The Montenegrin Frontier of the Ottoman Empire: Loyalties and Frontier Defense (1863-1870)

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Abstract

"The Montenegrin Frontier of the Ottoman Empire:
Loyalties and Frontier Defense (1863-1870)"

Nazif Koca, Master's Candidate at the Atatürk Institute
for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2016

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This thesis focuses on the period from 1863-1870 and analyzes the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in the Montenegrin frontier region of the Ottoman Empire with respect to military defense practices. The thesis revolves around the state's efforts in the frontier region to implement Tanzimat reforms while organizing a border defense and sustaining the loyalty of people living on the frontier. The thesis draws on archival documents as well as contemporary studies and demonstrates the Tanzimat state's policies on the Montenegrin frontier within the context of the administrative and military modernization of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. It also examines the relationships between frontier people, Montenegro, and the Ottoman administration. In addition, the thesis investigates how frontier people's own policies affected the efforts of the Sublime Porte and Montenegro to penetrate the area. At the same time, the study contains a general overview of the central state's attempts to directly control other frontier regions of the empire. These attempts by the Tanzimat state to control the frontiers were designated to increase treasury revenues and military manpower resources. The lack of sustainable sources restrained the limits of the Ottoman central administration in frontiers.

28,500 words

Özet

"Osmanlı Devleti'nin Karadağ Sınır Bölgesi:
Sadakatler ve Sınır Bölgesi Savunması (1863-1870)"

Nazif Koca, Yüksek Lisans Adayı, 2016
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Prof. Dr. Nadir Özbek, Tez Danışmanı

1863-1870 dönemine odaklanan bu tez, Tanzimat reformlarının Osmanlı-Karadağ sınır bölgesinde uygulanma çabalarını bölgedeki askeri sınır bölgesi uygulamaları üzerinden incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tezin odağı Tanzimat yönetiminin sınır bölgesinde savunmayı sağlarken bölgedeki insanların sadakatini de temin etmek amacıyla gösterdiği çabalar etrafında dönmektedir. Tez arşiv kaynaklarının yanı sıra çağdaş çalışmalardan da faydalanarak Tanzimat dönemi idaresinin Karadağ sınır bölgesindeki politikasını daha geniş bir şekilde 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı askeri ve siyasi modernleşmesi çerçevesinde göstermektedir. Sınır bölgesindeki insanlarla Karadağ ve Osmanlı yönetimi arasındaki ilişki de bu çerçevede incelemektedir. Aynı zamanda bu çalışmada Osmanlı ve Karadağ devletlerinin sınır bölgelerine nüfuz etme çabalarına karşı bölge insanının geliştirdiği siyaset de ele alınmaktadır. Tez, Karadağ sınır bölgesi haricinde, Osmanlı merkezi yönetiminin diğer sınır bölgelerini control etmek için gösterdiği çabalara dair genel bir bakış karşılaştırmalı bakış da ihtiva etmektedir. Tanzimat yönetiminin sınır bölgelerine nüfuz etme çabaları hazine için gelir ve orduya almak için insan gücü kaynaklarını arttırma amacını taşımaktadır. Ancak yine bu kaynakların yetersizliği Osmanlı merkezi yönetiminin sınır bölgelerindeki gücünü sınırlandırmaktadır.

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1

Introduction

The Ottoman Empire realized extensive administrative and military reforms throughout the nineteenth century. Those reforms and the centralization of the state accelerated after the elimination of the Janissary corps that constituted the main opposition against the accumulation of power by the newly emerging bureaucracy. An important part of these reforms was to expand direct rule of the bureaucracy to the limits of the empire. Standard laws and regulations regarding provincial administration and landed property were made and practiced in all regions of the empire after the Tanzimat edict. Frontiers were areas in which the newly emerged modern state apparatus had to push its administrative limits and, in most cases, act pragmatically. Although there are considerable studies about the frontiers of Baghdad, Damascus, the gulf and Yemen, research related to the Ottoman frontiers in the Balkans is insufficient. That is why I focus on these frontiers and more specifically on the Montenegrin frontier of the Ottoman Empire.

The questions guiding this research are, first, how the Tanzimat state operated in the frontiers? Second, what differences occurred in the implementation of laws between the core and frontier regions of the empire? Third, how did local people participate in the administrative and military organization of the frontier. In other words, I explore Ottoman attempts to govern and win the consent of local people on the Montenegrin frontier in comparison to the modern, state-making process of the empire and its administrative and mili-

tary aspects. More specifically, I will analyze the Tanzimat state's efforts to organize military colonies on the frontier districts within the framework of Tanzimat statehood. The Sublime Porte hoped to use the local population for border defense by promoting employment in various forms. The Ottoman Empire attempted to construct a modern, centralized state in the nineteenth century, capable of implementing standard rules and regulations through bureaucracy in parallel with its counterparts in Europe, namely France and Prussia. The limits of the administrative capacity of Ottoman statehood and the efforts to expand those limits is observed in frontier regions. Administrative capacity includes the capability to create and transfer funds and to sustain the required civilian and military manpower.

I will briefly introduce chapters of the thesis by noting important points related to the case study. Chapter 2 and 3 will analyze the historical background and development of Tanzimat administrative and military rule. The Ottoman experience on the eastern frontiers of the empire will also be summarized. The main topic of the research the Ottoman-Montenegrin frontier will be studied in Chapter 4 using archival resources.

In the second chapter, I will give a short introduction about the administrative, fiscal, and social aspects of the modern, state-making experience in Europe in order to better explain the Ottoman experience. I will approach the Ottoman Empire's centralization efforts in the nineteenth century as a process of strengthening the administrative apparatus, enabling penetration to the peripheries of the empire. Suppressing powerful local notables (*Ayan*) who wished to be included in the central government structure through Document of Agreement (*Sened-i İttifak*) made it possible for the Sublime Porte to control provincial administration and extract more revenue. As other states in European arena, the Ottoman Empire tried to eliminate notables from the provinces during the first years of Sultan II. Mahmud's reign. Revenue increases were demanded to fund the expansion of the bureaucracy and the military; reciprocally, revenue increases could only be realized by means of bureaucratic and military power. Another means for the Ottoman Empire to expand its reach to the peripheries was the modern standardization of legal codes, administrative rules, and units of measure in order to make provincial issues and data legible and accessible to the Sublime Porte. Technological de-

velopments such as railroads and the telegraph had a great impact on this process. Before these efforts, frontier regions such as southern Damascus, Transjordan, Baghdad, the Gulf, and Arabia had only nominally been under Ottoman control for centuries, and these regions had never expected to be a source of income or manpower for the state, which had no capacity to compel such a thing. Frontiers of Bosnia, Albania, and Montenegro had different specialties from those of in Eastern side of the Ottoman Empire. Those regions were under the rule of the Ottoman administration previous to nineteenth century. However, they were enjoying a kind of autonomy. Local rulers and local military units were employed to sustain the security of the frontier areas. By the turn of the nineteenth century centralization tendency of the Ottoman state to control directly provinces of the Empire led to a shift from autonomous local rulers to centrally appointed bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte in the administration. Given the aforementioned developments, the Sublime Porte attempted to penetrate into these areas to increase taxable production and to conscript recruits for army lines.

The policy of the Sublime Porte on the frontiers can be organized into three topics: First, sustaining public services such as healthcare, education, and security. Education service includes public education by primary and secondary as well as religious schools, which were also concerned with the ideological legitimization of Ottoman rule. Second, encouraging sedentism among nomadic people both to increase cultivation and to ensure their obedience. Third, and related to the previous two, implementing military conscription to provide manpower for the army.

Frontiers, which deserve considerable attention, were the limits of the empire, extending either to an independent state or to desert areas occupied nomadic Bedouin tribes. However centralized and bureaucratic it became, the Sublime Port had to cooperate and make concessions with local power holders and tribal leaders to implement the Tanzimat order on the frontiers. However, negotiation with local people generally led to a continuation of old practices with only minor concessions in return for the consent of the people. In fact, exceptional practices to the regulations were the norm in some areas, and new laws and regulations set idle. Ottoman administrators had to make do with gradual change and adapted regulations in favor of local conditions. Especially

for frontier regions, Ottoman officials prioritized gaining the consent of local people as a first step to preventing the loss of territory or population.

In third chapter, I will summarize contemporaneous developments in military tactics and technologies with reference to military revolution theory, as well as the effect of these developments on the expansion of the state apparatus. The Ottoman Empire experienced similar changes in the formation of its army and its military technologies. The main infantry units of the traditional Ottoman army consisted of the Janissaries. However, with changes in the army formation, military importance of the Janissaries decreased from the turn of the nineteenth century. The Janissaries had become a kind of interest group embedded in society and had been the most powerful opponents to the accumulation of power in the hands of the Sultan and his bureaucrats. The Janissary corps were abolished in 1826 and a new army formed by the conscription of ordinary citizens was founded.

The army played a major role in the central administration's penetration into the frontiers. Military presence and frequent interventions made provincial administrations operational. The well-trained soldiers with modern armaments were superior to local armed forces. On the other hand, compulsory military service for ordinary people changed the relationship between the state and its subjects and reshaped various identities inside the empire. In frontier zones, Ottoman officials faced difficulties conscripting locals and maintaining local security. The Sublime Porte tended to cooperate with local elements to defend the frontiers. This implementation was a continuation of old practices of employing locals for security in return for certain exemptions. The inability of the Ottoman state to enforce new juridical regulations compelled them to make exceptions.

In the fourth chapter, I will investigate the primary case: the frontier region between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro. Although the military frontier status of Bosnia, situated on the northern side of Montenegro, has been the subject of some academic study, there is no work on Herzegovina as a frontier to Montenegro. The military nature of the frontier, the policies of local tribes and villages located between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire, as well as Ottoman attempts to elicit obedience from the population will be investigated based on archival documents from Prime Minister's Office of

Ottoman Archives (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Devlet Arşivleri*-, or BOA). The scarcity of materials related to the administrative and defensive organization of the frontier is the main constraint of the study. However, tracking the main characteristics of the frontier as well as Ottoman policies regarding the region were possible from available documents. I focused on the years between 1863 and 1870 in the thesis. Cevdet Paşa's arrival to the region in 1863 for inspection was the turning point of the reorganization in the frontier areas. Till 1870 legal and administrative structure of the Montenegrin frontier changed continuously. After 1870 it seems that from the available documents the conditions of the frontier and the actual boundaries remained stable till the War with Montenegro in 1876 and Austrian annexation of Bosnia.

Montenegro was located between Herzegovina and the lake Shkoder in Albania. Ottoman Empire was seized Montenegro in 1478 which was under the rule of Venetia until that time. Due to the scarcity of cultivable lands and tax incomes Ottoman administration did not constitute a direct administration in this inland region. After the Ottoman conquest, the orthodox patriarch of Cetinje called *Vladika* held the local rule of Montenegro. Vladikas were under the religious authority of patriarchate of Pec in Albania till the eighteenth century. Montenegrin patriarch tied to the Orthodox Patriarch of Istanbul after the second half of the eighteenth century. Increasing Russian influence over the orthodox subjects in Eastern Europe and increasing nationalistic worldviews among the people as well as Ottoman maladministration strengthened autonomous tendencies in Montenegro. In addition, elimination of the powerful Muslim notable families in the second half of the nineteenth century increased the independency of Montenegro. Prior to the 1850s, Herzegovina was under the rule of Ali Pasha Rıdvanbegovic. After the elimination of Ali Pasha and other military notables of the region Orthodox subjects of the region had a chance to resist the Ottoman rule by cooperating Montenegro. Montenegro was being defacto independent state had also the opportunity to expand its borders to Herzegovina and Albania.

The Montenegrin state emerged as an independent state in the middle of the nineteenth century with delimited borders. However, the Ottoman administration did not recognize its independence. Foreign support and consulting facilitated the construction of a modern Montenegrin state. After the border delimitation the area around the border in Bosnian side populated in addition

to some Slavic-Muslim population mainly by the orthodox Slavs consisted a transitional zone between Montenegro and Ottoman Empire and became a frontier. From the south of Montenegro, the area surrounding the border was populated with mainly Catholic and some Muslim Albanian highlanders called *Malesor* and in some extend Orthodox Slavs. Both states spent effort to control and seize its authority to the frontier area.

The application of Tanzimat was the key term for the Tanzimat era to regulate unified practices in every province in the Empire. Regulations related with provincial administration structure as well as bodies for conscription of the locals for the regular army battalions were the priorities of the Sublime Porte. However, the application process of Tanzimat in frontier provinces faced with some difficulties in Arab provinces. Unlike Montenegrin frontier, Arab population in Transjordan, Baghdad, the Gulf, and Yemen did not generally support the Ottoman rule. Ottoman Empire collaborated with Muslim population in the Montenegrin frontier, but in different and exceptional situation.

Unlike traditional narratives, the separation of the Slavic population of Bosnia from the Ottoman Empire and their subordination to the newly emerged state of Montenegro cannot be explained solely by the fact they share an ethnicity and religion. It is true that the Montenegrin state used nationalistic and religious arguments to legitimize itself, but did so along with military force, punishing and exiling disobedient subjects. The central government structure and army were constructed along with the pacification of internal opponents. Gradual accumulation of power returned to the prince, along with compulsory tax payments, military service, and the exclusion of the powerful tribes of Montenegro from political decision-making processes. Slavic speaking tribes and villages in the Ottoman-Montenegrin borderland of Bosnia and Albania (to the south of Montenegro) made alliances with both states in accordance with their political situations. Although nationalistic ideals played an important role in their choices, they often shifted sides to protect their interests. The new state of Montenegro aggressively pursued a policy of centralization over powerful frontier tribes.

Despite contextual shifts of allegiance by the Slavic population to the Ottomans, (not without Ottoman incentives), the Sublime Porte relied heavily on Muslim populations for frontier defense. Moreover, a policy of Islamization

was followed by Ottoman officials through Islamic education and the resettling of Muslims along the frontier. Sustaining border defenses along with strengthening the loyalty of frontier people led to the organization of military colonies (*koloni militer*) surrounding the border with Montenegro. The organization of military colonies took Austrian military colonies as a model. They operated by exempting the frontier area from the administrative reach of Tanzimat reforms and imposing military rule. The Ottoman policy of organizing military colonies was in fact a means to legalize defacto structures of the frontier defense system. Those among the frontier population who opposed the centralization policies of the Tanzimat state nevertheless tried to attach to the empire through exceptional administrative orders. The military organization along the Montenegrin frontier changed during 1860s, but its main characteristics remained stable.

2

State Centralization in Europe and the Ottoman Empire

§ 2.1 State Centralization in Europe

State centralization processes occurred in different ways throughout Europe according to the political conditions of different countries. Within feudal power structures, kings as *primus inter pares,* came to the fore as a result of changing economic and class conditions during the late middle ages. Emergence of the towns on the European continent created a new era that would dissolve feudal lord-serf relationships and break the lord-vassal chain.[1] Free people gathered in towns and created new communities, and different kinds of production relations began to spread. Apart from agriculture, which had been the basic form of production to sustain human life, artisanal production arose and commerce in cities increased dramatically. These developments occurred especially in Spain and France, which then modeled the ideal of an absolutist state. In addition to these developments, long wars specifically the Hundred Years War forced European states to maintain permanent, central armies instead of mercenary armies, which in turn led to the strengthening of central states and the enlargement of state apparatuses. Since keeping a per-

1 Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State; a Sociological Introduction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), 36-37.

manent army necessitated proper land surveys and taxation. In France, for instance, total fiscal revenues increased twofold between the years 1517 and 1540.[2] Moreover, between 1610 and 1644, revenues extracted from the *taille*, the land tax, increased threefold increase and the total tax revenues of France quadrupled over the same period.[3]

From the fifteenth century onwards, monarchs on the European continent began to consolidate power by enlarging control over vassal states. For this purpose, they used military force or negotiation, diplomacy, and political tools such as stressing feudal ties with other lords and suzerain rights. Aristocrats were forced to disband armies and their concern themselves with integrating into the emerging, absolutist states. In some cases, aristocrats resisted the centralization process but ultimately failed, since their power was not comparable to that of the new states.

Emergence of a single, powerful authority over a delimited territory led to the standardization of every aspect of life in relation to the state apparatus. Taxation and trade codes were unified within national borders. Local customs and rights inherited from the feudal period were abolished, and new standardized laws were codified and applied within nation-state's territories. Moreover, measurements and timekeeping were standardized. Local timekeeping measures prevented the integration of different parts of a country. Clock towers in European towns represented the effort to unify timekeeping. As James Scott emphasized, standardization of codes, taxes and measurement were important in terms of legibility from the perspective of the central state.[4] Rationalization and legibility were key terms of the era. Rational central bureaucracy considered every possession of the country land, human power, forests, and mines as possible sources of income and power. Standardized surveys and registries about such resources made their quantification legible from the per-

2 Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso, 1979), 90.

3 Ibid., p. 98. For a comprehensive study that analyzes tax income increases of European states see Şevket Pamuk and Kıvanç Karaman, "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction Between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime" in American Political Science Review, August 2013.

4 James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 30-32.

spective of central authorities. Legibility allowed for rational use of every income possibility and increased predictability for long-term planning for both states and private entrepreneurs. In addition, this process of simplification promoted commercial activity, long distance trade, and as a consequence, large scale production for the market. These developments occurred along with the rise of bourgeoisie in new economic and political arenas.

Absolutist states emerged as the single political authority in a given territorial area with rights to extract resources and increase military power without internal opposition. Alternative political powers and armed groups such as bandits were eliminated by force based on the state's claim to have the right to rule. In Weber's terms, absolutist monarchs sustained monopolization over the legitimate use of violence within a limited territory by creating nation-states.

