt with the matter of the interrogation and punishment of the tribes, the tribal members of the Cibran and Hasenan along with some other tribes whose sentences were prescribed amounted to eighty-three persons.[149]

Notwithstanding, in a report of the Special Council (*Meclis-i Mahsus*) of the Interior Ministry it was emphasized that who were leading to misdeed and brigandage of tribes were called "aghas." These aghas were leaders of a few tribal families and it was indispensable to dispel them from the province of Erzurum. Nevertheless, it was argued that among the punishments, the sentence to hard labor could not be implemented as said persons had neither been questioned according to the law nor had their punishment been applied according to the law. Nevertheless, if those tribal members took up arms against the military troops dispatched upon their brigandage, hard labor could then be implemented. Hence, hard labor would be applied after details regarding their encounter with troops and the degree of tribal members' crimes were clarified. Besides, those to be exiled in Sinop and those to be settled in Rumelia with their families were to be sent to Istanbul to be dispatched to their places of exile.[150] To conclude, for the treatment and punishment of tribal groups, both traditional means and modern penal codes were implemented.

## § 7.6 In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Tribes and the Armenian Peasantry

Providing snapshots concerning the tribes of the sub-province of Muş, this chapter has undertaken the tribal issue in terms of Tanzimat program with a special focus on tribe-peasant and intertribal relations. Within the reforms of the nineteenth century, the sedentarization of nomadic and seminomadic groups, upon which Ottoman governments embarked several times in previous centuries, was the milestone for the inclusion of these same groups in the new taxation and conscription system. Hence, the settlement of tribes had a manifold mission. On the one hand, could tribes as a human resource would

149 Ibid.

150 BOA. İ. MMS. 38/1574, 16 Ramazan 1286 (20 December 1869).

be harnessed both as productive agriculturalists that would revive abandoned lands and as military conscripts. Such a way of life would "civilize these "nomads" and "savages" as they were mostly defined. As a result, their introduction to sedentary life would eliminate their assaults on settled populations.

This chapter not only dealt with the Tanzimat state's project with regard to the nomadic and seminomadic groups but also focused on the reception, negotiation, and contestation among local and central authorities, Kurdish and Armenian peasants, and tribal members. On one hand, the leaders of the most prominent local tribe of Muş – the Hasenan - Rıdvan Agha and his cousins, negotiated and pursued their own agenda in the settlement process and were actively involved in the reorganization of the administration of the subprovince of Muş, as well. On the other hand, tribes in the vicinity of Muş like the Bekiran and Reşkotan struggled vociferously to keep their summer pastures in the mountains in the south of Muş against the restraints of local and central authorities. The case of the Bekiran and other tribes sheds light on the difficulties in the immediate transitioning nomadic tribes to sedentary life and also points to how tribes negotiated to keep at least their summer pastures, which was a formulation for seminomadic life.

The literature on the tribal composition of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire has mostly engaged with the period beginning with the constitution of the Hamidian Regiments in 1891.[151] This period is infamous not only for extortion but also the land-grabbing practice by the Kurdish militia who enjoyed a range of privileges like tax and conscription exemptions and impunity for their acts. The period of the Hamidian Regiments is outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, one of the main purposes of this chapter was to get a nuanced understanding of the relationship between Kurdish tribes and local peasants in the decades before the establishment of the regiments, with which this relationship aggravated to a great extent. First the obligation on the settled population of Muş to provide winter quarters to the nomadic and semi-

151 Klein, "Power in the Periphery."; *The Margins of Empire, Kurdish Militas in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford Stanford University Press 2011); Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia " *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 2 (May, 1973 ); Bayram Kodaman, *Sultan II Abdülhamid Devri Doğu Anadolu Politikası* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1987).

nomadic groups was a custom implemented for many centuries which was promised to be annulled by the Tanzimat. Thus, the emergence of the hafirlik system reflected in documents in the 1850s was probably a continuance of the winter-quartering practice and was among the important dynamics that determined tribe-peasant relations.

Nonetheless, on the eve of the constitution of Hamidian Regiments, the assaults by tribes on the peasantry gathered momentum and exploited the reforms on the land. This chapter ends with a case of land seizure in Muş to exemplify what would be called the "agrarian question" in later decades. The "Agrarian question," as argues Janet Klein, "was a euphemism for the matter of the Armenian lands usurped during the previous decades mostly by Kurdish chiefs."[152] Nonetheless "the transformation in land tenure practices" had already been inaugurated before the foundation of the Hamidian Regiments which impacted the process.[153] The case of village of Gemig [Beşparmak] was such an example.

In a petition submitted to the imperial center, the priest Gabriel from Çanlı Monastery in Muş, who was the representative of the inhabitants, depicted the process of the evacuation of the Armenians from the village of Gemig in Muş and later the usurpation of their lands. The priest's claims were based on another petition penned by notables of villages in the vicinity of Gemig. The village of Gemig had been Armenian for time immemorial, yet the inhabitants had to disperse due to the assaults and cruelty of the Cibran and Hasenan tribes. The village was rich and large with around two hundred fields and two churches, as well.[154] The evacuation of villages, especially Armenian ones, due to the assaults and extortions of either the tribes or local authorities – that is to say, council members and tax farmers - was a trend observed since the early nineteenth century. However, the difference now lay in the extent of the power that Kurdish tribes enjoyed after benefiting from the new reforms.

Accordingly, after being abandoned by its inhabitants, the village of Gemig was auctioned off without the knowledge of the villagers - neither those of

152 Klein, *The Margins of Empire*, 131.

153 Ibid., 130. For the role of tax collection in the aggravation of the situation of the Armenian peasantry in the eastern provinces, see Özbek, "'Anadolu Islahatı,' 'Ermeni Sorunu'," 59-85.

