Ford Motor Company's Assembly Plant in Tophane–Istanbul, 1923-1944: Territoriality and Automobility during Interwar Global Capitalism

Emine Aslı Odman Pérouse

A dissertation presented to the

Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
at Boğaziçi University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

January 2024

Approvals

"Ford Motor Company's Assembly Plant in Tophane - Istanbul, 1923-1944: Territoriality and Automobility during Interwar Global Capitalism," a dissertation prepared by Emine Aslı Odman Pérouse in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, has been approved on 23 January 2024 by:

DISSERTATION ADVISORS

Professor Cengiz Kırlı _____
Department of History
Boğaziçi University

Professor Çağlar Keyder _____
The Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
Boğaziçi University

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Professor Himmet Murat Güvenç _____
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Kadir Has University

Assistant Professor Seda Altuğ _____
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
Boğaziçi University

Associate Professor Akansel Yalçınkaya _____
Faculty of Tourism
Medeniyet University

Professor Mine Eder _____
Department of Political Science and International Relations
Boğaziçi University

Declaration of Originality

The intellectual content of this dissertation, which has been written by me and for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other examination or degree of higher education. The sources of all paraphrased and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly acknowledged herein.

Emine Aslı Odman Pérouse
Istanbul, 23 January 2024

Copyright © 2024 Emine Aslı Odman Pérouse.
Some rights reserved.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/

Abstract

Ford Motor Company's Assembly Plant in Tophane-Istanbul, 1923-1944: Territoriality and Automobility during Interwar Global Capitalism

Emine Aslı Odman Pérouse, Doctoral Candidate at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2024

Professor Cengiz Kırlı, Dissertation Advisor

In the beginning of the 1920s Ford Motor Company opted for the Tophane pier in Istanbul as a nodal point of the internationalization strategy of its production facilities. The first Free Zone Law of the Republican period, promulgated in 1927, was actually a prerequisite that Ford posed in the negotiations with the Turkish authorities to establish this node as an assembly plant. Trieste, Alexandria, Piraeus, Constanța and Gorkygrad were alternative production locations to Istanbul within the territorial strategy of FMC. Finally, Ford received exclusive free zone rights for its projected assembly plant of automotives in Istanbul by way of a special legislation, called the Ford Law. Ford transformed the entrepôts at the pier of Tophane, a section of which was a former Ottoman imperial small arms factory, into a plant equipped with an assembly line capable of assembling cars, trucks, tractors and even airplanes. There it assembled between 1930 and 1933 around ten thousand vehicles. In April 1933 the assembly activities were stopped by Ford to evade further losses. The plant was shut down in 1944 after a long and consuming customs smuggling case for Ford during the second half of the 1930s.

This thesis consults new archival sources and nourishes mainly from the Ford Company Archives in Dearborn/Detroit besides the archival material on the Early Republican period from the Turkish State and American Consular Archives. It tries to trace the historical logic, territory, rescaling process and the subsequent exit of this enterprise. Ford-Fiat relations in Italy, the Ford-Soviet technical agreement, Ford's Alexandria enterprise, and contacts with Rumanian authorities for a plant in Constanța are also analyzed in or-

der to understand the making and unmaking of the Tophane plant, including the reasons behind the failed Ford investment.

On the empirical level this thesis constitutes a business monograph which is sensible to global spatial entanglements. It furthermore tries to decenter the state as the main agency of the majority of historical narratives on the Early Republican Turkey. Curious enough the monograph of the first automotive plant, first moving assembly line for motor vehicles and the very first free zone experience of the Republic had not been written so far. On the theoretical level the story of Tophane Ford assembly plant aims to integrate the formation process of the economic territoriality, i.e., a perspective of contingent space formation and the agency of capital into the Turkish Early Republican History on the scale of this exemplary case study. This thesis constitutes a proposition to include in historiography spatial case studies of 'failed projects' rather than only success stories as a way of avoiding teleological narratives of modernity. Thus, the possible reasons for this lack in the Turkish economic history will also be dealt with as 'a meaningful omission' to understand the functionings of Early Modern Turkish Historiography.

Keywords: Free Zone Law 1927, Ford Motor Company, Ford Istanbul, Interwar Turkey, Port of Istanbul, Tophane, Spatial Business History, Territoriality

Özet

Ford Motor Company'nin Tophane-İstanbul'daki Montaj Fabrikası, 1923-1944: İki Savaş Arasında Küresel Kapitalizmin Coğrafyası ve Otomobilizasyon:

Emine Aslı Odman Pérouse, Doktora Adayı, 2024
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü

Profesör Cengiz Kırlı, Tez Danışmanı

1920'lerde dünyanın en büyük motorlu taşıt üreticisi olan Ford Motor Company, bu dönemde Tophane Rıhtımı'nın bir kısmında bir otomotiv montaj fabrikası açmaya karar verdi. Ford'un bu "üretken sermayesini uluslararasılaştırma" stratejisi içerisinde İskenderiye, Trieste, Pire, Köstence veya Gorkygrad gibi rakipleri arasında İstanbul lehine tercihte bulunması için genç Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin siyasi elitlerine öne sürdüğü en önemli koşul, 1927'de şirketin etkisi altında çıkartılan Serbest Mıntıka Kanunu'nun zeminini oluşturduğu ayrıcalıkların kendine sağlanması idi. 1929'de Ford adına çıkartılan özel bir kanun ile serbest bölge ve bunun içerisinde önemli imtiyazlar edinen Şirket, bir kısmı Osmanlı döneminde Tüfenkhane-i Amire olarak inşa edilen, akabinde Seyr-i Sefain antrepoları olarak işlevlendirilen binaları, seri üretim bandı teknolojisi ile otomobil, kamyon, traktör hatta uçak monte edebilecek bir fabrikaya dönüştürdü. Burada 1930 ila 1933 yılları arasında onbini aşkın motorlu taşıt monte etti, fakat bu yatırımdan umduğunu bulamayarak, 1933 Nisan'ında üretimi durdurdu. İş makineleri İskenderiye ve Bükreş'teki Ford fabrikalarına aktarıldı. Uzunca süren bir gümrük kaçakçılığı davasının sanığı olarak geçirdiği 1930'ların ikinci yarısından sonra Ford, 1944'te fabrikayı resmen kapattı.

Cumhuriyet ve ABD Diplomatik Arşivleri yanında, aslen Ford Motor Company'nin Dearborn/Detroit'de bulunan şirket arşivlerinden faydalanılarak kaleme alınan bu tezde, bu yatırımın hem cesameti ve sevkiyat sahası hem de varlık nedenleri olan Sovyet Rusya pazarlarının akıbeti, İtalya'da

Ford-Fiat rekabeti, Ford'un İskenderiye'deki yatırımı ve Romanya hükümeti ile Köstence'de bir montaj fabrikası açmak için yapılan sonuçsuz pazarlıklar da analiz ediliyor. Ford Tophane'nin nihayetinde yaşadığı hezimetin nedenleri irdelenmeye çalışılıyor. Bunu yaparken Türkiye Cumhuriyeti sınırlarında kurulmuş olan ilk otomotiv fabrikası, motorlu araç üretiminde ilk elektrikli seri üretim bandının kullanıldığı işletme ve ilk serbest bölge deneyimini teşkil eden bu oluşumun niye şimdiye kadar tarihyazımının ilgisini çekmemiş olduğu epistemolojik açıdan sorgulanıyor. Bu şekilde devlet-merkezli ve çizgisel "başarı hikâyelerine" odaklanan cumhuriyet dönemi iktisat tarihi yaklaşımlarının eleştirel bir okuması ışığında, farklı ölçeklerdeki mekânsal bağlama hassas bir işletme tarihi örneği verilmeye çalışılıyor.

Kuramsal düzlemde çokuluslu bir şirkete ait fabrika ölçeğindeki bu çalışma Erken Dönem Cumhuriyet tarihine en azından bu vaka çalışması özelinde sadece siyasi sınırlar tarafından kapsanmayan bir ekonomik coğrafya tartışmasını ve sermayenin faillik ve perspektifini dâhil etmeye çalışıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Serbest Bölge Kanunu 1927, Ford Motor Company, Ford İstanbul, İki Savaş Arası Türkiye, İstanbul Limanı, Tophane, Mekânsal İşletme Tarihi, Bölgeselleşme

Curriculum Vitæ

EMINE ASLI ODMAN PÉROUSE

EDUCATION

Ph.D.	Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History Boğaziçi University 2024
M.A.	Department of Political Science University of Vienna 2002 Title of Master's thesis (in German): “Economic Nationalism in the Aftermath of the Great Depression in 1929: Comparing Cardenista Populism in Mexico with Kemalist Etatism in Turkey"
B.A.	Department of Political Science / Department of Economics (minor) University of Vienna / University of Economics Vienna 2000

PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENTS/EMPLOYMENT

- Jan. 2024 - 2028: Research Associate / Consultant at NGO Shipbreaking Platform, Brussels as part of the Horizon Europe Project SHEREC (Safe, Health, and Eco-Friendly Ship-recycling)
- June 2015 - June 2005: Coordinator of Yearly Workers' Education Cycles for the German Trade Union Federation (DGB)

- _____.“Mekân ve Emek üzerinden toplumsal yapılanmayı okumak." in: *Toplumsal Yapı - Kavramlar, Öğeler, Dinamikler*, ed. Cem Özatalay, İletişim Yayınevi, İstanbul: 2024, forthcoming.
- _____.“Depremde İşçi, Halk ve Çevre Sağlığı: Enkazın Molozlaştırılması.” in *Afetin Sosyal İnşası. Türkiye'de Deprem Sosyolojisi*, ed. Ulaş Sunata, Ankara: Nika Yayınevi, 139–52, 2024.
- ———. “The Pandemic State of Emergency as a Reading Guide of Notable Absences in the Urban Class Society of Istanbul.” In *We, the City: Plurality and Resistance in Berlin and Istanbul*, edited by Tuba İnal-Çekiç and Urszula Ewa Woźniak, Berlin: JOVIS Verlag, 61–79., 2023.
- ———. “Boru.” In *100 Sene 100 Nesne-Cumhuriyete Nesnelerin Gözünden Bakmak*, edited by Bediz Yılmaz and Esen Gülsen, Istanbul: Alfa, 188–99, 2023.
- _____and Murat Tülek, “COVID-19 Pandemisi Döneminde Sosyo_Mekansal Eşitsizlikler ve Veri/Halk Sağlığı İlişkisi,” in *COVID-19 Pandemisi. Türk Tabipler Birliği Pandemi Çalışma Grubu 6. Ay Değerlendirme Raporu*, ed. Osman Elbek, İstanbul: Türk Tabipler Birliği. 501–32, 2020.
- _____. “Akademiker*innen für den Frieden: Die Soziale Geographie der ‘Neuen Akademie’ in der Türkei,” in *Nach dem Putsch: 16 Anmerkungen zur “neuen” Türkei*, ed. İlker Ataç et al., Wien-Berlin: mandelbaumVerlag, 96–110, 2018.
- ———. “Industrialisierung und Arbeitswelt in Anatolien.” In Arbeitswelt und Industrialisierung Anatoliens aus der Sicht junger Künstler: edited by Ingo Nitzsche and Technomuseum, Hohenberg a.d. Eger: Porzellanikon - Staatliches Museum für Porzellan, 39–61, 2016.
- ———, and Hakan Aslan. “Vakıf Üniversitesinde Akademik Kapitalizm ve Akademik Sendikacılık: Laureate Edu. Inc., İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi ve Sosyal–İş/DİSK Örneği.” In *Yükseköğretimin Serbest Düşüşü: Özel Üniversiteler*, edited by Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu and Kemal İnal, Istanbul: Ayrıntı, 91–118, 2015.

- ———. “Working Poor or Working Deprived in Cool Istanbul.” In *Cool Istanbul: Urban Enclosures and Resistances*, edited by Derya Özkan, Urban Studies. Bielefeld: Transcript, 61–81, 2015.
- ———. “Avrupa’da İşçi Sağlığı ve İş Güvenliği Alanında Yeni Gelişmeler ve Mücadeleler.” *Eğitim Bilim Toplum* 11, no. 41 (2013), 9–37.
- ———. “Galata Rıhtımı’nda ‘Modern Zamanlar’: Ford’un Tophane Otomobil Montaj Fabrikası 1925-1944.” In Ex-Change: Istanbul - Marseille. The Industrial Architectural Heritage, Developing Awareness and Visibility = Ex-Change, edited by Ruşen Aktaş and Ahmet Sezgin, 104–23. İstanbul: ÇEKÜL, 2011.
- ———. “Serbest Mıntıka’dan Amerikan Pazarına Tophane Rıhtımı: FORD Motor Company Exports Inc., İstanbul Otomotiv Montaj Fabrikası (1925-1944).” *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 12 (2011): 71–93.
- ———, Nevra Akdemir and TTBİİK. Tuzla Tersaneler Bölgesi İzleme ve İnceleme Komisyonu: Tuzla Tersaneler Bölgesi’ndeki çalışma koşulları ve önlemebilir seri iş kazaları hakkında rapor. İstanbul: TMMOB, 2008.
- ———, and Nevra Akdemir. “Tuzla’da Örülen ve Üstü Örtülen Sınıfsallıklar.” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 113 (2008): 49–89.
- ———. “Laboratorium der Informalität: Angekündigte Arbeitsunfälle in der Schiffsbauindustrie in Tuzla/Istanbul.” In *Perspektiven Auf die Türkei: Ökonomische und Gesellschaftliche (Dis)Kontinuitäten im Kontext der Europäisierung*, edited by İlker Ataç, Bülent Küçük, and Ulaş Şener, 1. Aufl., 165–81. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2008.
- ———. “Taşeronlaşma ve Geçici/Ödünç İşçilik Gibi Esnek İstihdam Rejimi Formları, İş Güvencesi ve İnsan Sağlığı: Türkiye ve Almanya’dan Örnekler ve Tepkiler.” *Toplum ve Hekim* 23, no. 4 (2008): 284–301.
- ———. “Zur Aktualität und Tradition Gesellschaftskritischer Ökonomie in Österreich. Österreichische Varianten der Regulationsschule.” *Kurswechsel*, no. 4 (2006): 79–90.
- ———. “1929 Büyük Buhran Sonrası Meksika’da Korporatist Popülizm ve Türkiye’de Solidarist Devletçilik Karşılaştırması:” In *Türkiye’de Kapitalizmin Gelişimi. Yapıcılar Türkü Söylüyor 3*, edited by Demet Yılmaz et.al., 53–76, Ankara: Dipnot, 2006.

- ———, and Joachim Becker. "Von den Inneren zu äußeren Grenzen. Die Auflösung von Habsburger Monarchie und Osmanischem Reich im Vergleich." In *Grenzen weltweit: Zonen, Linien, Mauern im historischen Vergleich*, edited by Joachim Becker and Andrea Komlosy, 41–67. Historische Sozialkunde Internationale Entwicklung 23. Wien: Promedia-Verl. [u.a.], 2006.
- ———, İlker Ataç and Ulaş Şener "Türkei im Wandel: Finanzkrisen - politischer Islam und EU-Annäherung", *MGWU Kritische Geographie,* no: 3 (2002), 1–38.
- ———."Informalisierung und Staat: Die Türkei Seit der Neoliberalen Wende 1980." *Prokla. Zeitschrift Für Kritische Sozialwissenschaft* 30, no. 3 (2000): 449–69.
- ———, İlker Ataç and Gökhan Tuncer "Türkei Zwischen Grüner Gefahr und Ziviler Befreiung zur Aktuellen Diskussion über das Verhältnis zwischen Politik und Religion in der Türkei Seit 1980," *Journal Für Entwicklungspolitik*, no. 1 (2000), vol. 16, 75–92.

GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

- Research Grant by Istanbul Bilgi University, Faculty of Science and Letters, for archival research at Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford in Dearborn/Detroit - August - September 2005
- Research Grant by Department of History / Center for Latin American Studies, University of Vienna for Research at UNAM / México City, August 2002- March 2003
- Scholarship by Orient Gesellschaft, Vienna for the finalization of the MA Thesis, January - June 2002
- Erasmus Grant at Sciences-Po Paris, October 2000 - June 2001
- Scholarship by the Austrian Ministry of Education, Science and Research for BA and MA Studies at the University of Vienna and University of Economics, Vienna, September 1994 - September 2001

INVITED TALKS

- (2023) "Distaster Debris as Development." The People's Forum NYC, *Survival, Disaster Capitalism and the Right to Shelter*

- (2022) “İçinden GEMİLER geçen Hikayeler: Birkaç toplumsal mekan okuma önerisi.” Şirince, İzmir Arkhé Projesi, *Toplumsal Mekanın Siyaseti Yaz Okulu*
- (2021) “Weaving the Circles of Struggle around Workers’, Public and Environmental Health,” Center for Comparative Research on Democracy (CCRD) at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
- (2020) “Salgınlar ve Toplumsal Haritalar: İstanbul'da Sınıfı Görünür Kılan Pandemi.” Harita Mühendisleri Odası ve Mekansal Bilişim İnisiyatifi
- (2020). “Global labour history what is it good for? A conversation between researchers and practitioners.” Global Labor History Network Annual Conference III
- (2019). "Geleceğin kanserlerini asbest ile çağırmak", 16th Istanbul Biennale, Public Programme, Istanbul
- (2018). "Corporatocratic Crimes against and Struggles of Workers’ Health and Safety in Turkey", 2018 Hazards Conference, Keele/UK
- (2017). "Violation of Rights, Rights Struggles and Experiences of Organizing in the Corporate Academy: Cases", The Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation VIDC
- (2016). “The Ford Motor Company in Istanbul 1923-1944. Understanding Socio Political Change. Factory History: Perspectives from Turkey.” Middlesex University London
- (2015). “Working Conditions at Turkish Shipbreaking Building and Repair Aliağa Shipbreaking Region Izmir.” Annual General Meeting of NGO Shipbreaking Platform

CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

- (2023) "Antakya'da afette tercümanlık ve molozla ekokırıma tanıklıklar", Conference on Rethinking Social Work XXI, Istanbul
- (2022) "Aliağa'da Gemisöküm Sanayinde İşçi/Çevre Sorunlarının Teknososyal Belirleyenleri", Congress of the Chamber of Shipbuilding Engineers, Istanbul
- (2021). "Dev/let Şirketler ve Güçlülerin Suçları", Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, *Salgın Sonrası Dönemde İnsan Hakları Gündemi Sempozyumu*

- (2019). "We, the Invisible Hours, Spaces and Relations of the City: Labouring Istanbul, Labouring Berlin." Humboldt University, *We The City: Plurality and Resistance in Berlin and Istanbul*
- (2019). "Istanbul Labour and the Istanbul Poor: Tracing the Labour in the Urban Tissue during the Long 20th Century through Critical Cartographical Research," re-work at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, *Past and present through the lens of the factory: An interdisciplinary conversation*
- (2018). "Archive as Debris, Archiving the Debris. Remembering Benjamin in Istanbul," Istanbul Şehir University and Ministry of Culture, *Forgetting the Archive*
- (2018). "Producing the World Car. The Selective Know-How Transfer of Ford Motor Company during the İnterwar Period." Society History Technology (SHOT), ANAMED, IFEA. *History of Technology in the Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Cities at the Turn of the 20th Century*
- (2017). "De-constructing the industrial palimpsest in Tophane/Istanbul: From Industrial Cultures to Cultural Industries (15th-21st Century)" Second Conference of the European Labour History Network
- (2016). "Ford Motor Company Exports Inc. Istanbul Assembling Cars, Ports and Markets through Automotives." University or Birmingham. *The Global Middle East in the Age of Speed*
- (2015). "Ford Motor Company Export Inc Istanbul 1925-1944 as a place of work, spatial enclave and territorial condensation." First Conference of the European Labour HistoryNetwork (ELHN)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- February 2013 - until now: Lecturer at the Department of Urban and Regional Planning Department, Mimar Sinan University of Fine Arts, taught:
  Introduction into Social Sciences for Urban Planners,
  Spatial Political Economy and Economic Geography,
  Urban Planning Workshop (First Year, Second Year),
  English for Urban Planners: A Source-Based Approach I-II and III,
  Current Debates on Ecology and Urbanism,
  European Urban History,

New Methodological Approaches to Spatial Studies – Graduate School,
Ottoman Environmental and Urban History - Graduate School,

- September 2003 - September 2011: Teaching Assistant and Lecturer at Department of History, Istanbul Bilgi University, taught:
  European Economic History / Ottoman Economic History
  History of Istanbul: A Local History Perspective
  Basics of Political Economy
  Philosophy and Methodology of History
  European / Ottoman Social History
  Contemporary Turkish History
  Comparative Social Structures / Historical Sociology
  Regional Studies: History of Latin America
- October 1997 - February 2002, Department of Political Science, Universität Wien, taught:
  Introduction to History of Ideas and Political Theory
  Introduction into Political Science
  Political Economy of Turkey since 1980
- October 1996 - October 1997, Department of Economics, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, taught:
  Introduction to Micro and Macroeconomics and History of Economic Doctrines

UNIVERSITY/DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

- 2004 -2011 Erasmus Coordinator, Department of History, Istanbul Bilgi University

LANGUAGES

- Turkish –Native Speaker
- German - Fluent
- English – Fluent
- French– Fluent
- Spanish - Advanced
- Ottoman: *Matbu* Reading Knowledge

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS/AFFILIATIONS

- 2014 - Workplaces: pasts and presents working group of the European Labor History Network, member
- 2011 - Istanbul Health and Safety Labor Watch, founding volunteer
- 2010 - Member of the Board of Tarih Vakfı (Mütevelli Heyeti)

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of Necla Hanım,
Necla Turunç, who gave the students of ATA the compassion they needed
and who passed away too soon...

Table of Contents

List of Tables *xxiv*
List of Figures *xxv*
List of Maps *xxix*
Abbreviations and Acronyms *xxxi*
Acknowledgements *xxxiii*

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 11

§ 2.1 Space: Territoriality and Historywriting 11
§ 2.2 Agency: Bringing the "Capital" Back in: Global Business History 57
§ 2.3 Time: "Placing the 1930s" or Since When Is Ford Fordist? 87
§ 2.4 The Narrative Structure of the Thesis: "A Tale of Three Scales" 104
§ 2.5 Sources 107

3 DETROIT-ISTANBUL AXIS: THE SPATIAL CONTEXT OF THE FMC EXPORT INC., ISTANBUL 109

§ 3.1 FMC's Internationalization between 1903 and 1927 and Its Spatial Dynamics 117
§ 3.2 The Restructuring of Ford Europe in 1928: Dagenham, UK 141
§ 3.3 Mapping the Istanbul Territory: Markets of SSCB, Fiat of Trieste, Competition from Alexandria, Competition from Alexandria and Constanța 159

4 DETROIT - ANKARA AXIS OF REGULATION: NATIONAL AND LOCAL ACTORS INVOLVED IN FORD ISTANBUL 247

§ 4.1 Free Zone Law 1927: Hinterland of Ford and Port of Istanbul 251

§ 4.2 Ford Law 1929: Tailor-made Free-hand 269

5 TOPHANE-FACTORY SCALE: THE UNFOLDING OF THE "ENCLAVE" INVESTMENT 281

§ 5.1 Factory Regime: The Organization of Production and the Labor Process 296

§ 5.2 The Markets for Ford Tophane's Automotives: The Planned, the Advertised, and the Realized 335

§ 5.3 Customs in Corruption and Closure 351

6 CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 361

APPENDICES 371

Appendix A Chronology of Making and Unmaking of FMC Exports Inc., Istanbul, 1911-1960. 371

Appendix B Neighborhood Scale Chronology of Spatial and Functional Change of the Factory Site, Tophane. 387

Appendix C Timeline of Internationalization of Production of FMC. 396

Appendix D Visual Timeline and Time-map of Internationalization of Production of FMC, 1904-1944. 403

Appendix E "Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant," March 11, 1932. Acc. 970 / Box 3. Benson Ford. 405

Appendix F Plant Transformation Photographs, May-December 1929 Acc. 970 / Box 3-Istanbul. 409

Appendix G Translations of and Ford Law (*Ford Kanunu*) and Free Zone Law (*Serbest Mıntıka Kanunu*). 422

Appendix H Company Financial Records on FMC Exports Inc., Istanbul. 441

BIBLIOGRAPHY 449

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Three scales of the mapped historical narrative. 52

Table 2.2 State of the art of business history in Turkish scholarship. 61

Table 3.1 Imported passenger car brands in Istanbul, 1924-27. 175

Table 3.2 Number of cars, trucks and their brands in Istanbul in June 1927. 175-6

Table 3.3 Number of cars and trucks in municipalities in Turkey, 1930 and 1933. 176

Table 3.4 " 'Fordisation' of the Soviet Automobile Imports, 1922-1931." 205-6

Table Appx. H.1 Total sale numbers according to Ford Managerial Reports, 1931-1943. 441

Table Appx. H.2 Sale numbers for cars to Istanbul Territory, 1925-1930. 442

Table Appx. H.3 Sale numbers for trucks to Istanbul Territory, 1925-1930. 443

Table Appx. H.4 Sale numbers for cars and trucks to Istanbul Territory, 1925-1930. 444

Table Appx. H.5 Balance Sheet of Ford Motor Company Inc, Istanbul, December 1927 – December 1935, in USD. 445

Table Appx. H.6 Sales, Production and Stocks, 1929-1932. 445

Table Appx. H.7 Domestic and Foreign Production Numbers of Ford Motor Company, 1933-1936. 446-7

Table Appx. H.8 Domestic and Foreign Delivery Numbers of Ford Motor Company, 1933-1936. 447-8

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 FMC's display ad for "National Industries Fair" in Ankara. 3

Figure 2.1 Overlay map of Düyun-u Umumiye and Vital Cuinet's map of administrative divisions for the province of Hüdavendigar. 28

Figure 2.2 Total shipping in 1908 and 1956 tanker and shipping lines traffic. 34

Figure 2.3 Map representing the maritime traffic between Mediterranean ports for the year 1900 using GeoSeastems developed for World Seastems project funded by European Research Council, 2017. 35

Figure 3.1 "Globe in Court of the World, Ford Exhibition Building, Century of Progress International Exposition, Chicago, Illinois." 111

Figure 3.2 Still image showing Ford on top of the world surrounded by raw materials of the world. 112

Figure 3.3 Bird's-eye view of the Ford Motor Company, Highland Park Plant. 121

Figure 3.4 Letterhead of FMC correspondence, December 29, 1929. 129

Figure 3.5 Screenshot of the map of Ford's internationalization before and after 1928. 140

Figure 3.6 "Unloading Ford Cars for the export market," 1927. 142

Figure 3.7 Oil Painting, Rouge Plant, by Irving R. Bacon, 1949. 162

Figure 3.8 Delegates in Manger Square, Bethlehem, 1919 (in front of "Ford" of the Commission). 169

Figure 3.9 A. Vefa's Ford automobiles leaving the factory. 173

Figure 3.10 One of the Fords delivered to A. Vefa's Ford sales agency. 174

Figure 3.11 "F" Marks the provinces with a Ford dealer. 178

Figure 3.12 Ford executives with Soviet delegates after signing the technical assistance agreement, May 31, 1929. 210

Figure 3.13 Technical Agreement: The Soviet and the Turkish delegations at Sümerbank factories, cf. Figure 3.12. Nikolai Nikolayevich Ryabinin, "Machines for Turkey", oil on canvas, 207 x 297 cm., 1937 (photo: Mehmet Perinçek). 211
Figure 3.14 Travelling representative document for Mehmet Bahri Ergene issued by Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul dated February 6, 1934. 225
Figure 3.15 Travelling representative document for Mehmet Bahri Ergene issued by Ford Motor Company S. A. E., Alexandria Egypt dated December 7, 1938. 226
Figure 3.16 Mehmet Bahri Ergene on a tractor which he depicts as "useless" in Alexandria dated 1935. 227
Figure 3.17 Mehmet Bahri Ergene, enroute to Tahran, 1936. 227
Figure 3.18 The Story of 250 Trucks (250 Kamyon Hikayesi): Photos depicting the steps taken for assembling 250 trucks for Baghdad Ford dealer, 1938. 228
Figure 3.19 Ford Motor Company's facilities around the world, 1947. 230
Figure 5.1 Detail from the map showing Tophane and its environs from J. J. Hellert's *Atlas de l'Empire ottoman*, 1836. 289
Figure 5.2 Detail from Necip Bey's plan showing the environs of To-phane (upper part facing north), 1918. 291
Figure 5.3 Detail from Alexandre M. Raymond's map showing the environs of To-phane (upper part facing north), 1919. 292
Figure 5.4 "Imperial Ottoman Gun and Small Arms Factories: Gun Factory," 1880-1893. 294
Figure 5.5 Detail from Pervititch's insurance maps showing the area before the building of warehouses by TMA, 1926. 304
Figure 5.6 Detail from Pervititch's insurance maps showing the area after TMA's warehouses, 1927. 304
Figure 5.7 Balance Sheets of Ford Istanbul between Dec. 1927 - Dec. 1935. 320

Figure 5.8 Ford Fabrikası'nda iş arayanların şikayetleri hakkında, 1930. 335
Figure 5.9 Vehicles sold/delivered from Istanbul Plant, 1931-1943. 338
Figure 5.10 Number of dealers over the years, 1931-1943. 338
Figure 5.11 Total cars and trucks sales to Istanbul territory, 1925-1930. 339
Figure 5.12 Total sale numbers of FMC Exports Inc., Istanbul plant, 1931-1943. 340
Figure 5.13 Hand drawn illustration of Ford Tophane, Istanbul, 1930. 343
Figure 5.14 Hand drawn full page display ad for Ford Motor Company. 344
Figure 5.15 Full-page display ad announcing the parade of Ford automobiles, 1930. 345
Figure 5.16 "The cars of the Ford plant made a grand parade yesterday", 1930. 346
Figure 5.17 "Four Ford trucks travel within Turkey", 1930. 347
Figure 5.18 "Speed... speed in everything", 1930. 350
Figure Appx.D.1 Visual timeline of internationalization of production of FMC, 1904-1944. 403
Figure Appx. F.1 Work Chart made in order to control progress of rearrangement of buildings and installation of equipment. The work on the first tender started on May 22, 1929. Photo taken on August 15, 1929. 409
Figure Appx. F.2 Second section Front of Plant facing North: Intended Show Room and Service School (Building no. 4, before rearrangement). May 26, 1929. 410
Figure Appx. F.3 Part of Yard (Alley) pointing to South-West; showing main entrance; to the left part of intended General Office and Service School Building (building no. 5); to the right part of intended Service School and Finished Car Storage (building no. 4); scrap iron laying in yard comes from

former power-house (Before re-arrangement). May 26, 1929. 411
Figure Appx. F.4 Sea Front, Quay, Cranes and Sea Side of Intended Service Stock Building and General Office (building no. 5 and 6) pointing to South-West before re-arrangement). May 26, 1929. 412
Figure Appx. F.5 Interior of first section of Intended General Office (building no. 5) shown in photo No. 1 pointing to South-East (before re-arrangement).May 26, 1929. 413
Figure Appx. F.6 Front view of the plant with workers, 1929. 414
Figure Appx. F.7 Roof repairs, looking down assembly line. 415
Figure Appx. F.8 Standard Oil Company's Oil tanker discharging first consignment of oil to Ford Motor Co.'s tanks. Istanbul, Turkey. 416
Figure Appx. F.9 "The place where the assembled cars come down from the line." 417
Figure Appx. F.10 "Factory docks and cranes." 418
Figure Appx. F.11 "First semester students of the service school - February 1930 - instructors on the right." 419
Figure Appx. F.12 Istanbul: from the "North East," water tower with Ford logo. 420
Figure Appx. F.13 Istanbul: from the "North," oil tanks. 421

List of Maps

Map 3.1 Cut-out map of Istanbul Territory in 1929, at the time of the opening of the plant. 115

Map 3.2 Great Lake Region and the Erie Channel. 119

Map 3.3 Location of village industry plants. 122

Map 3.4 Cut-out from the map showing FMC's manufacturing, assembly plants, and service plants alongside the branch boundaries, 1927. 123

Map 3.5 Cut out from the map showing FMC's plants and industries: shipping lines, 1927. 124

Map 3.6 Map of the St. Lawrence River System and Profile of the Seaway. 132

Map 3.7 Ford Motor Company's international branches and corporations before 1928. 143

Map 3.8 Ford Motor Company's international assembly facilities, assembly plants, manufacturing facilities before 1928. 144

Map 3.9 Ford's Oversea Sales - Assembly – Manufacturing Expansion, 1904-1944: "Closeup of European expansion." 149

Map 3.10 Ford Motor Company's international branches and corporations after 1928. 158

Map 3.11 Ford Motor Company's international assembly facilities, assembly plants, manufacturing facilities after 1928. 159

Map 3.12 Projected territories in the report of Knudsen, 1919. 165

Map 3.13 How the King-Crane Commission envisioned the Middle East (Karl Sturm and Nick Danforth). 168

Map 3.14 Cut-out map of Trieste Territory in 1922. 190

Map 3.15 Cut-out map of territorial division in February 17, 1937. 229

Map 3.16 Alexandria Territory, 1948. 232

Map 3.17 Cut-out map of squeeze of the Istanbul Territory by 1930 and 1932. Blue borders show subtractions by December

1932, whereas yellow areas show additions at the same date. 246
Map 4.1 Istanbul Port, 1929: "Areas that can benefit from the developments of today and tomorrow." 266
Map 5.1 Hand drawn tram trains and ferry lines over Istanbul map accompanying a tourist guide, 1925. 284
Map 5.2 Tram trains and ferry lines, 1922. 285
Map 5.3 Map of the industrial plants 1900-1923. 286
Map 5.4 Map prepared as an advertisement for Gilchrist Walker Co. Ltd., a shipping agent company of Galata; showing activities and places of interest for shipping lines, 1925. 293
Map 5.5 Beyoğlu district in 1927: Differentiation of function at the street level. 308
Map Appx. D.1 Ford's Oversea Sales - Assembly – Manufacturing Expansion 1904-1944. 404
Map Appx. E.1 Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant, March 8, 1932. 405
Map Appx. E.2 Floor Plan or Buildings 1, 2, 3, and 6, March 11, 1932. 406
Map Appx. E.3 Floor Plan of Buildings No 4, 5 and the Offices, March 15, 1932. 407

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ICCI	Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry (İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası)
FMC	Ford Motor Company
TMA	Turkish Maritime Administration (Seyr-i Sefain İdaresi)
IPMC	Istanbul Port Monopoly Company (İstanbul Liman İnhisarı T. A. Ş.)
CQDW	Associated Company of Quays, Docks and Warehouses of Istanbul (Société Anonyme Ottomane des Quais, Docks et Entrepôts de Constantinople, İstanbul Rıhtım Şirketi)
MF	Ministry of Finance (Maliye Vekaleti)
IBLA	Istanbul Barge and Lighter Association of Loading and Unloading (İstanbul Mavna ve Salapuryacılar Tahmil ve Tahliye Cemiyeti)
NEP	New Economic Policy in USSR (1921-1928)
ILO	International Labor Organization (Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü)

Acknowledgements

It would not be an exaggeration to say that this history PhD thesis is history in itself, both in terms of the years it spans and the periods it covers. It was 2003 when I was a PhD student at the Atatürk Institute taking my first steps into the discipline of history, and 2005 when I first started working on Ford Istanbul. I believe that the way this thesis was finalized is a product of both what I learned doing it and what I experienced during the periods when it was constantly interrupted. I owe this thesis, which was completed in a nomadic format after all these years, first and foremost to the belief and contributions of my friends, colleagues, and mentors in this research at a time when the academia was falling apart.

First and foremost, I must thank my dear friend Sinan Çetin, who bore the burdens and needs of every stage of this journey almost more than me. The description of the myriad ways of his presence, his intellectual, technical, emotional support is too big to fit in this acknowledgment.

I am grateful to my thesis jury, Çağlar Keyder, Cengiz Kırlı, and Murat Güvenç, who believed in the contents I tried to propose in my thesis, which was to place Early Republican History in a non-linear, spatial, and entangled narrative through the lenses of a company, and who treated me all these years not as a "failed student who could not finish her thesis" despite all the delays, but patiently as a peer historian-to-be. Murat Güvenç also helped me realize the integrity of the social sciences with his relational spatial perspective. Çağlar Keyder has always opened my horizon with his research since I started to study the comparative Early Republic period very early on. The historiography courses I took from Cengiz Kırlı during my intellectually stimulating first years at ATA and his approach to social history were decisive in shaping my approach to the discipline. They have enlightened me with their research and teaching practice. I would also like to thank Şevket Pamuk, Umut Türem, Mine Eder, Akansel Yalçınkaya and Seda Altuğ, who honored me by participating in my thesis monitoring committees and thesis jury at different periods. I learned a lot from them about spatial and regional studies, business history, comparative political economy and the entangled history of borders.

The professors, academic staff and students of the courses I took at ATA and I gave at Bilgi University's History Department when I first stepped into these institutions as a historian-to-be provided me with a foundation of intellectual inspiration, rigour and meaning. I am thankful for the efforts of my colleagues and students in both departments. Again, the administrative and library staff at both institutions has eased what was often a lonely and bureaucratic process in which bureaucracy could get in the way of content. I would like to dedicate this thesis to Necla Turunç, of whose smiling face I always kept a dear memory. I would also like to thank dear Kadriye Tamtekin Aksoy from the ATA secretariat and the staff of Anamed and Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University Libraries during this long period. Yavuz Sezer, part of the research community between 2013 and 2016 motivating each other at Anamed, is no longer with us. How nice it would have been if I could have said to him, "Yes, I finished that PhD too!" I think this cold and lonely process would not have come to an end if we had not been able to warm up with a smiling face at the tea stove of ATA and in the dead-end street opposite Anamed, which is why Leyla Abla and Yakup Abi should be mentioned in these acknowledgments. Thanks to them.

I would also like to fondly remember my mentor and friend Joachim Becker from the Vienna University of Economics, who was also the shadow advisor of my master's thesis, and who always provided just-in-time shadow counseling and moral support from far away.

Two different institutions provided me with two sabbaticals to write this thesis. I would like to thank all my colleagues at the Department of History at Istanbul Bilgi University in 2007-2008 and the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University in 2021-2022, who took on the teaching and administrative burdens that should have been mine during my sabbaticals. I am very happy that I was finally able to finish this thesis, albeit not during my sabbaticals but at a time when time was completely pressed. I realize now that if it were not for what I did in other contexts but always with similar questions in mind during the productive procrastination periods then I would perhaps never have been able to write this thesis at all or in this way.

I would like to thank the then Istanbul Bilgi University Faculty of Arts and Sciences for funding part of my PhD thesis archival research at the Benson Ford Research Center in Dearborn with a research fellowship for two months in 2005. Peter Kalinski of the Benson Ford Research Center was a great support to my archival research. I would also like to thank him, the staff of the American Information Resource Center at the then American Embassy in Ankara, and the staff of the Ankara Prime Ministry Archives and National Library for their professionalism.

In this thesis, which is an example of spatial relational history, I received critical cartographic assistance from my friends Murat Tülek, Barış Göğüş and Ahmetcan Alphan, who are masters in the field of mapping. Thank you a lot.

In the long process of this thesis, especially after I published the first monographs on the subject, I received support in terms of sources and hints from many esteemed masters, friends, and sometimes complete strangers, often without even asking for it. As the variety of sources I sat on increased, the burden on me to do justice to the thoughtfulness of all these altruistic helpers increased. I hope this is a text worthy of their thoughtfulness. Prof. Mira Wilkins, a veteran business historian who wrote what is considered to be the first book on Ford's international investments in 1964, sent me her personal research notes of her work there even before the Ford International Archives were catalogued, with a letter from Florida full of stamps, and she has been an open door to all my questions in this long process. At the end of her e-mails answering my questions over the years, she always added the same final question, "So when will this precious thesis be finished?" very kindly and delivering me the feeling of great confidence and responsibility.

Hamdi Genç, who had written in 2001 the only monograph on Ford Istanbul when I started this thesis, shared all his sources with me with a generosity that is now rare in academia. Dear Hakan Koçak integrated the subject of Ford Istanbul into his routine meticulous and multifaceted archival work with great spontaneity, constantly feeding the thesis. Rıfat Bali set aside from his vast archives elements on Ford for me. Gökhan Akçura generously opened his archive to me and informed me about Ford Istanbul artifacts that fell into auctions by scanning the auction catalogues with my

eyes. Other documents and concrete hints came from Alexandre Toumarkine, Asena Günal, Ayhan Han, Bülent Yılmazer, Cengiz Arabacı, Cengiz Erdinç, Christoph K. Neumann, Derviş Akkoç, Doğan Çetinkaya, Eda Güçlü, Edhem Eldem, Elif Taşkın, Emek Durmuşoğlu, Ertuğrul Bilir, Fatma Genç, Özge Ertem, Shai Srougo, Simon Jackson, Stefan J. Link, Stuart Kline, Thomas Berchtold, Ufuk Yüksekkaya and an anonymous friend alias "Bamsi Beyrek" who sent me archival documents from the London Public Record Office about my thesis topic, I thank all of you.

I cannot thank Mehmet Can Ertem enough for sending me the magnificent photo albums of his late grandfather Mehmet Bahri Ergene, who worked as a Ford representative both at Ford Istanbul and Ford Alexandria and which helped me visualize the Ford territory I wrote about step by step, and Nurhan Ertem, Mehmet Bahri Ergene's daughter, who allowed me to interview her in 2011. I will never forget the day I spent with "Arap" İsmail, one of the Ford workers, and his wife Fatma Hanım, whom I had the honor of interviewing at the age of ninety-nine, again in 2011. I would also like to remember Edip Bey, Tophane Haber reporter, and Tophane residents Nusret and Eyüp Bey, who helped me, reach him.

There were dozens of academic meetings that have motivated me develop the insights of this thesis. I think the most decisive ones were the annual Küçükkuyu meetings organized by the team of Marmara University's (former) Department of Development Economics between 2004 and 2007, the seminar on the Free Zones organized by Mersin University's (former) Department of Public Administration and Political Science in 2010, the 2016 Conference on "The Global Middle East in the Age of Speed" organized by the Institute for Advanced Study at the University of Birmingham in 2016, and the 2019 IFEA seminar organized by the Society for the History of Technology. I would also like to mention the contributions of these academic meetings to the thesis to thank their organizers.

The working group that Görkem Akgöz and Nico Pizzolato founded in 2012 as the Factory History Working Group of the European Labor History Network, which we later re-baptized as Workplaces: pasts and presents, has been a collective where I have learned a lot about the possibilities and directions of workplace-scale global history, shared similar passions and continue

to learn at conferences in Glasgow, Birmingham, London, Istanbul, Paris, Athens, Amsterdam, Vienna and Stockholm since 2012. I would like to thank my friends who coordinated this team and the whole team.

During this long process, I had the opportunity to publish two articles addressing different aspects of the thesis topic. I would like to thank Ahmet Sezgin, the editor of the book on industrial heritage published by ÇEKÜL Foundation, and the anonymous referee of the journal *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar* for their valuable contributions, which allowed me to clarify the main paths of the thesis within the historical material.

I remember our Tophane memory tour and Göztepe Sanayi Ford A tour with Kâmil Pelfanoğlu -- Kâmil Abi, who lifted an A model Ford carcass left over from Ford's Tophane factory from where it was rotting in Samsun and assembled all its parts in Göztepe Sanayi with a spirit of craftsmanship without a single trace of Fordism, as one of the most pleasant moments of this thesis. May his artisan hands be blessed!

It was my family as my friend and my friends as my family that gave meaning and breathed sprit to everything I did in life. This did not change in the thesis either. I would like to thank all my soulmates and friends. It would be unrealistic for me to express the essential role they played in my life and how we grew up together through storms and dawns by mentioning their names one by one. Therefore, I can only give a representative greeting here to my dear ones who set up special games, played "man-to-man" for the completion of this thesis. Alper Açık, Aslı Güneş, Bediz Yılmaz, Bülent Şık, Fuat Ercan, Hakan Arslan, Mafalda Ade, Mine Yıldırım, Murat Özveri, Murat Tülek and Yonca Demir, who kept my belief that I could finish this endless thesis alive with compassionate warnings that I withheld from myself, who opened WhatsApp groups titled "this thesis will be finished!" from time to time, and who desperately tried to make me finally "start finishing it".

Those who come last in the acknowledgements, which is as long as the many years this thesis has spanned, are the ones who have carried the most consistent burden of this thesis. Jean-François, my friend, lifelong companion, colleague and always inspiring me with his approach to space and to joyful wisdom, our children Emil and Ida, and the cats (Bubi, Siyahfir,

Lukuş, Stello, Tigris, Amezon) hanging out in our house as they please, the seagulls of Tarlabaşı roofs landing and taking off in front of my window, the sun rising and setting through the cramped roofs, the sun beams falling on the buildings, the city sounds coming from the street, the city skyline divided by cranes, without you this thesis which is not a thesis but a nomadic enterprise would have never settled down, me neither

NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made detailed recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, syntax, and style of this dissertation.

L'automobile c'est la guerre.

– Walter Benjamin, 1930 (Theories of German Fascism, p .1)

A great business is really too big to be human.

– Henry Ford, 1929 (Stites, p. 148)

1

Introduction

The genesis of the automotive industry in Turkey is typically dated back to the early post-World War II years. The starting point of the standard narrative is Marshall Aid, the ensuing mechanization of agriculture and the assembly of the first tractors in Turkey by the *Minneapolis-Moline Türk Traktör Fabrikası* in Ankara.[1] This is followed by the story of the legendary joint venture of the Koç Group with the Ford Motor Company in 1959, giving birth to Otosan Automotive Industries Inc. (*Otosan Otomobil Sanayii A.Ş.*), by way of a dealer assembler status granted to the Koç Group. And the production of the first truck assembled under the Ford license leaving the factory in Uzunçayır, Kadıköy in 1960 is typically taken as the heroic start of an "essentially Turkish" automotive industry.[2]

---

1 Metin Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi: 1954-1997* (Ankara: Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş., 1998), 24–52.

2 Ford Otosan and VTR Araştırma Yapım Yönetim, eds., *Benim Adım Ford Otosan* (İstanbul: Kesişim Yayıncılık, 2010), 62; Önder Küçükerman, *Türk Otomobiliyle 50 Yıl* (Istanbul: Rahmi M. Koç Müzesi; MAS Matbaacılık, 2004); Mükerrem Hiç, "Türk Otomotiv Sanayiinin İktisadi Yönü ve Sorunları," in *Türkiye'de Otomotiv Sanayii ve Otomotiv Yan Sanayii* (Istanbul: İktisadi Araştırmalar Vakfı, n.d.); Ahmet Esmen, "Analysis of the Turkish Automotive Industry and Factor Affecting Its Develepment" (MA Thesis, Robert College, Faculty of Industrial Administration, 1968); Atilla, "Türkiye'de Otomotiv Sanayii Gelişme Perspektifi" (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2002); Cemal Üner, "Türkiye'de Otomotiv Sanayiinin Tarihçesi," *Mühendis ve Makine*, no. 166 (1971): 261–67.

Given the preponderance of the foregoing narrative, one is rather surprised to find out that, as early as the 1920s, there actually took place a major attempt at establishing an assembly industry of cars, trucks, tractors, and even airplanes on Turkish soil, more specifically in Istanbul. The legal formation of the so-called Ford Motor Company Export Inc. Istanbul, as a greenfield, stand-alone investment dated back to 1929. The assembly plant was erected by the Ford Motor Company at the Tophane pier. It assembled motor vehicles until April 1933 and remained legally intact until 1944, long after it ceased its production. Furthermore, until 1944, the year of its decommissioning, it enjoyed full exterritorial rights (*memleket / gümrük harici mahal*)[3] based on the very first Free Zone Law of the Republican Turkey, namely *Serbest Mıntıka Kanunu* which was promulgated in 1927. In many advertisements of the Ford Istanbul the factory was presented as a "national factory" whose products were the "fruit of Turkish sweat and ingenuity," i.e., at the "National Goods Fair" at the Galatasaray High School in Istanbul in August 1930[4] or "National Industries Fair" in Ankara April 1931 (*Ankara Milli Sanayi Sergisi*).[5]

3 "Türkiye Cümhuriyeti Hükûmeti İle Ford Motör Kumpani Eksports Enkorporeytet Şirketi Arasında Aktedilen Mukavelenamenin Tasdikına Dair Kanun," *T. C. Resmî Gazete*, no. 1119 (February 2, 1929): article 2 (from here on it will be referred to as *Ford Law*).

4 İki Gün İçinde Yerli Mallar Sergisini 6000 Kişi Gezdi," *Vakit*, August 13, 1930.

5 Ford (Lincoln, Fordson, Aircraft), "Ankara Milli Sanayi Sergisinde Yeni Ford Kamyonları," *Cumhuriyet*, April 6, 1931, sec. [Classified Ads].



FIGURE 1.1 FMC's display ad for "National Industries Fair" in Ankara. SOURCE: *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, April 6, 1931, p. 7.

It is, to say the least, a legitimate question why, to this day, this attempt has never been studied thoroughly in the form of a monograph, save the exception of a single article dating back to the relatively late date of 2001.[6] Keyder who wrote one of the earliest books on the Early Republican economy mentioned the Ford plant in Istanbul yet he both trivialized its importance by comparing it with the very small-scale supply and repair station of cars of the Baladour family in Izmir, which is only one of the local twenty three sales agencies of Ford in Turkey in 1929 and grouped Ford's plant along with other foreign direct investments by multinationals of the period such as Nestlé, Columbia classifying them as "investments aiming at

6 Hamdi Genç, "Özel Girişimle Sanayileşme Döneminde Sanayide Yabancı Sermayenin Boyutu (1923-1932). Ford'un Montaj Fabrikası," in *TMMOB Sanayi Kongresi 2001: "Küreselleşme ve Sanayileşme" Bildiriler Kitabı: [30 Kasım -1-2 Aralık 2001, İstanbul]*, ed. TMMOB Makine Mühendisleri Odası (Ankara: TMMOB Makina Mühendisleri Odası, 2002), 35–44.

the expanding internal [Turkish] markets."[7] Yahya S. Tezel's work, another seminal study on the Early Republican economic history of Turkey, covered the Istanbul plant in the chapter on "Relations with Foreign Capital between 1923 and 1950."[8] Tezel started that chapter by rightly criticizing the dominant historiographical approach at that time which takes a hostile attitude of the Early Republican elite towards the foreign capital for granted without empirical evidence. He then moved further to enumerating the different forms of foreign investment for that period. Yet he listed the greenfield industrial investment of Ford along with the *concessionaire* type investments (*imtiyazlı şirketler*) mainly into urban infrastructure; railways, banking, insurance, shipping, trade, transport, mining and forestry, though the extraterritorializing free zone rights, the industrial activity and sheer scale of the investment had a qualitatively different logic compared to the foreign *concessionaires* or chartered companies with foreign capital partners at that time.[9] The Ottoman concessions from the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century were granted on the basis of business activities or sectors for an urban or the whole Ottoman territory whereby the privilege which was granted to Ford was multinational territoriality for its own production system and extra-territorial for Turkey. Thus, the all-inclusive classification

7 Çağlar Keyder, *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929* (Cambridge; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press ; Editions de la Maison des sciences de Íhomme, 1981), 62.

8 Yahya Sezai Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950*, Rev. 3rd Ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 194.

9 The main reference on the corporate structure of the period between 1920 and 1930 is still Gündüz Ökçün's book on the foreign capital participation in the Turkish corporations: *1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1971). The book contains the most comprehensive list of the corporations which were established between 1920 and 1930 and their breakdown according to the sectors (manufacture, energy, mining, forestry, agriculture, construction, monopolies of all kinds, banking and loan societies, security, communication, transport, entertainment and hotel and trading) yet does not include Ford's Tophane investment since, firstly it was a greenfield investment without Turkish capital participation and secondly it was established outside Turkish legislation (both outside the corporate and administrative law) by way of a special law exterritorializing the production location at Tophane.

by Tezel could not grasp the raison d'être and peculiarity of Ford's industrial investment which neither aimed at urban or rural infrastructure services, nor at exploiting local natural sources. Ford Istanbul constituted a hundred percent "foreign" industrial investment from the scratch aiming at international markets instead of internal markets. Both the borders of this internationalized production in Tophane (its free zone area) and of the markets to be delivered from that production unit (its territory) were very clearly defined though and exactly when it was subject to changes during the process by the corporation itself. It thus needs to be discerned from the bulk of the foreign investments during the İnterwar period in terms of scale and scope and analyzed separately in its context.

The examples of these rudimentary mentions of Ford Tophane in the secondary sources of the Early Republican period can be expanded. Otherwise at the everyday level photographs and sketchy documents stemming from this episode have been changing hands at auctions like the dull, lifeless snapshots of an urban memory that has long fallen apart. The popular and intellectual; daily and structural amnesia towards this plant at Tophane allows us not only to question generally the limits of the mainstream economic history of the Early Republican period but also, more specifically the reasons of the scanty documentation of Istanbul's material and industrial culture in the twentieth century.

This dissertation aims firstly to recall this blank memory by bringing new and primary sources into play; comprising textual and visual documents from the company archives of the Ford Motor Company in Dearborn/Detroit and by cross-reading them with the Republican Archives, the US Embassy Reports at the American Resource and Information Center and the contemporary newsfeeds from Turkey and abroad. Moreover, it sets itself the task of comprehending the reasons behind this "meaningful" amnesia. By itself, this "lack" might shed light on the highlighted and shadowed corners, on the accents and silences of the prevailing historiographical stock of the Early Republican Turkey.

The questions derived would be as follows: How would one explain this historiographical amnesia? Was this assembly plant too "early" to be considered as part of the "real industrial period" of the history of Republican

Turkey? Alternatively speaking, does it remain outside the valid periodization of the industrial and economic history of Turkey so that it was simply left out as a temporal anomaly? Was it too "premature" in the sense that it cannot serve as a meaningful case study on the economic development of Turkey? Does this justify this historical case to be left out from the mainstream Early Republican historiography? Does the averagely high level of abstraction at which most of the research on this period is conducted not allow capturing this short and failed episode in Tophane? Or does the dominant focus on the state overshadow other actors / agencies like the capital / company and make it rather improbable to describe the history of a case where the dominant actor is a corporation and the narrative must evolve from the angle of this giant enterprise of the time, namely the Ford Motor Company? Why has the legacy of the first automotive assembly plant in Turkey not been assumed so far by any institution, -be it a company or a public body- to have its history written down, which is the case in so many other examples of institutional history (*kurum tarihi*), a subfield that seems to replace business history in Turkey both conceptually and in terms of content?[10] By questioning whether this global investment was "premature" from the angle of the national industrialization chronology or "belated" from the angle of the nineteenth century globalization theories, this thesis also aims to question the given periodizations and their spatial givens.

Besides the above-mentioned theoretical aspirations of concentrating on the hows and whys of the Ford plant in Tophane/Istanbul between 1923, the year of the first trace of a contact between Ford and the Turkish Government in the archival documents, until 1944 (the year the plant reported to shut down), I also hope to simply at least shed light on an untold episode concerning many "firsts" in the history of the Turkish Republic and located at the very heart of the Port of Istanbul: The first automotive plant, the first

10 See the subchapter 1.2. 'Bringing Back the Capital in: Global Business History', for the evidence of and discussion on the lack of business history in Turkish scholar tradition. See also a recent analysis of the business history of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey: Akansel Yalçınkaya, "Türkiye'de İşletme Tarihyazımı: Mevcut Birikime Eleştirel Bakış ve Yeni Bir Tarihyazımı İçin Muhtemel Açılımlar," *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 19 (2022): 104–44.

motorized moving assembly line of automotives and the first application of the first Republican Free Zone Law (*Serbest Mıntıka Kanunu*) in 1927. Ford played a direct role in the promulgation of that law which had not been documented so far either. We believe that this thesis' research in Fords' and Turkish state archives can provide convincing evidence of Ford's decisive role in the creation of Turkey's first Free Zone Law.

At the same time, we suggest a change of focus from national state policies to the agency of the global capital, the Ford Motor Company as one of the biggest corporations of the twentieth century.

The main source of this thesis is the Ford Motor Company Archives in Dearborn/Detroit. It opts deliberately for the perspective of a company that chose a production location, delimited territories for sale and designed strategies of action to relate to respective states' governments in which and for the period it invested. The perspective of the company has been furthermore scrutinized in terms of space to understand the establishment of and change in economic territories of the global economy.

Thus, we will scrutinize the dialectics between economic and political spatial formations of the İnterwar territoriality by way of a historical analysis of the territorial logic of Ford Tophane. The results of these spatial formations cannot be grasped and labeled with prepacked and backward projected regional designations dating mainly from the post World-War II like "Middle East, Islamic World, Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean" etc. As a result, this thesis tries to decenter both state-centric narratives and spatially fixed understandings of the formation of Turkish capitalism after the declaration of the Republic and formal drawing of the national borders in 1923 within the framework of National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*).[11] The analysis of the first Free Zone Law in Turkey is an important part of this problematization not simply because Ford grounded its ex-territorializing claims in its Tophane plant on that regulation but also because it exerted direct pressure on the government to promulgate that piece of legislation as a prerequisite to invest in Turkey, as will be shown in Chapter Four. The ex-territorialization made possible by way of the Free Zone Law, which is in

11 With, at least for our purposes, unsignificant exception of the integration of Antioch (Hatay) into Turkish territory in 1938.

fact a law of exception to the allegedly not-challengeable and changing territorial unity and sovereignty within politico-national borders, invites us not to take the national geography for granted as the geography of capitalism but to scrutinize instead the re-scaling activities of the capitalist multinational corporations to make sense of the developments in Turkey within global entanglements.

This thesis is composed of five chapters, including a theoretical introduction and a conclusion. The theoretical part re-examines the literature in three perspectives, namely space, agency, and time, i.e., the periodization of the Early Republican historiography. It proposes a spatial approach that focuses on the capital as the main agency of spatial formations and invites to do Ford's history which is at the same time global entangled history of the İnterwar flows of capital, information/know-how/technology, people, and commodities. The methodology applied in this thesis tries to enter into critical dialogue with readymade and macro recipes about periodizations of world capitalism such as globalization, de-globalization, Fordism, or post Fordism. It defines territoriality as the historiographical relevant concept which is not any more confined to national borders and formalized internal "colonization" activities/public works (*bayındırlık*, cf. in German *Innere Kolonialisierung*) by the state, but relates the concept to more complex, multi-actor and contingent global rescaling activities.

The following three chapters are designed to exemplify the choice made for a "narrative of spatial scales instead of a linear temporal narrative" induced by a theoretical and methodological discussion in Chapter Two. Chapter Three deals with the rescaling activities through which the main actor Ford, a company based in Dearborn/Detroit, had mapped its expansion throughout the globe between 1908 and 1929. It focuses on the contingent and competitive formation of the territory of Istanbul plant in interaction with the neighboring spatial dynamics such as the rise of economic nationalist policies of fascism in Italy, the New Political Economy and the introduction of the First Five Year Plan in Soviet Russia, the colonial economic stability in Egypt as a port to colonies further south, and the reasons of attractiveness of Constanța. Most of the time the story leads us

through port-cities with changing hinterlands instead of nation states with fixed boundaries, such as Trieste, Alexandria, Piraeus, Constanța.

