A SEMANTIC DESCRIPTION OF TURKISH CONDITIONAL SENTENCES

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A Semantic Description of Turkish Conditional Sentences

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ABSTRACT

A Semantic Description of Turkish Conditional Sentences

This thesis aims to provide a semantic description for the conditional statements in Turkish by mainly focusing on the interpretations of three different morphemes: namely the aorist, the conditional, and the past markers. Although Göksel and Kerslake (2005) briefly describe how the interpretation of conditional constructions may be affected by these markers, there has not been any detailed study on their semantic contributions. Therefore, I offer a semi-formal explanation for their interpretations in the context of conditionals here. Firstly, for the aorist marker occurring at the antecedent, I propose that it can shift the time of the modal operator in the conditional statement from the time of utterance to the future. However, if it chooses its characterizing reading instead of the future-oriented one, then it functions as an operator quantifying over situations. Secondly, with respect to the conditional morpheme, I argue that there are two separate markers with distinct meaning contributions. I claim that the indicative conditional marker *-(y)sA* assigns "epistemically possible" presupposition both for its antecedent and consequent clauses whereas the subjunctive *-sA* additionally brings in a certain "likelihood" presupposition for the antecedent. Lastly, concerning the past marker, I agree with the idea that it keeps its temporal meaning in both types of conditionals. Nevertheless, I suggest that it is interpreted as the modal time of the conditional statement when it is used with the subjunctive conditional marker and the conditional sentence holds no presuppositions in this context. As a result, due to the scalar competition between the past subjunctive and its indicative counterpart, the counterfactuality implicature arises for the past subjunctive conditional construction.

ÖZET

Türkçe Koşul Cümlelerinin Anlambilimsel Tanımı

Bu tez, temel olarak üç farklı biçimbirimin (geniş zaman, koşul ve geçmiş zaman belirteçleri) yorumlarına odaklanarak, Türkçedeki koşullu ifadeler için anlambilimsel bir açıklama sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Göksel ve Kerslake (2005) koşullu yapıların anlamlarının bu belirteçlerden nasıl etkilenebileceğini kısaca açıklasa da, onların anlamsal katkıları hakkında ayrıntılı bir çalışma yapılmamıştır.Bu nedenle, burada onların koşul cümleleri bağlamındaki anlamları için yarı resmi bir açıklama sunuyorum. İlk olarak, öncülde bulunan geniş zaman belirteci için, koşullu ifadedeki kip operatörününün zamanını sözce zamanından geleceğe kaydırabileceğini öneriyorum. Diğer yandan, eğer geniş zaman belirteci geleceğe yönelik okuması yerine karakterize edici okumasını seçerse, durumlar üzerinde nicelleştirme yapan bir operatör olarak işlev görüyor. İkinci olarak, koşul biçimbirimi ile ilgili olarak, farklı anlam katkıları olan iki ayrı belirteç olduğunu savunuyorum. *-(y)sA* bildirme koşul belirtecinin hem öncülü hem de sonucu için "epistemik olarak olası" önvarsayımı atadığını, buna ek olarak -s*A* dilek koşul belirtecinin öncül için belirli bir "olasılık" önvarsayımı getirdiğini iddia ediyorum. Son olarak, geçmiş zaman belirteci ile ilgili olarak, her iki koşul türünde de zamansal anlamını koruduğu fikrine katılıyorum. Yine de dilek koşul belirteci ile kullanıldığında, koşul cümlesinin kip zamanı olarak yorumlandığını ve koşul cümlesinin bu bağlamda herhangi bir önvarsayımı olmadığını ileri sürüyorum. Sonuç olarak, geçmiş dilek koşulu ile onun bildirme niteliğindeki karşılığı arasındaki skaler rekabet nedeniyle, geçmiş dilek koşullu yapısı için karşıolgusallık iması ortaya çıkıyor.

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ABBREVIATIONS

1Pl	First person plural
1Sg	First person singular
1SgPoss	First person singular possessive marker
2Pl	Second person plural
2Sg	Second person singular
2SgPoss	Second person singular possessive marker
3SgPoss	Third person singular possessive marker
Abl	Ablative
Acc	Accusative
AOR	Aorist
AUX	Auxiliary
Com	Comitative
COND	Conditional
Dat	Dative
EPIS	Epistemic marker
EV	Evidential
FUT	Future
IMP	Imperative
IMPF	Imperfective
IND.COND	Indicative conditional
Loc	Locative
NEG	Negation
OBLG	Obligative
PAST	Past
PFV	Perfective
Pl	Plural
PSB	Possibility
Q	Question particle
SUBJ.COND	Subjunctive conditional

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 My aim in this study

The categorization of Turkish conditionals is not uniform in the literature. While Aygen (1996) classifies them as "real and unreal" or "counterfactual and non-counterfactual" (2004), Sezer (2001) labels the conditional markers *–(y)sA* and *–sA* as "indicative and subjunctive", respectively. Although subjunctives are usually considered counterfactual or unreal and indicatives assert real or non-counterfactual interpretations, and many papers on the topic use these terms interchangeably, these notions are distinct. While *subjunctive* is a morphological label, *counterfactual* is a semantic notion. According to von Fintel (2005), counterfactual conditionals mostly correspond to past subjunctive conditionals like (1), whereas their non-past counterparts as in (2) are listed as future less vivid (FLV) constructions.

(1) If you had finished your meal, I would have given you some chocolate.

(2) If you finished your meal, I would give you some chocolate.

Furthermore, the counterfactuality of the antecedent clause in subjunctive conditionals is actually cancellable and hence regarded as an implicature as shown in (3), the famous example of Anderson (1951).

(3) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.

However, it is almost impossible to cancel the falsity implicature of the antecedent in mismatched past subjunctives (Ippolito, 20002, 2003, 2004) and inverted subjunctive conditionals (Iatridou & Embick, 1994), as seen from the examples (4) and (5) taken from von Fintel (2011, p. 5).

(4) If Charlie had married Sally tomorrow, he would have had his bachelor party tonight. #So, let's see whether the party is tonight.

(5) Had Charlie married Sally yesterday, they would have left on their honeymoon by now. #So, let's see whether they're gone.

Given that counterfactuality is a semantic notion, I will not use it to classify conditionals. Instead, I adopt an objective morphological distinction, namely the indicative and subjunctive division in describing various conditional constructions in Turkish, following Sezer (2001).

Although the conditional markers are instrumental in describing the conditional constructions, they are not the sole influential elements in Turkish. The aorist and the past markers also have certain effects on the interpretations of the indicative and subjunctive conditionals, respectively. Therefore, my aim in this thesis is not only to explain the distinctions between the indicative and subjunctive conditionals but also to investigate the impacts of the aorist marker in indicative conditionals and the past marker in the subjunctive version. While doing that, I mainly focus on the three distinct conditional structures that are illustrated in (6), (7), and (8). I propose that the aorist marker in (6) contributes to the time notion of the modal operator[1] in the conditional structure and sets it to the future or in some other contexts makes quantification over situations. Besides, to describe the division between the indicative and subjunctive conditionals, respectively shown by (6) and (7), I dwell on their presuppositions rather than their modal time. I argue that the indicative version has "epistemically possible" presupposition whereas the subjunctive alternative presupposes a certain kind of "likelihood" for the antecedent's assertion. On the other hand, the past marker in subjunctive conditionals

[1] I refer to this notion as "modal time" henceforth.

influences both the modal time and the presuppositions and allows speakers to generate a counterfactual implicature due to its effects on presuppositions.

(6) *Indicative Conditional*

Neşe	bilet	bul-ur-sa,	Artvin-e	gid-er.
Neşe	ticket	find-AOR-IND.COND	Artvin-Dat	go-AOR

'If Neşe finds a ticket, she will go to Artvin.'

(7) *(Present) Subjunctive Conditional*

Neşe	bilet	bul-sa,	Artvin-e	gid-er.
Neşe	ticket	find-SUBJ.COND	Artvin-Dat	go-AOR

'If Neşe found a ticket, she would go to Artvin.'

(8) *Past Subjunctive Conditional*

Neşe	bilet	bul-sa-ydı,	Artvin-e	gid-er-di.
Neşe	ticket	find-SUBJ.COND-PAST	Artvin-Dat	go-AOR-PAST

'If Neşe had found a ticket, she would have gone to Artvin.'

In this introductory part of my thesis, I first provide some basics for the semantic analysis of conditional structures in general, by mainly focusing on the restrictor analysis (Kratzer, 1986, 1991) since it is partially what I adopt in my own analysis as well. Later, I briefly compare different views on the derivation of counterfactual implicatures in the literature. Finally, I give some sample data and information for the conditional structures in Turkish to preview my claims in the upcoming chapters.

1.2 Semantics of conditionals

The conditional sentences in the form of *if p, (then) q* are minimally composed of an antecedent *p* and a consequent *q* clause. Although it is possible to have more than

one antecedent and more than one consequent, the type of conditional sentences that are examined in this study on Turkish meets this minimum requirement.

This section is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the simple logical form (LF) of conditional sentences according to the restrictor analysis. The second part provides a general background in the description of counterfactual, in other words, past subjunctive, conditionals.

1.2.1 Semantics of bare conditionals

There are certain classical analyses of conditionals in the literature, which do not sufficiently correspond to the meaning of 'conditional'. One of these analyses is the material implication which operates on the truth values of the antecedent and consequent clauses. In this view, only if the consequent clause is false when the antecedent is true, can the proposition be false (Suber, 1997). However, this does not apply to the conditionals of natural languages as the statement would always be true irrespective of the truth value of the condition (the antecedent clause) if the main clause (the consequent) is true. Another analysis that does not suffice for the description of conditionals is the strict implication analysis (Lewis, 1918), which is simply the propositional version of the material implication. Later, a "variably strict" version of this analysis was developed, which involves quantification over not all antecedent worlds but only the most similar ones to the actual world (Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968).[2] In natural languages though, the conditional part appears to add a certain restriction to the interpretation of the main clause. Therefore, the restrictor analysis works better for the semantics of conditionals and hence is the prevalent approach in linguistics, as well.

[2] For an elaborate information on the history of different approaches to the semantics of conditionals, see von Fintel (2011).

On the account of what is restricted with *if*-clauses, as von Fintel (2011) summarizes, there has been a certain shift. Lewis (1975) first proposed that the adverbs of quantification in the main clause get restricted by the conditional sentence as in (9), and *if* in the conditional clause is semantically vacuous.

(9) If we go out, we *always/usually/mostly/rarely/sometimes/never* eat dessert.

Thus, he argued that the only 'conditional' operator in the sentence is in fact the adverbs of quantification and the conditional sentence is merely restricting the adverb. However, he did not generalize his idea to all the conditionals, which was done later by Kratzer. Kratzer (1986) stated that the case of conditionals is a "syntactic mistake" and natural languages do not possess a "two-place *if…then* connective" as in logic and *if*-clauses only restrict the domain of different operators. Unlike Lewis (1975), Kratzer (1991) took 'modal' as the operator and claimed that when the *if* clause is included in the sentence, it functions as a restrictor for all the worlds that are accessible from the evaluation world in the modal base. He further argued that in case there be no overt modal operators as exemplified in (10) and (11), then there exists a covert universal operator.

(10) If I get up early, I do yoga.

(11) If he set off on Wednesday, he arrived yesterday.

Heim (1982) builds on this proposal and applies it to the "donkey sentences" as in (12) for the analysis of indefinite nouns. To put it simply, she argues that the reason for construing (12) with the meaning in (13) despite it including two existential quantifiers can be accounted for via the covert universal operator generated in bare indicative conditionals.


(12) If a man has a donkey, he beats it.

(13) Every man who has a donkey beats it.

Consequently, this analysis can sometimes be called the "Lewis/Kratzer/Heim" analysis following Partee (1991). However, I keep using the term "restrictor" to refer to this analysis as in von Fintel (2011).

The LF representation for conditionals under the assumptions of restrictor analysis would look as follows in (14)[3]:

(14)



It is apparent from (14) that compositionally the logical form of conditionals seems clearly distinct from their surface structure. Although the *if* particle is considered semantically vacuous here, I propose in my own adaptation of this analysis that the conditional markers in Turkish in fact do get interpreted in LF as well.

1.2.2 Semantics of counterfactual conditionals

On the ground of counterfactuality, certain attributes are agreed upon. The first of these traits is the fact that the counterfactuality reading emerges through the combination of a modal operator with a tense or aspectual marker that refers to the past or perfectivity; and the second one is about the counterfactuality interpretation

[3] I have not included the ordering source in the modal base for the ease of representation, but it needs to be noted that it is utilized for choosing the set of worlds which are most similar to the actual world.

being a conversational implicature[4] rather than an assertion or a presupposition of the sentence (e.g., Aygen, 2004; Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2002, 2003,2004, 2013; Verstraete & Van linden, 2008; von Fintel, 1998, 2005, 2011, 2012). As (15) demonstrates, the counterfactuality of the proposition is just an implicature since we can either cancel or reinforce this interpretation without creating any contradiction or redundancy.

(15) We would have gone to the picnic, and we actually did/but we didn't.

The occurrence of past morphology in both clauses of subjunctive conditionals is esteemed as agreement by many including Iatridou (2000), Ippolito (2002), and von Fintel (2005), and the past in the consequent clause with a modal operator is deemed necessary by Ippolito (2002). Therefore, (16) including the combination of *woll* modal with the past implies a counterfactuality while (17) does not do any such thing due to lacking the *woll* modal operator at the consequent.

(16) If I had time, I would help you.

(17) If I had time, I helped you.

Although the non-past subjunctives like in (16) also involve the past tense in English, they are not considered counterfactual by most (e.g., FLVs in von Fintel, 2005); albeit Iatridou (2000) regards FLVs and Present Counterfactuals as counterfactual in her analysis, as well.

In respect of the necessity of having a past tense morphology accompanying the modal operator in counterfactuals, two main frameworks of explanation exist: one regarding the past tense with a different meaning rather than past time (past as modal) (Iatridou, 2000) and the other considering past tense with its actual time

[4] It is possible to cancel the falsity of the sentence without creating contradiction or assert the falsity without causing redundancy. Although the counterfactuality implicature is mainly provided for the antecedent clauses of conditionals in the literature, I believe it is generalizable to main clauses with past modalities, as well.

reference (past as past) (Ippolito, 2002). Iatridou proposes that the past tense morphology actually introduces an *exclusion feature (ExclF)* to the proposition. If this *ExclF* ranges over times, the actual 'past tense' reading occurs, that is, the topic time is excluded from the utterance time. However, if it ranges over worlds[5], 'counterfactuality' reading arises by excluding the topic world from the actual world. Iatridou (2000) further discusses how the counterfactuality reading is implied but not asserted with this feature. She states that when the speaker chooses to utter *p* by excluding the actual world, it may be because she[6] does not consider the actual world to be a p world. However, it is not *asserted* that the actual world is a not-p world (i.e., member of the set of worlds where p is false). Thus, Iatridou (2000) concludes that "all a [counterfactual] conditional marks is that the actual world is not among the p worlds *that we are talking about*; it does not mark that the actual world is not among the *p* worlds." (p.248).

Inspired by Iatridou's (2000) idea, Ippolito (2002) also argues that the past morphology in subjunctive conditionals is indeed what marks counterfactuality[7]. Notwithstanding, they differ from each other on the meaning they assign to the 'past' morpheme. Although Iatridou attributes another meaning to the 'past', Ippolito retains its temporal/aspectual meaning in her analysis. She proposes that the past tense, depending on where it is interpreted in the logical form, may affect the interpretation of the antecedent proposition or the interpretation of the modal (in particular the accessibility relation). According to this view, if it affects the modal

[5] Iatridou calls this type of past morphology as *'fake past'*.
[6] I use the pronoun *she* to refer to the speaker henceforth.
[7] Like Iatridou, Ippolito also regards counterfactuals equivalent to subjunctives as all subjunctives include at least one past tense marker both in English and in Italian, which are two languages she bases her arguments on. However, this is not the case for Turkish subjunctives, which will be discussed in the upcoming section. Therefore, I refer to what Ippolito calls 'subjunctive' as 'counterfactual' here.

(i.e., which in turn determines which worlds we are talking about) the counterfactuality reading occurs.

Ippolito (2003) assumes [past] as a unary feature for tense, that is, its absence in the compositionality sets the evaluation time to the time of utterance and interprets it as a presupposition. Ippolito (2002, 2003) further suggests that the 'past' in one-past subjunctive conditionals like in (18), in other words, non-past subjunctives, is actually interpreted as the 'perfect' operator in the accessibility relation. Therefore, the conditional sentence continues to be evaluated at the utterance time[8]. Moreover, she deems the perfect operator as the prerequisite for subjunctive conditionals. In the case of two-pasts subjunctives like (19), she analyzes the 'past' as an operator setting up the end point for the time interval generated by perfect to a past point in time. She argues that this 'past' operator shifts the time of evaluation to a time before the utterance time. She also suggests that indicative conditionals as in (20) refer to the actual world at the utterance time due to the absence of the [past] feature in the accessibility relation. In (20), the [past] is located inside the proposition instead of the accessibility relation.

(18) If she liked your idea, she would say it.

(19) If she had liked your idea, she would have said it.

(20) If she liked your idea, she will say it.

Ippolito (2003) bases her proposal for counterfactuality interpretation on the presuppositions rather than the suppositions of subjunctive conditionals and makes use of Grecian scalar implicatures to derive the counterfactual reading in subjunctives. She suggests two different readings for the [past] feature in the domain of modals, one being the 'metaphysical' or 'root' reading and the other being the

[8] For further information on this proposal, see Ippolito (2002).

'epistemic' reading[9], which is illustrated in (21). She also states that a future adverb like *tomorrow* forces the root reading as (22) demonstrates.

(21) Scott could have gone.

a. It was possible that Scott could go. (Root)

b. It is possible that Scott went. (Epistemic)

(22) Scott could have gone tomorrow.

a. ✓It was possible that Scott would go tomorrow.

b. * It is possible that Scott went tomorrow.

To put it simply, the root reading places the [past] in the accessibility relation while the epistemic reading takes it to be located inside the proposition. Ippolito takes sentences similar to (22) as mismatched constructions due to the mismatch that exists between the time adverbial and the tense operators in the construction and states that within the domain of conditionals these mismatched constructions create the real counterfactuality and the antecedent is considered to be 'impossible'. For example, (23) is only felicitous in a scenario where you already submitted your final paper at a time prior to the utterance time so you cannot submit it tomorrow again and tomorrow being any day after the deadline.

(23) If you had submitted your final paper tomorrow, you would fail.

When it comes to how we get to the counterfactuality implicature based on the presuppositions, Ippolito (2003) posits two distinct *context sets*[10] for non-past and (mismatched)[11] past subjunctive conditionals. In simple terms, all the presuppositions of the speaker for the antecedent clause must hold at the utterance time in the case of

[9] These are referred as "historical necessity" and "epistemic necessity" types of accessibility relations by von Fintel (2011).

[10] Context sets are "the set of worlds where what the speaker presupposes to be true in the actual world is indeed true".

[11] The reason I give this in parentheses is that she proposes these for mismatched past subjunctive conditionals, but I regard them simply as past subjunctive conditionals in Turkish.

non-past subjunctives and at some past time for the past subjunctives. Considering these presuppositions of past and non-past subjunctives and also the fact that presuppositions related to the present knowledge entail the past ones but not vice versa, Ippolito (2003) uses Maxim of Quantity in Grecian (1975) scalar implicatures and *Maximize Presupposition!* notion by Heim (1991) to derive the counterfactuality implicature in past subjunctive conditionals. She states that as the speaker chooses to presuppose the less informative version which is the past subjunctive rather than the more informative one, the non-past version; she either does not know that the antecedent is compatible with the actual world at the time of utterance or knows that the antecedent is incompatible with the actual world at the utterance time. Then, because of the Maxim of Quantity which suggests us to be as informative as possible in our assertions (Grice, 1975) and presuppositions (Heim, 1991), we assume that the speaker knows what she presupposes and thus we deduce the falsity implicature for the past subjunctives.

Similar to Ippolito's (2002, 2003, 2004, 2013) claims, Leahy (2011, 2017) also makes use of the same process of scalar implicature derivation for the counterfactuality interpretation in his analysis. Nevertheless, he diverges from Ippolito (2002) and many others in one crucial aspect. Unlike others, he proposes that the past subjunctive conditionals hold "no presuppositions" whereas the indicative ones have "epistemically possible" presupposition for their antecedent clause. In this account, he argues that the antecedent falsity in past subjunctive conditionals is an antipresupposition generated by the competition with their indicative counterparts. If they do not have indicative alternatives, then this implicature is not produced due to the lack of competition as in the case of Anderson

(1951) type of examples. This is the major account that I build my own proposal on which is discussed further in chapters 3 and 4.

1.3 General information about Turkish data

The main distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals in Turkish, unlike English, does not come from an additional past tense but results from the conditional marker. As Sezer (2002) states, *–sA* verbal suffix marks subjunctive while *–(y)s*A clitic (or *ise* as its free form version) connotes indicative in conditionals. The indicative conditional marker can be realized after nearly all the possible tense-aspect-modality (TAM) markers and also the nominal predicates in Turkish and the consequent clause can surface with all the modalities[12] such as future, epistemic and obligative, as well as imperatives. Some possible combinations for indicative conditionals are exemplified from (24) to (30)[13].