154 BOA. Y. PRK. AZJ. 10/73, 21 Zilhicce 1302 (1 October 1885).

Gemig nor those in the vicinity. The village, its fields and properties, and its churches were assigned (*ferâğ*) to the son of Resul Efendi of the Sıpkî, Abdurrahman Agha. Resul Efendi was described as among the perpetrators leading to villagers' dispersal. Abdurrahman Agha in turn delegated (*tefvîz*) the village in equal shares to Halid Agha from among the notables and to Nadir Agha of the local council. Neither the villagers of Gemig nor those of other villages were allowed to perform their religious ceremonies by the agha. The villagers were afraid to complain about them, yet some dared to file petitions, though they remained inconclusive. The priest and villagers claimed that one of the churches was ruined and the other one ended up being used as a sheepfold. Drawing attention to the orders and codes regarding the protection of different religions and sects, Priest Gabriel asked for justice.[155]

Nevertheless, the governor of the province of Bitlis denied the charges of the priest, claiming that they were groundless. The latter repeated his claims and the former continuously refuted.[156] Despite the passing years, the case of Gemig remained unsolved like many similar cases.[157]

155 Ibid.

156 BOA. DH. MKT. 1458/34, 9 Safer 1305 (27 October 1887).

157 After the reinstitution of the Constitutional Regime Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), it and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) cooperated for restitution for seized lands of the Armenian peasantry and the improvement in their living conditions, as well. For the details and the failures of this collaboration, see Dikran M. Kaligian, "Agrarian Land Reform and the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire," *The Armenian Review* 48, no. 3, 4 (2003): 24-45. For an account of land disputes through an analysis of the petitions of peasants of certain villages of Diyarbekir in a post-revolutionary context, see Nilay Özok-Gündoğan, "A 'Peripheral' Approach to the 1908 Revolution in the Ottoman Empire: Land Disputes in Peasant Petitions in Post-Revolutionary Diyarbekir," in *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915*, ed. Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

# 8

## Conclusion

This study is a monograph of the sub-province of Muş in the nineteenth century. Covering the period between the 1820s and 1870s the study contextualized the milestones of the nineteenth century. On one hand, it explored the functions, sources of power, and intermediary role of provincial notables in the pre-Tanzimat era as well as how the transition to the Tanzimat era transformed their power and relations with different segments of the authorities. On the other hand, the dissertation scrutinized how the tribal landscape and land tenure were affected by these transformations in the locality of Muş.

The significance of Muş stemmed from a variety of geographic, geopolitical and socioeconomic particularities. Situated on a fertile plain surrounded by mountain ranges, Muş had significant agricultural potential. In the same vein, it was on the frontier contiguous with Iran and Russia and was vulnerable to the effects of imperial wars, boundary issues, and tribal movements. Demographically, Armenian peasants constituted the majority of the population in the plain of Muş, which had around a hundred villages - yet the plain also had Kurdish villages. On the other hand, nomadic and seminomadic Kurdish tribes, whose summer quarters were on the mountains to the south of the plain spent winters in the villages on the plain and depended on the peasants for their own subsistence and the subsistence of their large flocks.

Such particularities shaped the functions of the administrators of Muş. The sub-province of Muş had been granted to its mutasarrıfs as a yurtluk-

ocaklık, which refers to hereditary rights over large plots of lands and their revenues accompanied by great immunities. The Ottoman-Safavid rivalry in the sixteenth century determined the relations between the Kurdish beys and the imperial center. Although land tenure forms that were similar to yurtluk-ocaklıks and hükûmets were parts of an imperial policy applied on the frontiers, the course of the transformation of yurtluk-ocaklıks and their counterparts, hükûmet lands, differed from region to region. In the same vein, in spite of being similar to provincial notables all over the empire, yurtluk-ocaklık and hükûmet holders were also different as they had held historical, political, and economic power far earlier than the eighteenth century, which was called "age of the â'yâns." In the case of Muş, Alaaddin Pasha became influential by getting control of Muş in the eighteenth century during an era when the power of hükûmet holders of Bitlis was decaying. Sources regarding their power prior to the eighteenth century are scarce, yet, based on the reference of family members made during the nineteenth century to "a four-hundred-year dynasty" and from the fact that Alaaddin Pasha had been appointed as mütesellim of Muş by the khans of Bitlis it is possible to deduce that the family had controlled certain plots of lands as yurtluk-ocaklık, mâlikâne, or mukâta'a under the rule of Bitlis khanate and they expanded their control with the fall of the khanate. Thus, from the eighteenth century onwards, the lineage of Alaaddin Pasha held the mutasarrıflık of Muş as yurtluk-ocaklık. Moreover, in the course of time, the family members increased their economic and political power by getting control over Hınıs, Tekman, and Malazgirt as mukâta'as, mâlikânes, or yurtluk-ocaklıks. This revealed that the yurtluk-ocaklık-type lands were not static and their boundaries were extended or narrowed according to negotiations carried out with central and provincial authorities.

Nevertheless, the economic and political power of the yurtluk-ocaklık holders gradually decreased until the final abrogation of this land tenure form with the promulgation of the Tanzimat, which also took time. Thus, Emin Pasha of Muş was the last member of his family to enjoy the economic and political power that yurtluk-ocaklık lands entailed, and he struggled to keep these lands intact throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. His rise to power during the 1820s provides important clues about the sources of the power of the holders of yurtluk-ocaklık lands. Similarly, his position's

oscillation between rise and fall in the same years casts significant light on the transformation of such types of land. By the early nineteenth century, Ottoman central and provincial authorities had already drawn attention to the potential of such lands should they put under direct control of the government. Thus, in an era when the central government was asserting its control over those lands, yurtluk-ocaklık holders adapted through negotiation, collaboration, and as a last resort, through contestation.

The frontier location of Muş also shaped the role of yurtluk-ocaklık holders. Wars with Russia and Iran and the porous nature of the border vis-à-vis the mobility of nomadic tribes established a platform for the beys of Muş to negotiate and consolidate their power. Thus, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, Emin Pasha sought to keep and extend his range of power by taking advantage of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828-29, the trans-border movements of the Sıpkî and Haydaran tribes, regional revolts like that of Timur Pasha of Van, and by taking part in military reforms like the redif organization, the operations against the Kurdish beys of Garzan, and war with Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt. Each of these turning points enabled Emin Pasha to assert his importance and keep and expand his power. When he failed to do so, he did not hesitate to revolt, relying on his influence over tribal groups and his regional alliances. However, the rebellion of Emin Pasha neither stemmed from fierce opposition to the central government nor provincial authorities; rather, he never abandoned the strategy of negotiation for a single moment and sought different channels to maintain his position in Muş.