§ 2.2 Construction of a Modern State in the Ottoman Empire

Ottoman statesman in nineteenth century had to face failures in battle and important territorial loses of Muslim regions. Russian annexation of Crimea, the invasion of Egypt by France, and especially Mehmet Ali Pasha's victories over the Ottoman armies deeply impacted both high bureaucracy and the public in Istanbul.[5] Faced with these insufficiencies and failures, the Ottoman administration in Istanbul attempted several trial runs at constructing a more central, and rational state as European counterparts had done. Privileged classes and other powerful actors were eliminated from both the state center and periphery. This absolutist state structure enabled Sultans and their administrative cadres to consolidate political power, control their subjects, and extract more income for further reforms.

The Sublime Porte was made a great effort to standardize laws and increase the capability of the state apparatus to implement regulations in every part of the empire. Not only did they implement the administrative reforms in the different parts of the empire, but they also created an infrastructure for controlling the population, collecting information, and extracting resources made

5 See Cengiz Kırlı, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu; Osmanlı Modernleşme sürecinde "Havadis Jurnalleri"(1840-1844)* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2009).

possible by military reforms. Reformist sultans and leading bureaucrats of the era founded new educational institutions to raise statesman and military officers. Reorganizing the bureaucracy with more educated people and standardized codes increased the efficiency of the state apparatus. Statesmen were sent to Europe for training, and European experts were invited to consult on reforms. State revenues were increased to finance the new institutions: Land surveys and registries were created to monitor and extract all possible revenues. Taxation and land registration issues were problematic because the central administration wanted to obtain people's consent while simultaneously increasing state revenue. New taxation regulations and alternate solutions were attempted. Ottoman statesman in Istanbul worked to create a rational, bureaucratic, centralized state like its European counterparts, one with standardized legal codes executed by an expanding bureaucratic cadre and a trained, regular army corps in every district of the empire.

This more capable state apparatus enabled the Ottoman state to penetrate areas which nominally under its control, such as Arabia, Gulf, Transjordan, Yemen, and some mountainous areas in Anatolia and the Balkans. Improving the condition of the military was an obvious necessity in the eyes of Ottoman statesmen, and the Army had been training under the supervision of European experts since the turn of the century. However, the military strength of a state is closely connected to tax revenues and the size of the male population available for military conscription. Accumulation of knowledge about potential fiscal and human resources and the capacity to access them was tantamount. On the other hand, the rise of nationalism among subjects as well as the imperialist objectives of European states, especially England, on Arab territory forced the Porte to take precautions. Among these were the production of loyal imperial subjects under direct control of the central bureaucracy through the provision of government services and public education to all territories of the empire. To achieve this, local government institutions such as government buildings, military barracks, and outposts were established, and schools and mosques were built, as well. Moreover, funds were set aside for communication infrastructures such as roads and telegraph lines on behalf of the new governmental organizations. In every part of the empire, the central state tried to appease semi-independent tribal communities, villages, and towns and bring them under the authority of Ottoman regional governors.

State officials sought to disarm tribal communities and integrate them into agricultural activities that would oblige them to settle on a given land and renounce warlike nomadism. The state could not control armed roving communities for the purposes of taxation and conscription into the regular army. State promoted sedentism not only to prevent armed rebellions, but also to increase production and tax revenue.

Centralization of the Ottoman Empire in nineteenth century was different from that of continental Europe in previous centuries. There was neither on aristocratic class nor suzerain-vassal relations in the Ottoman Empire, such as was the case in France or England where lords had an almost equal status with kings. In these states, lords' strong ties to their regional publics caused strong rural opposition to centralization.[6] Ottomans used centrally appointed bureaucrats for administrative posts and *sipahi*s for *tımar*s temporarily. Apart from that, the authority of ruling families or tribes in remote areas was confirmed by decrees sent from Istanbul. This was a part of broader, flexible policy of the Ottoman administration in the frontier regions of empire, where laws and rules were adapted to local customs and governance was with the support of local rulers. In *Bandits and Bureaucrats,* Karen Barkey claims that state appointed officials of the Ottoman Empire and their periodical rotation by the central administration led to weak patron-client relations, in contrast with those in European states.[7] Thus, widespread, organized social opposition in rural areas did not emerge against Ottoman centralization.

The Sublime Porte relied on negotiation, persuading different peripheral communities, bandits, and tribes to accept the central authority. Karen Barkey claims that Ottomans realized a different model of state-making through "bargained incorporation" instead of contestation.[8] The cost of military intervention could be high, as many tribal communities were armed and had the advantage of knowledge of the territory. Moreover, military intervention could only provide a short term solution. After all, the central government was increasing state's presence in provinces to promote registration for tax payments

6 Anderson, *Lineages,* 53-54.

7 Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 11.

8 Ibid., 9.

and conscription. Nonetheless, military force was used by provincial governors against "rebellious" tribes, generally to force them to negotiate. Cevdet Paşa went to the region of Adana with an army to convince the autonomous tribal government to accept the central authority. He menacingly announced to each tribe that he carried in one hand an imperial order of forgiveness and mercy and in the other the sword that maintains the justice of sacred law.[9] He added that he wished everyone accept the order and live in peace, but for whom ever did not, the sword was ready. In every region, the Sublime Porte sought the consent of the locals and tribes, even rebellious ones. Regulations and laws were adapted according to the reactions of the local people. Tribal leaders were offered positions such as district governorships with high salaries. Barkey's evaluation of the political situation of seventeenth century bandits and the government's manipulations to incorporate them into state is similar to the approach to autonomous regions and governments in peripheral regions of the empire in the nineteenth century. Giving titles, positions, or employment in state services was a common tactic of Ottoman governments to eliminate opposition.

In the year 1864, a new provincial regulation was declared. The law was based on Midhat Paşa's experience and his practices as governor of Niş and Tuna. According to the new law, *vilayet*s (province) consisted of *sancak*s (district) and sancaks included *nahiye*s (village). For each management unit, local administrative assemblies were composed of local elites and tribal leaders, thus introducing a representative system into the local government mechanism.[10] Moreover, a new cadastral department was founded, and cadastral commissions were organized in every province under the supervision of provincial governors. These commissions registered land, property and the male population.[11] Land registration was important for the settlement of nomads and tax collection, and the male population was recorded for military conscription purposes. New regulations about roads and schools were issued in

9 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir* (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1991), 139. "Bir elde berat-ı eman ü merhamet ve diğerinde seyf-i madelet-i şeriat olarak gelindi."

10 Stanford J. Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 88-89.

11 Ibid., 88-89.

ensuing years. Primary school education became compulsory through age 12 in 1869, and schools were built in sancaks.[12]

These regulations were not instituted at the same time in every part of the empire. In core areas of the empire, regulations were adopted immediately after their decree. On the frontiers, however, executing these regulations meant first creating an administrative infrastructure and obtaining the consent of the local people. So while central government could not establish these regulations at the same time everywhere, but the central authority expanded the state's administrative capacity region by frontier region, bringing theoretic and actual borders in line. In the following sections of this chapter, I will explain Ottoman administrative expansions to important frontiers of the empire with reference to the literature on the field.

§ 2.3 Construction of the Modern State on the Frontiers

2.3.1 *Transjordan*

As mentioned, the Ottoman central administration sought to penetrate Arab territories with the Provincial Code of 1864. Ottoman officials hoped to increase state revenues and production to provide for expenditures of the state. Moreover, the Sublime Porte sought more human resources from the empire to conscript soldiers for long-lasting wars. The Transjordan region, unlike Bosnia, was an area that had never been directly administrated by Ottoman governors, and control was attempted by establishing the new Tanzimat government structure. Eugene Rogan in his study, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921,*[13] investigates the expansion of Ottoman frontiers from the Damascus region to the south into the Transjordan valley and surrounding areas where nomadic Bedouin tribes were living. He briefly analyzes the steps taken by the governors of Damascus who cooperated with the central government to construct government structures in Transjordan, as well as the reactions of local people and Bedouins

12 Ibid., 108.

13 Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

against their progress. He also examines government manipulation of local powers to settle nomadic tribes and immigrants onto agricultural lands claimed by Bedouins. Moreover, he evaluates local security measures to rain in local tribal power, correlating them with consequences such as increases in agricultural production and trade relations with other areas. Another important study about Ottoman Transjordan is Raouf Sad Abujaber's, *Pioneers over Jordan: The Frontier of Settlement in Transjordan, 1850-1914.*[14] Abujaber describes the development from the perspective of tribes and tribesman in Transjordan. He focused on the effects of the foundation of a state structure: settlement policies, taxation, immigration, and increasing trade.

In the 1840s after the Tanzimat decree, governors of Damascus tried to increase provincial agricultural production and tax revenue. Powerful Bedouin tribes controlled the southernmost parts of the province and functioned as a state apparatus, claiming rights over judicial and tax affairs on peasants.[15] Damascus attempted to bring southern extremities of the province under control several times with the consent of Sublime Porte, but the state could not consolidate authority even with the extensive Tanzimat reforms, and Bedouins continued to rule the area. Moreover, they sometimes collected taxes from peasants who were also being taxed by Ottoman officials. Disturbances occurred among such farmers and farming villages; many abandoned their lands and moved to other provinces to avoid double taxation.[16] The first serious initiative to create a permanent governorship in Transjordan –the sancak of Ajlun- occurred in 1851. The governor of Damascus set up Algerian refugees who had military training as irregular military force against Bedouins in the district. The head of the Algerian community was appointed as district governor.[17] However, it was unsuccessful, lasting a short time. The size of the Algerian community was insufficient to stand up against the tribes, and the district did not have enough water resources.

14 Raouf Sad Abujaber, *Pioneers over Jordan: The Frontier of Settlement in Transjordan, 1850-1914* (London : Tauris, 1989).

15 Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of State,* 9.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 45-47.

The Ottoman governor in Damascus, Mehmet Reşit Paşa, made a military expedition in 1867 to Salt and Karak, which are in the north of modern day Jordan. After suppressing tribes either by force or by agreement, a provincial administration was founded under the supervision of Damascus.[18] Like other provinces, the governor manipulated rivalries and hostilities among tribes to establish his authority. For example, the Ottoman intent to develop Karak as a district center was realized with the support of two powerful, regional tribes who also sought Ottoman assistance.[19] An administrative structure was created in the newly founded districts. *Kaimmakam*s (district governor) and other officials, such as treasurers and scribes, were appointed. Administrative councils were founded, and members were chosen among local notables. Construction of military barracks, prisons, and government buildings were among the first actions taken.[20] Seating the government was important both in terms of the visibility of the state and for exercising executive and juridical power.

Land Code of 1858 implemented in Transjordan. According to the code, all lands had to be registered and land holders were given individual titles. Tax payments and tithes were collected from title holders.[21] Apart from organizing tax issues, Ottoman provincial officials sought to weaken the tribal structures and solidarity by settling nomads and giving them individual responsibilities on a given land. Government attempts to resettle Circassian and Chechen communities in Transjordan encouraged Bedouins to register their *tapu* (deeds), because state officials did not recognize traditional usufruct rights and claimed all unregistered lands as *miri* (public) land. Therefore, unregistered, traditionally Bedouin lands were expropriated as refugee settlements.[22] This threat also forced Bedouins to register their lands and take their tapu deeds. Registration of lands was used as a tool to pacify the Bedouin tribes and settle them on lands as farmers. Governors used negotiation to bring tribes under control in addition to military intervention, and it succeeded in most parts of the area. However, to prevent rebellions, the Ottoman governors

18 Ibid., 49-51.

19 Ibid., 54-55.

20 Ibid., 60-61.

21 Ibid., 12.

22 Raouf Sad Abujaber, *Pioneers over Jordan,* 205.

hesitated to intervene to some difficult tribal areas on the matters of conscription and disarmament.[23]

One of the most important impacts of the foundation of the local administration was to improve local security measures. Construction of posts and barracks along trade road routes between cities brought about more secure transportation.[24] Chechen immigrants most of whom had had formal military training, as well as some Bedouins were employed as local security forces to secure roads and telegraph lines. Moreover, roads were reconstructed and new ones built. These improvements also encouraged the merchants of Palestine and Damascus to develop ongoing trade relations with Transjordan. Establishment of direct Ottoman rule in Transjordan and the implementation of legal codes created a more secure, stable commercial market. Sedentism policies that increased cultivation and enlarged markets excited wealthy merchants around Transjordan. Palestinian merchants from Nablus especially came to settle primarily in the city of Salt. Because of low grain prices in Transjordan, merchants invested their capital to buy grain in Transjordan and sell in other provinces. Bedouin products such as wool was also easy to obtain in Salt, which created a secure platform of interaction between nomadic and settled people. On the other hand, merchant families settled in the cities of Transjordan and built ostentatious residences and shops. They relocated, and along with old, tribal elites became new class of elites in the cities.[25] Their shops and palaces comprised the new commercially central streets in these cities. They participated in local politics as representatives in the administrative district and city councils.

Establishment of direct rule in Transjordan and the politics of sedentism were partly achieved by the Sublime Porte and the Ottoman governor in Damascus. This was an achievement from the perspective of the central government, because the administrative limits of the Province of Damascus had been enlarged to the south. Regular army units with superior armaments, such as

23 Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of State,* 190.

24 Ibid., 67-68.

25 Ibid., 98-101.

breech loading and repeating Winchesters riffles gave Ottoman forces supremacy over the Bedouin tribes.[26] Therefore, Ottoman government incorporated the frontier area in which the Bedouins lived. However, from the perspective of the Bedouins, this process forced them to live differently and forcibly took their right to rule in the area. They tried to escape taxation and demilitarization by every means. People were afraid of sending children to public schools because they feared school registers would be used for conscription.[27]

2.3.2 *Baghdad*

The Province of Baghdad was another autonomous frontier region with a nomadic population it endured Ottoman attempts at direct rule in the late nineteenth century. It was a frontier for Iran, as well, and tribes and Bedouins lived in its deserts. Moreover, in the nineteenth century another competitor had emerged on the Baghdad frontier: the British. Britain was trying to expand its authority through Bahrain and Najd by making alliances with local tribes. Ebubekir Ceylan in his comprehensive study, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East,*[28] analyzed the creation of state apparatus (in the form of a provincial governorate) and the politics of governors vis-a-vis local powers such as powerful, local tribes and international actors, such as Britain. The legal reforms of the Tanzimat and infrastructural developments in the province are explored in the study in detail. The author argues that the talented Tanzimat bureaucrat, Midhat Paşa, was the main actor with respect to the construction of a modern administration and public service infrastructures in the region. Midhat Paşa's reform experiments in Baghdad and his attempts to extend Baghdad's direct rule to the Arab Gulf and Hasa are also briefly examined

26 Norman N. Lewis, Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 28.

27 Ibid., 131.

28 Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East* (London; I.B. Tauris, 2011).

in the book from the perspective of the central administration. Another important study is Gökhan Çetinsaya's *Ottoman Administration in Iraq, 1890-1908,*[29]which focuses on the reforms of the late Hamidian era.

Previous to the nineteenth century, centrally appointed Ottoman governors could not effectively control the internal politics of the province. Baghdad province had a nomadic structure with about half of the population be nomadic before the attempts at reform.[30] Due to a lack of knowledge about tribal structure and local power relations, the governors could not adapt to the politics of the province. Thus the Sublime Porte started appointing governors from among the powerful, locally prestigious Memluk notables in eighteenth century. However, Istanbul's changing policies about governing frontier regions in the nineteenth century directly affected the governing structure of the Baghdad region. Memluk governors acted autonomously from the Sublime Porte and resisted demands from Istanbul, such as to intervene military against the Wahhabis and Arabian tribes. In 1831, Ali Rıza Paşa led a military expedition against the last Memluk governor of Baghdad, Davut Paşa, and against other Memluk lords and powerful Kurdish tribes in the region. He also retained other leading tribes of the region to eliminate the power of the Memluks, and the purposes of the intervention were achieved. Memluk rule in Baghdad ended and Ali Rıza Paşa became the new governor. After the declaration of the Tanzimat, new provincial regulations were implemented. Advisory councils were formed in all provincial centers in the early 1840s. These councils were then reorganized in the late 1840s and governor of Baghdad, Necip Paşa, created a new administrative council (Meclis-i İdare-i Eyalet) in Baghdad. Non-Muslim communities were also represented in the council. Moreover, small administrative councils were formed in sub-provincial administrative units.[31] Bureaucratic organization of the province was regulated according to Tanzimat rules: Hierarchical sub-departments of state institutions were created in all districts. Scribes and treasurers were centrally ap-

29 Gökhan Cetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908* (NY: Routledge, 2006).

30 Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq,* 32.

31 Ibid.,113-115.

pointed and their numbers were increased to perform bureaucratic functions.[32] Although separation of military and civil authorities in the administration was one of the most important principles of the Tanzimat, the governors of Baghdad were an exception, bearing both roles at once. After the creation of the 6th Ottoman Army in Baghdad, governors commanded the army corps, as well, because Baghdad's tribal structure and volatile frontier with Iran necessitated strong governors with military titles.[33] However, according to Çetinsaya's accounts, this administrative unity separated during the reign of II. Abdulhamid.[34]

Midhat Paşa was appointed the governor of Baghdad in 1869. He had served in various positions and he was experienced in provincial administration and the government structure of the Tanzimat. Moreover, he had had a leading role in the preparation of new legal codes regarding provinces. According to Ceylan, Midhat Paşa was superior to other Tanzimat governors in the Province. In the short term of service, he attempted to reform every aspect of social life and the local administrative structure in Baghdad. Midhat Paşa organized a cadre of about 100 leading intellectuals and bureaucrats of the time, such as Ahmet Midhat Efendi, Osman Hamdi Bey, and Odian Efendi.[35] He invited these people to Baghdad to consult on the reforms and retain their assistance. For instance, Ahmet Midhat Efendi published the official provincial newspaper, *Zewra,* during his stint in Iraq.