Chapter Four deals with the rescaling activity, which was woven mainly between Detroit and the capital of the Republic, Ankara. The content analysis of the Free Zone Law in 1927 and Ford Law in 1929 is accompanied by the analysis of the relations between Ford and the centrally authorized but Istanbul-based institutions acting –not favorably to Ford's investment- on the concrete level of the investment location, the port of Istanbul.

Chapter Five deals with the concrete spatial practices at the factory-scale at the pier of the neighborhood of Tophane, where all these rescaling activities are intermeshed in a hierarchical manner and concretized in the organization of production, targeted/realized markets, and the labor regime. The concluding chapter contemplates about the reasons of why the investment constituted a failure to all the parties involved in it and tries to suggest some paths to follow for future research in the field of non-deterministic, spatial business monographs as an integral part of the Republican history of Turkey.

2

Theoretical Background

§ 2.1 Space: Territoriality and Historywriting

To make our case study of Ford Tophane intelligible we will seek help from a hybrid literature that nourishes from questioning the relationship between territoriality and historywriting. This literature has emerged within a current which is called "spatial turn" covering a much broader perspective than only historiography.[1] The term alludes to "cultural turn" which pre-dated it as a movement of wider influence in scholarly debates and practices beginning in the early 1970s. As Delaney puts in his short introduction into the concept of territory,[2] "nothing better reveals how something is supposed to work than when it isn't working" by referring to the end of the 1970s generally seen as a crisis of the territorial-state centered global organization usually labeled as crisis of modernity, "Atlantic Fordism, welfare capitalism, nation-states, etc. The end of 1970s is also conceptualized as the crisis of historicism that was the dominant historiographical taken-

1 Barney Warf and Santa Arias, eds., *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

2 David Delaney, *Territory: A Short Introduction* (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 1.

for-grantedness around two hundred years and the beginning of the "reassertion of space in critical social theory."[3]

> In the nineteenth century, space became steadily subordinated to time in modern consciousness through the lens of historicism. Historicist thought linearized time and marginalized space by positing the existence of temporal "stages" of development, a view that portrayed the past as the progressive, inexorable ascent from savagery to civilization, simplicity to complexity, primitiveness to civilization, and darkness to light, sweeping teleological accounts that paid little attention to space, human consciousness, or the contingency of social life.[4]

John Agnew puts this phenomenon as the "territorial trap," assuming unproblematically a sense of state-centric spatial fix that is assumed to be framed by normalized and naturalized borders.[5] Yet Elden argues that "territory is political technology" that needs a to be interrogated with the tools of critical historical inquiry into how land, claims, rights, rates, resources and borders are fought over, ordered, quantified, divided, mapped, distributed or transformed.[6]

In fact, already the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed qualitatively new discussions by the predecessors Rose Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding and Nikolai Bukharin trying the make "the geographical spread of capitalism" intelligible under the term "imperialism" in terms of what it

3 See the subtitle of an influential contribution to the spatial turn: Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London and New York: Verso, 1989).

4 Barney Warf and Santa Arias, eds., *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 2.

5 John Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory," *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80.

6 Stuart Elden, "Territory," in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Human Geography*, ed. James Stuart Duncan and John A. Agnew (Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 266. Also see: Stuart Elden, "How Should We Do the History of Territory?," *Territory, Politics, Governance* 1, no. 1 (2013): 5–20.

implied for the political space.[7] Yet the early representants of an outspoken "spatial consciousness" have mainly written during the İnterwar period, responding to the restructuration of space as part of the crisis of liberal capitalism of the nineteenth century. They remained mainly as residual "pockets of provocative geographical analysis and theorization [...]"[8] The Chicago School for Urban Ecology, Walter Benjamin, Georg Simmel, Antonio Gramsci on the regional question and the early French *Annales* School are among the most prominent theoretical approaches of this period focusing systematically on spatial dynamics of social change and human geography. But it became a real turn within the spatial reordering of space starting from the 1970s up to today with the Parisian contributions (the seminal oeuvre of Henri Lefebvre, Michel Foucault, Christian Palloix and François Perroux[9]) and the anglophone critical geographers starting with David Harvey, Edward Soja, Manuel Castells, Neil Smith, Doreen Massey, Derek Gregory, Neil Brenner, Sassia Sasken, to name just some of the most influential scholars. The theorization of space to understand regional inequalities outside the mainstream, space-insensitive economics also led a part of the *Dependencia* School, namely the Latin American structuralists to problematize political and economic space to understand historical change in territory and the formation of centers and peripheries.[10]

In the following chapter, I will enter into dialogue with their concepts, approaches and theories as much as needed to build a comprehensive framework to make sense of the rise and fall of the Ford plant at the port of Istanbul, Tophane during the İnterwar period. With other words this thesis is an attempt at "reasserting of space" in critical historiography of the Early

7 Joachim Becker, *Akkumulation, Regulation, Territorium: Zur Kritischen Rekonstruktion Der Französischen Regulationstheorie* (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 2002), 51 ff.

8 For a masterly written and sythetic account of the how's and why's of the spatial turn, see: Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*, 10–42.

9 François Perroux, "Economic Space: Theory and Applications," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 64, no. 1 (1950): 89–104.

10 Representative for the ouvre of Celso Furtado, Anibal Pinto and Raúl Prebish, see: Celso Furtado, *Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution*, trans. Suzette Macedo (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

Republican Turkey or re-entering the historical narrative at a different place, namely at entangled, simultaneous spatial formations and not sticking to a linear succession of not-space sensitive events, implying causality in the "before" and "after" (such like "from the Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey, from an agricultural empire to an industrialized republic, from tradition to modernity, from liberalism to etatism" etc.).[11]

2.1.1 Territory in Scholarship on Modern Turkey

In Turkey the preoccupation with space within a social sciences framework is a much later and still an overly weak phenomenon. A strong indicator for the lack of analytical engagement with space is the overtly outdated, lethargic and isolated position of the discipline of geography as the "science of the space" in the Turkish academia.[12] The nation-state is taken for granted to such an extent that the conceptual duo "national" and "geography" has become nearly inseparable under the label of "national geography course" (*milli coğrafya dersi*) in high school curricula starting from the 1980s, following a period of focus on regional geographies, treated epistemologically as the constituting the particular elements of the "national whole" between ca. 1915 - 1980.[13] There is a nearly total lack of horizontal connection between geography departments and other academic departments with a spatial vocation, such us urban planning, architecture, (urban) sociology or political science and history departments in Turkey up until today.

11 Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*.

12 The absence of the departments of geography in the landscape of the literally mushrooming private universities since the 2000s has made this lethargy even more visible: Whereby the number of private universities inclining toward pragmatic market signals have doubled in the last ten years (in total to 67, out of the 186 universities in total in 2017) , there is still only one department of geography in the semi-private university sector. Jean-François Pérouse, "Türkiye'de Coğrafyanın Yansımaları," trans. Nuri Yavan and Sengün Acar, *Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi* 10, no. 1 (2012): 1–8; Ségolène Débarre and Jean-François Pérouse, "Dire et faire le territoire en Turquie: entre idéologie unitariste et obsession de la rente," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 23 (2016).

13 Erdem Bekaroğlu, "Modern Dünya-Sisteminin Bilgi Yapıları Bağlamında Coğrafya Disiplini İçin Bir Dışsal Tarih Okuması," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 136 (2016): 135 ff.

Thus, within the historiography of the Turkish Republic the concept of "territory" and derived from it, the concept of "territoriality," is bound tightly to the space and unity of the nation state. In this prevailing understanding territory is derived from the politico-juridical concept of "sovereignty" and the most commonly suggested translations (such as *toprak, vatan toprağı, ülke*) into the Turkish language witness this nation-centric approach.[14] On the other hand any translation of the term "territory" as *bölge* in order to avoid the nation-state centered view might come close to the term separatist (*bölücü*) by way of a slight semantic slip, both in political language and in a substantial segment of the Turkophone academic sphere, serving as a proxy for the still burning Kurdish issue also including territorial right claims. Within the Turkish discoursive tradition any attempt at translating the concept of territory seems to be associated mainly with a political particularistic stance.

According to this dominantly unitary nation-state centered view the only possible economic approach to the term remains developmentalist (*kalkınmacı*) once more teleologically addressing the "catch-up" development of the whole nation in "territorial unity." Thereby, the term "regional disparities" (*bölgesel eşitsizlik*) replaces the term "territorial disparity," which remains overtly non translatable into Turkish.[15] Even if space was problematized and theorized, non-national de-facto formations of and technologies of

14 'Territory' is usually translated as *toprak, vatan toprağı, ülke, bölge, arazi, mıntıka, alan, hükümranlık alanı, saha* ("territory" Cambridge Dictionary [online edition]. https://bit.ly/46ps4lK) and the concept of territoriality does not even exist in the internationally renowned dictionaries yet it has been translated by the Turkey-based popular online dictionary *zargan.com* as *bölgecilik, bölge savunma* and the term 'principle of territoriality' as " the territoriality of laws (according to this article, a law can only be applied within the territory of the country)" [*kanunların mülkiliği (bu maddeye göre bir kanun sadece memleket içinde uygulanabilir].*

15 Jean-François Pérouse, "Le Discours Sur Les Disparités Territoriales En Turquie: Remarques Terminologiques, Contexte Idéologique, Cadres Administratifs et Modalités de Formulation" ([unpublished paper], 2006). Pérouse exemplifies in his 2004 article how territory can be dealt with by looking at multiple agencies and scales at the same time by analyzing the 're-territorialization of Istanbul': Jean-François Pérouse, "Nouveaux enjeux territoriaux et environnementaux: le cas d'Istanbul," in *La Turquie au tournant du siècle*, ed. Ali Kazancıgil (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 2004), 88–112.

territoriality[16] have not deserved enough attention in the Ottoman-Republican geographic-historical thinking and writing throughout the whole formation period of capitalism. The ethnic conflicts residing during the shrinking of the imperial territory and the internal consolidation processes during the Republican period have been prioritized subjects of space-problematizing studies in the historiography of the Late Ottoman[17] and Early Republic.[18] The following topics protrude for the few studies problematizing territory; the "general inspection regions" in 1921,[19] change of toponomies during the twentieth century,[20] the Settlement Laws (*İskân Kanunu*) of 1934 and 1936[21] or internal colonialization issues within the Kurdish conflict.[22] Territory was analyzed by way of scrutinizing state action

16 Territoriality as well as terroir, to refer to a francophone fine tuning.

17 Özkan Akpınar, "Geographical Imagination in School Geography During the Late Ottoman Period, 1876-1908" (MA Thesis, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University, 2010).

18 Hande Özkan, "The History of Geographical Perceptions in the Turkish Republic: A Spatial Interpretation of the Republican Regime During the Single-Party Era" (MA Thesis, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University, 2002); also, see: Ahmet Sezgin, "From Imperial Imprints to National Markers of the Homeland: Süleymaniye, Selimiye, and Commemorating Sinan in Turkey, 1930-1950," *Journal of Historical Geography*, (*forthcoming*). The edited volume comparing Greek and Turkish nationalization processes of space: Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, Thaleia Dragōna, and Çağlar Keyder, eds., *Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010).

19 Cemil Koçak, *Umumi Müfettişlikler: 1927-1952* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003).

20 Kerem Öktem, "The Nation's Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of Toponymes in Republican Turkey," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 7, Thematic Issue: Demographic Engineering (2008). Sevan Nişanyan's study and interactive map on the issue is also worth mentioning on the first hand: Sevan Nişanyan, *Hayali Coğrafyalar: Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye'de Değiştirilen Yeradları*, ed. Özge Genç and Mehmet Ekinci (Istanbul: TESEV, 2011). The map of the changed place names can be consulted under "Index Anatolicus", [www.nisanyanmap.com].

21 All sources about the Dersim massacres during the 1930's deal inevitably with the Settlement Laws. For an overview of the increasing literature about Dersim see the edited book which grew out of the first symposium on the province in 2010: Şükrü Aslan, Songül Aydın, and Zeliha Hepkon, eds., *Dersim'i Parantezden Çıkarmak: Dersim Sempozyumu'nun Ardından* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013).

22 Joost Jongerden's book is a good example of the dominant foci of the few studies dealing with territories for the Ottoman-Republican period: The central agency of space formation remains the state and the conflicual process of territory formations is dealt with within an

seeking to strengthen its influence to better monitor the pre-existing space. Thus, territoriality was mainly defined as "establishment of direct state authority over territories, people and natural resources,"[23] history of modernity seen mainly as a formation of political space by way of state politics. The (violent) territorial production of a unitary culture, i.e., of a concordance between political units and Muslim-Turkish cultural / identity units, thus the ethnic and cultural homogenization policies by way of border formations, deportations, forced exchange of populations, forced migration, assimilation and re-settlement policies has lately gained considerable attention as subjects of study. Öktem, referring to his own research, exemplifies this perspective as follows:

> My major concern there was to understand how the unfixed, multi-ethnic, multi-religious spaces of the late Ottoman Empire with fluid borders and ambiguous identities were transformed into fixed territories and homogenized, solidified nation-states.[24]

Yet how change de-facto occurred in and through the economic spaces, non-national spatial condensations linked to capital accumulation; such as workplaces, factories, ports, economic zones etc., constituting the infrastructural basis of the state power didn't deserve as much attention so far. Consequently, a fixed territory and space of the homogenized, solidified nation-state is used as a point of departure for most of the studies dealing with the Republican period as if the Republican consolidation was a pre-

---

ethnic-conflict framework. Jongerden deals masterfully with 'the new spatial organization of the countryside and the colonization of peoples/population and territories' seen from the angle of the state projections and actual conflictual practices: *The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War* (Leiden; Boston, Mass.: Brill, 2007). The same focus on state, nation, politics and the residing ethnic conflict is also prevalent for another pathbreaking study which problematizes territory: Kerem Öktem, "Reconstructing the Geographies of Nationalism: Nation, Space and Discourse in Twentieth Century Turkey" (PhD Diss., Oxford, UK, University of Oxford, 2005); Kerem Öktem, "Nationalism and Territory in Post-Ottoman Space," *RAMSES Working Paper*, no. 2 (2006).

23 Akpınar, "Geographical Imagination in School Geography During the Late Ottoman Period, 1876-1908," 3.

24 Ibid.; Öktem, "Nationalism and Territory in Post-Ottoman Space," 1.

determined, unilinear, and omnipresent consolidation of space that can be read back starting from the national unity as *telos*, the *Misak-ı Milli*.

In one of his earlier articles dealing with the agricultural transformations during the first fifty years of the twentieth century, Toprak stated that

> [...] the transition from Imperial Turkey to Republican Turkey means a reduction of scale, a narrowing of the domestic economic market […] These borders [Misak-ı Milli], except for the one with Iran do not overlap with the borders of natural economic regions that have a geographical homogeneity.[25]

As one of the few researchers mentioning the economic space of the late Ottoman-Republican history Toprak, back in 1988, defined "scale" in an accustomed manner equal to the size of a pre-defined, "natural" coherent production and consumption unit, which is the "domestic or regional economic market." Yet "domestic" or "regional" is not a pre-defined category which is capable of shedding light on how borders and condensations space has evolved historically from one historic-administrative form, i.e., the "Empire" to the other, i.e., the "Republic." This statement also takes for granted the existence of "natural economic regions" mainly running through natural thresholds like chains of mountains, agricultural or river basins, valleys, networks of trade routes or port-cities/cities and their hinterlands as if they have eternally belonged to each other.[26] In this understanding of economic space, capital accumulation processes forming step by step capitalist modernity are constituted within quasi-natural bor-

25 Zafer Toprak, "Türkiye Tarımı ve Yapısal Dönüşümler (1900-1950)," in *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar: Bildiriler*, ed. Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak (Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi, 1988), 30. "İmparatorluk Türkiyesi'nden Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'ne geçiş ölçek küçülmesi, iç ekonomik alanın daralması anlamına gelir... Bu sınırlar İran'la olan hariç, coğrafi bütünselliği olan geleneksel doğal ekonomik alanların sınırlarıyla örtüşmez." quoted in Özkan, "The History of Geographical Perceptions in the Turkish Republic," 32.

26 The 'splitting up' of 'natural economic regions' is detailed in the same text passage as follows: "Southeastern Anatolia lost Syria and Iraq, while northeastern Anatolia and the eastern Black Sea regions broke away from the Caucasus. And as the exchange between Antep and Beirut dissolved, Batum could no longer function as the port city of Kars.": Özkan, "The History of Geographical Perceptions in the Turkish Republic," 32.

ders formed by inherited and overlapping flows of raw material, capital, labor, and technology. Yet this is exactly the period when the approach to and definition of nature has radically changed. The capitalist relations of production encroached concrete spaces and radically changed the human-environment relations, deformed topographies and reformed all types of routes through which capital, raw materials, labor, commodities, and energy flowed.[27] But in Toprak's definition of economic space the assumption is that if these flows are discontinued this does not have spatial / political-technological explanations but only spatial outcomes. In those still widely read approaches to the early modern Turkish history space is not an analytical category to explore social change. Yet this approach leaves vital questions like how and why flows are transformed and regulated on the one hand side and how and why an "economic hinterland" is formed and transformed on the other hand without an empirical historical exploration. Space and scale are thus naturalized and de-historicized. Therefore, non-state spatial formations like cities, smaller, special segments of cities like ports within their networks, not to mention workplaces like factories cannot be grasped in their importance as nodes of capital accumulation and social change. To put it differently, by sticking to a pre-fixed definition of scale, to the naturalizing definition of regions or to the domestic / foreign polarity imposed by the assumption of the exclusive sovereignty of the nation-state one can hardly grasp emerging economic units of capital accumulation and capitalist transformation, thus "ordering of space and historical change."

Yet at least the formation and importance of port-cities for the formation of the capitalist economic space for the period up until the 1930s has been intensively dealt with for the Ottoman period and geography in the last thirty years.[28] Özveren, as one of the earliest researchers on Eastern Mediter-

27 For a new, but rapidly flourishing new field of study for the Ottoman Empire, see the recent production of the Network for the Study of Environmental History of Turkey: "Sources," Institutional Blog, *NEHT* (blog), October 11, 2018, http://www.envhistturkey.com/sources/.

28 Nurçin İleri, "Rewriting the History of Port Cities in the Light of Contemporary Global Capitalism," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 47 (2012): 185–209, and the introduction to the special issue on port-cities: Malte Fuhrmann and Vangelis Kechriotis, "The Late Ottoman Port-Cities and Their Inhabitants: Subjectivity, Urbanity, and Conflicting Orders," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 24, no. 2 (2009): 71–78.

ranean port-cities has defined the port-city by referring to a political and social space developed by the world economy of the nineteenth century, rather than a "geographic expression applicable to all times and places."[29] So the term "domestic economic market" needs to be explored historically within the context of changing global economic flows and local mobilization of resources and assets within a network instead of being taken for granted in its scale. Faruk Tabak who revisited the Eastern Mediterranean port-cities debate from the world-systems approach underlined the importance of a global economic approach and temporalized the port-cities by stating:

> […] to a great extent, the lives and times of these dynamic port-cities can be accounted for by reference to an opportune conjuncture that marked the world-system from the 1870s to the 1920s, rather than to the internal properties or constitution of the maritime cities along the Ottoman shoreline.[30]

Thus, Tabak decentered the port city's merely topographical importance and focused instead on a specific spatio-temporality throughout the long nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century on the outcome of the strategies of the main actors of capitalist modernity; the capital and the nation-state. The story of Ford assembly plant at the Tophane pier of Istanbul between 1923 and 1944 witnesses the sunset of a specific spatio-temporal constellation and its failure sheds light to its main functions during a time where this is in a process of decay. This story, in turn can be told from the angle of one of the crucial actors of the port of Istanbul, namely the FMC to trace the historical contingencies instead of ascribing to linear and teleological explanations.

---

29 For further discussion, please see: Yaşar Eyüp Özveren, "The Making and Unmaking of an Ottoman Port-City: Nineteenth-Century Beirut, Its Hinterland, and the World-Economy" (PhD Diss., Binghamton, State University of New York, 1990), cited in İleri, "Rewriting the History of Port Cities," 185.

30 Faruk Tabak, "Imperial Rivalry and Port-Cities: A View from Above," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 24, no. 2 (2009): 79.

2.1.2 Emergence, Ascendancy and Crisis of Territoriality as a Suggestion for Periodization

Meaningful enough Charles Maier, a senior historian of İnterwar European capitalism suggests a similar periodization of world history motivated by the concern of "integrating territorial formations" as the nodal point into historiography. Maier singles out the period between 1860-1970 as the global time of the rise and fall of a new regime of exclusive territoriality and states that in historywriting "spatially anchored structures for politics and economics were taken for granted from about 1860 to about 1970 or 1980."[31] Taking the "norm" of territorial containment of social dynamics in the form of national states for granted has led to what he calls "moral narratives" in historywriting. According to Maier, the "teleology of modernization, nation-state or economic development" is at the inner core of any historical narrative if it remains a "moral narrative." The term implies either welcoming (century of progress and civilization) or criticizing (century of moral atrocities, like world wars, genocides, mass killings etc.) of a "course of history" which has a predetermined direction, good in the former and bad in the latter. He defends that the contemporary restructuring of global spatial order, i.e., the dissolution of correspondence between sovereignty, [exclusive] territoriality and identity within nationally bordered space allows us to question the "naturalness" of the organizational principle both of societies and historywriting.

Maier pleads instead for introducing "territoriality" as the criterion for the periodization of the modern age which might in his view help to replace moral teleological narratives by what he calls "structural "ones. He sees the period between 1860 and 1970/80 as a structural unit comprising of "the emergence, ascendancy, and subsequent crisis of what is best labeled territoriality"[32] as part of the nineteenth century transformation to capitalist sovereignty and property relations. Maier sees coevalness, i.e., a temporal parallelism in the emergence of administratively and territorially cohesive

31 Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 808.

32 Ibid., 807, 823.

regimes and no simple diffusionist model. He invites systematically to concentrate on "dramatic inventions' that overcome spatial dispersion, like steam power, railroad, telegraph, car; later, the information technology, etc., which have changed the geographical scale of political control.

Though we do agree with the assumption of a "global spatial clock" as formulated by Maier,[33] we still need to be cautious whether the territoriality in the formal colonies up until the end of the World War II has had some specific mechanisms to obey that needs to be dealt with separately in research. At least half of the territory served by the Ford Istanbul's plant consisted of formal colonies of some sort. But this thesis cannot study those colonial political units and their relations to the metropoles separately in detail so this cautionary remark to the main theoretical corpus of Maier remains here as a research topic to be dealt with in detail at some further step. Any effort to "spatially recast bourgeois Europe"[34] needs to recast colonial, post-colonial, and post-imperial territories' different formation mechanisms too, for evading any unintended eurocentrism.

Territoriality does not simply refer to controlling empty space, but putting a framework to order, count, measure, thus control people which in turn creates social space. Territory is thereby "[…] an expression of the fusion of meaning, power, and social space, […] entailing inscription of meaning (in the form of rules, or the terms of access, entry, confinement, or

33 Or the "principle of coevalness" as formulated by Harry D. Harootunian in: *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in İnterwar Japan* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000).

34 The seminal work of Charles S. Maier is its study on the authoritarian regimes of the interwar Italy, France, and Germany and how corporatist stabilization arose out of / despite these regimes in 1920's, see: *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). In the preface of a reprint of this book after forty years in 2015 the author also tackles the issue of eurocentrism and states that "Although tracking three national experiences was daunting enough, I might today actually extend the geospatial arguments of the work. This would not be a question of adding another country or two but examining the global or extra-European dimensions of the processes underway." *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I*, Revised Ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 12.

exclusion) and the spatialization of power of various kinds."[35] Yet the principle of territoriality as the intensification and subsequent dominance of a tendency for the fusing of economic, political and cultural borders has become the organizing principle of societies during the long period between the mid-nineteenth century and the end of the 1970s, so Maier. Sticking to this historiographical periodization port-city networks with extending social and physical infrastructures and complexity became one of the spatial markers of the ascendancy sequence of the long formation period of national exclusive territoriality.[36] Other spatial markers of that period might me universal expositions, imperial capitals as showcases of the consumption of the global elites, company towns, riverside industrial hubs, industrial belts at urban fringes and the City in London with its gold standard as the financial center of the world. All those spatial forms have to be dealt with within their spatial-temporal context and their definitions cannot be taken for granted prior to case-based historical research.

2.1.3 Economic Territoriality and Company Territories

Furthermore, backed by that wider definition territories do not necessarily need to be formal or codified by the law-giving sovereign to evolve and "take effect."[37] Yet, change in the political territoriality through war or any other

35 David Delaney, "Territory and Territoriality," in *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, ed. N. J. Thrift and Rob Kitchin, vol. 11, 11 vols. (Amsterdam; Boston: Elsevier, 2009), 196–208.

36 The assumption of a tradeoff or even an antagonism between the "liberal" port-cities and the "authoritarian" central-state has been critized for the Ottoman-Turkish context, yet on other historiographical grounds then the questioning of the historical territorialization. For this pointed critique, see: Nadir Özbek, "Alternatif Tarih Tahayyülleri: Siyaset, İdeoloji ve Osmanlı-Türkiye Tarihi," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 98 (2003): 234–54. This article discusses the book of Çağlar Keyder: *Memâlik-i Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003).

37 It is exactly because of their exclusive focus on the political agency of the state / statehood and epistemological choice for politico-philosophical sources two newer and masterly written books on the "history of territory" and an entry on the concept of "territory" in a handbook, though very insightful, couldn't serve as theoretical guides for this thesis which has itself the aim to shed light on the overtly ignored agent of the Ottoman-Turkish historiography, i.e. the capital / the corporation. The books are: Delaney, *Territory*. Stuart Elden, *The*

form of conflict over resources has been a major concern to historians thus the concept of territoriality was used nearly synonymous to state sovereignty. This methodological fallacy of a "state-centered spatiality" has been thoroughly studied and concepts like "territorial trap,"[38] as mentioned above and "embedded statism"[39] have been developed to elaborate on its various shortcomings. Territory is not necessarily and not only politico-legal territoriality and change therein has not always to come from states as agents. This is not to say that territorial sovereignty has emanated simply of capitalist rules, and it is derivative of the capitalist relations. This is neither to say that consequences of political territoriality formation and change in the political border regimes have not been profound for re-structuring capital's accumulation process. It simply implies that the antagonism between territorial states (political realm) and global markets (economic realm)[40] which is taken for granted for this long period of "formation of territoriality" in most of the literature on Early Republican history should be questioned. There is indeed a "territorial non-coincidence" of statehood and world economy, crucial for understanding the social and spatial development of capitalist modernity.[41] But the nation state is only one historical appearance of the territorial regime that is characterized by a separation of the economic and private realm from politics, or rule of law. Yet the task consists in tracing the modern disjuncture of the spaces of economic organization and political governance to the territorial prefiguration of capitalism, something which comes close to "international relations of capitalist modernity" according to Lachner. It

---

Birth of Territory (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013). Elden, "How Should We Do the History of Territory?". The entry point to more elaborate discussions is: Anssi Paasi, "Territory," in *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. John A. Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 109–22.

38 Agnew, "The Territorial Trap."

39 Peter J. Taylor, "Embedded Statism and the Social Sciences II: Geographies (and Metageographies) in Globalization," *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 32, no. 6 (2000): 1105–14.

40 For a more current discussion on this alleged dualism, see: Hannes Lacher, *Beyond Globalization: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).

41 Ibid., 117.

implies not taking the principle of exclusive national-political territoriality as a social form / norm of capitalism in a reductionist manner.[42] Thus the "national" in the "international" implies a call to renovate the conventional geographical fixity in international theory.

To refute the thesis of an empirical spatial dualism between states and global markets one can also look at the corporations as territorializing agents of history. Territories pertaining to the so-called "private (property) realm" like company territories (of sales and extraction/production) are also important historical formations worth to be explored in their relationships to state-formations and promise to be explorative units of analysis not only in the past but also today. Companies or corporations are too important an actor of the capitalist modernity to be reduced to simple executers of pre-directed "economic flows" in a world divided by and between fixed political borders.

In order to deal with territorializations by companies in general, we do not even need to go back to the rise of the commercial capitalism masterfully accounted for in the three volumes of *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century* of Fernand Braudel:[43] During the period covered by Braudel, company territories of the chartered companies were not so stabile yet politically, i.e., in terms of classical physical border formation[44] very influential actors before nation-states ever existed. Dutch East India Company was established in 1602, competing with British East India Company, and Portuguese East India Company shifting borders throughout whole Southeast

42 Ibid., 102.

43 Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 3 vols. (London: Harper & Row, 1979).

44 Here the term "border" implies not only external political borders, but also monetary, tribal, ethnic, gender, class, generational and other identitarian borders. For an application of this wider definition of the shifting borders of the term in the context of the dissolution of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires see: Joachim Becker and Aslı Odman, "Von den Inneren zu äußeren Grenzen. Die Auflösung von Habsburger Monarchie und Osmanischem Reich im Vergleich," in *Grenzen weltweit: Zonen, Linien, Mauern im historischen Vergleich*, ed. Joachim Becker and Andrea Komlosy (Vienna: Promedia Verlag, 2004), 75–100.

Asia along with raw materials and markets for its industrial goods.[45] They all employed thousands of armed men, thus formed military corps before the introduction of universal conscription and national armies. The Levant Company was an English chartered company that was even erected into a body politic capable of making laws under the title of the Company of Merchants of England trading to the Seas of the Levant and appointed consuls in Constantinople and Smyrna.[46] The Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company has literally "made" borders as late as the beginning of the twentieth century in central Africa chasing after rubber in the Congolese lands.[47] These and other earlier colonializing companies consortia "in the name of their respective states" were very effective political agents as border-drawers and political technocrats in Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America which should remind us of the primacy of capital flows and the importance of the companies in shaping even the narrowly-defined political space of sovereign, exclusive legislation.[48] The most-important actor ordering space and encroaching geographies of the first territorial expansion period, namely the imperialist period is also the Chartered Company, like the British East India Company, Dutch East India Company, and British Oriental Company. Looking at the history of a series of mutinies in India of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, we realize how the term "territory" is organically related to the realm of the corporations and how it constituted an extended version of the factory areas established for trading purposes. Those factory areas were then expanded through wars over resources, over the collection of revenue of specific provinces etc., fought by the Company's army. The Head, in

45 Nick Robins, *The Corporation That Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational*, electronic resource, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2012); Kevin Blachford, "Revisiting the Expansion Thesis: International Society and the Role of the Dutch East India Company as a Merchant Empire," *European Journal of International Relations* 26, no. 4 (2020): 1230–48.

46 James Mather, *Pashas: Traders and Travellers in the Islamic World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

47 Robert Harms, "The World ABIR Made: The Margina-Lopori Basin, 1885-1903," *African Economic History*, no. 12 (1983): 125–39.

48 Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. The Perspective of the World*, trans. Sian Reynolds, vol. 3 (London: Harper & Row, 1979), 213–32.

today's terms "CEO" of the British East India Company was called Governor-General.[49] So in the eighteenth century the territory of the chartered company was defined as one where it had acquired the right (usually by warfare) to collect taxes from local provinces. It was the company who collected taxes and not separated political bodies. It was the fiscal sovereignty of the actor which defined its territory and vice versa. The companies recruited local mercenaries, local tribes and thereby expanded their resource, tax, and market base by inducing fight of local tribes of one against the other. As Bayly puts in his seminal study on the global history of India, "this was achieved either by subsidiary alliances between the Company and local rulers or by direct military annexation [...] for practical purposes, the Company was the government of vast region of India."[50]

The Dutch chartered companies from the seventeenth century, the British dominated portfolio investment companies up until the World War I and the dominant US multinational corporations using new production technologies after the World War II all had their respective hegemonic (capital) cities, their headquarters (Amsterdam, London, and New York) overseeing the world's finances.[51]

A similar inquiry can be applied to the Administration of Ottoman Public Debt (*Düyûn-ı Umûmiye-i Osmaniye Varidat-ı Muhassasa İdaresi*), which was an administrative body running the business of a consortium of companies, trading the Ottoman state debt after the moratorium of 1881.[52] The rights to collect the revenues of certain goods and procedures (especially tobacco, silk, salt, alcoholic drinks, fishing, and stamps) were

49 David Ludden, *India and South Asia: A Short History* (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass.: Oneworld Publications, 2002), 306.

50 Christopher A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

51 Paul L. Knox and Peter J. Taylor, eds., "World Cities and Territorial States: The Rise and Fall of Their Mutuality," in *World Cities in a World-System* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 56.

52 Murat Birdal, *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century*, Library of Ottoman Studies 18 (London ; New York : New York: Tauris Academic Studies ; Distributed in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

accompanied with specific maps of revenue territories as conceptual spaces of this period, concretizing the historicity of state-capital relationship. Those maps only partly corresponded to the reformed administrative division of the Empire after the new set of regulations in the second half of the nineteenth century.



FIGURE 2.1 Overlay map of *Düyun-u Umumiye* and Vital Cuinet's map of administrative divisions for the province of Hüdavendigar. SOURCE: "Administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane, Nazaret de Brousse," 1:1,750,000. n.d. [Salt Research / Ottoman Public Debt Administration Archive, AINDPO009] and Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie: Géographie Administrative, Statistique, Descriptive et Raisonnée de Chaque Province de l'Asie-Mineure*. Vol. 4 of 4 vols. (Paris: E. Leroux, 1892), "Vilayet de Brousseou de Hudavendigar," 1: 1,000,000.

The period I am writing on here is situated- to follow Bayly's historical account of territory-making companies and Maier's "long century of the rise of territoriality" -at the end of the "new imperialist" era. During this period

the company territory was functionally separated from the state's territory and the term territory gained its hegemonic meaning of a state's sovereign area which Marx would later call "particularization or relative autonomy of state" (i.e., in German: *Besonderung des Staates*).

Yet the interwar period under study constitutes the demise of one spatial type of hegemonic expansion of capital where the new expansion type through multinational production corporations, i.e., the internationalization of the industrial productive capital had not yet fully evolved in global space. This period of consequent crises also reminds us of this trial-and-error phases of a crucial actor, the capital, creating thereby territoriality through both failure and success stories. We will therein follow the perspective of the Corporation, an actor that seems to be forgotten and becomes invisible in the historiography under the hegemonic "developmentalist paradigm" after the World War II when thinking about space and formation of territories mostly as as warrior against the bureaucratic straitjacket.

Ford's Istanbul Territory, marking the shift from the hegemonic territories of chartered commercial companies in the colonies to transnational networks of productive nodes within sovereign state bodies, comprised in the beginning a projected space including Russia, Near East, Central Europe (including part of the Balkans, Northern and North-eastern Africa, Caucasia). It transcended many state's soveriegn territories, or in other words, it envisaged them into a single production and distribution system with a nodal point in Istanbul. This territory comprised of different taxing, monetary systems, and market depths. The conditions under which the nodal assembly and delivery point of Ford Istanbul existed was subject to negotiation between a powerful corporation and a young government, experimenting with the economic, and world market borders of its political sovereignty. The fact that the corporation could successfully push the nation state to promulgate two laws within two years' time to make the Istanbul investment feasible for FMC gives a hint about who had power of projection and power to order space besides public sovereign authorities. This means that analyzing 1920s only under a conceptual roof of "nationalizing tendencies of the state," or "encroachment of the nation state" would leave important dynamics, agents, and contingencies outside of historywriting's focus.

So, what the case in this thesis implies is that territory cannot be defined a-historically as solely the space of state sovereignty. This hegemonic definition is the discoursive oeuvre of the "long age of territoriality," 1870-1960. There was a territoriality regime in formation during the first globalization wave, where global colonial companies defined the territory over resources, market, and taxes through "subsidiary alliances." The task of this thesis will be to try to place Ford İstanbul's territory's status in this perspective.

2.1.4 Territoriality and Urbanization

Besides the border-drawing role, the urban character of capital and its institutionalized form, the company is also distinctive, both during the expansion of European and Atlantic capital but also within Europe. Charles Tilly, a senior historical sociologist, mainly writing on the long-term dialectics of capitalism and state-making in Europe, was one of the earlier theoreticians of the historical affinity between the politics of the capital and the city, or urbanity, staying on the same line with Fernand Braudel's assumption of the importance of cities (and mostly port-cities) for capitalism. Tilly's (compared to Maier) longer-term analysis of the historic affinity between the city, urbanization and capital is accompanied with the assumption of a tradeoff between the agency of capital leading to "planetary" urbanization[53] and agency of the state exercising coercion. Till states that "capital concentrated production and consumption promoted the urbanization of Europe"[54] and adds that:

> [...] these centers of capitalism [...] were deep-water ports, but London was the first to be located within a large territorial state. Its priority only became clear in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

53 The urbanizing role of the capital is conceptualized as being planetary, complete, generalized, and global for the period after 2000's. For this see Neil Brenner's pathbraking edited volume *Implosions/Explosions: Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization* (Berlin: JOVIS Verlag, 2014). The concept of "planetary urbanization" refers back to Lefebvre of the 1970's contesting a city/rural dualism and desribing the tendency of capitalism exploding and imploding, forming new territorialities.

54 Charles Tilly, "Space for Capital, Space for States," *Theory and Society* 15, no. 1/2 Special Double Issue: Structures of Capital. (1986): 307.

> Thus, for almost three hundred years after 1500, during a time of tumultuous state-making, the maps of national states and of dense urban networks remained rough mirror images of each other [...] There, [around 1800] the relations between cities and states, between capital and coercion, altered [...] drastically. There, a multitude of city-states that were easily dominated by urban merchants and rentiers gave way to substantial states that overlapped with (but did not fully contain) extensive hierarchies of industrial, commercial, and administrative cities.[55]

The tradeoff is identified along the long career of capitalism until today ("e.g. medieval polymorphy, Westphalian exclusivity, post-Westphalian complexity").[56] The change in its spatial organization is defined as "the displacement of the urban scale by the national territorial scale with the emergence of [industrial] capitalism and the integration of cities into national economic systems and their subordination to the political power of states, or the recent emergence of global city networks more oriented to other global cities than to national hinterlands."[57] The turning point is set sometime around the seventeenth century as "the conversion from city-centered world-economies to a [firstly dynastic/absolutist, later nation-] state-centered world economy," whereby the "nationalization of the territoriality" comes much later around the late eighteenth century along with the changes in the carbon-base mode of production. With the words of Neil Smith, "The genesis of national states as a system for organizing the world's political economy provided an eighteenth century 'spatial fix' for specific economic dilemmas of emergent capitalism."[58]

---

55 Ibid., 302 and 308.

56 Bob Jessop, "The Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix and the Tendential Ecological Dominance of Globalizing Capitalism," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 24, no. 2 (2000): 335.

57 Ibid.

58 Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 142.

> With the full establishment of the modern world-system in the sixteenth century, world-cities become directly subject to inter-state rivalry and appear as part of the rise of hegemonic states. There are just three examples of such unrivalled economic leaders in the history of the modern world-system, and each has created a new world-city: the Dutch Republic and Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, the British and London in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the United States and New York in the twentieth century.[59]

The difference between the urban scale of the city-centered world-economies and the national-territory based world economy lies in the crucial difference between the dependence on a network in the former and servicing of a wider, national-bound hinterland, a capital-city centered "surface"[60] in the latter.

Remaining within this theoretical framework which postulates a tension between networks and hinterlands (surfaces) the spatial organization of the Ford territories during the 1920s definitively follows the network pattern rather than the hinterland/surface pattern. This is proven by the simple fact that the road system of Turkey within which the territorial productive node, namely the Ford factory was situated was not developed to an extent justifying its production capacity.[61] Neither was the internal market truly integrated to allow for the necessary demand for automotives again compared to the sheer daily productive capacity of this assembly plant. This proves that conceptual patterns are not to equate with empirically proven, clean-cut successions and they might well be the result of linearizing ab-

59 Peter J. Taylor and Ben Derudder, *World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis* (London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2004), 15.

60 For the methodological and epistemological differences that arise between when one sees and conceptualize the world in networks or in surfaces, see the brilliant article by Barney Warf: "From Surfaces to Networks," in *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Barney Warf and Santa Arias (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 59–77.

61 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "Türkiye'de Demiryolu Öncelikli Ulaşım Politikasına Geçiş (1923-1957)," in *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003), 369–432; İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "1923 Tarihli 'Umur Nafia Programı,'" in *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003), 217–33.

stract labels. This is why this thesis is situated at the workplace/factory scale and tries to depict its contemporary global entanglements. At that scale and period there is still an interwar globalization based on the network of port-cities within an inter-imperialist / inter-nationalist rivalry, though fragile and fading. To scrutinize the history of Ford Istanbul necessarily implies drawing and defining the global city network to which we will dedicate the following chapters.

This thesis engages with the re-territorializing and urbanizing role of the capital within a spatial configuration as an outcome of changing political, monetary, fiscal, demographic, and social frontiers during the interwar period. Juxtaposed with the framework put by Maier above, the interwar is at the same time the peak of the long formation period of the (exclusive) territoriality. The political territorial division was settled down after the World War I and II. Its norms and institutions were canonized after the World War II, too.

Translated into a Braudelian framework the interwar spatial system is both heir and dawn of a network, flow-based economic organization. This becomes most visible by looking at the list of the Ford productive nodes in the 1920s: One mostly encounters there many centuries-old free-ports and other recently rising port-cities. They do most of the time does not constitute capitals of the respective nation states.[62] And routes of the main trade routes and volumes were comparable up until the interruption by the Second World War. The Black Sea trade was organically linked to the Mediterranean routes and was more complex and busy compared to the period after the Second World War. The position of the Port of Istanbul as the main passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean had also compressed in importance with that shift. (See Figure 2.2. and Figure 2.3.)

62 Cf. Figure 2.2 and 2.3.



Abb. 13: Schiffsverkehr im Mittelmeerraum, 1908 und 1956

FIGURE 2.2 Total shipping in 1908 and 1956 tanker and shipping lines traffic. SOURCE: *Reinhard Stewig. Byzanz, Konstantinopel, Istanbul ein Beitrag zum Weltstadtproblem*. Kiel: Geographisches Institut der Universität, 1964.



FIGURE 2.3 Map representing the maritime traffic between Mediterranean ports for the year 1900 using GeoSeastems developed for World Seastems project funded by European Research Council, 2017. SOURCE: "Visualiser des flux de circulation," Mondis [Blog] OpenEdition Hypotheses Web Por-tal (1 March 2017) https://mondis.hypotheses.org/529

By scrutinizing the language in the company documents from the pen of the high-ranking managers in Detroit we can discern that Ford still had the geography of the Ottoman Empire in mind when ordering territories for sale and assembly of its cars by mid-1920s. Also in the period before any research was published on Ford Tophane hearsays on the raison d'être of the investment of Ford in Turkey were very frequently built on the assumption that the company must have constituted a *concessionaire* type (*imtiyazlı şirket)*, a monopoly seeking enterprise (*inhisar*) within a defined national

market like its antecedents in the Ottoman Empire.[63] Ford indeed applied for monopoly rights to deliver the urban taxis and urban buses in Istanbul, and automotives to public bodies, yet this took place at a later point[64] after the actual investment with the described international territorial outlook was realized in Tophane. National monopoly was never neiter the spatial outlook nor the aim of the investment in Istanbul for Ford. This study tries to show that the territorial scope of that investment is a different one for which concepts has to be developed to grasp the novelty of the situation.

The spatial strategies and outcomes of the industrial internationalization of the Ford Motor Company during the interwar period are analyzed with the help of the company archives, especially by scrutinizing a specific sort of document that was called the "territory reports." Ford territory reports from the 1920s trace meaningful economic borders that take into account changes in the political climate (the rising economic nationalism in Italy, the corresponding importance of Fiat as a rival in the automotive sector, the adaptation of Ford to the new political regime of the Soviet Russia by way of an indirect presence), aiming at political concessions (negotiating exterritorializing stipulations at national ports with governments, equipped with the argument of competing investment locations), changes in the national monetary policy (currency transfer possibilities, exchange rate policies), unplanned rise in demand for motor vehicles during border dis-

63 Cahit Kayra mentioned in the introduction to his book that Ford wanted monopoly rights of assembling automotives within the Turkish Republic in turn of financing the expansion of the Turkish road system, for which no proof could be found in any of the archives where research was conducted for this thesis: Mehmed Fuad Umay, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluş Yıllarında Bir Devrimci Doktorun Anıları*, ed. and trans. Cahit Kayra (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006), 11. A remote memory might come from a monopoly request made by Fiat in 1922, which consisted of a monopoly of transport routes in specific parts of Turkey in return of constructing garages, repairhouses alongside those routes and financing teaching skills on motorized vehicles to Turkish workers: "Fiat Otomobil Şirketi'nin, Ankara-İnebolu, Mardin-Samsun ve Ankara-Samsun Yollarında Nakliyat Tekel ve Imtiyazı İsteği ve Bakanlıkların Görüşleri," July 8, 1922, 30-10-000 / 154-87-3, CCA, or this assumption might be based on the misleading generalization of the standard type of the foreign investments mostly gearing towards monopoly rights in a specific sector (like urban facilities, coal, matches, tobacco etc.).

64 For more on this see Chapter 5.2.1. and 5.3.

putes and war (Italian interventionism in Africa etc.), heritage of pre-existing commercial networks (Istanbul as the historically grown transit port between Black Sea and Western European trade), changes in the borders between public and private property (in case of the formation of United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) after the Russian revolution, or generally spoken the rise of economic-nationalist interventions into foreign corporate or individual property) and many other variables which can be grasped by historicizing the period in which the company gave the decisions under analysis. The interwar Ford did not have a "Middle Eastern Region" in corporate mind while making its spatial plans of production nodes and sales zones. Yet it did have a specter of a hereditary Ottoman economic zone in mind the assumptions made of which led to fallacies and errors. Those fallacies which were reflected in the decision of the production and network logics will be depicted in the third and the concluding chapters. A pre-given region, which is projected backwards in time in an anachronistic way and could be taken for granted by the historian for reasons of convenience, did simply not exist. Those spatial conceptions were clearly outside the management horizon of Ford and constitute thus a "territorial trap" of which this research is aware.[65]

Within this framework even the political-administrative "territorial" consolidation in the form of the *Misak-ı Milli* after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic (with the small exception of the Hatay province) has to be checked on to what extent it was determinant in shaping the politico-economic space of the case under study, especially if we consider that Ford was directly lobbying for the promulgation of new legislation permitting the creation of an exterritorial free zone between -at least- 1925 and 1927, if not before. The economic role of Istanbul as conceptualized within Ford's terri-

65 This anachronism and projection of Cold War paradigms onto the İnterwar period is exemplified and criticized in terms of Ford-Soviet relations in a recent work: Stefan J. Link, Forging Global Fordism: Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and the Contest over the Industrial Order, America in the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 92"Surveying the field, one cannot help the impression that the scholarship still labors under received Cold War paradigms, including the assumption that an ontological abyss separated the economics of Soviet Communism from the 'capitalist West.' In this light, the Soviet engagement of Western firms must necessarily seem incongruous."

torial strategy in 1920s exposed a continuity with the second half of the nineteenth century (the late Ottoman period yet under radical territorial change) whereby the port-city was "not yet" eclipsed in the eyes of the Ford decision makers because of the role of the new capital city of the nation-state, but rather revived in face of rising demand for tractors by the nothern neighbour, the Soviet Russia.

2.1.5 Historywriting as a Narrative of Intermeshing of Scales and Re-territorialization

Economic flows and big corporations as "directors" of capital flows do effectively form borders both during peace and war times. This was masterfully expressed in one of the earlier writings of one of the most lucid witnesses of the interwar period, Walter Benjamin. In an effort at intellectually "grasping the evil," which is the economic essence of German fascism he states that "car is war," referring to the commodity outcome of the leading sector of the period, the automotive industry:

> […] "*L'automobile c'est la guerre*." This surprising association of ideas was based on the perception of an increase in technical artifacts, in power sources, and in tempo generally that the private sector can neither absorb completely nor utilize adequately but that nonetheless demand vindication. But vindication can only occur in antithesis to a harmonious balance, in war, and the destructive power of war provides clear evidence that social reality was not ready to make technology its own organ, and that technology was not strong enough to master the elemental forces of society. Without approaching the surface of the significance of the economic causes of war, one may say that the harshest, most disastrous aspects of imperialist war are in part the result of the gaping discrepancy between the gigantic

> power of technology and the minuscule moral illumination it affords.[66]

Here, the "car" as signifier of mass production of automobility and as a commodity whose production is in the hands of economically mighty multinational corporations is taken as a determining factor in the eruption of interstate wars. Yet war-making is space-making, it is geography. War results in political border making, i.e., the most easily traceable type of re-territorialization.

This encompassing view is also adopted by Delaney who in his introduction to territory states that "[…] if territory refers to a bounded space, 'territoriality' refers to behaviors related to the establishment and defense of territories" like "[…] demarcating or partitioning space, classifying spaces as territories; communicating that a territory exists and where the boundaries are; communicating the conditions for entering and leaving the territory, communicating the consequences for not abiding by the conditions […]."[67]

This definition of territory and territoriality leaves no room for any type of dualism between political and economic spaces or put it differently, between the so-called public and private realms, but an ongoing negotiation. It also excludes the assumption of 'naturalness' of territories on the ground that

> "[N]aturalizing" territory and territoriality may have the effect (intended or otherwise) of naturalizing what is associated with it or what it is giving spatial–material expression to. For example, the state, identity, private property, and various sorts of hierarchies that have been territorialized (such as those associated with racism, colonialism, male supremacy, or homophobia) have all commonly been naturalized. In these contexts, "naturalizing" may imply the denial of

66 Walter Benjamin, "Theories of German Fascism: On the Collection of Essays War and Warrior," ed. Jünger Ernst, *New German Critique*, no. 17 (1979): 120–28. [originally published in German, in *Die Gesellschaft* 7 (1930), vol. 2, pp. 32-41.]. Italics ara mine.

67 Delaney, "Territory and Territoriality," 196.

> contingency, and the de-politicization (and thereby, the tacit justification) of inherited or proposed territorializations.[68]

The tacit assumption of the "naturality" of territories is replaced in this thesis by a historical research agenda that looks at de-, and re-territorializations. In this research agenda the relation between mobility and immobility, definition of borders, ascribing of signs and meanings, embeddedness and movement of money, commodities (including commodified energy sources), people and technology is central to the study of the emergence of territory.[69] Thus we are dealing with the question of how agglomerations of economic and political functions were formed to a contested whole and in relation to nature and were transformed instead of taking them for granted on the ground of allegedly pre-given topographical or administrative borders. This approach takes the temporal, diachronous dimension into account along which spatial, synchronous change occurs and vice versa. Temporality is an irreducible dimension in the workings of territoriality comparable to the spatial formation in the workings of historiography. Yet temporality in this usage is neither chronometric nor calendric. It is not to equate with the linear chronology and the linear historiographical narrative which tacitly impose a causal relationship between what happened in the past for what comes after, as the developmentalist perspective imposes upon us based on the ideology of progress. A spatial narrative of transformation allows to account for the "the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous"[70] and to step out of a thinking in developmental stages. So

68 Ibid., 197.

69 Kevin R. Cox, *Political Geography: Territory, State, and Society* (Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002), 6.

70 The term originally stems from Ernst Bloch's study *Erbschaft dieser Zeit* (Zürich: Verlag Oprecht & Helbling, 1935), and still takes stages of social and economic development for granted, wondering about the preponderance of fascism within an atmosphere of technological advancement. This term was later expanded by critical geographers of the the late 1980's in order to designate a spatial representational strategy which enables to illuminate synchronous yet divergent co-existences in space and opts for displaying the, rather than narrating in a linear fashion. For this see: Karl Schlögel, *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit: Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik*, 3rd ed. (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2003).

"time can be parsed into timeframes of various interrelated durations from the momentary to the deep historic."[71]

The timeframe of the piece of legislation that ex-territorializes a segment of the port of Istanbul for a Ford plant to be erected turns out to be a relatively short timeframe whereby the transit position of the straits of Istanbul its close trade relationships with the northern neighbours is a deep historic one. A very wide timeframe is derived from fields of spatial study, like topography, geology, climatology, meteorology, biology, and hydrology etc., what Braudel would call "*histoire immobile*," a very slowly changing time, the geography. They all need to be accounted for in the spatial history of the Tophane plant to make sense of the interlude FMC Istanbul assembly plant. Yet to develop the steps of such a synthesizing approach one needs to discern segments of narration and put them into relation by way of a narrative map, so to say a "pathfinder."

The idea that a historical narration needs to be mapped leans against the assumption that "the past is the set of places made by human action." Following this assumption "historywriting becomes the mapping of the places of the past and the web of relationships they constitute, the topoi of history."[72] This approach draws attention to the non-narrative potential of the spatial representation of the past by stating that histories representing the past represent the places (*topoi*) of human action. Since the narrators share the topoi with the ancestors, the past articulates with the present-time in an organic manner which allows to "reading the time in space."

Yet, for the mapping the "topoi of the past" we need another important operational concept, the "scale," to be able to parse the "re-, and de-territorializations" out of the historical continuum and the seemingly linear time flow. In contemporary human geography, "scale" commonly refers to the spatial extent or level of operation of some relevant phenomenon or of sets of phenomena over a specific period. The compound term "economies of scale" from the area of business administration, referring to the cost ad-

71 David Harvey, "The Geopolitics of Capitalism," in *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, ed. Derek Gregory and John Urry (London: Macmillan Education, 1985), 142.

72 Philip J. Ethington, "Placing the Past: 'Groundwork' for a Spatial Theory of History," *Rethinking History* 11, no. 4 (2007): 465–93.

vantage of a business unit with increased output of a product has very frequently infiltrated the use of the term in historical social sciences in Turkey which might give way to misleading deductions. Scale is not a quantitative attribute of a given production space like size, but a qualitative constituent of spatial formations.[73] One should be referring to operational scale - that is, scale as an attribute or characteristic of the processes being studied, not merely as a metric of observation. Scale relates to space like the compass does to a circle, it fixes its radius and thus its outreach and effect for a given position and for a given period.

For human geographers, "[...] scales conventionally include the human body, household, neighborhood, city, metropolitan area, province/state, nation state, continent, and globe."[74] Geographical administrative scales such as the organized industrial zone, neighborhood, the urban, and the national are not only mere sizes or measurement tools – they also refer to material and social realities, inclusions, and exclusions, thus to substances. Therefore, the term "scale" is both an epistemological as well as an ontological category and its delimitation in the research directly relates to both domains.[75]

Furthermore, different scales manifest in real world different impact levels in terms of depth and duration. Peter Taylor classified in one of his former and meanwhile classical articles of critical geography this "impact" hierarchy referring to the relations between reality, ideology and experience as follows, whereby he sticked to a three-scale model:

> A geographical perspective is identified in terms of the three scales of analysis found in many current textbooks. The political and geo-

73 Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault, "Espace," in *Dictionnaire de la géographie et l'espace des sociétés*, ed. Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault (Paris: Belin, 2013), 353–59.

74 N. F. Sayre and A. V. Di Vittorio, "Scale," in *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, ed. N. J. Thrift and Rob Kitchin, vol. 10 (Amterdam; Boston: Elsevier, 2009), 22.

75 David Harvey in his early work explains this as follows: "At various points, for example, three interrelated problems in methodological analysis emerged which could only be solved by making some prior philosophical decision. These problems concerned: (i) The nature of geo-graphical individuals., (ii) The nature of geographical populations, (iii) The problem of scale,": *Explanation in Geography*, 3rd ed. (London: Arnold Publishers, 1986), 484.

> graphical are brought together in a political economy of scale where the world-economy is the scale of reality, the state and nation represent the scale of ideology and the city is the scale of experience. The materialist framework offered specifies these geographical scales as structurally related in the form of ideology separating experience from reality.[76]

Taylor criticized the approach which took scales as "three separate hooks upon which to hang sets of ideas" without a common framework and tried instead to interconnect them in a hierarchical manner back in 1982. Within the materialist approach of Taylor, the global scale was taken as the starting point as "the level at which capitalist accumulation is ultimately organized."[77]

The spatial theorist Doreen Massey[78] and later the actor-network theory[79] have retained the critique of a fixed and quantitative understanding of scale, yet radically modified the assumption of a hierarchical interconnection among these three scales:

> Likewise, Massey's [...] well received notion of power-geometries has called attention to the intertwined scales of the global, national, and local, refusing to see these as a simple hierarchy in which the global determines the local; the distinctions among these scales are as misleading as they are enlightening.[80]

Also, Bob Jessop, though or because he is a leading theoretician of the state scale from a radical regulationist perspective, defends the approach of an "intermeshing of scales" instead of an over-determinant and given global scale which invites the researcher for an even closer and tighter, i.e., a more

76 Peter J. Taylor, "A Materialist Framework for Political Geography," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 7, no. 1 (1982): 15.

77 Ibid., 22.

78 Doreen B. Massey, *Power-Geometries and the Politics of Space-Time: Hettner-Lecture 1998* (Heidelberg: Department of Geography, University of Heidelberg, 1999).

79 Ignacio Farias and Thomas Bender, eds., *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).

80 Warf, "From Surfaces to Networks," 73.

"entangled" investigation of the historico-spatial case under study. Though he is mainly dealing with the period of globalization after the 1970s his suggestion can well be extended to cover the interwar period under study in this thesis. Jessop states that;

> [...] we now see a proliferation of discursively constituted and institutionally materialized and embedded spatial scales (whether terrestrial, territorial or telematic), that are related in increasingly complex tangled hierarchies rather than being simply nested one within the other, with different temporalities as well as spatialities.[81]

Lastly Neil Brenner's reformulation of Henri Lefebvre's classical definition of scale for globalization studies brings us to an operational approach for the object study of this thesis. This is at the same time a suggestion to look at the specific historic articulation of the scales of decision and (corporate) action for the case under study:

> [...] we can understand the historical geography of capitalism as a multi-layered scaffolding of intertwined, coevolving spatial scales upon which historically specific linkages between processes of capital accumulation, forms of state territorial organization, and patterns of urbanization have been crystallized. Lefebvre rejects the attempt to attribute causal primacy to any single spatial scale: local, regional, national, and global social relations overlap within the same world-wide territorial grid of capitalist modernity.[82]

The "multi-layered scaffolding of intertwined, coevolving spatial scales" need to be "disentangled/unraveled" in order to account for Ford's plant located at one of the piers of Istanbul with its already built environment and social infrastructure. It was the outcome of several intervowen processes of the knocked-down parts it received from Detroit via Atlantic Ocean, the white collar managers of the plant who transferred their knowledge from

81 Jessop, "The Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix and the Tendential Ecological Dominance of Globalizing Capitalism," 343.

82 Neil Brenner, "Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre's Geographies of Globalization," *Public Culture* 10, no. 1 (1997): 145.

other Ford universes in Trieste, Alexandria, Copenhagen, Paris etc., the administrators in Detroit and London/Dagenham, who tried to evaluate the scope of the roaring Soviet markets for automobiles by way of excursions and technical agreements and decided where from they can be served, the changing monetary and customs regimes modifying the calculation basis of investments thus leading to relocation decisions etc. All these facts, events, biographies are analyzed, grouped, and interrelated to account for the dynamics of this factory-scale spatial formation in Tophane/Istanbul.

