State, Bureaucracy and Power in the Late Ottoman Empire (1908-1913)

Mustafa İlter

A dissertation presented to the

Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
at Boğaziçi University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

December 2021

Approvals

"State, Bureaucracy and Power in the Late Ottoman Empire (1908-1913)," a dissertation prepared by Mustafa İlter in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, has been approved on 24 December 2021 by:

DISSERTATION ADVISOR

Prof. Dr. Nadir Özbek _____
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
Boğaziçi University

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Prof. Dr. Cengiz Kırlı _____
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
Boğaziçi University

Prof. Dr. Cüneyd Okay _____
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Istanbul Technical University

Prof. Dr. Umut Karabulut _____
History Department
Pamukkale University

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ramazan Hakkı Öztan _____
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
Boğaziçi University

Declaration of Originality

The intellectual content of this dissertation, which has been written by me and for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other examination or degree of higher education. The sources of all paraphrased and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly acknowledged herein.

Copyright © 2021 Mustafa İlter.
Some rights reserved.

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/.

Abstract

"State, Bureaucracy and Power in the Late Ottoman Empire (1908-1913)"

Mustafa İlter, Doctoral Candidate at the Atatürk Institute
for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2021

Prof. Dr. Nadir Özbek, Dissertation Advisor

This study explains power relations in the civil bureaucratic apparatus through the controlling mechanisms of appointing and dismissing state cadres. The struggle to control the bureaucratic apparatus during the first five years of the Second Constitutional period suggests an alternative narrative that challenges the existing literature on political history which describes power relations among the political elite only in terms of dominating the government and parliament. Alongside governmental and parliamentary conflicts, this study concerns the extension of power relations to the state apparatus through bureaucratic cadres.

This approach is possible if the state is considered as neither a monolithic nor a unitary organization, as functional and institutional approaches to state theory do. Instead, such an approach must break from the modernization paradigm on which the literature of bureaucracy, including the late-Ottoman bureaucracy, has long been based. Rather than focusing on grand narratives over long historical periods, this research evaluates short periods of time that were formed by everyday struggles among the actors who comprise history itself.

This is evident when the complex struggles among different political and non-political actors to shaping state cadres are considered. For this reason, this dissertation puts to two antithetical practices – appointments and dismissals – under the microscope. Gubernatorial appointments and the mass purges (*tensikât*) are reviewed from this perspective.

80.500 words

Özet

"State, Bureaucracy and Power in the Late Ottoman Empire (1908-1913)"

Mustafa İlter, Doktora Adayı, 2021
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü

Prof. Dr. Nadir Özbek, Tez Danışmanı

Bu çalışma, devlet kadrolarının atanması ve görevden alınmasına ilişkin kontrol mekanizmaları aracılığıyla sivil bürokratik aygıttaki güç ilişkilerine odaklanmaktadır. İkinci Meşrutiyet döneminin ilk beş yılında bürokratik aygıtı kontrol etme mücadelesi, siyasi seçkinler arasındaki güç ilişkilerini yalnızca hükümete ve parlamentoya hükmetme açısından tanımlayan mevcut siyasi tarih literatürüne alternatif bir anlatı önermektedir. Hükümet ve parlamenter güç çatışmalarının yanı sıra, bu çalışma son tahlilde iktidar ilişkilerinin temelde bürokratik kadrolar üzerinden devlet aygıtına sirayet ederek açıklanabileceğini iddia etmektedir.

Bu tez, bu tür bir yaklaşımın, devlet teorilerinin işlevsel ve kurumsal yaklaşımlarından farklı olarak devletin monolitik ve üniter bir örgüt olarak görülmemesiyle mümkün olabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Bu da ancak, son dönem Osmanlı çalışmaları da dahil olmak üzere, bürokrasi literatürünün uzun süredir dayandığı modernleşme paradigmasından kurtulmakla mümkün olabilir. Bu araştırma, bürokrasi literatürünün alışkın olduğu uzun dönemli analizlere ve büyük anlatılara odaklanmak yerine, aslında tarihin gerçek politik aktörleri arasındaki günlük mücadelelerin şekillendirdiği kısa zaman dilimlerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır.

Bu da, nihayetinde, devlet kadrolarını şekillendirmek için farklı siyasi ve siyasi olmayan aktörler arasındaki karmaşık mücadeleleri göz önünde bulundurarak ortaya çıkarılabilir. Bu nedenle bu tez iki zıt uygulamayı örnek olarak araştırmaktadır: atamalar ve işten çıkarmalar. Vali atamaları ve toplu tasfiyeler (*tensikât*) bu bakış açısıyla incelenmektedir.

80.500 kelime

Curriculum Vitæ

MUSTAFA İLTER

EDUCATION

Ph.D.	Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History Boğaziçi University 2021
M.A.	History Sabancı University 2014
B.A.	History Boğaziçi University 2012

GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

- Sabancı University, History Department, Teaching Assistantship (2012-2014)
- TUBITAK undergraduate bursary (2007-2009)

INVITED TALKS

- 27.12.2018, Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Üniversitesi Fethiye İşletme Fakültesi, Ekonomi ve Finans Seminerleri, Muğla, Fethiye. "İktisat Tarihi Bağlamında Tarih ve Toplum: 1844 Bursa Temettuat Defterleri"

CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

- 24.07.2017-28.07.2017, *14TH International Congress of Ottoman Social and Economic History, ICOSEH*, University of Sofia, Bulgaria, "The Formation of the Tanzimat Society; Socio-Economic Relations in the Hinterland of İzmir"

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- World History I&II (2015-2016)
- Modern Turkish History (2015-2016)
- World History I&II, (T.A.) (2014-2015)
- SPS 101 (T.A.) (2012-2013)

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

- Princeton University, Department of Near Eastern Studies, Visiting Student Research Collaborator, April 2019

UNIVERSITY/DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

- Sabancı University, 2012-2014 (Teaching Assistant)

LANGUAGES

- Turkish –Native Speaker
- English – Fluent
- French – Novice
- Arabic – Novice
- Ottoman Turkish – Fluent in reading



To Batu

Table of Contents

List of Tables *xi*
List of Figures *xii*
Abbreviations and Acronyms *xiii*
Acknowledgements *xiv*

1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Is it Possible to Break the Modernization Paradigm: The Case of the Literature on the Ottoman Bureaucracy? 5
1.2 Theorizing the State: Revisiting the Relational Conceptualization 18
1.3 The Scope of the CUP's Power: Classics of the Literature on Second the Constitutional Period 37
1.4 Study Outline 42

PART I: ON DISMISSALS: THE LATE OTTOMAN MASS PURGES

2 THE *TENSİKÂT* LAW IN PREPERATION: FROM THE STATE OF EXCEPTION TO THE STATE OF LAW 47

2.1 Re-engineering the High Bureaucracy before the *Tensikat* Law 51
2.2 Parliamentary Debates on the Legal Lacuna 61
2.3 The *Tensikat* Law 66
2.4 Conclusion 80

3 THE AFTERMATH OF THE LAW: THE CUP IN ACTION 83

3.1 Determining Dismissals: The *Tensikât* Commissions 85
3.2 Amendment of the *Tensikât* Law 91
3.3 Additions to the *Tensikât* Law 98
3.4 Conclusion 100

4 RESPONSES FROM THE BOTTOM 102

4.1 Petitioning the *Tensikât* 107
4.2 Petitioning the *Tensikât* from the Margins of Politics 112
4.3 Conclusion 127

PART II: ON APPOINTMENTS: GOVERNING THE PROVINCES

5 THE GOVERNORS OF THE SECOND CONSTITUTION 130

5.1 Appointing Governors in the Late Ottoman Empire 131
5.2 Mapping Gubernatorial Appointments, 1908-1913 140
5.3 Turnover Rates in High Bureaucracy 153
5.4 Conclusion 164

6 NETWORKING GOVERNORS OF THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL BUREAUCRACY 167

6.1 Factionalism in the Ottoman Bureaucratic Structure 169
6.2 Politics and Networking in the Bureaucracy during the post-1908 Period 172
6.3 Alterations in the Political Balance vis-à-vis Gubernatorial Appointments 191
6.4 Facing Rivalries: Appointing and Dismissing Governors 197
6.5 Conclusion 202

7 EPILOGUE: CONSOLIDATING POWER, INCREASING STATENESS AND EMERGING AUTHORITARIANISM 204

APPENDICES 212

Appendix A Petitions of the *Tensikât* Victims 212
Appendix B Midhat Pasha's Nephew Mehmed Aziz Bey's Petition 219
Appendix C Halis Bey's Petition (Former Qaimaqam of Beykoz) 222
Appendix D Governor Appointments (1908 August-1912 October) 224
Appendix E Appointments of Cemal Bey, Bekir Sami Bey, Mahmud Muhtar Bey, Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha and Mazhar Bey (in August-September 1909) in *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye Defterleri* 230

BIBLIOGRAPHY 231

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Petitions in the Sample by Reason for Writing 116
Table 4.2 Petitions in the Sample by Institutional Addressee 117
Table 4.3 Petitioners' Former Positions 118
Table 4.4 Petitions in the Sample by Date 120
Table 5.1 Governor Turnover Rates in the *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiyye* Records 157
Table 5.2 New Governors vis-à-vis Total Appointments in the Hamidian Era 158
Table 5.3 New Governors vis-à-vis Total Appointments in the First Four Years of the Revolution 159
Table 5.4 High-Level Bureaucratic Turnover from July 1908 to March 1910 163
Table 5.5 High-Level Bureaucratic Turnover From March 1906 to July 1908 164

List of Figures

Figure 5.1 Ottoman Administrative Map of 1898 140

Figure 5.2 Governor Appointments Between August 1908 and October 1912 143

Figure 5.3 Governor Appointments from August 1908 to February 1909 (the Kamil Pasha Cabinet) 146

Figure 5.4 Governor Appointments from February 1909 to December 1909 (Cabinet of Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha) 148

Figure 5.5 Governor Appointments from January 1910 to October 1911 (Cabinet of Hakkı Pasha) 150

Figure 5.6 Governor Appointments from October 1911 to July 1912 (Second Cabinet of Said Pasha) 151

Figure 5.7 Governor Appointments from August 1912 to October 1912 (Grand Cabinet) 152

Figure 6.1 Networking Groups of Governors 195

Figure 6.2 Governor Appointments regarding the Istanbulites related network 196

Figure 6.3 Governor Appointments regarding the CUP related network 197

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A.{DVNS.TVCM.d.	*Bâb-ı Âsâfî Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye Defterleri*
A.}MKT.MHM.	*Sadâret Mektubi Mühimme Kalemi Evrakı*
BEO.	*Bâb-ı Âlî Evrak Odası*
BOA	*Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi*
BEO.İ.KAN.	*Bâb-ı Âlî Evrak Odası İrâde Kanun ve Nizamât*
DH.EUM.MH..	*Emniyet-i Umumiye Muhasebe Kalemi Evrakı*
DH.EUM.MEM.	*Emniyet-i Umumiye Memurin Kalemi Evrakı*
DH.EUM.SCL.	*Emniyet-i Umumiye Sicil Kalemi Evrakı*
DH.EUM.THR.	*Emniyet-i Umumiye Tahrirat Kalemi Evrakı*
DH.MKT.	*Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi*
DH.MTV.	*Dahiliye Nezareti Mütenevvia Evrakı*
DH.MUİ.	*Dahiliye Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi Evrakı*
DH.SAİD.d.	*Dahiliye Nezareti Sicill-i Ahval Defterleri*
HR.SAİD.	*Hariciye Nezareti Sicill-i Ahvâl*
HRT.h..	*Haritalar*
HSDHADB.	*Hacı Adil Bey Evrakı*
İ.AS.	*İrâde Askerî*
İ..DH..	*İrâde Dahiliye*
İ..TAL..	*İrâde Taltifât*
MF.İBT.	*Maarif Nezareti Tedrisat-ı İbtidaiyye Kalemi*
MF.MKT.	*Maarif Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi*
MV.	*Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları*
ŞD.	*Şurâ-yı Devlet*
TFR.I.M.	*Rumeli Müfettişliği Müteferrika Evrak*
TFR.I.MN.	*Rumeli Müfettişliği Manastır Evrakı*
TS.MA.e	*Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı*
Y..EE..	*Yıldız Esas Evrakı*
Y..EE..KP..	*Yıldız Kamil Paşa Evrakı*
ZB.	*Zabtiye*
M.M.Z.C.	*Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Cerideleri*
TDV	*Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı*

Acknowledgments

First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Nadir Özbek for the continuous support of my Ph.D. study as I greatly benefitted from his theoretical insights. The graduate courses designed by him have been of utmost importance in shaping this project. I'm extremely grateful to him as he has enriched my historical approach.

I am also deeply indebted to Ahmet Kuyaş for his guidance and encouragement throughout writing this dissertation. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to Umut Karabulut for his insightful comments, suggestions, and assistance at every stage of this research. His recommendations helped me in all the time of research and writing of this dissertation.

Besides, I would like to thank the rest of the jury members as I am honored to have Cengiz Kırlı, Cüneyd Okay and Ramazan Hakkı Öztan on my dissertation committee. I am deeply grateful for their insightful comments and encouragement.

My sincere thanks also go to Şükrü Hanioğlu for his illuminating feedback and suggestions that contributed much for the ultimate structure of this research. I am also thankful to Yakup Öztürk, Alexandre Toumarkine, Leyla Amzi-Erdoğdular, Güney Çeğin, Devran Koray Öcal, Selim Ahmetoğlu and Okan Ceylan for their helpful advices and constructive criticisms. Moreover, the late Yavuz Selim Karakışla had contributed much on the earlier version of the preparation of this research. I am deeply grateful to him and his cherished memory.

Lastly, the completion of my dissertation would not have been possible without the support of my family. I cannot begin to express my thanks to my wife Şeyma for her patience and everlasting support. Moreover, there is no appropriate word to express my gratitude to my mother, father and sister.

1

Introduction

The Young Turk Revolution has long been considered a political turnover in which a new parliamentary system arose from the ashes of an absolutist monarchy. This research asserts that the Young Turk Revolution, along with political struggles that continued through 1913, were furthermore an attempt to reformulate and control state apparatuses and bureaucratic cadres. In contrast with the great enthusiasm for upper political transformation, little interest has been paid to changes within the state cadres. Struggles over governmental restructuring, ministerial appointments and dismissals, parliamentary elections, and press and labor movements have created a splash, but conflicts vis-à-vis bureaucratic cadres attracted little. Beyond the political transformation that occurred after July 1908, this study considers the Young Turk Revolution as a state rebuilding project, advanced by internal struggles to control appointments and dismissals pertaining to bureaucratic cadres.

Bureaucracy, as a constitutive element of state apparatuses, has attracted attention from scholars as much as other subjects that comprise the theoretical bases of the social sciences and humanities. Notwithstanding a recent eclipse in this literature in the last two decades, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed a boom in descriptive and analytical studies

pertaining to bureaucracy. Just like contemporary counterparts, Ottoman studies benefitted from this trend.[1]

The literature pertaining to the Ottoman bureaucracy is based on a Weberian approach. Key to understanding the Ottoman bureaucratic structure has been an analysis of its transformation within a modernization paradigm. Based on Weber, the rationalization and professionalization of bureaucratic cadres in the nineteenth century as part of a supposedly top-down modernization process has constituted the approach. The transformation of bureaucratic structures has been assumed to be linear and developmentalist; as such, the modernization of Ottoman officialdom has been deemed to have evolved from arbitrary rule to the *kalemiye* and then the *mülkiye*. On the other hand, while the early modern bureaucracy was founded on a system of patronage and favoritism, "*intisâb*"[2], the late nineteenth-century cadres were professionalized and had high levels of schooling. Furthermore, the linear, developmentalist assumption of the modernization paradigm has continued into studies pertaining to the new republic[3] in which ideology

1 Certain prominent studies are: Ali Akyıldız, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012); Frederick T. Bent, "The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of Change," *Administration & Society* 1 no. 1 (1969): 47-64; Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980); Carter Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989); Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985); Metin Heper, "The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative and Historical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 271, no. 1 (1985): 86-110; Metin Heper. "Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a 'Historical Bureaucratic Empire' Tradition," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no. 4 (1976): 507–521; Metin Heper, "Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernizing Context: The Turkish Case," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 1, no. 1 (1977): 65-84; Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13, no. 3, Special Issue on Organizations and Social Development (December 1968): 451-470.

2 Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 19-20.

3 The historiography of Turkish modernization hinges on this generalization which can be traced in mainstream historical and sociological studies: Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998); Richard L. Chambers, "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey, ," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Studies in Political Development*, ed.

reoriented (or ruptured) bureaucracy, opening up a new era in which the new emerging bureaucracy had newfound agency. The position of the Turkish bureaucracy after 1919 has also been discussed comparatively, as in the case of a study of how the bureaucrats of Japan and Turkey respectively established centralized nation states by abolishing former rules via a revolution from above.[4] And while, the assumption of total fracture has already been revised in favor of continuity in recent discussions of the formation of modern Turkey, this approach still fits within the outline of the modernization narrative. For supporters of continuity, these new cadres who were top-down modernizers trained in late Ottoman schools in an ideological atmosphere of the late Ottoman world, were responsible for emergence of the Republican period.

Regardless of the subtle difference in the positions,[5] the literature has neglected a major point: the power struggles among actors who constituted the bureaucratic structure itself. In other words, the abstract approach that deems bureaucracy to have been shaped by an invisible modernization from the top disregards the actual components of the bureaucracy and the individual personalities engaged in a dynamic struggle within the bureaucratic

---

Robert E. Ward and A. Rustow Dankwart (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Carter Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity, A History, 1789-2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Turkey (*London: Croom Helm, 1981); Kemal Karpat, *Elites and Religion: From Ottomans to Turkish Republic* (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010); Kemal Karpat, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden: Brill, 1973); Jacob M. Landau, *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1984); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative Perspective," in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 1973); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2 *(*New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

4 Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru* (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), 1. In his *1908 Devrimi,* Aykut Kansu opposed this generalization of revolution from the top. Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devimi (*Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995).

5 Kansu elaborates on this position, standing with the continuity supporters. Kansu, *1908 Devrimi,* 4-16.

apparatus. The modernization paradigm shaped this attitude as if the bureaucracy was functioned as a unitary body. Moreover, by considering the bureaucracy as a discrete body isolated from party struggles, certain scholarly works that pursued a relational approach fail to explain inter-organizational relationships; rather, they explain only the relationships among the various structural and institutional organizations of the bureaucracy. Keyder's *State and Class in Turkey*, for example, deals with how the bureaucracy as a body, and indeed the state itself, developed a relationship with the bourgeoisie. He considers the continuous negotiations and conflicts between the bureaucracy and capital holders.[6] But ignoring the cliques, networks, conflicts, and negotiations inside the bureaucratic apparatus has paved the way for an academic illusion that the bureaucracy is immune from internal organizational conflicts and negotiations. This research questions this notion and the scope and extent of its applicability. It proposes a new approach of examining the late Ottoman bureaucracy.

These cannot be considered without an understanding of the context of the periodization of the subject – that is, trends and debates in the scope of the broader literature. In fact, bureaucracy is debated not only in the context of studies that pursue the agenda of explaining the form and functioning of bureaucratic apparatuses but also in the context of theories of the state. State theories, ranging from Marxist ones to those focusing on civil society and "bringing the state back in," have discussed the key relational aspect of the state apparatus. What follows is first a discussion of the modernization literature insofar as it relates to bureaucracy. Second, the state theories are considered, as the bureaucracy and the state cannot be considered independently of one another. In other words, what follows will situate the state and its bureaucratic cadres within a theoretical framework. It then proposes a new research agenda and explains how this study approaches the bureaucracy and the state.

6 Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987).

§ 1.1 Is it Possible to Break the Modernization Paradigm? The Case of the Literature on Ottoman Bureaucracy

Harry Harootunian suggests that the growing body of scholarly work on the modernization paradigm coincided with the postwar period and derives from cultural and political war between the United States and the Soviet Union and "their respective agendas of modernity and development."[7] These agendas were directed towards new, emerging nation states following decolonization. But the model needed to be demonstrated via the examples of nations that had already accomplished – or were on the path of accomplishing – modernization and development.

> The developmentalism contrived to transform "traditional" societies into modern, rational nations was principally spearheaded by the effort to induce newly founded nations, usually former colonies, to fashion their societies in such a way as to be receptive to American products, even though its ideological representation invariably projected a benevolently altruistic and liberal desire to offer a "helping hand."[8]

This process of modernizing new nations politicized historians, pushing them to find examples of accomplished modernization.[9] In other words, the burden of historians after World War II was to investigate certain "proper" models of development, which ultimately brought about the modernization paradigm itself. While Harootunian primarily considers Japanese history, Nadir Özbek argues that Harootunian's points should be considered in the theoretical framework of Ottoman-Turkish modernization narratives, as well.[10] Indeed, Özbek demonstrates in his study of the Ottoman welfare state that the modernization paradigm model, which necessitated a welfare state as the ultimate route for modernization, was insufficient on its own to

7 Harry Harootunian, *The Empire's New Clothes: Paradigm Lost and Regained (*Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), 1.

8 Ibid., 2.

9 Ibid.

10 Nadir Özbek, "İmparatorluk Tartışmalarında Radikal Bir Açılım," *Virgül* 101 (2006): 14-16.

explain dynamic political and administrative practices.[11] In fact, the literature pertaining to Ottoman westernization, secularization, and modernization coincided with the postwar period,[12] emerging in the 1950s aligning, in line with Harootunian's critique. The literature pertaining to Ottoman bureaucracy, more specifically, also started to appear in this theoretical context.

Growing interest in the modernization paradigm also prompted numerous studies of bureaucracy to examine what a model of modern bureaucracy should look like. For Harootunian, the social sciences provided a model of "technical and bureaucratic expertise"[13] to elites of the Third World assuming that they would Westernize and therefore found new, democratic nations.[14] Until the 1990s, all aspects of the bureaucracy had been studied in the social sciences even though a sharp decrease in such research would only be observed in the 2000s.

The boom in the literature pertaining to the bureaucracy stemmed from Weber's works which conflated modernity and bureaucratization. It should be noted that although Weber wrote his studies before World War II, they were translated to English in the postwar period in the midst of a growing modernization literature. Numerous studies on bureaucracy ensued pertaining to both public bureaucracies and private organizations and companies, providing models for development. A comparative global perspective developed in tandem with the agenda of demonstrating the differences between developed and underdeveloped nations, requiring further studies of bureaucracies in transition.[15] This trend, in fact, legitimates Harootunian's criticisms.

---

11 Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet (1876-1914)*. 7th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 17-18.

12 For the evolution of the literature on Ottoman modernization that emerged in the United States after World War II, see Doğan Gürpınar, "The Emergence of Ottoman Studies in North America: Orientalism, the Modernization School and the Cold War," *Turkish Review* 3, no. 1 (2013): 28-30.

13 Harootunian, *Empire's New Clothes,* 59.

14 Ibid.

15 Prominent studies include Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in the Western Democracies (*Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires, The Rise and Fall of the Historical*

As one of the first theoreticians of the bureaucracy, Max Weber affected the literature in the traditional disciplines of history, sociology, and political science and even such disciplines as business administration. The literature, especially of modernization theorists, has been inspired for decades by Weber's idealizations regarding the function of the bureaucracy and limited by the scope of Weber's definition of bureaucracy. The function of the bureaucracy has been evaluated in synch with the modernization paradigm considering the parallel evolution of modernity and the bureaucracy. [16] This, in fact, is why his chapter pertaining to the bureaucracy in famous *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (*Economy and Society*) begins by defining the characteristics of a "modern" bureaucracy.[17]

For Weber, modern bureaucratic rule differs from alternatives – namely traditional patriarchalism and charismatic rule, neither of which can be categorized as modern.[18] Comparing the three types of domination, the modern bureaucracy is the most "rational" structure according to his theory.[19] In defining what constitutes modern bureaucracy, Weber pointed out certain categorical distinctions between what is modern and what is not. Six points characterized his modern bureaucracy, which can be summarized as follows.[20] For him, in modern officialdom "there is the principle of official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or

---

*Bureaucratic Societies (*New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Daniel Field, *The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861 (*Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); John R. Gillis, *The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis, 1840-1860: Origins of an Administrative Ethos (*Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Nevil Johnson, *State and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Executive at Work,* 2nd edition *(*Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983); Roger K. Kelsall, *Higher Civil Servants in Britain: From 1870 to the Present Day (*London: Routledge, 1955); Joseph La Palombara, *Bureaucracy and Political Development (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Ezra Suleiman, *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

16 Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology,* eds. Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: Regents of the University of California, 1978), 956-1006

17 Ibid., 956.

18 Max Weber, *Economy and Society I; A New Translation,* ed. Keith Tribe (Cambridge and Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2019), 336.

19 Weber, *Economy and Society: Outline,* 954.

20 Ibid., 956-958.

administrative regulations."[21] As the primary mechanism constituting the basis of bureaucracy, he further stated that it develops only in the political and societal communities of modern states and in the most advanced institutions and private economic systems of capitalism. However, his definition does not explore to what extent the modern bureaucracy is the cause or result of the emergence of the modern state and capitalist institutions. Weber then stressed the principles of office hierarchy – that is, of establishing a system of supervision by higher offices over lower ones. This provided a control mechanism over the decisions of subordinates by higher officials. However, this does not imply an authoritarian takeover, only a check on the jurisdiction and competency of decisions being carried out, as stated in the first principle. Third, he points out that the modern office consists of written documents and files, which distinguishes the bureau (public office) from the private realm. Fourth, he stressed the professionalization of office management and assumed that modern executives of both the state and the private sector would be trained in their fields of specialization. Fifth, Weber claimed that working hours would also be professionalized, "demanding the full working capacity of the official," in contrast with pre-modern states in which "official business was discharged as a secondary activity."[22] As for the sixth point, Weber conflates the rationalization and professionalization of the management of offices that are strongly bound to the general rules that "do not entitle the agency to regulate the matter by individual commands given for each case, but only to regulate the matter abstractly."[23]

The details of these articles notwithstanding, Weber's proposal has one underlying characteristic: rationalization. As the major contribution to the literature pertaining to western modernization, Weberian rationality occupies a significant place in the historical origin of the idea of modernity.[24] In

21 Ibid., 956.

22 Ibid., 958.

23 Ibid.

24 For Weber's rationalization, see Martin Albrow, *Max Weber's Construction of Social Theory (*New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 114-135; and Sam Whimster and Scott Lash, eds, *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity* (Oxford: Routledge, 2006).

his projection, rationality is the basis for the development of modern, total bureaucratization.[25]

It is therefore clear that Weberian rationalization undervalues human agency by approaching bureaucratic officials as models that repeat the modern rules designated by western modernity. In modernized bureaucratic systems, each component of the bureaucracy must follow the rules and duly perform. Each role planned is planned excellently. In Weber's modern world, there is no room for human nature in the bureaucracy; relationships among statesmen as well as with people outside the official state apparatus are neglected. Networks, conflicts, patronage, and individual interests are disregarded or even regarded as symbols of backward forms of domination like patriarchalism.

Likewise, the literature on Ottoman bureaucracy takes its inspiration from Weber's studies that correlate modernization and bureaucratization. What emerges as the common approach among these studies is that the bureaucracy is considered to have emerged from top-down linear developmentalist modernization and to have gradually rationalized and professionalized. Moreover, the modernizer and the modernized elite effects which emerged during the late 1960s influenced the literature from the early appearance of the modernization paradigm.[26] Bouquet criticizes the determinism created by the modernization theorists of the late Ottoman studies in this way.[27]

The Weberian influence, moreover, provided a foundation for the hypothesized relationship between modernization and bureaucratization in studies of the late Ottoman literature. However, debates over the Weberian approach necessitate an alternative approach to Ottoman bureaucracy and its internal transitions. Rather than a defined, systematic, developmentalist approach to the bureaucracy, this study points to unexpected, unsystematic,

25 For example, the selection of officials based on education and rational examination is the basis of developed modern bureaucracy. See Weber, *Economy and Society: Outline*, 999.

26 Olivier Bouquet, "Is it Time to Stop Ottoman Modernization?" in *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century*, ed. Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse and Elise Massicard (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2015), 54-55.

27 Ibid., 59-67.

and incidental factors that shaped the overall bureaucratic structure by considering relationships shaped by internal struggles among bureaucratic actors.

However, certain studies that dominate the field need to be reviewed in light of their strong correlation with the modernization paradigm. Carter Findley's studies ingeniously piece together both empirical data and Weberian theories of modernization and bureaucracy. Metin Heper and Ali Akyıldız's analyses are on par with Findley's. While Heper's studies maintain a strong theoretical base, Akyıldız draws attention to the empirical aspect of the modernization with his strong narrative. Certain other studies that deal directly with late Ottoman modernization also address the relationship between the Ottoman bureaucracy and modernization. Berkes and Zürcher[28] did not limit themselves to bureaucratization, unlike Carter, Akyıldız, Heper, and Ortaylı. Therefore, this chapter deals with studies that addressed only the late Ottoman bureaucracy.

The most prominent of these scholars is Carter Findley. His position in the academic study of Ottoman modernization has remained steady from the time of his earliest works in 1980s to his latest books published in 2010[29] and 2019.[30] Unlike later works, his earlier studies primarily pertained to the Ottoman bureaucracy itself.

In the first chapters of *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire,* it is apparent that the author is influenced by Weberian explanations of modern bureaucratic rule. In the preface, he stresses that the relationship between processes of modernization and bureaucratization in "traditional societies" is the primary organizational guide for the preparation of his book.

> This is that the study should be written in a way that can be enlightening not only to specialists but also to broader audience, including readers who are not historians of the Middle East but are interested

28 See Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey (*London: Hurst & Company, 1998); Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994).

29 Carter Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity, A History, 1789-2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

30 Carter Findley, *Enlightening Europe on Islam and Ottomans: Mouradgea d'Ohsson and his Masterpiece (*Leiden: Brill, 2019).

> in bureaucracy or the modernization of traditional societies. It is true that this book is the work of historian and deals with the evolution of a bureaucratic system as seen in its own immediate cultural context. Yet works on bureaucracy and modernization, written by scholars in a variety of other fields and disciplines, have provided invaluable guidance for structuring the present analysis and for evaluating the phenomena it investigates. This is above all true of the works of theoretically oriented writers, and especially of Weber and Eisenstadt.[31]

His research is empirically based and focuses on the organizational structure of the Sublime Porte and, in certain cases, an evaluation of the evolution of the foreign ministry. With elaborate statistical data, he demonstrates the transformation of these departments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, he particularly investigates certain top-down attempts at reform along with the relevant laws and regulations that outlined the bases of Ottoman modernization. His detailed analysis and wealth of sources pertaining to the aforementioned organizations establishes the relational aspect of modernization and bureaucratization in the reform era.

His analysis not only reveals bureaucratic structure but also defines changes to the political power balance within sultanic rule. As the balance swung toward the civil bureaucracy vis-à-vis the hegemon, he points out the power relations across state rule. The *Tanzimât* refers to the civil-bureaucratic hegemony led by Mustafa Reşid, Ali, and Fuad Pashas,[32] but the palace, during the rule of Abdülhamid II, reestablished its power over the civil bureaucracy.[33] But his general point of view is that the civil bureaucracy consisted of a monolithic, power that conflicted with sultanic hegemony. In other words, Findley saw the bureaucracy as a unitary body consisting of actors pursuing a collective agenda rather than being in conflict with each other. While Abu-Manneh notes certain internal bureaucratic struggles among networks connected to various pashas from the early *Tanzimât* to the

31 Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire,* preface page xx.

32 Ibid., 151-221.

33 Ibid., 221-291.

Hamidian period,[34] Findley draws a generalized picture of struggle between the civil bureaucracy, as a monolith, and sultanic hegemony.

In fact, this assumption emerges from his explanation of the connection between the emerging modernization of traditional societies and a complicated political balance.[35] He attributes the swinging balance of political power to the modernization paradigm, arguing that the transition from traditionalist patterns to modern ones upsets the balance. This is the reason why the bureaucracy started to expand in size and power.

> In the case of a traditional empire beginning to undergo modernization, discussion of the political balance becomes more complicated… In the transition between these two patterns, as a number of scholars have pointed out, political systems tend to display a marked loss of balance and a burgeoning of the bureaucracy in both size and power before the controls implied by a balance of the modern kind can develop. Indeed, demand for the new controls emerges largely in reaction against the bureaucratic preponderance of the transitional period.[36]

From this perspective, the late Ottoman period is indeed a perfect case study for the approach Findley internalizes. The modernization of traditional society, as a model, can easily be applied to the attempts at reform undertaken by Ottoman authorities. The balance between civil bureaucracy and absolute political authority shifted often, paving the way for modern Ottoman bureaucratic structures in Findley's narrative.

Findley's other seminal work, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom,*[37] focuses attention on the lives of civil officials, stressing their social lives rather than vast structural reforms. He benefitted from the *sicills* (registers) of

34 Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-*Tanzimât* Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Paşa," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, no. 3 (1990): 257-274.

35 Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire,* 17.

36 Ibid., 17-18.

37 Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (*New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).

bureaucrats mostly from the foreign ministry. Describing the civil officials of the scribal service (*kalemiye*) and the patterns of their administrative duties in detail, Findley draws a general picture of transformation within the bureaucracy as it changed from a scribal service (*kalemiye*) into civil officialdom (*mülkiye*[38]). While the *kalemiye* evokes the premodern period with a system of a patriarchal authority, the *mülkiye* was based on the phenomenon of modernization, to use Weberian terminology.

> The conditions of scribal service differed from those characteristic of modern administrative systems in virtually all the ways that Weber defines as distinctive of patrimonial officialdom. Scribes and other members of the ruling class were seen as servants of the ruler, not free men who had accepted a contractually limited obligation to serve the state. Systems for recruitment and training tended to be rudimentary and ad hoc, more so for scribes than for some the other elites, although nepotism and favoritism had come to prevail for all branches of service. The scribes' responsibilities tended to be miscellaneous, shaped more by custom than by plan and poorly demarcated from another.[39]

Before the reform attempts – which is to say before modernization – the Ottoman state service was dominated by the scribal service which, according to Findley, was a primordial, arbitrary system that was unprofessionally implemented. He then points to a transformation in Ottoman history toward the Weberian understanding of modern bureaucracy.

> With time, the Ottoman administration did begin, in a ragged way often clearer in concept than implementation, to take on the traits of a modern bureaucracy, as opposed to those of the earlier scribal corps. In the famous Weberian listing, this meant that the officials should be personally free, that the offices should be hierarchically

38 The translated version of the book used *mülkiye* for civil officialdom and *kalemiye* for the scribal service: Carter V. Findley, *Kalemiyeden Mülkiyeye Osmanlı Memurlarının Toplumsal Tarihi (*Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996).

39 Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom,* 7-8.

> organized, that each office should have distinct and specific functions, that the officials' obligations should be contractually limited (as opposed to the patrimonial officials' unconditional personal dependence on sovereign), that officials should be recruited on the basis of their qualifications (preferably by examinations).[40]

Findley not only concedes that Ottoman officials never reached a significant level of Weberian standardization but also that the premodern scribal service was never really its exact opposite.[41] "Yet, the Weberian list of bureaucratic traits can be taken as an indication of the orientation of Ottoman administrative reform."[42] In the context of the vast structural transformation from the *kalemiye* to the *mülkiye*, he examined the details of bureaucrat's lives to explore the effects of modernization.

Seeking out structural transformations in the everyday lives of bureaucrats leads to contradictions vis-à-vis the grand narrative of the manuscript. An obvious example is the conflict between Pertev and Akif Pashas.[43] He defines the nature of conflicts and negotiations among bureaucrats of the pre-*Tanzimât* period, and it can be inferred from the way he describes these factions within the bureaucracy that their conflicts were a driving force behind structural transformation. In other words, insofar as a reform movement existed within the bureaucratic apparatus, it stemmed, to a degree, from the conflicts and negotiations of these internal actors. However, Findley prefers to align himself with the Weberian modern bureaucratic perspective, stressing that the bureaucracy "needed relief from the insecurities of official slavery and the vicious factional politics that accompanied it."[44] Actually, the conflicts and negotiations among high-level bureaucrats reveals the bureaucracy's upswings and downswings – that it was a field of struggle for control by different actors and networks. However, devotion to the modernization paradigm compels Findley to ultimately ignore this hypothesis.

40 Ibid., 8-9.

41 Ibid., 9.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 70-80.

44 Ibid., 85-86.

Furthermore, conflicts between political and non-political factions within the bureaucracy were not only evident in the premodern era; these kinds of conflicts characterized both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, this dissertation deals with the 1908-1913 period to demonstrate the nature of control over the bureaucratic field within state apparatuses.

In parallel with Findley, Akyıldız also evaluates factional struggles within the higher bureaucracy as detrimental for the execution of reforms. He stresses that as much as conflicts between reformists and anti-reformists, bureaucratic struggles for power also impaired reform movements. They opened Ottoman politics to foreign intervention.[45] He continues by arguing that the factions aligned according to individual actors' relationships to foreign powers, which ultimately decelerated the reform movement.[46] However, contradicting his own assertion, he also points out that certain reform attempts stemmed from conflicts between bureaucrats, as in the case of the founding of the *Meclîs-i Tanzimât* (Council of the *Tanzimât*).[47]

Indeed, Akyıldız accepts the idea that reform, and therefore modernization, already dominated Ottoman bureaucratic structures in the nineteenth century, especially with regard to the *Tanzimât*. In-line with the dominant paradigm of decline, Akyıldız draws a general picture of Ottoman enlightenment that was late in coming, given its relative backwardness at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[48] Accordingly, starting with the military, which is postulated to be the underlying reason for its backwardness, the Ottomans undertook a huge project: modernization. After certain amendments to and reforms of the military, they focused modernizing the civil service. This process constitutes the basis of Akyıldız's *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme*. His arguments are shared by İlber Ortaylı in his book on administrative history, *Türkiye Teşkilat ve İdare Tarihi,* which elaboratively narrates administrative history from the Middle Ages until the demise of the

45 Ali Akyıldız, *Osmanlı Merkez Bürokrasisi* (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2018), 363-364.

46 Ibid., 364; Ali Akyıldız, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 53.

47 Ibid., 67.

48 Ibid., 15-31.

Ottoman Empire.[49] As for the late Ottoman period, he draws a general picture based on a paradigm of decline. He narrates the late Ottoman period as one of modernization, which for him ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the classical Ottoman system.[50] Furthermore, he argues that the modernization the Ottoman state was compelled by external pressures.[51] Therefore, the reform of local administrative organs through the *Tanzimât* were the inevitable results of this compulsory modernization. [52]

Metin Heper's numerous articles and books, which are theoretically rich researches, deserve specific attention since he has provided a basis for understanding Turkish-Ottoman bureaucratic structure and its transformation from the classical Ottoman period through republican Turkey to the 1980s. He not only applies his conceptual framework to the bureaucratic apparatus, but also to the state apparatus. He considers the state and the public bureaucracies within the same theoretical framework, mostly endorsing an institutional approach to the state. His thoughts on the bureaucracy are scrutinized first, while the relationship among the state, stateness, and the public bureaucracy will be considered second.

Unlike Findley, Heper consistently supports the idea, starting from his earliest studies, that the Turkish bureaucracy never reached the level of legal-rational authority proposed by Weber.[53] For him, Weber's theory of legal-rational bureaucracy applies only to bureaucracies in the Western European context and cannot apply to the Ottoman bureaucracy. Therefore, he proposed that "the genesis and development of the bureaucratic institutionalization pattern in the Ottoman-Turkish state followed an entirely different course from that of the West."[54] In fact, he directed a criticism at Weber, suggesting that other, different models from the Weberian legal-rational

49 İlber Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilat ve İdare Tarihi (*Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2008).

50 Ibid., 345-355, 402.

51 İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devri'nde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880) (*Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), 16.

52 Ibid., 28.

53 Metin Heper, "The Political Role of Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: Some Observations from the Perspective of Comparative Public Administration Theory," *Turkish Public Administration Annual* 1 (1974): 58.

54 Ibid.

bureaucracy must be sought. Concentrating on societies in the process of transformation to modernization, new bureaucratic models must be developed.[55]

It was Bonapartist tendencies in the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy that confounded the process that would need to legal-rational bureaucracy.[56] Moreover, the bureaucratic structure was highly politicized, and the political actors involved in modernizing the social structure did not comprise an entrepreneurial middle class but a group of modernizing bureaucrats.[57] Therefore, bureaucratic elites never reached the level of legal-rational authority of their Western counterparts. Instead, Heper proposes that only in the 1980s was there and attempt to transform the politicized bureaucracy into a "rational-productive bureaucracy"[58], an idea first theorized by Ilchman. [59]

In fact, although Heper approaches the Weberian model of bureaucracy cautiously, he ultimately pursues the same modernization paradigm as his counterparts since the 1960s. He is clearly influenced by the intelligentsia in the United States; the theories he develops are concertedly in-line with ideas of modernization, institutionalization, and developmentalism. His book, *The State Tradition in Turkey,* stresses the "center-periphery" approach as well as modernization by modernizing bureaucrats.[60]

Furthermore, Çağlar Keyder portrays the state, consisting of elite, modernizing bureaucrats, as a single unity susceptible to outside influence stemming from the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie. For him, the comprador bourgeois dominated in the late Ottoman liberal economic phase, after which a national bourgeois emerged. The struggle between the

---

55 Metin Heper, "Osmanlı Türk Bürokrasisinde Modernleşme Saf Patrimonyalizmden Patrimonyal Yasallığa Geçiş," in *Yönetim Sosyolojisi,* ed. Ömer Bozkurt (Ankara: Doğan Matbaası, 1977), 52-54.

56 Metin Heper and M. Selçuk Sancar, "Is Legal-Rational Bureaucracy a Prerequisite for Rational-Productive Bureaucracy? The Case of Turkey," *Administration & Society* 30, no. 2 (May 1998), 159.

57 Heper, "Political Role," 58.

58 Heper and Sancar, "Legal-Rational Bureaucracy," 159.

59 Warren Ilchman, "Productivity, Administrative Reform and Antipolitics: Dilemmas for Developing States," in *Political and Administrative Development,* ed. Ralph Braibanti (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1969).

60 Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985).

state and capitalist classes dominated Turkish history until the 1980s.[61] Throughout, he depicts a bureaucracy constituted as a unified entity.

Given the work of these prominent scholars, one might ask whether it is possible to avoid the modernization paradigm when studying the bureaucracy. That is, is there an alternative methodological assumption with which to approach the issue? This study proposes that bureaucracy and the state should not be considered as monolithic; rather state cadres consisted of actors who engaged in conflicts and negotiations.[62] These state cadres never acted as a single intellect but as a collection of multifaced networks and intellectual propositions. The overall structure and transformation of the state cadres resulted from everyday struggles stemmed either from the politics or interest of these actors, not an abstract form of a top-down modernization. An explosion of functionalist and institutionalist state theories will lead to the alternative: Bourdieu's field theory of the state, which helps to explain the bureaucratic cadres and their internal struggles.

§ 1.2 Theorizing the State: Revisiting the Relational Conceptualization

The Weberian explanation of the modern rational bureaucracy is only possible within the ideal system of the state. In other words, the bureaucratic apparatus cannot be studied without understanding his state theorization. For him, a political organization is a state "insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order."[63] This definition comprises separate acclamations at the same time in different levels, considering that Weber tried to formalize both the institutional characteristics and the operative dimensions of the state. Weber was in pursuit of an explanation of the actual form and function of the state, and as such, he described the shape of

61 Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey.*

62 Ezra Suleiman considered the complex of French bureaucracy institutions in terms of political structure rather than as a monolithic mechanism. See Suleiman, *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France.*

63 Weber, *Economy and Society: Outline*, 54.

institutions supported by modern ideal bureaucrats. For Mann, while Weber defined the state considering both its institutional and functional dimensions, his focus was largely institutional.[64] Mann also suggests that the state theory of Weber was characterized by: a) a differentiated set of institutions and personnel, b) a centrality of political relations, c) a territorially demarcated area, d) and a monopoly over authoritative rule-making via a monopoly over the means of using physical violence.[65] These apply to both the institutional and functional formations regarding the state apparatus. Recent studies have also emerged on the relationship between state and the form of legitimacy that Weber proposed, suggesting that Weber went beyond the institutionalist understanding.[66]

The literature, in fact, consists of differing state theories starting in the early twentieth century. While some have intellectual links to the Weberian explanation of state formation, others are closer to the Marxist approach or to subsequent parallel cultural and liberal approaches. In a recent literature review, Vom Hau provides four analytical approaches to state theory: a class-analytic approach, a liberal approach, a neo-Weberian approach, and a culturalist approach.[67] With this in mind, prominent works pertaining to the state stress two main themes. For Skocpol, excess focus on the society-centered approach paved the way for efforts to "bringing the state back in" approach.[68] For Mann's, there was tension among reductionist approaches, as

64 Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie/Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie* 25, no. 2 (1984), 187.

65 Ibid., 188.

66 Philipp Lottholz and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, "Re-reading Weber, Re-Conceptualizing State-Building: From Neo-Weberian to Post-Weberian Approaches to State, Legitimacy and State-Building," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2016), 1467-1485.

67 Matthias vom Hau, "State Theory: Four Analytical Traditions," in *The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State,* eds. Stephan Leibfried, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 131-151.

68 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

he proposes an alternative institutional explanation throughout his studies.[69] In fact, Mann's methodological approach to how modern states established power over social actors as already applied to the Turkish case.[70] Bob Jessop, on the other hand, draws a multilayered picture of the form, functions, and impacts of the states.[71] Notwithstanding their predilection that puts all the theories within different umbrellas, they all shared a roughly outlined border differentiating each paradigm. Accordingly, Marxist and liberal approaches focused on the function of the state apparatus and potential relations with society; the state was deemed to have been formed by the outside influences of society and the economy. On the other hand, the institutional – that is to say, neo-Weberian – approach investigates the state as it is. The difference between the functional and institutional approaches are assumptions about what is operational and what is relational, as well as how state institutions actually formed. This raises questions pertaining to the details of how "institutional" (based on form) and "functional" approaches understand the state: What are the functions of states? Why have societies needed states? What purposes has the state served? What were the ideas behind constituting the organization of states – which is to say, what kinds of institutions have states needed? How were state institutions formed?

Answers to these questions were sought especially in the postwar period. The intelligentsia before World War II, on the other hand, focused more on institutional questions regarding the state itself. Like almost every discipline in the social sciences, state theories prior to World War II were substantially affected by the actual political atmosphere. Together with nationalism and militarism, states were evaluated as instruments for the exercise of ideological and military power over society. For Mann, intellectuals at the time saw

69 See in particular Michael Mann, *The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914*. vol. 2 of *The Sources of Social Power (*New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 44-92; and Mann, "Autonomous Power."

70 See Tim Jacoby, *Social Power and the Turkish State (*London: Frank Cass, 2004).

71 Bob Jessop, "Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections," *International Review of Sociology/Revue Internationale de Sociologie* 11, no. 2 (2001), 149-173.

the state as more than a mere "embodiment of physical force in society."[72] Accordingly, pioneering works on nationalism, racism, fascism, and social Darwinism played a key role in the era's theoretical explanations of the state.

1.2.1 *The Marxist Approach*

The postwar period witnessed several emerging works on the state that conceptualized both its function and form. Among Marxist theoreticians, the nature of the capitalist state became popular. Marxist theory during the postwar period focused on the function of the state, neglecting its institutional forms. In fact, long before World War II, Marx and Engel did not provide an adequate state theory;[73] rather they offered only a fragmented sketch. Furthermore, starting with the Second and Third Internationals, the writings of Marx and Engels were interpreted through selective accounts that stressed both the institutional and instrumental conceptualizations of the state.[74] In the 1980s, on one hand, the Marxist literature generally investigated the functioning of state apparatuses in the framework of state and bourgeoisie relations.

> These, *inter alia*, see the state variously as acting as an instrument of bourgeois rule, distinguishing its ideological appearance as serving the general interests of society as a whole from its particular interest in serving capital, as constituting a relation of production, acting as a guarantor of capital accumulation, expressing the space within which class struggles unfold, and maintaining the social order and protecting private property.[75]

On the other hand, Bob Jessop stresses six separate points by which the contemporary Marxist understanding of the state can be distinguished from the classical texts of the Marxist literature. After describing these respective formulations, however, he notes that the Marxist classics did not provide "well-

72 Mann, "Autonomous Power," 186.

73 Jessop, "Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again)," 149.

74 Ibid., 149-150.

75 Steven Loyal, *Bourdieu's Theory of State: A Critical Introduction (*New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 40.

formulated, coherent and sustained theoretical analysis of the state."[76] For him, "although they are often combined with varying degrees of consistency and mutual qualification, they involve different theoretical assumptions, principles of explanation and political implications."[77] His six points are as follows:[78] (1) For Marx, the modern state was "a parasitic institution"[79] made no fundamental contribution to production processes regarding the economy. For him, "the state and its officials, far from representing the common interest, tend to exploit and oppress civil society."[80] His later ideas became influential in the literature of anarchism. (2) Marx saw the state as component of property relations and economic class struggles. In fact, the exercise of state power is an "epiphenomena of the system"[81] that reflected economic struggles. This oversimplified the role of states, limiting it to interfering with or accelerating economic development and economic class struggle. "Although state intervention can accelerate or hinder economic development, the latter is always determinant in the last instance."[82] (3) The state holds an intermediary position of regulating and decreasing class conflicts. With reference to Engels, Lenin, Poulantzas, Buharin, and Gramsci, Jessop criticizes the notion that the role of the state, is to be "the factor of cohesion."[83] Then, he deemed this conclusion to be over-functional and inadequate for explaining the nature of the state. (4) The state itself is approached as an instrument for establishing class rule. For Jessop, it was the most popular approach the armchair Marxist-Leninsts supported, and he further criticizes the notion that the state was "neutral and can be used with equal facility and equal effectiveness by any class or social force."[84] However, this does not explain those circumstances in which state rule is powerful than rule by the

76 Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 29.

77 Ibid., 25.

78 Ibid., 26-29.

79 Ibid.,26.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid. 27.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

dominant classes. (For instance, the Second French Empire under Louis Bonaparte or the German Reich under Bismarck.) (5) Another approach resembles the institutional understanding of the state. Accordingly, rather than as an intermediator between classes, the state is seen as a certain form of institutions. As a "public power"[85], the state is comprised of monopolized officials within a distinct system of government. However, this does not negate class struggle: "The functions, effects and class nature of the state cannot be determined a priori, but depend on the relations between its institutional structure and the class struggle in various circumstances."[86] (6) The last point he stressed is that the states are "a system of political domination with specific effects on the class struggle."[87] For him, this approach would be valuable only if combined with the institutional definition of the state. If not, it would require a complicated theoretical analysis that could result in the oversimplified explanation that states function under the capitalist classes. Jessop uses Lenin's example that democratic republics could be best means of capitalist dissemination; once founded, no force within the state can diminish the rule of capital. He further noted that while instrumentalist approaches seek out the functions of states, this approach focuses on the forms of political domination, representation, and intervention.

As noted above, Jessop did not find that the Marxist classics established a reasonable as well as long-lasting theory of the state. Furthermore, he accepted that the classics provided drastic generalizations but laid out the groundwork for a more meticulous analysis in which "the perspective of political domination provides an adequate starting point for studying the state and state power."[88] A more coherent chronology could be pursued in the Marxist literature within the intellectual backstage of the Marxist understanding of the state.

Even before World War II, Marxist intellectuals put forward instrumentalist theories pertaining to the state, especially since the Second International. The Comintern also proceeded such views in parallel with Lenin's

85 Ibid., 28.

86 Ibid.,

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., 29.

ideas,[89] elaborating on the point that states emerged as a capitalist monopolies that carry out economic and political repressions.[90] Accordingly, democratic republics were basically capitalist in that those states serve the interests of the capitalist classes. In the end, this conclusion shows that the Marxist interpretation of the state was based on its function rather than its form or shape. In other words, what made sense for Marxist intellectuals was to analyze the functional basis of states.

Another step through the state theory during the interwar period was introduced and debated among the Critical Theorists for Jessop.[91] For Jessop, they were concerned with authoritarian and totalitarian influences in the formation of the structure of the bureaucratic state.[92] As for after the World War Second, Jessop evaluated the postwar period as one of turning points; Marxist intellectuals would continue to discuss the state until the late 1970s, long beyond initial prewar discussions.[93] For him, it was primarily the ability of Keynesian national welfare states and Atlantic Fordism in the economic field with that attracted attention to the origins of capitalist projections of welfare.[94] This approach deals first with the function of the state and then follows up with an analysis of form. This parallels the Miliband and Poulantzas whereby function corresponds the instrumentalist position and form corresponds the structural one. While Miliband elaborates on the extent to which the state serves the capitalist classes in general,[95] Poulantzsas claims that the state is ultimately capitalist in its own structural positioning.[96] Miliband approached the state as an instrumentalist or functionalist, while Poulantzas was more inclined toward the institutionalist or structuralist

89 For Lenin's ideas on the state, see V.I. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014); and Mel Rothenberg, "Lenin on the State," *Science & Society* 59, no. 3 (Fall, 1995): 418-436.

90 Jessop, "Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again)," 150.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid. For debates on the relationship between bureaucratism and authoritarian states among the pioneering works of the Frankfurt School, see David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory, Horkheimer to Habermas (*California: University of California Press, 1980).

93 Jessop, "Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again)," 150.

94 Ibid.

95 Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society (*London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969).

96 Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review*, 58 (1969): 67-78.

approach. For Miliband, in general, state elite and its bureaucracy serve the interests of capital holders via their social origins, networks, and personal links.[97] Poulantzas disregarded these, saying it was not the state elite but the state itself that is actually capitalist as its primary task is to preserve the capitalist system in general.[98]

Beyond the debates on the form and the function of the state, Marxist intellectuals also dealt with state power, considering it to be part of a complex web of social relations. An examination of the relational nature of the state together with the state's capacity for power is evident in Gramsci's studies. Unlike early Marxist theoreticians, he directly focused on state power, the level of which in bourgeois societies was determined by hegemony and coercion.[99] His idealizations paved the way for other conceptual theories including the approaches of post-modernism, feminism and Foucault.[100]

Marxist intellectuals from the time of Marx and Engels to the late 1970s pursued an approach that explains the state in terms of its ongoing, conceptual functioning with its monolithic structure as it is same with the bureaucracy. This fact unsettled some scholars who criticized the Marxist approach for being too functional. The most influential of such critiques was by Bourdieu.

> The Marxist tradition does not pose the problem of the existence of the state, resolving it right from the start by defining the functions it fulfils; from Marx to Gramsci, to Althusser and beyond, it always insists on characterizing the state by what it does, and by the people for whom it does what it does, but without investigating the actual structure of the mechanisms deemed to produce its foundation. Clearly, it is possible to emphasize more strongly the economic functions of the state or its ideological functions: to speak of 'hegemony' (Gramsci)

97 Miliband, *The State*, 162.

98 For a detailed discussion of the Miliband-Poulantzas debate, see Stanley Aronowitz and Peter Bratsis, eds., *State Theory Reconsidered, Paradigm Lost (*Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).

99 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebook (*New York: International Publishers, 1971).

100 Jessop, "Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again)," 151.

> or 'ideological state apparatus' (Althusser), but the accent is always placed on the functions, and the question of the being and acting of this thing designated as the state is sidestepped.[101]

The understanding of the monolithic state could similarly be followed with how Marx saw the bureaucracy. For him, the bureaucracy is a fictious state as a monolithic structure that is different than the real state apparatus which in fact constitutes the very being of the state itself.

> The bureaucracy is the imaginary state alongside the real state; it is the spiritualism of the state… The bureaucracy has the being of the state, the spiritual being of society, in its possession; it is its private property. The general spirit of the bureaucracy is the secret, the mystery, preserved inwardly by means of the hierarchy and externally as a closed corporation.[102]

Bourdieu was not alone in criticizing the functional nature of the Marxist theory of the state. Attempts to conceptualize the function of the state ultimately paved the way for a society-centered approach to the state. In other words, Marxist analyses of the state created a fundamental theory implicit in society itself. State and society, bourgeois rule as an economic determinant, and the relation between these were the primary basis of this approach. This generated pushback among neo-Weberian sociological approaches to the state, backspace which ejected a dependent, non-autonomous, society-centered idea of the state.

1.2.2 *The Neo-Weberian Approach on the State*

Theda Skocpol began her introductory essay in *Bringing the State Back In* by depicting how academic studies of the state, whether they approach the issue

101 Pierre Bourdieu, *On the State, Lectures at the Collége de France, 1989-1992,* eds. Patrich Champagne, Remi Lenoir, Frank Poupeau, and Marie-Christine Riviére, trans. David Fernbach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 5.

102 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ed. Joseph O'Malley (New York: Cam-bridge University Press, 2009), 47.

from a historical or conceptual perspective, has already been developing an understanding for being too much "society-centered".[103] It is for this reason that the neo-Weberian approach puts the state at the center of its analysis, disregarding the central position of state-society relations.

Weber himself was later one of the earliest scholars to discuss the state from and institutionalist perspective. According to Mann, Weber adopted a mix of functional and institutional approaches, but leaned toward the institutional.[104] Together with the functions of power, rule, and authority, Weber was interested in how the state and its institutional characteristics were formed. Neo-Weberian sociologists, on the other hand, went further than Weber. The state, as a distinct entity from society, has its own institutional autonomy. In other words, the state has its own field independent of society.