Pacification of tribes and incorporating them into the administrational structure of the province was one of the primary aims of the governorate. Ceylan claims that governors employed "carrot or stick" policies. Governors used subsidies and salaries for tribal sheikhs as a carrot to ensure their loyalty. Governors in Baghdad tried to negotiate with tribes to maintain road security and payment of annual taxes. On the other hand, governors used the stick for "disobedient" sheiks that refused to pay taxes or took part in plundering. In these cases, military operations were undertaken and the properties of the

32 Ibid., 127-128.

33 Ibid., 88-91.

34 Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq,* 16.

35 Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq,* 98.

tribes confiscated.[36] The 6th Ottoman Army was deployed to Baghdad both to protect against potential threats from Iran and to regulate strong Arab and Kurdish tribes. Military solutions were not preferred because of the fiscal and manpower expenses and the fact they could cause more complicated problems, such as widespread disturbances and intervention by foreign states. Thus, giving titles and positions to tribal sheikhs and employing them as state officials were seen as the preferable solution.

The anticipated result of provincial and particularly land reforms was sedentism of nomadic tribes. Provincial governors, especially Midhat Paşa, negotiated with tribes to settle down in certain places. Tribesman had to build houses and were exempt from taxes for a limited period. Settlement areas were declared as kaimmakamlıks and the sheikh of each tribe was appointed as kaimmakam in their settlement area.[37] Land was registered under the names of actual cultivators from the tribes according to the land code. This promoted personal entrepreneurship and personal responsibility for taxes. Moreover, the main hope was to dissolve the strong tribal ties among the people. Although Ceylan shows that annual data show that *öşür* (tithe) incomes doubled after the implementation of the land code implying that personal registration of land had partially succeed,[38] tribesman would avoid registering land in their own names. They feared enlistment and heavy taxation. In some cases, tribal sheikhs or city merchants emerged as large landowners. They benefitted from the reluctance of tribesman and registered large estates in their own names.[39] However, despite relative success the complete pacification and settling of tribes were not achieved. In fact, the policy of distributing land to the native population did not continue in the Hamidian era, but through the turn of the century reform plans discussed in Istanbul still included the issue of settling of tribes among the most important aims for the province.[40]

36 Ibid., 137-141.

37 Ibid., 149-152.

38 Ibid., 171.

39 Ibid., 173-174.

40 Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq,* 28.

On the other hand, according to Ceylan, infrastructure and security measures developed dramatically in Baghdad after the reform. Roads and telegraph lines were constructed. Road construction and maintaining road security were vital to improving trade and tax collection. Telegraph lines were extended to Basra.[41] Moreover, Midhat Paşa paid attention to transportation on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. A local transportation company, *İdare-i Umman-i Osmani Kumpanyası,* was established under the provincial governorate to rival the British Lynch Company for river transportation of people and goods. Attention was paid not only to improving naval transportation, but also to improving naval security on the rivers and in the gulf. Small security ships and corvettes were charged with this task, and to show an Ottoman naval presence in the Gulf and maintain the security of the cost ships were brought to the coast lines of the Ottoman frontier. The Basra dockyard and harbor facilities were upgraded.[42] In addition to transportation and security improvements, schools and other public services were developed. Public schools were constructed in the sub-provinces, and municipal services were established in Baghdad such as public trams.

2.3.3 *Gulf and Ahsa*

Midhat Paşa was eager to extend the direct authority of Baghdad to Kuwait, the Ahsa region, and Qatar. Saudi expansionism in the gulf region and Britain's contact with local sheikhs undoubtedly affected both Midhat Paşa's and Istanbul's intentions for the region. Moreover, the economic potential of the Ahsa region was taken into consideration. Frederic F. Anscombe, in his meticulous work, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar*,[43] describes the Ottoman statesman's policies of building administration structures in Ahsa and Qatar. Zekeriya Kurşun in his work, *Basra*

41 Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq,* 182-188.

42 Ibid., 191-199.

43 Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

Körfezi'nde Osmanlı-İngiliz Çekişmesi: Katar'da Osmanlılar, 1871-1916,[44] concentrates more on British and Ottoman rivalry in the gulf region via Ottoman attempts to extend their direct administration to the gulf.

Ottoman governors never directly attempted to rule the gulf region prior to the second half of the nineteenth century. The central administration had intervened in the area on occasion, such as in the face of the presence of colonialist foreign states or Saudi expansionism. For instance, increasing Portuguese activity in Arabia in sixteenth century forced the Ottomans to send fleets to the area at different times. In late eighteenth century, when Memluks took the governorship in Baghdad, the gulf area was considered to be under their nominal authority. The Ottoman central administration called the governor of Egypt to suppress Saudi movements in the late eighteenth century. When Egyptian forces withdrew from Ahsa and the gulf, Saudi forces again took control of the region. Ottomans tried to negotiate with the Saudis to establish Ottoman authority, and Sheikh Faisal was given the title of kaimmakam and became governor of Necd.[45] Increasing British dominance in the region cought the attention of Ottoman authorities, especially that of the governor of Baghdad, Midhat Paşa. He attached Kuwait to the Basra district in 1869.[46] Moreover, he planned to make a military expedition into Ahsa for further administrative reforms and to integrate them under Baghdad's administration. Meanwhile, leadership rivalries among the Saudis gave Midhat Paşa the chance to intervene. The military expedition in Ahsa took place in 1871.[47] Ahsa, Katar, and the region around them were organized as a district of Necid.[48] The ruling sheikh of Qatar was declared the kaimmakam and some regular (*Nizamiye*) soldiers and scribes were sent to Qatar.[49] Kurşun briefly describes the political situation of Qatar and Bahrain with respect to British and Ottoman attempts at domination. Both tried to legitimize their protectorates

44 Zekeriya Kurşun, *Basra Körfezi'nde Osmanlı-İngiliz Çekişmesi: Katar'da Osmanlılar, 1871-1916* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2004).

45 Ibid., 27-31.

46 Ibid., 43.

47 Ibid., 44-45.

48 Ibid., 58.

49 Ibid., 59.

in diplomatic terms and to strengthen their position with military power. The Sublime Porte always eschewed British intervention in the Ottoman lands of gulf. Thus, in conflicts with regional sheikhs/governors, such as the sheikh of Qatar, the Sublime Porte tried to calm the situation to prevent creating a situation foreign powers may use as an excuse to intervene.

Midhat Paşa himself visited the area in 1871. He met tribal leaders and inspected the governing structure.[50] According to Anscombe, Midhat Paşa thought that by opening deserted areas to cultivation and settling nomads in newly created agricultural areas, the regions' economic output could be raised dramatically.[51] Some measures were taken to realize Mithad Paşa's plan. Investigations into land registration were begun and the repair of irrigation canals was started.[52] Guardhouses were built around Hufuf to deter marauders and secure the communication routes.[53] Small gunboats patrolled the coasts to hinder arms smuggling. Moreover, distribution of tapu deeds was planned to settle the tribes, just as Midhat Paşa did in Baghdad. Military power was exercised to force reluctant tribes. Meanwhile, arbitrary taxes were abolished and military conscription was not implemented in order to secure the loyalty of the people and prevent wide-scale uprisings.[54]

Monetary issues hampered every aspect of the Ottoman efforts in the area. Strong garrisons could not be maintained. Without military power, sedentism policies were necessarily limited. Bedouins were armed with advanced weapons due to arms smuggling, which was not prevented despite the security measures along the coasts. Moreover, increasing taxes (after Midhat Paşa's governorship) also complicated the Ottoman presence in the region. Not only monetary issues, but an inaccessible geography made it difficult to realize governance and security measures. Communication problems that were mostly the result of the geography deepened the problems of governing in a politically

50 Ibid., 58.

51 Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf*, 36-37.

52 Ibid., 40.

53 Ibid., 35.

54 Ibid., 41.

complex area.[55] Because of the unsolvable monetary and geographical restrictions, Ottomans could not realize a longstanding presence in the gulf region.

2.3.4 *Yemen*

Yemen was a great challenge to Ottoman rule in the last part of the nineteenth century. Due to its strategically important location. After the opening of the Suez Canal, the importance of the Red Sea increased dramatically. British took control of Aden and tried to control the Red Sea route in order to secure the way to India. Italians increased their influence over Ethiopia and Prussia also established a presence in the Red Sea region. Moreover, Wahhabi expansionism on the Arabian Peninsula forced the Ottomans to control Yemen. The Sublime Porte struggled to put control of Yemen in the hands of Vali of Egypt Mehmet Ali Paşa, sending troops from Anatolia. However, prior to the Suez Canal, the dispatches of troops and munitions to Yemen were insufficient. Communication and transportation took weeks and harsh geographical and climatic conditions made it nearly impossible to penetrate Yemen's highlands. After 1869, once the Suez Canal was open, the Ottomans could move reinforcements by sea and maintain control over the highlands, establishing permanent military garrisons in the interior of Yemen.[56] Ceasar E. Farah in his study, *The Sultan's Yemen: Nineteenth-Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule,*[57] investigates Ottoman attempts to control Yemen, briefly describing local and international actors. His study contains useful information based on archival sources about the history of the Ottoman administrative experience in Yemen. Apart from Farah's book, Thomas Kuehn studied the same subject from a different perspective in *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849-1919.*[58] He describes the Ottoman central administration's efforts

55 Ibid., 56.

56 Caesar E. Farah, *The Sultan's Yemen: Nineteenth-Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 57.

57 See footnote 59.

58 Thomas Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849-1919* (Leiden: Brill, 2011)

in Yemen and the gulf in the same manner as those of leading European colonialist states, such as Britain's, France's, or Italia's colonialist practices in India and Africa. He especially emphasizes the interaction between Ottoman bureaucrats and their English counterparts in Yemen and the region around it. He compares the language in official documents in the terms of how Yemeni people were identified from the perspective of Ottoman government with how Indians were officially identified by the British. Moreover, he also examines the reflection of those identifications on the legal and institutional structures in comparison with the British experience in its colonies.

One of the most problematic issues for Ottoman hegemony with respect to the Yemeni people was a sectarian difference. The shi'a sect emerged from political opposition in the early period of the Umayyad state.[59] The Ottoman sultan declared himself the Sunni caliph - the leader of all Muslim communities - but *Zeydi* sheikhs and Yemeni community did not recognize the religious authority of Ottoman sultan, claiming obedience instead to the Imamate of the Zeydi Imams. The Zeydis in the highlands of Yemen with their strong tribal structure had maintained authority in Yemen for long times. The Ottomans tried to pacify the tribes by integrating them into the Ottoman administrative system. Zeydi tribes rose up against the Ottomans several times during the last decades of the nineteenth century, and Ottoman administrators suppressed the uprisings with military force. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, the Imam of the Zeydi community, Imam Yahya, made an agreement with the Ottoman government after long negotiations. According to the Da'an Agreement, the Imam would accept a position near the governor general of the province and the Ottoman central administration would recognize him as leader of the Zeydi community. He was also officially authorized to deal with judicial matters of the Zeydi community. The Da'an Agreement stabilized the situation in Yemen and Ottoman garrisons could be establish in the Imam's territory. Imam Yahya also benefitted by having the backing of the Ottoman military against other powerful, tribal leaders.[60]

59 İlyas Üzüm, "Şia" in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2010), v. 39, 116-120.

60 Thomas Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference*, 240-242.

As mentioned, after several insufficient attempts over nearly four decades after the 1830's, more effective interventions by the Sublime Porte were realized after the completion of the Suez Canal. A military expedition under the command of Ahmet Muhtar Paşa took place form 1871-1873. He was authorized with extraordinary civil administrative powers such as the authority to modify laws and administrative regulations according to local customs.[61] He broke the resistance of local rulers by exiling their families. The mountain strongholds of local rulers were torn down or garrisoned by Ottoman forces. Those rulers who were sympathetic to Ottoman rule were appointed as district governors, granted tax farming duties, and became council members.[62] According to Kuehn, the degree of flexibility of the adaptation practices in Yemen was very different when compared with other frontier provinces like Baghdad. Censuses, land registration, and military conscription could not be implemented in Yemen.[63] During Mustafa Asım Paşa's term, tax levies were adopted to the regional welfare to prevent disturbances. The Ottoman government in Yemen faced armed resistance not only when they tried to extend their authority, but also because of high taxation. Apart from tax regulations Mustafa Asım Paşa reformed the recruitment of people to government and jurisdictive positions.[64] He appointed local sheiks as kaimmakams or local gendarmerie officers in their regions in order to engage them with the administrative structure. Moreover, *seyyids* - who were accepted as descendants of Prophet Muhammed and highly respected by Zeydi community - were appointed as jurists or Council members to administrative councils.[65] The Nizamiye Courts were seen as secular among Zeydi tribes, therefore parallel, local Sharia courts were founded in 1889 and local jurists were appointed.[66] With respect to military recruitment, steps were taken by İsmail Hakkı Paşa. Until İsmail Hakkı Paşa,

61 Ibid., 43.

62 Ibid., 48.

63 Ibid., 91.

64 Ibid., 97-99.

65 Ibid., 100-101.

66 Ibid., 112. For a study related to the Ottoman judicial system in Yemen, see Humeyra Bostan, "Instutionalizing Justice in a Distant Province: Ottoman Judicial Reform in Yemen (1872-1918)," (M.A thesis, İstanbul Şehir University, 2013)

governors in Yemen had hired mercenaries from various tribes. He recruited a regular army unit from among the local people in 1880. These soldiers were not recruited by ballot, but were chosen from among volunteers. Their uniforms were adapted to local clothing traditions to promote participation (such as was the practice in Bosnia) and the Yemeni regular army was called the Hamidiye Soldiers.[67]

Thomas Kuehn claims that the Ottomans tried to control Yemen as a colony just as colonial European states dominated African and Asian countries. He briefly describes the European method of rule, which was based on colonial difference. This method purported the essential inequality between colonizers and the colonized, separating the two groups in terms of legal codes and social spheres.[68] This separation often included different legal practices, excluding colonized people from the politics of the mainland, as well as the regulation of sexual relations between natives and colonizers. Kuehn asserts that Ottoman rule in Yemen was based on the idea that "backward could not be governed like civilized."[69] According to him, politics of difference dominated the Ottoman policies in Yemen and he named these "Colonial Ottomanism."[70] Kuehn arrives at these conclusions from statements in the official documents describing the local population as "savage". He further interprets the adaptation of the rules and practices according to local "customs and dispositions" as an evidence of a politics of difference. However, the adaptation of laws to local conditions was a common practice by the Ottoman administration even in the Tanzimat period, where the standardization of legal codes, bureaucracy, and administration was hoped to be applied in every province. Although Kuehn compares the Ottoman government in Yemen with European colonial governments, he points out that they were dissimilar in many respects. The most important is that Yemen was never declared a colony by the Sublime Porte;[71] on the contrary, Yemen was seen as Ottoman territory from the sixteenth century, but its governance was taken over by defacto local

67 Thomas Kuehn., *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference,* 116.

68 Ibid., 10-11.

69 Ibid.,

70 Ibid., 2.

71 Ibid., 12-13.

rulers (*mütegallibe*). Moreover, there was no difference in the citizenship of Yemeni people with those of other provinces, nor were there legal differences between locals and Turks. Kuehn states clearly that "it was simply not possible to distinguish colonizers from colonized along clearly defined lines of ethnicity, language or religion."[72] It is obvious that from a legal aspect, Yemen was not as a colony like India, but with regard to the language of official documents describing Yemeni people as "savage" or "backward," the issue is controversial. Kuehn also analyzes this issue in comparison with other experiences of colonization. Contrary to European colonial rulers, Ottoman officials in southwest Arabia viewed culture, not race, as the basic indicator of difference. The "savagery" and "backwardness" of people was not perceived as static and unchangeable, but rather a situation that could be changed with education, different norms of governing, and lifestyle and religious practice.[73] The Ottoman statesman's approach to the people in the remote areas of the empire, especially to nomadic people, was probably shaped by Ibn Khaldun's theory about the development and differentiation of communities.

To sum up, the centralist tendencies of the Ottoman Empire were led by the palace and the cadres of the Sublime Porte. This tendency foresaw the administrative dependency of the provinces as well as the application of legal uniformity. Measures and timekeeping were standardized in order to make everything readable and controllable by officials at the center. Those developments occurred in parallel with European counterparts of the Ottoman Empire, but in a different way. After the 1850s, the Sublime Porte attempted to extend its control over vast areas of its frontiers. Especially with the emergence of nationalistic movements among Christian subjects of the empire, the Ottoman Empire tended to penetrate more into Arabian frontiers such as Transjordan, Iraq, the gulf and Yemen. Unlike the frontiers of Bosnia and Albania in the west those areas had never experienced the presence of a proper Ottoman administration mechanism. The administrative structure of the empire expanded along with imperial investments in infrastructure, and administrative and defensive buildings, as well as with attempts to settle the nomadic population. The army played a major role in the process. As the ultimate reason for

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., 93.

the expansion of the state apparatus was to cope with European counterparts as well as provincial notables, the execution of state expansion was accomplished through coercive force. The relation with state apparatus and the army formation not only related with increasing incomes but also formation of armies by conscripting ordinary people necessitated a different relationship in theory with its subject population. I will investigate these relationships between the formation of a modern army and that of the state in the Ottoman Empire in next chapter.