2.1.6 Scales, Spatial Fix, Built Environment and Social Infrastructure

For a thesis that concentrates on the history of a single factory it is important to relate the approach of "intermeshing and entangling of scales" explicitly to historical capital accumulation processes. These historically contingent relationships between scales are constituent of the accumulation of capital and the geography of capitalism, no matter at what level our analysis is set and whatever borders are about to be formed, or reformed alongside a single factory, a whole city, an administrative region, a free-zone, or the territory of a nation-state etc. Wherever capital flows to, it creates a new articulation between scales by building up a productive apparatus consisting of existing infrastructures, fixed capital, workers, land, nature turned into resources, political alliances, adapting (to) regulations, and so forth – all with a local base, to produce surplus value. In other words, to speak with David Harvey, capital is always in need of fixity in space ("scalar- oder spatial-fix") in order to continue its turnover.[83] If we operationalize this approach in order to make clear "what to look at in the historical material" the starting point would be the interface between transport and communication facilities (built environment) in relation to other nodes, the social infrastructure (legislations, regulations, labor skills etc.) on the one hand and locational decisions on the other. Here the term "interface" designates the area of intermeshing and "secreting" of the local, urban, regional, national, and global scales.

83 Harvey, "The Geopolitics of Capitalism," 145.

This spatial-fix molds heterogenous local social forms and norms into social infrastructures and built environments in the service of the circuit of capital accumulation.

> "For the primary circuit of capital to function successfully a portion of it must be composed of four kinds of built environments: namely, those of production (e.g., factories), consumption (e.g., sales agencies, shopping malls), reproduction (i.e., households) and distribution / communication (e.g., piers, airports, roads, rail-, waste-, sewage systems etc.) These built environments are like the arteries that make the process of capital accumulation possible."[84]

Social infrastructure on the other hand sight includes all types of intangible facilitators of a profit-oriented, private-property based production system, such as legal and regulatory frameworks. Harvey defines the social infrastructure in his seminal work as follows:

> The social infra-structures and institutions of capitalism are incredibly diverse and fulfil an immense variety of functions. They regulate contracts, exchange, money, and credit, as well as inter-capitalist competition, the centralization of capitals, the conditions of labour (such as the working day) and various other aspects of the capital-labour relation. They often define particular frameworks for class struggle. They provide means to produce scientific and technical knowledge, new managerial techniques and new means to facilitate the collection, storage and communication of information. They also embrace the wide variety of institutions which contribute to the reproduction of labour power (health, education, social services, etc.) and cultural life in all of its variegated aspects (including that of the bourgeoisie). They offer means of ideological control as well as forums for ideological debate. More sinister are the means of

84 Noel Castree, "The Limits to Capital (1982): David Harvey," in *Key Texts in Human Geography: A Reader Guide*, ed. Phil Hubbard, Rob Kitchin, and Gill Valentine (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2008), 67. Also, see: David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, New and Fully Updated 2nd Ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 395 ff.

> surveillance and repression, always the last resort when society is plunged into the cauldron of fierce class conflict. [85]

The spatial fix is created to find a cohort for excess capital. Finance capital, a more mobile form of capital "moving with great swiftness and to great distances in search of more advantageous combinations of inputs and markets"[86] is then what creates the link between the spatial fix and the temporal fix.

By having created spatial-fixes to invest its surplus capital and facilitate the continuity of the capital accumulation circuit, capital annihilates this space by integrating it into its crisis-laden circuit which devaluates as much as it creates capitalist values. As Harvey puts it [transnational and local] "spatial organization is necessary in order to overcome space."[87]

Capital urbanizes space on a global level, rescales spaces geographically set apart from each other and creates new, inter-urban and urban-rural networks.[88] Thus question of scale have become increasingly essential to any reflexive analysis of the historical and contemporary urban condition, including the urban condition of Istanbul in the interwar period.[89] The crisis of the capital accumulation in the form of overaccumulation and technological change induced by the tendency of falling profit rates lead concomitantly to destruction of values at a spatial fix and creating of others, i.e., other inter-urban or rural-urban networks and other ways of networking them together in order to extract value. These spatial fixes are formed by destructing elsewhere historically grown structural coherences between the forms of built environment and social infrastructures. This manifests itself

85 *The Limits to Capital*, 398–99.

86 Lacher, *Beyond Globalization*, 113.

87 Harvey, "The Geopolitics of Capitalism," 145.

88 Neil Brenner, "Introduction. Urban Theory Without an Outside," in *Implosions/Explosions: Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization*, ed. Neil Brenner (Berlin: JOVIS Verlag, 2014), 14–36.

89 Neil Brenner, "Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 16, no. 4 (1998): 463 ff.

as a "chaotic seesaw of perpetual re- and deterritorializations."[90] Spatial scales constitute a (not pre-set or pre-defined) hierarchical scaffolding of territorial organization upon, within, and through which the capital circulation process is successively territorialized, de-territorialized, and re-territorialized. Thus, the study of the geography of global capitalism has to adapt itself to this contextualized dynamic without deterministically pre-defined borders.

Changing constellations of spatial fixes by the principal agent of capital, i.e., the corporation is nothing else then a scale-configuration process. Availability of raw materials, infrastructural services (communication, roads, quays, monetary systems, etc.), private and public forms of fixed capital, qualified and disciplined labor, exploitable nature (natural "goods") and markets are the main features which are put together and "remapped" on the corporation's territorial desk. Thus capital "takes place" and changes places by re-scaling as much as it tries to control the time through the creation of fictitious capital (obligations, shares, bonds) or the credit money. Thus, the investment and subsequent failure of Ford Istanbul can only be accounted for if we can describe in detail the factors of this gradual re-, and de-territorialization process during the interwar period from a global assembly to multidomestic and then to a multi-manufacture system at FMC.

The monograph on the "local Ford plant in Tophane" is also a landscape study, accepting the intellectual invitation made by Don Mitchell.[91] According to this the story of the production site of the Ford Motor Company at the pier of Tophane will be told in a way "that links local place to both global process and the politics of representation through which that place is known, understood and circulated abroad,"[92] especially in the Ford Company reports, contemporary newspapers, advertisements, minutes of the Turkish National Assembly (TBMM, or Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) and

90 Ibid., 464.

91 Don Mitchell, "The Lure of the Local: Landscape Studies at the End of a Troubled Century," *Progress in Human Geography* 25, no. 2 (2001): 269–81. To see how a "landscape study" deals with concrete field work, see: Don Mitchell, *The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

92 Mitchell, "The Lure of the Local," 271.

diplomatic documents. The landscape production is based on changing geography of capital circulation and Ford Tophane's short lifetime should be used to exemplify this, especially in the Chapter Four and Chapter Five.

The spatial methodology which will be applied in this thesis needs one last, but not least reference to Henri Lefebvre's spatial triad producing the space, implying an interplay between perceived, conceived and lived spaces, respectively spatial practices, representations of space and representational spaces. This triad will be related to the intermeshing/entanglement of the three scales, namely local/urban, national, and global. This thesis that nourishes both from urban and economic history can't dispense with Henri Lefebvre's *oeuvre* because –as put by one of the few historians having masterfully applied this conceptual toolkit to the analysis of the *fin de siècle* Beirut: "Henri Lefebvre provides historians with a path to understand urban culture as subversive activity that defies conventional grand narratives and the triumphalist 'histories-of-becoming': becoming modern, secular, national, civilized, etc."[93] And we would add to this proposition the attributes of "becoming industrialized, developed or capitalist" and stress the agency of capital which is pragmatic and not teleological.

The first concept, the spatial practices, embody "a close association between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, 'private' life, and leisure)."[94] The existence of everyday routines, networks, links between the segmented parts of the everyday life, "patterns of interaction that link places"[95] point out to forces in the society that normalize, and discipline perceptions of the space (public and private, home and work etc.), and facilitates the functional divisions of space with definitive sets of discourses, emotions, rationalities, meanings ascribed to them. Thereby spatial practices have close links to perceived spaces. Layer by layer after each repetition of a routine, case by case

93 Jens Hanssen, *"Fin De Siècle" Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 12.

94 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford and Cambridge, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 38.

95 Andrew Merrifield, "Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 18, no. 4 (1993): 524.

"the spatial practice of a society secretes that society's space." Therefore, "from the analytical standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering/disentangling of its space."[96] This approach has methodological consequences for this thesis, without differentiating between historical (diachronic) or sociological (synchronic) analysis, which materialize in "disentangling" the scales of Ford Istanbul for the duration of its existence.

The representations of space refer to the conceptualized space. Therefore, they are a part of the history of ideologies, yet seen within a broader framework that is not restricted to the ideas of philosophers and of the ruling classes. It is "worked out" on the intellectual field, by the professionals, technocrats, urban planners, architects, cartographers, legal professionals, businessmen, social engineers, including sociologists and historians. "The conceptions of space tend (…) towards a system of verbal (therefore intellectually worked out) signs[97] a jargon, codifications, objectified representations. Thus, it is necessarily a conceived and abstract space, "since it subsumes ideology and knowledge within its practice." It is the field of the discursive dispositions. It is the production space of the order of things, the factory of meaning and framework fixing. Its "objective expressions" can be found in monuments, towers, factory and urban plans, reports, in the squares representing power,[98] universities and -in the today's "cognitive capitalism"- also in the way web algorithms are worked out. The Ford territory reports, the Free Zone Law, the Ford Law, and the plant plot plans which abstractly define a territory and a production locality to the Istanbul plant are first-class examples of "representations of space." Thus, their presumptions and categories will be analyzed to understand the way they try to order space.

Representational spaces are lived spaces, but they should not be confused with the purely physical aspect and material endowment of a space. Thus, spaces are "experienced through the complex symbols and images of its 'inhabitants' and 'users.'"[99] In that sense it makes symbolic use of the ob-

96 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 38.

97 Ibid., 39.

98 Merrifield, "Place and Space," 523.

99 Ibid.

jects of the physical space, for example of a bed, bedroom, dwelling, house, church, graveyard, factory, port, pier or a square. Consequently, it is not only a locus of action, but also one of passion and lived situations. This is why it is "lived," but neither consistently nor coherently. If spatial practices end up producing the everyday routes, routines, networks, and have mainly to do with conditioned social movement of the body, then the representational spaces immediately imply qualitative time; time out of selective perception, thus memory. This is unfortunately the least documented part of the thesis due to the relative lack of ethnographic, or labor historical data: The question of how Ford workers from Istanbul have experienced the factory space, the temporal and corporal discipline imposed upon them by the assembly line and how the Tophane neighborhood and by-passers have experienced it can only be derived partially from the neighborhood history in general, newspaper clippings and some oral history accounts in specific. The lost memory or lack of traces of this factory is yet another dimension of the functioning of the representational spaces:

> Redolent with imaginary and symbolic elements, they have their source in history – in the history of a people as well as in the history of each individual belonging to that people. Ethnologists, anthropologists, and psychoanalysts are students of such representational spaces, but they nearly always forget to set them alongside those representations of space which coexist, concord, or interfere with them; they even more frequently ignore social practices.[100]

To avoid that shortcoming Lefebvre pleads to locate the unitary theory of space between anthropology and political economy**,** "that must account for both representational spaces and representations of space, but above all their interrelationships and their links with social practice."[101]

Yet "the perceived-conceived-lived triad" (in spatial terms: "spatial practice, representations of space, representational spaces") loses all force if it is treated as an abstract 'model'. If it cannot grasp the concrete (as distinct

100 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 41.

101 Ibid., 116.

from the 'immediate') than its import is severely limited, amounting to no more than that of one ideological import among others."[102]

Our aim here is to use the bifurcation of the spatial triad of Lefebvre along with the approach of the "intermeshing, entanglement, and articulation of scales" to analyze the concrete factory's how and why at the pier of Tophane between 1923 and 1944. At every scale of analysis (which is used as an epistemological category and not as an ontological one), the global (which is the conceptualized space of the "universal car" of Ford), national and local, and urban (each of which respectively give a framework to the following chapters of the thesis) we would try to discern the spatial practices, representations of space and the representational spaces in order to grasp the different time horizons and scales of action of different actors. Whereby the global and national scale come closest to the representations of spaces, thus the abstract, and conceived territories of Ford and the Turkish State, it is harder for the local, or urban scale, namely Tophane to discern between the spatial practices imposed upon by the built environment at the pier of Tophane and representational spaces with the rhythms, images and habits of the workers, the immediate administrators of the factory and the neighborhood dwellers of Tophane. The "classical" scale designations local, and urban (Chapter Five), national (Chapter Four), and global (Chapter Three) will serve as a platform on which the intermeshing, entanglement, and articulation of the time horizons and scales of action of the actors will be scrutinized separately and in relation to each other. The thesis thus becomes a mapped historical narrative, "a tale of three scales."

TABLE 2.1 Three scales of the mapped historical narrative

H. Lefebvre		"classical" scales	P. Taylor
Spatial practice	Perceived space "real"	National	Ideology
Representations of space	Conceived space "imagined"	Global	Reality

102 Ibid., 40 and 116.

H. Lefebvre		"classical" scales	P. Taylor
Spaces of representation	Lived spaces "real-and-imagined"	Local / urban	Experience

SOURCE: Chart made by the author based on abovementioned the bifurcation of the spatial triad of Lefebvre

2.1.7 Conclusion

The choice of FMC for the Tophane pier at the port of Istanbul to establish an assembly plant for a wider market can be made intelligible within a specific spatial fix and temporal logic the story of which will be told in the subsequent chapters. This decision has in turn re-scaled the Tophane pier within a wider framework of productive facilities and markets for motor vehicles at the second half of the 1920s. As will be described in Chapter Three, during the 1920s the internationalization of the productive capital of Ford has constituted a specific spatial fix, i.e., a "provisionally stabilized, geographically fixed configuration of territorial organization that emerge through [the] dynamic of continual de- and reterritorialization."[103]

Seen from a broader perspective starting at the factory level, "[e]ach spatial fix is secured through the coordination of social processes articulated upon multiple, overlapping scales and through the 'meshing of various hierarchical arrangements" such as transnational corporations, monetary regimes, legal codes, interurban networks, and state regulatory institutions."[104] During the second half of the 1920s all these hierarchical arrangements have intermeshed in a way that a former imperial small-arms factory with a contemporary function of entrepôts alongside with twelve recently built entrepôts were turned into an assembly plant for motor vehicles of FMC at the pier of Tophane in Istanbul:

Firstly, the multinational corporation FMC was re-territorializing its investment decisions and switching from one moden (Ford T) to another (Ford A) in the mid 1920s. The question here is the following one: How are

103 Ibid., 463.

104 Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, 419 ff.

those business decisions related to the shifting of social, political, and monetary geographies of global capital accumulation?

Secondly, Ford's greenfield investment in Istanbul was linked to the changing balances in the inter-state system and monetary borders: Its fate was linked through its predecessor, the Ford free-port in Trieste to the changes in Italian economic policy; through the market expansion in Soviet Russia for automotives to the infrastructural-economic changes in the Soviet Russia -the New Economic Policy Program (NEP) and the First Five Year Program being the blueprints-; through the re-regionalization of the FMC in Europe in the new "headquarters" in Dagenham near London to the new corporate regulatory organization, through the spread of colonial wars to Africa to its delivery port of Alexandria, Egypt and to the negotiations with the Rumanian state heated by the promise of a Danube-Bucharest canal.

This single investment decision of the FMC abroad gives clues about the changes in the interstate system and intra-urban rearrangements within the urban network during the period and vice versa. When we look at the projected territory of Istanbul in 1928 and the ports and cities therein which are brought together to form a network, the emerging picture seems unintelligible and "exotic" to the spatial contemporaries of the beginning of the twenty first century interstate system and capitalism's network geography. That former network had been rendered futile and replaced by a different geography of corporate capitalism and state encroachment. That is why it makes sense to study a big corporation's spatial projections of the 1920s and compare it with the global "spatial outcome" in the 1930s on the eve of the Second World War. One has the possibility to check on how the past resonates with its own future without projecting upon it some abstract models and temporal labels such as liberal, statist, Fordist, post-Fordist, globalist, anti-globalist etc., fabricated for today's capitalism. This way analysis of current capitalisms' network composed of zones (special economic zones, city-states, havens, enclaves, free ports, high-tech parks, duty-free districts, and innovation hubs) that perforate the sovereign fiscal and legislative territories of nation-states will be historically informed about the economic zoning directions of the past to be able to make more accurate predictions about the future movements of the capital that is turning the world upside down. Ul-

timately, it is clear that in the economic geography formed by the two world and numerous regional political and economic wars and countless investments in which today's capitalism has "cracked up" past spatial order,[105] it is necessary to look at the historical spatial dynamics of capital accumulation processes of corporations, the main actors forming territories, in both periods.

Thirdly, The Republic of Turkey granted full free-zone rights to FMC and took the factory out of Turkish regulatory system which invites to a close analysis of Ford's ties at the national scale. The formation of a free zone constitutes an ex-territorialization from national territory and the re-territorialization of this concrete segment of the port of Istanbul in a company's transnational global commodity chains.

Lastly Ford's choice for Istanbul as a port-city and former imperial capital with an already existing built environment and social infrastructure helps to shed light on the qualities of "urbanization" of interwar Istanbul. Though the factory in Tophane was an export-oriented plant, which operated with imported knocked-down parts in an extra-territorial area with no national hinterland, it recruited most of its workers and some administrative staff in Istanbul, imposed its standardized production technology at this specific location upon them, paid wages above the Turkish average of the time, succeeded in excluding traditional elements of the port, namely the barge and ligther owners *(mavnacı* and *salapuryacı),* porters (*hamal*) from the powerful guilds, and administrative bodies linked to the port of the city (Turkish Maritime Administration, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Istanbul Port Monopoly Company, Associated Company of Quays, Docks and Warehouses, and Istanbul Municipality) from that segment of the port, made use of the sea routes that connect the city to other port cities, utilized the water and pier infrastructure of the city, some power from Silahtarağa Electrical Plant at least for the general electrification of the surroundings of the free zone, advertised its cars geared towards the 'national/ist tendencies' of the time, a to-be-life style for the new urban masses in Istanbul and peas-

105 Quinn Slobodian, *Crack-up Capitalism: Market Radicals and the Dream of a World without Democracy* (UK USA Canada Ireland Australia India New Zeeland South Africa: Allen Lane, 2023).

ants in Antaolia in daily newspapers, etc. In this sense the existence of the plant depended on the many urban functions and qualities of Istanbul during the interwar period.

A segment of the port and neighboring workers' districts of Istanbul delivered the necessary social and physical infrastructures (built environment) that supported the accumulation of industrial capital yet for a very limited period between end of 1929 and April 1933, the year the assembly was halted. The picture between 1933 and 1944 is one of a stagnant period where most of the fixed capital of Ford got stuck at the spatial fix without any significant production of values and realization of profits, comparable to a simple sales and repair facility.

The choice for the Istanbul investment ran parallel to the alteration of the territorial organization of Ford in 1928 by way of a regional re-centralization in Dagenham/UK, a plant which remained mainly alongside the same spatial logic of Ford's dominant multinational global assembly system in the 1920s. It was exactly this projected territorial organization of FMC in 1928 which "smashed against a wall" during the radical restructuration of the spatio-temporal fix; in other words, the Great Depression in 1929. The shift in customs and monetary borders within the projected Istanbul territory, which already started beginning of the 1920s, just to name an impact factor, had changed the calculation basis of the whole investment radically. The inter-urban networks and territorial agreements that have facilitated Istanbul to appear as the best-possible production location for the 1920s had lost their base during the 1930s.

The Great Depression, which unfolded in the form of more protective customs regulations and tight monetary regimes nearly everywhere, had rendered the spatial fix not appropriate anymore. The Soviet Russia's demand for Ford automotives which was a crucial factor of the investment decision in Istanbul led to a technical agreement between USSR and FMC instead of automotives exported from Bosphorus. Ford had to re-scale its productive facilities and sales territories again and became more "Fordist" i.e., "aiming at [multi]domestic markets rather than a global market." Without problematizing the rationality of both spatial moves by Ford and the wider changes in the geography of capitalism the story of this assembly plant

cannot be understood and narrated. This will be the main object study of Chapter Three.

§ 2.2 Agency: Bringing the "Capital" Back in: Global Business History

Bringing the State Back in was the title of an edited volume from 1985 which was motivated by the hypothesis that "dominant theoretical paradigms in the comparative social sciences did not highlight states as organizational structures or as potentially autonomous actors. Indeed, the term 'state' was rarely used."[106] The book which emanated from a collective research project called upon "a methodological strategy of analytical induction" defined as "doing comparative and historical studies to address theoretically relevant questions"[107] to avoid "fallacies of misplaced abstraction." These fallacies would become visible at the *gestus* of deriving a label of the state ("modern state, state in capitalism," etc.), from some seemingly given, theoretically highly abstract category in society, like bourgeoisie, capitalism, civilization etc.

Oddly, we can easily claim that the state had the diametrically opposed significance in most of the literature on the Turkish economic and political history. The term "state" is used in an inflationary manner both in comprehensive and critical social studies more often than not in a dualist framework of state vs. society or bureaucracy vs. bourgeoisie.[108] Furthermore state, deemed to be "strong"[109] has been given the main agency in the

106 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, "Preface," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), vii.

107 Ibid.

108 For a masterfully written, synoptic and critical dialogue with a wide array of literature on the Turkish political and economic history on their shared premise of the prevalence of a strong state in Turkey, see Demet Dinler, "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi," *Praksis*, no. 9 (2003): 17–54.

109 The emblematic academic book of this approach, Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverley, North Humberside ; Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Eothen Press; Humanities

historical social sciences, yet by preserving the above-mentioned danger of "the fallacies of misplaced abstraction." On the backside, the agencies of capital and companies as its incorporated form have been pushed back to a very negligible position in historywriting. Company monographs and research with company archives still constitute rare cases. In Turkey the nearly total lack of an institutionalized discipline of business history *(işletme tarihi, işletmecilik tarihi*) with its own departments, journals, associations, and regular meetings[110] deserves an attempt at an explanation.

The lack of scholarly articles on business history with examples from Turkey can also be evidenced by examples from established international journals in the field. *Business History Review*, a Cambridge Journal dating as back as 1926 only contains two articles on Turkey: An article on the Chester project and an article on the Anatolian Railway Company.[111] The second oldest journal *Business History* which is continuously published since 1958 by the publishing house Frank Cass contains only four articles on business-related aspects in Turkey, yet none of them can be classified as a company monograph. Two of them are on business management teaching,[112] one is about business associations[113] and the last one about foreign direct invest-

---

Press, 1985) has been translated into Turkish not before 2006. The fourth edition was published not later than 2012 by Doğu Batı Yayınları.

110 The first academic meeting (Business History Workshop) exclusively on business history which has left traces online has not been held before 2014 at a recently established peripheral state university: "Yalova'da 'İşletmecilik Tarihi' Çalıştayı," News Portal, Haberler, May 27, 2014, https://bit.ly/4a0Jnwu.

111 John A. DeNovo, "A Railroad for Turkey: The Chester Project, 1908-1913," *The Business History Review* 33, no. 3 (1959): 300–329; Donald Quataert, "Limited Revolution: The Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation and the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890-1908," *The Business History Review* 51, no. 2 (1977): 139–60.

112 Behlül Üsdiken and Alfred Kieser, "Introduction: History in Organisation Studies," *Business History* 46, no. 3 (2004): 321–30; Behlül Üsdiken, Alfred Kieser, and Peter Kjaer, "Academy, Economy and Polity: *Betriebswirtschaftslehre* in Germany, Denmark and Turkey before 1945," *Business History* 46, no. 3 (2004): 381–406.

113 Ufuk Çakmakçı and Beyza Oba, "The Role of Employer Unions in Hegemonic Struggle, Interest Representation and Promotion of Managerial Perspectives in Turkey," *Business History* 49, no. 5 (2007): 695–716.

ments in the Ottoman Empire.[114] Some articles on the nineteenth century international banking and manufacturing corporations also investing in or exporting to Ottoman Empire also tackle Turkey *en passant*. Lastly the journal *Business and Economic History* (1962-2000) and its successor *Enterprise and Society* (2000-) which publish the proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Association of Business History (BHC) see a relatively upsurge in articles on business history from Turkey, including genuine business monographs reconstructed with the help of company archives.[115] There are no articles in the two other important anglophone journals of the field, *Accounting, Business, and Finance History*, and *Essays in Business and Economic History*. The long-established Germanophone journal *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* (ZUG) from the 1970s [with a forerunner from the 1950s' Tradition: *Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Unternehmensbiographie*] only contains two articles on Ottoman Empire / Turkey, i.e., Deutsche Orientbank and the failed investment attempt of *Junkers-Flugzeugswerke* during the 1920s and several mentions of German capital in the Ottoman Empire in its incorporated form.[116]

This explanation cannot be substituted by a tautological and abstract reference to the rather late and weak development of a capitalist and corporate structure in the Ottoman Empire, or Turkey. Quiet on the contrary the formation of the early company and other corporate structures (like business associations) during the Ottoman period were temporally coeval of the de-

114 V. Necla Geyikdağı and M. Yaşar Geyikdağı, "Foreign Direct Investment in the Ottoman Empire: Attitudes and Political Risk," *Business History* 53, no. 3 (2011): 375–400.

115 Nevin Coşar, "Demirbank: The History of a Small Commercial Turkish Bank," *Business and Economic History* 28, no. 1, Papers presented at the forty-fifth annual meeting of the Business History Conference (1999): 125–32; Mehmet Erçek and Öner Günçavdı, "Imprints of an Entrepreneur and Evolution of a Business Group, 1948–2010," *Business History* 58, no. 1 (2016): 89–110; Yavuz Köse, "Nestlé: A Brief History of the Marketing Strategies of the First Multinational Company in the Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Macromarketing* 27, no. 1 (2007): 74–85.

116 Werner E. Braatz, "Junkers Flugzeugwerke A.G. in Anatolia, 1925-1926: An Aspect of German-Turkish Economic Relations," *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* 19, no. 1 (1974): 28–41; Boris Barth, "Politische Bank wider Willen: Die Deutsche Orientbank vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* 42, no. 1 (1997): 65–88.

velopments in the "model Europe." A reading of the literature on the legal and organizational characteristics of Ottoman economic institutions as business history would exemplify this masterfully.[117] This leads us to question where there might be other, not ontological but epistemological reasons behind the relative weakness and lack of institutionalization of business history. We might start with depicting the state of the art in business history in Turkey before we scrutinize the reasons for this alleged negligence and exemplify the reasons why it is essential to "bring back the capital in" to the agency status of historywriting for the aims of this thesis.

We can observe that even when companies are given due agency in Turkish historywriting that this historywriting unfolds generally in the form of the following three types:

1 Commissioned company monographs as business history
2 Aggregate capital approaches as business history
    a. The study of business associations as business history
    b. The study of the capitalist class as business history
    c. The study of foreign direct investments as business history
3 Company monographs with varying approaches as business history:
    a. Labor history as business history
    b. Industrial heritage studies as business history
    c. Business history as such

117 See: Seven Ağır, "Economic History Discipline in Turkey: A Review of the Existing Literature and Links to the Business History'" (The Business History Workshop, Yalova, 2014). Ağır, for example, worked on the grain provisioning policies of the Ottoman and Spanish Empires in the 17th and 18th centuries and the business solutions (like the *gedik* system as an asset ownership system) developed to provide for a continous provisioning of the capital cities Madrid and İstanbul. Another scholar, Murat Çizakça pushes the comparative view on business forms and partnerships as far as to the Islamic Golden Ages: *Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution and the Future* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011). For a temporally closer comparison, see: *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives* (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1996).

TABLE 2.2 State of the art of business history in Turkish scholarship

Commissioned company monographs as business history	Aggregate capital approaches as business history	Company monographs with varying approaches as business history
	The study of business associations as business history	Labor history as business history
	The study of the capitalist class as business history	Industrial heritage studies as business history
	The study of foreign direct investments as business history	Business history as such

SOURCE: Chart made by the author, 2024

In detail the state of the art of business history exemplifies the above landscape if we take only the book-length publications for reasons of representability.

2.2.1 Commissioned company monographs as business history

When companies are made agents of historywriting and objects of monographs most of the time the output of the research is a model of institutional history (*kurum tarihi*) of which the perspective, the source compilation and the discourse remains often too close to the "corporate identity." This is because most of the time companies themselves (public or private) have commissioned their histories written down for commemorative anniversaries and professional historians, journalists or public relation companies took charge of these requests. Comparable with the rest of the world also in Turkey the majority of the books which concedes agency to capital is financed by and conduced mostly to the "needs of corporations or single businessman for image-cultivation and self-affirmation" and this "has brought forth an increasing number of commissioned biographies and company histories, as well as autobiographical accounts."[118] Significant anniversaries from the perspective of the company serve as the basic

118 H. Berghoff, "Business History," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, vol. 2 (Amsterdam; New York: Elsevier, 2001), 1421.

motivation for commissioning of these books aimed at strengthening the corporate identity and image.[119] Some of these books are non-academic in the sense that they value more the prestige of the publication stressing the visuality and print quality than a coherent and contextualizing narrative even when they are written, or commissioned to academic professionals.[120] Others exemplify a more profound socio-economic research and contextualizing engagement with the company archives embedding them within their time and space.[121] Sometimes the writing process of the company mono-

119 For the critique of the use of institutional history to build up and transmit a company image, the danger of nostalgy, emotionalism and favoritism which emanate from the lack of a critical and analytical approach to the company history in the Turkish context, see: İlhan Tekeli, *Birlikte Yazılan ve Öğrenilen Bir Tarihe Doğru* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007), 197–202.

120 Best examples for company monographies with a stressed visuality concern are the books by Önder Küçükerman, a professor of industrial design. The state company Sümerbank which owned different production units commissioned many factory biographies to Küçükerman, see: *Batı Anadolu'daki Türk Halıcılık Geleneği Içinde İzmir Limanı ve Isparta Halı Fabrikası* (Ankara: Sümerbank Genel Müdürlüğü ; SümerHalı, 1990); *Geleneksel Türk Dericilik Sanayii ve Beykoz Fabrikası: Boğaziçi'nde Başlatılan Sanayi* (Ankara: Sümerbank Genel Müdürlüğü, 1988); *"Feshane", Defterdar Fabrikası: Türk Giyim Sanayii Tarihindeki Ünlü Fabrika* (Ankara: Sümerbank Genel Müdürlüğü, 1988); *Anadolu'nun Geleneksel Halı ve Dokuma Sanatı İçinde Hereke Fabrikası: Saray'dan Hereke'ye Giden Yol* (Ankara: Sümerbank Genel Müdürlüğü, 1987); there are also two monographies commissioned by private companies, Tofaş and Siemens: *Anadolu Tasarım Mirasının Ayak İzlerinde Türk Otomotiv Sanayii ve 40. Yılında Tofaş 1968-2008* (Istanbul: Tofaş Türk Otomobil Fabrikası and Arkeoloji ve Sanat Yayınları, 2008); Önder Küçükerman, *The Company from 1847 to 1997: 150 Years of Siemens – Turkey* (Istanbul: Siemens Publishing, 2008). For a synoptic bibliography, see his personal website: https://bit.ly/47J8MbW [September 10, 2014]. Also, see: Erol Üyepazarcı, *TSKB'nin Öyküsü* (Istanbul: Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası, 1995); Gülten Kazgan, Alkan Soyak, and Murat Koraltürk, *Cumhuriyet'in 75 Yıllık Sigortacısı Koç Allianz* (Istanbul: Koç Allianz, 1998); Zafer Toprak, *Sümerbank Holding A.Ş* (İstanbul: Sümerbank A. Ş. YAyınları; Alaş Ofset, 1988); Şaziye Karlıklı, ed., *45 Yılın Öyküsü: Migros* (İstanbul: CamEv Yayıncılık, 1999); Şafak Altun, ed., *Türkiye'ye Enerji Verenler* (Istanbul: Gama Holding; Elma Yayınları, 2010).

121 Some examples for these exceptions, i.e. for scholarly and contextualizing research on businesses though commissioned by companies themselves are: Uygur Kocabaşoğlu et al., *SEKA Tarihi: Türkiye Selüloz ve Kâğıt Fabrikalarının Tarihsel Gelişimi* (İzmit: SEKA Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 1996); Murat Koraltürk and Osman S. Arolat, *Sümerbank: Türkiye*

graph creates also physical archives, not only by way of collecting oral history accounts but also by physically saving archives from desertedness and decomposition.[122]

Here, I have to stress the gathering and catalyzing role of the Foundation of Economic and Social History, Turkey (Tarih Vakfı, or Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı), established in 1994, in the collection / cataloguing of company archives and institutionalization of the field of institutional and sectoral history (*kurum ve sektör tarihi*). Yet few of the research on institutional and sectoral history, as called by the Tarih Vakfı, does comply with all the prerequisites and ends of business history, not only because at least one fourth of the forty listed monographs pertain to public, non-profit

---

Ekonomisinde Bir Öncü (İstanbul: Sümerbank A. Ş.; Creative Yayıncılık ve Tanıtım Ltd. Şti, 1996); Murat Güvenç and Oğuz Işık, *Emlak Bankası: 1926-1998* (Istanbul: Emlak Bankası, 1999); Nevin Coşar, *Geçmişten Geleceğe Demirbank* (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999); Edhem Eldem, *Osmanlı Bankası Tarihi*, trans. Ayşe Berktay (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası, 1999); Uygur Kocabaşoğlu et al., *Türkiye İş Bankası Tarihi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001); Mehmet Altun, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Hayallerin Gerçekleştiği 100 Yıl: İ. E. Ulagay İlaç Sanayii Türk A.Ş. 100 Yaşında*, ed. İlhami Mısırlıoğlu and Rauf Kosemen (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003); Emre Dölen and Murat Koraltürk, *Aslan Çimento: İlk Çimento Fabrikamızın Öyküsü 1910-2012* (Istanbul: Lafarge Aslan Çimento; Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2004); Murat Koraltürk, *Şirket-i Hayriye (1851-1945)* (İstanbul: İstanbul Deniz Otobüsleri A. Ş., 2007); Tunç Tayanç, *İLK - Geçmişten Geleceğe STFA* (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Offset Yapımevi, 2012); Ford Otosan and VTR Araştırma Yapım Yönetim, *Benim Adım Ford Otosan*.

122 Bedirhan Toprak, Nalân Sakızlı, and Enis Rıza, *Mamulattan Markaya: Arçelik Kurum Tarihi, 1955-2000* (Istanbul: Arçelik A. Ş.; Mepa Medya, 2001); Eftal Şükrü Batmaz, Kudret Emiroğlu, and Süha Ünsal, *İnşaatçıların Tarihi: Türkiye'de Müteahhitlik Hizmetlerinin Gelişimi ve Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği* (Istanbul; Ankara: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği, 2006); Tunç Tayanç, *İnşaatçıların Coğrafyası: Türk İnşaat Sektörünün Yurtdışı Müteahhitlik Hizmetleri Serüveni* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği, 2011); Rıfat N. Bali, Murat Koraltürk, and Akansel Yalçınkaya, *Kurum ve Sektör Tarihi, İş İnsanı ve Yönetici Hatırat, Biyografi ve Otobiyografi Kitapları Bibliyografyası (1932 - 2018)* (Istanbul: Libra, 2019); Rıfat N. Bali and Murat Koraltürk, eds., *Türkiye'de Özel Girişimciliğin Gelişimi ve Iş Insanlarının Ağzından "Başarı" Hikayeleri (1930'lardan 1960'lara)*, 1. basım, Tarih 437 (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2021).

and mostly bureaucratic institutions thus do not constitute businesses.[123] To equate business history with institutional history is problematic because companies and corporations are not simply institutions but they are special institutions at which labor, political relations, built environment and technology are intermeshed within the perspective of accumulation and profit-orientation. The lack of institutionalization in this area makes the efforts of single individuals pushing company monographs[124] and biographies of entrepreneurs[125] sometimes serve the ends of business history too. Though there are some above-mentioned significant exceptions, the result of studying the company archives remains most of the time a narration of the internal affairs of the institution without an explicit wider historiographical problematization and contextualization. The majority of the commissioned

123 For the list of the published works in institutional and sectoral history between 1992 and 2016, see: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, "Kurum ve Sektör Tarihi Projeleri," Tarih Vakfı, September 10, 2018, https://bit.ly/47m6aB0. In this list, containing 40 books, not all of them constitute businesses, be it public or private. The following 7 are public non profit institutions: *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* (DPT), 2010 [=State Planning Institute]; *Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu* (SSK), 1996 [=Social Security Institution]; *Darülaceze*, 1995 [=Public Poorhouse]; *Darüşşafaka*, 1995; *İstanbul Su ve Kanalizasyon İdaresi* (İSKİ), 1993 [=İstanbul Municipal Water and Sewerage Institution]; *Milli Piyango*,1992 [=State Lottery] and *Tarım Satış Kooperatifleri Birliği* (TARİŞ), 1992 [=Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union]. Also, see: Bali, Koraltürk, and Yalçınkaya, *Kurum ve Sektör Tarihi*.

124 Gökhan Akçura is such a figure who has built up a wide collection of company archives cata-logued along sectors and commodities. Some examples are: *Aspirin: Türkiye Tanıtım Serüveni (1925 - 1944)* (Istanbul: Bayer Türk, 1994); Gökhan Akçura and Lowe Lintas, *Koç Topluluğu'nun 75 Yılı* (İstanbul: Koç Holding A. Ş., 2001); *Türkiye Sergicilik ve Fuarcılık Tarihi [=Exposition and Fair History of Turkey]*, ed. Gürel Tüzün (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; TÜYAP, 2009); *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye Matbaacılık Tarihi*, ed. Derya Bengi (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2012). For a similar perspective, also see: Turhan Baytop, *Eczahane'den Eczane'ye Türkiye'de Eczaneler ve Eczacılar (1800-1923)* (İstanbul: Bayer İlaç Yayını, 1995).

125 Can Dündar is a journalist who has regularly written biographies of businessman including materials from their personal archives, i.e., *Bir Yaşam İksiri: Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003); *Özel Arşivinden Belgeler ve Anılarıyla Vehbi Koç* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2006); *Özel Arşivinden Belgeler ve Anılarıyla Vehbi Koç, Vol. 2 (1961-1976)*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008).

company monographs "enlarge on their theme with abundance of archival material but with little regard for historical context" and "with no commitment to macro historical findings and inclusion of theoretical approaches of related disciplines;"[126] also, in the literature on and from Turkey. Yet what is more needed for the focus of this thesis is the regard for the wider spatial context and the problematization of the re-scaling activities of a company which constitute a small minority of the commissioned company histories, exemplified above.[127]

2.2.2 *Aggregate Capital Approaches as Business History*

This category contains myriad approaches and leans against various theories yet common to all of them is that their research output is not a company monograph, and their main source is not a consistent company archive. Thus, the advantages of an empirical micro-scale study are not fully cherished. Three forms can be discerned: The study of business associations as business history, the study of the capitalist class as business history, and the study of foreign direct investments as business history.

2.2.2.1 The Study of Business Associations as Business History

At many instances the study of business associations and their relationships to the state has replaced research with company archives and the output as a contextualized company monograph.[128] The analysis of class representation-

126 Berghoff, "Business History," 1426.

127 Kocabaşoğlu et al., *SEKA Tarihi*; Güvenç and Işık, *Emlak Bankası*.

128 Ayşe Buğra is the most prominent and pioneering representant of this approach, see: *State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994); "Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no. 4 (1998): 521–39; Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, "Yerel Sanayi ve Bugünün Türkiye'sinde İş Dünyası," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 117 (2010): 92–121; Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship Between Politics, Religion and Business* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014). In a similar vein, see: Dilek Yankaya, *Yeni İslâmî Burjuvazi: Türkiye Modeli*, trans. Melike Işık Durmaz (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014); also, see one of the few articles from / on Turkey in one of the most prominent indexed business history journals: Çakmakçı and Oba, "The Role of Employer Unions". Other ex-

al strategies, accumulation strategies, cultural affiliations and discourses of the members of Turkish business associations Turkish Industrialists and Business Association (TÜSİAD, or Türk Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği), Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD, or Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği), the former Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON, or Türkiye Sanayicileri ve İş Adamları Konfederasyonu), the Association of Anatolian Businessmen (ASKON, or Anadolu Aslanları İş Adamları Derneği), Council of Turkish Exporters (TİM, or Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi), and some local business associations as a group serve to single out periods of framework for business activities. The unit of analysis is the business association, an aggregate category. Common to this type of research is that the businessmen, or bourgeoisie is approached through its relationship to the state presuming that the evolution of the business enterprise in Turkey is a story how and why private capital lacks autonomy from and in which ways it relates to the state. Conceptualizations like "politicized capital accumulation" or "non-economic, politically created bourgeoisie" are coined which mainly nourish from a state vs. business dualism. The concrete historical and spatial conditions of capital accumulation and the rise and fall of single companies within this process do not deserve the same attention as the study of associative strategies and positioning towards the state. Labor is nearly totally left out of the focus. Yet businesses can also be studied on their own right as well as the subjects of historywriting, by looking at the whole nation-state formation process and the role of the state as an accumulation facilitating factor.

We can put under this category also most of the research on the newly industrializing periphery in Anatolia, namely the companies which are called "Anatolian Tigers." The leading research question is the conditions of formation and constitution of the "new conservative capital from the periphery."[129] This leads once more that "provincial capital or Anatolian

amples to be mentioned are: Murat Koraltürk, *Türkiye'de Ticaret ve Sanayi Odaları: 1880-1952* (Istanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2002); Mustafa Sönmez, *Türkiye'de İş Dünyasının Örgütleri ve Yönelimleri* (İstanbul: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2010).

129 Şevket Pamuk, "Globalization, Industrialization and Changing Politics in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 38 (2008): 267–73; Ayda Eraydın, "Sanayinin Anadolu'ya

capital" is aggregated to a representational category of which research is sampled and launched. The focus is sometimes on the geographical spread of macroeconomic growth figures, sometimes on the constitution of more recent national (TUSKON, ASKON, MÜSİAD) or local, provincial (Gaziantep, Denizli, Kayseri etc.), business associations. They do not substitute for systematic studies of a provincial company or a capital group with headquarters or primary accumulation locations in the Anatolian provinces. Thus, they are not wary of the "fallacies of misplaced abstraction," respectively of reproducing dualisms like "central vs. provincial capital, conservative vs. secular capital," etc.

Lastly, the research of Bayırbağ which also constitutes a study of local business associations should be put apart from the rest of the business association approaches for his focus on the "rescaling of the state." Put differently, Bayırbağ studies provincial business associations' changing role to explicitly understand the change in the spatial functions and scale of action of statehood since 1990s and exemplifies a rare example of spatial thinking about capital accumulation processes and a study of intermeshing of scales though he does not produce a company monograph. He has also shown in his research, proving the contrary of the thesis of the lack of autonomous agency of businesses from the state authority, which the creation

---

Yaygınlaşması ve Son Dönem Gelişen Yeni Sanayi Odakları," in *75 Yılda Çarklardan Chip'lere*, ed. Oya Baydar (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999), 257–78; Emin Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı, *Kentler: Anadolu'nun Dönüşümü, Türkiye'nin Geleceği* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010); Ahmet Haşim Köse and Ahmet Öncü, "Dünya ve Türkiye Ekonomisinde Anadolu İmalat Sanayi: Zenginleşmenin Mi Yoksa Yoksullaşmanın Mı Eşiğindeyiz?," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 77 (1998): 135–59; Alpay Filiztekin and İnsan Tunalı, "Anatolian Tigers: Are They for Real?," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 20 (1999): 77–106; Sencer Ayata, "Bir Yerel Sanayi Odağı Olarak Gaziantep'te Girişimcilik, Sanayi Kültürü ve Ekonomik Dünya İle İlişkiler," in *İlhan Tekeli İçin Armağan Yazılar*, ed. Selim İlkin, Orhan Silier, and Murat Güvenç (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2004), 559–90; European Stability Initiative, "İslami Kalvinistler. Orta Anadolu'da Değişim ve Muhafazakarlık" (Berlin and Istanbul: European Stability Initiative, September 19, 2005), https://bit.ly/3sOAANk; Oğuz Işık and Melih Pınarcıoğlu, "Turkey: Uncertain Emblem of the Future? Development and Conflict: Two Faces of Local Transformation: The Case of Denizli, Turkey," *City: Analysis of Urban Change, Theory, Action* 1, no. 3–4 (1996): 63–70.

of pro-business urban governance and the rescaling of the state are indeed brought about very much by organized local entrepreneurs.[130]

2.2.2.2 The Study of the Capitalist Class as Business History

Another prevalent version of doing business history with an aggregate unit of analysis is exemplified from an overtly Marxist perspective. This time the aggregation is made in favor of a class analysis which is organized around a periodization of the accumulation process along commerce-led, industry-led, and finance-led patterns. Thus, either dominant sectors within the dominant accumulation patterns or groups of leading companies within them are studied as business history.[131] We would argue that in this literature temporal and sectoral patterns of investment are structurally better discerned and depicted than in the case of the business association approach. Yet methodological and factual insights which could be gained from a systematic and embedded company monograph are not facilitated in this type of Marxist theory-led approach either. Nor can this approach grasp and analyze the interconnectedness of the geography of capitalism, capitalist accumulation, re-scaling, and crisis.

---

130 Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ, "Local Entrepreneurialism and State Rescaling in Turkey," *Urban Studies* 47, no. 2 (2010): 363–85; "Pro-Business Local Governance and (Local) Business Associations: The Case of Gaziantep," *Business and Politics* 13, no. 4 (2011): 1–37.

131 Mustafa Sönmez, *Kırk Haramiler: Türkiye'de Holdingler* (Istanbul: Gözlem Yayıncılık, 1987); Derya Gültekin-Karakaş, *Global Integration of Turkish Finance Capital: State, Capital and Banking Reform in Turkey* (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2008). Since its foundation in 2000, Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı (SAV) had an explicit focus on research on the capitalist class directly and indirectly through the study of think tanks and para-capital state councils: Özgür Öztürk, *Türkiye'de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi* (Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2010); Nuray Ergüneş, *Bankalar, Birikim, Yolsuzluk: 1980 Sonrası Türkiye'de Bankacılık Sektörü* (Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2008); Özlem Tezçek, *Düşünce Fabrikaları: Sermayenin Haricî Belleği* (Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2011); Ayşe Cebeci, *Bilmediğimiz Kapitalizm Gizli Elin Kurumsallaşması: YOİKK* (İstanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2012), and also Emine Yasemin Özdek, *Şirket Egemenliği Çağı: Sosyal Devletten Ceza Devletine* (Istanbul: Notabene Yayınları, 2011). The special issue of the quarterly journal .*Praksis* is dedicated to the analysis "Capital in Turkey since 1990s" and includes important examples to the "class-approach to businesses": Vol. 19, Türkiye'de Sermaye: 1990'lardan Bugüne Temel Eğilimler ve Stratejiler (2011).

2.2.2.3 The Study of Foreign Direct Investments as Business History

We can assert that a non-negligible part of the literature on companies in the Ottoman/Turkish history has been delivered as the study of foreign direct investments into different sectors and this is done with a stress on the "foreign and foreignness of capital."[132] Most of these studies give some information on companies and this, most of the time in form of lists and chronologies. Their focus is mostly on the competition they represent on the nation-scale ("French capital, German capital, inter-imperialist rivalry," etc.), to an allegedly "domestic" capital with intrinsic qualities. Some research is also sectoral-oriented (again by prioritizing the study of "European finance capital"[133]) but again with a stressed sensibility about where this capital came from rather than what these capital groups have moved, or changed geographically, socially and institutionally and motivated by what, in their concrete scales of action. The quasi "diplomatic" relationship between the "home" and "host" states, the concessions granted to capitalists of different "origins," the ratio of direct foreign investments to portfolio investments, the overall macroeconomic effect of inflow of "foreign" capital into "domestic" market, its interaction with the "local" capital and especially with "local" manufacture and its overall political implications are in the foreground of this type of research.

The other side of the study of the foreign concessionaires as a bulk is the study of the formation of "vernacular," or "local," thus Ottoman corporations (*esnaf şirketleri, milli şirketler)* as a local "corporatization movement"

---

132 Ökçün, *1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye*; Orhan Kurmuş, *Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (İstanbul: Bilim Yayınları, 1974); Haydar Kazgan, *Osmanlı'da Avrupa Finans Kapitali* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995); V. Necla Geyikdağı, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Yabancı Sermaye: 1854-1914* (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 2008); Ali Akyıldız, *Anka'nın Sonbaharı: Osmanlı'da İktisadî Modernleşme ve Uluslararası Sermaye* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005); Halil Tunca and Nihat Batmaz, *Doğrudan Yabancı Sermaye Yatırımları ve Türkiye* (Istanbul: Beta Basım Yayım A. Ş., 2005); Şafak Altun, *Türkiye'de Yabancı Sermayenin Tarihsel Gelişimi* (Istanbul: Uluslararası Yatırımcılar Derneği, YASED, 2008).

133 For an influential example of this approach, see: Kazgan, *Osmanlı'da Avrupa Finans Kapitali*. For a more up to date account, see: Hüseyin Al, *Uluslararası Sermaye ve Osmanlı Maliyesi: 1820-1875* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2007).

corresponding more or less to the "origins of Turkish, or Muslim capitalist development."[134] This literature exemplifies a tension between the foreign-domestic poles and displays the domestic companies as an economic response to the dominance of foreign direct investments, flourishing from the late nineteenth century to the post-1908 period. Thus, monographs on the previous period of overtly non-Muslim Ottoman financial entrepreneurship and corporations remains another recent area of research without many antecedents.[135] Despite their valuable contributions to the field of economic history these types of aggregate studies serve rather as portfolios of possible research agendas for business history rather than business history itself which stands out with the company as the consistent unit of analysis, the company archives as the main source which is cross-read with other sources

134 Ökçün, *1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye*; Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Millî İktisat", 1908-1918* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982); Rifat Önsoy, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayii ve Sanayileşme Politikası* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1988); Haydar Kazgan, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Şirketleşme* (Istanbul: Vakıfbank, 1999); Akyıldız, *Anka'nın Sonbaharı*. Two examples of publications transcribing historical sources in Ottoman Turkish are: Celali Yılmaz, ed., *Osmanlı Anonim Şirketleri: Ticaret ve Zıraat Nezareti Tarafından 1918 Yılında Yayınlanmış Olan "Memâlik-i Osmaniye'de Osmanlı Anonim Şirketleri" Başlıklı Katalog* (Istanbul: Scala Yayıncılık, 2011); Ramazan Balcı and İbrahim Sırma, eds., *Memalik-i Osmaniye'de Osmanlı Anonim Şirketleri* (Istanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası Yayınları, 2012).

135 In fact, if this dualistic tension "between foreign/european and domestic/Turkish capital" (implicitly meaning Turkish/Muslim) is dropped, the field of "potential business history research" can be expanded including the literature on "Galata bankers", i.e. Ottoman sarraf houses and other financiers lending en masse to the Ottoman state before the flow of European financial capital after 1853: Haydar Kazgan, *Galata Bankerleri* (Istanbul: Tük Ekonomi Bankası Yayınları, 1991); Nora Şeni and Sophie Le Tarnec, *Camondolar: Bir Hanedanın Çöküşü*, trans. Yaman Aksu (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997); Biltekin Özdemir, *Osmanlı Devleti Dış Borçları: 1854-1954 Döneminde Yüzyıl Süren Boyunduruk. 1854-1914 Borçlanmaları Galata Bankerleri ve Osmanlı Bankası Düyun-u Umumiye İdaresi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kabul Ettiği Osmanlı Devlet Borçları* (Ankara: Ankara Ticaret Odası Yayını, 2009); Başak Ergüder, *Galata Hanları, 1868-1945: Paranın Serüveni* (Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2011); Seçil Uluışık, "A Nineteenth Century Sarraf in the Ottoman Empire: Mıgırdıç Cezayirliyan" (MA Thesis, Istanbul, Koç University, 2011); Murat Hulkiender, *Bir Galata Bankerinin Portresi: George Zarifi, 1806-1884* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2003).

for the sake of spatio-historical contextualization and thus put within a longitudinal research perspective.

2.2.3 *Company Monographs with Varying Approaches as Potential Business History*

This category holds together a heterogenous group of research complying with the following qualities: They all take a public or private company as the unit of analysis and are diametrically opposed to any type of aggregate business approach even if they do not call the result of the study a "company monograph" or their field of study "business history."

First, they are historicist, micro-scale studies in which the historical actors are not derived from theories but from meticulous archival study, at the same time by accounting for the contextualization and the conceptualization of the micro-study.

Second, in one way or the other the archives of the company under question constitute the main source of the research without being obliged to take over the perspective of the company under study.

Third, they all constitute temporally longitudinal studies, yet they have differing approaches to the space of the and formed by the company including a total lack of interest for the question of space and scale.

Fourth, they are the results of scholarly research which does not replicate the perspective or the image scope of the business in question or focus only on the company which is the case in many of the commissioned company monographs.

Within this group the labor history perspective predominates. Some labor historians who are concerned with prioritizing the agency of the workers in historywriting try to evade abstract and aggregate historywriting and focus on the working conditions in a single shopfloor (which is most of the time the productive unit of a company). Thereby they exercise "unintentionally" also business history by scrutinizing in detail company archives, evading abstractions which most of the time substitute historical agency, following the history of a company through a rather long period of time and cross-read sources to contextualize the fortune of the workers within the overall situation of the laboring masses and society.

One of the earliest examples of labor history which at the same could be seen and rewritten as business history refer to the long labor history perspective of the coal mine corporation during the Ottoman Empire and early and late Turkish Republic: Quataert's, Gülboğa's and lastly Sarıkaya's research follow up the working conditions by detailing company strategies, state-company relationships, labor disciplining, productivity measures, local policies and ties of the corporations, investment behavior of the same company over a period of around 180 years.[136] Donald Quataert, the doyen labor historian has also worked on the Anatolian Railway Company.[137] All articles in the Ottoman and Republican Labor History supplement of the *International Review for Social History* except the one on worker's discourses in newspapers during the introduction of the multi-party regime have the potential to be expanded towards business history since they contain detailed descriptions of a single shopfloor of a company and the worker's interaction with and reaction to the policies of these corresponding state and private companies.[138] Hakan Koçak has written a comprehensive study on the glass

136 Donald Quataert, *Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire: The Zonguldak Coalfield, 1822-1920* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006) also see, ; the post-hume article of Quataert, co-authored with David Gutman for a brilliant historicization of the intersection between state power and corporations, "Coal Mines, the Palace, and Struggles Over Power, Capital, and Justice in the Late Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 2 (2012): 215–35; Nurşen Gürboğa, *The Zonguldak Coal Basin as the Site of Contest, 1920-1947: Mine Workers, the Single Party Rule, and War*, Istanbul (İstanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2009), and İbrahim Sarıkaya, "Work and Work Accidents in the Flexible Working Regime: The Zonguldak Hard Coal Basin Case" (MA Thesis, Istanbul, Boğaziçi University, 2012). Ereğli, the district where the coal mine corporation took root starting from the early nineteenth century has been also the object of study for one of the earliest sociological fieldworks on transformation of the rural livelihoods and urbanization. This poses an extraordinary opportunity for the pursuit of a spatially focused, widely contextualizing business history for a very large time span which has not been seized yet: Mübeccel Kıray, *Ereğli: Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası* (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Yayınları, 1964).

137 Quataert, "Limited Revolution."

138 Işıl Acehan, "'Ottoman Street' in America: Turkish Leatherworkers in Peabody, Massachusetts", 19-44; Gülhan Balsoy, "Gendering Ottoman Labour History: the Cibali Régie Factory in the Early Twentieth Century", 45-68; Mustafa Erdem Kabadayı "Working in a Fez Factory in Istanbul in the Late Nineteenth Century: Division of Labour and Networks of

workers during the 65 years existence of the public glass factory until its closure (1935-2000) using extensive company material and detailed analysis of the company-worker-state interface.[139] Görkem Akgöz has written the history of the biggest state cloth factory from the perspective of the formation of a worker's subjectivity, recuperating parts of the company archives.[140] Kurtuluş Cengiz's research on the industrialization of a former village and a district since 1990 (*Hacılar* in *Kayseri)* complies with the prerequisites of business history which is also sensible to the issue of spatial strategies and cultural inclinations within investment strategies.[141] A monograph from the previous century has also important attributes of a proper business history though it deals with an imperial and not a strictly profit-oriented workspace, the Ottoman Imperial Arsenal in the first half of the nineteenth century.[142] On the other hand sight there are some good beginnings which resulted so far in dead-ends in terms of business monograph writing: This is true for the first power plant of Istanbul, the Silahtarağa

---

Migration Formed along Ethno-religious Lines", 69-90; Yavuz Köse, "Vertical Bazaars of Modernity: Western Department Stores and Their Staff in Istanbul (1889–1921)", 91-114; Nurşen Gürboğa, "Compulsory Mine Work: The Single-party Regime and the Zonguldak Coalfield as a Site of Contention, 1940–1947", 115-142; Can Nacar, "'Our Lives Were Not as Valuable as an Animal': Workers in State-Run Industries in World-War-II Turkey," *International Review of Social History* 54, no. Supplement 17: Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labour History (2009): 143–66.

139 M. Hakan Koçak, *Camın İşçileri: Paşabahçe İşçilerinin Sınıf Olma Öyküsü* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014).

140 Görkem Akgöz, *In the Shadow of War and Empire: Industrialisation, Nation-Building, and Working-Class Politics in Turkey*, Studies in the Social History of the Global South, volume 4 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2024).

141 Kurtuluş Cengiz, *Yav İşte Fabrikalaşak. Anadolu Sermayesinin Oluşumu: Kayseri-Hacılar Örneği* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013). Yet another important contribution to labor history dealing with the 'globalized factory in the periphery' implying a theoretical discussion with the global commodity chains does not even consult a single company source: Metin Özuğurlu, *Anadolu'da Küresel Fabrikanın Doğuşu: Yeni İşçilik Örüntülerinin Sosyolojisi* (Istanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, 2008). It thus cannot seize the opportunities that might arise from the hybridization of both company sources and labor anthropology / history.

142 Akın Sefer, "Labor in the Heart of Empire: Workers, Industry and the State in Ottoman Imperial Naval Arsenal, 1839-1876" (PhD thesis, Northeastern University, 2018).

Power Plant which remained intact between 1914 and 1986. Though its archives have been preserved to a considerable extent within the premises of a university which took over the industrial campus and expanded with oral history accounts of former workers is constitutes until now a lost opportunity for business history. Its thin exhibition book gives an idea about the richness of an idle archive which has so far unfortunately only been used for extracting visual snapshots.[143]

In sum, using company archives to write labor history is a quite recent, yet a promising trend in the historywriting of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Factories are therein the preferred unit of analysis, and this unleashes an unintended potential yet unexplored in the Ottoman, or Turkish historywriting:[144]

143 Asu Aksoy, Funda Açıkbaş, and Ayşenur Akman, eds., *Silahtarağa Elektrik Santrali, 1910-2004 / Silahtarağa Power Plant, 1910-2004* (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007). The company archives extracted sur place remained within the hands of the for-profit university company which took over the foundation university in 2009 and no publications based on these archives are known to the author after that, though there are at least two researchers specializing on urban and labor history after the introduction of electricity in Istanbul. Nurçin İleri worked in her PhD on the period before Silahtarağa, thus the infrastructures of and results of electrification on the city, continues her research question concentrating on the period after the opening of the Power Plant: Nurçin İleri, "A Nocturnal History of Fin De Siècle Istanbul" (PhD Diss., Binghamton, State University of New York, 2015); and Erol Ülker, "Class, Nation, and Workers: The Silahtarağa Power Plant in Istanbul, 1914-1928" (The First European Network of Labor History, Torino, Italy, 2015). Its website, which has been immediately closed within a year, is haphazard and does contain a limited number of random documents out of the two millions of different type of documents that the archive is stated to hold: [https://bit.ly/47JFABJ.].