Throughout this study, the negotiation between local actors and provincial and central authorities was emphasized as opposed to a binary opposition between them. Similarly, local actors and central and provincial authorities were heterogeneous – far from seeking the same agenda. The relation between the governor of Erzurum, Esad Pasha, and mutasarrıf/mütesellim of Muş, Emin Pasha, as well as the intrafamilial rivalry within the dynasty of Muş were the best examples of this heterogeneity. Emin Pasha voluntarily took part in the military reforms during the reign of Mahmud II and in the settlement of the nomadic tribes; in return, he reclaimed the mukâtaʿas of Hınıs and Tekman. Similarly, the transformation of yurtluk-ocaklık types of land was also part of this negotiation. During the respective müşirliks of Reşid Mehmed and Hafız

Pashas, Muş was granted to them. After the establishment of the müşirlik of Erzurum in 1836, the sub-province of Muş was annexed to it and the revenues of the sub-province were allocated to the Mansure Army. With this, the yurtluk-ocaklık status of the sub-province changed. During this process, Emin Pasha managed to keep twenty-four villages for himself and his immediate family. Those villages were among the most fertile in the plain of Muş, and their boundaries and revenues would be contested even into the late nineteenth century. Thus, instead of being an abrupt process, the confiscation of yurtluk-ocaklıks was gradual. In the case of Muş, this process took place in two phases. The first was the abrogation of the yurtluk-ocaklık status of the sub-province of Muş in 1836 and its annexation to Erzurum Province. The second phase occurred with the confiscation of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages when the brothers of Emin Pasha were exiled along with their extended families in 1849, after the Tanzimat. Hence, one of the findings of this study is the difference between the granting of sub-provinces vis-à-vis villages as yurtluk-ocaklıks. In the case of the granting of the sub-province, holders were also entitled to the mutasarrıflık of that sub-province. Thus, during his entire career, the post of Emin Pasha oscillated between mütesellimlik and mutasarrıflık, which at the same time reflects the fluctuating nature of yurtluk-ocaklık types of land in the nineteenth century.

After two chapters discussing the strategies and conditions that led to the rise of a provincial notable and the composition of his political and economic power in the pre-Tanzimat era, the rest of the study focused on the implementation and reception of Tanzimat reforms and the transformation they brought about in the sub-province of Muş. The main purpose of the promulgation of Tanzimat was to increase the infrastructural power of the central state so that more peripheral provinces would gradually be included in this circle. Thus, the province of Erzurum was included in the Tanzimat program in 1845, yet soon after, a decision of the Meclis-i Vâlâ delayed it for a while and recalled once again about the gradual implementation of reforms. The tribal landscape of Erzurum and its location on the frontier were the main reasons for this delay. The fact that the tribes were in their summer quarters obstructed the carrying out of income and population surveys. In the case of any unrest on this issue, there was the risk of cross-border trouble. The initial responses in

eastern frontier provinces to the Tanzimat were a mix of opposition and fear, which was arising from ambiguity concerning the content of reforms. The yurtluk-ocaklık and mâlikâne holders in the province of Erzurum were resentful because of the new land tenure that the Tanzimat government envisaged. In Van, inhabitants revolted against the implementation of Tanzimat reforms. Thus, cautionary, gradual steps were required for the establishment of the new system of rule.

In such a conjuncture, the situation of Muş was no different. On the eve of the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in Muş, peasants were miserable and dispersed due to over taxation, corvée, and indebtedness as a result of the misdeeds by tax-farmers, governors, stewards, and Armenian notables as well as due to assaults by tribal members. Moreover, the rivalry within the dynasty of Muş over the mutasarrıflık of the sub-province aggravated this situation. By uncovering the network of power relations in the region, this study sheds light on both conflicting and congruent agendas of different local groups and their effects on the lives of the ordinary people of Muş. Thus, the implementation of the Tanzimat in Muş was first reflected by a change of administrator of the sub-province, which had been desired by many Ottoman authorities since the beginning of the century. Neither Şerif Bey nor Hüseyin Pasha, the former the brother and the latter the cousin of Emin Pasha, but a "stranger" was appointed as the new kaimakam of Muş.

However, the term of the new kaimakam proved short. A proper governor with local knowledge and influence over the tribes who could intermediate among regional powerholders was required. Thus, for the last time, Şerif Bey was appointed as the kaimakam of Muş to implement the Tanzimat reforms, settle the seminomadic tribes, and intermediate in the issue of Van, which had turned into a regional revolt that had merged with that of Bedirhan Bey in Bohtan. Thus, the study argued that Tanzimat reforms did not necessarily oust regional powerholders to establish direct rule. On the contrary, local knowledge, experience, and the intermediary role of local notables were essential in the implementation of a new system of rule. Thus, the incorporation of provincial notables in the new provincial administrations was not necessarily a failure of the reforms; on the contrary, it was a part of them. Rather than being a top-down process, the reforms were shaped and changed

according to the necessities of given localities. Similarly, local powerholders took part in new institutions of the Tanzimat like the local councils and were therefore the main implementers of the reforms. In the case of yurtluk-ocaklık holders, their power changed and in a sense was curtailed, but they also maintained their prominence as they were gradually incorporated into provincial administrations and participated in its politics.

However, the fiscal transformation that the Tanzimat reforms embarked upon initially required the annihilation of the yurtluk-ocaklık system, which in turn would eradicate the economic and political power of provincial notables. Thus, the existence of the dynasty of Muş in the region, like those of their contemporaries, was a major obstacle to this new fiscal, administrative transformation. Despite their collaboration in the suppression of the revolt of Bedirhan Bey and Han Mahmud, Şerif Bey and his brothers together with their immediate families were exiled soon afterwards. However, the exile of those notables was not necessarily prescribed from the center and applied in the locality. In the case of Muş, the once governor of Erzurum - who had become the governor of the newly established province of Kurdistan - Esad Pasha, was influential in the exile of the local dynasty. In a sense, the suppression of the far-reaching revolt of Bedirhan Bey and his allies was a chance to govern the region without the interference of local powerholders – a perception which had been on the agenda since many decades.