(24) Ödev-in-i bitir-ir-se-n, oyun
homework-2SgPoss-Acc finish-AOR-IND.COND-2Sg game
oyna-yabil-ir-sin.
play-PSB-AOR-2Sg
'If you finish your homework, you can play games.'

(25) Yemeğ-in-i ye-di-yse-n, bulaşıklar-ı
meal-2SgPoss-Acc eat-PAST-IND.COND-2Sg dishes-Acc
yıka-yacak-sın
wash-FUT-2Sg

[12] I use the term "modality" tentatively here. In the upcoming chapters, I avoid using such a label for these markers.

[13] (30) demonstrates that it is acceptable to use a past modality like AOR[13]+PAST *(-Ar+-DI)* in the consequent clause if there is an adverb that refers to the past or a contextually salient past interpretation in the sentence. In that case, the meaning would be similar to 'used to' in English though and this would still exemplify a past indicative conditional without a counterfactual implicature.

'If you ate your meal, you are going to wash the dishes.'

(26) Koş-uyor-sa-n, terle-r-sin.
run-IMPF-IND.COND-2Sg sweat-AOR-2Sg
'If you are running/run, you will sweat.'

(27) Ev-i sat-mış-sa[14], köy-e taşın-mış-tır.
house-Acc sell-PFV-IND.COND village-Dat move-PFV-EPIS
'If s/he has sold the house, she must have moved to the village.'

(28) Otobüs-e yetiş-ecek-sen, erken çık.
bus-Dat catch-FUT-IND.COND-2Sg early leave.IMP.2Sg
'If you will catch the bus, leave early.'

(29) Öğretmen-se-n, öğrenci-ler-in-i sev-meli-sin
teacher-IND.COND-2Sg stuents-Pl-2SgPoss-Acc love-OBLG-2Sg
'If you are a teacher, you should love your students.'

(30) (Eskiden) düş-tü-yse-m, ağla-r-dı-m.
formerly fall-PAST-IND.COND-1Sg cry-AOR-PAST-1Sg
'If I fell, I would cry (in the past).'

Although all the TAM suffixes keep their matrix clause interpretations under the scope of the indicative conditionals, the aorist marker seems to not do so. In matrix clauses, the aorist marker is either used to talk about a characteristic (habitual) trait of an individual or a future event (Yavaş, 1979). However, (31) and (33) illustrate that both of these interpretations seem to get restricted at the antecedent clause of an indicative conditional even though their respective counterparts in (32) and (34) are acceptable for those interpretations. Nonetheless, the aorist marker is not fully blocked at the antecedent of indicatives as (24) shows although it is so in the case of

[14] Since the third person singular marker is a null morpheme in Turkish, I do not represent it overtly in my glosses.

subjunctive antecedents, which is exemplified in (40). Therefore, how the aorist marker is interpreted inside the antecedent of a conditional is the main question of the second chapter of this thesis.

(31) #Her gün spor yap-ar-sa-n, sağlıklı-sın-dır.
every day sport do-AOR-IND.COND-2Sg healthy-2Sg-EPIS
'If you do sport every day, you must be healthy.'

(32) Her gün spor yap-ıyor-sa-n, sağlıklı-sın-dır.
every day sport do-IMPF-IND.COND-2Sg healthy-2Sg-EPIS
'If you are doing sport every day, you must be healthy.'

(33) #Yarın gid-er-se-n, çoktan
tomorrow go-AOR-IND.COND-2Sg already
bilet-in-i al-mış-sın-dır.
ticket-2SgPoss-Acc buy-PFV-2Sg-EPIS
If you go tomorrow, you must have bought your ticket already.'

(34) Yarın gid-ecek-se-n, çoktan
tomorrow go-FUT-IND.COND-2Sg already
bilet-in-i al-mış-sın-dır.
ticket-2SgPoss-Acc buy-PFV-2Sg-EPIS
If you are going to go tomorrow, you must have bought your ticket already.'

On the other hand, the subjunctive conditional marker mostly takes its proposition tenseless since it is directly attached to the verb stem as in (35) and if it is to be used with nominal predicates like in (36), it requires *ol-* auxiliary verb to attach to. It can also be used with certain aspectual markers in the antecedent with the insertion of *ol-* again, as (37), (39), and (41) exemplifies. However, the subjunctive marker cannot scope over the past tense marker *-DI* or the aorist marker *-Ar* despite

adding *ol-* to the antecedent, which is shown by (38) and (40), respectively. Furthermore, (37) demonstrates that despite not being preceded, the subjunctive conditional marker can be followed by the past tense marker *-DI* and also the evidential marker *-mIş*[15] as in (39). In this case, the past tense contributes to the counterfactuality meaning of the conditional. Likewise, the evidential marker preceded by the subjunctive conditional morpheme can only be used if the antecedent is hypothetical or hearsay.[16]

(35) Düzenli çalış-sa, başarılı ol-ur.
regularly work-SUBJ.COND successful be-AOR
'If s/he studied regularly, s/he would be successful.'

(36) Öğrenci ol-sa-m, bu fırsat-ı
student AUX-SUBJ.COND-1Sg this chance-Acc
kaçır-ma-z-dı-m.
miss-NEG-AOR-PAST-1Sg
'If I were a student, I wouldn't have missed this chance.'

(37) Kontrat-ı imzala-mış ol-sa-ydı-k,
contract-Acc sign-PFV AUX-SUBJ.COND-PAST-1Pl
taşın-acak-tı-k.
move-FUT-PAST-1Pl
'If we had signed the contract, we were going to move (in).'

(38) *Kontrat-ı imzala-dı ol-sa-ydı-k,
contract-Acc sign-PAST AUX-SUBJ.COND-PAST-1Pl
taşın-acak-tı-k.

[15] The suffix *-mIş* is mostly ambiguous between its perfective and evidential interpretation (Göksel & Kerslake, 2005). However, I consider the one in the scope of the conditional marker as perfective and the one outside the scope of the conditional as evidential for my current purposes.
[16] I do not elaborate the details of this argument in my study because I believe it requires a better understanding of the marker *-mIş,* which is not in the scope of this thesis.

move-FUT-PAST-1Pl

'If we had signed the contract, we were going to move (in).'

(39) Gid-iyor ol-sa-ymış, ben-i de
go-IMPF AUX-SUBJ.COND-EV me-Acc also
çağır-ır-mış.
call-AOR-EV
'S/he says that if s/he were/had been going, s/he would call/would have called me, too.'

(40) *Gid-er ol-sa-ymış, ben-i de
go-AOR AUX-SUBJ.COND-EV me-Acc also
çağır-ır-mış.
call-AOR-EV
'S/he says that if s/he went/had gone, s/he would call/would have called me, too.'

(41) Yağmur yağ-acak ol-sa, pikniğ-e
rain rain-FUT AUX-SUBJ.COND picnic-Dat
gel-e-me-z-di-k.
come-PSB-NEG-AOR-PAST-1Pl
'If it were going to rain, we couldn't have come to the picnic.'

With respect to the consequent clauses of the subjunctive conditionals, they license a marker like the aorist or the future without the past tense only for a non-past interpretation. Therefore, (42) is actually an acceptable sentence without the past adverbial *dün* 'yesterday'. However, if the modality is followed by the past tense marker, the statement gains a past reference naturally as represented by (43). Moreover, the comparison between (44) and (45) demonstrates that the occurrence of

the past marker in the antecedent requires it to be present in the consequent clause as well, but not vice versa. Therefore, it is agreeable to assume that the past marker at the consequent is the active [past] operator whereas the other is just an agreement item, in line with many others (Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2002; von Fintel, 2005).

(42) *Dün vakt-im ol-sa, yardım ed-er-im.
yesterday time-1SgPoss AUX-SUBJ.COND help-AOR-1Sg
'If I had time yesterday, I would help.'

(43) Dün vaktim ol-sa-ydı,
yesterday time-1SgPoss AUX-SUBJ.COND -PAST
yardım ed-er-di-m.
help-AOR-PAST-1Sg
'If I had had time yesterday, I would have helped.'

(44) Vakt-im ol-sa, yardım ed-er-*di*-m.
time-1SgPoss be-SUBJ.COND help-AOR-PAST-1Sg
'If I had time, I would have helped'

(45) *Vakt-im ol-sa-*ydı,* yardım ed-er-im.
time-1SgPoss be-SUBJ.COND-PAST help-AOR-1Sg
'If I had had time, I would help.'

However, it needs to be noted that without the past tense marker in the consequent clause, the counterfactuality meaning does not arise. Hence, the antecedent is "understood to be capable of fulfillment but is presented more as a hypothetical possibility than as one which the speaker locates in the 'real' future." (Göksel & Kerslake, 2005, p. 426). Furthermore, the counterfactuality inference of subjunctive with *-sA* is less absolute than its counterpart with *-sAyDI*, and the probability of the event in the antecedent to realize in the future is not entirely

eliminated in that case. Due to this, when I focus on the counterfactual implicatures in conditionals in chapter 4, I base my analysis on *-sAyDI* construction as well.

Aygen (2004) deploys Iatridou's (2000) *ExclF* to Turkish conditionals and claims that the counterfactuality meaning is a result of the switch between the conditional and the 'past tense' morphemes. While the order COND-'past' as in (46) generates counterfactuality, the 'past'-COND sequence like in (47) does not. She argues that the seemingly 'past' morpheme in (46) ranges over worlds instead of times in the domain of modals and marks counterfactuality in hypothetical environments but not past tense as it does in (47) by ranging over times.

(46) Kürşat erken gel-se-ydi parti-ye gid-ecek-ti-k
Kürşat early come-COND-"Past" party-Dat go-FUT-PAST-1Pl
'If Kürşat came early, we would go to the party.' [17]

(47) Kürşat erken gel-di-yse parti-ye gid-ebil-ir-iz
Kürşat early come-"Past"-COND party-Dat go-PSB[18]-AOR-1Pl
'If Kürşat came early, we can go to the party.'

(Aygen, 2004, p. 2)

The evidence she provides for the 'past' morpheme not indicating past tense in counterfactuals derives from the non-past adverbials along with past adverbials that are allowed in the antecedent clause of conditionals as it is presented in (48)-(50).

(48) Yarın gel-ecek ol-sa-ydı-n, …
tomorrow go-FUT AUX-COND-PAST-2Sg
'If you were to come tomorrow…'

(49) Şimdi gel-iyor ol-sa-ydı-n, …

[17] This was the translation given by Aygen but according to Göksel and Kerslake (2005), the translation would be 'If Kürşat had come early, we would have gone to the party.'
[18] This was given as *FUT* in Aygen (2004), but as it is actually the possibility morpheme in Turkish, I have made a modification in the gloss.

now go-IMPF AUX -COND- PAST-2Sg

'If you were coming now …'

(50) Dün gel-miş ol-sa-ydı-n, …

yesterday go-PFV AUX-COND- PAST-2Sg

'If you had come yesterday…'

Nevertheless, as it can be remembered from (42), it is ungrammatical to have an adverb referring to the past without an overt past morpheme in the consequent clause. Based on this evidence, it can be deduced that the 'past' tense morpheme in fact maintains its temporal meaning even in the context of counterfactuals as it licenses the use of past time adverbs in its domain, which is what I suggest in my analysis of past subjunctive conditionals in chapter 4.

Keeping all these data and discussions in mind, I organize my thesis in the following way. The upcoming chapter examines the interpretations of the aorist marker in the context of (indicative)[19] conditional antecedents. I propose that the aorist marker either shifts the modal time of the conditional from the utterance time into the future or signals a quantification over possible worlds. Then, chapter 3 tackles down the distinction between the conditional markers and offers "epistemically possible" presupposition for the indicative and "likelihood" presupposition for the subjunctive version. On the other hand, in chapter 4 I argue that the past marker can either be interpreted inside the proposition in the case of indicative conditionals or as the modal time of the whole conditional structure when combined with the subjunctive conditional marker. However, I claim that the presuppositions of the subjunctive conditionals disappear when they are past-marked

[19] Since the aorist marker cannot appear at the antecedent clause of a subjunctive conditional in any way, chapter 2 does not make any claims about the subjunctives either. Hence, I do not focus on the distinction between the indicative and subjunctive versions of the conditional marker and refer to it as the "conditional" marker only.

following Leahy (2011, 2017). As a result, they generate the counterfactuality implicature by competing with their indicative counterparts. Finally, I provide a summary of my claims for the conditional constructions in Turkish and finish with some points that need further investigation.

CHAPTER 2

AORIST IN CONDITIONALS

The so-called aorist marker in Turkish has been examined by many (e.g., Göksel & Kerslake, 2005; Kornfilt, 1997; Yavaş, 1979). It sometimes has been likened to the Simple Present Tense in English (Kornfilt, 1997) whereas some others (Göksel & Kerslake, 2005; Yavaş, 1979) deem it as an aspectual and a modal marker. On the other hand, Cinque (2001) refrains from discussing the aorist marker while tackling the tense, aspect, and modality affixes in Turkish due to not being certain about which head it might belong to in his study. As this controversy shows, defining the functions of the aorist is not an easy task.[20] Therefore, I focus on the interpretation(s) of the aorist rather than categorizing it as a tense, aspect, or modal marker for the current purposes.

In this chapter, I first discuss what kind of interpretations the aorist suffix gets in the context of matrix sentences. Then, I discuss how an antecedent clause behaves differently from a consequent clause in conditional statements. This part illustrates that the antecedent clause demonstrates an embedded occurrence and hence it bears certain restrictions compared to the consequent clause. The subsequent section is about the interpretations the aorist marker has when it appears in an antecedent clause of a conditional. Afterward, I provide a primary proposal for the issues discussed by then and continue with some challenges this proposal might have in the next section. I thereupon extend my proposal based on Schulz's (2008) approach to the Simple Present tense in English and von Fintel's (1994) analysis of

[20] An orthogonal point is that the label "aorist" itself is used to refer to past events or perfect aspect outside Turkish linguistics, such as in Ancient Greek or in other Indo-European languages.

quantifier domains and then conclude with some final remarks and discussion for the upcoming chapter.

2.1 The aorist in the matrix clauses

The aorist marker can be used in many different contexts in Turkish, ranging from habitual actions of individuals to generic properties of classes and from predictions to offers and requests, as respectively exemplified from (1) to (5), and so on (see Göksel & Kerslake, 2005; Kornfilt, 1997; Yavaş, 1979 a.o.).

(1) Elif her gün koş-ar.
Elif every day run-AOR
'Elif runs every day.' (Habitual)

(2) Flamingo-lar uç-ar.
flamingo-Pl fly- AOR
'Flamingos fly.' (Generic)

(3) Şeyma birazdan gel-ir.
Şeyma soon come-AOR
'Şeyma will come soon.' (Prediction)

(4) Çay al-ır-mı-sın?
tea get-AOR-Q-2Sg
'Would you like to have some tea?' (Offer)

(5) Bana kalem-i ver-ir-mi-sin lütfen?
1Sg.Dat pencil-Acc give-AOR-Q-2Sg please
'Would you please give me the pencil? (Request)

However, I propose combining these different usages of the aorist marker under two main interpretations, namely characterizing and future-oriented, intended as

descriptive labels at the moment. The characterizing interpretation can stand for both the habitual and generic readings since in both cases the sentences can be paraphrased as "it is the *characteristic feature of* x to do y"[21]. The only difference here is that in the context of habitual sentences, we express the characteristic feature of an individual whereas generic sentences are mainly related to the characteristic features of a certain class (Göksel & Kerslake, 2005). Likewise, the other readings in (3), (4), and (5) can be summed up into a future-oriented interpretation in general as they all refer to an action that might happen or is desired to happen in the future.[22] I put aside the offer and request functions when considering the future-oriented interpretation for my study, hoping that they can be subsumed under the future-oriented reading with an appropriate account of the pragmatics involved.

In sum, for the beginning, I postulate that the aorist can be utilized either if we are referring to the characteristic events[23] or if we are referring to future-oriented possibilities. In the next sections, I argue that these readings seem not accessible inside a conditional antecedent and try to explain its reasons.

2.2 The antecedent vs. the consequent clauses in conditionals

Even though the aorist marker can be seen in both the antecedent and the consequent clauses in conditional statements as in (6), it certainly does not have the same functions in both contexts mainly because the contexts are syntactically different from each other.

[21] It needs to be stated here that as the aorist marker can only attach to verbal predicates, I will not focus on the nominal predicates for the time being.
[22] Yavaş (1979) also argues that the aorist has two main functions one being the characterizing aspect and the other being the volitional modal. Inspired by her approach, I also make a similar categorization without assigning a label like "aspect" or "modal" for the moment.
[23] Göksel and Kerkslake (2005) uses "characteristic qualities" and Yavaş (1979) uses "characteristic or typical behavior" to refer to the characterizing interpretation of the aorist. Here, I refer to it as "characteristic events".

(6) Ela parti-ye gel-*ir*-se, onunla tanış-*ır*-sın.
Ela party-Dat come-AOR-COND 3Sg.Com meet-AOR-2Sg
'If Ela comes to the party, you will meet her.'

For instance, certain adverbials that are usually licensed by the aorist marker when it is in matrix sentences are not allowed when they are used inside the antecedent clause. The aorist marker in matrix sentences permits the use of speaker-oriented attitude adverbs such as *bence* 'in my opinion' or possibility adverbs such as *muhtemelen* 'probably' under its future-oriented possibility reading as respectively shown by the examples (7) and (8).[24]

(7) Şeyma *bence* birazdan gel-ir.
Şeyma in my opinion soon come-AOR
'In my opinion, Şeyma will come soon.'

(8) Şeyma *muhtemelen* birazdan gel-ir.
Şeyma probably soon come-AOR
'Şeyma will probably come soon.'

On the other hand, they cannot occur inside conditional antecedents, as shown by (9) and (10).

(9) Şeyma (#*bence*) birazdan gel-ir-se, otobüs-e
Şeyma in my opinion soon come-AOR-COND bus-Dat
yetiş-ir-iz.
catch-AOR-1Pl
Lit: #'If in my opinion, Şeyma comes soon, we will catch the bus.'

(10) Şeyma (#*muhtemelen*) birazdan gel-ir-se,
Şeyma probably soon come-AOR-COND

[24] The important point here is that these are allowed at the matrix level but not in the embedded one.

otobüs-e yetiş-ir-iz.

bus-Dat catch-AOR-1Pl

Lit: #‘If Şeyma probably comes soon, we will catch the bus.’

The reason for this situation is that the antecedent clause of a conditional statement is actually an embedded clause. Moreover, as shown by (11) and (12), the consequent clause, contrary to the antecedent, behaves exactly like a matrix sentence in terms of licensing these adverbials, which provides further evidence for the fact that the antecedent and consequent clauses are different from each other in terms of their structure.[25] The aorist marker per se does not create this difference but it does matter whether it is in the antecedent or the consequent of a conditional when it comes to its interpretation.

(11) Şeyma birazdan gel-ir-se, *bence* otobüs-e

Şeyma soon come-AOR-COND in my opinion bus-Dat

yetiş-ir-iz.

catch-AOR-1Pl

‘If Şeyma comes soon, in my opinion, we will catch the bus.’

(12) Şeyma birazdan gel-ir-se, *muhtemelen* otobüs-e

Şeyma soon come-AOR-COND probably bus-Dat

yetiş-ir-iz.

catch-AOR-1Pl

‘If Şeyma comes soon, we will probably catch the bus.’

This section had the purpose of showing that the antecedent and consequent clauses hold distinct properties since the former is embedded under the latter (Bhatt & Pancheva, 2006). As the consequent clause is a matrix clause, the interpretations

[25] See Bhatt and Pancheva (2006) for relevant discussion on the syntactic structure of the conditional statements.

of the aorist in this context are expected to not be any different from what I argued in the previous section. Nevertheless, its meanings inside an antecedent may not be that easy to identify. Therefore, I dwell on this topic primarily in the upcoming section and explain what kind of readings are allowed for the aorist marker in the antecedent clause of a conditional (henceforth "the antecedent aorist").

2.3 The restrictions on the interpretation of the antecedent aorist

As I stated earlier, the aorist marker can be interpreted with two main functions (characterizing and future-oriented) in matrix clauses and consequent clauses of conditionals. One can presume that although the antecedent clause is an embedded clause, the aorist can still hold its main interpretations in this context as well, which is not the case.

2.3.1 Testing the characterizing interpretation of the antecedent aorist

The aorist can be used interchangeably with the imperfective marker *-Iyor* in matrix clauses with respect to its characterizing meaning[26], which is shown by (13) and (14).

(13) Elif her gün koş-ar.
Elif every day run-AOR
'Elif runs every day.'
Paraphrase: It is the *characteristic feature* of Elif to run every day.

(14) Elif her gün koş-uyor.
Elif every day run-IMPF

[26] According to Yavaş (1979), the aorist marker and the progressive marker *-Iyor* do not share the same meaning. She proposes that the aorist marker reports a characteristic of the entity in question while the progressive one just delineates a repeated action of it. Nonetheless, I follow Göksel and Kerslake's (2004) approach and propose that the imperfective marker *-Iyor* is licensed in characterizing contexts (especially habitual ones) as well as the aorist whereas the aorist marker cannot be used in progressive contexts unlike the imperfective.