144 The Factory History Working Group was established in 2013 its coordinators were Görkem Akgöz and Nico Pizzolato. It currently constitutes one of the working groups of the European Network of Labor History. The working group comprises scholars working on factory monographs with a historical or an anthropological focus. A recent special issue of the journal *Labor History* was dedicated to Factory History, issue one in 2019. The working group, in which also the author takes part, was renamed 'Workplaces: Pasts and Presents' in 2020 and made a public exhibition and podcast series available under https://workplaces.omeka.net/, hosted by the History Deparment of University of Toronto. It is maintained and enriched with new contributions from historical and anthropological accounts of various workplaces all around the world.

> The factory is such an assembly form while the industrial form of urbanization can be seen as a specific capitalist response to the need to minimize the cost and time for movement under conditions of inter-industry linkages, a social division of labour, and the need to access to both labour and final consumer markets. Individual capitalist, by virtue of their particular locational decisions, shape the geography of production into distinctive spatial configurations.[145]

Seen from this perspective labor history and business history complement each other rather than constituting competing approaches. As Steven Parkins and Steve Ross who have introduced the first "American Business and Labor History" course in 1981 state, the hybridization of both perspectives did pose neither an epistemological nor an ontological problem. On the contrary this fusion helped the "demystification of the complex nature of industrialization. It allows […] to understand and portray capitalist change in human terms, with real men and women –not only the abstract forces of the market or labor and capital—making decisions."[146] The umbrella concept of the traditional Business History Conference and European Business History Association Joint Annual Meeting of 2015 proves another fusion of these two approaches, the study of labor on the one, the study of capital on the other hand sight: "Inequalities: Winners and Losers in Business."[147] Though this organic link between the two approaches has not been established yet in the Turkish academia this does not undervalue the potential cross fertilization of both approaches and their de facto existing parallels in their way of working, their priorities and their research outputs.

Another approach of which business history could be "extracted" constitutes a much less strong current than the labor history approach, yet exemplifies, nonetheless, systematic engagement with company archives

145 Harvey, "The Geopolitics of Capitalism," 146.

146 Steven J. Ross and Edwin J. Perkins, "Integrating Business History and Labor History," *Business and Economic History* 15, Papers Presented at the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Business History Conference (1986): 47.

147 "The 2015 Joint Meeting of the Business History Conference and the European Business History," Conference Announcement, BHC-EBHA Meeting Miami, Florida, 2015, https://bit.ly/3SVvucK.

because of its insistence on the urban remnants of a company as the unit of analysis and a longitudinal perspective.[148] This is the industrial heritage, or urban patrimony approach. Gül Köksal, a conservational architect has studied industrial heritage in general and the over five-hundred-year-old public shipyards at the Golden Horn (*Haliç*), Istanbul in detail. By doing this she also touches upon institutional and technological change within the production unit.[149] The recent team work on the company history of the first Turkish paper factory (SEKA, or Türkiye Selüloz ve Kağıt Fabrikaları İşletmesi) starts with an industrial heritage approach, yet expands the view comprising periods of company decisions, expansion, conflict and closure in connection with the urban history und worker's memories of Izmit.[150] Eser Tutel and Murat Koraltürk are two scholars who have conducted several studies based on the extensive Archives of the Public Maritime Company (1843-2014), sticking mostly to the perspective of urban and naval heritage.[151] The same urban artefact-oriented perspective on businesses is

148 Nurçin İleri, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e İstanbul'da Elektriğin Yolculuğu," in *Elektrik ve İstanbul Elektriğin Geçmişten Günümüze Serüveni*, ed. İBB Kültür A.Ş., İBB Kültür A.Ş. (Istanbul, 2021); Nurçin İleri, "Picturing the Labor Landscape: The Silahtarağa Power Plant and Istanbul's Electrical Infrastructure," Billet, *TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research* (blog), October 26, 2022, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/42129; Nurçin İleri, "Nationalism on the Shop Floor: The Silahtarağa Electric Power Plant in the Early 1920s," Billet, *TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research* (blog), May 18, 2021, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/28794.

149 T. Gül Köksal, "Haliç Tersanelerinin Tarihsel-Teknolojik Gelişim Süreci ve Koruma Önerileri" (MA Thesis, Istanbul, Istanbul Technical University, 1996); also, see: T. Gül Köksal and Zeynep Ahunbay, "İstanbul'daki Endüstri Mirası İçin Koruma ve Yeniden Kullanım Önerileri," *İTÜ Dergisi/a* 5, no. 2 (2006): 125–36.

150 "İzmit'te SEKA'nın Dönüşümü" is a joint project by *Tarih Vakfı* (History Foundation), Heinrich Böll Stiftung and *Kocaeli Dayanışma Akademisi* (Kocaeli Solidarity Academy, KODA), carried out by Fatmagül Eryıldız, Gül Köksal, Hakan Koçak, Aslı Kayhan and Örgen Uğurlu. It is also one of the first examples of only, open source, interactive and online business history: Kocaeli Dayanışma Akademisi, Online Research Project, İzmit'te SEKA'nın Dönüşümü, 2018, https://www.izmitteseka.com; Aslı Kayhan et al., *İzmit Seka'nın Dönüşümü* (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2024), izmitteseka.com/Arsiv.

151 Eser Tutel, *Şirket-i Hayriye* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994); *Gemiler... Süvariler... İskeleler...* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998); *Seyr-i Sefain: Öncesi ve Sonrası* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997); Murat Koraltürk, *Haliç`te Ulaşım ve Haliç Vapurları Şirketi, 1909 - 1941* (Istanbul: Degrade Ajans Reklamcılık ve Yayıncılık, 2005); *Şirket-i Hayriye*.

exemplified in other historiographies of urban utility companies some of which fall under the category of commissioned monographs.[152]

Finally, there is an emerging, explicit business historywriting which exemplifies all the above-mentioned strengths that might emerge from a systematic scrutinization of the evolution of companies from inside throughout a longer period: Koray Yılmaz has written a theoretically-led monograph of one of the companies (Arçelik) that belongs to the oldest capital groups of the republic, the Koç Group which is also crucial as a touch base for the operations of Ford in Turkey since its beginning.[153] In his book, Yılmaz has explicitly dealt with the history of business history overall and its position in the Turkish academia. He has fulfilled his claim to rewrite Turkish economic history of the twentieth century through the concretizations and institutional transformations of the "individual capital," using the Marxist concept. Şenalp dealt with the same holding and shed light on it by following its "trans-nationalization" process as a rescaling process.[154] Janset Özen Aytemur wrote the early evolution of the management ideology and organizational structure of one of the most typical state companies of the early republic, Sümerbank and comes with that research close to internalist approaches within business history.[155] Yavuz Köse's research on Nestlé is a rare historical study which puts the company with its marketing, lobbying, production and employment strategies into the center of study covering the

152 Çelik Gülersoy, *Tramvay İstanbul'da* (Istanbul: İstanbul Kitaplığı, 1989); R. Sertaç Kayserilioğlu, *Dersaadet'ten İstanbul'a Tramvay*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: İ.E.T.T. Genel Müdürlüğü, 1998); R. Sertaç Kayserilioğlu, Mehmet Mazak, and Kadir Kon, eds., *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Havagazının Tarihçesi*, 3 vols. (Istanbul: İGDAŞ Genel Müdürlüğü, 1999); R. Sertaç Kayserilioğlu, *Dersaadet'ten İstanbul'a Tünel*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: İ.E.T.T. Genel Müdürlüğü, 2007); İlhami Yurdakul, *Aziz Şehre Leziz Su: Dersaadet, İstanbul Su Şirketi, 1873-1933* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2010).

153 Koray R. Yılmaz, *Mahalle Bakkalından Küresel Aktöre Arçelik: İşletme Tarihine Marksist Yaklaşım* (Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2010).

154 M. Gürsan Şenalp, *Ulusötesi Kapitalist Sınıf Oluşumu: Türkiye ve Koç Holding Örneği* (Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2012).

155 *Türkiye'de Yönetim Düşüncesinin Erken Dönemleri: Sümerbank (1930-1945)* (Istanbul: Libra Yayıncılık, 2010).

whole period between 1855 and 1923.[156] Furthermore research that emanates from the Company Archives of the Ottoman Bank has paved the way to the establishment of the most comprehensive and well-researched business archives which attests to the production of a series of good-quality scholarly research.[157] The financial and banking history publication series of the Archives and Research Center of the Ottoman Bank has produced masterly written monographs on Trabzon Tobacco Monopoly,[158] the Orosdi-Back chain stores,[159] the Society for the Employment of Women as an Employer,[160] the Zarifi Banker's House,[161] and the Salonica Branch of the Ottoman Bank.[162] Research on railway companies of the Ottoman period which were built around specific project routes and which had organic ties to foreign financial companies has also been a prioritized field of business historical study.[163] The studies of ethnic and paternalist entrepreneurship in the provincial contexts (Erzincan before 1915 and Konya in the 1950s) by

156 *Westlicher Konsum Am Bosporus: Warenhäuser, Nestlé & Co. Im Späten Osmanischen Reich (1855 - 1923)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010).

157 Edhem Eldem, *A History of the Ottoman Bank* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası, 1999).

158 Filiz Dığıroğlu, *Memalik-i Osmaniye Duhanları Müşterekü'l-Menfaa Reji Şirketi: Trabzon Reji İdaresi (1883-1914)* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2007).

159 Uri M. Kupferschmidt, *European Department Stores and Middle Eastern Consumers: The Orosdi-Back Saga* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2007).

160 Yavuz Selim Karakışla, *Women, War and Work in the Ottoman Empire: Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women (1916-1923)* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2005).

161 Hulkiender, *Bir Galata Bankerinin Portresi*.

162 Giannēs Karatzoglou, *The Imperial Ottoman Bank in Salonica: The First 25 Years (1864-1890)* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2003).

163 Donald Quataert's early study has been mentioned earlier: "Limited Revolution". Also, see: Manfred Pohl, *Von Stambul Nach Bagdad: Die Geschichte Einer Berühmten Eisenbahn* (Munich: Piper; Sonderausgabe für die Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank, 1999); M. Metin Hülagü, *The Hejaz Railway: The Construction of a New Hope* (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2010); Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, *Gold, Bankiers Und Diplomaten: Zur Geschichte Der Deutschen Orientbank 1906-1946* (Berlin: Trafo Verlag, 2002); Jonathan S. McMurray, *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001); Jonathan S. McMurray, *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001).

Cora cover all the elemental aspects of workplace oriented business monographs.[164] A rather young publishing house, *Libra Kitapçılık* has also published a series of business monographs on previously marginalized sectors and geographies of investment.[165] Last but not least we should mention a selection from the "Institutional History" series from Tarih Vakfı which use the company archives and various types of vicinal documents in a masterful way so that the disadvantages of commissioned monographs are overcome in favor of scholarly business historical writing.[166]

We can easily state that only the titles which are mentioned under the latter subchapter contain one or more approaches within business history exemplified by Berghoff's synoptic account, i.e.;

- The enterprise as a commercial endeavor,
- finance capital and industrial production,
- businesses as innovators and users of technology,
- organizational capability and comparative advantage,

164 Yasar Tolga Cora, "Female Labor, Merchant Capital, and Resilient Manufacturing: Rethinking Ottoman Armenian Communities through Labor and Business," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 61, no. 3 (2018): 361–95; Yaşar Tolga Cora, "'The New Worker in The New Era': Entrepreneurship and Labor Control in Turkey in the 1950s**," *Reflectiv Journal of Social Sciences* 2, no. 3 (2021): 343–64.

165 Rahime İpek Taşkın, *Orosdi-Back Mağazaları*, Libra Kitapçılık (Istanbul, 2024); Didem Yavuz Velipaşaoğlu, *Crafting an Empire: The Hereke Factory Campus (1842-1914)*, 1st edition, Libra Kitap Tarih, 558 475 (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2023); Mehmet Saya, *Denizcilik sektöründe bir kamu iktisadi teşebbüsü: Denizcilik Bankası Türk Anonim Ortaklığı (1952-1983)*, 1. Basım, Libra kitap Tarih, 531 451 (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2022); Salih Başkutlu, *Osmanlı devleti'nde değirmencilik endüstrisi ve buhar değirmenleri*, 1. basım, Libra kitap Tarih, 525 448 (İstanbul: Libra, 2022); Ruhat Alp, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda bir endüstrileşme hamlesi: modern konserve sektörünün doğuşu (XIX. yüzyılın son çevreğinden XX. yüzyıla)*, 1. basım, Libra kitap Tarih, 524 447 (İstanbul: Libra, 2022); Ruhat Alp, *Bakraçtan Şirkete: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Süt Ile Imtihanı (XIX. Yüzyılın Son Çeyreğinden XX. Yüzyıla)*, 1. basım, Tarih 425 (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2021); Fatih Damlıbağ, *Yedikule Pamuk Ipliği Fabrikasi*, 1. basım, Libra Kitap ; Tarih, 379. 348 (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık Ticaret A.Ş, 2020); M. Emre Kılıçaslan, *Osmanlı Kıyılarındaki Batı: Avusturya Lloyd Buharlı Kumpanyası*, 1. basım, Tarih 312 (Osmanbey, İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık Ticaret A.S, 2019).

166 V. sup., fn.114.

- multinationals in the process of internationalization and globalization,
- firms as a venue of social interaction,
- corporations as cultural institutions,
- companies and entrepreneurs as political actors,
- and the biographical approach (entrepreneurial history),[167]

But we could not infer from what is at hand so far in terms of business history of the Ottoman Empire or Turkey a model that this thesis could follow to stay faithful to its original question: Can we and if yes, how can we take the micro-scale, workplace-based historiography serious to inquire about the re-scaling activities of corporations and the change in the economic geography?

2.2.4 *Why is the Business History Approach So Rare to Find in Turkish Scholarship?*

Obviously, we can at most speak of an "emerging" field of study in business history with so far pioneer yet scanty results especially when compared with the literature in countries of a similar encroachment in business economy.[168] Business monograph is a rarity in the Turkish economic history literature not only for the interwar period, but for the whole period of the evolution of capitalism in this politically confined territory called Turkey. This "state of the art" needs explanation. We would argue that this absence cannot be explained by a simplicist assumption of the slow and late development process of the companies or the private capital in the Ottoman-Turkish geography, an approach, commonly referred to as the "the late-comer or catch-up development" in the literature. According to this approach companies depend on state policies and the bourgeoisie is "nurtured." A substantial segment of the economic history literature embraces these assumptions as a given fact. Ultimately the main explanatory attempt of these approaches boils down to tautological argumentations which substitute for an effort to deal historically with the context-specific, spatial factors behind this historiographical absence. They do, for example, not deal with the question of why the first

167 Berghoff, "Business History."

168 Franco Amatori and Geoffrey Jones, eds., *Business History around the World*, , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

academic monograph of one of the most influential, persistent and oldest capital groups of the country and a "global player," namely the Koç Group was not published before the 2000s though there is neither a "continuity," or an "autonomy" problem of this specific capital group, hosting different "businesses" or "corporations" within its holding structure.[169] The same holds true for contemporary big companies which have become very visible in current political discussions, yet have left no significant traces in social science research in form of monographs, except some commissioned or/and non-scholarly monographs, biographies.[170] Capital and corporations miraculously made themselves nearly invisible in historiography, contributing to the naturalization of capitalism.[171] Thus, behind the methodological suggestion of "bringing back the capital in" there is a need to historicize the capitalist development in proper agency and in its contingent contemporary forms.

We would like to argue that it is not the weakness of business vis-a-vis the state ("the ontology") which explains this reticence but rather the state-centric scholarly tradition, or path dependency ("the epistemology"). The prevailing focus on the state makes the business in Turkey look like far too dependent as if capital could only be studied either in bulk (in the shape of their business associations, regrouped under the umbrella of "foreign direct investments in Turkey" or abstracted as "the capitalist class") and/or in de-

169 Ayşe Buğra, "Non-Market Mechanisms of Market Formation: The Development of the Consumer Durables Industry in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 19 (1998): 1–28; Yılmaz, *Mahalle Bakkalından Küresel Aktöre Arçelik*; Şenalp, *Ulusötesi Kapitalist Sınıf Oluşumu*.

170 Yet an artistic and activist mapping project, networks of dispossession (subtitle: 'What partnerships have been established between the state and corporations that dispossess the commmons in Turkey?') has proven the strength of displaying capital and state institutions at one glance. Their interactive mapping project of capital-state relations in recent urban and infrastructrural projects has the potential to serve as an academic hypothesis generation and holistic research design project: "Mülksüzleştirme Ağları," Online Project, Sermaye-İktidar İlişkileri Üzerine Kolektif Veri Haritalama, 2013, https://mulksuzlestirme.org/ Based on Graph Commons [www.graphcommons.com].

171 Aslı Odman, "Dev-Şirketler Ve Güçlülerin Suçları," in *Salgın Sonrası Dönemde İnsan Hakları Gündemi - Sempozyum Bildirileri, 20-23 Mayıs 2021* (Istanbul: Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, 2021), 20–31.

rivative form (secondary to state economic policies and derivative of/in response to them). The power of the "casing" approach does not seem to be discovered for or applied to the study of corporations.[172] So the epistemological question about where we get our data from and what scale we situate our perspective at when we study economic history becomes crucial when we question the absence of company monographs and plead for an improvement in quantity and quality.

This perspective change might give us new insights which the dominant narratives of Turkish economic history which take a binary opposition between state policy and capital (or the world economy) for granted, are hardly able to tackle. As referred to above the pioneering research on the early republican economy emerged within a state centered climate of historywriting and it has put the depiction of the economic policies and other actions of the Turkish state at the center of its narrative. The economic policy of the state was the criterion according to which economic history was periodized. Thus, the state action, concretized in economic policy models was tagged as "liberal, *étatic*," etc. Investment and other actions of capital and the corporations as its organized form were usually derived from it. As a result, their concrete actions as historical agents which only make sense within rescaling processes remained at best a behavioral derivation of the tag under study. With other words, the unanimous unit of analysis; the "Turkish state," i.e., the statically aggregated national scale dominates over the myriad scales of action of different agents during the period under study. This approach can be called, without underestimating the important analytical and empirical contributions it delivered, as "Turkish Economy" approaches, stressing the adjective "Turkish" meaning the "state." Common to them is a macro-economically focused assumption of a national development process which is equated with the evolution of capitalism even when

172 Howard S. Becker, "'Casing' and the Process of Social Inquiry," in *What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*, ed. Charles C. Ragin and Howard Saul Becker (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 217–26; Howard S. Becker, "Orada Ne Oluyor: Bir Vakadan Yola Çıkarak Her Şeyle İlgili Akıl Yürütmek," in *Peki ya Mozart? Peki Ya Cinayet? Vakalar Üzerinden Akıl Yürütmek*, trans. Özlem Alioğlu Türker and Ebru Arıcan (Ankara: Heretik Yayınları, 2017), 17–65.

it implies, or is based on a critique of the national(ist) historiographical approach.[173] In sum it would not be an exaggeration to "state" that the majority of the literature on Turkish economic history has a very high level of abstraction and operates with aggregate concepts of *the* economic and *the* politic.

Consequently, we can establish that capital and corporations have not sufficiently been analyzed in their historical reconfiguration, and on their own right. This is even more true for the interwar period which is usually divided into two temporal "tags;" one, liberal for the 1920s acting as a prelude to the "essential" interwar policy in the 1930s, which is étatism. It is striking to see that Gündüz Ökçün's aggregate research which is indeed very rich in empirical detail on companies of the interwar period has so far not served as a research portfolio and has not led to the compilation of various company monographs.[174] The same holds true for the 1930 book by Tahsin

173 It is interesting to note that the titles most of the meanwhile classical books dealing with 20th century economic history from different perspectives start with the designations "state" or "Turkey". This is yet another indicator that the unit of analysis is de facto equated with the national scale of the analysis, thus the national scale = the state: Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik (1923-1950): İktisadi Düşünceler ve İktisadi Mevzuat* (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü, 1962); *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985* (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1988); Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London and New York: Verso, 1987); Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950*; Buğra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey*; Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yentürk, *Türkiye Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1994); Gülten Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan XXI. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi: Birinci Küreselleşmeden, İkinci Küreselleşmeye* (Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1999); Oktay Yenal, *Cumhuriyet'in İktisat Tarihi* (Istanbul: Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası, 2001); Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Tarihi, 1900-1960* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003). A prominent portrait of the state of the art on the economic development literature of the Ottoman/Turkish geography during the 20th century can be found in: Şevket Pamuk and Reşat Kasaba, eds., "Economic Change in Twentieth-Century Turkey: Is the Glass More Than Half Full?," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey. Turkey in the Modern World*, vol. 4, 4 vols. (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 266–300.

174 Ökçün, *1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye*.

and Saka and 1974 book by Kurmuş. Both contain rich empirical data which can be split into much telling company monographs.[175]

2.2.5 *Global business history as world history*

To question this significant absence at that point is not an end in itself, rather it should serve us to sustain one of the main suggestions of this thesis: We are convinced that if we give agency to capital and corporations, develop the unit of analysis according to the scales that unfold while doing the research instead of taking a presumably the fixed national sovereign space for granted, work with company archives and read the contemporary public (state and periodical) archives from the lenses of the company with the tools of relational spatial inquiry we might gain glimpses into unresearched areas, question the valid periodization opening and closing research agendas and develop new and relevant research questions for the historiography of the Ottoman and Republican period. This is even truer in case of a systematic research on the activities of the multinational corporations, with their capacity to move capital and technology rapidly from place to place, "to tap different resources, labor and consumer markets, while organizing their own territorial division of labor and resources [and which] derives much of their power from their own capacity to command space and use geographical differentials in a way that the family firm could not."[176]

Thus, the stress on "company monograph" is not motivated by a concern of simply occupying another academic niche within economic history but takes shape in the light of the methodological priority of taking the study of territoriality as the main occupation of historywriting, dealt with length in the first subchapter on space. The (global) company monograph, the contextualized analysis of its investments, the analysis of how it moves capital, labor into and inside the workplace, technology, and relations with the political institutions at different scales allows us to write a spatio-temporally sensitive, entangled history. It has the potential of showing the insufficien-

175 Hamit Tahsin and Remzi Saka, *Sermaye Hareketi* (Istanbul: Türk Ocağı Koleksiyonu; Amedi Matbaası, 1930); Kurmuş, *Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi*.

176 Harvey, "The Geopolitics of Capitalism," 142.

cies of pre-set labels about "how capitalism or state policies work at all" in a very general and abstract way. That is why we argue that the history of FMC Istanbul, which was nonetheless one of the biggest corporations, active in Turkey in terms of invested capital and employed workforce during that period helps us to see through the dynamics and power constellation of its period. The "local" branch of one of the biggest industrial multinationals of the interwar period, namely the FMC Istanbul is the unit of analysis at which global, national, and local scales intermesh.

Furthermore, this thesis not only tries to look at the economic history of the interwar period in Turkey from a business history perspective, but from a global business history perspective.[177] Globalization is internationalization of production, an important drive-in spatial expansion and re-scaling. Global business history constitutes both the history of the globalized firms allowing us to scrutinize the global entanglements and networks they build, and also the globally scaled history of businesses, which sees the emergence, projects, failures, successes, shortly put the accumulation processes of the companies interrelated on the global context. As Mira Wilkins, a prominent business historian who also co-edited the first and most comprehensive study on Ford's investment activities abroad[178] states that writing Ford's international history is writing world history since

> [...] its business activity emerged in a context of changing economic conditions. […] Its structure as a multinational enterprise had evolved over time, altering according to new conditions internal and external to the organization […] Ford had through foreign direct investments spread its products and introduced its production methods worldwide.[179]

177 Alfred D. Chandler and Bruce Mazlish, eds., *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History* (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

178 Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill, *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964).

179 Mira Wilkins, "Ford among Multinational Companies," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 73.

Making the business history of one of the global operations of FMC enables us the opportunity to write a "coeval" global history by scrutinizing on concrete entanglements of a single investment of the company. It furthermore enables us to abstain from abstractions like "late-comers in capitalism, catch-up development," etc., which postulate a historiographical thinking in evolutionary stages and a modernist teleology.

The emergence of and periodization debate within globalization studies is the topic of the next subchapter. Yet at that point, it must be mentioned that the study of multinationals has not been the most popular form for studying globalization in Turkey. The global scale analysis was introduced into the heart of the Turkish economic history mainly by way of the "World System Approach."[180] The wide application of this approach has pushed the agency of the narrative from the Turkish state to the global context in the shape of an omnipresent world economy. Yet the world economy studies as defined as such did not systematically deal with the multinational companies or with the concrete chains of transmission where these global actors touched the "ground," i.e., in the shape of global commodity/supply chains and the new geography of capitalism.[181] This thesis sets itself an aim to display the preliminary results of what happens if the perspective is firstly focused and then intensified by way of a micro-study with a focus on the strategic planning of a multinational company, namely FMC in a concrete location of production. This micro-study sets itself as an aim to be informed both global and local spatial context. The new production methods introduced by the Ford Motor Company in the 1910s and later its internationalized sales and production network had a global impact per se.

180 Asım Karaömerlioğlu, "Bağımlılık Kuramı, Dünya Sistemi Teorisi ve Osmanlı/Türkiye Çalışmaları," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 91 (2002 2001): 81–99.

181 The most prominent and early example of the application of the world economy approach to the Early Modern Turkish historiography was Çağlar Keyder's *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy* The subchapters of this book shows that the analytical framework is organized according to the macroeconomic sectors, agriculture, manufacture, trade, finance and their modes of integration into the world economy. At that level of abstraction only the names of corporations (multinational or national) can just be dropped and their investment patterns cannot be analyzed in detail. Thus, the rationale of their investment behaviours are derived in aggregate form from the structure of the world economy.

Thus, this thesis looks at the intermeshing of scales where this form of globalization is concretized. Thereby, we will not try to dwell solely on the single company scale, i.e., Detroit or Tophane, but try to go after the depiction of the interactions between the different scales of decisions that gave birth to the first automotive plant in Turkey and its subsequent failure referring to the projections made by Ford itself.

§ 2.3 Time: Placing the Interwar Period or "Since When Is Ford Fordist?"

The problematization of space and agency inevitably leads us to the following sets of temporal questions about the periodization. Problematizing the temporal order into which the Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul was embedded invites us to think about the dominant periodization of the economic history of the Early Republic, by taking territoriality as leverage. This implies an immediate questioning of the progressivist temporal conceptions which evolve around the ups and downs of binary oppositions, or around consecutive cycles of globalization / de-globalization; liberalism / etatism; Fordism / post-Fordism, or other linear assumptions about stages of capitalist development which are mostly derived from either intrinsic attribute assigned to state policies or "nature" of cycles in capitalism.

Thus, the umbrella term "linear progressivist periodization patterns" account here for theoretical assumptions about "stages of Turkish economic development" that substitute each other consecutively. The baseline of those assumptions is that liberal and *étatic* phases alternate throughout the twentieth century economic history of the Turkish Republic as binary opposites.

Ford Istanbul does not fit into this dominant economic historical chronology in two aspects. Firstly, it does not fit into the temporal explanation pattern of the de-globalized interwar period, with its vast territory transgressing national borders. Neither does the existence of this four hundred-workers big industrial enterprise fit into the narrative of the commerce-led and not-yet industrial economic period of the 1920s in Turkey. Thus, if one wants to stick to these prevalent periodizations, Ford Istanbul needs to be designated either premature in terms of the industrial history of Turkey, the

history of the free-zones[182] or the history of export-orientation of Turkey, or belated in terms of the long globalization period of the late nineteenth century with the preponderance of port-city networks and unrestricted access of foreign capital to the Empire up until the World War I. Yet our aim in this subchapter is not to find out whether the assembly plant was "premature" or "belated" but to question this very periodization that leads to these normative labels like "pre-industrial, post-global, or de-global." Furthermore, it will be argued that this assumption of a temporal anomaly is the reason behind the fact that the history of this ambitious, significant, and centrally located assembly plant had not been written so far. In this respect the "discovery" of this unwritten chapter of early modern Turkish industrial history through this thesis cannot be attributed to an intensive search of the author for an "unexplored case" but rather through the theoretical and methodological perspectives opened in the questioning of passed on frames of analysis for the period under question.

The geography of capitalism and the interaction between the economic borders (spaces of accumulation) and the political borders (spaces of monetary, resource and labor etc., regulation) were undergoing radical and rapid changes during the interwar period. This also helps us to shift the category of space into our focus as something that cannot be taken for granted as most of the linear periodizations of presumed stages and shifts in the economic ideologies do. The concept of the territoriality or territorial change helps us to move away from a linear periodization and a chronological understanding according to which the case of FMC Istanbul appears as an anomaly. To put it with different words the spatial approach and the perspective of re-scaling gives meaning to the assumed temporal anomaly. The story of the FMC in Istanbul will be thus used as a lever to question the current periodization of the "capitalism" in the Early Republican era and the

182 The first export-oriented and realized free zone law dates 1987 and was situated in the Mediterranean port of Mersin: İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Serbest Üretim Bölgelerinin Doğuş ve Dönüşümü* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1987), 88–100. See the unpublished conference paper: Aslı Odman, "Tophane'den Mersin'e, Ford'dan Foxconn'a Türkiye'de Serbest Bölgeler" (Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Serbest Bölgeler Konferansı, Mersin, 2010), https://bit.ly/46soI1g.

implications of such a periodization in introducing and excluding research questions.

2.3.1 *Globalization, de-globalization and re-globalization*

The following periodization of globalization into the following periods is widely accepted in the historiography of the World Economy;

- imperialist globalization before 1930,
- de-globalization/Fordism after 1930,[183]
- and current globalization since the 1970s.[184]

Their common denominator is not so much the emergence of and withdrawal from globalization, much less a mechanic interplay between the "national" and the "global" as if these two were mutually exclusive. But they rather point out to rupture periods during which economic activities or accumulation spaces are "rescaled," according to Harvey.[185] Harvey sees rescaling of economic activities, shifting, decomposing, and recomposing accumulation spaces as the latest round of spatial fix for a crisis-ridden capitalist economy to resolve profit crisis of the capitalist system. The quality, scope and intensity of rescaling are the changing factors based on the common denominator of the historical system. He also argued in *Condition of Postmodernity* (1989) that

183 Theorists who see 1930's as the start of the deglobalization of globalization point out above all the bourgeois port cities, free zones, Mediterranean trade networks as distinctive features of globalization: Çağlar Keyder, "Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and in Republican Turkey, ca. 1900-1950," in *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950*, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 123–64; David Held et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999).

184 David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, "The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction," in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, ed. David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 1 ff.

185 Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, 413 ff.

> under capitalism time-space compression is accelerated in great bursts following major profit squeezes and market crises, during which capitalists seek technical innovations (e.g. steamships and railway trains, radio and electric power, TVs and computers, [IT technology in general, but also new legislative frameworks providing for swifter flows of capital and investments into contested domains]) that could accelerate capital's "turnover time" and speed realization of profit and reinvestment.[186]

Thus, any analysis of the rescaling and restructuring processes of production and consumption has at the same time to cope with the existing dominant periodization patterns of modes, stages, models, and crises.[187]

The globalization during the classical Gold Standard Era has been touched upon also in terms of the spatial order it brought about. In this discussion, world cities have been the site of special research interest both before the World War I and after the crisis in 1970s as "control centers for the flows of information, cultural products, and finance that collectively sustain the economic and cultural globalization of the world."[188] For example port-cities of the Ottoman imperial period were analyzed as nodal points of the world capitalist economy, usually contrasting it to the later period of national spatial consolidation.[189] Generally, the port-cities of the imperial era

186 Robert J. Antonio and Alessandro Bonanno, "A New Global Capitalism? From 'Americanism and Fordism' to 'Americanization-Globalization,'" *American Studies* 41, no. 2/3 (2000): 44.

187 Peter J. Taylor, Michael J. Watts, and R. J. Johnston, "Global Change at the End of the Twentieth Century," in *Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World in the Late Twentieth Century*, ed. R. J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor, and Michael J. Watts (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 7 ff.

188 Paul L. Knox, "World Cities and the Organization of Global Space," in *Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World in the Late Twentieth Century*, ed. R. J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor, and Michael J. Watts (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 329. More for "world-city hypothesis", see: Knox and Taylor, "World Cities and Territorial States."

189 Çaglar Keyder and Faruk Tabak, eds., *Osmanlı'da Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım*, trans. Zeynep Altok (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998); Çağlar Keyder, Y. Eyüp Özveren, and Donald Quataert, "Port-Cities in the Ottoman Empire: Some Theoretical and Historical

have been also compared with the global cities of the current period, of which the key spatial aspects are summarized as follows:

> Today, with the globalization of the economy, the key roles of the world cities are concerned less with the deployment of imperial power and the orchestration of trade and more with transnational corporate organizations, international banking and finance, supranational government, and the work of international agencies.[190]

This kind of a comparison does not necessarily mean equalizing important qualitative differences like the dominance of commercial-financial; industrial-financial capitalism in the former and the predominance of high value-added, expanding product markets, international finance organizations in the latter, or in terms of the leading sectors and profit margins. It rather serves as an invitation to look for more appropriate criteria and units of analysis for periodizations to understand changing dynamics within capitalism in a non-deterministic, non-teleological, contingent manner.

Keeping this aim in mind it is evident that the "globalization debate" after the 1970s has not always questioned the fixed understanding of space ("container-space") and thus more than often ascribed to a state-centered approach to territory. The canonical definition of globalization stated that the flows of information, capital and labor have rendered the territoriality of the national state meaningless and led to new regionalism as if those constituted fixed scales with predefined borders. This dissertation aims to show on empirical material that "globalization or territorial state" is a false dichotomy for the period under study and the factory under analysis here cannot be made intelligible within the dominant periodization of the economic history of the Republican Turkey which takes this dualism for granted.

Perspectives," *Review* 16, no. 4 (1993): 519–58; Çağlar Keyder, Y. Eyüp Özveren, and Donald Quataert, eds., *Doğu Akdeniz'de Liman Kentleri, 1800-1914*, trans. Gül Çağalı-Güven (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994).

190 Knox, "World Cities and the Organization of Global Space," 329.

Another widely discussed issue is whether the globalization since 1970s is a historically unique phenomenon.[191] The skeptics of the "uniqueness" thesis argue, drawing on evidence of world flows of trade, investment and labor from the nineteenth century, that the levels of current integration have not reached the levels of the classical Gold Standard Era yet and the regulatory power of the nation states still endure.[192] Evading the "charge of presentism," as Dicken puts it[193] one has to ask for historical path-dependencies. This means to consciously introduce criterion that will serve as the common denominator for comparison: Globalization, if defined as general as widening, deepening, and speeding up worldwide interconnectedness, medieval trade networks as well as the most recent instant financial networks between global cities would be treated under the same context. Thus, we need to specify where we grasp the phenomenon of "interconnectedness." The preference of this thesis will be to look at the "territoriality," i.e., the spatial aspect of integration, and disintegration and not take the historical evolution of Ford's strategies as part of a pre-set succession, or progression of periods of globalization and de-globalization. Thereby globalization as a process is defined as a new round of territorial setting introduced by rupture periods, such as wars and crisis that slowly "sneak into" the "normality of a period." To be able to compare periods of globalization one must scrutinize meticulously the changes in the spatial interconnections and exclusions and their dynamics.

Brenner, in his masterfully written article, summarizes the different attempts at grasping the current globalization with the help of Lefebvre's

191 David Held et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999), esp. 1 ff.; 414 ff.

192 Ibid., 5 ff.; this is specifically true for the port of Istanbul, see: Gelina Harlaftis and Vassilis Kardasis, "International Shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea Istanbul as a Maritime Centre 1870–1910," in *The Mediterranean Response to Globalization Before 1950*, ed. Sevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 233–65.

193 Peter Dicken, *Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy*, 7th ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2015), 14 ff.

framework of spatial scales.[194] To operationalize this Lefebvrien framework and to map historically the spatio-temporal and organizational dimensions of the globalization of business activity we need to examine firstly the environmental and infrastructural conditions underpinning the process of globalization of production under analysis, as Held and others argue.[195] Terms like "de-globalization" and "second globalization" should not mask that there is continuity in the reconfiguration of capitalist territorialities.[196]

In the Late Ottoman, and Early Turkish historiography there is another strong paradigm which situates the 1920s mainly within external dynamics and analyses it as a continuation of the late nineteenth century Ottoman way of integration into the world capitalist economy. This "peripheral integration" paradigm takes the -unequal- spatial fixity of political units for granted and depicts the global world economy as an arena of quasi preset unequal spaces of accumulation and political domination; as so much as a quasi-mechanistic up and down between center and periphery. Yet territorial fixity is, according to Maier, not something that was given but something that was step by step produced and destroyed during the period between 1860-1970s and 1980s. This "process of emergence" is, again according to Maier, where historical analysis should start with, problematizing and depicting its contingency and not simply take it for granted. This thesis aims at analyzing the emergence of a different form of territoriality during the interwar period departing from change in the industrial planning of a global automotive company that first chose and then abandoned Istanbul as a node in its production network. Thus, it tries to make intelligible the shift of FMC from a global assembly system aiming at a "Universal Car" to a multidomestic manufacturing system which takes the "domestic economies" into account in terms of local inputs, customs regulations, exchange barriers and market specificities during the tumultuous interwar period. The drive for economic nationalism, etatism or autarchy emanated from inside, transferred and em-

194 Brenner, "Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical"; for his main oevre on the topic itself: Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*.

195 Held et al., *Global Transformations*, 1999, chap. 5, esp. 237 ff.

196 See: Niall Ferguson, "Sinking Globalization," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2005): 64–77; which considers similarities between the pre-1914 and the current period of globalisation.

ulated the fordist mass-production coming from the other side of the Atlantic, yet was not its rejection.

At that point we better differentiate between the terms "Fordist" and "Fordian," two terms which are sometimes interchangeably used, causing disambiguation. The term "Fordist" in this thesis mainly relates to a period between the end of the interwar interlude up to the Oil Crisis beginning of the 1970s in a specific geography, called the Atlantic capitalist space. The term emanates mainly from the "Americanism/Fordism" analyses of an interwar contemporary political thinker, Antonio Gramsci[197] in his *Prison Notebooks* between 1929 and 1935. His teachings were later systematized by the French regulationist school, following a revival by British and Continental thinkers at the dawn of the presumed coherent period of Fordism,[198] i.e., during the 1970s,[199] yet applied to a different and much bigger scale. "The European reaction to Americanism [...] must be examined attentively. Analysis of it will provide more than one element necessary for understanding the present situation of a series of states of the old continent and the political events of the post-war period."[200]

Yet the term "Fordian" is related to the factory-scale social, cultural, financial and technological innovations exemplified in a single company, the FMC, in form of mass production, moving assembly line, social engineering of workers and "Five-Dollar-Day" roughly around 1914.[201] In fact Gramsci

197 Antonio Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism," in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: International Publishers Co., 1971), 277–321.

198 This connects us directly with the famous Owl of Minerva quote by the nineteenth-century philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, writing in 1820 during an important transition period of centrali-zation of power. He noted that " [...]When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by meansof grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takesits flight only when the shades of night are gathering"; meaning that philoso-phy comes to understand a way of life just as it passes away: *Philosophy of Right*, trans. S. W. Dyde (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001), 20.

199 Antonio and Bonanno, "A New Global Capitalism?"

200 Cited in, Charles S. Maier, "Society as Factory," in *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 22.

201 Marie Claude Bélis-Bergouignan, Gérard Bordenave, and Yannick Lung, "Ford: Une Sratégie Trans-Régionale," *Réalités Industrielles: Une Série Des Annales Des Mines*, October

analyzed the hegemony formation in the factory, i.e., the "Fordian" system and how future-oriented this system would be for world capitalism, yet called it "Fordism" implying an affirmative stance towards wide-spread adaptation with regional specificities. The time-lag between the factory-scale (Detroit) and the Atlantic-scale and beyond, namely the relation between the "Fordian" and the "Fordist" does not constitute a simple expansion and extended application process by way of the so-called "Americanism." Rather this supposed time-lag lies at the heart of the temporal question of how the economic geography changes and how re-scaling happens on a global level beyond a diffusionist model, a question to which this thesis tries to contribute by way of a historical evaluation of Ford Tophane.[202]

2.3.2 *Fordist Model or Fordian Model?*

The first section of moving assembly line for chassis, quintessence for "Fordism," was installed at Highland Park, Detroit in February 1914 and the full chassis assembly line was running in April 1914. This turn also corresponds to a change in the wage and social policy of the FMC which is mostly treated under the catchy name "Five-Dollar Day."[203] The powered chassis assembly line at Trafford Park, (Manchester, England) which was the first outside North America, was installed between April and August 1914.[204] This rapid transfer of technology meant more than a mere geographical relocation. It would turn out to be the trial-and-error phase of a new socio-cultural and industrial model as exemplified in the Americanism and Fordism discussion

---

1991, 39–45; "Le Mirage de La Territorialisation de La Grande Entreprise. Le Redéploiement Spatial de Ford," *Révue d'économie Regionale et Urbaine*, no. 3 (1993): 527–44; *Les Métamorphoses de La Ford Motor Company: De l'entreprise Pyramidale à La Firme-Réseaux ?* (Bordeaux, France: IERSO, 1991); "Ford Est-Il Toujours 'Fordiste'?," *Revue d'economie Industrielle*, no. 52 (1990): 23–38.

202 For a masterful discussion of this non-mechanistic expansion effect between the factory-scale and scale of (global) society, see: Maier, "Society as Factory."

203 Daniel M. G. Raff and Lawrence H. Summers, "Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?," *Journal of Labor Economics* 5, no. 4 (1987): 57–86.

204 Steven Tolliday, "The Rise of Ford in Britain: From Sales Agency to Market Leader, 1904-1980," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, vol. 2 (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 49.

by Gramsci which would later relate to discussions about a new spatial and social order. The most salient qualities of a whole period of Atlantic economic history after World War II, namely "Fordism," leant on the business strategies, which were developed within a long trial-and-error process between 1913 and 1945 mainly on the FMC's assembly plants both in USA and abroad.

The change in the employment practices and wage policy of the FMC in its hometown, Detroit is part of this transformation. The production technologies, designs and employment practices of the FMC have become worldwide references during the interwar period and formulated in a compact way mainly after the World War II. Thus, it is also worth questioning the dynamics starting from the second half of the 1910s that led the FMC to develop Fordian mass production, demand management and marketing methods in its US plants, its selective adaptation abroad within different spatial frames and contrast it with the national Fordism(s) of the post-World War II period. There is a rich, both contemporary[205] and "posthume"[206] literature on Fordism/Americanism and the Americanization of the production methods in Europe,[207] starting with Antonio Gramsci in the end of the 1920s, which considers Fordism not only as an economic innovation but takes it as the banner of an overall change in the mode of capitalist political regulation. This literature questions the relationships among the crisis of the liberal capitalism in the interwar years, peak of the labor movement, rise of the "illiberal,"[208] fascist, Keynesian as well as social democratic, corporatist and communist states. Thus, following the trial-

205 Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism."

206 For a broader discussion of the term, see: David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 141–72.

207 See: Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel, eds., *Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking Us Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).

208 Stefan Link, "Rethinking the Ford-Nazi Connection," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington DC* 49 (2011): 135–50, and "Transnational Fordism. Ford Motor Company, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union in the İnterwar Years" (PhD Diss., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, 2012).

error processes of the FMC and the shift from Fordian to Fordist may give us precious clues about the spatial and social transformation of capitalism in the twentieth century. In this sense "the Fordian factory microcosmos was the harbinger to the Fordist national macrocosmos" yet the process did not imply a simple temporal diffusion (a "quasi self-explanatory technology transfer")[209] but a qualitative transformation of economic geography, i.e., rescaling activities that need to be accounted for in the historical construction of the interwar period. Relatedly, it is worth looking at these carefully to see the "macroeconomic and -political development" in the micro development.

Thus, we cannot understand the system of Fordism as a master project that was designed by the global economic actor the Ford Motor Company in the interwar period which was then "just to be spread over to the world economy." As the case of the global oriented assembly plant network in the 1920s reveal, Ford Motor Company's practices of internationalization in the interwar period were not Fordist at all, as defined as a peculiar interplay between a regime of accumulation and mode of regulation in a national-bound "domestic" territory. Ford aimed at a world car, both in terms of marketing territories, input materials and brand image. Furthermore, the implicit ar-

209 Stefan Link, "Transnational Fordism. Ford Motor Company, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union in the İnterwar Years" (PhD Diss., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, 2012), iii. Link critizes in his PhD thesis dominant explanations about the spread of fordist practices, technology and ideas in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the interwar period: "the *'previous accounts of the global success of Fordism, which subsume the story under the spread of American market capitalism or portray it as a process of quasi-self-explanatory technology transfer.'* This thesis shares the critique of the linear conception of the diffusionist technology transfer approaches which can be subsumed under the precept 'Americanization', yet its focus is more on the how's and why's of the political reconfiguration during the interwar area that can be approached by following the trial and error processes of the FMC itself and not so much on the contemporary local inspirations it gave to 'illiberal regimes' of the time. Thus the stress on 'illiberal regimes' is replaced in my research by the stress on the shared productivist, progressivist and developmentalist approach which brought Nazi and Soviet economic doctrines and elites close to the Ford Motor Company. This tendency is butressed by the concrete need of those geographies for the final commodity, i.e. motor vehicles not only as consumer products but also as means of production, war and circulation thus as such as accelerators of capital accumulation."

gument of "the spread of Fordism" after the World War II has a methodological affinity to the ahistorical and personifying assumption of the "spread of the industrial sprit" through British imperialism, concretized in the "unbound Prometheus" approach;[210] to explain the teleologically linear but unequal processes of industrialization which have been profoundly criticized in literature. So, this thesis has opted to look instead at the concrete interrelations, transfer chains and especially their spatial aspects in the interwar period in a historicist manner to understand how the "Fordian" system of a company failed and eventually evolved to a Fordist system in some geographies of the world forming a "brave new territoriality."

To put it with different words, during the 1920s when the company made the decision to make Istanbul a production node of a huge territory, Ford was not Fordist. It did become one through a trial-and-error process of which the failure of the greenfield investment in Istanbul makes part. The 1920s is the beginning of the move of Ford from an attempted "Universal Car" to national cars, from a multinational assembly model to multidomestic production. The raison d'étre of the erection of assembly plants was more to circumvent the higher import tariffs for completely built units and less the search for closeness of productive facilities to national consumer markets. Before the rupture roughly around 1928, the productions costs plus the freight rates via maritime routes for knocked down parts was lower than producing them in another city then Detroit. This was the period when the *Salıpazarı* spot of the Galata customs at the port of Istanbul, became the main locus of assembly activities of automotives, but also for other consumer durables.[211] With protectionist walls slowly but steadily rising during the 1920s and 1930s Ford had better be inside each national border before they erected the customs walls. It also made persistent lobbying activities for favorable regulative structures for its assembly units.

---

210 David S. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

211 Yılmaz Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü: Türkiye'de Otomotiv Sanayii Nasıl Kuruldu? Anılar-Belgeler-Fotoğraflar* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996), 22 ff.

We would handle the specific case of the FMC Tophane, Istanbul within the context of Ford's global strategies also to attempt at a contextualization of capital-state relations in Turkey during that period which, as briefly stated above, has either been neglected or been evaluated as a relation unfolding between the Turkish state elites and an amorphous World System. The evolution of and qualitative change in capital-state relations is an important part of what is called "modernity." In this research, historical change induced through modernity, in other words, modernity which designates a different temporality and spatiality of historical change should be grasped through the analysis of the new production methods introduced in Tophane by the FMC within a global production, and sales network logic, to the extent of which cars, trucks and tractors are integrated into the daily life and of the changing local strategies of Ford managers to sell their commodities. The lack of an effective domestic demand, supporting infrastructure, corresponding workforce, and thus "Fordism" in general in Turkey makes this case even more promising to question the assumed periodization of capitalism. How did the Fordian enclave at Tophane come into being and how did it function?

2.3.3 *Peculiarity of the 1920s*

The "Roaring" or "Golden" 20s was a decade of a contingent transformation from an "open-door" policy of economic investment territories which was partly politically interrupted by World War I but partly fueled by it. It witnesses the subsequent introduction of trade restrictions (currency controls, protectionist measures, barter, and clearing agreements to bypass them) which would fully develop and dominate the 1930s. The steps leading to the investment decision of FMC for an assembly plant in Istanbul were taken within a surely optimistic interpretation of the future bringing forth "business as usual," typical attitude of the ruling classes:

> Because of its messianic promise and its recognition of the disequilibrium between industrial potential and real income distribution, Technocracy did respond to felt needs, but it grew not out of the flush of American economic success, but out of the crisis of capital-

> ism; it exemplified the quackery of despair, not the vision of triumph. In fact, the conditions of the Depression necessarily undermined all Americanist industrial Utopias. [...] At least until the Second World War and its aftermath, America's model of industrial productivity lost its catalytic inspiration. Not that Roosevelt's social experimentation would not attract followers, but the supreme confidence in technology and production, in engineering as social redemption, perished with the other dreams of the twenties.[...] Prescriptions for management hardly disappeared in the Depression, even if Taylorism and Fordism lost their luster. In some ways business ideologies actually became more grandiose and imperial in their implications- imperial in the sense that increasingly the task of imposing order in the factory seemed impossible unless the encompassing political economic milieu was also to be transformed.[212]

Before delving into the historical parts about how Ford Istanbul unfolded there is at least one more aspect that should be singled out. The 1920s constitute a trial-and-error period with forking paths, expectations ("dreams") and some strong tendencies (like the American industrialism) which the historical actors faced, but it did not pose a closed model with a defined center to copy from. 1920s are clearly classified as a period which deserves special attention by Maier, who masterfully analyzes the pace and space of reception of American industrialist ideologies Fordism and Taylorism in the interwar period in Western Europe.

Emanating from a perspective which includes contingency and opts for a spatial historicist narrative the relevant questions of this thesis are as follows: Can we situate the 1920s within the wider context of the globalization cycle between 1860 and 1929 as the peak of the long formation period of territoriality in the sense that Maier put it?[213] If this is true then the interna-

212 Charles S. Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 52–53. Maier refers here to: Howard Scott and Continental Committee on Technocracy, *Introduction to Technocracy* (New York: John Day Company, 1933), "which struck a chord in Europe."

213 Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History."

tionalization of production can be investigated through the change in the spatial strategies and patterns of investment of multinational companies as a response to their own previous period of trial and error in the 1920s. Thus, rather than ascribing to given generalizations about "paths of development, industrialization and modernization" the research questions of this thesis aim to unravel historical-spatial contingencies in the 1920s; as a period of rupture. When one operates with "scales" and geographies of production approach, then the concepts of centers and peripheries, i.e., sales and production nodes are not nationally bound but refer to the changing results of re-scaling activities. And as amply exemplified in the first subchapter on space, rescaling should be analyzed both by looking at the capital accumulation and its -partial- regulation by rules and norms.

The aim of this thesis on the temporal level is to look at Ford investments and their fate in the 1920s and 1930s from a comparative angle and situate Ford Istanbul's failure within the overall "wheel of fortune" of Ford's internationalization strategy. The central question concerning the periodization is thus organically related to the question of why Ford has chosen Istanbul as a production node, why this node has failed and how FMC had to change; had changed its industrial strategies: Why and how did Ford Motor Company fail to create a unitary global market for its motor vehicles at the end of 1920s with its revolutionary production and marketing methods? Though Ford failed to create the "Universal car" through the territorial connection of its industrial nodes and sales territories, it did indeed create a market for its motor vehicles which is split along national borders, marketing strategies, more internal linkages, local inputs and based on product diversification.

But then, why, and how did "Fordism" then become slightly the dominant mode of capitalist regulation instead of a Fordian projection of a global territory at the end of the 1920s? Put it differently, why was "Fordism in the world" turned out to be "mission impossible" and was slightly but decisively supplanted by "Fordism within single countries" starting from the beginning of the 1930s?[214]

214 The dismissal of the legendary British CEO of FMC, Percival Perry in 1919 arises because of this conflict between the centrist and universalist principles of Henry Ford of introducing

These questions relate directly to debates about the dynamics, spatial patterns, and periodization of current and historical globalizations. The main approaches within these debates helped to frame the appropriate periodization for the case under study.

The temporal focus of this thesis is thus clearly a period of crisis. As Polanyi called it is "a period of liberal capitalism at its deathbed" or "the beginning of the end of 'Great Transformation.'" It is a period of trial and error that gave birth to a new form of capitalism that was to dominate the World Economy up until the end of the 1970s, the so-called current "globalization" period, namely the multidomestic, Keynesian, Fordist form of capitalism.[215] Common to different attempts at periodization of the "modern age" with different aims is that end of the 1920s and beginning of 1930s are seen as turning points. Therefore, one of this thesis' aims is to look concretely into the political regulatory frameworks (political spaces) the FMC Istanbul was embedded in and the change in the spatial strategies (whether national, regional, urban, or global, or a peculiar historical mix of all four).

Last but not least we need to question how the trial-and-error process by Ford related to the 1920s in Turkey. That period is treated in the economic history literature mostly as a bridge between the acquisition of the political independence, and a continuation of a late Ottoman liberal policy. According to this prevalent approach the economic realization of this "hardly gained" political independence in the form of étatist policies would follow after the Great Depression, i.e., with a slight time lag.[216] This assumption of a mechanistic and inbound sequence leaves no space for questioning the qualitative change in economic geography by way of re-scaling activities of

---

the world car, playing on the economies of scale and Perry's insistence of "Britanification of the product and production process." Perry was reemployed in 1928 and was the architect of the regional decentralization program of Ford: Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964; Link, "Transnational Fordism," 2012; Paul Thomas, "Searching for Identity. Ford Motor Company in the German Market (1903-2003)," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 151–89.

215 Michel Freysennet, "Histoires et Hybridisation Du Fordisme," *Actes Du GERPISA*, no. 11 (1994): n. p.

216 Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik (1923-1950)*.

multiple actors. The changing position of the port of Istanbul within the economic flows of the region, change in the composition and intensity of the regional commerce, change in the energy base and routes with the commercialization of oil fields in the neighboring regions starting in the mid-1910s, peaking in the second half of the 1920s with the curtailing of Mexican and Soviet Caucasian production and establishment of the Turkish Petroleum Company which began in the late 1920s the exclusive exploitation of Iraq's oil,[217] and the shift of the capital from Istanbul to Ankara, the spatial fixes inherited from the Ottoman Empire will thus be some of the key questions to be addressed.

The example of Ford Istanbul makes it clear that

- the perfect rupture thesis from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic is untenable looking at the underlying determinants of the Ford Istanbul territory;
- the continuity from the late Ottoman period to the Turkish Republic holds true also for parts of the economic spatial organization though the political territory has been reduced to a substantial rate;
- there is a qualitative difference in terms of spatial organization of the Republic between the 1920s and 1930s, though the national territorial borders remain mainly the same, as the analysis of the *Free Zone Law* of 1927 exemplifies,
- this case study can be made only intelligible within the long wave of the formation of territoriality by the interplay of multiple actors, to put it with Maier's concepts.

It is exactly this critique of the fallacies of a linear conception of time and history (periodization) that has led this research to focus on the economic space; spaces that are constructed through regularities, regulations, routes, rhythms, and ruptures of flows of commodities and money. Thus, the main concern of this thesis is to depict the time-space peculiarities of the assembly

217 Timothy Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil* (London: Verso, 2011), 47 ff.; William Stivers, *Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1982).

plant in Istanbul and this concern leads also entering a dialogue with dominant periodizations of economic history of the Early Turkish Republic.

§ 2.4 The Narrative Structure of the Thesis: "A Tale of Three Scales"

The socio-spatial dynamics associated with territoriality can be seen to unfold not only with respect to two-dimensional space – as commonly represented on static maps. Instead, territoriality as process takes place within multiple, perhaps overlapping, or interpenetrating scales. Much of the practical work of territoriality, then, concerns the "vertical" relationships between or among these overlapping, mutually conditioning "levels" – again, commonly, but not only named, "the global, the national, and the local."[218]

The methodology of this thesis nourishes from a spatially conscious regulation school, geography of global flows, entangled business history and spatial history as exemplified by the writings of Charles Maier on "regimes of territoriality."[219] Thus rather than sticking to a linear narrative concept, I opted for a narrative strategy that aimed at laying bare the different scales of decision, the global, the national and the local; place-based in their mutual interactions. By doing this I have tried to see how capital, i.e., the Ford Motor Company as one of the biggest multinationals of the period, tries to shape its space of accumulation along with geo-political, environmental factors, regulations, markets and labor force it employs.[220] Yet the definitive stress of the thesis lies on the space of capital rather than on contesting local actors and their effects also because of the availability of more abundant sources on the former rather than on the latter.

---

218 Delaney, "Territory and Territoriality," 198.

219 Charles S. Maier, "Transformations of Territoriality 1600-2000," in *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, ed. Gunilla-Friederike Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 33–55.

220 See, Henri Lefebvre's path-breaking work: *The Production of Space* [originally published in Paris (1974)]. For a masterful application of Lefebvre's theory into Ottoman urban studies, see: Hanssen, *"Fin De Siècle" Beirut*.

The thematic chapters of this thesis represent at the same time different scales of interaction: First the Detroit-Istanbul axis passing through Trieste, Alexandria, Constanța, and Moscow (Chapter Three), second the Ankara-Istanbul axis passing through Detroit through negotiations on national legislation (Chapter Four) and last but not least the spatial practices at and around the Tophane plant as a field of projection of these complex interactions with new, local actors and spectators (Chapter Five).

As Brenner stated, urbanization is the source of the capital's place-based requirements and the site of everyday experiences. Concretely the Tophane Pier is the site of the concretization of the accumulation's place-based needs. The abstract space created by the multinational is visible in the standardized Plant Plan, technology, models produced, labor recruitment and control imposed by Ford Detroit. Globally mobile Ford managers without any local articulation were supposed to apply everywhere the same standards, fill in the standardized company documents, commission standardized plant photographs and silent or sound movies on the foreign Ford branches.[221] Those myriad documents of conceptualized or conceived space come from the spine and spirit of the company archives of Ford International in Dearborn, the hometown of FMC. In a way, Tophane was intended to be Detroit in miniature form. Yet attempts at creating abstract spaces never go without contention which became visible where the industrial conflicts are more abundantly documented, i.e., at the Danish assembly plant that took over an already unionized craftsmen labor force.[222] The contentions about the Ford Istanbul plant are also abundant, in terms of a abrupt wind of change, a long lasting customs smuggling case and protests of several local actors, which will be documented in Chapter Five.

---

221 In an archival document it is stated that there a sound film of the plant [of FMC Exports Inc. Istanbul] was being prepared as of 8th of December 1932: "[FMC Limited - Dagenham] Montly Report to Directors for the Month of November 1932, from Istanbul to Dagenham," November 1932, AR98.213591 / 110 F23, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford. So far the author could not get hold of this sould film neither in the company archives in Dearborn nor in National Archives, College Park (NARA) to which some copies of the Ford Film Collection (NARA 200FC) were transferred, digitized and make publicly available.

222 Lars K. Christensen, "Between Denmark and Detroit: Unionized Labour at Ford Motor Company, Copenhagen, 1919–1939," *Labor History* 55, no. 3 (2014): 326–45.