3

Development of the Modern Army

The use of the firearms and artillery on the battlefield began in the fifteenth century and became widespread by the turn of the sixteenth century. The extensive use of firearms caused important transformations of battle techniques and military training. Firearms were relatively easy to learn, and ordinary people could learn it in a limited time compared to archery training. However, firearms like smooth barrel arquebuses and muskets did not immediately become widespread after their introduction. They were effective against armor, but had a long reloading time and their short effective range made musketeers vulnerable to cavalry attacks. Experienced musketeers could shoot only once every two minutes at the beginning of the seventeenth century and were guarded by pikemans to protect them against the cavalry. Dutch military commanders –along with many others in different parts of the world- adapted the volley fire tactics of archers to the musketeers, compensating for the disadvantages of the firearms. They reorganized soldiers into long but few lines inside a square formation of pikemans. The volley fire tactic works by changing the order of the line such that the first line retreats to the back to reload after shooting. This tactic enables continuous shooting by the musketeers.[1] However, the practice of volley fire in war necessitated well-disciplined and trained soldiers. Soldiers had to continue firing from close range, which

1 Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 18-19.

meant being face to face with firing enemy soldiers. Army units reorganized into smaller sizes with an increasing number of commanders. Every action of shooting and reloading in volley fire was standardized and published in guide books. Army units started to drill intensively and regularly according to the guidelines.[2] This strict discipline and these drills were practiced by mercenaries hired in the kingdoms of Europe. Sweden and Holland were the leading states for the new types of training, and other kingdoms tried to hire Swedish and Dutch-trained mercenary soldiers for their wars. Although there is evidence of the Janissaries' use of volley fire in the sixteenth century,[3] in later periods, they became integrated into other economic activities of city life, and their training must have been neglected. As Gültekin Yıldız points out, they also probably did not willingly adapt to the intense, efficiency-oriented drills in which soldiers were essentially mechanical elements of a giant machine.[4]

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries European armies expanded in size and hired more local and foreign mercenaries on a permanent basis. New war tactics necessitated keeping a standing army to allow for longer periods of training and discipline. Hiring mercenaries from contractors shifted to permanent, paid soldiers and voluntary or involuntary conscription. While states enlarged their capacity to hire soldiers, they had to simultaneously control more elements within the society to sustain their war making capacity. States overthrew the military capacities of nobles and employed them in army command structures. On the other hand, to keep up large field armies, they created more effective revenue extracting tools for tax collection. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, states opened educational and health institutions, primarily to meet the needs of the army. Moreover, states became directly involved in the society's production and distribution processes either by opening industries or purchasing large quantities of

2 Ibid., 20.

3 Günhan Börekçi, "A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries' Use of Volley Fire during the Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593-1606 and the Problem of Origins" in Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 59/4 (2006): 407-438

4 Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devletinde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826-1839)* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2009), 332.

goods to supply the army.[5] These developments led to emergence of a unique power base surrounding a large quantity of people in a shared ground.

Eighteenth century Europe witnessed a rise in nationalism among the subjects of major states, especially in France. Large-scale wars among major powers in Europe increased nationalist sentiments and promoted the notion of belonging to a bounded community against the state's external enemies. External threats tended to unify subjects around emerging central governments that defended common interests. These developments prompted armies of native soldiers instead of mercenary armies from different nationalities. Although all states still used mercenaries, the percentage of native-born soldiers increased throughout the eighteenth century. For instance, 75 percent of the French army were French subjects in the course of the French Revolution.[6]

France had a special position having experienced the revolution in 1789. Nationalism was widespread in France during the eighteenth century, and the demands of the bourgeois and the public for participation led to the revolution. In the aftermath of the revolution, revolutionary governments represented being a soldier as a provision for gaining civil rights.[7] As Gültekin Yıldız points out, the main problem of European states faced with a huge citizen army in France was mobilizing their population while keeping them within the old political order. In other words, not only did they have to strengthen their armies, but they had to reorganize their political system. France was the leading country that had shifted to a modern national state with a bureaucratic government mechanism. The French Revolution of 1789 constituted the turning point for the creation of that mechanism and its export to other European countries through the Napoleonic Wars. In the aftermath of the revolution, the revolutionists eliminated nobles, landlords, and the clergy, which were the old administration's functional intermediaries. Instead

5 Michael Duffy, "Introduction: The Military Revolution and the State 1500-1800" in *The Military Revolution and the State 1500-1800* (University of Exeter, 1981), 3-6.

6 Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: the Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 122-124.

7 Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok,* 133.

of using semi-autonomous intermediaries, they created direct rule by centrally appointing administrators and officers.[8] Moreover, in the period of Napoleon, all legal codes were unified and applied in the same manner in all provinces. They were applied not only in the provinces of France, but also in many other European countries that the French armies invaded.[9] On the other hand, faced with France's new political and military order, other European nations as well as the Ottoman state had to reexamine their state-society relations.

The increasing sense of belonging people felt to their nation, as well as the enlargement of the state apparatus to control and extract resources, led to the emergence of the conscription system. Revolutionary France had to deal with both internal and external opponents. After the revolution, the French army greatly expanded with volunteers and conscripts. However, these expansions did not coincide with the need for fresh soldiers, therefore the French administration declared full mobilization in 1793. The mobilization decree aimed to conscript all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 25, and the French army nearly doubled in size, reaching approximately 750 thousand men.[10] A year later, this number reached about 1169 thousand. Although the French administration tried to mobilize through propaganda, it was not always easy to conscript such a large number of people. Resistance to conscription and desertion were common; the percentage of deserters was about a quarter of the total.

The most important dimension of the conscription of ordinary men into the army was the necessity of redefining their relations with the state. As mentioned, before the French revolution armies in Europe consisted of nobles, limited numbers of professional soldiers, and mercenaries. Monarchies eschewed the participation of the ordinary people in the army, because including them into the army implies an active participation in the public realm and therefore in politics. However, it was not solely about the preference of monarchs; mobilization of the masses to battle was predicated on the emergence

8 Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), 108-109.

9 Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State,* 134-135.

10 Ibid., 130-131.

of the feeling of national belonging. In most cases it worked from top to down. Conscription could not be implemented without force and punishment. Apart from using force, monarchs and state bureaucrats had to promote soldiering by granting civil rights and increasing its prestige through propaganda.

After its defeat by Napoleon's army, the Prussian state tried to reorganize their army and mobilize against France. The problem Prussian statesmen faced was similar to that of Ottoman administrators. Ottoman statesmen theorized their aim as responding to enemy armies as equals (*bi'l-misl mukabele*). Ottomans understood this response militarily, arming with the same weapons and practicing the same drills. However, Prussian administrators comprehended that the response to the enemy after their defeat was overall state reform as well as military reform. The reform in the state structure aimed to promote national feelings and responsibility to protect *the Fatherland*, which were connected to expansion of freedom and active political participation.[11] These reforms wrapped up with the announcement of compulsory military service. In the first version of the conscription law declared in 1810, those who escaped military service were deprived of civil rights. Although the king had reservations about the general conscription of ordinary men, the final version of the decree in 1813 abolished all exceptions to performing the military duty. Moreover, unlike France, Prussia intended to conscript all males of its relatively smaller population, but into different sections of the army. They organized the army in three sectors: active soldiers, enlisted reserves (*Landwehr*), and final reserves (*Landsturm*). All three had their own command hierarchy and organization. This system was adopted by the Ottoman Empire for the Mansure army in 1834. According to the reserve system, every male citizen had to serve in the active troops for three years, and then in the first reserve section for six years, and lastly in the second reserves.[12] Unlike the relatively small corps of active troops, reserves were more liable to serve the people. They trained for certain periods of the year, and the rest of the time they were back at their normal lives. Active service time was also relatively shorter than that of other states of that period. This army organization was more suitable

11 Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok*, 134-135.

12 Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society* (New York: Berg, 2004), 48-49.

for less populous countries such as the Ottoman Empire. Short service terms and the possibility for reservists to maintain their own lands resulted in less mutiny and less harm to production.

§ 3.1 Structure of the Ottoman Central Army up to the Nineteenth Century

The Ottoman state was founded as a frontier principality at the border of the Eastern Roman Empire in the thirteenth century. Apart from the ruling family, the principality consisted of warrior Turkmen Beys who constantly raid the enemy empire to seize lands. Those warrior commanders and their horseman were the soldiers of the principality. During the reign of Osman Bey and Orhan Bey, the principality turned into a state with the expansion of its borders to Bursa, the Dardanelles, and some parts of Greece and Thrace. The governing mechanism evolved from a principality into a state structure by inheriting the customs of old Muslim empires as well as that of the Roman empire.

The first central army was founded by applying the one fifth right of the ruler to war slaves. Slaves of the ruling family consisted of the first *Kapıkulu* (meaning literally "the slaves of the gate") army. The Kapıkulu army was conceived as the personal guards of the sultan and his throne. Forming an army of slaves was common practice in previous Islamic states such as the Memluk empire, in which all governors and military leaders had come from slavery. On the other hand, the Ottomans introduced a new practice called *devşirme*, which was the systematic levying of Christian boys for the administration and army.[13] They stayed in barracks and were regularly paid. They did not constitute the biggest group, but they comprised the core and most powerful part of the central army up to the seventeenth century. Their numbers reached 30 thousand in the reign of I. Süleyman.[14]

Ottoman provincial forces consisted mainly of *tımarlı sipahis*, who were the other important element of the Ottoman army. A tımar holder, called

13 Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Vol. 1; Empire of the Gazis: the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 113.

14 Ibid., 123.

sipahi, has the right to collect taxes in a certain land and has the duty to go with army when summoned. They had to form and equip armed cavalries in proportion to their income from the land and lead them to battle. Provincial armies were always more populous than the Kapıkulu army. At the turn of the seventeenth century there were about 80 to 100 thousand cavalrymen in provincial armies.[15]

After the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman army started to conscript more mercenaries, called *levend* (pl. *levendat*).[16] There are several social and military reasons behind the conscription of ordinary people into the military: population overgrowth, the tendency and availability of the population for military service, and of course, the Ottoman army's increasing need to conscript musketeers for war.

Rapid population increases in the fifteenth and especially the sixteenth century affected the rural population in economic terms. Barkey mentions Barkan's observation that the Anatolian population in this period nearly doubled.[17] The land per households was insufficient for the increasing population, and immigration of the landless male population to towns and cities became widespread.[18] Not only did the economic bottlenecks of these peasants impel their mobility, but also they were seeking a new life in the Paşa households in the empire's towns.[19] The increasing need of patrons to employ armed men in their service tempted rural males who had the possibility to buy arms. Local nobles and Ottoman governors maintained their own armies called *kapıhalkı*. On the other hand, in times of mobilization they were also ordered to provide mercenaries apart from their own for the central army, called *miri levendat*.[20] Levends hired by the state often returned to banditry after the mobilization ended.

15 Ibid., 126-127.

16 Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (İstanbul: İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi Yayınları, 1965), 137.

17 Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats,* 49.

18 For a brief summary and critique of the relevant literature see Oktay Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia during the 16th and 17th Centuries: The "Demographic Crisis" Reconsidered" in *IJMES* 36, No. 2, 183-205.

19 Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler,* 256-257.

20 Ibid., 351-352.

From the military side, the Ottoman Empire was engaged in wars with European counterparts throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. European armies were increasing their musketeer units and changing to infantry formations to accommodate the effective use of firearms. The Ottoman administration also changed its army composition from cavalry to infantry. Meantime, provincial cavalry forces became ineffective because they did not adapt to the new firearms and were still using weapons such as axes, swords, and pikes. In addition to that, cavalries became more vulnerable to the volley fire of the infantry.

Janissaries started to use firearms in the fifteenth century on a limited scale. As mentioned, there is information about Janissaries' use of volley fire in the sixteenth century. It was the newest and most effective war tactic of the period, but the total numbers of Janissaries were limited. Due to the sharp increase in infantry-men in European armies in the sixteenth century, the devşirme system was not providing enough recruits for the Ottoman kapıkulu army. Recruitment of devşirme necessitated a long training period and could provide only a limited number of men. Thus the Ottoman administration felt obliged to expand the janissary army in the sixteenth century by conscripting ordinary people.[21] Recruits from among subjects would return to their daily lives after the mobilization period ends. The recruitment of the subject population and worsening economic conditions -such as currency debasement and irregular salaries- affected Janissaries' involvement with local, urban economic life during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Janissary corps in Istanbul and other major Anatolian cities became involved with local manufacturing and trade. Different Janissary corps deepened their control over different sectors. People coming from outside Istanbul to seek a job and protection often tried to be included in Janissary networks'.[22] On the other hand, Janissaries shared lodges and vocations with non-janissary traders. Although they often violated market rules and regulations exerting their military or police authority, they faced the same problems vis-à-vis state regulations as

21 Mehmet Mert Sunar, "Cauldron of the Dissent: a Study of the Janissary Corps 1807-1826" (Ph.D. Diss., Binghampton University, 2006), 34-35.

22 Ibid., 73-75.

non-janissary colleagues. They also had to deal with the fiscal policies around the state centralization programs of III. Selim and II. Mahmud.[23] All in all, the Janissary corps were not an isolated military unit of the sultan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; rather they were embedded into society and constituted a social network. There is no doubt that they were not undertaking a military mission by the turn of the nineteenth century. However, their interference and the fact they had become part of the governing mechanism was unacceptable for the state elite who intended to establish an absolutist, modern state in line with those of their European counterparts.

After surviving the Janissary rebellion of 1808, II. Mahmud did not try to eliminate Janissary power in Istanbul. Rather he turned to the local powerful *ayans* (notables) of Anatolia and Thrace to eliminate them along with his advisor, Halet Efendi, who had good relations with the Janissaries. We know that Janissaries as a powerful group involved with trade and commerce was trying to interfere in the political decision-making process. Halet Efendi acted as a mediator between the Phanariots in principalities of the Danube and the Janissaries, who controlled the lucrative grain trade between Wallachia and Moldovia.[24] Halet Efendi lost his power when the principalities of the Danube and the Greeks revolted against Ottoman administration in 1821. II. Mahmud had to appeal to Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt for help to suppress the Greek rebellion. However, there was another threat for the Ottoman administration: the possibility of a Greek revolt in the capital city of Istanbul. Although Janissary presence was vital against a possible Greek rebellion, II. Mahmud accelerated the elimination of powerful Janissary officers with the termination of the head of the Janissary corps Hüseyin Ağa. II. Mahmud also eliminated Janissary supporters from among the ulama with the help of trusted men. Not only did II. Mahmud and his cadre try to eliminate the powerful members of the Janissary corps and ulama, but tried to cut off popular support for the Janissaries through propaganda and preventing immigration to Istanbul, since such popular support came from the lower strata of the city who came from rural areas and sought protection and work. The central administration

23 Ibid., 98.

24 Ibid., 181-182.

worked to prevent immigration by applying an internal passport system (*murur tezkeresi*) and demolishing bachelor houses in the city.[25] When Sultan and his cadre had been guaranteed the support of leading ulamas, bureaucrats and various army officers announced a military reform program and the formation of new trained army corps called the *Eşkinci*.[26] These corps were formed by choosing some men from each Janissary corps, and they totaled about 5000. A few days after new troops started training, Janissaries rebelled for the last time. Artillery, bombardiers, and navy corps as well as some mercenaries attacked the Janissaries and forced them to retreat to their barracks in Et Meydanı. The barracks were burned down and collapsed under artillery fire. Due to the propaganda of the government, non-Janissaries people did not participate in the uprising as they had in previous ones. We can deduct from the lack of real resistance against the government attack on the side of the Janissaries that the preparations of the anti-Janissary cadre worked. The Janissary barracks were destroyed and the rebels were killed within few hours, and in the aftermath, some officers known to have participated in previous incidents were caught and killed too.[27] The day after, the Janissary army was officially abolished and new *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediyye* army was founded.[28]

Despite disturbances in most cities in Anatolia and Thrace, Janissaries accepted the Imperial decree about the abolition of the corps except in a few cities. In Tokat, Amasya, Antep, and Edirne there was some resistance, but these did not last long after military intervention. Only the Bosnian resistance against state centralization processes -including the abolition of the Janissary corps and the foundation of a new army- could not be suppressed so easily. The reason lies in the historical experience of Bosnia up to the nineteenth century.

3.1.1 *Bosnian Military Structure before the Nineteenth Century*

Bosnia as a frontier region always had a military importance for the Ottoman administration. The defense structure of Bosnia against the Habsburgs was

25 Ibid., 194-196.

26 Ibid., 200.

27 Ibid., 208-209.

28 Ibid., 210.

created after the conquest in the fifteenth century and developed over the centuries with the needs of the province. Districts near the Habsburg border were organized as defensive units within defensive fortifications such as castles and outposts. In later years, every sancak was divided into smaller defensive units called captaincies (kapudanlık) with its own castles and defensive units. The first kapudanlık was established in 1558 in Gradicka, a town on the Austrian border. Local commanders called captains *(Kapudan)* were appointed to the captaincy. The governor of Bosnia was the commander over all captains and the Bosnian troops. Their primary duties were guarding the frontier against enemy and bandit groups and maintaining security of the roads. Apart from that, they were responsible for the logistics of the castles in their region, such as arms, men, and munitions.[29] Their number increased to twenty-nine over the next century, and during the reign of II. Mahmud in the first decades of nineteenth century their number reached thirty-nine.[30] Soldiers recruited from among local man called *yerlikulu janissaries,* were appointed to the castles of Bosnia or summoned to the duty as needs required. As a frontier province, Bosnia always needed a high number of armed men to protect the borders, and this permanent need was sustained mainly by local manpower. These yerlikulu soldiers who were engaged in ordinary life in peaceful times, were similar to a militia force and separate from the imperial Janissaries from Istanbul. Their payment was covered by local funds through the system of *ocaklık tımar*, in which local funds were transferred to specific captaincies with the mediation of local government officers.[31] This duty of the central administration to mediate operated as check and balance mechanism over local troops. Captains not only needed payrolls which, were sent from Istanbul, but also materials such as arms and powder.[32] That was another mechanism that tied regional defense forces to the center.

