POLITICAL ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY:

HOW ISLAMIST POLITICAL PARTIES SURVIVE IN HOSTILE SETTINGS

KADİR BARIŞ SAĞLAM

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2021

POLITICAL ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY:

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Thesis submitted to the

Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science and International Relations

by

Kadir Barış Sağlam

Boğaziçi University

2021

Political Islam and Democracy:

How Islamist Political Parties Survive in Hostile Settings

The thesis of Kadir Barış Sağlam

has been approved by:

Assist. Prof. Alper Yağcı _____
(Thesis Advisor)

Assist. Prof. Mert Arslanalp _____

Assist. Prof. Oğuzhan Göksel _____
(External Member)

February 2021

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Kadir Barış Sağlam, certify that

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ABSTRACT

Political Islam and Democracy:

How Islamist Political Parties Survive in Hostile Settings

In Muslim majority countries, political parties with Islamic backgrounds often come to power after democratic openings (e.g., first democratic elections). Only some of these parties, however, manage to survive after coming to power, while others are closed down and repressed by the establishment that consists of unelected officials (e.g., the military, constitutional court, and some parts of the bureaucracy). Although it is natural for the status-quo forces to suppress these political parties which are perceived as a threat to the secular political order, the fact that Tunisia's Ennahda and Turkey's Justice and Development Party (JDP) survived constitutes a significant puzzle for the researchers. So, why do some parties survive whereas others are repressed? Do all surviving parties survive under the same conditions? To answer these research questions, this thesis utilizes comparative method (i.e., most different and most similar systems design), and investigates six different political parties which won democratic elections, namely, the Welfare Party, Justice and Development Party (Turkey), Ennahda (Tunisia), Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt), National Salvation Front (Algeria) and Justice and Development Party (Morocco). By following the historical institutionalist literature, this work argues that although structural factors play a significant role, an election victory by the above-mentioned parties constitutes a critical juncture where several outcomes that depend on actors' choices are possible and macro-level factors do not restrict different choices in a deterministic manner. As a result of the interplay of

macro-level factors and actors' choices, three pathways came forward: reinforced survival, repression, and precarious existence.

ÖZET

Siyasal İslam ve Demokrasi:

İslami Siyasi Partiler Hasmane Düzenlerde Nasıl Hayatta Kalır

Müslüman çoğunluklu ülkelerde, demokratik açılımlardan sonra (ilk demokratik seçimler) ekseriyetle İslami hareket geçmişine sahip siyasi partiler iktidara gelmektedir. Ancak bu partilerin sadece bir kısmı iktidara geldikten sonra hayatta kalmayı başarırken, diğerleri seçilmemiş yetkililerden (askerler, anayasa mahkemesi ve bürokrasinin bazı kısımları vb.) müteşekkil yerleşik nizam tarafından kapatılmakta ve baskı altına alınmaktadır. Yerleşik nizam tarafından laik siyasi düzene tehdit olarak algılanan bu siyasi partilere karşı statüko güçlerinin bastırma yoluna gitmesi alışıldık olsa da Tunus'taki Ennahda ve Türkiye'deki Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AK Parti) ayakta kalmayı başarması araştırmacılar için önemli bir bulmaca teşkil etmektedir. Neden bazı partiler hayatta kalırken diğerleri baskılanmaktadır? Hayatta kalan tüm partiler benzer koşullarda mı varlığını sürdürmektedir? Bahsi geçen araştırma sorularını yanıtlamak için, bu tez karşılaştırmalı siyaset yöntemini (yani, en farklı ve en benzer sistem tasarımları) kullanarak demokratik seçimleri kazanan altı farklı siyasi partiyi, yani Refah Partisi, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Türkiye), Ennahda (Tunus), Özgürlük ve Adalet Partisi (Mısır), İslami Kurtuluş Cephesi (Cezayir) ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'ni (Fas) incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, tarihsel kurumsalcı literatürü takip ederek, yapısal faktörlerin etkisini topyekun reddetmeden, yukarıda belirtilen partilerin seçim zaferlerinin kritik bir dönemeç teşkil ettiğini, bahse konu kritik dönemeçlerde aktörlerin tercihlerine bağlı olarak birkaç sonucun mümkün olduğunu zira makro düzeydeki

faktörlerin böylesi dönemlerde deterministik şekilde aktör tercihlerini etkileyemediğini savunmaktadır. Makro düzeydeki faktörlerin ve aktörlerin seçimlerinin karşılıklı etkileşiminin bir sonucu olarak, üç patika ortaya çıkmaktadır: kuvvetlendirilmiş hayatta kalış, baskılanma ve güvencesiz varoluş.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Kadir Barış Sağlam

DEGREES AWARDED

BA in Political Science and International Relations, 2015, Boğaziçi University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

North Africa, Middle East, comparative politics, democratization, historical institutionalism, political parties, elections, nationalism, nationalist parties, secularism, Islam and democracy

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Interview Producer, TRT World, 2016-2020

Teaching Assistant, Koç University, 2015-2016

AWARDS AND HONORS

High Honor, Boğaziçi University, 2015

KYK Scholarship for Turkey's Top 100, 2010-2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Alper Yağcı, whose feedback and insightful comments helped me immensely. I could not imagine a better advisor for my MA thesis. Besides my advisor, I would also like to thank my committee members, Mert Arslanalp and Oğuzhan Göksel. Assistant Professor Arslanalp was the first person to motivate me to write a thesis on this subject. I also benefited significantly from my conversations with Assistant Professor Oğuzhan Gökse,l whose expertise improved my thesis.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my mother, Ahu; my father, Salih; my brother Umut; my uncle Kaan; my aunt Zeliha; and my cousin Mehmet for their constant encouragement. My special thanks to my beloved wife, Beste, who always provided support when I most needed it. Without her, it would have been much more difficult to write this thesis. Also, I thank my mother and father-in-law, Meral and Serdar, for their valuable support.

I would also like to thank my former manager, Faisal Aziz Khan, who trusted me and provided me with enough flexibility so that I could complete my classes, and my former colleague Dr. Tarek Cherkaoui, for our beneficial conversations on the subject.

Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my friends, particularly Barış Akkaya, Eren Kaya, and Didar Karadağ for their emotional support and great friendship through all those years.

DEDICATION

To Ahmet

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMP	Authenticity and Modernity Party
CHA	Comparative Historical Analysis
CHE	Council of Higher Education
CPR	Congress for the Republic (*Congrès pour la République*)
DİSK	Confederation of Progressive Labor Unions (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front (*Front Islamique du Salut*)
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
FLN	National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*)
FP	Felicity Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IP	Istiqlal Party
IPP	Islamist Political Party
ISIE	Independent High Authority for Elections
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JS	Justice and Spirituality
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MP	Motherland Party
MPCD	Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (*Mouvement Populaire Démocratique et Constitutionnel*)

MTI	Islamic Tendency Movement (*Mouvement de Tendance Islamique*)
MUR	Movement of Unity and Reform
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği*)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Democratic Party
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party
NOP	National Order Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
PJD	Justice and Development Party (*Parti de la Justice et du Développement*)
PM	Popular Movement
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
RNI	National Rally of Independents (*Rassemblement National des Indépendants*)
RPP	Republican People's Party
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces
SPEC	Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission
SUPF	Socialist Union of Popular Forces
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TESK	Confederation of Turkish Tradesman and Craftsman (*Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu*)
TGNA	Grand National Assembly of Turkey

TİSK	Confederation of Employer Associations of Turkey (*Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
TOBB	The Union of Chambers and Commodity (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği)
TPP	True Path Party
Türk-İş	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İş Adamları Derneği*)
UGTT	Tunisian General Union of Workers (*Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail*)
VP	Virtue Party
WP	Welfare Party
WWG	Western Working Group

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

On the 28th of February 1997, the leadership of the Turkish Armed Forces presented their decisions on protecting the secular nature of the republic during a National Security Council meeting and forced Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to sign certain decisions, which will later be called "28 February Decisions". The decisions were provisioning fundamental changes in education, domestic security, civil society, and international relations and as famously stated by then general Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, the influence of these decisions was planned to "last thousand years" ("28 Şubat Süreci," 1997). One immediate impact of the so-called post-modern coup on 28 February was the resignation of Welfare Party (WP)-True Path Party (TPP) coalition government and eventual closure of the WP. Although some of the key figures including Erbakan was banned from politics, WP's remaining legislators managed to form a new party called Virtue Party (VP) which was the successor of the WP. In 2000, a reformist group within VP challenged the traditionalists who follow Erbakan's views closely and after losing the intra-party elections, formed a new party called Justice and Development Party (JDP) and won 2002 elections by getting more than 60 percent of the seats in the parliament. Traditionalist wing's VP, on the other hand, has been closed down by the constitutional court in 2001. VP's party members formed a new party called Felicity Party, which is still active today, but the party is merely a shadow of its old self due to JDP's success among right-wing voters including devout segments of the society that previously supported WP and VP. Although the Turkish military and secular

bureaucracy often demonstrated their dislike toward JDP policies since its electoral victory in 2002, JDP successfully managed these early tensions. "28th of February moment" for JDP, however, arrived in 2007, 5 years after coming to governing position. JDP's candidate for the presidency was seen as a potential threat to the secular republic by a certain segment of the seculars in Turkey who organized mass protests in April 2007. Turkish General Staff released a statement that criticized Abdullah Gul's candidacy on its official website a few days later. The parliamentary election in July and the Constitutional referendum in October followed this shaky period; however, the results were showing that the secular establishment's policies toward JDP completely backlashed. In 2008, the last act of the JDP's confrontation with the secular establishment took place when JDP faced a closure case which was reviewed by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Because there was no meaningful majority in the Constitutional Court voting (i.e., 7 members had to vote in favor of the closure decision to ban JDP), the closure decision did not take place. While JDP managed to survive in a hostile environment, and WP's successors trapped into a precarious existence, as we can observe from coup d'états in Egypt (2013) and Algeria (1991), there were more repressive political outcomes for Islamist Political Parties (IPP). So, why do secular establishments in Muslim majority countries, whose main actors are military and high bureaucracy, fail to close some parties, while they manage to ban others? "Why did some IPPs survive after winning an election, while others were either repressed or trapped into a precarious existence, although the states where these parties join elections have a similar level of suspicion towards these parties?" This is the research question this thesis will attempt to answer.

1.1 Definitions

Islamist political parties

Since the term, *Islamism* is frequently used to define terrorist organizations such Al Qaeda, Daesh/ISIS, and Boko Haram (Momtaz & Braun, 2020; Harding, 2020) by the popular media outlets in Europe and the United States, the concept arguably lost its neutrality. Instead of using another term (though without going into discussions related to the history of Islamic thought which would exceed the scope of the thesis) to define political parties coming from religiously conservative backgrounds, this thesis attempts to regain the neutrality of the concept. The political parties examined in this thesis are in fact quite distinct in terms of their ultimate goals, approaches to politics, views on secularism, and voter bases. What they share in common are simply their position vis-à-vis the status quo and the direction (not the exact content) of the changes they want to make. A communist party may fulfill the first part of the definition (i.e., being an anti-status quo actor), but in terms of the direction of its objectives, it significantly diverges from Islamist political parties. Islamist political parties, therefore, include parties such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which wanted to form a religious state after coming to power via a democratic election, and Ennahda which defines itself as Muslim Democrat, a concept akin to Christian Democracy. It is also important to note that this thesis does not use the term Islamism for defining the above-mentioned terrorist groups that do not play according to the rules of the democracy game. Lastly, while the terms, socially and religiously conservative utilized to define these parties, the term conservatism (without the adverbs) is intentionally avoided because within the time frame examined in this thesis for each party, none of the IPPs were trying to conserve

the political order (i.e., the power balance between elected and unelected officials), rather, they were seeking to revise it.

(Secular) Establishment

While IPPs are pursuing to change the power balance, they inevitably confront those who benefit from the status quo. This thesis defines unelected officials who seek to protect the status quo as *the establishment* and since the alterations that IPPs want to make are perceived as a "threat to the secular order" the establishment takes the form of a secular one. In other words, the establishment is not a stable entity that is against merely one political ideology. When a socialist party aims to establish a socialist economy, for instance, an establishment may take the form of a capitalist establishment (e.g., socialist parties in Europe faced with this type of establishment in the late 19th and early 20th century). More often than not, the secular establishment aims to control religion rather than erasing it from society. The term *establishment* refers to unelected officials' pro-status quo stance, whereas the term *secular* refers to the type (i.e., direction) of political demands against which they try to maintain the status quo.

1.2 Variables

1.2.1 Dependent variable: Three pathways

Different perspectives study the problem of Islam's relationship with democracy. As we will see in Chapter II, theoretical works that focus on the envisioned political system in the Islamic faith had dominated the early literature. This thesis argues, however, that overlooking the policy choices of the IPPs that are often the strongest political

organizations in their respective countries, leads to misleading conclusions. In fact, limitations resulted from IPPs' environment (e.g., characteristics of the secular establishment) and possible policy choices available for them demonstrates the similarities between IPPs and other outsider movements such as socialists or Catholic parties in late 19th century Europe. The political outcome for an Islamist Political Party (IPP) is the dependent variable of this thesis. There are three possible outcomes for a given IPP, namely, repression, precarious existence and, reinforced survival. These outcomes are conceptualized as pathways, rather than irreversible historical moments (i.e., singular events). However, the impact of decisions is not the same in all moments within a pathway: Immediately after an IPP's electoral victory two different policy choices may lead to different political pathways, a few years later, the same choices do not cause a similar impact.

In the repression pathway, a secular establishment not only closes down an IPP but also make it impossible for those who belong to the same ideology/ political tradition to establish a new party and join elections. Mass arrests, banishments, and other repressive policies constitute the main indicators for the repression outcome. Algerian Islamic Salvation Front's closure after the 1991 election and policies against Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood after the 2013 coup d'état are the main examples of this political outcome. Though party closures are not unique to the repression pathway (e.g., WP's closure in 1998), the intention of the secular establishment by banning political parties in repression pathway is quite peculiar, namely, to prevent the IPP and all the related organizations from contesting in the political field again. In other words, forcing

IPPs to accept the boundaries of acceptable politics, an intention that is present in the precarious existence pathway, is missing in the repression pathway.

In the precarious existence pathway, the secular establishment keeps control of the powerful institutions, especially those that can veto the government's decisions. Nevertheless, the real reason behind this precarious condition is not the veto power of certain state institutions. The possibility of coup d'etat and party closure is common for these parties. In fact, every IPP experience a threat of coup d'etat, especially during the first few years of their rule, this threat can be prevented in a sustainable way (e.g., Ennahda in Tunisia), or can be realized (e.g., Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt); therefore, precarious existence is only used for those parties which fail to erase the impact of tutelary institutions. One of the most fitting examples for this pathway is the Moroccan Justice and Development Party. Reforms in Morocco after Arab Spring make it possible to talk about democracy, albeit in a rather limited way. Although Makhzen is still the most powerful institution, parties that are independent of the King can still exist under the hegemonic position of the Makhzen in the Moroccan political field.

In the reinforced survival pathway, IPPs erase the impact of tutelary institutions and overcome the commitment problem that otherwise may trigger a coup d'etat which aims either to keep the IPP in line with the acceptable boundaries or to repress the party altogether. Justice and Development Party in Turkey is an example of this pathway. Hitherto, the Turkish state closed several parties from the National Outlook ideology to protect the secular nature of the republic. These party bans were serious enough to put National Outlook tradition in a precarious condition, but they did not aim to eliminate

the movement as a whole. Justice and Development Party was the first IPP, which overcame this precarious condition.

1.2.2 Independent variable

This thesis argues that during the contingency periods, political actors' decisions have a better explanatory power compared to macro-structural factors. In the selected Muslim majority countries, the electoral victory of an IPP constitutes a contingency moment: with their decisions, they overcome the commitment problem, or they fail to do so. Obviously, every decision brings benefits together with costs. For Tunisian Ennahda, short-term vote loss was the cost of forming value-based alliances that required compromises on key social issues, while it provided the IPP with long-term legitimacy. For Turkey's JDP, legitimation came without loss of votes, rather, its realistic approach was in fact appreciated by the right-wing voters.

Political decisions: In order to understand different political outcomes, one should look at which decisions are taken by IPPs to overcome the commitment problem. Although the competitiveness of secular parties and strong institutions may explain the non-emergence of commitment problem, by looking at cases from Muslim majority countries such as Turkey, we can see that regardless of the vote the IPP (e.g., Welfare Party), and secular parties (e.g., center-right, nationalist and center-left parties) got, when IPP fails to form domestic and international alliances that are not solely interest-based, it also fails to enter the reinforced survival path. In other words, IPPs can survive when they form value-based alliances domestically and internationally.

Value-based Alliances: When an IPP won an election, the secular establishment immediately develops a reaction and considers this victory as a threat to the regime. This reaction can be compared with the reaction of Liberals or Conservatives to an election victory of a Socialist Party. Since promises made before coming to power cannot guarantee the steps taken after dominating the state apparatus, no matter how moderate IPPs' discourse was, these promises (e.g., election manifestos) fail to constitute a credible commitment. Value-based alliances with international and other domestic actors fill this credibility gap.

Alliances with international actors

It is important to underline that a value-based alliance does not exclude interest relations between the parts of this alliance. In fact, when we examine the experience of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, we observe that interests play a more significant role than values to sustain alliances. However, alliances based solely on interests fail to protect IPPs, as we observed in Egypt under Morsi. Indeed, especially on Egypt's relationship with Israel, Morsi's foreign policy included radical raptures with Muslim Brotherhood's foreign policy. Without a doubt, some of his policies (e.g., rapprochement with Iran) were considered problematic by the US, but Morsi worked hard to preclude the emergence of an unsolvable interest-based confrontation between the US.

The main problem of the alliances that are based solely on interest as follows: most of the time, democratically elected governments are not the only actors who can form this type of alliance with International actors. In fact, sometimes they are not the

most suitable actors to do so either, especially when democratic pressure prevents these governments from forming this type of alliance. When this is the case, democratic governments lack much needed international protection to protect themselves during the transition period where they are vulnerable. President Morsi's relationship with the US is largely based on weakly shared interests (e.g., Egypt's facilitating role in Hamas-Israel ceasefire agreement), despite the former's efforts to underline shared democratic values. The problem for Morsi was the fact that the Egyptian military was a trusted ally of the United States as well, therefore, for the leadership of the latter (which was uncharacteristically idealist in foreign policy under President Barack Obama), Morsi did not have a comparative advantage over the armed forces.

Another type of commitment problem occurs when an alliance does not include values. Interests change faster than values, therefore, when an alliance is solely based on interest, there is no buffer provided by values. In other words, each small crisis resulted from a difference of interests, can turn into bigger commitment problems. The United States' different reactions to Turkish leaders' Iran visits during WP and JDP eras can demonstrate the robustness of value-based alliances compared to interest-based alliances. While Erbakan's visit triggered a harsh response from the US leadership, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's trip did not cause a similar crisis in Turkey-US bilateral relations, despite the fact that President George W. Bush was more hostile to Iran (e.g., he considered Iran as a part of Axis of Evil) than his predecessor Bill Clinton (Sanger, 2002).

Alliances with domestic actors

Domestic alliances and pacts are the most important elements of altering power-balance between unelected and elected officials in Muslim majority countries. Different actors can form these types of alliances, however, only some domestic alliances lead to this objective (i.e., altering power balance), whereas others may lead to the continuation of the status quo or repression. In terms of the actor types, the domestic alliances can be classified as follows:

1. Old elites (e.g., military, King, etc.) and Islamist Political Parties
2. Secular/Liberal Parties and Islamist Political Parties
3. Old elites and Secular/Liberal Parties

Although it is impossible to find these alliances in their pure forms, as domestic alliances examined in this thesis demonstrates, it is possible to classify alliances according to the dominant actors of each alliance. In other words, when an IPP-led alliance includes negligible liberal/secular political groups (e.g., FJP's democratic bloc in 2011 elections), this alliance cannot be categorized under the second category that is listed above. The process of alliance-building in selected cases, namely, FJP, FIS, PJD, JDP, WP, and Ennahda, shows that each alliance has different consequences for the IPPs.

Table 1. Types of Alliances and Their Influence on Political Outcomes

Types of Alliance	Political Outcomes
I	Old elites' influence continues; therefore, IPPs are trapped in a precarious existence. If old elites can form alliances with Seculars/Liberals, a repression pathway is also possible.
II	If pro-democracy actors form alliances based on values as a result of deliberation without immediately hurting the military's interests, the reinforced survival pathway is likely
III	If an alliance between old elites and seculars/liberals is possible, without causing any significant division within either of them. Precarious existence and repression are two likely options.

As can be seen in the Table 1, for IPPs in countries with strong secular institutions (e.g., military) isolation increases the chance of closure and repression. Nevertheless, an alliance with the old elite does not offer a meaningful solution to their survival problem, as it leads to uncertainty and precariousness. In other words, the only viable option for the IPPs is a pro-democracy alliance with Seculars/Liberals. Building trust among these two groups, however, is quite difficult, because of the disparity of vote shares between IPPs and Seculars/Liberals. Indeed, due to the organizational power of IPPs which coincides with low turnouts in some cases, elections often lead to IPP-led governments which can be formed with little or no help from Seculars/Liberals (e.g., Voter turnout was 59 percent in both Egypt's 2011 and Algeria's 1991 parliamentary elections, Tunisia's Ennahda could have formed a coalition government with socially conservative Popular Petition). The strong electoral performances of IPPs make forming cross-ideological alliances redundant for ruling the country because coalitions can also be formed with other religiously conservative parties. Besides, these coalitions do not require huge ideological compromises. As a result, when there is an effort by an IPP to form an alliance, it is often considered as non-credible by Seculars/Liberals. So how did

Tunisian Ennahda manage to establish such an alliance? To answer this question, we should again return to the differentiation between alliances that are solely based on interest and value-based alliances (Table 2).

Table 2. Interest-based Alliances versus Value-based Alliances

Alliances that are solely based on interest	Value-Based Alliances
• Do not (cannot) change status-quo • Pragmatic • Coalitions are often established solely to form governments (i.e., they aim to achieve a parliamentary majority) • Do not need substantive consensus • Do not need to be deliberative • Can be dissolved easily	• Transformative impact on status-quo • Constitutive • Coalitions are broader than necessary (i.e., the aim is to represent broad segments of the society, not solely achieving more than 50% seats) • A consensus is needed on certain issues • Deliberation is important • Relative sustainability

The connection between domestic and international alliances

This thesis argues that forming value-based alliances with international and domestic actors leads IPPs into reinforced survival pathway. The values that are mentioned are democratic values. In other words, an IPP increases the chance of survival, once it establishes alliances that are not solely interest-based with other pro-democracy actors. Therefore, the following types of alliances are less likely to lead to a reinforced survival path:

a. An alliance with an anti-democratic actor (e.g., military institution)
b. An interest-based alliance with a pro-democratic actor (e.g., getting the support of the US for fighting against communism)

International value-based alliances provide IPPs with credibility while they are forming domestic alliances with Seculars/Liberals. Relationships formed with EU countries

helped both Ennahda in Tunisia and Justice and Development Party in Turkey to broaden their pact with different groups. EU Commissar Olli Rehn told that if AK Party was banned, EU-Turkey relations would stop ("Oli Rehn: AK Parti'ye kapatma", 2008). Similarly, when coup rumors demonstrated themselves in Tunisia shortly after the transition, Germany played a constructive role in keeping Ennahda's ruling coalition intact as an honest broker among the coalition parties.

Similarly, if broad domestic alliances collapse, the situation of international alliances also is at risk. Domestic isolation also brings about fragmentation of the political field, which makes it difficult for IPPs to act as the sole representative of the nation. Although interests may be sufficient to sustain certain international alliances, as mentioned above, alliances that are solely based on interest are weaker and more unstable than value-based alliances.

Table 3. Alliances and Their Impact on Political Outcomes

Political Party	Domestic Coalition	Foreign Support	Outcome
FIS (Algeria)	Low	Low	Repression
FJP (Egypt)	Low	Medium (IB)	Repression
WP (Turkey)	Medium (IB)	Medium (IB)	Precarious Existence
PJD (Morocco)	Medium (IB)	Medium (IB)	Precarious Existence
JDP (Turkey)	Medium (VB)	High (VB)	Reinforced Survival
Ennahda (Tunisia)	High (VB)	High (VB)	Reinforced Survival

IB = Interest Based; VB = Value Based.

Brief Summary of the Cases and the Table 3

Cases studied in this thesis are selected to understand specific political outcomes. Comparing these cases help to eliminate some of the alternative explanations, such as economic development, literacy rate, the role of the military, etc. As can be seen in the Table 3, IPPs who fail to establish value-based alliances such as Egypt's Muslim

Brotherhood and Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front face repression, regardless of their level of moderation (FJP, partially thanks to its learning process from Algerian and Tunisian experiences, was relatively more moderate and pluralistic than FIS). Those parties who successfully establish alliances, namely, Tunisian Ennahda and Turkish JDP, on the other hand, manage to survive in the political field (JDP's domestic alliances were less formal than Ennahda's party coalition, however, support from different groups such as Liberals, Kurds, NGOs, etc. helped JDP to overcome tumultuous 2007 period. Lastly, when parties establish interest-based alliances alone with both domestic and international actors, they only gain partial legitimacy and fail to solve the commitment problem in a sustainable manner.

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Research question

Although there are different forms of comparing in political science, in broad terms, comparative methodology "refers to the methodological issues that arise in the systematic analysis of a small number of cases" (Collier, 1993, p. 105). Small N studies are especially useful when the political phenomenon that is examined occurs rarely, particularly because of the nature of this phenomenon. Social revolutions such as French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions, for instance, are suitable for small N comparative studies, hence the reason why prominent social scientists such as Theda Skocpol and Barrington Moore Jr. used this methodology for their works on revolutions. Ragin mentions a tendency to render research questions applicable to quantitative methods in social sciences. According to him, this tendency causes social scientists to

overlook significant research questions. Compared to statistical methods or large-N studies, the "case-oriented approach" has a more "meaningful connection to actual empirical processes" (Ragin 1989, p. IX). As a result, researchers who focus on specific cases can avoid conceptual stretching (George and Bennett, 2005; Sartori, 1991), but they sacrifice generalizability in return. As mentioned below in the case selection part, the problem of generalizability (i.e., external validity), however, is not an inescapable one: "strategically choosing cases in search of representative variation can be one effective way to avoid the trap of selection bias" (Ziblatt and Slater, 2013, p. 1312). In short, before choosing a method (i.e., quantitative, or qualitative), certain benefits and limitations should be taken into consideration (Neuman, 2014, p. 17). Besides, the nature of the research question should lead researchers in this decision process (Ragin, 1989), rather than vice versa.

The main aim of this thesis is to explain the variation of the political outcomes that are triggered by an electoral victory of an IPP. Therefore, the research question that is answered in this study is: "Why did some IPPs survive after winning an election, while others were either repressed or trapped into a precarious existence, although the states where these parties join elections have a similar level of suspicion towards these parties?"

This thesis focuses on rare instances when IPPs win democratic elections in secular regimes where strong and hostile conservative segments in these societies consider these electoral performances as threats. Although cases examined differ in some respects this definition of the secular regime is sufficiently valid for all Muslim majority countries that are examined in this thesis. This "sufficient similarity" of the

context allows for a controlled comparison to answer the question of why hostile secular regimes close/ban certain IPPs and not others, despite they are motivated and capable to do so in all the cases examined. By covering all possible political outcomes, namely, reinforced survival, precarious existence, and suppression, it also achieves representativeness that is necessary for external validity.

1.3.2 Comparative historical analysis

Process analysis

James Mahoney defines comparative-historical analysis [CHA] as "a field of research characterized by the use of systematic comparison and the analysis of processes over time to explain large-scale outcomes such as revolutions, political regimes, and welfare states" (2004, p. 81). CHA, in other words, is a useful methodology that helps researchers to explain large political events that cannot otherwise be explained with statistical tools that ignore the temporal processes. If taking the temporal aspect (e.g. timing of a possible cause) into consideration is one defining feature of CHA, the second major feature of this methodology is the emphasis on causal analysis rather than interpretative approaches (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 11).