The story of the scale of the place-based requirements of Ford is narrated in Chapter Five and should exemplify a spatial-historicist approach on a factory scale carved out of a neighborhood. The abstract space conceived by FMC which formed an enclave and the social space secreting a part of the quay of Tophane (Salıpazarı) did not correspond to each other. When that enclave-plant failed, the remnants of this enclave were easily erased from the spatial memory of Tophane. The factory premises themselves resisted the destruction up until beginning, and until mid-1950s, the prelude of the infamous "Menderes urban transformations" alongside the Karaköy-Kabataş route.[223]

The national scale is mainly constituted by ways of negotiations on the legal sphere between FMC headquarters in Detroit, Turkish Ministry for Finance in Ankara and the US-Embassy acting as a facilitator in-between. Results are the Free Zone Law of 1927 and the Ford Law of 1929 which led to the construction of an urban enclave on top of an inherited military-industrial-commercial infrastructure and recently erected warehouse buildings at the port of Istanbul. The existing power and infrastructural relations at the port were re-modelled by way of subsequent re-scaling. Ford was strong enough to have direct influence on the promulgation of two sets of laws during the first six years of the Republic.

The global scale depicts a central diffusionist model that does not always respond to contextual peculiarities of space and time. It depicts the internationalization of FMC's sales and production facilities, its pace, its geography, and relations developed with national, transnational, and urban actors to make the global expansion possible. And the miscalculation is very much rooted in this spatial and temporal discord that had ousted the plant after a very short span of time from the pier of Tophane.

223 The exact year of the demolishment is most probably in 1955 or 56, right after the gigantic landfilling operation for the construction of four of the new, in total seven Salıpazarı entrepôt buildings (designed by the architect Sedad Hakkı Eldem): Rüya Ardıçoğlu, "Kıyı Dolgusunun Kent Morfolojisine Etkisinin Mekan Dizimi Yöntemiyle İncelenmesi: İstanbul Tophane Bölgesi" (PhD Diss., Ankara, Ankara University, 2019), 139.

§ 2.5 Sources

This thesis nourishes from various sources. The most important sources are the company archives of FMC in Dearborn/Detroit at the Benson Ford Research Library and The Henry Ford Archives. These archives are very rich both in quantitative (Managerial Reports, Balance Sheets, Sales, Production and Stock Reports, Activity Reports), and qualitative material (business letters, territory reports, dispatches, confidential cables, inspection reports circulating between Dearborn, London, Paris, Trieste, Alexandria, Istanbul, Bucharest, Athens, and the oral histories with the top officers conducted in the 1960s etc.). I had to chance to conduct research directly in Dearborn for two months in 2005.

I was also lucky enough to receive the personal copies of the Ford company documents on Ford in Turkey, Alexandria, Dagenham, and Rumania from Prof. Mira Wilkins, who wrote already by 1964 the first ever international history of FMC with Frank Ernest Hill. The author team also prepared the first catalogue of the archives of the international operations of the company.[224] Using company archives to write industrial and labor history is a quite recent, yet flourishing and promising trend in the historywriting of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic as exemplified in the subchapter on "agency."

The second type of source I have used are state documents produced in the 1920s and 1930s by the Turkish Republic physically kept in Turkish Presidency General Directorate of State Archives, Archives of the Republic (CCA, or T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı, Cumhuriyet Arşivi, which was formerly known as Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivi, Cumhuriyet Arşivi, or BCA) in Ankara.

The consular reports and Angora diaries of the American ambassadors in Ankara in the 1920s and 1930s provide yet another perspective on the unfolding investment. These were consulted in microfilm form in the American Information Resource Center at the Embassy of the USA in Ankara in 2005 and then in 2022, that second time at Bilkent University Library where the microfilm rolls were physically transferred to during the 2010s.

224 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964.

Various Turkish, American, British, and other European newspapers of the period were also indispensable especially to glean the few traces left by the institutions of the port of Istanbul and workers of this factory in the absence of workers' files relating to the Istanbul plant in the FMC Archives in Dearborn/Detroit.

The author also had the great chance to meet Prof. Nurhan Ertem in 2011,[225] daughter of Mr. Mehmet Bahri Ergene, chief roadman of FMC Export Inc., first in Istanbul than in Alexandria between 1929 and 1939 and conduct oral history with her on her father's activities and profit from their family archives. Mehmet Can Ertem, the grandchild of Mehmet Bahri Ergene provided the author with a copy of the vast visual archives of his grandfather comprising of his business trips in the Istanbul and Alexandria territories of FMC. The author also had the chance to conduct oral history with "Arap İsmail", one of the workers at the assembly line in Ford Tophane who still lived in Tophane when interviewed in 2011.

"The tale of three scales," a tale that leads from the Detroit strait to the Bosphorus strait, is about the history of an export-oriented assembly plant of motor vehicles in Tophane/Istanbul that turned out to be a failure for all parts involved in it compared to the contemporary projections and promises. We are convinced that this story gives clues about the spatial vision of the FMC as the entrepreneur, but at the same time the limits of the socioeconomic contexts and the peculiarities of the economic geography it was embedded in. The future projections, strategic planning, mental outlook, and the pragmatic answers to contemporary crisis by Ford's executives and state officials will be narrated without trying to inject upon them either the contemporary understandings of how capitalism looked like after the World War II, today or the ahistoric concepts of how capitalism functions "at all" in a "peripheral Fordist context."

225 [Ford İstanbul ve İskenderiye'nin 1930-1938 Arası Satış Mümessilliğini Yapmış Mehmet Bahri Ergene'nin Kızı İle Yazar Tarafından Yapılmış Mülâkat], interview by Aslı Odman, Transcribed Sound Recording, May 12, 2011.

3

Detroit-Istanbul Axis: The Spatial Context of the FMC Export Inc., Istanbul

In 1933, a rotating relief Globe was exhibited in the "A Century of Progress International Exposition" in Chicago (also called Chicago World's Fair) by Ford Motor Company. The "Ford Globe" was exhibited in a building called "Ford Rotunda," specifically erected for this occasion:

> The Ford Rotunda, as it was called, was the brainchild of company founder Henry Ford and architect Albert Kahn, who designed the building specifically for the Ford Motor Co.'s contribution to the Fair. The Fair's theme was technology, which inspired the tagline: "A Century of Progress," and since planes, trains and automobiles were a large part of the Fair's showcase exhibits, Ford fit right in.[1]

The more than six meters high revolving Ford Globe[2] contained both the physical aspects of the planet furnished with "the vast extent of the Ford

1 "1933 Chicago World's Fair Ford Rotunda," Blog, Unremembered: A History of the Famously Interesting and Mostly Forgotten, December 5, 2008, https://bit.ly/3MQg4m2.

2 Ford Motor Company. Photographic Department, *Globe in Court of the World, Ford Exhibition Building, Century of Progress International Exposition, Chicago, Illinois*, 1934, 1934, 64.167.232.973, From the Collections of The Henry Ford, https://bit.ly/3swpX1D.

Industrial World,"[3] i.e., the franchised dealers, sales branches and assembly plants of Ford by then.[4] It was a perfect example not only for the hegemonic belief in progress incorporated by automotives but also a symbol for "seeing like Ford," ordering the globe in territories attached to production, assembly, and sales nodes. Mountain chains and shorelines in relief were accompanied by a second globe, containing graphic information about the all the raw materials (zinc, copper, rubber etc.), of which the Ford car was composed. The names of the countries or cities were not mentioned.[5] A perfect representation of the intermeshing of scales concerning the business locations, namely the territory, the surface space where port cities serve as facilitators of industrial nodes, connected through transportation and communication systems. Nation states are not even mentioned contrasting with "abstract land" as sources of providers of raw materials, or sources of raw materials on whose provision FMC depended; a surface to be further conquered by way of slicing it into market segments. "*Out of the Earth comes the Ford car!*" was the motto. A triumphant over voice of belief in progress and abstract space already conquered and to be conquered infiltrated the whole

3 *History of Ford Motors at the 1934 World's Fair [Vintage News Reel]*, YouTube / @ClassicCarChannel, 19, accessed November 18, 2023, https://bit.ly/49EnrH7. For the general context see the contemporary video recordings as well: *1933 Chicago "Century of Progress" World's Fair - Part 1*, YouTube / @johnmeyer77, accessed November 18, 2023, https://bit.ly/3uvxGgI; *1933 Chicago "Century of Progress" World's Fair - Part 2*, YouTube / @johnmeyer77, accessed November 18, 2023, https://bit.ly/46ngo2X; *1934 Chicago World's Fair in Technicolor Century of Progress International Exposition 98534*, YouTube / @PeriscopeFilm, accessed November 18, 2023, https://bit.ly/40INrx0.

4 Faik Sabri Duran, "Sergide Gezenlerin Gözü Önünde Otomobiller Bir Saatte Kuruluveriyor, On Dakika İçinde Lâstik Tekerlekler Yapılıyor," *Akşam*, May 5, 1935, sec. Bir Türk Kızının Amerika Yolculuğu, No: 27: "Ortada, zeminden aşağı kazılmış bir çukur içinde yerleştirilmiş iki üç insan boyunda bir cam küre var. Dünyayı gösteriyor ve mihveri etrafında yavaşça dönüyor, içine ışık koyulmuş...Bu küre üzerinde Fordun dünyanın nerelerinde şubeler, acenteler,fabrikaları var, onu görüyoruz." [="In the center, there is a glass globe, two or three people tall, placed in a hole dug down from the ground. It is pointing to the world and it is slowly rotating around its axis, there is a light inside [...] On this globe we see where in the world Ford has branches, agencies, factories."], so the testimony of a traveling Turkish woman in the Fair about the Ford pavillon.

5 Willard Cope Brinton, *Graphic Presentation* (New York: Brinton Associates, 1939), 160.

show. The Ford Globe was part of a vast exhibition in which the production of a selection of the Ford V8 models' 15,000 components was meticulously simulated via live shows. The River Rouge factory in Detroit was the largest integrated factory of the world by then; main deliverer to dozens of assembly and manufacturing locations in USA and around the world and receiver of intermediate parts produced by around twenty Ford-owned plants in the USA known as the village industry plants.[6]



FIGURE 3.1 "Globe in Court of the World, Ford Exhibition Building, Century of Progress International Exposition, Chicago, Illinois." SOURCE: From the Collections of The Henry Ford / 64.167.232.973

6 Bruce Pietrykowski, "Fordism at Ford: Spatial Decentralization and Labor Segmentation at the Ford Motor Company, 1920-1950," *Economic Geography* 71, no. 4 (1995): 390.



FIGURE 3.2 Still image showing Ford on top of the world surrounded by raw materials of the world. SOURCE: History of Ford Motors at the 1934 World's Fair, min. 10:51, https://bit.ly/49EnrH7

In this chapter, we will provide the background story in flashbacks that led to the corporate landscape embodied in the Ford Globe by 1933. Ironically enough the "glorious" 1933 was also the year assembly activities at Ford Istanbul seized after only three and a half year of loss-producing assembly activity.

This flashback story will scrutinize the spatial history of the Ford Motor Company starting from the initial organization of Ford in its "home state," Michigan and the Great Lakes Region in Midwest, then focus on the geographical internationalization of its productive capital parallel to the spatial expansion of its sales network and diversification of the corporate legal forms. Two imprints of spatial turning points will be the highlights: The first

is the Knudsen Plan of 1919, first explicit plan of FMC to restructure its international operations within a new spatial order. The second is the restructuration program of 1928 which led to the creation of Dagenham plant in United Kingdom. The latter program aimed to decentralize the productive network of assembly plants centered in Dearborn, Detroit and re-regionalize most of the European operations under the prospective Dagenham, Greater London factory.

By tracking the historical evolution of the company's spatial steps, we hope to make sense of the shift of Ford's sales territory from Trieste, former assembly production node, to Istanbul during the year 1928, bypassing mentioned competing production locations like Alexandria, Piraeus, and Constanța and the final scope of the Istanbul territory during the initiation of the Istanbul plant. By the Trieste-to-Istanbul shift Ford aimed at reaching out not only mainly to the former Ottoman territory and the adjacent regions but also to the flourishing Soviet market where the demand for Ford products was in abundance in the 1920s, fueled by the New Economic Policy. Both the lost and now ghost imaginary of a past Ottoman and a future Soviet territory cast its shadow on the contours of this decision for a spatial shift.

William G. Collins was the key personality whose business biography will serve to personify the trial and error process that Ford leaders in Detroit went through during the restructuration in the 1920s. Collins was a diplomat in the US Consulate in Constantinople around 1921 for a couple of years,[7] Ford chief roadman, and later chief field inspector for the Trieste

7 "Mr W G Collins entered the Company's service in Detroit, where he had taken the Student Course. We were very pleasantly impressed with this gentleman, as he has sound judgment, good education and his experience in the Consular Service in Constantinople - where he is highly respected - will ideally fit him for promotion with the opening of Constantinople. He speaks English, French, Italian and a certain amount of German. He is an American and was connected with the Commercial Attache's office in Constantinople for several years." "Territory Report from 1925, July 25, From Trieste to Dearborn," July 25, 1925, Acc. 6 / Box 401, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill, American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), 214 ff. "[Records of the U.S. Embassy in Turkey 1928 / Angora Diaries 1928] Account from November 19, 1928 from the 'Angora Diary' of S. Pinkney Tuck, 1st Secretary of

territory starting from 1924,[8] an *envoyée* to explore the Soviet markets for Ford in 1926,[9] an assistant manager, then manager in the newly established sales and service node in Alexandria in 1928 and the founding plant manager of Ford Tophane in 1929. The peculiar map of the Istanbul territory in 1929 can be made intelligible by looking at the raison d'être of how and why William G. Collins changed posts within the same territory.

The question of the nodes and borders of Ford's territories in general bifurcates into the following smaller questions: What are the components of Ford's decisions to form, de-form and re-form territories until, during and shortly after the formation of the Istanbul plant? Why did Ford opt for a section; pier at the Port of Istanbul as the location of its new assembly plant and not for an enlargement of its Trieste plant which it had already erected in 1922 in a free port facility? Why and at what point was Alexandria, a prosperous port city with a wide hinterland in the Mediterranean Basin and the Near East through the Suez Canal, considered as an alternative to Istanbul? The same question is valid for the possible alternative assembly site, Constanța linking the Mediterranean ports with the northern economies via the Danube and the Black Sea. And lastly, did Piraeus, the brand-new free port of Greece, really come into question as a competitor to Istanbul as was mentioned during the first negotiations between Ford and the Turkish Government? Or was Ford only instrumentalizing the dislike of the Turkish political regime towards Greece to achieve full free port rights in Istanbul? This subchapter aims to find answers to those set of questions and draw on a holistic economic geographical map of Ford's productive and sales territory

---

the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Sent to Ernest L. Ives, Esquire, American Embassy, Constantinople, November 21, 1921," November 19, 1928, MC27 / Roll 6, AIRC.

8 "Mr. Collins is well known in Constantinople, having already been in these parts as an agent of the United States Department of Commerce and his familiarity with the Near Eastern situation will doubtless enable him to bring his negotiations with the Government to a successful conclusion." "A Ford Plant in Constantinople," *Levant Trade Review*, published monthly at Constantinople by the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, 13, no. 8 (1925): 328; "Auto Personnel," *Automotive News*, May 14, 1945.

9 "Report of the Ford Delegation to Russia and U.S.S.R," August 1926, Acc. 49 / Box 1A, Benson Ford.

on the eve of and after the investment of Ford Tophane by way of cartographic regression.



MAP 3.1 Cut-out map of Istanbul Territory in 1929, at the time of the opening of the plant. SOURCE: Adapted from "Territory Report from 1925, July 25, From Trieste to Dearborn," July 25, 1925, Acc. 6 / Box 401, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford. Map used: M. Fallex and A. Gibert, *Nouvelle Atlas Classique* [original scale: 1:48,000,000] (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1935), 65.

The infrastructural spatial fix and territorial dynamics of global capitalism in the first quarter of the twentieth century will be reckoned with while accounting for the decisional factors for opting out of the alternative loca-

tions for the erection of a new assembly node to deliver Russian, East European, Near Eastern and Northeast-African markets. FMC was one of the important actors of global capitalism of the interwar period and it had a global horizon from the very beginning of its corporate history. It was in a position to calculate (and mis-calculate!) the pros and cons of different locations of assembly that would serve as nodes within its territorially organized global map in the 1920s, nonetheless given path dependencies and world view constraints to its managerial decisions. So, to understand the final investment decision we will have to follow the traces of the internationalization process which the sales network and productive infrastructure of FMC underwent within the global context it was embedded in.

The first subchapter deals with the internationalization of the productive capacity of FMC from the very beginning until the 1927, the year it substituted the revolutionary Model T, the "Tin Lizzie" by the Model A and winded down the fully integrated production model. It is during this period FMC built a spatial model of expansion at home and abroad around the "global car." This global model of spatial scales was molded out of the concepts it developed based on its experiences in and around Michigan State, Great Lakes Region.[10] The model "global car" started to decline in the mid1920s. The limits of the single model became visible. That single model was meant to be produced as cheap as possible for the whole world market by integrating all the steps of the production and sales within the legal and technical premises of one decision making center. Competitors moved in and profited from the limits of the integrated production in terms of heavy fixed capital costs, sales, market expansion and profit figures. Yet FMC sticked to the global car concept with the Model T until the introduction of the Model A which triggered a regional restructuration in 1928.

The second subchapter depicts the spatial and organizational restructuration of FMC by way of regional re-centralization in UK, the so-called 1928

10 For the industrial cluster effect of the Great Lakes region see the infographic: Jeff Desjardins, "Great Lakes Economy: Examining the Cross-Border Supply Chain," News Portal, Visual Capitalist, October 19, 2017, https://bit.ly/40Oun0j. It compactly lays out the continuties in the economic flows, which reach back to a great extent to the İnterwar period.

Plan. The Dagenham plan was meant to respond to the crisis of "Fordism in the world," diffusing the standardized global car, yet replicating the Detroit model in Dagenham withough qualitative changes until mid 1930s.

The last subchapter deals with the gradual carving out of the prospective Istanbul territory in relation to the competing production locations in Trieste, Alexandria, Piraeus and Constanța and expanding market horizons in the Soviet Russia. It was a period of radical economic and political changes. The erratic changes in (physical and monetary) borders, trade routes and gravity centers of the Istanbul territory witnessed this, to which the last subchapter will be dedicated.

§ 3.1 FMC's Internationalization between 1903 and 1927 and Its Spatial Dynamics

Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill who wrote the first business history of the international operations of Ford in 1964 depicted in detail the context and the organization of the company that allowed it to be the biggest automobile producer in the world in terms of output between 1913 and 1925.[11] This monograph does not have an explicitly spatial perspective yet by exploring how the company shaped its overseas policies step by step it lays out the following five distinctive sequences within a chronological narrative between 1903 and 1964 for FMC as;[12]

1 exporter in quantities passing through several customs borders;
2 operator of sales branches abroad (from independent agents to franchised dealers);
3 founder of large concerns (branch factories = first service plants then assembly plants) importing knocked down parts from Dearborn via maritime canals and assembling the American production in foreign lands ("reducing transport costs, avoiding tariffs, cultivating the good will of peoples"[13]);

11 Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill, *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), 32 ff.

12 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 32 ff.

13 Ibid., 12.

4 converter of such concerns into manufactories, making complete cars, trucks, and tractors on the American model yet with ascending rate of local inputs (raw materials and staff)
5 finally, owner of still larger factories making automotive vehicles completely foreign in design, imported back to USA.

Steven Tolliday, another prolific researcher writing later Ford Europe with a focus on United Kingdom described this long-term movement of the company "from multidomestic to multinational corporation" changing car models, product diversification rates, legal forms and spatial organization patterns on the move adapting to changing conditions internal and external to the corporation.[14]

The advantages of this direct representation by way of assembly plants were the following, as explained in a company publication from 1927;

> [T]he mistakes common to export organizations operating from a point thousands of miles away are eliminated […] there are many things to be considered: topography, road conditions, foreign exchange, wage standards, automobile taxes, fuel prices, import duties, transportation charges and the general social, political, and economic situation.[15]

Throughout the interwar period push factors for this move were rising protectionism (most countries taxed whole cars with much higher rates then knocked-down parts) and high transport costs of wholly assembled cars. The pull factor for the establishment of regional sales and assembly systems yet was the desire to encroach more thoroughly market possibilities through proximity.[16] This piecemeal internationalization of production took "place" alongside the key spatial concept of "territory" which was developed within

14 Steven Tolliday, "The Origins of Ford of Europe: From Multidomestic to Multinational Corporation, 1903-1976," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 151–89.

15 Ford Motor Company, *The Ford Industries: Facts About the Ford Motor Company and Its Subsidiaries* (Detroit, Mich.: Ford Motor Company, 1927), 55–56.

16 Wolf Gaebe, "Räumliche Auswirkungen Der Internationalisierung in Der Automobilindustrie," *ERDKUNDE* 45, no. 2 (1991): 103.

Ford's "local" (in the USA) sales organization with its legally nominally independent, franchised agents through dealerships and their relationships to the mother and branch factories. Corporate territory reports sent by the branch managers or the European General Manager to the center in Detroit on a regular manner were perfect blueprints of the corporate spatial lens which is inscribed in the conceptions and language of the documents.

3.1.1 *Territorializing the USA as a Model for the "Overseas" Organization: Assembling Franchised Dealers around Branch Plants by Way of Roadmen*



MAP 3.2 Great Lake Region and the Erie Channel. SOURCE: "National Heritage Canal Map," Erie Canalway: National Heritage Corridor / Studies and Report (2023) [https://bit.ly/3RHHY6J]

As Akhtar put in her PhD covering both the traces of Ford in Detroit and the Near Eastern, as "Oriental" labor and markets in the company "global and local were informing one another, merging in places and shaping the decisions that the company made to uphold the its philosophy at home and

abroad."[17] Yet there was no pure application of a fixed "philosophy of the company," but rather a contingent trial and error process which was an offshoot of initially local corporate experiences. The "local" to Ford was first and foremost Detroit, the vicinity of the Great Lakes Region equipped with the infrastructure of the main international trade route towards Europe (like the Erie channel, ports etc.), and home to the earliest industrial capital accumulation.

Ford imposed a franchising agreement to its sales dealers but a subsidiary relationship to its product suppliers aiming at supplanting its position with the full ownership of the production facilities on the short term, a process called "integration of production." This Ford first applied at home in the USA, paralleled to buying railway lines and railway cars, iron mines, coal mines and supplanting its suppliers of iron, lumber, body frames, glass, wheels, tops, tires etc., one by one to build up the world capital of integrated production first in its Highland Park Plant (erected between 1908 and 1910). The central production complex in the headquarters Detroit was then expanded to River Rouge Plant between 1917 and 1928, to become the largest integrated factory in the world. When talking about the geography of production of Ford "at home" one should not dismiss to mention the around 30 assembly plants throughout USA by 1927 and eighteen Ford-owned village industry plants, small in size and located on rivers to which component part tasks were outsourced in the beginning of 1920s. So the intensifying vertical integration in Dearborn/Detroit went hand in hand with spatial expansion first by way of assembly branches and the franchised dealers, second through the village industry plants in Southeastern Michigan and Ontario/Canada.

With the rapid growth of the company the sales agencies expanded in number and the retail unit soon moved from independent agents to legally autonomous yet franchised dealers within five years of the company's founding in 1903. The franchised dealers were assigned exclusive sales territories. Trespasses were not allowed. They were under the control and

17 Saima Akhtar, "Corporate Empire: Fordism and the Making of Immigrant Detroit" (PhD Diss., Berkeley, CA, University of Berkeley, 2015), 13.

coordination of the company-owned branches (in total 22 by 1909)[18], themselves under the control of the home office, where final assembly of knocked-down parts and components from Highland Park, River Rouge Plant and its surrounding village industries were administered from.[19]



FIGURE 3.3 Bird's-eye view of the Ford Motor Company, Highland Park Plant SOURCE: "Highland Park Plant, Ford Motor Company, Highland Park, Michigan," Detroit Public Library Digital Collections, Burton Historical Collections / bh014609 [https://bit.ly/3RNVyFy]

18 Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, *Ford. Vol. 1, The Times, The Man, The Company*, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner, 1954), 397.

19 Thomas S. Dicke, *Franchising in America: The Development of a Business Method, 1840-1980* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 137–38.



MAP 3.3 Location of village industry plants SOURCE: Bruce Pietrykowski, "Fordism at Ford: Spatial Decentralization and Labor Segmentation at the Ford Motor Company, 1920-1950." *Economic Geography* 71, no. 4 (1995): 390.

The branch "garrisons" were situated at strategic points where freight rates jumped, affecting shipment costs.[20] The spatial organization had the form of adjacent concentric circles or walk of snails, not running over to the next one. Nevins and Hill, in their first comprehensive corporate history of FMC from 1954, gave a vivid account of Norval A. Hawkins, commercial manager with full charge of sales starting from 1907.

> [Hawkins] chief work, however, lay in marketing. Ford asked him in 1907: "Where do you expect to start selling cars?" Hawkins pointed to a grocery store on the opposite corner, saying, "I think we should start there, and then weave the web around until we reach a point where the freight rates change, which means Chicago, or which means Buffalo."[21]

In fact, Hawkins took over this task from the omnipresent vice president and treasurer of the company, James J. Couzens, who was called "the field

20 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 1, The Times, The Man, The Company*, 1:401.

21 Ibid., 1:342.

dictator."[22] In 1909 Couzens had divided the country up geographically - initially into nine areas- gradually increasing to thirty-four areas by 1921.[23] Branch boundries did not overlap with state boundries. "United Branches of Ford" were not equal to United States of America but remolded them into a different corporate territory and designed new internal borders. (See the legend and borders of Map 3.4.).



MAP 3.4 Cut-out from the map showing FMC's manufacturing, assembly plants, and service plants alongside the branch boundaries, 1927. SOURCE: Ford Motor Company. *The Ford Industries: Facts About the Ford Motor Company and Its Subsidiaries*. (Detroit, Mich.: Ford Motor Company, 1927): 2.

22 Ibid., 1:264.

23 Anthony Patrick O'Brien, "The Importance of Adjusting Production to Sales in the Early Automobile Industry," *Explorations in Economic History* 34, no. 2 (1997): 202.



MAP 3.5 Cut out from the map showing FMC's plants and industries: shipping lines, 1927 SOURCE: Ford Motor Company. *The Ford Industries: Facts About the Ford Motor Company and Its Subsidiaries*. (Detroit, Mich.: Ford Motor Company, 1927): 2.

The branch managers were responsible for recruiting dealers and signing them to contracts. The branch plants were equipped with enough parts to deliver all dealers in their territory, supervise their service to clients, exclusivity of sales of only Ford products and the uniformity of prices set by Detroit.

The dealers that were recruited carefully by branch managers received the exclusive right to sell Ford products in a neatly defined area within the territory of that branch

> [i]n exchange for the right to sell Ford products and as a consideration for meeting the service and repair terms of his contract. [...] Outside urban areas, Ford preferred to grant single dealers a fairly large territory, typically one in which they could expect to sell 100 or more cars per year, and then leave it to the dealer to cover his territory with sub-dealers. [...] In order to protect the territories of dealers and sub-dealers, Ford reserved the right to fine and/or cancel any dealer who engaged in cross-selling that is, selling to customers who lived outside the dealer's territory or "bootlegging," as the wholesaling of cars to unauthorized dealers was called.[24]

Since sales of cars needed to be accompanied more than any other commodity by service and repair the retail organization was even more strictly spatially defined and continuously monitored by the steps of travelling inspectors weaving literally the territory they were inspecting. This monitoring of spatial divisions, i.e., the borders of as well as activities within the borders was executed after about 1907 by the so-called "roadmen." These travelling inspectors reported to regional branches of the company.[25] The steps of the roadmen "secreted" the orders and borders of the corporate space while inspecting and evaluating the dealers according to various criteria of performance. This "working and walking" order facilitated the penetration of the automotives into wider "virgin lands of consumption," a term loaded with a gendered connotation of the "capitalist penetration with automotives." The scope of control comprised of advice to repair mechanics, checking of the standard shop display, keeping constant watch over the dealers' financial position, exclusivity of sale only of Ford products, non-conversion of the sold automotives' "suitability and amount of publicity arrangements with local publishers obtained in each territory,"[26] even their standing in the community comparing them with dealers serving other companies.

---

24 Ibid., 150–51.

25 Ibid., 153.

26 David L. Lewis, *The Public Image of Henry Ford: An American Folk Hero and His Company* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1976), 208.

> For selling purposes, all counties in the United States were ultimately divided into townships and all cities into zones; and as we shall see, the company policy was steadily to reduce the territory served by a given dealer, so as to require more intensive effort. In towns and cities, [dealer] agents were expected to make a systematic canvass, ringing doorbells and talking with all residents.[27]

If sales were meager, dealers risked the narrowing of their territory assigned. During the maturing phase of this spatial model around 1919-25, this organization consisted of branch offices, headed by managers, who controlled their dealers through roadmen, or travelling inspectors. Each branch had an assistant manager, a wholesale manager (in charge of the roadmen) and a superintendent (who operated the assembly plant). Each branch office was served by from 150 to 500 dealers, who in turn were overseen by from ten to twenty-five roadmen.[28] The ultimate aim of blanketing the vast American space with dealers pushed FMC to introduce in 1922 also a dealer rating system including the classifications "good, fair and poor" accorded by the branch managers. The latter ordered the roadmen to check off on dealer ratings in each territory according to sales, service and general criteria. This standardization led to the reduction of the number of roadmen by half. "The roadmen who continued such activity were called 'zone men,' confining their efforts to agencies in the 'fair' and 'poor' categories."[29] By force of regular, spatial controls by Ford roadmen with a quasi-military discipline, "dealers were like customers held under a near monopoly under threat of cancellation of their valuable contract / much desired Ford franchise."[30]

Thus, all-encompassing control from Detroit over the sales territory was designed by way of transfer of surveillance rights and practices in situ to branches and its application by their regular travelling inspections. These in turn pressured Ford dealers to consistently "deal with space", turn more of it into corporate sales space and the realm of the visibility of the company. The

27 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 1, The Times, The Man, The Company*, 1:344.

28 Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, vol. 2 (New York: Scribner, 1957), 257–58.

29 Ibid.

30 Dicke, *Franchising in America*, 165–66.

nominal legal independence of the dealers blanketing the Ford sales territory was in stark contrast to the projected impermeable control over them:

> They [the dealers] must study their territories, build up files of prospects, and work on them systematically and diligently. Many dealers kept maps showing with colored pins the owners of Ford cars, non-owners who gave promise of becoming customers, and recent sales. [The branch] instructed its roadmen to inquire into the alleged difficulties of a dealer, and to report him if he did not show resourcefulness and energy in meeting them. Some roadmen carried cameras and photographed untidy premises.[31]

Until 1928, there was not even a credit organization aiming at dealers (neither at consumers) to get credits (down payments) which changed with the formation of the Universal Credit Corporation (UCC) by FMC to boost the sales of the (second) Model A.[32]

The exclusive, fixed territory system applied to the dealers' organization remained intact until after the World War I and the crisis of 1920-21.[33] After the World War I, the FMC refused to give a dealer a fixed territory and started to apply a "crossroads policy" of multiplying dealerships.[34] By 1928, fifteen years after the introduction of mass production in Highland Park

---

31 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:260.

32 Dicke, *Franchising in America*, 168–69.

33 On the Post WWI-Crisis see: "In one final effort to 'obtain increased selling strength,' Edsel and Ryan announced to all Ford dealers that 'effective immediately, all territory lines will be eliminated.' The plan was described as an opportunity: 'Present large dealers will be benefited by being permitted to reach out into unlimited territory,' while small dealers could 'expand and grow [...] by intensively covering territory just over the line which they have constantly claimed could be handled best by them.' This open territory system brought few complaints at the time, but later, in more intensive form, was to cause much resentment. The company felt that the fixed territory plan represented both an abuse and a nuisance: a nuisance, because when an energetic dealer made a sale in another's territory, the company had to fix percentages of profit, often in dispute; an abuse, because lazy dealers were inclined not to push sales, but to demand their 'take' on a more industrious agent's work. Today [by 1957], all companies operate on an open territory basis." Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:156.

34 Ibid., 2:361, 422.

plant there were over 8,800 dealers, 20,000 sub-dealers and 45,000 garages under contract as service dealers that provided "Ford authorized Parts and Services."[35]

The evolution of the components and processes of the fixed and exclusive territory system and its subsequent relaxation served Ford as an example for the organization of its international operations. The company intensified and expanded its capital accumulation globally by imitating its local system in process, changing, and adapting it once more on the way to multi-nationalization.

3.1.2 *First Steps of Internationalization of the Production System: Ford Canada and Ford UK as Launching Pads*

A glimpse into the corporate history of FMC reveals that it was a transnational project from the very beginning on taken the location of its headquarters at the frontier city of Detroit into consideration. Ford Motor Company was incorporated there in 1903 and already by 1904; it has internationalized its sales and production by expanding into the neighboring Canada and by establishing a corporation in Oakville on Lake Ontario. The largest expansion step of FMC towards a truly multinational company with a global assembly and production network was yet during the 1920s. The company accomplished this through the spread of assembly facilities or plants mostly with maritime connections.[36]

These global sales, service and assembly units were subordinated to two centers outside Dearborn/Michigan, namely Ford Canada and Ford UK. Up until the beginning of 1930s, i.e., the actual implementation of the so-called Dagenham Plan of 1928, former and contemporary colonies of the British Empire remained within the territory of Ford Canada mainly because of the latters' proximity to the headquarters of the company.[37] Ford Canada had

35 Dicke, *Franchising in America*, 171.

36 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 88ff.

37 "The Company exported Ford cars, truck and tractors to Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma, Ceylon, Dutch East Indies, Newfoundland, Straits Settlements, Siam, Union of South Africa, British Cameroons, Zanzibar, Rhodesia, Kenya Colony, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Britisch Samoa, Mauritius, Reunion, Fiji, New Caledonia, British

ceded its sales rights in United Kingdom to a company founded in London by 1906[38] and kept the rest of the British Empire for itself. This changed radically with the Dagenham Plan that constitutes both decentralization and a London-centered regional re-centralization step to which second part of Chapter Three will be dedicated. The legal affiliation and designation of Ford Constantinople (to put it with the naming FMC managers mostly used both in their correspondence and in their letterheads) as a branch of the US-American company Ford Motor Company Exports Inc. would be called into question during this spatial restructuration process after 1928:



FIGURE 3.4 Letterhead of FMC correspondence, December 29, 1929. SOURCE: "Private and Confidential Letter by William G. Collins from Ford Istanbul to H. Stanford Cooper, Office of Percival Perry in London [FMC Correspondance 1929-31]," December 29, 1929. Acc 282 / Box 1. Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

Yet it is important to note that there was only a time difference of twelve days between the contract breathing life into Ford Constantinople (26 November 1928) and the first step of the Dagenham Plan, the creation of Ford Ltd. Britain (7 December 1928). Before laying out the whole story in the subsequent chapters, it would be not too bold to state that Ford, one of the

---

New Guinea, Tasmania, Aden, Nyasaland, Uganda, Madagascar, Portuguese East Africa." Ford Motor Company, *The Ford Industries*, 54. This is practically all British Empire less United Kingdom and Ireland. See also Figure ...'Map on Ford's Internationalizatin before and after 1928.

38 David Burgess-Wise, "Perry, Percival Lee Dewhurst," in *Dictionary of Business Biography: A Biographical Dictionary of Business Leaders Active in Britain in the Period 1860-1980* (London: Butterworths, 1984), 639–40.

biggest corporations of the time was far from being coordinated in its spatial and productive restructuration at the end of the 1920s.

Ford Canada was the most organizationally and administratively independent of Ford's offsprings. "In the Pre-War period, Ford Canada's managers built an impressive overseas empire, taking advantage of its British connection and its unique operational agreement with Detroit, an option not available to its competitors."[39] This contrasted with FMC's approach in Europe, departing from the rigid control of the "American era," only starting from 1928 to loosen control, re-regionalize in Ford Britain, and provide a measure of local ownership, management and inputs in Europe there where is substantial capital formation and demand.[40] On the other side in the eastern periphery of Europe towards Russia, in the Near-East and Northeast Africa FMC experimented directly with the expansion of the territory without local ownership and local management, shifting node of this territory several times from Trieste to Alexandria, from Alexandria to Istanbul and back to Alexandria, Bucharest and Pireaus from Istanbul between 1922 and 1935:

> In the belief that the countries whose buying power is great enough to warrant the location there of a[n independent] foreign plant further warrants reciprocal buying by the company wherever it may be done with economy to both interests, the Ford purchases were increased greatly in 1926.[41]

Ford Canada, from its initial phase until the end of the 1920s as a relatively independent entity within the Ford Empire displayed the individual ownership of 51% in total by all twelve FMC stockholders. In return, Detroit granted Ford patents and drawings to the Canadian Ford. By 1920 this share

39 Dimitry Anastakis, "From Independence to Integration: The Corporate Evolution of the Ford Motor Company of Canada, 1904-2004," *The Business History Review* 78, no. 2 (2004): 251.

40 Ibid., 252.

41 "Purchasing Abroad: Development of Foreign Industries Permits Expansion of 'Local' Purchasing Program," *Ford News*, March 8, 1927, 1002.

would have dropped to only 21% since FMC needed the funds for the construction of the new River Rouge factory complex.

Ford Canada also had its own foreign subsidiaries: There are three spatial reasons and one temporal reason for the exceptional relative independence of Ford Canada from FMC, the first is locational, the second is national, and the third is international. First, Windsor where Ford established a plant in a transformed wagon car factory was just across the river of Detroit, the headquarters of FMC. The Detroit River, as the name in French implies ("straits" in English), while linking Lake St. Clair and Lake St. Erie as a strait in the Great Lake system created a physical proximity in separation between the bordering cities of Detroit and Walkerville. The corporate territory of the FMC was continually shifting in accordance with US-Canadian economic and socio-political relationships.

> As Ford looked to FMC-Canada as a launching pad for international expansion in the global market, he encountered, as business historian Allan Nevins writes, "every conceivable obstacle, including alien prejudice and condescension; waves of nationalism expressed in tariff walls, unfair taxes, quota restrictions, and government decrees […] growing out of geography, climate, and unpredictable variations in taste; and all the vicissitudes of both hot and cold war.[42]

The second peculiarity related to the prohibitive tariff wall of Canada to import fully assembled automotives. This tariff wall furnished Ford with an early motivation to step into the other side of the river.

Thirdly, Canada had a unique relation within the British imperial trade system benefiting from all inter-colonial preferential tariffs either existing or prospective. So, stepping into the domestic economy of Canada was at the same time stepping into the British Empire by making just a small trans-river move.

42 Akhtar, "Corporate Empire," 36.



MAP 3.6 Map of the St. Lawrence River System and profile of the seaway. SOURCE: Pierre Camu and Roger William Benedict, "St. Lawrence Seaway." Encyclopedia Britannica, October 29, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Saint-Lawrence-Seaway.

The temporal reason, on the other hand sight, was that the agreement between Henry Ford and the founding entrepreneur of Ford Canada, Gordon McGregor of Walterville, Ontario was realized at a very early stage of the formation of FMC unlike the Company's other international enterprises. At that early point, the stupefying success of FMC was not yet foreseeable, and Henry Ford did not think about wholly owning the Canadian company. Yet by 1920 Ford Canada turned to be British Empire's largest industrial enterprise within only 16 years of its foundation. Under Gordon McGregor Ford Canada met a rising demand from Gibraltar to Auckland.[43] The 1904 agreement had granted Ford Canada the exclusive right to manufacture and sell Ford products in the British Empire save for the UK and Ireland where two incorporations took place in 1909, in Manchester and Cork respectively.

43 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:355.

In 1920, it was exporting as much as a third of its production overseas. This relationship expanded from a simple export type to the establishment of wholly owned assembly facilities in Australia, India, Malaya, and South Africa due to the abundant demand mainly in the settler colonies. Those imperial subsidiaries were established mostly by the Canadians and operated free from Detroit influence.[44]

> Ford-Canada's experience differed dramatically from that of the Ford companies in Europe and the rest of the world. At the same time that Ford Canada was developing its own miniature multinational structure across the empire, Ford was embarking upon what has been termed its "American era" in Europe. In 1920 European companies, especially the British branch was tightly controlled by Detroit. [..]Europe's branch plants were treated like plants in the various states of America [...][45]

This caused an open conflict between Henry Ford and Percival Perry, the head of Ford Britain many decades to come[46] and even led to an interruption in the relationship of these two key corporate figures by the resignation of Perry in 1919. He would reintegrate as the Chair of the brand-new Ford Motor Co Ltd. Britain as part of the restructuration of European operations in 1928, being offered this chairmanship personally by Henry Ford.[47] Perry was indeed the central figure for everything Ford in the UK, starting with the formation of a sales agency in 1904, expanding to a full-fledged Ford branch in 1909 after the launch of the T Model and then to an assembly plant in Trafford Park connected to the Atlantic Ocean through the Manchester Ship Canal in 1911. That same year Ford Motor Co. (England) Ltd, was for the first time incorporated "offering tax advantages and the prospect of greater strength through independence of the English firm."[48]

---

44 Anastakis, "From Independence to Integration," 221.

45 Ibid., 222.

46 Burgess-Wise, "Perry, Percival Lee Dewhurst."

47 Tolliday, "The Rise of Ford in Britain," 9.

48 Burgess-Wise, "Perry, Percival Lee Dewhurst," 640.

After the World War I, Ford Motor Company refused to give dealers in USA a fixed territory but kept the "sales of Ford products alone" rule. Yet in Britain, Percival Perry had created a system of sole distributors in large, protected territories, which were allowed to handle other cars besides offering Ford products.[49] This created another point of tension. Perry was forced to resign in 1919 because he insisted on a policy of more autonomy in product design, design of the sales territories, and a say over the British dominions. Those calls for more territorial autonomy were not echoed in the headquarter Dearborn before 1928 on the eve of the regional reorganization plan of Dagenham.

> [T]he expansion that Perry had wanted to undertake in 1919 was now being offered to him [...] Perry had succeeded in persuading Ford to do in Europe what had been done in Canada twenty-five years earlier: to place Ford subsidiary companies under local management and direction in order to fit national business conditions.[50]

Until then even a country like Cyprus where right-hand drives were used was delivered with automotives from the mainly left-hand drive country Canada rather than the right-hand drive Britain.[51]

When Ford Motor Co. (England) Ltd., was established in 1909 as a legal entity in London, it was wholly owned by the Michigan Company and its shares were not traded in the London stock exchange.[52] Ford Canada had imposed this exact same procedure to its own subsidiaries. This was another prime example for the double standard within the internationalization strategy in the two "launching pads" of FMC.

Despite its new overseas branches, Ford by 1909 continued to rely chiefly on export houses and dealers appointed by its main sales agent in Europe, Lockwood and approved by Detroit. Each of these agencies had the right to

49 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:361.

50 Burgess-Wise, "Perry, Percival Lee Dewhurst," 641–42.

51 "[FMC Correspondence 1925-31] Letter Sent by William G. Collins, General Manager of the Alexandria Plant to to FMC Manchester on 1929, March 5," March 5, 1929, Acc. 282 / Box 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

52 Tolliday, "The Rise of Ford in Britain," 10.

sell Fords for limited periods. Each agreed to "appoint a sub-dealer or to establish a properly equipped Branch House or garage for the sale and repair of Ford automobiles in every City or Town within the above-described [specific] territory as may at any time be designated by the Manufacturer."[53]

In 1908, FMC started to produce T Model Fords, "Tin Lizzy"s, which would later become the symbol of mass production, at the Highland Park factory in Detroit. There, mass production by way of moving assembly line (MAL) was launched in 1913 taking an example of the "disassembly lines in the meat-packing industry in Chicago and Cincinnati"[54] taking advantages both from the division of labor and increased flow of the product.[55] There, unlike the older vertical production structures marked by skilled workers assembling cars in teams by hand, a modern horizontal plant layout allowed workers to remain stationary while the parts and components moved around them.

A social, even sociological innovation accompanied the technological innovation. This was an encompassing labor control regime and constituted an evolved model for the period it was embedded in. It was known under an economistic name, the "Five Dollar Day" launched in 1914. At that time FMC not only applied the mass assembly line (MAL) which would later be called by his name, to the industry, but increased the wages of the workers exactly one-fold to five dollars a day. With this Ford gave one of the most sophisticated examples of demand management on a factory scale later to be named by its brand when applied by nation state scales after the World War

53 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 40.

54 "Henry Ford himself claimed that the idea derived from the 'disassembly lines' of meatpackers in Chicago and Cincinnati. William Klann, a Ford deputy who was deeply involved in the innovation, agreed but noted that an equally important source of inspiration was flour milling technology as practiced in Minnesota. Klann summarized this technology in the expression' 'flow production". David A. Hounshell, *From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 242.

55 Alfred D. Chandler, *Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors, and the Automobile Industry: Sources and Readings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), 25–49.

II.[56] One of the institutional pillars of the Five Dollar Day was the Sociological Department of FMC, personally founded by Henry Ford who appointed a protestant priest as its head. Higher morals defined by the company were required for higher wages and the Sociological Department was here to provide for statistics and guidance in matching the "virtues of the work" (diligence, temperance, and industriousness) with the needs of the family, dwelling, community, and leisure.[57]

Ford territorial landscape displayed the following pattern for the period after the switch to mass production in 1913. There were "[t]hirty branch agencies and service stations in the United States, nine in Canada, three in Europe, and one each in Australia and South America assisted in selling the Model T."[58] Each had its own manager, who maintained contact with Detroit; each continually received men from home office who gave advice in sales and service; and each domestic office had unnoticed visits from travelling auditors. The branches supervised dealers in their areas. The Detroit office provided standard form contracts on an annual basis, carefully defining the territory assigned and they usually maps were attached to those definitions.[59]

Also, the internationalization of the productive facilities outside North America was quite early. The first assembly plant in Europe was erected in Manchester in 1911 as mentioned above.[60] By the early 1920s when Ford Motor Company started planning to invest into an assembly plant in Istanbul, it had already internationalized its industrial capital over six continents.[61] Between 1908 and 1923 over one half of the cars produced and sold in the United States were Fords.[62] By the early 1920s while Ford was delivering more than 60% of all vehicles produced in the United States,

56 Jessop, "The Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix and the Tendential Ecological Dominance of Globalizing Capitalism."

57 Georgios Paris Loizides, "Deconstructing Fordism: Legacies of the Ford Sociological Department" (PhD Diss., Kalamazoo, Mich., Western Michigan University, 2004).

58 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:510.

59 Ibid.

60 Tolliday, "The Rise of Ford in Britain," 10.

61 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 83–113.

62 Dicke, *Franchising in America*, 139.

about half of all the vehicles produced or used in the entire world were Fords.[63] Yet in 1921, for example, the Highland Park factory fully assembled only 9.5% of the total company production of 928,000 vehicles. The rest of the knocked down parts was sent to other assembly spots in the USA and all around the world. The Highland Park complex (and later the River Rouge factory complex) in Detroit were principally giant, vertically -backward-integrated manufacturing plants which dispatched kits for final assembly (the knocked down parts) at the USA branch assembly plants and overseas subsidiaries.[64] 1922 was an exception to this trend. The export ratio to the total cars produced in the USA was around one to ten. This meant that that year of crisis nine tenth of all cars produced in the USA were also sold in the USA.[65]

The only exception to this ultra-centralized system which was delivering this continuous upward trend of internationalization with firm centralized control was the Cork tractor factory. Henry Ford established the Cork factory in his hometown in Ireland in 1917 under the designation Henry Ford & Son Ltd., considering the market promised by the need for autarchy in agriculture during the World War I.[66] International flows of Ford automotives were -despite centralized demarcations- quite chaotic during the war:

> Ontario-assembled Fords did ambulance work with Canadian troops in Flanders; British-assembled Fords carried ammunition and dispatches in the Somme Valley; American-made Fords ran on all fronts, even going to Serbia with the Columbia University relief expedition. [...] Almost as soon as the Treaty of Versailles was signed,

63 Alfred D. Chandler, Thomas K. McCraw, and Richard S. Tedlow, *Management: Past and Present: A Casebook on the History of American Business* (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western College Publications, 1996), 6–9.

64 Steven Tolliday, "Transferring Fordism: The First Phase of the Overseas Diffusion and Adaptation of Ford Methods, 1911-1939," *Actes Du GERPISA*, no. 11 (1993): 54.

65 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:357.

66 Thomas Grimes, "Starting Ireland on the Road to Industry: Henry Ford in Cork." (PhD thesis, National University of Ireland Maynooth., 2008).

> [...] the number of American units exported in 1920 rose to 171,644 with the Ford well in the lead.[67]

Cork factory was the main assembly and worldwide shipping center for Fordson tractors for a short period between 1919 and 1922. This central role faded slowly until 1932. This was mainly due to political factors. With the establishment of the independent Irish State in 1922 a different customs regime between England and Ireland entered into force.[68]

The American company had opened dealers' offices in the chief Latin-American and Japanese cities. It separately approached Chinese and Russian markets during the 1920s. Marketing on the European continent had been taken in charge from Paris headquarters supervised selling outlets scattered from Lisbon to Warsaw. When international sales would go down it was seen as a transitory phase of the linear success story of the centralized Ford system and palliative measures "of more of the same" were suggested. The export managers' conference in Detroit in the year 1923 epitomizes this mindset of the Company.

> In the fall of that year 1923 an export managers' conference in Detroit produced some searching of hearts. Those present were full of enthusiasm, pointing out that the total of foreign sales amounted to more than eight per cent of Ford output, with excellent opportunities for expansion. But their discussions revealed a highly inadequate organization of the foreign field, which needed more assembly plants, more dealers, and more managers. Ford executives, in summarizing the results of the conference, declared that each of the 2174 dealers abroad ought to employ, on the average, one more salesman; that each salesman ought to make at least ten calls a day; and that a more energetic demonstration of cars, trucks, and tractors was essential.[69]

We can well call this first phase of internationalization the Fordian model, conceptualized as the American Age of Ford in Europe. It was fixed at a

67 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:356.

68 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 70ff.

69 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:357.

world car and a global market organized around territories cutting through the national borders. The weaknesses of this Fordian model incrementally became visible after the crisis of 1921 giving way to the first signs of protectionism globally. The decline of the global market dominance Ford Motors from the late 1920s throughout the mid-1940s and the rise of the competition of the rival General Motors illustrates well the limits of mass production without diversification and the importance of developing a full range of subsidiary institutions and product diversification,[70] to which Ford responded with the boom in the number of branch assembly plants all around the world (See Figure 3.5).[71]

70 Dicke, *Franchising in America*, 140; Chandler, *Giant Enterprise*.

71 For the interactive online version of the map made by Murat Tülek, see: https://bit.ly/3Rt5FOR



FIGURE 3.5 Screenshot of the map of Ford's internationalization before and after 1928. SOURCE: Compiled by the author using: Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill. *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964., esp. Appendix II, and "Ford in Europe, 1903-2003, A Chronology," In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 1: 9–24. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003. Map made by Murat Tülek and Aslı Odman, interactive version: https://shorturl.at/lBLSY

In the 1920s it was more profitable to import knocked down parts from Detroit and assemble them in the assembly nodes around the world to bypass customs regulations and taxes and be at the same time closer to market demand. This quantitative expansion took nevertheless under the sign of a strictly centralized international network up until 1928, except for Ford Canada.

§ 3.2 The Restructuring of Ford Europe in 1928: Dagenham, UK

Why and how did the Ford's 1928 de-centralization and regionalization strategy in England/Dagenham evolve, of which Istanbul plant later became part?

Until 1928, the FMC's European operations remained simply small-scale marketing and assembly operations in its assembly plants, Manchester, Cork, Antwerp, Rotterdam (then Amsterdam), Berlin (later Cologne), (first Bordeaux, later) Asnières/Paris, (first in Cádiz, later in) Barcelona, Trieste (later Genoa), Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsinki.[72] With the exception of the capital cities Paris and Berlin they were all port cities that had access to main global maritime trade routes. All the European assembly plants were incorporated in their respective countries between 1911 and 1926 and constituted separate legal entities as subsidiaries of FMC, four of the assembly plants also embodied Free Ports. The assembly plants located at free ports were Copenhagen (in 1919), Cádiz (in 1920) Trieste (in 1922), Barcelona (in 1923).[73]

They were not only assembly and export, but also administrative, service/maintenance and credit centers. Except for the Fordson tractor factory in Cork they were all delivered with knocked-down parts from Detroit. The boxes containing the semi-finished automotive (automobiles, trucks, tractors and, rarely, airplane) parts would be loaded from the Highland Park plant in Detroit, the heart of Ford in Detroit through the Erie Lake/Erie Canal/Hudson River/Edgewater Harbor to the Atlantic Ocean either to Ford-owned fleet of Ford Transports or to American Export Lines Inc.[74] This is

72 Steven Tolliday, "The Origins of Ford of Europe: From Multidomestic to Multinational Corporation, 1903-1976," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 151–241; Tolliday, "The Rise of Ford in Britain," 7–123 .

73 For the "Timeline of Internationalization of Production of FMC, 1904-1944," and accompanying time-map, see Appendix B and C.

74 "American Export Lines Inc.," accessed December 7, 2023, https://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/americanexport.shtml.

exactly why most Ford European nodes were located in either port cities or on waterways with easy access to maritime transportation.[75]



FIGURE 3.6 "Unloading Ford Cars for the export market," 1927 SOURCE: Ford Motor Company. *The Ford Industries: Facts About the Ford Motor Company and Its Subsidiaries*. (Detroit, Mich.: Ford Motor Company, 1927): 65.

During the "American era in Europe" between 1920-1928 in Manchester, Cork, Bordeaux, Paris, Copenhagen, Trieste, Cádiz, Barcelona, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Helsinki, and Berlin, Detroit determined all. There were standard Detroit practices on the shop floor. The European operations remained simply small-scale marketing and assembly operations. Propositions to produce a smaller car better suited to European market conditions were repressed. Ford Motor Company's priority was not to develop produc-

75 The geostrategical planning of FMC until well into the 1930's involved a direct maritime connection as a must which is poignantly exemplified in an anectode from a trip made by Henry Ford in October 1930 to Rotterdam: "Then he left to look at work on factory sites in Europe, rejecting a part-built plant in Rotterdam on a site chosen by Perry because it was not beside the deep-water canal. 'No water, no plant,' he snapped to stunned Dutch officials, and ordered his chauffeur to drive on." David Burgess-Wise, *Ford at Dagenham: The Rise and Fall of Detroit in Europe* (Derby: Breedon Books, 2001), 35.

tion but to export American cars. All European plants were tied to the single product Model T. [76]



MAP 3.7 Ford Motor Company's international branches and corporations before 1928. SOURCE: Compiled by the author using: Mira Wil-kins and Frank Ernest Hill. *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964., esp. Appendix II and "Ford in Europe, 1903-2003, A Chronology," In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 1: 9–24. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003. Map by Murat Tülek.

76 Tolliday, "The Origins of Ford of Europe:," 2003; Tolliday, "The Rise of Ford in Britain."



MAP 3.8 Ford Motor Company's international assembly facilities, assembly plants, manufacturing facilities before 1928. SOURCE: See Map 3.7.

Ford switched in 1928 to a new strategy to effectively deal with the rising protectionist policies and deepen individual markets by diversifying products, allow for more customs-free local inputs, outsource management responsibilities by hiring more local managers by nevertheless keeping the control ties tight. Thus, the so-called 1928 Plan for European restructuring involved a strategic change in production and organization. Ford England would be empowered for the overall aim of regional re-centralization of production in Europe. This involved not only a simple switch from the standardized "world car" Model T to Model A. It was much more than this. The core of the Plan was the construction of a massive works in England. This new, gigantic plant after the model after the Rouge River Plan on the edge of Detroit was to be built somewhere in England in three years' time starting from the initiation of the 1928 Plan.

The Trafford Park plant in Manchester, which was erected in 1911, was facing the Atlantic Ocean, welcoming ocean-going vessels through the Manchester Ship Canal. But this time for the regional centralization of production for European operations a location strategically placed towards the European continent deemed to be more fit.

> The final choice of Dagenham came as a surprise to many people. Ford already had land at Southampton. The 310-acre Essex site, acquired in 1925, was mostly low-lying marsh. Some experts said it was unworkable, but the geographical advantages of the site proved decisive. Its proximity to London's docks gave easy access to European ports - it was as a great exporting center that the idea of such a factory was conceived.[77]

The geostrategic decision for Dagenham fell from Detroit. The conceptual space for the prospective factory, the low-lying marshland on the northeastern shores of Thames, downriver from London had served for decades as a dumping site for metropolitan London. The rubbish tips where waste dumped or burned were full of rat-ridden rotten fat from London's meat markets, spoil excavated during the construction of the London Tube. The concrete space that hosted literally all that was disposed of a vast industrializing area - once *the* center of the World Economy - was now disposable to Ford to establish its "Detroit-on-Thames." [78]

The head of the project was Percival Perry, the powerful man of Henry Ford, veteran manager of all Ford operations between 1903 and 1919. Percival had resigned in 1919 when his propositions for a direct expansion in Britain and more autonomy were rejected by Henry Ford. Ford wanted to continue running the English company as a simple branch of Detroit and had disposed of Perry alongside the latter's premature propositions for decentralization. The return of Perry to the chair of Ford England in 1928 was by personal invitation by and a sign for change of heart of Henry Ford forced by new global economic conditions.

---

77 Burgess-Wise, "Perry, Percival Lee Dewhurst," 641.

78 Burgess-Wise, *Ford at Dagenham*, 27–28, 40.

The "Detroit-on-Thames" would be the regional center of manufacture for Europe, serving assembly plants in Manchester, Cork, Paris, Berlin, Antwerp, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Trieste, Stockholm, Helsinki, Rotterdam, and later on Istanbul and Alexandria. The European demand for Ford products should be filled from Dagenham to justify the plant. FMC hoped to tap economies of scale by integrating its European operations. This entrepreneurial logic is also traceable in the planned output of Dagenham which was not less than 250,000 cars per year. But the capacity was cut back already during construction between May 1929 and to October 1931 to 120,000. This means that by 1930 even half of the projected amount was a faraway target to realize.

Perry Percival stated in that year that "Dagenham's goal has been rendered almost impossible because of the growth of tariff walls and the consequent necessity to have self-contained manufacturing plants in Germany, France and Italy."[79] Ford Detroit had acted pragmatically to the rise of European protectionism: The new entrepreneurial rationality required a switch to manufacture nationally in the former production sites that have a sufficient effective demand for cars, trucks and tractors, in order to hold on to its markets. Already in 1930 Ford started to build a manufacturing plant at Cologne to serve the German market with "German-built" Fords, cutting across the international strategic aims of the 1928 plan. In 1933 the German plant became self-sufficient and ceased to take Dagenham exports.[80]

The stages leading to the greenfield investment of Ford in Istanbul and its realization had evolved mainly between 1925 and 1933 in the middle of this important switch in the territorial order of FMC. The investment in Istanbul emanated from and was legally bound directly to an FMC-US affiliated subsidiary with official address in the "tax shelter" state of Delaware, called FMC Exports Incorporated (Inc.).[81] FMC Exports Inc. was the legal

79 Tolliday, "The Origins of Ford of Europe:," 2003, 161.

80 Thomas, "Searching for Identity"; Link, *Forging Global Fordism*, 131ff; Burgess-Wise, *Ford at Dagenham*, 46.

81 Hal Weitzman, 'Delaware is everywhere': how a little-known tax haven made the rules for corporate America - ICIJ, interview by Nicole Sadek, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, June 27, 2022, https://bit.ly/3tmtgJ8; Hal Weitzman, *What's the Matter*

frame for the investments in Brazil, China, Egypt, and Turkey in the order of the launching of Ford operations in these respective countries. In fact, the Ford Motor Company Exports Incorporated incarnates the modified title of the original Ford Motor Company of Brazil, founded in 1923 again as a Delaware corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of FMC-US.[82] Mending and modifying legal frameworks according to specific cases was a marker of the expansion of Ford operations abroad.