Nevertheless, exile did not exclude the option of incorporation. Some family members were employed in posts in imperial offices in the capital city. Similarly, negotiation and bargaining continued. The main negotiation after their exile was over the limits and revenues of their yurtluk-ocaklık villages, in return for which they had been put on salary. To determine the revenues and boundaries of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of the family, an official was employed who was accompanied by representative of the family. The lack of a proper survey and records about the limits and revenues of the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Şerif Bey and his brothers played into hands of these notables. On the other hand, as they were far away, their interference was limited. The discrepancy between the registry that the family prepared on their own and the results of the official process displays the conflicting claims concerning their yurtluk-ocaklık villages. The family rejected the new registry, which

they alleged was far from showing the real value of their villages. However, the governor of Kurdistan Province, Esad Pasha, was especially bent upon rejecting the claims of the beys of Muş. After the abrogation of the yurtluk-ocaklık status of Muş as a sub-province, the family members were granted just certain villages in the plain in 1838. However, as provincial authorities at the time alleged, family members, using their influence, annexed hamlets and vacant land to their villages. Most importantly, in their absence the inhabitants of Muş had begun to use those lands, which the family regarded as an infringement of their rights. Thus, it is possible to observe that the fiscal transformation aiming at the abrogation of the yurtluk-ocaklık system partially corresponded to the interests of the common people of Muş. Eventually, the salaries were determined according to the registry to which the family objected.

Despite being paid in return for their yurtluk-ocaklık villages, the notables of Muş lost a tremendous part of their power. The yurtluk-ocaklık land tenure system not only consisted of control of the revenues of certain plots of land, but also entails considerable autonomy, including the right to collect taxes and control over and the taxation of semi nomadic and nomadic groups. Furthermore, in addition to the yurtluk-ocaklık lands, the notables of Muş left behind landed properties, like mansions, mills, vineyards and orchards. Thus, they did not cease for a moment to negotiate the terms of their return to their homeland in petitions. The contours of this negotiation changed in the course of time from challenging the limits and revenues of their villages to being content with sharecropping. However, the forgiveness of the family members was gradual and conditional. After the women and children of the family were allowed to return to Erzurum (not to Muş), Hurşid and Murad in the 1850s, and Şerif in the 1860s were also allowed to return. Some of them were employed in the administration of small districts in the province of Erzurum and were promoted in rank. Given that the descendants of the family are today living in their former contested yurtluk-ocaklık villages, it is possible to infer that family members returned to their homes in the course of time.

On the other hand, the yurtluk-ocaklık villages of the family were supposed to have been confiscated and governed by the treasury. In the first few years, the villages were governed through the emanet system, and the mean

for the revenues of two years were allocated to the three brothers as salaries that could be handed down to their children. However, this process was not unproblematic. Some provincial powerholders like religious leaders took advantage of the absence of the Kurdish beys and enjoyed the revenues of certain villages of Emin Pasha, who had died without a child. When this situation came to light in the 1870s, Hurşid Bey fought to retake those villages. Although he failed, the case shows that fiscal control by the central government was not yet refined in the Kurdish periphery, and local powerholders benefitted from the lacunas.

One of the main motivations of this study was to explore the effects of nineteenth-century transformations on the lives of the common people of Muş. The collective petitions of the inhabitants of Muş in the 1850s and 60s enabled me to depict the aftermath of the Tanzimat reforms. These petitions also elucidate the discursive strategies of the peasantry who appealed to the justice of the sultan by reminding him the consequences if their grievances were not redressed. The main source of the grievances of the peasants of Muş was the ineptitude of centrally-appointed kaimakams since the exile of the Muş dynasty. On the other hand, the matters of complaint in the early 1850s were not much different from those in the pre-Tanzimat era. Over taxation, extortion, corvée, and the assaults of Kurdish tribes were still weighed down the peasants of Muş; consequently, the population, mostly the Armenian population, was dispersing. The difference from the pre-Tanzimat era lies in the fact that the new institutions of Tanzimat like the local councils were the platforms through which this exploitative system was imposed. Thus, the common people of Muş believed the solution was to reappoint Şerif Bey as the kaimakam of Muş. The only justification for such a wish was his local knowledge, experience, and the influence of his family over the tribes. Hence, petitions by the peasants of Muş emphasized the importance of local notables for the everyday politics of the region, supporting the main argument of this study that the implementation and fulfillment of reforms were realized through the agency of local notables. Although the exile of the Muş dynasty was necessary to bring about a new land tenure system with which the centuries-old yurtluk-ocaklık system was eradicated, the implementation of reforms could not be realized without the collaboration of local notables.

As I have traced both in Ottoman archival documents and in British consular reports, the pace of reforms increased in the eastern provinces of the empire in the 1860s. However, the conjuncture began with the Crimean War and its aftermath displayed how the grievances of the peasants of Muş about the kaimakams, council members, local notables, and tax farmers had not been redressed. As a frontier close to the battlefield with a fertile plain, Muş was an important supplier for the Imperial Army during the war. However, extortion by the kaimakam of Muş in alliance with council members, moneylenders, tax farmers, and Muslim and non-Muslim notables were still prevalent. Furthermore, the complaints mostly came from villages on the plain of Muş, which were at once mostly Armenian and also the former yurtluk-ocaklık villages of Emin Pasha and his brothers. Hence, it became possible to trace the fate of once yurtluk-ocaklık villages of the family.

Similarly, the issue of indebtedness - stemmed largely from the monetization of the economy - which resulted in the dispossession of the peasants, emerged with the system of usury (murabahacılık) in the 1860s. The indebtedness and dispossession of peasants in the locality of Muş increased in the following years with selem system. Thus, this study contributes to the literature by filling in the lacuna regarding the dispossession of the peasants of Muş in the early 1860s. Moreover, while filing petitions about the issues of extortion, indebtedness, corvée, over taxation, and the need for a competent administrator, the peasants of Muş were abandoning their homes and dispersing. However, the migration of peasants from Muş was not the only population movement of the 1860s. Though not as intense as would be experienced after the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, Muslims were flowing to the Ottoman lands after the Crimean War. The sub-province of Muş was among the important places for the settlement of Muslim immigrants.