Unlike the statistical method, the comparative-historical approach necessarily includes process analysis which facilitates understanding causal mechanisms. A relationship between two variables found by a regression model may be a spurious correlation if there is a third confounding variable that is ignored by the researcher. By studying the temporal processes that contain all the significant steps between the cause (X) and the outcome (Y), CHA avoids the problem of mistakenly consider spurious relationships as

true correlations (George & Bennett, 2005). Another benefit of process analysis used that is used as a part of the comparative method is differentiating necessary causes from the sufficient causes of a particular outcome (Mahoney, 2004). Comparativist researchers often use the most similar and most different systems designs to make a distinction between these two types of causes, as well as to eliminate false explanations. If, for instance, a strong and politicized military institution is present in all the cases despite the fact that the expected outcome (e.g., repression of the IPP) only occurs in half of them, we can confidently say that a strong and politicized military institution is not a sufficient cause for the projected political outcome. In small N studies, we cannot confidently claim that, however, our independent variable is a necessary cause, simply because it exists in all the cases. In order to make such a claim that has external and internal validity, meticulous process analysis for explaining the causal mechanism between the necessary cause and the political outcome is needed. On the other hand, more quantitatively oriented scholars, such as King et al., rejects deterministic perspectives on causal mechanisms. According to them, even if the social world is not intrinsically probabilistic, the impossibility of "controlling for all potential omitted variables," makes explanations of the "social relationships…only probabilistically accurate" (King et al., 1994, p. 211).

Critical junctures and path dependency

Though CHA focuses on long-term processes and their impact on certain political outcomes, they often incorporate moments of contingency into their analyses to explain the reasons behind the change. These contingency moments which are also called

critical junctures defined as “events and developments in the distant past, generally concentrated in a relatively short period, that have a crucial impact on outcomes later in time” (Capoccia 2016, p.1). In other words, critical junctures are brief but decisive historical moments in which agency (i.e., actors’ decisions) gain importance, and therefore long-term socioeconomic factors (i.e., macro trends) lost some part of their explanatory power. Of course, these structural factors do not completely disappear, hence the decisions made by relevant actors during these brief moments do not occur in a vacuum. This thesis, rather than following a deterministic approach, treats the impact of those macro-level factors on the critical junctures as opportunities and limitations.

Critical junctures, however, can gain significance, only if agents’ decisions have the power to influence long-term processes. When agents choose a certain policy option among all the possible options, they make choosing alternative policies more difficult in the future. Social scientists use the concept of path-dependency to describe political processes where past steps shape future steps. Lipset and Rokkan’s groundbreaking work on European party systems demonstrates the lasting impact of significant contingent moments in the past on party cleavages in the future (1967). More recently, Pierson examined mechanisms behind path dependency to refine the conceptualization. According to him, path dependency can be better understood with the help of the “increasing return” or “positive feedback” mechanism which were often used by economics. Cost of choosing an alternative path and the cost of leaving for a previous path rise over time, while staying on the same path becomes less and less costly with each step taken (2000, p. 252). Unlike functionalist arguments, path dependency does not explain reasons with consequences, instead, this process can lead to suboptimal

outcomes, particularly because of the inflexible nature of the choices (Arthur, 1994, p. 14).

The election victory of an IPP constitutes a critical juncture because undefined aspects of the power balance between the IPP and the secular regime allow a sufficient level of agency. Though secular and conservative segments hold the key institutions which provide them with the capacity to repress, they cannot fully control policies of the victorious IPP which have legitimacy and popularity in the eyes of the public. This brief contingent period which begins with the election victory of the IPP and ends with the mutual acceptance of the new equilibrium on the power balance matrix strongly influences the future of IPP's pathway. When an IPP select to form an alliance with the army to suppress factions with more radical demands (e.g., anarchists, leftists), this particular choice leaves a strong mark in the sense that it makes breaking the alliance as well as forming a new alliance very costly for the IPP. Military-IPP alliance is, therefore, a self-reinforcing suboptimal choice for the latter, because it isolates the IPP by aggravating its already existing trust problems with other political groups. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the "increasing return" approach should not lead to another form of functionalism. When an IPP form and cross-Ideological alliance, the endurance of the alliance does not automatically become inevitable thanks to the costs related to the breakdown of this alliance, rather, it merely becomes possible for the parts of this alliance. In other words, a democratic bloc can only be sustained with the great effort of the relevant parties, but actors' decisions during the critical juncture make this bloc possible.

1.3.3 Case selection

In order to avoid comparing "apples with oranges," the case selection strategy should limit itself to comparable cases. This thesis' scope is confined to countries which (a) have an unbalanced relationship between unelected and elected officials (even when these elected officials are from secular or leftist parties) and (b) have experienced a democratic opening that provided IPPs a meaningful chance to alter this relationship. In other words, the causal relationship that is formed in this thesis is valid for those countries where IPP, as a newcomer, constitutes the revisionist side, and the regime, as a gatekeeper, constitutes the conservative side. Although Moroccan, Egyptian, Tunisian, Turkish and Algerian regimes, during the periods of opening when IPP won an election, have different definitions for secularism and religion, they were insistent on these definitions which were challenged by the IPPs.

As Geddes claims, despite it is inevitable for many of the comparative works to use a different selection strategy, selecting cases on the dependent variable often causes selection bias (Geddes 1990, p. 132; Kirdis, 2019, p. 5). In order to overcome this type of selection bias, this research exhaustively covers the possible variation in the explanatory variable for the Islamist parties who win elections in weak democratic settings with strong guardian institutions such as the military and constitutional court. As mentioned above, the independent variable in this study is policy decisions on cross-ideological alliances. There are three levels of alliance-building, namely, forming robust value-based alliances, forming weak interest-based alliances, and not forming alliances at all.

1.3.4 Sources

This thesis utilizes both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include newspaper articles (i.e., archives of Milliyet, Washington Post, and New York Times are systematically scanned), party manifestos, press statements of state visits, and books written by significant party figures. While secondary sources include policy papers, opinion pieces, analyses, and secondary interviews conducted with IPP members published in local media outlets. While books and journal articles are also used as secondary sources for classifying different perspectives on the relationship between political Islam and democracy, the bulk of the secondary sources are gathered from the media outlets mentioned above because of their temporal proximity to the events that are examined.

1.3.5 Time frame

Although it is relatively simple to designate the exact timing of the critical juncture (i.e., the beginning point), it is more difficult to do the same for the end date, especially if we accept the fact that the IPPs should always be vigilant against possible reactions in order to survive. Without a doubt, for FJP and FIS, it is easier to spot the endpoints because the repression pathway has a more unambiguous conclusion. For the reinforced survival and precarious existence pathways, however, even a decade will not guarantee a particular outcome, an IPP can pick all the right policies for several years, but its previous choices do not guarantee this IPP's reinforced survival, rather, previous smart choices make reinforced survival possible and likely in the future. As a result, for JDP and Ennahda, the time frames that are examined in this thesis starts with the electoral

victory, end ends with the first serious challenge that these IPPs experienced (e.g., the case for the shutting down of JDP and coup threat against Ennahda after the overthrow of President Morsi). Lastly, for WP and PJD, the time frame starts with a critical juncture and ends with these IPPs' compliance to the secular establishment. Without a doubt, historical backgrounds and IPPs' policies right before the critical junctures also examined, since historical conditions have an impact on IPPs' later choices, albeit a limited one, as further discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Mass protests in the Arab World which resulted in regime changes in some instances and significant institutional arrangements in others provided students of democratization with a fertile ground for testing theories. Indeed, despite the similarities in potential explanatory variables, we observed a huge variation in outcomes. As discussed further below, in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, IPPs won the first elections after the Arab Spring and challenged the status quo, not only by implementing novel policies but also by simply existing in a country that has been ruled by secular elites for years. Indeed, The fact that IPPs were in the parliament as the winners of democratic elections, was a significant challenge to the status quo (conservative) forces in these countries which were relatively secularist compared to these IPPs. Even though closing down an IPP does not necessarily indicate a collapse of a democratic regime, these closures reveal the limitations of the democratic system for a given country (Welfare Party's closure was a sign of democratic weakness in Turkey, but it did not result in the establishment of an authoritarian regime). If IPPs are the strongest and most organized parties after the democratic transition, as they often were after the Arab Spring, the fate of the democracy and the fate of an IPP are more closely interconnected. In other words, when we are talking about a particular outcome for an IPP, we are most probably talking about a regime outcome for a country where this IPP is located.

In the literature, one can find at least four broad categories that explain democratization by emphasizing different frameworks, namely, (1) actorless explanations which

underline macro-level socioeconomic factors such as economic development; (2) culturalist explanations, both as critical and constructivist versions, which focus on the compatibility of Islam and democracy; (3) class-based approach that attributes democratic consolidation and breakdown to the peculiar historical development of class relations; (4) actor-oriented approaches which can underline the role of elites, political parties or the masses.

2.1 Actorless explanations

In his much-cited paper, Martin Lipset scrutinizes the relationship between economic development and democracy. Just like other theorists who follow modernization theory such as Lerner, Lipset is optimistic about the socioeconomic development's positive impact on democracy. According to him, with urbanization, industrialization, increasing literacy, and rising income levels come democratization and democratic consolidation (Lipset, 1959, p.72). By including countries from different geographical and cultural areas, Lipset, in essence, demonstrates that democracy is not confined to western civilization. In other words, when it comes to predicting the fate of democracy, economic indicators do a better job than cultural analyses.

Modernization theory is challenged by two empirical developments: (1) opulent Muslim majority (i.e., countries where Muslims constitute more than 50 pct of the total population) countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have established durable but significantly undemocratic regimes, (2) and when democracy developed almost uninterruptedly in poor states such as India. In order to vindicate modernization theory, Michael L. Ross shows that oil abundance may hinder democratization by

providing autocratic regimes with enough resources to sustain the regime without raising taxes (Ross, 2001, p. 357). By using different estimation strategies, such as quasi-experiments and time-series centric techniques, however, other researchers reject the "resource curse" argument (Haber & Menaldo 2011; Liou & Musgrave, 2013). In this comparative work, Algeria is the only country which heavily relies on oil for its tax revenues and exports, however, by examining its Polity scores and level of fiscal dependence, we can state that oil is actually a limited blessing for Algeria (Haber & Menaldo, 2011, p.8). For Algeria, the collapse of oil prices was the main factor behind the mass protests which eventually led to the end of the single-party regime. Therefore the complete collapse of newly born democracy and the suppression of FIS in 1991 cannot be comprehended by applying the resource curse argument.

The sheer presence of the 1991 election results and gradual developments in the Algerian political system demonstrates the inapplicability of the above-mentioned argument as one of the major causal mechanisms for Algeria. Without a doubt, the resource curse argument focuses on the probability of democratization in resource-rich countries, rather than claiming that resource-rich autocracies cannot become democracies. In other words, this thesis' scope is confined to showing (by analyzing the historical process) that oil resources were not the main driver behind the repression of FIS. Indeed, high fiscal dependence on oil does not preclude respectable turnout numbers in the 1990 and 1991 elections. In both the 1990 Local and 1991 Legislative elections, the anti-regime IPP won almost half of the votes. The reason behind the collapse of this democratic experience was not the self-sufficiency of the regime but the gross strategic miscalculations of the political leaders. Even those who follow the

resource curse theory to explain the developments in Algeria underlined the exceptional nature of the 1988 constitutional change, which cannot be simply explained by the taxation-representation argument (Sandbakken, 2006, p.147). As explained later in Chapter 3, the repression of the FIS continued to haunt IPPs in other Arab countries where IPPs won the first free and fair elections in their countries by getting a significant portion of the votes.

Modernization theory's main arguments were tested by Przeworski and Limongi as well, they questioned the main reasons behind the positive correlation between GDP per capita and level of democracy. According to them, the reason why we do not see poor democracies because it is challenging for them to survive in poor countries. In other words, increasing wealth cannot explain transitions, therefore "democracy is or is not established by political actors pursuing their goals and it can be initiated at any level of development… only once it is established do economic constraints play a role" (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997, p. 177). What does this probabilistic account tell us when we are comparing Tunisia and Egypt, two countries with similar levels of GDP PPP per capita? Like many actorless explanations, this one point to aggregate probabilities for certain societal outcomes, without, however, shedding enough light on the causal mechanisms that generate those outcomes through social action. In other words, while the modernization thesis points to broad patterns at best, variations from the patterns (the residual error term) remain large enough to necessitate a closer look at the processes and actors in play in individual country cases. Both Tunisia after Ennahda's election victory and Turkey after JDP became the majority government experienced coup threats after contingent moments of IPP election victory, but it did not

happen in either of the cases. In addition, Turkey's GDP PPP per capita in 1997, is only 10 pct lower than its GDP PPP per capita in 2002, but although the army's position did not change in 5 years, only in the former case we saw Turkish Armed Forces acted to get rid of the ruling government under PM Necmettin Erbakan.

This thesis does not deny the role of socioeconomic development in the endurance of democracy. Without a doubt as Tilly (2007) and Acemoglu & Robinson (2019) underline, it is impossible to have full-fledged democracy without first having a Weberian state, which successfully monopolizes the legitimate use of power in a given territory, and economic development makes it easier for states to achieve this objective. The real puzzle, however, continues to stay unsolved: given the fact that these states have sufficient capacity to monopolize the legitimate use of violence, and that North African states have similar levels of economic development measured by GDP PPP per capita, what explains the different political outcomes after IPPs came to power (Table 4).

Table 4. Modernization Indicators during Contingency Moments Brought about by IPPs' Electoral Victories.

Country	GDP PC	Year	Literacy*	Outcome
Turkey (JDP)	13468$	2002	87,37(00)	Reinforced Survival
Turkey (WP)	12310$	1995	79,24(90)	Precarious Existence
Tunisia	10139$	2011	79,65(11)	Reinforced Survival
Algeria	9929$	1991	49,63(87)	Repression
Egypt	9982$	2011	73,87(12)	Repression
Morocco	6703$	2011	67,08(11)	Precarious Existence

Note. GDP PC = Per capita gross domestic product estimated according to 2011 USD level;
* The closest year in which the data are available is given inside the parentheses.
Source: World Bank

2.2 Religio-centric explanations

Although one may immediately think of anthropological works such as Clifford Geertz's *Islam Observed,* this approach also includes those who use Islam as an independent variable in their statistical analyses to study the religion's distinct impact on regime type (1968). In fact, not only Islam but also other social groups such as Catholic, Asian, and Latin cultures were thought as incompatible with democracy before the democratic examples within these cultures emerge. Lastly, culturalist accounts also include those who claim democracy in the Islamic world is possible, but these democracies cannot be similar to Western democracies due to the unique characteristics of Islamist actors and devout masses (Hamid, 2016).

One of the earliest works which utilize culture as an independent variable is written by Samuel Huntington. He previously criticized those modernization theorists who explain democratization without giving sufficient attention to political institutionalization (Huntington, 1965, p. 417). For him, the best possibility is having both a participant society and strong institutions, but since most of the developing world lacks the latter part which needs more time and commitment to fully develop, social mobilization should be slowed down with various policies including "reducing the number of university graduates" (1965, p. 420). Huntington's later work on so-called Third Wave Democratization has become a punching bag for democratization theorists due to some of his essentialist arguments on Islam and Confucianism (1991). Huntington claims that due to the cultural factors inherent in Islam, there is not any Islamic leader who is an "advocate and supporter of democracy while in office" (1991,

p. 22). Nevertheless, despite slightly contradicting his early work on democratic development, Huntington also mentions the possibility of democratization for the Islamic world in case socioeconomic modernization erases the impact of Islamic culture. According to him, "Middle Eastern economies and societies are approaching the point where they will become too wealthy and too complex for their various traditional, military, and one-party systems of authoritarian rule to sustain themselves" (Huntington, 1991, p.33). Regardless of this erasure, however, for Huntington, culture as an independent variable has immense explanatory power for explaining the lack of democratization in Muslim majority countries. Later other quantitative works by Steven Fish (2001) and Daniela Donno and Bruce Russett (2004) supported this argument by controlling this relationship for other factors such as oil income and economic development. Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, on the other hand, argue that there is not any Muslim exceptionalism when it comes to democracy, rather, the democracy deficit is a problem especially for the Arab regimes (2003, p. 143). In fact, elsewhere, Stepan argues that the real obstacle for the development of democracy in Muslim countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia is not Islamists but the secular military which could not be controlled by elected governments (2000, p. 52).

Hamid disagrees with Stepan and Robertson's article on Arab exceptionalism. In his provocative book on Islam, statehood, and democracy, Hamid asserts that there is a significant difference between Muslims and others in terms of how they understand their holy scripture and apply it to their political views (Hamid, 2016, p. 22).

> The tendency to see religion through the prism of politics or economics (rather than the other way around) isn't necessarily incorrect, but it can sometimes obscure the independent power of ideas that seem, too much of the Western world, quaint and archaic. (Hamid, 2016, p. 31)

According to Hamid, Justice and Development Party and Ennahda gave away many of their Islamist policies, and moved to the center, however, once the "undemocratic military stick" is not there, there are no reasons for these parties to concede their Islamism (2016, p. 51). Hamid claims that Ennahda lost a significant portion of its votes in the 2014 elections by jettisoning its Islamist policies. To sum up, rising democratic demands should not mean liberalism in Muslim countries, because of the peculiar relationship of Islam with democracy. Hamid's disintegrating democracy and liberalism is supported by others (Esposito et al. 2016, Esposito et al. 2018) who emphasized that many people in Muslim countries who are anti-authoritarian do not necessarily favor secularism. Asef Bayat and Paul Kubicek, on the other hand, criticize those who "essentialize Islam as inherently antidemocratic or democratic" (Kubicek. 2015, p. 3). According to Bayat, not only Islamist activists in Muslim majority countries, but also some of the academics, analysts, and political leaders in the west tend to understand these countries with a religio-centric conceptual framework (2007, p.7). Ciftci et al., by using the latest empirical data from Arab Barometer, also demonstrate the existence of different groups, which can be distinguished in terms of their positions on issues such as pluralism and democracy; therefore, they also support Bayat's and Kubicek's position (2018, p. 12).

In one of his later works, Steven Fish also demonstrates that Muslims are not that distinctive when it comes to their opinions on secularism and democracy, therefore although data shows that Muslim majority countries are underachievers when it comes to democracy, the causal mechanism is not clear (2011). The discussion on Muslim exceptionalism is beneficial for understanding these seemingly incongruent two facts:

On the one hand, according to Arab Barometer's surveys in 2011 and 2014, the majority of the Muslims in the Maghreb thinks that democracy is the best system for them, and they think this democracy should be open to all political parties from different ideological backgrounds (Teti et al., 2018, p. 77), but on the other hand, as Fish (2001), Ross (2002) and Donna and Rusett (2004) demonstrates, there is a strong negative relationship between Islam and Democracy. As mentioned above, Hamid's and Esposito's suggestion for overcoming this incongruence is to accept Islam's peculiar relationship with state and secularism. Indeed, it is especially apparent in Hamid's writings that any democracy that will come to Muslim majority countries will not be a liberal and secular one. Whereas Bayat and Kubicek argue that each country should be analyzed separately, and as a result, the right way to look at Islam's relationship with democracy is to focus on successful cases and study how democracy works in Muslim-majority countries.

In this thesis, cases are selected from different countries where the election victories of IPPs resulted in different outcomes in each case. If, on the one hand, Muslims are supportive of democracy, and on the other hand, contingency situations that arise after Islamist parties' election victories ended up with different political outcomes, can we say that Islam in general or Muslims' opinions on democracy have explanatory power? Larry Diamond also argues that the reason behind the lack of democracy in the Middle East is not the culture dominated by Islam, but the regimes and unfavorable geopolitical situation (2008, p.277). If that is the case, the problem is less unsolvable because regimes sometimes collapse and there are often better ways of dealing with foreign policy despite the unfavorable geopolitics. As Ziblatt also argues in

his brilliant work on conservative parties in Europe, focusing on macro factors makes us overlook the importance of political parties and their strategic decisions. Culturalist approaches are stronger when they analyze cultures without disregarding cultures' interaction with their peculiar political and social contexts. In *Islam Observed* (Geertz, 1968), and *Understanding Political Islam* (Burgat, 2019) for instance, we see strong analyses which escape the trap of essentializing religion. In short, even though Islamist parties and actors themselves underline the similarities of their causes, differences that are resulted from their particular institutional settings which vary among countries are almost impossible to ignore. If we return to Hamid's example above, despite Ennahda and Justice and Development Party both moved to the center to escape from the "undemocratic military stick," unlike Ennahda which lost votes as a result of this move, in 2002 elections, JDP got 15 percent more in than what Welfare Party got in 1995 elections.

2.3 Class-based macro-structural theories

In *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore Jr. examines the conditions that lead to different regime types, namely, capitalist-democratic, fascism, and communism. According to Moore Jr., power balance among different classes determines inter-class alliances, and these alliances, in turn, determine particular regime outcomes. Since neither crown was "too strong" nor landed aristocracy was "too independent" in England, a specific type of crown-aristocracy peace has developed. Also, enclosure movements which epitomized the transition to commercial agriculture curbed the power of peasantry. Lack of strong peasantry, together with strong

bourgeoisie that emerged after commercial agriculture, made any reactionary alliance between the bourgeoisie, and landed aristocracy redundant (Moore, 1967, p.430). In Germany, on the other hand, neither bourgeoisie nor aristocracy was independently strong enough to fight against the peasantry. The relative weakness of these two classes resulted in an interest-based alliance that sought protection from the state bureaucracy and paved the way for fascism (Moore, 1967, p. 437). In countries where the bourgeoisie is too weak to be an actor, and where a strong bureaucratic state, rather than aristocracy, was the address from which peasants seek protection, the result was communism.

Later, Luebbert rejected Moore's findings by applying the comparative method to eliminate some of Moore's causal explanations. According to Luebbert, "dependent peasantry", contrary to Moore's claims, is not correlated with fascist outcome, besides, the existence of a landed elite is not a prerequisite for fascism, because independent peasantry's alliance with the bourgeoisie can also bring this regime outcome even when aristocracy is weak (1987, p.477). Luebbert distinguished four pathways, but according to him, the first path, that is, pluralist democracy was only possible for those countries where workers gradually entered politics under dominant liberals' control before WWI destabilized these countries. For late democratizers (i.e., countries that experienced democratization after WWI), where workers' political participation developed more rapidly, and liberals are weaker, social democracy, fascism, and traditional dictatorship were the only possible regime outcomes. These outcomes were determined by the types of inter-class coalitions: middle peasantry's (not rural proletariat's) alliance with socialists resulted in social democracy, while its alliance with traditional liberal parties

brought about traditional dictatorship, lastly, when the coalition was formed between the middle peasantry and fascist parties the result was fascism.

By examining the same period, Ziblatt also arrives at a conclusion that is different from Moore's. Just like Luebbert, Ziblatt claims that pacing of political participation rights affects regime outcome since in cases where the enfranchisement process was gradual, conservative parties managed to build their organizational capacity and discovered taking advantage of cross-class cleavages such as religion. This capacity-building process gave confidence conservative party confidence to believe that it can also win an election without seeking undemocratic forces' help. Although some underlying conditions such as class structure, the existence of primordial cleavages, level of polarization, etc., may limit the extent of actors' choices, both in Luebbert and Ziblatt, strategic choices of the important actors, rather than Moore's macro-structural explanations, illuminate the distinct regime outcomes (Ziblatt, 2017).

Even though countries examined in this thesis seem more vulnerable to cross-class cleavages compared to European countries, there are some authors such as Hesham Sallam who examine historical trajectories to understand disparities among Islamists and leftists. Works that focus on historical trajectories for political parties are closer to Moore, rather than Luebbert, due to their deterministic arguments. For Sallam, there are historical reasons behind the left's inability to mobilize masses as opposed to Islamists. In Egypt, President Gamal Abdul Nasser applied harsher policies to Islamists compared to communists, at the same time, he was not comfortable with the presence of independent leftist movements. Two developments significantly weakened communist movements in Egypt: First, in the 1960s, Nasser forced these independent movements to

dissolve into his Arab Socialist Union, and second, Nasser's successor Anwar Sadat pushed already weakened communist movements to join "state-managed political contestation" (Sallam, 2017, p. 64). The trajectory was quite different for the Islamists, compared to leftists who deeply enmeshed with the Nasserist state and became too dependent. President Anwar Sadat by releasing Muslim Brotherhood members from prison and utilizing Islamist activists in universities to fight against communists and Nasserites, helped Islamists to organize without being coopted or assimilated (Sallam, 2017). A similar organizational capacity-building process by Islamists was also the case for Tunisia, however, the Tunisian state, unlike the Egyptian state under Sadat, did not offer a hospitable environment for Tunisian Islamists (though there were political openings as a result of leadership change, these periods were too brief compared to Egypt). To sum up, as Anne Wolf demonstrates, Islamists "thrived despite the repression" of Habib Bourguiba and Zine El- Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia (2017, p.57). Tunisia under Bourguiba and later Ben Ali was hostile to all opposition groups which has the potential to challenge the establishment. As the political and cultural threat coming from Islamist political groups increased in the 1970s, the Tunisian regime began to focus more on Islamist activisits and groups compared to other political and civil organizations. Ennahda's predecessor Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) was competing against rival ideological groups as well as Bourguiba's secular policies in the universities. In the 1990s, however, Ben Ali's regime increased the pressure on Islamist groups and forced many Ennahda members to exile (mostly to Europe). Despite the ideological rivalries inside Tunisia, Ennahda members managed to form a constructive dialogue with secular and left-wing groups during their exile.

Though Moore and Luebbert focus on European democratization which is heavily shaped by social class relations. Studying the difference between the two authors' approaches is beneficial for understanding how IPPs survive in examined countries. While Moore grasps the power balance between the social classes as a static relationship, Luebbert conceptualizes it as a dynamic relationship. Here, *static* and *dynamic* relationships are conceptualized according to the role of social classes' decisions in influencing political outcomes (Ziblatt's work on conservative parties can be considered in the middle of these two categories). In Moore, for example, dependent peasantry, weak bourgeoisie, and strong bureaucratic state lead to communism regardless of the choices of political actors (i.e., social classes in Moore). Luebbert, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of political alliances made by distinct social classes in affecting political outcomes. Though underlying conditions (i.e., existing power-balance) have an impact on these political alliances, there is no pre-determination. This thesis is closer to the latter approach, since, as further elaborated in the chapters below, IPPs' different alliance choices in similar contexts (e.g., WP and JDP) can lead to different political outcomes.

2.4 Actor-based models

Przeworski (1986, p. 47) distinguished two broad approaches on democratization; macro approach (Moore, 1967) which retrospectively explains why it could not have been different even though the actors had chosen the most creative policies, and micro approach which (again retrospectively) claims that it could have been different if the actors had behaved differently. Above, we examined significant examples of the former

who focused on factors such as socio-economic development and the role of religion. On the other hand, as Przeworski also mentions, Karl Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* is an illuminating example for the latter micro approach. Indeed, Marx brilliantly displayed how the French bourgeoisie's policy choices against socialists (e.g., their alliance with conservatives) to maintain order, in turn, destroyed the bourgeoisie republic (Marx, 1852). Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter's works on democratic transition culminated into seminal *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* which consist of several volumes and chapters on different geographies such as Southern Europe and Latin America. Their major contribution was to show not only the fragmental structure of authoritarian regimes and opposition movements, but also demonstrating how this fragmental structure makes authoritarian breakdown possible (1986, p. 19).

Linz and Stepan state that in culturally diverse societies, it is more difficult to achieve a consensus on democratic norms, compared to more homogenous societies, luckily, however, people can have multiple political identities and their political identities can change (1978., p 35). Therefore, polarization based on these political identities is not inevitable if political leadership does not choose polarizing policies. Indeed, although Linz and Stephan utilize macro variables such as the size of civil and political society, they never overlook the actors' choices when they are explaining regime breakdown, transition, and consolidation. In every transition process, there are some parties, groups, and organizations country that can be called disloyal opposition who does not consider the new democratic system as legitimate (1978, p. 27). Although Linz and Stepan mention several types of disloyal opposition, in general, we can say

that this type of opposition does not accept the basic premise of the democratic process, namely, "institutionalized uncertainty" (Przeworski, 1991, p. 10). For countries examined in this small-N research, uncertainty is in fact somehow smaller, due to the immense organizational capacity that Islamist organizations accumulated during the authoritarian era. As a result, even semi loyal opposition can easily join the ranks of disloyal opposition, when they begin perceiving that democracy will lead to an inevitable loss, especially if stakes are high. Linz and Stepan's conceptual framework helps us to understand why Islamist electoral victories cause a reaction that can endanger the whole transition process (e.g., Egypt's counter-revolution in 2013) or the party itself (e.g., Welfare Party's closure after 1997 coup d'état) by undemocratic forces. To sum up, in transition processes, there is a positive correlation between the amount of the vote difference between winners and losers on the one hand, and a chance of democratic breakdown on the other, because as the vote gap between these two groups gets bigger, semi loyal factions within the losers will have more reasons to become disloyal.