Ford Manager of the Alexandria plant (William G. Collins) and Turkish Minister of Finance (Şükrü Saraçoğlu) negotiated the Turkish investment, during which Collins kept close contact with the US Embassy in Ankara also profiting from his network as a former Assistant Trade Commissioner at the American Embassy in Constantinople back in 1921.[83] Two milestones of those negotiations were first the signature of the contract on November 27 of 1928 between FMC and the Turkish Republic and second the enactment of this contract into Law Nr. 1391 by way of ratification by the National Assembly on February 2 of 1929, called the *Ford Law*. This Law codified the extraordinary privileges FMC received from the Turkish Government "especially since certain free port and other privileges [were] granted which were not provided for by any existing Turkish laws."[84]

---

with Delaware? How the First State Has Favored the Rich, Powerful, and Criminal - and How It Costs Us All (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022).

82 Wilkins points out to the legal forms through which the South American Ford operations were framed, including those in Brazil: "In studying Ford's South American branch operations it is an error (occasionally made in Ford company records) to date any of them from the time a company was incorporated. FMC-Arg. began as a branch of FMC-US, and remained such until 1959, when a corporation came into being. In Brazil the Ford company started to do business in May 1919. Four years later, in 1923, the Ford Motor Company of Brazil—a Delaware corporation—was formed; it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of FMC-US. This subsidiary's title was changed to Ford Motor Company, Exports, Inc. in 1925, and for many years Ford operated in Brazil under this name. (FMC, Exports, Inc. also had branches in Egypt, Turkey, and China.)" Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 473, footnote 9.

83 "Account from November 19, 1928 from the 'Angora Diary' of S. Pinkney Tuck."

84 "Ford Plant in Constantinople," *Levant Trade Review*, Published Monthly by the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, 16, no. 11 (1928): 432.

During the initial steps of the Dagenham Plan managers of European operations and top managers in Detroit heatedly debated about a possible change in the legal attachment status of Ford Istanbul and the designation of the Ford Motor Company Exports Incorporated. It was clear that the generous privileges by the Turkish Government to locate the assembly plant to Istanbul were granted because they were prerequisites posed by Ford Detroit. Thus, Ford Istanbul came into being as a purely American enterprise. The negotiations took place between Detroit and Ankara. Yet the beginning of 1930s had witnessed this radical change in the territorial center of Ford's European operations from Detroit to Dagenham. The until then independently operating companies in Europe were now to be included to FMC Ltd. Britain and the latter would become the owner of all stocks and assets of the former. Ford Limited with headquarters in London, a newly established company per December 7, 1928, was successfully floated to this end. The FMC England Ltd. was replaced by FMC Limited. It had acquired all the following European assets including Henry Ford & Son Ltd. in Ireland.

> The company has been formed to acquire and carry on as a going concern as from 31st of October, 1928 the business of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers carried on by Ford Motor Company (England), Ltd, (including Henry Ford & Son, Ltd., Cork, Ireland) and the following associated Companies in Europe: -Automobiles Ford, S.A. Paris, France; Ford Motor Company (A.G.) Berlin, Germany, Ford Motor Company d'Italia, S.A. Triest, Italy; Ford Motor Company of Belgium; Ford Motor Company, S. A. E. Barcelona, Spain; N:V. Ford Motor Company of Holland; Ford Motor Company A/S Copenhagen, Denmark; Ford Motor Company A/B, Stockholm, Sweden; and Ford Motor Company O/Y, Helsingfors, Finland.[85]

85 "Prospectus of the Memorandum of Association of Ford Motor Company Ltd. [FMC Correspondence 1929-31]," December 12, 1928, Acc 282 / Box 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.



MAP 3.9 Ford's Oversea Sales - Assembly – Manufacturing Expansion, 1904-1944: "Closeup of European expansion." SOURCE: See Appendix C, Map by Ahmetcan Alphan.

Ford of America owned 60% of the English company's stock and thus controlled its policy. The rest was offered to the British public. The Ford of England in turn would hold 60% of the shares of each of the European affiliates, offering the public in each country the remaining 40%. The plan was that through this repartition each European Ford company would take on a national character. It had a capitalization of Seven Million Pounds compared with former company's 200,000 Pounds. Each continental nation taxed the Ford affiliate and England taxed again the profit repatriation into England. Therefore Ford Ltd. Chair Perry formed a holding company in a tax-heaven, first in Lichtenstein, than in Luxemburg under the name of Société D'Investissement Ford.[86] Charles E. Sorenson, the legendary production manager of FMC described this new grouping as "eleven new companies [which] each had its own board of directors and a chairman

86 "Ford at Dagenham," *The Economist*, November 29, 1930.

[and] when listed looked like a Who's Who of Europe."[87] In the FMC Limited Memorandum of Association it is stated that "The Company will acquire from Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, Michigan, U.S.A., the exclusive rights in Europe (not including Russia); large areas in Africa, and Asia, of its present and future products, together with rights to use and employ all patents, trademarks, etc., now owned or to be owned by such Company."[88] *The Economist* furthermore detailed the territory under the umbrella of the British company:

> British company [...]holds the the sole right to manufacture, assemble, distribute and market all Ford products in the following territories:-The British Isles, the Continent of Europe (excluding Russia), Asia Minor, including Palestine, Syria, Arabia (except Aden), Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, Egypt and certain other parts of Africa and certain parts of Turkey.[89]

With this move the global distribution of production

> "[...] should be systematized from three main centers, Michigan, Ontario, and England. Besides intensively cultivating the home market, the Rouge would send parts for assembly mainly to Japan and Latin America. Ford Motor of Canada, the largest automotive factory under the British flag, would principally distribute (chiefly through affiliated companies) to most of the Empire Commonwealth."[90]

The Agreement five of the English Prospectus from December 12, 1928, also stipulated that the "territories controlled from the Alexandria branch should be handed over to the English Company."[91] Just two years before

87 Cited in: Akhtar, "Corporate Empire," 42.

88 "Prospectus of the Memorandum of Association of Ford Motor Company Ltd. [FMC Correspondence 1929-31]"; Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:543–44.

89 "Ford at Dagenham," 997.

90 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:542.

91 "[FMC Correspondence 1929-31] Letter Sent by Percival Perry, Director of FMC Ltd. London, from March 22nd, 1929, from Asnières / France to the Secretary of FMC B. C.

this, much of the Trieste territory under the control of Ford Motor Company d'Italia was transferred to Alexandria. This move was accompanied by the appointment William G. Collins, former chief roadmen in Trieste[92] as assistant manager to Alexandria sometime during 1927,[93] and then to the post of manager at Alexandria on November 6, 1928.[94] The Turkish contract had been signed three weeks after the appointment of Collins to the post of Manager of the Alexandria plant on November 27, 1928 and just a couple weeks before the launching of the new British company on December 7, 1928. Yet simply officially adapting the requirements of Article Five to Ford Istanbul was more difficult than moving executives and machinery of the factory from Alexandria Branch to Constantinople Branch.

This should be also the reason about the confusion of the in the press coverage of the territory assigned to Ford Britain. Contrary to *The Economist*, *New York Times* cited the Alexandria territory out when describing the area of delivery of the new British company:

> The English company will have the sole exclusive right of manufacturing, assembling, distributing, and marketing Ford and Lincoln motor cars and other Ford products in Great Britain, Ireland, and Europe, *with the exception of Soviet Russia, but not in Asia Minor,*

Craig in Dearborn," March 22, 1929, Acc. 281 / Box 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

92 "Territory Report from 1925, July 25, From Trieste to Dearborn," July 25, 1925, Acc. 6 / Box 401, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

93 "Branch Questionnaire Alexandria, Egypt," May 30, 1927, AR-65-5 / Box 20 Alexandria, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt on July 22, 1960," July 22, 1960, Acc. 880 / Box 7, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

94 "Plant Questionnaire Alexandria 2," January 11, 1929, AR-65-5 / Box 20 Alexandria, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] FMC-England - Reorganization - 1928, F.L. Rockelman to Craig et.Al.," November 6, 1928, Acc 880, Box. 5, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

> *Syria, Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt and certain other parts of Africa.*[95]

The business correspondence of that transition period abounded about the feasibility of changing the attachment status and designation of the Turkish investment according to the new Dagenham Plan. Perry Percival, Managing Director of Ford Ltd. in Britain formulated this question directly, without embellishment, as follows:

> As a matter of principle, do you believe that the concession granted to the American Ford Company would not have been granted e.g., to the Company being British, or even to another British automobile concern, e. g. Austin?[96]

Could Ford Constantinople not be made fit the re-regionalization plan centered in London? This was something that Ford managers in Britain were keen to know and the main concern of all the questions they asked, twisting this and that way.

Yet the conviction of the main negotiator and founding Ford Istanbul manager William G. Collins was unshaken: Ultimately, UK was a country, against which the founding military elites of the Turkish Republic fought during the World War I. Turkey and UK were attached to enemy alliances just around ten years ago. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the British army had even occupied parts of the former sovereign territories of the Ottoman Empire, including the capital of Constantinople. The historically based distrust of Britain's economic dominance and aggressive expansionist policies went back much further. The commerical diplomacy of Britain had dominated Ottoman trade between 1830 and 1875 overfloating the relatively weak domestic industry. After the financial weakening and on the eve of the dissolution of the Empire, British capital increased its investments in form

95 "FMC - Great Britain," *New York Times*, December 11, 1928. cited in ; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] FMC - Foreign Agencies and Plants," n.d., Acc 880, Box. 5, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford. .*Italics* are mine.

96 "[FMC Correspondence 1925-31] Letter Sent by Percival Perry, Chairman of FMC Ltd. London William G. Collins, Manager of the Constantinople Plant on 1929, October 3," October 3, 1929, Acc. 282 / Box 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

of concessions (of railways, the submarine telegraph system, oil extraction), large-scale factories (flour, cotton, olive oil, soap, using steam powered machinery), insurance companies, banks and even landgrabbing in Ottoman lands of Cyprus and Egypt to protect the trade routes to its colony India.[97] At the same time, British capital, as a powerful member of the Ottoman Bank, which managed the Ottoman debt, was de facto draining a significant portion of the young Turkish republic's ressources. So, the historically founded distrust would obstruct the transfer even if it seemed to be a simple act in terms of legal technique. Linking the Constantinople branch of FMC to Ford Britain instead of Delaware seemed unfeasible, especially seen a part of the port of Istanbul was declared "free zone," de facto ex-territorialized and put partly outside the sovereign powers of the Turkish state.

> I do not believe that the concession granted the American Ford Company would have, in the first instance been granted to the British Ford Company. Neither do I believe any British automobile company like Austin could obtain the same facilities. As you know, the Turks are always apprehensive lest some European power, especially the French, British, Italians, and Germans, may take military action against them, and, having a freeport here where all sorts of boxed materials may be freely brought in without examination, appears to be in their minds too much of a risk. I believe that they granted us the facilities in question owing to Henry Ford's good intentions and well-known reputation, as you suggest, and also to the fact that they realize that the USA is far ways off and is not likely to become embroiled in any European conflict of territory expansion which may arise — at least not at the outset.[98]

97 Necla Geyikdağı, "The Evolution of British Commercial Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire," *Conress* 1, no. 1 (2017): 9–46.

98 "[FMC Correspondence 1929-31] Confidential Letter Sent by William G. Collins, Manager of FMC Export Inc. Istanbul, to Percival Perry, Manager of FMC Ltd. to London, 1929, October 9," October 9, 1929, Acc. 281 / Box 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

Collins, in another letter sent half a year before to the Office of B. J. Craig, Secretary and Treasurer at FMC Dearborn had defended consistently that profits and surplus funds could be transferred anywhere within the Ford empire, but the designation should absolutely not be changed:

> I explained to Sir Percival that I had no inkling whatsoever at the time of signature of our Contract with the Turkish Government (i.e., November 27, 1928) that we should ever have the desire to change the name of this plant to something other than "Ford Motor Company Exports Inc;" that should we now, at this late date (i.e., after formal signature of the Contract by both parties, and its subsequent passage through the various sub-commissions of Parliament as well as the main body itself which had the effect of enacting our privileges into law) attempt to affect any change, it was feared that our overtures in this connection would very likely be received with suspicion on the part of the Turks; that even if they agree to any change in name, it would require months and months of pushing on our part in an attempt to get same through Parliament; etc., etc., in short - Sir Percival agreed that it would not be a wise move on our part to attempt to have any change made in designation or name of the Company at this late date. [...] In Conclusion the writer would say that insofar as the source from which we draw our Constantinople assembly material (whether from the U.S., Manchester, Cork or anywhere else) is concerned, or where we may wish to transmit our profits and surplus funds, are both matters in which we can do just as we please in Constantinople. The important thing is to let the Contract remain just as it was enacted into law [...]"[99]

99 "[FMC Correspondence 1929-31] Letter Sent by William G. Collins, Then the Manager of Alexandria, to B. J. Craig, Secretary and Treasurer at FMC Dearborn from 1929, March 11," March 11, 1929, Acc. 282 / Box 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford. Half a year later Collins would modify its optimism that Ford Istanbul could draw the knocked-down parts from any Ford entity and modified that "Our Lawyer's opinion here is, and I quite agree with him that we are required to draw our assembly material and parts directly from the USA, as per the contract arrangement'": "[FMC Correspondence 1925-31] Confidential Letter Sent by William G. Collins, General Manager of the Constantinople Plant to

Neither did Collins find it feasible to form a separate Turkish company to by-pass the problem of the change of designation of the company. The sheer number of the countries under the umbrella of the Alexandria territory (about to be transferred to Istanbul), the insufficient demand and the negotiated privileges of a free zone with the Turkish Government would render such a move irrational.

> The writer pointed out to Sir Percival that the Alexandria territory was quite different from the other territories like France, Germany, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, etc., in which the Ford Motor Company Ltd is now busy organizing local companies with the view of permitting residents thereof to participate in Stock purchases, and in which the economic position and number of inhabitants were sufficient to warrant separate companies and plants. Under Alexandria, we control 18 different countries, not one of which would support by itself a local plant, and inasmuch as our sales in Turkey would not be increased at all were we to form a Turkish Company, with the privilege of local stock participation, it would be much better for all concerned were we to continue to operate as at present, especially in view of our 25 year contract with the Turkish Government.[100]

The question about where the Istanbul plant in the free zone would get its semi-finished parts from posed another point of discussion between Collins and Perry. The massive projected capacity of Dagenham at a scale of 200,000 cars annually "would be shipped within the United Kingdom, Irish Free State, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, the continent of Europe (with the exception of European Russia), Asia Minor, including Palestine, Syria, Arabia (except Aden), Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, Egypt and certain other parts of Africa." Within this wide market FMC Ltd. had the exclusive right of manufacturing, assembling, distributing, and marketing Ford and Lincoln Motor

---

H. Stanford Cooper, Vice-Chairman of the Ford Motor Co., Ltd., London on 1929, September 23," September 23, 1929, Acc. 282 / Box 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

100 "Letter Sent by William G. Collins, 1929, March 11."

Cars, Fordson tractors, other Ford products which justified the scale of the plant to be erected.[101]

Collins was in a firm position not to risk the hardly negotiated privileges in Turkey. Basically, the motivation of Perry was the same, yet for another location. He, in turn did in no way want to jeopardize the dearly gained position and future success of a central European production node in Dagenham:

> In view of the foregoing we feel quite sure that it would be best for all concerned by continuing to operate as an American company and draw the majority of our supplies from the USA.[102]
> For the time being, i.e. the next two years, the bulk of your requirements will obviously be drawn ex USA, but it is Mr Ford's intention that when Dagenham is working, the supplies for your territory shall be shipped from England. - Our whole plans in respect of Dagenham are based on that assumption [103]

Despite the painstaking discussions at the end of 1928 and during the whole year of 1929 the plant in Istanbul did not continue its assembly operations long enough to witness the streaming of knocked-down parts from Dagenham.

The designation issue was postponed as well. When the territorial and legal ties of the European operations were shifted from Dearborn/Detroit to London, the application of the Article 5 of the English Company's Prospectus was put aside for some time. The legal status of the Istanbul investment remained unchanged. It kept its legal roots in Delaware but was de facto co-managed from London until 1931. In August 1931 the London based Ford England, took over the authority to control all the assets of Ford Motor Company Export Inc., Istanbul to which the government concession was granted as an American-based company in 1928.

---

101 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 193.

102 "Confidential Letter Sent by William G. Collins, 1929, October 9."

103 "Letter Sent by Percival Perry, 1929, October 3."

> The Agreement dated Aug 5, 1931 between Ford Motor Company (Exports) Inc., U.S.A and Ford Motor Co Ltd provides that although the property in the assets at Istanbul has been conveyed to the English Company, it is the Export Company which is carrying on the business there through their duly appointed Attorney -- Lord Perry. The Agreement provides, moreover, that all profits earned shall be paid over to the English Company had, conversely, that all losses incurred shall be made good to the Exports Company.[104]

Ford Ltd. Britain carried the financial and administrative burden when the Istanbul investment failed to deliver even a fraction of the expected results, was in the red most of the time.

> [T]he profits of the Istanbul Company accrue to the English Company and that there is no liability attached to the Exports Company in respect of any losses resulting from trading operations at Istanbul.[105]

The already meager assembly activities stopped some time by April 1933. It practically served as a transit location of imported cars, trucks, tractors and a service station. The machinery of the assembly plant was moved back to the city with strong colonial ties to UK, i.e., to Alexandria during the year that followed and to the newly established Romanian Company's headquarter, Bucharest in 1938. Part three of Chapter Three is dedicated to this adaptation process of the territorial strategy of FMC after the World War I, one that left Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul take shape on a very shaky ground.

---

104 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers], Letter by H. Stanford Cooper from Dagenham to B. J. Craig, Ford-US Auditor," May 4, 1938, Acc 880 / Box. 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

105 "[FMC Correspondence 1929-31] Letter Sent by Percival Perry, Director of FMC Ltd. London, from June 17th, 1929, to the Secretary of FMC B.C. Craig in Dearborn," June 17, 1929, Acc. 281 / Box 1, Benson Ford.



MAP 3.10 Ford Motor Company's international branches and corporations after 1928. SOURCE: See Map 3.7



MAP 3.11 Ford Motor Company's international assembly facilities, assembly plants, manufacturing facilities after 1928. SOURCE: See Map 3.7

§ 3.3 Mapping the Istanbul Territory: Between Markets of USSR, Fiat Beating Trieste, Competition from Alexandria and Constanța

"The hub of the wheel with no weak spoke."[106] This description is from a lengthy article in the February 1930 issue of *Levant Trade Review*, official periodical of the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, celebrating the opening of the Ford Constantinople plant. It summarizes poetically the spatial imagination of the Ford Corporation which led to the choice of Istanbul as the node of a vast territory and of the Tophane pier in Istanbul as the concrete site of the plant. So, what was the shape of that "imagined"

106 "Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul," *Levant Trade Review* 18, no. 2 (1930): 42.

wheel that should determine the span of the capitalist accumulation strategies centered in Istanbul? What were the length, thickness, and direction of each spoke that radiated from the production node? This part of the chapter will try to deal with these questions in a non-deterministic manner since the "assumed rationality" of the decisions of Ford was exposed to an ever-spinning wheel of fortune marked by interruptions and accelerations. Nothing known to FMC about the pace and the space of its markets seemed to replicate itself in the 1920s. The vast Istanbul territory which was made and unmade during this period seems so alien to the eyes of anyone who looks at it today. It corresponds to neither Middle East, the spatial bundle under which Turkey started to be categorized after the World War II in the USA-dominated international relations and business (as well as in academia in the USA), nor Near East, neither Eastern Europe, Balkans nor Northeast Africa, neither Mediterranean nor Caucasia. That map[107] had something from all of them, combined in such a way that cannot be explained in an anachronistic manner. Exactly in this feeling of unfamiliarity, which disturbs our current, mainly politically dominated sense of borders and regions, lays the insight of the story of the making and unmaking of the Istanbul territory.

3.3.1 *Knudsen Report 1919: World Divided into Ford Territories*

To unravel the Istanbul territory that Ford knitted until 1929 at the time of the opening of the Istanbul plant it would be wise jump back to the first comprehensive spatial plan of internationalization made by and named after one of the "lieutenants" of Henry Ford in 1919, i.e., William S. Knudsen.[108] Knudsen worked at FMC Dearborn in the glorious decade between 1911 and 1921 when Ford experienced an unprecedented, exponential boom in its national and international business and never to be experienced again. Knudsen was the production manager and "architect" -alongside with the professional architect Albert Kahn[109] - of a series of assembly plants in the

107 V. sup. Figure 2.4-4 İstanbul territory in 1929 at the time of the opening of the plant

108 Ford R. Bryan, *Henry's Lieutenants* (Wayne State University Press, 2003), 153.

109 His factory designs were not only simply the industrial backbone for the Soviet Union in 1929–31 as consulting architect for the first Five Year Plan, but rather a workspace-scale blueprint of a new social order of productivism. Michael H. Hodges, *Building the Modern*

USA (fourteen) and in Europe (three). "Without the production genius of Knudsen, the Model T could not have reached its phenomenal position in automotive history."[110] Soon after resigning from Ford he would move to its main rival, General Motors Company to become its president in 1937. He was a typical example of the generation of engineer managers which ceded their dominant positions in big scale industrial enterprises to professional business administrators after the World War II.

Right after the end of the World War I and the coming of the Armistice in 1919, Knudsen was sent to Europe to oversee the expansion directions of the operations. Ford was convinced of the "Universal Car" and that Ford methods could be applied anywhere abroad. He saw his brand like an industrial mission(ary). For this end he wanted to have a plan drafted by Knudsen which should determine the springboards, velocities, and radii of expansion.[111] The same year the present-day FMC was re- incorporated in the tax-shelter state Delaware. Two years had passed since the construction of a giant plant at the shores of the River Rouge in Detroit was set about to replace the Highland Park plant. When its construction finished in 1928 it would constitute the largest integrated factory of the world.[112]

World: Albert Kahn in Detroit, 1st edition (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 2018); Adam Lauder and Lee Rodney, "Albert Kahn's Five-Year Plant and the Birth of 'Uncertain Space,'" *Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism* 12, no. 2 (2015): 39–61; Sonia Melnikova-Raich, "The Soviet Problem with Two 'Unknowns': How an American Architect and a Soviet Negotiator Jump-Started the Industrialization of Russia, Part I: Albert Kahn," *IA. The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archeology* 36, no. 2 (2010): 57–80; For Kahn's design work back home, in Detroit where "Kahn's office became an architectural assembly line, a 'plan factory' to mass-produce factory buildings", see; Charles K. Hyde, "Assembly-Line Architecture: Albert Kahn and the Evolution of the U.S. Auto Factory, 1905-1940," *IA. The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archeology* 22, no. 2 (1996): 5.

110 Bryan, *Henry's Lieutenants*, 154.

111 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:358ff.

112 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 116.



FIGURE 3.7 Oil Painting, Rouge Plant, by Irving R. Bacon, 1949. SOURCE: From the Collections of The Henry Ford / 00.28.69

So, by 1919 the company was ready to heap up production and sales in an atmosphere of post-War optimism, if not yet stability. When Knudsen made his trip to Europe (in March and May of 1919)[113] and drafted his plan he had the following Ford landscape at the back of his head,[114] listed in order of their respective launching and according to the legal type, and scope of production of the enterprise (Corporation, Assembly Plant, Manufacture, Assembly Facility, Free Port):

- 1904 (CO and AP): Oakville / Canada: FMC of Canada, Ltd.
- 1908 (MA): Walkersville - Windsor / Canada
- 1908 (BR): Paris / France
- 1908 (BR): London / UK

113 Ibid., 474 fn. 12.

114 V. inf. Appendix C, "Visual Timeline and time-map of Internationalization of Production of FMC, 1904-1944."

- 1909 (BR): Geelong / Australia
- 1911 (CO): London / UK: FMC England, Ltd.
- 1911 (AP): Manchester / UK
- 1912 (MA): Sandwich East - Windsor / Canada
- By 1913 (BR): London-Ontario, Montreal, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Vancoover, Saskatoon, Calgary / Canada
- 1913 (AP): Toronto / Canada
- 1913 (BR): Buenos Aires / Argentina
- 1914 (AP): Bordeaux / France
- 1916 (CO): Paris / France: Ford (France) SA, Société Automobiles
- 1916 (AF): Buenos Aires / Argentina
- 1916: the New York Branch Manager Gaston Plantiff proposed to create a Russian Ford Company and build assembly plants in Russia, proposition was not accepted
- 1917 (CO): Cork /Ireland: Henry Ford & Sons, Ltd.
- 1919 (MA): Cork / Ireland (tractors only)
- 1919 (BR): São Paolo / Brazil

This real expansion map at hand and under tight advice from Detroit, he worked out an ambitious program.[115] He tentatively divided Europe into six divisions which are noted here in the order of their importance:

> *The British Division* would embrace the United Kingdom, Egypt, and Malta, with *headquarters in Manchester*. Managing both large manufacturing works and an assembly plant, it would receive more attention from Detroit than any other.
> *The Northern Division* would comprehend Scandinavia, Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, and at first Germany and Holland, with offices and an assembly plant at Copenhagen. Obviously, Germany and Holland would in time demand separate facilities.

115 The complete name of the report is: "Report Dealing with Establishment of Foreign Branches and Development of Foreign Business" from October 1, 1919. Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 474.

The Central Division, with headquarters in Paris, would include France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Algeria, and would set up assembly plants as these were needed.

The Southern Division would cover Italy, Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli, *with an assembly plant in a convenient Spanish city.*

The Adriatic Division would embrace Central Europe south of Germany, the Balkan lands, and Asia Minor, and would have *headquarters and an assembly plant at [the port city in the Free State of] Fiume.*

Finally, *the Black Sea Division* would include the Ukraine, Central Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and the Caucasus, a difficult region for which planning was shadowy, but which Knudsen hoped would develop *a center in Odessa.*[116]

116 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:358–59, *italics* are mine.



MAP 3.12 Projected territories in the report of Knudsen, 1919. SOURCE: "Report of the Ford Delegation to Russia and U.S.S.R," August 1926. Acc. 49 / Box 1A. Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford. Map by Barış Göğüş.

"While Ford plants in the 1920s would function in four of these six territories, the six as Knudsen envisaged them never came into operation."[117] Knudsen, before his resignation in 1921, could successfully press for the realization of only two plants according to this plan. Those were the Copenhagen assembly plant, incorporated as FMC Aktieselskab, Denmark[118] and in Spain the Cádiz -plant instead of Barcelona -in order not to burden itself with an extraordinarily mobile working class in Catalonia.[119] The latter was incorporated as FMC SAE.

117 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 98.

118 Lars Christensen, *Between Denmark and Detroit. Ford Motor Company A/S and the Transformation Af Fordism* (Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2021).

119 Salvador Estapé Triay, "Ford in Spain: The First Stage (1920-1954). A Multinational Confronts Political Constraints," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, vol. 2 (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 428.

The Knudsen Plan laid out in a crystal-clear manner basic traits of Ford organization; the principle of exclusive territories under strict control of Detroit[120] and the maxim of "no water no plant." The material and physical aspects of the geographical expansion were above all making economies on sea, and land transport fare and sneaking into the national markets to profit from the considerable difference in the export duties for knocked down car parts compared to completely built cars.

Principles were clear, yet the political geography of Europe posed a blurry picture by 1919 to focus and head on. The territorial outcome of the First World War was indecisive, negotiations and arm wrestling among the war winning countries persisted, especially for the last two projected divisions, the Adriatic, and the Black Sea.

The Knudsen plan largely remained unrealized. Yet the analysis of the Knudsen Divisions, which can veritably be called a "map of curiosities," gives valuable insights about the spatial mindset of the company, inspired about the Zeitgeist it was embedded in. Ford was attempting to fit his corporate geography on the eve of an expansion period to the expectations about the new economic geography and border regimes of Europe, open at all end.

On the peculiar map today's Turkey is divided into two Divisions; Asia Minor in the Adriatic Division with the projected headquarter in Fiume (now Rijeka in Croatia, back then part of the Free State of Fiume[121]) and

120 The only "partial" exception to the centralization of management of European companies in Detroit is mentioned in a footnote in the second volume of the seminal book on Ford History: '* [...]one partial exception must be noted. Temporarily a Foreign Department was established, with headquarters first at Copenhagen and later in Paris, which was responsible for areas not yet under a branch or affiliated company. This department sent representatives to yet unopened countries or districts, selected resident agents and dealers, and advised them in their activities. It pushed its work energetically but always on too small a scale. (Knudsen Report; Roberge, Reminiscences.) For a time the Foreign Department, under A. Lie and later J. J. Harrington, exercised a considerable supervision of European operations. But beginning in 1925 Detroit took full control. Ten-day cable reports and a monthly letter kept it informed. A travelling auditor had European accounts under constant scrutiny. (L. E. Briggs, Reminiscences.)' Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:361.

121 Dominique Kirchner Reill, *The Fiume Crisis: Life in the Wake of the Habsburg Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020).

Turkey in the Black Sea Division with a projected center in Odessa. The west of today's Turkey was thought to be economically closer to the influence of the Mediterranean, and Eastern European sphere. That Division very much looked like the numerous nineteenth century maps called "Turkey in Europe." The Black Sea Division is thought -in the middle of the Russian civil war and on the eve of the defeat of the White armed forces in Crimean peninsula, without wavering- to assemble myriad regimes of regulation under the same regional umbrella, namely Ukraine, Central Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and the Caucasus. In this imaginary the regional orientation of two fading Empires, Russian and Ottoman were bundled into one.

That projected division deviated utterly from the worldview of a polarized geography, divided into hostile property regimes (i.e., capitalism vs. communism). This worldview would later become taken-for-granted by the generations to come after the World War II. Firstly, the ancient trade connections in the Black Sea Region seemed to hold the Division together. Apparently, the probable war outcome for the (post)Ottoman and (post)Russian territories looked this way so far away across the Atlantic Ocean. Yet to someone who sees the Knudsen Report mapped today, it looks like an odd Monopoly game board.

To make Knudsen's "map of curiosities" a little bit more intelligible and historicize it in its own context we would thus like to touch upon another example of a contemporary geographical imagination. That map too, was imagined, and prepared at the higher echelons of power, this time not economic but political power. This map too lingered around for some time and was not translated into real space-producing activities "that took place." Also in this map, spatial fixes of the last period of the Ottoman space like the main geostrategic locations, infrastructure of circulation and recent energy extraction nodes around oil are traceable.



MAP 3.13 How the King-Crane Commission envisioned the Middle East (Karl Sturm and Nick Danforth) SOURCE: Danforth, Nick. "The Middle East That Might Have Been." The Atlantic [Blog], February 13, 2015. [https://bit.ly/41qVI9i].

This is the map of the King Crane Commission from the same year as the Knudsen Plan we are talking about here. The commission was a by-product of the Paris Peace Conference and formed solely by the United States Government, appointed by President Woodrow Wilson to inquiry about the territorial inclinations in the post-Ottoman space, either towards self-determination or the mandate system.[122] After a forty two day trip in the Near East ("Syria, Mesopotamia, in the non-Arabic-Speaking Portions of the Former Ottoman Empire"[123]) the Commission prepared a report and submitted it to the Paris Peace Conference in August 1919. But the designs of mandate regimes by Britain and France around their spheres of influence

122 Andrew Patrick, *America's Forgotten Middle East Initiative: The King-Crane Commission of 1919* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

123 Note that the term "Middle East" is not mentioned even a single time throughout the whole around 400 pages long report. The same is true for the Knudsen Report. Charles K. Krane and Henry Churchill King, "Report of the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey," August 28, 1919, Paris Peace Conf. 181.9102/9, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv12/d380.

and rich oil reserves undercut the territorial design suggested by the Commission even before it was submitted to the Paris Commission the same year. The report was shared with the public only in 1922 and concluded that for the transition into self-determination USA led mandates were to be established. This proposition was presented as the outcome of "the first-ever survey of Arab public opinion."[124]



FIGURE 3.8 Delegates in Manger Square, Bethlehem, 1919 (in front of "Ford" of the Commission). SOURCE: Oberlin College Archives, King Crane Commission Digital Collection / RG 2/6, box 129, fol. 6.

The territorial imagination mapped out by the King-Crane-Report bares similarities to the Knudsen Report. The most salient two are the following: It singled out water-city connections and highlighted the autonomy of the most important port cities at geostrategic -transit- locations (International Constantinopolitan State, semi-autonomous Smyrna in Turkish Mandate, semi-autonomous (coastal) Lebanon in Syrian mandate). It furthermore grouped Turkey, Armenia, Kurdistan, Syria and Mesopotamia, albeit as sep-

124 James Zogby, "Opinions Matter: A Lesson From History," *HuffPost*, July 11, 2008, sec. U.S. News, https://bit.ly/3ROIZKv.

arate entities, within the same map and under similar regimes like in Knudsen's map, but put Caucasus apart. This was a clear difference to Ford's projected map of economic territories. A contemporary economic historian who wrote his book on the Turkey-USA relations in 1932 called this period "the carving of Turkey."[125] Knudsen's map conceptualized two to-be-carved-out post-imperial regimes within the same territory.

Similarities in the "strangeness" of the territorial designs of both reports should be borne in mind when trying to make sense of the Istanbul territory: the importance of the Black Sea trade, the path dependency of established sea routes, and the spatial contingency of the moment that left ample room for expansionist imaginations across the borders for economic and political elites.[126]

Back then, the (internally and internationally) weakly integrated geography of what is today the Republic of Turkey turned its face to the eastern Mediterranean (primarily Italy) on the one hand and to the Black Sea on the other to orient its economic relationships. The territory of Istanbul at the time of the opening of the Istanbul Ford factory in 1929 bears deep traces of this Janus-faced contingency.

3.3.2 Making and Unmaking of the Istanbul Territory

Ford's first appearance in Ottoman lands was the automobile purchased by the Ministry of War in 1909 for the use of Enver Pasha, the then Minister of War.[127] During that period the technology of the Ottoman army was mainly

125 Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), 267ff.

126 Another projected but not realized American project based on a contingent territoriality was the Chester Project (between 1908 and 1923) that envisioned the construction of a 2000-kilometer long railway from Central Anatolia to the Mosul Province (Vilayet) in today's Iraq and the exploitation of mineral resources along this line. But it failed among others when Mosul oil reserves, the most profitable part in the Project, was accorded to Great Britain after long negotiations between 1918 and 1926. Bilmez Bülent Can, *Demiryolundan Petrole Chester Projesi, 1908-1923* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000); DeNovo, "A Railroad for Turkey."

127 Küçükerman, *Anadolu Tasarım Mirasının Ayak İzlerinde*, 162; Ahmet Azcanlı, *Türk Otomotiv Sanayiinin Tarihsel Gelişimi* (İstanbul: Panel Ltd. Şti., 1996), 43ff.

of German origin and the total number of the automotives imported did not even surpass two hundred. Spare parts and service for the existing automotives posed a real problem that was partly solved in Thursday Market in Karaköy (Perşembe Pazarı), caulking place (Kalafat Yeri) near Azapkapı and in the workshops inside Robert College.[128] The majority of what can be called "road network" were routes covered with stone and muddy soil fit for trade with camel caravans. Thus, Ford did not have a breakthrough at that early age neither in the military, nor in the civil sectors. The miraculous success of the model T starting from 1908 penetrated more the public imagination rather than the concrete market.

Ford's corporate entry was later in the 1920s through sales agents. The American Foreign Trade Corporation, which launched its first office in Sirkeci in July 1919, started selling motor vehicles of US origin (Ford, Fordson, Buick, Oldsmobile, GMC and Cadillacs) as well as agricultural implements, textiles and staple foods to "Levant, South Russia and the Balkans."[129] Afterwards it established several branches (in Samsun, Smyrna, Alexandria, and Cairo) and in Constantinople "[...] the company ran two auto showrooms, two mechanic shops and a driver school."[130]

> At Nichantache a large assembly and repair shop is equipped with the most modern machinery for the assembly and repair of motor cars, tractors and farming machinery. This plant is under the supervision of an expert American mechanic. Here there is a storage space for 100 cars. At Pangalti are located the display and salesrooms for cars, motor car accessories, spare parts, benzine and oils. Autos of the most popular American makes are on display.[131]

128 Küçükerman, *Anadolu Tasarım Mirasının Ayak İzlerinde*, 163.

129 "American Foreign Trade Corporation," *Levant Trade Review* 11, no. 3 (1923): 128ff.

130 Ercan Karakoç and Hasan Küçük, "Turkish-American Commercial Relations (1908-1930): The Success of Trade-The Failure of Investment," *Journal of History Culture and Art Research* 9, no. 4 (2020): 10.

131 "American Foreign Trade Corporation," 130.

Edgar B. Howard Co. later took over the American Garage (in Taksim) [132], the car and tractor dealership sometime after its opening in 1922, mainly for the automotives of General Motors but also dealt Ford automotives.[133] Information of car agencies for the period before the establishment of the Ford plant is scattered and scanty so that we do not know the period when exactly the Avidor Ford agency in Karaköy was active but the below indication about good sales and the presence of an American Embassy in Istanbul (which was closed in 1917) hints to the period before the World War I:

> Among those who were convinced that automobiles would be in great demand in our country, a Jew named Avidor first appeared in Karaköy, opposite the Ottoman Bank, under the name Ford Agency. In a short time, he succeeded in selling Ford automobiles to the Ministry of Interior, the Police Directorate, the American Embassy and the Bank of Salonica.[134]

132 "Everything from America. American Foreign Trade Corporation," *Levant Trade Review* 11, no. 4 (1923): The American Garage was originally opened in Pangaltı. It is probable that a second branch was opened sometime during the 1920's, this time in Taksim.

133 "Edgar B. Howard," *Levant Trade Review* 11, no. 3 (1923); "Mr Heck, the manager of Howard & Co., Constantinople, where 50 units are being sold monthly, has a Buick contract which will total about 50 Buicks this year, and is extending little or no service. He frankly stated that he did not believe it advisable to extend service until such time as there were sufficient cars in the territory as would ensure profit for this end of his business. When his attention was called to the number of dilapidated Ford taxis to be found in Constantinople, he frankly stated that "he was hoping this class of car would be scrapped and then it would be only necessary for him to extend service to new cars", in: "[Territory Reports - J. J. Harrington] Letter Sent by Ford European General Manager J. J. Harrington, Dated to 25th of July 1925 from the Ford Motor Company Trieste, to the Vice President Edsel Ford in Detroit," July 24, 1925, Acc. 6 / Box 401, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

134 Erhan Afyoncu and Coşkun Yılmaz, eds., *Osmanlı İstanbul'unda Otomobil*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 2020), 225. The book cites a newspaper article from 10 November 1926, Milliyet; "Memleketimizde Ilk Otomobil Acenteleri," *Milliyet*, November 10, 1926.

The first local exclusive Ford agency was A. Vefa Muhurdarowitch, [135] established in Istanbul in 1924-25 by a White Russian entrepreneur. He also had the premises on the historical peninsula of Istanbul (Sirkeci, Salkımsöğüt)[136] like the American Foreign Trade Corporation. For some time, A. Vefa and Katipzâde Sabri (in Pera, Taksim), a former Anatolian merchant, were both acting as Ford dealers, at least during the year of 1930.[137]



FIGURE 3.9 A. Vefa's Ford automobiles leaving the factory SOURCE: Google Search Engine Image Cache [Unidentified]

135 "Advertisment Section. Agent Oficiel. Furdson Ford Lencoln. Muhurdarowitch," *İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Mecmuası*, January 1, 1926.

136 "İstanbul'da Bir Türk Müessesesi Ferdi Acentesi A. Vefa," *Servet-i Fünun*, no. 1498_24 (April 30, 1924): 385.

137 Bernar Nahum, *Koç'ta 44 Yılım: Bir Otomativ Sanayii Kuruluyor* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1988), 24; Nusret Kulin, *Cep Muhtırası. Türkiya Otomobilci ve Şöförlerine 1929-1930* (Istanbul: Emel Matbaası, 1929), 194.



FIGURE 3.10 One of the Fords delivered to A. Vefa's Ford dealer SOURCE: Google Search Engine Image Cache [Unidentified]

According to a report in the Istanbul municipality's magazine, *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* from June 1927, in terms of the cars and trucks circulating in the city Ford came after Fiat (438 units) with 356 cars and 45 trucks (50 units were of Fiat brand) out of a total machine park of 1951 motorized vehicles in total.[138] In the same report Ford fared first with 1,391 and ascending figures for each year in a row, out of a total of 4,187 imported cars between 1924 and 1927, all registered in Istanbul.

138 "İstanbul'un Karadaki Vesait-i Nakliyesi," *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 34 (1927): 616–18.

TABLE 3.1 Imported passenger car brands in Istanbul, 1924-27

Passenger Car Brands	1924	1925	1926	1927	Total
Ford (*Ford*)	202	262	455	472	1391
Fiat (*Fiyat*)	109	250	361	447	1167
Studebaker (*Ştudebeykır*)	26	33	72	86	217
Chevrolet (*Şevrole*)	26	22	75	92	215
S. A. G. M. (*Saciem*)	52	47	33	32	164
Berliet (*Berliye*)	9	22	53	66	150
Citroën (*Sitroen*)	4	10	53	68	135
Benz (*Benz*)	27	39	28	25	119
Buick (*Buik*)	12	17	32	52	113
Peugeot (*Pejo*)	11	16	35	35	97
Renault (*Reno*)	8	14	19	24	65
Mercedes (*Mersedes*)	17	17	14	13	61
Oldsmobile (*Olsmobil*)	13	17	13	14	57
Vauxhaul (*Voksol*)	16	16	12	12	56
Others (ten different brands)	48	49	37	57	180
Total	580	831	1292	1495	4187

SOURCE "İstanbul'un Karadaki Vesait-i Nakliyesi." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 34 (1927): 617.

TABLE 3.2 Number of cars, trucks and their brands in Istanbul in June 1927

Passenger Car and Truck Brand	Number of Passenger Cars	Number of Trucks
Fiat (*Fiyat*)	438	50
Ford (*Ford*)	356	45
Chevrolet (*Şevrole*)	108	12
Citroën (*Sitroen*)	102	NA
Studebaker (*Ştudebeykır*)	94	NA

Passenger Car and Truck Brand	Number of Passenger Cars	Number of Trucks
Buick (*Buik*)	74	NA
Berliet (*Berliye*)	54	34
Chrysler (*Kraysler*)	27	NA
Renault (*Reno*)	23	NA
? (*İesegis*)	22	NA
Pontiac (Ponçak)	22	NA
Morris (*Moris*)	20	NA
Benz (Benz)	18	NA
? (*Ersegin*)	16	NA
Oakland (*Okland*)	12	NA
Oldsmobile (Olsmobil)	10	NA
Other minor car brands	87	NA
Albion (*Albiyon*)	NA	10
Perle (*Perles*)	NA	8
Leyland (*Leyland*)	NA	6
White (*Vayt*)	NA	5
Other minor truck brands	NA	18
Total	1483	47

SOURCE: "İstanbul'un Karadaki Vesait-i Nakliyesi." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 34 (1927): 617.

TABLE 3.3 Number of cars and trucks in municipalities in Turkey, 1930 and 1933.

	1930	1933
Passenger Cars	5056	4605
Kamyon	2579	2654

SOURCE: "Belediyelerde Kayıtlı Bulunan Otomobil, Kamyon, Otobüs ve Motosiklet Miktarı Hakkında Yapılan İstatistik," May 18, 1933, 24-136-5 / 30-10-0-0, CCA.

In 1928 Koçzade Vehbi acquired the dealership of Ford in Ankara, so far administered by A. Vefa in Istanbul, and of Standard Oil, the biggest American investment in Turkey of the time. Koçzade Vehbi would later build a corporate empire with the initial capital he gained as a merchant-dealer-developer,[139] expanding to all other capitalist sectors spanning the entire history of the Republic, including an assembler-dealer agreement with Ford in 1956.[140] The Bursa business run by Raşit Katipoğlu was also attached to A. Vefa in Istanbul in the 1930s.[141]

The dealership agreement made it obligatory to keep both a store and a repair garage employing a master mechanic.[142] In 1928, when Ford Motor Company was negotiating the terms of the contract to establish an assembly plant in Istanbul, the number of dealers reached twenty three, and they were spread over a wide area from Erzurum to Izmir[143], administered from the Ford Motor Export Inc.'s branch in Alexandria. As far as we can glean from Ford's company archives in Detroit, those dealers were Naci and Hacı in Gaziantep, Sungur in Elazığ, Bastacızade in Diyarbakır, Sadıkzadeler in Trabzon, Salih Cepzade in Giresun, Makine in Samsun, Hacı Yirmibeşoğlu in Kastamonu, Taşçıoğulları in Zonguldak, Saitler and S.A.S.O. in Mersin, İstikbal in Antalya, Sunguroğlu in Malatya, Yedekçizade in Kayseri, Muradoğlu Sabri in Konya, and Balladur in İzmir. As their names imply (the suffix *"zâde"* meaning noble in Turkish) the dealers that undertook the regional distribution of their cars, trucks and tractors were mostly local notables.[144]

---

139 Yılmaz, *Mahalle Bakkalından Küresel Aktöre Arçelik*.

140 Vehbi Koç, *Hatıralarım, Görüşlerim, Öğütlerim* (Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfı; Hürriyet Ofset, 1987), 50ff.

141 Ibid., 52.

142 Ibid.

143 *İstanbul'da Yeni Açılan Ford Fabrikası'na ve Çalışanlarına Ait Fotoğraflar* (Istanbul: Ford Motor Company Export Inc., Istanbul, 1930) Photograph Nr. 1, titled "F harfler, o mıntıkada Ford Acentesi Bulunduğuna İşarettir" (Letter F means that there are Ford agencies in this territory).

144 "FMC Limited – Dagenham England Manager Reports to Directors – Ford Motor Company Exports Inc. – İstanbul Turkey 1932-1942," n.d., Acc.98-213541, Box 110, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "Sales, Production and Stock Report Istanbul,



FIGURE 3.11 "F" Marks the provinces with a Ford dealer SOURCE: FMC Export Inc, Istanbul. *İstanbul'da Yeni Açılan Ford Fabrikası'na ve Çalışanlarına Ait Fotoğraflar,* photo no. 2 [Milli Kütüphane, Kitap Dışı Materyaller Koleksiyonu / 1994 FOTO ALBÜM 7]

Besides the visibility of Ford cars and trucks in Turkish cities, landowners and peasants in Thrace and Anatolia were familiar with Fordson tractors. A large part of dozens of tractors, which were sold to farmers on favorable

1932," 1932, Acc. 98-213541 / Box 108, Benson Ford; Nahum, *Koç'ta 44 Yılım*, 26 Nahum in his memoirs remembers them as follow which corresponds to a great extend the names in the manager reports in the Ford Archives "Sadıkzadeler in Trabzon, Aldıkaçtı Yeğenler in Samsun, Giraud and Alliotti in İzmir, Rasihzade Biraderler (Fevzi Dural) in Adana, Mehmet Ali Alevli in Gaziantep, Birecikli Halil in Diyarbakır, Alişan in Zonguldak and Koçzade Vehbi in Ankara'. The differences in both lists may arise because of the divergence between the company designations and managing owners, to the difference in the period or to the shortcomings in Nahum's memory. .

Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankası*) loans between 1926 and 29 were Fordson tractors. Gasoline was sold customs-free to tractor owners.[145] However, sales stagnated soon due to suddenly rising oil prices, falling agricultural product prices, severe drought, and lack of repair/service facilities. In the beginning of 1930s Anatolia turned into a "machinery cemetery" full of broken-down tractors, rusting on the spot. Some of them were used as chicken coops.[146]

The 1920s was a period of expansion not only of Ford's sales and its dealer network in Turkey, but also of US diplomatic relations. In 1921, the same year as the Occupation of Constantinople and the dispatch of the American commercial attaché Julian Gillespie, which constituted "the first official communication between the United States and the emerging post-Ottoman Anatolia,"[147] [future Ford Istanbul plant manager William G. Collins] was appointed "[...] Assistant Trade Commissioner at the American Embassy in Constantinople"[148], and remained "connected with the Commercial Attaché's office in Constantinople for several years."[149] After his years in Istanbul Collins would enter "the automobile field with Ford Motor in Europe in 1924,"[150] as a chief roadman in Trieste inspecting the vast territory the assembly plant was delivering to, including visits to Turkey.[151] But

145 During this period Fordson manuals were translated into Ottoman and Turkish. The corporations which issued the manuals were Ford Motor Company of Italy between 1923-1926 and Ford Motor Company Export Incorporated, Alexandria/Egypt. Ford Motor Company d'Italy, *Fordson Traktörü* (Trieste: Ford Motor Company, n. d.); Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., *Fordson Çiftçilik* (İskenderiye, Mısır: Ford Motor Company, n. d.); Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., *Fordson Kitabı* (Istanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1927); Nahum, *Koç'ta 44 Yılım*, 26.

146 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "Tarımsal Teknolojide İlk Gelişmeler. İlk Makineleşme," in *75 Yılda Çarklardan Chip'lere*, ed. Oya Baydar (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999), 6–10.

147 Karakoç and Küçük, "Turkish-American Commercial Relations (1908-1930)," 5.

148 "Account from November 19, 1928 from the 'Angora Diary' of S. Pinkney Tuck."

149 "Letter Sent by Ford European General Manager J. J. Harrington."

150 "Auto Personnel."

151 "Messrs. Harrington , Cooper and Collins of the Ford Motor Company, visited Constantinople during July, Mr. Harrington is in charge of general operations in Europe, with headquarters at Paris; Mr. Cooper is the Manager of the Trieste plant; and Mr. Collins chief

he surely had to take the student course in Detroit before entering the Company's service as part of the routine formation of Ford managers of all levels.[152] While working in Trieste he was chosen as one of the five executives to take part in the "Ford Delegation to Russia and the USSR" between April and August 1926. The delegation was invited by the Soviet regime mainly for the purposes to inspect the general situation and deliver expertise in the domain of tractors to the flourishing mechanized agriculture.[153] Collins was one of the authors of the confidential report, bearing undertones of an anthropological narrative of the time, compiled after these six months trip. During that trip "[t]the five men traveled 6,000 miles within Russia, visited factories and tractor centers, held exhibits, wrote a frank but tactful letter-report to the Soviet government, and brought back a rather astounding picture of Russia's first faltering steps in industry."[154] Impressed by the dominance of Fordson tractors and its Soviet copies in this vast market and the reputation of Ford the report the delegation advised Dearborn for Ford representation in Russia yet "against credit or a Ford factory (at Ford Expense), for it might eventually be seized by the government."[155]

Shortly after that trip Collins was transferred to the newly established Alexandria branch of the FMC Exports Incorporated as assistant manager.[156] This move corresponded to the separation of the vast Near Eastern, Northeast African and Eastern Balkan territories from the Trieste territory and their assignment to the node of Alexandria. Convinced that the future expansion of Ford markets in this vast region is better served from a strategic point both encompassing the former Trieste territory and the flourishing Soviet markets, yet without a security of property to establish a greenfield

---

field inspector for the Trieste district." "Personalia," *Levant Trade Review* 13, no. 7 (1925): 310.

152 "Letter Sent by Ford European General Manager J. J. Harrington."

153 "Report of the Ford Delegation to Russia and U.S.S.R"; Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 213ff; David E. Greenstein, "Assembling 'Fordizm': The Production of Automobiles, Americans, and Bolsheviks in Detroit and Early Soviet Russia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 2 (2014): 270ff.

154 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 213.

155 Ibid., 215.

156 "Branch Questionnaire Alexandria, Egypt."

investment there, he was the main protagonist for the move to Istanbul. With round trips between Alexandria-Paris-London-Istanbul-Ankara-Constanța-Bucharest-Trieste, exploring at the same time other options and the maximum limits of the privilieges required by Ford, he ran the negotiations with the Turkish Minister of Finance, Şükrü Saraçoğlu during 1928[157], which was signed on 27 November 1928 and turned into Ford Law beginning of the following year. The Alexandria plant, alongside with the territory it was delivering to, its machinery and some of its personnel moved to Istanbul aboard a ship.[158] Collins remained manager of Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul during the transformation of the Tophane entrepôts into a streamlined Ford factory, its opening full of high hopes end of 1929 until a time when it was seen as a "problem case" dealt with crisis management strategies in 1931. Coincidentally, William Collins was serving in Turkey in the US army as a special assistant to the US Ambassador to Turkey in 1942 when the Istanbul branch was preparing to pack up and leave Turkey for good with all its legal assets.[159] The professional biography of Collins serves as an allegory for the erratic changes that the economic geography and imaginations about this geography were undergoing. This part is dedicated to the making and unmaking of the Istanbul territory out of this erratic period.

3.3.2.1 Trieste: First Foothold of Ford "East of Europe"

Ford Motor Company d'Italia, where Mr. Collins was acting as a chief roadman before his Russian trip in 1926, was incorporated in Trieste on the 1st of December 1922. An assembly plant was put up for the Model T cars and Fordson tractors in an ancient sugar warehouse at the Porto Franco Vittorio Emmanuele III, transformed for Ford's needs.[160] At that time this

157 "Account from November 19, 1928 from the 'Angora Diary' of S. Pinkney Tuck"; "[Records of the U.S. Embassy in Turkey 1928 / Angora Diaries 1928] Angora Diary by Pinkney Tuck, First Secretary of US Embassy in Ankara [20 November - 1 December 1928]," n.d., MC27 / Roll 6, American Information Resource Center (AIRC), Ankara.

158 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt."

159 "Auto Personnel."

160 Guiseppe Volpato, "Ford in Italy: Commercial Breakthroughs Without Industrial Bridgeheads," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung,

was Ford's easternmost outpost in Eurasia and Asia.[161] The assembled motor vehicles here aimed at export into a huge "regional market" and it was exposed to all the abrupt changes in the definition of what that "region" included and excluded. The Ford Motor Industries' Review boastfully tried to describe this vast territory in 1924:

> The Ford Motor Company d 'ltalia at Trieste is in many respects the most unique of the foreign Ford companies because it does business on three continents and crosses dozens of national boundaries in carrying out its program. Egypt, Crete, Greece, Cyprus, Palestine, Persia, and Rhodes are among the historic countries where the *Ford* sales and service sign is now a familiar sight and the picturesque camel is being supplanted by *Ford* cars. The work of translating Ford literature into widely differing languages spoken in the Trieste territory is almost a business in itself, as an analysis of the territory will show. The following countries comprise the territory under the supervision of the Trieste plant: Italy, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Georgia, Grecce, *Turkey-in-Europe, Turkey-in-Asia*, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Persia, Syria, Arabia, (except Aden), Oman, Afghanistan, Bahrein, Abyssinia, Egypt, Egyptian Sudan, Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, Tripoli, Azerbaijan, Djibuti, Crete, Cyprus, Malta, Rhodes, Sardinia and Sicily. The combined population of these is reckoned at 173,375,814. It has been estimated that 75% of all motor cars in this vast region *Ford*— another testimonial to the excellence of Ford service.[162]

Leaving aside the undertone which surely stems from the purpose of image-making, the reason why FMC publishes a magazine for, the list is still im-

---

and Steven Tolliday, vol. 2 (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 453–81; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Thornhill Cooper Interview," June 27, 1960, Acc 880, Box. 5, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "Plant Questionnaire Trieste Branch 1," September 9, 1924, AR-65-5: 28 Trieste folder 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

161 V. sup. Figure 3.1-8

162 "European Associated Companies," *The Ford Industries; Facts about the Ford Motor Company and Its Subsidiaries*, 1924, 145–46. *italics* are mine. V. sup. Figure Trieste Map.

pressive, not because it is factual information of really existing markets, but because it gives an account of the vision of the unified market, which Ford of that period "in mind." Drawing the "mental economic map" of FMC at that time gives insights into the horizon of possibilities that was expanding before the eyes of one of the most powerful economic decision maker, put it differently possible re-scaling activities around new spaces of accumulation of the period. What the Ford Review called the "territory," was not the sum of national territories, but a list of the constituents of a regional market that the Ford enterprise aimed to create within the context, and the expectation of the continuation of global capitalism of the liberal era.

It should be noted that Trieste, rather than Fiume as laid out in Knudsen's Plan of 1919 was chosen as the node of the territory-to-be-designed.

> [W]hile the Versailles Treaty assigned Trieste to Italy, the fate of Fiume, claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia, remained uncertain for a few years. Therefore, Trieste appeared to be a much safer location for the Italian branch, even though until 1922 the port and its surrounding region were ruled only indirectly by the Italian Government through a General Commissioner.[163]

However, the spatial imagination of a split Turkey into Turkey-in-Europe and Turkey-in-Asia persisted from the Knudsen-Plan well until into the concrete formation of the territory in the mid-1920.

At the time of the establishment of Ford Motor Company d'Italia in 1922, Trieste was already playing a unique role in the external trade of Turkey. Italy was Turkey's main trading partner between 1924-29 totaling to 25% of its exports and 15% of its imports on average. Trieste was a re-export port for Turkish two-tiered export and import trade. This two-tiered trade was mainly carried by Greek merchants who had to leave the metropolitan trade centers in Asia Minor after the Turco-Greek War and established in Trieste, continuing their trade with that territory from that transit port. Another reason was the ancient role of Italian freighters in the long-distance

163 Pier Angelo Toninelli, "Between Agnelli and Mussolini: Ford's Unsuccessful Attempt to Penetrate the Italian Automobile Market in the Interwar Period," *Enterprise & Society* 10, no. 2 (2009): 339.

commercial navigation which strengthened the intensification tendency of Turkish export trade at the port of Trieste.[164] All in all, at that time Trieste had lively commercial and social ties to Istanbul due to its role as the principal transshipment port for agricultural products exported from Turkey. Especially tobacco which was the main export good of Turkey into the USA, a trade pattern that survived the Ottoman Empire, was mainly manipulated by American companies in the same free zones of Trieste where the Ford assembly plant was situated and re-exported to the USA ports until 1926.[165]

Soon Trieste plant needed additional space which corresponded to the flourishing sales in its territory, but "because of the congestion in the port, the Authorities refused to give any additional space."[166]

> The above decision left us no alternative except to look elsewhere for premises, which influenced us to take the next boat for *Constantinople, where, if the Government grants the free Port concessions requested, a plant can be established which would advantageously handle all the present Trieste territory* with the exception of Italy, Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Albania and the Italian Colonies. We estimated a division of production contingent on this line-up as follows: Trieste to handle approximately 7,000 units and Constantinople 14,000 annually. On this basis, provided no additional space was secured in Trieste, the Italian Company could

164 For the number and carriage capacity of Italian ships passing by Istanbul Port, see Walker D. Hines et al., *Türkiye'nin İktisadi Bakımdan Umumi Bir Tetkiki, 1933-1934. Kitap II.*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Mehmed İhsan Matbaası, 1936), 350ff.