'Elif runs every day.'

Paraphrase: It is the *characteristic feature* of Elif to run every day.

The imperfective marker is also compatible with the progressive interpretation as in (15) and the future-oriented interpretation as in (16) in matrix sentences similar to the progressive construction in English.

(15) Elif şu an koş-uyor.
Elif right now run-IMPF
'Elif is running right now.'

(16) Elif yarın maraton-da koş-uyor.
Elif tomorrow marathon-Loc run-IMPF
'Elif is running in the marathon tomorrow.'

While the imperfective marker still holds its interpretations inside an antecedent clause, the aorist does not designate a characterizing interpretation in the identical environment anymore. Imagine a context where Elif typically goes running to the same park in her neighborhood every day, and I want to introduce a friend of mine to her and we are all at the same park at that time. While (17) is not felicitous to utter in this context with the intended reading, (18) is.

(17) #Elif her gün koş-ar-sa, burda onu
Elif everyday run-AOR-COND here 3Sg.Acc
gör-ür-üz.
see-AOR-1Pl
Unavailable intended reading: If it is the *characteristic feature* of Elif to run every day, we will see her here.

(18) Elif her gün koş-uyor-sa, burda onu
Elif everyday run-IMPF-COND here 3Sg.Acc

gör-ür-üz.

see-AOR-1Pl

Available intended reading: If it is the *characteristic feature* of Elif to run every day, we will see her here.

Not only the characterizing reading but the other readings of the imperfective marker are also still available inside the antecedent clause as (19) and (20) illustrate.

(19) Elif şu an koş-uyor-sa, park-ta-dır.

Elif right now run-IMPF-COND park-Loc-EPIS

'If Elif is running right now, she must be at the park.'

(20) Elif yarın maraton-da koş-uyor-sa, orda

Elif tomorrow marathon-Loc run-IMPF-COND there

tanış-ır-sınız

meet-AOR-2Pl

'If Elif is running in the marathon tomorrow, you will meet her there.'

Although I have combined the habitual and generic readings of the aorist under the characterizing interpretation and presented that the characterizing interpretation is not accessible in the habitual context via (17), it might be useful to test the generic environment as in (2) inside an antecedent clause to provide further evidence for my discussion. For instance, in a betting context where I am arguing with my friends about whether flamingos are a kind of birds that fly or not and I bet on the side which says that they do not have this feature, I can perfectly utter (22) while (21) would be infelicitous in the same context[27].

(21) #Flamingo-lar uç-ar-sa, sana kahve

flamingo-Pl fly- AOR-COND 2Sg.Dat coffee

[27] It needs to be stated here that (21) would not be infelicitous by itself but it would not give the intended reading under the discussion.

al-ır-ım.

buy-AOR-1Sg

Unavailable intended reading: If it is the *characteristic feature* of flamingos to fly, I will buy you a coffee.

(22) Flamingo-lar uç-uyor-sa, sana kahve

flamingo-Pl fly- IMPF-COND 2Sg.Dat coffee

al-ır-ım.

buy-AOR-1Sg

Available intended reading: If it is the *characteristic feature* of flamingos to fly, I will buy you a coffee.'

As it is evidenced by (21), the characterizing reading is not attainable for the antecedent aorist in generic contexts as well as the habitual ones like (17) even though the intended interpretation can be provided by the imperfective marker as in (18) and (22).

This part basically shows that the aorist marker cannot have the characterizing interpretation in the embedded part of a conditional statement. In the subsequent section, I focus on the future-oriented reading of the aorist marker in the same context and argue that the future-oriented interpretation is not fully available there either.

2.3.2 Testing the future-oriented interpretation of the antecedent aorist

Other than the aorist and the imperfective markers, Turkish has another future-oriented suffix *-AcAk*[28], which mainly refers to an event happening in the future in

[28] Yavaş (1979) also compares the aorist marker to *-AcAk* in terms of its future reference and argues that while the aorist designates a volitional modal, *-AcAk* suffix is a neutral marker without any modal connotations. As I stated previously, for my current purposes I mainly focus on their interpretations rather than their labels. Therefore, I take both of these markers as future-oriented.

matrix sentences[29]. Therefore, it is considered the "future" marker in Turkish. Although (23), (24), and (25) slightly differ from each other in terms of their interpretations, in a way similar to their English translations, all can be used to talk about the events that are happening in the future (Göksel & Kerslake, 2005).

(23) Şeyma birazdan gel-ir.
Şeyma soon come-AOR
'Şeyma will come/comes soon.'

(24) Şeyma birazdan gel-iyor.
Şeyma soon come-IMPF
'Şeyma is coming soon.'

(25) Şeyma birazdan gel-ecek.
Şeyma soon come-FUT
'Şeyma is going to come soon.'

Since I showed that the imperfective marker keeps all its interpretations inside an antecedent while the aorist does not hold its characterizing reading in the previous section, I focus on the future-oriented interpretation of the aorist and the future marker *-AcAk* in this section. As exemplified by (26) and (27), both of these suffixes are allowed in the antecedent of a conditional statement.

(26) Şeyma birazdan gel-ir-se, otobüs-e yetiş-ir-iz
Şeyma soon come-AOR-CON bus-Dat catch-AOR-1Pl
'If Şeyma comes soon, we will catch the bus.'

(27) Şeyma birazdan gel-ecek-se, otobüs-e yetiş-ir-iz
Şeyma soon come-FUT-COND bus-Dat catch-AOR-1Pl
'If Şeyma is going to come soon, we will catch the bus.'

[29] This marker might have some other interpretations but the future-oriented one is the most basic one.

However, the aorist does not assign the same future-oriented interpretation that the future marker does in this environment. In a context where I just learn that Şeyma will come to a meeting and she lives in a place an hour away from the meeting location and there are fifteen minutes left to the meeting time, I can make the deduction in (29) by using the future marker. However, (28) which is minimally different from (29) in having the aorist marker instead of the future marker, cannot be used in the same context.

(28) #Şeyma toplantı-ya gel-ir -se, çoktan ev-den
Şeyma meeting-Dat come-AOR -COND already home-Abl
çık-mış-tır.
leave-PFV-EPIS
Lit: #‘If Şeyma comes to the meeting, she must have already left home.’

(29) Şeyma toplantı-ya gel-ecek -se, çoktan ev-den
Şeyma meeting-Dat come-FUT-COND already home-Abl
çık-mış-tır.
leave-PFV-EPIS
Lit: ‘If Şeyma is going to come to the meeting, she must have already left home.’

Even though both of these markers can undoubtedly allow us to talk about the future, only the future marker is licensed here whereas the aorist marker seems to be incapable of adding its future-oriented interpretation.

So far, I have laid out the fact that the aorist does not provide its characterizing interpretation as in (17) and (21) or is not allowed in certain contexts with the future reading as in (28) when it is used in an antecedent clause. In the meantime, the other markers with similar interpretations like the imperfective and the

future are licensed for the same contexts with the intended characterizing reading as in (18) and (22) or felicitous to utter with the future-oriented interpretation as in (29). In the upcoming part, I offer a preliminary explanation for the restrictions of the aorist marker and propose that the antecedent aorist is licensed based on the available interpretation in the consequent clause.

2.4 The initial proposal

What I propose initially is that – following Kratzer's (1986, 1991) well-known restrictor analysis of *if-clauses* –only when the consequent clause has one of the matrix clause interpretations of the aorist marker is the aorist licensed inside the antecedent clause. Kratzer argues that conditional sentences are modal sentences whose modal operator is designated by the modal in the consequent clause and the antecedent clause merely restricts the modal base of the consequent modal. This explanation can satisfactorily describe why the aorist marker encounters the restrictions we have identified thus far.

2.4.1 Licensing of the characterizing interpretation of the antecedent aorist

In line with my proposal, it is apparent that in the contexts like (30) and (31) in which the consequent clause has the characterizing reading, the aorist marker is acceptable inside the antecedent clause.

(30) Bebek-ler acık-ır-sa, genellikle ağla-r.
baby-Pl get hungry-AOR-COND usually cry-AOR
'If babies get hungry, they usually cry.'
Available intended reading: In most situations where babies get hungry, it is their *characteristic feature* to cry.

(31) Ebru erken kalk-ar-sa, kahvaltı yap-ıyor.
Ebru early wake up-AOR-COND breakfast have-IMPF
'If Ebru wakes up early, she has breakfast.'
Available intended reading: In all situations where Ebru wakes up early, it is her *characteristic feature* to have breakfast.

The characterizing interpretation of the consequent clause in (30) can be evidenced by the availability of the frequency adverb *genellikle* 'usually' in the consequent part while (31) demonstrates its characterizing reading via the use of the imperfective marker on the main predicate. In both of these examples, nevertheless, as it can be understood from their available intended readings, the aorist does not attain the characterizing interpretation to the antecedent clause per se; it is just *licensed* here.

The licensing of the antecedent aorist by the consequent can be illustrated better with the help of a non-characterizing consequent clause and by comparing the aorist and the imperfective markers inside the antecedent one more time. For instance, assume a context where Ebru and I decide to be roommates and I prefer to have a roommate who wakes up early because I do also wake up early. In this case, I can perfectly utter (33) to refer to a future event that is based on Ebru's characteristic behavior whereas (32) cannot yield the given intended reading. Evidently, as the consequent does not have the characterizing reading in this instance, the aorist with the characterizing interpretation cannot be licensed.[30]

(32) #Ebru erken kalk-ar-sa, iyi anlaş-acağ-ız.
Ebru early wake up-AOR-COND well get on-FUT-1Pl
Unavailable intended reading: If it is the *characteristic feature* of Ebru to wake up early, we are going to get on well.

[30] On the other hand, as (32) has a future-oriented reading in the consequent which can license the antecedent aorist, the sentence per se is not ill-formed. It just does not denote the intended reading. This is further described in the following subsection.

(33) Ebru erken kalk-ıyor-sa, iyi anlaş-acağ-ız.
Ebru early wake up-IMPF-COND well get on-FUT-1Pl
Available intended reading: If it is the *characteristic feature* of Ebru to wake up early, we are going to get on well.

The infelicity of (17) and (21), which are repeated here as (34) and (35) respectively, can be also explained with the same proposal since in both cases the consequent clauses convey the future-oriented interpretation rather than the characterizing one.

(34) #Elif her gün koş-ar-sa, burda onu
Elif everyday run-AOR-COND here 3Sg.Acc
gör-ür-üz.
see-AOR-1Pl
Unavailable intended reading: If it is the *characteristic feature* of Elif to run every day, we will see her here.

(35) #Flamingo-lar uç-ar-sa, sana kahve
flamingo-Pl fly-AOR-COND 2Sg.Dat coffee
al-ır-ım.
buy-AOR-1Sg
Unavailable intended reading: If it is the *characteristic feature* of flamingos to fly, I will buy you a coffee.'

Nonetheless, as stated before, (34) and (35) are not infelicitous sentences because the future-oriented reading in their consequent clauses allows the aorist marker to be used in their antecedents. This is further discussed in what follows.

2.4.2 Licensing of the future-oriented interpretation of the antecedent aorist

Similar to the licensing of the antecedent aorist when the consequent has the characterizing interpretation; if the consequent part has the future-oriented reading, the antecedent allows the use of the aorist inside the antecedent as represented by (36) and (37).

(36) Ela parti-ye gel-ir-se, yarın onunla
Ela party-Dat come-AOR-COND tomorrow 3Sg.Com.
tanış-ır-sın.
meet-AOR-2Sg
'If Ela comes to the party, you will meet her.'

(37) Ela parti-ye gel-ir-se, onunla tanış-acak-sın.
Ela party-Dat come-AOR-COND 3Sg.Com meet-FUT-2Sg
'If Ela comes to the party, you are going to meet her.'

The future-oriented reading of the consequent in (36) can be justified by the future-oriented time adverbial *yarın* 'tomorrow' and the future marker overtly demonstrates the future reference in the consequent of (37).

On the other hand, if the consequent clause does not have a future-oriented interpretation like in (38), its antecedent cannot license the aorist marker while the use of the future marker is highly acceptable in the same context as in (39).

(38) #Ela parti-ye gel-ir-se, şimdi hazırlan-ıyor-dur.
Ela party-Dat come-AOR-COND now get ready-IMPF-EPIS
Lit: #'If Ela comes to the party, she must be getting ready now.'

(39) Ela parti-ye gel-ecek-se, şimdi hazırlan-ıyor-dur.
Ela party-Dat come-AOR-COND now get ready-IMPF-EPIS
Lit: 'If Ela is going to come to the party, she must be getting ready now.'

This can also explain the infelicity of (28), which is replicated here in (40).

(40)	#Şeyma	toplantı-ya	gel-ir -se,	çoktan	ev-den
	Şeyma	meeting-Dat	come-AOR -COND	already	home-Abl
	çık-mış-tır.				
	leave-PFV-EPIS				

Lit: 'If Şeyma comes to the meeting, she must have already left home.'

In both (38) and (40), the consequent clause makes an epistemic claim about what might be happening now or what might have happened until now respectively. In either case, as there is no future-oriented reading available for the consequent part, these sentences cannot license the antecedent aorist marker. Notwithstanding, there are cases that appear to assign neither the future-oriented nor the characterizing interpretation to their consequent clause and yet allow the usage of the antecedent aorist. The next part reveals these cases, and the final proposal will try to accommodate these additional observations, as well.

2.5 The challenges

I have argued that in order to license the antecedent aorist, the consequent clause must have one of its matrix clause interpretations. However, even when the consequent clause does not seem to have either of these interpretations, the aorist is still acceptable in the antecedent part in some situations, which creates a problem for my initial proposal.

For instance, although there is no future-oriented marker in the consequent part of (42) just like (41), it still licenses the antecedent aorist unlike (41). It is possible to utter (42) in a context where I know Şeyma is not on speaking terms with Gül for a while and she only shares pictures with her friends if she is talking to them.

(41) #Şeyma toplantı-ya gel-ir -se, çoktan ev-den
Şeyma meeting-Dat come-AOR -COND already home-Abl
çık-mış-tır.
leave-PFV-EPIS
Lit: 'If Şeyma comes to the meeting, she must have already left home.'

(42) Şeyma Gül'le fotoğraf paylaş-ır-sa,
Şeyma Gül.Com photograph share-AOR-COND
onu affet-miş-tir.
3Sg.Acc forgive-PFV-EPIS
Lit: 'If Şeyma shares a photograph with Gül, she must have forgiven her.'

Analogous to the difference between (41) and (42) in terms of allowing the antecedent aorist despite seeming identical with respect to their syntactic structure, there is a discrepancy between (43) and (44) in spite of the exact same morphology on their consequent verbs. Even though I cannot make the deduction in (43) due to not having a future-oriented consequent, (44) is highly acceptable to say despite lacking the future-oriented interpretation in the consequent.

(43) #Ela parti-ye gel-ir-se, şimdi hazırlan-ıyor-dur.
Ela party-Dat come-AOR-COND now get ready-IMPF-EPIS
Lit: #'If Ela comes to the party, she must be getting ready now.'

(44) Ela parti-ye gel-ir-se, sen-den hoşlan-ıyor-dur.
Ela party-Dat go-AOR-COND 2Sg-Abl like-IMPF-EPIS
Lit: 'If Ela comes to the party, she must like you.'

Moreover, it is possible to use the antecedent aorist when making an inference with nominal predicates as in (45), which is similar to (44) with respect to its meaning. It

could be presumed that both (44) and (45) have the characterizing interpretation and that is why they allow the antecedent aorist, yet it is not the case for either of them.

(45) Ela parti-ye gel-ir-se, sana aşık-tır.
Ela party-Dat go-AOR-COND 2Sg.Dat in love-EPIS
Lit: 'If Ela comes to the party, she must be in love with you.'

Additionally, one can assume that as *hoşlan-* 'to like' and *aşık* 'in love' are stative predicates and *hazırlan* 'to get ready' is an action verb, this might be something related to the stativity of the main predicates. However, in the case of (41) and (42) both of their consequent verbs are action verbs, yet the latter licenses the antecedent aorist, unlike the former one.

Another possible explanation for all the challenges discussed so far could have been attributed to the epistemic marker *-DIr*. As it is easily realized from (41) to (45), all those instances happen to have the epistemic marker and it might be considered that the interpretation of this marker may have an effect on these challenging examples. Nonetheless, there are consequent clauses that have neither the epistemic marker nor any of the interpretations of the aorist marker and yet still license the antecedent aorist as shown by (46) and (47).

(46) Elif'i gör-ür-sen, bu kitab-ı ver.
Elif.Acc see-AOR-COND-2Sg this book-Acc give.IMP
Lit: 'If you see Elif, give this book.'

(47) Elif'i gör-ür-sen, onunla konuş-malı-sın.
Elif.Acc see-AOR-COND-2Sg 3Sg.Com talk-OBLG-2Sg
Lit: 'If you see Elif, you should talk to her.'

The example in (46) shows a consequent clause with the imperative and (47) with the obligative forms. As it is obvious, neither of these seem to have either the

characterizing or the future-oriented interpretations of the aorist but even so, they let the use of the antecedent aorist.

Considering all these I diverge from my initial proposal and change my perspective to be able to bring a better explanation for these issues. In my final proposal, I argue that, inspired by Schulz (2008), instead of the consequent clause licensing the antecedent aorist, the antecedent aorist sets the time of the consequent modal (henceforth "the modal time") to the worlds that are in accordance with the interpretations of the aorist. The next section discusses the details of this proposal and demonstrates how all these challenges can be accounted for by this new version.

2.6 The final proposal

Before I discuss my updated proposal, I believe that it is more appropriate to briefly overview the source of my inspiration for this explanation. Schulz (2008) analyzes the tenses in conditionals as non-deictic, evaluated relative to a local evaluation time, based on the proposal by Abusch (1997). Schulz states that the local evaluation time might differ from the utterance time in the scope of intensional operators, in this case – the conditionals. She also argues that the Simple Present in English has a non-pastness interpretation and hence it can select a future denotation time instead of the utterance time. Combining these ideas, she suggests that when the Simple Present selects the future denotation time in the antecedent of a conditional, it can shift the anchor[31] of the consequent from the utterance time to the future. She claims that this shift can only take place if the denotation time of the antecedent is the future. However, according to her, the future shift on the consequent is not compulsory. I

[31] Schulz (2008) uses the term "anchor" mostly for this context, but I prefer to use the term "modal time" for the same meaning in my proposal.

disagree with this last claim in my proposal, and I argue that this shift in the modal time is obligatory if the antecedent has the future denotation.

I adapt Schulz's (2008) analysis for the Simple Present in the antecedent of conditionals to the antecedent aorist in my case. As the aorist marker in Turkish is regarded as similar to the Simple Present in English (Kornfilt, 1997), this kind of similarity between them can be expected. However, I expand her claims and propose that the denotation time of the antecedent aorist sets the modal time of the consequent clause. In other words, if the aorist denotes a future time (the future-oriented reading), the consequent proposition is evaluated relative to that future time. Schulz (2008) exemplifies this as in (48), which is example (13) in her study. In both (48) and (49), its direct translation in Turkish, the Simple Past or the perfective marker in the consequent denotes a time before the denotation time of the antecedent, which is the future, not before the utterance time of the statement.

(48) If he comes out smiling, the interview went well.

(Schulz, 2008, p. 706)

(49)	Gülerek	çık-ar-sa,	görüşme	iyi
	smiling	come out-AOR-COND	interview	well
	geç-miş-tir.			
	go-PFV-EPIS			

'If s/he comes out smiling, the interview went well.'

Schulz (2008) bases her discussion on *possibilities*, world-time pairs, rather than possible worlds. In this way, when the denotation time of the possibility is shifted, the worlds that are compatible with it are shifted in the same direction. However, she also suggests that when the modal base is epistemic, not ontic[32], the

[32] Schulz (2008) suggests a modal base called "ontic" in her analysis and she argues that only when this modal base is chosen might the future shift happen in the consequent, which I do not agree with.

future shift for the consequent does not occur. Nevertheless, I argue that this is not the case in Turkish. Once the denotation time of the antecedent is shifted to the future, the modal operator cannot be evaluated relative to the utterance time even in epistemic claims. This can be shown better with the examples (41) and (42), which are repeated here as (50) and (51) respectively. (50) demonstrates an example where the perfective marker in the consequent tries to refer to the possibilities before the utterance time. However, as the antecedent aorist chooses its denotation time as the future, the possibilities where Şeyma comes to the meeting, the consequent cannot make a claim relative to the utterance time anymore, it can only be relativized to those future possibilities. Hence, the sentence is infelicitous. On the other hand, in (51), the modal time of the consequent is in accordance with the denotation time of the antecedent aorist, which involves the future possibilities in which Şeyma shares a picture with Gül. The perfective marker in (51) is evaluated relative to that future time and denotes the times before it, not before the utterance time.

(50) #Şeyma toplantı-ya gel-ir -se, çoktan ev-den
Şeyma meeting-Dat come-AOR -COND already home-Abl
çık-mış-tır.
leave-PFV-EPIS
Paraphrase: In all future possibilities where Şeyma comes to the meeting, she must have already left home now.