With this as the primary concern, analyses varied. For example, Skocpol focused on state formation and social revolutions from an international comparative perspective,[105] while Tilly, who also addressed international state building, formalized and focused on the state, capital, and coercion.[106] By 1975, Tilly had already theorized the long-term formation of nation states in the Western European order.[107] Indeed, Skocpol and Tilly were both heavily influenced by Barrington Moore's studies on historical sociology,[108] which explains why they focused how states emerged and operated within the international order.[109] The main trends in historical sociology had converged on explaining the capitalist formation of the states and were concerned primarily with the function. This was in fact a dilemma as far as Skocpol and

103 Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 4-7.

104 Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," 187.

105 Theda Skocpol , *States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (*Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1979).

106 Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (*Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1990).

107 Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

108 Dennis Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology (*Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 68.

109 See Barrington Jr. Moore's prominent study *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (*Middlesex: Penguin University Books, 1973).

Tilly, as the prominent scholars of historical sociology who dismissed the functional theory of the state, are considered.

To explain Skocpol's and Tilly's perspectives on the state, the analytical and empirical foundations of their research must be mentioned. In addition to Skocpol's chapter in *Bringing the State Back In* in which she strongly espouses a break from the society-centered approach to the state, she further points to the autonomy of states in *States and Social Revolutions*.[110] In fact, she argues, revisions of social revolution are inaccurately based on revolutionary vanguards rather than existing socio-economic and international conditions. As international relations and domestic socio-economic situations are state affairs, state apparatuses would necessarily affect social solutions in a strict political regime. This is how international pressure – that is to say, autonomous interstate relations – affects domestic politics.[111] Social revolutions, therefore, can only be understood by studying the state itself as well as its institutions.

> We can make sense of social-revolutionary transformations only if we take the state seriously as a macro-structure. The state properly conceived as no mere arena in which socio-economic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, as a set of administrative policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, and executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations.[112]

In the footnote to the passage above, she states that her understanding of state was actually influenced by Max Weber's writings.[113] She also noted the influence of Charles Tilly, Otto Hintze, Randall Collins, and Franz Schurmann.

As stated earlier, Tilly's works on state formation deserve special attention as a prominent contribution to the neo-Weberian institutional

110 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 24-33.

111 Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology*, 70.

112 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 29.

113 For the footnote, see Ibid., 301.

approach. His approach to the state is revealed by his methodological understanding of history; it was natural for him to avoid the functionalist analysis of Marxist state theories. As Dennis Smith points out; "Tilly does not disguise his dislike of misleading assumptions contained in the structural-functionalist approach to history…"[114] However, this does not mean that he avoids grand narratives pertaining to the international order, especially with respect to the birth of nation states. Inspired by the same muse, Barrington Moore, Tilly establishes a methodology that parallels Skocpol's analysis of the macro, interregional level. Like Skocpol, Tilly's comparison of international structures underlines the autonomous nature of state elites in relation to society. For him, it is ultimately about the method of resource extraction.

> The organization of major social classes within a state's territory, and their relations to the state, significantly affected the strategies rulers employed to extract resources, the resistance they met, the struggle that resulted, the sorts of durable organization that extraction and struggle laid down, and therefore the efficiency of resource extraction.[115]

Moreover, for Tilly, the organization of state elites vis-à-vis social classes differed between coercion-intensive regions and capital-intensive ones.[116] In fact, he had already pointed by 1975, the Weberian postulate of the state's monopoly of violence – that is, how the state can be seen as the criminal enterprise of war making elites[117] – is again a matter of resource extraction. Unlike his Marxist colleagues, Tilly establishes a state-centered narrative even in his explanation of the relationship between state and society.

Concerning the autonomous character of the state, the most influential scholar is Michael Mann. Apart from his three-volume *The Sources of Social Power,* in which he also comments on the state, he wrote a separate article in which he consolidates his ideas on the autonomy of the state. In fact, he

114 Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology*, 79.

115 Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992*, 15.

116 Ibid.

117 Lottholz and Lemay-Hébert, "Re-reading Weber, Re-conceptualizing State-Building," 1472.

begins his article critique of the existing literature through 1984, which he argued is too reductionist.

> Nowadays there is no need to belabour the point that most general theories of the state have been false because they have been reductionist. They have reduced the state to the pre-existing structures of civil society. This is obviously true of the Marxist, the liberal and the functionalist traditions of state theory… Though such theories disagree about many things, they are united in denying significant autonomous power to the state.[118]

Mann also references Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions*, mentioning her endeavor to merge the two dimensions of state theories: the domestic economic/ideological aspect and the military-international aspect. For him, this combination of the two was the best theory to which academia had arrived by the 1980s.[119] Indeed, Mann's other work, which concerns English state finances, use directly with this methodology of combining the two versions of the state theory.[120] He stressed the autonomy of the state and then defines the state's power and autonomous arena over against that of civil society.

Neo-Weberian state theory proposes its methodological infrastructure to a scale that fits on the international historical processes through an autonomous and based on discussions about state violence that played significant roles in forming state apparatuses. This was one of the criticisms they faced. For Lottholz and Leman-Hébert, institutionalist approaches were based on Western experiences within a global framework.[121] Moreover, neo-Weberian state building theory "rests on a universalist logic underlying the way in which modern, Western, 'Weberian' state institutions have been adopted as a template for states throughout world."[122] Applying the

118 Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," 185.

119 Ibid., 187.

120 Michael Mann, "State and Society, 1130-1815: An Analysis of English State Finance," in *Political Power and Social Theory, vol.* 1, ed. Maurice Zeitlin (Connecticut: J.A.I. Press, 1980).

121 Lottholz and Lemay-Hébert, "Re-reading Weber," 1473.

122 Ibid., 1474.

institutional template to "other" states might be an inappropriate approach; furthermore, this was a conscious academic initiative.

Jessop proposes five main criticisms of neo-statism.[123] Some of his criticisms are aimed at the fact that the neo-Weberian approach was not generating genuine discussion as certain themes were already addressed in functionalist approaches as well. Other criticisms suggest that neo-statism is one-sided, excludes political forces outside the state, and necessitates a single, monolithic approach to the state. But in fact, neither neo-Weberian theory nor its criticisms move beyond the monolithic unitary state approach. Both approaches, as well as those of Marxists and even liberals, consider the state as a single monolithic entity without endeavoring to understand its internal dynamics. Ignoring the state's internal forces, struggles, conflicts, and negotiations renders the major theories developed either by both functionalists and institutionalists deficient. This study pursues an alternative approach that considers the internal struggles among in-state actors.

1.2.3 *An Alternative to State Autonomy: The State as an Autonomous Field of Struggle from Mann to Bourdieu*

Mann states that functionalists, Marxists, liberals, and other traditional approaches have evaluated the state "as a place, an arena, in which the struggles of classes, interest groups and individuals are expressed and institutionalized."[124] They describe how relations between non-state actors who claim to have power and in-state agents shape the actual state apparatus. Neo-Weberians, in turn, proposed an autonomous field of power pertaining to the state, independent of non-state figures in society. However, both of these explanations ultimately failed to consider that the state can itself be an arena of internal struggles and negotiations among the actors of the state itself, not just between "civil society" and state elites. Independent of the influence of outside actors who claim power over state apparatuses, how can struggles among actors inside the state apparatus, from both the lower and higher strata of the bureaucracy, be evaluated?

123 Jessop, "Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again)," 154-155.

124 Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," 185.

Furthermore, for traditional explanations, the state is ultimately seen as a monolithic organization subject to outside intervention. In other words, the two schools of thought see the state as a monolithic unitary organization – a single force that acts as a single body. To varying degrees, outside actors then struggle to establish relationships with this organization. Although neo-Weberian scholars did not analyze this relationship, they still focused on the state's power as a monolithic organization. The circles and relationships between non-state actors and a monolithic state are innumerable. However, studies of these discount the formative roles of in-state actors, underplaying their everyday struggles. In other words, describing the state as a coalesced monolith that acts in concert is misleading. The multifaceted struggle among actors within the state must be considered to understand both the formation and operation of the state as an autonomous arena of outside organizations.

This study primarily concerns how in-state actors struggled to form the state apparatus through collaborative networks, ideological and political fallouts, and everyday conflicts and negotiations among actors within the bureaucratic circle. This provides an alternative perspective on the Ottoman Second Constitutional Period in the sense that the state apparatus can be seen as a "field" in Pierre Bourdieu's terminology.

This perspective is initially best understood via, although not identical to, Bourdieu's field theory – that is, by merging the idea of the state with his conceptualizations of field, habitus and capital. This study does not directly adopt Bourdieu's field theory; rather, it is inspired by Bourdieu's ultimate theoretical endeavor.

It is not possible to grasp Bourdieu's explanation of the state without considering his interdependent general theories of relational sociology. One cannot consider *habitus, capital,* and *field* independently, especially with respect to his approach to the state. Although at first glance he seems to be proposing a basic addition to Weber's definition of state, his approach is actually more complex. Where Weber defined the state as "the monopoly of

the legitimate use of physical force"[125] within a given territory, Bourdieu adds the concept of symbolic violence.

> I made an addition to the famous definition of Max Weber, who defined the state [as the] "monopoly of legitimate violence," which I corrected by adding "monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence," inasmuch as the monopoly of symbolic violence is the condition for possession of the exercise of the monopoly of physical violence itself.[126]

This ultimately transformed the whole definition implicating at the same time the whole of postwar destructuralist literature. However, although this "new" definition alone was path-breaking, it was actually not Bourdieu's pioneering contribution. Understanding his approach is only possible by grasping the conceptual approaches pertaining to his field theory.

Summarizing even the basic concepts of field theory is difficult because of its sophistication. A field can be considered as certain arena based on social relationships that are structurally built upon power relations among agents who voluntarily or necessarily enter the given field. As one of his definitions states, it is the relationships of positions determined by capital:

> In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).[127]

125 Weber, *Economy and Society: Outline*, 54.

126 Bourdieu, *On the State*, 4.

127 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 97.

Therefore, the field is an arena of struggle among agents in which capital (whether cultural, political, physical force, economic, or symbolic) plays a significant role with respect to holding certain positions. And while certain fields necessitate the formation of only one type of capital to maintain power within the field, other fields are comprised of different kinds of capital at the same time. The state, as a field, is one such culmination of different capitals at the same time.

> The state is the culmination and product of a slow process of accumulation and concentration of different species of capital: a capital of physical force, in the form of the military and the police (which is evoked by Weber's definition of the state as exercising the "monopoly of legitimate physical violence"'); economic capital (which is necessary, among other things, to provide the funding for the physical force); cultural or informational capital, accumulated in the form of statistics, for example, and also in the form of instruments of knowledge endowed with universal validity within the limits of its competence, such as weights, measures, maps or land registers; and, lastly, symbolic capital.[128]

The capital accumulation process paves the way for internal conflicts and struggles. Relationships among agents who possess different levels of capital determine the course of struggles within a field. An agent or actor with less capital needs to increase it in conflict or negotiation with others, while those with higher levels of capital can even change the entire system. Therefore, promoting one's level of capital can be interpreted as the main stimulus behind the overall struggles in the field. For the field of the state, political capital and the use of physical and symbolic power are the prevailing forms of capital that agents pursue.

By shifting the very nature of the argument vis-à-vis functionalist and institutionalist approaches to the state, Bourdieu transforms not only how to approach the state but also on what subject to concentrate. In Bourdieu's

128 Pierre Bourdieu, *The Social Structures of the Economy,* trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 12.

approach, the focus is on intra-state struggles rather than interstate or state-society relationships. Bourdieu nevertheless commented on the mainstream literature on the state of the 1990s. Consolidating his own arguments, he criticizes the functionalists and institutionalists that indicate the actual problem:

> Indeed, it seems to me that, when you take a close look at what goes on inside what we call the "state," you immediately annul most of the scholastic problems that scholars, armchair Marxists and other speculative sociologists, keep raising about the state, that quasi-metaphysical notion that must be exploded in order to "go to the things themselves," as Edmund Husserl said in a different context.[129]

He continues by criticizing the "new" alternative proffered by the institutionalists in the 1980s: the autonomy of the state. For Bourdieu, this alternative to the functional, Marxist model of state theory supposedly advanced a state approach in which the unitary reality is shaped by relations with outside forces.[130] From Bourdieu's point of view,

> In fact, what we encounter, concretely, is an ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields (they often take the empirical form of commissions, bureaus and boards) within which agents and categories of agents, governmental and nongovernmental, struggle over this peculiar form of authority consisting of the power to rule via legislation, regulations, administrative measures (subsidies, authorizations, restrictions, etc.) … The state, then, if you insist on keeping this designation, would be the ensemble of fields that are the site of struggles in which what is at stake is— to build on Max Weber's famed formulation— the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence, i.e., the power to constitute and to impose as universal and universally applicable within a given "nation," that is, within the boundaries of a given territory, a common set of coercive norms.[131]

---

129 Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 111.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid., 111-112.

Bourdieu's approach stressed struggle over authority, the power of which is made apparent through tools like regulations, legislation, and restrictions. This study deems it valuable to also highlight how bureaucratic appointments and dismissals contributed to in-state struggles. The power to control bureaucratic appointments and dismissals ultimately created a struggle over the field of power among state cadres.

On the other hand, the struggle over the use of power – physical or symbolic – occurs at different levels of a field, just as the state is an ensemble of conflicts. As Bourdieu pointed out, there is no "one" field, as well as no "one" struggle. This study insists on a combination of neo-statist and Bourdieuvian approaches; it considers the state as an autonomous field of power comprised of overlapping struggles among different actors and agents at the same time. Unlike neo-statist approaches, this study focuses on autonomous power using different methodology: the state is the autonomous place of multiple agents' field of struggle. In other words, rather than concentrating on outside influences and a global, interstate scale of power, one must first investigate the state's own dynamics which are shaped by conflicts and negotiations among in-state actors. Moreover, although the study is inspired by Bourdieu's approach as a means to concentrate on in-state struggles, and empirical application of the methodology of capital-based field analysis is not yet possible. Rather than on a capital-based analysis, this study concentrates on the field itself and the struggles within.

In contrast with the existing literature on the Ottoman bureaucracy, it could be argued that the struggles among bureaucrats contributed much to the overall structure of this field. This ultimately appends the long-standing modernization paradigm. Rather than concentrating on grand narratives spanning more than a century, a focus on the everyday struggles among actors located not only in the political field but also in the bureaucratic field would enable historians to uncover the historical temporality. Furthermore, struggles among political elites for control over the bureaucratic field poses a different question for the literature pertaining the Second Constitutional Period, namely to what extent did the CUP's power manage to control state cadres in practice.

§ 1.3 The Scope of the CUP's Power: Classics of the Literature on the Second Constitutional Period

The literature on the Second Constitutional period has long been based on the notion that a high political structure took shape in accordance with an idea that emerged from the CUP. But this process took place backstage during the first years of constitutional rule. Indeed, the literature's standpoint emerged from Sina Akşin's periodization of the early Constitutional Period: the "*denetleme iktidârı*"[132] (inspection period) of the CUP. He benefitted from the term *denetleme iktidârı* by pointing out the limitations faced by CUP elites acting backstage within the state. This circumstance started in July 1908 and lasted until summer 1912.

Akşin's statement was echoed by prominent scholars of the era. In fact, Ahmad went beyond Akşin's *denetleme iktidarı*, questioning the extent of the CUP's power vis-à-vis the government and Mahmut Şevket Pasha during their struggle in 1909.[133] It is true that the CUP wished in part to be visible via taking a seat in government. It was also true that the experienced pashas of the Hamidian period held onto their ministries. For Tarık Zafer Tunaya, it was the inexperience of CUP members that resulted in the Committee not dominating earlier governments.[134] In the initial cabinet of Kamil Pasha, the CUP was represented by only one minister: Manyasizâde Refik Bey, the Minister of Justice.[135] But, as Feroz Ahmad notes, Manyasizade was unable to play an important role because he passed away soon after the cabinet was formed. Ahmad argues that the first member of the CUP to really be a minister was Cavid Bey, who came by the position of Minister of Finance in June 1909.[136] Within months, on August 1909, the prominent CUP member Talat Bey also entered the government. Indeed, the CUP's influence in the government gradually increased through the summer of 1912.

---

132 Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987), 83-245.

133 Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki, 1908-1914 (*Istanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1971), 105.

134 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi*, vol. 1 of *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler,* 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988), 25-26.

135 Ibid.

136 Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki,* 88.

Tarık Zafer Tunaya and Yusuf Hikmet Bayur did not apply a general periodization like Akşin. Bayur, for example, approached the period by describing the ups and downs using a methodological formulation: the CUP was always struggling to demand political power, not waiting for inspecting. For him, the CUP assumed *de facto* power as early as February 1909 when Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha became the *sadrazâm*.[137]

However, the literature has evaluated the scope of the CUP's power within certain spheres of influence, namely the government, parliament, and public opinion.[138] Moreover, certain exceptions aside, studies of the pre-1908 period, focus on how CUP power prepared the way for political takeover. This attitude in the literature is apparent in certain prominent studies of not only the period after 1908 but also of the Young Turk power before 1908.

The 1940s and 1950s witnessed the emergence of a literature on the Second Constitutional Period pioneered by Tunaya, Kuran, Ramsaur, and Bayur. The historian Tarık Zafer Tunaya focused on Turkish history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His three-volume masterwork, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, focused on the period from 1908 to 1922.[139] In fact, his habilitation thesis, *Âmme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Fikir Cereyanları*,[140] one of the first attempts at an intellectual history of the period, constituted the main foundation for his later projects.[141] Şerif Mardin's studies are also significant as far as the intellectual

137 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, vol. I/II *(*Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 172-182.

138 For a detailed, comparative review of the literature on the Second Constitutional Period, see Cüneyd Okay, "Meşrutiyet Dönemi Türk Siyasi Hayatı Kaynakçası," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 2, no. 1 (2004), 99-112.

139 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi*, vol. 1 of *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler (*Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984); Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Mütareke Dönemi, 1918-1922*, vol. 2 of *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986); Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İttihat ve Terakki: Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi*, vol. 3 of *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989).

140 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Amme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Fikir Cereyanları* (Habilitation Thesis, İstanbul University, 1948).

141 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Tunaya, Tarık Zafer," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 41, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2012), 377-378.

history of the late Ottoman Empire is concerned. Although his monumental study, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought,*[142] did not deal with the post-1908 period, together with *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri,*[143] his work pioneered further studies on the intellectual history of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks. On the other hand, another study on intellectual thought that emerged in the 1960s, that of Hılmi Ziya Ülken, elaborately discusses the intellectual trends of the Second Constitutional period.[144] Hanioğlu's research on Abdullah Cevdet is a primary example of a later study pertaining to intellectual thought.[145]

Ramsaur's study can be evaluated in the same manner. He concentrates on the political atmosphere in which Young Turk intellectual and political ideas were born. His book, *The Young Turks,* [146] focuses on the period mostly before 1908 and explains political and intellectual struggles within and outside of the Committee. He benefits from firsthand accounts of those who experienced the late Ottoman period. His writings are based mostly on contemporary intellectuals and politicians who were in the Young Turks movement but opposed the CUP. According to Zürcher, this is why he misunderstood the organization in Macedonia even though the revolution took place during the time period he was writing about.[147] Ramsaur also benefited from Ahmed Bedevi Kuran's studies on the Young Turks and the Second Constitutional Period. Kuran's *İnkılap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*,[148] published in 1945, covers the broad chronology from the late 1850s to 1923. As a witness to the first half of twentieth century, an active opponent of the CUP, and

142 Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

143 Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri, 1895-1908 (*Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992).

144 Hılmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (*Istanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1966), 139-344.

145 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi (*Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981).

146 Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

147 Erik J. Zürcher, "İlan-ı Hürriyetin Tarihyazımı: Geniş Bir Fikir Birliği, Biraz İhtilaf ve Kaçırılan Fırsat," in *Yadigar-ı Meşrutiyet*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 267-270.

148 Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *İnkilap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler (*Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1945).

known supporter of Sabahaddin Bey,[149] he gave a wide coverage in his book to those who contended with Ahmet Rıza and his followers before 1905 and with CUP supporters after 1908. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, the grandson of Kamil Paşa, was 17 when the revolution took place.[150] His chronological study covers the first two decades of the twentieth century. In the beginning of his first volume, he presents the chain of events starting with the Treaty of San Stefano and continuing until 1908. His analysis starts in the second chapter that in which he focuses mostly on the Young Turk movement. Ten separate booklets in three volumes were built on this subject.[151]

The generation of scholars that dominated the historiography after Kuran, Bayur, Tunaya and Ramsaur included Şerif Mardin, Feroz Ahmad, and Sina Akşin. Ahmad's *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress*, was published in 1969 and based on diplomatic reports and newspapers.[152] His methodology paved the way for later studies like Kansu's *1908 Devrimi* and *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey.*[153] Sina Akşin's *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*[154] covers a broader period compared to Ahmad's study. Akşin starts his book with the initial intellectual movements of the Young Turks and continues through its evolution into a political organization of until the end of the World War I. Ahmad covers only the period between 1908-1914. Akşin's *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*[155] also covers the whole period from 1889 to 1918. Studies focusing directly on opposing political

149 Ali Birinci, "Kuran, Ahmet Bedevi," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 26, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2002), 422-423.

150 For a detailed biography, see Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, "Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1992), 282-283.

151 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi (*Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1940-1967). Ten books were published between 1940-1967, two in the first volume, four in the second volume, and four in the third.

152 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914 (*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

153 Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devimi (*Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995); and Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913 (*Leiden: Brill, 2000).

154 Akşin, *Jön Türkler.*

155 Sina Akşin, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki (*Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980).

organizations also emerged, like Ali Birinci's *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*.[156] These works, as well as Eric J. Zürcher's studies, focus primarily on political events that took place during this period.[157]

These classics paved the way for the emergence of a new literature, albeit the new historiographical trend was inclined to concentrate on what had been ignored before late 1980s. In other words, from 1990s onwards, the histories of actors from below started to emerge which concentrated on grassroots movements, labor movements, the press, and women.[158] Indeed, Kansu's *1908 Devrimi* successfully merged high politics with a propelling force from below. He attributed the primary causes of the revolution to tax revolts that occurred before 1908, which was indeed a new introduction into the historiography.[159] Yet, as Özbek also points out, the social history of the masses during the revolution remains limited.[160]

---

156 Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası: II. Meşrutiyet Devri'nde İttihat ve Terakki'ye Karşı Çıkanlar* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1990).

157 For instance. Eric J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905-1926 (*Leiden: Brill, 1984); Eric J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey (*New York: IB Tauris, 2014); Eric J. Zürcher, "Ilan-I Hürriyetin Tarihyazımı: Geniş Bir Fikir Birliği, Biraz Ihtilaf Ve Kaçırılan Fırsat," in *Yadigar-I Meşrutiyet*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 259-72.

158 For specific examples, see Erol A.F. Baykal, *The Ottoman Press (1908-1923) (*Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2019); Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014); Y. Doğan Çetinkaya and Mehmet Ö. Alkan, eds., *Tanzimattan Günümüze Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015); Muammer Demirel, *İkinci Meşrûtiyet öncesi Erzurum'da Halk Hareketleri (1906-1907)* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990); Umut Karabulut, *İzmir Kentinde Siyasi Protesto Kültürü (*Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2015); Yavuz Selim Karakışla, *Women, War and Work in the Ottoman Empire: Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2005); Orhan Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan günümüze Türkiye'de Basın* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992); Can Nacar, *Labor and Power in the Late Ottoman Empire: Tobacco Workers, Managers, and the State, 1872-1912 (*Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Nadir Özbek, "II. Meşrutiyet İstanbul'unda Dilenciler ve Serseriler," *Toplumsal Tarih* 64 (1999).

159 Kansu, *1908 Devrimi,* 35-97.

160 Nadir Özbek, "Ikinci Mesrutiyeti Hazirlayan Kosullar, Rumeli'de Vergi Tahsilati ve Jandarma," *Toplumsal Tarih,* 183 (2009): 46.

After this brief survey of the literature, returning to the question of CUP power is more meaningful. Apart from the aforementioned studies that concentrate on the social history of the late Ottoman period, the classical literature and its current adherents primarily investigate high political structures and the struggles among political organizations as well as pashas to grasp governmental and parliamentary power. In other words, political struggles are evaluated within the scope of political groups that are in conflict for control of the government as well as parliament. Such analyses are valuable, but this study will challenge political histories of the Second Constitution that confine power struggle to only those over the government and parliament.

Was it so significant that prominent members of the CUP leadership entered the government? What were the meanings and sources of the power for the CUP elites? Was it enough for the CUP to take seats in the government and a majority in parliament? Did the participants in the actual political structure consider state cadres to be a source of the power? And if so, in what kind of struggles were they involved to hold sway over the bureaucratic cadres?

§ 1.4 Study Outline

Considering the Late Ottoman state as a "field" of struggles among bureaucrats at different levels, the first question to be answered is how to concretely study the dynamic nature of political and non-political conflicts and negotiations over control of bureaucratic cadres. However, rather than conceptualizing the types of capital within the field of the state, as Bourdieu's does, this study focuses on the concrete fields of struggle – that is, on the bureaucracy itself. Bourdieu's conceptualization would require that the analysis to be applied to tangible structural events over a given period. While his methodological approach to in-state struggles in general prompted this research, the study does not directly borrow Bourdieu's terminology and conceptualization. Of course, an analysis that addresses how political actors acted in order to shape bureaucratic cadres from within the bureaucracy through their conflicts and negotiations necessitates a consideration of the relationship between actors within the bureaucratic structure and those within the

political field. Actors beyond the bureaucratic and political apparatus fall outside the scope of this research.

Solidifying the internal struggles of the bureaucracy is possible by focusing on two concrete concepts that can be traced in the archives: new appointments and dismissals. These two practices demonstrate the level of struggle over the design of the bureaucracy engaged in by various in-state agents linked to certain political and ideological organizations. The conflict is ultimately over the cadres themselves – that is, over appointing associates and dismissing adversaries. The power to control the bureaucratic cadres in terms of number, which ultimately amounted to governance of the state apparatus, was sometimes even more significant than controlling actual political power. This is because the post-1908 period was a new period in which the state and actual politics were discrete – governed by different actors at the same time.

This study, therefore, is divided into two general parts: on dismissals and on appointments, respectively. The first, which includes chapters 2, 3, and 4 concentrates on mass purges of bureaucrats as a Unionist practice of designing the bureaucratic cadres. Purges started in the early days of the revolution even without a legal basis, though the CUP initiated a campaign to legalize the purges soon after the March 31 Incident. Chapter 2, therefore, focuses on how the CUP struggled with rivals to concentrate power in parliament vis-à-vis the government by enacting various laws including the *tensikât*. The *tensikât* law revealed one of the first attempts by CUP elites to claim direct power over the state, bypassing the government, the palace, and even Mahmut Şevket Pasha. Chapter 3, on the other hand, demonstrates how the CUP struggled to control the application of the *tensikât* law by establishing commissions and making amendments to the original law. It shows how dismissals were decided by the prominent CUP members. Chapter 4 focuses on the results of the *tensikât* with respect to petitions from victims of the process. It is not limited to describing the effects of the purges on its victims, however. It also demonstrates how petitioning became an instrument of the political power struggle between the CUP and its rivals.

Chapters 5 and 6 fall within the study's second part and demonstrate how the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and various actors within the

state struggled to control gubernatorial appointments. The first reason for concentrating on governorships is because of their key position within the state; the level of struggle can be expected to be higher for control over these appointments. Second, the individual personalities of governors can be more easily traced than those of actors holding other bureaucratic positions. Third, systematic documentation of the appointment of governors exists in the Ottoman Archives.

While the chapter 5 focuses on a description of gubernatorial appointments, including how governors were appointed or dismissed as well as a comparison of turnover rates in certain periods, chapter 6 concentrates how governors as individuals and the networks around them played a role in their appointments. Chapter 5 paints a general picture by mapping governor appointments vis-à-vis government changes and explains the methods of appointing bureaucrats, specifically governors. This allows a comparative perspective on appointments during the Hamidian and Constitutional periods, respectively. On the other hand, chapter 6 focuses on the microscale narratives of governors, examining to what extent the governors who were appointed benefitted from their political networks. This ultimately reveals the dynamics behind the appointments and the struggles for power to control the appointment of bureaucrats. Moreover, it demonstrates that some actors were not active political agents but were active in the struggle to appoint their associates. In this way, the struggle over governor appointments is traced through a period of political turnover, revealing that political as well as non-political agents were engaged.

This ultimately begs a question pertaining to the abrupt emergence of the CUP's absolute power in 1913. The epilogue explores the extent to which CUP elites had already created state power – stateness, to use Heper's terminology. An existing literature pertaining to the CUP's authoritarianism attributes it to the Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars as well as to arrogance within the Committee as its power grew. The conclusion proposes an alternative perspective.

All these could be possible by means of certain sources that helps to understand the intra-state relations. As the Part I discusses the mass purges, certain contemporary newspapers and magazines such as *Tanin*, *Volkan,*

Şehbal Mecmuası and *Dalkavuk* provides with diametrical opposite perspectives that enable to grasp the everyday perceptions of the mass purges. However, it does not mean that the *tensikât* was not subjected to discussions except aforementioned press. Including *İkdâm, Yeni Gazete, Tercüman-ı Hakikât* and *Saadet Gazetesi,* the majority of the contemporary press often reported the daily news about the purges elaborately. Alongside the archival documents from the BOA, the M.M.Z.C. also demonstrate certain attempts for regulating the purges under a legitimate law. Moreover, the petitions of the victims are also significant sources attracting attention to the experiences of the purges as the actual sufferers of the Revolution.

As the Part II concentrates on the biographies of the governors, it follows a different methodology comparing to the Part I. The *tevcihât-ı mülkiye defterleri* are primarily taken as the sources that provide tracing the gubernatorial appointments, as the documents include a very brief biographical entries of the governors. For the individual biographies of the governors, *sicill-i ahvâl*s enables a very detailed information although it seems to have certain deficiencies for the period after 1909. Any specific entry from the catalogues of the Ottoman Archives pertaining to a governor has been valuable in terms of creating a biographical sketch. Memoirs and autobiographies also contributed much in terms of demonstrating the individual networks as well as experiences. Moreover, there are of course a prominent literature for the biography studies that helped the overall structuring of this dissertation.[161]

161 The most significant biographical collections are Mehmet Aldan, *İz Bırakan Mülki İdare Amirleri (*Ankara: İç İşleri Bakanlığı, 1990); Ali Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. 3 (Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968); Sinan Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricâli, 1839-1922: Prosopografik Rehber (*Istanbul: İSİS Press, 1999); Nahid Sırrı Örik, *150 Yılın Türk Maşhurları Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Ekicigil Yayınevi, 1953); and also Pakalın's 19 volume of *Sicill-i Osmani Zeyli* involves a great number of biographical entries. Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmani Zeyli,* 19 volumes, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008-2009)

PART I:

ON DISMISSALS: THE LATE OTTOMAN MASS PURGES

2

The *Tensikât* Law: From the State of Exception to the State of Law

A humor magazine published during the Second Constitutional Period, namely *Dalkavuk,* pointed out in February 1909 that an artificial aura created by the new actors of the Constitutional Period among the citizens paved a further way for the *tensikât* (mass purges) to be discussed in every stratum of the society.[1] During the first months of re-promulgation of the constitutional monarchy, nobody knew to what extent it would affect the society, but it did not take much longer as the sense of curiosity gave its way to the feelings of sorrow.[2] For the magazine, this period was going to be harked back as good, in that the worst days were yet to be awaiting.[3] Indeed, the period soon after the July 1908 witnessed a serious of attempts regarding the arbitrary application of purges without a legal backing, which was

1 *Dalkavuk*, "Zaman Olur ki Hayali Cihan Değer" n.24, 12 *Şubat* 1324, (25 February 1909), 2.

2 "…çünki ilân-ı hürriyetten sonra tensikât tensikât diye herkesin ağzında bir sakızdır çiğnendi. Kahvede, kıraathanede, vapurda, tiyatroda, kalemde, evde, sokakda, velhasıl her yerde herkes ne olduğunu ne olacağını bilmediği tensikât! dedi, tensikât! işitti. Fakat netice bazı yerlerde aksi çıkmaya başlayınca bir teessür hemen umumî olarak baş gösterdi…" Ibid.

3 "Evet, zaman olur ki hayali cihan değer… İşte bu söz bundan sonra bizim yegâne sözümüz olacak…" Ibid.

followed by a period after the May 1909 for enacting a law fulfilling the lacuna created during the early months of the Constitutional Period. The early purges did not seem to fill a gap which was a deficit before, rather the practice of purges without a legal backing was itself a creation of a legal lacuna that paved a way for enacting a legitimate law process.

This evokes Giorgio Agamben's state of exception in several ways. He wrote his *Stato di Eccezione* in 2003, two years after the president of the United States issued a military order on November 13, 2001, on the indefinite detention of noncitizens suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. For Agamben, "what is new about President Bush's order is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual."[4] However, during the two months between September 11 and the military order on November 13, there were already certain cases that disregarded the legal status of individuals. Providing a legal basis for an illegal situation, the military order was meant to legalize illegitimate activities before the order was enacted as well as subsequent ones. Moreover, the state of exception appears as a norm after aimed for filling a legal lacuna:

> Far from being a response to a normative lacuna, the state of exception appears as the opening of the fictious lacuna in order for the purpose of safeguarding the existence of the norm, and its applicability to the normal situation.[5]

Paralleling Agamben's argument, the fictious lacuna that existed during the first two months after September 11 benefitted from the positions of the media and civil society against the terrorist attacks, providing a legitimate state of exception. With the military order, the state of exception achieved a permanent, legal status, filling the fictious lacuna.

Furthermore, the state of exception, according to Agamben, as "a technique of the government"[6] is uses an emergency situation to become rule itself in the sense originally pointed out by Walter Benjamin in the late

4 Giorgio Agamben. *State of Exception*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 3.

5 Ibid., 31.

6 Ibid., 6, 9, 14.

1930s.[7] Agamben's book conceptualizes how the state of exception becomes rule itself by using legal tools against the legal status of individuals observable from the French Revolution, yet in many cases the exception became permanent during and after World War I.[8] While the definition varies, examples of the state of exception concentrated on the use of power between the legal vis-à-vis political in the democratic systems of western countries. Agamben remarks that "the state of exception was the creation of democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one".[9] It is then significant to ask how much a state of exception operates as a "technique of the government"[10] to deal with citizens when establishing power. How did the state itself handle the *personae non gratae* of the political system on a micro scale? For Agamben, modern totalitarianism and the state of exception enable the destruction of certain citizens who for whatever reason were not to be part of the subsequent political system.[11]

As Özbek states, Ottoman-Turkish history is characterized by states of exception which became a general attribute of the political regime in certain cases.[12] Moreover, Lévy-Aksu also discusses the origins of the exceptional rule with the martial law (*idare-i örfiyye*) enacted in 1877.[13] However, it must be noted that although the martial law promulgated within another context soon after the 31 March Incident[14] evoked a state of exception in Lévy-Aksu's idealization, this chapter underscores a more symbolic and infrastructural attempts that could remind the state of exception not under the concrete rule of emergency under military order but inside the civil bureaucratic

7 Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History" part VIII (translated by Dennis Redmond, 1940). https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm

8 Agamben, *State of Exception*, 10.

9 Ibid., 5.

10 Ibid., 14.

11 Ibid., 2.

12 Nadir Özbek, "İstisna Hali: Devletsiz, Abdülhamidsiz Osmanlı Türkiye Tarihi Yazmanın İmkânları," *Toplumsal Tarih* 301 (January 2019): 47.

13 Noémi Lévy-Aksu, "An Ottoman variation on the stage of siege: The invention of the *idere-i örfiyye* during the first constitutional period," *New Perspectives on Turkey,* no.54 (2016): 1-24.

14 For the politics under the martial law, see Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 160-201.

apparatus. Besides, the mass purges within the civil bureaucracy had already started when the martial law was promulgated. Yet, this chapter does not deliberate on states of exception in the Ottoman context; rather, it is inspired by the nuances of the concept itself which provide an alternative approach to understanding the early constitutional political atmosphere. It demonstrates how early on the Committee of Union and Progress eliminated citizens thought to be unfit for the new democratic-revolutionary system. The following is a small-scale example of how the constitutional rule dealt with bureaucrats seen as deleterious for the emerging regime as it paves emerging certain questions.

How can the late Ottoman practice of purges be evaluated in this perspective? Importantly, the purges in the late Ottoman period were applied in the context of a political promise to liberalize the state apparatus and rebuild on the cornerstone of justice. The Young Turks established the parliamentary system which gradually increased in power vis-à-vis the sultan. They did not possess actual political power until 1913, and they continuously clashed with rivals in their struggle to survive in the system.

The Young Turk method of organizing purges had two significant characteristics. The first factor was that early purges in the higher strata of the bureaucracy was accompanied with propaganda in the press, whereby the Committee of Union of Progress (hereafter the CUP) gained public support. The second factor was that after the March 31 Incident the CUP leadership struggled to concentrate the political power to run the state apparatus in parliament vis-à-vis the government (Sublime Porte) and the network of Mahmut Şevket Pasha. Their legitimate power came from the fact that the CUP had the majority of deputies. This enabled them to enact certain structural laws, one of which was the *tensikât* law.

In what follows, I begin by concentrating on dismissals from the higher levels of the bureaucracy starting in the early days of the revolution. I focus specifically on certain powerful pashas who had close ties to the former Hamidian Regime. This shows how the CUP dealt with weakening powerful men outside the legislative realm. The second part describes the parliamentary discussion of the legal lacuna that accompanied the reopening of parliament. The ongoing purges in the name of the *tensikât*, which were

directed at both the higher and lower strata of the bureaucracy, became a heated debate among deputies that were mostly initiated by independent and liberal non-CUP linked deputies. The CUP rejected legislative rounds to interfere with the executive organ during the first months of parliamentary discussions, but the Committee changed its position following the March 31 counterrevolution. The third point is that the CUP under the de facto leadership of Cavid Bey prepared the *tensikât* law. The law provided a legitimate basis for an illegitimate situation, paralleling Agamben. The state of exception was not a response to a normative lacuna but a fictious one; it then fills the fictious lacuna with a legislative regulation that purportedly safeguards the existence of the norm.[15] The following is one small-scale example of the methods that the Young Turks adopted during the process of enacting a law in the early phases of constitutional rule. The chapter then concentrates on the law itself and a chronology of events that took place after the law was enacted.

§ 2.1 Re-Engineering the High Bureaucracy before the *Tensikât* Law

The *tensikât* means regulation, yet it refers during the Second Constitutional Period to a specific mass purge affected the entire bureaucratic apparatus. Thousands of civil officials were forced to leave their positions.[16] Although there are numerous studies pertaining to the *tensikât,*[17] more questions have

15 Agamben, *State of Exception*, 31.

16 The *tensikât* was two-sided, as the purges within the military and the civil bureaucracy. For Bayur, the civil bureaucratic purges resulted in more serious outcomes in terms of societal reactions. See Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, v. I/II, 91.

17 Certain studies based on the *tensikât,* are: Abdülhamit Kırmızı, "Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları: 1908 İhtilalinin Bürokraside Tasfiye ve İkame Kabiliyeti" in *100. Yılında Jön Türk Devrimi,* ed. Sina Akşin, Sarp Balcı and Barış Ünlü (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010); Arif Kolay, "II.Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Hariciye Nezareti'nde Tensikat ve Bürokratik Değişim (1908-1910)", *Türkiyat Mecmuası,* 27/1, (2017): 193-214; Nursel Manav, "II. Meşrutiyet'te Abdülhamid Dönemi Kadrolarının Tasfiyesi ve Tekaüd Sandıkları", *Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi,* 2/1, (2017): 240-260; Nursel Manav, "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde

still been awaiting to be touched upon. For example, although there are speculations pertaining to the overall numbers of dismissals,[18] the literature did not pay enough attention regarding how this degree of mass purges could have been possible within the context of the early Revolutionary period. Was it an overall CUP-originated projection attempting for rebuilding the entire bureaucracy, or a reaction against the former Hamidian bureaucracy? Was it a rebuilding of the entire bureaucracy on the CUP's agenda? Were they the result of conscious, systematic practices or an artifact of the process of governing? Although its systematization is open to speculation, from the first days of the revolution, the CUP was fully committed to a bureaucracy consisting of loyal members of the CUP. As Hanioğlu notes, that the CUP sought to fill critical positions in the bureaucracy with its supporters is clear from a memorandum sent to the Monastir branch of the CUP for recitation at the first secret CUP congress. It stated the urgent need to create a new, loyal bureaucracy of the devoted, self-sacrificing members of the Committee.

> In order to fulfill our goal we should try to ensure that the high-level law enforcement personnel, the minister of education, all directors, professors and teachers at the university and all kinds of schools, the board of education, directors of education in the provinces,

---

Maliye Nezareti'nde Tensikat, Memurların Tepkisi ve Yeni Teşkilat Yapısı", *Yeditepe Üniversitesi Tarih Bölümü Araştırma Dergisi,* 2/3, (2018): 71-92; Erkan Tural, "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Danıştay", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 5/13, (2008): 79-89; Erkan Tural, "Osmanlı Posta Bürokrasisi 1908-1914", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 28/46, (2009):205-230; Erkan Tural, "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Maârif-i Umûmiyye Nezareti'nde Bürokratik Reform", Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi OTAM, 22, (2009): 177-206; Erkan Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi, II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Bürokratlar, İttihatçılar ve Parlamenterler* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2016); Nader Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Nader Sohrabi, "Illiberal Constitutionalism. The Committee Union and Progress as a Clandestine Network and Purges" in *L'ivressé de La Liberte*, François Georgeon, ed. (Leuven: Peeters, 2012).

18 While British annaul reports estimated a total number of 27,000 people lost their positions, a recent study by Nursel Manav indicated a number of 17,924. For both, see: *British Documents on Foreign Affairs,* ed. David Gillard, Part 1, Series B, vol.20, (University Publications of America, 1985), 113; Manav, "II. Meşrutiyet'te Abdülhamid Dönemi Kadrolarının Tasfiyesi ve Tekaüd Sandıkları", 251.

> inspectors of education, the minister of the interior, governors, sub-governors, district directors, the minister of justice, judges, and the itinerant officials of the Ministry of Public Works and the Directorate of Forests should all be chosen from our loyal and self-sacrificing members.[19]

Because of the systematic attempts by Young Turks intellectuals, the CUP established a long-term bureaucracy within the six years after the 1908 revolution that outlasted the CUP's own political hegemony. In other words, within a short time after July 1908, the Committee managed to establish a considerable network of bureaucrats who would maintain their positions long after the CUP retreated from the political arena. Even in the 1950s there were still statesmen who had had connections with the Balkan networks of the Young Turks. Eric Jan Zürcher depicts the continuity among the cadres at the top of the bureaucracy during the late Ottoman and early Republican period by indicating that the central positions of the Kemalist regime after the 1920s were occupied by those who had been young civil or military officials in the Balkans just before the Young Turk Revolution.[20] Furthermore, the Balkan network had managed to govern the state apparatus even earlier than the 1920s, which leads this chapter to focus on the early years of the revolution. The founders of the Ottoman Freedom Committee (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti)* in Salonica and Bitola in 1906-1907 were the principal actors of policymaking after the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Paşa in 1913. The case of Enver Pasha and his promotion is an excellent example.[21] However, the actual participants in the events of July 1908 were not so effective in controlling the real politics of the period, which Sina Akşin called as

19 Quoted in Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 286. According to Hanioğlu, this draft memorandum dated October 4, 1908 was submitted to the CUP Monastir branch to be forwarded to the congress. From the private papers of Bahaeddin Şakir.

20 Erik Jan Zürcher, "Macedonians in Anatolia: The Importance of the Macedonian Roots of the Unionists for their Policies in Anatolia after 1914," *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 6 (2014): 960-975.

21 For Enver Pasha's biography, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlı, *Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa (*Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989).

an inspection, (*denetleme iktidarı)*.[22] They started to emerge as key figures in the political arena only in 1913. Various studies demonstrate that in the early Revolutionary period the CUP could not fully wrest power in a political field characterized by conflicts among multiple groups. This chapter, however, focuses on another area of struggle with respect to governing the state apparatus, namely controlling the high bureaucracy with purges in the early revolutionary period.

Before concentrating on the individuals who would be employed at the top of state service, the CUP leadership first focused on cleansing the bureaucracy of the old regime's bureaucrats. The early purges started in August 1908, soon after the constitutional revolution, and were directed first at high-level bureaucrats. Governors, certain ministers, and famous pashas of the old regime were dismissed, exiled, or obliged to flee Istanbul. Starting in the first days of the revolution, the bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte felt fear, sorrow, and worry. New bureaucratic positions, high or low, were safe. Nader Sohrabi points out that most ranking administrators and military officers were deemed guilty due to their affiliation with the sultan, regardless of their merit or education as their large numbers were interpreted as a drain on the treasury.[23] On the other hand, there was felicity among educated but redundant Young Turk sympathizers who hoped to fill the newly vacant bureaucratic positions. The *nevzât*s of the new era were to be selected from among educated people with merit, as repeatedly claimed by Huseyin Cahit Yalçın in *Tanin*.[24] The importance of education as a selection criterion for low-ranking appointments is the subject of an upcoming chapters. However, the stress on "educated bureaucrats" in the press was because CUP cadres and sympathizers were mostly from among the educated classes, themselves. Employing educated people in state service would mean appointing the CUP sympathizers. The later ideological feature that emerged in the military between self-taught soldiers (*alaylı*) and school-trained soldiers (*mektebli*) was

22 Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 110-167.

23 Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism,*190.

24 That is to say, *Tanin*, 5 Ağustos 1324 R, 12 Receb 1326 H (18.08.1908) "Dairelerde Tensikat." For a detailed evaluation of Hüseyin Cahid's claims, see Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi*, 78.

an example of the CUP's agenda of distinguishing between the formally educated and the non-educated.

Although there are a few exceptions, the early literature mentions the purges as a means to dispose of the old regime's inadequate bureaucrats.[25] Conversely with the contemporaneous press that emerged after July 1908,[26] scholarly studies attributed the purges of the top cadres to the inefficiency and corruption of Hamidian bureaucrats. Accordingly, G.P. Gooch and Harold Vazeille wrote in 1928, in *British Documents on the Origin of the War,* that the League of Union and Progress (Committee of Union and Progress) worked vigilantly to make sure that "corrupt governors and officials and those on whom any suspicion rested, were immediately dismissed and disappeared."[27] Kansu's study is striking example not only because of its dependence on the domestic press but because he also collected reports from the foreign press regarding the reasons for the purges, which mostly attributed it to the corruption and inefficiency of the pashas.[28] These studies share a common opinion on the purges since they are all based on the contemporary press. After Selim Melhame's flight from the capital on July 28, the press, which had organic links with the CUP, started to write about the possible escape of bureaucrats who were old regime sympathizers. In other words, after the escape of Selim Melhame, which stunned the public, newspapers started to report that certain pashas were planning to escape with their ill-gotten wealth. On August 5, *Tanin* wrote that a group of bureaucrats including Tahsin Paşa, Sultan Hamid's first secretary, and Abu'l-Huda, the pan-Islamist advisor to the sultan, were preparing to leave the capital.[29] That same day, they also wrote that the dismissals of Tahsin and Ragıb Paşas were "well-received with most pleasure."[30] Indeed, the newspaper organized a

25 The most significant example is Kansu, *1908 Devrimi.*

26 *Tanin* and *Tercümân-ı Hakîkât* are two of the most important voices that supported the purges.

27 G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *The Near East,* vol. 5 of *British Documents on the Origins of War, 1898-1914*, 254.

28 Kansu asserts that famous bureaucrats were dismissed or disappeared in the heat of the Revolution, which he attributed to their corrupt behavior. Kansu, *1908 Devrimi,* 185-220.

29 *Tanin*, 5th August 1908, 23 *Temmuz* 1324, 4.

30 *Tanin*, 5th August 1908, 23 *Temmuz* 1324, 3.

systematic campaign against the well-known pashas of the old regime as they played a vital role, for example, in the discharge of Rami Paşa, the Minister of the Navy. In the same article on the potential escapes of Tahsin and Abu'l-Huda on August 5, they called Rami Paşa a "robber" (*haramî*) which rhymes with his name: "*harâmî Rami Paşa*." Although information about the planned escape of the pashas did not include evidence, it resulted in the dispatches from the ministry of security (*zabtiye nezareti*) to certain district police stations of Istanbul, primarily Üsküdar and Beyoğlu, to be hypervigilant with respect to pashas including Rami, Ragıp, and Rıza because of the possibility that they would flee the capital.[31] While the report in *Tanin* was dated August 5, the official telegrams from the ministry to the district police offices were sent the next day, August 6. However, the newspaper reported that the telegrams urging caution and already been sent and would have arrived by August 4 at the very latest. Was this discrepancy a mistake or a systematic attempt in by the press to direct official instructions?

The next day, August 6, *Tanin* announced that Rami Paşa, Memduh Paşa (the former minister of the interior), and Reşid Paşa (the mayor of Istanbul) were arrested because they intended to escape from the capital. After their capture, their families were informed not to worry. The pashas were given separate rooms in the police station for their security vis-à-vis other criminal detainees.[32] The news suggested that the pashas were taken prisoner for the public good to prevent their escape and to provide for their own security. However, archival records show the opposite. Accordingly, when Rami Paşa was informed of the gossip of his imminent escape, he went to the Zaptieh Office (*Zabtiye Dairesi*) of his own relation to report his presence.[33] It is clear from the document that he never attempted an escape from the capital. The contradiction between the newspaper and archival documents are no innocent mistake. Instead, it is more like seemingly that it was part of a conscious, systematic effort on the part of the press to help establishing the new order. These kinds of reports, which included misinformation and contradictions,

31 BOA. ZB.620/110; BOA. ZB.620/118; BOA. ZB.620/111; BOA. ZB.620/114 - 24 *Temmuz* 1324 (6 August 1908)

32 *Tanin*, 6th of August 1908, 24 *Temmuz* 1324, 3.

33 BOA. ZB. 620/99, 23 *Temmuz* 1324 (05 August 1908)

make it clear that the press (specifically the newspaper *Tanin*) was intended to form public opinion in opposition to pashas with organic ties to the former regime.

On August 8, *Tanin* published a press release from the CUP which was released the day before.[34] The declaration appealed directly to the common people to stop protests and return to their everyday lives. However, the text can also be interpreted differently. The text made a distinction among the sultan, Ottoman citizens, and the CUP. The sultan was disconnected from his citizens because, before July, of conniving powers close to the sultan. After the events of July, there remained no such traitors between the citizens and the sultan. National sovereignty (*hakimiyet-i milliye*) could stop these powers which had misguided the sultan until July. As loyal nationalists who were devoted to the sultan, the citizens should stop their protests and trust the CUP and the sultan. The text implied that the repromulgation of the constitution freed not only the citizens but the disconnected sultan himself because he was being misguided by former bureaucrats. This opened an opportunity for the state to be rid of these former bureaucrats who were depicted in the text as not having the interests of citizens in mind.

Ragıb Paşa, who was depicted as one of these conspirators behind the Hamidian Regime, was dismissed on August 4, which *Tanin* announced "with great pleasure" on August 5 as stated earlier.[35] According to the press, he was arrested by the police the following day. Not only *Tanin* but the international press was interested in his arrest since his personal economic power was claimed to have been underwritten by international trade. He became rich in time because he controlled the economic resources of the empire.[36] Moreover, he not only monopolized financial resources but also manage human resources at the top levels of the bureaucracy. Kansu remarked that he made a significant role in appointing top bureaucrats before

34 *Tanin*, 8th of August 1908, 26 *Temmuz* 1324, 4.

35 *Tanin*, 5th of August 1908, 23 *Temmuz* 1324, 3.

36 Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. 3, 75; Harry Lamp, "Officials of the Palace," in *The Near East*, vol. 5 of *British Documents on the Origins of War, 1898-1914*, eds. G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, 9.

1908.[37] Despite the negative attitude toward him in the press, the archival documents show that he was protected by the zaptieh office. On August 6, when *Tanin* asserted that Ragıb Paşa had already been arrested, the zaptieh office dispatched a telegram that he must be protected from attacks by civilians and that he should be allowed to travel unless he was officially indicted.[38] The next day, a telegram was again sent to warn officers that there must no illegal moves be made against Ragıb Paşa.[39] In September, he was provided with a steamboat and police officers for his own protection.[40] On one hand, the press was denouncing Ragıb Paşa, but on the other, an invisible hand in the state apparatus was protecting him. A letter containing a translation of an article in a Berlin newspaper was sent to Kamil Paşa on October 13, 1908, and it mentions that the rumors about Ragıb Paşa originated in Young Turk circles.[41] According to the same letter, the Young Turks started to lose prestige because of the rumors they disseminated about certain pashas of the Hamidian Regime. The political disagreements between the CUP and Kamil Paşa extended to the issue of the purges of top-level bureaucrats.

Ostensibly, the systematic purge of famous bureaucrats of the old regime was based on the idea that the statesmen of the Hamidian Era were inefficient, defrauded the people, and took bribes. The CUP, which presented its new administration as "the provider of freedom," therefore tried to clean the state apparatus by dismissing these bureaucrats. The conditions were ripe since the common people were waiting for a performance from the new political actors. Therefore, sacking the famous bureaucrats of the old regime was a good start because the citizens who supported a new system shared sentiments against these bureaucrats. Therefore, it seems like common sense that the purges were intended to cleanse the bureaucracy of inefficient bureaucrats, as indeed the press in the early revolutionary period claimed.

37 Kansu, *1908 Devrimi,* 191.

38 BOA.ZB. 620/116, 24 *Temmuz* 1324 (6 August 1908)

39 BOA.ZB. 484/103, 25 *Temmuz* 1324 (7 August 1908)

40 BOA.ZB. 621/156, 29 *Ağustos* 1324 (11 September 1908)

41 Y.EE.KP. 33/3238, 13 *Ramazan* 1326 (9 October 1908)

Although the literature on the revolution in the 1930s narrated the early purges in parallel with what the contemporaneous press had written, it would be a methodological mistake not to consider alternative explanations; the CUP infiltrated press cannot be considered a reliable source. The bureaucrats were ostensibly dismissed because of their inefficiency, but what if their services were ended for political reasons rather than incompetence? And were the newly appointed bureaucrats who replaced these dismissed officials themselves efficient? Were there efficient bureaucrats dismissed after July 1908 for reasons related to the distribution of power within the state apparatus in the new era? Or more fundamentally, who were these new and old bureaucrats? The second part of this study focuses on the individual personalities and networks of the governors appointed during the first five years of the revolution as a case study.

These concerns direct this study to ask another fundamental question: what was the position of the CUP in the first months of the revolution regarding the early dismissals? Did they have the opportunity to directly intervene in the purges? The CUP's position affirms Sina Akşin's point that they were in an inspection period which is substantiated by the attitude of the CUP toward the early purges. The position of the CUP shows one of the Committee's means of auditing. Although Akşin implies that the CUP were a de facto inspectorate regarding the running of the government, sometimes endeavoring to establish shadow cabinets[42] by appointing counselors to each ministry, but control over the press as a means of molding public opinion was beyond the scope of his analysis. The CUP, which was not as powerful a political actor as might be expected during the early revolutionary period, used the press to sway the public against the former bureaucracy. Put differently, the CUP, which recognized the power of the press given the Young Turks' experiences in Europe and Egypt[43] long before the revolution, shaped public opinion as an important instrument against the ancien regime. The contribution of Hüseyin Cahit to *Tanin* vis-à-vis the resignation of the Said Paşa cabinet in early August 1908 exemplifies how the CUP successfully

42 Although the CUP center tried to enforce a law for establishing shadow cabinets legally, it was not seen proper neither by the government nor the parliament.

43 Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution,* 8-130.

steered the government via the CUP linked press. On August 3 and 4, *Tanin, İkdam,* and *Servet-i Fünun* discussed the appointments of Ministers of War and Navy directly by the Sultan and the *sadrazam's* selection of other ministers. Hüseyin Cahit's editorial column implicitly accused Said Paşa of being responsible for the law.[44] As for the purges, while the CUP did not have the political power or legislative infrastructure to directly dismiss bureaucrats, they had the press which made it possible to motivate the public against the bureaucrats of the old regime. Which they did.

Given that one of their mottos was *adâlet* (justice), the CUP could not begin the purges without a legal basis. Therefore, trial by the press became an alternative means to start the early purges to cleanse the bureaucracy of the so-called frauds. In other words, the CUP did not have the actual power during the early revolutionary period – neither in politics nor among bureaucratic cadres – to dismiss high-level bureaucrats. Moreover, it would have been lawless to start the purges without a valid legal infrastructure, which would not be put in place until the *tensikât* law was enacted in August 1909, a year after the repromulgation of the Constitution. The CUP manipulated the press to form public opinion in favor of starting the purges as soon as possible; there was no legal way to dismiss the famous pashas. The Committee benefitted from this public opinion created by the press, using it to legitimize the purges, at least of the top levels of the bureaucracy.

Returning to Agamben's conceptualization of the state of exception, attempts to reengineer the bureaucracy can be evaluated as a legal lacuna in which press propaganda directed at defrauding bureaucrats was in the interest of safeguarding the basic ideology of the revolution. The new regime thus legitimized its authority to act. Rather than Abdulhamid, the CUP first targeted bureaucrats, which could ultimately enable them to infiltrate the state apparatus.