165 "The American tobacco men felt that the Italian port of Trieste met [the] requirements. Trieste offered a number of advantages. The Porto Duca d'Aosta and Porto Vittorio Emanuele II, two free zones, were areas outside the customs jurisdiction of the Italians. Here, tobacco could be manipulated and stored without the assessment of duties. Trieste possessed an abundance of low-cost and efficient labor in Trieste (experienced tobacco graders received $.50 for an eight-hour day as late as 1932). Insurance cost one-third what it did in Greece. Trieste provided better housing for the industry than Izmir: the ports were superior: and direct shipping connections to America and good rail connections to central Europe were available.": Robert Carey Goodman, "The Role of the Tobacco Trade in Turkish-American Relations, 1923-29." (University of Richmond, 1988), 78.

166 "Letter Sent by Ford European General Manager J. J. Harrington."

> operate as at present in their existing quarters, but would need the additional building to handle assembly operations, later, as the territories develop, Alexandria and Piraeus could be lined up with small service plants. This subject is being covered fully in another letter.[167]

This strategic territory report that gives crucial insights about the spatial conceptions of Ford in July 1925 was from the plume of James J. Harrington, who was former branch manager of the American plant in Cincinnati, Ohio. He was appointed manager of the pioneering Copenhagen factory in 1919 as part of the restructuring plan of European operations by Knudsen. He had climbed up the ladders of the corporate hierarchy to promote to the post of the European general manager in 1921. So, from the highest authority of Ford in Europe by 1925, we learn that two years before the Free Zone Law was promulgated in Turkey, negotiations between Ford and the Turkish state were well under way. Harrington indeed took in July 1925 the next boat to Constantinople accompanied by Thornhill Cooper, Manager of the Trieste plant, and Mr. Collins chief field inspector for the Trieste district.[168] They most probably furthermore travelled to Ankara by train and laid out the plans and prerequisites of Ford to establish a plant in Istanbul to authorized Turkish statesmen. The precondition of launching a plant in Istanbul was granting of free zone privileges to the company. The following lines leave no doubt that Ford made concrete steps towards Istanbul already by 1925.

> No doubt due to the fact that the Company started early in this territory, Ford sales have a tremendous start on their competitors. The principal competition, however, does not come from the States but from Fiat in Italy, who are selling quite a few cars in the countries surrounding the Mediterranean. However, we notice a number of American cars are beginning to filter into the various ports, which must necessarily be watched very closely and our service strengthened and improved in all sections. We were impressed with the tremendous possibilities of the Near East. Barring the breaking out of

167 Ibid. *italics* are mine.

168 "Personalia."

> a new war in this section, all of the countries will improve their position, and believe that Constantinople eventually will be one of the biggest plants we |have in Europe.[169]

Concrete plans were made as of 1925 how to organize the transition period in terms of the personnel.

> Mr Cooper had arranged no scheduled regular meetings, which he has now agreed to do, and will start a number of men through the plants with the intention of developing them for roadmen and more important positions, and will endeavour to build up understudies for every important position, so that he will have two organizations functioning, which will permit our opening in Constantinople with a line-up of employees for the important positions drawn from Trieste, and still leave sufficient responsible executives in Trieste to carry on satisfactorily.[170]

Five days before Harrington, the manager responsible for European operations reported to his bosses in Detroit, a Turkish Newspaper reported about him and Ford's project in Istanbul.

> Ford Factories Representative - Mr. (Harington), the American Ford Factories Representative, has gone to Athens for investigations. After his return from Athens, he will go to Ankara. In the meantime, according to the response from the American institution, negotiations will be initiated with our government to establish facilities in our country.[171]

We do not know whether Harrington went again to Ankara[172] but by August 1, 1925, the Constantinople project was news in American press, citing the official broadcasting institution of Turkey, the Anatolian Agency:

---

169 "Letter Sent by Ford European General Manager J. J. Harrington."

170 Ibid.

171 "Ford Fabrikaları Mümessili," *Cumhuriyet*, July 20, 1925, sec. Küçük Şehir Haberleri.

172 The Ottoman Empire severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 20, 1917, after the United States declared war against Germany on April 4, 1917. Normal diplomatic relations were re-established with the Empire's successor state, Turkey, in 1927. This should

> The Anatolian Agency declared Henry Ford applied to the Turkish Ministry of Commerce for permission to erect a factory in Constantinople. In event the scheme is agreed on all the necessary material possible to be obtained in Turkey will be employed. The factory will serve as a center for Greece, Roumania, Caucasus, Persia and Afghanistan.[173]

After around a year on 6 April 1926 there is a trivial, pure bureaucratic entry in the Turkish official archives for the permission to enter to Turkey of a certain Madame "Helena Romakofna" without regard of her previous travel records. She has only three attributes to be found worth to mention, she is White Russian, thirty-three years old and the wife of the "new representative of Ford" of American origin, Monsieur "Jozef Gorifar" who is in Istanbul "to negotiate the establishment of an enterprise for a transit center of Ford automobiles to be shipped to the Balkans, Russia, Egypt, Iran and Afghanistan."[174]

Same year, two months after the heir of the Ford Empire, Edsel Ford while returning from his five weeks' European trip would announce American journalist that this trip was partly on business:

> "The work of constructing new plants at Constantinople and Alexandria/Egypt, which held been held back for some time, would be started at once." [...] "The sale of Ford cars in Europe last year" he continued "was approximately 200,000 and 35,000 tractors, of which 17,000 were sold in Russia. That country has immense areas which might be cultivated, and tractors will have to be used."[175]

---

be the reason that diplomatic visits took place in Athens before paying any visit to a specific public authority in Ankara.

173 "Plant in Turkey Said to Be Plan of Ford," *Los Angeles Times*, August 1, 1925; "Ford Factory for Constantinople," *New York Times*, August 24, 1925.

174 "Balkan, Rusya, Mısır, İran ve Afganistan'a Sevkedilecek Ford Otomobillerinin Transit Merkezi Kurulmasına Dair Görüşmelere Katılmak Üzere İstanbul'a Gelen Jozef Gorifor'un Eşinin de Gelmesine İzin Verilmesi," April 6, 1926, 30-18-1-1 / 18-24-8, CCA.

175 "Edsel Ford Returns - Says Plants in Turkey and Egypt Will Be Started at Once," *New York Times*, June 2, 1926.

What happened to those early negotiations? Why were they held back “for some time"? No trace is left in the official archives of Turkey - to the best of our knowledge - about direct negotiations with Ford between 1925 and beginning of 1928. Yet a clear direction towards forming of the legal, economic and discoursive basis of a free zone at the port of Istanbul was well documented. But during that time Ford knocked on other, alternative doors as a node of this promising territory. The doors knocked were in Greece for its newly expanding Piraeus port (to also include a free port in 1930, after the first in Thessaloniki starting from 1925), in Alexandria, a location that offered substantial tax privileges, and in Constanța to receive the maximum of privileges at the port for an asembly plant "to supply the markets from Romania and the Orient".[176] In a report sent by Alexander Lie, manager of Trieste plant in October 1926 the establishment of a new plant in Alexandria seemed to be already set. Even the part of the former Trieste territory to be taken over by the newly established branch in Alexandria was defined.

> Since the time the writer moved from the Trieste plant it is apparent that business in Central Europe, the Balkan States and the various other territories controlled by Trieste, has developed to such an extent that it cannot possibly be efficiently handled from Trieste from a standpoint of supervision, *and the establishment of a plant in Egypt - which the writer understands is the Company's intention-* unquestionably help to solve this problem, as our organization will by this means be able to establish more direct contact with various outlying territories. There is a question, however, in the writer's mind as to whether even this arrangement will be sufficient to enable us to obtain maximum results from the very big potential market in the Near East, and, as a matter of fact, it might be desirable to extend further and open up a depot, with supervision headquarters, in Roumania. We are unable, however, to submit our definite recommendations in this respect without having personally visited the territories in question.[...] We attach hereto our recommendation as to the division of

176 Lavinia Popica, “Ford Motor Company in Romania,” *Revista Muzeul Național*, no. 12 (2010): 120–40.

> territory between the Trieste and the new Egyptian organization, and recommend an early careful analysis of conditions in Roumania - or some part of the Balkan States - with a view to establishing a depot, and possibly a responsible sales-service organization there, so that these territories can be developed to give maximum results, as it is feared that a sufficiently close watch cannot be kept on our dealers organizations in these territories from either Trieste or Egypt.[177]

In October 1926, the division of the countries to be put under control of Trieste and Alexandria plant respectively, exemplified the following landscape: Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia, Malta, Tripoli for the former, and Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Arabia, Azerbaijan, Bahrein, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Eg. [English] Soudan, Eritrea, Georgia, Greece, It. [Italian] Somaliland, Mesopotamia, Oman, Palestine, Persia, Rhodes, Romania, Syria, Turkey & Armenia for the latter.

177 "[Territory Reports -Alexander Lie 1926} Letter Sent by the General Manager of FMD D'italia Alexander Lie, Dated to 25th of October 1926 from the Ford Motor Company Trieste, to the Vice President Edsel Ford in Detroit," October 25, 1926, Acc. 6 / Box 401, Benson Ford. *italics* are mine.



MAP 3.14 Cut-out map of Trieste Territory in 1922. SOURCE: Adapted from "The Ford Industries Review 1924" cited in Guiseppe Volpato, "Ford in Italy," In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, 452-53. Map used: M. Fallex and A. Gibert, *Nouvelle Atlas Classique* [original scale: 1:48,000,000] (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1935), 65.

Meanwhile the economic diplomacy was fervent, and Ford had intentions to motivate the young Turkish state to grant the free port concession it was keen on, by playing the card of the "arch enemy Greece." There plans to establish a second free port in Piraeus were under way after the first one (the dual Jugoslav/Serbian-Greek free zone) was established in Thessaloniki in 1925.[178] In Piraeus the free port was to be initiated only by 1930. Yet Ford

178 "«Τα Λιμενικά Άεργα» (The Lack of Works in the Port [of Thessaloniki)" (Εφημερίς των Βαλκανίων (Efimeris ton Valkanion [The newspaper of the Balkans], March 19, 1934); Shai Srougo, "Core–Periphery Interactions in the Late and Post-Ottoman Periods: Dependency

had received the promise of provisory free zone concessions from the Greek state already by 1927, before an area at the port was officially declared as a free zone. Greek locations were presented as attractive alternatives to Constantinople. At the same dizzying sequence of time the move of a substantial part of the Trieste territory to Alexandria seemed to be set as well, as exemplified above. Ford was pushing all possibilities for the best offer for an investment location to the limit to find out from where to cover the "Oriental Markets" (*Şark Kurbu)* and Russia. This was the term that the truck department head of Ford Trieste,[179] Monsieur Lange used during a visit he paid to the Embassy of Turkey in Athens apropos the willingness of FMC to establish *the* plant in Istanbul. From the document sent to the Prime Ministry via the Minister of Foreign Affairs it was clear that Monsieur Lange oversaw finding the most appropriate location for the establishment of an assembly plant to serve the *Şark Kurbu* and Russia. In this visit to the Turkish Embassy in Athens he was accompanied by a Ford executive of Turkish origin from Detroit, Mr. Mehmet Şefik Ziya *(Mehmet Shefik Zia,* as cited in the Dearborn documents[180]).

> I am in favor of establishing the factory in the port of Istanbul, because we want to establish this factory for the needs of the Orient

---

and the Uneven Development of Thessaloniki: 1870–1936," *European Review* 21, no. 3 (2013): 422–34; "Port History - ThPA S.A. Port of Thessaloniki," May 9, 2023, https://www.thpa.gr/the-port-history/; "Greece - Circulation and Foreign Exchanges - Public Finances - Obligatory Cession of Gold to the State - Salonika Port Free Zone - the Refugee Problem," *The Economist*, February 10, 1923; Shai Srougo, "The Fall of the Balkan Port: Geopolitical Dynamics and the Decline of the Free Zone in Thessaloniki (1923-1939)," *Journal of Historical Geography*, January 1, 2021, https://www.academia.edu/49064717/The_fall_of_the_Balkan_port_Geopolitical_dynamics_and_the_decline_of_the_free_zone_in_Thessaloniki_1923e1939; Dragan Bakic, "The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1919-1941," *Balcanica* 2012 (January 1, 2012): 191–219, https://doi.org/10.2298/BALC1243191B.

179 "Letter Sent by the General Manager of FMD D'italia Alexander Lie."

180 "Amerikan'ın New York Şehrinde Bulunan Yardım Derneği The International Committee of Young Men's Christian Association Temsilcisi A.K. Jennings'in Türkiye'den Yirmibeş Öğrencinin, Detroit Ford Teknoloji Okulu'nda Staj Yapabilmeleri Için Destek Vereceklerini, Maarif Vekili Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver'e Bildirdiği Mektup.," April 16, 1925, 180-9-0-0 -103 -507- 40, CCA.

> and Russia. The port of Istanbul is more suitable for this because of its important position in transit trade. On the other hand, there is no stable government in Greece. And therefore, despite our disagreement, we would like to make an agreement with Turkey, which is a self-sustaining and great Republic, rather than with the aforementioned government. Especially from the point of view of our exports to Russia, the port of Istanbul is very convenient for our business. Last year alone we sold 26,000 tractors to Russia. We received millions of dollars in cash.[181]

Apparently, Mr. Lange had been to Ankara in the autumn of 1926, and this was definitely not his first visit to the Turkish Embassy in Athens to push the negotiations with the Turkish state to realization. What is interesting here is that the choice for Istanbul -put aside the nationalistic agitation of in the narrative of "Greeks against Turks"- had to do with the flourishing Russian markets. We should also remember that by 1927 the tariff and quota barriers of the protectionist 1930s were not foreseeable. Big industrial enterprises such as Ford Motor Company thought in terms of a world market for the "Universal Car" and not in terms of single protected national markets, not even totally in the case of Soviet Russia. The economic context, that makes the "competing production sites" discourse in this report (i.e., Piraeus vs. Istanbul) possible, would be forgotten, first because of the great catastrophe of war as an interruption (or rather the logic of rival sites of production reaching its logical conclusion in it) and second due to the fordist post-war return to domestic markets, until the end of the 1970s and will then become the rule in the globalized capitalism of the last five decades.

Ultimately Mr. Lange mentions at several instances that he had to report the outcome of his visits in Ankara and Athens to his chief in Trieste (either Alexander Lie or A.W. Ware) where William Collins was about to leave for Alexandria as an assistant manager, back from his long trip to Russia as part

181 "Ford Motor Fabrikası'nın İstanbul'da Bir Fabrika Kurmak Isteğine Dair Atina Elçimizin Raporu," January 31, 1927, 30-10-0-0 / 171-187-12, CCA.

of the Ford Delegation.[182] In this Delegation he was the only executive who was from the organization of Ford in Europe and not from Ford USA.

The report that summarized the insights of the Russian expedition for the Ford headquarter concluded that "*the question of the company laying down any kind of a manufacturing plant on Soviet soil would be nothing short of madness*"[183] So the search for an outpost with a solid base and property security to serve the Russian market was running parallelly and on all possible fronts.

Before we delve into the Russian part of the story of Istanbul territory, it might make sense to satisfy any curiosity about what happened to the Trieste plant and territory. This would not be delving into too much detail but would rather provide another insight into the critical motivations of shifting territories of capital accumulations and re-scaling activities during the period.

> Given that "with the transfer of the foreign territories, Ford Italiana SA [was] left with Italy proper and the two Italian colonies in North Africa, Cirenaica and Tripolitania," locating the Italian headquarters in Trieste lost all appeal. The now-much- leaner company was transferred in 1931 to Genoa and a year later, to Bologna; Credito Ford d'Italia closed in 1931.[184]

The "national industry approach" of Mussolini coincided with the "trade jealousy" of Fiat[185] -to put it with the words of the Head of the European operations, Perry- and was intensified with the Great Depression. Ford attempted to make a greenfield investment aimed only at the Italian market in a newly acquired area in the industrial zone of the port of Livorno which by the time of the acquisition had included substantial privileges and subsidies

182 "Report of the Ford Delegation to Russia and U.S.S.R."

183 Borris Shpotov, "Ford in Russia, from 1909 to World War II," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, vol. 2 (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 505–29. *italics* are mine.

184 Toninelli, "Between Agnelli and Mussolini," 350.

185 "Letter by Percival Perry, Chairman of Ford Britain Ltd, London, to Edsel Ford, Dearborn," October 11, 1929, Acc 6 Box 256, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

attached to the zone.[186] Canalizing the production only to the Italian Kingdom and seizing its export orientation was a prerequisite that the Mussolini regime posed.

> At the same time the company launched a search for a new location, which resulted in the selection of Livorno. In this way Trieste's fate was sealed. Once its main advantage as the gateway to the Orient was no longer valued, its attractiveness vaporized.[187]

When the market orientation had to change from international export to domestic production, Trieste on the Adriatic See, east of "the Boot," was - at least on the paper- supplanted by Livorno on the Tyrrhenian Sea, west of "the Boot." This move was never realized because Ford cars and trucks were to be ousted from the domestic market, too, despite long efforts of negotiation by Ford Managers personally with Mussolini and his lieutenants. A letter addressed directly to "His Excellency Mussolini" summarized those efforts of adaptation to the new economic policy aimed at autarchy and pleaded for exemptions for Ford:

> Our project, in the form of a pro-memoria, was brought before Your Excellency on June 5th 1929. [...] According to the contents of H.E. [the Minister] Martelli's letter we have had to examine again our position, deciding to restrict our programme to the erection of a plant in Italy for the sale of our output in the Italian Kingdom, leaving out the exportation of our products. As a consequence of such decision the Ford Headquarters had to modify their programme for the Near East allotting to other plants already existing or to be laid down in

186 "[FMC Dagenham - Office of Percival Perry] Letter by Thornhill Cooper, Manager of the Ford Motor Company d'Italia, Trieste to Percival Perry, Chairman of the Ford Britain Ltd.," September 17, 1929, AR-98-213541: 133, Folder 2, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

187 Toninelli, "Between Agnelli and Mussolini," 359.

> other States the territory which had been previously destined to us."[188]

When this prerequisite was accepted another, this time insurmountable obstacle hindered any profitable business in Italy, neither alone-standing, greenfield, nor in joint venture with Fiat or Isotta Fraschini. Painstaking negotiations with the two Italian automotive producers had indeed occupied the following months of Ford executives, in vain.[189] This was the obligation to use one hundred percent Italian inputs in the production process, accompanied by successive, de facto prohibitive import duties on automotives and parts.

In 1931, the year in which Trieste plant was shut down, the Ford Motor Company Italia decided to move to Genoa, again west of Italy, only to await the final move to Bologna, the heart of the agricultural Padana plain to resume the assembly of Fordson tractors for the domestic Italian market, now protected by high tariff walls. Mussolini's edict of 18 November 1929 blocked ideas to establish an assembly plant of cars there definitively.[190] Autarchy was seen as the basis to build Italy's military might on. Between 1929 and 1931 Ford was practically ousted from Italy by Fiat and its guardian, the Mussolini regime. Ford would later profit from the militarist autarchy policies of Mussolini during his imperialist invasion in Abysinnia to which a part in the chapter on Alexandria is dedicated. At that singular moment Fiat, the closest competitor of Ford in the Turkish market in the 1920s[191] was the definitive winner of the emerging fascist economic policy in Italy. Now Ford had more reasons to put its hopes in Turkey, with an eye on and a foot in the promising market in its Northern neighbor, the Soviet Russia.

---

188 "Translation of the Letter of Managing Director of FMC d'Italia F.S. Thornhill Cooper to to H.E. Mussolini, Prime Minister, Rome [Edsel Ford Papers, Subject Series]," September 25, 1929, Acc. 6 / Box 256, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

189 Toninelli, "Between Agnelli and Mussolini," 363ff.

190 Tolliday, "The Origins of Ford of Europe:," 2003, 163.

191 Erhan Afyoncu and Coşkun Yılmaz, eds., *Cumhuriyet İstanbulunda Otomobil*, (İstanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 2020), 26ff.

3.3.2.2 Russian "Fordizm": Converts to the Ideology of Planning

When Monsieur Lange from Ford Trieste paid visit to the Greek Embassy of Turkey in Athens in January 1927 this was just a sequence of long-standing company efforts to pressurize the Turkish state to grant the requested free zone privileges for the future Istanbul plant. The company's motivation to reach out to the flourishing Soviet demand for this enterprise was clear. When Lange, in charge to find a new venue for an assembly plant, said "I" he meant the Corporation:

> I am in favor of establishing the factory in the port of Istanbul, because we want to establish this factory for the needs of the Orient and Russia. [...] Especially from the point of view of our exports to Russia, the port of Istanbul is very convenient for our business. Last year alone we sold 26,000 tractors to Russia. We received millions of dollars in cash.[192]

Although the figure he mentioned about the Russian sales was exaggerated it bore a strong base of truth. Only fifteen days after the above-mentioned Athens correspondence, Ford News, the company newspaper, was laying out a similar optimism in its headlines:

> An order for 3,500 Fordson tractors [...] was received at the Fordson offices on January 22. The order was placed by Amtorg Trading Corporation for the United States of Soviet Russia and comes in the nature of a follow-up one year after a similar order for 10,000 Fordson tractors placed in December, 1925, and 11,100 other ordered in smaller quantities since 1921. [...] To make the delivery specified, it was necessary to box and ship 280 tractors daily, specifications demanded that the order be completely manufactured, boxed and shipped by February 9, just 19 days, including three Saturdays and Sundays, after receipt, or a total of 13 working days. The shipment was scheduled to leave New York, 500 on February fifth, 1500 February tenth, and 1,500 February fifteenth, for thirteen Russain [sic] ports, 1,025 being the greatest number assigned to any single port.

192 "Ford Motor Fabrikası'nın İstanbul'da Bir Fabrika Kurmak Isteğine Dair."

> [...] The Fordson order of 1925-26 was shipped variously to Vladivostok, Odessa, Moscow, Leningrad, and Novorossiysk. [...] Eighty-five per cent of the trucks and tractors in Russia are Ford-built.[193]

We cannot say that the Ford News editors exaggerated when they described at length the exceptional speed required for this extremely large order placed at one time. According to company records the Soviet Government had bought a total of 24,600 tractors via its trading corporation Amtorg since the initiation of the NEP in Soviet Russia in 1921 until the beginning of 1927.[194]

By July 1920, quite a while before the Bolsheviks had definitively won the Civil War and enforced a state monopoly on foreign trade, the US Government removed restrictions on shipments to Russia. Imports of passenger cars have been banned temporarily in 1923 by the Soviet Government. This impractical ban was to be pulled back after a couple of months. "The bilateral trade was realized through the American Trade Corporation, Amtorg, inaugurated in New York and Moscow in May 1924. The contract between the Amtorg and Ford Motor Company was signed in 1924. In 1924-26, when the Soviets needed large quantity of tractors, the Ford Motor Company became their main exporter to Russia and Soviet Government become worldwide the largest of all Fordson buyers.[195] Fordsons became first the symbol of the agricultural revival in Soviet Russia and then starting from 1929 the symbol of the forced collectivization. "Children and entire villages [Communes] were named 'Fordson' (...) fordisation entered the Soviet vocabulary."[196] Henry Ford's "scientific organization of work" was seen as a model to emulate for moving from an "agricultural past into the glorious

193 "Russian Tractor Order Completed by Company. Amtorg Trading Corporation Orders 3,500 Fordsons; Brings Total in Russia Over 24,000," *Ford News*, February 15, 1927, sec. Vol 7, Number 8.

194 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 212.

195 Shpotov, "Ford in Russia, from 1909 to World War II," 512.

196 Yves Cohen, "The Soviet Fordson. Between the Politics of Stalin and the Philosophy of Ford, 1924-1932," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, vol. 2 (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 534; Jeffrey G. Brooks, "The Press and Its Message: Images of America in the 1920s and 1930s," in *Russia in the Era of NEP. Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 240.

industrial future of the Soviets." The enthusiasm of the Soviet regime for scientific management and American engineering was absolutely in the same Zeitgeist as its peers in Europe.[197] Ford executives had all the evidence to think that this was a stable demand.

William G. Collins who personified the Company's inclination for the choice of the next assembly plant in Istanbul, the closest, most developed port to Soviet Russia with direct historic and geographical ties to the region, rather than Piraeus, Alexandria or even Constanța, was part of Ford Delegation to investigate the Russian situation by 1926. His convictions matured in such an environment.

By then, thousands of Soviet copies of Fordson, the Fordzon-Putilovets, or the "Red Putilov"[198] had been manufactured in the Putilov factories in Leningrad. They became the symbol of revival in agriculture after a long period of major collapse in agriculture due to revolutionary clashes and civil war. The Putilov factory was a heritage from Imperial Russia. The pre-revolutionary canon-producing factory was transformed into steel, artillery, and tractor shop factory and Fordzon-Putilovets, the reverse engineered copies of Fordsons, were delivered to meet the demand of a vast territory since 1923. The "adaptation" took place without a patent agreement.[199] That was the dominant way of mechanization and motorization in 1920s in Soviet Russia. The country's patent law did not

> [...] seem in any way to hinder the reproduction in Russia of foreign patented products. In the automotive line the Fordson Tractor is re-

197 Maier, "Society as Factory," 86–87.

198 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 213.

199 In the memoirs of Charles Sorensen, the legendary production manager of Ford who travelled to Soviet Russia in 1928 and visited the Putilov Tractor factory the reproduction process by way of reverse engineering was desribed as follows: "What the Russians had done was to dismantle one of our tractors in the Putilov works, and their own people made drawings of all the disassembled parts. [But] it was apparent that, while the Russians had stolen the Fordson tractor design, they did not have any of our specifications for the material that entered into the various parts.": Charles E. Sorensen, *My Forty Years with Ford* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006), 202–3; cited in: Christina E. Crawford, *Spatial Revolution: Architecture and Planning in the Early Soviet Union* (Ithaca [New York]: Cornell University Press, 2022), 219–47.

> produced in Leningrad under the name of the "Red Putilov" Tractor. The Italian Fiat one-and-a-half-ton Truck is reproduced in Moscow under the name A.M.O. and the Bosch spark plug is reproduced in Leningrad by the Autopromtorg organization, the Ford Delegation observed.[200]

The spare parts of automotives were mainly imitations as well.[201]

The mentioned delegation was invited by the Soviet government to explore the general situation there.

> Five executives were chosen to represent the company interest; they sailed from New York on April 3, 1926, accompanied by a contingent of workmen to assist in the assembly of machines and the setting up of exhibits [...] The five men traveled 6,000 miles within Russia, visited factories and tractor centers, held exhibits, wrote a frank but tactful letter-report to the Soviet government, and brought back a rather astounding picture of Russia's first faltering steps in industry.[202]

William Collins from the Italian Company was indeed the most eager and active observer; he covered more miles than the other executives, a total of 14,865 kilometers, conducted most of the personal talks and wrote the substantial part of the correspondence with different Soviet officials, also the above-mentioned "tactful letter-report to the Soviet government," reprinted in the report.[203]

Collins wrote, while still in Russia, this long executive summary about the Tractor Service Conditions in USSR addressed to the State trading monopoly with the USA, the Amtorg Trading Corporation and a Memorandum addressed to its Head in Moskow, Mr. Poliskoff.[204] He also

200 "Report of the Ford Delegation to Russia and U.S.S.R," 38; See also the memoirs of the head production manager Sorenson on his trip to the Putilov steel and tractor factory in Leningrad in early summer 1929. Sorensen, *My Forty Years with Ford*, 188ff.

201 "Report of the Ford Delegation to Russia and U.S.S.R," 125.

202 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 213.

203 "Report of the Ford Delegation to Russia and U.S.S.R," 10.

204 Ibid., 123.

backed up the content of the letter "by frequent personal talks with officials of the various organizations concerned." He investigated the feasibility of a permanent display of Ford products, the possibility of launching a Mechanic's repair school and the establishment of a service and spares depot. The type of concession, profit-sharing, the precondition of granting of a generous credit to the Government and also the best possible location for the service depot were the main points in his enquiry: "The establishment of a service and spares depot somewhere in the Black Sea area is the only way service will ever be available on the tractors now operating in Russia" he reported to his bosses in Dearborn.[205] Two out of the three most important agricultural belts (i.e., Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Volga district) of the Union, where most of the tractors were to be found (Ukraine Republic with 5,890 and North Caucasus District with 4,114 tractors) were best to be served from the Black Sea area, preferably from port cities of Odessa and Novorossiysk, close to deep water dock which would permit of ocean going steamers to come alongside and as close as possible to railway tracks.[206] Collins, with his own signature in the report, laid out the proposition of Amtorg on the spares depot alongside with his evaluation of the situation to his bosses in Detroit, citing himself on the letter to Amtorg:

> We further understand that such depot will be granted "free port" facilities and that you will be able to bring therein without the payment of customs duties any of the Company's products sent over under the proposed agreement; that the servicing organizations buying spares will assume the duty of passing them thru customs, and that immediately orders are received and shipment made from such depot, payment therefore will be immediately made through your New York office to the Company, in dollars. [...] For several days thereafter conferences were held by Messrs. Poliskoff and Ziev with various government departments which it appears have a say-so as to whether a parts depot under our own management or else under Amtorg's could be set up at Odessa or Novorossisk for the purpose of helping

205 Ibid., 139.

206 Ibid., 123–24, 153, 263.

> service the country's tractors, Mr Ziev advised the delegation that it would be quite impossible for us to go in under a concession basis owing to high taxes and necessity of splitting profits with the Government. [207]

Another important part of the report, again penned by Collins was about the "possibilities of Company laying down Fordson tractor manufacturing plant on Soviet soil" by invitation of the Soviet Government.[208] That part of the report, especially the questionnaire containing twenty questions relevant on a possible future enterprise, addressed to the Chief Concessions Committee in charge of foreign concessions contains valuable insights about the spatial priorities for a plant location that Ford put when deciding in the 1920s.[209] Collins analyzed the response received by the Concession Commission and the two suggestions for a production location, Stalingrad and Taganrog, connected through the Volga-Don route to each other and to the Black and oil-rich Caspian Seas. Collins' assessment of the situation was undoubtedly negative. Any serious consideration of direct manufacturing possibilities in Soviet Russia by the Company should be cancelled. The following two main reasons were mentioned:

> 1. We could not with confidence feel that the Government would not take the plant over itself (without compensation and before stipulat-

207 Ibid., 133.

208 Ibid., 172–87.

209 Those twenty areas of question underlying the decision of a plant location are worth enumerating: 1. nearness to steel producing plants, 2. availability of petroleum products, 3. rail and water facilities, 4. population of or around suggested locations, 5. labor, 6. relationships with buying public, 7. imported materials for manufacture or plant installation, 8. exportation of tractors to other countries, 9. copyright and trade mark protection, 10. taxation, 11. laws governing export of capital, 12. shipping, 13. if tractor plant was established, would any preferential treatment be accorded cars and trucks, 14. time limit upon private operation - special considerations, 15. effect of present absence of diplomatic recognition in this particular case, 16. differences which might arise in interpretation of contract, 17. guarantee of private operation during agreed time limit, 18. establishment of assembly or service plants in the USSR, 19. Russian students being trained in the Ford Motor Company's works at Detroit, 20. approximate number of tractors which can be absorbed in the USSR yearly for the next ten years. Ibid., 173–79.

> ed time limit expired) when it pleased to do so once same was established and working smoothly. There are various ways in which the Government could do this, and in the absence of diplomatic recognition, no help could be expected from the American Government. 2. Should the above happen, then a competitor would be created manufacturing the genuine product whereas none existed before. [...] A Ford plant or so would come in handy should and if emergencies arise in future which would warrant same being taken over by the Government.[210]

Demand for Ford products was impressive, invitations of different institutions of the Soviet regime to Ford were plentiful and varied, yet for investing directly into a plant, even into a service and spares depot in a free-port zone as a concessionaire company, the suspicions of confiscation and take-over were just as great. Collins must have made up his mind for Constantinople after that trip: A secure investment location offering considerable trade privileges and located physically and historically close to Soviet Russia and itself in the middle of a potentially big market: that was the port of Istanbul. The decaying Trieste location or the Piraeus free-port being created, or even Alexandria, though it was inspiring hope with the tax exemption and geostrategical and political stability offered there, were all too far away from the biggest future market and had to be thought de-scaled with this new orientation. Constanța was an alternative, too through its proximity to Russian Black Sea ports. Here, however, applications to the Romanian government since 1920 had not evolved in a positive direction for Ford.[211]

This conviction was not shared by the then boss of Collins in Trieste and Alexandria, Thornhill Cooper. He would later tell in an interview in 1960 to Mira Wilkins, pioneering historian of Ford's International Operations, that

> Collins had been to Russia and thought that Ford could get sales there. It was "chasing a rainbow." Anyway, Collins had the idea that Constantinople would cover the Black Sea area. He convinced everyone in Dearborn and Dagenham that Constantinople was the place

210 Ibid., 186–87.

211 Popica, "Ford Motor Company in Romania."

> for the assembly plant. [...] Collins went over Thornhill Cooper's better judgment [to have the plant in Alexandria] [...] The Constantinople operation was a big mistake.[212]

This -on the surface- personal rift between Collins and T. Cooper about the best plant location in the East of Europe and Near East was in fact a reflection of the corporate choices the Company tried to make between paths that seemed open at the same time. It was sure that the Soviet path had multiple attractions for Ford, and this meant the company's territory would shift its center of gravity to the north. If Ford could not be present in Russia in the form of direct investments, then it could adapt to the new wave of wholesale technology imports by way of the technical agreements initiated with the First Five Year Plan in 1928 and replacing the concessionaire type relationship with foreign capital induced by NEP, which came under fiercer critique by the emerging Stalinist cadres in the later stages. So, for Ford "moving to north" had several ways, but to Collins this was moving the node of assembly physically to Istanbul.

Ford's system of scientific management of labor was an inspiration both in the 1920s during NEP as well as afterwards during the Soviet First Five-Year Plan.[213] The appetite for Ford in Soviet Russia in 1920s emanated from the mechanization drive in agriculture and motorization in society, linked to the new policy developed to encounter the serious challenges after the Soviet Revolution to establish a continuous livelihood for the new system. The NEP economic system lasted between 1921 and 1928.

> As an experiment in market socialism, [it] consisted of the coexistence between state ownership of the commanding heights of the economy, including foreign trade, finance, and large-scale industry, and private and communal forms of small-scale production and distribution in agriculture, retail trade, and petty manufactures.[214]

---

212 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Thornhill Cooper Interview."

213 Shpotov, "Ford in Russia, from 1909 to World War II," 505–29.

214 John B. Hatch, "Labor Conflict in Moscow, 1921-1925," in *Russia in the Era of NEP. Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 58–59.

In 1920s the promotion of tractors, especially Fordsons meant economic investment into agriculture but also ideological-affective investment into a belief that progress would transform the "sloth and backwardness of the Old Rus" into revolutionary proletarians "who know how to work at such a speed and with such vigor, and pressure."[215] "Soviet journalists advocated Taylorism and Fordizm", as well as vague notions of "American efficiency, practicality, and organizational skills, in the hope of solving specific economic problems. [...] These moral lessons were part of a broader effort to create new ways of thinking and new attitudes toward the self and society in the early 1920s."[216] A potential Ford was seen within every worker "who "gave his strength" to the "fatherland."[217] "Soviet Americans" and the phrase "Russian Fords" was used "to refer to active groups of workers and managers" in Soviet newspapers.[218]

Fordism, in turn, meant the assembly line and the conveyer belt. "There is nothing frightening about Fordism in a Soviet country" [...] wrote one publicist, who added that one could adopt Ford's conveyer without "his system of slavery."[219] Antonio Gramsci who wrote his Prison Notebooks in Mussolini's prisons between 1926 and until his death in 1937, a practical and brilliant observer of social change departing from the labor process, pointed out at the same time; that the promoters of Americanism/Fordism[220] preached rationality, sobriety, and puritanism for workers as a means of internalizing and perfecting labor discipline. Such ideas also gained currency in Russia during the late 1920s.

Practically, Soviet Fordism began when the recovery of existing factories after the economic collapse between 1917 and 1921 was largely complete and the Bolsheviks could think of new investments. "Soviet 'Fordism' and articles in praise of American technology continued to appear during the

215 Brooks, "The Press and Its Message: Images of America in the 1920s and 1930s," 242.

216 Ibid., 239.

217 Ibid., 240.

218 Ibid., 241.

219 Ibid., 240.

220 Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism."

early 1930s."[221] By the late 1920s, "Soviet America" referred to the fulfillment of the dream of collective utopia,[222] and the imaginary and motivations were crucial driving forces in the process of advancing it. The promotion of Ford tractors in the mid-1920s meant investment in agriculture. In 1928, tractors would spell collectivization as "inevitable stages of a utopia to be realized."

On the other hand, the clear market dominance of FMC in the Soviet imports of passenger cars starting from 1929 (jumping from 29 in 1928 to 4.312 cars in 1929/30)[223] was due to the technical assistance agreement signed on 29 May 1929 between Ford Motor Company, VSNH (Soviet Supreme Council for National Economy) and Amtorg for the duration of nine years.[224] To put this in context this technical agreement was one of the 170 technical assistance agreements that the Soviet Union entered into with foreign firms between 1923 and 1934 after the annulation of the concessionaire type relationship with foreign capital during the later stages of NEP.[225] Henry Ford became the "Auto King in Russia due to the new Model A (passenger car) and AA (truck) which contributed 80% of total automobile imports in 1929-31."[226]

TABLE 3.4" 'Fordisation' of the Soviet Automobile Imports, 1922-1931"

Models	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929-30	1931	Total
Passenger cars imported to the Soviet Union										
Ford	35	242	45	122	134	12	29	4,312	2,868	7,799

221 Brooks, "The Press and Its Message: Images of America in the 1920s and 1930s," 243.

222 Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West*, 1st MIT Press paperback ed (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002); Richard Stites, *Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution*, 1. issued as paperback (New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), 145ff.

223 see Table 5 in: Shpotov, "Ford in Russia, from 1909 to World War II," 529.

224 Kurt S. Schultz, "Building the 'Soviet Detroit': The Construction of the Nizhnii-Novgorod Automobile Factory, 1927-1932," *Slavic Review* 49, no. 2 (1990): 204; Link, *Forging Global Fordism*, 93ff; Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Cars for Comrades: The Life of the Soviet Automobile* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 36ff.

225 Siegelbaum, *Cars for Comrades*, 18.

226 Shpotov, "Ford in Russia, from 1909 to World War II," 514.

Models	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929-30	1931	Total
Buîck	2	2	6	10	20	10	65	150		265
Mercedes-Benz-Daimler	11	30	24	19	62	14	4	-	-	164
Renault		-	-	17	170	20	11	-	-	218
Fiat	17	47	27	73	210	27	25	48	-	474
Steier	1	7	20	22	80	5	34	66	-	235
Others	35	157	87	79	286	114	263	19	62	1,102
Total	101	485	209	342	962	202	431	4,595	2,930	10,257
Trucks imported to the Soviet Union										
Ford	31	83	109	275	183	80	60	8,606	13,525	22,952
Buessing	3	51	17	2	193	54	18	-	225	563
Gider & Stiefr	-	-	-	-	-		-	229	65	294
Zaurer	-	-	-	-	56	133	13	-	-	202
Krupp		-	-	-	6	1		-	185	192
Lancia	-	-	-	-		3	28	-	243	274
Liland	-		-	7	23	4	-	-	-	34
Mercedes-Benz-Daim 1er	4	84	24	29	27	36	14	31	230	479
Prag	-	-	1	-	-	-	-		250	251
Renault	-		-	7	84	120	18		-	229
Spa	-	-		-	1	1	28	1580		1,610
Fiat	-	20	13	37	179	47	4	-	-	300
Fomag	3	-	-	7	60	20	18	-	-	108
Steier	2	-	-	6	43	27	44	-	-	122
Others	44	64	49	62	69	52	122	88	21	571
Total	87	302	213	432	924	578	367	10,534	14,744	28,181

Source: Shpotov, Borris. "Ford in Russia, from 1909 to World War II." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, Vol. 2 (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 529.

This agreement was in fact an excrescence of the First Five Year Plan that was launched in 1928. By mid-1928 the Soviet Government under Stalin had opted for a more intensive industrialization and automobilization. Revenues from the countryside should pay for the crucial imports, collectivized peasants had to toil for grain and other crops to be transformed into machinery. This technical assistance agreement involved more than what its name revealed:

FMC granted to VSNH an exclusive license to manufacture, use and sell in the Soviet Union, the Ford Model A cars and AA trucks' and not to export them from the USSR until expiration of the agreements. FMC was to furnish all know-how, patents, and specifications necessary for manufacturing, and provide technical personnel and instructors to assist at every stage of design and erection of the plant and equipment installation.[227]

In sum, the technical agreement involved a fourfold movement: In the first three of these movements the direction was from Midwest to Soviet Russia: First, propriety technology like patents and blueprints, second a considerable tangible movement of all types of production machinery and third knocked-down cars and spare parts. But the last form of mobility that the agreement implied was reciprocal instead of unilateral:

> [N]ot only machines traveled across the Atlantic. The third step in the transfer of technology was a two-way exchange of people: Midwestern workers and engineers who traveled to Russia, and Soviet trainees who traveled to Detroit. While the machines took the route from New York City to the Black Sea ports, technicians and engineers more commonly boarded the ships crossing to German and Scandinavian ports and from there the trains that connected to Moscow. During the early Thirties, the traffic was considerable."[228]

227 Ibid., 516; Siegelbaum, *Cars for Comrades*, 35ff; Link, *Forging Global Fordism*, 90–130.

228 Link, *Forging Global Fordism*, 110.

This technical agreement with the mentioned components between the Soviets and Ford attracted ample coverage very early on in the Turkish state documents and local press as well.[229] According to the contract the automobile factory Nizhniy-Novgorod was built in about two years' time and opened in January 1932. That factory-city was built by the Austin Company that was trained in the art of building streamlined factories in the school of the Detroit architect Albert Kahn, designer-builder of the gigantic integrated Ford factories back home in Detroit. Kahn himself, on the other hand sight, was invited to contribute to the First Five Year Plan and was busy working for the Soviet Government in the establishment of two tractor factories between 1929 and 1931, the Stalingrad and Kharkov plants.

> The ambitious timetable set by the state's economic planners for the Plan did not allow for a period of internal architectural research and development. Pragmatism, forced by the schedule, led the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (VSNKh) to Detroit architect Albert Kahn, the designer for Henry Ford. In May 1929, the Soviet government signed a contract with Kahn's firm to design and oversee construction for a single tractor factory in Stalingrad, one that would produce 40,000 tractors annually.[230]

229 "Rusya. Ford'la Anlaşma," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, June 6, 1929; "Ford Rusya'da Neler Yapacak?," *Vakit*, June 3, 1929; "Rusyada Ford Ile Mukavele," *Milliyet*, June 3, 1929; "Ford Rusyada Büyük Bir Fabrika Yapıyor," *Akşam*, January 21, 1929, sec. Hususî Telgraf Haberleri; "Ford Rusya'yı İhya Edecek," *Vakit*, June 6, 1929; "Fordun Rusyadaki Fabrikası," *İkdam*, June 6, 1929; "Rusya. Ford'la Mukavele," *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, June 21, 1929; "Ford Otomobil Müessesi Ile Sovyet Hükümeti Arasında Yapılan Akt Edilen Mukavele.," January 29, 1929, Dışişleri_Diplomatik-571-34930 -137929 -2, CCA; "Ford Otomobil Müessesi Ile Sovyet Hükümeti Arasında Yapılan Akt Edilen Mukavele.," February 28, 1929, Dışişleri_Diplomatik-571-34930-137929 -1, CCA.

230 Christina E. Crawford, "Soviet Planning Praxis: From Tractors to Territory," accessed December 19, 2023, https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/centerpiece/spring2015/feature-crawford; Christina E. Crawford, "From Tractors to Territory: Socialist Urbanization through Standardization," *Journal of Urban History* 44, no. 1 (2018): 54–77; Jean-Louis Cohen, Christina E. Crawford, and Claire Zimmerman, eds., *Detroit-Moscow-Detroit: An Architecture for Industrialization, 1917-1945* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2023).

While the construction works for the car factory by Albert Kahn was going on, which was actually a factory city proposing a whole new urban model to the Soviets,[231] Russia had already started to assemble cars that bore the original brand name Ford with the components imported from FMC Detroit. Already by February 1930 the first car with imported knocked-down parts came off the small assembly line,[232] around the same time as in the newly established Istanbul plant.

This was, as mentioned, part of the agreement: For the duration of the agreement, FMC would sell the components of 74,000 automobiles and trucks at a cost of 30,000,000 USD. But the Great Depression had diminished shop output and increased overhead costs in the River Rouge Plant in Detroit. Amtorg delayed paying bills. USSR was facing great foreign exchange problems that rendered them impossible to continue to make large payments abroad. The agreement was terminated in March 1935 unilaterally and prematurely. FMC had a final loss of 578,000 USD but only in terms of immediate financial calculations. It had gains elsewhere: "Since the company was going to substitute the Model V-8 for the Model A, it could send the Soviets much of the used equipment that otherwise would have been discarded."[233] The value of the supplied discarded equipment was calculated around Three Million Dollars. These dollars were mainly extracted from Soviet grain exports channeled to the state through collectivization of agriculture. Another source for the necessary hard currency was art; "European oil paintings and 'household goods' of the aristocracy" confiscated after the October Revolution, including from the collections of the Hermitage were sold on the international markets to art investors rubbing their hands.[234]

By the time of the cancellation of the agreement, the Nizhniy-Novgorod had already been producing cars for three years under the name of NAZ (*Niznehgorodski Automobilnyi Zavod*), which than became GAZ, when the city was renamed Gorky, in honor of Maxim Gorky. The year the agreement

231 Melnikova-Raich, "The Soviet Problem with Two 'Unknowns'"; Lauder and Rodney, "Albert Kahn's Five-Year Plant and the Birth of 'Uncertain Space.'"

232 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 222.

233 Ibid., 223; Sorensen, *My Forty Years with Ford*, 208.

234 Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe*, 168ff.

was cancelled with Ford, the Soviet Union achieved a turn in technology assistance. This time the receiver was the Turkish state. "Turkstroi, founded in 1933 as a division of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, constructed major textile plants in Kayseri and Nazilli that were finished by 1935 and 1937, respectively."[235] Turns in the directions of technology transfer flows were dizzying and not foreseen end of 1920s.



FIGURE 3.12 Ford executives with Soviet delegates after signing the technical assistance agreement, May 31, 1929. SOURCE: Stefan Link, *Forging Global Fordism*, 101.

235 Samuel J. Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s," *Slavic Review* 72, no. 1 (2013): 52; Link, *Forging Global Fordism*, 116; İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "Birinci Sanayi Planı'nın Hazırlanışında Sovyet Uzmanlarının Rolü," in *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları (Istanbul, 2004), 201–38.



FIGURE 3.13 Technical Agreement: The Soviet and the Turkish delegations at Sümerbank factories, cf. Figure 3.12. Nikolai Nikolayevich Ryabinin, "Machines for Turkey", oil on canvas, 207 x 297 cm., 1937 (photo: Mehmet Perinçek) source: Caner Karavit, "Nikolai Ryabinin's painting depicting the Production Revolution" *United World International* [Web Portal] October 28, 2021 [https://bit.ly/48jAQ6t]

Thus, the end of the 1920s was marked by bold trial and error processes by FMC. While restructuring European operations under the British Company, it was venturing at the same time in different potential assembly nodes in Trieste, Livorno, Alexandria, Piraeus, Istanbul, Constanța and Soviet Russia to capture the wide Asian, and Eastern front for its products within one single territory and at the same time trying to deepen its productive base in some of the closing domestic markets.

The inherited spatial mindset of American businessmen was one of a single vast "Levant" territory with internal peculiarities to be conquered by all means, as masterfully exemplified in the official periodical of the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant by March 1923: "American

Consuls and the *American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant,* first of all, must present a united front throughout the Balkans, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Persia, and South Russia."[236]

FMC tried, by all means and in all ways, to come closer to the "uncanny" Soviet market and expand there without taking too many risks. The Soviet Russian Government tried to emulate the Fordist model as a way of heavy industrializing the country through transfer of technical know-how, introduce *Fordizm* in one country or fordization of the society and its morals by nominally subtracting private property from the capitalist equation.

For our purposes here, it is important to underline that the port of Istanbul was a secure trampoline into the Soviet market given the market profile outlined above. Turkey had signed a Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Russia already in March 1921 and a trade treaty in 1927.[237] It was an internally consolidated and internationally recognized Republic with stabile relationships to Soviet Russia. During the venture capitalist period imposed by the erratic 1920s Istanbul seemed to be a better node of assembly covering many outposts at the same time.

Yet, in the FMC Company documents or the interviews made with the Istanbul plant manager by Turkish journalists, Russia was not systematically pronounced as the market which Istanbul plant would be mainly or also assembling for. As far as the list of the international markets was concerned, the traces left are a few but vocal. During the transformation process of Tophane entrepôts into a streamlined Ford factory but also after it has started assembling for export the General Manager Collins was clear about the intentions of the Company to export a part of the automotives into Soviet Russia as well as to the Oriental Region. His declarations were clear, but he

236 "American Influence in the Levant," *Levant Trade Review* 11, no. 3 (1923): 115.

237 Onur İşçi, "Interwar Territoriality and Soviet-Turkish Convergence across the Aras River," in *Borders, Boundaries and Belonging in Post-Ottoman Space in the Interwar Period*, ed. Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2022), 225–40; Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery," 39ff; Onur İşçi, "Başbakanlık ve Milli Şef Döneminde İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası," in *İsmet İnönü*, ed. Mehmet Ö Alkan, (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Kültür ve sanat Ürünleri Ticaret A.Ş, 2021), 404ff; Samuel J. Hirst and Onur İşçi, "Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian-Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development," *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 5 (2020): 834–59.

was not eager to highlight the main Russian orientation of the investment. It was mentioned as one in the list of the many countries of destination, mitigating its original importance.

> Our factory will be finished and operational in nine months. The factory will produce 100 automobiles a day. Five percent of the automobiles will be manufactured in Turkey and the rest will be sent to Russia, Balkan countries, and other countries in Oriental Region.[238]
>
> The factory will start operating very soon and will produce 50-80 automobiles a day. The cars and trucks to be manufactured will be shipped to Russia, Oriental Region [*aksayi şark*], Romania and the Balkans.[239]

In some news the "Oriental Region" was enriched by "other countries in the West"*(şark ve garptaki diğer memleketlere).*[240]

> With the establishment of our Istanbul plant, we were exposed to so many orders from the Balkans, Russia and Turkey. The factory to be built here will export to Russia, all the Balkans, Egypt, India, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Bulgaria, and Afghanistan.[241]

Already by February 1930, only after a month after the plant started assembling cars rumors about a possible move from Istanbul to another location was news in Turkish press. Any rumor during that accelerated rhythm of decision making by Ford about shifts of the nodes of territories could have a base of truth. The erratic spatial orientations of Ford were based on the policy to pit one location of investment against the other. Another newspaper article the same period revealed that this "other location" was Constanța in Romania, a port city nearer to main Soviet maritime arter-

238 "Ford Otomobil Fabrikası," *Akşam*, July 1, 1929; "Fort Fabrikası," *İkdam*, July 1, 1929, sec. Düne Bugüne Yarına Ait Müteferrik Haberler.

239 "Ford Otomobilleri Şehrimizde Yapılan Arabalar Teşhir Ediliyor," *Vakit*, January 6, 1930.

240 "Rusya. Ford'la Anlaşma."

241 "25,000 Kişi İş İstiyor. Ford'un İstanbul'daki Fabrikası Ne Zaman Açılacak, Nasıl İşliyecek, Neler Yapacak. M. Kollins Bunları Anlatıyor," *Vakit*, April 29, 1929.

ies and where also news about the project of building the Danube-Bucharest-Black Sea Channel was aired end of 1929.[242] Yet the allegations were denied personally and fiercely by Collins by referring to the shipments to Russia and Balkans that have already started:

> It is absolutely not true that the assembly plant will be transferred to another location. The factory continues to operate. Automobile shipments to Russia and the Balkans have started. Soon shipments to other eastern countries will also start. We are busy with our work. We do not even think it is necessary to reply to such news. It would be very good if you did not even write these words of ours in your newspaper.[243]

Other signs about Russia's markets weighing heavily in the decision of Ford for Istanbul are to be found in myriad documents. Take for example the confidential dispatch sent by the British Diplomat Mr. Edmonds from Ankara to Sir Austen Chamberlain, British Foreign Secretary.

> Messrs. Ford would, he added, transfer to Constantinople their present Trieste installation, and Constantinople would become the distributing center for Italy and Russia as well as the Near East. It is, I think, noteworthy that a firm of the importance of Messrs. Ford should have ultimately selected Constantinople, by virtue of its geographical position, would be the most suitable center of distribution for an area including Black Sea as well as Mediterranean ports, and Messrs. Ford, who have been making exhaustive enquiries for several months past with a view to the selection of a distributing center, have, in deciding upon Constantinople, in preference to the Piraeus or Varna, justified this view. A firm of their international standing and extensive resources, able to establish itself at whichever center made best offer, was naturally in a position to strike a more satisfactory bargain with the Turkish Government than a smaller

242 "Ford Fabrikası," *Cumhuriyet*, February 25, 1930, sec. Küçük Haberler.

243 "Ford Top[h]Anedeki Fabrikayı Kapatacak Mı? Haber Tekzip Ediliyor," *Vakit*, February 25, 1930.

> undertaking could hope to do, and it remains to be seen how far Messrs. Ford's example will carry other firms in their wake and lead to a real revival of the port of Constantinople. In any case, while the tendency ever since 1922 has been for business to leave Constantinople for the Piraeus, this is a very striking instance of business preferring Constantinople to the Piraeus or elsewhere. If the Turkish Government is now alive to the importance of Constantinople as a source of national wealth, this concession may mark the turn of the tide of the city's fortune.[244]

The British perspective stressed the Greek-Turkish rivalry in the whole issue, yet the territory's outreach depicted was Russian-dominated Black Sea, together with Near East and the Mediterranean. The same is true in another British document: The British Commercial Secretary in Istanbul Sir Colonel Woods states in the year of the establishment of the plant (in 1930) that this "will serve as a distributing center [...] for ports in the Black Sea and Near East generally."[245]

Take another contemporary example, this time from the Turkish Government. The Consultative Council on Fiscal Affairs of the Turkish National Assembly (Millet Meclisi Maliye Encümeni) comments on December 27, 1928 in its protocol (*mazbata*) on the advantages of the recently concluded agreement between FMC and the Ministry of Finance of Turkey and lists the markets the project was aiming at: "The main benefit expected from the conclusion of this contract is that Istanbul will be the transit center for the sale of Fort [sic] products in Egypt, Greece, Russia and Asia."[246]

Evidence is carved in the memory Bernar Nahum, whose name is attached to the "birth of a genuine Turkish automotive industry" in Turkey.

---

244 "Turkey. Confidential. Dispatch by W. S. Edmonds British Embassy in Ankara, to Sir Chamberlain, London," December 24, 1928, FO 371/18257, Public Record Office (PRO).

245 "[Economic Affairs 1930-34] Report of Colonel Carlson Woods (March 1930): A Study of the Economic Life in Turkey," 1930, M1224 / Roll 12, AIRC.

246 "Türkiye Cümhuriyeti Amerika Fort Motör Kumpani Eksportes İnkor Poreytet Şirketi Arasında Münakit Mukavelenamenin Tasdiki Hakkında (1/296) Numaralı Kanun Layihası ve Maliye, İktisat ve Bütçe Encümenleri Mazbataları," *T. B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi / Tutanak Dergisi* VII, no. Devre III, İçtima II (January 28, 1929): 83–85.

Nahum had just started working for Vehbizâde Koç during the time of the conclusion of the agreement between Ford and the Turkish state. He would play a determining role in the later assembler dealer agreement of Koç with Ford in 1956. Nahum, who would work a total of forty-four years in the automotive department of the Koç Group, the then Ankara dealer of FMC, remembered the territory of the Istanbul plant as follows in 1988:

> The British branch of the Ford Motor Company contacted our government and informed us that they wanted to establish an assembly plant in Istanbul and that they intended to export some of the automobiles and tractors to be assembled to the Soviet Union and sell some domestically.[247]

Another testimony voices the memory of capital about the importance of the Russian market for the Istanbul plant comes from Can Kıraç, who was leading the automotive branch of the Koç Holding in the 1960s.

> When analyzing the history of the automobile in Turkey, one should not forget the contribution of the Ford Motor Company. In 1929, the company received the necessary permission to establish an assembly plant in Turkey and started work in the warehouses in Tophane and succeeded in exporting some of the automobiles and tractors produced to Russia. However, the economic crisis that shook the world in 1929, on the one hand, and the events between the bureaucracy and the company management, on the other, resulted in Ford leaving our country.[248]

One thing was clear. The importance and priority of Soviet markets were pronounced vocally neither by Ford nor by the Turkish state and left a few but strong traces that must be gleaned carefully. Yet shortly after the signature of the technical agreement between Ford and USSR in May 1929 the mention about the Russian markets as part of the territory of Istanbul would evaporate.

---

247 Nahum, *Koç'ta 44 Yılım*, 28.

248 Can Kıraç, "Otomobil 100 Yaşında," accessed December 11, 2023, https://www.cankirac.com/otomobil-100-yasinda.

It is highly probable that these contradictory statements and reporting are repercussions of the fine-tuning policy on the part of the Turkish Government with its northern neighbor. The Early Republican Turkey actually had a very complex balance with its socialist neighbor, which was also influenced by the numerically small, but vocal communist movement in the political arena in Turkey. Added to that, Ford was riding on many horses at the same time and there were no clear demarcations that the company could declare once and for all. It had to adapt to the prerequisites of the technical agreement introduced by the Five-Year Plan to reach out to the Soviet markets, instead of exporting there assembled vehicles from Istanbul. Ultimately, that agreement was aimed at producing inside USSR with knocked-down parts, to first buy then adapt machinery, transfer technology and finally substitutes their import. The biggest industrial capitalist enterprise of that period was trying to figure out the best way to be present on Soviet soil with its products. Ford's attempt at getting closer to the Soviet market through an export-oriented plant in Istanbul would end as a stillborn project, given –as outlined above- that the "Soviet Fordizm" worked differently: not through import of automotives but technology in all its *facette*s. This in turn crosscut the scope of the Istanbul investment even before it started assembling automotives. In Ford's first comprehensive three-volume monograph, this link of failure linking Istanbul and Russia was described as follows.

> In Istanbul by that year [1929] Ford had an assembly plant, planned in Dearborn by its American manager, capable of turning out 37,000 cars annually, and so supplying not only most of Asia Minor, but any Russian trade that could be developed through Odessa. Unfortunately, no Russian or Near Eastern market ever justified the plant.[249]

This must have been an unexpected move for William Collins, turning upside down the initial calculations and scope on which the Istanbul plant was based. But if this is true, another question arises: How was such an uncoordinated move among the decision makers of the same company possible

249 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*.

considered this was the biggest industrial enterprise of the period, one that wrote standardized planning of all the steps of production on its banner? The
Ford-Soviet technical agreement stood in tension to the purpose of the vast greenfield investment into Istanbul. The so-called "designation problem" of the Istanbul branch persisted until 1931. All three steps with important consequences for the orientation of the company (Dagenham, Nizhny Novgorod, and Istanbul) were concluded within a couple of months during the same year of 1928 and they all pointed to different nodes of territories. Where were the standardized criteria of Ford left, the company that gave its name to rationalizing of production plans?