(51) Şeyma Gül'le fotoğraf paylaş-ır-sa, onu
Şeyma Gül.Com photograph share-AOR-COND 3Sg.Acc
affet-miş-tir.
forgive-PFV-EPIS

Paraphrase: In all future possibilities where Şeyma shares a photograph with Gül, she must have forgiven her in those possibilities.

This fact applies to all the other challenging examples in the previous section as well. Although the examples (44) and (45), repeated in (52) and (53), seem to counter my proposal, they are also evaluated relative to the future denotation of the antecedent. Nevertheless, as they are stative predicates, they might be understood as holding true even at the utterance time, which is just an implication.[33]

(52) Ela parti-ye gel-ir-se, sen-den hoşlan-ıyor-dur.
Ela party-Dat go-AOR-COND 2Sg-Abl like-IMPF-EPIS
Paraphrase: In all future possibilities where Ela comes to the party, she likes you.

(53) Ela parti-ye gel-ir-se, sana aşık-tır.
Ela party-Dat go-AOR-COND 2Sg.Dat in love-EPIS
Paraphrase: In all future possibilities where Ela comes to the party, she is in love with you.

Other than the future denotation, the aorist has another function that is related to its characterizing interpretation. The characterizing reading of the aorist can be analyzed as "quantification over situations[34]" more specifically "quantification over minimal situations[35]" in line with von Fintel's (1994) proposal for adverbial quantification. Von Fintel (1994) argues that the frequency adverbs denote this quantification in conditional statements. Since the frequency adverbs are allowed with the characterizing interpretation of the aorist, this analysis can be implemented

[33] I do not go into the details of how this implication is generated but I believe that it might be related to the internal semantics of the stative predicates, which is not in the scope of this study.
[34] What von Fintel (1994) refers to as "situations" seems similar to what Schulz (2008) means by the term "possibilities".
[35] Von Fintel (1994, p. 18) states that "the minimal situations in a set of situations, i.e., in a proposition, are those that do not have proper parts that are also in the set.". However, for my current purposes, I do not focus on this specification.

for explaining the characterizing interpretation of the antecedent aorist in our case. As it is seen from (54), the antecedent aorist allows the characterizing reading, evidenced by the frequency adverb *genellikle* 'usually' there, but it just makes a quantification over the situations without any specific time restriction.

(54) Ebru genellikle erken kalk-ar-sa, kahvaltı yap-ar.
Ebru usually early wake up-AOR-COND breakfast have-AOR
Paraphrase: In most situations where Ebru wakes up early, it is her *characteristic feature* to have breakfast.

Furthermore, when the antecedent aorist denotes a quantification over situations, i.e., has the characterizing reading, it only licenses the characterizing interpretation for its consequent clause. It does not even allow the future-oriented interpretation or any others as we may remember from (32), provided here one more time in (55).

(55) #Ebru genellikle erken kalk-ar-sa, iyi anlaş-acağ-ız.
Ebru usually early wake up-AOR-COND well get on-FUT-1Pl
Unavailable paraphrase: In most situations where Ebru wakes up early, we are going to get on well.

My future shift and quantificational proposals only work for the antecedent aorist because the other markers, namely the imperfective *-Iyor* and the future marker *-AcAk,* can neither set the denotation time to the future – it always stays as the utterance time – nor make a quantification over situations. They add their own interpretation to the antecedent proposition directly, but they do not influence the

modal time of the consequent clause. We can realize this from the paraphrases of (56) and (57), which are the replications of (33) and (39) respectively.

(56) Ebru erken kalk-*ıyor*-sa, iyi anlaş-acağ-ız.
Ebru early wake up-IMPF-COND well get on-FUT-1Pl
Paraphrase: In all present possibilities where it is the *characteristic feature* of Ebru to wake up early, we are going to get on well.

(57) Ela parti-ye gel-*ecek*-se, şimdi hazırlan-ıyor-dur.
Ela party-Dat come-FUT-COND now get ready-IMPF-EPIS
Paraphrase: In all present possibilities where Ela *is going to* come to the party, she must be getting ready now.

All in all, the only marker that can set the denotation time to the future or make a quantification over situations is the aorist and if there is a mismatch between the denotation of the antecedent aorist and the interpretation of the consequent, the statement is infelicitous.

2.7 Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter, I illustrate that the aorist has two main interpretations in matrix sentences, namely the characterizing and the future-oriented ones. Then, I argue that the antecedent aorist behaves differently from its counterpart in the consequent clause since it surfaces in an embedded context by being inside an antecedent. I subsequently demonstrate what kind of differences or restrictions the antecedent aorist has by comparing it to the imperfective and the future markers in the same contexts for its characterizing and future-oriented interpretations, respectively. Based on these restrictions, I make a preliminary proposal by stating that the antecedent aorist is licensed only if the consequent clause has one of its matrix clause

interpretations in accordance with Kratzer's (1986, 1991) restrictor analysis of conditionals. However, I thereupon encounter some counter-examples for this initial proposal. In some cases, the antecedent aorist is allowed for certain epistemic deductions, but it is not licensed by some others even though their syntactic structures are seemingly the same. Moreover, the consequent clauses with the imperative or the obligative marker let the use of the antecedent aorist as well. In order to better explain all these challenging situations, I eventually update my proposal in line with Schulz's (2008) analysis of the Simple Present in conditional antecedents. I discuss that the antecedent aorist can have a denotation time referring to the future instead of the utterance time, unlike the imperfective and the future markers. Thus, it changes the modal time of the consequent from the utterance time to the denoted future time in the antecedent. Furthermore, based on von Fintel's (1994) analysis, I argue that if the aorist makes a quantification over situations with its characterizing interpretation, it only licenses the characterizing reading for the consequent clause as well. Finally, I state that while the aorist can change the denotation time from the utterance time to the future, the other markers like the imperfective and the future cannot do so. They are always evaluated relative to the utterance time and can add their interpretation directly inside the antecedent proposition, unlike the aorist. In short, the aorist selects its denotation either as the future time and evaluates the consequent modal based on this future time or as the quantification over situations and requires the use of the characterizing interpretation in the consequent.

The conditional involving the antecedent aorist not only sets the modal time for the consequent or makes some quantifications but also adds some kind of "possibility" reading compared to its non-aorist marked counterpart, as shown in the

pair (58) and (59). While (58) regards the event of you finishing your meal as an open possibility, (59) treats this event as if it is not possible to occur.

(58) Yemeğini bitir-ir-se-n, sana çikolata
meal.Poss.2Sg.Acc finish-AOR-COND-2Sg 2Sg.Dat chocolate
ver-ir-im.
give-AOR-1Sg
'If you finish your meal, I will give you some chocolate.'

(59) Yemeğini bitir-se-n, sana çikolata
meal.Poss.2Sg.Acc finish-COND-2Sg 2Sg.Dat chocolate
ver-ir-im.
give-AOR-1Sg
'If you finished your meal, I would give you some chocolate.'

Thus, (58) talks about the antecedent worlds that are likely to happen whereas (59) implies the worlds that are not alike the stated world, which is going to be examined in detail in the upcoming chapter.

CHAPTER 3

"ISE" AND "-SA" IN CONDITIONALS

In the previous chapter, I have analyzed the antecedent aorist, i.e., the "aorist + conditional" construction, and argued that this construction assigns either a future-oriented or characterizing reading to the main predicate in the conditional, basically the consequent clause. This chapter tackles the compositional and interpretational differences between the conditional statements constructed with the conditional markers *ise*, or its clitic form *-(y)sA*[36], and *-sA*. The aim of this chapter is to provide an explanation for their distinction. Sezer (2001) labels the conditional marker *-(y)sA* as the indicative conditional marker while he refers to its counterpart *-sA* as the subjunctive conditional marker. Although Göksel and Kerslake (2005) do not use such labels, they also state the meaning difference between these markers; as *-sA* referring to the hypothetical possibilities and *-(y)sA* talking about open or habitual conditionals[37]. On the other hand, Aygen (1996) differentiates them as real and unreal conditionals; *-(y)sA* being the real and *-sA* being the unreal marker. As these labels suggest, these markers certainly have a difference in terms of their interpretation. How this difference is generated is the main question of this chapter.

The first section of this chapter lays out the meaning-related differences between the conditional markers *-(y)sA* and *-sA* and in which contexts they are available or not. In the next section, I provide a preliminary analysis for their

[36] For the rest of the chapter, the examples and discussion will be given with this clitic form as it is more commonly used in the daily language compared to its free form *ise*.

[37] What I refer to as the future oriented in the previous chapter is similar to open conditionals and the characterizing one is alike habitual conditionals in Göksel and Kerslake (2005). As they mainly base their description of the *-(y)sA* marker on the conditional sentences constructed with the "aorist + *-(y)sA*" pair, they only state these two readings for the conditionals with *-(y)sA*. However, as I proposed in the previous chapter, the reason of these open (future) and habitual (characterizing) readings is the aorist marker in the antecedent rather than the conditional marker per se. In this chapter, I claim that the *-(y)sA* conditional marker adds its own interpretation, independent from the aorist marker.

interpretation, which is further developed in the upcoming chapter. Then, the third section demonstrates the differences in their syntactic structures to be able to provide further evidence for my claim that they are distinct morphemes. Lastly, section four summarizes the main points.

3.1 The semantic difference between *–(y)sA* and *-sA*

In order to facilitate the discussion, from this section onwards, I refer to *-(y)sA* as the indicative conditional marker ("IND.COND" in glosses) and *-sA* as the subjunctive conditional marker ("SUBJ.COND" in glosses) in line with Sezer (2001) because I believe that they behave similarly to the indicative and subjunctive conditionals in English. Even though the terminology for English conditionals is not clearly set either[38], what I refer to when I say "indicative" conditionals in English is conditionals like in (1) and "subjunctive" conditionals are similar to (2).

(1) a. If you study hard, you will achieve your goals.

b. If you are afraid of height, do not travel by plane.

c. If you finished your meal, you deserved a dessert.

(2) a. If you studied hard, you would achieve your goals.

b. If you were afraid of height, you would not travel by plane.

c. If you finished your meal, you would deserve a dessert.

[38] The term "subjunctive" and "indicative" generally refer to grammatical moods as von Fintel (2012) states. However, neither in English nor in Turkish is this the case. Yet again, von Fintel (2012) adopts the term "subjunctive" considering it more appropriate compared to the term "counterfactual" as the counterfactuality of these conditionals can be cancelled, which will be further discussed in this chapter and in the following one. On the other hand, Iatridou (2000) calls the type of conditionals like subjunctive conditionals as *future less vivid* or *present counterfactual* whereas Ippolito names them *non-past subjunctive conditionals* (2003) or *simple past subjunctive conditionals* (2013) according to their time reference and morphological marking, respectively. Even though they might somehow disagree in terminology, they mostly agree in the meanings of these conditionals. Indicative conditionals have the possibility in the actual world and subjunctives somehow sound like not possible in the actual world.

Similarly, what I mean when I talk about the "indicative" conditionals in Turkish is any kind of conditional statements that are constructed with the *-(y)sA* marker as in (3). On the other hand, the "subjunctive" conditionals in Turkish that I discuss in this chapter are exemplified in (4). One important detail that needs to be stated here is that the kind of subjunctive conditionals I work on in this chapter are the ones without the past marker both in the antecedent and in the consequent.

(3) a. Sıkı calış-ır-sa-n, hedef-ler-in-e
hard study-AOR-IND.COND-2Sg goal-Pl-2SgPoss-Dat
ulaş-ır-sın.
reach-AOR-2Sg
'If you study hard, you will reach your goals.'

b. Yüksek-ten kork-uyor-sa-n, uçağ-a
height-Abl fear-IMPF-IND.COND-2Sg plane-Dat
bin-me.
get on-NEG
'If you are afraid of height, do not get on a plane.'

c. Yemeğ-in-i bitir-di-yse-n,
meal-2SgPoss-Acc finish-PAST-IND.COND-2Sg
tatlı-yı hak et-ti-n.
dessert-Acc deserve-PAST-2Sg
'If you finished your meal, you deserved a dessert.'

(4) a. Sıkı calış-sa-n, hedef-ler-in-e
hard study-SUBJ.COND-2Sg goal-Pl-2SgPoss-Dat
ulaş-ır-sın.
reach-AOR-2g

‘If you studied hard, you would reach your goals.’

b. Yüksek-ten kork-sa-n , uçağ-a
height-Abl fear-SUBJ.COND-2Sg plane-Dat
bin-me-z-sin.
get on-NEG-AOR-2Sg
‘If you were afraid of height, you would not get on a plane.’

c. Yemeğ-in-i bitir-se-n,
meal-2SgPoss-Acc finish-SUBJ.COND-2Sg
tatlı-yı hak ed-er-sin.
dessert-Acc deserve-AOR-2Sg
‘If you finished your meal, you would deserve a dessert.’

Even though the past layer is obligatory for English subjunctive conditionals (von Fintel, 2011, 2012; Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2013; Mackay, 2019), it is not so for the Turkish version (Aygen, 1996; Göksel & Kerslake, 2005; Kornfilt, 1997; Sezer, 2001), which creates the biggest challenge in providing analysis for these conditional structures in Turkish. However, this detail will be further discussed in the next section. Therefore, I set it aside for now and continue with the meaning-related differences of indicative and subjunctive conditionals.

The main difference between an indicative conditional and a subjunctive one is related to the contexts in which they are allowed. While the indicative version is licensed in a context where the speaker is fully ignorant about the truth or the falsity of the antecedent clause, the subjunctive is not. For instance, imagine a scenario where I have recently met with Rabia in my aikido lesson in the university at the beginning of the semester, and I do not know much about her. I just know that we are in the same department. Right now, I am talking to my friend about Rabia in one of

our department lessons and I do not know if she is taking this class or not. In this context, it is much more acceptable to utter (5) rather than (6).

(5) Rabia bu ders-i al-ıyor-sa,
Rabia this lesson-Acc take-IMPF-IND.COND
onunla yakın arkadaş ol-ur-uz.
3Sg.Com close friend be-AOR-1Pl
'If Rabia is taking this lesson, we will be close friends with her.'

(6) Rabia bu ders-i al-ıyor ol-sa,
Rabia this lesson-Acc take-IMPF AUX-SUBJ.COND
onunla yakın arkadaş ol-ur-uz.
3Sg.Com close friend be-AOR-1Pl
'If Rabia were taking this lesson, we would be close friends with her.'

On the other hand, if I have a reason to believe that Rabia is probably not taking this lesson, then I would be more likely to utter (6) instead of (5).

Furthermore, when we want to imply that the antecedent is not true right now, in other words, it does not hold at the utterance time in the actual world, then we can only use a subjunctive conditional and an indicative one would be odd in that context. For example, in a context where one of my friends comes and asks me whether or not Dilay is sad right now because something bad happened in the workplace, I would most certainly respond with (8) but not with (7) to be able to imply that she is not sad at the utterance time as she is not eating chocolate assuming that she only eats chocolate when she is sad.

(7) Dilay üzgün-se, çikolata ye-r.
Dilay sad-IND.COND chocolate eat-AOR
'If Dilay is sad, she eats chocolate.'

(8)	Dilay	üzgün	ol-sa,	çikolata	ye-r.
	Dilay	sad	AUX-SUBJ.COND	chocolate	eat-AOR

'If Dilay were sad, she would eat chocolate.'

Another difference of subjunctive conditionals from their indicative counterparts is that although both can be used to talk about future possibilities, their level of likelihood differs from each other. The subjunctive option is mostly for hypothetical situations or events that are thought to be less likely to happen in the future by the speaker (Aygen, 1996; Göksel & Kerslake, 2005). On the other hand, the indicative one is most certainly not used in hypothetical scenarios and when it is used in a conversation, it implies that the speaker thinks that the event is more likely to happen compared to the subjunctive version.

In terms of hypotheticality, we can test both types of conditionals after the term *farz et* 'suppose' as in (9) and (10), to be able to see which one is available in a hypothetical ground. When we do that, we realize that the subjunctive conditional is the one that is allowed in this context but not the indicative version.

(9)	Farz et.	#Yarın	Dünya-ya	meteor
	suppose	tomorrow	Earth-Dat	meteor
	çarp-ar-sa,		ne	yap-ar-sın?
	hit-AOR-IND.COND		what	do-AOR-2Sg

'Suppose this: if a meteor hits the Earth tomorrow, what will you do?'

(10)	Farz et.	Yarın	Dünya-ya	meteor
	suppose	tomorrow	Earth-Dat	meteor
	çarp-sa,		ne	yap-ar-sın?
	hit-SUBJ.COND		what	do-AOR-2Sg

'Suppose this: if a meteor hit the Earth tomorrow, what would you do?'

Although this kind of test has not been applied in the other studies (Aygen, 1996; Göksel & Kerslake, 2005), I believe it does show that the indicative type is odd in hypothetical contexts.

When these constructions are felicitous depends on what the speaker knows and believes when uttering the conditional sentence. The main difference in the interpretation of (11) and (12) comes from how much the speaker considers the antecedent is likely to happen in the future. In (11), the speaker thinks that in all future possibilities where Damla studies for the exam, she passes and believes that she is likely to study. However, (12) sounds like the speaker thinks that Damla will not study and hence will not be able to pass the exam. Notice that both of them can be uttered in a situation where I know that Damla is not the kind of student who studies for her exams. The only thing is that how likely *I* think she is to study from this moment onwards.

(11)	Damla	sınav-a	çalış-ır-sa,	geç-er.
	Damla	exam-Dat	study-AOR-IND.COND	pass-AOR
	‘If Damla studies for the exam, she will pass.’			
(12)	Damla	sınav-a	çalış-sa,	geç-er.
	Damla	exam-Dat	study-SUBJ.COND	pass-AOR
	‘If Damla studied for the exam, she would pass.’			

One last thing to add to the list on how indicative conditionals differ from the subjunctives is associated with the type of consequent clauses that are licensed by the indicative and subjunctive antecedent markers. The indicative conditional marker allows various types of constructions, such as epistemic claims, imperatives, and obligative, in the consequent clause as it can be remembered from Section 6 in Chapter 2. On the contrary, the subjunctive conditional marker nearly exclusively

licenses the aorist marker in its consequent clause as it has been seen in all the subjunctive conditional examples so far. It also occasionally allows the future marker as (13) exemplifies.

(13) Az ye-se-n, daha iyi ol-acak.
little eat-SUBJ.COND-2Sg more good be-FUT.
'If you ate less, it would be better.'

However, the subjunctive antecedent is highly restrictive in licensing other markers at its consequent clause. For instance, it never licenses the epistemic marker *-DIr* or the imperative and obligative moods in the consequent part, as shown by (14), (15), and (16) respectively.

(14) *Ela gel-se, Baran onu ikna et-miş-tir.
Ela come-SUBJ.COND Baran 3Sg.Acc convince-PFV-EPIS
Lit: 'If Ela came, Baran must have convinced her.'

(15) *Dışarı çık-sa-n, beni ara.[39]
outside go-SUBJ.COND-2Sg 1Sg.Acc call.IMP
Lit: 'If you went outside, call me.'

(16) *Diş-in ağrı-sa, doktor-a git-meli-sin.[40]
tooth-2SgPoss ache-SUBJ.COND doctor-Dat go.OBLG-2Sg
Lit: 'If your tooth ached, you should go to a doctor.'

The indicative counterparts of these ungrammatical subjunctive conditionals would be respectively as follows in (17), (18), and (19).

[39] The imperative is allowed with the subjunctive antecedent when there is *da* 'even' after the negated subjunctive conditional marker as illustrated below in (2). However, these types of concessive like examples are not in the scope of this chapter or this thesis.

(1) Dışarı çık-ma-sa-n da beni ara.
outside go-NEG-SUBJ.COND-2Sg even 1Sg.Acc call.IMP
Lit: 'Even if you do not go outside, call me.'

[40] The same goes for obligative as well, which is shown in the following example:

(2) Diş-in ağrı-ma-sa da doktor-a git-meli-sin.
tooth-2SgPoss ache-NEG-SUBJ.COND even doctor-Dat go.OBLG-2Sg
Lit: 'Even if your tooth does not ache, you should go to a doctor.'

(17) Ela gel-ecek-se, Baran onu
Ela come-FUT-IND.COND Baran 3Sg.Acc
ikna et-miş-tir.
convince-PFV-EPIS
'If Ela is going to come, Baran must have convinced her.'

(18) Dışarı çık-ar-sa-n, beni ara.
outside go-AOR-IND.COND-2Sg 1Sg.Acc call.IMP
'If you go outside, call me.'

(19) Diş-in ağrı-yor-sa, doktor-a
tooth-2SgPoss ache-IMPF-IND.COND doctor-Dat
git-meli-sin.
go.OBLG-2Sg
'If your tooth is aching, you should go to a doctor.'

As these examples demonstrate, the indicative conditional marker offers a wider range of possible structures for its consequent clause whereas the consequent clause of subjunctive conditionals is mostly limited to the aorist and the future markers.