44 *Tanin*, 4th of August 1908, 22 *Temmuz* 1324, 1.

§ 2.2 Parliamentary Debates on the Legal Lacuna

After the opening ceremony of the Ottoman Parliament on December 17, 1908, one of the most heated discussions that lasted through the end of the first session (*birinci içtimâi*) concerned the *tensikât*.[45] Regarding the means, legitimacy, and lawfulness of the dismissals, the ethical outcomes, the possible political results, and the humanity and prospects of those discharged from the *memûriyet* were among the topics of discussion. Ministers and high-level statesmen including the head of the Council of the State (*şurâ-yı devlet reisi*) were called for testimony several times.

One of the debates was whether the ministers during the early constitutional regime deliberately delayed the *tensikat*. The minister of foundations and endowments, Şemsettin Bey, answered an interpellation issued by the Deputy of Bolu, Mustafa Zeki Efendi, on January 23, 1909. When the Deputy of Istanbul, Mustafa Asım Efendi, spoke about delays to the *tensikat,* he mentioned potential financial risks that could stem from the *tensikat.*[46] He then examined the possible outcomes of a total *tensikât,* which would have no benefits according to him.

Another debate concerned the method used during the application of the *tensikat*. Parliamentary discussions often revolved around how the *tensikat* purges and recruitment of new bureaucrats would be undertaken, which revealed its anomalous application in practice. On January 23, 1909, the head of the Council of the State, Hasan Fehmi Pasha, came to parliament to deliver a speech in response to an interpellation issued by the Deputy of Trabzon, Mahmud Mazhar Bey.[47] His request concerned the execution of the *tensikat* within the Council of the State in which the new appointees,

45 It must be noted before anything else that Tural's prominent study, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* skillfully illustrates the parliamentary debates benefitting from parliamentary registers (M.M.Z.C.) contextualizing with the contemporary newspapers and the archival documents. This chapter and the following chapter 3 also benefitted from the M.M.Z.C., but the aim followed here is rather for illustrating how the CUP centralized the parliament vis-à-vis other forces using the legal lacuna created specific to the *tensikât.* It also shows to what extent Akşin's inspection period (*denetleme iktidarı*) for the CUP could be applied to the period.

46 M.M.Z.C. 1. içtima, 17. inikad, 10 *Kanunisani* 1324 (23 January 1909), 301.

47 Ibid., 307-312.

according to his assertion, were not being based on merit and competence. Rather than appointing graduates of *Mekteb-i Mülkiye,* which the deputies called *mektebli*, almost all newly appointed bureaucrats were sons for sons-in-law of some pashas and the sultan. Among those were the sons-of-law of the sultan, Arif Hikmet and Mehmed Şerif Pashas, as well as Mehmed Reşad Bey the son-in-law of Zihni Pasha, Behçet Bey the son-in-law of Rıza Pasha, Fuad Bey the son-in-law of the former Minister of the Interior, and Abdullah Bey the son of *sadrazam* Kamil Pasha. The deputy gave a long list of sons (*mahdum*) and sons- in-law (*damad*) whose positions were protected from the *tensikat* or who had been appointed as bureaucrats in the Council of the State.[48] Notably, deputies like Talat Bey, İsmail Hakkı Bey, Emanuel Karasu, Yusuf Kemal Bey, Aristidi Pasha, and others with organic links with the CUP defended Hasan Fehmi Pasha. The *damad* and *mahdum* appointments were not made under his watch but rather just before Hasan Fehmi Pasha was appointed as the head of the Council of the State.

The arbitrary application of the *tensikat* meant that there was no central organizational law to control the activities of individual ministries. This was another topic of debate. The Deputy of Tokat, Sabri Bey and his two companions issued a motion on February 24, 1909, that there was a need to constitute a permanent parliamentary commission responsible for discussing the applications of the *tensikat* up until that point.[49] Although it was slated to be considered later, the majority of deputies rejected the formation of a permanent commission.

These debates from the beginning of the first session reminded deputies that there was no legal basis for the *tensikat*. The *tensikat,* which started in the first days of the revolution, was not being systematically applied based on a legal framework. Deputies in the minority first argued on January 26, 1909, that a systematic law about how the *tensikat* was to be applied must be introduced and enacted. The Deputy of Mamuretülaziz[50] made a motion following the statement to prepare a law for the *tensikat.* However, deputies

48 Ibid., 310.

49 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 34 inikad, 11 *Şubat* 1324 (24 February 1909), 38.

50 Unfortunately, his name is not found in the parliamentary minutes.

close to the CUP like Emanuel Karasu Efendi and İsmail Hakkı Bey (Babanzâde) prevailed, and the motion was rejected without discussion.[51]

On March 1, 1909, Sabri Efendi (the Deputy of Tokat) and his companions[52] made a motion which was added onto agenda on February 24.[53] The main argument of the proposal that Sabri Efendi, the first speaker, elucidated was that a law imposing order on the *tensikat* needed to be prioritized before all else.[54] However, the *tensikat* had been applied in practice from the early days of the revolution, long before and eventual law would be enacted. In other words, he concluded that a *tensikat* law or at least a legal regulation should have been legislated before its application. The Deputy of Biga, Arif İsmet Bey, addressed another side of the *tensikat* in his speech. He was a former bureaucrat of the foreign ministry and still had many contacts in the department. He mentioned that he had spoken with dismissed bureaucrats who felt mistreated. According to him, a *tensikat* would be beneficial only if based on justice. Moreover, citizens must wholeheartedly believe that the application of the *tensikat* was just. Arif Hikmet Bey was concerned that with purges the bureaucrats were subjecting to injustice.[55] For him, only if the *tensikat* applied within the strictures of a law then would it be just. Ömer Fevzi Efendi, the Deputy of Erzincan, noted that each ministry was applying the *tensikat* arbitrarily, which was not just. For him, it was urgent for a bill of law (*kanun layihâsı*) to be issued by the government to clarify the method of implementing the *tensikat*.[56] A consensus gradually emerged among the deputies to make the *tensikat* a law. As Erkan Tural points out, the delicate issue of the victimization of officials turned into a discussion on the process

51 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 17. inikad, 13 *Kanunisani* 1324 (26 January 1909), 325-326.

52 Muharrem Hasbi Bey, the Deputy of Karesi, and Mustafa Bey, the Deputy of Tokat.

53 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 36 inikad, 16 *Şubat* 1324 (01 March 1909), 87-93.

54 "Devair-i devlet yeniden teşekkül ettiği halde, Kuvve-i Kanuniye tarafından bu yolda bir kanun konmadan, bir kanun vaz olunmadan Kuvve-i icraiye nasıl teşkilat icra ediyor?" M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 36 inikad, 16 *Şubat* 1324 (1 March 1909) 88, 91.

55 Ibid., 89.

56 Ibid., 92.

of enactment.[57] The conclusion of the struggle was successful, and a bill of law (*layiha*) was sent to committee.[58]

The main opposition to arguments regarding the motion to draft a *tensikat* law originated from Hasan Fehmi Pasha during the course of an interpellation. According to some deputies, it was the responsibility of the executive organ, the government, and the specific ministries, not parliament, to make regulations about the *tensikat*.[59] In other words, in line with Hasan Fehmi Pasha's warning that parliament should not intervene with the executive organ, most of the deputies were inclined to ignore the problems of the *tensikat* to an extent. Only once deputies like Sabri Efendi came forward did the majority of deputies recognize certain negative outcomes to the current application of the *tensikat*.

It is interesting to note that both Hasan Fehmi Pasha and the deputies who rejected motions possible were close to the CUP. Hasan Fehmi Pasha was an experienced statesman who started his career as a dragoman in 1858. In 1881, he was given the title of vizier, and he held several positions afterwards including a governorship, the Minister of Justice, and lastly, the head of the Council of the State during the Hamidian Period. However, interestingly, he was known as an "Old Young Turk,"[60] especially after the repromulgation of the constitution, due to his good relationships with the central CUP organization. For Sabri Efendi, on the other hand, it was challenging to issue his motion given that Hasan Fehmi Pasha was openly supported by CUP elites. To understand the nature of discussions, the ideological differences among the actors must be clarified. Although Sabri Efendi did not

57 Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 92-93.

58 Parliamentary minutes on the vote end without stating the result. Although there is no written documentation of the acceptance of the motion, it can be inferred from debates during in subsequent sessions, for instance Mustafa Arif Bey's speech of March 22, 1909. M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 44. inikad, 9 *Mart* 1325 (22 March 1909), 396.

59 "Kuvve-i icrâiyenin ve idarenin vazifesi." M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 17. inikad, 10 *Kanunisani* 1324 R. (23 January 1909), 307-312. Sabri Bey (the Deputy of Tokat) mentions that Hasan Fehmi Pasha himself asked parliament not to intervene in the executive branch regarding the *tensikat.* M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 36 inikad, 16 *Şubat* 1324 R. (1 March 1909), 88.

60 Cevdet Küçük, "Hasan Fehmi Paşa," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 16, ed. Editor (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), 322-323

openly express his political stance during the early constitutional era, his biography provides significant background information. He had an *ilmiye* background and became *hafiz* in 1879 when he was ten years old. Catch the young age of twenty, he became the *müderris* of the Fatih Mosque. His brilliant career continued in religion-oriented occupations, including the *hafiz* of the library of Yildiz Palace, until he entered the political life. In 1908, he was elected as the Deputy of Tokat for the first parliament after the repromulgation of the constitution. He kept his opposition to the CUP under wraps until the foundation of the Ahali Fırkası party in 1910, of which he was on the founding committee. In 1911, the party along with Sabri Efendi joined forces with the Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası. In 1913, after the Bab-ı Âli Coup, Sabri Efendi escaped to Romania where he was arrested and returned to Istanbul. He was then forced to live in exile in Bilecik. In 1919, he was reelected as the Deputy of Tokat when the CUP fell from the political arena.[61]

Support for an arbitrary application of *tensikat* with no law-based framework can be interpreted in different ways. Although the CUP center and CUP affiliated deputies were persuaded to enact a *tensikat* law by March 1909, the CUP leadership arguably preferred its arbitrary application in order to more easily intervene in the process of both dismissals and new appointments. In other words, the CUP leadership took the pragmatic approach that a more rapid, effective, and therefore arbitrary *tensikat* was in the interest of the Committee was eventually compelled to support the enacting of a law because of the campaign initiated by Mustafa Sabri Efendi.

Another possibility parallels the conceptual framework of Agamben's state of exception. As Agamben points out, one of the methods of the state of exception is the opening of a fictious lacuna, which differs significantly from a response to a normative lacuna. This strategy serves the purpose of safeguarding the norm and its applicability to the normal situation.[62] The arbitrary application of the *tensikat* and the resulting political atmosphere and psychological situation of the *memurîn* were designed to establish a fictious lacuna for the purpose of running the new norm constituted with the

61 Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Mustafa Sabri Efendi," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 31, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2006), 350-353

62 Agamben, *State of Exception,* 31.

revolution. In other words, the blow of the *tensikat* as a new phenomenon of the early constitutional era – which had not been a normative lacuna before the revolution – suddenly became the most heated debate of the period. It created thousands of victims who were thought to have been subjected to injustice. It can be evaluated as an example of a fictious lacuna because of the very lack of a legislative framework; the mood was created by high politics. In order to protect the constitution as a discourse, the CUP leadership used this fictious lacuna to eliminate the opposition. The process of making the *tensikat* law was about filling a fictious lacuna that the governing elites had created themselves, not illustrative of a normative lacuna that had appeared organically as a result of social and economic processes. In other words, laws and codes are enacted by governments in normal conditions are responses to normative lacunas which arise as a result of social and economic processes. In the state of exception, on the other hand, laws and codes are made response to a fictious lacuna which is not anonymous but authored through activities controlled by the power itself.

§ 2.3 The *Tensikat* Law

Articles 53 and 54 of the *Kanun-i Esâsi* (Ottoman Constitution) of 1876 stated that the legislative proposals of the deputies would be sent to the sultan through the government for imperial consent. If the sultan agrees, the Council of the State was responsible for the preparation of the draft bill (*layihâ*). The government itself could also prepare legislative proposals and drafts.[63] Article 80 noted that the bill of law prepared by the Council of the State would be sent to the Council of Deputies, discussed, and put to a vote. If the bill passed, it would be sent to the Council of Notables (*Heyet-i Âyân*). If ratified by the Notables, the bill would again be sent to the sultan for his ultimate approval and official promulgation.

This was the sequence for enacting a law according to the Constitution of 1876 which was in force during the debates over the *tensikât* law. This

63 İrem Karakoç, "1876 Tarihli Kanun-i Esasi'de Yürütme Organı," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 8, no. 2 (2006): 132.

official procedure is clear and was easily followed with respect to other laws enacted during this period, such as the *içtimaat-ı umûmiyye kanunu* (law on public assembly).[64] However, for the *tensikât*, the process of drafting the law was complicated. A draft was first expected to be prepared by the government, and as late as May 1909 the government pretended to be pursuing this. Actually, they submitted a draft on May 12, 1909.[65] However, the CUP took action to organize a commission to investigate the preparation of the draft law.[66] After the official presentation of the draft by the *sadâret* in parliament, two deputies of the CUP, Zeynel Abidin Efendi[67] of Konya and Emrullah Efendi of Kırkkilise, approached the rostrum and made a motion to form an independent commission (*layihâ encümeni*) to review the draft law.[68] This was most probably because of that the parliament was not satisfied with the limited effort of the government. It was a routine procedure in parliament to send individual drafts to one of various commissions; however, for the *tensikât* law draft, a separate, independent commission was formed. This could imply that parliament was interfering in the Council of the State's and the Sublime Porte's areas of responsibility.[69] Before, the front of parliament's say regarding a draft law was an up or down vote to accept or refuse it, but with the *tensikât,* parliament became directly involved in the process of

64 BOA.BEO. 3500/262452, 6 *Safer* 1327 (27 February 1909)

65 M.M.Z.C. 71. inikad, 30 *Nisan* 1325 (13 May 1909), 395.

66 Mehmed Cavid Bey served as the commission reporter (*mazbata muharrir encümeni*) for the committee. According to Tural, the committee consisted of Sabri Bey (Tokat), Mehmet Cavit Bey (Selanik), İbrahim Vasfi (Balıkesir), Ahmet Müfit (İzmit), Edip (Yozgat), Bedri (İpek), Halil (Menteşe), Hayri (Niğde), Talat (Edirne), Ali Münif (Adana), Ömer Şevki (Sivas), Ömer Fevzi (Bursa), Mahmut Mazhar (Trabzon). Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 101.

67 Although later he resigned from the CUP and became a leading figure of Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası, he served as deputy under the banner of the CUP in 1909. See Ahmet Çelik, "Zeynelabidin Efendi ve Siyasi Görüşleri," *Merhaba Gazetesi Akademik Sayfalar Eki* 11, no. 4 (2011): 56-57.

68 M.M.Z.C. 71. inikad, 30 *Nisan* 1325 (13 May 1909), 396.

69 Nadir Özbek also demonstrated certain attempts from the parliament for decreasing the role of *Şura-yı Devlet* in law preparations. For him, the bill of law for the vagrants and the beggars was truly changed by the parliament as it disregarded the Council of State's bill. Nadir Özbek, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Dilencilere Yönelik Devlet Politikaları ve Kamusal Söylemin Değişimi" In *Bir Kent Sorunu Dilencilik: Sorunlar ve Çözüm Yolları*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Zabıta Daire Başkanlığı, 2009), 29-30.

drafting the law. The members of the *encümen* consisted of deputies of the CUP, and some were even close to the *merkez-i umûmî* of the CUP.

Centralizing parliament and extending its power was one of the most critical projects of CUP policy makers, as their legitimate power came from parliament where they had a majority.[70] Indeed, the history of the early revolutionary period until 1910 was a struggle by CUP elites to strengthen the authority of parliament to the other actors like the Mahmut Şevket Pasha network, the Sublime Porte, and even the sultan. In other words, the CUP leadership, especially after the March 31 counterrevolution, struggled to concentrate power in parliament. This enabled them to enact certain structural laws, one of which was the *tensikât* law. Moreover, strengthening parliament by concentrating the power to make laws was a show of bravado to counterrevolutionary rivals.

Before analyzing the details and articles of the law, the political process in which the *tensikat* law was prepared must be explained. Most significant event, after the eventual decision to enact a *tensikat* law was accepted in the *meclis-i umûmî*, was the March 31 counterrevolutionary event. Although many studies focus on the period in which the counterrevolution took place in April 1909, few expand on the aftermath and possible outcomes of the incident. The fact that the literature concentrates on the moment of the counterrevolution itself has overshadowed the struggles in the aftermath of the counterrevolution by which the CUP reestablished power in the capital. The literature has been content with the story that the outcome of the counterrevolution was a landslide victory for Mahmut Şevket Pasha and the CUP. To some extent this was true, but there was no guarantee that the CUP leadership would not encounter another such coup in the future. In other words, although the literature suggests that the CUP leadership was relieved after

70 Tural also pointed out the growing significance of the parliament vis-à-vis the government. Briefly exemplifying the fall of the Kamil Pasha cabinet in the early 1909 as well as certain bills that dealt with extending the purges, he ultimately stressed that the Constitutional Amendment in August 1909 provided an advantage in favor of the parliament over the government. See Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi*, 51. However, this dissertation addresses the systematic endeavor centralizing the parliamentary power over certain other actors especially after the 31 March Incident until July 1909.

the incident, this notion should be questioned. First, the situation worried the CUP center because of the potential of another uprising that could resemble the March 31 Incident. Second, the CUP from that point forward was going to be responsible for every act of government given that the public opinion was that the CUP was more powerful than ever. The growing power of Mahmut Şevket Pasha was a third worry for the CUP. These were sufficient for the CUP to proceed with caution. Within a few months, several laws, codes, and even an amendment to the constitution were drafted.[71] The *Tensikat* law was one of these laws in the post-counterrevolutionary period.

This raises another question. How did the post-counterrevolutionary atmosphere accelerate the process of appearing certain laws? For Feroz Ahmad, the unsuccessful counterrevolution resulted in a revival of reformists in parliament who took advantage when the conservative anti-reformists were downed. He calls the period after May 1909 as the constitutional reform (*meşrûtî ıslahat*).[72] For Sohrabi, the fact that the Sublime Porte and parliament were freed from pressure by the sultan directly affected the decision-making process. Their institutional independence from Yıldız Palace was demonstrable.[73] Sohrahi shares Azmi Özcan's idea that the laws wiped away the ruins of the ancient regime.[74] Another approach was proposed by Zeren. The gap between parliamentarism and *Kanûn-i Esâsi* started to decrease along with this legislative furor.[75] However, from the CUP point of view, there were

71 For Bülent Tanör, while changes to the Constitution of 1876 were limited in number, the content of the amendments were important. The important aspect of the 1909 amendments was that it gave extra power to the parliament and restricted the power of the sultan, which is why the August 1909 Constitution is considered a new constitution. Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (1789-1980),* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013), 192-193. For another detailed evaluation of the changes to the constitution, see Cem Eroğul, "1908 Devrimi'ni İzleyen Anayasa Değişiklikleri," in *100. Yılında Jön Türk Devrimi,* eds. Sina Akşin, Sarp Balcı, and Barış Ünlü (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), 85-141.

72 Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki, 1908-1914,* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayıları, 1999), 80-81. For certain laws enacted after April 1909, see; Akşin, *Jön Türkler*, 144-145.

73 Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism, 267.*

74 Azmi Özcan, "Otuzbir Mart Vak'ası," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 34, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2007), 9-11

75 Barış Zeren, "The Formation of Constitutional Rule: The Politics of Ottomanism between de jure and de facto" (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2017), 182.

other explanations, as well. One was that the CUP leadership was warned by the counterrevolution and retreated for the sake of playing by the rules. Another interpretation put forward by Feroz Ahmad who embraces the idea that the CUP did not make laws before the counterrevolution because they encountered a harsh opposition. After the March 31 Incident, but this time the opposition was eliminated, they finally had the opportunity to enact important laws. The third explanation corresponds with points made by both Sohrabi and Feroz Ahmad. The CUP filled a huge lacuna in the political arena after the counterrevolution through which they could act independent of an external pressure from either the anti-reformists or the sultan. Each of these three explanations are correct, but to a limited extent. A more comprehensive explanation would be that the CUP was initially troubled by the tensions that prompted the counterrevolution created, but then enjoyed a relatively emancipated political atmosphere after the March 31 Incident, combining Nader Sohrabi's an Feroz Ahmad's positions. Second, Mahmut Şevket Pasha's influence over the executive organ and the military isolated the CUP in the political arena.[76] The CUP, on the other hand, had the parliamentary majority where they found an important base from which to wield power against Mahmut Şevket. In other words, the CUP showed off its parliamentary majority as a strategic advantage over Mahmut Şevket, explaining the large number of new laws that passed through parliament. However, in each case, the CUP had to play by rules since the threat of another counterrevolution and Mahmut Şevket's inestimable power lurked in the background. This indicates how the CUP transformed the state of exception into a state of law. The March 31 Incident can thus be evaluated as the denouement for the state of exception.

76 The literature generally asserts that Mahmut Şevket Pasha assumed the whole of political power during early post-counterrevolutionary period. He maintained distance from the CUP in various ways. He published a notice on May 3, 1909, that there was to be no organic links between any political party and the military. Military members who continued to be members of political partieswere to be discharged from the military. All these decisions made under the strict control of Mahmut Şevket Pasha. See Aykut Kansu, *İttihatçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1918* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016), 125-126; and Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki, 1908-1914* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayıları, 1999), 69-72.

As for parliamentary debates in the atmosphere of uncertainty following the counterrevolution, the *tensikât* issue fell from favor. Although the counterrevolution was quelled by CUP linked forces on April 27 and parliamentary committees resumed work, discussions regarding the *tensikât* law would not be put back on the agenda until May 13, 1909. In fact, the government program of the Hılmi Pasha Cabinet established after the counterrevolution was stated that the *tensikat* law was about to be promulgated.[77] However, after this date, both the government and parliament worked to enact the law as soon as possible. On May 13, *sadrazâm* Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha sent an official memorandum to parliament that a draft bill (*layihâ*) was ready for discussion.[78] The draft bill did not cause remarkable disagreement among the deputies and was passed without delay in advance of debate to be held on May 29. During the discussions of the following three weeks, the wages of current *memurin*s and discharged officials were subject to fierce debates among the parliamentary members. On May 29, parliament started general debate on the draft of the *tensikat* law.

The first speaker, Mehmed Cavid Bey,[79] the Deputy of Selanik, stressed in his long speech that it was not possible to have enacted a *Tensikat* law before the March 31 Incident. But according to him, the incident made it necessity. If parliament could not manage to make a law, then, it would not be possible in the future.[80] He also notes in response to opponents of the *tensikat* that the purges were not about recovering the wages of discharged bureaucrats. Rather, the *tensikat* issue, he continued, was a matter of life and death. He strongly asserted that the economic ramifications were never an issue; in fact, they acted generously toward those who were to be dismissed. However, he continually contradicted himself, stating that the purges and reappointments from a new pool of human resources would rectify the economic structure. According to him, the former regime (*idâre-i sâbıka*) mismanaged human resources by employing in the state service those who were

77 İhsan Güneş, *Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyete Türkiye'de Hükümetler, Programları ve Meclisteki Yansımaları (1908-1923)* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 100-104.

78 M.M.Z.C. 1. içtima, 75. inikad, 30 *Nisan* 1325 (13 May 1909), 395.

79 Mehmed Cavid Bey was the commission reporter (*mazbata muharrir encümeni*).

80 M.M.Z.C. 1. içtima, 82. inikad, 16 *Mayıs* 1325 (29 May 1909), 20.

young and would more profitably have staffed economic foundations outside of the state's own institutions. Instead, from the first years of Abdülhamid's accession, the quantity of members of every department increased. Whereas each department could be run with just three members before 1876, there were now almost sixty members in each department. Moreover, by employing such an excessive number of bureaucrats, the former regime taught its own citizens how to earn money without working. Therefore, the *tensikat*, according to him, would revive the economic structure and provide new opportunities.[81]

The wage of bureaucrats was another point in Cavid Bey's speech. Before the Hamidian regime, the average wages were between twenty and thirty lira, but they reached almost eighty Turkish lira during the late Hamidian period. The department of finance and treasury needed to pay 300,000 Turkish lira[82] to bureaucrats assigned in Istanbul alone. He continued with populist rhetoric that this amount could be used for the poor, orphans, and widows, but was instead needed to pay the wages of underserving *memurîn*. On one hand, this fostered injustice among the lower classes of the motherland for him. On the other, it prevented the progress of the structures of finance.

The most critical part of his speech was his analysis of the former regime's bureaucrats who, according to him, did not deserve their positions. They employed because they had ties to higher-level bureaucrats who were linked ideologically to the former regime. Many of the *memûrin,* soon after their appointment, became dependent on the soul and deed of *istibdâd* (tyranny), and they were the individuals who endeavored most for the continuity of tyranny. Clientelism and favoritism in the appointment of bureaucratic cadres must be replaced by an evaluation of the candidates' industriousness, merit, and moral character. He continued that there was no need to reward the men of the former regime, though it could be done for the sake of not turning them off from the constitutional ideology.[83]

81 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 82. inikad, 16 *Mayıs* 1325 (29 May 1909), 20-21.

82 Converted to the gold standard, this is approximately 1984.5 kilograms of fine gold. (1 lira equals 100 *guruş,* which is about 6.615 grams of fine gold).

83 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 82. inikad, 16 *Mayıs* 1325 R. (29 May 1909), 21.

Cavid Bey's speech continued by describing what the law would look like. Accordingly, a draft law was prepared that categorized bureaucrats into four groups. The first group would see no harm from the *tensikat* since they had enough merit, endeavor, and moral character in Cavid Bey's opinion. The second group of bureaucrats consisted of men who were not as efficient as the first but could continue in state service. The bureaucrats in the third group were adherents of the former regime who would be told to "get out" (*buyurunuz, dışarı*). The last category included bureaucrats who were incapable of carrying out their duties. They would be dismissed yet maintain certain rights including a compensation wage. The difference between the third and the fourth categories was that bureaucrats in the third category would receive no compensation or pension. They would be summarily dismissed from government service without any consideration of their merit.[84]

The second, third, and fourth groups were to be scrutinized by a commission comprised of members of the *Meclis-i Umûmî,* which included both the Chamber of Notables (*meclis-i ayân*) and the Chamber of Deputies (*meclis-i mebusân*). This commission would operate as an investigative committee to determine dismissals. Cavid Bey stressed that there would be different committees for each ministry. The remainder of his speech concerned the details of each article separately.[85]

After Cavid Bey's informative speech on behalf of the Committee describing the bill of law, deputies entered into negotiation regarding the draft. Emanüel Karasu Efendi, the Deputy of Selânik, was the first person to go to the rostrum. He strongly rejected the draft presuming that it was injustice towards the officials. His opposition, as a well-known Unionist deputy, was significant in terms of demonstrating that the *tensikat* issue also caused dissent even among Unionist deputies.[86] İsmail Paşa (*Hattatzâde*), the independent Deputy of Tokat,[87] criticized the draft for not considering the actual outcomes as far as the dismissed officials were concerned. He insisted that there was an urgent need to generate employment for those discharged from

84 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 82. inikad, 16 Mayıs 1325 (29 May 1909), 22.

85 Ibid., 22-25.

86 Ibid., 25-26.

87 Kansu, *1908 Devrimi,* 419.

office lest they be chained to the coffeehouses.[88] Another Unionist deputy, Mustafa Asım Efendi, also quarreled with Cavid Bey regarding the wages and potential compensation of discharged officials.[89] The independent Deputy of Karesi, Şefik Bey, criticized the draft law saying that it spared the treasury only a pittance while the poor, discharged officials would die of starvation.[90]

Critiques continued and were directed at Cavid Bey, so he took the floor again to change the course of the discussion. Cavid Bey accepted the atmosphere of discontent created within parliament by the draft, but he insisted that most of the deputies supported the *tensikât* in principle; unsatisfactory parts of the draft could be corrected. He then managed in part to turn the mood to his advantage with the help of Halil Menteşe, another well-known Unionist deputy. From then on, the debate proceeded as a clash of two fronts: supporters and opponents of the *tensikât*.[91] After heated discussion, the first two articles of the draft were accepted by the end of the session. Consideration of the remaining articles was postponed for two days.

This later session, which took place on May 31, was unaggressive compared to the session of parliament two days earlier. The remaining articles of the draft were explained by Cavid Bey along with his own commentary. As the leading figure behind the draft, he was the champion of the overall discussions. Other commentators close to the CUP called him brother Cavid (*birâderimiz Cavid Bey*), with the exception of Emanüel Karasu Efendi. It is unknown whether the conflict between Karasu and Cavid Bey, which comes out in the discussions of the *tensikât* law draft, was initially personal.[92] They were both from Selanik, grew up in the same cultural environment, shared

88 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 82. inikad, 16 Mayıs 1325 (29 May 1909), 27.

89 Ibid., 29.

90 Ibid., 30.

91 Ibid., 30-46.

92 Karasu Efendi was Ottoman-Jewish, whereas Cavid Bey's origins were Sabbatean. For the origin of Cavid Bey, see Rifat Bali, *Musa'nın Evlatları, Cumhuriyetin Yurttaşları* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 53-54. For the biography of Karasu Efendi, see Zeynep Uçak, *Selanik Mebusu Emaüel Karasu Hayatı ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri* (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık, 2019).

the same political ideology,[93] and were even members of the same masonic lodge. The significant difference was that while Karasu was a Sephardic Jew, Cavid Bey was a Sabbatian. Apart from the dispute between Karasu and Cavid Bey, the discussions from which the *tensikât* law emerged made clear that Cavid's star was rising.

The most intense point of debate among the deputies in the session on May 31 was the financial hardships that discharged bureaucrats would potentially face. Another point concerned the tenures in state service, which speakers stressed should be born in mind when dismissing officials. However, by the end of the session, the parliament had managed to discuss and accept all the articles in the draft law,[94] though some were to be revised. Latter sessions would not be as confrontational as the session on May 29 or as detailed as the one on May 31. Opponents of the law might have given up because their efforts fell flat during the first session, even if they managed to positively influence other deputies on certain issues. Second, after the unexpected shock of the first session, they CUP was better prepared for later meetings and admonished dissenting deputies who were close to the Unionist ideology. Karasu Efendi, for example, toned down his critiques in the meeting on May 31. He took the floor, but he was inclined to contribute to changes to the content of the draft rather than reject the *tensikât* law outright as he had done in the previous meeting.

The second round of general negotiations, after the initial ones on May 29 and 30, started on June 10, 1909. This session was a formality. Speakers did not propose major changes but asked only to add or exclude words or at most a sentence. The president of the *Meclis-i Mebusân*, Ahmed Rıza Bey, exhorted deputies not to discuss the articles at length at the beginning of the session. Rather, the speeches were to be brief.[95] He frequently interrupted deputies who spoke at length. For example, Kozmidi Efendi, the Deputy of

93 Karasu Efendi was also elected as a deputy of the CUP. See Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Meclisler, 1908-1918," *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Degisi,* 4-5 (1975-1976): 267.

94 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 83. inikad, 18 *Mayıs* 1325 (31 May 1909).

95 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 90. inikad, 28 *Mayıs* 1325 (10. June 1909) 260.

Istanbul from Ahrar Fırkası,[96] took the floor at the beginning of the discussions. He asked that the investigating committees, which according to the draft were comprised of members from both the Chamber of Notables and the Chamber of Deputies, be separated. He continued by asking who would be responsible for adjudicating unjust dismissals by the committees? Ahmed Rıza Bey interjected that this line needed to have been argued in the first round of negotiations, warning that was not the time. Although Kozmidi Efendi persisted, Ahmed Rıza Bey summarily rejected his resolution. Although there were other attempts to enlarge the scope of the discussions, the president imposed an environment for the efficient revision of the draft. By the end of the session, all the articles were accepted and forwarded to the council of ministers (*heyet-i vükelâ*).[97]

On June 24, a memorandum arrived at the Chamber of Deputies from the president of the Chamber of Notables. The memorandum stated that the disquisition of the draft in the Chamber of Notables was complete. The Chamber of Notables had worked through the draft in two weeks and sent its ultimate report to the Chamber of Deputies in which it recommended certain changes to the draft. Although the recommendations mostly concerned the form, some suggestions concerned content, as well. While recommendations were for a change to a word, others asserted the reevaluation of a whole article. Article 10, for instance, was to be rewritten since, according to the notables, the statement that certain bureaucrats would never be employed in the state service again was contrary to the interests of justice. Moreover, they suggested certain changes to the compensation of dismissed bureaucrats. In its present form, the draft law was rejected by the Chamber of Notables.

The memorandum shocked Mehmed Cavid Bey. He stated regretfully; "the result is sorrow; the protraction of this task is sorrow; I cannot say

96 Ahmad and Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Meclisler, 1908-1918," 269. Ahmad and Rustow coded Kozmidi Efendi as an ideologically liberal member of Ahrar Fırkası during the early constitutional period and a member of Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası after the elections of 1912. Also see Kansu, *1908 Devrimi,* 396.

97 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 90. inikad, 28 *Mayıs* 1325 (10. June 1909), 277.

anything else."[98] The ultimate reason for Mehmed Cavid Bey's desperation was that, according to him, the memorandum would considerably delay the *tensikât* law. It would also postpone the future organizational law (*teşkilat kanunu*) and budget discussions, both of which hinged on passage of the *tensikât* law. However, many deputies, including the speaker Ahmed Rıza Bey, did not share Mehmed Cavid Bey's opinion. They insisted that the committee for the bill of law (*layiha encümeni*) could efficiently complete the work.

After a short time, the law was promulgated on July 1 and published in the official newspaper, *takvim-i vekayi,* on July 10, 1909.[99] The CUP did not consider the Council of Notables to be important in the process of enacting laws, but they nonetheless managed to pass the law immediately. The CUP leadership worked within the Council of Deputies to ensure that the law passed exactly as Cavid Bey had proposed. Although they had a majority, the debates during the *tensikât* law preparations demonstrated that most deputies acted independently and needed to be persuaded. Cavid Bey, in this respect, was the whip who united and organized the deputies under the CUP banner. Therefore, enacting the *tensikât* law contributed to the congealing of CUP deputies, an important step toward strengthening parliament. All in all, the CUP managed to enact the *tensikât* law which enabled them to have the actual political power to design legislation.

As for the articles of the law; the first article stated that those who were dismissed or would be dismissed from the state service who believed that they had been wronged because of practices before or after the proclamation of the constitution would be subject to an investigation by a commission within the department in which they had been employed. The investigating commissions would be presided by a representative from the Chamber of Notables (*Meclis-i Ayân*) accompanied by a vice-president from the Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Mebusân*) along with three examiners from the respective department. For the *memurîn* whose complaints the commission

98 "Neticesi teessüf, bu işin bu kadar uzamasına teessüf. Başka bir şey söyleyemem." M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 100. inikad, 11 *Haziran* 1325 (24 June 1909), 627.

99 BOA.BEO. İ.KAN. 6/5, 12 *Cemaziyelahir* 1327 (01 July 1909); *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 27 *Haziran* 1325, vol. 267 (10 July 1909).

decided had merit, they would return to an appropriate position in the *memuriyet*. They would also have the right to apply for a compensation wage (*mazuliyet maaşı*) until they were reappointed. The second article states that the commissions mentioned in the first article will meet to determine the means of investigation, which is to say that the ultimate decisions about the methodology of investigation were left to the discretion of the commissioners. The third article indicated that purges from the Istanbul municipality (*şehremâneti*) would be undertaken by the commission within the Ministry of the Interior, although the organizational body of the *şehremâneti* was actually under the authority of the *Cemiyet-i Umûmiye-i Belediye* (the General Community of Municipality). The fourth article regulated the application of the *tensikat* in the provinces, formalizing the institutions responsible for the implementation of the law.

The first section (*fasıl*) of the law was comprised of five articles. Article 5 dealt with the rights of *memurin* who were dismissed but regained right the right to be appointed following an evaluation carried out by the investigatory commissions. According to the article, those who had been in the official service less than two years would not receive the compensation wage. They would be given a consolation payment equal to two months' salary. The article then indicates how the compensation wage was to be distributed among former officials who had served more than two years previously and who were awaiting reappointment. The distribution was to be according to their former wages and years completed in the state service. Article 6 indicated that only those older than twenty could apply for the compensation wage. For those who started their service before 20 years of age, only the years of service after age 20 would be considered. Article 7 indicated that the compensation wage would continue to be paid until an official was reappointed to an appropriate position. If an official refused two offers of a position in Istanbul or in the provinces without a valid excuse, their compensation wage would be cut. Article 8 stated that if an official passed away while awaiting reappointment, half of the compensation wage would be paid to the families of officials who had been in service less than 10 years. The families of deceased officials who had served more than 10 years were entitled to apply to the retirement fund. Article 9 gave the right to anyone entitled to

the compensation wage to apply for discharge from the state service. They would receive a one-time severance payment equal to twice their previous monthly wages and they would agree never to apply for a position in the state service again.

The second section of the law could result in further unease among potential victims. This section, composed of two articles, itemizes the conditions for dismissed bureaucrats to return to their offices. Article 10 specified that officials who were intrinsically inappropriate (*sû-i hali tebeyyün edenler*) after a detailed investigation by the commission would never again serve in the state service. They could apply for neither a compensation wage nor a salary. Article 11, on the other hand, stated that for those with not inappropriate conditions but whose dismissal was on account of their ineptitude (*sû-i ahval ile maruf olmayıb*) could apply for the compensation wage. These two articles drew a distinction between officials lacked merit and those who were inherently unfit. But what did the latter refer? Did the commission members dismiss bureaucrats arbitrarily on the pretext of being unfit? Unfortunately, the sources are silent on who these individuals were, but most probably they were the officials with ties to the Hamidian Regime. The broad scope of Article 10 essentially allowed authorities to dismiss any official anywhere in the empire without reason.

After making these two important points, the text continued with supplemental provisions (*mevâdd-ı müteferrika*) regarding potential problems that could arise. Article 12 stated that those 65 years old or older would be forced into retirement, but there was a provision of state officials whose employment the government saw as necessary. Article 13 designates the offices responsible for paying the retirement and compensation wages. Article 14 provides additional remedies if victims were confused about which department they should apply to for their compensation. Article 15, on the other, returns to the issue of those deemed inappropriate for state service according to Article 10. The article clarified that they send their grievances neither to the government nor to the departments in which they had been employed, but only to parliament. This article is critical in terms of explaining how parliament, in which the CUP had the majority, would decide the ultimate destinies of victims dismissed on the grounds of *sû-i hâl*. The remaining

articles of the law, which was comprised of a total of 18 articles, sketched out certain issues pertaining to the implementation of the law.

§ 2.4 Conclusion

Considering the span from the reopening of parliament to the beginning of July 1909, the CUP's position in the overall struggle shifted several times. In the beginning, in August 1908, the CUP approached the purges as an arbitrary, natural process. While members in parliament with organic links to the CUP proposed that a law need not be enacted since it would interfere with the executive, liberal and independent deputies often remarked on the legal lacuna that existed after the constitution was repromulgated. The *tensikât* was applied arbitrarily before the law was enacted. Propaganda against the pashas at the higher strata of the bureaucracy established the groundwork for the engineering of both the higher and the lower levels of the bureaucracy without a legal basis. There would have ultimately started a process for fulfilling the legal lacuna and acceleration of the process of enacting a law to legalize prior acts that coincided with the counterrevolution. The CUP found the space to enact laws to legitimize the norm. Making the *tensikât* law also resolved another major issue, safeguarding the new norm created in the eleven months after the constitution was repromulgated.

The process evoked Agamben's State of Exception. However, further study is needed, especially with regard to the passing of other laws during the four months after the March 31 counterrevolution. Only then should the following be asked again: Was this one of the methods the CUP implemented from the legislative organ to establish the second constitutional rule? If not – that is, if the systematic struggles were only to bring about the purges – then a second debate emerges: Did the CUP approach the bureaucracy as an arena of struggle and an equally significant space for power distribution together with the actual political arena?

The scholarship on the second constitutional period has long tended to evaluate the CUP's political trajectory as a gradually shift toward an authoritarian attitude after 1913, as discussed in the epilogue. The *tensikât* law, together with other fundamental laws enacted in summer 1909, came into

effect at a point when the CUP had nowhere near the power to run the state that it would possess in 1913. It was a huge political project achieved with limited political power. To cleanse the bureaucratic cadres unfit for their projected political system, the CUP adopted methods with a so-called limited power to achieve what authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century did with total power. Considering that legislative power was distributed among diverse actors, the period from the March 31 Incident until August 1909 is significant for understanding the nature of actual politics. For the CUP, press propaganda and centralizing legislative power solely in parliament enabled them to achieve the vast political project of eliminating bureaucrats thought to be unfit for the new rule.

Having propounded the notion of the *denetleme iktidârı*, Akşin points to limitations on the CUP's freedom to act between 1908–1913.[100] The political climate was marred by everyday conflicts among political actors as well as by fluctuations in the influence of the CUP over the government, reinforcing Akşin's argument. The CUP's executive powers were restricted compared to the period after 1913. However, there is a lacuna in the historiography of how the CUP combatted this limited political power. It is important to examine how it tried to overcome the frustration of its power by external and opposing forces after July 1908. This study attempts to seek answers to these inquiries by focusing on a specific law-making process.

Furthermore, this chapter proposed ultimately that lacking visibility at the top echelons of government did not mean that the CUP was impotent. It had control of parliament and struggled to overhaul the state bureaucracy. It also had the support of the press which shaped public opinion in its favor and gathered support for certain laws. The press and parliament enabled the CUP to accomplish a critical political project: the *tensikât*. Thus, depicting the CUP as weak during the early constitutional period, without considering the struggle of CUP-aligned intellectuals to totally control of the state apparatus, would be a mistake.

The CUP's process of consolidating power from August 1908 to late 1909 shows that, from the beginning, the CUP approached the purges arbitrarily.

100 Akşin, *Jön Türkler*, 238.

Press propaganda constituted a vital element of the purges by depicting the pashas of the high strata of the bureaucracy as treacherous, paving the way for the political engineering of both the higher and lower strata of the bureaucracy without a legal basis. This was followed by an eventual legalization and legitimization of these arbitrary acts. The acceptance that a legal lacuna existed for the purges and the acceleration of the law-making process came about in the stressful political climate following the short-lived counterrevolution. By centralizing its position in parliament and occasionally interfering with the authority of the executive as well as the Council of the State, the CUP overcame the *denetleme iktidarı*. Finally, this chapter opens the extent of power wielded by the CUP up to question. Further studies could focus on the methods that the CUP adopted to enact other laws in 1909 such as *matbuat, içtimaât, tâtil-i eşgâl,* and *matbaalar*.

3

The Aftermath of the *Tensikât* Law: The CUP in Action

The aftermath of the law meant a new period of ambiguity; across the board, statesmen were uncertain about what would happen next. Not only those who were at risk of being ousted, but also bureaucrats whose positions were secure had questions regarding the enforcement of the law. The very executors of the law who held the power of dismissing officials were unclear about the articles of the law. Deputies, on the other hand, continued to debate the potential outcomes. In the meantime, the victims of the law were petitioning the relevant authorities in expectation that they would ultimately return to their offices, which is further discussed in chapter 4. This chapter will primarily focus on the aftermath of the law, concentrating on problems faced during its implementation regarding government offices and parliamentary discussions. Moreover, it inquires to what extent the CUP actively involved in the process which in fact the executive body's area of responsibility.

The process demonstrates an example of the degree to which political and administrative history, methodologically, overlap each other. Not only administrative organizations within the state apparatus – that is, the departments and offices of various ministries – but parliament itself struggled to resolve the issues of executing of the law, which was actually the

responsibility of the government. This was inevitably given that parliament, from the beginning, acted as a means of arriving at consensus both to prepare and enact laws as well as to solve problems stemming from their execution. In many instances, parliament acted as the umbrella organization. For the application of the *tensikât* law, parliament discussed each detail extensively until the law fell from favor. The offices directly related to the government and ministries also struggled to handle the initial and subsequent problems of implementing it. Passing the law was itself a success for the CUP, parliament, and the government, but it seems that they expected no further complications, explaining why a series of amendments were ushered in soon after the law passed in July 1909. Moreover, the law, which consisted of 18 articles, was not sufficient detailed to address the diversity of operational factors in its implementation.

This chapter presents a brief chronology of events in the aftermath of the *tensikât* law[1] to clarify its difficult fate as well as analysis the period how the law was executed. However, rather than a descriptive projection of the chronology of the aftermath of the law, it is argued here that the CUP was actively participating the executive apparatus.

Soon after the law was enacted, parliament started to discuss the method of establishing the commissions as mentioned in the first article of the law. Moreover, certain operational issues became immediately apparent; the issues of wages, retirement pensions, and other problems with the implementation of the law became the subject of discussions in fall 1909. Petitions from the targets of the law constituted an important problem for deputies unsure how to handle them. Voluminous data in the Ottoman Archives reflects the problems faced by state office starting in the first days of the law's enactment. However, the most frequent complaints in both archival documents and parliamentary minutes concerned the law itself (rather than its execution), which prompted its amendment by the Hakkı Pasha cabinet in January 1910. The additional law (*zeyl*) consisted of amendments to make the law seem more justifiable to accommodate its victims. Until late 1911, the

1 Erkan Tural gives a detailed chronology of the aftermath of the enactment of the tensikat law. Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 130-147.

tensikât continued to be relevant, as the process by which individual ministries executed the law was drawn out.

In what follows, the main issues faced during the implementation of the law are elaborated upon in terms of understanding the attitudes of participants in high politics as well as the reactions from the actual executors, namely commission members, governors, and ordinary officials who were confused about its application. This is possible through a simultaneous evaluation of parliamentary minutes, in which the attitudes of deputies are reflected, and archival documents, in which the voice of the state officials comes through.

§ 3.1 Determining Dismissals: The *Tensikât* Commissions

The *tensikât* law stated in its first article that officials who had been discharged from state service would be subject to an investigation by a commission. The investigating commission would consist of a president from the *Meclis-i Ayân* accompanied by a vice-president from the *Meclis-i Mebusân*. There would also be three officials from each department who would work as examiners. Those bureaucrats dismissed before the law was enacted who were deemed to merit their offices would be reinstated. They would also have the right to apply for a compensation wage (*mazuliyet maaşı*) until their reappointment was finalized. If the investigation commission determines that a dismissal was legitimate, the second section of the law (articles 10 and 11) would be applied.

This begs the question: who were the members of these commissions? Did their political affiliations affect the process of adjudicating on dismissals? Above all, does the fact that individual personalities were involved prove the political nature of the process of investigating and deciding who would be required to leave their positions? How did the commissions determine who had merit and who was incompetent? According to Kırmızı, many officials dismissed during the *tensikât* were indeed competent; at least, they had graduated from the *mekteb-i mülkiye*.[2] It is therefore legitimate to ask

2 Kırmızı, "Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları" 343-345.

what were the actual attitudes that commission members bore. But at the start, it is significant to examine how their individual personalities affected their ultimate decisions if inefficiency was not the only criterion for dismissing bureaucrats.

Determining the commission members was one of the first items to accomplish after the law was enacted. Within ten days of the law's proclamation, parliament started to discuss the need to form a commission. A governmental resolution (from *sadrâzâm* Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha) stated that one member of the *tensikât* for each ministry would be chosen from among deputies, which prompted further discussion among deputies who argues that it was the government's duty, not parliament's, to execute the law.[3] However, Ahmed Rıza proposed that commission members from parliament be elected by parliament itself. Approximately two weeks after this discussion, another resolution from Hüseyin Hilmi stated the urgent need to organize the commissions, stating that parliament must inform the government of the deputies elected to sit on the commissions.[4] Ultimately, these deputies were identified on August 16, 1909.[5]

Ali Münif Bey, a prominent Unionist deputy of Adana,[6] became the parliamentary member of the commission for purges from the Ministry of the Interior. For purges from the foreign ministry, Rahmi Bey, a deputy member of the CUP, was the delegate.[7] Mustafa Hayri Efendi, another prominent Unionist who would run the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, preside over the Council of the State, and serve as *sheikhulislam* during his long career, became the member of the commission for the purges in the

3 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 109. Inikad, 27 *Haziran* 1325 (10 July 1909), 283-284.

4 M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 118. inikad, 13 *Temmuz* 1325 (26 July 1909), 509.

5 For the list of deputies, see M.M.Z.C. 1. İçtima, 135. inikad, 3 *Ağustos* 1325 (16 August 1909), 464-465. *Tanin* also published a list of deputies on August17, but certain names are missing from the newspaper's list. *Tanin*, 4 *August* 1325 (17 August 1909), 2-3.

6 See Taha Toros, *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları (*Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1996).

7 For Rahmi Bey's biography, see Ayşe Özil, "Evrenoszade, Rahmi Bey," in *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War,* eds. Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, Freie Universität Berlin. Published August 31, 2018. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/evrenoszade_rahmi_bey

Ministry of Justice in autumn 1909.[8] For the purges from the Council of the State, Ahmed Nesimi Bey represented parliament. He was a prominent Unionist and member of the central committee (*merkez-i umûmî*) and would serve as the Minister of Trade and the Foreign Minister during the World War I.[9] A well-known Unionist Hallaçyan Efendi was elected as the delegate for the commission of the Ministry of Finance.[10] For the military and administrative retirement fund (*askerî ve mülkî tekâüd*), Ali Cenani Bey served as the member of the commission representing parliament. He became close to Talat Bey and certain members of the *merkez-i umûmî* in the mid-1910s.[11] Another prominent Unionist was Bursalı Tahir Bey, who became the parliamentary delegate for the purges from the Ministry of War. He was a deep-rooted Unionist, a connection originating from his time as an army officer in the Balkans during the pre-revolutionary period.[12] Gani Bey, the Unionist deputy of Denizli,[13] took the charge for the customs, postal, and telegraph departments. CUP Deputy of Sinop, Hasan Fehmi Efendi, participated in the purges from Religious Affairs (*Bab-ı Meşihât*), and Vasfi Efendi of Karesi, was elected to the commission for the Ministry of Pious Foundations (*evkâf nezareti*). Although he started as a deputy under the flag of the CUP, he resigned from the Committee on February 21, 1910,[14] but while the commissions were active in fall 1909, he was still a CUP member. For the Ministry

8 For a detailed biography based on his diaries, see Ali Suat Ürgüplü, *Şeyhülislam Ürgüplü Mustafa Hayri Efendi'nin Meşrutiyet, Büyük Harp ve Mütareke Günlükleri (1909-1922)* (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015).

9 Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricâli,* 59.

10 For a brief biography, see Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Tanıdıklarım*, prep. Göktürk Ömer Çakır (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2020), 129-135.

11 Ümit Kurt, "The Curious Case of Ali Cenani Bey: The Story of a Génocidaire during and after the 1915 Armenian Genocide," *Patterns of Prejudice* 52, no.1 (2018): 67. The sources to which Aykut Kansu refers state that Ali Cenani Bey was an independent deputy, not a deputy under the banner of the CUP, in the first elections after the repromulgation of the constitution. Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, 409.

12 Ömer Faruk Akün, "Bursalı Mehmed Tâhir," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 6, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1992), 452-461.

13 Ahmad and Rustow, "2.Meşrutiyet Dönemi Meclisler, 1908-1918," 270. Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, 385.

14 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'deTürkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, Cilt 1, İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi, 1908-1918*. v.vol. 2. (İstanbulIstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988), 244.

of Education, Ahmed Müfid Bey of İzmid participated on the commission. Although he had ties to independent deputies and later participated in the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası* in 1912, in the autumn 1909 he was among the CUP members of parliament and an active member of the *hizb-i âtik*, a liberal faction within the CUP.[15] On the other hand, independent deputies were also elected as commission members: Feraci Efendi for Ministry of Trade, Tevfik Efendi for the *defter-i hâkânî* (the Ottoman land registry and cadaster office), Sabri Bey for the *sadâret*,[16] Ali Galib Bey for Ministry of the Navy, and Salim Efendi for the Ministry of Forests and Mines. Nonetheless, CUP members comprised the great majority of commission members; moreover, prominent Unionists represented parliament on the commissions for the most critical ministries.

Apart from deputies serving on separate ministry commissions, a chairmanship council (*riyâset divânı*) was also formed as an umbrella organization for the commissions. İsmail Bey, the Deputy of Gümülcine, was elected as chairman; Arif İsmet Bey of Biga became the court reporter (*mazbata muharriri*); Yusuf Şetvan Bey, the Deputy of Bingazi, served as reporting officer (*zabıt kitabeti*).[17] İsmail Bey had one of the most interesting political careers among the actors that started their political activities within the CUP. He started his career as a passionate Unionist in the first parliament after 1908[18] and was then sentenced to death by leading political figures after the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Pasha in 1913. Indeed, he resigned from the CUP in February 1910 for establishing the *Ahali Fırkası* even as he was the vice president of the Committee.[19] His political career continued as an

15 Yücel Yiğit, "İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası İçinde Parti İçi Muhalefet: Hizb-i Cedit Hareketi," *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 14, no. 28 (Spring 2014): 115.

16 According to Erkan Tural, İsmail Bey of Gümülcine participated on the commission overseeing the purges in the prime ministry, but sources found for this research indicate that Sabri Bey, The Deputy of Bursa, was selected as the member of the commission for the *sadâret*. For Tural's list, see Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 119.

17 M.M.Z.C. 2. İçtima, 7. inikad, 14 *Teşrin-i Sâni* 1325 (27 November 1909), 98.

18 Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası, II.Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde İttihat ve Terakki'ye Karşı Çıkanlar (*Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1990), 234.

19 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi, 1908-1918*, vol. 2 of *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988), 244.

opponent of the CUP; he joined the *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası* when he was the president of the *Ahali Fırkası* and became the most passionate actor of the opposition to the CUP.[20] However, in his early career as a parliamentarian, when the *tensikât* commissions were being established, he was a prominent Unionist.[21]

Yusuf Şetvan Bey, the third member of the chairmanship council, also had an interesting career. Although he had ties within the opposition in 1910 and 1911, he had also close relationships with CUP politicians. His political affiliation during the 1908 elections cannot be confirmed, but he became a deputy under the CUP banner in 1912. But according to Sezai Balcı, his relationship with the CUP must have started earlier.[22]

The politics over the formation of the commissions suggests that the CUP endeavored to exert control through its members on each commission. Ali Münif Bey, the parliamentary delegate for the interior ministry, stated in his memoir that the *Merkez-i Umûmî* of the CUP made importunate (*mussırâne*) demands on both the government and the parliament with respect to purges from the interior ministry.[23] Although there were commission members elected from among independent deputies, the majority of delegates were active in the CUP. By controlling the activities of each commission, the CUP ultimately intended to exert its influence over the dismissals. As the previous chapter proposes, Cavid Bey's rise paralleled the authoring of the *tensikât* law, and the implementation of the law was controlled by CUP members in most places. Electing prominent Unionists to critical commissions such as for the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign, War, Justice, and Finance (Ali Münif Bey, Evranoszâde Rahmi Bey, Bursalı Tahir Bey, Ürgüblü Hayri Efendi, and Hallacyan Efendi, respectively) demonstrated the

20 Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası,* 234.

21 Ahmad, and Rustow, "2. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Meclisler, 1908-1918," 270; Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, 381.

22 Sezai Balcı, "Panislamist Bir Mebusun Biyografisi: Bingazili Yusuf Şetvan (1868-1949)," in *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Demokratik Kesitler*, eds. E. Malkoç and İ.A. Odabaşı (Istanbul: Derlem Yayınları, 2016), 91.

23 "İttihat ve TerakkiMerkez-i Umûmîsi, memur sicilleri üzerinde durulmasını, memurlardan eski idareye hafiyelik ve jurnalcilik yapanların bilinmesini, şaibeli olanların ayıklanmasını, hülasa dahiliyemizin ıslahını hükümetten ve meclisten musırrâne talep ediyordu." Toros, *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları,* 43.

extent to which the CUP leadership wished for the purges to be carried out according to the standards of the Committee. Furthermore, the vice-president of the CUP when the commissions were formed, Gümülcineli İsmail Bey, led the chairmanship council of the *tensikât* commissions. Even for independent delegates on the commissions, nothing in the personal profiles of these deputies' hints that they would oppose the Unionists. Although sources pertaining to their personal and political affiliations are limited, their careers in parliament suggest that they mostly got along with CUP members.

Ali Münif Bey expressed candidly in his memoir that there was no tougher or more blameworthy task than being a commission member for the purges.[24] He claims to have approached it fairly with a sense of justice,[25] though it is obvious from the memoir that he felt embarrassed for having been a part of the implementation of the *tensikât*. But two facts eased his conscience. First, the *merkez-i umûmi* demanded the mass purges of the offices, and he felt obliged to execute of its decisions. Secondly, he felt that he approached the task fairly. Undoubtedly, most commission members would assert the same sentiments.

Beyond the inner, moral misgivings of commission members, delegates faced practical problems in the course of the process. For Tural, most commissions completed their task soon after being formed since parliament was in recess and those members could focus on their duty to the *tensikât.*[26] But this was not the end of the *tensikât* investigations. As the commissions were responsible for investigating the *legitimacy* of earlier decisions, they faced complications in the heat of the law's implementations. Many bureaucrats were being dismissed, while many others were being compelled to retire. Determining who would be dismissed involved collecting data about the bureaucrats, understanding their own wishes, and deciding whose objections had merit and whose did not. These were some of the problems commissions members faced early in the process.