If the exploitative system of the kaimakams, council members, moneylenders, and Armenian notables was the first source of the grievances of the peasants of Muş, assaults by Kurdish tribes was a close second. Given the absence of the notables of Muş who had influence over tribal groups, a problem arose concerning the control of these groups. Nomadic and seminomadic Kurdish tribes and their relations to peasants – especially to Armenian peasants – mostly addressed in the context of the Hamidian regiments. Thus, this

study filled a lacuna in the literature on Kurdish tribes by focusing on tribal-peasant relations in the period from the 1820s to the 1870s. Providing winter-quarters to seminomadic tribes was a long-standing practice of the peasants that was supposed to disappear with the Tanzimat yet prevailed in different forms. Thus, the emergence of a similar practice called hafirlik in the 1850s was no coincidence. Referring to the protection provided to Armenian peasants by the tribes in return for hay, straw, and similar subsistence materials, the system of hafirlik played key role in the deterioration of relations between Muslims and other communities in later years. Nevertheless, this study focused on the tribes not only in the terms of inter communal relations. The study also deploys the settlement process for the semi nomadic tribes of Muş, the migration patterns of nomadic tribes in its vicinity, and inter-tribal relations to contribute to the understanding of nomadism in the locality of Muş.

# Appendix A: Source Language Versions of Quotations in the Main Text

Bitlis Vilâyeti'nin münkasım olduğu dört sancâkdan en mühimi şübhesiz (Muş) livâsıdır. Sancâğın bu ehemmiyeti evvelâ kabl-i zirâ'at arâzîsinin kesreti gibi tabî'î, sânîyen sekenesinin cins ve mezhebce mütehâlif akvâmdan mürekkeb olması gibi siyâsî esbâbdan münba'isdir. Fi'l-vâki' merkez livâ olan kasabanın şimâl ve cenûba doğru uzanub giden (Mûş Ovası), her cihheti dağlık olan Kürdistân havâlî-i sâiresinde emsâli mefkûd, latîf bir ova olub, Fırat Nehrinin en mühim şu'besini teşkîl eden meşhûr (Murad Çayı) ovanın vasatından mürûr eylediği gibi etrâfındaki cibâl-ı refî'den nebeân, ve câ-be-câ cereyân ile mezkûr çaya insıbâb iden enhâr-ı sagîre ve kesîre de arâzîyi her cihetden irvâ ve iskâ ettiğinden arzen on ve tûlen yirmi sâ'atlik bir sath-ı müstevi-i türâbî iştimâl eden bu cesîm ovanın kabiliyet-i fevk-al-âde-i inbâtiyyesinden kinâyeten (Muş Ovası altın yuvası) ta'bîri zebânzeddir. Muş düzünün kuvâ-yi nâmîyesine mukâbil livânın cebel cihhetleri envâ'i eşcâr-ı müsmirenin ve mer'aları külliyetli hayvânât-ı ehliyyenin yetiştirilmesine pek müsâid vüs'at arâzîsi, bin-nisbe kesret ve kesâfet-i nüfûsu i'tibâriyle de ehemmiyete zâiddir. Bir de mevki'-i coğrafiyesı hasebiyle Erzurum, Van vilâyetleriyle hemhudûd ve Rusya ülkesine karîb bulunması ve sekenesinin her yerden ziyâde Kürd ile Ermeni'den mahlût olması livânın idârî ve siyâsî nokta-i nazarınca olan ehemmiyet-i mahsûsasını teşkîl eder.

Quotation 1. Ahmed Mâcid, Kürdistân Ahvâli ve Mesele-i Islahât, Mülkiye, No. 8, 1 Eylül 1325. [For English translation, see pp. 1-2].

Muş sancâğı ve gerek bu havâlîde birâz mahaller yûrtluk ve ocâklık ta'bîriyle mine'l kadîm ba'zı yerlu hânedân dedikleri takıma ihâle ve ihsân buyrulmuş ve o makûlelerin tarafdâr ve ta'âllukât rütbeleri her birisi bir tâkım karye ve birer tarafı zabt ve kendü mülkü ittihâz iderek her bir hâsılât ve mua'yyenâtını ekl ve bel' idegelmiş ve bu cihetle o makûle mahallerde cânib-ı mîrîye şimdiye kadar bir akçe menfâ'at olmıyarak herkes istediği gibi yapmış ve bu makûlelerin ittifâk ve nişân sûretleri gösterilerek kullanılmak muktezâ-yı cibilliyetleri elvirmeyeceğinden ve henüz bunlar bir işe yaramıyacaklarından ve mülk ittihâz itdikleri mahaller ellerinden alınub şimdi (...) idâre itdirilmek vaktçe uyamıyacağından kimisini tard itmek ve müstehak bulunanı izâle eylemek ve yabancı istihdâmından ise işe yarayacaklarını hazır yerlu olarak icâb-ı hâle göre kullanılmak buralarca muktezâ-yı tab'iyet-i maslahat bulunmuş olmak cihetiyle işte ezcümle Muş sancâğı dâhi zikr olunan usûl-i kadîme üzere bulunub vâridât ve hasılât lâyıkî vechile tahsîl olunması cânib-i mîrîye senevî bir dört bin kise akçe husûle geleceğini ba'zı kimesneler ifâde itmekde ise de tahkikât-ı 'acizânem bilâ şübhe senevî iki bin kise cânib-i mîrîye 'aidat ve hasılât olacağı anlaşılmış ve şimdiye kadar livâ-i mezbûrdan gayr-ı ez-i cizye hasılâtı ve vâridâtı sâiresi olarak sûb-ı 'acizânemden hiçbir şey aranılmamış ise de iktizâ iden husûsları (…) sâye-i cenâb-ı pâdişâhide sırasına konuldukda lâyıkî vechile hâsılâtının ahzine muvaffak olunacağı derkâr…

Quotation 2. BOA. HAT. 533/26254 A, 15 Ramazan 1251 (4 January 1836). [For English translation, see pp. 107-108].