In sum, the indicative conditionals differ from subjunctive conditionals in terms of the contexts that they are allowed or preferred to be used in. In an ignorance context, where the speaker does not have any knowledge or belief about the truth value of the antecedent, the indicative version is preferred over the subjunctive one. On the other hand, in a situation where the speaker believes that the antecedent is not likely to be true at the time of the utterance, the subjunctive alternative is chosen. Furthermore, if the speaker does not believe the antecedent clause to be describing a likely future or makes a hypothetical supposition, the subjunctive conditional is opted for. Lastly, they are distinct from each other in terms of the types of markers

that are available in their consequent clauses. While it is possible to use a variety of different constructions at the consequent of the indicative conditionals, it is not so for the subjunctive case, which almost only licenses the aorist marker and sometimes the future one. In light of all these distinctions, the next section tries to provide an explanation for how the interpretations of indicative and subjunctive conditionals are generated.

3.2 A preliminary explanation for the difference

Although it is obvious that the indicative and the subjunctive conditionals are unlike each other in many terms, it is not trivial to explain the reason for this contrast in Turkish. The reason for this challenge is that, as I mentioned earlier, the subjunctive conditionals in English and many other Indo-European languages require the addition of a past layer when referring to the present or the future, unlike Turkish. In Turkish, we might have the past marker after the subjunctive conditional marker, but it is not obligatory to talk about the present or the future hypothetical possibilities. Since it is so in English, many studies (e.g., Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2013; Mackay, 2019) describe the past marker as the signal of the subjunctivity. While doing that, they follow different routes. Iatridou (2000) suggests that the past is an "exclusion feature", and when it ranges over times, it excludes the utterance time and when it ranges over the worlds, it excludes the actual world. Thus, the past marker in the subjunctives ranges over worlds and can refer to the worlds that are not similar to the actual world. On the contrary, Ippolito (2002, 2003, 2013) argues that the past marker holds its time reference and claims that one layer of past in the subjunctive conditionals set the "accessibility time" of the conditional antecedent to the past while the "reference time" of the whole conditional stays at the utterance

time. That is how the subjunctive conditionals with the simple past marker can refer to the present or the future and be counterfactual (not hold at the utterance time) at the same time. Another "past-as-modal" interpretation like Iatridou (2000) for the analysis of the past marker in subjunctive conditionals is argued by Mackay (2019). He defines it as "< relation" and states that some presuppositions in the factive common ground are removed from the modal base by the use of the modal past. Even though all these different interpretations of the past marker might help in describing the English subjunctives, they most certainly do not apply to the Turkish case that I discuss in this chapter.

Rather than the past marker, Turkish makes use of the *-sA* marker, which does not have any specific temporal interpretation, to generate the subjunctive conditionals that refer to the present or future hypothetical possibilities. Hence, we need a non-past-related type of analysis for Turkish subjunctive conditionals here. I explain these constructions and their indicative counterparts by getting inspiration from Leahy (2011, 2017). His analysis actually focuses on the indicative conditionals and subjunctive conditionals with the past perfect marker rather than the simple past. Leahy (2011, 2017) states that the indicative conditional bears an "epistemically possible" presupposition while the subjunctive one has "no presuppositions", and the competition between these presuppositions creates an "antipresupposition", the interpretation that the speaker knows that the antecedent is false. Nonetheless, as Leahy (2017) himself remarks the "no-presupposition" reading does not hold for noncounterfactual subjunctives, which I discuss here. He does not offer any ideas on how to analyze that type of conditionals and leaves it as an open question. Here, I try to provide an answer for that question while making my analysis.

I agree with Leahy (2011, 2017) in accounting for the indicative conditionals and propose that the indicative conditionals do in fact demonstrate an epistemic possibility presupposition. As it can be remembered from examples (5) and (6), which are repeated here in (20) and (21), respectively, in a fully ignorant context where the speaker does not have any knowledge or belief about the truth or the falsity of the antecedent clause, the indicative conditional in (20) is opted for.

(20) Rabia bu ders-i al-ıyor-sa,
Rabia this lesson-Acc take-IMPF-IND.COND
onunla yakın arkadaş ol-ur-uz.
3Sg.Com close friend be-AOR-1Pl
'If Rabia is taking this lesson, we will be close friends with her.'

(21) Rabia bu ders-i al-ıyor ol-sa,
Rabia this lesson-Acc take-IMPF AUX-SUBJ.COND
onunla yakın arkadaş ol-ur-uz.
3Sg.Com close friend be-AOR-1Pl
'If Rabia were taking this lesson, we would be close friends with her.'

I take the "epistemically possible" to mean that the speaker does not know that the proposition is true or false and hence according to what she knows it is possible (it can be true). However, if the speaker knows that the antecedent or the consequent is false at the utterance time, then she cannot utter an indicative conditional.[41]

[41] Trivially, if the speaker knows that both the antecedent and the consequent are true, then the conditional is ruled out altogether due to the lack of "iffiness" element, proposed by von Fintel and Iatridou (2002). In their analysis, they propose a "normal conditional" meaning to *if* rather than the "semantically vacuous" interpretation suggested by Kratzer (1986). I also agree with von Fintel and Iatridou (2002) on this term and claim that the *-(y)sA* indicative conditional marker assigns a "conditional" meaning.

Consider the following contexts with respect to the example sentences (22) and (23) to be able to better understand the effect of knowledge states on indicative and subjunctive conditionals.

Context 1: Damla is in her room right now and I have no information and belief about whether she is studying for her exam or doing something else. Then, I would choose (22) over (23).

Context 2: I see (from a camera) that Damla is not studying for her exam in her room right now. Then I can say (23) but not (22).

(22) Damla çalış-ıyor-sa, sınav-ı geç-er.
Damla study-AOR-IND.COND exam-Acc pass-AOR
'If Damla is studying, she will pass the exam.'

(23) Damla çalış-ıyor ol-sa, sınav-ı geç-er.
Damla study-IMPF AUX-SUBJ.COND exam-Acc pass-AOR
'If Damla were studying, she would pass the exam.'

As it can be realized from context 2, the subjunctive conditional can be used in situations where the speaker knows that the antecedent is false at the utterance time. Nonetheless, the important detail to be noticed here is that in both contexts the consequent clause is epistemically possible. Neither (22) nor (23) can be used if (the speaker knows that) Damla took the exam already. This follows my discussion naturally because the conditionals I describe here refers to the utterance time and if the consequent happened in the past, we would need a past marker. Moreover, if the speaker knows the consequent is no longer possible based on some evidence, the indicative and the subjunctive conditionals are not licensed as shown by context 3.

Context 3: It is past midnight and Damla's exam is tomorrow morning. I see that Damla is not studying for her exam in her room right now. Since she does not

have enough time left to study, she is going to fail her exam tomorrow. I know this. Then, (23) would not be accessible anymore, I could only utter either (24) or (25), which will be discussed further in the upcoming chapter.

(24) Damla çalış-ıyor ol-sa, sınav-ı
Damla study-IMPF AUX-SUBJ.COND exam-Acc
geç-er-di.
pass-AOR-PAST
Lit: 'If Damla had been studying, she would have passed the exam.'

(25) Damla çalış-ıyor ol-sa-ydı, sınav-ı
Damla study-IMPF AUX-SUBJ.COND-PAST exam-Acc
geç-er-di.
pass-AOR-PAST
Lit: 'If Damla had been studying, she would have passed the exam.'

Next, let us consider scenarios that manipulate the beliefs of the speaker (rather than what they know). Even though the speaker does not know anything about the antecedent, she still may or may not hold some beliefs about the likelihood of the truth or the falsity of it, in other words, be opinionated or unopinionated. If we evaluate the examples (22) and (23) relative to the following belief contexts by assuming that we already do not know whether the antecedent is true or false, we realize their distinction once more.

Context 4: I have recently met with Damla, and I do not know much about her characteristics. Hence, I do not have any opinion about whether she studies for her exams or not. In this case, I would choose (22), instead of (23).

Context 5: I have known Damla for a while and she usually studies for her exams. So, I believe that she is probably studying for the exam in her room right now. Then, only (22) would be felicitous to utter, but not (23).

Context 6: I know that Damla usually does not study for her exams. However, in those rare moments when she studies, she usually gets a passing grade. Therefore, I believe that she is most probably not studying in her room right now. For this situation, I would use (23) rather than (22).

Similar to context 2, context 6 demonstrates that the subjunctive is preferred in a case where the speaker believes that the antecedent is more likely to be false. In both contexts though, the consequent is still an open possibility in the future as she still did not take the exam and it is still not clear whether she will pass it or not. Therefore, I propose that in both the indicative and the subjunctive conditionals I discuss here, the consequent clause must be epistemically possible. However, the subjunctive one has a certain kind of likelihood presupposition for its antecedent: presuppositionally the speaker believes that "¬p" is more likely than "p". Thus, it can be uttered in situations where the speaker believes that the antecedent is false or knows that it is false at the utterance time. On the other hand, the indicative option offers an epistemically possible presupposition at its antecedent clause as well.

What I claim for the felicity conditions of the indicative and subjunctive conditionals are simply as follows in (26) and (27). In the literature, many studies (Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2013; Leahy, 2011, 2017) argue that the counterfactuality of the antecedent in subjunctive conditionals is an implicature and it is derived from the competition between the presuppositions of the indicative and the subjunctive counterparts. Nevertheless, in these studies, the subjunctive conditionals they refer to are the ones with the past perfect morphology in English and mostly labeled as

"counterfactuals". They are distinct from the subjunctive conditionals I examine in this chapter and hence the antecedent falsity implicature need not apply here.

(26) *Presuppositions of Indicative Conditionals:* p-ysA, q

a. p is epistemically possible for s[42]

b. q is epistemically possible for s

(27) *Presuppositions of Subjunctive Conditionals:* p-sA, q

a. p is more likely to be false than true for s

b. p is epistemically possible for s

c. q is epistemically possible for s

Yet again, Iatridou (2000) suggests that the type of subjunctive conditionals I investigate, called "future less vivid" in her study, has the counterfactuality implicature. The important detail that needs to be realized here is that although the antecedent is false can be an implicature, that the speaker believes the antecedent is more likely to be false than true is a presupposition. A good way to demonstrate that this likelihood reading in subjunctive conditionals is a presupposition but not an implicature can be to test its cancellability since implicatures can be canceled whereas presuppositions cannot. Canceling the likelihood interpretation is impossible as shown by the continuation in (28).

(28) Damla çalışıyor olsa, sınavı geçer # ve Damla'nın sınava çalışıyor olma ihtimaline inanıyorum.

'If Damla were studying, she would pass the exam and I believe in the likelihood that she is studying for the exam.'

Thus, we can show that although the falsity of the antecedent might be an implicature[43], the likelihood for the proposition at the antecedent to be false rather

[42] The *s* stands for the "speaker" here.
[43] This notion is further examined in the following chapter, so I do not discuss it here.

than true must be a presupposition. Eventually, this presupposition makes the subjunctive conditional the presuppositionally stronger option. Based on the new Gricean (1975) maxim, *Maximize Presupposition!* proposed by Heim (1991) as cited in Ippolito (2002, 2003, 2013) suggests that the speaker must be as informative as possible in her presuppositions and utter the sentence with the strongest presupposition. If the speaker utters a sentence with a weaker presupposition, she either does not know the stronger version is true or she knows that it is false. As a result, when the speaker utters the indicative conditional, the presuppositionally weaker alternative, the hearer derives the implication that the speaker either believes the antecedent is likely to occur or the speaker is not opinionated about the likelihood of the proposition at the antecedent at all.

Following my proposal, since the subjunctive conditional already has the likelihood presupposition in favor of the falsity of the antecedent, it is predicted to be used when the antecedent is believed by the speaker to be false. Furthermore, as it is just related to the likelihood of the event from the speaker's perspective, the probability of the antecedent is not evaluated relative to the actual world but in accordance with the speaker's perception of that possibility. To be able to better understand this, we can think of a context like the following:

Context 7*:* We are deciding on which team will start a game first by playing heads or tails. My team chooses heads and I have a strange belief that the team who starts the game wins the game. However, I am pessimistic about the result of heads or tails, and I do not think it will come heads. In this case, I can utter (29).

(29) Tura gel-se, oyun-u kazan-ır-ız.
heads come-SUBJ.COND game-Acc win-AOR-1Pl
'If it came heads, we would win the game.'

Although the likelihood of the result being heads or tails is the same in the actual world as both are fifty percent possible, the speaker can still consider one to be more likely than the other due to a certain reason. Thus, (29) can be uttered without creating any problems. However, what needs to be clarified here is that when I take my inspiration from Leahy (2011, 2017) in these "speaker-oriented" presuppositions for conditionals, I do not claim that presuppositions vary from speaker to speaker. What I suggest is that both the epistemic possibility and likelihood of the events in conditionals are relative to the speaker's perspective and these presuppositions are available both when the speaker utters these sentences and when any interlocutor hears those utterances.

In consequence, the explanations and analyses provided for the subjunctive conditionals, referring to the utterance time or the future, in English are not applicable for the Turkish version. They mostly suggest either a temporal (Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2013), or a modal (Iatridou, 2000; Mackay, 2019) effect of the past marker, but Turkish do not employ any past marker in the same context. Therefore, there needs to be another kind of account for the description of the subjunctive conditionals in Turkish. Inspired by Leahy (2011, 2017), I propose that *-(y)sA* in the indicative conditionals presupposes that the speaker knows that both the antecedent and the consequent are possible. Adding to Leahy's argument, I also argue that *-sA* in the subjunctive ones presupposes that the speaker knows that the consequent is possible but believes that the falsity of the antecedent is more likely than its truth although she does not claim to know that it is false. Due to this likelihood presupposition, we can use the subjunctive conditionals in the contexts where the antecedent is not true at the utterance time. In addition, it is possible to use the subjunctive case in situations where the probability of the antecedent is fifty percent

in the actual world, but the speaker holds an (irrational) belief. Lastly, it naturally follows from this proposal that when the speaker chooses the indicative conditional, she is either unopinionated or opinionated for the possibility of the antecedent along with being ignorant about it.

The next section lays out the formal differences between the indicative conditional marker *-(y)sA* and the subjunctive one *-sA* to able to provide further evidence for their distinction.

3.3 The syntactic differences between *-(y)sA* and *-sA*

Both the *-(y)sA* and *-sA* markers are referred to as conditional markers in Turkish (Göksel & Kerslake, 2005; Kornfilt, 1997). However, while *-(y)sA* can attach to nominal predicates and nearly all TAM1 markers just like the other two markers with *i-* auxiliary[44], *-iDI* and *-imIş*; *-sA* only attaches to verbal roots (Sezer, 2001). Unlike the other two forms with the defective auxiliary *i-* and their counterparts attached to non-defective verbs (Sezer, 2001), the *-(y)sA* marker is never used together with *-sA*, as it can be seen from the examples[45] (30) to (32).

(30) yap-tı-ydı-m

do-PAST1-PAST2-1Sg

'I had done (it).'

(31) yap-mış-mış-ım

do-INF.PAST1-INF.PAST2-1Sg

a. 'It turns out that I had done it.'

b. 'They say that others say that I did it.'

[44] Sezer (2001) describes the *i-* or *y-* particles in *i-*+Tense forms, such as *-idi, -imiş and -ise*, as the defective auxiliary stem.

[45] The examples (30) and (31) are directly taken from Sezer (2001, p. 12) while the example (32) is my example, constructed based on the discussion in Sezer (2001).

(32) *yap-sa-ysa-m

do-SUBJ.COND-IND.COND-1Sg

(No reading)

I believe that the case in example (32) can be considered as a clue for the competing meanings of these two markers. The reason that they cannot be used together at the same time might be because they have two contrasting and competing interpretations as it is stated in the previous section.

Another formal distinction between the *-(y)sA* and *-sA* markers is related to the TAM markers that can be used in the scope of these markers. As it is stated before, the *-(y)sA* marker with the defective auxiliary *i-* can follow any tense, aspect, or modal markers, as examples (33)-(38) show.

(33) yap-ıyor-sa-n

do-PROG-IND.COND-2Sg

'If you are doing it'

(34) yap-acak-sa-n

do-FUT-IND.COND-2Sg

'If you are going to do it'

(35) yap-mış-sa-n

do-PFV-IND.COND-2Sg

'If you have done it'

(36) yap-ar-sa-n

do-AOR-IND.COND[46]-2Sg

'If you do it'

[46] As this structure is already discussed in detail in the previous chapter, I do not go over it one more time. The only thing that needs to be remined is that the "aorist+conditional"combination either sets the modal time of the conditional sentence to the future or makes a quantification over the situations. All the remaining examples here are evaluated relative to the utterance time with their literal meanings.

(37) yap-tı-ysa-n

do-PAST-IND.COND-2Sg

'If you did it'[47]

(38) yap-malı-ysa-n

do-OBLG-IND.COND-2Sg

'If you should do it'

On the other hand, although -s*A* directly attaches to the verb root, when it is used with the auxiliary verb *ol-*, it can still scope over certain aspectual markers but not the other TAM markers (Göksel, 2001), which is apparent in examples (39)-(44).

(39) yap-ıyor ol-sa-n

do-PROG AUX-SUBJ.COND-2Sg

'If you were doing it'

(40) yap-acak ol-sa-n

do-FUT AUX- SUBJ.COND-2Sg

'If you were to do it'

(41) yap-mış ol-sa-n

do-PFV AUX- SUBJ.COND-2Sg

'If it were the case that you have done it'

(42) *yap-ar ol-sa-n

do-AOR AUX- SUBJ.COND-2Sg

(No reading)

(43) *yap-tı ol-sa-n

do-PAST AUX- SUBJ.COND-2Sg

(No reading)

[47] It needs to be stated here that this is an example of a past indicative conditional not a past subjunctive one, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

(44) *yap-malı ol-sa-n

do-OBLG AUX- SUBJ.COND-2Sg

(No reading)

The reason that (43) and (44) are ungrammatical might be due to the auxiliary verb *ol-*, rather than the conditional marker -s*A* because the past marker -*DI* and the obligative marker -*mAlI* are never used together with the auxiliary *ol-* under any circumstances.[48] However, the fact that (42) is ungrammatical might be related to the nature of the -s*A* marker rather than the auxiliary *ol-*. As (45), (46), and (47) show, the aorist can be followed by the auxiliary verb *ol-* when it is combined with other TAM markers, but not with the -s*A* marker. Therefore, it seems like the type of the conditional marker might be responsible for the ungrammaticality of (42). However, I do not go into the details of this ungrammaticality here and leave it open for further research. What we can conclude from here is that -*sA* can only scope over the aspectual markers such as progressive, future, and perfective via the *ol-* auxiliary.

(45) O sıralar-da her konu-yu konuş-ur ol-du-k.

those times-Loc every topic-Acc talk-AOR AUX-PAST-1Pl

'During that time, we started talking about all kinds of things.'

(Göksel, 2001, p. 158)

(46) Gelecek yaz üniversite-ye gid-er

next summer university-Dat go-AOR

ol-acağ-ım.

AUX-FUT-1Sg

'Next summer, I will be going to the university (regularly).'

(Kornfilt, 1997, p. 342)

[48] The reason why the auxiliary verb *ol-* never scopes over the past marker or the obligative is not in the scope of this thesis though. For further discussion on this issue, see Göksel (2001).

(47) Her şey-e çabucak ağla-r ol-muş-sun.
everything-Dat quickly cry-AOR AUX-PFV-2Sg
'You have become a person who cries for everything quickly.'

Lastly, the type of sentences the *-(y)sA* and *-sA* markers can be used in differ from each other as well. The *-(y)sA* marker can only surface inside the conditional antecedents but never as the main predicate as in (48). On the other hand, *-sA* can appear in the main predicate position, as shown by (49), and even at the consequent clause of certain conditionals just like in (50), in addition to its availability at the antecedent clause.

(48) *Erdem konferans-a kabul al-dı-ysa.
Erdem conference-Dat acceptance get-PAST-COND
'If Erdem got accepted to the conference.'

(49) Erdem konferans-a kabul al-sa.
Erdem conference-Dat acceptance get-COND
'If only Erdem got accepted to the conference.'

(50) Erdem konferans-a kabul al-dı-ysa,
Erdem conference-Dat acceptance get-PAST-COND
bana söyle-se-ydi.
1Sg.Dat tell-COND-PAST
Lit: 'If Erdem got accepted to the conference, I wish he had told me.'

Nevertheless, conditional statements like (50) are not in the scope of the discussion of this chapter. Although they will not be further discussed here, (49) and (50) demonstrate that *-sA* marker is not simply a conditional marker while *-(y)sA* is.

All in all, the main morphosyntactic difference of *-(y)sA* from *-sA* lies in the type of predicates they can directly attach to, namely nominal and verbal predicates,

respectively. In addition, the kind of TAM markers they can scope over are distinct from each other. Whereas *-(y)sA* can scope over nearly all kinds of tense, aspect, or modality markers; *-sA* cannot scope over aspectual markers without the help of the auxiliary *ol-* providing a verbal host for *-sA*. Furthermore, the sentence structure they can occur in is also distinct from each other: *-(y)sA* appearing only in the embedded position of a conditional and *-sA* surfacing both in the embedded clause and in the main predicate.