24 "Bir memlekette, bâhusus azim bir inkilâb geçiren bir idarede tensikât kadar güç, yıpratıcı, vebal alıcı vazife olamaz." Ibid.

25 Ibid., 44-45.

26 Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi* 122.

Although the commissions generally finalized the issue of new dismissals in September 1909, they continued to investigate bureaucrats who had previously been dismissed from service. As investigations proceeded, new complications emerged. For example, one of the early problems they encountered was access to documents concerning the bureaucrats.[27] Indeed, it was a complex question of the reach of the commissions' authority, of their ability to investigate officials, and whether they were the sole competent authority to so.

§ 3.2 Amendment of the *Tensikât* Law

During the last phase of enacting the law, a problem emerged pertaining to the official stance towards bureaucrats who had already dismissed while the new law was awaiting official coordination. Correspondence within the ministries evince the expectation that the *tensikât* law of 1909 would solve many problems. The Ministry of Education, for example, asked the Presidency of the Council of Deputies how to treat dismissed bureaucrats, like Abdülkerim Efendi and his cohorts, until the law was officially promulgated.[28] Indeed, the same problem arose before the *tensikât* commissions were constituted. Correspondence within the Ministry of Education stated that the law could not yet be executed for bureaucrats who were deemed incapable in accordance with Article 10 of the *tensikât* law since the commissions had not yet established.[29] The law, the commissions, and all other official instruments that would stipulate the process of dismissing bureaucrats were anticipated as if they would definitively solve all the operational problems. In practice they did not; moreover, new ones emerged that subsequently led to amendments to the law.

One of the obvious problems concerned the wages of dismissed bureaucrats. Indeed, many complications originally stemmed from the economic

27 It was the first official request coming from the *riyâset dîvanı* in the parliament during the second year of the assembly (*ictimai*): M.M.Z.C. 2. İçtima, 7. inikad, 14 *Teşrin-i Sâni* 1325 (27 November 1909), 98-100.

28 BOA.MF.MKT. 1136/44, 22 *Cemaziyelahir* 1327 (11 July 1909).

29 BOA.MF.MKT. 1137/42, 2 *Receb* 1327 (20 July 1909)

implications of dismissing officials, and the great part of the law itself concerned their subsequent compensation and the distribution of retirement funds. The petitions from the victims of the *tensikât* mostly concerned being reinstated or wage increases, as discussed in the upcoming chapter. As the previous chapter demonstrates, heated debates in parliament during the authoring of the law concerned compensation to discharged bureaucrats. However, the eventual law itself caused further confusions among statesmen with respect to both the dismissals and the executors of the law.

An early problem emerged concerning the wages of those who were asked to retire. For all *tensikât* applications, there were two paths to retirement. First, the government demanded the retirement of those over 65 years old, and second, officials whose was dismissal was imminent could voluntarily apply for retirement. But what about the meantime before they were granted their retirement salary? Would they continue to receive their previous wage, or would they receive the new retirement salary? The law itself did not offer practical solutions to such everyday problems, which left them open to further adjudication by individual government offices. A record from the *Meclis-i Vükelâ*[30] (Council of Ministers), for example, stated that those asked to retire would be treated according to the requirements of the law until they were put on their retirement salary.[31] But this was itself unclear and did not resolve the issue. The *tensikât* law already guaranteed the retirement rights of certain officials who were over 65 years old unless they were accused of *su-i ahvâl*.[32] They were even entitled to severance pay calculated according to their previous wages.[33] However, the situation of the officials who were not yet 65 but asked to retire because they had completed a certain number of years in the service of the state was ambiguous. A statement by the Council of the State declared that a new decision must be issued for

30 For detailed information regarding the institutional evolution of the council of the *sadrazâm*, see Ali Akyıldız, "Meclis-i Vükelâ," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 28, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003), 251-253.

31 BOA.MV. 129/69 27 *Cemaziyelahir* 1327 (16 July 1909).

32 Those who were dismissed but were not entitled to retire lived in misery. They were given compensation wages only until the commissions were formed. BOA.ZB. 335/41 R.06.05.1325.

33 BOA.BEO 3690/276704, 6 *Muharrem* 1328 (18 January 1910).

them.[34] Another problem concerned those who retired in the time between law's preparation and its proclamation. Would they receive the severance pay? A decision issued by the interior ministry indicated that they were ultimately entitled to their severance.[35] However, the situation of those who were asked to retire but whose retirement was postponed for one reason, or another remained ambiguous until a decision by the interior ministry resolved it some 8 months after the proclamation of the law. The decision was that they were eligible to apply for severance pay.[36] While the problems pertaining to severance pay were resolved peacefully and did not cause further discontent among those affects, authorities hesitated in fear of causing further public displeasure.

Of course, severance pay was not the only problem concerning the economic aspects of the law that policy makers faced. The wages of those who were directly dismissed as well as of those too young for retirement constituted a more serious problem. Predictably, the victims of the process focused foremost on the financial difficulties they would face unless they got their positions back. If not permanent wages, compensation wages comprised their agenda together with the struggle to return to their offices. Although the law clearly stated the amounts of compensation, it remained vague about how it would be put into practice. The atmosphere of uncertainty adversely affected policy makers and deputies who at first endeavored to accelerate the process of paying out compensation. An August 1909 instruction from the *meclis-i vükelâ* ordered that payment of compensation to officials dismissed in accordance with the *tensikât* law and to those who had requested retirement be expedited.[37] In most cases, it was expected that dismissed officials apply for compensation themselves,[38] but receipt of compensation implied waiving one's right to apply for further benefits or reinstatement – at least,

34 BOA.ŞD.194/66, 15 *Şevval* 1327 (30 October 1909).

35 BOA. DH.EUM.MH. 239/69, 29 *Zilhicce* 1327 (11 January 1910).

36 BOA. DH.EUM.MH. 13/13, 19 *Safer* 1328 (2 March 1910).

37 BOA.MV. 132/44, 05 *Şaban* 1327 (22 August 1909).

38 For instance, see: BOA.DH.EUM.MH... 237/53, 28 *Ramazan* 1327 (13 October 1909); BOA.DH.EUM.MH... 3/18, 07 *Şevval* 1327 (22 October 1909); BOA.DH.EUM.MH... 3/46, 15 *Şevval* 1327 (30 October 1909).

that is how dismissed officials interpreted it. The number of applications for compensation was limited, and in some cases, officials indeed required receipts from the dismissed bureaucrats indicating that they had been paid.[39]

Certain other issues in addition to economic ones also occupied the agendas of both policy makers and the victims of the *tensikât* law in the early months of its implementation. For example, when the *zabtiye nezareti* was abolished and offices within the ministry were closed, officers who would remain out of work until after the revolution[40] asked whether they were going to be treated in the scope of the *tensikât* law. Some were told that they would be evaluated under the law, answering their questions with respect to receipt of compensation.[41] The Ottoman Archives are full of correspondence among departments pertaining to the application of the law during the first months of its execution. The archives include lists of officials who were dismissed but expected to return to their former positions[42] as well as responses to dismissed officials with respect to the reasons for their discharge.[43] One thread of correspondence indicates uncertainty within the Interior Ministry pertaining to the starting date after which the law was applicable.[44]

The Council of Deputies closely followed what transpired during this period of ambiguity. By the time the second legislative year of the *Meclis-i Mebusân* began on 14 November 1909 (1 *Teşrîn-i Sânî* 1325), the *tensikât* commissions were already undertaking their duties, deciding who was to be removed and who would continue in their current positions or be reinstated.

---

39 For instance, BOA.DH.EUM.MH. 4/8 H.23.10.1327; BOA.DH.EUM.MH. 5/61 H.26.10.1327; BOA.DH.EUM.MH. 5/62, 26 *Şevval* 1327 (10 November 1909).

40 Concerning the abolishment of the ministry, the establishment of the *emniyet-i umumiye müdüriyeti* in turn, and the appointment of Galib Bey as the director, see BOA.DH.MKT. 2898/31, 25 *Receb* 1327 (12 August 1909).

41 BOA.DH.MKT.2897/42, 24 *Receb* 1327 (11 August 1909); BOA.DH.EUM.MH.10/16, 5 Zilhicce 1327 (18 December 1909).

42 BOA.MF.MKT. 1144/22, 14 *Zilkade* 1327 (27 November 1909).

43 For example, Ali Rıza Efendi, a second degree police commissar in Konya, came to Istanbul to investigate the reason for his dismissal, asking upon which article of law his situation was based. BOA.DH.EUM.MH. 238/120, 8 *Zilkade* 1327 (21 November 1909)

44 BOA. DH.MUİ. 3/50, 19 *Şaban* 1327 (5 September 1909)

However, this did not mean that the commissions did not encounter problems in the execution of their investigations.

One of the problems was brought to light soon after the opening of parliament. İsmail Bey, the commission speaker, went to the rostrum to detail the problems the commission had and would subsequently encounter. He put forward, first, that the commissions be given access to all ministry documents during the execution of the *tensikât*, regardless of the document's subject. He justified this demand by the fact that 80-100 petitions that had been sent to the commissions were awaiting official execution. Because the commissions did not have easy access to pertinent document, the process was delayed.[45] He stressed the grievances of many victims in recent months could not be resolved because their petitions were pending in the individual ministries. Although the majority of deputies believed İsmail Bey's arguments were sufficient for action, the parliamentary speaker allowed for further debate.

According to Tural, deputies demonstrated awareness of the victims of the *tensikât*.[46] However, the deputies were divided. Certain members saw the victimhood of bureaucrats under the *tensikât* as a significant matter to be dutifully addressed, others evaluated the process as liberation from the bureaucrats of tyranny. Ahmet Bey, the Deputy of Lazistan, likened the dismissed officials to harmful parasites that had been gradually eating away at the state itself.[47] He stated that deputies were unable to access the *jurnal*s even to confirm issues about which rumors were widespread. This would

45 M.M.Z.C. 2. İçtima, 8. inikad, 16 *Teşrin-i Sâni* 1325 (29 November 1909), 126-127.

46 Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 128 .

47 "Bendenizin de burada söyleyeceğim şey şundan ibarettir: İptida tensikattan maksat memurini devlet arasında duramayacak, ve esasen devleti muzır mikrop gibi yiyen eşhası çıkarmak idi. İkinci dereceden erbâb-ı liyakatten olmayanları dahi çıkarmak idi. Esasen onların lekelerini bulmak için öyle vaktiyle birçok jurnaller vermiş, jurnaller vermiş, her türlü rezaleti irtikap etmiş adamları çıkarabilmek için komisyona memur olanlar da aynı vesaitten mahrumdurlar. Halbuki biz görüyoruz ki memleketimiz içinde tebcil ettiğimiz adamların bile jurnalleri var idi. Filancaların da jurnalleri varmış deniliyor…" M.M.Z.C. 2. İçtima, 8. inikad, 16 *Teşrin-i Sâni* 1325 (29 November 1909), 128. For further discussions about Ahmed Bey's and certain other deputies speeches on the matter of the *tensikât* on November 29, see Ibid., 127.

subsequently create further problems for the implementation of the *tensikât* by the commissions.

Ultimately, the law did not bring about an overall solution pertaining to the application of the *tensikât*. Until late December 1909, debates continued along these lines, which in certain cases resulted in breakups among deputies.[48] Nonetheless, there was a gradual reduction in the level of discussion pertaining to the *tensikât.* Tural attributes this to an emerging problem in the political and international arena, whereby deputies recognized that there were more important issues than these purges.[49] In fact, a series of events in late 1909 made visible a structural fissure not only among the CUP, Mahmut Şevket Pasha, and the Hılmi Pasha government, but also within the CUP organization itself. The dissolution within the party stemmed from the privileges of the Lynch Company, and members were divided along the lines of supporters and detractors.[50]

The *Merkez-i Umûmî* differentiated itself from the party organization.[51] As discussed in chapter 2, the Committee struggled to centralize power in the parliament. But first, it needed to unite the deputies under the banner of the CUP, for which Cavid Bey played a significant role. This worked out for the CUP considering that they enacted certain structural laws as well as an amendment to the constitution without further opposition within the party. However, by the second convening of parliament in November 1909, the disintegration that was evident within the party prior to the March 31 Incident reappeared.

Furthermore, according to Akşin, the triangular relationship among the CUP, the government, and Mahmut Şevket Pasha became more troublesome because of certain debates on foreign relations.[52] The disagreement between the CUP and Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha over the CUP's attempt to establish an alliance with Bulgaria as well as the attacks in *Tanin*, under the editorship of Hüseyin Cahit, on Mahmut Şevket's relationships with the Germans led the

48 For further details on the debates, see Ibid., 126-130.

49 Ibid., 129.

50 Akşin, *Jön Türkler*, 173-174.

51 Ibid., 149-151.

52 Ibid., 171-173.

pasha to close the newspaper on 22 December 1909.[53] Neither the CUP nor the *sadrazâm* could compete with Mahmut Şevket's power. Although Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha won a vote of confidence from parliament in late December 1909, he was nevertheless obliged to resign.[54] This portrait of a relatively powerless CUP-center contributed to dissolution among deputies of the party in parliament.

When Hakkı Pasha established the government in January 1910, he was aware of the disintegration among its actors. He struggled to redress the balance between the Committee and Mahmut Şevket Pasha. Unlike the cabinet of Hılmi Pasha, Mahmut Şevket entered government as the Minister of War this time. For Akşin, Hakkı Pasha expected that Mahmut Şevket Pasha's outside intervention could be terminated if he was included in the cabinet.[55] Moreover, the number of ministers from parliament was increasing, as six members from parliament entered the new government. Prominent CUP ministers also arose as Talat, Cavid, İsmail Hakkı, and Hayri Beys entered the government.[56] Moreover, Musa Kâzım Bey and Necmeddin Molla, who had close ties to the CUP, also entered the government.[57] Hakkı Pasha was not just establishing a new cabinet but reformulating the balance in the uppermost echelon of politics.

The additions to the *tensikât* law appeared in this political climate. Hakkı Pasha not only sought a balance at the uppermost level but also struggled for consensus in both parliament as well as the state bureaucracy, to which his revisions to the *tensikât* law attest. For Tural, Hakkı Pasha's attitude toward the law was one of dispensing justice (*adl-i ihsân tensikâtı*).[58] Indeed, Hakkı Pasha's use of soft power to find a balance among different power

53 Ibid., 173.

54 Tunaya focuses attention on Hilmi Pasha's unsuccessful reign. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, vol.* 3, 55-65. For Ahmad's remarks on the conflicts in the second half of 1909, see Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki,* 90-94.

55 Akşin, *Jön Türkler,* 175.

56 Ibid., 174.

57 Ibid., 174-175.

58 Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 130-152. In fact, Tural coined the term *adl-i ihsân* from Hakkı Pasha's *adl ü ihsân* (justice and benevolence), which was the slogan of the new cabinet. See *Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, vol.* 3, 70.

groups allowed him to protect his position relatively longer than any *sadrazâm*.

§ 3.3 Additions to the *Tensikât* Law

As stressed before, the *Meclis-i Mebusân* considered itself an institution as much as a legislative body. In certain cases, parliament saw itself as an executive organ, as the commissions for implementing the purges demonstrated. However, another area that exceeded the scope of parliament's responsibility was petitions. Petitions after 1908 could be sent to certain ministries, the Council of the State, and the sultan himself, as well as directly to the parliament. The victims of the *tensikât* sent petitions and grievances regarding their dismissals. Within parliament there was a commission responsible for the petitions (*istidâ encümeni*). As such, in nearly all respects, the *tensikât* law was made and executed by parliament itself.

It must be noted that when the endeavor to concentrate power in the parliament began, there were no CUP-linked ministers in the government. Manyasizâde was the first minister from the CUP, and after his death in March 1909 the CUP was not represented in the cabinet until Câvid Bey entered the government in June 1909.[59] As discussed in the previous chapter, the CUP sought to centralize the position of parliament, and managed to do so especially after the March 31 Incident. However, in January 1910, the picture at the highest levels of politics changed entirely. The CUP was represented in the government more than ever. Prominent CUP members aside, the other ministers were chosen from among the statesmen whose approach aligned with the CUP's. This freed the CUP's agenda that had up until then been built upon strengthening the position of parliament. In other words, the CUP's strategy changed with the Hakkı Pasha cabinet where the CUP was heavily represented. Indeed, for the CUP, the importance of parliament gradually began to decrease in early 1910.

59 Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki,* 88.

The additions (*zeyl*) to the *tensikât* law should be regarded in this context. After four months of discussion and preparation,[60] the official promulgation of the revamped law was published in the *Takvim-i Vekâyi* on May 23, 1910.[61] The first article stated that petitions sent to the parliament would be reviewed by the government and *şura-yı devlet* from then on. The second article proposed a structural change to the commissions that seemed to fulfill the new cabinet's slogan: *adl ü ihsân.* According to the article, for each ministry there would be one commissioner who had participated in the former commissions. Moreover, three members would be chosen from among bureaucrats who had been dismissed from the state cadres but reinstated after investigation by the earlier commissions. The article is interesting in that it suggests that the government is giving a voice to those who could empathize with the victims.

The third article stated that state-based employment, retirement and compensation would be determined and executed in accordance with official regulations from then on. Article four concerned bureaucrats who had been dismissed but were subsequently reinstated. They were granted a fifty percent increase in their salaries. Article five, on the other hand, addressed the most controversial article of the original *tensikât* law about officials of whom *su-i ahvâlleri tebeyyün edenler.* According to the original article, they were to be dismissed without any compensation. However, the *zeyl* of the *tensikât* law granted them a suitable wage from the pauper ordinance. In these ways, the amended law redressed the situations of the victims of the original law.

The remaining articles of the *zeyl* dealt with the specifics of the law's execution with respect to retirement and compensation. However, the additions to the law indicate that the attitude of the state towards the victims had softened in Hakkı Pasha's cabinet.

60 For parliamentary debates on additions to the law, see Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 130-152.

61 *Takvim-i Vekâyi*, n.536, 13 *Cemaziyelevvel* 1328 (23 May1910), 1-2.

§ 3.4 Conclusion

The CUP struggled with rivals for full control of the highest levels of politics together with a control over the mass purges inside the state apparatus. When chapters 2 and 3 are considered together as a chronology, certain points exemplify the attempts by the CUP to overcome its rivals. In other words, the process of making and applying the *tensikât* law suggest a trend that, in fact, challenges the literature on the actual power of the CUP.

Foremost, the *tensikât* allowed CUP rule to be established throughout the state apparatus via its ability to engineer bureaucratic cadres. It was designed to eliminate cadres who were close to the former regime. Second, the March 31 Incident demonstrated to CUP elites that parliament was an important instrument with which to oppose the emerging power of Mahmut Şevket Pasha. In fact, before March 31, there was an apparent division between the Committee and the Party. The Committee had a limited power over the Party since the deputies were not selected under the strict control of the center. The earliest action by the Committee was to unite the deputies under the CUP banner with the significant help of Cavid Bey. The making of the *tensikât* law demonstrated how the CUP had assumed legislative power in its respects. The Party in parliament interfered with areas of responsibility that traditionally belongs to the Council of State and the government. This was due to an emerging clash among the CUP, Mahmut Şevket, and Hüseyin Hılmi, which resulted in the resignation of the Hilmi Pasha cabinet in late 1909. The CUP ultimately managed to centralize the position of parliament, transforming it into an organization responsible for all levels of legislation.

Third, and most interestingly, the CUP interfered in the area of the executive by establishing the *tensikât* commissions. The commissions, as decision-making mechanisms, were responsible for determining who would and would not be dismissed. And these commission included prominent CUP members with close relationships with the *Merkez-i Umûmî*. Together with centralizing the position of the parliament, the parliament and the CUP also chipped away at the executive via these commissions. Although the Committee lost control over the Party in the complicated political climate of late

1909, Hakkı Pasha's new cabinet with its CUP ministers reinvigorated the power of the CUP in parliament.

These three points challenge the widely held notion in the classical literature that the CUP stayed backstage and inspected the government with limited power.

4

Reşponses from the Bottom

The previous chapters discuss how purges in the bureaucracy were instrumentalized in everyday political conflicts. The struggle by new policy makers to redistribute power relations at the top levels of state service by exercising their power to control bureaucratic appointments at any stratum of the bureaucracy ultimately affected the everyday lives of ordinary officials. For Bayur, it was not unexpected that the *tensikat* would cause a public dissent.[1] This leads to the question of how the actual victims of the *tensikât* reacted given that their very victimhood resulted from actual politics at the higher strata of the state apparatus? This chapter purports to demonstrate a constative aspect of state-society relationships especially for those were adversely affected by constitutional rule.

Although certain amendments were introduced by mid-1910, the original form of the law as prepared by the CUP would continue to be implemented over the following years. And from the early dismissals which lacked any legal basis to later ones after the promulgation of the law, there was no official estimation of how many bureaucrats had lost their positions. Indeed, there are no statistics in the Ottoman Archives indicating ministry-level (much less overall) dismissal rates, the total costs of compensation

1 Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi,* vol. I/II, 90.

payments, or any financial gains from the *tensikât*.[2] However, the British annual report estimated that as of early 1910, that 27 thousand officials had been asked to leave their positions.[3] Sohrabi, however, notes that the report fails to specify whether this number included military officers.[4] He indicates that the total number of civil officials was between 35.000 and at most 70.000, which casts doubt on the report's estimate.[5] In any case, the *tensikât* drastically reduced the number of civil officials at every strata of the civil bureaucracy. Tural states that even the annual yearbook (*salnâme*) for 1909 could not be prepared because offices were understaffed.[6]

From the perspective of officials, the new rule created an environment of uncertainty. Naciye Neyyal Hanım noted that the bureaucrats of Istanbul lived in fear of what would happen next.[7] One Ottoman bureaucrat, Mehmed Tevfik Bey, argued the *tensikât* law in his memoir that the law was improper in every respect. In his view, the law was written by incompetent people still under the influence of the red-hot emotions of revolution.[8] After the law came into effect, he continues, both the victims who were left famished along with their families, as well as those who listened their complaints, fell into despair. The implementation of the law caused an explosion in the number of citizens dissatisfied with the new rule.[9] Moreover, the

2 For Tural, the lack of statistical information is attributable to the 1912 fire in the Sublime Porte. Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 334.

3 *British Documents on Foreign Affairs,* ed. David Gillard, Part 1, Series B, vol.20 (University Publications of America, 1985), 113.

4 Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 275.

5 Ibid.

6 Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,* 334.

7 Fatma Rezan Hürmen, *Naciye Neyyal, Münevver bir Türk Hanımı: Ressam Naicye Neyyal Hanımefendi'nin Mutlakiyet, Meşrutiyet ve Cumhuriyet Hatıraları* (Istanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2000), 276-78.

8 "…bu nâ-ehil insanların, inkilâbın ilk günleri geçtikten sonra dahî, henüz teskin edilmeyen müfrit hislerin tesirile hazırladıkları bu kanûn tatbikatta çeşitli mahzurlara yol açtı." F. Rezan Hürmen, *Bir Devlet Adamının: Mehmet Tevfik Bey'in (Biren) II. Abdülhamit, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatırları, vol.* 2 (Istanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1993), 90.

9 "…zira kanunun tatbike konulmasile birdenbire aç bırakılan ve meyusiyete sevk edilmiş bulunan bir sürü memurun, çoluk çocuk, akraba ve mensupları ile, bu kişilerin perişan hallerini görüp

tensikât would predictably generate a population of victims who would get involved in crime. Ali Rıza Öge, a police officer in Istanbul during the *Meşrutiyet*, mentioned in his memoir that one dismissed official, Ahmet, was approached by famed burglars and became involved in the planning of a robbery of Dolmabahçe Palace.[10]

On the other hand, it would be mistaken to suppose that the victims of the purges remained passive observers.[11] Until the formal promulgation of the law, the only recourse for the victims of the arbitrary application of early purges was to reach out authorities, mostly via petitions. They wrote thousands of petitions to state authorities in the ministries, to parliament, and to the Council of the State. Although the great majority of the petitions were requests to return to the service of the state, some petitions directly addressed the arbitrary nature of the purges.

The purges were two-sided. As the sultan repromulgated constitutional rule, those who were either Young Turk members or sympathizers were optimistic about their prospects in state service, while those on the other side of the coin were apprehensive. Naciye Neyyal Hanım provided a snapshot of the mental world of bureaucrats in her memoir.

> When the possibility of losing one's tenure appeared, the bureaucrats kept their mouths shut. There was fear, sorrow, and worry in the air, and the *memurîn* started to brood over what would happen if they were fired. Those who were secretly Young Turk or Young Turk sympathizers were extremely glad because they knew that in the new era they or their relatives would replace those who would lose their

---

şikâyetlerini teessürle dinleyenlerin, hoşnutsuzlar safında yer almaları, gayr-i memnunlar sınıfının gittikçe kalabalıklaşmasına sebebiyet veriyordu." Ibid.

10 Ali Rıza Öge, *Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Bir Polis Şefinin Gerçek Anıları (*Bursa, 1957), 144-45.

11 Özok-Gündoğan used the term "passive observers," arguing that the post-1908 peasants of Diyarbekir defended their rights with petitions rather than remain passive observers: Nilay Özok-Gündoğan, "A 'Peripheral' Approach to the 1908 Revolution in the Ottoman Empire: Land Disputes in Peasant Petitions in Post-revolutionary Diyarbekir," in *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915*, eds. Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 213.

positions. The people of our country split in half; one's reason for happiness was another's for sadness.[12]

In parallel with Naciye Neyyal's statement, an article in *Şehbal* also dealt with how the victims would feel anxious after being informed about the *tensikât*.[13] In fact, *Şehbal* supported the purges from the beginning. The press during the Second Constitutional Rule had already divided into two regarding the mass purges. On the one hand, the CUP-linked press, like *Tanin,* and *Şehbal* mostly mentioned about the necessity of applying mass purges, thus the victims were attracted little attention. On the other hand, the voices of the victims were given coverage by certain newspapers which were mostly CUP opponents. For example, before the law enacted and even before preparations started, *Volkan,* the newspaper, which was accused to be guilty of rabble-rousing the 31 March Incident with its publisher Derviş Vahdeti,[14] firmly opposed the applications of the mass purges. On 11 February 1909, the newspaper attracted attention to the arbitrary application of the *tensikât*, regarding it as an unlawful application.[15] For the newspaper, the *tensikât* was, in fact, being implemented in favor of certain bureaucrats who were going to protect their position, as their wages would increase afterwards. The same report concludes with this: "nothing on earth can satisfy you!"

12 "Kadro haricinde kalmak ihtimali baş gösterince memurların ekserisinin çenesini bıçak açmaz oldu, herkeste bir tasa, bir korku, bir telaş, böyle bir şey başlarına gelince, ne yapacaklarını acı acı düşünmeye başladılar. Devr-i cedit'te İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti'ne mensup bulunanlar ise, şimdi bu vesile ile açılacak olan mevki ve makamlara kendilerinin ve yakınlarının tayin edileceklerini bildikleri cihetle, sevinçten ne yapacaklarını şaşırdılar, hasılı memleketimizdeki insanlar iki kısma ayrılmış ve birinin felaketi, diğerinin sebeb-i saâdeti haline gelmişti." Hürmen, *Naciye Neyyal,* 276-278.

13 "Eminim ki tensikat maddesinin meclis-i mebusanda mevzû-bahis olduğunu işiten memurlar kalblerinin bir ru'şe-i endişe ile ürperdiğini hissetmişlerdir." *Şehbal*, n.3, 1 Nisan 1325, (14 April 1909), 44:

14 M.Ertuğrul Düzdağ, "Volkan" in *TDV İslam ansiklopedisi,* v.43, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2013), 123-125.

15 "Tensikât-ı ahire sırf hayaldir, adalete mugayyerdir." *Volkan,* "Yine Tensik-i Maaş", n.41, 19 *Muharrem* 1327, (11 February 1909), 2-3. It should be noted that this report was stated to be taken from *İkdam.*

(*gözlerini toprak doyursun!*).[16] Moreoever, *Volkan* often stressed the conflicts between the *mektebli* and the *alaylı* disintegration. Vahdeti's own opinion column soon before the 31 March Incident, for example, attempted to protect *alaylı* members of the military from the purges via recognizing words of an *alaylı* navy lieutenant Mustafa.[17]

Dalkavuk, a humor magazine, also dealt with the *tensikât* issue in certain ways. One of the issues teased about the exceeding authority given to the *tensikât* commissions and their pointless gatherings about making decisions during the arbitrary applications of the *tensikât* soon after the Revolution.[18] *Memûrîn,* a newspaper started to be published during the preparations of the additional law (*zeyl*), evaluated the additional law process undertook by Hakkı Pasha as introducing justice for the victims of the original law. *Memûrîn* regarded these attempts as proposing justice for the losers of the original law.[19] Moreover, the newspaper often voiced unjust treatments faced by victims like those who were being forced to early retirement.[20]

Despite the dichotomy created by the politics of the purges, in which bureaucrats who were Young Turk sympathizers were separated from those slated for dismissal as Naciye Neyyal indicated, this chapter focuses on discharged officials employed at low strata of the bureaucracy. Reactions to the *tensikât* emerged from various sources. First, reactions to the early purges came from the victims themselves, regardless of the reason for their dismissal, whether incompetence or pure politics. Hundreds of petitions (*arz-u hâl,* and *istidâ*') are listed in the Ottoman Archives from those who were discharged from state service starting as early as August 1908. Last, the minutes of parliament after December 1908 reveal that certain deputies strongly warned their fellow deputies and the government to be fair with respect to

16 *Volkan,* "Posta ve Telgraf Nezaretinin Nazar-ı Dikkatine", n.48, 26 *Muharrem* 1327, (17 February 1909), 3.

17 *Volkan*, n.80, 29 *Safer* 1327, (21 March 1909), 2-3.

18 "…ve nihayet kararda, içilmekte olan yevmi üç nöbet kahve ve şerbete üç nöbet daha ilavesi ve sigara içerlerken müzakerata devam edilmemesi tensikat komisyonunca taht-ı karara alınmıştır." *Dalkavuk,* "Taze Havadis", n.2, 23 *Şaban* 1326, (20 September 1908), 6.

19 For examples, see: *Memûrîn,* 3 *Rebiülevvel* 1328, (15 Mart 1910), 3.

20 For a report on those forced unjust retirement, see: *Memûrîn,* 6 *Rebiülevvel* 1328, (18 Mart 1910), 3.

the mass purges. In this chapter, the first point is discussed in detail. 167 petitions by victims of the purges are scrutinized, demonstrating how a legislative act affected officials at every level of the bureaucracy from policemen and customs officials at the bottom to a Kaymakam at the top.

§ 4.1 Petitioning the *Tensikat*

The Ottoman institution of petitioning played an important role in the Ottoman social and political system through the twentieth century. It not only contributed to the public good by providing a functional means of voicing dissatisfaction or displaying the gratitude, but it was desirable for governing elites in terms of revealing the successes and pitfalls of the system. The Constitution of 1876, in fact, provided a legitimate base for writing petition for ordinary citizens.

> One or more persons of Ottoman nationality have the right to present petitions in the proper quarter relating to the breaking of law and regulation, done either to their own or public detriment, and may likewise present in protest signed petitions to the General Ottoman Assembly, complaining of the conduct of state servants and functionaries.[21]

As the constitution provided a legal base for petitioning, the characteristics of reason for petitioning was diverse. While the majority of petitions were complaints, there were also other categories of gratitude or celebration. The

21 *Kanûn-i Esâsî,* "Article 14", 1876. "Tebaai Osmaniyeden bir veya birkaç kişinin gerek şahıslarına ve gerek umuma müteallik olan kavanin ve nizamata muhalif gördükleri bir maddeden dolayı işin merciine arzuhal verdikleri gibi Meclisi Umumiye dahi müddei sıfat ile imzalı arzuhal vermeğe ve memurinin ef'alinden iştikâye selâhiyetleri vardır." This English translation is in R.G. Landen, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (*New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co, 1970), 100. For the translation of all the articles of the 1876 Constitution, see "The Ottoman Constitution, Promulgated the 7th Zilbridje, 1293 (11/23 December, 1876)," *The American Journal of International Law,* Vol. 2, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (Oct., 1908): 367-87. There are important differences between Landen's translation and the translation in the *American Journal of International Law*. Landen's translation was presented here because it centralizes the issue of petitioning in relation to the breaking of laws and regulations.

scope of petitions was broad, ranging from everyday conflicts between citizens, to gratitude for well-received matters, to taxation implemented by the central government.[22]

The right to petition in the Ottoman history appeared in the classical period and persisted as a privilege for the public. From its early forms consisting of requests or compliments submitted during Friday prayers to later telegrams, it provided rulers with the legitimacy for their authority. For the sultan, it was a method of displaying mercy as a fair ruler.[23] Moreover, later practices of petitioning in the late nineteenth century were guaranteed by the constitution itself. But while the Ottoman Constitution gave the right to citizens to present petitions regarding the breaking of laws, in practice few petitions were written because a law was directly broken. The *tensikât* was one of few political matters subject to petitioning from the bottom. In other words, while the scope of petitions ranged from complaints to legal issues, to land disputes, to requests regarding economic matters like taxation, and even to expressions of gratitude or celebration, only a small number directly concerned political matters, one of which was the *tensikât* issue. This chapter is built on this matter of assumption which will be discussed further below.

Much of the literature regarding justifiably addresses certain questions, the most prevalent of which is how can researchers access the actual voices of actors from below? Although in most cases petitions were written by *arz-ı halci*s (scriveners), they still give voice to their signatories. The petitions themselves are one of few primary sources that offer firsthand accounts of real situations on the ground. In Ottoman studies, *arz-ı hal, şikâyet, arz-ı mazhar*, *istidâ,* and *ma'ruzât* provide a wealthy of firsthand accounts from

22 For Avcı, Lemire, and Özdemir, 97 of 102 collective petitions (ʿarż-ı mahżār) from Jerusalem between 1908-1915 were written to expressing gratitude, but the remaining five were complaints that requested favors and the support of the governor and government. Yasemin Avcı, Vincent Lemire, and Ömür Yazıcı Özdemir. "Collective Petitions (ʿarż-ı mahżār) as a Reflective Archival Source for Jerusalem's Networks of Citadinité in the late nineteenth century," in *Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840-1940*, edited by Vincent Lemire and Angelos Dalachanis (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018), 180.

23 Yuval Ben-Bassat, "The Ottoman Institution of Petitioning When the Sultan No Longer Reigned: A View From Post-1908 Ottoman Palestine." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 56 (2017): 89.

the classical Ottoman era through the twentieth century. Regarding the *tensikât* alone, there are hundreds of petitions in the Ottoman Archives.

The literature[24] regarding the classical and early modern period in the nineteenth century has benefited considerably in terms of access to primary sources. The first petitions be traced in the *mühimme defterleri* (registers of important affairs) in which individual petitions were recorded until the mid-seventeenth century.[25] The registers of petitions in the *mühimme defterleri* ended with the formation of the *şikâyet defterleri* (registers of complaints) in 1649. Between 1649 and 1742, the *şikâyet defterleri* were the central

24 Prominent studies on Ottoman petitions include Halil İnalcık, "Şikayet Hakkı:'Arz-ı Hal ve 'Arz-ı Mahzar'lar," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları 7*, nos. 7-8 (1988): 33-54; Michael Ursinus, *Grievance Administration (şikayet) in an Ottoman Province: The Kaymakam of Rumelia's "Record Book of Complaints" of 1781-1783*, vol. 1 (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005); Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up' in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their Existence," in *Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire, 1550–1720*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (İstanbul: Isis, 1995); Anton Minkov *Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahas Petitions and Ottoman Social Life, 1670-1730*, vol. 30 (Leiden: Brill, 2004); Eyal Ginio, "Coping with the State's Agents 'from Below': Petitions, Legal Appeal and the Sultan's Justice in Ottoman Legal Practice," in *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi,* eds. Eleni Gara, Chrisoph K. Neumann, and M. Erdem Kabadayi (İstanbul Bigi Universitesi Yayınları, 2011), 41-56; Başak Tuğ, *Politics of Honor in Ottoman Anatolia: Sexual Violence and Socio-Legal Surveillance in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2017); James E. Baldwin, "Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 75, no. 3 (2012), 499-524; Yuval Ben-Bassat, *Petitioning the Sultan: Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine*, vol. 42 (New York: IB Tauris, 2013); Yuval Ben-Bassat, "Mass Petitions as a Way to Evaluate 'Public Opinion' in the Late Nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire? The Case of Internal Strife among Gaza's Elite," *Turkish Historical Review* (2013): 135-152; Yuval Ben-Bassat, "The Ottoman Institution of Petitioning When the Sultan No Longer Reigned: A View From post-1908 Ottoman Palestine," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 56 (2017): 87-103; Yasemin Avcı, Vincent Lemire, and Ömür Yazıcı Özdemir. "Collective Petitions (ʿarż-ı mahżār) as a Reflective Archival Source for Jerusalem's Networks of Citadinité in the late nineteenth century," in *Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840-1940*. (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 161-185; and Nilay Özok-Gündoğan, "A 'Peripheral' Approach to the 1908 Revolution in the Ottoman Empire: Land Disputes in Peasant Petitions in Post-revolutionary Diyarbekir," in *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915* (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 179-215; Henning Sievert, "Intermediaries and Local Knowledge in a Changing Political Environment: Complaints from Libya at the Turn of the 20th Century ", *Die Welt des Islams* 54, 3-4 (2014): 322-362.

25 Avcı, Lemire, and Özdemir. "Collective Petitions," 165.

depository for registering the petitions.[26] In 1742, the *ahkâm-ı şikâyet* (orders of complaints) was formed under the *ahkâm defterleri* (registers of administrative orders) and differed from the central *şikâyet defterleri* in that the *ahkâm* was comprised mostly of provincial registers.[27] During the early Tanzimât, the office of the *ma'rûzât-ı rikâbiye dairesi* (the bureau of requests of the subjects), which was responsible for petitions submitted to the sultan during Friday prayers, was formed as part of administrative reforms of the period. Significantly, an institutionalized system of petitioning had been in operation for centuries by the time the constitution was repromulgated in 1908.

The nature of the stable, systematic institution of petitioning changed in the course of the Second Constitutional period. This was not the result of institutional arrangements such as the new committee for petitions formed in the Chamber of Notables (*Meclis-i Ayân İstida Encümeni*). Petitioning during the Constitutional Period transformed in that the citizens could now write to a newly emerging institution, namely parliament itself. The *Kanun-i Esâsi* provided as early as 1876 that citizens could send their petitions to parliament directly. While petitions had typically been addressed to the sultan or the *sadrazâm*, by 1908 many petitions began to be sent to parliament, either to the Notables or the Deputies.[28] The sultan had been responsible for petitions through the centuries; as with many other political arenas, parliament was to replace the sultan with parliament itself.

The practice of petitioning had been used to booster the sultan's image as a just, benevolent ruler; now it was boosting parliament's image. Even though the canonical literature generally suggests that the public accepted the new political reality of constitutional rule vis-à-vis the Sultan, the actual politics were trickier. The official arrangement of sending petitions to parliament was a method of legitimating parliament's position. In this respect, the Ottoman Archives contain voluminous requests for information from ministries in response to petition protests. These were sent with the official seal of Ahmed Rıza Bey, the parliamentary speaker. Even so, citizens could

26 Yusuf Sarınay. *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi*. (Istanbul: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2010), 21.

27 Ibid., 22.

28 For detailed information, see Ben-Bassat, "Ottoman Institution of Petitioning."

still send petitions to other government offices including that of the sultan, grand vizier, and the Council of the State as well as individual ministries. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain to which office a petition was addressed.

However, there are limitations to the archival materials, the abundance of primary sources notwithstanding. First, although petitions are collected in certain registers, it is difficult to argue that these primary sources were systematically documented.[29] In other words, petitions can be found in a variety of locations, at least in regard to petitions within the scope of this study. Relevant petitions were found in the catalog of the *ahkam defterleri* as well as in various registers throughout the Ottoman Archives. For example, while petitions were found within each ministries' catalogs, there were also relevant petitions after 1908 in the collections of the Council of the State and parliament, most of which were not catalogued in the *ahkâm defterleri*. As far as this study is concerned, most petitions regarding the *tensikât* were listed in the catalogues of the Council of the State and individual ministries.

Second, documentation of the petitions consisted mostly of summaries of the original and the official responses. Few original petitions remain, and they necessitate considerable effort to discover. Many researchers treat the summaries and responses as if they were the original. Başak Tuğ, one of the exceptions, specifically describes them as "petitionary registers" rather than as petitions themselves, adding that the imperial rescripts were only record of the petitions and responses.[30] In the case of the *tensikât*, original petitions could be found anywhere of Ottoman archives, but especially if the casefile of the dismissed official was available which would include other documentation relating the individual's *sicill* together with the respective responses of each relevant department to the petitions. In most cases, these petitions were well designed, employed a solemn language, and related the backstory of their dismissals. This could suggest that only detailed, well-written petitions were preserved in the casefiles.

29 Başak Tuğ, *Politics of Honor in Ottoman Anatolia: Sexual Violence and Socio-Legal Surveillance in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 88-89.

30 Ibid., 88.

§ 4.2 Petitioning the *Tensikât* from the Margins of Politics

Returning to the apolitical character of petitioning mentioned above, it was conceived "as a non-contentious form of popular protest."[31] But with the *tensikât,* it became a contentious form of expressing dissatisfaction with a political decision enacted through legislation. The heretofore non-political scope of subjects ranged from personal disputes to expressions of gratitude to government officials, this would be a misinterpretation where the *tensikât* is concerned. Considering the petitioning as mostly non-political notices as their scope of subjects ranged from individual disputes to gratification of government officials would be misinterpretive when the *tensikât* is regarded. Few petitions in Ottoman history directly addressed political decisions. Petitions opposing the imposition of taxes would be an example, yet even this was not directly aimed at the politics of the legislation.

A recent study pertaining to the methods of petitioning in the post-1908 period deserves attention. As one of few scholars to concentrate on this period, Ben-Bassat analyzed petitions sent from Palestine to the central government in the post-1908 period. Focusing on the early Constitutional Period until the dethronement of Abdulhamid II, he argued that confusion and hesitation emerged among petitioners, particularly about the proper addressees for their petitions. For him, petitioners were careful not to disrespect the Sultan, accounting for a possible failure of the revolution.[32] Second, he stated that petitions now began to be sent to parliament, the Council of the State, and individual ministries. His third point pertained to the increasing politicization of petitions which, he argues, was the most important development.[33] These analyses are significant in terms of understanding that the nature of petitioning itself was being transformed as a result of the

31 Eleni Gara, Chrisoph K. Neumann, and M. Erdem Kabadayi. "Ottoman Subjects as Political Actors: Historiographical Representations," in *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi* (Istanbul: İstanbul Bigi Universitesi Yayınları, 2011), 2.

32 Ben-Bassat, "The Ottoman Institution of Petitioning When the Sultan No Longer Reigned: A View From Post-1908 Ottoman Palestine," 92.

33 Ibid., 97-100.

political changeover after the constitutional revolution. Ben-Bassat focused on a region at the periphery of the empire and did not concentrate on petitions about any specific issue. What about petitions in the post-1908 period from victims of a specific legislative act that was the result of a politically motivated decision?

Historical studies of petitioning throughout the world, including in Britain, Russia, Japan, and Germany, suggest that petitioning was suitable for allowing petitioners to voices their concerns and influence legislation.[34] Participating in the legislative apparatus and thereby influencing future legislation, as a proactive political activity, was common among ordinary petitioners with respect to subjects like a common law code, demanding the improvement of public spaces, or promoting manufacturing.[35] In certain cases, rulers even saw petitioning as political interference in what had been the absolute right of the ruler.[36]

This proactive political activity at the potential to change the discourse of the governance as petitioning evoked a democratic sphere of the public for demanding legislation. In other words, demands for new laws and regulations applied direct democratic participation, which recalls the making of civil society.

In most cases where petitioning evoked political activity, the petitions resembled grievances in terms of content. Their action tends to oppose a political decision, and many historical studies throughout the global indicate that the subject is mostly the tax regulation. This fact distinguishes the proactive political activity of civil society from the reactive one of petitioning. Most examples of petitioning were reactive rather than proactive. Faroqhi's work on political activity suggests that commons most affected

34 Lex Heerma van Voss, Introduction to *Petitions in Social History, International Review of Social History Supplements 9*, ed. Lex Heerma van Voss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3.

35 Beat Kümin and Andreas Würgler, "Petitions, Gravamina and the early Modern State: Local Influence on Central Legislation in England and Germany," *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 17, no. 1 (1997): 49.

36 R. W. Hoyle, "Petitioning as Popular Politics in Early Sixteenth-Century England," *Historical Research* 75, no. 190 (2002): 366

political affairs on the matter of increased taxation as from her perspective, this is political activity since the petitioners were trying to change the course of history by engaging the high politics.[37] Petitions were instruments of political disagreements. The *Tensikât*, taken from this point of view, seems to be a reactive activity like petitioning against the tax regulations. Both subjects, tax increases and purges, drew public ire since the outcomes directly affected the public in various ways.

However, the resemblance between petitioning against the purges and against tax regulations cannot mean that they could be evaluated using the same methodology. The two obviously emerge as a result of a reaction to a political decision, but while tax regulations concerned the majority in society, the purges applied only to a marginal group and did not attract mass attention. Reactions to the law came mostly from victims themselves, members of parliament, and columnists, not from the masses. As the previous chapter shows, parliamentarians and certain newspapers often drew attention to the injustices faced by dismissed bureaucrats. However, ordinary people took no interest in the purges unless friends or relatives were affected.

Sohrabi's study on the causes of the March 31 counterrevolution attributes the insurgencies to the ongoing purges before the incident broke out.[38] The staffing policy of the empire concerned educated and uneducated bureaucrats, *mektebli* and *alaylı*; it pertained only to two interest groups, not to society as a whole, like tax regulations. An ordinary agriculturalist, merchant, or artisan would not be expected to empathize with the dismissed bureaucrats but could be directly affected by tax regulations. In this regard, the targets of the purges had no access to popular support, explaining why there were no mass protests against the application of the purges.[39] Returning to Sohrabi's point, the purges were one of the reasons for the creation of a dichotomy between the *alaylı* and the *mektebli,* which was one of the

37 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and Problem of Sultanic Legitimation (1570-1650)," *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 35, no. 1 (1992): 1-39.

38 Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism,* 189-287.

39 A search of Ottoman Archives related to the purges for keywords like *nümâyîş, protesto,* and *gösteri* yielded no results.

stimuli along the path to March thirty-one. Yet the purges were never directly vocalized by the insurgents.

Most of the petitions regarding the *tensikât* were for the dismissed bureaucrats either to be reinstated to their former positions or to another equivalent position in state service. The hundreds of petitions to the government, the Council of the State, and parliament[40] registered in the Ottoman archives made clear their authors' wishes to be reappointed to an appropriate position within the state apparatus.[41] They even acquiesced to be appointed to any location throughout the empire, as in the case of Nuri Bey, a former police officer based in Üsküdar, requested appointed in any place the government deemed appropriate.[42]

Although the petitions resembled grievances in terms of structure, most of the petitions did not involve the reproaches one might expect. Apart from a certain few that involved political undercurrents, most of the petitions only included a request to be reinstated or to receive compensation rather than a criticism of the application of the *tensikât*. The reason why the petitions did not invoke criticisms was that most of the bureaucrats were expecting to be reappointed; it is unlikely that they saw the purges as a natural right of the state to dismiss statesmen at will. In any case, their petitions were timid and avoided a critical approach to the issue.

Examples from a sample of 167 petitions[43] regarding the *tensikât* reveals the attitudes of the petitioners. Their language was consistently respectful as they strongly believed that the final decision had not been made regarding the dismissal. They believed that they would be reappointed to another appropriate position. Indeed, the great majority of petitions in the sample for

40 It must be noted that the Parliament was the primary address before the January 1910, but the *zeyl* of the law restricted sending petitions to the parliament as stated in chapter 3.

41 i.e. BOA. ŞD. 3108. 30; BOA. ŞD. 3108.31; BOA. ŞD. 3108.41; BOA. ŞD. 3108.46; BOA. ŞD. 3108.47.

42 BOA. ŞD. 3101-34, 17 *Cemaziyelahir* 1330 (3 June 1912).

43 The sample is petitions that turn up in a search of the keywords *tensikat istida* on the website of the BOA for the period July 1908 to January 1913. It is not possible to obtain all petitions sent to the state; the methodology of this study selected a sample of cases to represent the overall population. Keyword searches for *istidâ*, *arzuhâl*, and *arz-ı mahzar* all yeild petitions, yet the keyword *istidâ* yeilds more cases than others. For the sample petitions, see the bibliography. For the detailed list of the petitions, see Appendix A.

this study expressed the expectation that they would be reappointed. As the Table 4.1 shows, nearly half of the total petitions were request for reinstatement within the state service.

Table 4.1 Petitions in the Sample by Reason for Writing

Consideration	Number of Petitions	Percentage
Reappointment	80	47.9%
Aggrievement	54	32.34%
Wage	10	5.99%
Compensation	7	4.19%
Inquiry	7	4.19%
Retirement	4	2.40%
Reinvestigation	3	1.8%
Complaint	2	1.2%
Total	167	100%

SOURCE BOA

While 47.9 percent of the petitioners wrote only to the state their desire for reappointment, 32.34 percent of the petitioners cited their aggrievement to which most ended a request for reappointment. In effect, 80.24% of the petitioners wrote implicitly or explicitly requests for reinstatement to an appropriate position. The remaining 19.76% of the petitioners had issues with topics ranging from wages to compensation, to retirement, or they had general inquiries about the application of the *tensikât*.

A problem emerged for the petitioners in the early days of dismissals. There was ambiguity regarding to which institution petitioners could send their requests. Whereas until the Second Constitution most petitions were sent to the sultan, the new period allowed for new institutions like parliament to be petitioned directly.[44] In fact, petitioners believed the Council of

44 Petitions sent to parliament may have disappeared from the archives. İsmail Bey, the Deputy of Gümülcine, stated that 80-100 petitions from victims of the *tensikât* reached parliament by late 1909, but not all could be found in the course of this research. For İsmail Bey's speech, see M.M.Z.C. *İçtima* 2, *İnikad* 8, 16 *Teşrin-i Sâni* 1325 (29 November 1909) 127. Moreover, as stated earlier, one of the most important reasons for making additions to the original *tensikât* law was that the petitions sent to the parliament within the six monts were about 1,500.

the State was the best official addressee, especially after the *tensikât* law passed on July 10, 1909. Before the *tensikât* law was enacted, individual ministries were the primary official addressee. As the Table 4.2 shows, the great majority of petitioners sent their requests to the Council of the State.

Table 4.2 Petitions in the Sample by Institutional Addressee

Institutions	Number of Petitions	Percentage
Council of the State	145	86.83%
Ministry of the Interior	9	5.39%
Ministry of Education	7	4.19%
Foreign Ministry	2	1.2%
Ministry of Justice	1	0.6%
Religious Affairs	1	0.6%
Trade and Public Works	1	0.6%
Defter-i Hakani	1	0.6%
Total	167	100%

SOURCE BOA

Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine how many statesmen were dismissed from each department. Estimates are based on documents and newspaper accounts that did not provide numbers systematically. Studying a sample of petitions can engineer a basic understanding of who the majority of the actual victims were and of the departments they formerly employed. The petitions and overall dismissals can be expected to correlate. Table 4.3 shows the distribution of petitions according to the former positions of the dismissed bureaucrats' This suggests the percentage of the comparative total of dismissals among the departments.

Table 4.3 Petitioners' Former Positions

Previous Occupation	Number of Petitions	Percentage
Police	58	34.73%
Council of State	19	11.38%
Customs	16	9.58%
Justice	12	7.19%
Interior Affairs	11	6.59%
Financial Affairs	10	5.99%
Education	7	4.19%
Municipality	5	2.99%
Post and Telegram	5	2.99%
Foreign Affairs	3	1.8%
Gendarmerie	3	1.8%
Trade and Public Works	3	1.8%
Navy	2	1.2%
Religious Affairs	2	1.2%
Ziraat Bank	2	1.2%
Forest	2	1.2%
Civil Registry	2	1.2%
Imperial Navy Yard	1	0.6%
Worker (*Hademe*)	1	0.6%
Student	1	0.6%
Prison	1	0.6%
Total	167	100%

SOURCE BOA

The police department would be expected to be the institution within the state service most affected by the purges since it would have been perceived as the closest unit to the Hamidian Regime. Actually, the fact that the notorious secret service of Yıldız Palace was comprised mostly of police officers would have negatively affected the perception of police in the eyes of the public. Starting early in the Hamidian period, the sultan gradually established a secret service at Yıldız Palace which evolved into the infamous

Hamidian institution of *jurnal* espionage.[45] The spy network of the sultan played a major role in the surveillance of the opposition, the result of which was that many people were arrested or exiled abroad. The secret Young Turk organization survived by hiding from the spy network far from the capital of Istanbul. In Istanbul, the secret opposition recoiled from the spies and always risked being reported via the *jurnal*s. It is unsurprising that the Young Turks first targeted police officers.

Purges of other departments such as the Ministry of Justice, the Council of the State, and the Ministry of the Interior were directly correlated with political disintegration. As previous chapters discuss, establishing hegemony over the state bureaucracy was what initially prompted the CUP leadership to infiltrate each ministry via the purges. Dismissing bureaucrats enabled them to gain strength both in the political arena as well as via the state apparatus.

Another variable in this sample of 167 petitions suggests what is perhaps the most interesting outcome. Apart from reasons or writing, the institutions in which the petitions were addressed, and petitioners' former positions, the dates of the delivery of the petitions are significant. The time period in which petitioners most comfortably conveyed their wishes can clarify the relationship between political actors and society. This is particularly important in terms of the time period in which victims dared to bring up their aggrievements. Table 4.4 summarizes the dates when petitions were sent to state offices.

45 For the evolution of the institution of espionage, see Emrullah Tekin, "Hafiye," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 15, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), 115-116; Asaf Tugay, *İbret: Abdülhamid'e Verilen Jurnaller ve Jurnalciler* (Istanbul: Okat Yayınevi, 1961); Orhan Koloğlu, *Abdülhamid Gerçeği: Ne Kızıl Sultan Ne Ulu Hakan (*Istanbul: Gür Yayınları, 1987); Mehmet Ali Beyhan, "II. Abdülhamit Dönemi'nde Hafiye Teşkilatı ve Jurnaller," *İlmî Araştırmalar* 8 (1999): 65-83; and Taner Timur, "Osmanlı Gizli Polis Örgütü Nasıl Kuruldu?" *Tarih ve Toplum* 6 (1984): 414-419.

Table 4.4 Petitions in the Sample by Date

Date	Number of Petitions	Percentage
July 1908- July 1909	13	7.78%
July 1909- July 1910	5	2.99%
July 1910- July 1911	29	17.37%
July 1911- May 1912	26	15.57%
May 1912- January 1913	94	54.29%
Total	167	100.00%

SOURCE BOA

From the perspective of petitioners, it was risky to write a petition opposing a decision that was known to have come from the ruling political power, the CUP. Victims must always have born in mind that opposing the decision of the political power would not resolve their issue. Indeed, questioning the political decision might lose them the economic rights they could potentially win. Therefore, some may have preferred to wait for a government changeover or the cancellation of the law altogether.

The total time period for this sample of petitions is 54 months, but 54.29% were written in a 9-month span. Petitions sent between the early purges and the implementation of the *tensikât* law in July 1909 accounted for only 7.78 percent of the total. After the law was enacted on July 10, 1909, the number of dismissed bureaucrats spiked, but petition rates remained low, increasing gradually over a 34-month period after the law was enacted. But even so, the number accounted for less than one-third of the total.

How can it be explained that more than half the petitions over a 4 ½ year-long period were sent in 9 months starting in May 1912? First, May 1912 was a significant milestone in the political history of the CUP. Its internal struggles were about to become apparent with the appearance of the *Halaskâr Zâbıtân* (Redeemer Officers).[46] The officers seemed to have a close relationship with the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*, which would control high politics

46 For the *Halaskâr Zabıtân,* see Ahmet Turan Alkan, *II.Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordu ve Siyaset* (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 1992), 121-149; Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (*Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1990), 166-177.

during the Grand Cabinet and the Kamil Pasha Cabinet from July 1912 until the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını* in January 1913.

Two major factors explain the increase in the number of petitions in parallel with the rise of an opposition. The first is that dismissed officials might have started availing themselves of the opportunity to write petitions given the CUP's power relative loss of power. In other words, the victims of the purges tried to benefit from the tactical advantage that corresponded with strengthening of the opposition. When it is considered that the CUP was responsible for their discharged from offices, they could expect to be reappointed as the CUP weakened.

The second factor behind the rapid proliferation of the new petitions emerged in May 1912 was the attitude of the new government toward dismissed officials. This new attitude can be substantiated by certain cases in the archival section of the Sublime Porte, Division of Documents (*Bâb-ı Âlî Evrak Odası – BEO*) which reveals the actual behavior of the office of the *sadrazâm* (*daire-i sadâret*). Starting in the early days of the Grand Cabinet (Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha Cabinet), for an example, the office of the *sadrazâm* granted leave to officials responsible for application of the *tensikat.*[47] These leaves of absence were in most cases protracted. In effect, the personnel who were in charge of deciding dismissals in the field were relieved from their duties in practice by permitting them to take leaves of absence, delaying their official discharge for months.