29 Ahmet Cevat Eren, *Mahmut II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek* (İstanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1965), 24-26.

30 Fatma Sel Turhan, "Rebelling for The Old Order: Ottoman Bosnia 1826-1836" (Ph.D. Diss. Boğaziçi University, 2009), 107.

31 Michael Robert Hickok, *Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia* (New York: Brill, 1997), 49-50.

32 Ibid., 20.

It has been argued whether captaincies and other low-ranking military commanders were hereditary positions or not. The discussion is important for understanding the relationship of the Bosnian yerlikulu troops and their captains to the central authority. As Hickok points out, Bosnian militia troops were recruited and organized as regular troops under the supervision of the Ottoman governor and central administration in the eighteenth century. Moreover, promotions and recruitment of new soldiers had to be approved by Istanbul, because payrolls were prepared with confirmation by the central government.[33] Hickok gives various examples of documents sent from Bosnian captaincies to Istanbul requesting the appointment of certain people to high positions. Although the central administration generally approved the appointment of the lower ranking soldiers automatically, the decision process was more meticulous for the appointment of high-ranking soldiers. Hickok states that captains felt obliged to justify their choices by cataloging the abilities of their nominees in detail in their requests.[34]

The central administration could create a huge regional army in times when the border needed defense without paying regular salaries, and common people enjoyed the prestige of being in the *askeri* class. Bosnian regional militia forces reached 20 thousand soldiers in the eighteenth century. We can comprehend the sufficiency of the Bosnian defense structure in the eighteenth century from the Habsburg-Ottoman war of 1737. Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa was appointed governor of Bosnia on the eve of the Austrian attack with the duty to prepare the province for war. The Ottoman Empire had been in a war with Russia for a long time and had extended its military capacity as much as possible including *timariots* of Bosnia. Therefore, the central government could not send adequate soldiers to defend against a Habsburg attack of Bosnia; Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa had to rely on Bosnian provincial soldiers. He organized all the regional commanders as well as the notables of the province to face Austrian forces that had a force of not less than 60 thousand.[35] Bosnian militia forces of about 20 thousand were able to defeat the threefold larger Habsburg

33 Ibid., 66-68.

34 Ibid., 70-75.

35 Ibid., 26.

army by capturing its artillery.[36] The victory of the Bosnian troops over the Habsburg's shows the organizational strength and discipline of Bosnia's militia soldiers and their relationship with the Ottoman administration in the chain of command.

During the eighteenth century, local notables seized power with new tax farming regulations, and it became possible for them and other wealthy individuals to influence the militia. *Malikane* holders agreed directly with local ayans for their cash collection. As Hickok points out, the important pillars of stability for the militia's finances –the state's role as a middleman and the captains– started to disappear.[37] As a consequence, militias' ties with the state loosened and the state could not restrain the command structure of the region's militia. Moreover, semi-autonomous, regional commanders and members of the yerlikulu yeniçeris (who benefited from tax immunities, etc.) were confronted with the centralization policies of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.

3.1.2 *3.1.2. Abolition of the Janissary Corps and the Bosnian Resistance*

A fierman was sent to Bosnia along with other provinces about the abolition of the Janissary Corps. Along with the yerlikulu soldiers, many in Bosnia were affected their abolition. In fact, the main problem was enlarging scope of the state apparatus and limits on the autonomy of local actors. In other words, the problem was not only the abolition of the Janissaries, but the forthcoming suspension of local privileges. Turhan interpreted subsequent rebellions as a type of regional policymaking or method of bargaining with central authorities to introduce regional demands.[38] This interpretation coincides with Karen Barkey's claims about the Ottoman method of bargained incorporation to eliminate or take advantage of armed bandit groups.[39]

36 Ibid., 34-35.

37 Ibid., 101-108.

38 Fatma Sel Turhan, Rebelling for The Old Order, 129.

39 Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats,* 11.

Istanbul was aware of the critical situation in the Bosnian province with regard to the Janissary issue and therefore sent influential ulama and bureaucrats to Bosnia to convince the people of the necessity of destroying the Janissary corps.[40] After the circulation of the news around the province, regional councils called *meşveret* -in which notables of the region discussed important decisions- gathered in Saray. Leading figures decided not to obey the orders from Istanbul.[41] According to Turhan, the reaction against the new regulations turned into a regional movement in a short period of time,[42] but the uprising did not last long because rebels were unwilling to confront the governer's armed forces.[43] Vali Abdurrahim Paşa invited notables of the region to Saray for a meşveret to discuss the rebellion. The Sublime Porte ordered the governor to build and stay in a fortified, administrative residence in Saray instead of Travnik. Notables in Saray were influential over the reactions of Bosnian notables in other, smaller districts and over the rest of the population. Therefore, the vali's residence was moved to Saray to directly control these notables, but it was necessary to support the governor with an armed force of about 12 thousand men that were intended to be conscripted from among the local people.[44] However, the vali feared an uprising and reported that conscription of Bosnians could create disorder. Thus, the conscription of men for the new army was suspended.[45]

The Ottoman administration struggled with many major conflicts during this period, such as those with Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa and with Russia. Apart from these conflicts, they also faced local mutinies such as that of the Albanians of Shkoder and the Bosnians'. Therefore, they intended to calm the situation in Bosnia by abandoning conscription efforts. Moreover, the next vali, Ali Namık Paşa, was ordered to reside in Travnik, following the previous custom. Since local notables in Saray were strong, the governors hesitated to provoke them.

40 Fatma Sel Turhan, Rebelling for The Old Order, 133.

41 Ibid., 138.

42 Ibid., 134.

43 Ibid., 158-160.

44 Ibid., 162.

45 Ibid., 163.

The situation in Bosnia did not remain peaceful for long and got worse because of a land issue with Serbia. According to the treaty of Edirne, Serbia had taken six districts from Bosnia.[46] The Ottoman government accepted the agreement but wanted to postpone the border change because they expected rebellions in the region. Mahmud the II and the Ottoman administration in Istanbul were in a conflict with regard to the war for Syria with the governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Paşa. They tried to avoid creating any reasons for mutiny in Bosnia, but the captains of the Serhad region called for a gathering in the house of Hüseyin, the captain of Gradacac, and started preparing their soldiers. Moreover, Albanians in Shkoder such as Mustafa Paşa Bushati, started to make similar preparations in correspondence with the Bosnians. Namık Paşa feared their coalition and reported the situation to Istanbul.[47] Grand Vizier Mehmed Reşit Paşa was charged with suppressing the rebellion. He first attacked and defeated Mustafa Paşa of İşkodra in 1832. The lowlands of Albania were pacified, and only the highlands to Montenegro stayed autonomous from the control of the Sublime Porte. In the meantime, Captain Hüseyin was chosen governor in a meşveret and applied to the Sublime Porte to be appointed as governor of Bosnia. According to Turhan, it is understood from documents sent to Bosnia that Istanbul pretended to approve his application for a time in order to focus first on solely Athe lbanian issue.[48]

While Albanians were being suppressed with military power, Mahmud Hamdi Paşa was appointed governor of Bosnia in 1832 and charged with quelling the Bosnian rebels. On the other side, the Ottoman administration invited leading Gheg Paşas to Istanbul to confirm their loyalty and to procure their assistance for securing mountain passes for the march of the army of the governor.[49] Moreover the assistance of some captains, including that of Ali Paşa Rizvanbegovic, was obtained. Finally, after several battles with the rebels Captain Hüseyin and his army was defeated on June 4, 1832.[50] Hüseyin and a group

46 Ibid., 178.

47 Ibid., 181-182.

48 Ibid., 195-198.

49 Ibid., 201-203.

50 Ibid., 206-207.

of his men fled to Austria as refugees. Later, Captain Hüseyin asked for forgiveness from sultan and moved to Istanbul where he lived until his death in 1834. As a reward to Ali Paşa Rizvanbegovic, who was instrumental in the governor's victory, he was appointed as governor of Herzegovina, which was separated from Bosnia.

After the suppression of the rebellion in Bosnia, new regulations were still not be implemented due to ongoing conflict with the Kavalalı. According to Mahmud Hamdi Paşa, it was not opportune to demand anything from the Bosnians because of the probable reaction.[51] In fact, application of the new regulations, or the *Nizamat*, meant recruiting soldiers for the new Mansure army. In 1834, the Sublime Porte again attempted to apply the Nizamat by appointing Akif Efendi who was seen trustworthy, to oversee the process. He gathered the notables of Saray and they agreed to obey the Nizamat. However, Akif Efendi did not reassign local soldiers into infantry corps to avoid a possible reaction.[52] The Sublime Porte changed the vali on Akif Efendi's recommendation and appointed Vecihi Paşa to Bosnia. Vali Vecihi Paşa intended to recruit two battalions of Mansure soldiers in December 1835 and applied the Porte to send military material and instructors. However, the recruitment process was still not finished in 1838.[53] The Gülhane Edict was declared in 1839, yet could not immediately be implemented in Bosnia. Resistance among Bosnians prevented the central administration from applying the edict in the province. After the Gülhane Edict, an uprising occurred, and Bosnians and Albanians were therefore exempted from military service. The Sublime Porte periodically tried to impose centralization policies on Bosnia by suppressing the local opposition. However, the strong opposition of the Bosnian elites and the old military class forced the Central administration to withdraw. After the reforming of the military structure and conscription system in 1843, Bosnians and Albanians were again exempted from conscription. They in 1849, affected by waves of movements in 1848, and the government responded by sending an army under the supervision of Ömer Lütfi Paşa who violently suppressed the

51 Ibid., 214-215.

52 Ibid., 225-231.

53 Ibid., 243.

rebellion. Administrative and military reform in the province was only realized after the 1860s, which will be investigated in the next chapter.

§ 3.2 Administrative and Military Reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century

The Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (Victorious Soldiers of Muhammed) army was founded immediately after the abolition of the old corps. Actually, the centuries-old practice of recruiting mercenary soldiers, called *levend* or *sekban,* became the norm by recruiting among peasants for the long term with regular training. This policy implies the direct control of the state over the recruitment process and the soldiers themselves (levends used to be hired by contractors and powerful ayans in the peripheral regions). Moreover, Ottoman provincial governors hired mercenaries and sent them to war in the times of mobilization. Apart from practical problems such as high salaries, and desertion, the centralization project of the administration included eliminating ayans and creating trained soldiers loyal to their religion and state. Monopolization of violence coincided with monopolization of fiscal issues and monetization. On the fiscal side, developments including the elimination of ayans and abandonment of askeri class rights returned in the form of more fiscal resources for the state. Not only did abolishing tax privileges and eliminating mediators produce extra funds for the state, but destroying the Janissary corps freed the Ottoman administration from the base of opposition among ordinary people in the main cities of the empire who opposed levies to fund the new army.

The pool for recruitment into the new army was the rural population of Anatolia and Rumelia. The new army was small, consisting of 12 thousand soldiers in the first stage.[54] As did its counterparts in France and Prussia, the Ottoman administration maintained a peasant army consisting of ordinary men. According to Yıldız, this phenomenon could be interpreted as averse to the Janissaries and provincial notables who much intervened to the politics.[55] The

54 Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok,* 139.

55 Ibid., 144-145.

pool for recruitment was the rural population of Anatolia and Rumelia because these areas were more or less under the direct control of Istanbul. Remnants of old provincial armies of *Nizam-ı Cedid* and *Sekban-ı Cedid* were prioritized for recruitment into the Mansure army, since new army required soldiers who had experience with modern military drills to supervise the training of the newcomers. Apart from the former Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers, Janissary units in some Anatolian cities like Erzurum were included to the new army.

The count of new army soldiers reached 7 to 8 thousand in first two months, which counted as a success, since soldiers had been recruited on a volunteer basis. However, those who joined the army were subject to 12 years of service. Moreover, unlike with previous armies, Mansure army soldiers lived in barracks during their service and could not take vacations or get married until their service period ended.[56] Barracks were built in the main city and district centers to keep soldiers away from daily life and trade. Uniforms and paraphernalia samples were sent to the provinces to have them produced locally.

For the former soldiers of previous armies, it was difficult to accept such harsh rules. In addition to the strict regulations regarding the form and duration of service, wages were lower than the average pay of levend and sekban soldiers. Therefore, it may be assumed that in many places the poorest strata of people enlisted in the army. Not only the neediest in society, but also physically unsuitable people were sent to the army corps due to a lack of detailed regulations and a lack of officials to enforce them. Moreover, in some places soldiers were recruited under coercion by the armed forces in times of need. Thus, desertions were inevitable. Many of those who did not desert died from the disease or in battle during their 12-year terms of service.

After a short period after the foundation of the army, payments of soldiers were improved to attract more experienced soldiers. However, the number of recruits did not reach the desired level even by the end of the 1830s. From its foundation in 1837, nearly 160 thousand soldiers were enlisted into the Mansure army, but just one third of them were in active service. The number

56 Ibid., 173-176.

reached to 90 thousand by 1841.[57] The government used irregular armed forces from Albanian and Kurdish tribes during the wars with Egypt and Russia in the 1830s. To decrease the need for irregular forces and recruitment of ordinary people (*nefir-i amm*), a reserve army called the *Redif-i Asakir-i Mensure* was founded in 1834. The Redif army was inspired by the Prussian *Lendwehr* and organized parallel to the command structure of the active army.[58] The conscripts were trained for a certain period and then returned to normal life, getting together twice a year for drills. The purpose of the new army was to decrease opposition to the long active service period and train a large reserve from among a limited population without harming agriculture and crafts. Soldiers in the Redif army were recruited directly after its foundation. In later years, the active service period of regular soldiers was shortened and Redif troops substituted for ones who finished their terms.

Improvements in service conditions were realized in the 1830s through trial and error before publicly announcing the shortening of active service time in 1837-1838. Moreover, conscription by drawing of lots was tested in some locations. In 1843, a new set of military regulations was publicly announced in line with the Gülhane Edict which sanctioned reforms already in practice. Moreover, the reform of recruitment by drawing lots was announced in 1846. The active service duration reduced to five years. Those who finished their active service or escaped it by drawing lots would be in the Redif army for 7 years.[59]

The Ottoman administration tried to implement new administrative and military regulations in all regions starting with the central and western Anatolia and Rumelia except for Bosnia and Albania. Increasing manpower for the army and tax incomes forced the administrative cadre to penetrate semi-autonomous areas of eastern Anatolia and Arab lands, including areas that had not been attached to the center, such as Adana-Kozan, Kurdistan, and Albania where a nomadic way of life predominated. New army corps played a major role in bringing the borderlands of the empire under the administrative

57 Veysel Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment and the Recruit: 1826-1853" (M.A thesis, Bilkent University, 2005), 38.

58 Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok*, 256-257.

59 Veysel Şimşek, Ottoman Military Recruitment, 50-53.

control of Istanbul. Army corps were used either to suppress or threaten local power holders such as tribal leaders. Along with suppression and threats, the regular army often operated to disarm and settle local armed groups. Thus, permanent military structures such as barracks were established in every district along with other governmental buildings, and also guards were stationed. Not only did the Sublime Porte create governmental structures in the cities, but also delimited and eliminated the frontier zone by settling nomads in rural areas. One of the primary advantages of provincial administrations against local armed groups was the superiority of the regular army's armaments. They carried modern rifles that were more accurate and easier to reload. As investigated in the first chapter, administrative and public service buildings were built in the newly controlled places. However, the most important step towards centralization was military conscription. To sustain the continuity of conscripts and tax revenues from a region, a permanent military presence was seen as vital in addition to government services. For instance, when governor of Damascus Mehmed Reşit Paşa took the district of Salt in Transjordan, one of the first project undertaken was the repair of the citadel to use as a military barracks, in other words, permanently situating soldiers in that place.[60] Moreover, after the construction of new roads and telegraph lines, police and gendarmerie stations as well as guard houses were built around the district for protection. Apart from regular soldiers, local Bedouin and Circassian forces were employed as security forces.[61] A similar experience in Ottoman Iraq took place where a military expedition eliminated the powerful Memluk governorship in 1831. Considering Baghdad's importance, a new provincial army, the 6th Army, was founded and located there. Despite the dualism between civilian and military rulers in the governing structure after the Tanzimat reforms, Baghdad governors bore both titles, just as before. After the foundation of the 6th Army, a military barracks was situated in Baghdad as well as in other important cities. An arsenal was built to store locally produced ammunition.[62] The governors of Baghdad tried to settle the Bedouins and attach them to the

60 Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of State*, 49.

61 Ibid., 67.

62 Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq,* 63.

provincial administration. Meanwhile they constructed many forts along the trade routes such as the Baghdad-Aleppo road and alongside the Euphrates. Riverboats were also introduced to patrol the Euphrates.[63] Security measures against Bedouins were seen vital to increasing commerce and tax incomes. To take all these security measures, the number of regular Asakir-i Nizamiye soldiers was increased by conscription from among local men, and from Anatolian men in case of need. Conscription of tribesman was avoided, though, in order to evade conflicts. Yet, to some extend villagers were recruited. Irregular soldiers, called *başıbozuk*, were reduced in number with the increase in Nizamiye soldiers. Tribesman were encouraged to settle to engage them with agriculture and break their histories of war and nomadism. Similar steps were taken in Kuwait, Basra, and Hasa in the gulf region. Several administrative and military steps were taken by Midhat Paşa as governor of Baghdad. Kuwait being close to Basra was attached to Baghdad's administrative control through cooperation with the local rulers. Some local security forces were operated. A military expedition was conducted with an army and several ships to the more important Basra and Hasa regions. Their importance for the Sublime Porte came from increasing Saudi power in Riyadh and British interventions in the gulf. After Britain's protection of Bahrain by obtaining support of the local ruling family and their attempts to offer similar protection to tribes in other districts of the gulf, the Sublime Porte decided to build a governmental structure in the region. Midhat Paşa led the 1871 military expedition to the region and established a military base in Hufuf, which was most open to British influence.[64] The central administration's centralization efforts were not always undesirable for local power holders. Ottoman governors used tribal conflicts to secure local allies in most of Iraq, southern Syria, and the gulf region. For instance, the ruling tribe of the Basra al-Thani family called for Ottoman alliance against increasing British and Saudi interference in their region.[65] Apart from tribal hostilities, local actors in the gulf region had many diplomatic options to choose among, such as accepting British protection or making an alliance with the Saudi, who were the most powerful tribal group opposed to

63 Ibid., 57.

64 Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf,* 29-30.