The peculiar challenge posed by the IPPs can be compared with the crisis of democracy that followed the rise of socialist movements in Europe. Before socialist parties were tamed and became safe for the status quo thanks to the "iron law" that Robert Michels underlines, further democratization by expanding suffrage was a serious challenge for the Western countries (Michels, 1911). Despite the similarities in terms of development indicators, as Ziblatt demonstrates (2017), democratization pathways were quite different. In other words, while some European countries experienced uninterrupted and gradual democratization, others such as Spain and Germany suffered

democratic breakdowns. In his work where he compares Belgium's Catholic Party with Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, Kalyvas states that:

> When powerful religious parties are set to win critical elections in emerging democracies, the future of new and fragile secular and liberal democratic institutions is put in question… Incumbents, in control of the state's repressive apparatus, seek guarantees to protect their basic material interests and their future access to power, while challengers seek power so that they can enact their program… for democratization to proceed it is necessary (though not sufficient) for religious challengers to solve their commitment problem. (2000, p. 379-380)

Of course, it is legitimate to ask why the religious challengers should prove their democratic credentials to others, however, it would solely be a normative question if the repressive apparatus belongs to secular incumbents. Ziblatt astutely illustrates that when incumbents are competitive and have enough organizational strength (e.g., Conservative Party in the United Kingdom), the threat posed by challengers can be solved more smoothly without any demand by incumbents for extra-democratic means to prevent challengers from coming to power. I argue that, however, his comparison between Egypt and Tunisia (Ziblatt, 2017, p. 361) is not as strong as his comparison between his main cases, namely, Germany and the United Kingdom. Although secular and status quo alliance managed to win the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections against Rached Ghannouchi's Ennahda, according to 2011 election results, no secular, liberal or leftist party managed to get more than 9 percent of the votes. This three-year period where there is no competitive non-Islamist opposition party brought about a coup d'état in Egypt; despite the coup rumors, however, democracy and Ennahda survived in Tunisia. The reason behind Egypt's failure and Tunisia's success, therefore, is not the existence of a competitive conservative party with strong organizational strength (there

were no such parties during the first elections after the transition) but the policies of Islamist parties, overcame this commitment problem.

Without a doubt, some actor-based models position themselves between structure-oriented and agency-oriented approaches. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, argues that actors' level of radicalism (i.e., urgency to reach their political objectives) and normative commitment to democracy (or autocracy) have a better explanatory power in predicting regime outcome, compared to macro-level factors such as economic development, culture and religion (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2014, p. 39). Actors' normative preferences and level of radicalism are meso-level factors since they are more changeable than macro-level indicators. In terms of the definition of actors (i.e., not classes but politically relevant actors), this thesis follows Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán. However, as explained in Chapter I, types of alliances that are conceptualized in this thesis emphasizes the role of contingent decisions, rather than, previous normative preferences and level of radicalism.

CHAPTER 3

REPRESSION PATHWAY: ALGERIA'S ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT AND EGYPT'S FREEDOM AND JUSTICE PARTY

3.1 Defining repression

Repression and precarious existence pathways can both lead to party closure and arrest of important political figures, only in the former pathway, however, the violence is used to eradicate the targeted political movement as a whole, whereas in the latter pathway, disciplining is the main objective. The most important objective of this disciplining process is to demonstrate unequal power relations between the unelected officials (i.e., secular establishment) and elected political party (e.g., IPPs). Without a doubt, this disciplining process is not an apolitical one, rather, when IPPs came to power, they fight to change the status quo that is supported by the secular establishment. In other words, the struggle to alter the power relationship takes place for changing highly politicized issues such as, the headscarf ban in Universities or a constitutional change that renders Islam as the religion of the state. In the precarious existence pathway, some of these political struggles are won by the IPP without significantly altering the power relationship between the establishment and the elected political party, whereas, in the repression pathway, IPPs seek for revolutionary changes in both politicized issue areas and power structure. As a result, in the repression pathway, IPPs broaden the status quo-pact to such an extent that even an interest-based alliance became difficult to form with other political parties or civil society actors. The repression pathway, then, refers to IPPs' complete eradication from the political field, together with the banning of any

political or civil society actor (e.g., youth organizations, charity organizations, schools, etc.) who are related to these parties.

3.2 Mechanism of repression and cases

In Muslim majority countries, an electoral victory of an IPP triggers a formation of status quo-pact which consists of non-Islamist political parties, civil society organizations, and secular establishment. Only in certain cases, however, status quo-pacts are strong enough to suppress IPPs, whereas, in others, cross-ideological value-based alliances that are formed by IPPs create divisions within status quo-pacts. As can be seen in Egypt's post-Arab Spring experience, the strength of an alliance is not determined solely by the vote share, rather, one should look at an IPP's capacity to divide status quo-pacts for comprehending the strength of alliances. Two parties that are examined in this chapter (i.e., FIS and FJP) were in fact quite popular in terms of the share of votes they got in the elections, but their failure to decrease the size of status quo pacts in their countries led to bloody coup d'états which aimed at complete repression of the IPPs.

In the precarious existence pathway, on the other hand, IPPs focus on politicized issues rather than substantive changes in the power relationship. Choosing to focus on politicized issues, rather than fighting to change power inequality between elected and unelected officials, is quite significant in terms of subsequent alliance-making efforts, because the former strategy makes it difficult to form cross-ideological alliances in countries which are vulnerable to secularist-Islamist polarization. In other words, though seculars, leftists, and liberals also suffer from the status quo, if IPP chooses to focus on

highly politicized issues, above mentioned groups tend to line up behind the unelected officials. In the suppression pathway, IPPs also reduce their chances for forming cross-ideological alliances by focusing on politicized issues, however, they also struggle to change the power inequality. IPPs' ambition for making revolutionary changes in power structure alienates other political and civil society actors in a polarized context, since these groups may feel that there will not be any emergency valve (e.g., the army, high courts) to stop IPPs' from implementing their agenda. At the beginning of the reinforced survival pathway, IPPs try to calm the polarizing discussions with their compromises and focus on the substantial changes regarding the role of unelected officials instead.

In IPPs' international alliance-making efforts, a similar pattern emerges: IPPs in the reinforced survival pathway manage to maintain and expand their international alliances firstly by committing to respect mutual interests and secondly by forming transforming their interest-based alliances into value-based ones. IPPs in precarious existence pathway, do not fully control foreign policy, because secular establishment often plays a more dominant role in international alliances. As a result, IPPs necessarily pay lip service to their countries' traditional alliances (e.g., WP's comments on the United States, PJD's official support to coup d'état in Egypt), and confine themselves to weak alliances with novel and alternative actors (e.g., PJD's objective to improve Morocco's relationship with other Muslim majority countries). IPPs' alliances with alternative actors in the precarious existence pathway are weak because (1) the establishment controls the key foreign policy issues (e.g., PJD could not generate an alternative discourse in key foreign policy issues such as coup d'etat in Egypt and normalization with Israel because of the dominant position of Makhzen in Morocco's

international relations), (2) strong alliances with alternative actors cannot be formed without leaving the traditional alliance architecture (e.g., WP could not form strong alliances with Iran and Libya due to Turkey's strong involvement in US-led alliance architecture). Even though IPPs in the repression pathway fail to exist long enough to make important changes in their countries' foreign policy orientations, one common characteristic of repressed parties is their inefficacious pragmatic approach. Because IPPs are aware of the limitations of the international system, all IPPs that are examined in this thesis use a certain level of pragmatism (e.g., after coup d'etat in Algeria, FIS' insufficient pragmatism became a frame of reference for FJP, PJD, and Ennahda who have a chance for coming to power by elections) in their foreign policy discourse, however, IPPs in the repression pathway, not only misperceives the interests of their existing international allies but also fail to make sufficient concessions on their foreign policy agenda due to their highly ideological discourse which was heavily supported by their voter base as well.

This chapter focuses on two IPPs, which do not belong to the same historical period, namely FIS and FJP. Even though there was 30 years difference between FIS' and FJP's first electoral victory, they both suffered from similar repressive policies of the secular establishment in their respective countries. In fact, just like other IPPs examined in this thesis, FJP also considered FIS's experience with democratic elections as an important lesson. As a result, unlike FIS's straightforward approach, FJP under Morsi preferred to follow less confrontational and more moderate policies regarding secularism. Indeed, two new constitutions were adapted thanks to Muslim Brotherhood's successful campaigns were largely similar to the previous constitutions in

terms of the role of Islam in state affairs (e.g., the 2011 and 2012 constitutions). Despite the minor changes which were accused of promoting a conservative lifestyle, the above-mentioned constitutions were primarily secular texts which even improved certain liberties and introduced pluralism. Nevertheless, these constitutions triggered polarization between secular and devout Egyptians, especially during the campaigning periods. Among other reasons, FJP's main goal by following moderate policies was to escape from FIS destiny. In fact, the reason behind FJP's slightly longer rule can be explained by the fact that FJP's moderateness reduced the cost of inaction for the armed forces. In Egypt, the main driver of the status-quo alliance was the method followed by the Muslim Brotherhood while making fundamental changes in Egypt's political system, rather than the content of these changes. Morsi's answer to hostile institutions was quite distinct from the approach followed by Turkey's JDP and Tunisia's Ennahda who overcame the troubles caused by the establishment by forming cross-ideological alliances, thereby escaping isolation.

3.3 Repression of Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria

3.3.1 Historical background

Early forms of political Islamism in Algeria emerged in the 1920s when the northern part of the country was colonized by the French and divided into three administrative regions, called departments. Islamist activists who became more vocal against French colonialism after World War I, can actually be considered as "proto-nationalists" (Keddie, 1969) due to their peculiar use of the term "Muslim." Although the term Muslim referred to those who adhere religion of Islam, it was, at the same time, used to

designate native Algerians as opposed to colonizers. Khaled ibn Hashim ibn Abd El Qadir, who studied in French High School in Algeria and served in the French army in WWI, was among the first representatives of this nationalist/Islamist tradition, which mainly focused on fighting against the cultural and moral influence of France in Algeria (Zack, 2006, p. 206). In the 1930s, the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema pursued a similar objective of protecting Algerian culture from Western influence and became the backbone of the prominent Islamic organization called Qiyam el Islamiyah which was founded immediately after Algerian independence in 1962. Qiyam was heavily influenced by the writings of Hassan al Banna and Sayid Qutb, two prominent thinkers of the Muslim brotherhood who played a key role in the rise of political Islam in Egypt. Similar to Egypt, the moment of independence resulted in unearthing ideological differences among secular nationalists and political Islamists, despite their previous convergence in the anti-colonialist struggle. According to the Islamist camp, National Liberation Front which had functioned as an umbrella organization between 1954 and 1962 was founded not only for independence but also for constructing a new state which "operates within the framework of Islamic principles" (Njarakkulath, 2015, p. 257). In order to answer these criticisms, FLN sought to integrate Islamic elements into its modernist/secular governing style (Ghanem, 2019); however, these consent-seeking policies, as the FLN's frequent use of repressive means demonstrated, were insufficient to appease the demands of Islamic organizations. In 1965, FLN decided to ban Qiyam el Islamiyeh due to the diplomatic strain that was caused by the group after sending a letter to Nasser which demands to prevent Sayid Qutb from being executed by the Egyptian state (Zoubir, 1996, p. 68).

After the coup d'etat overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella, the first President of Algeria who was one of the leading members of the Algerian resistance, the new leader Houari Boumediene maintained Ben Bella's state socialism by supporting heavy industrialization on the one hand and following nationalist policies on the other. Algeria, under the leadership of Boumediene, nationalized its oil industry despite France's harsh opposition (Garavini, 2015, p. 84), and developed economically by using revenue coming from this new resource; however, in return, Algerians witnessed the consolidation of the single-party authoritarian regime which was backed by the military. Indeed, the Algerian Parliament which had already been dominated by FLN was dissolved by President Boumediene who banned prominent politicians from the government with the support of the army. Between 1964 and 1977 no legislative elections were held by the regime, while the military-bureaucracy coalition ruled the country without any significant barriers. In spite of the restrictions on political freedoms, though, Algerian citizens, who were tired from years of violence and disorder, appreciated stability and economic growth which directly improved their life standards (Pierre & Quandt, 1995, p. 134). In addition to economic growth which was resulted from industrialization and the rise of oil revenues, more than 2 million hectares of cultivable lands were allocated to almost 100 thousand Algerians as a result of agrarian reform. Agrarian reform initiated by President Boumediene also aimed to "improve crop production" and "reverse rural migration," however, the reform did not become fully successful (or unsuccessful) at neither of the objectives (Nellis, 1980, p. 485).

Chadli Bendjedid who came to power in 1979 after Boumediene's unexpected death, was less fortunate than his predecessor as the oil prices plummeted in the early 1980s, thereby confronting Bendjedid with one of the worst fears of an authoritarian leader in a rentier state (Garavini, 2015, p. 89). During the 1980s, Bendjedid radically altered economic policies that were implemented under Boumediene, by simply "reducing the size of the public enterprises," however, rather than resolving the problem of unprofitability, Bendjedid's small enterprises exacerbated the deficit problem (Addi & Bawtree, 2006, p. 209). After the 1986 economic crisis which was resulted from oil price collapse (Escribano, Boucher, Chevallier & Huneeus, 2016, p. 3), more radical reforms were implemented, such as privatization of education and health sectors, under the broader program of economic liberalization (Zoubir, 1993, p. 87). Regardless of their inefficiency, however, public companies were providing Algerians with jobs, therefore, privatization of state companies, together with, rural migration and rapid population growth, brought about unemployment (Figure 1). In an undemocratic country which was ruled by a single party (i.e., FLN) since its independence, economic difficulties were signaling the end of the Algerians' social contract with the state (Heristchi, 2004, p. 115). Popular revolts which started in 1988 and were later called "Black October" due to the high number of protestors killed by the security forces, were the culmination of anti-regime sentiments particularly among the young Algerians who constituted the majority. On 11 October, six days (and hundreds of deaths) after the protests had erupted, President Bendjedid made a statement in which he promised to undertake significant political and economic reforms (Hasan, 2018). Though protests

suddenly eased off after President's pledges, they made a substantial impact on the single-party regime and paved the way for FIS's rise.



Fig. 1 Evolution of Unemployment, Employment, and Labor Participation Rates between 1966 and 2011
Source: Lassasi & Hammouda, 2012

3.3.2 Algerian regime and the Islamic Salvation Front

Just like Egypt before the Arab Spring, Army had a "historical legitimacy" that was resulted from its role in armed anti-colonialist struggle (Mortimer, 2006, p. 156). After president Ben Bella, who served in the French Army for several years but was not a career officer, Colonel Boumediene consolidated the military's role in the political field during his rule. In fact, the main spark behind Boumediene's coup d'etat against Ben Bella was the latter's attempts to reduce the influence of the army by creating an alternative security organization (i.e., militias) which was planned to be directly responsible to the presidency (Lounici, 2011, p. 291). Under the "charismatic leadership" of the Boumediene which was resulted from its populist policies and

Algeria's strong economic performance due to high oil prices during his rule, the armed forces gained more power within the Algerian regime. Boumediene's coming to power after the 1965 coup d'etat symbolized Army's victory over civilian executives within FLN. As soon as he took the power, Boumediene began to work to decisively end this civilian-military duality. In order to achieve this objective, he formed a 26-member Revolutionary Council and dissolved the parliament (Addi, 2002, p. 183). Though the 1967 coup attempt against Boumediene demonstrated the limits of his project, his reign was mostly stable because, among other reasons, of his "historically unique and unrepeatable relationship to the Algerian army" (Roberts, 1992, p. 443). After Boumediene's death, the army decided to cancel the revolutionary council and promoted Bendjedid as the next president of Algeria. Boumediene's populist policies coincided with a favorable economic environment (e.g., high oil prices), whereas Benjdedid's first years as a president were followed by negative developments caused by the worldwide events (e.g., decreasing oil prices) which made it difficult for him to build a committed support base. During the 1988 revolts, for instance, rioters praised the success of the Boumediene era whereas they criticized Benjdedid's mismanagement of the economy (Roberts, 1992, p. 435).

Though the Algerian army preferred to "operate behind a 'veil' of civilian leaders and institutions," 1988 revolts forced them to leave their barracks to restore the order and prevent protestors from significantly altering the Algerian regime where the military had a dominant role (Mortimer, 1996, p. 20). Both for the Armed Forces and president Bendjedid, political reforms, which, at least seemingly, put an end to the single-party regime was necessary to forestall civil uprisings (Addi, 1998, p. 49).

Though reforms indeed took place, they created the intended outcomes for neither those who support democracy for fundamentally altering the political system nor those who aimed to create a farcical democracy where the army retains its prominent role. Though Benjdedid ordered the army to repress the riots and caused the death of hundreds of demonstrators, his subsequent liberalizing policies created a fertile ground for the rise of unlikely political actors such as political Islamists (Mortimer, 2006, p. 157).

As mentioned in the preceding section, the Algerian regime, especially under Boumediene, continued to refer to itself as a socialist country while it was trying to co-opt Islamic groups' demands as much as possible without giving them legitimacy in the political field (Byrne, 2009, p. 442). In other words, Algeria was still a single-party regime, therefore strong Islamic organizations such as Al-Qiyam was banned when they were perceived as a threat, however, some items in their policy agenda, such as Arabization of the education system, was implemented by the regime itself. Boumediene also underlined that socialism and Islamic values are in fact complementary, and revival of the Islamic culture in Algeria is necessary to counteract the influence of foreign cultures (Ghanem, 2019). Indeed, Islam was defined as the official religion of the state in the constitution which was drafted after independence. Nevertheless, Islam's position as a state religion was not sufficient for the Islamic organizations, as they promoted a more unambiguously defined role of Islam in the constitution. Again, the Algerian secular establishment was not sufficiently secular when it is judged by the text-book definition of the concept, however, just like Egypt, the regime belonged to the status quo party whereas political Islamists were mostly reformists due to their demand for change.

In addition to the above mentioned positional difference between the regime and political Islamists, “the military has remained one of the most Francophone institutions in the country,” despite their historical role in fighting against French colonialism (Esposito, 1999, p. 592). Indeed, the regime, irrespective of its discourse, prioritized nationalism and modernization over Islamism and instrumentalized religion to achieve its nationalist and modernist policy objectives (e.g., reducing Islam’s role by considering it as a cultural identity which is a part of broader Algerian national character).

3.3.3 Political opening in 1989 and the rise of Islamic Salvation Front

The constitutional referendum in 1989 was a breaking point for Algeria, particularly because the voter turnout was unexpectedly high (around 79 percent) for a country which had been ruled by a single party since its establishment. The new constitution continued to consider Islam as the official religion, but it retained the broad secular outlook of the Algerian legal system. Unlike secularism, socialism, which was a defining feature of previous constitutions, was completely erased in the new constitution, as the country transitioned from a single party regime into a multi-party system. While the president kept most of his previous powers and became the strongest actor according to the new constitution, the army’s role is “limited to safeguard the national independence and sovereignty” (Beke, 1991, p. 242). In other words, the army was no longer the guardian of the socialist revolution, as the main pillars of the revolution was eradicated by the new constitution, in turn, the president and constitutional council became the safety valves in case an anti-status quo party

dominates the parliament. Among other articles, article on emergency provisions which provide the president of the republic with a monopoly on proclaiming a state of emergency, and article which render two-thirds majority necessary for approval of the acts which was asked for a second reading by the president, generously empowered president when compared to parliament. Despite its shortcomings, however, it significantly improved the legal framework in terms of freedom of speech, right to strike, and most importantly right to form political associations. Indeed, according to Abubakr Belkaid who was the minister of interior in 1989, the approved constitution:

> open[ed] the way to a new era…to know more democracy, to assure public and individual liberties, and to establish the sovereignty of the law" ("Algeria approves new constitution", 1989)

When FLN stopped being an integral part of the regime as a consequence of the multi-party system, armed forces left the party's central committee and political bureau, thereby bringing about the formal separation of the political wing of the FLN from the armed wing (Roberts, 2007). Together with the 1989 Constitution which reduced the military's role in the political field on paper, this separation could have led to the civilianization of the Algerian political system, however, FIS' sudden rise was such a radical challenge to the state that the military's presence in fact expanded after the liberalization reforms. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or the National Outlook movement in Turkey, FIS was an umbrella organization for different Islamic groups and figures in Algeria. In other words, it was the political Islamists' need to form a "formal organizational structure" that led to the formation of FIS in 1989 (Ghanem, 2019). Since FIS did not have a chance to build itself a strong organizational identity, several visions on economic and foreign policy were present within the party, nevertheless, reducing

the role of the military and implementing shari'a were the common objectives of the party as a whole (Heristchi, 2004, p. 121). Indeed, political parties that were established after the introduction of the right to form political associations, "instead of canvassing alternative programs for government, were canvassing alternative, indeed diametrically opposed and totally irreconcilable, conceptions of the state" (Roberts, 1992, p. 449). For the military, therefore, FIS's electoral victory could lead to the assignment of a hostile minister of defense which significantly damages its organizational interests.

Bendjedid interpreted the results of constitutional referendums in 1988 and 1989 as an approval of his leadership, as a result, he confidently continued with his reform agenda. For Benjdedid, political reforms and transition to a multi-party system was useful, not only for reducing the social tensions but also for transforming his own party from those who criticize his economic policies. It was not uncommon for western commentators to compare Bendjedid with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev who experienced similar hardships, which were mostly caused by the Soviet establishment, in implementing his policies (Randal, 1989). Together with the results of the above-mentioned referendums, the common belief that FIS could not receive more than 30 percent of the votes, pushed Bendjedid to be optimistic about his political future; however, his optimism resulted from a grave miscalculation. The disillusionment of the ruling elite took place only after FLN performed disastrously in the first democratically held local elections in Algeria. FIS took control of the biggest provinces such as Algiers, Constantine, and Oran, by receiving 55 percent of the vote in 1990 local elections. Although FLN officials were confident that FIS' electoral victory was a short-term achievement which would not be able to turn Algeria into an "Islamic republic"

(Ibrahim, 1990b), and blamed FIS for "bringing Islam back to an era of charlatanism" ("Algeria's ruling party criticizes", 1990), FIS' leader Abbasi al-Madani, immediately called Bendjedid to hold a new parliamentary election (Ibrahim, 1990a), to capitalize on the political momentum.

Though it was not surprising for Islamist movements to garner sizeable support in the election, the vote difference between FIS and FLN was unanticipated for all the political actors including FIS' leader al-Madani. In the region, FIS was the first IPP who managed to receive more than 50 percent of the votes in a democratic election, therefore no political actor, including the military, had the required knowledge to deal with this type of scenario. In spite of their inexperience, however, FIS' leaders were prudent enough to presume that in a country where the military staged a coup against those who more or less share the same ideological principles (e.g., 1965 coup), a coup against an Islamist government was more than a possibility. As a result, al-Madani started to seek a solution for breaking the isolation of his party in the political field by stating that FIS "did not rule out a coalition with any political group" and they would "guarantee freedom of all opinions" (Randal, 1990), while simultaneously calling President Bendjedid to dissolve the parliament.

A sizable number of secular opposition parties boycotted the 1990 elections and provided FIS with an even greater victory (Samuelson, 1995, p. 309). Opposition parties' unwillingness to participate in the electoral competition had devastating impacts on the newly introduced democratic system by turning their perception of secular parties' being unable to contend against IPPs into a self-fulfilling prophecy. While newly elected local councils' above-mentioned policies on symbolic issues such as

"dress, alcohol consumption and gambling" merely render it more difficult for FIS to break their isolation by provoking non-Islamist actors (Entelis & Arone, 1992, p. 29).

FIS' victory in 1990 was, without a doubt, resulted from Algerians' ideological affiliation, however, religiosity and ideological was not the only reason. In the 1990 elections, FIS was one of the few parties which did not have organic (i.e., close relationship with the army) or ideological (i.e., socialism) proximity to the pre-1989 regime which was held responsible for "soaring foreign debt, high unemployment, housing crises, and heightened social polarization between rich and poor" by the Algerians (Sadiki, 2000, p. 81). In the urban areas, anti-regime sentiments and economic concerns were as influential as the ideological affiliation on the voting behavior (Lazreg, 1998, p. 50). Though local elections only provided FIS with limited power to implement its ideological agenda, there were examples of movie theater and coeducational school closures in certain towns by elected councils that were dominated by FIS (Mortimer, 1991, p. 586). In addition, there were some cases where the local administrations dominated by FIS refused to celebrate national holidays such as the 1st of November (i.e., Anniversary of the Revolution) and 5th of July (Independence Day), two significant anniversaries which were largely associated with FLN (Babadji, 1992, p. 106).

As mentioned above, FIS officials more or less shared the same views on the type of state that they aim to build in Algeria, however, there was a significant debate among the high-ranking members of the party on the most suitable way to achieve this proposed state. While al-Madani, who held a Ph.D. in education in London offered a more gradualist approach, the party's co-founder Ali Benhadj had considered the democratic system as blasphemous, due to its empowering people as the only source of

political power (Zoubir, 1996, p. 77). Though Ali Benhadj later accepted the benefits of the electoral system and called to end anti-regime protests in June 1991 after Bendjedid accepted to hold parliamentary elections (Ibrahim, 1991a), similar opinion struggles within the FIS, which led to ambiguity on certain policy issues, overshadowed al-Madani's constructive comments on coalition-building, thereby triggering fears among seculars. At the same time, as FLN under the leadership of Bendjedid became more dysfunctional, not only demonstrations against his leadership but also the military's presence in the political field intensified.

As FLN diverged from the regime after Benjdedid's democratic reform agenda, the military felt less confident of the secular political actors' ability to maintain the status quo. June protests in 1991 brought about a new cabinet, which consisted of non-partisan figures such as Algeria's first Minister of Human Rights Ali Haroun. The cabinet which was appointed by the new Prime Minister Ahmed Ghazali was commended by both FIS and Western countries who appreciated the technocratic and liberal outlook of the new ministers ("New Algerian cabinet named", 1991). Rather than leading to normalization in the political field, however, the technocratic government was blamed for adopting a soft stance against FIS by the military. Consequently, in July, the armed forces started to exploit Article 11 of the state of emergency decree in order to "cut off the head of the FIS" (Entelis & Arone, 1992, p. 32). After removing regional council members who are affiliated with FIS, the military began to arrest significant politicians including al-Madani and Belhadj who were accused of "fomenting, organizing, triggering and leading an armed conspiracy against the security of the state" (Khiari, 1991). Although Ghazali announced to end state of emergency in September

and decided on election day, the Algerian military's repressive policies continued to target FIS members (Ibrahim, 1991b). In fact, after the incarceration of almost all its shura members, and the banning of its media outlets, the regime deprived FIS of meaningful ways to do political campaigning. In addition to repressive policies against FIS, the Ghazali government, which was initially supported by the FIS, also exercised "blatant gerrymandering in favor of FLN" (Ghanem-Yazbeck, 2018, p. 10) to guarantee FLN's electoral victory. Despite the efforts of the regime, however, FIS won 188 of the 430 seats in the first round of the elections, whereas FLN merely received 16 seats and became the third party in terms of the number of seats despite getting second-most votes. Polarization intensified in the days following the first round of elections, especially after the chairman of the FIS' political commission, Sheikh Mohamed Said stated that "Algerian people should prepare for a radical change of their food and clothing habits" (Amirouche, 1998). Though Mohamed Said later explained that he was in fact, referring to the harsh economic conditions that Algerians would face due to austerity measures, the level of dialogue between different ideological groups in Algeria was extremely low for allowing bona fide interpretations. On 2 January 1992, Hocine Ait Ahmed, whose party received 25 seats in the first round of elections, organized a march against FIS to mobilize "apathetic voters" to vote in the second round ("Algerians march against Islamic state", 1992). As can be seen in chants and banners of the protestors, the main concern of the protestors was the possibility of regime change after FIS came to power. Just 5 days before the second round of the elections, which was planned to be held on 16 January, President Bendjedid announced his resignation, thereby marking "the end of the democracy experiment" (Murphy & Tempest, 1992) in

Algeria, as his resignation further expanded military's presence in the political field. In other words, Bendjedid's resignation was foreshadowing the inevitable coup d'etat which would take place a few days later.