The Ramadan Bairam in 1912 was observed on the 12th of September. Three days before the Eid, a memorandum was sent to the ministries from the office of the *sadrazâm* stating that a premium wage would be paid to *tensikât* victims who were discharged but then reappointed.[48] Rather than the content of the memorandum, how people interpreted its subtext is important. The order clearly indicated that the new government was coming to the defense of the victims of the purge. The government also granted an additional right to the dismissed officials to reapply to the investigation

47 i.e. BOA.BEO. 4064/304787, 06 *Şaban* 1330 (21 July 1912); BOA.BEO. 4064/304798 06 *Şaban* 1330 (21 July 1912); BOA.BEO. 4069/305147, 22 *Şaban* 1330 (6 August 1912); BOA.BEO. 4071/305284 24 *Şaban* 1330 (8 August 1912); BOA.BEO. 4076/305682, 13 *Ramazan* 1330 (26 August 1912).

48 BOA.BEO.4082/306101, 27 *Ramazan* 1330 (9 September 1912).

commission for the application of the *tensikât* (*Tedkikât-ı Tensikât Komisyonu*).[49] The commission was responsible for resolving grievances regarding unjust dismissals, and the decision gave dismissed bureaucrats a second chance to appeal to the commission.

The government also tried to expedite petitioners' requests. For example, an order to the ministries from Kâmil Pasha just before the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını* stated that the daily functions of the ministries do not excuse them from paying due attention to the aggrievement of purge victims.[50] The memorandum also stated that the personnel of each ministry must prioritize petitions regarding the *tensikât* coming in from the provinces.

Do these imply the petitions were a means of a political disintegration among the actors in the high levels of politics? The petitions are one of the few ways of apprehending the victims of the *tensikât* from their own perspective, and the political opposition arguably benefitted from becoming their guardians. The degree to which petitions became a struggle in everyday politics is debatable, but it could directly be attributed to the ideological dispositioning from the viewpoint of the public. Therefore, although the petitions typically avoided political language, it is clear that petitions regarding the *tensikât* were apparently instrumentalized in the high echelons of politics within the part of the everyday political conflicts between rivals.

This raises other important questions. What if the texts of the petitions had invoked political language? Were there petitioners who dared to comment on actual politics? Were the dismissed bureaucrats aware of that they were pawns in a political struggle on the higher strata of politics? More generally, how did the petitioners view the new constitutional regime or the constitution itself? Above all, what do the petitions say about the individual relationships that constituted the dynamic through which the *tensikât* was implemented.

Halis Efendi, the Kaymakam of the Beykoz region in Istanbul, had an interesting career as a high-status official, having served in both Ödemiş and Beykoz. After an uneventful tenure in Ödemiş, his office in Beykoz, starting

49 BOA.BEO. 4132/309866, 29 *Muharrem* 1331 (8 January 1913).

50 BOA. BEO. 4134/310031, 5 *Safer* 1331 (14 January 1913).

in 1898, was swamped with complaints from diverse officers complaining of his misbehavior. However, the denunciations of his attitude as Kaymakam fell on deaf ears with the sultan. All the complaints against him up until the constitutional revolution were rebuffed after perfunctory investigations.[51] The government even dismissed one official, Beykoz fiscal director Sâlim Efendi, who reported Halis Efendi's fraud.[52] Sâlim Efendi was discharged as result of accusations of malpractice (*sû-i istimâl*) and misbehavior, but the charges were filed soon after his reports against Halis Efendi.

The archival documents make clear that Halis Efendi had a good relationship with Yıldız Palace over the course of his career, as the examples demonstrate. Another striking example was his affiliations with institutions directly linked to Sultan Hamid himself. Sixteen months before the revolution, the municipality (*şehremâneti*) sent an official request to the Ministry of the Interior[53] in response to the mounting complaints about Halis Efendi. The request was addressed specifically to the *memûrîn-i mülkiye komisyonu* (civil service commission), a Hamidian institutional invention founded in 1896, the members of which were responsible for dismissals and reassignments as a result of investigations.[54] The municipality had already arranged for Hamdi Celal Bey, Kaymakam of Zebedani in Syria, to replace him. The response from the Ministry of the Interior Ministry was that no fraud was detected on Halis Efendi's part.

He continued his position until forced to retire four months after the constitution was repromulgated. On September 29, 1908, a report that mentioned that Halis Efendi had insulted and put a gun to Enver Vahid Bey, an official in the Ministry of Justice, called for an investigation.[55] The report was originally about the appointment of two officials for an investigation into Halis Efendi. The reason behind the quarrel between Halis and Enver Vahid,

51 For example, see BOA.DH.MKT. 2283/63 8 *Şaban* 1317 (9 December 1899); BOA.DH.MKT. 1559/8, 14 *Safer* 1325 (29 March 1907).

52 BOA.DH.MKT 529/51, 19 *Rebiülevvel* 1320 (26 June 1902).

53 BOA.DH.MKT 1159/8, 14 *Safer* 1325 (29 March 1907).

54 For further information regarding the transformation of the institution, see Atillâ Çetin, "Sicill-i Ahvâl Defterleri ve Dosyaları Hakkında Bir Araştırma," *Vakıflar Dergisi 29* (2005); 87-104.

55 BOA.TS.MA.e 1064/38, 3 *Ramazan* 1326 (29 September 1908).

whether personal or political, was not mentioned in the report, and there were no further documents in the file. But it was declared that Halis Efendi was officially pensioned off on November 19, 1908.[56]

Two years after his retirement, he wrote a petition to the Council of the State on November 9, 1910, stating his grievance stemming from the *tensikât*.[57] It is significant that the language of the petition was politically charged, one of very few that ventured to criticize a political decision of the government. As most of the petitions were addressed to the government to request reinstatement, they generally adopted a cautious language and excluded political matters. However, the tone of Halis Efendi's petition was as if he were debating the *tensikât* with policy makers, although he did also request to be reappointed once more. For him, the constitutional regime was the best time to serve the motherland, but he had been forced to be retire anomalously.[58] Interestingly, he referred to his former service as evidence of his appropriateness for serving the new constitutional regime. Moreover, he stressed the concept of justice, which was part of a popular political discourse of the constitutional period. He said that he could not bear to be destitute of the blessing of justice which the Constitution provided.

Speaking of individual petitions containing political discourses, another example was Mehmed Aziz Bey's lengthy petition[59] on how he felt destroyed by the *tensikât*. He wrote a petition on September 26, 1908, regarding what he said was his unfair dismissal. According to him, he was Midhad Pasha's nephew, and he tried to use this fact to his advantage. (There is no family tree of Midhad Pasha by which to verify this statement).

The family link to Midhad Pasha aside, in his long petition, Mehmed Aziz Bey built his argument on three points. First, he repeated terms such as *ahvâl-i zâlimâne* (tyrannic conditions) and *idâre-i sâbıka-i zâlimâne* (former tyrannic rule) to suggest that the Hamidian period was oppressive, which would have positively influenced the addressees with CUP links.

56 BOA.DH.MKT 2664/24, 24 *Şevval* 1326 (19 November 1908).

57 BOA.ŞD. 3070/47, 6 *Zilkade* 1328 (9 November 1910).

58 "…şimdiye kadar bulunduğum hidmetlerde vücuda getirdiğim aşara nazaran vatana tam hidmet idecek bir zamanda iken tekaüd eyledim." For his petition see Appendix C.

59 BOA.BEO. 3405/255334, 29 *Şaban* 1326 (26 September 1908). For his petition see Appendix B.

Furthermore, he knew that the CUP cadres would want to avoid what the Hamidians labelled as tyranny. He frequently made references to the former Hamidian regime as a terrible example, but for him certain applications regarding the *tensikât* went further.[60]

Second, through the text he stressed concepts he thought to be identified with CUP ideology, like justice and freedom. He praised the new rule's ideals which could ultimately prevent rulers from being unfair. Together with this, he included a harsh comparison of Hamidian and the constitutional period, for him even the Hamidian tyranny in certain cases would have not acted like the "rule of justice and freedom." Third, he laid out a backstory for the petition that he was dismissed not because of his inefficiency but because of a conflict with superiors whom he accused of for being loyal to the Hamidian regime.

His *sicill*[61] indicates that he was dismissed in the early stages of the revolution, in early September 1908. After the aforementioned petition, the central government decided that he could return to official state service, but in a different office. However, his position was not secure, as he was dismissed once again after the *tensikât* law was enacted.

Mehmed Aziz Bey's case is significant in terms of demonstrating that petitioning could actually work for the victims. Although he was again discharged from his office, he managed once to reclaim his rights soon after his initial dismissal. Moreover, his case also tells another story of the impulse certain dismissals. Interpersonal conflicts independent of actual politics could have played an important role in many dismissals. Especially if there was a clash of interests in a superior-subordinate relationship, superiors had the chance to get rid of the subordinate under the guise of the *tensikât*. This is telling with respect to the dynamic, inconsistent nature of the application of the *tensikât*. Individual conflicts could play as significant a role as political projects from the top. Moreover, it suggests that the opposite may have been true, as well; those likely dismissals may have been precluded by networks close to officials whose discharge was imminent.

60 "…İdare-i sâbıka-i zâlimânede bile emsali görülmemiş olan imzalarla yapılan cedveller…"

61 BOA.HR.SAİD. 22/10.

The application of the *tensikât* were related to the actual content of the legislation of the purges. Possible reactionary outcomes for victims of the *tensikât* law were to be expected. The act of petitioning was revealed through the *tensikât* as a form of expressing dissatisfaction with an actual political decision tken by the new policy makers. Article 10 of the *tensikât* law stated that those who were deemed inappropriate (*sû-i hali tebeyyün edenler*) as a result of an investigation carried out by the commission were by no means to be reemployed in state service. Moreover, they could not apply for a compensation wage as they had no right to a salary.[62] Article 10 clearly states that bureaucrats who were supporters or followers of the former regime would be dismissed without recourse. The scope of the phrase *su-i hâli tebeyyün edenler* was open ended and could apply to any official who was thought to be a potential threat to the emerging political system. In other words, this article of the legislation allowed for the arbitrary implementation of purges. Moreover, Article 15 of the law stated that bureaucrats dismissed because of their *sû-i ahvâl* could send grievances only to parliament, not to any other institution. That is to say, a parliament where the majority of the deputies had organic links to the CUP had the sole say in the futures of individuals branded as *sû-i ahvâl.*

In certain cases during the application of the law, specifically regarding the Article 10, dismissed bureaucrats' names were reported to the Council of the State.[63] Although these documents did not indicate why the Council of the State needed to know upon which articles the dismissals hinged, it could be that the Council of the State was refusing petitions from those discharged in accordance with Article 10. In other words, Article 10 was inviolable; if a bureaucrat was dismissed in accordance with this article, further petitions would not be taken into consideration. This argument is supported by the fact that although certain archival documents referred the existence of petitions opposing Article 10, these petitions are absent from the catalogs of the Ottoman Archives. In response to all petitions from the victims of Article 10, the Sublime Porte stated that Article 10 must be applied and that

62 *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 27 *Haziran* 1325 (10 July 1909).

63 i.e. BOA.DH.EUM.MEM 8/60, 02 *Rebiülevvel* 1330 (20 February 1912).

the petitions are not processed.[64] This is significant in terms of understanding that petitions could only be sent in accordance with what the legislation allowed.

§ 4.3 Conclusion

This chapter proposes an alternative approach to the *tensikât* law by drawing attention to the actual victims of a legislative process. The *tensikât* law and the purges both before and after the law was enacted, were an early attempt by the CUP to claim direct control over the bureaucratic apparatus vis-à-vis the former state organization. Redesigning the bureaucratic cadres from top to the bottom was more than a legislative undertaking; it included the total mobilization of CUP cadres and risked possible backlash. In this respect, the CUP managed to implement purges despite its limited power in the actual political arena. This is but one side of the coin, the other being the victims of the process.

A look at the other side of the coin begs the question did the victims of the purges remain passive observers or did they react to some degree? Moreover, did they dare write petitions to an emerging political authority that seemed to be the most powerful in the empire? In contrast with the general narrative of constitutional rule as a liberal period, bureaucrats who were discharged had reasons enough for not expressing their requests. Although the CUP did not hold actual political power until 1913, they had popular support and had the press behind them to a degree that gave them expensive powers with respect to state affairs. Moreover, the CUP launched the purges as a means to move on from the tyranny of the former regime as well as to spread symbolic fear among the remaining bureaucrats. This could have swayed victims to refrain from raising their voices against a political decision with a legitimate legal basis. This was why more than half of the petitions, 54.29% of the sample in this research, were sent to the Council of the State in the nine-months period between May 1912 and January 1913 – a time when the CUP's political power was weakened starting with the pressure of the

64 BOA.BEO. 3825/286812, 17 *Zilkade* 1328 (20 November 1910).

Halaskâr Zâbıtân and ending with the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını*. This challenges the idea that constitutional rule provided an overall liberal climate given that the victims of the purges waited until the CUP was politically weak to write petitions.

Waiting for a power changeover to defend their rights hints at the new political orientation of petitioning. Ben-Bassat's argues that petitioning became a public instrument for political rights,[65] and as a means of expressing political discontent with legislative acts, the *tensikât* petitions align with this assertion. On the other hand, the actual contents of the great majority of petitions did not contain political rhetoric, certain exceptions aside. This chapter indicates that although certain petitions made political insinuations, the majority of the petitioners did not openly oppose the politics of the *tensikât*. In other words, while the majority of the petitioners were not passive observers, their expectation to be reinstated prompted them to stay out of the politics of the issue.

In sum, this chapter proposes that because of their active expectations, the attitudes of victims were subject to in-state political struggles. As pointed out, the most significant factor behind the rapid upshoot in petitions in May 1912 can be attributed to new approaches by new governments, namely the Grand Cabinet and the Kamil Pasha Cabinet. As the empirical examples above stress, new governments paved the way for new petitions. The attitudes of victims shifted with the emergence of internal struggles within the state bureaucracy together with high-level political conflicts. As such, the in-state struggles to reconfigure bureaucratic cadres can even be observed in the testimonies of victims via their petitions.

65 Ben-Bassat, "Ottoman Institution of Petitioning," 101.

PART II:

ON APPOINTMENTS: GOVERNING THE PROVINCES

5

The Governors of the Second Constitution

When Ali Münif Bey was appointed governor of Ankara in 1910 he was thirty-six – young for a bureaucrat to become governor compared to other appointees.[1] Undoubtedly, his appointment was merit-based, yet beyond merit were certain causal agents behind it. After his graduation from *Mülkiye* in 1897, after only six months as a novice bank official in *Ziraat* Bank, his early career took off in 1908. He was together with his classmate, Cavid Bey, in *Ziraat* Bank who later became the Minister of Finance during the Constitutional Period.[2] After working as a small-scale civil official in İşkodra in the Balkans at the beginning of the twentieth century, Ali Münif Bey found himself as lieutenant district governor of the towns of Köprülü and Görice in the vicinity of Bitola. During his days in Köprülü, he worked closely with the Young Turks for the repromulgation of the constitution.[3] He experienced the heated early days of the revolution in the Balkans. His positions in the Ottoman Freedom Community and Committee of Progress and Union in 1907 allowed him to take part in negotiations between the CUP and the sultan in July 1908 concerning the repromulgation of the constitution. During the Second Constitutional period, he was elected as a deputy

1 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d. 3/8 p.13, 18 *Ramazan 1328* (23 September 1910)

2 Toros, *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları,* 28.

3 Çankaya. *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. 3, 628-629.

in the first parliament. Two years later, in September 1910, he was appointed as the governor of Ankara.

Ali Münif Bey's case was not unique among young civil/military officers who were involved in the Balkan network of the Young Turks at the beginning of the twentieth century. Hacı Adil Bey, who became the Secretary-General of the CUP in 1910 and Minister of the Interior in 1911, was working in the customs directorate in Thessalonica when he became governor of Edirne in 1909.[4] The question of their ability to perform as governors aside, their rapid promotion can be attributed to connections within the Balkan network of the Young Turks, based primarily in Thessalonica and Bitola developed before July 1908. This chapter argues that the CUP not only fought in the political arena with rivals but also struggled to control the upper echelons of the bureaucratic machinery. To do so, they sometimes sacrificed power in the pollical field in favor of governance over the actual state apparatus. This chapter therefore focuses on gubernatorial appointments in the bureaucracy.

The reason for this strategy was that gubernatorial appointments would lead to direct control of actual politics given that governors were the primary representatives of the state in the provinces. Second is a methodological predilection: it is relatively straightforward to trace gubernatorial appointees in the archives compared to other positions in the higher stratum of state service. Given that administrative and political histories converged in these governors, they are key for analyzing and understanding the nature of state-making processes and the structures of the Second Constitution.

§ 5.1 Appointing Governors in the Late Ottoman Empire

The literature seems to have reached a consensus that bureaucratic appointments in the Ottoman Empire from the early modern period until the nineteenth century were mostly the result of favoritism and clientelism. Networks, connections, alliances and favoritism played a primary role in recruitment, appointments, turnovers, and dismissals. Cornell Fleischer

4 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d 3/4, p.5, no. 1351/25456, 27 *Ramazan* 1327 (12.10.1909).

states that for early modern career paths within the *askerî* class, *intisâb* was the main means of advancement in the bureaucracy.

> Whatever the specific professional and genealogical requirements of the career tracks within the *askerî* class, one more factor helped to determine individual advancement and both vertical and lateral relationships, *intisâb* "connections." *İntisâb* signifies a semiofficial patronage system whereby a member of the *askeri* class would help to secure entry into and advancement within the government system for his own proteges, who would in turn support their patron and his interests. *İntisâb* was established on the basis of a variety of other, sorts of relationships. Blood kinship constituted the most immediate basis for patronage, but friendship, marriage ties, sexual relationships, ethnic and geographical origins, household service, and student-teacher bonds also played an important part in the establishment of *intisâb* networks.[5]

The literature addressed that the system of advancements in the government based on *intisâb* lasted even into the late nineteenth-century Ottoman civil bureaucratic reforms that transformed the bureaucratic structure. Findley states that in the classical Ottoman bureaucracy, "to make ability count, the individual needed connections. Ability without connections would mean frustration; connections without ability might lead to high position."[6] Every statesman in the state service was aware of this, and the phenomenon of clientelism was consented to from bottom to top-level bureaucratic appointments. For Bouquet, favoritism was valid for the full pyramid of the bureaucracy.[7] Governors, who were top-level appointees, can be evaluated within this framework. Roderic Davison, one of the first historians to claim that favoritism played an important role in the appointment of governors in the late Ottoman period, stated:

---

5 Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 19-20.

6 Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire,* 98.

7 Olivier Bouquet, *Sultan'ın Paşaları, Osmanlı Devlet Ricali Hakkında Bir Deneme (1839-1909)* (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 192, 370.

> Much of the inefficiency and corruption in provincial administration was, of course, due to the manner in which governors were appointed and shifted about. Appointment was frequently the result of intrigue, influence, and bribery rather than of merit; sometimes it was simply a means to remove a politically influential man to a post of, honorable exile far from the Porte.[8]

Intrigue, influence, and bribery, as forms of favoritism, indeed shaped relationships among actors in the higher strata of the bureaucracy. For Akyıldız, citing Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, favoritism was the dilemma of the traditional Ottoman bureaucratic system.[9] As Bouquet stated, the sources for academic claims concerning favoritism were nineteenth-century orientalists and the complaints of certain Ottoman statesmen like Lütfi and Ahmed Cevdet.[10] That said, favoritism has been accepted as a canonical fact in the literature, and most mentions of it are not even backed by references to primary or secondary sources.

A more recent study by Cengiz Kırlı, however, put forward a counterargument on how the corruption, as a term, was de-historicized by the modernization paradigm. For Kırlı, the modernization paradigm designated the corruption as a determining factor for the Third World, while the West had already left behind it after they completed their modernizations.[11] Favoritism, as a form of corruption, was prevalent within the pre-modern societies according to the modernization theory. However, Kırlı then asks certain questions pertaining to de-historicizing the term corruption:

> What could embezzlement have meant in the early modern era, when there was no system of wage paid to the bureaucrats? What could be the meaning of the concept of "nepotism" in a bureaucratic operation where there was no connection between rank or merit into

8 Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 138.

9 Ali Akyıldız, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme,* 4th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 24.

10 Bouquet, *Sultan'ın Paşaları*, 369-370.

11 Cengiz Kırlı, *Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi* (Istanbul: Verita Yayınları, 2015), 11-12.

> where most of the appointments were made directly through patronage? On the other hand, to what extent can the "gift" be accepted as a bribe, both in the patronage relationship within the bureaucracy, and between the officials of the state and the society (*tebaa*) in the countryside?[12]

Bouquet criticizes the position of literature in regard to the favoritism.[13] Erkan Tural also expressed his disagreement with a Weberian model, especially on salary and merit.[14] Besides, Kırmızı also pointed out an inconsistency regarding the Weberian model and the Ottoman bureaucratic structure, criticizing the existing literature.[15] Yet it must be noted that Kırmızı's critics on Weberian bureaucratization resulted in an acclamation of certain alternative theories like multiple modernities.[16] It must, however, be noted that theories like alternative or multiple modernities were also criticized; in Özbek's words, it was the modernization's "capability of mutation".[17] Bearing these critics in mind, it must also be considered to what extent literature's so-called favoritism was subjected to change during the 19th century. Ibnülemin wrote in *Son Sadrazamlar* that Hayreddin Pasha (Tunuslu) sent an official statement (*arizâ*) to the sultan in July 1879,[18] approximately one month

12 Translated by the author of this dissertation from: "Bugünkü biçimiyle bir maaş uygulamasının olmadığı, devlet görevlilerinin gelirlerinin bürokrasinin rutin aktivitelerinden ve halktan toplanan vergi ver harçlardan edinildiği, kurumların belirli ve sabit bütçelerinin olmadığı, yönetici elitin kişisel gelirleri ile yönetici bulundukları kurum veya bölgenin gelirleri arasında bir ayrım gözetilmeyen erken modern siyasi zihniyetinde "zimmete para geçirmek" gibi bir kavramdan söz edilebilir mi? Veya makam veya liyakat arasında bir bağlantının olmadığı, atamaların doğrudan patronaj üzerinden gerçekleştirildiği bir bürokratik işleyiş içinde "adam kayırmacılık" kavramının ne anlamı olabilir? Öte yandan gerek bürokrasi içindeki patronaj ilişkilerinin gerekse taşrada eşraf, yönetici ve tebaa arasındaki ilişkilerin "hediye" üzerinden ifade edildiği bir sistemde, hangi hediyenin rüşvet sayılması gerektiği nasıl belirlenebilir?" Ibid., 16.

13 Bouquet, *Sultan'ın Paşaları*, 370.

14 Tural, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi*, 44-46.

15 Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri,* 3-8.

16 Ibid., 6.

17 Özbek, "İmparatorluk Tartışmalarında Radikal Bir Açılım", 14.

18 İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982), 946-951.

before his resignation from his position as *sadrazâm*.[19] He served only eight months in the *sadâret* between 1878-1879, although he was famous as a religious intellectual for his reform-mindedness.[20] In his *arizâ* sent to Abdülhamid, which was originally written in his native Arabic but translated into Turkish, his reformism pertaining to the organization of the state is clear. In eight articles, he defended his position against critics and proposed solutions to the breakdown of certain state institutions. He referred to the problems that he faced as "the great devastation" (*atâb-ı ulyâ*[21]).

In Article 6, which revealed his position on the distribution of power between the Sublime Porte and the Palace (*Mabeyn-i Hümâyûn*), he stressed that the governors and certain *memûrîn* had good relations with the servants of the *Mabeyn*. For him, governors should be in direct contact with the grand vizier, but many seemed to prefer back channels through the Palace, the extent of which the *sadrâzâm* did not know.[22] This caused complications and restricted the authority of the *sadrâzâm*. One speculation about the meaning of this practice was that governors and those who hoped to be governors insinuated themselves into Palace networks because this was the most effective way of obtaining, maintaining, and upgrading an appointment as governor. This was indeed an example of favoritism[23] entering into the appointment of governors. However, the consensus within the literature regarding favoritism in the traditional Ottoman bureaucratic system shifted once the modernization paradigm entered into scholarly discussions. Although still invoking favoritism in the process of appointments, Kırmızı

19 BOA.Y.EE. 80/50, 27 *Receb* 1296 (17 July 1879).

20 Atillâ Çetin, "Hayreddin Paşa, Tunuslu," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 17, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), 57-60.

21 İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar,* 947.

22 "Altıncısı, vilayet valilerile me'murin-i devletin pek çoğunun nezareti Bâb-ı âliye aid olan ümurı me'murelerine müteallik olan hususatda mabeyn-i hümayun kübera-yi me'murini ile muhabere müfaveze etmekde olmalarıdır. Halbuki buna dair sadrâzâmın malûmâtı olamıyor." Ibid., 949.

23 Abdülhamit Kırmızı, *Rulers of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908* (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2005), 48. When he published his book based on his dissertation, Kırmızı omitted the sentence about favoritism when referring to İbnülemin. Abdülhamit Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri, Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi 1895-1908*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2008).

argued that schools of modern education like *Mülkiye* and a bureaucrat's experiences in the provinces were influential in their appointments as governor.[24] It is significant to note that Kırmızı's take on the Hamidian bureaucracy during the late nineteenth century was poles apart from how he describes the traditional Ottoman system. Merit had never played a significant role before, as the mainstream historiography of Ottoman modernization followed this line, which was consistent with their intention to demonstrate the transformation of the bureaucratic system. For Bouquet, the modernists transformed the traditional system of favoritism into a new order in which schools like *Mülkiye* contributed to the projection of a merit-based system.[25]

Another perspective on the *arizâ* of Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha pertains to the centralist tendencies of Hamidian ideology. Late Ottoman governors were de facto appointed by Abdulhamid himself. This point is discussed by Abdülhamit Kırmızı, who disagrees with Enver Ziya Karal's criticique of Hamidian rule. For Karal, appointments reflected the centralist organization of Hamidian rule in which every department consulted the sultan before making appointments, especially for governors, army officers, and sub-governors.[26] For Kırmızı, not to consider the legal basis of appointments and dismissals from within the legal structure of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire is anachronistic.[27] He sought the original regulations on which governor appointments were based in the *nizamnâme*s enacted after the promulgation of the *Tanzimât*. For him, the right of sultans to appoint new governors was first declared in Article 6 of the *Tuna Vilâyet Nizamnâmesi* of 1864 and reaffirmed in the first article of the *Vilâyet Nizamnâmesi* of 1871.[28] Indeed, one interpretation of the texts of both *nizamnâme*s is that this was the natural right of the sultans throughout the history of the Ottoman

24 Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 46-47.

25 Bouquet, *Sultan'ın Paşaları*, 370.

26 Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol.8, 6th ed. (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2007), 265.

27 Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 45.

28 Ibid., 45-46.

Empire.[29] Karal's point on this matter could be seen as problematic, but he was correct to consider the centralist ideology the sultan internalized together with the point that he was ultimately responsible for implementing the decrees of the *Tanzimât*.[30] It must be noted that Stanford and Ezel Kural Shaw claim that the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for appointing, promoting, checking, and disciplining governors.[31]

Together with governmental actors and the institutions in charge of appointing governors, the actual process is also significant. In other words, investigating the conditions under which statesmen were asked to become governors can lead to an understanding of the process of their appointment. Of course, favoritism played a significant role as the narrators of the modernization paradigm note, but the *Tanzimât* state also mentioned other factors for appointments. Değirmendere states that there were seven considerations that factored into the appointment of governors:[32] the sultan's opinion, the individual capacities of candidates, institutional nationalism,[33] relations with the *Mâbeyn* (which are indeed related to favoritism), conflicts among pashas, the say of foreign ambassadors, and the positions of local notables. These factors suggest that was already an Ottoman institution of appointing governors in place. Moreover, these factors applied to nearly all high-ranking bureaucratic appointments. Therefore, with respect to

29 For the *Tuna Vilâyet Nizâmnâmesi.* see Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Yerel Yönetim Metinleri III: Tuna Vilâyeti Nizâmnâmesi," *Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler Dergisi* 5, no. 2 (1996): 67-81; For the *Vilâyet Nizâmnâmesi* of 1871, see Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Yerel Yönetim Metinleri VI: 1871 Vilayet Nizamnamesi ve Getirdikleri," *Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler Dergisi* 5, no. 5 (1996): 89-103.

30 Stanford Shaw, "Sultan Abdülhamid II: Last Man of the Tanzimat," *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu, 25-27 Aralık 1989* (Ankara: Milli Kütüphane, 1989), 179-197; François Georgeon, *Sultan Abdülhamid*, trans. Ali Berktay (Istanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2006).

31 Stanford and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, vol. 2 of *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 72.

32 Muammer Değirmendere, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Son Dönemi'nde Vali Atamaları (1839-1908 Hüdâvendigar Vilâyeti Örneği)," *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 43 (2015): 108.

33 By institutional nationalism (*kurumsal milliyetçilik*) he was referring to in-house patronage among persons of the same institution, as examples in the article suggest.

positions at the top of Ottoman officialdom, an established, stable institution pertaining to appointments already existed.

The institution of appointing bureaucrats can also be traced by concentrating on the turnover rates of the governors. Kırmızı stated that when a change was necessary, the procedure for replacing a governor was arranged between the sultan and the *sadrâzâm,* while the *Meclis-i Vükelâ* would make suggestions.[34] In most cases, these suggestions were not arbitrary. Rather, candidates were organized according to a hierarchy.[35] The first group to be considered for appointment was comprised of former provincial governors (*mazul*) who were in the capital awaiting reappointment.[36] However, the sources for this study demonstrate that bureaucrats from any stratum could be appointed as governor, especially in the period after 1908. Before then, *icrâ-yı becayiş* (substitution) was a common practice when appointing a governor. For Kırmızı, *becayiş* was implemented in the situation that the local people were complaining about a governor,[37] regardless of the reason. The practical solution in this circumstance was to substitute one governor for another such that both remained in office.

The narrative of the modernization paradigm regarding the nature of the transformation of late Ottoman bureaucracy enabled its own linear progressive evaluation of modernization. Not only did the quantity of bureaucrats increase in the nineteenth century, so too did the quality of individual bureaucrats. Merit increased due to progressive new schools like *Mülkiye* for this perspective. As exemplified by the approaches of historians influenced by the modernization paradigm, the grand narrative of modernization stresses that the favoritism, clientelism, and intrigue were already in decline in the late nineteenth century.

This makes the current study all the more challenging in terms of determining the distinctions of the post-1908 period. If one seeks for a transformative element pertaining to the appointments and favoritism, it must be

34 Kırmızı presents examples of the procedures for changing governors. Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 47-51.

35 Ibid., 52.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

searched through and paid attention to the agencies during the early Constitutional period. Unlike the invention of corruption coincided with the early *Tanzimât* period referring Kırlı's study,[38] invention of favoritism as an unnatural practice were started to be voiced in the parliamentary congregations regarding the *tensikât* as the Part 1 of this study demonstrated above. However, this did not clear off favoritism, rather, a new version of favoritism appeared: political and ideological favoritism in practice.

The following sections of this chapter provide a snapshot of governor appointments between 1908-1913, accompanied by a comparison with appointments during the Hamidian era. The *tevcihât-ı mülkiye defterleri*,[39] which provide brief biographic information on appointees, enables a comparative analysis regarding the appointments, answering the following: Did the nature of appointments transform with the revolution? If so, how did the new political actors struggle to shape high-level bureaucratic appointments in accordance with new standards? Did favoritism still play a role? Were there other causal factors that came into play in appointments along with the 1908 Revolution? Furthermore, what was the relationship between actual politics and appointments?

As a preliminary answer to these questions, the post-1908 climate provided a political atmosphere that also affected the nature of appointments in the bureaucracy. It is unfortunately not possible to comparatively trace the influence of favoritism between the Hamidian and the Young Turk periods, yet the new politics that emerged with the revolution made appointments more subject to actual politics. In other words, the appointments started to become political and to reflect the currents of everyday politics. Political favoritism rather than individual or personal relationship-based favoritism became the effective agent of appointments. Therefore, favoritism in the constitutional period must be correlated to political ups and downs. This chapter offers a description of governor appointments to explain this new formation in terms of political moments, changes of governmental crises, and critical turns in the period from 1908 to 1913.

38 Kırlı, *Yolsuzluğun İcadı.*

39 Yusuf Sarınay, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi* (Istanbul: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2010), 196.

§ 5.2 Mapping Gubernatorial Appointments, 1908-1913



Figure 5.1 Ottoman Administrative Map of 1898[40]

The fundamental laws organizing Ottoman provincial administration at the beginning of the Second Constitutional Period were codes inherited from the 1864 and 1871 *nizâmnâme*s and the 1876 Constitution itself.[41] In fact, the first Council of Deputies in 1877 attempted to make an amendment on the articles regarding provincial administration in the *Kânûn-i Esâsî*, but it was not enacted due to the abrogation of the parliament. The Second Constitutional rule also ventured to write a new code in 1910, but it was only realized after 1913. Though the CUP had sufficient legislative power to enact several

40 Source: BOA.HRT.h. 2577, 18 *Şevval* 1315 (12 March 1898).

41 İlber Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilat ve İdare Tarihi,* 3rd ed. (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2008), 498-501; Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "Taming the Governors: The Swinging Pendulum of Power over the Ottoman Provinces in the Nineteenth Century," *The International Journal of Regional and Local Studies*, 6:1, (2010): 6-8,

fundamental laws as early as 1909,[42] they deemed it not prudent to force through changes to the existing provincial laws. Therefore, in 1908, the Ottoman administrative map was still divided as envisaged by the earlier legal law (certain losses of territory in the late nineteenth century aside) in which for Kırmızı these were legally "little absolute states"[43]. Figure 5.1 shows the provincial divisions by population density (with the exceptions of Hijaz and Yemen). There were 29 provinces (*vilâyet*) and certain sanjaks with special status such as Jerusalem, Zor, and Biga (*müstakil mutasarrıflık*),[44] and unlike other *mutasarrıflık*s, they were directly linked with the center like *vilâyet* governorships. In what follows, governor appointments are scrutinized along with visuals that depict the appointments on a provincial basis.

There are three ways to trace governor appointments in the archives. The first and most common is the state yearbooks, the *Salnâme*s. [45] However, *Salname*-based analyzes shows fewer appointments compared to what is indicated in another archival record, the *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye Defterleri.* This second source for tracing high-level appointments concerns conferrals in the civil service.[46] On one hand, the *Salnâme* lack data on 1908-1909, which is significant for a study of the early revolutionary period. On the other, the number of appointments recorded is small when compared to the *Tevcihât.* In the *Salnâme*s between 1908 and 1910, there are 29 recorded governor appointments, while the *tevcihât* indicates nearly 75 for the same period. However, for sub-provincial governor appointments, the number in the *salnâme* is slightly higher. Although this study includes the data of both, the *tevcihât* records take priority as they provide more detailed information with respect to high-ranking governors, such as brief biographies of appointees including

42 The *Tensikât, matbuat, matbaalar,* and *tatil-i eşgâl* laws and the amendment to the constitution are examples.

43 Kırmızı, "Taming the Governors", 11.

44 Sub-governors (*mutasarrıf*), who were appointed to sanjaks, had the same special rights and status as governors in *vilâyet*s. See Ali Fuat Örenç, "Mutasarrıf," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 31, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2006), 377-379.

45 For example, Şükrü Hanioğlu and Nader Sohrabi consulted the *Salnâme*s with respect to appointments in the higher strata of the bureaucracy. See Hanioğlu, *Preparation for Revolution,* 287; and Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 201-203.

46 Yusuf Sarınay, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi* (Istanbul: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2010), 196.

the previous offices the bureaucrat occupied. Third, the *takvim-i vekayi,* the official state newspaper, listed information on a daily basis about appointments in the higher strata of the bureaucracy. While one can trace governor appointments there, the *tevcihât* records are more systematic and comprehensive. Therefore, this study preferred the *tevcihât* records as the primary means to trace governor appointments.

If one were to map the appointments and dismissals recorded in the *tevcihât* between 1908-1913, what would it suggest about their frequencies by provincial center? The figure 5.2 below demonstrates the complex structure of governor appointments in the first four years of the revolution. Red dots indicate the places of the previous duties of the bureaucrats, green dots are the places to which they were appointed next. The size of the dots corresponds to the number of bureaucrats dismissed from or appointed to a given locale, which provides insight into the frequency of appointments and dismissals in each province.




Figure 5.2 Governor Appointments Between August 1908 and October 1912[47]

Moreover, the map suggests those *vilâyet* centers and certain peripheral *müstakil mutasarrıflık*s to which political importance was attached by governing elites in Istanbul. The total number of governors appointed in four years would be higher for cities that were paid extra attention by the central government. However, it can also just friction in the relationships between local actors and appointed bureaucrats. In other words, when the turnover for a given governorship increases, it could mean that either the governing elites or local powers were dissatisfied with the previous governor. Furthermore, for governing elites in the Sublime Porte, increasing turnover would also apply to show force, especially in dynamic regions where they had less political authority and bureaucratic control.

47 This figure, following maps and network diagrams in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 were generated from *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye* records between August 1908 and October 1912 using the tool http://hdlab.stanford.edu/palladio/ which was created by Stanford University Center for Spatial and Textual Analysis (CESTA). Red dots indicate the locations of the previous duties of governors and green ones the places where they were currently appointed. The size of the dots indicates the number of total governors appointed and reassigned.

In general, the map shows that Istanbul was the only place from which many bureaucrats were appointed as governors of certain cities in the Balkans, Anatolia, and on the Arabian Peninsula. Why were there so many Istanbul-based appointees charged with governorships in various places through the Empire? Kırmızı suggests that there was a pool of former provincial governors in Istanbul, *mazul*s, that had previously been dismissed and were waiting for reappointment.[48] Whether they were appointed on the basis of merit or because they were close to certain networks responsible for appointments is a legitimate question. On the other hand, there were those who were removed from Istanbul for political reasons as well. In other words, three possible reasons explain the appointment of governors from candidates based in the capital: merit, network connections, and exile.

Another important consideration regarding appointments from Istanbul was that the new system allowed newer bureaucrats from among the lower strata to be promoted up the bureaucratic ladder. As discussed later, the Hamidian method of appointing governors was mostly based on the swapping of offices (*icra-yı becâyîş*); the revolutionary system unpacked the previous regime's human capital in order to introduce new governors into the system. Moreover, the human capital in Istanbul was sufficient to appoint governors from within the bureaucracy.[49] Which is to say, the removal of governors loyal to the old regime men and the simultaneous introduction of new governors help explain why so many Istanbul-based bureaucrats were appointed in the first four years of the revolution.

Second, the map shows that there were places where the political atmosphere was relatively calm and stable compared to other places. The District of Aydın is a good example. As seen on the map, both the red and green dots

48 Kırmızı, *Abdülhamit'in Valileri,* 52.

49 For example, Emin Bey, the head of the provincial treasury (d*efterdâr*), was appointed Deputy Governor of Istanbul on November 16, 1909 after the resignation of Şerif Paşa. BOA. DH. MUİ. 33/18, 3 *Zilkade* 1327 (16 November 1909). In 1912, Emin Bey was appointed Governor of Kastamonu. BOA. İ.DH. 1491/45, 10 *Safer* 1330 (30 January 1912). The governorship of Istanbul was notably different than that of other provinces as the municipality and governorship were a single entity. Mehmet Güneş, "Osmanlı Dönemi'nde İstanbul'da Vilayet İdaresinin Tesşekkülü," *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırması Dergisi* 37 (2016): 182.

are small compared with other districts in Anatolia, the Balkans, and Arabia. Interestingly, bureaucrats appointed to Aydın as governors were originated from the higher strata of the bureaucracy. The appointees from August 1908 to February 1912 were as follows: Rauf Pasha, a major of Istanbul and vizier; Ali Galip Bey, the former minister of the postal and telegraph service; Ferid Paşa, a member of the upper house (*âyan âzası*); Mahmud Muhtâr Bey, a high-level commander in the military and the son of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha; Nâzım Paşa, a former governor of Baghdad; and Celal Bey, the former Minister of the Interior. Except for Nazım Paşa, none were subsequently re-appointed as governors. Some returned to Istanbul and held different positions in the bureaucracy, while some moved on to actual politics. Appointment to the governor of Aydın was prestigious given the former duties of the appointees. Second, these governors were mostly bureaucrats of the Hamidian regime. It was a place of relative calm to which former high-ranking bureaucrats were appointed to keep them from interfering with the new system: a kind of prestigious exile.

Third, district centers where political chaos existed before the revolution[50] attracted more of the attention of the governing elites in terms of appointing and dismissing large number of this of governors. It must be with an effect of pre-1908 insurgencies in Trabzon, Van, Bitlis, and Kastamonu – in Eastern Anatolia –, the rate of governor turnover was high. In Bitlis, where there were tariqas played an important role in provincial power relations, turnover was slightly higher than in other regions of the empire.

Fourth, in centers where the CUP organization was established and powerful, like Selanik, Monastir, and İşkodra, there was also a high rate of turnover among governors. This could be because most of the governors of these centers, like Hacı Adil Bey, entered politics after 1909.

These concerns evoke other questions. If this visualization could be extended over the dimension of time, showing the differences among the tenures of different governments, what would it say about the relational aspects of politics and bureaucracy? In other words, how would the maps differ if

50 See Kudret Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in İlanı Temmuz-Ağustos 1908* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999).

separated by different governments? Did the different governments focus on different provinces? The following maps show governor appointments during cabinets of Kamil, Hülseyin Hılmi, Hakkı, Said, and Ahmed Muhtar Pashas, revealing their respective attention to different provinces.



Figure 5.3 Governor Appointments from August 1908 to February 1909 (the Kamil Pasha Cabinet)

After the short-lived cabinet of Said Pasha, Kamil Pasha was tasked with forming a new cabinet on August 5, 1908. Figure 5.3 shows governor appointments during the seven months of the Kamil Pasha cabinet. Although the CUP leadership did not get along with Kamil Pasha in several respects, the interior ministers (*dahiliye nâzırı*) in the Kamil Pasha cabinet, Hakkı and Hüseyin Hılmi Pashas, had good relations with the CUP. Furthermore, they would assume the position of *sadrâzâm* after Kamil Pasha. Therefore, although the CUP and Kamil diverged on several matters, the CUP had influence in deciding interior matters, one of which was governor appointments.

The governor appointments during the Kamil Pasha cabinet were concentrated in places where there were already political struggles before the revolution. In 1906-1907, Ottoman statesmen were struggling with dissent appeared in Kastamonu, Sivas, Erzurum, Bitlis, and other provinces in Eastern Anatolia.[51] From the perspective of the government, these areas were still potential risks. In Sivas, Bitlis, Van, and Trabzon, the turnover of governors was higher than other places.

Apart from this, this map shows that nearly all of the governorships of the *vilâyet* centers had changed hands over the course of this seven months. The Kamil Pasha cabinet tried to maintain the state organization and convert potential risks the state could face in the atmosphere of a constitutional revolution. Meanwhile, the government also struggled to reestablish its rule by appointing new governors. This is apparent when the appointments of the Kamil Pasha are compared to its successor, the government of Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha. Arguably, Kamil Pasha left behind a stable environment in terms of the governor appointed.

Figure 5.4 maps the appointments during the cabinet of Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha.

51 Nadir Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli, Osmanlı'da Vergi, Siyaset ve Toplumsal Adalet (1839-1908)* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Ünversitesi Yayınları, 2015), 147-152; E. Attila Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During the Tanzimat Period (1839–1876) and Before the Young Turk Revolution (1904–1908): Popular Protest and State Formation in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Policy History* 25, no. 3 (2013): 308-333; Kansu, *1908 Devrimi,* 35-97; Zafer Kars, *1908 Devrimi'nin Halk Dinamiği (*Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1997).



Figure 5.4 Governor Appointments from February 1909 to December 1909 (Cabinet of Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha)

Unlike the Kamil Pasha cabinet, that of Hüseyin Hilmi, who served as both the *sadrâzâm* and Interior Minister at the same time, focused much more on the Balkans. Military officers from the Balkan region like Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha and Fuad Pasha were promoted as the governors of Selanik and Hijaz, respectively, while sub-governors and bureaucrats from various ministries, such as Mazhar Bey, Halil Bey, and İbrahim Hayrullah Bey, were promoted to the governorships of the Balkan cities of Kosova, Monastir, and Selanik.

There are further examples, and while some Unionists were promoted, Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha actually made far fewer appointments than Kamil Pasha. There are several reasons for this. First, the Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha cabinet was confronted with several political issues that would have distracted them from interior appointments. The 31 March Incident, the amendment of the constitution, and the enactment of fundamental new laws occupied the agenda of the *sadrâzâm* until his resignation in late December 1909. Moreover, although the literature has not yet fully explored the aftermath of the March 31 Incident, for months afterward the cabinet focused on the possible

repercussions of the event, which again took their concentration away from governor appointments.

The Hakkı Pasha cabinet was founded in January 1910, and three months after forming the government, in April 1910, the government accelerated the pace of governor appointments. A few explain this cabinet's differing approaches to interior affairs. The Hakkı Pasha cabinet, soon after its formation, faced an important challenge: the Albanian uprising. In April-May 1910, the Albanians reacted against the new policies of the constitutional regime towards centralization policies being implemented by the CUP-linked governor (Mazhar Bey).[52] The government tried to solve the problems that appeared in İşkodra, but the uprising in Rumelia recalled previous uprisings in the Eastern Anatolia. The government knew that events in Rumelia could easily trigger subsequent uprisings in the eastern provinces. For this reason, the government could have concentrated its efforts in terms of governor appointments on various turbulent geographies. Figure 5.5 shows the appointments during the Hakkı Pasha cabinet.

52 For the Albanian uprising, see Suat Zeyrek, "II. Meşrutiyette Demokratik Muhalefetin Sonu: Arnavut İsyanları ve Sonuçları," *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 33 (2012): 299-336.



Figure 5.5 Governor Appointments from January 1910 to October 1911 (Cabinet of Hakkı Pasha)

The focus during the Hakkı Pasha cabinet reflected similar concerns as the Kamil Pasha cabinet, which is unsurprising since Hakkı Pasha was the Interior Minister in the Kamil Pasha cabinet. It can propose that Hakkı Pasha was the actor behind the Kamil Pasha appointments, although the CUP did not openly support his earlier position as a minister. However, within a year, in January 1910, the CUP wanted him to assume the office of *sadrâzâm*.[53] His maneuvers in the provincial centers of eastern Anatolia during his time as the Interior Minister continued during his days as the prime minister. As the map shows, the turnover rate of governors in Eastern Anatolian centers was relatively high compared to other cabinets between August 1908 and October 1912.

After the fall of the Hakkı Pasha Cabinet, when the Turco-Italian War started in fall 1911, Said Pasha formed a cabinet for a second time since the repromulgation of the constitution. Cooperating with the CUP, the Said Pasha cabinet of 1911 and 1912 lasted much longer than his first in July 1908. In

53 Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, vol.* I/II, 63.

the cabinet's nine months, the number of governors moving in and out was slightly lower. As his cabinet inherited the Albanian uprising together with Turco-Italian War, the primary concern was not interior matters. Figure 5.6 shows the appointments and dismissals.




Figure 5.6 Governor Appointments from October 1911 to July 1912 (Second Cabinet of Said Pasha)

The aftermath of May 1912 tells a different story. The period from May 1912 until the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını* in January 1913 was significant in the political history of the CUP because the *Halaskâr Zâbıtân* (Redeemer Officers) appeared as an important opposition to the CUP. After Said Pasha's resignation and the formation of the Grand Cabinet (of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha) the CUP lost its power in the executive as the new government started to dismiss CUP-linked governors replacing them with new ones. Ahmed Reşid Bey (Rey), who was appointed as the governor of Aydın in August 1912 and became the Interior Minister in October 1912, was an important example of the rise of the opposition to the CUP during period of the Grand Cabinet and

the Kamil Pasha cabinet, which is discussed in the upcoming chapter. Figure 5.7 depicts the governor appointments of the Grand Cabinet:



Figure 5.7 Governor Appointments from August 1912 to October 1912 (Grand Cabinet)

The density of governor appointments per month during the Grand Cabinet was high compared to appointments of previous cabinets. The average number per month in the 50-month period between August 1908 and October 1912 was 3.48, but during the Grand Cabinet there were 8 appointments per month. On the other hand, during the early revolution, there were 2.66 per month during the Said Pasha cabinet, 2.2 during the Hakkı Pasha cabinet, 3.55 for the Hüseyin Hılmi Pasha cabinet, and 5.5 for the Kamil Pasha cabinet.

The maps above indicate a complex system of governor appointments as well as a relationship to actual everyday politics. The socio-political dynamics of the system as well as its logic are discussed in detail within the

upcoming chapters. However, in the following section of this chapter, the process and a more detailed descriptive analysis of the turnover rates in the high levels of bureaucracy are discussed.

§ 5.3 Turnover Rates in High Bureaucracy

Governor appointments during the early revolutionary period provide a snapshot of a significant political turn, as demonstrated by the maps above. Moreover, high-level provincial appointments are notable examples of attempts by actors who claimed power over the new bureaucracy to shape the bureaucratic mechanism, and provincial appointments were a good starting point for the new regime.

The systematic, organized process of shaping the bureaucratic apparatus necessitated a top-down infiltration of every corner of the bureaucratic organization. Indeed, the actors intending to change the bureaucratic system would not be expected to organize the change from bottom-up, as that would take a long time. They first needed to transform the highest levels of the bureaucracy, which would make easier to constitute a loyal bureaucracy at the bottom. Therefore, the change must start from the top and proceed to the lower strata.

However, it was not so easy to take the control of the elite bureaucracy in the capital. The Hamidian hegemony over the bureaucracy that had been created in the previous decades was hard to overcome. Furthermore, the Young Turks did not dominate the political decision-making process as they dominated the shaping of public opinion using the magnetic power of the press, which was "invented" by the Young Turks at the turn of the century as far as Ottoman history is concerned. Other than their power struggles with elite bureaucrats in the capital, rotating out provincial governors was not the complicated process that the earlier purging of pashas in the capital was. The archives show various ways of appointing a new governor.

Before concentrating on the ways of appointing new governors, it must be mentioned that the society in certain provinces played a significant role in the dismissal of governors. Kudret Emiroğlu stresses that demonstrations

occurred in every province of the empire with the revolution.[54] Furthermore, these demonstrations allowed the CUP provincial administrations to intervene in executive duties of the central government, including the discharges of governors. According to Kırmızı, the process was unplanned[55]; as there was no governmental control over society. However, the events were controlled by the CUP provincial administrations in which most members were officials in the military or civil service. According to Karal, it was difficult for governors to resist the CUP in the provinces since most CUP members were military members[56]. Therefore, governors either complied with the CUP or were dismissed. If there were overt CUP interventions in the governorships, they were systematic, unlike the early unplanned discharges.

On the other hand, archival sources indicate various ways by which new governors were appointed. In the post-1908 period, several new methods of appointing governors and sub-governors emerged which were unique to the revolutionary period. Perhaps the most democratic were the direct requests of ambitious young bureaucrats who – the cases in the archives lead us to think – had links to the Young Turk network in the Balkans. As Nader Sohrabi mentioned, the first such requests started to reach to the district inspectorates and capital within weeks of the start of the revolution.[57] One request, for instance, came from the district governor (qaimaqam) of Tiran.[58] In the same document, Hıfzı Pasha wrote to the office of the *sadrazâm* about a position regarding Pirlepe and Filorina sub-governors.[59] Hıfzı Pasha referenced the former qaimaqam of Tiran, Behçet Efendi's good personality, *hüsn-ü hâl*[60], for being a potential candidate of one of these two positions. After earning his high school diploma, Behçet Efendi had graduated from the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şâhâne*. Then he worked as a high school teacher

54 Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri,* 125-227

55 Kırmızı, "Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları," 337-339.

56 Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi, İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, vol.* 9, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 58.

57 Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 201.

58 Ibid. Sohrabi mentions that the request was written directly by the district governor of Tiran. However, it was originally written by the governor of Monastir, Hıfzı Pasha.

59 BOA. TFR.I.MN. 175/17411, 3 *Receb* 1326 (1 August 1908).

60 "…mûmâ ileyhin hüsn-ü hâl ve iktidârına dalalet etmekte bulunmağla…"

until being appointed the first-degree district governor of Tiran in the Balkans. He sent his request to the governor of Monastir province, Hıfzı Pasha, requesting to be appointed either to Pirlepe or Filorina districts in the Balkans. It seems that Behçet Efendi was very close to the circle of Hıfzı Pasha who was a famous governor of Monastır who opposed against the Young Turks during the heated moments of the 1908 Revolution.[61]

Hıfzı Pasha was dismissed from governorship in December 1908.[62] On the other hand, although it was an ambiguity whether Behçet Bey was appointed one of these districts, he promoted to be the governor of Monastır after four years on September 19, 1912 when the Grand Cabinet of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha was soon established.[63] Before his governorship in 1912, Behçet Bey was a member of the council of the state (*şura-yı devlet*) according to the *tevcihât-ı mülkiye*.

The second way concerned personae non-gratae were appointed or transferred to distant provinces. Although it is not possible to discern which officials were considered undesirable by the new regime, some of the new governors held more prestigious positions in the capital but were sent to the distant provinces of the empire. For example, Rauf Paşa was one of the viziers of the sultan when he was appointed as the governor of Aydın on August 8, 1908.[64] Similarly, Hasan Tahsin Paşa was nominated as the governor of Yemen on November 23, 1908.[65] The chairman of *Tanzimat* office in the Council of the State (*şura-yı devlet tanzimat dairesi reisi*), Edhem Bey, became governor of Beirut on December 26, 1908.[66] The case of Abdullah Paşa is unusual: after his appointment as governor of *Trablusgarb*,[67] his arrival was precluded by "invisible hands" who indicated that he would be attacked

61 For example, he was among the first state officials who sent telegrams to the Yıldız Palace informing about the Revolutionaries Niyazi and Eyyüb Sabri. BOA. YEE. 71/63 H.22 *Cemaziyelahir* 1326 (22 July 1908).

62 BOA.DH.MKT. 2677/69, 14 *Zilkade* 1326 (8 December 1908). Soon after his dismissal he requested to be retired. See BOA.DH.MKT. 2718/77, 2 *Muharrem* 1327 (24 January 1909).

63 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d 3/24, p.45, no. 1579/4504, 7 *Şevval* 1330 (19 September 1912).

64 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d. 2/97, p.272, no. 1554/1664, 23 *Receb* 1326 (21 August 1908).

65 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d 2/99, p.277, no. 2339/1842, 28 *Şevval* 1326 (23 November 1908).

66 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d 2/101, p.280, no. 2832/1929, 25 *Zilkade* 1326 (19 December 1908).

67 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d 2/98, p.275, no. 2315/1818, 9 *Şevval* 1326 (4 November 1908).

if he went there.[68] There are also examples of military officials who were appointed as governor as an indirect way of dismissing them from the military. Süleyman Şevki Paşa, for example, was nominated for the governorship of Diyarbekir on November 2, 1908[69] and forced to retired on November 20, 1909.[70] Such cases are numerous, especially with respect to appointments in the first months of the revolution.

Table 5.1 shows the rate of turnover of governors according to the *tevcihât* records during the first four years of the revolution. In some provinces – such as Hijaz, Kastamonu, Aydın, and Sivas – there were as many as three governors appointed within the span of a year. Between 1908 and 1912, eight different governors each were appointed to Hijaz and Kastamonu, the highest rate of turnover in the four years; there were only two changes of the governor of Yemen, the lowest number in the four years. Together with the high provincial turnover rate in the first year of the revolution, the data reveal an extraordinary turnover rate in 1911 and 1912. While there were 53 appointments between August 1908 and August 1909, there were 28 and 22 in 1909-1910 and 1910-1911, respectively. However, from August 1911 to October 1912, there were 69 appointments made – more than in the first year of the revolution. This suggests that the emerging conflict between the CUP and the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf* affected an increase in the turnover rates.

68 BOA. DH. MKT. 2680/46, 18 *Zilkâde* 1326 (12 Decemer 1908).

69 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d 2/98, p.275, no. 1889/1724, 7 *Şevval* 1326 (2 November 1908).