Erzurum eyâletinin ekser mahali Rusya ve İrânlu ile hemhudûd olarak mevâki‘-i nâzikede bulunduğuna ve ba‘zı mahalin sekenesi ekrâd ve ‘aşâir olub bu mevsimlerde yâylâklara ‘azîmet eylediklerine ve şu aralık bir tarafdan Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye usûl-ı eahâsin şümûlunun refte refte te’sîsine ve bir tarafdan ber mûceb-i irâde-i seniyye emlâk ve temettua‘tları tahrîri ve bir tarafdan altmış senesi rûz-ı kâsımından altmış bir senesi mârtına kadar vukû‘ bulan masârîf-i memleketden başka bu defa‘ hasbe’l zarûre eyâleti-i merkûmenin hâvi olduğu elviye ve kazâlardan ‘ale’lhesâb olarak istenilan iki bin kiseden mütecâviz akçenin tahsîl-i mîrîyelerinin mütevâliyen tesviyesiyle uğraşılmakda iken tahrîr-i nüfûs mâddesinin dâhi irâde-i seniyeye tatbîken merkez lâyıkında icrâsı birâz suûbetlice olacağına ve zikr olunan ‘aşâirin yâylâklara gitmiş bulunacakları cihetle tahrîrin mümkün olamıyacağına binâen şimdilik oraca tahrîr-i nüfûs husûsunun iki üç mâha kadar tevkîfi münâsib olacağı beyân ve inhâ olunmuş…

Quotation 3. BOA. MVL. 2/18, 3 Cemaziyelahir 1261 (9 June 1845). [For English translation, see pp. 124-125].

Muş sancâğı yirmi sekiz kazâ sekiz yüz kurâdan ‘ibâret ve mahal-i mezkûrın cevânib-i erbâasını seksân oymâk ekrâd her biri bin iki bin haymeye müştemil olub kesreti cihetle sâbıklarda bulunan kâimakâmlar ekrâd-ı merkûmun cins ve oymağını ve ne mahalde serkeş olduğunu ciddice bilur ve bir fukarânın mâl ve eşyâsı ve davâr ve hayvânâtı ‘akab-ı gârâtında olvakt gasb olunân mâlı istirdâd ve icrâsına teşebbüs ve ibtidâr ile mukaddemâ Muşlu Şerif beğin kâimakâmlığı evânında sâye-i şâhânede istirâhatimiz olduğuna ve elhâletü hâzihi kâimakâm bulunan Habib efendi livâ-i merkûmeyi idâreye muktedir olamayub ekrâd-ı merkûme üzerlerimize dâimen tasallut ve celb û mâl ve katl-i nüfûs itmek misillû hareketlerde yedi bin re’s ağnâmdan mütecâviz hayvânâtımızı sürub götürmek ve buna mümâsil hareketlerde bulunub emniyyet-i mâl û cân olamamış ve binâen‘aleyh senede birkâç bin nüfûs re’s-i hudûd olduğundan Rusya tarafına savruşub memleket dağılmakda olduğundan bu kere otuz kadar ahâlî mahsûsen ifâde-i hâle bu tarafa gelmiş olduklarımızdan ve ekrâd-ı merkûmenin cins ve oymağını bilur ma‘lûmatlı ve kadîmden berû beldemizde istihdâm olunmuş olân Şerif beğin çend seneden berû Asitâne’de bulunduklarından Muş kâimakâmlığı ve mutasarrıflığı ‘uhdesine ihâle ve Muş cânibine gönderilmesi zirâ mûmâileyh ceddîce Muşlu olduğundan mûmâileyhüma eşkıyâsını cümleten bilur ve anın ihâfesiyle hiçbirisi bu hareketlerde bulunamayub emniyyet-i mâl û cân ve ‘ırz ve nâmûs olacağından ve o makûle tasallut-ı vâki‘den halâs olacaklarımıza iştibâh olmayacağından…

Quotation 4. BOA. İ. MVL. 227/7731, 22 Safer 1268 (17 December 1851). [For English translation, see pp. 218-219].

… olhavâlîde bulunan yirmi dört kabile-i ekrâd tâifesi çend seneden berû kazâlarımızı basub emvâl ve emlâklarımızı gârât ve hasârât ve ʻırz-ı kesir iderek ve çend mâh zarfında yirmi otuz nefer reâʻyâ-ı fukarâ kulları cerh ile telef-i nefs itmiş ve yâylâda bulunân mândaların ayâklarından biçâk ile sakât iderek telef olmakda ve hayvânât zehâiri giyâhları ateş ile ihrâk idub ve bu esnâda yedi sekiz bin re's-i ağnâmlarımızı cebrî sürub götürmekde olduklarına mebnî keyfiyet-i hâllerimizi meclise ifâde ve iştikâ olunmakda iken zehâir harmânlarımızı ihrâk itmiş olduklarından vâlisi tarafından üç dört bin nefer ʻasâkir taʻyîn ve me'mûr olunmuş olan me'mûrân karyelerimizde hayvânâtıyla meccânen bir mâh olmikdâr kesânı hânelerimizde idâre olunub sâye-i muaʻdeletvâye-i seniyyede gârât olunan emvâllerimizin tahsîl olunmasına müterekkib isek de me'mûrânın ʻavdetinde meclis-i me'mûrânın her birerleri külliyetlü akçe ahz ile ve kârvânıyla kâtır vesâire ahz iderek ʻavdet itmiş olduklarından bu husûsu meclis-i mezkûrun ʻadem-i idâresinden ve kendülerine menfaʻat olduğu anlaşılmış ve mütehassıs virgümüzün üzerine beher sene iki yüz bin gurûş tevziʻ ve taksîm ve cebren tahsîl eylediklerinden ve derbâr-ı merhametkarâne ʻazimet idecek kimesnenin ʻindinde mazbata ve iştikâya dâir evrâk bulunmamak içün esnâ-yı rahde me'mûrları olub şâyed o misillû evrâk zuhûr ider ise giruye red ile mahbûsa ilkâ ve günâ gün ezâ ve cefâ eylediklerine mebnî hâllerimiz derece-i nihâyetde perişân olmağla bu tarafda henüz vürûd iden fukarâ bu tarafda mevcûd kulları hâllerimizi ifâdeye cesâret kılınmış ve senede bir iki bin hâne ecnebî toprâğına firâr itmekde olduğu muhât-ı ʻilm-i ʻalem arâ-yı rahimâneleri buyruldukda rahmetü'lfukarâ Tanzîmât-ı hayriyye-yi mehâsin şumûlü icâbınca fukarâ kullarını gadrden vikâye buyrularak kazâ-i mezkûr hânedânından Şerif beğ kulları ol tarafın hâline vâkıf ve idâresine muktedir olduğundan lutfen ve kermen ve inayeten mîr-i merkûm kullarını nasb ve taʻyîni husûsuna …"

Quotation 5. BOA. İ. MVL. 227/7731, 22 Safer 1268 (17 December 1851). [For English translation, see pp. 227-228].