65 Ibid., 32.

Ottoman administration. Considering the situation, Midhat Paşa attempted neither to recruit soldiers for the Nizamiye army nor to levy taxes on the local people. Settling of nomadic tribes was encouraged by issuing land titles and production was increased by protecting farmers against the tribes. Apart from the military supply base in Hasa, chains of forts and guardhouses were constructed along communication routes.[66]

The correlation between rationalization in military and administrative affairs is investigated above. The introduction of standardized military service caused reactions in frontier areas, and so were subjected selective implementation as in the Bosnian case. The Ottoman administration practiced a mix of coercive power and bargaining to obtain the consent of locals at the fringes of the empire. The actors were not just Ottoman officials and locals; neighboring states and international powers often played a role. In the Montenegrin-Ottoman borderland case to be analyzed in next chapter, I combine the effects and bargaining power of those actors while explaining the construction of a military line of defense on the frontier.

66 Ibid., 43.

4

The Ottoman-Montenegrin Frontier

Ottoman empire had a flexible administration system analyzed in the previous chapters. Up to the nineteenth century, frontier regions of the empire such as south of Damascus, Iraq, and Yemen in the east; and Shkoder and Bosnia in the west were ruled by autonomous or semi-autonomous power holders. In the nineteenth century, Ottoman sultans and leading bureaucrats carried out centralization policies to increase the state income and military power, eliminating these different power groups. This process coincided with efforts to increase the state capacity to govern and directly control the vast territories of the empire. The increase in state capacities included administrative and military presence even in frontier provinces. Appointing civil servants, commanders, and soldiers; creating road and communication infrastructures; and building governmental and military buildings were among the primary duties of the central government. Without developments in the communication technology, it would have been impossible to realize the central governance of the provinces. In order to make every datum from different parts of the empire legible, standardization was vital. Standardization of the education of officers and governors of administrative divisions, and of legal codes as well as time keeping were simultaneous. Much efforts went into to realizing reforms in frontier areas as well as in the empire's difficult, inland geographical areas. However, in frontier regions locals had reason to resist Istanbul's direct control. In the first place, most had experienced weak or no state intervention in their lives prior to the nineteenth century and were not

willing to be subjected to taxes or compulsory military service. Moreover, with the spread of nationalistic ideas, most people living in peripheries of the empire felt no sense of belonging to sultan and his subjects. At the same time, they had bargaining power. Governors and the Sublime Port tended to bargain with the frontier people. The most important factor behind this tendency was the remoteness of the frontiers from the center, with the economic bottlenecks for the treasury that entailed. Rebellions and military interventions had high economic costs not only as expenditures but also because they were obstacles for tax collection and trade. In addition, disputes, rebellions, and military actions drew international attention such that the Porte had to deal with political pressure from other states. Last but not least, in frontier regions adjacent other countries, people gamed the system by shifting citizenship between the empire and the neighboring state.

In this chapter I will investigate the efforts of the Sublime Porte to implement the Tanzimat on the Montenegrin frontier of the empire, mainly in Shkoder and the Herzegovinian part of the Bosnian province. The aim of the Porte was not solely to implement a set of rules and regulations through coercion, but to obtain the consent of local notables and population while changing their relations to the state. Muslim populations in those areas had long struggled against the direct control of the Porte. Although the Sublime Porte was ready to negotiate, large-scale military operations regularly took place. Meanwhile, Montenegro with its newly emerging national sentiments, was encouraged by Serbia's privileges over its territory as well as by the weak military presence of the central administration in Bosnia and Albania. Moreover, the fiscal, administrative, and diplomatic support of Russia empowered Montenegrin rulers inside the country and in the international arena. Russia's close ties with Montenegro attracted the attention of other Western powers and their involvement to counterbalance Russia's acquisitions. Ottoman central and regional administrations not only worked to implement Tanzimat regulations in problematic, neighboring areas such as Bosnia and Shkoder, but also to prevent the Serbian speaking population on the Montenegrin frontier of the empire from defecting to Montenegro.

Tanzimat reforms could neither be practiced in Bosnia nor in Albania in the decades following its proclamation. As examined in the previous chapter, the Bosnian population and notables resisted to the abolition of the Janissary

corps and other reforms made by the central government. In the two decades after the abolishment of the Janissaries, the power of local Muslim notables was eliminated. Cevdet Paşa criticizes Ömer Paşa for being harsh with the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other places he served,[1] as evidenced by the large scale revolts led by the Muslim captains and notables of Bosnia that occurred after the abolition of the Janissary corps and inurement of reform laws, incidents which started in Bosnia spread to Herzegovina, and lasted from 1849 to 1851. After those incidents, the Muslim population in Bosnia was not involved in a large scale revolt again, probably due to the lack of the leadership. Ömer Lütfi Paşa was charged with the duty to suppress the revolts and implement Tanzimat laws in the region in 1849.[2] Ömer Lütfi Paşa suppressed notables of the region including the powerful governor of the Herzegovina province, Ali Paşa Rıdvanbegovic.[3] Upon Ali Paşa's death, Bosnia and Herzegovina united administratively. After Ömer Lütfi Paşa's military intervention, another decade was needed before military conscription could be practiced in the region.

The Shkoder district (or Albania) was situated on the southern border of Montenegro. Unlike Bosnia, the region was not an actual military frontier zone until the end of the eighteenth century. Northern Albanians, called *Gheg*s, were living in clans, called *fis,* in highlands similarly to neighboring Montenegrins. The difference between the Albanian and Montenegrin highlanders was religion: there were Muslim Albanians, but most of Ghegs were Catholic. Gegh highlanders called *Malesor* living in an autonomous administrative and legal situation. Cevdet Paşa emphasizes in the *Tezakir* that both Muslim and Catholic Malesors carried arms.[4] Southern Albanians were living in lowlands around Shkoder under the rule of notable families that affected the governing structure during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[5] Albanians served as one of the main supplies of mercenaries for the Ottoman army. In the eighteenth century powerful provincial families secured local rule. Two

1 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 13-20* (Ankara: TTK, 1986), 34.

2 Zafer Gölen, *Tanzimat Dönemi Bosna İsyanları (1839-1878)* (Ankara: Alter Y., 2009), 88-89

3 Ibid., 99-100.

4 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 13-20*, 201.

5 Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Vol I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 83.

chiefdoms were founded at the end of the eighteenth century: the Bushati family based in Shkoder controlled northern Albania, while in the south Ali Paşa of Tepelena in Janina emerged as the autonomous ruler. The Bushatis ruled Shkoder for generations, extending their rule from having been a local, notable family to the autonomous ruler. Kara Mahmud Bushati conflicted with the Ottoman central administration, for a long time and then was pardoned and recognized as the governor of Shkodre. Ali Paşa was likewise appointed governor of Janina by the Porte at the end of the eighteenth century. However, his accumulation of diplomatic and military power attracted the attention of the Porte; he was subsequently dismissed and defeated by the Ottoman administration. On the way to enforcing the Tanzimat, notables and other local actors who had the ability to resist reforms of the central administration were eliminated. Conflicts between the provincial actors of Albania and reformist governments of II. Mahmud reached their peak in the 1830s. The Ottoman army made several expeditions to Albania to suppress rebellions and eliminate notables. The Bushati family surrendered in 1832, and many other powerful notables of Shkoder were punished.[6] This does not imply that all powerful families were destroyed; many local families survived, and as long as they cooperated with Istanbul they were employed in the service of the state due to their local prestige and their education.[7]

§ 4.1 Emergence of Montenegrin State

Montenegro, an infertile mountainous region, had been a nominal part of the Ottoman Empire since 1499, but Ottoman administrators did not regularly control Montenegrin lands after its conquest. The population was mainly a Serbian speaking, Orthodox people living in tribes. The religious center was Cetinje Monastery. The head of the monastery, called *Vladika,* had secured political power apart from religious authority in the eighteenth century. Although Montenegro had developed political ties with Venice and the Habs-

6 Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians: a Modern History* (Londra: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 18-25.

7 For more information about a notable Albanian family, see Abdulhamit Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferit Paşa: Bir Ömür Devlet* (İstanbul: Klasik Yay., 2014)

burgs in accordance with their relations to the Ottoman Empire, the relationship with Russia affected the institutionalization of the Montenegrin state. Annual monetary and grain subsidies, as well as assistance with administrative affairs, were the leading examples. Moreover, assistance with diplomacy vis-a-vis the Ottoman administration supported Montenegro through its independence. This process reached its peak when Vladika Danilo came to power in 1852. He abandoned his religious titles, separated political and religious authority, and took on the title of prince with Russian support.[8] Not only did he separate administrative posts but he tried to build an administrative apparatus. He consolidated his power, suppressing leading tribes through military means. He also introduced a legal code and tax regime where none existed before.[9] Prince Danilo brought his demands for recognition of Montenegrin sovereignty by Western powers to the Paris Congress. However, deprived of support of the defeated Russians, he did not achieve that recognition. On the other hand, the idea of delimiting a border between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro without resolving the sovereignty issue was accepted by the English, Austrian, and French delegates.[10] The Ottoman administration was forced to accept an international committee's designation of the border and cede some cultivable land to Montenegro. An agreement was signed in 1858 after the Montenegrin victory in the Grahovo War, and border stones were placed the next year.[11] The Ottoman administration was struggling with a rebellion of Herzegovinian Orthodox Serbs along the Montenegrin border when delimitation ended. The Ottoman administration accepted the border, which meant recognizing the defacto independence of Montenegro while stressing its political dependency on the Ottoman Empire for both international diplomacy

8 Elizabeth Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), 218.

9 Ibid., 222.

10 Ibid., 224.

11 Zafer Gölen, "Karadağ Devletinin Doğuşu: Osmanlı-Karadağ Sınır Tesbiti (1858-1860)," BELLETEN, 282: LXXVIII (Ankara: TTK, 2014) 681-683.

and official correspondence. In official documents, the border was referred as *hatt-ı imtiyaz,* which means literally the "border of concession."[12]

With the border, Ottoman Administration consented to cede some cultivable land to Montenegro. Since Montenegro did not have enough land to cultivate and feed their animals, they had to plunder.[13] Indeed, Montenegrins had serious famines in some years and received grain subsidies from Russia.[14] However, delimitation of the border did not prevent Montenegrins from raids and small scale attacks on Ottoman border villages; in fact, the border worsened the issue in some respects. Some villages were even divided by the border and some Turkish villages were surrounded by Montenegrin lands and left vulnerable to attack. According to the Treaty of Paris, the Ottoman administration could not "discipline" Montenegro for crossing into their territory. Ongoing raids by Montenegrins, Herzegovinian revolts supported by Montenegro, and external pressures about the issue frustrated the Ottoman administration. On the other hand, Montenegrins acted oppressively in battles, cutting off enemy soldiers body parts according to their custom as in aforementioned battle of Grahovo.[15] In another case, Montenegrins attacked villages around Niksic and Koryanik in Bosnia together with Orthodox Serb villagers living on the Ottoman side (*Nevahi-yi Asiye*). They burnt the villages down and killed women and children. The Ottoman administration sent letters to foreign consuls to inform them of the events and the precautions that would be taken, making mention of the torture that pregnant women subjected to.[16] Such incidents and eminent Ottoman military intervention attracted international attention. After a similar incident in 1858, where Montenegrins attacked Kolaşin killing the men and enslaving the women and

12 For instance, see Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 13-20*, 162., BOA TŞRBNM 26/141 5 Ra 1281 (8 August 1864), BOA A.MKT.UM 487-1 19 M 1278 (27 July 1861)

13 Zafer Gölen, "Karadağ Devletinin Doğuşu: Osmanlı-Karadağ Sınır Tesbiti (1858-1860)," 667-668.

14 Elizabeth Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain,* 202.

15 Ibid., 226.

16 BOA A.MKT.UM 453/6, 23 B 1277 (4 February 1861)

children, France sent two ships to the Adriatic Sea to support the Montenegrins against any Ottoman counterattack.[17] However, the Ottoman administration finally sent a military expedition to Montenegro in 1861-1862 after the Herzegovinian rebellion had calmed down. Montenegrin raids and the aforementioned incidents were deemed valid reasons. The commander of the Rumelian Army, Ömer Lütfi Paşa, led the military intervention.[18] Montenegro was unable to resist the large-scale Ottoman attack and suffered many casualties. At the beginning of the action, the Ottoman administration was aware that international intervention could soon put a stop to the Ottoman army. An order sent by the Sublime Porte to Ömer Lütfi Paşa, stated that the armies should advance as fast as possible to Cetine before foreign consuls called to stop the hostilities.[19] The aftermath of the military intervention was that little changed with regard to the legal condition of Montenegro, but there would be no large-scale military conflict between two armies until Montenegrin independence.

Montenegrins continued their aggressive policy of expanding their borders to Shkoder with small-scale attacks and aiding to Orthodox villagers who did not accept direct rule by the Ottoman administration on the Herzegovinian side of the border. Especially those villages on the Montenegro-Herzegovina border, which in Ottoman sources are called *Nevahi-yi Asiye* (rebellious districts), resisted Ottoman forces through not obeying government demands, if not through armed rebellion. Ottoman governors and inspectors negotiated to obtain their consent and loyalty to the Ottoman administration. As mentioned above, the Ottoman administration tried to solve border hostilities with Montenegro. Defensive measures were taken along the border including the construction of towers and fortresses as well as dispatching soldiers. On the other hand, one of the main objectives of the Sublime Porte was to construct a border defense against Montenegro employing the local population, as it did before the nineteenth century in Bosnia. The negotiations be-

17 Elizabeth Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain,* 228.

18 See Zafer Gölen, "1862 Karadağ Askeri Harekatı ve Sonuçları", BELLETEN, LXXV, 273 (Ankara: TTK, 2011)

19 BOA A.MKT.UM 519/27 20 Ca 1278 (23 October 1861)

tween *Nevahi-yi Asiye* and highland Albanians with the Ottoman administration were based on the objective to obtain their consent with tax immunities and autonomy as it was before to prevent them from accepting Montenegrin rule. It was easier for Malesor highlanders since most were Catholic. But some powerful tribes in the border area tended to act independently. While negotiating with Catholic tribes, the Ottoman administration build its defenses among Muslim tribes in the region. For Orthodox villages on the Herzegovinian frontier, it is too simple to assume they wanted to join Montenegro because of religious fraternity. Those frontier districts were resisting centralization attempts by the Sublime Porte and the demands of the governors. On the other side, the Montenegrin ruler, Vladika Danilo, and his successors were also carrying out a centralization program. Probably many frontier villages were also not keen on full integration with Montenegrin state. On the frontier, they had room to negotiate with both sides and were freed paying taxes or fulfilling other obligations dictated by either state. For instance, the Kuci (Koç) tribe on Albanian side of the border line rebelled against both the Ottoman governor and Vladika Danilo for the same reasons.[20] Not only the Kuci tribe but others that fluidly changed sides to avoid tax payments were punished by having their villages burned and being sent into exile.[21] It is unsurprising that Danilo was assassinated by a member of an exiled tribe.[22]

After the suppression of the Herzegovinian rebellion as well as the war with Montenegro, the Porte sent Ahmed Cevdet Paşa to the region to inspect the administrative and military situation. In fact, Grand Vizier Mehmet Emin Paşa has himself visited other areas in Rumelia to inspect the conditions of the Christian population with the pressure of the Russia.[23] Mehmet Emin Paşa could not finish his survey due to the pressing political situation in Lebanon. Apart from an inspection of the civil administration and land issues, one of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's primary objectives was to obtain local consent for con-

20 Kenneth Morrison, *Montenegro: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 26.

21 Elizabeth Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain,* 222.

22 Ibid., 229.

23 For the transcription of the inspection documents, see Yonca Köksal, Davut Erkan, *Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Paşa'nın Rumeli Teftişi* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi yay., 2007)

scription and to organize the defense structure of the Montenegrin borderland. As investigated in the previous chapter, Bosnia was the westernmost military frontier of the Empire. During the decades after the abolition of the Janissary corps, the system of military captaincies and local Janissaries was abandoned and deconstructed by the military powers of the central administration. Due to resistance by local notables and the people, the new military structure was not implemented. With the emergence of the Montenegrin and Serbian states, the situation in Bosnia became more complicated. Bosnia's land communication with the rest of the empire was limited due to the recognition of the Serbian and Montenegrin borders. Thus by the 1850s, preventing Montenegrin expansion into Serbia was a crucial subject for the Ottoman Empire. The only possibility to prevent Montenegro from seizing those Orthodox districts that had problems with the Ottoman administration was to obtain the consent of the Orthodox populations and strengthen the border defense. These two conditions were merged in the minds of Ottoman administrators in Istanbul as well as of Cevdet Paşa.