70 BOA. İ.AS. 97/29, 7 *Zilkâde* 1327 (20 November 1909).

Table 5.1 Governor Turnover Rates in the *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiyye* Records

	1908-09	1909-10	1910-11	1911-12	Total
Hicaz	3	2	1	2	8
Kastamonu	3	0	2	3	8
Aydin	3	1	1	2	7
Bitlis	2	1	1	3	7
Haleb	1	1	1	4	7
Adana	2	1	0	3	6
Işkodra	2	0	2	2	6
Konya	2	1	0	3	6
Kosova	2	1	1	2	6
Sivas	3	1	1	1	6
Trablusgarb	2	1	1	2	6
Trabzon	1	1	1	3	6
Ankara	1	1	1	2	5
Bağdad	2	1	0	2	5
Basra	3	1	0	1	5
Beyrut	1	2	0	2	5
Manastir	1	1	1	2	5
Selanik	1	1	0	3	5
Suriye	1	1	1	2	5
Van	1	1	1	2	5
Yanya	2	1	0	2	5
Cezayir	0	1	1	2	4
Edirne	0	1	1	2	4
Erzurum	2	0	0	2	4
Ma'mure-tü'l-Aziz	2	0	0	2	4
Diyarbekir	2	0	0	1	3
Hüdavendigar	1	0	1	1	3
Musul	1	1	0	0	2
Yemen	1	1	0	0	2

SOURCE BOA, *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye* Records

Under the Hamidian regime, provincial turnover rates were also high. Nonetheless, appointments in the constitutional period were approximately three times higher per annum than in the Hamidian Era. Furthermore, the

content of the changes differed. Movement was lateral and done as rotations (*icra-yı becayiş*) during the Hamidian period.[71] In other words, Hamidian regime's administrative turnover was actually a system of substitutions among a pool of governors. The number of appointments of governors who were new to the position was quite low compared to the constitutional period. Table 5.2 shows a sample of four randomly selected periods in the Hamidian Era. While the average percent of appointments of rookies was 41% in the Hamidian Era, it was 75% in the 1908-1909 period, as shown in Table 5.3. There was little variation among the four randomly selected periods in the Hamidian Era. Both the number of appointments per year and the percent of novice governors stayed steady, as depicted in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 New Governors Vis-à-vis Total Appointments in the Hamidian Era

Year	Total No. of Appointments	No. of Novice Governors	Percent of Novice Governors
1884-1885	18	7	39%
1887-1888	16	7	44%
1902-1903	12	5	42%
1907-1908	15	6	40%
Total	61	25	41%

SOURCE BOA, *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye* Records

On the other hand, data from the *tevcihât-ı mülkiye* records indicate a sharp difference between the Hamidian and constitutional eras. As Table 5.3 shows, in the first year of the revolution between August 1908 and August 1909, approximately 75% of appointed governors were new to the position. The ratio of governors who were new to the position gradually decreased from 75 to 45% by 1912. While the average ratio of new governors in the Hamidian Era was 41%, it averages 60% during the first four years of the revolution. Therefore, it can be concluded that while the Hamidian appointments were mostly lateral moves and based on substituting officials of the same

71 Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism,* 203.

rank, appointments during the revolutionary period focused on new officials who had not previously been governors.

Table 5.3 New Governors Vis-à-vis Total Appointments in the First Four Years of the Revolution

Year	Total No. of Appointments	No. of Novice Governors	Percent of Novice Governors
1908-1909	53	40	75%
1909-1910	28	19	68%
1910-1911	22	13	59%
1911-1912	69	31	45%
Total	172	103	60%

SOURCE BOA, *Tevcihat-ı Mülkiye* Records

Moreover, these numbers are validated by data Abdülhamit Kırmızı provides for governors during the Hamidian period.[72] Among the total governors appointed during the first year of the revolution, 25% of the governors were actively serving as governors already, meaning that 75% were being appointed as governors for the first time. Moreover, only 36.6% of governors who had actively served in the pre-1908 period found the opportunity again after the revolution. Even if the CUP leadership was content to leave governmental ministries in the hands of the experienced pashas of the former regime, it did not do so for governorships. And some of the few governors who were active prior to 1908 period and continued as governors, even if in a different province, had a fair relationship with the CUP like Mehmed Tevfik Bey.[73]

The revolution allowed not only intellectuals who were banished abroad but also ordinary bureaucrats who lost their positions during the Hamidian Regime because they were denounced (*jurnallenmek*) to return. One of

72 The *tevcihât* records post-1908 are compared with Kırmızı's data on the pre-1908 period. Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 89-90.

73 Governors who continued in the position of governor by being appointed to a different province in the first year of the Revolution included Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, Ahmed Reşit Bey, Ali Rıza Bey, Ebubekir Hazım Bey, Ferid Paşa, Mehmed Nazım Paşa, Mehmed Tevfik Bey, Nuri Bey, Rauf Paşa, Şevket Paşa, and Tahir Paşa.

them, Azmi Bey, earned his high school degree at *Mekteb-i Sultânî* before graduated from the *Mülkiye* with honors (*aliyyü'l-ulâ)* in 1883.[74] Soon after his graduation, he started to work in the fields of pedagogy and educational administration. After working as a low-level professional for eight years, he became the director of elementary schools (*ibtidâi mektebler şubesi müdürü*) in 1891. In 1893 and 1895 he became the director of junior high schools (*rüşdiye mektebleri müdiri*) and the director of high schools (*idadî mektebler müdiri*), respectively. In 1897, he was accused by an elementary school teacher for preparing a package of dynamite to assassinate the sultan.[75]After the *jurnal*, he was imprisoned for three months and banished from the capital. He worked as a district educational administrator in Konya and Bursa during his exile. Following the revolution, he returned to the Sublime Porte as the headmaster of *Galatasaray Sultanisi.*[76] Soon after his appointment, he was elected as the deputy of Preveza in the first parliament after the repromulgation of the constitution. However, soon after the opening of the parliament, he was appointed as governor of Hüdavendigâr on January 14, 1909.[77] During the first months in *Sultanî*, he was awarded a National Order from the French Government,[78] and during his Hüdâvendigâr governorship he was granted another.[79] After a short-lived Kastamonu governorship, he was appointed to Hüdâvendigâr, but by then, according to Ali Çankaya, political power had shifted in favor of *Hürriyet ve İtilaf,* and they supposedly blocked his appointment.[80] Regardless of whether this is true, he was a significant figure in the CUP-based bureaucracy. In December 1914, he was awarded a Gold Medal of the Ottoman Navy[81] and retired from his duties.

There were also cases who, despite never being denounced in the Hamidian Era, had a rapid rise in the revolutionary period with the aid of the

74 Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli,* vol.4, prepared by Hava Selçuk (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), 18-19.

75 Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiyeliler Tarihi*, vol. 3, 160.

76 Ibid.

77 BOA. İ.DH. 1472/68, 21 *Zilhicce* 1326 (14 January 1909).

78 BOA. BEO. 3439/257888, 28 *Şevval* 1326 (23 November 1908).

79 BOA. BEO. 3690/276724, 07 *Muharrem* 1328 (19 January 1910).

80 Çankaya, Yeni Mülkiyeliler Tarihi, vol. 3, 160.

81 BOA. İ.TAL. 499/1, 12 *Sâfer* 1333 (30 December 1914).

CUP. These included first time governors with direct links to the CUP or who had relatives who were involved in the CUP. One example was Babanzade Mustafa Zihni. He did not directly participate in the CUP organization, but the position of his son, İsmail Hakkı Bey, within the CUP played a vital role in Mustafa Zihni's rise.[82] Babanzâde İsmail Hakkı, after completing his high school degree at *Galatasaray Sultanisi*, attended the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* and *Mekteb-i Hukuk*. He was a columnist for *İkdam* and *Tanin* during the first years of the revolution. In 1908, he was elected as the deputy of Bağdad and later, in 1910, he became the Minister of Education. In 1908, together with his political involvement, he launched an academic career as a professor at *Mekteb-i Hukûk*.[83] His father Babanzâde Mustafa Zihni, on the other hand, started his career in the bureaucracy in Bağdad where he worked at the service of Midhad Paşa. After this, he worked as a lower-level bureaucrat until 1908.[84] Soon after the revolution, while working as the sub-district governor of Burdur, he was appointed as the governor of Adana.[85] He was dismissed in July 1909 because he was claimed to be negligent in his duties.[86] The powers behind his dismissal are unknowable, but the CUP leadership likely played a role in appointing his successor, Cemal Bey, who replaced Mustafa Zihni in August 1909. After three months, Mustafa Zihni, was appointed as the governor of Yanya.[87] After two years there, Mustafa Zihni and the CUP leadership clashed over the Balkan Wars leading to Mustafa Zihni's dismissal.[88] On December 19, 1911, the government appointed a lieutenant governor to Yanya because it claimed that Mustafa Zihni Paşa had not

82 For details, see Davut Hut, "II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Entelektüeli Babanzade İsmail Hakkı," *Tarihimizden Portreler: Osmanlı Kimliği*, eds. Z. Kurşun and H. Çoruh (Istanbul: Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Derneği, 2013); and Edip Bukarlı, "Mustafa Zihni Paşa'nın Balkan Savaşı Öncesindeki Görüşü Hakkında İnceleme," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 13, no. 8 (Spring 2018): 37-50.

83 Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiyeliler Tarihi*, vol. 2, 996.

84 BOA. DH. SAİD.d. 4/442.

85 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d 2/108, p.295, no: 2194, 3 *Cumaziyelevvel* 1327 (23 May 1909).

86 BOA. DH.MKT. 2888/18, 13 *Receb* 1327 (31 July 1909).

87 BOA. DH.MUİ. 87/1, 15 *Zilkâde* 1327 (28 November 1909).

88 Edip Bukarlı, "Mustafa Zihni Paşa'nın Balkan Savaşı Öncesindeki Görüşü Hakkında İnceleme," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 13, no. 8 (Spring 2018): 37-50.

maintained order and safety there.[89] Although twice dismissed from the governorships of Adana and Yanya, he nevertheless managed to secure another governorship.

Necmeddin Bey's case deserves attention, as well. His father was *Şeyhü'l-islâm* Ahmed Muhtar Efendi, a well-educated man who not only performed as a *Şeyhü'l-islâm* but also worked as a professor (*müderris*) and member of the grand assembly (*Meclis-i Vâlâ*). His son, Necmeddin Bey, was known as a religious man because not only because of his father's profession but also his own intellectual background, for which he was called *Molla.* His case is striking because at the beginning of the century he was working as a prosecutor in Salonica. He tried many rebels in the Balkans who likely had close relationships to military officers in the Balkans. Although speculative, it is probable that he encountered the Young Turks during this period. After his return to Istanbul, he continued as a prosecutor in the court of first instance and then as the director of the commercial court in Istanbul until 1908. After the repromulgation of the Constitution, he was appointed as governor of Baghdad on December 24, 1908.[90] According to Kuneralp, he was the only governor between 1839-1922 whose background included religious schooling (*ilmiye*).[91] However, soon after the 31 March incident, he was urgently recalled to Istanbul and appointed as the Minister of Justice.[92] To make room for him in parliament, Yusuf Kemal Bey, the Deputy of Kastamonu, resigned. Until October 1911, he remained the Minister of Justice but also served as head of the State Council (*Şurâ-yı Devlet*) between 1909-1911. In 1912, he was reelected as the Deputy of Kastamonu under the CUP.

Each example is significant in terms of understanding the nature of appointing governors. Furthermore, all shared one important characteristic: they were all appointed as governors for first time after the repromulgation of the constitution. These examples also evince a concrete link between governor appointments and everyday politics. Therefore, it can be argued that

89 BOA. DH. MTV. 18/33, 27 *Zilhicce* 1329 (19 December 1911).

90 BOA. İ.DH. 1471/26, 29 *Şevval* 1326 (24 November 1908).

91 Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricâli,* xxii.

92 BOA. BEO. 3549/266141, 24 *Rebi'ü-l Âhir* 1327 (15 May 1909).

administrative history cannot be written without considering the concurrent flow of politics.

Although provincial appointments are an important subject by which to capture the relationship between top-level political and bureaucratic mechanisms, there were certain other positions in the state service that demonstrates this relationship equally well. As Hanioğlu notes, the *Salnâme*s provide significant data regarding the appointment rates of governors as well as ambassadors, education directors, and chargé d'affaires.[93] As the *salnâme* show and the *tevcihât-ı mülkiye* confirms, all of the provincial governors changed between July 24, 1908, and March 1910.[94] Likewise, 25 of 27 provincial communication directors changed in the first two years of the revolution. All 16 ambassadorships changed hands, and 15 of 16 *chargés d'affaires* were replaced new appointees. It can thus be asserted, as Hanioğlu's estimations corroborate, that the new constitutional regime undertook a mass transformation of the bureaucratic cadres.

Table 5.4 High-Level Bureaucratic Turnover from July 1908 to March 1910

	Total No.	No. Replaced	Percentage
Governors	29	29	100%
Provincial Communications Directors	27	25	93%
Provincial Education Directors	27	25	93%
Ambassadors	16	16	100%
Chargés d'affaires	16	15	94%

SOURCE Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 287

These percentages, which show a nearly 100% change in every department, differ greatly from the data from 1906 March to July 1908. Table 5.4 and 5.5, which are based on Hanioğlu's study, show high-level bureaucratic turnover in comparative perspective.

93 Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution,* 287.

94 Ibid. However, the *tevcihat-ı mülkiye* indicates that all governors except for *Cezayir Bahr-i Sefîd* changed in the first six months of the revolution.

Table 5.5 High-Level Bureaucratic Turnover from March 1906 to July 1908

	Total No.	No. Replaced	Percentage
Governors	29	17	59%
Provincial Communications Directors	27	10	37%
Provincial Education Directors	27	7	26%
Ambassadors	16	2	13%
Chargés d'affaires	16	3	19%

SOURCE Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 287

§ 5.4 Conclusion

After first mentioning the transformation of bureaucratic cadres not only quantitatively but also in terms of the qualities of the bureaucrats, the followers of the modernization paradigm observed a gradual decrease in favoritism and clientelism with the increasing schooling rates in the nineteenth century. In fact, it is not easy for Ottoman historians to validate this assumption with the sources available to them. What is feasible is to describe the new framework provided by the constitution – that is, the everyday conflicts in high politics that were about to reshape the bureaucratic structure. This chapter provided scrutable descriptions of how actual political actors intervened in the governor appointment process.

Rather than small scale, individual and relational favoritism, the post-1908 period can be characterized as a political clientelism that furthered certain interests in high politics. In fact, the followers of the modernization paradigm had already drawn a picture of a gradual decrease in favoritism in the 19th century. However, one must bear in mind that as like the corruption in Kırlı's positioning, the clientelism was also de-historicized by the modernity itself. Rather than considering the favoritism as a signal of backwardness as of the West considered, it must be realized that the system of appointments was running in regard to favoritism which was indeed the norm itself. If one struggles to find a transformation pertaining to the favoritism, it would be meaningless to expect a decrease in the level of clientelism. However, it could have been changed the shape. With the Revolution of 1908, it started

to be voiced that merit rather than clientelism should play a role on appointments. In fact, what was happening was that the interpersonal clientelism was started to be adjusted to the political climate of the post-1908 period. The appointments were started to be controlled by political groups. Indeed, by controlling appointments with political power, the ultimate aim was to control the state apparatus. As the following chapter will reveal, the clientelism and favoritism did not decrease unlike the modernization paradigm envisioned.

By February 1909, in the first six months of the constitutional revolution, all of the *vilayet* governors had been replaced with one exception: *Cezayir Bahr-i Sefîd*. However, with seven months, it would also be replaced. Furthermore, only 25% of the governors appointed in the first year of the revolution had ever been governors before the revolution – that is to say, 75% of the new governors were just starting out. While the CUP leadership supposedly stayed backstage and left governance and executive power to the experienced pashas of the former regime,[95] they did not do so with respect to governor appointments.

Studying governor appointments is a pragmatic ways of tracing direct interventions into the bureaucratic mechanism by the new political actors. There was already an ongoing system of governor turnover in the Hamidian Era; appointments prior to 1908 period were lateral and based on temporary substitutions (*icrâ-yı becâyiş*). Their dynamic nature of appointments after the 1908 period makes it easier to trace political intervention; other top positions in the bureaucracy were more permanent compared to governorships. To grasp the nature of changes in the post-1908 period, the *tevcihât* records were used to compare the governor appointments during the first four years of the revolution with a randomly selected four-year period in the Hamidian Era. As can be expected, the conditions of the new constitutional rule caused the total number of appointments as well as turnover rates to increase from 1908 to 1913.

All in all, this chapter demonstrates a relationship between governor appointments and the everyday politics. The scope, extent, and complexity of

95 Akşin, *Jön Türkler,* 110-167.

the system, its dynamics pertaining to socio-political relationships and networks, and its degree of systematism or arbitrariness are discussed in detail in the upcoming chapter. Scrutinizing the governors as individuals, their affiliations, and their potential relationships to politics helps explain the reality of the political struggle during constitutional rule.

6

Networking Governors of the Second Constitutional Bureaucracy

The previous chapter not only scrutinizes how the second constitutional rule dealt with the bureaucratic appointments in practice, but also raises important new questions. Having explained the driving force of the transformation of the state apparatus via networks from the bottom, such as the Phanariotes, Philliou's concerns herself with dispelling top-down modernization narratives of the Tanzimât.[1] The modernization paradigm notwithstanding, research into the transformation of bureaucratic structure have neglected the question of how network-based relationships as well as political struggles affected the bureaucratic structure as top levels. More generally, what were the socio-political as well as intellectual origins of the new appointed bureaucrats?

1 Christine Philliou, *Biography of an Empire, Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

As far as governor appointments were considered, the CUP organization in the bureaucratic apparatus originally consisted of two mainstream networks. The first consisted of governors directly linked with the central CUP organization, which can be called the core. The second faction within the CUP was governors born or previously employed in the Balkans.[2] This chapter explains the relationships among the core and Balkan networks of the CUP, both together, bureaucrats who opposed the CUP, bureaucrats whose position was neutral, and governors who were not affiliated with any ideology or interest a network. A limitation of this research is that the memoirs, autobiographies, and archival documents do not reveal much about non-CUP networks themselves. Thus, the focus is conflicts among networks – how CUP networks dealt relationally with various bureaucrats, most of whom were not as organized.

The Istanbulites, for example, constituted an umbrella group of bureaucrats with varying political backgrounds. They did not constitute a political organization and were independent and unaffiliated. But most were very close to *Ahrar,* Prince Sabahaddin, and later the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*. However, there is no concrete evidence that they were in regularly contact with each other much less organized with respect to bureaucratic appointments, even if there are clues indicating that they struggled to control appointments. Most of them knew each other well, since they shared the same socio-economic background. Most were from Istanbul and had held important positions during the Hamidian era. They were generally born as son of pashas or came from wealthy families where there was a history of bureaucratic employment within their families. They cannot all together be defined neither as monarchists nor CUP opponents, but as an umbrella which consisted of both groups. Before 1908, for example, they sometimes acted independently of the Hamidian Regime as antagonists not linked to the Young Turks. This chapter investigates how the CUP network dealt with

2 In fact, the CUP also divided into certain sub-groups like Selanik and Manastır. The inside struggles between these groups formed before the Revolution but continued afterwards for a while. For a first-hand account pointing out this disintegration, see Abidin Nesimi, *Yılların İçinden* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977), 31–33.

bureaucrats, specifically governors, who were not organized even if they seemed to act in concert.

§ 6.1 Factionalism in the Ottoman Bureaucratic Structure

Findley argued that in order for reaching a modernized bureaucracy in Weberian terminology rests upon relieving of the inside struggles and factions that dominated the Ottoman early modern period.[3] Doing this would ultimately made the bureaucrats concentrate on their own duties as must be occurred in the modern bureaucracies. Indeed, as discussed in the introductory chapter above (Chapter 1), the formulated narrative throughout Findley's prominent studies is based on a prejudgment that there was a linear decrease in the inside bureaucratic factionalisms aligning with the modernization of the bureaucracy throughout the 19th century.

However, factions and inside struggles among bureaucratic actors had always been in the center of the bureaucratic structure. This reality never changed, furthermore it can even be pointed out that it increased with the effect of politicization after 1908. There was always an ongoing power struggle within the bureaucracy either individual based or political and ideological based.

From the classical period until the nineteenth century, struggles among the bureaucrats were the results of competition among them. The competitive and reactive nature of bureaucratic power struggle are illustrated in early chronicles like Aşıkpaşazâde's in which he directly blames Halil Pasha as a fraud for withholding power to run the state apparatus. He further criticized other bureaucrats for collecting taxes for themselves from the new migrants who had immigrated after the conquest.[4] Competition between Çandarlı Halil Pasha and Zaganos Mehmed Pasha[5] during the reign of Murad II in the fifteenth century is an apt example of controlling the high bureaucratic mechanism by exercising influence over the sultan. Moreover,

3 Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom,* 85.

4 Derviş Ahmed Aşıkî, *Aşıkpaşazâde Tarihi*, prep. Ayşenur Kala (Istanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 2013).

5 M. Münir Aktepe, "Çandarlı Halil Pasha," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 8, (İstanbul, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), 212-213.

Mustafa Âli's chronicle demonstrates personal competition among bureaucrats, such as the competition between Mustafa Âli and Hamza Çelebi who, Cornell Fleischer points out, fought with one another to be chancellor.[6] As an important figure of the early modern Ottoman state in the seventeenth century, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, became the grand vizier after several clashes with his enemies. When the sultan offered him the position, he stipulated certain conditions, one of which was that nobody, not even the sultan, would interfere with bureaucratic appointments.[7] After eliminating existing and potential rivals, he sought to control all bureaucratic appointments from the lowest to the highest strata of the bureaucratic mechanism. Such examples increased in number when the classical and early modern Ottoman political systems are considered. For Bouquet, the Ottoman political system was based on contention among individual parties; the system could not stand neutrality while bureaucrats took note of competition among high level bureaucrats by trying to estimate the position of sultan.[8] Therefore, competitive struggle among bureaucrats resulted in parties and circles collecting around them. The networks of individual pashas had competitive clashes with other networks which had a determinant position in the early modern Ottoman political system.

When the new ruling system emerged with the *Tanzimat* in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, power struggles increase among the pashas regarding who and which networks would control the bureaucratic mechanism. Struggles among pashas in the high bureaucracy like between Mustafa Reşid and the *damâds* Mehmed Ali and Ahmed Fethi Pashas during the early *Tanzimât* and among Ali and Fuad's networks with Mahmud Nedim Pasha's[9] in the 1860s and early 1870s manifested competitive political power struggles but also included reactive elements. The dual nature of the organization of the *Tanzimât* state became apparent through these conflicts among pashas. It was a competitive so-called early modern structure, on one

6 Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 91-92.

7 Mücteba İlgürel, "Köprülü Mehmed Pasha," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 26, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2002), 258-260

8 Bouquet, *Sultan'ın Paşaları,* 41.

9 Abu-Manneh, "Sultan and Bureaucracy," 258-260.

hand, since the individual pashas and their networks in the bureaucracy sought more control over the bureaucratic mechanisms. On the other, it was reactive because the main structure of the struggles was brought about by the new system: *Tanzimât* concepts had reshaped the distribution of power which was welcomed by certain pashas and reviled by others. Abu Manneh claims that the conflict between Mustafa Reşid Pasha, politically the most influential figure of the early *Tanzimat* period and the *damads* Mehmed Ali and Ahmed Fethi Pashas damaged the reputations and credibility of both in the late 1850s.[10] The conflict between the two networks instigated the rise of Ali and Fuad Pashas since they were the most senior bureaucrats after the fall of Mustafa Reşid and the palace affiliated *damads*. While the conflicts among Mustafa Reşid and his rivals was a significant example of the competitive nature of bureaucratic power struggles, the case of Mahmud Nedim Pasha smacks of the reactive side of bureaucratic power struggles. His *Naqshbandi* and political backgrounds prompted him to react to the new concepts of the *Tanzimat* during his tenure as grand vizier. His political actions against the bureaucratic cadres of Ali and Fuad Pasha can be explained as both competitive and reactive, since his political stance opposed the decreasing power of the sultan in favor of the new bureaucrats, which was being furthered by both Ali and Fuad as well as the *Tanzimât* itself.

These examples were indeed paradigms of pure political power struggle between individual parties without an ideological basis. As such, Nedim Pasha's struggle was indeed a reaction to the pashas who had taken control of the government by exploiting the *Tanzimat*, which had decreased the authority of the sultan. The struggles between individual pashas revolved around a transformation taking place in the mid-nineteenth century about by which the power of the Sublime Porte was increasing by means of reducing the power of the sultan. While some supported a more autonomous Sublime Porte, like Ali and Fuad, others like those in Nedim's network opposed a powerful bureaucratic apparatus that would reduce the power of the sultan. It was indeed a reaction to a newly established system of power distribution. In other words, while the individual personalities of high-ranking

10 Ibid., 259.

pashas played a significant role in dividing statesmen in the bureaucratic apparatus as a reaction to *Tanzimat* concepts, proactive political ideologies did not play a role in those divisions until 1908. The power struggles were between bureaucrats aligned with certain pashas, not around a political and ideological purpose. If the powerful pasha disappeared, the struggle itself disappeared, as well. It was not self-reproducing, systematic, continuous process; rather, it was a part of everyday, ephemeral politics. Therefore, early power struggles around controlling the bureaucracy were not an outcome of ideological struggles but a reaction to newly established concepts. They were not long-term, self-reproducing, systematic, or perpetual, unlike those in the post-1908 period.

Bureaucratic power struggles in the nineteenth century were reactive as well as competitive, which helps to distinguish them from struggles to control bureaucratic appointments in the post-1908 period. The difference stems directly from the actors themselves on the one hand. Nineteenth-century actors were pashas under the sultan who were in a power struggle with each other; actors in the post-1908 period were mostly low-ranking military and administrative officials who were dissatisfied with Hamidian rule and were trying to reestablish the constitutional regime.

§ 6.2 Politics and Networking in the Bureaucracy during the post-1908 Period

Networks should not be understood only as political connections but also social networks which were mostly lay outside the formal discourse of the state but sometimes played a significant role on governing the state apparatus via the bureaucratic mechanism. The social networks based on religious orders, *tariqas*, masonic relations, communions, being alumni of the same school, or having previously worked on a project together played an important role in holding the same political opinions later. It is also significant to consider the occupational backgrounds of bureaucrats some were military school graduates, whiles others had administrative, legal, or trade-based backgrounds. However, bearing all these in mind, this chapter focuses primarily on political networks that comprise a significant relational

structure of the bureaucracy and political fields. Starting with the Young Turk revolution, struggles among proactive political networks, alongside the aforementioned social factors, were instrumental in shaping the bureaucratic mechanism.

The history of the Young Turk revolution has long been considered as the history of the CUP and its conflicts with political opponents. Of course, there are variations on this claim. What this chapter proposes, on the other hand, is that the history of the CUP and the Young Turk revolution are histories of negotiations and conflicts among networks within and outside of the state apparatus. Aligning with this, about seventy governors' networks can be located in the biographies, memoirs, and autobiographies,[11] primary sources,[12] and other prosopograpic secondary literature.[13]

One of the contributions of the Revolution to the Ottoman political system was that power struggles to control bureaucratic appointments took place among networks that represented an ideology rather than commitment to an individual. The complex new structure of political power struggles caused them to be long-term and self-perpetuating. The new political struggles were shaped by networks that had already emerged in the Hamidian Era, yet some were not previously visible because of political oppression of public opposition to the Hamidian regime.

Tevcihât-ı Mülkiyye allows certain clues for understanding of the organization of various networks at the highest bureaucratic levels. The individual biographies and autobiographies of governors and sub-governors in these records reveal the diversity of their networks and their impact on the political and everyday lives of bureaucrats. Those with common ideals, shared political interests, social backgrounds like hometowns or alma maters,

11 Compared to the number of memoirs of governors, there are far more politicians' memoirs. Unfortunately, there are a limited number of memoirs and autobiographies of governors during the Constitutional Period.

12 The *sicill-i ahval* is the most important register to trace the biographical trajectories of bureaucrats; however, the Ottoman Archives makes it possible to trace them to certain other locations, as well.

13 See Aldan, *İz Bırakan Mülki İdare Amirleri;* Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler;* Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricâli, 1839-1922*; Örik, *150 Yılın Türk Maşhurları Ansiklopedisi*; Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmani Zeyli.*

memberships in social organizations like masonic lodges, or shared religious philosophies like *Mevlevî*, *Bektaşi,* and *Melâmî* orientations constituted diverse networks throught the empire. The CUP, the most organized, systematic, and long-lasting political network was divided into subnetworks. While some governors became part of a given network voluntarily, others were obliged to participate in certain networks to maintain their positions, especially when the post-1908 period is considered. Many were amenable.

Indeed, the fluidity of the positions and actual networks of the bureaucrats constitute an obstacle for this study. On the one hand, there are many cases in which people embedded in the CUP network in 1908 became opponents soon after the revolution; there are also example of the opposite. On the other hand, the opposite could also be followed. Kırmızı points to one group of bureaucrats of the former regime who converted wholesale to the Young Turk ideology.[14]

Alongside the emerging actors who claimed the reigns in the bureaucratic apparatus, like CUP-linked appointees, there were other opponents of the Hamidian regime inside the bureaucracy that did not emerge as the new actors of the state making apparatus in the post-1908 period. Although they had long existed before the revolution, they were neither linked to the Young Turks nor to monarchist circles. Kansu's account is as if the political and ideological struggles occurred only between reformists and monarchists, but this is an inefficient understanding the nature of the post-1908 conflicts.[15] While some hid within the bureaucracy – even in Istanbul itself– to avoid the wrath of Hamidians within the bureaucracy or Abdulhamid himself. Others played along with the official state ideology. Except for the Young Turks, other socio-political networks were not well-organized; they consisted of people who shared common ideals or had common interests. These networks were spontaneous and non-organized. However, they were more permeable, less visible, and not as artful as the CUP in terms of negotiating with other networks.

14 Kırmızı used the term "*ideolojik irtidât*". Kırmızı, "Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları," 345-351.

15 Kansu drew a picture of a dualistic ideological and political struggle in his books *1908 Devrimi* and *İttihatçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi.*

6.2.1 *Networking of the Unionist Governors*

The CUP, as a political and social body, was ultimately a collection of a diverse groups. Along with the core CUP members, who were embedded in networks around the *Merkez-i Umûmî,* there was a significant Balkan network of the Committee that was closer to the center though not an important in terms of decision making. People around the Ottoman Freedom Committee and the Committee of Progress and Union in Salonica and Monastir in pre-revolutionary period comprised the core network, the secondary Balkan network consisted of people in direct contact with the core but who did not hold high positions at the center. Nevertheless, most held high bureaucratic positions just after the revolution.

Alongside the secondary sources and the archival documents, the memoirs and biographies also provide valuable information pertaining to the scope of Unionist networks. Kazım Karabekir is another example. His memoir covers a broad period, 1896-1909, but it is significant because most of his narrative is of his time in Manastır. Negating Zürcher's claim that Karabekir did not play an important role in the CUP and that he concentrated on his professional life,[16] Karabekir's own narrative suggests that he pretended to be the leader of the Manastır group, which is especially clear considering his relationship with Enver.[17] Karabekir also had remarkable ties to Resneli Niyazi of Resne, a place in Macedonia in the vicinity of Manastır,[18] and who is considered an initiator of the 1908 revolution. More importantly, Karabekir's writings also include relatively obscure individuals.

Comparative cross-readings of the memoirs of the Young Turks in Selanik show that a charismatic but low-ranking civil officer, Mehmet Talat Bey, spearheaded the group after 1906. Although his own memoir[19] mostly concerns the post-1908 period, the relations and networks after 1908 had been cultivated before then. Talat Bey's charismatic leadership is clear in

16 Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy,* 19.

17 Kazım Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti,* 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2011), 79-153.

18 İsmial Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Hürriyet Kahramanı Resneli Niyazi Hatıratı: Hâtırât-ı Niyâzi*, ed. Ö. Andaç Uğurlu, trans. Sami Kara and Nurer Uğurlu (Istanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2003).

19 Enver Bolayır, *Talat Pasha'nın Hatıraları (*Istanbul: Güven Yayınevi, 1946).

various memoirs like that of Kazım Nami Duru,[20] a low-ranking military officer in Selanik. His memoir, which is significant for historians, describes the everyday life for Young Turks in Salonica as well as the network they created. Apart from the memoirs of those who participated in the movements in Selanik and Manastır, memoirs emerging from other parts of the Balkan geography allow one to pursue the networks of the Young Turks, as well. Ibrahim Temo, one of the leaders of Young Turks in 1889, mentioned the Young Turk organization that emerged in Köstence, Romania shortly before 1908.[21] These memoirs and autobiographies and much more are disposed to comparative cross-reading, which allows for historical network analysis of the movement.

As an example of yet another path to governorships, that people with close ties to the Balkan network of Young Turks started to be appointed as provincial administrators. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, this helps explain the nature of the appointments of Ali Münif Bey and Hacı Adil Bey as governors of Ankara and Edirne, respectively. Mazhar Bey is another striking example, as mentioned above with respect to the Albanian uprising. In general, appointments in Balkan provinces were directly correlated to Young Turk ties. On 13 December 13, 1908, Fahri Paşa was appointed as the governor of Monastir upon the suggestion of CUP central committee (*Merkez-i Umûmî*).[22] His appointment is a significant example because the documents directly show the influence of the CUP in his promotion. Accordingly, certain appointments, especially in the Balkans, were done with the permission if not recommendation of the *Merkez-i Umûmî.*

Since the new policy makers of the state had a significant say in controlling high-level of appointments, as Bahaeddin Şakir claims, it is not legitimate to investigate the networks and political affiliations of governors appointed during the post-Revolutionary period. For Şakir, all ranks of the bureaucracy were "chosen from the loyal and self-sacrificing members of the

20 Kazım Nami Duru, *"İttihat ve Terakki" Hatıralarım (*Istanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957).

21 İbrahim Temo and Ahmet Rıza, *Biz ittihatçılar (*Istanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2009).

22 "İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Merkez-i Umûmisi'nin tebliğ ve telkini üzerine Manastır Valiliği'ne Fahri Paşa'nın tayin edildiği." BOA. DH.MKT. 2681/60, 19 *Zilkâde* 1326.

Committee."[23] Paralleling his statements, Ali Münif Bey's biography explains how political networks struggled over bureaucratic appointments. In other words, Münif's own statements demonstrate the degree to which political and administrative history were intertwined and how political networks played important roles as far as the governor appointments are considered. He stated that the *merkez-i umûmî* of the CUP played a significant role on governor appointments.

> After two years as a member of parliament, I returned to the administrative tribe abiding by a decision of the CUP Central Committee itself. The decision of CUP Central Committee was as such: Most of the governors in the provinces were weak. Particularly, they could not adjust to the new rules of the administrative system. For the constitutional regime to take root, it must benefit from people in parliament. Therefore, five or six colleagues were requested to return to governorships. Talat particularly insisted for me. Interior Minister Hacı Adil Bey and Halil Bey affirmed the same conclusion.[24]

It must also be stated that the Balkan network was not as effective as the core CUP network in terms of politics. Most members of the Balkan network ended up representing the CUP at the periphery, while core CUP members stayed in the capital and held important positions in government. They were mostly sub-governors of various towns on the Balkan peninsula before the revolution who were then appointed as governors during the post-1908 period. In other words, the Balkan network provided a pool of human resources from which the core of the CUP network made bureaucratic appointments at the periphery. However, this does not mean that people in the core of the CUP network never held bureaucratic positions at the periphery. Considering that they were also appointed to the Balkan cities, respectively Kosova, Monastir and Selanik, governors' rapid promotion from being ordinary bureaucrats is the relational aspect of politics and bureaucracy. To be

23 Quoted from Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution,* 286. According to Hanioğlu, this draft memorandum dated October 4, 1908 was submitted to the CUP Monastir branch to be forwarded to the congress from the private papers of Bahaeddin Şakir.

24 Translated by the author from Toros, *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları,* 57.

quickly promoted to governor Kosova, Mazhar Bey, for example, was appointed to Edirne in 1910 and to Halep in 1911. İsmail Hami Danişmend noted the CUP started to replace experienced governors appointed by the Sultan Abdülhamid with inexperienced, unskilled governors who, like Mazhar Bey, were even involved in secret organizations in the Balkans (*komitacı*).[25] Ibrahim Hayrullah Bey, a prominent Unionist, was subsequently promoted to Istanbul in 1912 and became Minister of Law after 1913.

Mehmed Reşid Pasha's case is a representative example of someone in the Balkan network of the CUP who assumed positions in the high bureaucracy. According to Ali Çankaya, he was among those who sent telegrams from the Balkans, specifically from Serres to Yıldız Palace on July 20, 1908, in which he threatened the sultan to repromulgate the constitution.[26] His CUP connections date to his days as a bureaucrat in Salonica where he attended secret meetings of Young Turks long before his appointment as the sub-governor of Serres in 1906. As early as 1896, he was one of the figures who constituted the secret Committee in Salonica, and he continued to serve the Committee as a low-ranking bureaucrat in the Balkans. However, despite maintaining his presence in the organization for years, he did not take on roles within the Committee. As a part of the Balkan network, the human resource pool of the Committee, he was promoted to governor of Edirne twenty days after Committee members first sent their telegrams to Yıldız Palace. After serving as governor of Edirne, he was appointed as the governor of *Cezayir Bahr-i Sefid* in 1910, Monastir in 1911, Ankara in 1912, Kastamonu in 1914, and Sivas in 1919.

25 "Sultan Hamid'in meslekten yetişmiş tecribeli valilerinden sonra «İttihad ve Terakki» bir takım tecribesiz ve dirayetsiz adamları sırf Ittihadçı olduklarından dolayı o zamanın büyük valiliklerine göndermiye başlamıştır: Bunların içinde bâzı komitacı zâbitler bile vardır! Meselâ Kosova valisi Mazhar Bey esasen sivil olmakla beraber tecribesiz bir komitacıdır." İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, vol.* 4 (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972), 382.

26 Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler,* 315; Aldan, *İz Bırakan Mülki İdare Amirleri,* 175-221.

6.2.2 *The Target Governors*

Supporters of the Hamidian Regime who had held positions in the Hamidian bureaucratic order were bypassed when new governor appointments were started to make in the post 1908 period. The new order avoided appointing governors who were marked as Hamidian. Local actors sick of the Hamidian order had already denounced them as frauds and tyrants. On August 7, 1908, *Tanin* reported that the "contaminated cruel spies" of the former Hamidian regime were discharged from their duties as governors including the governors of Hijaz, Erzurum, Trabzon, Kastamonu, Beyrut, and Adana, respectively Râtıb, Abdü'l-vehâb, Ferid, Fuad, Mehmed Ali, and Bahri Pashas. [27] The former regime aside, the CUP's main struggles in politics and over the bureaucracy during the revolutionary period was mostly in opposition to others who shared their antagonism before the revolution. Soon after July 1908, the various antagonist networks started to organically separate from each other. They were already ideologically discrete in the last years of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, as Hanioğlu stresses throughout his book.[28] Their one shared political target was accomplished in July 1908.

As one of the outcomes of the consequent dissolution of this alliance, the CUP leadership understood that it must take advantage of those experienced statesmen who had been close to the Hamidian Regime before the revolution but seemed to have softened their position in response to the politics of the day. Although groups like the CUP and Istanbul-based bureaucrats struggled to control appointments, there were governors like Mehmed Tevfik Biren who tended to remain neutral. However, the target governors were both experienced and congenial, fitting with Kırmızı's "*ideolojik irtidât.*"[29] In other words, experienced governors who had distanced themselves from the former regime politically, unlike Ratıb, Abdü'l-Vehab, and

27 "Valilerin Azli: İdare-i sâbıkanın en mülevves vesait-i icraiyesinden, hafiyelerinden, zalimlerinden olan Hicaz Valisi Râtıb, Erzurum Valisi Adbü'l-vehab, Trabzon Valisi Ferid, Kastamonu Valisi Fuad, Beyrut Valisi Mehmed Ali, Adana Valisi Bahri Pasha ve Beyler azil edilmiştir. İşte ahaliye emniyet verecek şeyler bu gibi icraatlerdir." *Tanin,* 25 *temmuz* 1324 (07 August 1908), s.4.

28 Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution.*

29 Kırmızı, "Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları," 345-351.

Fuad Pashas, could be beneficial as governors in the new era. These "target" governors were in demand not only because of their merit and experience, but also because most had had good relations with local actors during their previous governorships. Since the CUP did not have the human resources to appoint governors to each *vilayet* from within, they chose from among existing governors who had merit, experience, and the respect of the local *eşraf*. These were targets – in a positive sense – as the resources of the CUP were insufficient to fill local governorships. The relationship was reciprocal: the CUP benefited from these governors' experience, and the governors maintained their presence in the bureaucratic mechanism.

It must be clarified that these target governors did not constitute a network like the CUP-affiliated governors. They were not necessarily in contact with one another and did not help one another. They were rather a group of people who shared only the limited characteristics of being experienced, neutral, nonpartisan, and disinterested in the politics in Istanbul, which were a means of survival during the complex early revolutionary period. Their experience as governors before the revolution appealed to the CUP leadership, and they were approached by the core CUP network individually.

A significant example was Mehmed Tevfik Bey,[30] one of few governors to write an autobiography that details his time as governor. This source is significant not only as a presentation of a governor's life, but also as a primer for how a governor in the early revolutionary period should act given the rapidly evolving situation. As the son of a bureaucrat with an *ulama* background, Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, Mehmed Tevfik was born in Istanbul in 1867. He graduated from *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in 1885 summa cum laude. After brief employment as an official in the *Bâb-ı Âli* chamber of translation (*Bâb-ı Ali Tercüme Kalemi*), he was appointed to Yildiz Palace as an amanuensis in the department of the chamberlain. After more than a decade in this position, he was appointed as the sub-governor (*mutasarrıf*) of Jerusalem in

30 For Mehmed Tevfik Bey's *sicill,* see BOA.DH.SAİDd. 192/163; Abdülkadir Özcan, "Mehmed Tevfik Bey," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 28, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003), 536-537; and Ali Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. 3, 192-193. For his autobiography, see Fetha Rezan Hürmen, *Bir Devlet Adamının, Mehmet Tevfik Bey'in (Biren) II. Abdülhamit, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları (*Istanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1993).

1897. In 1901, He was promoted to governor of Selanik, and then to Konya and Yemen in 1902 and 1904, respectively. In 1906, he became the comptroller general of the Court of Accounts (*Divân-ı Muhasebât Reisi*). He returned to being a governor when he was appointed to Bursa (*Hüdavendigar*) in 1907, and finally he became a member of the Council of the State (*Şura-yı Devlet*) on September 18, 1909.

When the constitution was repromulgated, Mehmed Tevfik Bey was serving as the governor of Bursa where he learned of the decision of the sultan to reopen parliament on July 24, 1908. When he received the telegram from Said Pasha, Mehmed Tevfik Bey approached it with suspicion. In his own words:

> I could not believe my eyes! As I did not think it possible for the sultan to restore the constitution again, I also could not accept that Said Pasha may have lost his mind. The way the telegram was written was bizarre… I wondered whether Sultan Abdülhamid had repromulgated the constitution voluntarily, or under duress. Or might he have made the pronouncement out of vanity towards the Europeans. Maybe all of these were a way to eliminate the opposition with a politics of distraction. Or was he trying to understand who would act and how in order to oppress them afterwards.[31]

The day the telegram reached Bursa was uneventful. At one point, another telegram arrived from the CUP central committee to the CUP center in Bursa. Mehmed Tevfik Bey indicated that since nobody knew who exactly the addressee of the telegram was, telegraph official asked him where it should be sent. In the end, it was decided that the telegram should be sent to the municipality. The telegram indicated that the constitution had been repromulgated on account of the CUP's own efforts and devotion. Later that day, when the addressees of telegram visited Mehmed Tevfik Bey, the mystery ended. Actually, he already knew them. Most were bureaucrats in

31 Hürmen, *Devlet Adamının,* 445-446.

different strata of the state service, but he had not known that they were affiliated with the CUP. [32]

The CUP center in Bursa hoped to benefit from Mehmed Tevfik Bey, as he was a highly experienced governor and statesman. He had no links to the CUP organically, but he was also not entirely satisfied with the former regime. As his memoir attests, CUP members approached him in various ways, even before the revolution, without his knowledge. During the first days of the revolution, they visited Mehmed Tevfik's office and home often. And in celebration of the revolution, CUP members marched with a bevy of people to his house to administer an oath of his loyalty to the constitution.[33]

The most significant example of how the CUP approached what this study calls "target" governors in the provinces was a meeting between the governor Mehmed Tevfik and the CUP members of Bursa center. The CUP members came to the office of the governor to persuade him regarding certain *personae non gratae* whom they wished to be dismissed from duty immediately. CUP members would then determine their replacements. Mehmed Tevfik admitted[34] in his memoir that he accepted the CUP's demands though he believed that some officials were innocent and did not deserve to be discharged. He added that all such decisions were taken in consultation with CUP members during this delicate time.[35]

It is clear that the CUP leadership hoped to benefit from the experience of bureaucrats despite possible links to the former regime. These bureaucrats were a positive target, on one hand. On the other, they were a negative target if they continued to act as if they were loyal to the former regime. The CUP method of avoiding the pitfalls of appointing such bureaucrats was that they established tight control over their actions and surveilled them. Sometimes they showcased their actions in the press, as Tahir Pasha's case, and many others, revealed.

Arîfî Pasha, for example, was the deputy-governor (*vali vekîli*) of Diyarbekir when the revolution was first attempted. He was also the sub-governor

32 Ibid., 447.

33 Ibid., 451-452.

34 Ibid ., 469-470.

35 Ibid ., 469.

(*mutasarrıf*) of Mardin, a position he had held before he became becoming deputy-governor of Diyarbekir on March 7, 1908.[36] After five months, on August 6, 1908, during the first purges, he was promoted from his main position as the sub-governor of Mardin to governor of Trabzon.[37] His political standing can be postulated in different ways. His rapid promotion in August 1908 could have resulted from his CUP links, but he had had good relations with the former regime, as well. His promotions before August 1908 were merit-based as he already held the position of governor before the revolution. He had been granted the title of *Rumeli Beylerbeyi* during the Hamidian period on August 29, 1907.[38] It can be speculated that his appointment as governor of Trabzon in the early revolutionary period was similar to that of Tahir Pasha. This research uncovered no primary sources indicating an organic link to the CUP leadership, but they may have hoped to benefit from his experience. While he was outside of the CUP network, but he was one of the welcomed governors approached by the CUP leadership.

There were 172 governor appointments during the first four years of the revolution according to the *tevcihât-ı mülkiye* records. When it is considered that these appointees were chosen from among a pool of approximately one hundred individuals, the "target" governors constituted approximately 30% of the total. In other words, a third of the governors appointed between 1908 and 1912 had no organic links with the CUP leadership. But they did not publicly oppose the new regime, either. They presented themselves as neutral, nonpartisan, and disinterested in the flow of politics at the center. Their experience as governors before the revolution render appealed to the CUP leadership.

6.2.3 *The Istanbulites*[39]

The target governors were not part of an organized network. Moreover, they had no access to any means to further their promotion. Furthermore, they

36 BOA. DH. MKT. 1343/4, 03 *Safer* 1326 (7 March 1908).

37 BOA. BEO. 3369/252609, 08 *Receb* 1326 (6 August 1908).

38 BOA. İ.TAL. 429/37, 20 *Receb* 1325 (29 August 1907).

39 These networks were named by the author for convenience. Neither İstanbulites nor the target governors used these names.

stayed clear of actual politics as well as from the power struggles among interest groups within the bureaucracy. However, it would be irrational for the CUP leadership to fully trusted all who shared these characteristics with the target governors. The "Istanbulites," for example, were a cluster of bureaucrats whose experience was far greater, in most cases, than target governors, CUP affiliated bureaucrats, and avowed CUP opponents. Yet there is no evidence that they were in cahoots or constituted a network like the CUP.

The Istanbulites were kind of an umbrella group that included bureaucrats with diverse political backgrounds. They were not a political organization and had no organizational body, unlike the CUP. They were independent, and there is no evidence that they knew or were in contact with each other. While some had ties to the CUP or the former regime, these were in the minority. But it can be said that the majority of Istanbulites opposed the CUP. Many were critical of both the Hamidian and CUP regimes at the same time. What they shared in common was that they were born in Istanbul, they were the sons of pashas, and they had worked in the higher strata of the bureaucracy in Istanbul at some point in their life. Moreover, most came from wealthy families. But the most striking characteristic of the Istanbulites was that they acted as if they were the state. Most did not get along with the CUP cadres because in theory the CUP took what they believed they possessed, namely the state itself.

Tahir Pasha's case exemplifies how a network of non-CUP origins worked for certain existing governors as one of the parties within the umbrella of the Istanbul based bureaucrats. CUP, in fact, treated governors who had links to the Hamidian regime before the revolution but hoped to survive in the new constitutional regime. Tahir Pasha was the former governor of Mosul from 1889 to 1891, Van from 1898 to 1906, and Bitlis from 1907 to August 1908. He was among those discharged after the repromulgation of the constitution, but he was tasked again with the governorship of Erzurum after the dismissal of Abdü'l-Vehab Pasha in August 1908. His reappointment during heated moments of high-level dismissals during the early days of the revolution confirms that the CUP was content with tiny distinctions to benefit from the experience of governors whose were not as disreputable as Ratıb or Abdü'l-Vehab Pashas. His governorship suited the CUP's

purposes because of his experience like target governors mentioned above; nevertheless, the CUP leadership kept an eye on him since he had links to the former Hamidian regime. Eight months after his appointment as the governor, he quarreled with the newly appointed Erzurum chief of police, Mehmed Emin Efendi, who was a CUP supporter. The quarrel ended with the discharge of Mehmed Emin Efendi on March, 20 1909.[40] After his dismissal, Mehmed Emin petitioned the central government about his "unfair discharge," upon which the central government launched an investigation into the claims of the former chief of police.[41] Moreover, six days after Mehmed Emin's petition, an official letter from the Ministry of the Interior demanded information from the Fourth Army and the Action Army regarding newspaper reports about Tahir Pasha's activities defying the constitutional administration.[42] The report was first published by *Neyyir-i Hakikât*, a CUP-linked newspaper based in Bitola, on May 5, 1909.[43] On May 12, the exact same report was published in the Istanbul-based *Saadet Gazetesi.*[44] After five more days, on May 18, the Ministry of the Interior demanded information regarding the these speculations about Tahir Pasha. On May 20, a telegram was sent to the Ministry of the Interior from the Commander (*müşir*) of the Fourth Army, İbrahim Pasha, in reply.[45] İbrahim Pasha denounced Tahir Pasha, together with Commander Yusuf Pasha, for mischievously sending telegrams to bureaucrats around Erzurum opposing constitutional rule. On May 29, the Ministry of the Interior discharged Tahir Pasha from the governorship of Erzurum.[46]

However, this was not the end of his story. Indeed, he applied to the retirement fund for a pension soon after his dismissal from the governorship.[47]

40 BOA. ZB. 627/26, 7 *Mart* 1325 (20 March 1909).

41 BOA. DH. MKT. 2809/75, 21 *Rebiülahir* 1327 (12 May 1909).

42 BOA. DH. MKT. 2816/17, 27 *Rebiülahir* 1327 (18 May 1909).

43 *Neyyir-i Hakikât*, 24 *Nisan* 1325 (7 May 1909), 2. (A copy of the newspaper was included with the document BOA. DH. MKT. 2816/17, 27 *Rebiülahir* 1327 (18 May 1909)).

44 *Saadet Gazetesi*, 29 *Nisan* 1325 (12 May 1909), 2. (A copy of the newspaper was included with the document BOA. DH. MKT. 2816/17, 27 *Rebiülahir* 1327 (18 May 1909)).

45 BOA. DH. MKT. 2818/98, 29 *Rebiülahir* 1327 (20 May 1909).

46 BOA. DH. MKT. 2825/26, 9 *Cemaziyelevvel* 1327 (29 May 1909).

47 BOA. BEO. 3611/270781, 18 *Receb* 1327 (5 August 1909).

Although the central government initially accepted his request,[48] they subsequently invited him to the Sublime Porte three months later. On December 28, 1909, Tahir Pasha arrived at the Sublime Porte for "advisement on certain questions."[49] The related documents do not detail the content of the meeting, but tellingly, after two months, Tahir Pasha was reappointed as the governor of Bitlis.[50] Notwithstanding the recent discredit on him, it was a mystery how he was re-appointed again, during the last days of Hılmi Pasha cabinet. Moreover, his service maintained until he was appointed to Mosul in August 1910, which was his last duty in the state service.

Ali Daniş Bey was another example. For Karabekir, Daniş Bey was one of the early members of the CUP's Istanbul center which was thought to be established apart from Paris and Selanik centers.[51] It could indeed explain the fact that he was appointed to Selanik as the governor soon after the revolution in August. However, the later evidences show that Daniş Bey had quarreled with the center as he was dismissed soon after his appointment.[52]

Daniş Bey originally came from a wealthy family with strong aristocratic bonds. To name a few, his father and grandfather were Abdurrahman and Yaşar Pashas of Pristina who were prestigious in the district. Yahya Kemal notes that Dâniş Bey, as a dignitary in the Istanbul, was well-educated and believed in science and progress.[53] For a long time, he worked as an official in the St. Petersburg Embassy. In 1902, when Yahya Kemal met him, Daniş Bey was a prosecutor in the court of the first instance (*Bidayet Mahkemesi Müddeiumûmîsi*). However, his influence went beyond that of an ordinary prosecutor since he was head chamberlain's son-in-law.[54] Yet his rise as a bureaucrat started with the revolution. A secretly anti-Hamidian bureaucrat, he was appointed as the governor of Salonica on August 10, 1908 as stated

48 BOA. DH. MKT. 2906/13, 3 *Şaban* 1327 (20 August 1909).

49 BOA. BEO. 3682/276095, 15 *Zilhicce* 1327 28 December 1909.

50 DH. MUİ. 70/26, 20 *Safer* 1328 (3 March 1910).

51 Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti,* 186.

52 BOA. DH.MKT. 2679/59, 16 *Zilkade* 1326 (10 December 1908).

53 Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, *Çocukluğum, Gençliğim ve Siyasi ve Edebi Hatıralarım* (Istanbul: Fetih Cemiyeti, Yahya Kemal Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1986), 69.

54 Ibid.

above.[55] However, this did not last long, and he was appointed to the committee of inspectorates (*heyett-i teftişiye riyaseti*) on December 10, 1908.[56] Indeed, there was no reason for his dismissal other than a single letter of complaint.[57] The CUP may simply not have wanted him as a governor of a such a symbolically significant city for the CUP given that Daniş Bey was not a clear CUP supporter. On December 12, 1909, he demanded a compensation wage for having been dismissed from the Salonica governorship.[58] The ideological differences between the CUP members and Daniş Bey became apparent when the cabinet of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha was announced in 1912. For three months, Dâniş Bey served in the Ministry of the Interior before being appointed as the governor of Hüdavendigar. Daniş Bey's case is significant considering that the CUP was not alone in struggling to fill bureaucratic cadres. Those who opposed the Hamidian Regime but still had close relations with Istanbul-based bureaucrats and did not wish to share the power with the supporters of national sovereignty (*hakimiyet-i milliye*[59]) – even if they were inexperienced young civil and military officers – were recruited into this struggle.

İbrahim Edhem Bey (İbrahim Edhem Mesut Dirvana),[60] a well-educated bureaucrat who graduated from the *Mülkiye* in 1885 and the Sorbonne in 1893, was not affiliated with CUP-linked bureaucrats although his career path was paralleled that of those with organic links to the Young Turks. His father, Mesut Bey, was an official in the *Duyûn-u Umûmiye İdaresi* when Ibrahim Edhem started his career as an unpaid (*mülazemet*[61]) dragoman in the foreign ministry while still a high school student in 1885. After finding success there, he was appointed as an official in Yıldız Palace (*Mabeyn-i Hümâyûn*). In 1889, he was sent abroad as a governor fellow for higher

55 BOA. İ.DH. 1468/32, 12 *Receb* 1326 (10 august 1908).

56 BOA. DH.MKT. 2679/59, 16 *Zilkade* 1326 (10 December 1908).

57 BOA. TFR.I.M. 22/2141, 11 *Şaban* 1326 (8 September 1908).

58 BOA. ŞD. 3064/20, 29 *Şevval* 1327 (13 November 1909).

59 For supporters and opponents of the *hakimiyet-i milliye,* see Ahmet Kuyaş, "II. Meşrutiyet, Türk Devrim Tarihi ve Bugünkü Türkiye," *Doğu Batı – II. Meşrutiyet 100. Yıl* 45 (2008): 50-64.

60 BOA. DH.SAİD.d. 77/474.

61 Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. 3, 184.

education to the Sorbonne. After his graduation, he returned to Istanbul and resumed his former duty in the palace until he resigned and requested transfer to the foreign office. Over the next four years he was employed at the embassies of Brussels, Washington, and London. He returned to Istanbul in 1897a well-educated, experienced bureaucrat. He resigned from the foreign office in 1898 and was appointed a member of the Council of the State (*Şurâ-yı Devlet Azası*). Given his educational level and his life as an intellectual abroad (he translated Descartes' *Discourse de la Méthode* into Ottoman Turkish, for example) one might expect a connection to the Young Turks, but there is no concrete evidence that he was a sympathizer. His aloofness from the Young Turks could have resulted from his career path through the highest levels of the bureaucracy. Until 1908, he continued at the Council of the State and held several other positions, as well. Like Daniş Bey, he was appointed as a governor soon after the revolution, but his duty as the governor of Beirut did not last. Like Daniş Bey, he was dismissed soon after being appointed and sent to be the sub-governor of Tirgovişte in the Balkans.[62] In August 1912, he was reappointed as the governor of Beirut during the Grand Cabinet of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha, which again parallels the story of Daniş Bey.