"…çok vaktden berû ehl-i ʻırz gurûhi ve fukarâ-i ahâli ve reâʻyâ tâkımı pek aşûri zahmet ve ıztırâb ve elem çeker ve kab'lel Tanzîmât vâkiʻ olan mezâlim ve taaʻdiyât-ı mute'ellimenin her nevʻini görürler idi altmış altı senesinde Kürdistân vâlisi esbak müteveffa Esʻad pâşânın dûr tarafıyla bu taraflara dâhi vürûdunda doğrusu Muş sancâğına dâhi haylice ıslâhât vermiş ve o makûle ʻaşâir-i muzırranın menʻ ve ... sâye-i devlet-i ʻaliyyede teşekkür.. olunacak derece istirâhat hâsıl olmuş idiyse de müşârünileyh çok durmayub burâlardan çekildiği anda kâimakâmların ʻadem-i ehliyet ve idâreleriden mi nedendir derʻakab eski hâl ʻavdet idub ve böylelikle müşârünileyhin zemân-ı hükûmetinde icrâ kılınan muhâkemât ve muaʻdelet münâsebetiyle birtâkım eşkıyâ ve rüesâ tâkımı dâhi icrâ-yı nefsâniyet ve ahz-ı intikâma düşdüklerinden evvelkinden ziyâde fenâlıklar zuhûra gelub nihâyet kâimakâmlar dâhi bunların bir vechile önünü alamayub az vakte müteʻâkıben pek çok tebdilât vukûʻ bulduğundan ʻalem öylece zulm ve eşkiyâ ellerinde kalmış ve herkes cânından bıkub bütün livâ herc û merc olmuş …"

Quotation 6. BOA. MVL. 300/89, 29 Şevval 1272 (3 July 1856). [For English translation, see pp. 253-254].

"… hasbe'lkader ahâlîmiz kullarından birine üç beş yüz gurûş luzûm görün-düğü hâlde bir müddetden berû beldemizde zuhûr iden ba'zı sarrâfân ve tama'kârân faizciler mugayr-ı şerri' şerif ve muhâlefet-i nizâm-ı seniyye beher yüz gurûşa senevî kırk elli gurûş güzeşte zammıyla asl-ı mâl iderek 'aynen edâ olunmak üzere şu kadar Osmânî lira diyerek sened rabt itmekde bu ise on sene zarfında ahâlîmizin birer ... perişân olarak diyâr-ı ahere firâr ve elyevm Dersa'âdet'de on bin nüfûsu mütecâviz her birerleri sâye-i şâhânede kesb ve ticâretleriyle uğraşmakda iseler de yine işbu zikr olunân gadârân ve zâlimeyn yedlerinden tahliyeye çâre bulamayub sürünmekde ve bi'lâhire bu husûs emvâl-i mîrîye dâhi sekte getüreceği aşikâr çünkü işbu mürâbaha cayân olan-lar ekserisi mer'iyy-ül-hâtır kimselerden oldukları cihetle fukarâyı himâye idecek meclis-i livâ a'zâları ve kâimakâm ve sâir me'mûrin iken bunlar dâhi kendülere her nasılsa tesâhub iderek bir fukarâyı hükûmete düşdüğü anda söyletmeyerek hemân mahbûsa ilkâ ve yüz iki yüz guruş içün mahal virmey-erek iki mâh mahbûsda tutub ba'de her ne eşyâsı vâr ise satdırub tesviye-i deyn itdirdiklerinden fukarâmızın gözü tutub hükümât tarafına gitmeğe vaktleri kalmayûb istedikleri gibi yüz gurûş borcu olan çend sene zarfında bin gurûşı tecâvüz itmeğe …"

Quotation 7. BOA. MVL. 476/77, 7 Rebiülevvel 1282 (31 July 1865). [For English translation, see pp. 264-265].

... vâridât-ı öşriye ve rusûmiyeyi mahalli mültezimleriyle Muş meclisi a'zâsı ve vücûhu meyânelerince şirket-i hafiye ile der'uhde iderek me'mûrlar ta'yîniyle ahâliden meccânen yem ve yiyecek aldıkdan başka bayağı yarıcı ve ortakçı gibi hâsılât-ı vâki'nin nısfını ve belki daha ziyadesini ellerinden aldıkları ve Muş meclis a'zâsıyla vücûhları idâre-i beytiyeleri içün lâzım olan revgan ve bûlgûr ve hıtab ve şîr ve buna mümâsil sâir erzâkı adamlar göndererek meccânen karyelerden tobladub bilâ ücret ahâlinin 'arye ve hayvânâtını tahmîlen hânelerine nakl itdirdikleri ve me'mûriyyetle gelan zabtiye ve sâire köylerden meccânen yem ve yiyecek aldıkdan başka beher karyeden ellişer yüzer gurûş hidmet-i mübâşiriye nâmıyla akçe aldığı dâhi Muşda arâmsâz olan 'asker-i nizâmiye-i hazret-i şâhâne içün lâzım olan erzâk-ı mütenevvi' bi't-tevzi' ahz olunmakda ise de ordu-yu humâyûndan virilmekde olan akçeden ahâliye bir pâre virilmediği ve ifâde-i hâl içün Muşa vardıklarında kendüleri habs ve tazyîk olunarak ifâde ve istirhâmlarına katien husûl-i sem' ve i'tibâr olunmadığı hasebiyle şunlardan dolayı bi'l'umûm ahâlinin hâlleri diğer gûn ve Muşça haklarında vâki' olan zulm ve ta'addi haddından efzûn olduğundan buralarına tâbâvere mütehammil olamıyarak Rusya devleti tab'iyyet ve mahtutiyetini kabûle mecbûr olduklarını cevâben beyân ve ifâde eylemiş ...

Quotation 8. BOA.MVL. 629/41, 20 Zilkade 1278 (19 May 1862). [For English translation, see pp. 271-272].