3.3.4 International alliances of FIS

FIS's isolation in domestic politics was reinforced by the mistrustful attitude of the international actors towards the IPP and FIS's failure to form value-based (or even interest-based) alliances with countries such as France and the United States. Despite its short life span (as a legal political party at least), the period in which FIS was active in politics, coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War. FIS offered a revolutionary break from the main pillars of Algerian foreign policy, by introducing an ummah-centered vision that emphasized "a wise foreign policy to encourage" countries such as "China, India, the USSR and Bulgaria" to respect human rights by stopping atrocities committed against their Muslim population (Heristchi, 2004, p. 121). Because FIS largely focused on fundamental and ideational criticisms of what they perceive as a Western-dominated international system, the party overlooked at times particularities and realities of this system. In other words, for the sake of consistency, FIS disregarded national interests (Shahin, 2003, p. 122). For FIS, approaching international relations from a value-based perspective was useful in making just decisions, while interest-based decisions could lead to immoral and inconsistent policies. Inviting Western countries, such as the United States to respect their values was a common theme in many of the FIS members' interviews:

> We ask the West to respect its own principles…If the Western world is truly democratic, it should respect democracy. If it is not…it should admit that. The

> fear of Islam does not explain all-out support for the military junta…This junta is killing the population. (Roth, 1993, p. 2)

As explained in Chapter I, value-based alliances and interest-based alliances are not mutually exclusive, rather, they should be comprehended as two stages of building alliances. A political party whose policy agenda largely contradicts with an international actor's policies in terms of interests, cannot build a value-based alliance with this actor. For instance, if a political party's objective is to reorient its country's most vital foreign policy choices (e.g., membership to international alliances or recognition of previously signed treaties, etc.), the main agenda item during this political party's discussions with other international actors would be above mentioned foreign policy choices rather than value-related subjects (e.g., human rights and liberties). In fact, the peculiarity of the Algerian regime's international relations provided FIS with a better chance to form international alliances with countries such as France and the United States. Indeed, contrary to other countries examined in this thesis, Algerian military forces lacked a long-standing relationship with the above-mentioned countries. Despite Bendjedid's efforts to alter his country's foreign policy by reducing the size of Soviet military advisers, seeking to acquire more Western military weapons, and liberalize the economy (Central Intelligence Agency, 1985), Algeria was still dependent on Soviet military products during the period examined in this thesis (Pierre & Quandt, 1995, p. 139). In other words, though Bendjedid made visits to Western capitals to diversify Algeria's allies (Dobbs & Randal, 1985), other sections of the regime, such as the military (which is known as a francophone institution), was unwilling to develop strong ties with the western powers particularly because of its close cooperation with USSR in the defense sector. FIS' foreign policy vision which prioritizes the Islamic world (i.e., Muslim

population, not rulers of Muslim majority countries), justice in the international order, and anti-colonialism (Projet de Programme politique du Front Islamique du Salut, 1989), however, pushed the IPP to follow a peculiar foreign policy which largely contradicts with the interest of major international powers. As a result, despite the Algerian regime's relatively anti-Western stance, FIS could not build a strong relationship with western countries due to the clash of interests. Anwar Haddam who was the president of the Parliamentary Delegation Abroad of FIS and an elected member of parliament in canceled 1991 elections explains FIS' failure to form international alliances by stating that:

> It's unfortunate the West in general, the United States in particular, did not listen to the voice of the Algerians. We were not that good at expressing ourselves, so it has listened to those so-called representatives of the military regime -- ambassadors and the like. Those people have been using socialist rhetoric for the past thirty years. Now they are trying to win the sympathy of the world, by fanning the flames of fear about Islamic fundamentalism ("Anwar N. Haddam", 1996).

In fact, FIS's "failure to express itself" was just a part of their problem, as the party's position in the Gulf War demonstrates. When the Gulf War started, FIS deemed the United States' foreign policy as a new form of colonial invasion and a modern crusade (Shahin, 2003, p. 132). In fact, then minister of foreign affairs Ahmed Ghazali and other secular political party leaders were not less critical of the United States during the Gulf War (Piscatori, 1991, p. 31). Nevertheless, FIS's leadership, despite their natural dislike towards the Ba'athist regime in Iraq, took things a step further by actively demanding arm transfer to the Iraqi regime and safe transportation for volunteers who wanted to help Iraq against the United States, (Amirouche, 1998). Besides, the FIS's relationship

with regional powers also deteriorated when its leaders requested an embargo against Saudi Arabia and Egypt due to their support for invasion (Greenhouse, 1991).

Without a doubt, France, unlike the United States, had more to worry about crises in North Africa due to its proximity. France's socialist government led by François Mitterand gained the unexpected support of far-right right National Front's leader Jean-Marie Le Pen by following a traditionalist foreign policy in Algeria contrary to his campaign promises (Pierre & Quandt, 1995, p. 121). Indeed, Mitterand, who was blasted because of his silence during the 1988 protests in which Algerian military's atrocities caused the death of hundreds, continued to pursue a foreign policy which prioritized protecting the status quo in Algeria (Whitney, 1995). To put it another way, the endurance of the status quo in Algeria is France's principal interest because French political elites were afraid of possible immigration waves as a result of continuous turmoil in Algerian cities after FIS's election victory or spread of FIS' ideology among Muslims in France. Another socialist leader, François Hollande, acted quite differently by visiting Tunisia in July 2013, right after the Egyptian military organized a coup against Egypt's elected president.

To sum up, Algerian FIS, despite their initial favorable position due to the military's close relationship with the Soviet Union, failed to form any kind of international alliances with regional powers, such as Tunisia and Gulf Countries that supported US' invasion to Iraq; and international powers, such as United States and France. Together with FIS' domestic isolation, its lack of international alliances facilitated Algerian military's repressive policies.

3.4 Repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

3.4.1 Historical background

In 1991, Algeria's Islamist FIS won the first round of the parliamentary elections, and it was more or less obvious for the regime that the second round was not going to be different. In 1992, just before the second round, Algeria's political opening was disrupted by the Algerian military. The military intervention started a decade-long civil war between the regime and Islamists who were radicalized even more by the repressive measures of the military. Algeria's failure was particularly important for those who argue that democracy does not suit Arabs, and it came to the fore after a series of uprisings in the Arab World. Just like Tunisian Ennahda, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was aware of the Algerian case, however, the latter failed to escape the same conclusion, while the former managed to survive. Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 and aimed to turn Egypt into a state "governed by the teachings and values of Sunni Islam" (Danahar, 2013, p. 138). Although under President Anwar Sadat who used Islamism as a counterweight against Nasserism and socialism, the Brotherhood enjoyed relative freedom, they failed to constitute a significant challenge against the Egyptian regime. Under Hosni Mubarak's presidency (1981-2011), there were 28 political parties who could legally run for the seats, but elections were merely for an "appearance of a democracy" (Álvarez-Ossorio, 2017, p. 57), behind this appearance the National Democratic Party (NPD) was holding the real power. Arguably, "the toppling Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali's regime on January 14, 2011… became the catalyst that sparked Egyptian demonstrations, which erupted only eleven days later" (Esposito, Sonn, & Voll, 2016, p. 209). Just like what happened in

Tunisia, the army's decision to abstain from violence against protestors signaled the end of the regime of Hosni Mubarak who was planning to establish a hereditary regime by declaring his son Gamal as his successor. Mubarak's plans were unacceptable not only for the Egyptian youth who were suffering from economic difficulties and human rights violations but for the army who controls a significant amount of Egypt's wealth as well (Danahar, 2013, p. 222). Unlike Tunisia where the transition was mainly controlled by civilian actors since the beginning, in Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power immediately after the revolution and oversaw all the significant electoral processes during the transition period. As we see below, civilian actors (e.g., first the Muslim Brotherhood, later the secular groups) helped the army to retain its prominent position, by forming short-term alliances with the military instead of establishing a value-based alliance among themselves. In other words, forming an interest-based alliance with the military was just another example of "pragmatism" which only served the short-term objectives of civilian actors.

After the 2011-2012 legislative election (first and second rounds of the election were held in 2011 while the third round was held in 2012), Mohamed Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) got 37.5 percent of the votes and became the first free and fairly elected political party since the independence. Just like in the Tunisian election in which divided secularist and leftist parties failed to get a meaningful share of the votes. Unlike Tunisia, however, there was a strong Salafist Party (al-Nour) which achieved to get more than a quarter of the valid votes. FJP and Salafists' dominance at the parliament caused serious problems for Egyptian democracy, particularly because of Morsi's misreading of the society. Indeed, except for the Presidential elections in 2012, all the

elections turned into a crushing victory for the Muslim Brotherhood, but these victories were far from representing the actual power balance in Egypt, due to the low turnout numbers. Unlike Ennahda, who successfully interpreted the election results and formed broad coalitions with different segments of the society, FJP followed a less inclusive strategy. Indeed, Morsi formed its presidential team with mostly Muslim Brotherhood members,(Esposito, Sonn, & Voll, 2016).

3.4.2 Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood

Anwar Sadat's popularity with Islamist groups started to wane when Egypt signed a historical peace treaty with Israel in 1979, following the Camp David Accords. His shocking assassination by a group of Egyptian Army soldiers who are believed to be part of an Islamic organization did not immediately lead to suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood. Because Hosni Mubarak, as the successor of Sadat, needed legitimacy during the first years of his rule, he allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in Egypt's farcical elections. Brotherhood's improving organizational capacity, and an IPP's electoral victory in Algeria in the early 1990s, however, pushed Mubarak to alter its strategy towards Muslim Brotherhood (al-Awadi, 2009, p. 215). In the 1990s, unlike the previous decade, Mubarak started to give the rising number of violent acts by radical groups as an excuse to legitimize its repressive policies against Muslim Brotherhood (al-Anani, 2015, p. 530). Mubarak's policy change towards the Muslim Brotherhood was further motivated by the disgruntled military. High ranking officers such as then chief of staff Salah Halaby and then commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces and Minister of Defence Mohamed Hussein Tantawi were also concerned about the rise

Islamist groups (Hashim, 2011, pp. 110-111), as a result, they started to utter covert threats against Mubarak to convince him to follow a stricter stance against the Muslim Brotherhood. The culmination of the years of rising tensions between Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood was the Egyptian Supreme Military Court's decision on Muslim Brotherhood members in November 1995. The court prosecuted 81 leading Muslim Brotherhood members (e.g., former parliamentarians, civil rights activists) and sentenced 54 of them with hard labor (Campagna, 1996, p. 301).

Just like Morocco's regime under Mohammad VI's rule, the Egyptian regime under Mubarak was secular in relative terms. Egyptian constitution has considered sharia as the principal source of legislation (the sharia amendment has been ratified during Anwar Sadat's rule). Besides, the state often utilized institutions such as Al-Azhar University and the Ministry of Endowments (Awqaf) to provide its policies with an "Islamized look". Although Mubarak was not able to fully control the above mentioned religious institutions, he managed to influence this institution significantly by selecting favorable executives. Al Azhar's fatwas, for instance, legitimized the regime's policies in the eyes of devout Egyptians, while Awqaf controlled public mosques as well as some of the private ones to thwart anti-regime views in the places of worship (Sharakawy, 2013, p. 39). Egyptian state also benefitted from Al-Azhar's binding suggestions on banning certain books, movies, etc. to suppress liberal figures. In short, above mentioned religious aspect of the Egyptian state served three purposes: controlling radical/unfavorable religious views (e.g., preventing the politicization of Islam), legitimizing state's policies (e.g., Al-Azhar's fatwas that supports regimes' policies), and suppressing liberal narratives (e.g., restrictions on the cultural field).

Regime backed parties in Egypt were the only political actors who were free to use religious narrative: Mubarak's National Democratic Party often claimed that the party was the protector of Islam in Egypt. When other political parties utilized religious discourse (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood's famous slogan was "Islam is the solution") to mobilize the Egyptians, however, the regime blamed these parties for violating political party law. Without a doubt, secular/liberal candidates who rejected compromise were also frequently repressed when Mubarak considered them a threat to his rule (e.g., Ayman Nour was jailed, right before and after running for the presidency in 2005). This seemingly indiscriminate suppression aimed to maintain Mubarak's ruling mechanism which was based on exploiting Egyptians' fears. Most of the religiously conservative parties were suppressed except the Muslim Brotherhood which was neither too revolutionary to threaten Mubarak's regime nor too centrists to get cross-ideological support. Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to compete "in certain periods" to show the people "that the only choice was Mubarak or the Islamist radicals" (Abrams, 2011). In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to compete because it was a moderate group that can be presented as a radical organization by Mubarak. At the same time, anti-government Islamist groups were continuously targeted by the regime (Esposito and Piscatori, 1991, p.430). Liberal and secular political actors, on the other hand, were suppressed because their success might have demonstrated to Egyptians that Mubarak was not the only non-Islamist option.

Just like his predecessors, Hosni Mubarak was a respected career officer in the Egyptian Armed Forces before becoming a president, therefore, he usually maintained a close relationship based on "shared interests and worldviews" with the Egyptian army

which in turn trusted him "as the steward of the state and political development"(Cook, 2007, p. 70). As the above-mentioned tensions in the 1990s between the military and Mubarak demonstrates, however, rifts between the president and the Egyptian army were not unprecedented. Mubarak "was widely believed to have been grooming" his businessman son Gamal, who did not have any military background, to succeed him, while the military considered Mubarak's dynastic succession plans unacceptable ("Alaa, Gamal Mubarak released from prison", 2015). In addition to Gamal's lack of military credentials, his support for "Washington Consensus style economic reform" was a serious concern for the Egyptian army which has traditionally benefited from the controlled economy (Abul-Magd, 2012).

The Military has a unique role in Egypt's secular establishment, particularly due to its vast financial power. Indeed, military-owned companies contribute around 10 percent to Egypt's GDP and hire tens of thousands (Roll, 2012). Mubarak was aware of the army's disgruntlement with his son and his reform-oriented mindset; therefore, he had tried to coopt the army by allowing them to expand in public sector and giving them significant bureaucratic positions. Mubarak's forced removal as a result of mass protests was, therefore, a challenge to the Egyptian military: Mubarak was the continuation of Egypt's civilianized rulers, whereas democratic elections could have brought about a radical break. Although Egyptian army was strong enough to protect its economic interest under a democratically elected government, figures such as Mubarak (and arguably Gamal) were a better option for the army, because they were more predictable than a well-organized political party with mass support. Without a doubt, the military could have minimized the political risks by repressing the mass movement after

Mubarak's fall, but harsh repression and subsequent military dictatorship would have risked US' annual $1.3 billion military aid package (e.g., Obama administration halted military aid to Egypt after 2013 coup d'etat) (Corn, 2011). In fact, the United States used its financial tools as a form of bribery (Mather, 2014, p. 78): Military aid package was conditional on Egypt's abiding by the 1979 Peace Agreement with Israel while duty-free exports to the United States was conditional on Egypt's importing from Israel (i.e., imports from Israel should constitute at least 12 percent of Egypt's total imports). On the other hand, especially after Egyptian military's raids on NGOs and think tanks such as the Freedom House and Adenauer Foundation in 2011, United States started to hint that cutting off the military aid to Egypt is indeed a possibility. In this regard, then State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland stated that:

> We do have a number of new reporting and transparency requirements on funding to Egypt that we have to make to Congress. The Egyptian government is well aware of that and it certainly needs to be aware of that in the context of how quickly this issue gets resolved. (Awad & El Madany, 2011)

As further examined in the next section, the Muslim Brotherhood's pragmatic policy choices during the first days of the protests were also significant in preventing the secular segments of the society from supporting the military-led government. Muslim Brotherhood had traditionally abstained from direct confrontation with the regime in order to survive in the economic field and civil society. In other words, limited political presence had been the cost of existing in other areas for the Muslim Brotherhood, especially during the Sadat and Mubarak eras. Without a doubt, there were exceptions such as the Kifaya movement (2005) which was often considered as the predecessor of the 25 January Revolution, in the sense that both protests made the same democratic demands against the Mubarak regime. Muslim Brotherhood was an integral part of the

Kifaya movement. Subsequently, the organization managed to become the largest opposition bloc in the parliament by winning 88 seats in the 2005 elections. Brotherhood's electoral performance, however, was followed by the regime's crackdown on the group. Since Kifaya and the ensuing reform period were tragic experiences for the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, they were vigilant during the 2011 protests. When the Brotherhood finally decided to participate, it did so without taking the leading role. Despite the fact that its grassroots organizations were clashing with Mubarak's official and unofficial security forces, "the leadership of the Brotherhood was reluctant to insert themselves on the side of the people" (Milton-Edwards, 2015, p. 37). This careful calculation made by the Brotherhood was useful for preventing a commitment problem, which is similar to the one which took place after Kifaya protests/2005 elections, from emerging again.

3.4.3 Muslim Brotherhood after the Mubarak's fall

When mass protests broke out in major cities of Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, despite its official absence in Tahrir square which was the foremost symbolic venue of the revolution, was one of the most frequently discussed topics both domestically and externally. Without a doubt, many young Muslim Brotherhood members were protesting together with seculars, Nasserites, liberals, and leftists; by clashing with Mubarak's security forces, building barriers, and providing injured protestors with medical care (Muedini, 2014). Nevertheless, the leadership of the organization maintained its silence and preferred to remain in the background firstly because they did not want to give an impression that 25 January was an "Islamic Revolution" (de Kerckhove, 2012), and

secondly because they were afraid of regime's backlash in case of Mubarak's survival as the president or his replacement with a more repressive military dictatorship. Muslim Brotherhood retained this pragmatism by accepting a known secular figure as the main representative of the opposition. When the umbrella organization for the opposition groups, namely, National Association for Change, selected Mohamed El Baradei, the former president of the International Energy Agency and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, as the lead spokesperson for the platform, Helmi Gazzar, head of Brotherhood's district office in Cairo, stated that:

> What [Muslim Brotherhood] want[s] is what the people want; right now we should have a completely different regime. We should have freedom and free elections…We respect Mr. Baradei. He has the most potential. (Coker & Said, 2011)

As the protests gained momentum, Muslim Brotherhood increased its official presence in Tahrir square. After the Egyptian army signaled its neutrality during a televised speech on January 31, not just the Brotherhood, but all segments of the Egyptian society became more intrepid (Wickham, 2015, p. 164). Army's support to remove Mubarak increased its popularity in the eyes of the protestors. Indeed, chants such as "The army and the people are one hand" were not uncommon during the protests. Consequently, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) under the leadership of Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi offered to run Egypt during the transition period which was initially planned to last 6 months and suspended the 1971 constitution, there were not many Egyptians who opposed army's decisions. On the 14th of February, SCAF set up a drafting committee that consisted of eleven members and was led by Tariq Al-Bishri, a prominent Egyptian judge who became a vocal critic of the armed forces after the 2013 coup d'état. According to Bishri, Article 2 of the 1971 constitution, that is, "Islam is the

state religion, and Islamic Shari'a is the main source of legislation," was not a contested issue during the constitution drafting process, because Egypt's "predominant culture…is either Islamist in nature or inspired by Islam" (El-Beshry, 2013, p. 414). Bishri's comments on Egypt's "predominant culture" were partially proven by the Referendum results, constitutional amendments made by the committee was approved by getting more than 77 percent support: there was contestation despite the predominance of socially conservative values.

The constitution drafting process in 2011 unambiguously unveiled the main actors of Egypt, namely, the army (SCAF), Muslim Brotherhood, and liberals, and major fault lines among them on the other. As mentioned above, the army was seeking to maintain its economic and political interests, so they were ready to work with any actor which could make a credible commitment to protect those interests. Due to its formidable organizational capacity, the Muslim Brotherhood was not a perfect fit for the military's search for allies who could make a credible commitment, however, the Brotherhood was the least revolutionary actor in Tahrir Square at that time. As a result, an interest-based alliance was formed between SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood accepted to leave the protests, SCAF released famous Islamists figures from the prison and appointed MB member Sobhi Saleh to the drafting committee (Eskandar, 2013). Of course, these trust-building gestures were just the ostensible reasons for Muslim Brotherhood's interest-based pact with the SCAF. By supporting the army during the transition phase, the Muslim Brotherhood was trying to become a legitimate political actor in the eyes of the military. Muslim Brotherhood backed the SCAF during the constitution drafting process, while many liberals and

seculars who had praised the role of the military in removing Mubarak before, started to criticize this alliance and accused the drafting committee of lack of transparency (Selim, 2015, p. 180). Indeed, for liberal and secular actors, the Muslim Brotherhood-SCAF alliance imposed a fait accompli for the new constitution, because "the amendments were drafted in just 10 days and offered to the public for discussion for only three weeks" ("Q&A: Egypt's constitutional referendum", 2011). Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, was quite content about the pace of this constitutional process, because according to them, rapid approval of the constitution meant rapid elections. Secular and liberal actors, however, were not pleased about the particular method that was chosen by the SCAF. Together with the surprising results, this constitution drafting process increased the severity of the commitment problem in the eyes of liberal actors. As Hani Shukrallah, then editor of Ahram Online stated, the results of the referendum were "very, very disappointing" (MacFarquhar, 2011) for the liberal and secular actors who had campaigned for a "No" vote in the referendum. Later it became apparent that the marriage of convenience between SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood pushed non-Islamist groups to prioritize survival over liberal and democratic ideals.

Even though SCAF's and Muslim Brotherhood's short-term interests had been overlapping, they had different visions on how the Egyptian political system will work in the long term. Muslim Brotherhood's strategy was to form a political party that has legal status first and to alter the civil-military relations later (i.e., after the elections). Since the group was aware of its organizational strength, they were planning to revise the political system incrementally after the elections. When Freedom and Justice Party was achieved legal status in June 2011 and allowed to contest in the prospective

elections, it became the first Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political party which was permitted to run as a party in Egyptian elections. A few days later, Brotherhood boycotted the protest that demanded to put "Hosni Mubarak and members of his clique on trial for the political crimes committed against Egypt and its people" and to end the army's (SCAF) influence on Egyptian political life (Shukrallah, 2011). On the 29th of July, devout segments of Egyptian society, including Salafist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood, gathered in Tahrir Square. Although Muslim Brotherhood and other moderate groups outnumbered Salafist groups who were calling for "a state bound by strict religious law" (Shadid, 2011) during the protests, the fact that secular and political Islamist groups were protesting separately was indicative of the divisions within Egyptian society which were growing at an alarming pace after a period of relative unity.

Although liberals and seculars interpreted the Muslim Brotherhood's pact with the military as the beginning of a religious military-dominated regime, the relationship between the two actors was in fact not suitable for such symbiotic cooperation. Neither Muslim Brotherhood's grassroots organization nor its upper cadres had favorable views about the military, whereas, for the military, the formation of such a regime with Muslim Brotherhood was simply too risky due to Muslim Brotherhood's organizational capacity. Indeed, for many members of the Brotherhood, the army was just a necessary evil which should be cooperated with till the elections, therefore when the SCAF showed its intention to postpone the elections, a leading Muslim Brotherhood member Hassan El-Brence stated that:

> In the Brotherhood, we were raised on the notion of martyrdom and we are more than happy to offer new martyrs and begin new protests and strikes in Tahrir

> Square if the will of the people is denied [by putting off the parliamentary elections] (Tarek, 2011a).

Military's distrust of civilian actors, on the other hand, became more apparent when then Deputy Prime Minister Ali Al-Selmi proposed a supra-constitutional communique (i.e., Al-Salmi Document) which identified the SCAF as the guardian of constitutional principles and legitimacy, gave the army special privilege to discuss its annual budget (El Bahi, 2011). The communique also empowered SCAF to veto any passage offered by the drafting committee and contradicts the basic values of the Egyptian state and society. On 18 November, the Muslim Brotherhood organized a protest, which targeted the military's unwillingness for transferring power to civilian actors, under the name of "Friday of One Demand." For Brotherhood, Al-Selmi Document was unacceptable because it aimed to provide the ruling SCAF with "unfettered powers," thereby creating a tutelary regime. Not surprisingly, liberal groups such as Wafd Party and Free Egyptians Party, along with Tagammu Party and Egyptian Communist Party, boycotted the protests, whereas Salafist Al-Nour and Al-Asala Parties, two groups who had criticized Al-Salmi Document since its announcement, decided to join the demonstration (Tarek, 2011b). Although Muslim Brotherhood's absence during the earlier protests against the military rule was one of the main reasons behind the boycott of non-Islamist groups, many of these groups were not against supra-constitutional principles that are protected by the army. Indeed, despite the fact that secular and liberal actors criticized the military's overwhelming presence before the collapse of the SCAF-Muslim Brotherhood alliance, Muslim Brotherhood's rising popularity which was measured by the election polls created a commitment problem and pushed these actors to consider the army as a necessary tutelary institution against Muslim Brotherhood's and Salafists'

encroachment. Nevertheless, liberals were not perfectly comfortable with the SCAF due to its serious human rights violations such as the killing of more than two dozen Christians during their protest against the Aswan church's destruction by the regime and closing down liberal NGOs/think tanks. In December 2011, for instance, hundreds of women from different ideological groups demonstrated against "the brutal treatment of female protesters" by the security forces (Johnson & Harding, 2011). In other words, a value-based alliance against the military's anti-democratic acts was possible because both the Muslim Brotherhood and liberal/secular factions were sharing the same concerns towards the military's role in politics. Muslim Brotherhood's short-term pact with the SCAF, however, prevented the group from building a cross-ideological value-based alliance with non-Islamist actors and paved the way for the military's subsequent utilization of seculars' and liberals' fear. When Muhammed Morsi and Freedom and Justice Party tried to cooperate with other segments of the society after the elections, he failed to form a value-based alliance with these actors because Muslim Brotherhood's powerful position resulted from election results caused a commitment problem.

Just like the Tunisian election in 2011, 2011-2012 elections in Egypt (The first round of the elections was on 28-29 November, whereas the third and last round of the elections was on 3-4 January) quite disappointing for the non-Islamist actors. While the FJP-led bloc received 37 percent of the votes and Salafist Al-Nour Party received 27 percent, 35 percent of the votes were shared by liberal, secular, Nasserist, leftist, and NDP-affiliated parties. Though commentators lumped FJP and Al-Nour together under the name of "Islamists" (Tadros, 2012), Muslim Brotherhood intentionally sought to separate itself from this group and formed "Democratic Alliance" which included

secular-leaning parties as well as more socially conservative ones. However, the powerful parties within the coalition such as the liberal Al-Wafd Party, the Nasserist Al-Karama Party, the socialist Al-Tagammu, and liberal Islamist Al-Wasat Party left the coalition before the elections, partially because of the above-mentioned rifts that took place during the protests at Tahrir Square. The main reason behind the secular-leaning parties' decisions to leave the alliance, however, was the intrinsic fragility of the interest-based alliances. Amr Hamzawy's Egypt Freedom Party, for instance, quitted the alliance because:

> its participants seemed unserious about developing consensus among its member organizations on the principles that would guide constitution-drafting efforts. ("Democratic alliance for Egypt", 2011)

Experiences of Turkey's JDP and Tunisia's Ennahda demonstrates the benefit of not postponing discussions on essential fault lines such as secularism-religiosity division. Interest-based alliances (e.g., Turkey's WP-TPP alliance) may seem cross-ideological, but the major fault lines haunt these alliances, thereby making them fragile. FJP was aware of the necessity of forming cross-ideological alliances and consistently put a distance between itself and the Salafist Al-Nour Party, however, it could not form value-based robust alliances with secular-leaning parties (Asem, 2012).