There are other, similar cases. Şerif Mehmed Rauf Pasha,[63] for example, was a highly experienced statesman born in in 1838. He was appointed as the governor of Aydın in August 1908 while he was the mayor (*şehremini*) of Istanbul.[64] His father, Şerif Osman Pasha, was governor of Bosnia and was awarded the title of vizier in 1861.[65] After serving in various strata of the bureaucracy, Rauf Pasha was first appointed as governor in 1889. In the nineteen years from 1889 until 1908, when he became the *şehremini* very soon before the Revolution, he was appointed to seven different *vilayet*s. His position as the mayor of Istanbul did not las longer when he was dismissed very soon after the Revolution, on 27 July 1908. During the time that the Young Turk organization was transforming into a well-organized committee

62 BOA. BEO 3502/262633 08 *Safer* 1327 (1 March 1909).

63 Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricâli,* 104.

64 BOA. DH.SAİD.d 3/72.

65 BOA. A.}MKT.MHM 216/91, 19 *Şevval* 1277 (30 April 1861).

in 1906 and 1907, Şerif Mehmed Rauf Pasha was notably the governor of Selanik. Unfortunately, there is no record of the relationship between the pasha and the Committee during his governorship. While his appointment as the mayor soon before the July 1908 could suggest that he had good relations Abdülhamid, after nine days as mayor, he was detracted from Istanbul as he appointed as the governor of Aydın.[66] In February 1909, he was dismissed from the governorship and appointed to the position of extraordinary commissioner (*Mısır fevkalâde komiseri*) to Egypt, where he remained until 1912. Like Daniş and Edhem Beys, he would not hold another position between 1913-1919 during the time the CUP held absolute political power over the state apparatus. In 1919, he became the head of the Council of the State (*Şura-yı Devlet Reisi*) when the CUP lost power.

Another example could be Ahmed Reşid Bey's services as governor. Before the revolution, he had connections with Arab İzzet Pasha, a famous pasha within the close circle of Abdülhamid, which can be understood from Reşid Bey's memoir.[67] Although Reşid Bey's memoir seems in certain cases to show Abdülhamid as a proper ruler, it cannot be said that his relationship with the sultan seemed good as his memoir tells. For example, after returning from Reşid Bey's Bitola governorship in 1906, Arab İzzet Pasha recommended Reşid Bey to become the governor of Edirne, while the sultan rejected because Reşid Bey had close relations with Osman Pasha before.[68] Although he mentions that the sultan was an intelligent person, he also criticized the sultan's apprehensive personality.[69] Yet he always plums for the sultans' politics.

During the early days of the Revolution, he was the governor of Ankara where he was appointed in 1907. Soon after the Revolution, he was appointed to the Haleb as the governor of the *vilâyet*. For Çankaya, "the reason behind this could not be understood."[70] Soon after the 1909 Constitutional

66 Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricâli,* 104.

67 Ahmet Reşit Rey, *Gördüklerim – Yaptıklarım (1890-1922)* (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945), 28, 61.

68 Ibid., 28-29.

69 Ibid., 27-32.

70 Çankaya, Yeni Mülkiyeliler Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, v.3, 329.

Amendment in August, he was dismissed from governorship of Haleb when Fahri Pasha, a reliable governor for the CUP,[71] was appointed in return. He taught literature classes at *Galatasaray Sultanisi* as he did not serve within the governmental service anymore until the August 1912 when the Grand Cabinet was formed. He was among the founding members of *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası.*[72] Yet, after the August 1912, he returned to the governorship as the governor of Aydın and after the three months as a governor, he became the interior minister until the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını* in January 1913.

The specific cases of Tahir Pasha, Daniş Bey, İbrahim Edhem Bey, Şerif Mehmed Rauf Pasha and Ahmed Reşid Bey reveal a conflict within the bureaucracy in terms of controlling appointments. These cases demonstrate three significant points. First, although there is not concrete evidence that the Istanbulites contacted each other regularly as a well-organized network, as mentioned in the first part of this chapter, these cases and others reveal a network of people acting in concert. The dates of their appointments and dismissals prove this. However, their organizational structure is unclear, which is why we can call the Istanbulites a "non-organized" network, unlike the organized network of the CUP. In other words, although there is no specific evidence from the memoirs, autobiographies, and archival sources affirming the existence of a conscious, organized network like the CUP, the career paths and biographies of individual personalities show a group of people acting together as a network. Since we do not know the scope and structure of this network of Istanbulites, we can only call it an arbitrary network of people acting simultaneously with awareness of each other as a network of bureaucrats and politicians opposing the activities of the Unionist fractions within the bureaucracy.

71 For his CUP origin, see Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki,* 323-324; Erdal Aydoğan and İsmail Eyyüboğlu, *Bahaeddin Şakir Bey'in Bıraktığı Vesikalara Göre İttihat ve Terakki* (Ankara: Alternatif Yayınları, 2004), 445.

72 Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası,* 55.

§ 6.3 Alterations in the Political Balance vis-à-vis Gubernatorial Appointments

Akşin's term, *denetleme iktidarı,* concerning the extent and scope of the CUP's actual power, is discussed in the chapter 2. The period between July 1908 and January 1913 was characterized by the attempts of various political actors to overtake political power, whether the government or parliament. The CUP readjusted its strategy in accordance with the flow of politics. While at certain times they struggled to concentrate executive and legislative power in parliament, as in the period from the March 31 Incident until late 1909, at other times the CUP sought to fill the government with its own members, as it did after January 1910.

Starting in the early days of the revolution through May 1912, the CUP's power rose on occasion, yet there were limitations they needed to overcome. Mahmut Şevket Pasha's growing power after May 1909 was an example.[73] Although the CUP and Mahmut Şevket Pasha seemed in certain cases to work collaboratively, neither of the parties sought a long-lasting alliance. The Unionists were aware that Mahmut Şevket Pasha could cause trouble. For Akşin, Mahmut Şevket Paşha was a "big brother" for the Committee who often warned and admonished Unionist leaders.[74] Even so, there is no indication that those in Mahmut Şevket Pasha's circle meddled in the appointment of governors.

The actual conflicts occurred between the CUP and the Istanbul based bureaucrats. It would be expected that given the political fluctuations, appointment rates would gradually favor whoever increased their political power. In other words, changes to the political atmosphere would trigger a changeover in bureaucratic power; the increasing influence of certain groups would also strengthen their influence vis-à-vis bureaucratic

73 Regarding Mahmut Şevket's power, see Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 69-72; Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası,* 206-207; Kansu, *İttihatçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi*, 125-126; M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 167; and Zekeriya Türkmen, "Mahmud Şevket Pasha," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*. vol. 27, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003), 384-386.

74 See Akşin, *Jön Türkler,* 142-143.

appointments. It would be expected, for example, that the power of the CUP in the bureaucratic area would have decreased in the second half of 1910. The CUP's power vis-à-vis its opponents weakened with Cavid's attempts to find foreign debt. Moreover, problems in Macedonia were attributed to Talat Bey's inability to overcome them as Minister of the Interior, resulting in his resignation in February 1911. The emergence of the *Hizb-i Cedid* (the New Faction), the ascending power of an anti-CUP coalition, and the Turco-Italian War caused a significant loss of the CUP's power in high politics.[75] A strong attempt by the CUP to wrest political power in early 1912 seemed to affect power relations in the bureaucracy positively. However, the push did not last, and the CUP lost its position with the emergence of *Halaskar Zâbıtân*.

But this dissertation argues that until the second half of 1912, the CUP, without interruption, increased its influence over governor appointments. Although their influence in the high political field fluctuated to an extent, this was not reflected in the bureaucratic arena. Appointments of CUP-backed governors continued until the Muhtar Pasha Cabinet was formed in summer 1912. The subsequent dismissals of CUP-linked governors that started in Fall 1912 were accompanied by an increase in the appointments of Istanbul based bureaucrats.

Although they existed long before the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası* was established, the Istanbulites coordinated with the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası* and its intellectual backers, and the party openly supported the Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha cabinet although Muhtar Pasha did not publicly support *Hürriyet ve İtilâf*.[76] Governor turnover rates during this cabinet indicate an important shift for both the CUP and Istanbul based bureucrats. In August, September, and October 1912, the bureaucracy endured significant turnover that favored the Istanbulites over CUP-linked bureaucrats. Ali Münif Bey, who was the governor of Monastir at the time, mentioned in his memoir that the Grand Cabinet was politically neutral on the surface. However, for him, the truth

75 For a detailed chronology of the period from January 1910 to December 1911, see Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki,* 103-153; Akşin, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki,* 175-191; Akşin, *Jön Türkler,* 174-195; and Kansu, *İttihatçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi,* 163-295.

76 See Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası,* 191.

was different.[77] As soon as the cabinet was formed, they started a purge of CUP-linked governors, a fury that included Ali Münif Bey. Behçet Bey, who had closer ties to the Istanbulites, was appointed as the governor of Manastır[78] after Ali Münif Bey's dismissal. The case of Mehmed Galib Bey, the son of Mehmed Said Efendi, a former Interior Minister in the Hamidian period, also exemplifies how conflicts within the bureaucracy coincided with disruptions of the political balance. In 1902, he was appointed as the sub-governor of Manisa where he remined until being dismissed from duty in 1909. He was not reappointed until the Grand Cabinet was established. He was then first appointed as the sub-governor of Beyoğlu, which was a significant, symbolic position. He was then appointed as the governor of Kastamonu in September 1912.[79] Soon, he was dismissed from his duty. For Birinci, the reason behind his dismissal was that "he was not an easygoing person getting on well with the prominent Unionists."[80]

Kansu's dichotomy of monarchists and reformists,[81] which purports as a political struggle between just the remnants of the former regime and the Young Turks, is erroneous as far as the bureaucratic struggle for power is considered. There are two significant reasons. The first is that the bureaucracy was consisted of more than two groups – for example bureaucrats who endeavored to remain neutral should not be underestimated. The second is that the Hamidian monarchists were not, as the literature has supposed, effective in this arena, especially given certain important incidents. One was the propaganda campaign against the famous pashas of the Hamidian era that lasted until the September 1908. The second was that the March 31 Incident diminished the superior standing of the Hamidian bureaucrats. The third incident was the amendment of the constitution in August 1909,

77 Toros, *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları,* 61.

78 BOA. İ.DH. 1495/5, 29 *Ramazan* 1330 (11 September 1912).

79 Ali Birinci, "Mehmed Galib Bey," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 28, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003), 486-488.

80 "Burada asıl sebep kendisinin İttihatçı devletliler nazarında uslu ve uysal bir vali olamamasıdır." Ali Birinci, *Tarihin Gölgesinde: Meşâhir-i Meçhûleden Birkaç Zât*, (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2001), 180.

81 Kansu, *İttihatçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1918.*

diminishing the monarchist ideology. The Istanbulite network mentioned in this chapter was a kind of umbrella network of former monarchists or supporters of the Hamidian regime as well as those who before 1908 opposed both the Hamidian regime and the Young Turk ideology. These Istanbulites were adjusting and playing along with the new rules of the constitutional regime. Especially after August 1909, the political and bureaucratic struggles were not between monarchists and Young Turks, rather it was among the networks that had already internalized the new rules of the constitutional regime. In other words, the struggles, conflicts, and negotiations were done in accordance with the new norm: the constitutional system.

Figure 6.1 demonstrates the network of the governors in the period from 1908 to 1913. As the diagram shows, certain actors were contacted with only one network, but there were others who were more flexible. Mustafa Vefik Bey,[82] who was Midhad Pasha's son-in-law (*damâd*), became the governor of Sivas in December 1908 after several other bureaucratic positions. After his Sivas, during the constitutional period, he was appointed to Konya and Haleb.[83] His father, Ahmed Rasim Pasha, was a well-known bureaucrat of the Hamidian order who had been the governor of Aydın and Trablusgarb and had held several other positions in the higher strata of the bureaucracy.[84] Mustafa Vefik Bey's career path, family origins, and his contacts as the *damâd* of Midhad Pasha suggest that he was close to both CUP members as well as Istanbulites. For the CUP, he was a "target" governor from which the CUP wished to benefit.

82 BOA. DH.SAİDd. 1/354.

83 Ömer Özcan, "Mithat Pasha'nın Torunu Rasim Fenmen'in Bir Mektubu," *Türk Yurdu* 102, no. 307 (March 2013). https://www.turkyurdu.com.tr/yazar-yazi.php?id=695

84 Ahmet Semih Mümtaz, *Tarihimizde Hayal Olmuş Hakikatler (*Istanbul: Hılmi Kitapevi, 1948), 44.




Figure 6.1 Networking Groups of Governors

It is not possible to assert systematic connections and a regular contact among members of each network apart from the CUP-linked networks. However, the career paths, family origins, and individual biographies suggest a meaningful link among the Istanbulites, as exemplified above. It is a methodological preference to infer networks of individuals by tracing their similar career paths and family origins when these are the only means to identify them. It is rare that a governor publicly declares such inclinations in his memoir. In other words, if there is no strong evidence or firsthand account of the relationships among governors in their autobiographies, it is a methodological inevitability to trace their careers and family origins to understand their networks.

One of the main differences between governors of the two networks is clear from the places to which they were appointed, as Figures 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate. The first graphic shows that governors who were close to the Istanbulites were mostly appointed in certain Anatolian cities like Sivas, Bitlis, Erzurum, and Aydın.



Figure 6.2 Governor Appointments regarding the Istabulites related network

As Figure 6.2 illustrates, Istanbul-affiliated governors were appointed almost equally distributed throughout the Empire. However, one important thing here to mention is that comparing with the CUP related governors, the Istanbulites seemed to be appointed to the Balkan more rarely. On the contrary, while the CUP related governor appointments reached all corners of the empire, they were particularly dense in the Balkans, as Figure 6.3 demonstrates.




Figure 6.3 Governor Appointments regarding the CUP related network

§ 6.4 Facing Rivalries: Appointing and Dismissing Governors

The previous parts within this chapter aimed to reveal how the political networks would be described from a one-sided approach. Appointing a fellow by political networks would be complex to evaluate. However, considering multi-level struggles within a chronological periodization and encounters of networks would help conceptualizing it. In other words, there could exist certain characteristics that would make available to trace how the networks reencountered in terms of appointing fellows and dismissing rivalries.

Certain examples deserve specific attentions, describing how the rivalries occurred through appointing and dismissing governors especially when the periods of political ups and downs are considered. Alaaddin Bey, the sub-governor of Priştine, was dismissed from his duty under the political climate that the CUP was experiencing a strict opposition during the last days of the Hılmi Pasha cabinet on December 13, 1909. It must be recalled

that the CUP and the government were started to disagree on certain political matters, such as Lynch Company and Bulgaria, which led the resignation of the Hılmi Pasha cabinet. [85] Soon before the governmental change, Alaaddin Bey was dismissed from the *mutasarrıflık* of the Priştine. Within the following months, he went to Beirut for a non-official duty.[86] After a year without appointing to a sub-governor position, he then was appointed, in fact promoted, as the governor of Sivas during the January 1911.[87] As Pakalın stated, it was written in his *sicill* that because of his merit in governance as he proved, he deserved to be appointed as the governor of Sivas as a substitute (*vekâleten*).[88] After 8 months, he then was appointed as the principal (*asâleten*) governor of Sivas.[89] During the June 1912, soon before the CUP started to lose political power vis-à-vis the opponents, a man named Osman Paşazade Halid was arrested because he wrote a complaint against Alaaddin Bey.[90] The reason behind his arrest was that he used a libelous language against Alaaddin Bey and the interior ministry. Osman Paşazade Halid was released shortly, but he wrote another petition to the Sublime Porte. This time he charged the Unionist branch in Sivas for rigging the municipal elections.[91]

After 20 months as the governor of Sivas in total, Alaaddin Bey was dismissed during the Ahmet Muhtar Pashas cabinet, stated officially that he was discharged because he could not be able to preserve his impartiality over the new government in which the petition of Osman Paşazâde was pretended as the reason behind.[92] However, it could be considered that it was

85 Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki,* 103-141.

86 BOA. DH.MTV 1/30, 20 *Muharrem* 1329 (21 January 1911).

87 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCHM.d, 3/10, 17, n: 4004/3650, 11 *Muharrem* 1329 (12 January 1911).

88 "Vekaletde ibraz eylediği müessir kârgüzar-ı umur-ı vilâyeti hüsn-ü tedvir ve temşiyete liyakat göstermesine mebni". Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli: Son Devir Osmanlı Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi*, v.2, prepared by Şakir Batmaz (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), 119.

89 BOA. DH.MTV 1/51, 18 *Ramazan* 1329 (12 September 1911).

90 BOA. DH.MTV 23/9, 11 *Receb* 1330 (26 June 1912).

91 BOA.DH.MUİ 160/86, 29 *Şaban* 1330 (13 August 1912).

92 "Umur ve muamelat-ı hükümete bi-taraflık iltizam edemediği müracat ve şikayat-ı vakı'adan anlaşılmasına biaen." Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli,* v.2, 119.

one of the strategies adopted by the new government against the CUP-linked governors as Alaaddin Bey was not alone who was dismissed during the Muhtar Pasha cabinet. After the CUP regained its political authority with the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını*, Aladdin Bey also reappointed as the governor, but this time to Basra in March 1913.

Ahmed Nedim Efendi is another figure who had a similar fate with Alaaddin Bey. Before January 1912, he was working as an important figure within the *Duyun-u Umûmiye* as the general director. In March 1911 he was tasked with an additional duty that could subsequently make him a popular figure among the religious tariqas. He was appointed as the director (*emin*) of the office of the *Surre-i Hümayûn*.[93] As his *sicill* tells, after successful duties within the department as the *surre emini*[94], he was appointed as the governor of Bitlis. Once the religious tariqas' effects over the population in Bitlis is considered, such an appointment would then be more meaningful in terms of understanding that the interior ministry would have preferred a governor who had previous religious background. Ahmed Nedim Efendi, in that matter, seemed to be a proper candidate after his successful days under the *Surre Emâneti*. Moreover, the religious title of *effendi* was not prevalent among the governors, which in fact indicates religious attributions of an individual.

Pakalın mentions citing Ahmed Nedim Efendi's *sicill* that his successful days in *Duyun-u Umumiye* and *Surre-i Hümayûn* as well as his religious background which was stated as "*o havali ahâlisinden bulunmuş olduğundan*" made him appointed as the governor of Bitlis on January 30, 1912.[95] However, very similar to the case of Alaaddin Bey, his position was terminated after seven months when Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha established his cabinet. Ahmed Nedim was officially dismissed because of his partisanship

93 BOA.BEO. 3869/290125, 16 *Rebiülevvel* 1329 (17 March 1911).

94 *Surre emaneti* is an institution which provided security for gifts sent from Istanbul to Mecca and Medina during Hajj. Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, "Surre" in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi,* v.37 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2009), 567-569.

95 "Müddet-i medide-i umur-u hükümete hidemât-ı hasenesi mesbuk ve tecrübe ve iktidari ve her suretle itimâd-ı mazhariyeti nezaretce malum olup ahiren surre emaneti memuriyetinde de reviyyetini irade ve ispat etmis ve esasen o havali ahalisinden bulunmus oldugundan." Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli: Son Devir Osmanlı Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi*, v.13, prepared by Cengiz Kartın (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), 69-70.

and grievances written against his so-called mismanagement.[96] The government appointed Ali Paşa who was former minister of Zabtiyah before the Revolution. After *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını,* Ahmed Nedim wrote a petition to the government that he would like to be appointed as the governor of Hijaz on April 10, 1913.[97] In July 1913, his request was accepted as he was then appointed as the governor of Hijaz.[98]

Alaaddin Bey's and Ahmed Nedim Efendi's stories could be increased in number who were appointed during the post-1910 period and dismissed soon after the establishment of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha's and Kamil Pasha's cabinets during the second half of 1912. However, they turned back to the state service after the CUP retook the power with the January 1913. However, there were also certain other cases that tell the opposite. There are stories of governors who were dismissed after the August 1909 when a constitutional amendment was passed but reappointed during the second half of 1912 on the contrary to the stories of aforementioned governors Alaaddin Bey and Ahmed Nedim Efendi. Cemal Bey's case could be an example of this kind.

Cemal Bey was the former *mutasarrıf* of Kayseri and İzmid before 1910. For Pakalın, in 1910, he refused to be appointed as the *mutasarrıf* of Bolu, as then he started to live in in Istanbul as well as founded an opponent newspaper named *Bedahet*.[99] The opposition during 1911 in the *Bedahet* led him to be imprisoned until an amnesty was granted during 1912.[100] During the Grand Cabinet in September 1912, he was returned to the state service as the governor of Mamuretülaziz.[101] In May 1913, he was discharged from all the duties from the state service.[102]

---

96 "Intihabât ve sair hususâtta tarafgirâne hareketten ve su-i idaresinden dolays hakkinda şikayât vuku' bulunmakta olmasina binaen" Ibid.

97 BOA.HSDHADB. 1/3, 28 *Mart* 1329 (10 April 1913).

98 BOA.MV. 231/159, 27 *Cemaziyelahir* 1331 (3 June 1913).

99 Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli: Son Devir Osmanlı Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi*, v.4, prepared by Hava Selçuk (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), 94-95.

100 Ibid.

101 BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCHM.d. 3/25, p.48, n.1646/4511, 11 *Şevval* 1330 (23 September 1912).

102 Pakalın, *Sicill-i Osmanî Zeyli,* v.4, 95.

Ohannes Ferid Bey's case is somehow different than those above in terms of his lower-rank positions.[103] He was never appointed to be a governor, yet throughout his career he was either a vice-governor or a sub-governor. However, his career tells more about how a non-CUP based ordinary bureaucrats could face certain difficulties. In 1884, he was graduated from the *Mülkiye* as his career started after his graduation as an ordinary level official. Until 1891, he had worked in certain different ministries when he was appointed as the qaimaqam of Kerpe. In 1892, he was awarded with meritorious service medal (*mecidi nişanı*).[104]

His career within the interior administrative structure started in 1896 when he was appointed as the vice-governor of Van[105] as the position maintained eleven years until the January 1908. There are certain reports mentioned his promotion before the Revolution.[106] However, after his brother Armanak Efendi was assassinated by Armenian guerillas, he needed to ask his transfer.[107] In December 1907, he was appointed as the vice-governor of Mamuretülaziz.[108] Soon after the 1908 Revolution, he was awarded the state medal of France, *Officiel d'Academie*.[109] Then he was appointed as the vice-governor of Kosova in January 1909,[110] and then sub-governor of Limni in October 1909.[111] Soon, he was dismissed from Limni and appointed to Canik in September 1912[112] during the cabinet of Muhtar Pasha, yet it also did not last longer as he was dismissed two months after the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını.*[113] Within the following six years during the most powerful years of the CUP, he was kept apart from the state service until the January 1919.

---

103 For his biography, see Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiyeliler Tarihi*, vol. 3, 178-179.

104 BOA.DH.MKT. 1992/57, 1 *Safer* 1310 (25 August 1892).

105 BOA.İ..DH.. 1336/54, 28 *Safer* 1314 (8 August 1896).

106 BOA.DH.MKT. 626/67, 4 *Şevval* 1320 (4 January 1903).

107 BOA.DH.ŞFR. 384/86, 9 *Temmuz* 1323 (17 July 1907).

108 BOA.İ..DH.. 1461/15, 27 *Şevval* 1325 (3 December 1907).

109 BOA.DH.MKT. 2625/69, 12 *Ramazan* 1326 (8 October 1908).

110 BOA.İ..DH.. 1471/74, 16 *Zilkade* 1326 (10 December 1908).

111 Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiyeliler Tarihi*, vol. 3, 178-179.

112 BOA.BEO. 4082/306082, 27 *Ramazan* 1330 (9 September 1912).

113 BOA.İ..DH.. 1498/14, 29 *Rebiülevvel* 1331 (8 March 1913)

Ohannes Ferid Bey's case is significant in terms of demonstrating that even a brilliant *Mülkiye* graduate bureaucrat with merit who was awarded series of medals from Ottoman and France state's official services, as well as served as several years as a vice-governor, could have ultimately discharged under the CUP rule. Rather, if his merit would have taken into consideration, he would have been already appointed as a governor during the early Revolutionary period. Considering Cavid Bey's speeches in the parliament as well as *Tanin*'s propaganda for enacting the *tensikât* law in which both of them pointed out that the *tensikât* was going to provide positions for people with merit as chapter 2 demonstrates above, it is clear that dismissing and appointing practices was in fact more than so-called modernizing the bureaucracy. It was about distribution of power over the bureaucratic cadres for controlling the actual state apparatus via appointments and dismissals.

§ 6.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter is to propose an alternative approach to the period 1908-1913, in which there was considerable conflict among political groups vis-a-vis bureaucratic appointments. Although the nature of conflicts among bureaucrats was always observable in the Ottoman Empire, the political climate after 1908 enabled a new arena for struggles among political groups for control over bureaucratic appointments. In other words, the nature of bureaucratic conflicts was changing from individual networking to a political, group-based networking, facilitated by the constitutional political atmosphere. Governor appointments and the struggles among political networks is one example.

Unlike the political ups and downs during the period between January 1910-August 1912, the CUP seems to have created a bureaucratic hegemony over appointments and dismissals. Until the January 1910, the Committee and other agents of networks were struggling to hold the power for bureaucratic appointments. After the legislation of the *tensikât* was applied which resulted in cleaning out the bureaucratic cadres, the CUP after January 1910 seems to have concentrated on the matter of appointing bureaucrats in

return. The gubernatorial appointments could be an example of this kind lasted until the summer 1912.

On the other hand, the period started in summer 1912 till the January 1913 witnessed a wave of discharging CUP-linked governors. The vacant positions were mostly replaced with bureaucrats around the Istanbul based network. However, with the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını,* the CUP started to reappoint bureaucrats who were dismissed during the second half of 1912. In this respect, it would be possible to speculate further that one of the reasons for the process which caused the Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını was undoubtedly the decreasing power of the CUP in the bureaucratic cadres. With the June 1913, they seemed to have redressed what they lost during the 5 months of period of the late 1912.

7

Epilogue: Consolidating Power, Increasing Stateness, and Emerging Authoritarianism

The political structure in the late Ottoman Empire faced structural challenges in 1913 prompted by the internal actors of high politics. In late 1912, the CUP seemed to be losing power in the upper echelons of politics,[1] but this did not last long. The CUP reassumed power in January 1913 with the *Bâb-ı Âlî Baskını* and reinforced it with the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha in June 1913. Interestingly, the return of the CUP to power did not prompt a backlash from the state bureaucracy. Unlike in 1908 when the CUP cadres encountered pressure from the state apparatus of the time, there was no resistance to CUP rule in 1913. One of the outcomes of this dissertation is an alternative explanation of the origins of the growing authoritarian tendencies of the CUP. The struggles over state cadres considered together with upper-level political developments between 1908-1913 reveal a significant respect by which the CUP became an unrivaled organization that ruled the actual state apparatus. In fact, its unrivalled structure within the state allowed the CUP to attain a significant level of stateness, which set the stage for the one-party authoritarianism that followed.

1 Kansu refers to the devitalization of the CUP that started in summer 1912 as a coup. Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi,* 341-399.

The decline in the political power of the CUP in the summer of 1912 resulted in the dismissals of bureaucrats and appointments of new ones, which meant that the CUP not only lost power in the upper levels of politics, but also in the bureaucratic structure. However, compared to the CUP's efforts to establish its rule in the bureaucracy before summer 1912, the five-month period in the second half of 1912 had a limited impact on key bureaucratic positions. For example, although the Muhtar Pasha and Kamil Pasha cabinets attempted to appoint governors from within their networks of power, the rate of turnover was limited compared to the years leading up to it.

Scholarship on the Second Constitutional Period has long tended to evaluate the political character of the CUP as one of a gradual increased in authoritarianism, especially from 1913 forward. But depicting the CUP as an organization struggling to survive in the system of the early Constitutional Period without considering the struggles of CUP-affiliated intellectuals to gain total control of the state organization is a great mistake. For Taglia, the repromulgation of the Constitution implied to a certain extent a transformation from the despotic Hamidian rule to the authoritarian regime of the CUP.[2] Sohrabi also focuses attention on the character of the Unionist approach, namely its "illiberal constitutionalism."[3] Furthermore, Özbek points out that the Constitutional regime established a firm social control mechanism starting from the early Revolutionary period.[4]

Göçek, on the other hand, argues that the gradual increase in the dictatorial tendencies of the CUP are related to the Balkan Wars.[5] But in fact, the roots of its so-called transformation into an authoritarian organization are evident throughout the pre-revolutionary period, the literature that locates

2 Stefano Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Young Turks on the Challanges of Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2015), 7.

3 Nader Sohrabi, "Illiberal Constitutionalism. The Committee Union and Progress as a Clandestine Network and Purges," in *L'ivressé de La Liberte,* ed. François Georgeon (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), 109-120.

4 Nadir Özbek, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Dilencilere Yönelik Devlet Politikaları ve Kamusal Söylemin Değişimi." In *Bir Kent Sorunu Dilencilik: Sorunlar ve Çözüm Yolları*, (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Zabıta Daire Başkanlığı, 2009), 29-38.

5 Fatma Müge Göçek, "What is the Meaning of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution? A Critical Assessment in 2008," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 38 (2008): 203.

the growing authoritarian tendency of the Constitutional Regime starting in 1913 notwithstanding.[6] Hanioğlu discusses this major flaw in the literature that interprets "the authoritarian character of the CUP as an unforeseen and surprising outcome frequently attributed to the corruption of power or viewed it as a response to internal and external developments."[7] In fact, the future-based determining force attributed to the Balkan Wars were evident in the literature as Öztan discusses.[8]

Purges in the early revolutionary period were an early example of how the CUP established power, prophesying its authoritarianism. In fact, the broader literature already established a structural link between totalitarian or authoritarian organizations and mass destruction, of which purges are an example. For Agamben,

> modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system.[9]

To say that the CUP established a totalitarian regime in 1913 would be an exaggeration. However, the autocratic character of the regime became apparent at that time. Nevertheless, earlier purges, the press law, and the 1912 elections presaged the authoritarian character of its post-1913 rule. In this respect, following Agamben, these purges were a process of eliminating statesmen that were potentially unfit for the political system the CUP hoped to create, even if they were no declared adversaries.

---

6 Hanioğlu, "The Committee of Union and Progress and the 1908 Revolution," 16.

7 Ibid. For Hanioğlu, the reasons for this disposition were irrespective of the intellectual aims of Young Turk intellectuals in the pre-revolutionary period.

8 For Öztan, the literature regarding the Balkan Wars falls into the trap of teleology, as the defeat was considered to be an effective power behind the subsequent events took place after the Balkan Wars. See Ramazan Hakkı Öztan, "Point of no return? Prospects of Empire after the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars (1912-13).", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 50, no 1 (2018), 65–84.

9 Agamben, *State of Exception*, 2.

Purges were not a unique to the late Ottoman *tensikât*; the twentieth century up until the 1970s witnessed a global phenomenon of purges of the cadres of both state and party institutions. Engineering bureaucratic cadres to be in tune with emerging political systems served the purposes of governing elites, strengthening their grip on power. There were purges of elites by which governing autocrats eliminated actual and potential rivals, as well as mass purges in which thousands of low-ranking officials lost their positions regardless of their status.[10] Mass purges can be seen as the destruction of masses that would subsequently be unfit for the emerging political system, as Agamben argues,[11] or they can be viewed as a "baffling phenomena of totalitarianism in action," [12] as Brzezinski asserts. The literature has even suggested that mass purges are "instruments of accountability used to motivate subordinates."[13] It could serve to intimidate the opposition, to bulldozing potential rivals, or to radicalize supporters against rivals.

Under the Soviet Rule, the communist party was subject to several purges as a result of power struggles within the organization starting in 1919 and repeating several different times until 1971. The most known purges took place from 1933-1938.[14] During the 1930s, fascist regimes in both Italy and Germany were also subject to mass and party purges.[15] Another communist regime, China, experienced purges starting in the late 1940s and lasting through the second half of the 1960s.[16] A purge campaign commenced in

10 B. Pablo Montagnes and Stephane Wolton, "Mass Purges: Top-Down Accountability in Autocracy," *American Political Science Review* 119, no. 4 (November 2019): 1046.

11 Agamben, *State of Exception,* 2.

12 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Permament Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 1.

13 Montagnes and Wolton, "Mass Purges: Top-Down Accountability in Autocracy," 1047.

14 See Brzezinski, *The Permament Purge*; J.Archy Getty, *Origins of Great Purges: The Soviet Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (London: The Bodley Head, 2018).

15 See Dietrich Orlow, *The Nazi Party, 1919-1945: A Complete History* (New York: Enigma Books, 2010), 288-342.

16 See Frederic C. Teiwes, *Politic and Purges in China, Rectification and Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965* (New York: East Gate, 1993); Eberhard Sandschneider, "Political Succession in the People's Republic of China: Rule by Purges," in *The Process of Political Succesion*, ed. Peter Calvert

North Korea in the late 1950s in reaction to Khruschev's de-Stalinization in which the result was "national Stalinism."[17] Another struggle over de-Stalinization took place in communist Latvia where staff policy played a significant role in accepting Khruschev's rule.[18] Portugal's purges following a coup d'état in the 1970s tell a different story.[19] Purges were firstly political actions led by governing elites who possessed absolute power; therefore, in most cases, they took place under authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Second, in certain cases, purges were applied after a coup d'état when the actors who had staged the coup needed to cleanse the state of the old regime. But in each case, those who organized the purges had absolute political power except for the Young Turks. By staging mass purges without holding total power, they were able to do what only authoritarian and totalitarian regimes with absolute power would manage to do in the twentieth century.

The mass purges and its outcomes discussed in chapters 2, 3, and 4 may be evidence of the early origins of Unionist authoritarianism. The control of the bureaucratic apparatus and cadres through purges and appointments by what was at the time only a political network ultimately strengthened state capacity. In other words, by 1913, the CUP managed to incorporate a growing state capacity and stateness in which bureaucratic power aligned with its political structure. This was possible because of struggles to purge incumbent cadres and appoint associates in the five-year period after July 1908. Until early 1913, the CUP struggled to eliminate other forces inside the state that sought control over bureaucratic cadres. The Unionists ultimately remained unchallenged not only in the political arena but also in the state. Because of the increasing degree of stateness that had been implements by 1913, no opposition was able to arise from within the state bureaucracy as it had in July

---

(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), 110-134; and Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," *Problems in Communism* 15, no. 2 (1966).

17 Andrei N. Lankov, "Kim Takes the Control: The Great Purge in North Korea, 1956-1960," *Korean Studies* 26, no. 1 (2002): 87-119.

18 William Prigge, "The Latvian Purges of 1959: A Revision Study," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 35, no. 3 (2004): 211-230.

19 Antonio Costa Pinto, "Political Purges and State Crisis in Portugal's Transition to Democracy, 1975-1976," *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (2008): 305-332.

1908. This dissertation asserts that the primary reason for this increasing stateness was the attempt by Unionists to monopolize power both in high politics and in the state bureaucracy. This was made possible by the mass elimination of actual and potential opponents from within the bureaucracy and appointing associates in their place.

For Heper, stateness could arise when "a decrease in the isolation of a country, a conscious decision to modernize by drawing upon foreign models, and/or an increase in specialization in bureaucracy."[20] He is influenced by the neo-Weberian institutionalist explanation of the state, and his stress on the bureaucracy is based on the Weberian notion of professionalization. Moreover, Heper further hints at a model for the imminent modernization of "backward" states. The modernization process, he asserts, increases the level of stateness. Compared to states that have already realized modernization, the level of stateness may be higher in states still in the process of modernizing.[21]

Heper is inspired by Skocpol's statutory question: "What are the determinants of state autonomy and state capacities?"[22] As stated in chapter 1, given the autonomous nature of the state and its capacity to implement power and violence together with struggles in the international arena, neo-Weberians like Skocpol, Mann, and Tilly asked which outside actors shape the state apparatus. In the state cadres, bureaucrats who are independent of the dominant actors in society nevertheless have the power to shape state-centered ideology.

> it seems that organizationally coherent collectivities of state officials, especially collectivities of career officials relatively insulated from ties to currently dominant socioeconomic interests, are likely to launch distinctive new state strategies in times of crisis. Likewise, collectivities of officials may elaborate already established public policies in

20 Metin Heper, Introduction to *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective,* ed. Metin Heper (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1987), 4-5.

21 Ibid., 6.

22 Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 9.

distinctive ways, acting relatively continuously over long stretches of time.[23]

However, this explanation excludes an alternative: what if outside actors or career officials with links to dominant socio-political actors, were struggling to control the actual state mechanism? Could they not determine the ideological basis of the state without using the state for their own economic interests? Could they lay claim to be the state itself? Outside interest groups, as a check on the state's autonomy, would try to change a state designed for bureaucrats' own good, limiting this perspective of state autonomy. But what if certain groups within the bureaucratic as well as the political fields were struggling to be the autonomous actors of the autonomous state?

Considering Heper's and Skocpol's points on stateness, state capacity, and state autonomy together, this dissertation points to an alternative approach: while internal struggles within the state apparatus decrease the level of stateness, the conclusion of conflict – that is the control of state cadres by a specific group – increases stateness. In other words, a harsh conflict over control over the state apparatus via the appointment of its cadres would cause an eventual monopoly of the victors. And this could even result in the emergence of an authoritarian regime. This dissertation does not propose an alternative model to neo-Weberian stateness even if the events that took place in the Ottoman Empire during and after the 1908-1913 period call for such an analytic inquiry. Rather than to modernization, to international power relations, or to the increasing specificity of bureaucratic tasks, the case of the Ottoman Empire after 1913, which was characterized by growing stateness and state capacity, can be attributed to the everyday struggles played out over the everyday political agenda.

Therefore, scrutinizing the convergence between the upper-level politics and the administrative structure leads to grasp the struggle for the bureaucracy via the makeup of its cadres constituted a field of struggle among political elites to control the state apparatus. This materialized not only as governmental or parliamentary force, but also as the power to appoint and dismiss bureaucratic cadres. For the late Ottoman case, the struggle to

23 Ibid.

control the bureaucracy resulted in the emergence of an authoritarian tendency among the ruling elite, namely the CUP's triumvirate.

Appendix A Petitions of the *Tensikât* Victims

BOA	NAME	DATE	PREVIOUS POSITION
BEO 3384/253798	Haydarizade İbrahim Efendi	02 Ş. 1326	Maarif
BEO 3405/255334	Mehmed Aziz Bey	27 Ş. 1326	Hariciye
BEO 3423/256690	Mehmed Affan	07 L. 1326	Hariciye
ŞD 2775/60	İshak ve Mehmed Ali Efendi	13 L. 1326	Polis
DH.MKT. 2666/69	Mehlehek Paşa	28 L. 1326	Belediye
BEO 3472/260344	İmadeddin Efendi	23 Z. 1326	Maarif
DH.MKT. 2721/64	Nizameddin Bey	05 M. 1327	Hazine-i Hassa
DH.MKT. 2739/81	Ali Rıza	25 M. 1327	Posta ve Telgraf
MF.İBT. 227/57	Cemal Bey	22 S. 1327	Muallim
BEO 2529/264658	Mehmed ve Refailyan	14 Ra. 1327	Dahiliye
BEO 3530/264678	Abdullah Efendi	14 Ra. 1327	Ticaret ve Nafia
BEO 3548/266050	Damad Refik Bey	24 R. 1327	Şura-yı Devlet
BEO 3550/266241	Cafer Efendi	27 R. 1327	Mülga Teftiş azası
BEO 3559/266912	Halis Efendi	09 Ca. 1327	Meşihat
DH.EUM.SCL. 15/5	Süleyman Tevfik Efendi	09 Ca. 1327	Polis
BEO 3664/274773	Sadık Bin Mustafa	4 Za. 1327	Öğrenci
MF.MKT. 1144/34	Yusuf Hüsnü Efendi	17 Za. 1327	Muallim
DH.MUİ.52/17	İznavor	07 S. 1328	Polis
BEO 3708/278032	Nuri Bey	12 S. 1328	Senadat Umumiye
ŞD 3066/7	Edhem Efendi	19 B. 1328	Telgraf Memuru
BEO 3718/27884	Recai Bey	02 Ra. 1328	Vilayat-ı Mümtaze
ŞD 3070/5	Muhammed Şükrü Efendi	12 Ca. 1328	Maarif
ŞD 3070/68	Davud Hamdi	23 S. 1328	Adalet
ŞD 3070/55	Mehmed Nuri fendi	03 N. 1328	Rüsumat
DH.EUM.THR. 50/11	Hüseyin Hüsnü	10 N. 1328	Polis
ŞD 3071/35	Cemil Bey	29 N. 1328	Hariciye
ŞD 3070/67	Necmeddin Efendi	16 L. 1328	Meşihat
ŞD 3071/46	Rahmi Efendi	28 L. 1328	Posta ve Telgraf
ŞD 3070/78	Abdullah Lütfü Efendi	06 Za. 1328	Dahiliye
ŞD 3070/47	Halis Efendi	06 Za. 1328	Dahiliye
ŞD 3070/22	Mehmed Şakir Efendi	18 Za. 1328	Adalet
ŞD 3069/15	Mustafa Hikmet Efendi	03 Z. 1328	Dahiliye
BEO 3838/287834	Hüseyin Celaleddin Efendi	25 Z. 1328	Adalet

ŞD 3074/9	Eyüp Sabri Efendi	28 Z. 1328	Dahiliye
ŞD 3075/75	Demir Ferdi Efendi	06 M. 1329	Jandarma
DH.EUM.MH.. 23/56	Hasan Basri Efendi	08 M. 1329	Polis
BEO 2848/288578	Mahmud Hamdi ve Mahmud Nedim	21 M. 1329	Divan-ı Muhasebat
ŞD 3078/17	Timur Efendi	15 R. 1329	Jandarma
ŞD 3085/2	Feyzullah Efendi	16 R. 1329	Polis
ŞD 3082/40	Timur Ferdi	16 R. 1329	Jandarma
ŞD 2799/21	Ziver Efendi	12 Ca. 1329	Adalet
ŞD 3078/11	Mehmed Nuri Efendi	17 R. 1329	Hazine-i Hassa
ŞD 3082/41	Kadri Efendi	02 Ca. 1329	Defter-i Hakani
MF.İBT. 321/9	Muhteli istidalar	04 Ca. 1329	Maarif
ŞD 3100/86	Mehmed Tevfik	13 Ca. 1329	Polis
BEO 3894/291997	Remzi Efendi	17 Ca. 1329	Adalet
ŞD 3085/4	İsmail Efendi	14 C. 1329	Polis
ŞD 3084/11	Süleyman Efendi	18 C. 1329	Rüsumat Memuru
ŞD 3085/37	Arif Efendi	29 C. 1329	Ziraat bankası
ŞD 3085/9	Şerif Efendi	12 B. 1329	Dahiliye
ŞD 3085/40	Mustafa Muhsin Efendi	14 B. 1329	Polis
ŞS 3085/30	Ali Rıza Efendi	26 B. 1329	Adalet
ŞS 3090/29	Abdülkerim Efendi	12 L. 1329	Rüsumat
ŞD 3088/73	Yusuf Ziya Efendi	29 L. 1329	Polis
ŞD 3089/2	Hayreddin Efendi	29 L. 1329	Polis
ŞD 3088/18	İsmail Necip Efendi	10 Za. 1329	Adalet
ŞD 3089/13	Ahmed Hamdi Efendi	28 Za. 1329	Maarif
ŞD 3082/38	İsmail Hakkı Efendi	07 Z. 1329	Polis
ŞD 3108/69	Mustafa Nuri Efendi	01 M. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3095/32	Mehmed Ali Efendi	21 M. 1330	Adalet
ŞD 3104/50	Ali Rıza Efendi	28 M. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3104/72	İbrahim Ağa	13 S. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3096/20	Ali Sami Efendi	23 S. 1330	Posta ve Telgraf Nezareti
ŞD 3096/70	Abdülkadir Sırrı	24 S. 1330	Meskukat İdaresi
ŞD 3100/18	Mehmed Nuri Bey	24 S. 1330	Şur-yı Devlet
ŞD 3104/48	Abdülkadir Efendi	08 Ra. 1330	Orman
ŞD 3100/32	Nurullah Bey	01 R. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet

ŞD 3100/33	Ahmed Muhtar Bey	01 Ra. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3100/92	İbrahim Edhem Efendi	04 R. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3096/69	Rauf Bey	14 R. 1330	Dahiliye
ŞD 3101/20	Mustafa Mehmed Bey	18 R. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3100/50	Bekir Efendi	19 R. 1330	Ticaret ve Nafia
ŞD 3100/27	Kemal Efendi	19 R. 1330	Dahiliye
ŞD 3101/22	Kemal Bey	19 R. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3101/37	Burhaneddin Bey	22 R. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3101/51	Hüseyin Nazım bey	27 R. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3100/25	Tevfik Efendi	28 R. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3100/84	Mehmed	29 R. 1330	Hademe
ŞD 3100/82	Mustafa Efendi	04 Ca. 1330	Bekçi
ŞD 3101/18	Sadeddin Efendi	04 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3100/67	Cemal Efendi	06 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3089/34	Yusuf Süleyman	11 Ca. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3100/52	Mehmed Zühtü Efend	11 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3100/70	Mehmed Efendi	11 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3100/79	İsmail Efendi	13 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/27	Mustafa Hılmi Efendi	13 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3100/101	Simon Efendi	13 Ca. 1330	Nafia
ŞD 3101/40	Şükrü Bey	13 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/58	Köprülüzade Mazhar Bey	18 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3100/83	Mustafa Halim	19.95.1330	Adalet
ŞD 3100/28	İbrahim Efendi	21 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/29	Abdullah Efendi	22 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/57	Cemaleddin Efendi	22 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/59	Ahmed Efendi	22 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/61	Abdullah	22 Ca. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3033/50	Bektaş Efendi	25 Ca. 1339	Polis
ŞD 3100/106	Mehmed Efendi	01 C. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3100/68	Mahmud Cemaleddin Efendi	02 C. 1330	Adliye
ŞD 3101/32	Hasan Efendi	02 C. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/35	Mustafa Reşid Efendi	05 C. 1330	Belediye
ŞD 3101/50	Mehmed Turak Efendi	06 C. 1330	Nüfus


ŞD 3101/62	Mahmed Adil Efendi	13 C. 1330	Vergi Tahsil İdaresi
ŞD 3101/31	Mehmed Nuri Efendi ve Tahsin Efendi	17 C. 1330	Bahriye Nezareti
ŞD 3101/34	Nuri Efendi	17 C. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/47	Muhtar Efendi	18 C. 1330	Belediye
ŞD 3100/56	Salih Efendi	24 C. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/49	Abdülkadir Sırrı	25 C. 1330	Meskukat İdaresi
ŞD 3101/52	Hüseyin Efendi	01 B. 1330	Tersane-i Amire
ŞD 3101/45	Mehmed Emin Efendi	02 B. 1330	Belediye
ŞD 3101/54	Mustafa bin Süleyman	04 B. 1330	Polis
BEO 4058/304299	Mustafa Sabri Bey	17 B. 1330	Nüfus
ŞD 3104/59	Mehmed Yusuf Efendi	19 B. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3101/14	Mehmed Nail Efendi	21 B. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/14	Esad Efendi	22 B. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3101/43	Mehmed Efendi	22 B. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3104/45	Fehmi Efendi	09 Ş. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3104/3	Hılmi Efendi	12 S. 1330	Adalet
ŞD 3104/68	Nail Efendi	12 S. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3100/88	Muhtar Efendi	24 Ş. 1330	Orman
ŞD 3104/1	İbrahim Ağa	24 Ş. 1330	Bahriye Nezareti
ŞD 3104/44	Talat Efendi	02 N. 1330	Posta ve Telgraf
ŞD 3100/87	Yusuf bin Hasan	09 N. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3104/26	Behram Efendi	21 N. 1330	Ziraat Bankası
ŞD 3108/4	Mehmud Nuri Bey	23 N. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/24	Adnan Bey	29.00.1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/15	Tevfik Bey	30 N. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3100/93	Abdullah Efendi	05 L. 1330	Hapishane-i Umumi
ŞD 3108/31	Cemil Efendi	05 L. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/30	Osman Efendi	05 L. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/41	Refik Efendi	06 L. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/47	Mustafa Muzaffer Bey	07 L. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/46	Abdurrauf Bey	07 L. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/32	İbrahim Efendi	09 L. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3103/23	Nesim veled-i Niya	10 L. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3103/23	Selim Efendi	10 L. 1330	Adalet

ŞD 3108/20	Bosnalı Rıfat Rıza	11 L. 1330	Belediye
ŞD 3108/61	Ali Nureddin Efendi	11 L. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/63	Burhan Bey	11 L. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3108/68	Ahmed EdİB Efendi	19 L. 1330	Dahiliye
ŞD 3108/44	Mehmed Cemal Efendi	20 L. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3108/28	Şakir Bin MusA	20 L. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3108/48	Reşid Efendi	23 L. 1330	Adalet
ŞD 3108/38	Abdülkadir Efendi	03 Za. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3108/51	İsmail Hakkı Efendi	03 Za. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3101/2	Ahmed Subhi Bey	03 Za. 1330	Dahiliye
ŞD 3101/39	Hüseyin Cemal Efendi	03 Za. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3108/40	Mürüvvet bin Elmas	06 Za. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3108/53	Mehmed Yaver Efendi	08 Za. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3110/1	Osman Nuri Efendi	15 Za. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3110/27	Hüseyin Akif Efendi	15 Za. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3108/1	Malatyalı Ahmed Efendi	16 Za. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3108/49	Abdullah Ağa	18 Za. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3110/9	Mehmed Refik Efendi	25 Za. 1330	Dahiliye
ŞD 3108/45	İshak Efendi	01 Z. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3110/70	Abdülkerim Efendi	14 Z. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3110/74	Osman bin . İbrahim	16 Z. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3110/24	Refik Bey	20 Z. 1330	Şura-yı Devlet
ŞD 3110/51	Ali Haydar Efendi	22 Z. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3104/52	Hasan Fehmi Efendi	28 Z. 1330	Rüsumat
ŞD 3110/25	Mehmed Emin Efendi	29 Z. 1330	Polis
ŞD 3110/53	Hüseyin Basri	06 M. 1331	Hazine-i Hassa
ŞD 3110/44	Ahmed Şükrü Efendi	23 M. 1331	Polis
ŞD 3108/23	Mehmet Rıfat Efendi	26 M. 1331	Rüsumat
ŞD 3110/52	Todori Efendi	27 M. 1331	Polis
ŞD 3108/56	Mehmed Cemil	04 S. 1331	Polis
ŞD 3110/75	Mehmed Tevfik Efendi	06 S. 1331	Muhasebe
ŞD 3108/65	Mehmed Rıfat Efendi	11 S. 1331	Hazine-i Hassa
ŞD 3100/38	Halil Efendi	12 S. 1331	Polis
ŞD 3108/57	Mehmed Dilaver Efendi	12 S. 1331	Rüsumat

ŞD 3110/78	Mehmed Bin Yakub	12 S. 1331	Polis
ŞD 3101/28	İsmail Hakkı Efendi	12 S. 1331	Polis
ŞD 3108/3	Edhem Bin Osman	12 S. 1331	Polis

SOURCE *BOA*

Appendix B Midhat Pasha's Nephew Mehmed Aziz Bey's Petition


T.C. BAŞBAKANLIK OSMANLI ARŞİVİ DAİRE BAŞKANLIĞI (BOA) ©

BEO.003405.255334.002


Huzur-u sâmi-i hazret-i sadâret-penâhiye

Mahruse-i çaker-i kemineleridir,
Kulları bu milleti muhafaza-i osmaniyeye saadat-ı ebediyye bahşettirmek içün feda-yı can ederek şehid-ü vefat eden Midhat Paşa'nın hemşirezadesi olub, idare-i müstebidde zamanında envai tahkirata katlanarak ecdadımızın takib etmiş oldukları selamet-i vatan-ı tarik-i müstakiminde sebat etmiş ve nihayet hariciye nezaret-i celilesi mektubcusu münir ve mühürdarı asaf beylerle emsalinin evlad-ı vatana karşı yapmış oldukları ahval-i zalimaneye tahammül edmeyerek bundan bir kaç sene mukaddem hicaza gitmek bahanesiyle mısır canibine giriş etmiş idim. Mahal-i mezkurda devam-ı ikametim olan üç buçuk mah zarfında yemen ahalisinin bu gibi memurin yüzünden uğradıkları felaketlere muhibb-i vatan bulunmak hasebiyle vicdan-ı acizanem kail olamadığından safahandanından olub son derece de du-çar zulm olmuş olan ve firaren adana ve adanadan dahi mısıra gelen ahmed beyle bi'l-ittifaken Namı altında bir gazete neşrine muvaffık olmuş isem de paranın fikdanındannaşi bir bahane ile ve hiçbir mükafat talebinde bulunmayarak dersaadete avdet etmiş idim. Takibinde devam eylediğim şu mülk yüzünden muma ileyhim ve asaf beyler ağraz-ı sahısalarını abd-ı ahkarları hakkında birkez daha tezyid ederek ve sirkeş ünvanı altına alarak nezaret-i müşarünileyhde vukıubulan on üç seneyi mütecaviz hizmetim indlerinde kaidelim hükmünde tutularak ba-imtihan ihrazını muvaffık olduğum ikinci sınıf hülefalık maaş yediyüzelli guruş olduğu halde acizlerini iküyüzyetmiş guruş bırakıp bu kere bunda kanaat edemeyerek idare-i sabıka-i zalimanede bile emsali görülmemiş olan ve imzalarla yapılan cedvelde tarafdarlıklarını isbat edecek bulan tensikat-ı hariciyede kadro haricine çıkararak bâr-u ağyere karşı eba ve ecdadımızla beraber bunca senelerden berü fezaat olduğumuz şerefi bu yüzden olsun ami-yü vahiddeliğe dar etmeğe sebebiyet vermiş oldukları ve ailemiz gibi muhibb-i vatan bulundukları nice delail ile müsbet bulunanların böyle bir zaman-ı adalette idare-i müstebidde tarafdaranı ayakları altında az bilerek perişan edilmekliğimize

ne millet-i Osmaniye ve ne de merhamet-i padişah-ı fehimaneleri kail olamayacağından hülasa muvafak surette hukukumun muhafazasıyla mazuriyetimi ihbar ederim. Ol bâbda emr-ü ferman hazret-i veliyyü'l-emrindir.