3.4 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter revolves around the differences of two homophonous conditional markers in Turkish, namely-*(y)sA* and *-sA,* and how their difference can be interpreted. The first section lays out the semantic differences of these markers. I provide example scenarios to demonstrate the meaning distinction between the indicative conditionals constructed with *-(y)sA* and the subjunctive conditionals with *-sA.* I argue that the indicative conditional is uttered in fully ignorant contexts whereas the subjunctive one is chosen when talking about the situations that are unlike the actual world at the utterance time or hypothetical future possibilities or events that are considered to be unlikely to happen. In addition, the subjunctive conditional is much more restrictive in its consequent clause compared to the indicative version. The indicative one allows various structures ranging from epistemic claims constructed with the *-DIr* suffix to imperative and obligative moods, along with many other tense, aspect, or modality markers, at its consequent. However, in the subjunctive case, the consequent clause is mainly constructed with the aorist marker, and occasionally with the future one.

Next, the second section provides an analysis for the interpretation of the indicative and subjunctive conditionals in Turkish. Unlike many studies which associate the antecedent falsity reading in the subjunctive conditionals with the past marker and deem it an implicature, I argue for another presuppositional difference between the indicative and subjunctive conditionals due to the lack of the past marker in the Turkish case. Originating from Leahy (2011, 2017), I propose that for an indicative conditional to be felicitous, the speaker must know that the antecedent is possible, and in the case of a subjunctive one, the speaker believes that it is more likely for the antecedent to be false than true even though she does not claim knowledge of it. Moreover, in both the indicative and subjunctive conditionals, the consequent needs to be epistemically possible. Due to the likelihood presupposition in the subjunctive conditionals based on the speaker's belief, we can make use of them in cases where the antecedent is false and also when the truth and falsity probability of the antecedent is the same in the actual world. Since this extra presupposition makes the subjunctive version scalarly stronger, uttering an indicative conditional implies either the speaker does not hold any beliefs related to the likelihood of the antecedent or believes that the antecedent is more likely to be true.

In the third section, I provide the morphosyntactic differences between the indicative and subjunctive conditional markers. The *-(y)sA* indicative marker, including the defective auxiliary verb *i-*, can attach to nominal roots and nearly all TAM1 markers. On the other hand, the -s*A* subjunctive suffix can exclusively attach to verbal predicates and in case it is used with nominal predicates or with some aspectual markers, it requires the insertion of the auxiliary verb *ol-* to attach to. These conditional markers also differ from each other with respect to the type of sentences they are licensed in. While the *-(y)*s*A* marker cannot surface at the main

predicate position in a sentence, *-sA* can be realized both at the antecedent clause of a conditional and at the main predicate.

My proposal not only explains the semantic differences between the indicative and the subjunctive conditionals but also justifies the syntactic ones. Firstly, the reason why the subjunctive and the indicative conditionals cannot be used together even though morphosyntactically they belong to different categories is that they have competing presuppositions and hence cannot co-occur in the same context. Second, these presuppositions substantiate *-(y)sA* being a pure conditional marker and *-sA* appearing both in the antecedent and the consequent contexts. Remember I take "p is epistemically possible" as "not know p is true or false"; since people would not normally assert a proposition whose presuppositions they are ignorant about, this kind of statement can only appear in the restrictor position of the main predicate. On the contrary, as the speaker is opinionated about the likelihood of the argument when she utters a subjunctive, it is possible to see this structure in both parts of the conditional or even out of a conditional context. This can also explain the intuitive difference between the "hope" and "wish" statements. While in "hope" sentences the speaker believes in the possibility of the prejacent, "wish" clauses have the opposite interpretation, or according to my approach presupposition. Therefore, in "hope" sentences as in (51), the aorist marker which might be considered in the indicative mood is used. However, "wish" clauses like (52) require the subjunctive marker.

(51)	Umarım	Gülşah	parti-ye	gel-ir.
	I hope	Gülşah	party-Dat	come-AOR
	'I hope Gülşah comes to the party.'			
(52)	Keşke	Gülşah	parti-ye	gel-se.
	I wish	Gülşah	party-Dat	come-SUBJ.COND

'I wish Gülşah would come to the party.'

Lastly, the fact that the indicative conditionals can bear the epistemic modal marker or various other structures on their consequent clause, which the subjunctive alternative cannot, might also reason from their presuppositions. As the indicative version is the weaker choice and fully epistemically open without having any beliefs, it is possible to make epistemic claims or state imperative and obligative actions via it. Nonetheless, it is not permissible to do any of these when you believe that the antecedent is more likely to be false than true. Although the consequent is still epistemically possible in the case of subjunctives, it is not fully open anymore as the speaker is opinionated in favor of the probability for the falsity of its antecedent. However, with respect to the distinction in the TAM markers both conditionals can scope over, I cannot offer any reasonable account based on my arguments. This might be either a purely morphosyntactic restriction or there might be another motivation, which I could not identify.

What needs to be noted here before we begin the next chapter is that in the case of the subjunctive conditionals, although they presuppose the likelihood of the falsity for the antecedent, they still keep the existence presupposition. Nonetheless, the past subjunctives in Turkish or the subjunctives with the past perfect morphology in English are regarded counterfactual as they bear no presuppositions[49] according to Leahy's proposal (2011, 2017). The reason that the "no-presupposition" analysis does not apply to the present subjunctive conditionals I have discussed here is that, as it can be noticed from (53), when a presupposition, such as the existence one does not hold at the utterance time, the present subjunctive is eliminated. Only the past

[49] Even though other accounts of the past subjunctive conditionals do not make such a claim, they all agree on the fact that the past subjunctive version implies a counterfactual reading.

subjunctive option, either in the form of (54) or (55), can be uttered in that kind of context.

Context 8*:* Agatha Christie is dead.

(53) #Yaşa-sa, İstanbul'a gel-ir.
live-SUBJ.COND İstanbul-Dat come-AOR
'If she lived, she would come to İstanbul.

(54) Yaşa-sa, İstanbul'a gel-ir-di.
live-SUBJ.COND İstanbul-Dat come-AOR-PAST
'If she had lived, she would have come to İstanbul.

(55) Yaşa-sa-ydı, İstanbul'a gel-ir-di.
live-SUBJ.COND İstanbul-Dat come-AOR-PAST
'If she had lived, she would have come to İstanbul.

The following chapter focuses more on the details of the past subjunctive conditionals compared to the other types and the effect of the past morphology in conditional structures in general.

CHAPTER 4

PAST IN CONDITIONALS

The previous chapter lays out the distinction between the two conditional markers, namely the indicative *-(y)sA* and the subjunctive *-sA*, and this chapter aims to represent the effects of the past marker in both of these conditional constructions, by mainly focusing on the subjunctive type. I argue that although the past marker in an indicative conditional merely refers to some past time relative to the utterance time, the one added to the subjunctive conditional generates a "counterfactual" reading for the conditional statement, following many studies in the literature (e.g., von Fintel, 2005, 2011, 2012; Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2013; Mackay, 2019 a.o.). The "counterfactual" reading refers to the antecedent falsity implication diverging from the likelihood (of the falsity) presupposition I suggested for the subjunctive conditionals in the previous chapter. How this counterfactual interpretation is generated is what I try to explain in this chapter.

As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the past marker can either precede the indicative conditional marker or follow the subjunctive one (Aygen, 1996), as shown by (1) and (2), respectively.

(1) Esra ev-e git-ti-yse, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-PAST-IND.COND mother-3SgPoss
sevin-miş-tir.
be.happy-PFV-EPIS
'If Esra went home, her mother must have been happy.'

(2) Esra ev-e git-se-ydi, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND-PAST mother-3SgPoss

sevin-ir-di.

be.happy-AOR-PAST

'If Esra had gone home, her mother would have been happy.'

As Ippolito (2004) states the morphosyntactic position of the past marker in Turkish gives away an important clue about its interpretation relative to these constructions, which is discussed further in the upcoming parts of this chapter.

How I organize my arguments in this chapter is as follows. The first section describes the interpretation differences of the past marker in indicative and subjunctive conditional structures. Next, the second section compares the felicity conditions of the present subjunctive conditionals I examined in chapter 3 and the past subjunctive ones I analyze here. In section three, I offer my proposal to describe the past subjunctive conditional statements by getting inspiration from various authors, such as Ippolito (2002, 2003, 2004, 2013), Leahy (2011, 2017), and Schulz (2008). Lastly, I conclude this chapter with a summary and some final remarks.

4.1 The interpretations of the past marker

As illustrated in the previous chapter, the indicative and subjunctive conditional structures hold competing presuppositions and posit various restrictions for their consequent clauses resulting from these presuppositions. Taking all the previous arguments into account, I dwell on the meaning added by the insertion of the past marker to these constructions.

4.1.1 The past in indicative conditionals

The past marker appearing inside the indicative conditional antecedents has a regular temporal interpretation and picks out events that occurred before the utterance time.

Therefore, it can only co-occur with the time adverbials referring to the past, such as *dün* 'yesterday' but not with the future time adverbs like *yarın* 'tomorrow', as it is exemplified in (3) and (4), similar to the past indicative conditionals in English (Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2013) and Italian (Ippolito, 2004) and most probably in many other languages.

(3) Esra *dün* ev-e git-ti-yse,
Esra yesterday home-Dat go-PAST-IND.COND
anne-si sevin-miş-tir.
mother-3SgPoss be.happy-PFV-EPIS
'If Esra went home *yesterday*, her mother must have been happy.'

(4) *Esra *yarın* ev-e git-ti-yse,
Esra tomorrow home-Dat go-PAST-IND.COND
anne-si sevin-miş-tir.
mother-3SgPoss be.happy-PFV-EPIS
*'If Esra went home *tomorrow*, her mother must have been happy.'

Although the antecedent is interpreted with a past inference, the consequent does not need to be located in the past as in (5), it can also refer to future possibilities like (6) shows.

(5) Esra ev-e git-ti-yse, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-PAST-IND.COND mother-3SgPoss
bakkala git-ti.
market-Dat go-PAST
'If Esra went home, her mother went to the market.'

(6) Esra ev-e git-ti-yse, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-PAST-IND.COND mother-3SgPoss

ona kek yap-ar.

3Sg.Dat cake make-AOR

'If Esra went home, her mother will make a cake for her.'

These two arguments clearly prove that the past marker simply locates the main eventuality in the antecedent of indicative conditionals as prior to the utterance time. It neither imposes any constraints on the consequent clause nor has any impacts on the meaning of the indicative conditional itself. In both (5) and (6), the antecedent still holds its epistemically possible presupposition proposed in chapter 3. The speaker uttering these sentences does not know whether Esra went home or not and hence does not know whether their consequent is true or false either.

4.1.2 The past in subjunctive conditionals

In the case of subjunctive conditionals with the past marker, the time reference of the past inside the antecedent clause is not as strict as it is in the indicative context. The past subjunctive conditionals can appear with both the past and the future referent time adverbials, unlike the past indicative ones, which can be realized from examples (7) and (8).

(7) Esra *dün* ev-e git-se-ydi,

Esra yesterday home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND-PAST

anne-si sevin-ir-di.

mother-3SgPoss be.happy-AOR-PAST

'If Esra had gone home *yesterday*, her mother would have been happy.'

(8) Esra *yarın* ev-e git-se-ydi,

Esra tomorrow home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND-PAST

anne-si sevin-ir-di.

mother-3SgPoss be.happy-AOR-PAST

'If Esra had gone home *tomorrow*, her mother would have been happy.'

Nonetheless, the past subjunctive conditional is much more restrictive in its consequent clause compared to its antecedent in terms of assigning a past interpretation. Unlike its past indicative counterpart, the past subjunctive conditional only allows an overtly past marked consequent clause. That is why (9) is ungrammatical without the past marker at the end.

(9) *Esra ev-e git-se-ydi, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND-PAST mother-3SgPoss
sevin-ir.
be.happy-AOR
Lit: 'If Esra had gone home, her mother would be happy.'

A detail to be stated here is that it is not only required for the consequent clause to be past marked in past subjunctive conditionals, but also sufficient for it to be so to construct this conditional type. That is, even though the antecedent might not have an overt past marker after the subjunctive conditional suffix, it may still be regarded as a past subjunctive conditional if its consequent clause is marked with the past. Therefore, (10) is not semantically discernable from (2) in any detectable way.[50]

(10) Esra ev-e git-se, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND mother-3SgPoss
sevin-ir-di.
be.happy-AOR-PAST
'If Esra had gone home, her mother would have been happy.'

[50] Göksel and Kerslake (2005) claim that the option without the past marker in the antecedent as in (10) is slightly less counterfactual than the fully past marked version in (2). However, they also state that both of these constructions have a counterfactual reading. Since I have not been able to find a single context where one is acceptable while the other is not, I will need to set aside Göksel and Kerslake's claim that there might be a slight difference between them.

However, notice that not only the past marker but also the aorist or another suffix referring to the future is necessary at the consequent clause to generate a "counterfactual" past subjunctive conditional. The sentence (11) only with the past marker at the consequent would be ungrammatical while it was acceptable in the indicative version as in (5). On the other hand, as it can be realized from (12), the subjunctive counterpart of (6), the sentence would still be acceptable if we switched the aorist marker with the future marker *-AcAk*.

(11) *Esra ev-e git-se-ydi, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND-PAST mother-3SgPoss
bakkala git-ti.
market-Dat go-PAST
Lit: 'If Esra had gone home, her mother had gone to the market.'

(12) Esra ev-e git-se-ydi, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND-PAST mother-3SgPoss
ona kek yap-acak-tı.
3Sg.Dat cake make-FUT-PAST
'If Esra had gone home, her mother would have made a cake for her.'

All in all, what I claim is that the past subjunctive conditionals are morphosyntactically structured as in (13). Other than the past marker at the antecedent, all the elements in (13) constitute the minimum requirements of a past subjunctive conditional statement.

(13) *The underlying structure of past subjunctive conditionals*
If p-SUBJ.COND(-PAST), q-FUT[51]-PAST
[p-sA(-yDI), q-Ar-DI]

[51] The future here stands for the future-oriented interpretation rather than the future marker itself. Hence, it can be realized as the aorist or the future markers at the surface representation.

Although the antecedent past might be regarded as optional, I keep including it in my examples of past subjunctives just to be able to illustrate its distinction from the present version better. Furthermore, I suggest that the mismatch between the future and the past might be our first clue for the counterfactuality of these statements following Ippolito (2002, 2003, 2004, 2013). In particular, I will be arguing that the past subjunctive conditionals basically make a statement about the future possibilities in the past, in other words, historical possibilities (Macfarlane, 2003b).

4.2 Present subjunctives vs. past subjunctives

An evident difference between the present subjunctive conditionals, which I analyzed in the previous chapter, and the past subjunctive ones here is the fact that only the past version can be used to refer to the past events naturally. However, in referring to the future events both versions are acceptable to a certain degree. Ippolito (2013)[52] proposes that both of these conditional structures have the same counterfactuality implication at their antecedent clause, but they differ in their presuppositions. Although I agree with her in relation to their distinction in their felicity conditions, the type of presuppositions I suggest for these conditional types differ from her proposal, which is examined in detail in the upcoming section.

In terms of their felicity conditions, Ippolito (2013) argues that the present subjunctive conditionals, which are called simple past subjunctive conditionals in her version, are felicitous only if the event or the state at the antecedent has not already occurred in the past. If it has already occurred, then the present subjunctive version will be infelicitous and only the past subjunctive one will be acceptable. To be able

[52] I consider the present subjunctive conditionals in Turkish similar to the "simple past subjunctive conditionals" in her study and the past subjunctive ones to the "past perfect subjunctive conditionals".

to better understand these felicity conditions, we might consider the following contexts.

Context 1: Esra's birthday is tomorrow. However, Esma thought that it was today and called her to celebrate. Esra got upset as her friend did such a mistake. Then, I would say (15) to Esma but (14) would be infelicitous[53] to utter.

Context 2: Esra's birthday is tomorrow. However, Esma thinks that it is today, and tells me that she is calling her now to celebrate her birthday. In this case, I would use (14) instead of (15).

(14)	Yarın	ara-sa-n,	iyi	ol-ur.
	tomorrow	call-SUBJ.COND-2Sg	good	be-AOR
	'If you called her tomorrow, it would be nice.'			
(15)	Yarın	ara-sa-ydı-n,	iyi	ol-ur-du.
	tomorrow	call-SUBJ.COND-PAST-2Sg	good	be-AOR-PAST
	'If you had called her tomorrow, it would have been nice.'			

In addition to the occurrence of the events, the existence presupposition at the antecedent clause plays an important role in differentiating the present and past subjunctive conditionals as well (Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2013). As we can remember from the last examples of the previous chapter, which are repeated here in (16) and (17), in the case that the referent of the subject in the antecedent clause does not exist in the actual world at the utterance time, only the past subjunctive alternative like in (17) would be felicitous.

Context 3: Agatha Christie is dead.

[53] (14) would become felicitous with the insertion of *dA* 'also' to the antecedent part as in the following example. However, this would generate the connotation of repeating an action that has already occurred, which turns the statement into an open possibility again. Nevertheless, this type of examples is not in the scope of the discussion here.

(1)	Yarın	da	ara-sa-n,	iyi	ol-ur.
	tomorrow	also	call-SUBJ.COND-2Sg	good	be-AOR
	'If you called her tomorrow too, it would be nice.'				

(16) #Yaşa-sa, İstanbul'a gel-ir.
live-SUBJ.COND İstanbul-Dat come-AOR
'If she lived, she would come to İstanbul.

(17) Yaşa-sa-ydı, İstanbul'a gel-ir-di.
live-SUBJ.COND İstanbul-Dat come-AOR-PAST
'If she had lived, she would have come to İstanbul.

Not only the subject but also all the other nominal elements of the antecedent clause must exist in the actual world as Ippolito (2003) argues. For instance, in context 4 although the subject exists at the utterance time, the object lacks a referent (it is an undefined definite description). Therefore, the present subjunctive option in (18) would be infelicitous while the past subjunctive (19) is acceptable for the same context.

Context 4: Emre's car was stolen a week ago and he does not have a car anymore.

(18) # Yarın araba-sı-nı sat-sa, çok para
tomorrow car-3SgPoss-Acc sell-SUBJ.COND very money
kazan-ır.
earn-AOR
'If he sold his car tomorrow, he would earn a lot of money.'

(19) Yarın araba-sı-nı sat-sa-ydı, çok
tomorrow car-3SgPoss-Acc sell-SUBJ.COND-PAST very
para kazan-ır-dı.
money earn-AOR-PAST
'If he had sold his car tomorrow, he would have earned a lot of money.'

Even though Ippolito (2002, 2003, 2013) bases her arguments mostly in relation to the antecedent clause and its presuppositions, I argue that the consequent clause is also effective in choosing a present or past subjunctive alternative as I mentioned briefly in the previous chapter. If the speaker has acquired knowledge based on certain evidence that the consequent is not likely to occur in the future, then she would prefer a past subjunctive conditional even though the event has not occurred yet. This account can be better realized by considering contexts 5 and 6.

Context 5: Şevval has a flight at 10 am and she left the house at 8 am to catch her plane. It is 9:00 now and she is stuck in a traffic jam but there is a short road left to the airport. So, it is possible for her to catch the plane. In this case, (20) would be more likely to be uttered rather than (21).

Context 6: Şevval has a flight at 10 am and she left the house at 8 am to catch her plane. It is 9:30 now and she is stuck in a traffic jam and there is still a long road left to the airport. So, it is not possible for her to catch the plane. Then, (20) would be inaccessible in this scenario and only (21) would be acceptable.

(20) Trafik ol-ma-sa, uçağ-a yetiş-ir.
traffic be-NEG-SUBJ.COND plane-Dat catch-AOR
'If there were no traffic jam, she would catch the flight.'

(21) Trafik ol-ma-sa-ydı, uçağ-a yetiş-ir-di.
traffic be-NEG-SUBJ.COND-PAST plane-Dat catch-AOR-PAST
'If there had been no traffic jam, she would have caught the flight.'

Consequently, the choice between a present and a past subjunctive conditional relies on their presuppositions, such as possibility and existence, as Ippolito (2002, 2003, 2013) states. However, not only the presuppositions at the antecedent clause but also the ones at the consequent clause must be accessible at the

utterance time for a present subjunctive conditional to be uttered. If any one of these presuppositions does not hold at the utterance time, the past subjunctive version is required by eliminating the present option. The following section puts forward my proposal for the past subjunctive conditional statements by taking my arguments for the indicative and subjunctive conditionals in the previous chapter into account.

4.3 My proposal for past subjunctive conditionals

What I propose for the meaning of the past in subjunctive conditionals gets its origin from various studies (Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2013; Leahy, 2011, 2017; Macfarlane; 2003a, 2003b, 2008, 20011; Schulz, 2008). Firstly, I agree with the idea that past tense is interpreted outside the modal operator in the subjunctive conditionals (Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2013). Based on this, I propose that it sets the modal time of the conditional statement into a past time, much similar to the aorist setting the modal time to the future in conditionals (Schulz, 2008) as it can be remembered from chapter 2. I suggest that this shift in the modal time of the conditional clause lets us make claims about the future possibilities from a past perspective. Macfarlane states that the truth values of both the future contingents (2003b, 2008) and the epistemic modalities (2003a, 2011) are relativized based on the assessment context or time[54]. Since the conditional statements are related to our epistemic states and mostly used to refer to the future possibilities as I argue for in chapter 3 and also many others do (von Fintel, 2011; Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2013; Kratzer, 1986; Leahy, 2011, 2017 a.o.), what the past marker does is to basically set a value for this assessment time.