The growing political polarization of the country became more visible during the process leading to presidential elections. Though Brotherhood had declared that it would not seek the presidency (Hessler, 2019), its successful electoral performances in the 2011 Constitutional Referendum, 2011-2012 Parliamentary Election, and 2012 Shura Election pushed the party to reconsider its decision. As Khairat el-Shater, the FJP's first presidential candidate who was disqualified by the Supreme Presidential Electoral

Commission (SPEC), stated, “politics is the art of the possible,” and for the Brotherhood, conditions were ripe for fielding a presidential candidate (Kaminski, 2012). FJP’s chairman Mohammed Morsi was the second and unexpected choice for the candidacy (Hessler, 2019). When the SPEC disqualified several candidates such as FJP’s Shater and Mubarak era vice-president Omar Suleiman, Brotherhood decided to field Morsi instead. The first round of the presidential elections was the closest race that FJP has experienced since its foundation: while Morsi was the winner of the first round of the election with 24.8 percent, Mubarak’s last prime minister Ahmed Shafiq won 23.7 percent of the votes. In major cities such as Cairo and Alexandria, the chairman of the Nasserist Dignity Party, Hamdeen Sabahi came in first while Morsi came in third. As the second round of the elections approached, the Military decided to take some precautions to limit the Muslim Brotherhood’s power. On 14 June, the constitutional court ruled that one-third of the parliamentary seats were illegitimately elected because the political parties had run for the seats which were supposed to be filled by independent candidates. SCAF, on its part, declared that the whole parliament should be dissolved if any part of it was deemed illegal by the constitutional court (“Egypt court orders”, 2012). Some analysts considered the military’s decision on dissolving the parliament as a “soft-coup” (Smith-Spark, Martinez & Basu, 2012), however, this decision was overshadowed by SCAF’s constitutional decree which grants the military significant legislative and executive powers, including control over military budget, and right to veto war decisions, and power to write the new constitution (“Egypt elections: Shafiq v Morsi”, 2012). By announcing its power grab while the early second-round results were coming in, SCAF was displaying its distrust towards the Muslim

Brotherhood once again, because the early results were indicating Morsi's electoral victory. On 24 June, SPEC confirmed that Morsi won the elections with 51.7 percent of the votes, whereas Shafiq came in second with 48.3 percent. Although the election result was a huge success for Morsi who became a candidate at the last minute after Shater had been disqualified by the SPEC, the minor difference between the votes of Morsi and Shafiq was showing the growing support for the establishment figures.

Tensions between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood became insurmountable during the first 6 months of Morsi's elections. Contrary to the popular claims of secular and liberal political parties, Morsi targeted the military immediately after he was declared the winner. In his famous Cairo speech, Morsi criticized the army's soft-coup, which consisted of series of interventions made in June 2012, by stating that "no institution will be above the people" ("Egypt's Morsi defies military", 2012). While the military's power struggle with the Brotherhood was deepening, leftist, secular, Nasserist, and liberal parties decided to boycott the constituent assembly, thereby further alienating FJP. Morsi utilized its popular support to resist the secular establishment as much as possible, but he was also aware of the key interests of these groups (e.g., the military's insistence on controlling the military budget). Since most of his reform attempts, such as appointing a new prosecutor general, were reversed by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), he implemented indirect policies by reducing the number of justices in the SCC or by proposing a new retirement age for the judges from 70 to 60 (Aziz, 2017, p. 107). In August 2012, Morsi, together with canceling SCAF's controversial constitutional decrees which gave them the power to control the president, transferred Field Marshal Tantawi into retirement and appointed Abdel-Fatah El-Sisi as

the new Minister of Defense General. Although SCAF stated that the decision was in fact "based on consultation with the field marshal, and the rest of the military council" ("Egypt leader Morsi orders", 2012), a civilian president's decision to change top military leaders, namely Minister of Defence Tantawi and the Chief of Army Staff General Sami Anan, was a symbolic moment for the civil-military relations in Egypt. In order to accommodate Tantawi and Anan, Morsi appointed them as presidential advisers and provided them with the top state honor, that is the Grand Collar of the Nile.

Muslim Brotherhood's above-mentioned policies could have led to different results, had the timing calculated more carefully by the leaders of the organizations, however, Morsi thought that the sole way to alter the power balance between the secular establishment and the elected IPP, is to act as quickly as possible on fundamental issues such as drafting a new constitution and cleaning the remnants of the former regime from the key institutions. FJP's resistance to the secular establishment was in fact quite similar to the experience of JDP in Turkey. Nonetheless, FJP acted without the support of a cross-ideological alliance, therefore its reactions to the secular establishment were interpreted as Brotherhood's power grab by almost all the non-Islamist political parties. In late-September, most secular parties signed the boycott call of liberal Al Baradei and Nasserist Sabbahi, however, FJP, together with Salafists, continued working on the drafting process. As SCC continued to slow down the drafting process, Morsi issued a declaration on 22 November which basically protects the presidential decrees from judicial oversight till the referendum in December (Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2012). Although the time limit of the declaration was clearly defined, the opposition started to call Morsi "new pharaoh" ("Egypt's President Morsi assumes", 2012) and thousands

gathered in major cities to protest against Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi rescinded the decree before the referendum but the demonstrations resumed because Morsi managed to declare a referendum on the constitution before annulling the decree.

The draft constitution prepared by the constituent assembly which was dominated by FJP and Salafists (after liberal, secular, and Coptic Christian members boycotted the drafting process) was "largely secular" (Albrecht, 2013). Despite the fact that the draft constitution's emphasis on Islam, family, and morality was relatively stronger than the 1971 constitution, there were newly introduced articles which guaranteed "freedom of belief," "freedom to practice religious rites" and "freedom to establish places of worship for the divine religions" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013). According to Human Rights Watch, the constitution was in fact protected some rights by protecting citizens against arbitrary detention and torture but failed to end some problematic aspects of the 1971 constitution, such as military trials of civilians. Nevertheless, the fact that it was adapted "without consensus" was its most significant shortcoming ("Egypt: New constitution", 2012). In other words, the process that led to the referendum was more polarizing than the draft constitution's actual content. The new constitution was adapted by winning more than 63 percent of the votes, but this was a pyrrhic victory for the Muslim Brotherhood because from Salafists (though Al-Nour Party supported) ("Salafi Jihadi movement to boycott", 2012) to secularists (Hussein & Borger, 2012), several segments of Egyptian society boycotted the referendum. Though the voter turnout was never high in post-Spring Egypt, with 32 percent turnout, the constitutional referendum in 2012 was the lowest of all Egyptian elections that were held between 2011-2013 (except the Shura elections), therefore, the

real winner of the referendum was the Egyptian army who not only kept its constitutional protections but also benefited from public's distrust towards the new political system.



Fig. 2 Voter Turnout in Egyptian Elections between 2011 and 2012
Source: Election Guide

3.4.4 Muslim Brotherhood's international alliances

The foreign policy section in Freedom and Justice Party's 2011 Election Manifesto reflected the ideals and concerns of the Muslim Brotherhood. While there was a mention to "protecting and supporting Palestinians" in their resistance against "Zionist usurpers of their land," Camp David Accords which were previously criticized by the Brotherhood were absent. In a similar vein, the United States was called to end its "occupation" in Iraq but building "excellent relations" with the US was considered as a "necessary endeavor" (Freedom and Justice Party Election Program, 2011).

Although opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood criticized Morsi for neglecting national interest, both Morsi and FJP demonstrated that their main goal is to increase Egypt's influence in the region. Nevertheless, according to Morsi, certain revolutionary policy decisions must be made without jeopardizing Egypt's relationship with its traditional allies, for achieving prominence in the region. Just like Necmettin Erbakan whose first foreign trip was to Iran, Morsi's first diplomatic visits were to Ethiopia, China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Morsi was seeking to balance three different dimensions in Egyptian foreign policy, namely, Arab, African and Western; however, since "Western dimension… had been a dominant and single-handed approach of the Mubarak's presidency" (Özkan, 2013, p. 13), each of Morsi's foreign policy steps was interpreted as a dangerous shift by Morsi's opponents. In fact, aside from its symbolic importance as the first visit to Iran by an Egyptian president since the Iranian Revolution, Morsi was less enthusiastic than Iranian President Ahmadinejad about the rapidly improving bilateral relations. During his short trip to Tehran for the Non-Aligned Movement summit, Morsi made some harsh comments on foreign interference in Syria, and strongly criticized Iran's ally Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad for his suppressive policies against the Syrian people, whereas Iranian media ignored Morsi's comments on Syria and considered this trip as a breaking point for Egypt's ties with Israel and United States (Abdo & Akbari, 2012). Indeed, for Muslim Brotherhood, improving ties with Iran was essential for Egypt to pursue a more independent and balanced foreign policy; however, the room for improvement was quite limited, because of their different positions on several regional problems including the Syrian Civil War. For Iran, on the other hand, the fall of Mubarak was a major opportunity to break Iran's

years-long isolation in the region. In this regard, Iran was among the first countries to congratulate Mohammed Morsi by describing the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as "Islamic Awakening" (Casagrande, 2012).

Although Morsi's initial support on Camp David Accords ("Muhammed Morsi: Camp David", 2012), was interpreted as a shift in Muslim Brotherhood's policy on Egypt-Israel relations, Morsi's legal adviser Mohamed Gadallah announced the president's intention to amend the Accords for strengthening Egypt's sovereignty, after rising security concerns in the Sinai Peninsula ("Adviser: Morsy studying", 2012). United States' distrust towards Muslim Brotherhood did not break the relations between the United States and Egypt during the first months of Morsi's presidency, however, the bilateral relations significantly deteriorated after a YouTube video in which Prophet Mohamed was insulted triggered anti-US protests in Cairo that resulted in protestors' burning a US flag in the embassy building. While the White House accused Morsi of not moving fast enough to deal with the security situation, Morsi emphasized that his government acted "wisely" but "decisively" to "avoid an explosive backlash" (Kirkpatrick & Erlanger, 2012). Obama also increased the tensions by stating that:

> I don't think we would consider them an ally, but we don't consider them an enemy. They are a new government that is trying to find its way… [Egypt] said the right thing and taken the right steps but it has also responded to other events in ways that may not be aligned with our interests ("Obama: Egypt is not", 2012).

Egypt-US relations were later improved when Morsi helped to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in November. Both Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton praised Egypt's efforts in encouraging Hamas which has a close relationship with Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Baker & Kirkpatrick, 2012), while at the same time

they criticized the decree which expanded Morsi's powers till the constitutional referendum ("White House has concerns", 2012). As the protests against the Muslim Brotherhood continued after the 2012 referendum, Obama urged Morsi to build consensus among different ideological groups and protect democratic principles of the revolution. After coup d'etat, Anne Patterson, ambassador of the United States to Egypt between 2011 and 2013, stated that the United States was "fed up" with President Morsi's "arrogance" and his "resistance to advice" (Lockwood, 2019). To sum up, Egypt's relationship with the United States under President Morsi was not based on values but shared interests such as Morsi's respecting the peace with Israel. However, there are also other policy issues such as Morsi's relationship with Iran (though Iran was more willing to improve ties than Egypt) and Hamas, which prevented Egypt from developing a stronger interest-based alliance with the United States. When the armed forces removed President Morsi, the United States emphasized the need for returning democratic elections without defining the removal as a coup d'etat. Defining the army's act as a coup was quite significant for the amount of US aid that Egypt would receive, as "coup law" in the United States necessarily triggers suspension of all US aid to a country in which coup d'etat takes place except humanitarian assistance. Besides, this "modest and temporary" economic sanction ($260 Million out of $1.3 Billion US aid was suspended) was implemented, 3 months after the coup d'etat, when the army killed at least a thousand civilians and closed NGOs including liberal ones (Gordon & Landler, 2013).

CHAPTER 4

PRECARIOUS EXISTENCE PATHWAY: TURKEY'S WELFARE PARTY AND MOROCCO'S JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

4.1 Defining precarious existence

Between the success of JDP and Ennahda in consolidating its position within secular states and the failure of FJP and FIS in doing so, there is a third type that managed to survive without taking over the power from the secular establishment. In countries where IPPs precariously exist, party closures are not uncommon, however, these policies aim to punish and discipline instead of annihilating the Islamist movement (e.g., National outlook movement) as a whole. There are other IPPs such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and PJD in Morocco, which are not banned by the secular establishment but fail to deteriorate the power of unelected officials, namely King Mohammad IV of Morocco, and King Abdullah II of Jordan. There are several explanations behind IPPs' failure to enter the reinforced survival pathway, among those, one of the most significant reasons is their alliance-making decisions. In Morocco, PJD formed interest-based alliances with other parties, just like the Turkish Welfare Party and its predecessors.

The precariousness of IPPs refers to their inability to challenge the authority of unelected officials by forming cross-ideological transformative alliances with domestic and international actors. In this pathway, parties assume that forming an interest-based alliance is sufficient to pursue their agenda, however, since deliberation on fundamental issues such as secularism and democracy is missing in interest-based alliances, IPPs'

allies do not protect IPP against an intervention coming from unelected officials. National Outlook Movement under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, for instance, became a part of three coalition governments that are led-by RPP's Bülent Ecevit and Justice Party's Süleyman Demirel, before winning the elections in 1995, however, neither Demirel nor Ecevit supported Erbakan during 1997 coup d'etat. Besides, even WP's coalition partner TPP lost more than 30 of its MPs who were against TPP's coalition with WP, after the coup. Unlike Tunisia's Ennahda and Turkey's JDP who managed to reduce the size of the secular bloc with their alliance making strategy during the critical moments (e.g., coup rumors, closure trial), WP fought against a cross-party secular bloc who supported the secular establishment.

Interest-based alliances are not strong enough to protect IPPs during crisis times, but these alliances help IPPs to integrate into the political system without giving them the power to change it. In other words, pragmatic and unsubstantial concessions made by IPPs on certain issues to form interest-based alliances with secular actors, normalize IPPs existence within a given political environment without fully legitimizing them. Although the discourse of Turkish WP and Moroccan PJD was bothersome for unelected officials and secular parties in Turkey and Morocco, WP and PJD failed to make substantive changes which might have given them real power while democratizing their countries. Moreover, despite their uneasiness about ongoing international alliances, WP and PJD neither changed the foreign policy direction of their countries nor took the lead in these alliances by muscling unelected officials (e.g., Makhzen, bureaucrats in the ministry of foreign affairs) out of the policymaking process. In other words, WP and PJD were trapped into ineffective and precarious existence because they did not form

strong value-based alliances. At the same time, they escaped from total repression, because the secular establishment knew that they were unable to make drastic alterations with weak international and domestic alliances.

4.2 Mechanism of precarious existence and cases

This chapter focuses on WP and PJD, two IPPs which entered to precarious existence pathway in different regimes, namely, republic and monarchy. Although Turkey before JDP had a strong secular establishment which precludes certain parties and policies to be represented in the parliament or even public life, this bloc had not claimed to have Islamic authority, unlike Moroccan king. Despite this difference, however, IPPs and Islamist movements represented a similar revisionist side of the discussions in their respective countries on Islam's role and secularism. Besides, despite TAF's dominance in peculiar periods, the Turkish secular establishment lacked the Moroccan king's constitutional rights and de facto position in the country. As a result, PJD has always recognized and endorsed the king as the commander of the faithful, while WP had a more problematic relationship with the secular establishment. Despite PJD's support to the king, however, Makhzen covertly supported other political parties such as Authenticity and Modernity Party to compete against PJD.

Another important difference between the contexts in which these two parties compete was the electoral systems in Morocco and Turkey. Although the Moroccan electoral system, which forbids parties to win an outright majority in the parliament regardless of how many votes parties get, was designed to force parties to compromise and moderate, it failed to produce strong value-based alliances, rather, coalitions are

formed out of necessity without significant deliberation process on secularism and democratization. In Turkey, Welfare Party won the 1995 elections by getting only 21 percent of the votes because center-right votes were divided into two parties (i.e., Motherland Party and True Path Party cumulatively got 39 percent of the votes by getting 19 percent each). Although the National Salvation became a coalition partner in the 1970s, Welfare Party was the first coalition leader from the National Outlook movement. Just like Moroccan PJD, WP was an isolated political party (though it was not the only one) compared to other center-right and center-left parties in the eyes of unelected officials of the secular establishment. WP also failed to form a value-based cross-ideological alliance with domestic and international actors. WP's coalition with TPP was an interest-based alliance in which TPP did not problematize WP's reformist agenda. While some of WP tried to form value-based international alliances with Islamic countries, they were not cross-ideological alliances that are similar to what JDP formed with EU and US. Besides, since WP, just like Morocco's JDP, failed to challenge the secular establishment in a meaningful way, it failed to develop a fully independent foreign policy agenda for Turkey. To sum up, both WP and PJD failed to reduce the power of unelected officials, and their interest-based alliances that are often formed out of necessity failed the transform the system.

4.3 Precarious existence of WP in Turkey

4.3.1 Historical background

Although socially conservative citizens have constituted the majority of Turkish voters, since Democrat Party's electoral victory in 1950, this vast voter segment chose center-

right parties over more religiously oriented parties. Increasing migration to cities in the 1960s, however, made it easier for religious organizations to reach these devout people more systematically. Mehmet Zahit Kotku's Naqshbandi order that was organized in Iskenderpasa Mosque was among these religious groups which strongly influenced Turkish politics (Yavuz, 1997, p. 66). Kotku influenced some of the most significant names of Turkish politics including Erbakan, Erdoğan, Recai Kutan, Temel Karamollaoğlu, and Turgut Özal (Ertürk, 2020, p. 5).

Because Erbakan was aware of the dominance of center-right parties in the Turkish political field, he first unsuccessfully tried to become an MP from Demirel's Justice Party. After Demirel's veto, Erbakan became an independent candidate from Konya and subsequently was elected as an MP in the 1969 general elections. In 1970, after getting support from Kotku, Erbakan formed his first party named National Order Party which aimed to realize his National Outlook vision which aimed to make Turkey more independent both economically and culturally. After the 1971 coup d'etat, Erbakan's NOP, just like the Workers' Party of Turkey, was banned by the constitutional court due to its actions that are contrary to the secular nature of the Turkish Republic.

Ziya Öniş claims that "the process of top-down implementation of the secularist ideology has also triggered a process of long-term social and political change" (Öniş, 2006, p. 124), and therefore, even pre-JDP political Islamist parties such the Welfare Party (WP), was relatively moderate compared to other IPPs in the region. Indeed, unlike the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, the demands of the Welfare Party and its leader Necmettin Erbakan were

less rigid. In fact, as a former engineer, Erbakan's vision for Turkey was in line with Atatürk's vision for the republic in several aspects, such as nationalism, industrialization, and economic independence. Besides, although several political Islamist parties were closed by the constitutional court and military elite, National Outlook as a movement and its leadership survived (Yılmaz, 2012, p. 365). The only exception was the coup d'etat in 1980, which played an important role in rendering Turkey more socially conservative, perhaps more than what coup-leaders intended. The military junta suppressed all the existing political parties including the Republican People's Party which was founded by Atatürk and banned all the existing political party leaders from the political field.

In 1983, the political parties were allowed to function, and Welfare Party is formed by the same elite who were the members of the National Salvation Party (NSP) which was closed by the military for representing the national outlook movement. Contrary to Social Democrats who lost a significant portion of their votes after the coup d'état, the Motherland Party (center-right) and the Welfare Party managed to keep their votes in the 1980s. In the 1990s, side-effects of Turgut Özal's neoliberal policies such as rising inequality and increasing migration to the cities created a favorable environment for the alternatives (Yang & Guo, 2015, p. 16). The leftist movements, however, were not strong enough to mobilize masses after years of repression by the state, and as a result, it was the political Islamists who successfully mobilized the urban and marginalized groups with their eclectic project called "Just Order." The project, as Yılmaz underlines, focused on "politics, economics, science and religion/morality, in that order" (Yılmaz, 2012, p. 368) for alleviating the problems created by the neoliberal

policies and modern lifestyle, without entirely rejecting capitalism and modernism. Many people criticized the project for its apparent shortcomings and contradictions: for the leftists, the project was unrealistic due to their disregard for the real causes (i.e., the capitalist mode of production) of the problems that they pledged to solve (i.e., economic inequality), whereas for the liberal economists, the project was utopian, because they were envisioning a capitalist state without interest-based banking system which is a sine qua non for capitalism to work. Regardless of these contradictions, they achieved to influence the "losers" of the "Motherland era," with their promise for a just order. After the successful performance of the WP's mayors mainly in metropolitan municipalities, they won the 1995 elections. Another factor that helped WP in the general election was the lack of a dominant center-right party (e.g., Democrat Party in 1950, Justice Party in the 1960s and 70s). Indeed, the dividedness of the right-wing parties and the weakness of the left-wing parties made it possible for the Welfare Party who received slightly more than 21 percent of the votes to be the first party in the elections (Somer, 2014, p. 48).

When the coalition government was set up by the center-right actors, namely, the Motherland Party and True Path Party collapsed, the Welfare Party and True Path Party formed a coalition government in 1996. Despite their significant differences and Necmettin Erbakan became Turkey's first Islamist prime minister. Although military and secular elite were relatively permissive towards political Islamist parties, which, in turn, at least seemingly accepted the secularism principle of the Turkish constitution, the republican elite's natural distrust towards Islamists resurfaced when they actually are in a position to execute their policies. Besides, the upward trend in the Welfare Party's

votes was an alarm bell for the seculars in Turkey, even before Erbakan became the prime minister. In fact, WP was not strong enough in the parliament and cabinet for implementing ambitious policies in the Turkish political system or the economy. As Somer and Yılmaz state, this lack of sufficient power pushed him to focus on the cultural field (e.g., discrediting Kemalist ultra-secularist ideology in public speeches and planning to build mosques in Taksim and Çankaya), and international relations (e.g., visits to Libya and more emphasis on relations with Muslim majority countries) (Somer, 2014, p. 49; Yılmaz, 2012, p. 374). Regardless of how mild WP policies were compared to other Islamist political parties in the Arab world, however, it was enough to convince the secular establishment that WP's ultimate goal was to form a religious state by introducing the Sharia law. After a series of control measures in January, on February 28, 1997, the military forced the WP government to resign.

4.3.2 Turkish secular establishment against Welfare Party

IPPs that are followers of national outlook ideology have had a problematic relationship with the Turkish secular establishment since Erbakan formed its first party in 1969, however, they started to constitute a challenge to the secular elites only after the 1994 Municipal elections when Erbakan's Welfare Party got 19 percent of the votes by winning in main metropolitan cities such as İstanbul and Ankara. WP's electoral victory in the 1995 General elections confirmed the Turkish secular establishment's worries on the rising influence of Islam because the elections provided WP with an unprecedented opportunity to lead the country as the main coalition partner. The Military's first reaction to WP's election victory was to urge two center-right parties, namely, Çiller's

TPP and Yılmaz's MP, to reject any coalition with Erbakan. When coalition talks between MP and WP progressed, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, then chief of staff, warned about "unpleasant consequences" of this coalition (Bildirici, 2002). In fact, since both parties were close to each other ideologically TPP-MP coalition, which cumulatively got 39 percent of the total votes in 1995 elections, was seen as the most viable option for leading the country by both the business elite and secular establishment. In line with the armed forces' demands, the TPP-MP coalition was formed with Çiller's promotion of the alliance as a solution for the threat of WP. Reaction to possible WP-led government, however, was not enough for the endurance of the coalition in a context where series of corruption scandals weakened the trust among coalition parties.

As memoirs of high-ranking military officials demonstrate, TAF's skepticism towards IPPs was quite similar for both JDP and WP; nevertheless, they failed to realize their threats against JDP while they became successful in their preventive strike against WP. Among the main reasons behind their "success" in 1997, the broad secular coalition that isolated WP in the political field and WP's failure to form VBAs with EU countries and the United States were the most influential ones. Despite their differences, major civil society actors called as "Five-member Civilian Initiative" which consisted of The Union of Chambers and Commodity (TOBB), Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk-İş), Confederation of Progressive Labor Unions (DİSK), Confederation of Turkish Tradesman and Craftsman (TESK), Confederation of Employer Associations of Turkey (TİSK) asked for the resignation of TPP-WP coalition government (Aslan, 2016, p. 371). Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) which actively lobbied against the inclusion of WP to the government by supporting the TPP-MP coalition,

criticized the military's political interference on its "democratization reports", but they supported the "fight against Islamists" that started with 28 February Process (Dilaveroğlu, 2012, p. 71; Narlı, 2011, p. 221). TÜSİAD's support was particularly crucial due to its members' presence in the media industry which was considered as one of the key sectors in influencing public opinion by the military (Aslan, 2016, p. 372). During the tumultuous period between 2007-2008, the Turkish military's political interference that targeted the JDP government was criticized by the civil society organizations mentioned above, such as Türk-İş and TOBB ("TOBB'dan kapatma yorumu", 2008; "TÜRK-İŞ: Kapatma davası", 2008)

4.3.3 TPP-WP Government: An interest-based domestic alliance

Welfare Party charged TPP based on its failure to prevent state losses by not awarding the lowest bidders with the contracts during the privatization of electricity company TEDAŞ and car maker TOFAŞ. In addition to TEDAŞ and TOFAŞ charges, WP accused Çiller of using the government's power to increase her family's wealth and described Çiller family as the "Waterfront Gang" (Dorsey, 1996). TPP's partner MP's support to Çiller's impeachment became the finishing blow for the short-lived coalition which had managed to survive for 3 months between March and June 1996. Another interesting development was the Constitutional Court's decision to render the TPP-MP coalition's vote of confidence invalid after WP's application. Although Constitutional Court rejected WP's second request, namely, stay of execution for the coalition government's actions that took place after the vote of confidence, the court's ruling on

the first request demonstrated that the Turkish secular establishment was not a monolithic entity that was dominated by the military.

Despite WP's harsh corruption charges against TPP, as soon as TPP-MP coalition collapsed, Erbakan and Çiller met for coalition talks which lasted 2 hours and 30 minutes. Although Çiller stated that the meeting was positive, she also added that the final decision of her party would be declared five days later, just after the impeachment vote in the parliament. Çiller's pragmatic move helped her to get support from WP MPs during the impeachment voting and marked the unofficial beginning of the WP-TPP coalition government. Both in WP and TPP this coalition created a rift between those who are ideologically oriented (i.e., hard secularists in TPP and non-pragmatic Islamists in WP) and those who are more pragmatic. For WP, alliance with an actor that is legitimate in the eyes of the secular establishment meant reducing military pressure, while for the TPP, the coalition was a way to overcome corruption charges that were hanging like the sword of Damocles. Çiller assured the army of TPP's views on secularism by stating that they were the best-positioned party to resist WP's possible anti-secular policies, whereas prominent writers from National Outlook Movement's media outlet Milli Gazete claimed that WP decided to overlook problems with TPP to solve greater problems of the country (Üreten, 1996). Although WP managed to extinguish dissident voices within the National Outlook Movement, hard-secularist opposition in TPP so influential that the party lost around a third of its MPs and a significant segment of members within its province organizations within one year following the formation of the TPP-WP coalition.

Two parties agreed on a rotating scheme, according to which Erbakan would be the first prime minister, then the position pass to TPP's leader Çiller after two years of Erbakan's prime ministry. In order to convince TPP, WP also agreed to hand ministries that are important for the secular establishment such as National Education, National Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior to TPP. During his duty as a prime minister, Erbakan tried to compensate for his party's inability to make substantive changes in important areas such as civil-military relations and national education by being proactive in two policy fields, namely, culture and foreign policy (Somer, 2014, p. 48). Although senior WP members' comments on secularism and Atatürk created tension between the military and WP (Armutçu & Kurt, 1997), the breaking point was reached on the 11th of January 1996 when Erbakan invited prominent religious figures including Sufi leaders to an Iftar meal in prime minister's residence. Following the famous Iftar meal, RPP MPs filed a criminal complaint against Erbakan, while President Demirel was invited to a briefing by then Chief of Staff Karadayı. On the 31st of January, WP's Sincan Municipality organized "Al-Quds Night" to criticize human rights violations committed by Israel. As an invitee to the organization, Iranian ambassador to Turkey Mohammad Reza Bagheri gave a speech, in which he praised the Iranian regime and criticized the secular nature of the Turkish republic, while some parts of the Sincan mayor Bekir Yıldız's speech on the headscarf issue was interpreted as a call for Sharia law. The Military gave a rapid response to "Al-Quds Night" by holding a parade with several tanks and armored vehicles. In his trip to the United States, general Çevik Bir elaborated the military's intentions by stating that "Sincan [parade] adjusted democracy" ("Çevik Bir: Sincan", 1997). While the military was raising the tone of their

threats, high-level TPP members including two ministers, namely, Yalım Erez and Yildirim Aktuna began to criticize WP on the grounds that its policies were harmful to the military and secular regime.