§ 4.2 Attempts to Organize Military Colonies (*Koloni Militer)* on the Frontier

The Sublime Porte was ready to solve the military conscription issue in Bosnia, which had not been properly applied for nearly four decades. The archival documents stress the protection of the Bosnian frontier using local manpower after the 1850s with the emergence of the Serbian and Montenegrin states.[24] After the destruction of the Janissaries and captaincies, the protection of the Bosnian front had been sustained either by Nizamiye soldiers from other provinces or by mercenary forces. Recruitment of local men into the army was partly implemented in Bosnia, but was unsuccessful. A record dated

24 For example, BOA A.MKT.MHM 213/13 10 N 1277 (22 March 1861) "Bosna eyâleti mevâki -i sâireye mikyas olunmayıp bir tarafı Karadağ ve diğer tarafı dahi Sırbistan ile mütecâvir ve muhit olup bir müddetten beri emr-i muhafazası hakkında asakîr-i nîzâmiye ve cünûd-i sâire ta yin ve cem iyle külliyetli masârif ihtiyâr olunmakta olduğundan hem bu teklifâtın def î ve hem de esbâb-ı muhâfazanın istikmâli hakkında eyâlet-i merkûme dahilinde dâimi sûretle bir kuvve-i dâfi a mevcut bulundurulması…"

in the beginning of 1861 of a discussion of the *Dar-ı Şura-yı Askeri* (Deliberative Council of the Army) states that Bosnia had around 7000 local men who had been conscripted in the Nizamiye army apart from 2000 Albanian mercenaries. However, according to the record, the local Nizamiye soldiers were deserting in times of confrontation. As a solution, the Porte decided to disband the local Bosnian soldiers and hire 3500 additional Albanian mercenaries.[25] It meant an extra expenditure for the treasury as well as permanently using Nizamiye soldiers with limited training who had been dispatched from other provinces in Bosnia. Thus, due to the resistance of the Bosnian population to conscription and other Tanzimat regulations, the Sublime Porte opted to implement an exemption and imitate an Austrian defense structure on the Bosnian frontier called *koloni militer*. There is no clear definition of the term in documents concerning Bosnia, but it is described in the *Tezakir* as being associated with Austrian military colonies in Croatia.[26] In an older case, Governor Mehmet Tahir Paşa made a request to Istanbul in 1849 to organize the frontiers of the province of Bosnia as koloni militer to maintain border security as practiced in Austrian and Russian states.[27] In the same year, a more detailed request was made by the commander of the Anatolian Army, Mehmed Reşit Paşa, with regard to the Iranian frontier. According to the request, the plan was to construct about 60-70 posts along the border supported by cultivable lands and equipment. About 7000 men among the redif soldiers who had completed their active service period would be settled along the border. However, Istanbul stressed that conscripting from among locals for a koloni militer system led to too high a rate of conscripts from a limited population. Moreover, these men were occupied with agriculture for their livelihood. Because that income was not expected to be sufficient, they were also paid

25 BOA A.MKT.NZD 396/10 29 B 1278 (10 January 1861)

26 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 21-39* (TTK: Ankara, 1986), 17.

27 Zafer Gölen, *Tanzimat Dönemi Bosna İsyanları (1839-1878)*, 85.

from the treasury.[28] Apart from the attempt by the Ottoman Empire, the application of the system referred to in the documents were primarily Austrian and Russian military colonies, which will be examined below.

The Habsburg Empire constituted its military frontier and first military colonies in the first half of the sixteenth century in Croatia with refugees who escaped from the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans.[29] They were settled on agricultural lands throughout the Bosnian frontier of the Habsburg Empire. Settlers called *Granzer* had a military status and consequent privileges unlike other villagers. They were not serfs like the ordinary peasants, which meant that they were not obliged to pay taxes and perform manorial duties. In addition, the Catholic Habsburgs guaranteed settlers religious freedom, because many were of Orthodox faith. Settlers in the military colonies were not regularly paid, but received the usufruct rights of a certain amount of land. This land could be bequeathed as long as those who inherited the land continued with the military duties. Administratively, colonists were under military rule and were subjected to a kind of military code interpreted by military judges.[30] They were expected to be involved in agriculture for their livelihood and serve as border defense forces. The primary aim of the military colonies in the Habsburg Empire –as with Ottoman projects- was to conscript as many armed men as possible from a given number of people. A high number of armed man could be employed from among a limited population at a low cost and on a permanent basis, unlike hiring mercenaries.

Granzer regiments became a part of the field army in the eighteenth century. With shifts in the frontiers as well as an increasing need for soldiers in field armies, the Habsburgs used colony soldiers in the regular army. Consequently, the military frontier and military colony organization expanded to

28 Fatih Gencer, "Merkeziyetçi İdari Düzenlemeler Bağlamında Bedirhan Bey Olayı" (Ph.D. Diss., Ankara University, 2010), 239-240. Sabri Ateş also gives an account of documents regarding Koloni Militer on the Iranian as well as the Bosnian border. See Sabri Ateş, "Empires at the Margin: Towards a History of the Ottoman-Iranian Borderland and Borderland People, 1843-1881" (Ph.D. Diss., New York University, 2006), 205-206.

29 Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia 1740-1881* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 8.

30 Ibid., 26-27.

Slovenia and Hungary. The military colonists reorganized into regiments, the quality of their arms and equipment improved, and they started taking a regular salary. They constituted more than a quarter of the field army of the Habsburg Empire during the eighteenth century.[31]

In the Russian case, Russia had an extended frontier in Ukrainian territory in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The people of the frontier, namely Cossacks, lived outside the direct control of political authorities. They had a nomadic way of life and often served as mercenaries in various armies. Russia also used Cossack mercenaries against Tatar raiders. With the sixteenth century, Russia established a military zone with fortifications, guards, and outposts along the southern border with the Tatars. Cossacks were employed as guards in the border outposts and patrolled the areas between them. Meanwhile, the Russian state started to settle Cossacks in border areas, giving them land to cultivate. They were also paid for their services.[32] In the aftermath of the settlement, Cossacks were used as regular soldiers in the field army. Not only Cossacks, but also ordinary peasants were resettled to colonies in the eighteenth century to increase the number of men in the military colonies.[33] Some regular troops in the Russian army, such as hussar regiments, were also settled in frontier colonies.[34]

By the nineteenth century, the area between the Bug and Dnieper rivers became a military settlement area. Half -and in some areas, two-thirds- of the population were military settlers.[35] However, in 1810, as a part of modern imperial project, Russia created a different form of military colony.[36] For similar fiscal reasons as the Habsburgs and Ottomans, the need for trained, armed men played a crucial role in the organization. Unlike in previous centuries, they were expected to be regular soldiers with more training and loyalty. For

31 Ibid., 40-41.

32 Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (London: Constable, 1969), 14-15.

33 John L.H. Keep, *Soldiers of The Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 276-277.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 279-281.

36 Richard E. Pipes, "The Russian Military Colonies, 1810-1831" in The Journal of Modern History, vol. 22, No. 3 (September 1950), 207.

the colonists, new villages were created with modern institutions such as hospitals and schools. Colonists were given land and necessary equipment for agriculture. They had a privileged status, were not serfs like ordinary peasants, and were freed from feudal duties. Self-sustained units were created. In addition to their military purpose, the csar created the colonies as carriers of cultural reform.[37] Modern schools for proper education of children as well as modern hospitals for public health were established in all of the colonies. This project was an imperial model project that ultimately aimed to organize all the villages of Russia in a similar way.[38] Self-sustained military units and loyal subjects were created through a high disciplined way of life. However, after several uprisings these troops were seen as a threat to the government and abolished.[39] For a short while the experiment was successful and the total number of male military personnel in the colonies was 144,525 in 1824.[40]

The practice of resettling military colonists resembles an old Ottoman practice called *Derbend*.[41] In the Derbend system was used to protect a limited area: generally a mountain pass, bridge, or any insecure road where robberies occured. In these types of areas, nearby villages named *Derbendci* were charged with maintaining the security of the insecure place; in turn they were exempted from taxes. Armed men from Derbendci village kept watch at the Derbends in rotation while other villagers continued with their normal economic activities to pay their wages.

As mentioned, the Sublime Porte intended to organize the province of Bosnia as a military colony in the 1860s after long conflicts. Cevdet Paşa, who went to Bosnia in 1863, was charged with the duty of assessing public opinion. He analyzed the colony alternative nothing that conscripting all available Muslim men in the region would be costly in terms of social consequences as well as fiscally. Providing arms and equipment for such a high number of men was also not possible for the treasury at the time. Moreover, it would lead to a

37 Ibid., 210-211.

38 John L.H. Keep, *Soldiers of The Tsar,* 282-283.

39 Richard E. Pipes, The Russian Military Colonies, 219.

40 A. Bitis and Janet Hartley, "The Russian Military Colonies in 1826" in SEER, Vol. 78, No. 2 (April 2000), 326.

41 See Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Derbend Teşkilatı* (İstanbul: Eren Yay., 1990)

drastic decrease in production and trade. Cevdet Paşa argued that it would also attract opposition. On the other hand, Cevdet Paşa intended to organize a defensive cordon around Montenegro by organizing military colonies starting in the districts of Herzegovina through the border Malesore in Shkoder. Apart from those frontier areas, he argued normal conscription could be implemented in the rest of the Bosnian province.[42] After discussions in Meşverets with representatives of the Muslim community, military conscription was accepted in Bosnia with caveats. The active service period was shortened to 3 years to increase reserve forces in the province in a relatively short period. In addition, Cevdet Paşa (after correspondence with Istanbul) accepted the demand to not dispatch Bosnian soldiers to other provinces, at least for a time. Notables of the region would be appointed as officers to the newly formed corps. Conscripts would not be selected by ballot (*Kur'a-yı Şeriye*) since there were no proper population registers. Thus, they were chosen on a voluntary basis with the help of local notables.[43] Accordingly, recruitment for the new Nizamiye battalions were started. In the first stage, two battalions of 800 soldiers each would be recruited. The first battalion was stationed in the Sarajova barracks and the other in Travnik. Later recruitment was started for a third battalion based in Mostar in Herzegovina. Half the sergeants were chosen from among sons of leading families in the region, and the rest from regular troops.[44]

Cevdet Paşa determined that villages south of Trebinje and the districts including Gacka, Bileca, Niksic, and Kolasin in the Montenegrin border region of Herzegovina were exempt from recruitment by ballot. According to his account, all capable males in those areas would be accepted as soldiers according to the application of the koloni militer. They would train and perform their duty in rotation.[45] These areas were also exempt from civic codes, and martial law would be applicable. By this way Montenegro as well as the nevahi-yi asiye were surrounded by Ottoman military colonies. Cevdet Paşa hoped that the nevahi-yi asiye would join the koloni militer order in the future. In

42 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 21-39*, 32-33.

43 Ibid., 38-41. For the agreement, see BOA A.MKT.MHM 311/75 12 R 1281 (14 September 1864)

44 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 21-39*, 73-75.

45 Ibid., 75-76.

fact, some districts in the region were loyal to the Ottoman administration and in others the administration could implement more serious security measures because of the geographical situation. Due to the gradual expansion of the Montenegrin border and the ongoing rebellious situation on the Ottoman side, districts such as Kolasin (Kolaşin) and Niksic (Nikşik) were surrounded by Montenegrins. The aforementioned record about the abolition of locally recruited soldiers in Bosnia in the beginning of 1861 also stated that local soldiers of Niksic and Kolasin were exempt, since they had no place to flee.[46] Those districts relied heavily on the Ottoman military as well as aid in the form of foodstuffs because of hostilities with surrounding villages. Not only logistic support, but also monetary assistance by the Ottoman administration sustained the aforementioned districts. A request to the Sublime Porte states the risk that the village of Ispic on the border with Montenegro would be seized by Montengrins. As a solution, apart from tax immunities already in place, salaries were offered to the Ispuzi and Niksic populations.[47] This practice counted as employment of the population of the district as soldiers charged with border protection. On the other side, Ottoman governors and military commanders in Herzegovina dispatched soldiers to border areas in urgent situations such as assaults from Montenegro or the nevahi-yi asiye. For instance, the inhabitants of Kolasin had to flee when the Ottoman governor in Mostar failed to support them and dispatch troops. Due to strikes by the Montenegrins and the inhabitants of the nevahi-yi asiye, those from Kolasin emigrated to surrounding districts. This happened after the border was delimitated when Kolasin was divided between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro. The lower part of Kolasin (Kolasin-i Zir) was again taken by the Ottoman army and Muslim inhabitants were resettled there again. The *palanka* (a small defensive building made of earth and wooden palisades) in the district and houses were rebuilt.[48]

46 BOA A.MKT.NZD 396/10 10 29 B 1278 (10 January 1861) "…Yalnız Nikşik ile Kolaşin yerlisinden mürettep olarak firar edecek mahalleri olmayıp ekserisine zaruri tayinat dahi ita kılınmakta idiğinden bunların ibkasıyla…"

47 BOA TŞRBNM 22/11 1 M 1281 (6 June 1864) "Zaten vergilerden muaf tutularak gönülleri kazanılmış olan bu nahiyenin ahalisine İşbozi ve Nikşik ahalisine olduğu gibi durumlarına göre aylık bağlanması"

48 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 21-39*, 55. And see BOA TŞRBNM 16/2 8 L 1280 (17 March 1864)

The Ottoman administration relied on districts with a Muslim population and those which were geographically suitable for constructing a defensive line against Montenegro and other border districts populated by Slavic-speaking Serbs. Other than Niksic and Kolasin, districts like Trebinje (Trebin), Bilace (Bileke), Gacko (Gaçka), Tjentiste (Tentişta), and Pljevlja (Taşlıca) were situated in flatlands and easier to defend and support logistically. More importantly, all had a Muslim population to some extent that could serve as soldiers. Although religious affiliation did not strictly determine how people chose sides, the Muslim population of those districts was already militarized due to ongoing attacks by neighboring districts. Official reports repeatedly mention that the populations of Niksic and Kolasin were in a similar situation to the koloni militer practice,[49] such that application of koloni militer in the area would not disturb them. Intentions by Cevdet Paşa and other Ottoman officials in the area salt to legalize those districts' defacto situation.

Despite Cevdet Paşa's optimism about extending the koloni militer to nevahi-yi asiye areas, Ottoman officials were more confident about using the Muslim population on the frontier. Ongoing Circassian migration from the Caucasuses overlapped with the need of the Ottoman administration for loyal Muslim subjects on the frontiers. As mentioned in previous chapters, Circassians -most of whom had military experience- settled in Syria, Transjordan as well as Baghdad and were employed in the service of the military. For the same reasons, the Ottoman administration intended to settle Circassian and Abazin migrants on the Montenegrin frontier from Mostar to Niksic -in other words between the administrative center of the area and Montenegro.- Official correspondence stresses that increasing the Muslim population of the area was important. In addition, it is suggested in one report that stone houses should be built for Circassian migrants, both for shelter and defensive purposes. It is implied that it was a common practice by the Ottoman administration in the

49 BOA TŞRBNM 12/101 15 Ş 1280 (25 January 1864) "…Zira bunların eski hali bir nevi Koloni Militer şekline karib idiler. Koloni Militer tertibi şimdileri bunları bir kaide ve nizama rabt etmek demek oluyor…"

area to build such fortified houses.[50] However, it was expensive to build new villages with fortified houses and, another report about resettling Kolasin's population mentions instructing a certain percentage in each village according to its population.[51] Obviously, the Ottoman administration preferred to settle all migrants together under the koloni militer system or as militarized settlements, as in other border area districts. The fiscal difficulties of the Ottoman Empire compelled more moderate solutions.

Despite Ottoman cooperation with Muslim populations Ottoman officials in the district tried to regain the loyalty of rebellious districts. Many had individually rebelled against the Ottoman administration or tended to cooperate with Montenegrin leadership. They had conflicts amongst themselves. Leaders of powerful villages often tried to control less powerful ones. The Ottoman administration naturally intervened in such power struggles in order to arbitrate between parties and obtain the loyalty of some villages. Giving gifts and granting titles and annual salaries were the most common methods. On the other hand, Cevdet Paşa gives an account of the problems vis-a-vis villagers and *çiftlik* (farm) owners. For disputes between farm owners and villagers a new set of laws was applied. Moreover, land titles were distributed.[52] According to Cevdet Paşa, these improvements led to the changes in the approaches of some nevahi-yi asiye leaders toward the Ottoman administration, but it seems that Cevdet Paşa and other officials in the region had difficulty trusting the words. In a request by Cevdet Paşa to the Sublime Porte, he stated that some villages that had come to Cevdet Paşa to show loyalty asked for the towers to be constructed in their villages - "by trusting to their words," noted Cevdet Paşa- to protect themselves from the Montenegrins. He added that as long as they remained free from Montenegrin policy, good treatment was important. As long as they did not display untrustworthy behavior, a "lightly fortified" tower could be made for them.[53] Cooperation with recently compliant

50 BOA TŞRBNM 19/13 24 Za 1280 (1 May 1864) "…Buralarda sair mevakide olduğu gibi taş binalar inşa edilerek istihkam görevi görecek bu binalara yerleştirilmeleri…" For another request to colonize Abazin and Circassian migrants in the area see BOA TŞRBNM 14/122 15 N 1280 (23 February 1864)

51 BOA TŞRBNM 25/73 11 S 1281 (16 July 1864)

52 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 21-39*, 4-7.