[54] What Macfarlane (2003a, 2003b, 2008, 20011) calls as the "assessment time" is similar to what Ippolito (2013) suggests with the "reference time", as she also states. I believe that they are alike the "anchor time" proposed by Schulz (2008) as well. Instead of choosing one of these labels, I simply refer to the same concept as "modal time" in my account.

Although I agree with the basics of most previous accounts, I either extend their claims or disregard some parts in their original formulations while articulating my proposal. Firstly, when Macfarlane argues for assessment sensitivity in evaluating the assertions (2003b) or propositions (2008) related to the future contingents, he mainly bases his arguments on simple statements but not conditionals. He does the same with reference to the epistemic modals (2003a) despite providing a very brief account of counterfactuals (2011). Ippolito (2013), on the other hand, similar to Macfarlane's assessment time, suggests the "reference time" for the evaluation of the subjunctive conditional statements. However, she proposes a distinction between the "accessibility time" of the modal operator and the "reference time" of the whole conditional. According to her claim, the past marker in simple past subjunctive conditionals in English accesses the past possibilities while referring to the utterance time whereas double layers of the past morphology in the past perfect subjunctive conditionals sets both the accessibility time and the reference time into the past independently[55]. She suggests that switching the accessibility time to the past allows us to make counterfactual suppositions and the past shift in the reference time sets the ground for counterfactual presuppositions. Hence, while both the simple past and past perfect subjunctive conditionals have the same antecedent falsity implication at their propositions, only the past perfect version is allowed when the felicity conditions of the antecedent are not satisfied at the utterance time, in Ippolito's (2013) account. Furthermore, Ippolito (2004) offers a brief discussion on Turkish conditionals by comparing the indicative conditionals with [[V-past]-conditional] structure to the subjunctive conditionals with [[V-conditional]-past] morphology. Here, she states that the past in the subjunctive conditionals contributes

[55] Ippolito (2013) also states that the "reference time" either follows or coincides with the "accessibility time" but never precedes it.

to the accessibility time and gets its interpretation outside the scope of the modal. Nonetheless, as we may remember from the previous chapter, I do not agree with Ippolito's (2013) framework in relation to differentiating the accessibility time from the reference time since Turkish do not require any past morphology in subjunctive conditionals while referring to the non-past events. Moreover, the addition of the past morphology affects the presuppositions as well as the suppositions at the subjunctive conditional statement. Therefore, it must be the case that either the past marker in subjunctive conditionals contributes to the reference time directly or the shift in the accessibility time leads to a shift in the reference time as well. I propose that the latter is the case by expanding my interpretation of Schulz's (2008) account for the aorist marker in indicative conditionals in chapter 2 to the past marker in subjunctive conditionals here.

Simply, I suggest that when the antecedent clause denotes a past time, the modal time of the conditional statement necessarily shifts to that past time. As we can recall from the ungrammaticality of (9), repeated in (22), when the subjunctive antecedent has an overt past marker, the consequent modal must surface with that past morpheme as well.

(22) *Esra ev-e git-se-ydi, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND-PAST mother-3SgPoss
sevin-ir.
be.happy-AOR(-PAST)
Lit: 'If Esra had gone home, her mother would be happy.'

However, despite the necessity of the past marker at the consequent clause of past subjunctive conditionals, the overtness of the one at the antecedent clause might be considered non-compulsory (Göksel & Kerslake, 2005) as (23), which is a

reduplication of (10), illustrates. The reason for this optionality might come from the symmetry between the denotation time of the antecedent and the modal time of the whole conditional statement. Since both necessarily refer to the same time, the one at the antecedent might be covert while the modal time must stay overt.

(23) Esra ev-e git-se(-ydi), anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-SUBJ.COND(-PAST) mother-3SgPoss
sevin-ir-di.
be.happy-AOR-PAST
'If Esra had gone home, her mother would have been happy.'

Nonetheless, the fact that this idea does not apply to the aorist in indicative conditionals might be the result of the morphosyntactic requirements of the indicative conditionals explained in the previous chapter. Since the indicative conditional marker *-(y)sA* needs a TAM marker to attach to the aorist cannot be covert in that context.

Unlike the past marker in subjunctive conditionals, the one in the indicative context only sets a value for the proposition in the antecedent clause itself rather than contributing to the denotation or the modal time. This is apparent from the availability of (6), provided again in (24). In indicative conditionals without the antecedent aorist, the denotation time of the antecedent and hence the modal time of the conditional statement stays at the utterance time while the propositions at the antecedent and the consequent clause set their own time value separately. For ease of reference, I call this time the "proposition time" henceforth.

(24) Esra ev-e git-ti-yse, anne-si
Esra home-Dat go-PAST-IND.COND mother-3SgPoss
ona kek yap-ar.

3Sg.Dat cake make-AOR

Paraphrase: In all present worlds where it is epistemically possible that Esra went home, it is epistemically possible that her mother will make a cake for her.

In addition to setting the modal time to the past, the past marker in the subjunctive conditionals also influences the presuppositions of the whole conditional statement. However, I disagree with Ippolito's (2002, 2003, 2004, 2013) suggestion of evaluating the presuppositions in the past and generating the implication that they do not hold at the utterance time in explaining the counterfactuality. I align with Leahy's (2011, 2017) argument that the past subjunctive conditionals hold no presuppositions primarily because I believe that the presuppositions are generally related to the utterance time rather than the future or the past. When we switch the modal time to the future in indicative conditionals, we do not reach our future knowledge rather we make claims about it based on our current epistemic state. Similarly, I argue that when the modal time is shifted to the past, instead of switching our epistemic state, we practically disregard all the presuppositions that hold at the utterance time. Another reason why I adopt Leahy's (2011, 2017) proposal is that changing the time of the felicity conditions of the subjunctives would produce a past likelihood presupposition for the antecedent in my case, which does not imply any counterfactuality at the utterance time. That is to say, if the speaker presupposes that she believed that the antecedent was more likely to be false than true at some past time, this will eventually imply that she believes otherwise right now, so she believes that the antecedent is more likely to be true. As this is not the case in the past subjunctive conditionals, I decide on a "no presupposition" interpretation in explaining their counterfactuality (Leahy, 2011, 2017).

As a result, my preliminary proposal in the previous chapter becomes more inclusive with the addition of the past subjunctive conditionals into the discussion. The felicity conditions of these three conditional structures, disregarding their time reference, can be ordered scalarly from the strongest to the least strong one as respectively follows in (25), (26), and (27). I argued in chapter 3 that since the present subjunctive conditionals presuppose that the speaker is opinionated for the likelihood of the falsity of the antecedent, presuppositionally they are much stronger than their indicative counterparts, which do not posit any opinions. When the past subjunctive version is included in the scale as it holds no presuppositions, it is naturally located at the bottom of the scale.

(25) *Presuppositions of Present Subjunctive Conditionals:* p-sA, q

a. p is more likely to be false than true for s

b. p is epistemically possible for s

c. q is epistemically possible for s

(26) *Presuppositions of Indicative Conditionals:* p-ysA, q

a. p is epistemically possible for s

b. q is epistemically possible for s

(27) *Presuppositions of Past Subjunctive Conditionals:* p-sA-yDI, q-DI

a. No presupposition

Leahy (2011, 2017) argues that the past subjunctive conditionals compete with their past indicative counterparts when referring to the past possibilities, and due to the presuppositional implicature[56] resulting from the maxim of quantity

[56] Although Leahy (2017) provides his analysis of implicature derivation based on the alternatives that only differ from each other in terms of the informativeness in their presuppositions, he also states that this implicature might be also derived from the alternatives that have different strength in their assertions and presuppositions. In my case, as I suggest the past subjunctive conditionals select their modal time as the past while the modal time in their past indicative counterparts is the utterance time, they probably differ from each other with respect to both their assertions and presuppositions.

(Grice, 1975), the counterfactuality implicature gets triggered. When it comes to Anderson's (1951) type of examples, seen in (28), which cancel the counterfactuality implicature at the antecedent, he argues that this implicature is not triggered at all as there is no more informative indicative competitor.

(28) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show. Hence, he must have taken arsenic.

Leahy (2017) considers the past subjunctive conditional structure and the past indicative one as "potential contextual equivalents" as they can be two competing alternatives to talk about possibilities related to the past. However, Leahy (2011, 2017) does not provide any clear explanations for the past subjunctive conditionals that refer to the future. Ippolito (2004), on the other hand, suggests that the past subjunctive conditionals compete with their non-past subjunctive counterparts when referring to the future and with their past indicative counterparts while talking about the past. She (Ippolito, 2003) also argues that as the past subjunctives refer to the past epistemic states of the speaker rather than the current ones, the antecedent falsity implicature might get canceled according to the epistemicity of the speaker at the utterance time.

Although I agree with their view that the past subjunctive conditionals referring to the past possibilities compete with their past indicative version, I disagree with respect to the future-referent past subjunctives. I propose that the past subjunctive conditional statements which imply future counterfactuality are in competition with their indicative conditional counterparts referring to the future possibilities. I assume that the past subjunctive constructions are not potential contextual equivalents with their present subjunctive alternatives as in most

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However, a fully worked compositional analysis needs to be done to be able to understand whether they are equivalent in their assertions or not, which is a thing I leave for future research.

situations the past version can also be used instead of the present one. Therefore, I argue that the past subjunctive conditionals only go into a competition with their indicative alternatives but not with their present subjunctive versions. This can be better understood by considering the examples (29) and (30).

(29) Gizem yarın buraya gel-ir-se, onunla
Gizem tomorrow here-Dat come-AOR-IND.COND 3Sg.Com
buluş-ur-um.
meet-AOR-1Sg
'If Gizem comes here tomorrow, I will meet her.'
Paraphrase: In all *future* possibilities where Gizem comes here tomorrow, I meet her.

(30) Gizem yarın buraya gel-se-ydi, onunla
Gizem tomorrow here-Dat come-SUBJ.COND-PAST 3Sg.Com
buluş-ur-du-m.
meet-AOR-PAST-1Sg
'If Gizem had come here tomorrow, I would have met her.'
Paraphrase: In all *past* possibilities where Gizem comes here tomorrow, I meet her.

Both of them can be used to talk about a future possibility. However, while (29) presupposes that the events at the antecedent (Gizem coming here tomorrow) and at the consequent (my meeting with her) are open possibilities according to my knowledge, (30) posit neither of these presuppositions. Hence, if the speaker chooses to utter the presuppositionally weaker version, we can derive the implication that neither of these strong presuppositions holds at the utterance time, assuming that the speaker does not violate the maxim of quantity and is as informative as possible in

her utterance. Hence, we can explain the counterfactuality, not only for the antecedent but also for the consequent.

Nonetheless, even though my proposal explains the counterfactuality implication, it should also be able to provide reasoning for the cancellability of this implication as shown by example (31).

(31) Betül nişanlansaydı, tam da şu an taktığı gibi yüzük takardı, demek ki nişanlanmış.

'If Betül had got engaged, she would have worn a ring just like she wears right now, which means that she got engaged.

Leahy (2011, 2017) states that the past indicative versions of these types of sentences are not interpretable, which is also the case in Turkish as we can realize from (32).

(32) #Betül nişanlandıysa, tam da şu an taktığı gibi yüzük taktı, demek ki nişanlanmış.

'If Betül got engaged, she wore ring just like she wears right now, which means that she got engaged.

This situation might be explained via the presuppositions suggested for these two conditional structures. Firstly, the reason that (32) is infelicitous while (31) is perfectly fine comes from the fact that (32) presupposes epistemic possibilities unlike (31). What this means is to be able to utter the indicative version in (32) the speaker must have no knowledge about the truth or the falsity of both the antecedent and the consequent clauses.[57] However, this is not the case in (32); the speaker actually sees or realizes and hence knows that the consequent is true at the utterance time since she is wearing a ring. Furthermore, when it comes to how the counterfactuality implicature gets canceled in (31), my answer will be in accordance with Leahy's

[57] Unlike Ippolito (2004), I do not take epistemically possible as "¬K¬p" but consider it as "¬Kp∧¬K¬p". This version better explains the indicative conditionals becoming infelicitous in the cases where both the antecedent and the consequent is known to be true.

(2017) claim. I suggest that the counterfactuality implication is not formed in the first place in examples like (31) as its competing indicative version does not exist. Moreover, since the past subjunctive conditionals do not compete with their present subjunctive counterparts, (33) can be uttered in the same context with (31), with a slightly different interpretation as explained in the previous chapter.

(33) Betül nişanlansa, tam da şu an taktığı gibi yüzük takar, demek ki nişanlanmış.
'If Betül got engaged, she would wear a ring just like she wears right now, which means that she got engaged.

Lastly, contrary to Ippolito's (2013) *forward constraint*, which suggests that the consequent time must either coincide with or follow the antecedent time but cannot precede it, I argue that the consequent clause might be able to reach out to the times before the time of the antecedent event with the help of certain morphological items in Turkish subjunctives. This provides further evidence for my claim that the past marker basically sets the modal time for the whole conditional statement and the proposition times might vary independently as (34) illustrates. In (34), although the antecedent clause refers to a prospective event evaluated in the past, the consequent provides a claim about the times before that event occurs, instead of necessarily introducing times after the antecedent proposition.

(34) Baran yol-a çık-acak ol-sa-ydı, çoktan
Baran road-Dat leave-FUT AUX-SUBJ.COND-PAST already
bavul-u-nu hazırla-mış ol-ur-du.
suitcase-3SgPoss-Acc prepare-PFV AUX-AOR-PAST
'If it had been the case that Baran would set off, he would have packed already.'

Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that without the insertion of the future marker and the perfective marker to the structure as (35) shows, what Ippolito (2013) suggested mainly holds. The consequent clause needs to follow the proposition time at the antecedent in this context. It might be because the time of the propositions in (35) is not specified and hence they automatically get evaluated in relation to the past time only. However, the overt use of the perfective marker at the consequent in (34) provides a ground for a non-forward interpretation.

(35) #Baran yol-a çık-sa-ydı, çoktan
Baran road-Dat leave-SUBJ.COND-PAST already
bavul-u-nu hazırla-r-dı.
suitcase-3SgPoss-Acc prepare-AOR-PAST
'If Baran had set off, he would have packed already.'

In summary, what I propose for the interpretation of the past in the subjunctive conditional statements is that the past marker sets the modal time of the whole conditional statement into the past while its antecedent and consequent clauses might bear their own independent time information. Thus, we can make counterfactual claims about both the future and the past. Additionally, I argue that how the counterfactuality implication gets generated is the result of the scalar implicature coming from the competitions between the presuppositions of the past subjunctive conditionals and their indicative counterparts. In the case that no indicative alternative exists for the stated past subjunctive, then the counterfactuality implicature is not produced either.

4.4 Discussion and conclusion

The general purpose of this chapter is to provide an explanation for the past marker in conditional structures. However, while doing that I mainly focus on the past marker in subjunctive conditionals since it creates much more intriguing questions compared to its counterpart in the indicative version. The past in indicative conditionals basically contributes its usual past meaning to the proposition time of the antecedent, and sometimes to the consequent without producing any anomalies, unlike its subjunctive version. On the other hand, in the context of subjunctive conditionals, the past marker allows the use of the future-referent time adverbials along with the past ones. Besides, it provides a basis for the counterfactuality implication.

I compare the morphologically present subjunctive conditionals with their past subjunctive alternatives in certain contexts and infer that for a present subjunctive to be felicitous all of its presuppositions need to be available at the utterance time. Not only its specific likelihood presupposition for the antecedent and the epistemically possible one for the consequent but also the other presuppositions like the existence of the nominal expressions are necessary for the felicity of the present subjunctive conditionals. Nonetheless, it is not so for the past subjunctive options.

Considering all these arguments, I claim that the past marker in the subjunctive conditional sets the denotation time of the antecedent and also the modal time of the whole conditional statement to the past similar to the antecedent aorist setting them to the future in indicatives as expressed in chapter 2. When it comes to the felicity conditions, the past subjunctives simply bear no presuppositions. Thus, by competing with their stronger alternative, namely the indicative conditionals, they

create the implication that the antecedent and also the consequent clause are false at the utterance time. However, if the indicative counterpart is not available, this implication does not surface due to the lack of a scalarly more informative competitor.

In the following chapter, I provide an overview of the arguments I have discussed thus far related to all these different types of conditionals in Turkish. Then, I include some questions that may require further analysis for future research.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In the previous chapters of this thesis, I respectively analyzed the impacts of the aorist marker, two different conditional markers, and also the past marker on conditional statements in Turkish. I made various proposals and explanations for each topic. In this final chapter, my aim is to provide an integrated summary of my main claims and a unified proposal for explaining the conditional constructions in Turkish. The first section of this chapter lays out this summary. In the second section, I list some possible issues that may not be fully described with my proposal or have not been included within the scope of this study and require further research.

5.1 The summary of main arguments

My arguments in describing Turkish conditionals might be collected under two major points: the first one being related to the modal time of the conditional statements and the second one dealing with their presuppositions. With respect to the modal time, my proposal originates from Schulz's (2008) argument that the present tense marker in English might denote a future time reference at the antecedent of a conditional and hence can set the anchor time of the conditional statement into the future. Firstly, I applied this analysis to the conditional statements that had the aorist marker in their antecedent clauses since the aorist marker might be considered the Turkish counterpart of the present tense in English (Kornfilt, 1997). Then, I extended this core idea that the denotation time of the antecedent sets the modal time of the whole conditional to all the conditional structures in Turkish, rather than limiting it to the ones with the antecedent aorist.

I argue that the conditional markers, both the indicative *-(y)sA*, and the subjunctive *-sA*, pick out the utterance time as their modal time by default. However, the insertion of the aorist marker to the indicative conditional shifts the modal time to the future whereas the use of the past marker in combination with the subjunctive conditional marker leads to the evaluation of the modal operator relative to the past. What I mean by changing the modal time to the future or the past is basically to assign a reference point for the interpretation of the time values inside the propositions of the antecedent and the consequent, in other words, the proposition times[58]. To be able to clarify my argument, I provide the following examples (1)-(4) with their paraphrased interpretations according to my proposal. Example (1) illustrates that the perfective marker refers to the completion of the event at the antecedent relative to a future time while the same event is comprehended relative to the utterance time in (2).

(1) İrem iş-ler-i-ni bitir-miş ol-ur-sa,
İrem work-Pl-3SgPoss-Acc finish-PFV AUX-AOR-IND.COND
pikniğ-e gel-ir.
picnic-Dat come-AOR
Paraphrase: In all *future* possibilities where İrem has finished her works, she comes to the picnic.

(2) İrem iş-ler-i-ni bitir-miş-se, pikniğ-e
İrem work-Pl-3SgPoss-Acc finish-PFV-IND.COND picnic-Dat
gel-ir.
come-AOR

[58] In the conditionals with the antecedent aorist or the subjunctive conditional marker, the proposition times at the antecedent need not be specified. However, if we want to specify, we can only select from the aspectual markers: progressive *-Iyor*, perfective *-mIş*, or prospective *-AcAk*. On the other hand, the indicative conditional marker mostly requires an overt proposition time at its antecedent and licenses nearly all the possible tense, aspect, and modality markers.

Paraphrase: In all *present*[59] possibilities where İrem has finished her works, she comes to the picnic.

The utterance time evaluation applies to example (3) as well. However, (3) also includes the likelihood of falsity in the realization of the antecedent event. Lastly, when it comes to (4), the occurrence of the events in the antecedent and the consequent is relativized to some past time This does not necessarily mean that the events occurred in the past, rather it means that we evaluate the events from a past perspective.

(3) İrem iş-ler-i-ni bitir-miş ol-sa,
İrem work-Pl-3SgPoss-Acc finish-PFV AUX-SUBJ.COND
pikniğ-e gel-ir.
picnic-Dat come-AOR
Paraphrase: In all *present* possibilities where İrem has finished her works, she comes to the picnic, but I believe in the likelihood that İrem has not finished them.

(4) İrem iş-ler-i-ni bitir-miş ol-sa-ydı,
İrem work-Pl-3SgPoss-Acc finish-PFV AUX-SUBJ.COND-PAST
pikniğ-e gel-ir-di.
picnic-Dat come-AOR-PAST
Paraphrase: In all *past* possibilities where İrem has finished her works, she comes to the picnic.

In addition to the modal time, another major distinction among the conditional structures is related to their presuppositions, which are repeated in (5), (6), and (7). As it can be noticed from (6), the modal time being the future, or the

[59] I use the term "present" while referring to the statements that has the utterance time as their modal time.

present does not create any difference for the presuppositions of the indicative conditionals. Nevertheless, shifting the modal time to the past in subjunctive conditionals generates a huge difference. As I stated in the previous chapter, (7) demonstrates that since the presuppositions are mostly related to the speaker's current epistemic state, when she makes evaluations relative to the past, none of the current epistemic presuppositions needs to hold at that time.