27 şaban 1326
Mektubi-i hariciye hulefasından
Mehmed Aziz

Appendix C Halis Bey's Petition (Former Qaimaqam of Beykoz)



ŞD.03070.00047.006

Tedkîk-i Tensikât Komisyonu Heyet-i Muhteremesine

Nüsha ve merbuta-i takdim kılınan sicilime ve şimdiye kadar bulunduğum hidmetlerde vücuda getirdiğim aşara nazaran vatana tam hidmet idecek bir zamanda iken tekaüd eyledim. Biz de bu vatanın evladıyız. Meşrutiyetin bahs ettiği nimet-i adaletten mahrumiyeti hiç bir vakit kabul edemem. Heyet-i muhteremelerinin insaf ve adaletine iltica ediyorum. *17 Kanun-i Evvel 1325*

Fatih civarında sarıkız mahallesinde
yağhane sokağındaki hanede sakin
Beykoz kaymakam-ı sâbıkı
Halis Bey

Appendix D Governor Appointments, (1908 August-1912 October)

Name	Previous Position	Appointment	Ottoman Hicri Calender	Gregorian Calender
Daniş Bey	İstinaf Mahkemesi Reisi	Selanik Valisi	21 B. 1326	Aug. 19, 1908
Rauf Paşa	Vezir/Şehremini	Aydın Valisi	23 B. 1326	Aug. 21, 1908
Muharrem Efendi	Gümülcine Mutasarrıfı	Basra Valisi	5 Ş. 1326	Sep. 2, 1908
Mehmed Reşid Paşa	Serez Mutasarrıfı	Edirne Valisi	8 Ş. 1326	Sep. 5, 1908
Hacı Arif Paşa	Mardin Mutasarrıfı	Trabzon Valisi	8 Ş. 1326	Sep. 5, 1908
Subhi Bey	Ticaret Müdürü	Kudüs Mutasarrıfı	21 Ş. 1326	Sep. 18, 1908
Ahmed Reşid Bey	Ankara Valisi	Halep Valisi	30 Ş. 1326	Sep. 27, 1908
Mehmed Nazım Paşa	Haleb Valisi	Konya Valisi	30 Ş. 1326	Sep. 27, 1908
Cevad Bey	Kütahya Valisi	Adana Valisi	30 Ş. 1326	Sep. 27, 1908
Seyfeddin Bey	Maliye Nezareti Memur	İşkodra Valisi	7 N. 1326	Oct. 3, 1908
Ebubekir Hazım Bey	Sivas Valisi	Ankara Valisi	7 N. 1326	Oct. 3, 1908
Nuri Bey	İşkodra Valisi	Sivas Valisi	7 N. 1326	Oct. 3, 1908
Nusret Paşa	Midilli Sancağı Mutasarrıfı	M.Aziz Valisi	19 N. 1326	Oct. 15, 1908
Tahir Paşa	Bitlis Valisi	Erzurum Valisi	29 N. 1326	Oct. 25, 1908
Süleyman Şevki Paşa	Trabzon Redif Kumandanı	Diyarbekir Valisi	7 L. 1326	Nov. 2, 1908
Abdullah Paşa	Rical-i Devlet	Trablusgarb Valisi	9 L. 1326	Nov. 4, 1908
Ferid paşa	Trablusşam Mutasarrıfı	Van Valiliği	10 L. 1326	Nov. 5, 1908
Hasan Tahsin Paşa	Kumandan	Yemen Valisi	28 L. 1326	Nov. 23, 1908
Ali Rıza Bey	Van Valisi	Kastamonu Valisi	2 ZA. 1326	Nov. 26, 1908
Kazım Paşa	Hicaz Demiryolu Nazırı	Hicaz Valisi	4 ZA. 1326	Nov. 28, 1908
Necmeddin Bey	İstinaf-ı Ticaret Mahkemesi	Bağdad Valisi	7 ZA. 1326	Dec. 1, 1908
Edhem Bey	Şura-yı Devlet Tanzimat Dairesi	Beyrut Valisi	25 ZA. 1326	Dec. 19, 1908
Mustafa Vefik Bey	Rusumat Nazırı	Sivas Valisi	25 ZA. 1326	Dec. 19, 1908
Nazım Paşa	Beyrut Valisi	Suriye Valisi	25 ZA. 1326	Dec. 19, 1908
Mehmed Hadi Paşa	Ferikân-ı Kiramdan	Kosova Valisi	26 ZA. 1326	Dec. 20, 1908
Fahri Paşa	Kumandan-ı Kiramdan	Manastır Valisi	29 ZA. 1326	Dec. 23, 1908
Ahmed Fevzi Paşa	Harbiye Levazım Dairesi Reisi	Trablusgarb Valisi	4 Z. 1326	Dec. 28, 1908
Bedri Paşa	Erkan-ı Harbiye	İşkodra Valisi	17 Z. 1326	Jan. 10, 1909
Nazım Paşa	Müfettiş-i Sabık	Yanya Valisi	25 Z. 1326	Jan. 18, 1909
Ahmed Reşid Paşa	Bitlis Valisi	Musul Valisi	8 M. 1327	Jan. 30, 1909
Hüsnü Bey	Serfice Sancağı	Bitlis Valisi	8 M. 1327	Jan. 30, 1909
Mahmud Bey	Kozan Mutasarrıfı	Zor Mutasarrıfı	9 M. 1327	Jan. 31, 1909
Ali Galib Bey	Posta ve Telgraf Nazırı	Aydın Valisi	4 S. 1327	Feb. 25, 1909
Ali Rıza Bey	Kastamonu Valisi	Yanya Valisi	4 S. 1327	Feb. 25, 1909
Ömer Âli Bey	Mutasarrıf	Kastamonu Valisi	4 S. 1327	Feb. 25, 1909

Name	Previous Position	Appointment	Ottoman Hicri Calender	Gregorian Calender
Mardini Arif Bey	Şura-yı Devlet Azası	Basra Valisi	15 S. 1327	Mar. 8, 1909
Ferid Paşa	Ayan Azası	Aydın Valisi	29 S. 1327	Mar. 22, 1909
Tevfik bey	Hüdavendigar Valisi	Ankara Valisi	2 RA. 1327	Mar. 24, 1909
Mustafa Zihni Paşa	Burdur Mutasarrıfı	Adana Valisi	3 CA. 1327	May 23, 1909
Mehmed Hadi Paşa	Kosova Valisi	Hicaz Valisi	14 CA. 1327	June 3, 1909
Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa	Selanik Feriki	Kosova Valisi	19 CA. 1327	June 8, 1909
Mehmed Celal Bey	Darülfunun ve Mekteb-i Mülkiye	Erzurum Valisi	21 CA. 1327	June 10, 1909
Mehmed Ali Bey	Lazkiye Mutasarrıfı	Mamuretülaziz Vali V.	22 CA. 1327	June 11, 1909
Galib Paşa	Bingazi Mutasarrıfı	Diyarbekir Valisi	24 CA. 1327	June 13, 1909
Cevat Bey	Lazkiye Mutasarrıfı	Bingazi Mutasarrıfı	2 C. 1327	June 21, 1909
Fuad Paşa	Manastır Fırka Kumandanı	Hicaz Valisi	5 C. 1327	June 24, 1909
Şevket Paşa	Birinci Ordu Ferikanından	Bağdad Valisi	6 C. 1327	June 25, 1909
Hüsnü Bey	Bitlis Valisi	Kastamonu Valisi	7 C. 1327	June 26, 1909
Mustafa Vefik Bey	Sivas Valisi	Konya Valisi	8 C. 1327	June 27, 1909
Mehmed Nazım Paşa	Konya Valisi	Sivas Valisi	9 C. 1327	June 28, 1909
Cemal Bey (Paşa)	Üsküdar Muhafızı	Adana Vali Vekaleti	27 B. 1327	Aug. 14, 1909
Bekir Sami Bey	Van Vali Vekili	Van Valisi	4 Ş. 1327	Aug. 21, 1909
Mahmut Muhtar Paşa	1.Ordu Kumandan-ı Sâbıkı	Aydın Valisi	19 Ş. 1327	Sep. 5, 1909
Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa	Kosova Valisi	Trablusgarb Valisi	21 Ş. 1327	Sep. 7, 1909
Mazhar bey	Mutasarrıf	Kosova Valisi	21 Ş. 1327	Sep. 7, 1909
Mehmed Reşid Paşa	Edirne Valisi	Cezayir Bahr-i s. Valisi	27 Ş. 1327	Sep. 13, 1909
Halil Bey	Müfettiş-i Umumiye Vekili	Manastır Valisi	27 Ş. 1327	Sep. 13, 1909
Ferid Paşa	Van Vali-i Sâbıkı	Ankara Valisi	27 Ş. 1327	Sep. 13, 1909
Nazım Paşa	Suriye Vali-i Sabık	Beyrut Valisi	27 Ş. 1327	Sep. 13, 1909
İsmail Fazıl Paşa	İzmir Fırka Kumandanı	Suriye Valisi	27 Ş. 1327	Sep. 13, 1909
İ. Hayrullah Bey	Mahkeme-i İstinaf Azası	selanik Valisi	7 N. 1327	Sep. 22, 1909
Süleyman Nazif Bey	Hüdavendigar Mektubi Esbakı	Basra Valisi	8 N. 1327	Sep. 23, 1909
Fahri Paşa	Manastır Vali-i Sabıkı	Haleb Valisi	11 N. 1327	Sep. 26, 1909
Cemal Bey	Kayseri sancağı mutasarrıfı	İzmit mutasarrıfı	18 N. 1327	Oct. 3, 1909
Hacı Adil Bey	Selanik Rusumat Nazırı	Edirne Valisi	27 N. 1327	Oct. 12, 1909
Şevket Paşa	Bağdad Valisi ve 6. Ordu Kumandanı	Hicaz Valisi	11 L. 1327	Oct. 26, 1909
Mustafa Bey	Şura-yı Devlet Mülkiye Dairesi Azası	Trabzon Valisi	24 L. 1327	Nov. 8, 1909
Mehmed Fazıl Paşa	6. Ordu Kumandanlarından	Musul Valisi	3 ZA. 1327	Nov. 16, 1909
Nâzım Paşa	Şura-yı Askerî Azası	Bağdad Valisi	17 ZA. 1327	Nov. 30, 1909


Name	Previous Position	Appointment	Ottoman Hicri Calender	Gregorian Calender
Mustafa Zihni Paşa	Sabıken Adana Vilayeti Valisi	Yanya Valisi	1 Z. 1327	Dec. 14, 1909
Azmi Bey	Rical-i Devlet	Hüdavendigar Valisi	22 Z. 1327	Jan. 4, 1910
Mehmed Ali Paşa	Erkan-ı Harbiye Mirlivası	yemen Valisi	2 R. 1328	Apr. 13, 1910
Cemal Azmi Bey	Zabtiye Nezareti Muavinlerinden	Kudüs Mutasarrıfı	3 R. 1328	Apr. 14, 1910
Kamil Bey	Sivas Valisi	Hicaz Valisi	7 C. 1328	May 27, 1910
Emin Bey	Hicaz Vali Vekili	Sivas Valisi	7 C. 1328	May 27, 1910
Nureddin Bey	Şura-yı Devlet Mülkiye Dairesi Reisi	Beyrut Valisi	27 C. 1328	June 6, 1910
Hacı Arif Paşa	Trabzon Valisi (sabıken)	Konya Valisi	25 C. 1328	July 4, 1910
Tahir paşa	Sabıken Erzurum vilayeti	Bitlis Valisi	26 C. 1328	July 5, 1910
Ziver Bey	Esbak-ı Şehremaneti	Medine	29 C. 1328	July 8, 1910
İbrahim Paşa	Kumandan	Trablusgarb Valisi	29 Ş. 1328	Sep. 5, 1910
Hüseyin Kazım Bey	Siroz Sancağı mutasarrıfı	Haleb Valisi	8 N. 1328	Sep. 13, 1910
Ali Münif Bey	Sabık Görice Mutasarrıfı	Ankara Valisi	18 N. 1328	Sep. 23, 1910
Hüsnü Bey	Kastamonu Valisi	Hüdavendigar Valisi	21 N. 1328	Sep. 26, 1910
Azmi bey	Hüdavendigar Valisi	Kastamonu valiliği	21 N. 1328	Sep. 26, 1910
Süleyman Nazif Bey	Basra Vali-i Sabıkı	Kastamonu valiliği	25 ZA. 1328	Nov. 28, 1910
Nazım Paşa	Bağdad Valisi	Aydın Valisi	1 Z. 1328	Dec. 4, 1910
İbrahim Bey	Siird Mutasarrıfı	Cezayir Bahr-i S. Valisi	18 Z. 1328	Dec. 21, 1910
Galib Bey	Mahkeme-i Temiz Azası	Suriye Valisi	19 Z. 1328	Dec. 22, 1910
Mehmed Reşid Paşa	Cezayir Bahr-i Sefid Valisi	Manastır Valisi	22 Z. 1328	Dec. 25, 1910
Halil Bey	Manastır Valisi	Kosova Valisi	22 Z. 1328	Dec. 25, 1910
Mazhar Bey	Kosova Valisi	Edirne Valisi	22 Z. 1328	Dec. 25, 1910
Bekir Sami Bey	Van Valisi	Trabzon Valisi	7 M. 1329	Jan. 8, 1911
Alaadin Bey	Priştine Mutasarrıfı	Sivas Vali Vekaleti	11 M. 1329	Jan. 12, 1911
İsmai Hakkı Bey	Bitlis Vali Vekili	Bitlis Valisi	30 S. 1329	Mar. 1, 1911
Ebubekir Hazım Bey	Şehremini Esbakı	Hicaz Valisi	4 RA. 1329	Mar. 5, 1911
Ali Nazım Bey	Muş Mutasarrıfı	Van Vali Vekaleti	13 RA. 1329	Mar. 14, 1911
Celaleddin Bey	Çatalca Mutasarrıfı	Zor Mutasarrıflığı	27 R. 1329	Apr. 27, 1911
Mahmud Bey	Zor sancağı mutasarrıflığı	Çatalca Mutasarrıfı	27 R. 1329	Apr. 27, 1911
Muammer Bey	Kayseri Sancağı Mutasarrıfı	Adana Valisi	16 C. 1329	June 14, 1911
Mustafa Nedim Bey	Adliye Nezareti Münşarı	İşkodra Valisi	16 C. 1329	June 14, 1911
Mehmed Celal Bey	Erzurum Valisi	Edirne Valisi	19 Ş. 1329	June 15, 1911
Hüseyin Celal Bey	Basra Valisi	Diyarbekir Valisi	19 Ş. 1329	June 15, 1911
Süleyman Nazif Bey	Kastamonu Valisi	Trabzon Valisi	19 Ş. 1329	June 15, 1911
Emin Bey	Sabık Sivas Valisi	Erzurum Valisi	19 Ş. 1329	June 15, 1911

Name	Previous Position	Appointment	Ottoman Hicri Calender	Gregorian Calender
Hasan Rıza Paşa	Miralay	Basra Valisi	19 Ş. 1329	June 15, 1911
Sami Bey	Sultaniye Mutasarrıfı	Maresi Mutasarrıfı	19 Ş. 1329	June 15, 1911
Cevdet Bey	Bingazi Mutasarrıfı	Kudüs Mutasarrıfı	24 C. 1329	June 22, 1911
Cemal Bey (Paşa)	Adana Valisi	Bağdad Valisi	21 B. 1329	July 18, 1911
Mehmed Reşid Paşa	Manastır Valisi	Ankara Valisi	26 B. 1329	July 23, 1911
Ali Münif Bey	Ankara Valisi	Manastır Valisi	2 Ş. 1329	July 29, 1911
Bekir Sami Bey	Trabzon Valisi	Trablusgarb Valisi	19 Ş. 1329	Aug. 15, 1911
Mazhar Bey	Edirne Valisi	Haleb Valisi	19 Ş. 1329	Aug. 15, 1911
Galib Paşa	Diyarbekir Valisi	Kastamonu valiliği	19 Ş. 1329	Aug. 15, 1911
Raşid Bey	Dahiliye Nezareti Muhaberat-ı Umumi	Sultaniye Mutasarrıfı	30 Ş. 1329	Aug. 26, 1911
Subhi Bey	Şehremini abıkı	Cezayir Bahr-i S. Valisi	21 L. 1329	Oct. 15, 1911
Ebubekir Hazım Bey	Hicaz Valisi	Beyrut Valisi	21 L. 1329	Oct. 15, 1911
Ali Nazım Bey	Van Valisi	Mamuretülaziz Valisi	9 ZA. 1329	Nov. 1, 1911
İsmai Hakkı Bey	Bitlis Valisi	Van Valisi	15 ZA. 1329	Nov. 7, 1911
Mehmed Ali Bey	Mamuretülaziz Valisi	Bitlis Valisi	15 ZA. 1329	Nov. 7, 1911
Mazhar Bey	İstanbul Polis Müdür-ü Umumisi	Konya Valisi	29 ZA. 1329	Nov. 21, 1911
Neşet Bey	Miralay/Trablusgarb Kumandanı	Trabzon Valisi (ilave)	22 Z. 1329	Dec. 14, 1911
Muammer Bey	Adana Valisi	Konya Valisi	8 S. 1330	Jan. 28, 1912
Mustafa Nedim Bey	İşkodra Valisi	Adana Valisi	8 S. 1330	Jan. 28, 1912
Mustafa Zihni Paşa	Yanya Valisi	Hicaz Valisi	8 S. 1330	Jan. 28, 1912
Galib Bey	Suriye Valisi	Haleb Valisi	8 S. 1330	Jan. 28, 1912
Mehmed Ali Bey	Bitlis Valisi	Hanya Valisi	8 S. 1330	Jan. 28, 1912
Emin Bey	İstanbul	Kastamonu valiliği	10 S. 1330	Jan. 30, 1912
Ahmed Nedim	Divanı Umumiye Baş Müdürü	Bitlis Valisi	10 S. 1330	Jan. 30, 1912
Hayri Paşa	Mutasarrıf	İşkodra Valisi	10 S. 1330	Jan. 30, 1912
Kazım Bey	Sabık Şehremini	Selanik Valisi	10 S. 1330	Jan. 30, 1912
Halil Bey	Hicaz Vali-i Sabıkı	Edirne Valisi	14 S. 1330	Feb. 3, 1912
Nâzım Paşa	Aydın Valisi ve Vüzera-yı Saltanat	Suriye Valisi	14 S. 1330	Feb. 3, 1912
Mehmed Celal Bey	Dahiliye Nâzır-ı Sabıkı	Aydın Valisi	14 S. 1330	Feb. 3, 1912
Bekir Sami Bey	Trablusgarb Vali-i Sabıkı	Trabzon Valisi	17 S. 1330	Feb. 7, 1912
Vagluri Efendi	Mersin Mutasarrıfı	Sisam Ceziresi Beyliği	7 R. 1330	Mar. 26, 1912
Hasan Rıza Bey	İşkodara Miralayı	İşkodra Valisi	12 R. 1330	Mar. 31, 1912
Enver Bey	İşkodra	Bingazi Mutasarrıfı	3 CA. 1330	Apr. 20, 1912
Cemal Bey	Siverek Mutasarrıfı	Bolu Mutasarrıfı	21 B. 1330	July 6, 1912

Name	Previous Position	Appointment	Ottoman Hicri Calender	Gregorian Calender
Cevdet Bey	Kudus-u Şerif Mutasarrıfı	Karesi Mutasarrıfı	21 B. 1330	July 6, 1912
Kâni Bey	Bolu Mutasarrıfı	Canik Mutasarrıfı	21 B. 1330	July 6, 1912
Mihri Bey	Canik Sancağı Mutasarrıfı	Kudüs Mutasarrıfı	21 B. 1330	July 6, 1912
Sami Bey	Karesi Sancağı Mutasarrıfı	Konya Valisi	21 B. 1330	July 6, 1912
Ali Rıza Bey	Yanya Vali-i Esbakı	Konya Valisi	16 N. 1330	Aug. 2, 1912
Galib Paşa	Kastamonu Valisi	Konya Valisi	22 Ş. 1330	Aug. 6, 1912
Hasan Tahsin Paşa	5.Kolordu Kumandanlığı	Yanya Valisi	9 N. 1330	Aug. 13, 1912
Hasan Basri Bey	Miralay	Medine Muhafızlığı	9 N. 1330	Aug. 13, 1912
Ahmed Reşid Paşa	Musul Vali-i Esbakı	Erzurum Valisi	13 N. 1330	Aug. 26, 1912
Ahmed Reşid Bey	Haleb Vali-i Esbakı	Aydın Valisi	13 N. 1330	Aug. 26, 1912
Edhem Bey	Beyrut Vali-i Esbakı	Beyrut Valisi	16 N. 1330	Aug. 29, 1912
Ebubekir Hazım Bey	Beyrut Valisi	Haleb Valisi	16 N. 1330	Aug. 29, 1912
Mehmed Ali Bey	Yanya Valisi	Trabzon Valisi	16 N. 1330	Aug. 29, 1912
Kamil Bey	Dahiliiye Nezareti Müsteşarı	Sivas Valisi	4 L. 1330	Sep. 16, 1912
Mehmed Galib Bey	Beyoğlu Mutasarrıf	Kastamonu valiliği	4 L. 1330	Sep. 16, 1912
Ali Paşa	Zabtıye Nazır-ı Esbakı	Bitlis Valisi	4 L. 1330	Sep. 16, 1912
Kazım Paşa	Selanik Valisi	Suriye Valisi	4 L. 1330	Sep. 16, 1912
İzzet Bey	Hariciye Nezareti Kalemi Müdürü	Van Valisi	5 L. 1330	Sep. 17, 1912
Mustafa Vefik Bey	Sivas Vali-i Esbakı	Haleb Valisi	5 L. 1330	Sep. 17, 1912
Ferid Paşa	Mirliva	Selanik Vali Vekaleti	6 L. 1330	Sep. 18, 1912
Emin Bey	Kastamonu Valisi	Adana Valisi	6 L. 1330	Sep. 18, 1912
Behçet Bey	Şura-yı Devlet Azası	Manastır Valisi	7 L. 1330	Sep. 19, 1912
Ohannes Ferid Bey	Limni Mutasarrıfı	Canik Mutasarrıfı	7 L. 1330	Sep. 19, 1912
Zeki Paşa	4. Ordu-yu Şerif Şüşiri	Bağdad Valisi	9 L. 1330	Sep. 21, 1912
Cemal Bey	İzmit Mutasarrıfı	Mamuretülaziz Valisi	11 L. 1330	Sep. 23, 1912
Mehmed Nazım Paşa	Sivas Vali-i Esbakı	Selanik Valisi	19 L. 1330	Oct. 1, 1912
Halil Paşa	Beyrut Viyaeti Esbakı	Hüdavendigar Valisi	19 L. 1330	Oct. 1, 1912
İbrahim Susa Efendi	Posta Nazırı Esbakı	Ankara Valisi	19 L. 1330	Oct. 1, 1912
Muhiddin Paşa	Denizli Mutasarrıfı	İzmit Mutasarrıfı	19 L. 1330	Oct. 1, 1912
Ahmed Reşid Paşa	Musul Vali-i Esbakı	Hicaz Valisi	20 L. 1330	Oct. 2, 1912
Ali Ekrem Bey	Sabık Cezayir Bahr-i Sefid Valisi	Cezayir Bahr-i S. Valisi	27 L. 1330	Oct. 9, 1912

SOURCE *BÂB-I ÂSÂFÎ TEVCIHÂT-I MÜLKYE DEFTERLERI*

Appendix E Appointments of Cemal Bey, Bekir Sami Bey, Mahmud Muhtar Bey, Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha and Mazhar Bey (in August-September 1909) in *Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye Defterleri*



Bibliography

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS FROM BOA (STATE ARCHIVES OF TURKEY):

BOA. A.{DVNS.TVCM.d.	*Bâb-ı Âsâfî Tevcihât-ı Mülkiye Defterleri*
BOA. A.}MKT.MHM	*Sadâret Mektubi Mühimme Kalemi Evrakı*
BOA.BEO.	*Bâb-ı Âlî Evrak Odası*
BOA.BEO.İ.KAN.	*Bâb-ı Âlî Evrak Odası İrâde Kanun ve Nizamât*
BOA.DH.EUM.MH.	*Emniyet-i Umumiye Muhasebe Kalemi Evrakı*
BOA.DH.EUM.MEM.	*Emniyet-i Umumiye Memurin Kalemi Evrakı*
BOA.DH.EUM.SCL.	Emniyet-i Umumiye Sicil Kalemi Evrakı
BOA.DH.EUM.THR.	*Emniyet-i Umumiye Tahrirat Kalemi Evrakı*
BOA.DH.MKT.	*Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi*
BOA.DH.MTV	*Dahiliye Nezareti Mütenevvia Evrakı*
BOA.DH.MUİ	*Dahiliye Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi Evrakı*
BOA.DH.SAİD.d.	*Dahiliye Nezareti Sicill-i Ahval Defterleri*
BOA.HR.SAİD.	*Hariciye Nezareti Sicill-i Ahvâl*
BOA.HRT.h.	*Haritalar*
BOA.HSDHADB.	*Hacı Adil Bey Evrakı*
BOA.İ.AS.	*İrâde Askerî*
BOA.İ.DH.	*İrâde Dahiliye*
BOA.İ.TAL.	*İrâde Taltifât*
BOA.MF.İBT.	*Maarif Nezareti Tedrisat-ı İbtidaiyye Kalemi*
BOA.MF.MKT.	*Maarif Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi*
BOA.MV.	*Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları*
BOA.ŞD.	*Şurâ-yı Devlet*
BOA.TFR.I.M.	*Rumeli Müfettişliği Müteferrika Evrak*
BOA.TFR.I.MN	*Rumeli Müfettişliği Manastır Evrakı*
BOA.TS.MA.e	*Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı*
BOA.Y.EE.	*Yıldız Esas Evrakı*
BOA.Y.EE.KP.	*Yıldız Kamil Paşa Evrakı*
BOA.ZB.	*Zabtiye*

NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Dalkavuk
Memurîn
Neyyir-i Hakikât
Saadet Gazetesi
Şehbal Mecmuası
Tanin
Tercümân-ı Hakikât
Volkan

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

B.D.F.A British Documents on Foreign Affairs
M.M.Z.C *Meclis-i Mebusân Zabıt Cerideleri*

"The Ottoman Constitution, Promulgated the 7th Zilbridje, 1293 (11/23 December 1876)," *The American Journal of International Law,* Vol. 2, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (Oct., 1908): 367-387. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212668

PETITIONS

BEO	2529/264658; 2848/288578; 3384/253798; 3405/255334; 3423/256690; 3472/260344; 3530/264678; 3548/266050; 3550/266241; 3559/266912; 3664/274773; 3708/278032; 3718/27884; 3838/287834; 3894/291997; 4058/304299
DH. EUM. MH.	23/56
DH.EUM.SCL.	15/5
DH.EUM.THR.	50/11
DH.MKT.	2666/69; 2721/64; 2739/81
DH.MUİ.	52/17
MF.İBT.	22757; 303/76; 321/9
MF.MKT.	1144/34

ŞD	2775/60; 2799/21; 3033/50; 3066/7; 3069/15; 3070/22; 3070/47; 3070/5; 3070/55; 3070/67; 3070/68; 3070/78; 3071/35; 3071/46; 3074/9; 3075/75; 3078/11; 3078/17; 3082/38; 3082/40; 3082/41; 3084/11; 3085/2; 3085/30; 3085/37; 3085/4; 3085/40; 3085/9; 3088/18; 3088/73; 3089/13; 3089/2; 3089/34; 3090/29; 3095/32; 3096/20; 3096/69; 3096/70; 3100/101; 3100/106; 3100/18; 3100/25; 3100/27; 3100/28; 3100/32; 3100/33; 3100/38; 3100/50; 3100/52; 3100/56; 3100/67; 3100/68; 3100/70; 3100/79; 3100/82; 3100/83; 3100/84; 3100/86; 3100/87; 3100/88; 3100/92; 3100/93; 3101/14; 3101/14; 3101/18; 3101/2; 3101/20; 3101/22; 3101/27; 3101/28; 3101/29; 3101/31; 3101/32; 3101/34; 3101/35; 3101/37; 3101/39; 3101/40; 3101/43; 3101/45; 3101/47; 3101/49; 3101/50; 3101/51; 3101/52; 3101/54; 3101/57; 3101/58; 3101/59; 3101/61; 3101/62; 3103/23; 3103/23; 3104/1; 3104/26; 3104/3; 3104/44; 3104/45; 3104/48; 3104/50; 3104/52; 3104/59; 3104/68; 3104/72; 3108/1; 3108/15; 3108/20; 3108/23; 3108/24; 3108/28; 3108/3; 3108/30; 3108/31; 3108/32; 3108/38; 3108/4; 3108/40; 3108/41; 3108/44; 3108/45; 3108/46; 3108/47; 3108/48; 3108/49; 3108/51; 3108/53; 3108/56; 3108/57; 3108/61; 3108/63; 3108/65; 3108/68; 3108/69; 3110/24; 3110/25; 3110/27; 3110/44; 3110/51; 3110/52; 3110/53; 3110/70; 3110/74; 3110/75; 3110/78; 3110/9

Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in the Western Democracies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-*Tanzimât* Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Paşa." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, no. 3 (1990): 257-274.

Agamben, Giorgio. *State of Exception*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics: 1908-1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

————. *İttihat ve Terakki, 1908-1914*. Istanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1971.

Ahmad, Feroz, and Dankwart Rustow. "İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Meclisler, 1908-1918." *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Degisi* 4-5 (1975-1976): 245-284.

Akün, Ömer Faruk. "Bursalı Mehmed Tâhir." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi vol.* 6, 452-461. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1992.

Akşin, Sina. *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki.* Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980.

————. *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*. Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987.

Akşin, Sina, Sarp Balcı, and Ünlü Barış. *100. Yılında Jön Türk Devrimi*. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010.

Aktepe, M. Münir. "Çandarlı Halil Paşa." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi vol.* 8, 212-213. Istanbul, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1993.

Akyıldız, Ali. "Meclis-i Vükelâ." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* vol. 28, 251-253. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003.

————. *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004.

————. *Osmanlı Merkez Bürokrasisi.* Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2018.

Albrow, Martin. *Max Weber's Construction of Social Theory,* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Aldan, Mehmet. *İz Bırakan Mülki İdare Amirleri.* Ankara: İç İşleri Bakanlığı, 1990.

Alkan, Ahmet Turan. *II.Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordu ve Siyaset,* Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 1992.

Alkan, Mehmet Ö, ed. *Yadigar-ı Meşrutiyet*. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010.

Aronowitz, Stanley, and Peter Bratsis, eds. *State Theory Reconsidered, Paradigm Lost.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.

Aşıkî, Derviş Ahmed. *Aşıkpaşazâde Tarihi*. Prepared by Ayşenur Kala. Istanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 2013.

Avcı, Yasemin, Vincent Lemire, and Ömür Yazıcı Özdemir. "Collective Petitions (ʿarż-ı mahżār) as a Reflective Archival Source for Jerusalem's Networks of Citadinité in the late nineteenth century." In *Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840-1940*, edited by Vincent Lemire and Angelos Dalachanis, 161-185. Leiden: Brill, 2018.

Aydoğan, Erdal and İsmail Eyyüboğlu, prep. *Bahaeddin Şakir Bey'in Bıraktığı Vesikalara Göre İttihat ve Terakki.* Ankara: Alternatif Yayınları, 2004.

Aytekin, E. Attila. "Tax Revolts During the Tanzimat Period (1839–1876) and Before the Young Turk Revolution (1904–1908): Popular Protest and State Formation in the Late Ottoman Empire." *Journal of Policy History* 25, no. 3 (2013): 308-333.

Balcı, Sezai. "Panislamist Bir Mebusun Biyografisi: Bingazili Yusuf Şetvan (1868-1949)." In *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Demokratik Kesitler*, edited by Eminalp Malkoç and İ. Arda Odabaşı, 77-116. Istanbul: Derlem Yayınları, 2016.

Baldwin, James E. "Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 75, no. 3 (2012): 499-524.

Baykal, Erol A. F. *The Ottoman Press (1908-1923).* Leiden: Brill, 2019.

Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet. *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi,* vol. 1. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Ben-Bassat, Yuval. "Mass Petitions as a Way to Evaluate 'Public Opinion' in the Late Nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire? The Case of Internal Strife Among Gaza's Elite." *Turkish Historical Review* (2013)

————. *Petitioning the sultan: Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine*, vol. 42. New York: IB Tauris, 2013.

————. "The Ottoman Institution of Petitioning When the Sultan No Longer Reigned: A View From Post-1908 Ottoman Palestine." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 56 (2017): 87-103.

Benjamin, Walter. "On the Concept of History" part VIII, translated by Dennis Redmond, 1940.

Bent, Frederick T. "The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of Change." *Administration & Society* 1, no. 1 (1969): 47-64.

Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey.* London: Hurst & Company, 1998.

Beyatlı, Yahya Kemal. *Çocukluğum, Gençliğim, Siyasi ve Edebi Hatıralarım*. Istanbul: Fetih Cemiyeti, Yahya Kemal Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1986.

Beyhan, Mehmet Ali. "II. Abdülhamit Dönemi'nde Hafiye Teşkilatı ve Jurnaller." *İlmî Araştırmalar* 8 (1999): 65-83.

Birinci, Ali. *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası: II. Meşrutiyet Devri'nde İttihat ve Terakki'ye Karşı Çıkanlar.* Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1990.

————. *Tarihin Gölgesinde: Meşâhir-i Meçhûleden Birkaç Zât*, Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2001.

————. "Kuran, Ahmet Bedevi." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 26, 422-23. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2002.

————. "Mehmed Galib Bey." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 28, 486-88. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003.

Bolayır, Enver. *Talat Paşa'nın Hatıraları.* Istanbul: Güven Yayınevi, 1946.

Bouquet, Olivier. "Is it Time to Stop Ottoman Modernization?" in *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century*, edited by Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse and Elise Massicard, 45-68. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2015.

————. *Sultan'ın Paşaları, Osmanlı Devlet Ricali Hakkında Bir Deneme (1839-1909),* Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016.

Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loic J. D. Wacquant. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Social Structures of the Economy.* Translated by Chris Turner. Cambrdige: Polity Press, 2005.

————. *On the State, Lectures at the Collége de France, 1989-1992*. Edited by Patrich Champagne, Remi Lenoir, Frank Poupeau and Marie-Christine Riviére. Translated by David Fernbach. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. *The Permanent Purge, Politics in Soviet Totaliterianism*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.

Bukarlı, Edip. "Mustafa Zihni Paşa'nın Balkan Savaşı Öncesindeki Görüşü Hakkında İnceleme." *Journal of Turkish Studies* 13, no. 8 (Spring 2018): 37-50.

Buzpınar, Ş. Tufan. "Surre" In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi,* v.37, 567-569. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2009.

Chambers, Richard L. "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Studies in Political Development*, edited by Robert E. Ward and A. Rustow Dankwart, 301-328. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Conquest, Robert. *The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties.* London: The Bodley Head, 2018.

Çankaya, Ali. *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. 3. Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968.

Çelik, Ahmet. "Zeynelabidin Efendi ve Siyasi Görüşleri." *Merhaba Gazetesi Akademik Sayfalar Eki* 11, no. 4 (2011): 55-62.

Çetin, Atillâ. "Hayreddin Paşa, Tunuslu." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi vol.* 17, 57-60. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997.

————. "Sicill-i Ahvâl Defterleri ve Dosyaları Hakkında Bir Araştırma." *Vakıflar Dergisi 29* (2005): 87-104.

Çetinkaya, Y. Doğan. *1908 Boykotu: Bir Toplumsal Hareketin Analizi.* Istanbul: İletişim, 2004.

————. *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey.* London: I.B. Tauris, 2014.

————. *Osmanlı'yı Müslümanlaştırmak: Kitle Siyaseti, Toplumsal Sınıflar, Boykotlar ve Milli İktisat (1909-1914).* Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015.

Çetinkaya, Y. Doğan, and Mehmet Ö. Alkan, eds. *Tanzimattan Günümüze Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi.,* Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015.

Danişmend, İsmail Hami. *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, vol.* 4. Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972.

Davison, Roderic H. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Değirmendere, Muammer. "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Son Dönemi'nde Vali Atamaları (1839-1908 Hüdâvendigar Vilâyeti Örneği)." *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 43 (2015): 101-114.

Demirel, Muammer. *İkinci Meşrûtiyet öncesi Erzurum'da Halk Hareketleri (1906-1907)*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990.

Duru, Kazım Nami. *"İttihat ve Terakki" Hatıralarım*. Istanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957.

Düzdağ, M. Ertuğrul. "Volkan" in *TDV İslam ansiklopedisi,* v.43, İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2013.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. *The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of the Historical Bureaucratic Societies.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

Emiroğlu, Kudret. *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri: İkinci Meşrutiyet'in İlanı Temmuz-Ağustos 1908.* Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999.

Eroğul, Cem. "1908 Devrimi'ni İzleyen Anayasa Değişiklikleri." In *100. Yılında Jön Türk Devrimi,* edited by Sina Akşin, Sarp Balcı, and Barış Ünlü, 85-141. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010.

Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Faroqhi, Suraiya. "Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and Problem of Sultanic Legitimation (1570-1650)." *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 35, no. 1 (1992): 1-39.

————. "Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up' in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their Existence." In *Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire, 1550–1720*, edited by Suraiya Faroqhi, 25-37. Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995.

Field, Daniel. *The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Findley, Carter. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922,* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980.

————. *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

————. *Kalemiyeden Mülkiyeye: Osmanlı Memurlarının Toplumsal Tarihi.* Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996.

————. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity, A History, 1789-2007.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.

————. *Enlightening Europe on Islam and Ottomans: Mouradgea d'Ohsson and his Masterpiece.* Leiden: Brill, 2019.

Fleischer, Cornell H. *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600).* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Gara, Eleni, Chrisoph K. Neumann, and M. Erdem Kabadayi. "Ottoman Subjects as Political Actors: Historiographical Representations." In *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi,* edited by Eleni Gara, Chrisoph K. Neumann, and M. Erdem Kabadayi, 1-37. Istanbul: İstanbul Bigi Universitesi Yayınları, 2011.

Gelman, Harry. "Mao and the Permanent Purge" *Problems of Communism* 15, no. 2 (1966): 2-14.

Georgeon, François. *L'ivressé de La Liberte*. Leuven: Peeters, 2012.

Getty, J. Archy. *Origins of Great Purges, The Soviet Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Gillis, John R. *The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis, 1840-1860: Origins of an Administrative Ethos.* CA: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Ginio, Eyal. "Coping with the State's Agents 'from Below': Petitions, Legal Appeal and the Sultan's Justice in Ottoman Legal Practice." In *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi,* edited by Eleni Gara, Chrisoph K. Neumann, and M. Erdem Kabadayi, 41-56. Istanbul: İstanbul Bigi Universitesi Yayınları, 2011.

Gooch, G.P., and Harold Temperley. *British Documents on the Origins of War, 1898-1914*. vol. 5 of *The Near East.* London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1928.

Göçek, Fatma Müge. "What is the Meaning of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution? A Critical Assessment in 2008." *İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 38 (2008): 179-214.

Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebook.* New York: International Publishers, 1971.

Güneş, İhsan. *Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyete Türkiye'de Hükümetler, Programları ve Meclisteki Yansımaları (1908-1923),* Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012.

Güneş, Mehmet. "Osmanlı Dönemi'nde İstanbul'da Vilayet İdaresinin Tesşekkülü." *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırması Dergisi* 37 (2016): 181-199.

Gürpınar, Doğan. "The Emergence of Ottoman Studies in North America: Orientalism: The Modernization School and the Cold War." *Turkish Review* 3, no. 1 (2013): 24-31.

Habermas, Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.* Translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT press, 1991.

Hale, William. *The Political and Economic Development of Turkey.* London: Croom Helm, 1981.

Hanilçe, Murat. "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemine Dair Hatırat Bibliyografyası Denemesi." *Bilig/Türk Dünyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 47 (2008): 147-166.

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi.* Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981.

————. *1889-1902. vol.* 1 of *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1986.

————. *Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa.* Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989.

————. *The Young Turks in Opposition.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

————. *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

————. "Tunaya, Tarık Zafer." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 41, 377-78. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2012.

————. "The Committee of Union and Progress and the 1908 Revolution." In *L'ivressé de La Liberte.* edited by François Georgeon, 15-26. Leuven: Peeters, 2012.

Harootunian, Harry. *The Empire's New Clothes: Paradigm Lost and Regained.* Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004.

Held, David. *Introduction to Critical Theory, Horkheimer to Habermas.* California: University of California Press, 1980.

Heper, Metin. "The Political Role of Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: Some Observations from the Perspective of Comparative Public Administration Theory." *Turkish Public Administration Annual* 1 (1974): 45-60.

————. "Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a 'Historical Bureaucratic Empire' Tradition." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no. 4 (1976): 507-521.

————. "Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernizing Context: The Turkish Case." *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 1, no. 1 (1977): 65-84.

————. "Osmanlı Türk Bürokrasisinde Modernleşme Saf Patrimonyalizmden Patrimonyal Yasallığa Geçiş." In *Yönetim Sosyolojisi,* edited by Ömer Bozkurt, 51-78. Ankara: Doğan Matbaası, 1977.

————. *The State Tradition in Turkey.* North Humberside, North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985.

————. "The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative and Historical Perspective." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 271, no. 1 (1985): 86-110.

————, ed. *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective.* Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1987.

Heper, Metin, and M. Selçuk Sancar. "Is Legal-Rational Bureaucracy a Prerequisite for Rational-Productive Bureaucracy? The Case of Turkey." *Administration & Society* 30, no. 2 (May 1998): 143-165.

Hoyle, R. W. "Petitioning as Popular Politics in Early Sixteenth-Century England." *Historical Research* 75, no. 190 (2002): 365-389.

Hut, Davut. "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemінde Bir Osmanlı Entelektüeli Babanzade Ismail Hakkı." In *Tarihimizden Portreler: Osmanlı Kimliği*, edited by Z. Kurşun and H. Çoruh, 101-123. Istanbul: Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Derneği, 2013.

Hürmen, Fatma Rezan. *Naciye Neyyal, Münevver bir Türk Hanımı: Ressam Naicye Neyyal Hanımefendi'nin Mutlakiyet, Meşrutiyet ve Cumhuriyet Hatıraları*. Istanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2000.

————. *Bir Devlet Adamının, Mehmet Tevfik Bey'in (Biren) II. Abdülhamit, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları.* Istanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1993.

Ilchman, Warren. "Productivity, Administrative Reform and Antipolitics: Dilemmas for Developing States." In *Political and Administrative Development,* edited by Ralph Braibanti, 472-526. North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1969.

İlgürel, Mücteba. "Köprülü Mehmed Paşa" In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 26, 258-60. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2002.

İnal, İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal. *Son Sadrazamlar,* vol. 2, Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982.

İnalcık, Halil. "Şikayet Hakkı:'Arz-ı Hal ve 'Arz-ı Mahzar'lar." *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 7 (1988): 33-54.

Jacoby, Tim. *Social Power and the Turkish State.* London: Frank Cass, 2004.

Jessop, Bob. *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place.* Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990.

————. "Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections." *International Review of Sociology/Revue Internationale de Sociologie* 11, no. 2 (2001): 149-173.

Johnson, Nevil. *State and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Executive at Work.* 2nd ed. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983.

Kansu, Aykut. *1908 Devimi.* Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995.

————. *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913.* Leiden: Brill, 2000.

————. *İttihatçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1918.* Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016.

Karabekir, Kazım. *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti,* 2nd ed., İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2011.

Karabulut, Umut. *İzmir Kentinde Siyasi Protesto Kültürü.* Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2015.

Karakışla, Yavuz Selim. *Women, War and Work in the Ottoman Empire: Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women*. Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2005.

Karakoç, İrem. "1876 Tarihli Kanun-i Esasi'de Yürütme Organı." *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 8, no. 2 (2006): 115-149.

Karal, Enver Ziya. *Osmanlı Tarihi, İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, vol.* 9. 2nd ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999.

————. *Osmanlı Tarihi, vol.* 8. 6th ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007.

Karpat, Kemal. *Elites and Religion, From Ottomans to Turkish Republic*. Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010.

————. *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*. Leiden: Brill, 1973.

Kars, Zafer. *1908 Devrimi'nin Halk Dinamiği*. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1997.

Kelsall, Roger K. *Higher Civil Servants in Britain: From 1870 to the Present Day.* London: Routledge, 1955.

Keyder, Çağlar. *State and Class in Turkey, A Study in Capitalist Development.* London: Verso, 1987.

Kırlı, Cengiz. *Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi,* Istanbul: Verita Yayınları, 2015.

Kırmızı, Abdülhamit. "Rulers of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908." PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2005.

————. *Abdülhamid'in Valileri, Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi 1895-1908*. 2nd ed. Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2008.

————. "Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları: 1908 İhtilalinin Bürokraside Tasfiye ve İkame Kabiliyeti." In *100. Yılında Jön Türk Devrimi,* edited by Sina Akşin, Sarp Balcı, and Barış Ünlü, 333-357. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010.

————. "Taming the Governors: The Swinging Pendulum of Power over the Ottoman Provinces in the Nineteenth Century," *The International Journal of Regional and Local Studies*, 6:1, (2010): 4-23.

————. "Going round the province for progress and prosperity: inspection tours and reports by late Ottoman governors," Studies in Travel Writing, 16:4, (2012): 387-401

Kolay, Arif. "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Hariciye Nezareti'nde Tensikat ve Bürokratik Değişim (1908-1910)", *Türkiyat Mecmuası,* 27/1, (2017): 193-214.

Koloğlu, Orhan. *Abdülhamid Gerçeği: Ne Kızıl Sultan Ne Ulu Hakan.* Istanbul: Gür Yayınları, 1987.

————. *Osmanlı'dan günümüze Türkiye'de Basın.* Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992

Kuneralp, Sinan. *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricâli, 1839-1922: Prosopografik Rehber.* Istanbul: İSİS Press, 1999.

Kuran, Ahmet Bedevi. *İnkilap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler.* Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1945.

Kurt, Ümit. "The Curious Case of Ali Cenani Bey: The Story of a Génocidaire during and after the 1915 Armenian Genocide." *Patterns of Prejudice* 52, no. 1 (2018): 58-77.

Kuyaş, Ahmet. "II. Meşrutiyet, Türk Devrim Tarihi ve Bugünkü Türkiye." *Doğu Batı – II. Meşrutiyet 100. Yıl* 45 (2008): 49-65.

Küçük, Cevdet, "Hasan Fehmi Paşa" In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 16, 422-23. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997.

Kümin, Beat, and Andreas Würgler. "Petitions, Gravamina and the early Modern State: Local Influence on Central Legislation in England and Germany." *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 17, no. 1 (1997): 39-60.

Landau, Jacob M. *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey.* Leiden: Brill, 1984.

Landen, R.G. *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East.* New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970.

Lankov, Andrei N. "Kim Takes the Control: The Great Purge in North Korea, 1956-1960." *Korean Studies* 26, no. 1 (2002): 87-119.

Lenin, V.I. *State and Revolution.* Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014.

Lévy-Aksu, Noémi. "An Ottoman variation on the stage of siege: The invention of the *idere-i örfiyye* during the first constitutional period" *New Perspectives on Turkey,* no.54 (2016): 1-24.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Lottholz, Philipp, and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert. "Re-Reading Weber, Re-Conceptualizing State-Building: From Neo-Weberian to Post-Weberian Approaches to State, Legitimacy and State-Building." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2016): 1467-1485.

Loyal, Steven. *Bourdieu's Theory of State: A Critical Introduction.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Manav, Nursel. "II. Meşrutiyet'te Abdülhamid Dönemi Kadrolarının Tasfiyesi ve Tekaüd Sandıkları", *Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi,* 2/1, (2017): 240-260.

————. "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Maliye Nezareti'nde Tensikat, Memurların Tepkisi ve Yeni Teşkilat Yapısı", *Yeditepe Üniversitesi Tarih Bölümü Araştırma Dergisi,* 2/3, (2018): 71-92

Mann, Michael. "State and Society, 1130-1815: An Analysis of English State Finance." In *Political Power and Social Theory, vol.* 1, edited by Maurice Zeitlin, 165-208. Connecticut: J.A.I. Press, 1980.

————. "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results." *European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie/Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie* 25, no. 2 (1984): 185-213.

————. *The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914*. vol. 2 of *The Sources of Social Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Mardin, Şerif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

————. *Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri, 1895-1908*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992.

Marx, Karl. *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.* Edited by Joseph O'Malley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Miliband, Ralph. *The State in Capitalist Society.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969.

Minkov, Anton. *Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahas Petitions and Ottoman Social Life, 1670-1730*, vol. 30. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

Montagnes, B. Pablo., and Wolton, Stephane. "Mass Purges: Top-Down Accountability in Autocracy." *American Political Science Review* 119, no. 4 (November 2019): 1045-1059.

Moore Jr., Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* Middlesex: Penguin University Books, 1973.

Mümtaz, Ahmet Semih. *Tarihimizde Hayal Olmuş Hakikatler.* Istanbul: Hılmi Kitapevi, 1948.

Nacar, Can. *Labor and Power in the Late Ottoman Empire: Tobacco Workers, Managers, and the State, 1872-1912.* Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Nesimi, Abidin. *Yılların İçinden,* İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977.

Okay, Cüneyd. "Meşrutiyet Dönemi Türk Siyasi Hayatı Kaynakçası." *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi,* 2, no. 1 (2004): 99-112.

Orlow, Dietrich. *The Nazi Party, 1919-1945: A Complete History*. New York: Enigma Books, 2010.

Ortaylı, İlber. *Tanzimat Devri'nde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880).* Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000.

———. *Türkiye Teşkilat ve İdare Tarihi.* 3rd ed. Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2008.

Öge, Ali Rıza. *Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Bir Polis Şefinin Gerçek Anıları,* Bursa, 1957.

Örenç, Ali Fuat. "Mutasarrıf" In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 31, 377-79. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2006.

Örik, Nahid Sırrı. *150 Yılın Türk Maşhurları Ansiklopedisi,* İstanbul: Ekicigil Yayınevi, 1953.

Özbek, Nadir. "II. Meşrutiyet İstanbul'unda Dilenciler ve Serseriler." *Toplumsal Tarih, no.* 64 (1999): 34-43.

———. "İmparatorluk Tartışmalarında Radikal Bir Açılım." *Virgül* 101 (2006): 14-16.

———. "Defining the Public Sphere during the Late Ottoman Empire: War, Mass Mobilization and Young Turk Regime (1908-1918)" *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no .5 (2007): 795-809.

———. "Ikinci Mesrutiyeti Hazirlayan Kosullar, Rumeli'de Vergi Tahsilati ve Jandarma." *Toplumsal Tarih* 183 (2009): 46-50.

———. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Dilencilere Yönelik Devlet Politikaları ve Kamusal Söylemin Değişimi." In *Bir Kent Sorunu Dilencilik: Sorunlar ve Çözüm Yolları*, 17-44. İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Zabıta Daire Başkanlığı, 2009.

————. *İmparatorluğun Bedeli, Osmanlı'da Vergi, Siyaset ve Toplumsal Adalet (1839-1908).* Istanbul: Boğaziçi Ünversitesi Yayınları, 2015.

————. "İstisna Hali: Devletsiz, Abdülhamidsiz Osmanlı Türkiye Tarihi Yazmanın İmkânları." *Toplumsal Tarih* 301 (January 2019): 46-53.

————. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet (1876-1914),* 7th ed. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.

Özcan, Abdülkadir. "Mehmed Tevfik Bey." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 28, 536-37. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003.

Özcan, Azmi. "Otuzbir Mart Vak'ası" In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 34, 9-11. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2007

Özcan, Ömer. "Mithat Pasha'nın Torunu Rasim Fenmen'in Bir Mektubu," Türk Yurdu 102, no. 307 (March 2013). https://www.turkyurdu.com.tr/yazar-yazi.php?id=695

Özil, Ayşe. "Evrenoszade, Rahmi Bey." In *1914-1918 Online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, edited by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson. Freie Universität Berlin. Published August 28, 2018. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/evrenoszade_rahmi_bey

Özkan, Asaf. *II.Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'e Askerî ve Mülkî Bürokraside Tasfiyeler, Askerî ve Mülkî Heyet-i Mahsûsalar.* Ankara: AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2014.

Özok-Gündoğan, Nilay. "A 'Peripheral' Approach to the 1908 Revolution in the Ottoman Empire: Land Disputes in Peasant Petitions in Post-revolutionary Diyarbekir." In *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915*, edited by Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij, 179-215. Leiden: Brill, 2012.

Öztan, Ramazan Hakkı. "Point of no return? Prospects of Empire after the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars (1912-13)" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 50, no 1 (2018), 65–84.

Pakalın, Mehmed Zeki. *Sicill-i Osmani Zeyli,* 19 volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008-2009.

Palombara, Joseph L. *Bureaucracy and Political Development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Philliou, Christine M. *Biography of an Empire, Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

Pinto, Antonio Costa. "Political Purges and State Crisis in Portugal's Transition to Democracy, 1975-1976." *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (2008): 305-332.

Poulantzas, Nicos. "The Problem of the Capitalist State." *New Left Review* 58 (1969). https://newleftreview.org/issues/i58/articles/nicos-poulantzas-the-problem-of-the-capitalist-state

Prigge, William. "The Latvian Purges of 1959: A Revision Study." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 35, no. 3 (2004): 211-230.

Ramsaur, E. Edmondson. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908.* Princeton: Publisher, 1957.

Rey, Ahmet Reşit. *Gördüklerim – Yaptıklarım (1890-1922),* İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945.

Rothenberg, Mel. "Lenin on the State." *Science & Society* 59, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 418-436.

Rustow, Dankwart A. "The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative Perspective." In *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural- Historical Analysis*, edited by Kemal Karpat, 93-123. Leiden: Brill, 1973.

Sandschneider, Eberhard. "Political Succession in the People's Republic of China: Rule by Purges." In *The Process of Political Succesion*, edited by Peter Calvert, 110-135. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987.

Sarınay, Yusuf. *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi*. İstanbul: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2010.

Seyitdanlıoğlu, Mehmet. "Yerel Yönetim Metinleri III: Tuna Vilâyeti Nizâmnâmesi." *Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler Dergisi* 5, no. 2 (1996): 67-81.

————. "Yerel Yönetim Metinleri VI: 1871 Vilayet Nizamnamesi ve Getirdikleri." *Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler Dergisi,* 5, no. 5 (1996): 89-103.

Sievert, Henning. " Intermediaries and Local Knowledge in a Changing Political Environment: Complaints from Libya at the Turn of the 20th Century ", *Die Welt des Islams* 54, 3-4 (2014): 322-362.

Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China.* Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1979.

————. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 3-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Shaw, Ezel Kural. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol.* 2. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

————. "Sultan Abdülhamid II: Last Man of the Tanzimat." In *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu, 25-27 Aralık 1989*, edited by Işın Duruöz and Gönül Büyüklimanlı, 179-197. Ankara: Milli Kütüphane Yayınları, 1991.

Smith, Dennis. *The Rise of Historical Sociology.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.

Sohrabi, Nader. *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

————. "Illiberal Constitutionalism. The Committee Union and Progress as a Clandestine Network and Purges." In *L'ivressé de La Liberte,* edited by François Georgeon, 109-120. Leuven: Peeters, 2012

Suleiman, Ezra. *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.

Şakiroğlu, Mahmut H. "Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5, 282-283. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1992.

Taglia, Stefano. *Intellectuals and Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Young Turks on the Challanges of Modernity*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Tanör, Bülent. *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (1789-1980).* Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013.

Teiwes, Frederic C. *Politic and Purges in China: Rectification and Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965.* New York: East Gate, 1993.

Tekin, Emrullah. "Hafiye." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 15, 115-116. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997.

Temo, İbrahim., and Ahmet Rıza. *Biz İttihatçılar.* Istanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2009.

Tilly, Charles. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975.

————. *From Mobilization to Revolution.* New York: Random House, 1988.

————. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992.* Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990.

Timur, Taner. "Osmanlı Gizli Polis Örgütü Nasıl Kuruldu?" *Tarih ve Toplum* 6 (1984): 414-419.

Toros, Taha. *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları.* Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1996.

Trimberger, Ellen K. *Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru.* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978.

Tugay, Asaf. *İbret: Abdülhamid'e Verilen Jurnaller ve Jurnalciler*. Istanbul: Okat Yayınevi, 1961.

Tuğ, Başak. *Politics of Honor in Ottoman Anatolia: Sexual Violence and Socio-Legal Surveillance in the Eighteenth Century*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2017.

Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Amme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Fikir Cereyanları*, Habilitation Thesis, İstanbul University, 1948.

————. *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi. vol.* 1 of *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler.* Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984.

————. *Mütareke Dönemi, 1918-1922. vol.* 2 of *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler.* Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986.

————. *İttihat ve Terakki: Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi. vol.* 3 of *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler.* Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989.

Turfan, M. Naim. *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse.* London: I.B. Tauris, 2000.

Tural, Erkan. "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Danıştay", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 5/13, (2008): 79-89.

————. "Osmanlı Posta Bürokrasisi 1908-1914", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 28/46, (2009):205-230.

————. "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Maârif-i Umûmiyye Nezareti'nde Bürokratik Reform", Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi OTAM, 22, (2009): 177-206.

————. *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi, II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Bürokratlar, İttihatçılar ve Parlamenterler*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2016.

Türkmen, Zekeriya. "Mahmud Şevket Paşa." *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 27, 384-386. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2003.

Ursinus, Michael. *Grievance Administration (Şikayet) in an Ottoman Province: The Kaymakam of Rumelia's "Record Book of Complaints" of 1781-1783*, vol. 1. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

Uzunçarşılı, İsmial Hakkı. *Hürriyet Kahramanı Resneli Niyazi Hatıratı: Hâtırât-ı Niyâzi*. Edited by Ö. Andaç Uğurlu. Translated by Sami Kara and Nurer Uğurlu. Istanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2003

Ülken, Hılmi Ziya. *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi.* Istanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1966.

Ürgüplü, Ali Suat. *Şeyhülislam Ürgüplü Mustafa Hayri Efendi'nin Meşrutiyet, Büyük Harp ve Mütareke Günlükleri (1909-1922).* Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015.

van Voss, Lex Heerma. "Introduction." In *Petitions in social history, International Review of Social History Supplements*, vol. 9, edited by Lex Heerma van Voss, 1-11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Vom Hau, Matthias. "State Theory: Four Analytical Traditions." In *The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State*, edited by Stephan Leibfried, et al., 131-152. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society, An Outline of Interpretive Sociology,* edited by Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: The Regents of the University of California, 1978.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society I: A New Translation.* Edited by Keith Tribe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019.

Weiker, Walter F. "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13, no. 3, Special Issue on Organizations and Social Development (December 1968): 451-470.

Whimster Sam, and Scott Lash, eds. *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity.* Oxford: Routledge, 2006.

Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit. *Tanıdıklarım*, haz. Göktürk Ömer Çakır. 2nd ed. Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2020.

Yavuz, Yusuf Şevki. "Mustafa Sabri Efendi." In *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol.* 31, 350-353. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2006.

Yiğit, Yücel. "İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası İçinde Parti İçi Muhalefet: Hizb-i Cedit Hareketi." *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 14, no. 28 (Spring 2014): 103-125.

Zeitlin, Maurice, ed. *Political Power and Social Theory.* Connecticut: J.A.I. Press, 1980.

Zeren, Barış. "The Formation of Constitutional Rule: The Politics of Ottomanism between de jure and de facto." Ph.D. diss., Boğaziçi University, 2017.

Zeyrek, Suat. "II. Meşrutiyette Demokratik Muhalefetin Sonu: Arnavut İsyanları ve Sonuçları." *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 33 (2012): 299-336.

Zürcher, Eric J. *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905-1926.* Leiden: Brill, 1984.

————. *Turkey: A Modern History*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994.

————. "İlan-ı Hürriyetin Tarihyazımı: Geniş Bir Fikir Birliği, Biraz İhtilaf ve Kaçırılan Fırsat." In *Yadigar-ı Meşrutiyet*, edited by Mehmet Ö. Alkan, 259-272. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010.

————. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey.* New York: IB Tauris, 2014.

————. "Macedonians in Anatolia: The Importance of the Macedonian Roots of the Unionists for their Policies in Anatolia after 1914." *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 6 (2014): 960-975.