Turkish Armed Forces decided to join culture wars more actively after Erbakan's Iftar meal to religious figures and Yildiz's Al-Quds Night by establishing Western Study Group (WWG). WWG aimed to investigate *irtica* more closely by assigning some of the human resources of the TAF specifically to examine this "religious threat" more closely in cities and countryside. In addition to its investigations, WWG conducted information warfare against religious organizations by constantly briefing media on these organizations' wrongdoings. While during the first confrontation between the army and IPP, two parties started a culture war which resulted in the isolation of the Welfare Party domestically, JDP, during the first years of its rule, escaped from this culture war and focused on substantive changes that weaken military's position in civilian issues.

4.3.4 WP's foreign policy

The first vital foreign policy challenge for Erbakan was the parliamentary vote on extending the mandate for Operation Provide Comfort, a military operation organized by an American- led international coalition against Saddam Hussein. The operation was a divisive subject among the political parties in Turkey, but the parties' position was generally determined by whether they are ruling the country or not. Indeed, parties who supported the operation while they were in the government such as MP and Social Democratic People's Party, started to criticize Turkey's support after Erbakan formed a

government with Ciller, whereas Welfare Party, which had previously stated that the operation's main aim is to create an independent Kurdish state, decided to extend the mandate till 31st of December. Although Erbakan's strong criticisms provided him with greater leverage during the negotiations with the US, his main concerns were about the Turkish economy:

> We cannot afford to offend the US. Our national defense depends on the US and our economy is facing difficulties. A policy of confrontation [with the US] is not in our interest…Of course we have our own conditions. The renewal of the mandate can no longer be made free of charge. (Kohen, 1996)

Erbakan's Libya visit in October 1996 triggered a serious reaction due to its leader Kaddafi who had problematic relations with several Western countries including the United States. Erbakan's main aim was to collect the unpaid debts for Turkish contractors after negotiating with Libya's leader, however, he was surprised by Kaddafi's harsh comments on Turkey. Kaddafi accused Turkey of forgetting Islam and working with NATO, the United States, and Israel. He also demonstrated his support for Kurds' independence by stating that:

> Turkey's future lies not in NATO, U.S. bases and repressing the Kurds, but in its nobility and its past… Kurdistan should be established. I am talking about the Kurdish nation. This nation should have its place in the Middle Eastern sun. (Kinzer, 1996)

Gaddafi's comments had both domestic and international repercussions which strengthened the Turkish secular establishment's hand against Erbakan. For the Turkish military who was currently fighting against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and nationalist segments of Turkish society, the Libyan leader's comments on independent Kurdish state was a huge scandal which proved Erbakan's inadequacy in foreign policy, whereas, for the United States, a Turkish leader's visit to someone who "is responsible

for the deaths of hundreds of people including hundreds of American citizens" and "supports international terrorism" was unacceptable (Marshall, 1996). In December 1996, just two months after Erbakan's visit to Libya, a visit by Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani triggered another crisis between the two allies. Just before Rafsanjani's visit, Erbakan sent his State Minister Fehim Adak to Washington to prevent "misunderstandings" from deteriorating the bilateral ties between the US and Turkey (Çakırözer, 1996). According to Erbakan, Turkey's improving ties with Iran and the East was beneficial for both NATO and the US. WP was aware of the importance of foreign alliances with the US and EU for sustaining its rule, however, its ideological baggage prevented the party to form value-based alliances with these two actors. Two weeks before the National Security Council meeting on 28th of February, US' Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that "the evolution of Turkish is important for [them]" and "it is important for [Turkey] to stay as a secular country" ("Albright says U.S. not happy", 1997). Deterioration of Turkey's relations with the West, and Erbakan's effort to build new alliances with the Muslim World also triggered a reaction inside Turkey as well. For the Turkish army, Turkey's western alliances were reinforcing the secular nature of the republic, in addition, Iran's and Libya's position on PKK was unacceptable and against Turkish national interest. Just like WP's cultural policies, Erbakan's foreign policy during his short term was insufficient for making substantive changes, but they were enough to expand the anti-WP alliance domestically and internationally.

4.4 Precarious existence of PJD in Morocco

4.4.1 Historical background

Unlike Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, three North African countries examined in this thesis, Morocco was a monarchy which has been ruled by the Alaouti dynasty since the 1600s. Although the current King Mohammad VI often warns political Islamists on pluralism and secularism, the Alouite dynasty has taken its legitimacy from two traditional sources: the king's title as "Commander of the Faithful" (Amir al-Muminin) and being descendants of Prophet Mohammed. This palace-dominated political system in Morocco is often called the *makhzenian* order. Although different definitions of Moroccan Makhzen are present in the literature (Daadaoui, 2011, p.41), this thesis chooses a practical conceptualization of the term. Accordingly, as a remnant from Moroccan history (including the period under French colonialism), the Makhzen -as an institution- mainly refers to unelected officials of the country, among which the King occupies the central/hegemonic position thanks to his historical and religious legitimacy (Derradji, 2011, p. 72).

The Moroccan monarchy is quite different from other secular regimes in the Middle East due to King's religious title; nevertheless, the regime-IPP relationship in Morocco shares similar characteristics with those countries which had been ruled by staunchly secular regimes. Indeed, the Moroccan regime under Mohammed VI tried to constrain PJD without pursuing repressive policies due to the fact that the ruling elite thought that a strict approach against moderates might empower extremists' demands. Morocco's democratization process was an epitome of gradualism because the regime managed to keep political changes under control. However, there were episodes when the monarchy went through threatening crises, such as when it was subjected to

attempted coups (e.g., coup attempts in 1971 and 1972) and revolts (e.g., mass protests in 2011). Following continuous protests that started in the 1980s, Hassan II decided to make constitutional changes that empower parliament. Although some of these amendments made in 1992 were criticized due to their disregard for basic opposition demands, the 1996 constitutional referendum brought some significant changes. Among the noticeable amendments is that the constitution made the government responsible toward Parliament, establishing the Constitutional Council, and making dissolution of Parliament more difficult. These changes were supported by all the major parties (Wegner, 2008). In addition to limited democratization that started in the 1990s, Morocco also witnessed liberalization in other parts of social life: the number of human rights associations increased, systematic torture became less prevalent, freedom of press and expression improved (Monjib, 2011, p. 7).

Before turning into a political party, the Moroccan Islamist movement existed in civil society (e.g., school organizations) in the 1960s and 70s. Just like Egypt's Anwar Sadat, who allowed Islamist movements to balance leftist groups, the Moroccan regime also tried to use Islamists against the left and secular opposition. However, the regime's policies changed due to three factors: Islamist movements' rising power, the assassination of leftist labor union leader Omar Benjelloun in 1975, and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Maghraoui, 2015). Besides, Salafists who have traditionally occupied a marginal position in the Moroccan Islamist movement, there are two competing currents which achieved a mass following, namely Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR)/Party of Justice and Development (PJD) and Justice and Spirituality (JS). Although both organizations reject violence as a tool for achieving their goals,

contrary to MUR/PJD, JS has been frequently targeted by the Makhzen due to their insistence on not accepting King's position as Commander of the Faithful. As a result, despite JS's powerful organizational capacity inside Morocco, PJD/MUR is the only significant IPP in the political field.

Many of the founders of MUR/PJD were part of Islamic Youth, an organization dissolved after Benjelloun's assassination in 1975. The King's restrictions against followers of Islamic Youth, pushed the leading members to pursue politically moderate, non-violent, and pragmatic policies, among which recognizing King's position as the commander of the faithful was the most vital one. In 1992, due to the Algerian Civil War's repercussions, the leaders of the organization changed their name to Reform and Renewal, a name that does not refer to Islam. They managed to join the 1997 elections as a part of the Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPCD) (Pruzan-Jørgensen, 2010, p. 11). In 1998, MPCD changed its name to Party of Justice and Development, while its predecessor Reform and Renewal, with the support of other Islamist groups connected with Islamic Youth, formed Movement of Unity and Reform. In 2002 elections, PJD became the third party after secular Istiqlal and Socialist Union of Popular Forces by winning forty-two seats despite its reluctance to compete in all the districts. However, the Ministry of the Interior canceled 12 of these 42 seats. After the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the Casablanca bombings in 2003, King Mohammed VI launched a campaign to fight against violent extremism, including the promotion of Sufi Islam and stricter control over Mosques and Islamic organizations. In this context, PJD reluctantly accepted anti-terror law (Maghraoui, 2015) which was criticized by the UN Human Rights Committee due to the law's "broad definition of

terrorist acts" and making "police detention of up to 96 hours" possible (Dakwar, 2004, p. 26). In 2005, PJD also voted in favor of the new family code which improved equality for women. Despite the party's underperformance in the 2007 elections, the 2011 early election which was declared by King Mohammed VI as a result of the Arab Spring protests, became a breakthrough for the PJD who became the first party in this election by getting 23 percent of the votes.

4.4.2 Relationship between PJD and unelected officials in Morocco

As demonstrated above, unlike the establishments in Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia, the Moroccan King has enjoyed legitimacy in both religious and secular matters, therefore, it is hard to find a secular establishment in its ideal form in Morocco. Nevertheless, especially after PJD's impressive electoral performances in 2011 and 2016, the relationship between Mohammed VI and pro-palace parties with PJD started to resemble other dyads examined in this thesis. Once again, the concepts of IPP and secular establishment should be understood in relative rather than absolute terms. For instance, eliminating the headscarf ban in universities was a non-issue in Morocco but it triggered a harsh reaction by the secular establishment in Turkey. In other words, regardless of the issues' contents, two positions, namely, revisionist and status quo, emerge after IPPs' electoral victories. Although these positions exist before the elections, when an IPP captures the power to make serious changes (i.e., potential to transform), status quo forces perceive an imminent threat. The Makhzen's comments on PJD's policies, together with pro-palace parties' remarks on secularism, then, do not show that Morocco is a secular country (In Weberian terms, it certainly does not constitute the ideal type for

secular countries). Rather, these comments demonstrate the positional difference between these two and PJD.

The monarchy's position towards PJD's predecessor (i.e., the Islamic Youth) was twofold: on the one hand, the party was tolerated because it was seen as useful for the Makhzen's "divide and rule" strategy which was used for softening the opposition, on the other hand, the party's opposition to the king and his political and religious authority often triggered regime's repression. PJD's above-mentioned compromise broke the repression-toleration cycle by strengthening the party's position in the political field. In fact, despite the party's growing popularity after 2011, making compromises was the only choice in the 1990s and early 2000s. The institutional setting was quite restrictive before the political reforms which started during the last years of Hassan II's reign and continued during Mohammed VI's (Daadaoui, 2017, p. 9).

In addition to institutional obstacles which prevent elected officials from making meaningful changes in Morocco's political system, political parties which have close ties with the palace played an active role in maintaining the king's hegemonic position. Besides their official ideology which can be defined as royalism, Pro-palace parties also have direct ties with the monarchy: National Rally of Independents (RNI) was founded by King Hassan II's brother-in-law, Ahmed Osman, while Authenticity and Modernity Party (AMP) was founded by Fouad Ali El Himma who is King Mohammed VI's close friend and his former adviser. In addition to these two parties which have had a close relationship with the King (Masbah, 2014), some of the other traditionalist, secular, and leftist parties also positioned themselves within the pro-palace camp either as a result of King Hassan II's and later Mohammed VI's cooptation

policies or PJD's rise in the political sphere (El Bouchikhi, 2016). Socialist Union of Popular Forces (SUPF), which was "the torchbearer of opposition" (Fakir, 2017), during Hassan II's reign, for instance, often asked help from King Mohammed VI to intervene against PJD in the 2010s ("USFP Head asks", 2015). Nationalist Istiqlal Party (IP) also fiercely opposed King Hassan II's policies, however, just like the SUPF, the party approached the palace during Mohammed VI's reign.

On the surface, the Moroccan army's position vis-à-vis the monarchy and politics is a rarity in the region: the army is perceived as a depoliticized institution and there is no significant tension between the civilian actors and the armed forces. In fact, as two near-successful coup attempts at which King Hassan II "miraculously survived" demonstrates, the army's depoliticization is not a constant feature of Moroccan politics (Roberson, 2014, p.73). After two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, Hassan II decided to reorganize the military forces by increasing the number of Arabs in the army to balance traditional Amazigh dominance, appointing loyal commanders to key army positions, distributing economic incentives to army officers, and "atomizing the military forces to avert power concentration (Camps-Febrer,2019, p. 111-112). When Mohammed VI came to power, therefore, there were not any tensions between the monarchy and military as most of the high-ranking officers appointed during his father's reign were loyal to the regime. Besides, legal and institutional reforms on armed forces under Mohammed VI's rule helped the palace to abstain from using the military during Arab Spring protests in 2011 (Saidy, 2018, p.14). In other words, the army's lack of political involvement after the 1970s was referring to its close relationship with the palace, a highly political institution despite its proclaimed mediator position. In fact,

among the countries that are examined in this thesis, only the Tunisian military had a long-lasting antagonistic relationship with the ruling elite. While Algerian and Egyptian armed forces also decided to sacrifice Husni Mubarak and Chadli Bendjedid, their decision came as a result of mass protests and unresolvable tensions.

4.4.3 Opportunity window for PJD after Arab Spring

As the previous section demonstrates, in addition to institutional obstacles, PJD's precarious position can be seen in its acceptance of the King's hegemonic role despite the palace's overt/covert support to royalist parties such as RNI and AMP (Wegner, 2007, p. 80). Since to be part of the Moroccan political system unavoidably involves recognizing King's legitimacy, the term "pro-palace" may cause definitional problems. There are four levels of positioning vis-à-vis the palace in Morocco: anti-systemic opposition, systemic relative independency, systemic semi-dependency, systemic dependency. Marxist and Islamist organizations who oppose monarchy and/or pursue republicanism as an ideology constitute anti-systemic opposition which is often repressed and banned from the political field. Systemic relative independency is PJD's unique position in the Moroccan political system, due to the party's recognition of the King as the commander of the faithful without fully supporting Makhzen's policies in different areas such as foreign affairs, cultural field, etc. Systemic semi-dependency describes the position of those parties who do not need the monarchy's direct support for existing in the political sphere but align their policies with Makhzen's either due to their political conformity, or their threat perception as a result of the rise of PJD. Lastly, systemic dependency refers to the position of palace-backed political parties which have

a direct relationship with the King or royal elite (in fact the founders of these parties are among the royal elite as well). Table 5 presents a summary of this thesis' original categorization of political organizations in Morocco:

Table 5. Categorization of Political Parties According to Their Proximity to the Regime

Anti-systemic Opposition	Systemic Relative Independency	Systemic Semi-dependency	Systemic Dependency
Justice and Charity	PJD	Istiqlal	PM
Democratic Way		SUPF	RNI
NUPF		PPS	AMP

Just like Tunisia and Egypt, mass protests affected Morocco's political field by pushing for significant changes. Unlike semi-dependent and dependent parties, PJD's relative independency opened a window of opportunity for the party; however, the party's leadership chose not to join the protests (i.e., February 20 Movement) "for pragmatic and practical long-term goals of taking part in the political system" (Daadoui, 2017, p. 6; Lefèvre, 2013, p. 628). Interestingly, the majority of the IPPs, namely, WP, JDP, Ennahda, and FJP chose pragmatic long-term goals over short-term ideological goals; nevertheless, the parties' different alliance-making strategies had a strong impact on whether they achieve these long-term goals. PJD did not choose to form a cross-ideological alliance with anti-systemic actors particularly because the party was afraid of possible closure. Unlike more dependent parties, however, PJD managed to maintain its strong relationship with the people by maintaining its relative distance. In other words, PJD was loyal enough to participate in the Moroccan political system, but the

party was considered as sufficiently independent by a significant segment of Moroccan people, thereby protecting itself from the criticism directed towards the regime. Its strong relationship with the Moroccan voters provided the PJD with consecutive electoral victories. Without value-based alliances; however, these electoral victories were not sufficient to alter the balance of power between elected and unelected officials.

PJD won 107 seats by getting almost 23 percent of the votes in the first election following the mass protests. Just like Tunisian Ennahda Party, PJD formed a coalition with secular parties namely, Istiqlal and Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS); unlike Ennahda who carefully excluded supporters of the ancient regime from its coalition; however, PJD's alliance also included a royalist Popular Movement (PM) in the coalition. PM and Istiqlal prevented PJD from implementing reforms which aimed to bring more transparency into the Moroccon political system (Lefèvre, 2013). Istiqlal's and its leader Hamid Chabat's criticisms which aimed at Benkirane reached their peak after PJD proposed a subsidy reform. Along with the IMF, Benkirane supported the reform by stating that "subsidies burn up 57 billion Moroccan dirhams," while Istiqlal spokesperson Adil Benhamze indicated that:

> The PJD is ignoring our demands and trying to rule as if it controlled the whole government…PJD wants to raise prices and hit the poorest, while we prefer to pick up some billions which are at the hands of speculators by controlling imports (Yaakoubi, 2013)

King Mohammed VI was also concerned about the possible consequences of the subsidy reform, since, according to the palace, reducing subsidies could have triggered mass protests. Nevertheless, when Istiqlal Party decided to leave the coalition in May 2013, the King called the party's leader Hamid Chabat to keep his party's ministers in the cabinet. As a result of King's phone call, Istiqlal renounced its decision by saying that

the party"totally adheres to royal wish to guarantee conditions of stability and to serve the higher interests of the nation," ("Morocco King intervenes", 2013) however, the palace's intervention solely postponed the political crisis for 2 months, on July, 5 out of Istiqlal's 6 ministers in the coalition government resigned. Resignations could have been seen insignificant by PJD, but the timing of Istiqlal's move, thanks to a deliberate decision of the party's leaders, coincided with the timing of the coup in Egypt. To make matters worse for the PJD, during anti-government protests in Morocco (the protests were named Tamarod just like Egypt's protests which resulted in Morsi's removal), Istiqlal's leader Chabat stated that he wanted "to see the end of … Benkirane, as was the case for his brother Morsi" ("Key party quits", 2013). This move coincided with the King's tacit support for the coup against Morsi. PJD's Saad-Eddine El Othmani, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, was forced to publish a neutral statement on coup d'état which differentiated government's position from that of PJD to appease both the monarchy and the party's voter base (Masbah, 2013). However, the party organization -carefully- and PJD's youth movement -harshly- criticized Egyptian coup d'état. In order to prevent an early election from destabilizing the political field, PJD turned to another political party which has more organic ties with the regime than Istiqlal, namely, RNI. Coalition talks with RNI, therefore, were conducted under stressful conditions for the ruling PJD, as its other coalition partners, namely, PM and PPS pushed Benkirane to solve the political gridlock either by finding a coalition partner or renewing elections prolonged (Sakthivel, 2013). RNI, on the other hand, tried to prolong the coalition talks as much as possible, due to its awareness of PJD's precarious position. As a last resort, PJD asked help from the king to moderate its

coalition talks with RNI. Unlike his efforts in May, however, Mohammed VI did not help PJD immediately: while coalition talks were continuing, for instance, King made a televised speech where he directly targeted PJD for its unsuccessful education policies (Masbah, 2013; "Morocco: King launches", 2013). Again, the timing of the criticism was as important as its context. The King's speech was interpreted as a warning for the PJD government. Only after major concessions, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Saad-Eddine El Othmani's replacement with RNI's leader Salaheddine Mezouar and Economy and RNI's Mohamed Boussaid's appointment as the Minister of Economy and Finance, did the RNI accepted forming a coalition with PJD. Unlike Egypt's FJP, PJD under Benkirane's leadership survived until the next parliamentary elections partially due to its major concessions, but another political deadlock in 2016, when PJD had failed to form a coalition government for 5 months, pushed the palace to oust designated prime minister Benkirane "to overcome the current situation of immobility" ("Moroccan king ousts", 2017), despite the fact that Benkirane's PJD increased its votes to 27 percent in 2016 elections. Although another PJD member, namely, Othmani replaced Benkirane as the prime minister, as discussed below, PJD lost control of all of the four significant ministries which are also called "ministries of sovereignty" which comprises of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Islamic Affairs (Daadaoui, 2010, p. 212). In fact, the PJD's rising precariousness can be observed by examining the number of sovereign ministries the party had: 2 ministries between 2012-2013, 1 ministry between 2013-2016, no ministry after 2016.

4.4.4 PJD's international alliances

As demonstrated in the sections above, because the collapse of its alliance with Istiqlal in October 2013 led to major concessions made by Benkirane, PJD worked with a Foreign Minister from RNI. When PJD's deputy leader Saadeddine Othmani was appointed as the prime minister after Benkirane failed to form a coalition government, Nasser Bourita, a career diplomat with no party affiliation became the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. In addition to PJD's failure to control the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the King's hegemonic position in Morocco's international relations constituted an even bigger institutional obstacle to PJD realizing its foreign policy vision (Maghraoui, 2018, p. 5). Constitutional changes that have been introduced in the 2011 Referendum, despite their democratizing aspects, institutionalized PJD's "subordinate cohabitation with the Monarchy" (López García & Hernando de Larramendi, 2017). Above mentioned constitutional reforms changed the naming process for the Prime Minister position by rendering the appointment of the Head of Government from the winning political party necessary, (Article 47) while before 2011, the king had not been limited by the constitution in choosing the Prime Minister. Simultaneously, however, the constitution refrains from giving clear executive powers to the Head of Government, therefore, "there is a wide space for interpretation that can be used to legally distance the Prime Minister from foreign policy-making" (Abouzzohour & Tomé-Alonso, 2019).

Makhzen's committed fight against radicalism strengthened its relationship with the EU and United States because the fight against terrorism has been at the top of these actors' agenda since 2001. While PJD did not openly criticize King's promotion of

"Moroccan Islam" which aims to underline flexibility and pluralism in Moroccans' belief system, the party's ideological baggage makes it difficult for them to be the flagbearer of King's vision. Indeed, PJD could not control the Ministry of National Education, Vocational Training, and Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, two of the ministries which play a very significant role in promoting the palace's vision. During Benkirane's first coalition government (2012-2013), the Istiqlal party controlled the Ministry of Education, while during his second coalition government (2013-2016), Rachid Belmokhtar, an aeronautical engineer without any party affiliation, was responsible for National Education. Belmoukhtar's announcement on the return of the French language in teaching scientific and technical subjects triggered a reaction of Benkirane who criticized the king's technocratic super-ministers for being anti-democratic (Lamlili, 2015). Ministry of Islamic Affairs, on the other hand, was more strictly controlled by the palace due to its peculiar role in regulating different interpretations of Moroccans' beliefs. While four Moroccan prime ministers have served since 2002, there is only one Minister of Islamic Affairs who have served during this period, namely, Ahmed Toufiq. Toufiq's views on Islam suited Mohammed VI's ambitious project on promoting moderate Islam. Even before the 2003 Casablanca terror attack, Toufiq thought that "a correct Muslim" is someone who is not afraid of different "faiths and cultures" (Priyadarshini, 2020; Toufiq, 2014). During his positions as Minister of Islamic Affairs under PJD-led governments, Toufiq often clashed with the PJD elites over significant issues, such as, dismissing Imams who were accused of mixing Islam and politics (PJD protested against dismissals) ("Ahmed Toufiq cible", 2016), or gender segregation in schools (Toufiq considered this policy as

counterproductive) (“Radical Islam: Moroccan PJD”, 2018). In short, the palace’s monopoly in counterterrorism policy made Mohammed VI an indispensable ally in the eyes of the EU and United States, while PJD had neither the capacity nor intention to implement this counterterrorism policy. During King Mohammed VI’s trip to the United States, for instance, then President of the United States Barrack Obama “commended the action and the leadership of… the King in deepening democracy and promoting economic progress and human development during the past decade” while both leaders also underlined their commitment in fighting against terrorism in the region (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2013). While further democratization was also mentioned during the Obama-Mohammed VI meeting, the emphasis was quite weak compared to Obama’s tone in praising previous reforms on democratization and human rights. In 2015, during his press conference with Moroccan Foreign Minister Mezouar, United States’ then-Secretary of State John Kerry celebrated King Mohammed VI for the democratic developments in Morocco such as strengthening political parties and civil society. While Kerry stated that there is room for development for Moroccan Democracy, he emphasized that “democracy needs time to develop,” and even “United States has problems that are needed to be addressed” (U.S. Department of State, 2015). Due to the palace’s traditionally and structurally advantageous position, therefore, PJD had very little room for maneuver. While the pressure coming from the palace prevented PJD from touching some crucial foreign policy issues such as Morocco’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the PJD focused on fiscal policy by implementing reforms such as reducing subsidies and increasing the pension age. Party’s bold reform agenda gained the support of IMF and other international economic institutions, as demonstrated in the

previous section, however, contrary to PJD's expectations, they also triggered a reaction by the palace and other political parties (Fakir, 2017).

CHAPTER 5

REINFORCED SURVIVAL PATHWAY: TURKEY'S JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY AND TUNISIA'S ENNAHDA

5.1 Defining reinforced survival

Democratization literature defines the period following a successful transition from authoritarianism as the consolidation phase. Despite definitions differ, consolidation usually designates strengthening institutions that favor democracy, adopting a more liberal/democratic political culture, having a robust civil society, getting rid of the holders of tutelary power, etc. Although these conditions indeed favor democracy and decrease the chance of democratic breakdown (i.e., authoritarian revival), the concept of consolidation may disguise more than it reveals when it comes to cases where these conditions are not fully present, but democracy survives regardless. In those countries where democratization results in a strong revolutionary or revisionist party and a weak conservative party in the parliament, there are simply too many things at stake, therefore conservative forces often do not risk waiting till the preconditions of consolidation develop gradually. What these revolutionary or revisionist parties can achieve with their meticulous policymaking is, therefore, not consolidation but reinforced survival.

An IPP enters the reinforced survival pathway when it establishes value-based domestic and international allies to successfully overcome the threat of conservative backlashes, such as coup d'état or party closure as a result of a decision by the constitutional court. Reinforced survival implies a dynamic process in which actors' decisions simultaneously create and destroy certain potentials. At the same time, a

decision made during a critical juncture is often insufficient for guaranteeing the future of the pathway. In other words, a decision may close a certain branch and make another one possible on the pathway, however, to stay on this branch (which has been made possible by this decision), may need continuous effort.

When an IPP comes to power in a secular regime, the party's reinforced survival depends on its success in building and maintaining robust alliances, which prevent the IPP from confronting the regime on its own. After sustaining its value-based cross-ideological alliance long enough, the IPP may conceive that the power balance between the elected government and secular institutions is altered in favor of the former and disband its alliance. Losing domestic and international alliances, however, lead to a series of different interest-based alliances that are more difficult to sustain. Without a doubt, interest-based alliances are more costly and less effective when they are formed immediately after the IPP's electoral victory. In fact, decreasing the cost of contenting oneself with interest-based alliances summarizes the path-dependent nature of the process: while forming less stable and more pragmatic alliances leads to party closure during the early phases of the period following IPP's electoral victory, it may not result in a similar outcome in the later phases of reinforced survival pathway.

5.2 Mechanism of reinforced survival and cases

If an IPP establishes value-based domestic and international alliances, its chances of entering the reinforced survival pathway increases. Value-based alliances (VBAs) do not differ from other types of alliances by disregarding interest related issues; on the contrary, alliances that do not consider material interests are weaker than

purely interest-based alliances. VBAs, then, are fortification of the solely interest-based alliances, rather than the direct opposite of the latter. Fortification means that when two partners have a clash of interest on a certain issue-area, shared values protect the alliance by minimizing misunderstandings over meanings and providing these partners with a long-term perspective. Without a doubt, when interests diverge in an insurmountable way, value-based alliances may collapse, however, this relative robustness and stability differ VBAs from interest-based alliances.