Bundan otuz sene mukaddem merhûm ve mağfûr cennet-mekân Anâtolu Ordu-yu Humâyûn müşiri gözlüklü Reşid Pâşâ hazretleri ile merhûm ve mağfûr Kürdistân vâlîsi Es'ad pâşâ hazretleri maen birlikde Muş kazâlarından Malâzgird kazâsının ahâlîsini cebellerden cem' idub mecmûan Malâzgird kazâsına cem' idub bi-külliye rençberlik ile meşgûl ve sâye-i şâhânede kotân ve çift sâhibleri olub işimizle meşgûl ve devlet-i 'aliyyemizin her bir umûr ve husûsuna ve tekâlif-i virgümüze ve her bir irâde-i 'aliyyelerine boyun virub ve 'aşîret ağâ bendeleri mesele-i zâilede bin süvârî ile berâber muhârebeye kıyâm idub ve Kozân muhârebesinde yine hâlâ Diyârbekir vâlisi İsmâ'il pâşâ hazretlerinin ma'iyyetlerinde cân-siperân yedi sekiz yüz süvârî ile birlikde dîn ve devlete hidmet eylediklerinde mâ'adâ 'aşîret ağâ bendelerinden bir ağâmız hatır-bendeleri vefât iderek böyle hidmet-i devletimizde bulunduğumuzdan bu târîhden dört beş mâh mukaddem 'aşîret ağâ bendelerini birkâç adamdan 'ibâre Erzurûma celb ve 'asâkir-i şâhâne kışlâsına mahbûs idub bilâ cünha kusûrları olmayub sefîl ve perişân olduklarından mâ'adâ kazâmızda ahâli-i fukarâ kulları dâhi perişân-ül- hâl olduğumuzdan sâye-i şevketvâye-i rahimânelerinden mercu ve … ki ağâ bendelerini mahbûsdan halâs buyurmaları niyâzı ve istirhâmı ve bu fukarâ kullarını ezâ cefâdan halâs buyurmaları …"

Quotation 9. BOA. ŞD. 2884/54, 2 Zilhicce 1292 (30 December 1875). [For English translation, see p. 288].

"… şöyle ki tekrâra hâcet olmadığı üzere ʻaşâîr-i merkûmenin tamâmen iskânları icrâ olunmayub bunlardan baʻzıları Muş ve Erzurum ve Bâyezid sancâkları kazâlarında hâne inşâ itmişler ise de ekserîsi hayme-nîşin olmalarından nâşi mezkûr Hasenânlı ʻaşîreti mevsim-i sayfde çadırlarla yâylâka çıkarak mevsim-i şıtâ hulûlünde Muş sancâğı dâhilinde kâin Malazgird ve Bulanıklar ve Van sancâğına tâbiʻ Ahlat kazâ ve nâhiyelerinin hâvi olduğu kurâya ve Cibrânlı ʻaşîreti kezâlik mevsim-i şıtâda Erzurum eyâleti dâhilinde kâin Hınıs ve Kığı ve Köynek kazâlarıyla Muş kazâsı ova kurâsıyla Vârtolar kazâsına ve Bâyezid sancâğına tâbiʻ ʻAyntâb nâhiyesinde meskûn Sıpkî ʻaşîretinin iki üç seneden berû ve ekserîsi çadırda çıkub eyyâm-ı şıtâda mezkûr Bâyezid sancâğına tabiʻ Patnos ve Malâzgird kazâ ve karyelerine ve Hınıs kazâsında meskûn olan Zırki ve Beliki ʻaşîretleri dâhi etraf kazâ ve karyelere dağılarak bunlardan baʻzıları mevsim-i bahâr hulûlüyle hayvânlarının idâresine kâfi yâylâklarda ot yetişinceye kadar hayvânâtlarını ahâli-i mutavattına-i mezkûreye meccânen idâre itdirilmekde ve ahâli bunlardan renciyet ve taʻaddiyât görmekde oldukları cihetle kurâ ve nevâhi-i merkûme ahâlîsi Rusya ülkâsına nakl-i hâne itmek üzere etrâf sancâk ve kurâlara yaʻni re's-i hudûdda vâkiʻ Kars ve Bâyezid taraflarına gidub içlerinden fırsat bulanların Rusya toprâğına geçdikleri ve bir tâkımı dâhi elhâletü hâzihi oralarda ikâmet eyledikleri derkâr bulunmuş …"

Quotation 10. BOA. MVL. 646/81, 27 Şevval 1279 (17 April 1863). [For English translation, see pp. 304-305].

"… her bir mahalin fukarâ ve berâyası dâhil-i dâire-i Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye olmak vâcibesinden kesb-i rahat itmişler oldukları misillû Muş sancâğı fukarâsı dâhi kesb-i rahat itmeğe arzumend iseler de sancâğ-ı mezbûr 'aşâîri ağâvâtından Hasenânlû 'aşîreti ağâsı Rıdvan Ağâ akrabâ ve ta'allukatıyla ve birtâkım va'adlerle başına yığmış olduğu mikdâr ekrâd-ı bed-nihâdlarla üç seneye bâliğ oluyor ki Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye usûlünü kabul itmedikleri ve sancâğımız burda usûl-i mezkûrenin lâyıkıyla icrâ olunması mâni' ve kâimakâmlar hükûmetlerinin bütün bütün ref' itdirdiklerinden başka sancâğımız bura ahâlîsinin mecmu'una ve 'ale'l-husûs kazâ ve nevâhilerinden Malâzgird kazâsı ve Bulânık-ı 'Ulya ve Sufla Ahlât nâm nevâhiler ahâlîsine eyledikleri envâi' cebr ve zulum ve ta'addiyâtlarının keyfiyetini kaç def'a bâ mazbata 'arz ve inhâ eyledik ise de Erzurum vâlîleri taraflarından ısgâ olunmıyarak olvechile işitmeze kalub yandık ve merkûm zâlimler dâhi bakdılar ki itdikleri kendülere kalıyor artık gitdikçe fukarâyı yakub perişân itdiler elhâsıl merkûmlara bir çâre bulamadık …"

Quotation 11. BOA. İ. MSM. 69/2010, 9 Rebiülevvel 1263 (25 February). [For English translation, see pp. 315-316].

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