(5) *Presuppositions of Present Subjunctive Conditionals:* p-sA, q

a. p is more likely to be false than true for s

b. p is epistemically possible for s

c. q is epistemically possible for s

(6) *Presuppositions of Indicative Conditionals:* p-ysA, q

a. p is epistemically possible for s

b. q is epistemically possible for s

(7) *Presuppositions of Past Subjunctive Conditionals:* p-sA-yDI, q-DI

a. No presupposition

To be able to better illustrate the felicity conditions of the stated three main types of conditional structures, I provide various contexts by setting different time parameters and epistemic conditions. Firstly, in future referent contexts like 1 and 2 where the epistemic possibility presuppositions are forced, the past subjunctive version would not be acceptable due to the *Maximize Presupposition* maxim by Heim (1991). Only if the possibility presuppositions are taken out of the context set as in context 3, will the past subjunctive alternative be felicitous to utter.

Context 1: Zerrin has her driving license exam tomorrow, and I do not have any opinions about whether she will be able to pass it or not. In this case, I would utter (8) rather than (9) while (10) would be totally unacceptable.

Context 2: Zerrin has her driving license exam tomorrow, but I believe that she will not be able to pass it although it is still possible that she might. Then, (8) would be selected instead of (9), and (10) would again be infelicitous.

Context 3: Zerrin has her driving license exam tomorrow. However, she broke her leg today and she will not be able to take the exam tomorrow. So, (10) would be the only felicitous option out of these three.

(8) Yarınki sınav-dan geç-er-se, kutlama yap-ar.
tomorrow's exam-Abl pass-AOR-IND.COND celebrate-AOR
'If she passes tomorrow's exam, she celebrates it.'

(9) Yarınki sınav-dan geç-se, kutlama yap-ar.
tomorrow's exam-Abl pass-SUBJ.COND celebrate-AOR
'If she passed tomorrow's exam, she would celebrate it.'

(10) Yarınki sınav-dan geç-se-ydi,
tomorrow's exam-Abl pass-SUBJ.COND-PAST
kutlama yap-ar-dı.
celebrate-AOR-PAST
'If she had passed tomorrow's exam, she would have celebrated it.'

As it can be realized from context 3 and example (10), the past subjunctive conditional not only implies the falsity of the antecedent and the consequent propositions but also disregards all the other presuppositions of both parts. Clearly, the assertion of passing an exam presupposes that the exam will be taken. However, when the possibility of taking the exam and hence passing the exam are taken out of the context, the past subjunctive conditional remains as the only acceptable option. On the other hand, if the presupposition that the exam will be taken holds at the utterance time, it leaves the event of passing the exam and then making a celebration

as a possibility according to my knowledge. Thus, either the indicative or the present subjunctive version is opted for based on the epistemic state of the speaker. If the speaker is unopinionated about the antecedent or believes that the antecedent might happen, then the indicative conditional is preferred. Nonetheless, in the case that the speaker believes in the likelihood of the falsity of the antecedent more than the probability of its truth, the present subjunctive structure becomes the best alternative since the possibility of passing the exam and having a celebration still holds.

On the other hand, when we want to talk about the possibilities related to the past, there are two available options, either the past indicative or the past subjunctive version. As we may remember, in the past indicative conditionals only the proposition time inside the antecedent and sometimes in the consequent refers to the past relative to the utterance time. However, in the case of subjunctive conditionals with the past marker, the modal time of the entire conditional denotes the past. In choosing between the indicative and the subjunctive versions, both the epistemic state of the speaker and the other presuppositions of the antecedent are instrumental.

Context 4: Zerrin had her driving license exam yesterday, but I do not know whether she passed the exam or not and also whether she made a celebration or not. In this situation, I would pick out (11) rather than (12).

Context 5: Zerrin had her driving license exam yesterday, but she could not pass the exam and I know this. Then, (12) would be the only felicitous option.

Context 6: Zerrin had her driving license exam yesterday, but I have not heard about her result. However, I know that she did not make any celebration. This state would allow me to utter (12) instead of (11), as well.

Context 7: Zerrin had her driving license exam yesterday, but she had broken her leg the day before and therefore I know that she could not take the exam

yesterday. Under these circumstances, (12) would again be available to utter whereas (11) would be unacceptable.

(11) Dünkü sınav-dan geç-ti-yse,
yesterday's exam-Abl pass-PAST-IND.COND
kutlama yap-mış-tır.
celebrate-PFV-EPIS
'If she passed yesterday's exam, she must have celebrated it.'

(12) Dünkü sınav-dan geç-se-ydi,
yesterday's exam-Abl pass-SUBJ.COND-PAST
kutlama yap-ar-dı.
celebrate-AOR-PAST
'If she had passed yesterday's exam, she would have celebrated it.'

It is apparent from context 4 that the past indicative option is only available when all the presuppositions of the conditional statement are met at the utterance time. That is, both the antecedent and the consequent assertions must be epistemically open to the discussion while all the other presuppositions remain intact. For instance, in the case that the speaker is not sure about whether Zerrin took the exam or not, (11) would not be so felicitous to utter since the indicative conditional construction only presupposes the epistemic possibility[60] of the assertions but not their own independent presuppositions. Nonetheless, in the case of past subjunctive conditionals, since they have an empty set for their presuppositions, not only the epistemic possibility presuppositions provided from the conditional structure but also all the other presuppositions of the antecedent and consequent assertions can be disregarded. Disregarding all these presuppositions naturally creates the implication

[60] As I stated in the previous chapters, "epistemically possible" presupposition might be considered equal to the full-ignorance situation. In other words, the speaker does not know anything about the truth or the falsity of the proposition.

that those presuppositions are false. Thus, we get the counterfactuality reading in past subjunctive conditionals not because they presuppose this but because they make no presuppositions.

Nonetheless, although the counterfactuality is implied in past subjunctive conditionals, this implicature can get canceled or in my interpretation, it may never arise in the first place. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the main reason for the counterfactuality implication in past subjunctive conditionals is their scalar competition with their indicative counterparts. Technically, if this competition does not occur, this implication does not emerge either. I propose that this is what happens in Anderson's (1951) type of examples, which are used to provide evidence for the speaker's deductions and imply that the antecedent is true. Leahy (2011, 2017) writes that the indicative counterparts of these examples are infelicitous. Therefore, the antecedent falsity implication does not surface. In a context like 8, the reading that the consequent is true does not allow the use of the indicative conditional whereas the past subjunctive one can still be felicitous since it includes no presuppositions. Moreover, as it has no presuppositions and as its indicative counterpart is not acceptable, the counterfactuality implicature does not become applicable in (14).

Context 8: Zerrin had her driving license exam yesterday, but I do not know whether she passed the exam or not. However, in her Instagram stories, I see that she had a celebration with her friends, and I deduce that she passed the exam. In this scenario, (14) would still be felicitous to utter while (13) is infelicitous.

(13) #Dünkü sınavdan geçtiyse, tam da şu an yaptığı gibi kutlama yaptı.[61]

[61] I feel the need to state here that there are other indicative conditional options which might be uttered in this context, like (1) and (2). However, in both examples, the consequent makes a claim about another celebration that is similar to the one I saw, not to this specific celebration. Hence, the consequent clause remains as an epistemic possibility and the sentences (1) and (2) become acceptable. These are not considered the counterparts of the past subjunctive conditional in this context.

'If she passed yesterday's exam, she celebrated it just like she did now.'

(14) Dünkü sınavdan geçseydi, tam da şu an yaptığı gibi kutlama yapardı.

'If she had passed yesterday's exam, she would have celebrated it just like she did now.'

Although the distinction between the indicative conditionals and the past subjunctives is mostly straightforward in every context, the difference is not so apparent in the case of the present and past subjunctive conditionals, particularly when referring to the events or the states at the utterance time. Interestingly, while making a claim about the current situation, the speaker might utter the present subjunctive version even though she has enough evidence for the falsity of the antecedent or the consequent.

Context 9: It is nighttime. Elif and I are going to pass by Hüseyin's house when we turn the corner. I do not have any idea about whether he is at his home right now or not. Then, I would say (15) to Elif instead of (16) or (17).

Context 10: It is nighttime. Elif and I are going to pass by Hüseyin's house when we turn the corner. I believe that he is probably not at his home right now, but I do not know it. Then, I would choose to utter (16) to Elif rather than (15) or (17).

Context 11: It is nighttime. Elif and I are passing by Hüseyin's house right now. I see that his lights are off, and I conclude that he is not at home. In this context, both (16) and (17) would be available but not (15).

(15)	Şu an	ev-de-yse,	ışık-lar-ı	yan-ıyor
	now	home-Loc-IND.COND	light-Pl-3SgPoss	be on-IMP
	ol-ur.			

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(1) Dünkü sınavdan geçtiyse, tam da şu an yaptığı gibi kutlama yapar.[61]
'If she passed yesterday's exam, she will celebrate it just like she did.'

(2) Dünkü sınavdan geçtiyse, tam da şu an yaptığı gibi kutlama yapmıştır.[61]
'If she passed yesterday's exam, she must have celebrated it just like she did now.'

AUX-AOR

'If he is at home now, his lights will be on.'

(16) Şu an ev-de ol-sa, ışık-lar-ı

now home-Loc AUX-SUBJ.COND light-Pl-3SgPoss

yan-ıyor ol-ur.

be on-IMP AUX-AOR

'If he were at home now, his lights would be on.'

(17) Şu an ev-de ol-sa-ydı, ışık-lar-ı

now home-Loc AUX-SUBJ.COND-PAST light-Pl-3SgPoss

yan-ıyor ol-ur-du.

be on-IMP AUX-AOR-PAST

'If he had been/were at home now, his lights would have been/would be on.'

According to my proposal, in the case that the consequent is known to be false, the past subjunctive option must be the only acceptable structure to articulate. Nevertheless, if the speaker has just acquired the knowledge that the assertion in the consequent is false, not only the past subjunctive but also the present subjunctive version might be acceptable to utter. Why this is the case remains an open question for my proposal. In the following section, I list the other questions that are currently left unanswered in the scope of my study.

5.2 Remaining questions

The fact that both the present and the past subjunctive conditional constructions can be used when referring to the events or states that are not true at the moment of the

utterance might be the main issue against my proposal. [62] If my approach is correct, in the case that the consequent is known to be false, the present subjunctive version must be infelicitous, yet it is not so. One possible reason for this might be due to what the speaker chooses to include in her common ground for that utterance similar to Leahy's (2017) claim for the indicative Oswald-Kennedy example ('If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, someone else did.'). He argues that in that example sentence, the speaker is merely discussing the possibility of Oswald shooting Kennedy although she knows that he already did. Similarly, when the speaker chooses to utter the present subjunctive version in (16) for context 11, she considers the possibility of his lights being on as a subject to discussion by disregarding her current knowledge. Another similar problem arises in the Turkish versions of Anderson's (1951) kind of examples where the antecedent is implied to be true based on the evidence at the consequent. Not only the past but also the present subjunctive versions of those statements are possible as (18) and (19) illustrate, respectively.

(18) Selin işten ayrıl*mış* olsa*ydı*, tam da şu an yaptığı gibi iş arardı, demek ki işten ayrılmış.

'If Selin had left her job, she would have been looking for jobs just like she is doing right now, which means she left her job.'

(19) Selin işten ayrıl*mış* ols*a*, tam da şu an yaptığı gibi iş arar, demek ki işten ayrılmış.

'If Selin left her job, she would be looking for jobs just like she is doing right now, which means she left her job.'

[62] Although these cases support my claim that there is no competition between the present and past subjunctive constructions while generating the counterfactuality implicature, why there is no competition remains as a question to answer.

However, when we do not specify the proposition time of the antecedent with the perfective marker, interestingly the present subjunctive version as in (21) becomes infelicitous whereas the past subjunctive alternative in (20) is still acceptable.

(20) Selin işten ayrıl*saydı*, tam da şu an yaptığı gibi iş arardı, demek ki işten ayrılmış.

'If Selin had left her job, she would have been looking for jobs just like she is doing right now, which means she left her job.'

(21) #Selin işten ayrıl*sa*, tam da şu an yaptığı gibi iş arar, demek ki işten ayrılmış.

'If Selin left her job, she would be looking for jobs just like she is doing right now, which means she left her job.'

There has been no examination of this situation neither in Turkish nor in other languages according to my knowledge of the literature. Therefore, this issue might be further examined in the following studies.

Other than that, another intriguing fact about the present subjunctive conditional structure is that it cannot co-occur with the conditional conjunction *eğer* 'if' as Göksel and Kerslake state (2005), while the past subjunctive one can. This might further support my proposal that the present and past alternatives of the subjunctive conditional have distinct presuppositions. As we have seen in all the examples so far, the use of the *eğer* 'if' particle is not necessary for Turkish conditional sentences. However, if we want to use it overtly, it is only acceptable with indicative and past subjunctive conditional constructions, which are shown by (22) and (24). On the other hand, (23) illustrates that the present subjunctive alternative does not license this conjunction. The reason for this infelicity might come from its likelihood presupposition. If *eğer* is a type of conjunction that requires the speaker to be unopinionated about her propositions, then it might be felicitously

uttered with both the indicative and the past subjunctive versions since neither of them holds any specific belief presuppositions. In the case of past subjunctive conditionals, although they frequently imply that their propositions are false at the utterance time, they do not bear any presuppositions that *believe* in that. Hence, they are also presuppositionally unopinionated, which agrees with my suggestion.

(22) Eğer İzel ben-i dinle-r-se, mutlu ol-ur.
if İzel 1Sg-Acc listen-AOR-IND.COND happy be-AOR
'If İzel listens to me, she will be happy.'

(23) #Eğer İzel ben-i dinle-se, mutlu ol-ur.
if İzel 1Sg-Acc listen-SUBJ.COND happy be-AOR
'If İzel listened to me, she would be happy.'

(24) Eğer İzel ben-i dinle-se-ydi, mutlu
if İzel 1Sg-Acc listen-SUBJ.COND-PAST happy
ol-ur-du.
be-AOR-PAST
'If İzel had listened to me, she would have been happy.'

Furthermore, the occurrence of the particle *keşke* 'if only' with these three conditional constructions might also give away some clues for their distinct interpretations. Unlike the conjunction *eğer* 'if', the availability conditions for *keşke* 'if only' resembles its English counterpart. It can only surface with the subjunctive conditionals as in (26) and (27) but not with the indicative ones like (25). This might be because *keşke* calls for the falsity of its proposition. Since the present subjunctive conditional presuppositionally believes in the likelihood of this falsity and the past subjunctive one scalarly implies it, both might be uttered in that context.

(25) *Keşke İzel ben-i dinle-r-se, mutlu

if only İzel 1Sg-Acc listen-AOR-IND.COND happy ol-ur.
be-AOR
*‘If only İzel listens to me, she will be happy.’

(26) Keşke İzel ben-i dinle-se, mutlu ol-ur.
if only İzel 1Sg-Acc listen-SUBJ.COND happy be-AOR
‘If only İzel listened to me, she would be happy.’

(27) Keşke İzel ben-i dinle-se-ydi, mutlu
if only İzel 1Sg-Acc listen-SUBJ.COND-PAST happy
ol-ur-du.
be-AOR-PAST
‘If only İzel had listened to me, she would have been happy.’

Nonetheless, these semantic conditions I assign for *eğer* and *keşke* are merely my assumptions that have not been discussed in detail so far. Hence, this topic might be looked further into, as well.

Moreover, as we may remember from chapter 3, I stated that the subjunctive conditional marker can also be made use of in *wish* clauses, which is in fact a common cross-linguistic phenomenon (von Fintel & Iatridou, 2020). However, what might create a question is how we compose the conditional and wish clauses together in one statement as in (28) and (29). These examples suggest that the subjunctive conditional marker in Turkish might not be a conditional marker per se, rather it might just be a subjunctive mood marker, which assigns the likelihood of falsity presupposition for its domain in (28). Besides, when it is combined with the past marker like in (29), it does not keep any presuppositions in its scope anymore. Therefore, we might suggest that when it is used at the antecedent of conditionals

without the past marker, it adds its specific likelihood presupposition for the antecedent; and if it occurs at the consequent, it does the same for that. As to its past version in antecedent clauses, when the antecedent does not hold any presuppositions, the consequent cannot do either. However, if this combination appears in the consequent clause as (29) shows, only the presupposition set of the consequent clause becomes empty while the antecedent is still epistemically possible.

(28) Hilal dondurma al-dı-ysa, biz-e de
Hilal ice-cream buy-PAST-IND.COND 1Pl-Dat also
getir-se.
bring-SUBJ.COND
Lit: 'If Hilal bought ice-cream, I wish she brought it for us too.'

(29) Hilal dondurma al-dı-ysa, biz-e de
Hilal ice-cream buy-PAST-IND.COND 1Pl-Dat also
getir-se-ydi.
bring-SUBJ.COND-PAST
Lit: 'If Hilal bought ice-cream, I wish she had brought it for us too.'

Nevertheless, this is just an intuitive assumption that might be postulated based on my proposal to be able to describe the subjunctive conditionals and wish clauses in a unified way. It needs to be scrutinized if we aim to provide a single analysis to cover both cases. It was not my goal in this thesis, that is why I left the wish clauses out for my current purposes.

Another debatable point about the present subjunctive conditionals as I mentioned very briefly in chapter 3 is related to the types of consequent clauses this construction licenses. Unlike the indicative context, the subjunctive alternative limits its consequent clause to either the aorist or the future marker, by excluding the

epistemic marker *-DIr,* and the obligative and imperative moods. However, all these markers become acceptable with the insertion of *da* or *bile* morpheme into the present subjunctive structure as (30), (31), and (32) respectively demonstrate. What the reason for this might be is a topic to investigate. It is probably due to the contributions of the particles *da* or *bile.* However, I do not know what type of semantic contributions they make, hence this stays as an open question.

(30) Zor ol-sa da/bile yap-mış-sın-dır.
hard AUX-SUBJ:COND even do-PFV-2Sg-EPIS
'Even if it was hard, you must have done it.'

(31) Zor ol-sa da/bile yap-malı-sın.
hard AUX-SUBJ:COND even do-OBLG-2Sg
'Even if it is hard, you should do it.'

(32) Zor ol-sa da/bile yap.
hard AUX-SUBJ:COND even do.IMP
'Even if it is hard, do it.'

Maybe the most apparent puzzle related to my arguments in this thesis might be the question of why the aorist marker at the antecedent can set the modal time into the future only in the context of indicative conditionals but not for the subjunctive ones. (33) reminds us that the aorist marker cannot appear inside the scope of the subjunctive conditional suffix and hence cannot shift the modal time to future times.

(33) *Ecem yarışma-ya katıl-ır ol-sa,
Ecem competition-Dat join-AOR AUX-SUBJ.COND
birinci ol-ur.
first be-AOR
'If Ecem was to join the competition, she would come in first.'

Paraphrase: In all *future* possibilities where Ecem joins the competition, she comes in first, but I believe in the likelihood that she will not join the competition.

Similarly, the past marker cannot scope over the indicative conditional either, as Sezer (2001) also demonstrates in his examples. Even the clitic past morpheme *-(y)DI* naturally precedes the indicative conditional *-(y)sA* not follows it, which is demonstrated by (34) and (35) respectively. Therefore, the indicative conditional sentences are never evaluated with respect to the past.

(34) Aslı yemek şipariş ed-ecek-di-yse,
Aslı food order make-FUT-PAST-PAST-IND.COND
pizza söyle-r-di.
pizza say-AOR-PAST
'If Aslı would order food, she would order pizza.'

(35) #Aslı yemek şipariş ed-ecek-se-ydi,
Aslı food order make-FUT-PAST-IND.COND-PAST
pizza söyle-r-di.
pizza say-AOR-PAST
'If Aslı would order food, she would order pizza.'

Nevertheless, although these restrictions do not counter my proposal for their presuppositions, it may still remain a question for my arguments related to the modal time. Therefore, this issue can also require further investigation.

One last intriguing detail to add to this list is the fact that only the future-oriented interpretation of the aorist, not the characterizing one, can be realized in past subjunctive conditionals as already demonstrated in chapter 4. On the other hand, vice versa holds in the past indicative context; only the characterizing interpretation

can surface under the past marker in this alternative, but not the future-oriented one. (36) can exemplify what I try to explain much more clearly. Here, the aorist marker combined with the past can exclusively be interpreted with the past habitual reading. The future-oriented interpretation of the aorist, discussed in chapter 2 is inaccessible in this context.

(36) (O zaman-lar) Tuba canı sıkıl-dı-ysa, spor
that time-Pl Tuba get.bored-PAST-IND.COND sports
yap-ar-dı.
do-AOR-PAST
Lit: '(In those days) if Tuba got bored, she would/used to do sports.'

This might be because the mismatch between the future and the past combination generates a counterfactuality interpretation that is incompatible with the presuppositions of the indicative conditionals, proposed in chapter 3. Nevertheless, how this restriction occurs and whether the past marker following the aorist in examples like (36) is interpreted in the modal time of the conditional or the proposition time of the consequent might be another question to be looked into in future research.

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