Another significant parameter that should be examined is the peculiar partner that an IPP selects as an ally. Although important actors within Muslim majority countries vary in terms of size and influence, for the sake of parsimoniousness, it is possible to group these actors into three categories, namely, non-Islamist civilian actors, regime, and Islamist civilian actors. If an IPP has sufficient power (e.g., seats in the parliament) after coming to power, it may choose to govern the country on its own. More frequently, however, it chooses to form an alliance with one of these actors or with a certain faction of it. As further examined in the repression section, ruling alone and ruling with other Islamist actors, require the least amount of compromise, however, it is also the most perilous option for the IPPs because it leads to a reactionary alliance formed by non-Islamist actors, military and high bureaucracy. This type of alliance may reward or punish IPPs, depending on the characteristics of the base from which IPPs got their votes. In Turkey, IPP's move to the center rewarded JDP in the elections, whereas in Tunisia, Ennahda's distance from other Islamist actors harmed the party in the elections. Alliance with the regime or non-Islamist actors, on the other hand, push IPPs to compromise on certain issues, especially on matters related to secularism and

religiosity. Among the cases examined in this work, Turkey's JDP and Tunisia's Ennahda were the only two political parties who decided to form cross-ideological alliances with non-Islamists, whereas, in Morocco and post-Spring Egypt, IPPs couldn't form VBAs with civilian actors, and worked with the regime elements (despite the fact that FJP quickly distanced itself from the regime elements) such as, Makhzen or the army, by necessity. By failing to erase the impact of tutelary regime institutions, Morocco's PJD and Egypt's FJP increased their vulnerability against coups and closures.

As mentioned in Chapter I, this thesis defines VBA as a cross-ideological and pluralistic type of alliance, even though there are less pluralistic and liberal values. Although it is possible to mention religious values, in secular regimes examined in this thesis, only cross-ideological and pluralistic alliances with unlikely partners can provide IPPs with a way to overcome the commitment problem. An alliance based on religious values is also more robust compared to interest-based alliances, however, these types of alliances fail to aid in solving IPPs' commitment problem in secular regimes. For instance, IPPs can form an alliance based on religious values both with domestic actors (e.g., Freedom and Justice Party's alliance with al-Nour Party) and international actors (e.g., Qatar's support to Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), but these alliances are insufficient for IPPs to overcome the commitment problem in secular regimes, because none of these alliances constitute a credible guarantee in the eyes of secular segments of the society, let alone the military and high bureaucracy who are already suspicious of IPP's motives. In both Tunisia and Egypt, IPPs who won elections were supported by Qatar. Only in Tunisia, however, the IPP managed to form value-based alliances with

European countries such as Germany. While Morsi's FJP was also concerned about forming alliances with Egypt's traditional Western allies such as the United States, they could not form robust alliances with those countries (due to the reasons further examined in Chapter 3), thereby failing to stay in the reinforced survival pathway. To sum up, forming an alliance based on religious or cultural values is not an obstacle unless there the IPP simultaneously toils for establishing cross-ideological value-based alliances with different actors.

For the examination of the reinforced survival pathway, two political parties, which utilized value-based alliances during the first few years following their electoral victory, are selected. Indeed, value-based alliances with non-Islamist actors that were formed during the critical junctures tangibly helped these two IPPs to avert a possible party closure or coup d'état. Both Ennahda and Justice and Development Party took lessons from how secular regimes reacted to the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front and Turkish Welfare Party after an electoral victory. Because they were aware of a possible preemptive strike by the military or constitutional court, they sought domestic and international allies who are legitimate in the eyes of the regime.

5.3 Reinforced survival of JDP in Turkey

5.3.1 Historical background

Although IPPs from the National Outlook background had been closed by the state before the 1997 coup, the Welfare Party-led government's forced resignation and its subsequent closure was the breaking point for not only Turkish Islamists but also the secular establishment and secular segments of Turkish society. National Outlook was a

pragmatic and peaceful movement, compared to other Islamist movements who frequently committed violence against secular authoritarian regimes in the Arab World. One of the main reasons behind this difference was the Turkish state's relative openness towards Islamist parties who, as a result, thought that it is possible to pursue their agenda within the democratic framework. In other words, the bulk of Turkish political Islamists belonged to semi-loyal and loyal opposition who consider democracy as the only game in town partly because of the semi-permissive political system in Turkey. This semi-permissive system was also transformative for political-Islamists because, after each closure, they changed their policies, discourses, and strategies.

Virtue Party was formed by the old cadres of the WP; however, the Necmettin Erbakan's response to the 1997 coup d'etat led to an intra-party crisis between "reformists," such as Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and "traditionalists," such as Recai Kutan who was considered as the custodian of party's leadership position while Erbakan was banned from politics. Abdullah Gül not only criticized the meek attitude of Erbakan when the secular establishment forced him to sign National Security Council decisions on secularism but also emphasized the party's need to embrace democratic values to be consistent in using these values for condemning the regime's actions. In other words, according to reformists, embracing, rather than exploiting, democratic values was needed to "confront the regime with its own mistakes" and to reconcile secular establishment with Political Islamist parties (Çakır, 2001). In May 2000, Gül ran for the chairmanship of the Virtue Party but eventually came second to Recai Kutan who managed to get 112 votes more than Gul. A year later, Virtue Party was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court, which stated that the party violated the

law by becoming a "focus of Islamic and antisecular activities." After VP's closure, reformists established the Justice and Development Party together with some important politicians from Turkish center-right parties, whereas traditionalists formed Felicity Party with the old cadres. Although JDP utilized a more centrist discourse which uses religiosity and spirituality on its manifestos and rallies less frequently than its predecessor, it managed to get votes from not only the center-right but also the more socially conservative National Outlook voter base.

While some analysts considered JDP's moderation as a pragmatic step taken by the party leadership to avoid WP's and VP's fate, others emphasized the socio-economic transformation of the Islamist and socially conservative segments of Turkish society. Accordingly, the Muslim bourgeois class who profited from the economic liberalization process that started with Turgut Özal's policies became an interest group within the Islamist bloc and supported democracy and liberalism for protecting their economic gains (Gümüşçü, 2010; Tuğal, 2002). In addition to the pro-democracy and pro-market stance of the devout bourgeoisie and middle class, other analysts underlined the secularization of the "third phase Islamists" (Duran, 2010) and their support for pro-EU foreign policy (Öniş, 2006).

5.3.2 Turkish army and secular establishment against JDP

In 2002, when JDP won the November elections, the Turkish secular establishment comprised of some segments of civilian bureaucracy, especially those who work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supreme courts, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, and most importantly Turkish army who staged a soft coup just a few years ago against another IPP (Cizre, 2007). Although Turkey was considered as a democratic state where

democratic institutions are stronger than other countries examined in this work, above mentioned institutions were important to maintain the semi-permissive (rather than fully-permissive) nature of the regime by pursuing a tutelary/vanguard role. Unlike the Tunisian military, which is arguably disinterested in politics, the Turkish army both directly and indirectly intervened in politics to guard the Turkish Republic against disorder/disintegration and secular principles against being deteriorated by political Islamist parties. Even during the National Security Council held by President Sezer in April 2002, high ranking officers stated their uneasiness resulted from Erdoğan's previous criticisms on the role of armed forces in Turkey's domestic affairs. In late 2003, the president of The Council of Higher Education (CHE) Kemal Gürüz visited the Former Land Forces Commander General Aytaç Yalman upon his request to discuss JDP's law draft on facilitating Imam Hatip students' entrance to universities. Besides CHE's and TAF's reactions, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer also criticized and eventually vetoed the bill which, according to him, was harming the secular nature of the republic by "making Imam-Hatip schools attractive in the eyes of young people" ("Sezer YÖK Yasası", 2004)

JDP was aware of the threat coming from the secular establishment in case its policies are continuously interpreted from the perspective of Islamization of society, but acquiescing to the secular bloc on every policy issue was as dangerous as a direct confrontation with this bloc, especially after Welfare Party's closure. JDP's decision to continue the EU accession process was vital for achieving transformation in civil-military relations and curbing the influence of unelected officials without triggering a strong reaction from the secular bloc. With the seventh harmonization package in 2003,

the JDP government confirmed the 2001 Constitutional change on National Security Council and emphasized that it is an advisory body rather than a part of the executive branch. The package also increased the number of civilian members and gave them a majority in the council, decreased the frequency of meetings from monthly to bimonthly, and opened the way for a civilian secretary-general. Although the chief of staff, Hilmi Özkök had concerns on EU-oriented security policy's harmful impacts on Turkey's unitary nature, he was supportive of Turkey's EU membership which, according to Özkök, was in line with Atatürk's vision on "exceeding the level of contemporary civilizations" ("Özkök: AB üyeliği", 2005).

5.3.3 Conservative democrats: Alliance building without party coalitions under Turkey's JDP

Defining conservative democrat

In November 2002, JDP managed to capture 363 out of 550 seats by getting 34 percent of the votes, while Felicity Party which was founded after the last party from the National Outlook movement was banned, failed to surpass the electoral threshold by getting only 2 percent of the total votes. Although old center-right parties such as True Path Party and Motherland Party received 15 percent of the votes cumulatively, JDP's self-proclaimed centrist identity worked well with the center-right voter base and pushed these two traditionally strong political parties under the 10 percent threshold. Despite this significant electoral victory, however, the period between 2002-2008 was the most perilous era for JDP due to the strong position of the unelected officials (i.e., secular establishment). During its unconsolidated phase, JDP achieved reinforced survival with

its smart alliance-building decisions which were facilitated by its leaders' prudent discourse on secularism, religiosity, and democracy.

Less than a month after JDP's foundation, the party's leader Erdoğan corrected Russia's then-ambassador Alexander Lebedev who said he was happy Turkey has a progressive Islamist party on his visit to Erdoğan's office in Istanbul, by stating that "JDP is not a religion-oriented party, it is a conservative party" ("Erdoğan: AKP din eksenli", 2001). Although the concept of "conservative democracy" was missing in JDP's manifestos till the 2007 elections, JDP's prominent figures defined the party as conservative democrat and modern party instead of utilizing the concepts of Islamo-democrat or Muslim democrat, terms which are inspired from European Christian-Democratic parties. Yalcin According to Akdogan, Erdoğan's former adviser and JDP's ideologue in the party's early years, conservative democracy emphasizes evolutionary (i.e., gradual) change rather than revolutionary change, defines politics as a field of compromise, prioritize national will, rejects authoritarianism and arbitrary rule by respecting rule of law, values family as an institution as well as personal rights and freedoms, prefers moderate discourse over radical one (Akdoğan, 2004, pp. 9-13). Akdoğan's (2004) influential work on conservative democracy, without a doubt, was not the manifesto of the JDP, but as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wrote in the preface of Akdoğan's book, it was a "theoretical contribution to JDP's political identity" (pp. 7). With these types of theoretical discussions, JDP, just like the National Outlook movement, was searching for its place not only in the Turkish political field but also among other historical political ideologies such as liberalism and socialism. Unlike the National Outlook movement which proclaimed that it constitutes a unique alternative to

both socialist and pro-market ideologies, JDP was trying to emphasize its similarities with other conservative ideologies from the West. To sum up, the term conservative democrat, was JDP's conceptual invention to normalize/legitimize itself in the eyes of the secular establishment who considers JDP as the latest successor of Turkish IPPs. At the same time, JDP made it possible to form broad democratic blocs with different groups in Turkey by using liberal arguments rather than narrow interest-based ones to fight against undemocratic policies of the secular establishment.

2007-2008 Crisis in civil-military relations

JDP managed to escape an unsolvable confrontation with the military by submerging its political agenda in democratization reforms during the EU accession process, 2007 Presidential election, a seemingly much simpler but symbolically significant issue, however, changed the course of JDP's relationship with the secular establishment. On 14 April 2007, around 300 thousand people protested in Turkey's capital Ankara against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's possible candidacy for the presidency. Since JDP had the clear majority in the TGNA, it was certain that the JDP-backed candidate was going to be the president as a result of the parliamentary vote. Although Abdullah Gul, instead of the party's leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, became JDP's candidate in the presidential elections, mass demonstrations continued in other metropolitan cities. On the 27th of April, during the first round of the presidential elections, Abdullah Gül could not secure the two-thirds majority in the parliament. According to the Turkish constitution, if all the candidates fail to get 367 votes in the first two rounds, a simple majority, that is 276 votes, was sufficient for electing the president. Republican People's Party, on the other

hand, filed a suit on the constitutional court, by claiming 367 MPs are required for a quorum. Later, the Turkish Armed Forces stepped into the discussion on presidential elections with a memorandum that is published on its website:

> The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. ("Excerpts of Turkish", 2007)

E-memorandum was the culmination of TAF's unfriendly attitude against JDP under Ozkok's successor Yasar Buyukanit, who had warned Erdoğan to "bound not by words but by essence to the principles of the Republic" on 12 April ("Erdogan: Gul's words", 2008). Coup rumors gained further strength when Former Admiral Özden Örnek's diary, which contains parts on two separate coups that were planned to take place in 2004, was revealed by Nokta magazine. Although the president of the constitutional court, Haşim Kılıç, said that he hoped parliament solve the "367 crisis" among themselves, after the military's explicit statements, the supreme court ruled in favor of RPP's claim. While Turkey's accession process slowed down in 2007, the European Union, together with the United States made it clear that they support the elected government. EU's Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn who closely followed the developments regarding presidential elections warned TAF in his statements:

> It is important that also the military respects the rules of the democratic game and its own role in that democratic game…This is a test case whether the Turkish armed forces respect democratic secularization and democratic values. ("Turkey crisis", 2007)

EU's and US' support to JDP and Turkey's democratization was vital in JDP's reinforced survival, but it was JDP's ability to divide secular opposition by getting support from distinct secular, liberal, and leftist groups, that helped the party to be

backed both by Western democracies. Unlike its predecessor, JDP formed a broad coalition with different groups who were harmed by coup d'etats and other anti-democratic policies of the Turkish secular establishment. As a result, JDP managed to increase its votes by 12 percent in the 2007 early election which was decided to take place after the constitutional court decided on presidential elections. While RPP could not increase its votes higher than 21 percent, the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) managed to surpass the electoral threshold with 14 percent of the votes. JDP's vote increase did not improve the party's number of seats in the parliament due to the NMP's entrance to parliament; therefore, if other parties had continued their protest against an "Islamist president," it would not have received enough seats to surpass the quorum of two-thirds. NMP overcame this problem by its leader Devlet Bahceli's decision to nominate Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu as president instead of boycotting the voting. Following the 2007 elections, JDP challenged the secular establishment's coup threats by organizing a constitutional referendum which aimed to change the system of electing the president from parliamentary vote to popular vote. Although each party had different reasons to support JDP's proposition on the presidential election, the "yes" campaign achieved the support of nationalist Great Union Party, political Islamist Felicity Party, center-leftist Social Democratic Populist Party, and pro-minority Democratic Society Party. As a result of this broad party support which was perceived as a "coalition," the JDP-led campaign got around 69 percent of the total votes ("Referandum koalisyonu", 2007).

Although Büyükanıt's coup threat was not realized in 2007, JDP faced the danger of party closure when a chief prosecutor submitted an indictment to

constitutional court by stating that "the party became the center of activities that are contrary to the principles of secularism." The party closure case received more reaction from the distinct segments of the society than the "367 crisis" in 2007. In fact, except RPP and Democratic Left Party, all parties from socialist to political-Islamist, published harsh statements against this "undemocratic application" ("Siyasi partilerin kapatma", 2008). EU Commissioner Olli Rehn repeated his warnings to Turkish institutions by saying that "it is another test for Turkish's EU accession bid," and "there is no place in EU democracies for the party closures" ("Oli Rehn: AK Parti'ye kapatma", 2008). In July 2008, 6 out of 11 Constitutional Court members voted for JDP's closure, therefore, a five-thirds majority that is needed for the party closure decision was not reached, however, 10 out of 11 members decided to cut the treasury's financial aid to JDP by half due to "JDP's anti-secular activities". Among the members who rejected JDP's closure, two of them, Serdar Özgüldür and Serruh Kaleli were assigned by President Gül's predecessor Ahmet Necdet Sezer who is known for his distrust of JDP's commitment to principles of secularism. The president of the constitutional court Haşim Kılıç and member Sacit Adalı voted against both Virtue Party's closure in 2001 and JDP's in 2008, while Ahmet Akyalçın who had voted in favor of VP's closure, rejected JDP's closure.

5.3.4 JDP's international alliances

United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003 became JDP's first serious foreign policy challenge when the Bush administration asked Turkey to allow United States' soldiers to attack Iraq via Turkey. Despite Erdoğan's pressure on JDP MPs, the parliament

rejected the license. Although JDP was giving pro-US messages before the elections, TGNA's rejection marked the beginning of a period of deterioration between Turkey-US relations. Hostile statements to Turkey by high-level US bureaucrats including Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz were followed by the "Hood Incident" where 11 Turkish soldiers were humiliatingly hooded and handcuffed by American Forces in Sulaimaniya, Iraq. According to Öniş and Yılmaz, Turkey's rift with the United States facilitated its progress in the EU accession process, by falsifying EU suspicions on "Turkey's being a trojan horse of US" (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005, p. 277). Indeed, JDP's unintended decision paved the way for greater cooperation with France and Germany which are also critical towards the US' decision to invade Iraq. Although Turkish soldiers' arrest and civilian casualties of the Iraq invasion resulted in an increase in unfavorable views on the US among the Turkish public, JDP leadership accepted the United States' request for deploying Turkish soldiers in Iraq as a peacekeeping force. EU accession process was the second challenge for the newly elected incumbent government, though, unlike the invasion of Iraq which was a momentous crisis, Turkey's accession bid was a long-term process. One of the most significant differences between the JDP and the National Outlook movement was the latter's position towards Turkey's Europeanization. After the Helsinki decision which declared Turkey as a candidate country in 1999, TGNA approved 8 harmonization packages and 2 constitutional changes which aimed to improve the level of democracy in Turkey. In October 2005, accession negotiations for full membership officially started with the approval of the Negotiation Framework Document which includes 35 negotiation chapters on different issue areas from the human right to culture. Besides human rights

reforms, however, there were foreign policy issues which caused harsh debates between the incumbent JDP and the secular establishment, such as the Annan Plan on Cyprus.

To sum up, JDP's relationship with the US and EU, especially till the early 2010s, had two complementary bases: a shared interest and common values. Turkey was one of the most significant countries within the NATO, due to its position as the southeastern border of the alliance. During the last days of the Cold War, Turkey's role within the NATO alliance started to change because of the decreasing relevance of the Soviet Union threat. When Saddam Hussein rejected to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolution on his invasion of Kuwait, United States started an operation in which Turkey actively participated by "letting its borders be used as the second front" (Haberman, 1991). Although the 2003 crisis between the two countries triggered a reaction on both sides, the two countries' common values helped to overcome the interest-based crisis among strategic allies. During his visit to Ankara in 2004, George Bush defined Turkey as a "model country" which should be supported in its EU accession bid:

> I will remind the people of this good country that you ought to be given a date by the EU for your eventual acceptance into the EU… I appreciate very much the example that your country has set on how to be a Muslim country, and at the same time a country which...embraces democracy and rule of law and freedom, ("Turkey a model", 2004)

Similarly, when Turkey's talks on accession to the EU slowed down, especially after Cyprus acceded to the union, the EU continued to be supportive of the reform process in Turkey. JDP followed pro-EU policies on Cyprus, by supporting the Annan Plan; and on the Kurdish issue, by supporting a political rather than a military solution. Although under Hilmi Özkök Turkish Armed Forces limited its criticism against JDP's foreign

policy choices, Yaşar Büyükanıt often complained about JDP's decisions on Cyprus which was contrary to Turkish national interest according to him. The main opposition party RPP also shared Büyükanıt's concerns and criticized JDP's pro-EU and pro-US stance in the context of the Cyprus issue and Iraq War. Against this monolithic anti-EU coalition, JDP, together with NGOs such as TUSİAD, MÜSİAD, and TOBB, constituted the loose pro-EU coalition. When Cyprus became a member of the EU despite their vote against the Annan Plan, however, the EU put JDP in a difficult position by confirming the fears of the military and main opposition party. Besides, starting from 2006, Cyprus' applications for blocking the chapters that had already been agreed upon, accepted by the Council of EU, and aggravated the problems between EU and Turkey. Despite the deterioration of the accession process, however, the EU continued to support JDP in its fight against the military's dominant presence in politics, and as we have seen above, its carrot and stick approach became a deterrent for the military.

5.4 Reinforced survival of Ennahda in Tunisia

5.4.1 Historical background

After decades of French colonization, Tunisia gained its independence under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba who later became the first president of Tunisia after the abolition of the monarchy. Under president Bourguiba and his successor Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali strict secularizing policies are adopted to transform the society and Tunisian social life. Despite the failure of erasing religion in the private sphere, these secularizing policies made it almost impossible for religiosity to appear in the public

sphere (Wolf, 2017, p. 27). The relative success of these policies, especially those under Bourguiba, left a significant mark in Tunisian society, which continued even after the Jasmine Revolution that wiped off many policies and institutions of the ancient regime. Although Bourguiba and Ben Ali suppressed almost all the opposition groups including Islamists, political Islamism that increased its presence especially after the 1970s was perceived as a major threat that challenged the Tunisian autocracy on several fronts including culture, social life, and economy. As the first serious Islamist organization, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) consisting of "first-generation university students with family roots in the country's interior and marginalized regions, who felt Islam offered guiding principles that could help reform society and politics, was formed in 1981 (Marks, 2017, p. 33). At the end of the 1980s, MTI later changed its name to Ennahda and participated in elections as much as the Tunisian regime under the leadership of Ben Ali allowed. Later, it became evident that Ennahda's participation in the political field was not going to be tolerated for a long time. After a brief period of support, Ennahda started to criticize some of Ben Ali's policies (e.g., the appointment of Minister of Education, government's policies in the Gulf War), and as a result, prosecutions against prominent members of Ennahda started again in 1991 and many nahdawis were forced to leave the country (Allani, 2009, p. 263). Despite the fact that some of the nahdawis (i.e., members and followers of the Ennahda party) committed violent acts before 1990 without the direct endorsement of the party's leadership, compared to other Islamist parties in the Arab world, Tunisian Ennahda was a peaceful example (Esposito, Rahim, & Ghobadzadeh, 2018, p. 4). In the 1990s, the level of autocracy and suppression increased and many nahdawis were arrested by the

government or fled for exile, together with leftists and other critiques of the Ben Ali regime. Unlike Algeria that entered a decade-long civil war after canceling the elections and repressed the Islamist Salvation Front (FIS) in 1992, Tunisian Islamists, who experienced similar human rights violations, did not choose violent ways to resist Ben Ali's autocratic regime.

In the late 1980s, Ben Ali started to impose neo-liberal policies including privatization that was advised by the International Monetary Fund. Interestingly, however, this privatization and marketization did not create an independent bourgeoisie who is able to play a positive role in democratization. Instead, the president, his wife, and those who are close to the regime "accumulated enormous wealth through the state, a relationship that radiated out and down through both the state apparatus and the new capitalists… [which] derived its surplus partly from state licensing and property speculation" (Allinson, 2015, p. 8). Without a doubt, the impact of foreign aid was quite significant for the endurance of Tunisian kleptocracy, indeed, until the revolution which toppled Ben Ali's regime, France had supported Tunisia monetarily. Arguably, the most important player in Tunisia who was against these policies was the Tunisian General Union of Workers (UGTT) which managed to retain its independence though in different degrees under Bourguiba and Ben Ali (Allinson, 2015, p. 9). After the success of the Jasmine Revolution, together with the Ennahda, UGTT played a positive role in the democratic transition as an important part of the post-Ben Ali national dialogue.

5.4.2 Tunisian army

Unlike Egypt and Turkey, civilian (and civilianized) leaders of Tunisia, namely, Bourguiba and his successor Ben Ali, chose to keep the military small compared to security forces of the Ministry of Interior. Indeed, the Tunisian army before Arab Spring is often considered as an "apolitical, patriotic and… professional institution" which does not interfere with domestic issues unlike most of the armies in the Muslim world (Mühlberger, 2015, p. 8). This "professionalism" narrative is repeated in many other works that explain the success of the Jasmine revolution (Bellin 2012; Lutterbeck, 2011); however, there is historical evidence which refutes this narrative by demonstrating series of failed coup attempts in 1962 and 1987 (Grewal, 2019, p. 4). Indeed, it was actually Ben Ali's growing fear of possible coup d'état that pushed him to support internal security forces at the expense of the Tunisian Armed Forces by cutting the budget for the military.

Moreover, coalition crises resulted from economic hardships and political disagreements, together with terror attacks organized by Salafist groups triggered serious coup rumors. Indeed, in 2013, the problems among the ruling coalition's members seemed insurmountable, especially after the assassination of secular politicians. The "near miss coup" was averted by two factors: Ennahda's political compromises and the role of international actors among which Germany led the field. In short, when the Tunisian military decided to side with the rioters during the Arab Spring, the military's distance to the regime was a key factor, but the army's choice in 2011 does not guarantee their disinterest in politics. In fact, their recent budgetary gains after democratization suggest that there are more at stake now for the military. In addition, their increasing prestige in the eyes of Tunisians (WVS, 2020) makes it less

costly for the army to intervene. The following sections will examine political alliances after the 2011 elections, deliberative processes during constitution drafting processes, and formation of international alliances, to answer how Ennahda's policies helped to keep the party within the reinforced survival pathway.

5.4.3 First democratic elections in Tunisia

Following Ben Ali's escape to Saudi Arabia, the first democratic elections in Tunisia, which was held in 2011, resulted in a broad cross-ideological coalition among secularist, leftist and IPPs. Although this unlikely democratic alliance which brought Nobel Prize is quite surprising for the region, this bloc was almost a decade older than the Arab Spring. In 2003, political Islamist Ennahda, social-democratic Ettakatol, center-left Congress for the Republic, and liberal Progressive Democratic Party representatives met in France's Aix-en-Provence and agreed on a common charter which states that the most important and immediate problem in Tunisia is to get rid of Ben Ali's dictatorship and establish a democratic regime (Marks, 2014, p. 11). These coalition-building efforts before the revolution provided different segments of the society with much-needed trust that is necessary during the transition period.

The consensus which was facilitated by the early meetings by different parties was indeed a unique aspect of Tunisian post-Spring politics; however, October 2011 elections and the subsequent constitution-drafting process was a significant challenge to newly born Tunisian democracy. More importantly, just like Egypt, during the constitution-drafting process, the "relation of forces was known and uneven" in Tunisia because elections chronologically preceded constitutional debates (Przeworski, 1991, p.

82). Unlike Egypt, however, remnants of the ancient regime (i.e., Neo- Destour Party) were excluded from politics and the army was relatively less involved in the early phases of the transition process. The main difference between the two countries was, however, Ennahda's willingness to compromise during the constitution-drafting process (2011-2014) despite its huge popularity after the 2011 elections (Table 6).

Table 6. 2011 Parliamentary Election Results in Tunisia

Political Party	Seats in the Parliament	Percent of Seats	Percent of Votes
Ennahda	89	41 percent	37 percent
Congress for the Republic	29	13.4 percent	8.7 percent
Popular Petition	26	12 percent	6.7 percent
Ettakatol	20	9.2 percent	7 percent
Democratic Progressive Party	16	7.4 percent	3.9 percent
The Initiative	5	2.3 percent	3.2 percent
Democratic Modernist Pole	5	2.3 percent	2.8 percent

Source: Carter Center, 2011

As Table 6 demonstrates, Ennahda won 41 percent of the seats and became the biggest party in the constituent assembly. While Salafist moments and parties failed to enter parliament, the third biggest party was the socially conservative Popular Petition which has been led by Mohamed Hechmi Hamdi. None of the non-Islamist parties including social democrats and leftists, on the other hand, managed to get more than 10 percent of the votes. According to Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE),

voter turnout was 54 percent which was high enough to demonstrate Tunisians' support for democracy, but not sufficiently high to provide the winner of the election with overconfidence when it comes to pursuing their political agenda. Indeed, one of the most vital differences between Ennahda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was their distinct interpretation of the election results. Following compromises resulted from this interpretation triggered grassroots reaction against Ennahda's leadership, however it helped Ennahda to survive in the long-term. In fact, the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party was also aware of the risk of political polarization which is a direct result of the Muslim Brotherhood's failure to establish a cross-ideological alliance. However, besides a few MPs from secular parties, Democratic Bloc that won the Egyptian Parliamentary election was dominated by the Brotherhood. Though Brotherhood's policies were not radical in terms of secularism, the fact that Morsi undertook many of the vital changes without strong alliances, was one of the main reasons behind his party's isolation in the political field.