53 BOA TŞRBNM 12/47 2 Ş 1280 (12 January 1864)

districts could enable for the Ottomans to penetrate the Montenegrin frontier. As investigated in previous chapters, road construction in frontier areas for security measures as well as for transportation. This was also valid for the Montenegrin frontier. However the unlike desert frontiers of Baghdad, Transjordan, and Arabia the construction of roads and defensive buildings along them was more difficult in the mountainous Montenegrin frontier due to the rapid shifts in the loyalties of the surrounding districts. In the same document, the urgency of constructing communication roads between the aforementioned koloni militer districts was examined in detail. However, the hostilities of locals as well as high costs due to the remoteness of the area locked new construction. On the other side, use of local men for guard duty was a common Ottoman practice known as Derbend practice. Locally recruited guardsmen, called *pandur*, were also used on the Montengin frontier.[54] Yet as in the aforementioned case, local elements affected the situation, especially relations with the Orthodox Christian population. For instance, the Ottoman administration avoided employing *pandur*s in nevahi-yi asiye region for any fortifications larger than guard towers (such as palankas).[55]

Cevdet Paşa examined the conditions of the Malesor in Shkoder. He detailed the number of villages and their populations according to religion. Moreover, he listed the number of armed men in each district. He also intended to extend the koloni militer system to the province of Shkoder. He stresses that highland Albanians, the Malesor, had many armed men and were hostile to Montenegro. Catholic and Muslim Malesore could organize into koloni militer by accepting all males as soldiers and training and employing them in rotation. In Shkoder, the Ottoman administration had less defensive problems with Montenegro. Since there were not many villages likely to cooperate with Montenegro, armed Malesore men as well as Tosk Albanian mercenaries hired by the Ottoman administration satisfactorily defended the frontier.[56] The problem with the Malesore for the Ottoman administration was not

54 For an example of the reenrollment of Christian Pandur guards by Hafız Paşa after the Herzegovinian rebellion, see TŞRBNM 13/113 29 Ş 1280 (8 February 1864)

55 BOA TŞRBNM 12/47 2 Ş 1280 (12 January 1864) and also see BOA TŞRBNM 16/90 18 L 1280 (27 March 1864)

56 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 13-20*, 212-213.

the possibility of their shifting loyalty to Montenegro, but rather their autonomous situation. Catholic malesors as well as Muslim ones halve political disputes and vendettas with other tribes on the frontier. However, religion was not the basis for political issues.[57] Some powerful tribes in the region worked to enlarge their domains vis-a-vis other tribes in the region or the Montenegrin border. Either situation was undesirable for the Ottoman administration. The Sublime Porte was willing to organize all Malesors in a single defensive structure. Moreover, the Ottoman administration tried to prevent border tribes from violating the Montenegrin border in order not to face international pressure. Thus, the autonomous acts of Malesor on the frontier were not approved by the Ottomans. Apart from the Malesor, there were also some villages populated by Orthodox along the border, such as the aforementioned Kuci (Koç) village that rebelled against Ottoman administration and yielded to Montenegrin authority. In 1860 they shifted again the Ottomans. The Ottoman administration took precautions both militarily by reconstructing forts and organizing local troops and administratively by giving monetary gifts.[58] Moreover, Ottoman officials were concerned about religious education in the Muslim villages of Malesore to prevent apostasy and ensure the presence of loyal Muslim subjects in the area. It is stated that Muslim malesors were affected by Catholic priests since they heard nothing but advice of priests. Because of missionary activities by Rome and Austria, the number of Catholic priests was high in the region. In addition, it can be understood from the document that priests fulfilled a kind of function of doctor, giving medicines and cupping treatments. In response it is suggested to construct a mosque in every village and appoint imams to teach reading and writing as well as religion. Thus, it was expected they would trust the Ottoman state more.[59]

57 İsa Blumi made similar statements concerning Malesian autonomy after the Berlin agreement İsa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities 1800-1912* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 135-138.

58 BOA A.MKT.NZD 351/84 29 L 1277 (10 May 1861), MVL 919/77 16 R 1277 (1 November 1860)

59 BOA A.MKT.MHM 269/5 22 M 1280 (9 July 1863) "…ahali-yi merkumenin tecdid-i din ve itikad ve hükumete hüsn-i itimad eylemeleriyle beraber…"

Cevdet Paşa added a small note in the Tezakir that koloni militer was not applied in the region because of the incapability of the officers.[60] There is also information in an order to the Bosnian governor indicating the abolition of the koloni militer regime in 1865.[61] It states that koloni militer areas that were excluded from Tanzimat regulations did not benefit from the advantages of the Tanzimat. It also adds that the population of the area did not demand exclusion. On the other side, it mentions some concerns about the exemption itself. Christian villages in the border region called nevahi-yi asiye might interpret it as a kind of autonomy, as happened with Montenegro. The unwillingness of the local people might be correlated with the distribution of the land titles and other land implications of the Tanzimat, but it seems that the Sublime Porte was concerned about autonomous tendencies in the border region. Apart from legal aspects, the situation in the area did not change much. Although the situation with nevahi-yi asiye calmed at some point along with Cevdet Paşa's inspection, the military importance of the areas and ongoing threats of attack by neighboring villages continued. After the implementation of Tanzimat regulations, locally-recruited troops were called by the same name as the regular army: Asakir-ı Nizamiye. However, the way they were recruited and their rank did not change; in these respects, they were the same as irregular soldiers (başıbozuk).[62] A year after the official abrogation of the koloni militer, a new order was issued for organizing *hudud askeri* (frontier soldiers) in the region. This was also to legalize defacto border defense organizations and to increase efficiency by standardizing the terms of duty and training. Moreover, the order says that just a part of the population of the area could "benefit" from the duty of defense while others in those districts could not.[63] It seems odd to describe guard duty as benefit. It possibly concerned ongoing, large-scale warfare in the area. Because of the insecurity of transportation, even necessary goods were maintained by the government, let alone

60 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 21-39*, 104-105.

61 BOA A.MKT.MHM 341/98 27 R 1282 (19 September 1865)

62 BOA İ.DH 553/38505 26 R 1283 (7 September 1866) "Kaza-yı mezkurdan ba-irade-yi seniyye müretteb olan üç yüz nefer asakir-i muvazzafa başıbozuk hey'etinde istihdam olunmakta…"

63 BOA İ.DH 553/38505 26 R 1283 (7 September 1866)

involvement of locals in crafts and trade. In addition, raids and climatic conditions restricted agriculture. Although the new hudud askeri was planned to operate along the whole of the frontier with Montenegro including Podgorica[64] in Shkoder, the document makes clear that it would be applied first in Niksic –one of the most important districts on the Serbian side of the Montenegrin border. The new frontier *hudud askeri* would be organized in four battalions in the first phase, each with 180 soldiers charged with three months of rotational active duty a year. These soldiers were responsible of the protection of border fortifications. They received half the salary of regular soldiers. To promote the service, the sons of the martyrs –one from each household– would be registered in the battalions and paid a salary, yet would not be involved in active duty until they reached the age of 16. On the other side, the logistics of providing necessary materials and arms emerged as an important issue. To prepare a defense against an organized attack, a couple months' worth of provisions for soldiers as well as the civilian population in Niksic were stored.[65]

Modernizing the arms used in frontier regions was another important issue of the organization of the new frontier troops. Possibly due to the increasing use of the muzzle-loading rifles[66] (*şeşhane*) by Montengro,[67] frontier troops of the Ottoman Empire had to shift from smoothbore muskets (*kaval tüfenk*) to rifles. Several petitions were sent from Shkoder during the first months of 1866 to the Sublime Porte to request rifles (şeşhane) be sent to Podgorica and

64 For integration of Podgorica and Spuz (İşboz) to the hudud askeri see BOA A.MKT.MHM 363/18 12 Ca 1283 (22 September 1866)

65 BOA A.MKT.MHM 360/252 27 S 1283 (11 July 1866)

66 Rifles have a longer range and higher accuracy than smoothbore muskets. Improvements in bullet and shell technologies enabled the development of rifles. Reloading is also easier and faster with the newer rifle types. For an analysis and experiment, see Salih Atalay, "Eski Harpler ve Silahlar – Pratik Deneyler" in *Yeni Bir Askeri Tarih Özlemi: Savaş, Teknoloji ve Deneysel Çalışmalar* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013), 71-95.

67 A.MKT.MHM 360/252 27 S 1283 (11 July 1866) "Dağlılar şeşhaneli top ve tüfenkler kullandıklarından savunma için şeşhaneli top gönderilmesi" and BOA A.MKT.MHM 399/7 (3 February 1868) "Dağlıların çobanlarına varıncaya ellerinde şeşhaneler bulunduğu halde bizim asakir-i ihtiyatiyye ellerinde bulunan atik mütenevvi tüfenkler işe yaramayacağından…"

Spuz.[68] Petitions demanded a thousand rifles – or at least five hundred – for distribution to the population of those districts. The Sublime Porte sent five hundred to Shkoder claiming that it was sufficient for the area's defense and that other areas had priority for further reinforcements. Probably the implication was Herzegovina. The demand by Herzegovina was for 2500 rifles for its frontier soldiers, but the Sublime Porte's reply was negative. Due to a lack of rifles, it decided to send old muskets which were converted to rifles. In the first phase, small numbers of rifles were distributed to the populations of Niksic and Kolasin. Distribution of rifles coincided with the implementation of the hudud askeri system. Regular drills on the proper usage and maintenance of the recently distributed rifles were ordered.[69] The Sublime Porte had difficulty maintaining modern weapons and prioritized distributing them to regular troops. The aforementioned requests from 1866 were partly fulfilled, yet another document from 1868 mentions the continued superiority of Montenegrin weapons over those of Ottoman troops on the border. There was still urgent need for at least 10 thousand rifles on the frontier.[70]

Local populations were extensively employed in frontier defense in addition to regular battalions employed rotationally in critical districts such as Niksic and along important communication routes such as Duga pass. A record from 1868, two years after their introduction, states that there were two battalions of regular soldiers in Duga and two battalions of hudud askeri in Niksic.[71] Trebin and Bileca also each had one battalion. It is not clear from the document whether the soldiers in the latter districts were recruited from among the local population or dispatched from among regular troops. Yet the populations of the districts along the border which had been koloni militer certainly took part in their own defense structures. In some critical regions such as mountain passes with limited populations, regular battalions were used. Moreover, regular battalions were also employed to reinforce defenses in critical districts like Niksic. The Sublime Porte found an alternative method

68 BOA A.MKT.MHM 350/73 25 L 1282 (13 March 1866), BOA A.MKT.MHM 355/66 (13 May 1866), BOA A.MKT.MHM 356/40 9 M 1283 (24 May 1866)

69 BOA A.MKT.MHM 358/23 29 M 1283 (13 June 1866)

70 See footnote 67.

71 BOA A.MKT.MHM 399/7 9 L 1284 (3 February 1868)

of combining the use of regular troops and local soldiers. As investigated above, the Ottoman administration worked to increase the Muslim population in the area by resettling immigrants in proportion to concerns about the Orthodox Christian propensity to integrate with Montenegro. In addition to that, they were also intended to be reliable soldiers in the defense structures. In 1869, regular army soldiers garrisoned in Niksic were settled in the area on a voluntarily basis.[72] To promote settlement, soldiers were given land and farming equipment as well as materials to construct a house. Those soldiers were also exempted from compulsory service in the Redif Army (reserves) after completing their active service. Moreover, they had already been registered in the Nizamiye army corps in the district and when the troops replaced their record would be shifted to the replaced troops. Thus they will be settled like in a koloni militer, but continue to be registered as regular troops. The aftermath of the order is not clear; there is no archival information about how many soldiers were settled in that manner. After inspections by local officials and correspondence made among ministries in Istanbul, the issued order should have been applied in the region. However, because of difficulties in the region, it might not have been attractive to Nizamiye Soldiers.

The legal order of frontier troops changed again in 1870. An order was issued about the foundation of regular *Kordon* troops (*Kordon Asakir-i Muvazzafası*), suspending the regular and irregular troops which were then in duty.[73] With the reorganization of the *Zaptiye Nezareti* (Ministry of the Gendarme) in the same year, local security and border protection duty were transferred to the Zaptiye.[74] Kordon troops were founded in other regions under the Zaptiye for border and customs control. It is not certain whether the official abolition of the old troops actually happened or not. It seems impossible to recruit completely different men for new Kordon troops in districts with such moderate populations. Moreover, the aim of the Ottoman administration as stressed above was to prepare the entire region for defense. Officially, Kordon troops

72 BOA İ.DH 592/41227 15 S 1286 (27 May 1869)

73 BOA İ.DH 616/42899 2 Ca 1287 (31 July 1870)

74 Ayten Can Tunalı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Yapılanma: 1839-1876" (Ph.D. Diss., Ankara Üniversitesi, 2003), XLVIII-XLIX

counted as regular troops; in practice, the application was different. The men were recruited on a voluntary basis, unlike regular soldiers (Nizamiye Askeri) and had higher salaries than regular troops.[75]

The Ottoman administration tried to arrange border defenses in the area around Montenegro and other borders with limited manpower. This was especially true for the Montenegrin frontier because of the difficulties of the area and a limited Muslim population from which to draw on. As with previous policies, improvements were made with respect to manpower and the conditions of physical structures of defense on the frontier. In addition, the command structure was changed. However, there was certainly continuity among the troops of the Montenegrin frontier. The legal aspects changed continuously related to changes in the administrative structure of the Tanzimat state as well as concerns about local conditions. But unlike in previous centuries, there was a tendency towards legal uniformity in the practices of the Ottoman Empire, even if practices differed in extreme cases such as along the frontiers.

75 BOA İ.DH 632/43928 18 S 1288 (9 May 1871)

5

Conclusion

In my thesis I answer the question of how the Tanzimat state operated on the Ottoman-Montenegrin frontier. The area was dominated by a semi-autonomous population until the second half of the nineteenth century. From the aspect of the administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire, Montenegro was neighbor to the province of Bosnia in the north and Shkoder in the South. Both regions were semi-autonomous prior to the nineteenth century. Similarly, they were a main locus of reaction against the Sublime Porte centralization policies. The Ottoman administration broke the resistance of local notables in the 1830s and 1840s; however, it was a challenge for the Tanzimat state to push its limits to the frontier zone. The demarcation of the border between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro did not change much from the perspective of local actors. Although hostilities stemmed from nationalistic and religious motives that played a role for different groups on the frontier, these motives were not the only factors influencing their policies. The frontier region of Herzegovina, which was the southern part of Bosnia, consisted of a Slavic-speaking (Serbian) population some of whom were living on the Ottoman side of the border line as well as a Muslim (Bosniak) population accumulated in district centers. The frontier region of Shkoder, on the other hand, had a limited Slavic population in addition to Catholic and Muslim Albanians. Muslim populations in the district centers such as Niksic, Kolasin, Trebin, and Bileca were organized as main defense by the Ottoman Empire. This organization stemmed from the defacto necessity of the Muslim population to defend


themselves against Montenegrin assault. The region between the aforementioned districts and the border with Montenegro was inhabited by a Slavic population that cooperated with Montenegrins to resist direct Ottoman rule. Some among those populations shift sides to escape similar demands and attempts at control by the Montenegrin state. Ottoman officials also tried to promote loyalty to the Ottoman state among frontier people by giving aid and tax immunity. To sum up, although the Sublime Porte was optimistic about winning the Slavic population to its side, it was also aware of increasing nationalism among non-Muslim subjects. Thus, the subjects on which the Ottoman administration truly relied on the frontier were the Muslim population. In addition to the local Muslim population, additional, loyal Muslim immigrants were settled along the frontier. For the Albanian populated Shkoder district, the threat to the Ottoman Empire was not integration of the frontier population with Montenegro, but rather autonomous highland Albanians who were unwilling to cooperate with the Ottoman administration. Similarly, the Sublime Porte relied on Muslim Albanian district centers along the border, such as Podgorica, for border defense. In addition, religious education was promoted along with the construction of mosques to inspire more loyal subjects.

The Ottoman state organized different types of border defense structures according to archival documents. The contribution of this thesis to the literature is to give a brief analysis of these border defense structures based on primary sources. There is a line of continuity in the organization, even though the names of administrative structures changed during the 1860s. I explained the stability of the defacto situation as the political, fiscal, and administrative limits of the Tanzimat state. Although some clues can be deduced from archival documents, the intentions of frontier populations and the details of the implementation of some practices remain vague due to the scarcity of archival sources.

The implementation of koloni militer was first attempted in the Bosnian part of the frontier. It was an exception among frontier regions in that it was exempt from Tanzimat regulations. It is obvious that Tanzimat state was unable to obtain consent from the local population to rule more directly. Moreover, the fiscal and military resources of the Ottoman Empire were limited, and dispatching large numbers of regular soldiers from other parts of the Ottoman Empire was impossible. However, taking defensive measures and sustaining

the loyalty of the frontier people was seen as crucial. All among the population on the frontier were accepted as soldiers and they subject to military rule. In practice, the implementation of koloni militer was not achieved due to administrative problems, but the administrative failures did not affect the defacto situation on the frontier. Muslims and some among the Christian population on the Ottoman side of the border were already militarized and employed as defensive units in the border area. The efforts taken by the Ottoman officials included the aforementioned populations in an alternative administrational system. In other words, the efforts served to include all frontier populations in an exceptional administrative system outside the Tanzimat reforms, but nevertheless defined and restricted by the Sublime Porte. Other defensive structures on the frontier were also implemented during the 1860s. The frontier area was brought under Tanzimat laws and the people of important, Muslim populated districts on the frontier were again all defined as soldiers. The same population was employed under a different name. Periods of duty as well as training issues were rehabilitated. The Sublime Porte subsidized frontier regions with grain, weapons, as well as command. Moreover, some Christian populations in the district were given salaries to promote Ottoman loyalty. Although the general nature of Ottoman frontier governance can be traced in the archival documents, the scarcity of available documents restricts knowledge of the details of the implementation of policies studied in this thesis. Moreover, the lack of additional secondary studies constrained my thesis, a fact which will hopefully will be overcome by future studies.

Appendix: Ottoman Balkan Map



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