On December 24, Ennahda's Hamadi Jebali was assigned as the prime minister, while CPR's Moncef Marzouki became the president and Ettakatol's Mustapha Ben Jafar became the head of the parliament. Ennahda occupied key ministries including Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, and Economy; however, CPR (6), Ettakatol (6), and independents (11) combined held more ministries and secretaries than Ennahda (19). While the Ennahda-led coalition was running the country as an executive branch, the constituent assembly was trying to agree on a new constitution according to the law that was approved on December 10. As a result of this law, a two-thirds majority was needed

to adopt the constitution, and if a two-thirds majority was not achieved for the second time, amendments and changes can be adopted by a general referendum.

Constitution-drafting process

In 2014, after 200 MPs of the 217-member National Constituent Assembly voted in favor of the new constitution, Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki stated that "with the birth of this text, we confirm our victory over dictatorship" ("Tunisia Signs New Constitution into Law", 2014). It was a momentous statement, particularly because of the difficulties experienced by Tunisians and the members of the so-called Troika government that consisted of CPR, Ennahda, and Ettakatol, during the constitution-drafting process. Among other tensions, stark differences among secularist and Islamist camps shaped the main debates which caused a series of postponements. Although a general referendum could have been a solution for the delayed process, it was a risky choice for all the actors of the nascent Tunisian democracy. For the secular actors, a constitution that is approved without deliberation and compromises might have led to an Islamist rule; while for Ennahda and other political Islamist, there were two threats: Firstly, the adoption of a new constitution in line with the party's ideology might have been a pyrrhic victory for Ennahda because the success could have frightened the secular parties and isolated the party; secondly, legitimacy of the party would have deteriorated, if the drafted constitution had been rejected by the general public.

In 2012, several thousand men and women who mostly belonged to Salafist groups and Ennahda's hardliners protested to include Sharia law in the country's constitution ("Thousands call for constitution", 2012). Sharia protests were the

successor of the Persepolis controversy where police arrested around 50 protestors who tried to set Nebil Karoui's Nessma TV station fire after it broadcast the Oscar-nominated animation "Persopolis" on the Iranian Revolution (Child, 2011). According to Marzouki, most of the Nahdawis were in favor of the Sharia reference in the constitution, whereas the minority within the party was claiming that Article 1 of the 1959 constitution which states that "Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state: its religion is Islam, its language is Arabic and its regime the Republic," was sufficient for emphasizing Tunisia's Islamic identity (Marzouki, 2017, p. 355). Rached Ghannouchi was among the latter group within Ennahda, particularly because of the possible international and domestic response due to the adoption of Sharia reference's inclusion. In March 2012, Ennahda leaders officially ruled out Sharia law and stated that they wanted to keep Article 1 of the 1959 constitution (Peyron, 2012). According to Marzouki, by maintaining the old article, Ennahda was showing its willingness to work with its coalition partners and "cultivating its international image of a moderate Islamist party" (Marzouki, 2017, p. 355). In one of his interviews after Ennahda decided on Sharia law, the party's cofounder Ghannouchi explained the underlying reasons behind this decision:

> We also tried to convince [the Salafis] that the situation was very fragile and if they pushed things to the limit, things could collapse. I reminded them that the Islamists in Algeria [the Islamic Salvation Front] got 80 percent of the votes – but that they lost everything because they didn't read the balance of power correctly. There was a bloodbath, maybe the ones who lost the election in Algeria had only 20 percent [of the vote] but they held all the centers of power in the country. (Fisk, 2012)

There were two other polarizing issue areas which delayed the constitutional process but eventually resulted in Ennahda's compromise: women's rights and criminalizing

blasphemy. In August 2012, around 6 thousand Tunisians protested when reports on Ennahda's push to alter the status of women which was defined as full equality with men by the 1959 constitution. Instead of using the term "equality," the constitutional draft stated that the "state guarantees the rights of women and supports what has been achieved for them as real partners of men in the building the nation and that the roles of men and women in the family are complementary" (European Parliament, 2012). Despite intraparty resistance, however, 2014 Constitution affirmed that "all citizens, male and female, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any discrimination" (Article 21); and the Tunisian state guaranteed "the equality of opportunities between women and men to have access to all levels of responsibility in all domains" (Article 46). First vice-president of Tunisia's constituent assembly, Meherzia Labidi celebrated the article by saying that "it's one of the articles in the constitution that I am most proud of." (Kottoor, 2014). In other words, as a result of deliberation and compromise, Ennahda decided to work with its coalition partners on women's rights and retained the equality-centric legal language of the Personal Status Law which was passed by Habib Bourguiba in 1956.

The third divisive Article in the constitutional draft was regarding the criminalization of attacks against sacred values of Abrahamic faiths, namely, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. It was a sensitive issue not only for Islamists but also for seculars as well, because criticizing the article in the constitutional draft might have interpreted by Tunisian people, of which bulk are religious, as supporting people's right to publicly attack Islam. Salafists' attempted raid to Nessma Tv after its Persepolis broadcast, for instance, did not trigger a strong reaction by secular and liberal NGOs,

unlike articles regarding women's rights in the constitutional draft which resulted in women's rally in Tunis. In the absence of a strong civil reaction, non-Islamist coalition members within the Troika government became the engine of compromise. Indeed, at the beginning of the drafting process, Ennahda's discourse on this matter was much less compromising compared to the appeasement policy that they pursued in women's rights issues and Sharia law discussion. In April 2012, for instance, when two young graduates posted caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed on Facebook sentenced to 7 years, some analysts considered this as an example of a "crackdown on freedom of expression" under the Ennahda-led government (Deasy, 2012). As a result of deliberation, the so-called blasphemy article which criminalizes attack on the sacred was dropped. Instead, the state is defined as "guardian of religion" and "protector of the sacred," after Ennahda accepted that constitution is not a place for specifying punishments. Regarding these deliberative processes, head of leftist Ettakatol, Mustapha Ben Jaafar stated that:

> There will certainly be no criminalization [of blasphemy]…That is not because we have agreed to (allow) attacks on the sacred, but because the sacred is something very, very difficult to define…Sometimes we hold talks within the troika (three-party ruling coalition) and we feel that they (Ennahda) are prepared to let their opinions develop, to move the lines a bit. (Lambroschini, 2012)

Coup rumors

Despite the continuous efforts of the political parties in Tunisia, two important developments triggered fears of coup d'état and civil disorder. The first one was the Egyptian coup on July 3, 2013, and the second one was the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, the leader of the secular People's Party and an opposition leader, on July 25, 2013. Egypt's coup was a warning sign for nascent Tunisian democracy, especially after

brutal civil wars in Libya and Syria were shown as proofs of liberty's costly outcomes for the Arab world. As constitution talks triggered polarization in some areas regarding religion, supporters of the ancient regime and worried seculars began to show their support for Military rule more vocally. Although regime supporters and Bourgibist parties constituted "disloyal opposition" since the fall of Ben Ali, the move of other secular, leftist and liberal parties that were not aligned with the regime from "loyal/semi-loyal" to "disloyal opposition" could have resulted in the revival of authoritarianism in Tunisia. Since the economic performance of the Troika government was not satisfactory enough to legitimize the democratic regime (Figure 3), an unbearable level of ideological polarization among political parties could have triggered the collapse of the transition.



Fig. 3 Support for Democracy in Tunisia between 2012 and 2014
Source: Pew Research Center (2014)

Mohamed Brahmi was the second Tunisian opposition leader after Chokri Belaid, head of liberal Unified Democratic Nationalist Party who was assassinated in 2013. Just like Belaid's assassination on February 6, the death of Brahmi sparked anti-Ennahda

protests, nonetheless, the timing of the latter protests was more threatening for the Ennahda, because of the successful coup d'état led by Sisi in Egypt. Not only Brahmi's family but also secular/leftist elite and political parties blamed Ennahda for encouraging Salafists by not fighting their ideology enough and giving life space to them. Indeed, Ennahda's did not follow repressive policies that were implemented during Bourguiba's and Ben Ali's rules to eradicate Salafist ideology in Tunisia. Though Ennahda tried to implement policies to curb the influence of the Salafists in the mosques ("Le gouvernement tunisien s'inquiète", 2012) the party's main aim is the legalization of the Salafist movements. Ghannouchi once stated that his aim was to make them sit at the political table, by encouraging legal Salafist parties and reducing restrictive policies which were the reason behind Salafists' radicalization:

> Most of the Salafis are enrolled in non-government organizations (NGOS). Only two parties have registered– Islah (or Reform), and the other is new. Both are small. They are not like Egyptian Salafi parties. We want to draw them into work in an organized and lawful way… Jihadi violence is not a normal phenomenon. It is more of a reaction to the absence of freedom and the lack of development. (Wright, 2012)

5.4.4 Ennahda's international alliances

The role of foreign policy and foreign countries was also quite significant in the reinforced survival of Tunisian democracy and the Ennahda Party. As the former protectorate of Tunisia, France supported the secularly flavored autocracy of Ben Ali until he fell from power. In fact, this support continued during the protests where the French political elite offered help to the regime for suppressing the revolt (Krüger & Stahl, 2018, p.1; Ratka & Stahl, 2018, p. 133). After Tunisia's successful revolution French President Sarkozy accepted that he has "underestimated" the revolutionary

situation in Tunisia and asked Prime Minister François Fillon to economically assist the transitional government ("Sarkozy says France 'underestimated", 2011). France's underestimation did not cause a breakdown in its relationship with Tunisia, but it helped other actors, such as Germany, to take the political lead in Tunisia's transition process. The Tunisian Troika government developed a constructive relationship with Germany to gain legitimacy internationally, and Germany, which had not pursued a systematic MENA strategy before, happily accepted Tunisia as an ally. Besides promoting European democratic values, stability in Tunisia was significant for Germany for pragmatic reasons such as migration (Holthaus, 2019). German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, in January 2012, emphasized the importance of supporting the democratic process in Tunisia:

> It is important for us to take a sober and unbiased view. Political Islam is not the same thing as radical Islamism. An Islamic orientation does not in itself mean that a group has retrograde, anti-modern, anti-democratic or anti-freedom views…There is an opportunity for moderate Islamic forces to permanently establish themselves in the form of Islamic democratic parties. It is very much in our interest for Islamic democratic parties to become established as a role model. That is why we should do everything we can to support this approach. (Westerwelle, 2012).

German support to Tunisian democratic revolution and Troika government was particularly important for Ennahda Party whose "international recognition was furthered" by diplomatic visits by German officials. Germany's diplomatic activities were followed by a "U-turn" in French policy, especially after President Nicolas Sarkozy lost an election to François Hollande (Krüger & Stahl, 2018). Two months after Hollande's inauguration, Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki made a significant visit to France for rebuilding bilateral relations. In his historical address to French Assembly, he stated that the ruling Ennahda is "Islamo Democratic Party", just like Western

Christian Democrats ("Marzouki: Ennahda is Tunisian prototype", 2012). On July 4, 2013, two days later the coup d'etat in Egypt Hollande became the first French president to visit Tunisia after the revolution. In his speech at Tunisian Parliament, Hollande not only expressed his wish to rebuild strong relations with Tunisia but also praised the democratic transition by comparing it with unsuccessful examples, such as Syria, Libya, and Egypt (Bryant, 2013).

On August 6, 2013, Ben Jafaar, Ettakatol's leader and the head of the constituent assembly, suspended the assembly till the dialogue between the Ennahda-led government and secular opposition restarts. Because Ben Jafaar's decision occurred in such a heated context (i.e., series of assassinations and mass protests), some members of the parliament from the ruling Ennahda considered it as "a participation in the coup d'etat led by the opposition" ("With suspended constituent assembly", 2012). The opposition Nidaa Tounes party, on the other hand, regarded this decision as a confession made by a member of the Troika coalition regarding the grave situation in the country. Amid growing fears of a domino effect after the Egyptian coup d'etat, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle visited Tunisia to mediate between the Ennahda-led government and the opposition (Mersch, 2013).

There were two main camps in the opposition, namely, those who demanded the downfall of the Ennahda-led Troika government and dissolution of the parliament (e.g., Nidaa Tounes), and those who demanded a non-partisan and technocratic government without dissolving constituent assembly before the constitutional drafting process is completed (e.g., UGTT) (Marzouki, 2017, p. 362). Ennahda, on the other hand, was not willing to establish a technocratic cabinet which, according to the ruling party, was

unable to solve the country's problems that were piling up; however, as a result of international (i.e., Germany) and domestic (i.e., UGTT) mediation efforts, both the ruling party and opposition parties decided to compromise. Accordingly, Ennahda accepted the caretaker non-partisan government which will serve till the next elections, and the opposition gave up their demands to dissolve the constituent assembly. Ennahda lost the 2014 elections to the former main opposition party, Nidaa Tounes, in an election where almost 65 percent of Tunisians voted, but the IPP continued its cross-ideological alliance strategy after the 2019 elections.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary

This chapter presents a summary of the main arguments that were introduced in the chapters above. The relationship between political Islam and democracy is a significant research topic which helps us to comprehend the political developments in Muslim majority countries on the tenth anniversary of the Arab Spring. The research question of this thesis is: "Why did some IPPs survive after winning an election, while others were either repressed or trapped into a precarious existence, although the states where these parties join elections have a similar level of suspicion towards these parties?" Alternative explanations were examined in the literature review section under four different categories, namely, (1) modernization theory, (2) culturalist explanations, (3) macro-level, and (4) actor-oriented approaches. Another commonly used independent variable, that is, the military's level of involvement in politics also controlled for all the cases. Although actorless theories successfully describe the reasons behind the difficulties experienced by IPPs once they came to power, and why these regimes are considered hostile to IPPs, these explanations reduce IPPs to being ineffective actors. In other words, according to the above-mentioned theories, regardless of the strategy that is followed by an IPP, if the structural factors are not suitable for IPP's coming to power, the result is repression. This thesis challenges these arguments by demonstrating the significant impact of different policy decisions chosen by the IPPs. Without a doubt, decisions matter more in certain periods when the impact of structural factors decreases.

In an extremely undemocratic system where all political parties are pro-regime or a country ruled by a monarchy with totalitarian tendencies, for instance, it would be meaningless to talk about political parties' choices, as opposition parties would be found in other countries which accepted opposition figures' asylum request. IPP's electoral victory constitutes such a contingency moment when decisions of actors gain importance. Though structural limitations continue to play a role in shaping those decisions during contingency periods, political actors still have a relatively wider palette of policy choices among which each decision leads to distinct outcomes. For instance, characteristics of the IPPs' voters affect the costs and benefits of choosing a certain policy: by following liberal policies, Ennahda lost a certain segment of its votes, but JDP received more votes. For an IPP during a contingency period, however, the number of votes received is merely one of the main goals, because, as repeatedly underlined by the leaders of IPPs examined here, winning an election by receiving 50 percent of the votes does not guarantee reinforced survival (e.g., coup d'état against FIS). In addition to election victory, therefore, parties aim to survive, and occasionally these objectives collide with each other (e.g., Ennahda).

Without a doubt, not all political decisions have similar impacts: this thesis argues that when a new-comer IPP gains enough power to alter the system, the secular establishment (unelected officials) develops a reaction that may lead to repression. In order to avoid this pathway, IPPs should build strong alliances, thereby escaping isolation which can increase their vulnerability. These strong alliances are called value-based alliances, not because they do not require common interests, but rather due to the fact that alliances that are solely based on interests (i.e., interest-based alliances) are

significantly weaker than the former type of alliances. In other words, value-based alliances are not the exact opposite of interest-based alliances, but rather, as detailly explained in Chapter I, reinforced versions of the latter type of alliances. By introducing a novel typology for alliances, this thesis aims to serve a practical purpose as well: because IPPs are the most organized organizations in most of the Muslim majority countries, democratic openings often lead to IPPs electoral victory, which in turn trigger a harsh reaction by a secular establishment. As mentioned above, alliances allow IPPs to avert these reactions and ultimately alter the power balance between elected and unelected officials. Lastly, the term value is used in a very specific sense here, namely, principles that can bring different ideological groups together. In other words, alliances based on single religion, ethnicity, or ideology may still be considered value-based alliances, however, these types of alliances are intentionally excluded from the definition of the term particularly due to their ineffectiveness in protecting IPPs from isolation. When an alliance is called a value-based one, therefore, we are referring to cross-ideological value-based alliances.

Turkey's JDP and Tunisia's Ennahda managed to form value-based (strong) alliances with both domestic and international actors, as a result, the IPPs did not face isolation which might have led to a repression pathway. At the other end of the spectrum, FIS and FJP could not form even interest-based alliances with domestic actors who see these parties as threats. Though President Morsi formed a weak interest-based alliance with the United States by brokering the Hamas-Israel ceasefire deal, domestically FJP was isolated by the secular establishment and other secular parties. This thesis argues that the most dangerous strategy for IPPs is seeking fundamental changes without strong

allies, even if these changes are largely acceptable to the secular groups (e.g., 2012 Constitution in Egypt). The precarious existence pathway, on the other hand, explains WP's and PJD's experience. Despite WP's closure in 1997 coup d'état (and its predecessor NSP's closure in 1980), the National Outlook movement continued to exist in the political field, as secular establishment aimed to discipline these political parties rather than eliminating them. PJD-led governments were also interfered with by the palace quite frequently. Rather than seeking to alter the power balance between unelected and elected officials, these parties chose to focus on symbolic and cultural policy issues which were highly divisive both in Turkey and Morocco. Besides, none of these parties formed robust value-based alliances with domestic and international actors. While WP's and PJD's divisive symbolic issues resulted in isolation and polarization, they were able to form coalition governments based on interest-based alliances, since these parties did not attempt to alter the status quo (i.e., power balance).

6.2 Alternative explanations

Explanation 1) Strong economic performance (i.e., high growth, low unemployment, low inflation) after IPPs come to power, reduce the chance of repression

One alternative hypothesis can be formed by examining economic developments on the one hand, and the timing of these economic developments on the other. In other words, IPPs that introduce strong economic performance in countries with unstable economies would survive thanks to the strong economic performance's support-generating influence. While this thesis accepts the strong impact of macro-level factors on political outcomes, as Tunisia's experience demonstrates, low growth and high unemployment

does not necessarily lead to repression (Figure 4 and 6). While stronger growth numbers and significantly lower unemployment does no help PJD in Morocco and WP in Turkey to escape from precarious existence. Having said that, as claimed above, stable economic growth after 2002 was in fact played an important role in increasing the level of support for JDP (Figure 5 and 7). Nevertheless, the economic growth hypothesis cannot explain why the secular establishment waited long enough to allow JDP for garnering more support. When the WP-TPP coalition government ended the year 1996 with impressive economic growth (7.4 percent) and relatively low unemployment (6.6 percent), the military acted quite rapidly. Consequently, even the JDP case which seemingly fits the hypothesis offers weak evidence for the "economic growth-survival" argument.



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Egypt	11.2	10.49	8.8	8.517	9.087	8.757	11.85	12.6	13.15	13.1	13.05
Tunisia	12.87	12.51	12.36	12.44	13.29	13.05	18.33	17.63	15.93	15.06	15.22
Morocco	11.01	9.67	9.56	9.57	8.96	9.09	8.91	8.99	9.23	9.7	9.46

Fig. 4 Unemployment Rates in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco between 2005 and 2015
Source: World Bank



Fig. 5 Unemployment Rates in Turkey between 1994 and 2004
Source: World Bank



Fig. 6 GDP Growth (Annual %) in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco between 2005 and 2015
Source: World Bank



Fig. 7 GDP Growth (Annual %) in Turkey between 1994 and 2004
Source: World Bank

Explanation 2: Military's involvement in politics

Explanation 2.a: Depoliticized armed forces increase the chance of reinforced survival for IPPs.

Explanation 2.b: When there is a divergence between military and civilian wings of secular establishment, IPPs have a better chance of reinforced survival.

Explanation 2.c: When a security apparatus is not dominated by the military (i.e., domestic security forces are as influential as the military), IPPs are more likely to survive.

Examining the military's professionalism and politicization is common in democratization literature, especially those that focus on Muslim majority countries. It is indeed sensible to claim that militaries which have experience in political involvement (e.g., coups, memorandums) are more likely to act against IPPs, particularly because, parties examined in this thesis are an anti-status quo stance on many of the critical

issues. Accordingly, IPPs in countries with professional and depoliticized armies, such as Tunisian and Moroccan armed forces, will have a better chance of surviving after an electoral victory. Without a doubt, Tunisian and Moroccan armies were structured as such because they were considered a threat to the regime's persistence. Ben Ali who came to power as a result of the 1987 coup d'état, was a Brigadier General before being appointed in high civilian positions, such as, minister of interior and prime minister by then-president Bourguiba. Despite his military background, however, during Ben Ali's reign, as demonstrated in Chapter I, the military budget significantly declined, and the domestic security apparatus started to play a more dominant role in Tunisia's security architecture. In Morocco, on the other hand, a similar process began after two coup attempts in the early 1970s, which aimed to topple King Hassan II. Under Mohammed VI's rule, his predecessor's policies continued, and domestic security forces became a counterbalancing factor against military forces. Though in Morocco (especially under Mohammed VI), unlike Tunisia, the ultimate objective was to create a military which is loyal to the monarchy, not to the leader as a person.

In Algeria and Egypt, civilianized leaders were not always on good terms with the military as well. While Boumediene who came to power as a result of a coup, was targeted by an almost successful coup attempt in 1967, his successor Bendjedid's reforms were not fully welcomed by the military forces. Mubarak, on the other hand, was continuously threatened by the high-ranking military officers due to his soft-handed approach towards Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s, his market-friendly economic program, and his alleged plans to prepare his son as his successor. Turkish armed forces were not less politicized than Egyptian and Algerian militaries, though their method was

less visible and more indirect than the armies in these two countries. Indeed, Turkish armed forces interfered in politics mainly to discipline and redesign, rather than ruling for long periods.

As demonstrated in Chapters III, IV, and V, military institutions in examined countries were among the most significant parts of secular establishments. Besides, regardless of their politicization level, they play a vital role by acting (e.g., Algerian coup d'état in 1992) or not-acting (e.g., military's refusal to suppress the demonstrators during Jasmine Revolution) during the contingency periods. Table 7 is also a useful tool for scrutinizing common explanations used for explaining the success or failure of IPPs. This thesis does not overlook the differences of military institutions, rather, it aims to understand why the same armed forces acted quite differently against two different parties, that is, WP and JDP. This novel understanding has also direct policy implications: a depoliticized army does not necessarily lead to reinforced survival pathway, as PJD's experience demonstrates, therefore IPPs should accept the military's political involvement as a continuous possibility.

Table 7. Alternative Explanations

Explanations	Incompatible cases	Compatible Cases
Explanation 2.a: Depoliticized armed forces increase the chance of reinforced survival for IPPs.	**JDP:** Highly politicized military, but the outcome is reinforced survival. **PJD:** Depoliticized military, but the outcome is a precarious existence.	**WP:** Politicized military, the outcome is a precarious existence. **FJP, FIS:** Politicized military, the outcome is repression. **Ennahda:** Depoliticized military, the outcome is reinforced survival.
Explanation 2.b: When there is a divergence between military and civilian wings of secular establishment, IPPs have a better chance of reinforced survival.	**JDP:** No significant divergence between civilian and military wings of secular establishment, but the result is reinforced survival. **FJP, FIS:** Civilian and military wings of the secular establishment are somehow divergent, but the result is repression.	**Ennahda:** Significant divergence between civilian and military wings of secular establishment, the result is reinforced survival. **WP, PJD:** No significant divergence between civilian and military wings of secular establishment, the result is a precarious existence.
Explanation 2.c: When a security apparatus is not dominated by the military (i.e., domestic security forces are as influential as the military), IPPs are more likely to survive.	**JDP:** Security apparatus is dominated by the military, but the result is reinforced survival. **PJD:** Security apparatus is divided, but the result is a precarious existence.	**FJP, FIS:** Security apparatus is dominated by the military, the result is repression. **Ennahda:** Security apparatus is divided (domestic security forces are more dominant), the result is reinforced survival. **WP:** Security apparatus is dominated by the military; the result is a precarious existence.

Explanation 3: IPPs have a better chance of surviving in countries with a high level of human development

The level of human development is a commonly used independent variable in modernization theory (Chapter II). Accordingly, democracy can only emerge and/or endure in those countries with a high level of human development (e.g., high literacy rate, high income, etc.). Table 8 demonstrates the problems of predicting outcomes by simply observing Income level or human development. Indeed, PJD which has operated in a country with lower GDP per capita PPP and HDI score, managed to exist in the political field albeit precariously, whereas FJP was repressed. Similarly, Turkey's GPD per capita PPP in 2002 (i.e., the year JDP won the election) was slightly lower than Egypt's in 2011 (i.e., the year FJP won the election), however, parties faced radically different fates namely, reinforced survival and repression.

Table 8. Socio-economic Indicators and Political Outcomes

IPP	FIS	WP	JDP	Ennahda	PJD	FJP
HDI (year)	0,576 (1991)	0,620 (1996)	0,677 (2002)	0,718 (2011)	0,626 (2011)	0,671 (2011)
HDI Ranking	90th	85th	88th	98th	128th	115th
GDP per capita PPP (year)	6.892$ (1991)	11.113$ (1996)	9.401$ (2002)	10.067$ (2011)	6.712$ (2011)	9.686$ (2011)
Outcome	Repression	Precarious Existence	Reinforced Survival	Reinforced Survival	Precarious Existence	Repression

Source: World Bank and UNDP Human Development Reports

6.3 Future research

In countries that are examined, the secularist-religious division is not the only fault line that separate people, rather, there are a significant number of works that focus on other cleavages such as social classes (e.g., devout bourgeoisie), nevertheless, during the above-mentioned contingency periods, class cleavages play a secondary role in mobilizing the society. For instance, between 2002 and 2007, JDP's pro-market economic policies, were not the primary discussion topic in the society, rather, despite the impact of these economic policies on people's daily lives, the tensest debates were about secularism. Interestingly, as can be observed in Egypt and Algeria, IPPs' economic policies, which are often more market-friendly than the majority of the other political parties in those countries, play a vital role in causing a reaction by the regime, since unelected officials in countries with controlled economies have too much to lose from liberalization agenda that was promised by the IPPs. Even when the economy is a major factor, however, the regimes rarely use arguments related to the economy. Arguably, if a political party or leader that aims to radically transform the economic system (e.g., Salvador Allende) wins a democratic election in a Muslim majority country, fault lines may change, and unexpected novel pacts can be formed among different political actors.

Examining alliances serves another purpose as well: though IPPs were active mostly in authoritarian regimes, even in full-fledged democracies, there are certain groups which are considered illegitimate. Far-right parties in robust western

democracies are among the examples of such political parties. On February 8, 2020, Thuringia State Premier, Christian Democrat politician Thomas Kemmerich resigned after being elected thanks to the support of Alternative for Germany (AfD). Thomas Kemmerich was the first candidate who was elected with the support of a far-right party since World War II. Despite the fact that it was an electoral victory against left-wing parties for the Christian Democrats, Angela Merkel described the election in which AfD supported her candidate as "unforgivable" and "a bad day for democracy" ("Germany: state premier resigns", 2020). Without a doubt, Merkel reacted rapidly and clearly, because she was aware of the legitimizing role of domestic alliances. Though Ennahda, the first democratically elected political party in Tunisian history, played a democratizing role, alliances may also legitimize far-right agendas of political parties as can be seen in Germany. Before arriving at this conclusion, however, one should keep in mind that value-based alliances lead to reinforced survival pathway when they are cross-ideological, and different ideologies can only meet on principles which are pluralist and democratic by nature. Further research can examine the moderation impact of cross-ideological value-based alliances as opposed to interest-based alliances.

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