3.3.2.3 Alexandria: Hop In, Hop Off Istanbul

The laid-out trial and error and successive adaptation processes of Ford during the interwar period were far from being implantations of standardized rational company decisions but concrete spatial practices as response to a changing environment. In the evolution of Ford's internationalization of its sales and production network, the relationship between two cities, Istanbul and Alexandria stands out in intensity and directness. Ships loaded with "wandering machines and executives" between the two port cities and discoursive evidence about their competitive positions have gone beyond the interwar period and well into the twenty-first century. Rahmi Koç, the heir of one of the biggest holding companies of Turkey, i.e., the Koç Group, made a speech during the opening ceremony of the new Ford Otosan factory, a joint venture between Ford and Koç, in 2001 in Gölcük, Kocaeli (de facto in Istanbul city region). In this speech the memory of capital was prominently put into words. It represented the gaze of the corporation that never diverts eyes away from its arch-competitor but also the focus on the target markets, projected into the past.

> Ford evaluates its investments in the long term. Turkey is important in terms of its proximity to the Middle East and Russian markets. For this reason, it did not see any harm in transferring technology and capital, trusting our group. [...] We wanted to buy this land (as the factory site], and I cannot tell you the difficulties and negativities we

> suffered because of this. [...] It seemed to us as if an invisible hand, a force, was preventing the progress of this country. In 1927, Ford had moved its assembly workshop in Tophane to Alexandria, Egypt because of the bureaucracy and the rigid attitude of a few customs officials. Fortunately, the insistence of the government headed by Mr. Yılmaz and the statement of President Süleyman Demirel that he would even give the garden of Çankaya [the Presidential Palace] for such a project put an end to the controversy.[250]

Koç was right when he mentioned the intertwined destinies of Ford investments in both cities and told that the Tophane plant was moved to Alexandria but was wrong about the date. Ford Alexandria was originally an offspring of the Trieste node. A branch was formed in 1926[251] with an initial capitalization of 12,125 USD[252] in a leased building around a kilometre from the pier on Rue 1er Khedive. As far as we can infer from the plant questionnaires[253] and plant photographs from 1927[254] the building was not constructed from the scratch but transformed very much like the Trieste and Tophane entrepôts-to an automotive facility. Although "Ford Egypt executives indicated that they had the capacity at Alexandria to assemble twenty five cars and twenty five trucks and to charge eighty batteries at one time, in fact, most of the cars, trucks and tractors that were exported to Egypt arrived in a "built-up" condition and required little to make them ready for purchase."[255] Actually the facility constituted actually a small service and simple assembly facility that had a storage capacity of thirty built-up cars. Its first manager, Thornhill Cooper as well as its assistant manager, William Collins were transferred from Trieste. For Alexandra no reorganization was needed,

250 "Ford Kocaeli Fabrikası Resmen Açıldı," [Online Archive], NTVMSNBC News Portal, April 20, 2001, https://bit.ly/3Sa1okS.

251 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 435.

252 Robert L. Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics: The Ford Motor Company of Egypt, 1945-1960," *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 3 (1990): 385.

253 "Branch Questionnaire Alexandria, Egypt"; "Plant Questionnaire Alexandria 2."

254 "Alexandria (Plant Photograph)," August 5, 1927, AR-65-5 Alexandria folder 2, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; ibid.

255 Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics," 386.

it simply continued as a branch of the Delaware Company FMC Exports Incorporated.[256]

Thornhill Cooper was described by his superiors as a polyglot who could handle the many languages spoken in that area.[257] That was one of the reasons why Perry, Head of Ford Britain sent him to Egypt to organize the Alexandria branch at the initial phase. Other reasons were, according to Charles Sorenson, production manager of FMC that he was "a sort of a roving salesman useful in any place where sales needed a boost. [...] He could open doors anywhere."[258] His subordinates remembered this man with army background as a superior to be feared.[259]

Alexandria offered substantial tax privileges. There was "no income tax, and direct shipping from United States and Dagenham. It was near the big markets in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey" praised Cooper this location, still in an interview in 1960.[260] Those were for sure the main factors why Ford divided the vast territory of Trieste among the two branches right at the beginning in 1926.

> We attach hereto our recommendation as to the division of territory between the Trieste and the new Egyptian organization, and recommend an early careful analysis of conditions in Roumania - or some part of the Balkan States - with a view to establishing a depot, and possibly a responsible sales-service organization there, so that these territories can be developed to give maximum results, as it is feared

256 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Letter by H. Stanford Cooper in London to the Attorneys at Law, Lovell, White & King," December 4, 1929, Acc 880 / Box 5, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

257 Charles E. Sorenson, "'Oral Reminiscences'_ European Branches, BFRC," n.d., Acc. 65 / Box 67, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

258 Ibid.

259 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt"; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Conversation with Christopher Mataras, Assistant Manager of Ford (Egypt) S.A," April 20, 1960, Acc. 880 / Box 3 Folder Ford Romana, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

260 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Thornhill Cooper Interview."

> that a sufficiently close watch cannot be kept on our dealers organizations in these territories from either Trieste or Egypt.[261]

According to this division of territory, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Arabia, Azerbajan, Bahrein, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Egyptian Soudan, Eritrea, Georgia, Greece, Italian Somaliland, Mesopotamia, Oman, Palestine, Persia, Rhodes, Roumania, Syria, Turkey & Armenia shifted under the control of Alexandria branch. The Alexandria territory by 1927 was identical to the Istanbul territory in 1929, except for Italian Somaliland, which would then have a huge sales effect on Egypt's company records in 1935. There was no separate company, no local buying, and just simple assembly to resale.[262] Even for this vast territory 98% of all the deliveries to the dealers were driveaways.[263] Cooper remembered in 1960 that he defended that dealer experience of America had to be localized. In "the Middle East you can't do house to house canvasing. [...] For example, to have a dealer for each 1000 people in the Middle East is foolish. You can't expect to have that many natives as customers. Your dealers have to cover a wider territory."[264]

When Collins came back from his Russian trip as an assistant to Thornhill Cooper the latter had already laid out the plans to boost sales radiating from the Alexandria node. Collins came back with the plan to move the assembly node to the north to Constantinople near to Russian ports, and - despite Cooper's objections and resentment- convinced the bosses in London and Dearborn. Two Ford executives were competing around the choice of the next best production location to cover Near Eastern, Mediterranean, East African markets and whether to count in the Russian markets in or not. Exacerbating competition among staff and personalizing success were part of the labor regime at Ford. Opportunities and risks of each investment location in the given erratic, open ended setting was personified, the burden of the outcome loaded to executives in this way. In Alexandria Collins would remain subordinate to Cooper but Istanbul would grant him a higher posi-

261 "Letter Sent by the General Manager of FMD D'italia Alexander Lie." *italics* are mine.

262 Ford Motor Company, "Purchasing Abroad: Development of Foreign Industries Permits Expansion of 'Local' Purchasing Program," *Ford News* 6, no. 15 (1927): 5.

263 "Branch Questionnaire Alexandria, Egypt."

264 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Thornhill Cooper Interview."

tion and more autonomy due to his background in the region. In the beginning Collins won. A disillusioned and demoted Cooper, "painted black by Collins"[265] went back to Trieste and got involved in negotiations for the expansion of the Italian operations with the Mussolini regime and the automotive producers Fiat and Isotta Fraschini (see Chapter 3.3.2.1). But it was Cooper who lasted and he won in the end in the turf wars.

Collins was travelling back and forth between Alexandria and Istanbul - most probably on ships of one of the many international steamship companies sailing between these two cities[266] during the negotiations with the Turkish government officials which led to the promulgation of the Free Zone Law in 1927 and the Ford Law in 1929.

By October of 1928 the intention of Ford to transfer the operations in Alexandria to Istanbul was clear even before the contract was signed with the Turkish Government in November 1928. Perry, Head of Ford Britain mentioned regarding the internal reorganization of European operations and the status of the Alexandria branch that "[t]he reason why Alexandria was omitted when Mr Ford gave his original instructions in October last [in 1928] was because there were no fixed assets there, and it was the intention to transfer to Constantinople."[267]

G. F. Riedt witnessed the move from Alexandria to Istanbul during 1929 and was personally affected, since a part of the staff had been transferred to Turkey along with the factory fittings.

> The office staff in Alexandria was made up of English, Greek, Germans, Italians, Americans, etc. [...] [When] the operation was moved from Alexandria to Istanbul, spare parts, equipment etc was all loaded and taken off to Istanbul. "Nobody knew until the boat left who was going." "We were either going to get three months salary or a ticket to Istanbul."

265 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt."

266 The Turkish Maritime Company has initiated the regular Alexandria-Istanbul line by 1929 "Deniz Yolları İşletmesi - Seyri Sefain'in Yoktan Var Oluşu," *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, October 29, 1933, sec. Cumhuriyet 10. Yıl Özel Eki, 53.

267 "Letter Sent by Percival Perry, 1929, March 22."

Riedt went to Istanbul and remained there for most of the existence of Istanbul operations. Listed as chief clerk in the plant questionnaire of the Istanbul Plant in 1938[268] he was also accused during the customs smuggling case against Ford that lasted between 1935 and 1940, the year he was acquitted along with the then general manager Aubrey Molossi. [269]

The Alexandria plant must have seized all assembly activity by that move.[270] By October 1929, the year of the great crash in Wall Street, the physical move of the Alexandria plant to Istanbul and the conceptual move of the nodal point of the territory to the north were concluded.[271] The Istanbul operation had to deal with all the consequences of a rapidly changing economic geography, rise of economic nationalism on the one hand sight and the consequences of Ford's sometimes diametrically opposed and mutually sabotaging spatial decisions on the other hand sight. By April 1933 assembly activities in Istanbul came to a halt, sometime during, or after 1934 the factory fittings were transferred back to Alexandria on the same ship with a tiny little fraction of the Istanbul executives. Among the hundreds of workers and office staff, three executives were transferred from Istanbul to Alexandria according to the autobiography of Mehmet Bahri Ergene, chief roadman in Istanbul between 1930 and 1934.[272] He was one of them and would work for Ford Alexandria until the year the World War II broke in 1939, travelling back and forth between the nodes of a territory as tremendous as encompassing East India, Afghanistan, Iran and East Africa at the

268 "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant," March 2, 1938, Acc. 970 / Box 3, Benson Ford.

269 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt."

270 "Ford Fabrikası. Amele Almağa Başladı. Şefleri ve Amelesi Yalnız Türk Olacak," *Milliyet*, August 23, 1929, sec. Milliyetin Şehir Haberleri.

271 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Letter by H. Stanford Cooper in London to the Attorneys at Law, Lovell, White & King"; "New Ford Factory in Turkey Is Open," *New York Times*, February 23, 1930.

272 "Autobiography of Mehmet Bahri Ergene, Chief Roadman in Istanbul and Alexandria," 1986, Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives.

same time. He took hundreds of photographs during those professional travels automobilizing the areas and weaving literally a territory together.[273]

273 "Photograph Albums, Taken and Compiled by Mehmet Bahri Ergene, Chief Roadman in Ford Istanbul (1920-24) and Ford Alexandria (1934-39)," n.d., Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives.



Ford Motor Company, Exports, Inc.

Manufacturers of Automobiles, Trucks and Tractors.

Telegraphic Address:
"FORDMOTOR-ISTANBUL"
LOCK BOX 581 ISTANBUL

ISTANBUL TURKEY.

TELEPHONE 44654
" 53
" 52

February 6th 1934

PLEASE QUOTE REF.

ALL STATEMENTS OR AGREEMENTS CONTAINED IN THIS LETTER ARE CONTINGENT ON STRIKES, ACCIDENTS, FIRES OR ANY OTHER CAUSES BEYOND OUR CONTROL AND ALL CONTRACTS ARE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE SIGNATURE OF A DULY AUTHORIZED EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THIS COMPANY CLERICAL ERRORS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to inform you that Mr. BAHRI HUSSEIN is an accredited Representative of this Company.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY EXPORTS INC.

A L Molossi
Asst Manager.

PLEASE ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COMPANY AND NOT TO INDIVIDUALS.

FIGURE 3.14 Travelling representative document for Mehmet Bahri Ergene issued by Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul dated February 6, 1934. (Cf. Figure 3.15) SOURCE: Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives



Ford Motor Company (Egypt)
S. A. E.

TELEGRAMS & CABLES :
"FORDMOTOR"
TELEPHONE No 22876
R. C. ALEX. NO. 4542

ALEXANDRIA
RUE SOTER. MAZARITA

PLEASE ADDRESS
ALL COMMUNICATIONS
TO THE COMPANY
IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
DEPARTMENT A

7 Dec 1938

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that Mr
M BAHRI ERGENE is a Travelling Representative
in Afghanistan of Ford Motor Company (Egypt)
S A E, Alexandria, and we shall be glad if
you will give him every assistance in the
fulfilment of his duties.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY (EGYPT) SAE

M Hoffinger
Manager

MH VC

ALL STATEMENTS OR AGREEMENTS CONTAINED IN THIS LETTER ARE CONTINGENT ON STRIKES, ACCIDENTS, FIRES, OR ANY OTHER CAUSES BEYOND OUR CONTROL AND ALL CONTRACTS ARE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE SIGNATURE OF A DULY AUTHORIZED EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THIS COMPANY. CLERICAL ERRORS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION

FIGURE 3.15 Travelling representative document for Mehmet Bahri Ergene issued by Ford Motor Company S. A. E., Alexandria Egypt dated December 7, 1938. (Cf. Figure 3.14) SOURCE: Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives



FIGURE 3.16 Mehmet Bahri Ergene on a tractor which he depicts as "useless" in Alexandria dated 1935. SOURCE: Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives



FIGURE 3.17 Mehmet Bahri Ergene, enroute to Tahran, 1936. SOURCE: Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives



FIGURE 3.18 The Story of 250 Trucks (*250 Kamyon Hikayesi*): Photos depicting the steps taken for assembling 250 trucks for Baghdad Ford dealer, 1938. SOURCE: Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives

During the year of 1933 Alexandria took over much of the former Istanbul territory. Smaller segments of the territory had been distributed among Ford Romana, Ford Italiana and Ford Motor Co. Greece.[274]

274 "Manager's Report to Directors for the Period October-November-December 1933 - FMC (Egypt) SAE Alexandria," January 13, 1934, Acc 712 / Box 3 Alexandria, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "Sources of Supply & Territory," February 17, 1937, Acc. 285 / Box 2025, Benson Ford.



MAP 3.15 Cut-out map of territorial division in February 17, 1937. SOURCE: Adapted from "Summary of Domestic and Foreign Production and Deliveries, 1933-36," March 12, 1937. Acc. 285 / Box 2025. Benson Ford. Map used: *Meyers Universal Atlas* [original scale: 1:100,000,000] (Leipzig: Verlag Bibliographisches Institut AG, 1937)

The legal preparation for this backward move was the incorporation of a separate company in Egypt. The Ford Motor Company (Egypt) SAE was founded in 1932[275] by Ford-England, the new center of European operations

275 Another sign that the economic paths of both port cities were interwoven was that the first Turkish private bank of the Republic, İş Bankası opened a branch in Alexandria "İş Bankası, 51 yıl sonra yeniden Mısır'da," *https://www.dunya.com/gundem/is-bankasi-51-yil-sonra-yeniden-misir039da-haberi-118140*, June 22, 2010, https://www.dunya.com/gundem/is-bankasi-51-yil-sonra-yeniden-misir039da-haberi-118140; Kocabaşoğlu et al., *Türkiye İş Bankası Tarihi*; The short-lived periodical of the Iskenderiye branch of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce lists only automotives and spare parts of General Motors (Buick, Chevrolet) as export goods from Alexandria to Istanbul which proves that Ford was operative in both locations and exports of Ford automotives did not start before 1934, "Mısırdan Türkiye'ye İhracat," *İskenderiye Türk Ticaret Odası Mecmuası* 1, no. 3 (1934): 15.

since 1928. Its capitalization was 45,000 USD.[276] That year Ford Britain was busy reorganizing its territory to the new challenges of economic nationalism and thus the inefficiency of the Istanbul plant to serve its territory.

> During the first seven months of 1932 Bucharest saw Ford Romana SAR begin operations; Alexandria saw the Ford Motor Company (Egypt) commence handling sales and service; and a sales company was incorporated in Athens. They all reported directly to Perry. Early returns from all these operations, except the Turkish, were encouraging."[277]



FIGURE 3.19 Ford Motor Company's facilities around the world, 1947. SOURCE: Edgar N. Duffield, *Ford Through European Eyeglasses, 1907-1947*. (Chelmsford, Mass.: Mercury Press, 1948): 106-107.

276 Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics," 385.

277 Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, *Ford. Vol. 3, Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962*, vol. 3 (New York: Scribner, 1963), 86.

The legal formation was accompanied by the construction of Ford facilities, mainly depots for finished and semi-finished automotives and spares, from the scratch in the Mazarita neighborhood of Alexandria between January 1932 and March 1933,[278] this time around six kilometers away from the pier. The stock delivered by steam liners was transported to the plant by trailers drawn by Industrial Fordson Tractors.[279]

> Operating from Alexandria merely for sales and service, with no assembly plant, it conducted Ford business in Iraq, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Rhodes, İtalian Somaliland, Oman, Muscat, Bahrein, Malta, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Eritrea, Yemen, Albania, Sinkiang, Mongolia, Transjordania, Hadramaut, and Kuwait as well as in Egypt."[280] In the second half of the 1930s "[i]t provided wholesale and retail financing for more than fifty dealers located in the region.[281]

During the Abyssinian Crisis in 1935 Ford's sales from Alexandria scored a record high. When Italian armed forces from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland invaded Ethiopia in October 1935, Ford in Egypt supplied the Italian forces despite the -weak- economic sanctions imposed on Italy by the League of Nations, since both colonial countries were part of the territory of Ford Egypt.

278 "Plant Construction Photographs, Ford Motor Co. (Egypt) S.A.E.," January 1934, Acc 1790 / Box 33 - Egypt 1, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

279 "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant."

280 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 258–59.

281 Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics," 386.



MAP 3.16 Alexandria Territory, 1948. SOURCE: "Ford in Egypt [Commemorative Brochure]," 1948. AR 65.5 / Box 28. Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford

Despite the well-publicized anti-militarist stance of Henry Ford during the World War I the booming military business in trucks was encountered by a small dealer of Ford Egypt in Mogadiscio, an Italian small grocery shop owner. That year Ford sold around 4,800 trucks and enormous number of spare parts to the Italian army. Sales of units skyrocketed to more than four times compared to the year before.[282] "For the year 1935 Ford Egypt showed profits of 724,000 USD, higher than those of any European Ford company except Dagenham." [283]

> The trucks for the order were supplied from the United States. Also large orders from Mussolini for spare parts were filled. All the trucks came from United States -- from Ford in U.S. None came from Dagenham. They came in chartered boats and were taken down to Mogadishu. Henry Ford's sanctions on Mussolini came late, too late. The trade in trucks had been key for the Egyptian company. They made good profits on this. The "Italians were paying any price."[284]

Ford Egypt was one of the actors behind the furnishing of the international conflict that discredited the League of Nations for sure and was one of the elements that paved the way to the World War II.

During World War II the shipments from Ford Egypt had changed destination from one army to its enemy. When the Mediterranean was blocked off by the British and Italians "the American Ford company was able to ship via the Cape of Good Hope and the Red Sea to Alexandria, Egypt, where Ford materials were being used by the British in their wars against Italian armies in Libya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia."[285] Business was business. So, the capitalization of Ford Egypt rose to 1,000,000 USD by 1938.[286] But the

282 "Manager's Report to Directors for the Period July/August/September 1935 - FMC (Egypt) SAE Alexandria," September 30, 1935, Acc 712 / Box 3 Alexandria, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

283 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 258ff.

284 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Thornhill Cooper Interview", see also: "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Conversation with Christopher Mataras, Assistant Manager of Ford (Egypt) S.A."

285 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 320.

286 Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics," 385.

Alexandria branch was not saved from military politics. It was rather literally "hit" by their instruments; the bombs. Its depots were totally destroyed shortly after the entire stocks of the parts depot were transferred to a leased facility in Cairo by the decision of Thornhill Cooper.[287]

Five years after the end of the war in 1950 FMC could establish a new and larger plant in Alexandria, the Smouha plant despite the strong Egyptianization tendencies against foreign capital. [288] The Atlanta plant was used to some extent as a model for its design.[289] It was established under the direct control of Ford USA as part of a worldwide policy change by FMC to bring its subsidiaries directly under American control. Henry Ford became a board member of Ford Egypt. The Smouha plant had a total floor space four times the square footage of the old plant, with a capacity of assembling ten to twelve units a day from a completely knocked-down condition, four hundred employees and an initial capitalization of 1,200,000 USD. This new investment was based on the positive scores of the previous period. Between 1926 and 1950 out of the 326,354 vehicles sold in the territory 61,500 were sold in Egypt only, as the most important revenue-producing country. And this success was despite the fierce competition by General Motors, Chrysler Corporation, Fiat and Mercedes.[290]

Again, a transfer of executives took place from Istanbul to Alexandria. We know at least of one such figure for this period: Aubrey L. Molossi who served as the longest general manager of the decimated Istanbul branch (between 1932 and 1944) and had to stand trial during the customs smuggling case [291] moved to Alexandria after the closure of the Istanbul plant and became the general manager of Ford Egypt S.A.E.[292] Riedt, the chief clerk with whom he worked remembered him as "an American married to a Russian."

The assistant manager of Ford Egypt, Christopher Mataras drafted a crafty model to boost sales there after the closure of the Turkish plant.

287 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Thornhill Cooper Interview."

288 Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics," 390.

289 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Thornhill Cooper Interview."

290 Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics."

291 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt."

292 Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics," 389.

Wenn Ford pulled back totally from Istanbul, Turkey was included into the Egyptian company's territory. Mataras negotiated beginning of the 1950s with Egyptian authorities about the so-called "home manufacturing legislation." He had the idea giving Ford the appearance of a truly Egyptian product by buying "glass, batteries, and a few other things in Egypt."

> If the Ford could be considered as an Egyptian product, it could be sold in Turkey, without exchange problems. Turkey sold tobacco to Eygpt, Egypt didn't have the means to pay. So they paid with Egyptian Ford trucks. This was fine by the Ford Company. [...] They as a result got big Turkish orders.[293]

The Ford hop in hop off shuttle between Alexandria and Istanbul took another turn after 1956. This was the year of the Suez crisis and the mass business sequestrations of foreign businesses in Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser and Ford "was to severe all relationships with dealers in the larger Middle East and Mediterranean."[294] Surely this was the single most important push factor for the dealer assembler agreement concluded in the same year between Ford and Koç Group and the establishment of Ford Otosan Turkey. In three years' time Koç had finished the construction of its first, Kadıköy (Uzunçayır, Acıbadem) Ford assembly plant assembling mainly F-600, F-100, F-350 trucks and F-100 pick-ups out of imported completely knocked down (CKD) parts. Local purchase rate was around 15% and the number of employees in total one hundred forty-one. [295] The assembly location had shifted from the European side (Tophane) of the city to the Anatolian side (Kadıköy) with direct road connections Anatolian hinterland where most of the dealers of the exclusively Turkish territory were situated. The year Ford Otosan started assembly operations, public owned assembly companies to produce cars, trucks and buses were established in Egypt, which operated under license agreements "with the Italian manufacturer Fiat, the former East German manufacturer NSU, and the German truck

293 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Conversation with Christopher Mataras, Assistant Manager of Ford (Egypt) S.A."

294 Tignor, "In the Grip of Politics," 393.

295 Ford Otosan and VTR Araştırma Yapım Yönetim, *Benim Adım Ford Otosan*, 54ff.

and bus producer Magirus Deutz" for a protected domestic market. [296] Six years after, in 1966 Ford abandoned Alexandria as a location of production permanently.

3.3.2.4 Constanța and Bucharest: Trying Even Further North

In 2022 the same Ford Otosan (Turkish for 'Ford Automotive Industry'), based in Turkey with production facilities in Kocaeli, east of Istanbul, currently equally owned by Ford Motor Company and Koç Holding annouced on its corporate website that "Ford Otosan Takes Ford Plant in Craiova [Roumania] into Electric Future".[297] The Craiova factory itself was acquired by the mother company, Ford Motor Company from the Romanian goverment in 2008 and which served as the Oltcit factory during the communist regime (a Goverment-Citroën joint venture) until 1994 and Daewoo Automobile Romania between 1994 and 2006.[298] This peculiar intersection of Ford fates of both countries was one of the significant afterlives of Ford Istanbul in the Interwar period.

The shared history started in the 1920's. As early as in 1920 Ford sales agency Collin & Co requested [from the Romanian Government] on behalf of the president of Ford Motor Company's European Division the permission to build an assembly plant in Romania. Arguments of competing production locations and know-how transfer were again used in the letter addressed to the Government to increase the attractiveness of the proposal:

296 Mohamed Askar, Karim Assabghy, and Syed Imam, "A Business Dynamics Exploratory Model for Reviewing Industry Evolution in Developing Countries: The Case of the Egyptian Automobile Industry A Business Dynamics Exploratory Model for Reviewing Industry Evolution in Developing Countries: The Case of the Egyptian Automobile Industry," *Proceeding of the The American University in Cairo*, 2005, 3, https://proceedings.systemdynamics.org/2005/proceed/papers/ASKAR448.pdf.

297 "Ford Otosan Takes Ford Plant in Craiova into Electric Future," accessed February 22, 2024, https://www.fordotosan.com.tr/en/media/press-kits/ford-otosan-takes-ford-plant-in-craiova-into-electric-future.

298 Ford Motor Company, "Ford - Romanian Expansion. Ford Motor Company," May 5, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20110725051259/http://www.at.ford.com/news/Publications/Publications/%40Ford84_Gb.pdf.

> Ford Motor Company, interested in contributing to the development of our country's industry and economy, and despite the requests of collaboration from other countries such as Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, has decided to build in Romania, at Constanţa, a large assembly plant, capable of producing, at the beginning, 25-50 cars a day. The cars produced there will supply the markets fromRomania and the Orient.[...] The company will recruit the majority of personnel from Romania, thus creating a priceless advantage for usby increasing the number of both agricultural and industrial mechanics. [299]

The proposed organization of production in Constanţa on the Black Sea shore was basically the same as the future Istanbul plant:

> The company will build or buy a metallurgical plant in Constanţa, which will be (if is not already) connected to the harbor, with a garage line, and it will be re-organized according to its new purpose as a private warehouse (so to say). There we will store tools, machines, parts sent by Ford Motor Company, without paying the import taxes.[...]Ford Motor Company reserves the right to send the final products to the designated neighboring countries, without any restrictions from our authorities.

The proposal from 1920 was rejected by the Romanian Goverment. For the second move the future Istanbul plant manager William G. Collins was sent to Bucharest in October 1927 to renew the proposal while Ford was busy finding ways to expand its assembly facility in Trieste, establishing a new facility in Alexandria and negotiating both with Greek and Turkish Governments. The Company proposed a fifteen year lease for the Government-owned premises at the port of Constanţa. Proposals, modifications of proposals at the higher echalons of power in Dearborn and Bucharest went on during 1928. In a letter from July 1928 addressed by E. G. Liebold, Henry Ford's general secretary, to Andrei. Popovici, the Secretary of the Romanian Legation in Washington D.C., both the conflict points and the stance of Ford

299 Popica, "Ford Motor Company in Romania," 123–24.

trying to trying to jump on several horses at the same time were clearly formulated.

> Sometime ago our representative endeavored to secure a site for an assembly plant in Romania, but found that the only land available at a sea port was owned by the Romanian Government. The Government, wanted to lease the site for ten years; Ford Motor Company was to construct a building and the factory would revert to the Government at the expiration of the lease, which in turn would rent it to us. This was unsatisfactory. *We have been also considering serving this territory from Constantinople; however the introduction of the new model A has caused us to reconsider these plans with regard to distribution.* We find that Romania presents the possibility of a very good market, which will be increased as the construction of good roads advances. There is a possibility of establishing a service branch somewhere in Romania.[300]

Yet, they received another negative answer. Ford opened a separate subsidiary attached to FMC Ltd. Britain in November 1931 in Bucharest, the Ford Motor Company of Romania.[301] Sir Percival Perry became the chairman of the board and president, with Thornhill Cooper from Trieste and Alexandria representing the board of directors alongside with Sir Percival Perry, Edsel B. Ford, Sir John T. Davies, Sacha Roman, and T. Davilla.

Until an assembly facilility (without an assembly line) in Bucharest was opened Romania in January 1932, it received assembled automotives from Ford Istanbul and ranked first among the countries which Ford Istanbul delivered finished products to.[302] Well before the opening of the Ford facility Bucharest the fear that the Ford plant might move to Romania was

300 Ibid., 125, highlight by the Author. .

301 "Ford Romana - SAR [Mira Wilkins Research Papers]," 1947 1936, Acc 880 / Box 3 Folder FMC Romania, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

302 "Sales, Production and Stock Report Istanbul, 1932."

reflected several times in Turkish press.[303] Just like in Turkey Ford's entrance in Romania was made visible by an official parade for 79 days "which included a huge caravan reaching the most important cities".[304] Automotive vehicles and parts ranked first in Romanian imports from the United States in 1932. We can assume that a part of them were delivered from Ford Motor Company Exports Inc. Istanbul. Again, the main buyers were upper and middle classes.[305]

In 1935 a military historian, Randolph Leigh who wrote on the "The New Turkey" in Los Angeles Times mentioned that that Ford was moving his assembling plant from Istanbul to Bucharest with a culturalist undertone:

> [T]hat it has entered into an arrangement with the Rumanian government whereby he will virtually conduct in an individual capaticy barter transactions with Rumania in exchanges for the money received for his automobiles. In this way he will by the eventual sale of goods bought in Rumania with his sales receipts, get his profits back into American money. His withdrawal from Turkey, if the report is correct, as it seems to be, will be due not so much to the competition with other manufacturer, as to the fact that Turkey is not yet car-minded."[306]

The first manager of Ford Romana, Wachner was a shared figure with the Istanbul plant. He was a Ford manager of Austrian origin who was previously the head of the Lincoln Department and also handling airplanes in Constantinople in the very beginning of the Istanbul enterprise.[307] His Austrian origin, transformed into a German one by force of annexation of Austria by Germany in 1938 (*der Anschluss*) would cause him extra questioning during the Second World War as a manager of a British subsidiary company. Yet

303 "Kraliçe Meri[.] Romanya Kraliçesi ve Kızı Şehrimize Geldiler[.] Kraliçe ve Güzel Kerimesi Bugün İskenderiyeye Gidecekler," *Cumhuriyet*, February 22, 1930; "Romanya Kralı Fort Resmi Geçidinde Hazır Bulundu," *Vakit*, July 3, 1931.

304 Popica, "Ford Motor Company in Romania," 126.

305 Ibid., 120.

306 Randolph Leigh, "The New Turkey," *Los Angeles Times*, May 21, 1935.

307 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt"; "Ford Romana - SAR [Mira Wilkins Research Papers]."

after the annexation of Romania by Germany in 1940, German forces insisted on keeping "the German manager" as a prerequisite of continuation of Ford's corporate operations in the annexed country.[308]

Unlike Istanbul, Ford's investment in Bucharest was a profitable one well into the Second World War. Its territory also included sales in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which formerly were parts of the Trieste then the Istanbul territory (see Map. 3.14 and Map. 3.17).

In 1935 Ford decided to build an assembly plant with a motorized assembly line in Bucharest and expanded to a new premise on *Calea Floreasca* in Bucharest. This plant, inspired by the Ford's Highland plant designed by the architect Albert Kahn, was represented as a true palace, made only of concrete and glass "[i]nstead of a swamp, which spread illness and death through the wretched inhabitants of the Floreasca ditch", particularly impressing with its socio-cultural annexes like a nautical club with the Ford chalet on the Floreasca Lake, a swimming pool and plant space according to the lates hygiene standarts.[309]

For this new plant Ford received the privileges set forth in the new Romanian law encouraging the national industry but still payed import duties for an unlimited number of part imports and knocked-down parts equivalent to 2500 units through clearing agreements. The cars and trucks assembled in this plant were labeled as made in Romania. Ford plant's capacity was ten cars a day, but increased up to forty cars a day. "The storage capacity was of 200-300 unassembled vehicles.The number of employees increased from 5 in 1931 to 280 in 1936, 607 in1942; the number continuously decreased during and after the war to 376 in 1946."[310] In the following years after the halting of assembly operations in Istanbul, well into the war the cars, trucks, knocked-down parts and parts would be delivered from Detroit, Dagenham and Cologne.

Though in the following years the tax privileges granted for the number of units were reduced to one hundred and the imported parts were taxed as built-up units Ford invested in a rubber goods plant in Banloc. In 1938 the chassis conveyor

308 "Ford Romana - SAR [Mira Wilkins Research Papers]."

309 Popica, "Ford Motor Company in Romania," 129.

310 Ibid., 132.

in Istanbul was being dismantled for shipment to Ford Romana as one of the last reminders of the industrial projections of Ford inIstanbul.[311]

During the tumultuous years of the Second World War the plant did only repair activities for the army fleet. [312] After the war, the plant was under the control of Romanian government officials, working on Russian operated vehicles on Romanian account. Ford executive Mataras, who was appointed to Bucharest from the post of assistant manager of Alexandria in 1946 vividly recounted in his oral reminiscence to Ford historian Mira Wilkins in 1960 how difficult it was to manage the company in the years before its nationalization. This included the help of the British Military Mission when workplace riots broke out, since the Romanian Company was officially still part of the British Ford Company. Mataras smuggled the share certificates of the company out of the country to England prior to its nationalization in 1948.[313] Its dissolution and liquidation due to concecutive losses "owing to abnormal working conditions" was decided already in 1946, but could this decision by Ford could not be implemented up until 1948.[314] With the nationalization under a new regime the plant changed its activity to become in 1960, *Automatica*, a manufacturer of electrical equipment and automation.[315]

When the negative attitude of the Romanian government in the 1920s was instrumental in making Istanbul the node of Ford's Russian, Eastern European, Near Eastern, and Northwest African operations, the two countries' Ford destinies were aligned, and the takeover of the Craiova plant by Turkey-based Ford Otosan in 2022 made their destinies intersect for the second time. The rivalry that Istanbul briefly won over Constanţa at the beginning of the twentieth century gave way to Ford Otosan's take-over of Ford Romania's most important automotive plant in the changed automobility geography of the twenty-first century.

311 "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant."

312 "Ford Romania," in *Wikipedia*, February 8, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ford_Romania&oldid=1204866941.

313 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Conversation with Christopher Mataras, Assistant Manager of Ford (Egypt) S.A."

314 "Ford Romana - SAR [Mira Wilkins Research Papers]."

315 "Ford Romania."

§ 3.4 Conclusion

> Turkish principal attraction is not [...] the market which it offers for Occidental merchandise [...] [I]t is rooted in physiography. Turkey's location across so many vital commercial lines of communication, the access it affords to other lands, enhances the importance of the Turkish market far beyond its intrinsic value.[316]

Gabriel Bie Ravndal, prominent American diplomat of the late Ottoman and Early Republican period, scrutinizing the expansion possibilities of American investments and exports in Turkey, concluded with this analysis. It reflects in a nutshell the main attribute of the Ford Istanbul territory, even the attribute was not an "intrinsic" one but historically contingent and as such exposed to changes. Those were lines from a yearly handbook on the economic conditions in Turkey, penned down in 1924. This paragraph in the handbook followed a lengthy description of the automobile market in the Turkish territory: Only hundred and fifty tractors were operating in Anatolia. One hundred and twenty of these were American tractors. Some 65 % of all automobiles and motor trucks running in Turkey were American products. Among them Ford was the most conspicuous in the market.

Ravndal was a prominent American diplomat who was dispatched as Consul and later Consul General to Istanbul between 1911 and 1925 (after his diplomatic post in Beirut between 1898 and 1910) and the main figure behind the establishment of the American Chamber of Trade for the Levant in 1911, a pressure group to facilitate lobbying for the interests of American businessmen in the Eastern Mediterranean Region -Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, Cyprus- and the southern parts of the Balkans with headquarters in Constantinople and branches in Beirut, Izmir, Salonica, Athens, Patras, and Cairo. In that context *Levant* was defined as the Eastern Mediterranean region including Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, Cyprus and the southern parts of the Balkans. The Chamber included "[p]owerful merchant families of the Ottoman Empire," prominent bureaucrats and "more than 100 US based

316 G. Bie Ravndal, "[Reports on Economic Conditions, 1919-29] Report of Ravndal Bie (1924): Turkey, An Economic Handbook," 1924, 406, M353 / Roll 56, AIRC.

companies, like the Standard Oil Company of New York, Ford Motor Co., A. B. Farquhar, International Harvester Co., Studebaker, American Tobacco, and Gary Tobacco.[317]

From the beginning on it was clear that the domestic market of Turkey for automobiles was not the driving force due to the low level of effective demand, situation of roads and shortage of foreign exchange. What diplomats, statesmen and businessmen unanimously underlined was the importance of the "geographical position" of Istanbul and expectations of know-how transfer. Şükrü Saraçoğlu, then Minister of Finance, who ran the negotiations with Ford defended the advantages of the Istanbul plant with the same argument during the parliamentary debate before the promulgation of the Ford Law.

> The geographical position of Istanbul has the value of being a major branch, if not the center, of large enterprises, and if they were not mistaken in their calculations and we hope that we were not mistaken in our calculations, it means that the first of the enterprises that will provide a great benefit in the economic life of Turkey will come to Istanbul.[318]

This chapter was dedicated to breathing the spirit of historical contingent transformations into this "geography." The history of the Istanbul factory has led us from the Ford zone men in Midwest to free ports in Europe, from the rise of autarchic policy in Italy, to implantations of factory cities in the First Five Year Plan in Soviet Russia, from the opportunities of automobilization offered by colonialist interventions in Africa and the possible opening of the Danube-Bucarest canal to the direct role played by Ford Company for the promulgation of two unique laws of the Early Republic, a chapter that had hot been documented in the historiography of the Early Republican Period so far.

317 Hasan Küçük and Ercan Karakoç, "An Important Figure in the Development of Turkish-American Trade Relations: Consul General Gabriel Bie Ravndal (1865-1950)," *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 2, no. 44 (2020): 197ff.

318 "(1/296) Numaralı Kanun Layihası ve Maliye, İktisat ve Bütçe Encümenleri Mazbataları."

Neither the Istanbul factory, which is an enterprise of the biggest global corporation of the time, nor any other factory can be fully understood by way of an isolated narrative of and inside a single industrial building. Workplaces evolve; take first place then shape as part of piecemeal decisions as - usually late- responses to changes in the socio-economic environment. By the sum of those decisions, again, the socio-economic geography changes gradually. The history of why Istanbul was chosen as the node of this specific territory led us to a global entangled history of interactions of political changes and contingencies of the economic geography.

The Istanbul territory as per 1929 was a blueprint of the choices Ford has made and unmade which were overlapping, conflicting and full of miscalculations. The main aim was overcoming protectionist barriers which built up during the 1920s and having more direct access to expand markets. Ford was knocking on many doors at the same time as a global player to remodel its international operations rather than importing smoothly its "universal model" into the world. It was restructuring the European operations in 1928 to infiltrate the rising protectionist barriers and made a slow turn to multi-domestic assembly. This would involve more local purchases, local personnel, and slightly also product diversification instead of insistence on a Universal Car for the global economy. It failed tremendously in Italy and pulled back. At the same time Ford definitely aimed at conquering and solidifying its position in Soviet Russia in an indirect way using Istanbul as an export bridgehead where important free zone privileges were extracted from the Turkish state after long-lasting negotiations. With free port concessions, Ford aimed at foreseeing and securing the Company against the worst case scenarios of full scale protectionism. Before deciding, Ford waged pros and cons of alternative production locations in Piraeus, Alexandria and Constanța and got involved at negotiations at several tables at the same time to maximize the privileges of regulation offered to the company.

The failures of Ford cannot be tautologically defined as the outcome of the Great Depression of 1929 but rather one of the many steps of capitalist corporations that finally led to it. Formations and miscalculations of the Istanbul territory can rather be seen as carrying embryonic elements of what the momentous event of the Great Depression was made of, notwithstand-

ing whether we are close to monetarist, Keynesian or Marxist explanations of the crisis and stress more the circulation, or consumption, financial or the production sphere.[319]

Given that Ford's presence in Istanbul was not aimed at domestic markets but at putting a step in a macro-region to be formed, the failures of it become a meaningful field of inquiry about the formation of historic regions of accumulation and links among themselves. It is a field of inquiry which is structurally inclined to interrogate about the formations/deformations in the economic geography which led to the World War II beyond subtly following and describing the diplomatic steps of political figures with painstaking accuracy. Istanbul was the node of an "imagined," "conceptualized" macro-territory that finally did not "take place." The piecemeal changes of (monetary, customs, physical) borders led Ford to adapt a hybrid strategy - contrary to his reputation as *the* "streamliner." Ford Istanbul reflects these ambiguities of the time when weight points of infrastructures and the energy bases that fuel the system changed physically, the monetary relationships were transformed financially, and the spheres of influence and sovereignty shifted politically.

As a matter of fact, Ford Tophane plant which started assembly in December 1929 and seized its operations in April in 1933 formed one of the spatial occurrences of this worldwide rescaling process in formation. The concrete venue of the factory at the pier of Tophane was formed by way of a direct relationship of the Company's headquarter in Detroit with the State's capital in Ankara. In the next chapter the axis between Detroit and Ankara - used as synecdoches for the Company and the State- will be scrutinized by way of content analysis of two legislations, the promulgation of which Detroit had direct influence on. From the "strait" (Detroit, in French) in the Great Lakes region to the Bosphorus strait, another synecdoche or spatial fix was created as a node of capital accumulation, passing through Ankara.

319 Dietmar Rothermund, *The Global Impact of the Great Depression, 1929-1939*, Nachdr. (London: Routledge, 2010).



MAP 3.17 Cut-out map of squeeze of the Istanbul Territory by 1930 and 1932. Blue borders show subtractions by December 1932, whereas yellow areas show additions at the same date. SOURCE: Adapted from AR-98-213541/ / Box 106, fold. 44, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford. Map used: M. Fallex and A. Gibert, Nouvelle Atlas Classique [original scale: 1:48,000,000] (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1935), 65.

4

Detroit - Ankara Axis of Regulation: National and Local Actors Involved in Ford Istanbul

So far we have tried to contextualize the making and unmaking of the territory that had the Istanbul plant as a node of production from the economic and business geography point of view. Now it is time to turn to the particular plans, regulations and conflicts that shape this initiative in the Turkish context of the 1920s and 1930s.

When starting this research, I have not come across a single monographic work about Ford's foreign direct investment except Genç's pioneer article[1], though the attitude of the political elite of the early republic towards foreign capital was and is a hotly debated, "loaded" issue. The historical evaluation of the legacy of the foundation period feeds directly the present political discussions about the current form, content, and limit of the integration "of foreign capital" in the political economy and the state-capital relationship in Turkey. The discussion relating to the early republican period is organized around the following main questions that may easily take the form of slogans: Did the Republic set its foundations on an anti-imperialist, corporatist, or a liberal basis? Though these questions may seem to be overcome around the specialized scholarship, they still have an important organizing power in popular and political discussions through which public

1 Genç, "Özel Girişimle Sanayileşme Döneminde."

opinion is formed in Turkey today. These discussions are selectively fed by academic and intellectual contributions to the historywriting on the early republican era. Thus, in our opinion, when dealing with the first two decades of the foundation period one cannot escape to position her/his research in dialogue with this "everyday level" of the perceptions and interpretations of the mentioned era. Here we will try to sketch out the main positioning of our research in dialogue with the "everyday level," the present of interpretations of the "classical Kemalist era."

Turkish etatism is remembered by some within fogs of nostalgia as a memory of a lost paradise. They see the origins of the problems of Turkey after the globalization period after 1980 in the abandoning of this ideal state-interventionist model. This group constitutes an amalgam of different classes and groups whose common point is the feeling of threat, economically, politically, or culturally by the changes introduced by "globalization." Sassen has analyzed this phenomenon in her book *Loosing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*.[2] Rescaling of economic activities has deprived the national economies of their status as basic units of development and this process has produced losers, including dropouts from the traditional middle class, marginalized in the expanding metropolitan areas, informal workers, huge segments of the peasantry etc. We may expect the current losers to incline more towards or to be mobilized along these nostalgic interpretations of the foundation period of the Republic.

Yet Ökçün, Tezel, Boratav and Keyder[3] had long ago criticized the nationalist interpretations of the economic policies of the first decade of the Republic that took the economic-nationalist discourse of the contemporary elites for granted and saw in the 1920s an "independent economic policy course" in accordance with the ideals of the "War of Independence." "Independent" signified in that context especially free from capitalist interests,

2 Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

3 Ökçün, *1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye*; Yahya Sezai Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi, 1982); Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik (1923-1950)*; Çağlar Keyder, *Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye, 1923-1929* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993).

pursuing a "third way" to increase common good through industrialization, education, urbanization etc. for the "common good." In these critical accounts of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s the designation "liberal" was used for the period between 1923 and 1929 in terms of openness of the Turkish economy to the world economy and the deliberate state support for the private capital accumulation especially in the commercial sector. Furthermore, in the beginning of the 1980s, Keyder tried to change the focus for the analysis of the 1920s from internal political dynamics to world system dynamics and defended that the real rupture in the political-economic course of the Republic lay in an external effect, namely the 1929 Crisis.[4] The institutional change(s) in political economy induced by the foundation of the Republic in 1923 took place and were determined mainly within and by the long cycle of liberal capitalism in the World Economy that covers the period between 1870 and 1929. The year of the declaration of the Republic, though highly praised in nationalist historywriting and still constitutes a milestone for Turkish history in a considerable part of historical narratives, was thereby radically revised with macroeconomic evidence about the dominance of commercial capitalist class with close ties to the state elites, their import-dependency, high export/GDP ratios,[5] significant number of foreign-Turkish joint ventures etc.[6]

A second socially amorphous group today welcomes dearly or is at least favorable towards the liberal changes and has an overtly negative evaluation of the protectionist 1930s. Again if we try to breakdown this heterogeneous group into its constituents at the cost of radical simplification, the picture would look like as follows: either net economic or cultural gainers of the current globalization period (white-collar workers in the transnational service sectors of the global cities, the upgraded segment of the middle class, culturally mobilized ethnic, provincial or religious identities etc.) or groups recently integrated into public sphere and filled with hopes of gaining culturally in the new era.

4 Keyder, *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy*.

5 Sevket Pamuk, "Turkey's Response to the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective, 1929-1939," Working Paper (European University Institute, 2000), https://bit.ly/3QW0lmY.

6 Ökçün, *1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye*.

Despite significant differences in quality and quantity of both sides of this polarized discussion, the common point of the intellectual production that feeds these two parts is that it takes the 1920s as a prelude of and to mainly to understand the *étatist* 1930s. The 1930s is then taken as the "classical Kemalist period" where the legacy of the Republic mainly emanates from.

The "breakdown" of the label "liberal" for the 1920s into concrete accounts of state-capital relations usually remains either on the level of discourse analysis of the Turkish state elite and the leading representatives of the economic groups like National Economic Council (Ali İktisat Cemiyeti), Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI, or İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası) etc.,[7] or at the level of macroeconomic analysis.[8] In this thesis we hope to deepen the current analytical spectrum trying to reconstruct the political mindset of the period by narrating the concrete steps from the very beginnings of how the Ford investment was planned, evolved and failed. At every narrative step, which puts the Ford Motor Company's perspective in the center stage, we nourish from and check the macro conclusions drawn for the period. Thus, we hope to enter a dialogue with that "macro" debate with this concrete case study that seems significant in terms of its scale, special terms it enjoyed, and global market orientation. The FMC Istanbul case allows us to touch upon the above-mentioned broader issues like activities of foreign capital, internationalization of production, attributes of commercial capital accumulation and the quality of "national economic policies" in the formation period.

Here we would like to keep the label "liberal" for the 1920s but wish to look at the 1920s with a different methodology in tree aspects. Firstly, we wish to opt for a micro rather than a macro level and try to reconstruct the story of the FMC in Tophane, Istanbul in a historicist manner. Secondly, we want to look at the period not through the perspective of the state elite but through the perspective of the FMC as laid out in the Third Chapter. Thirdly, we will try to analyze the decision of the FMC to invest in Tophane in

7 See, Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik* (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982), 6–33.

8 Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950*; Keyder, *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy*.

1920s in its own terms, spatiality and contingency and not as a prelude of the 1930s.

For this end we now turn to the first Free Zone Law of the Republic. We will show that the Free Zone law was a subordinate law enacted with the direct influence and to comply with the precondition imposed by the company in order for Ford to make its investment. Of course, in his insistence on the free zone, Ford was not sowing seeds in barren soil, but rather acting - knowingly or unknowingly - within a ground formed by a search for free zones that had been present in a significant part of the commercial capital since the end of the nineteenth century.

In late 1929, Ford had indirectly signed two laws passed in the first six years of the young republic that allowed him to incorporate part of the Galata docks as a node in his international production and distribution network. We will now try to reconstruct these two laws in a historicist manner with a political economy of law approach.

§ 4.1 Free Zone Law 1927: Hinterland of Ford and Port of Istanbul

The first Free Zone Law of the Republic, Law No. 1132, which entered into force on June 21, 1927 (see Appendix E), contained the following enigmatic statement in its justification submitted to the Parliament.

> [The Government] is convinced that the establishment of a free zone in the Port of Istanbul, which is the most important transit center between Europe and the Orient due to its geographical location and geography, will provide significant benefits in terms of the commercial, industrial and agricultural interests of the country. The increase and proliferation of such facilities in neighboring countries and *the desires and demands of some foreign industrial enterprises have also confirmed this point of view.*[9]

9 "İstanbul'da Tesis Edilecek Serbest Mıntıka Hakkında (1/1054) Numaralı Kanun Lâyihası ve Ticaret ve Bütçe Encümenleri Mazbataları," *T. B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi / Tutanak Dergisi* 33, no. Devre II, İçtima IV (June 21, 1927): 438, italics are mine.

This echoes a constatation made by G. Bie Ravndal more than four years ago, as early as September 1923. Ravndal was the then American attaché and compiled yearly comprehensive reports on the economic condition of Turkey. "It is believed that the government will consider the application of a foreign firm of good repute for a free port in Istanbul."[10] And he added "Its location accentuates its value as a distributing center, and, like Copenhagen, it requires free port accommodations. As Copenhagen is the key to the Baltic, so Constantinople is the key to the Black Sea."[11]

In those comprehensive reports Ravndal always included analyses of one the most promising import segments of USA, the motor industry. He covered the Ottoman motor market, the legal requirements, customer preferences and the trends of the prevalent brands therein. As early as 1916 Ravndal predicted that the motor vehicle market in Turkey would expand steadily and American companies would gradually dominate the motor vehicle sector.[12] Additionally, Ravndal contributed to the promotion of American tractors in Turkey and the region where economy was mainly agrarian. For example, he advised local merchants to import American agricultural equipment in Syria.[13] While fifteen tractors out of three hundred tractors in the Empire in 1914 were of American origin, by 1925, six hundred of the 750 tractors in Turkey were American made. Ravndal also helped to introduce American agricultural equipment to the region, in which American companies obtained a significant share in the following years. "Ford is the most conspicuous in the market" he stated in a report dated 1924.[14] So we have all the reasons to think that the statement of this close observer of expanding markets had a concrete address concerning the "foreign firm of good repute for a free port in Istanbul," which was Dearborn, Detroit.

10 Çağlar Keyder, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Türk Tüccarının 'Milli'Leşmesi," *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, no. Özel Sayı: Türk İktisat Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar II (1980 1979): 255, fn49.

11 G. Bie Ravndal, "Supplement to Commerce Reports, Published by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce - United States Department of Commerce," 1922, 10.

12 G. Bie Ravndal, "Automobiles in Turkey," *Levant Trade Review* 5, no. 4 (1916): 397–403.

13 Küçük and Karakoç, "An Important Figure in the Development," 204.

14 Ravndal, "Report of Ravndal Bie (1924)."

From the company archives, foreign and the Turkish press as shown in the Chapter 3.3.2.1., we could trace that the negotiations between Ford and the Turkish Government had started around 1925 and the granting of free zone privileges was the prerequisite of Ford setting foot in Turkey.[15] The first step of the official relations might be the sending of Turkish students to River Rouge to be trained in Ford's methods of production. Students who applied for the government grant to be sent to Detroit were required to take an exam.[16] Bahri Ergene, who became later chief roadman in Ford Istanbul and Alexandria, remembered this episode very well in his autobiography. He did not go and did not regret it later.[17]

Minister of Finance Şükrü Saraçoğlu was authorized to run the negotiations with the Ford representative William Collins in November 1928.[18] The Minister wrote to the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü how hopeful he was about the role Ford would play to revive the port of Istanbul.[19] When he penned the letter he was in Athens and had inspected the port of Piraeus. He could not restrain himself "from describing the good administration and order [he has seen] in the port of Piraeus in this miserable Greece." Criticizing heavily

15 "Letter Sent by Ford European General Manager J. J. Harrington"; "Letter Sent by the General Manager of FMD D'italia Alexander Lie"; "Ford Fabrikaları Mümessili"; "Plant in Turkey Said to Be Plan of Ford"; "Ford Factory for Constantinople"; "Edsel Ford Returns - Says Plants in Turkey and Egypt Will Be Started at Once."

16 İstanbul Mıntıkası Sanâyi'i ve Mesâ'î Müdîriyeti, "[Ford Fabrikasına İ'zâm Edilecek Talebenin ...]," *Cumhuriyet*, June 14, 1925, sec. [Classified Ads]; "Detroit`te Bulunan Ford Motor Şirketi`ne Eğitim Için Gönderilecek Türk Öğrenciler.," March 28, 1925, Dışişleri_Diplomatik_502-22384 -99314 -1, CCA; "Amerika'da Michigan Eyaletinde Detroit Şehrinde Kain Ford Motor Fabrikası'na Talim ve Tahsilde Bulunmak Üzere Yirmi Beş Türk Gencinin Gönderilmesi. (Osm.-Fr.-İng.)," January 26, 1925, HR.İM_130_40, CCA; "Detroit`te Bulunan Ford Motor Şirketi`ne Eğitim Için Gönderilecek Türk Öğrenciler.," February 17, 1925, Dışişleri_Diplomatik_502-22384 -99314 -2, CCA; "Detroit`te Bulunan Ford Motor Şirketi`ne Eğitim Için Gönderilecek Türk Öğrenciler.," January 26, 1925, Dışişleri_Diplomatik_502 _22384 -99314 -3, CCA.

17 "Autobiography of Mehmet Bahri Ergene, Chief Roadman in Istanbul and Alexandria."

18 "Kabotaj Konusunda Amerika Ford Motor Company Exports Incorporated Şirketi Ile Yapılacak Sözleşmeyi İmza İçin Maliye Vekaleti'ne Yetki Verilmesi," November 25, 1928, 30-18-1-2 / 1-5-12, CCA.

19 "Maliye Vekili Şükrü Saraçoğlu'nun Başbakan İsmet İnönü'ye Mektubu," December 1, 1928, BBA-CA-030-10-171-187-15, CCA.

the recently established Istanbul Port (Monopoly) Administration (İstanbul Liman Şirketi) he was keen on the role of Ford to push the long overdue issue of free ports and free zone to a conclusion:

> [T]he conclusion of the negotiations with Mister Ford's representative and the signing of the contract for the establishment of a factory in Istanbul to assemble automobiles, tractors, etc., are among the matters that will instill confidence in foreign capitalists and artisans and will have a good effect on our economy and are among the thankful successes. Although it is understood that Mister Ford will start working on a small scale, it is evident that he will expand his installations, increase his operations, and increase our benefits in a short time by taking advantage of the special characteristics of the Istanbul location.

One thing was clear. Ford was the driving force behind the promulgation of the first Free Zone Law of Turkey. In the first quarter of the twentieth century Ford preferred navigating between free ports and zones to overcome the rising protectionist barriers when deciding for new territorial nodes. In the "fourteen ports on the continent that still enjoyed such a [free port] privilege [nine in Germany (Hamburg, Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Geestemunde and the free districts of Bremen, Emden, Stettin, Brake and Danzig), two in Austria-Hungary (Trieste and Fiume), one in Denmark (Copenhagen), and one in Sulina (Rumania).[20]] Ford had invested in three. It remains clear, that the speed with which such a complex case [granting a part of the most strategic port of the nation the status of exterritoriality] without a precedent was dealt with was impressive. Only three among fourteen assembly plants of FMC worldwide were erected within a free zone where the company was exempted from customs taxes and wider interference. Istanbul was one of them. Since the early 1920s, Ford had decided to invest in Istanbul with its weak domestic market but attractive geographical location on the condition of receiving an open "free port/zone" right - just like in Cádiz, Barcelona, and Trieste and later an entire "free village inside a forest" in the rubber planta-

20 Constantin Ardeleanu, "Europolis – from a Piratical Republic to a Collective Colony," in *The European Commission of the Danube, 1856-1948* (Brill, 2020), 283.

tions he established Pará, Brazil,[21] which inspired Ilya Ehrenburg's novel Life with Cars.[22] (see Map 3.7 and Map 3.8).

But as Saraçoğlu stated the issue was a long overdue one for the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. The external influence fell on a fertile ground. There had been attempts at establishing a free production zone long before that date.[23] At the end of the nineteenth century proposals into that direction by Beyoğlu merchants left ample traces in the commercial periodicals of the time advocating a system of "duty-free warehouses and harbor stores" The first attempts at a legal draft came right before the 1908 revolution in form of a special commission which drafted a report on the issue.[24] In 1913 another special commission was established by the initiative of the then minister of commerce, Süleyman el Büstani[25] and it came with the proposition to establish a free zone either near the lake of Lake of Küçükçekmece, or Yedikule and calculated that three hundred million gold francs were needed to realize it.[26] This meant that the Committee of Union and Progress regime, which we mostly associate with "national economy" policies during that specific period, established a commission to investigate the feasibility of the free zone and to design the project. This commission had evaluated that the benefits of the planned free port on the shores of Lake Çekmece or Yedikule were less than the costs, and the project was not implemented.

Those projects were interrupted not only due to consecutive wars that raged the country (Balkan War, the World War I and the War of Independ-

21 Greg Grandin, *Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009).

22 Ilya Ehrenburg, *The Life of the Automobile*, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (London: Serpent's Tail, 1999).

23 Tekeli and İlkin, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Serbest Üretim Bölgelerinin Doğuş ve Dönüşümü*, 88ff; Haydar Kazgan, "İmparatorluğun Son Devirlerinde Dış Ticaret Politikası," in *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Şirketleşme* (Istanbul: Creative Yayıncılık ve Tanıtım, Vakıfbank, 1999), 186ff; Osman Nuri Ergin, "İktisadi Kısım," *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası*, no. 8 (1925): 26; Muhlis Ethem, "Der Hafen von Stambul und seine Organisation" (PhD Diss., Leipzig, DE, Leipzig University, 1929), 88.

24 Ergin, "İktisadi Kısım."

25 Ethem, "Der Hafen von Stambul und seine Organisation," 88.

26 Kazgan, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Şirketleşme*, 197.

ence) but also due to the resistance of the Public Dept Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye İdaresi) that controlled about one third of the tax revenues of the Ottoman Empire as a way of securing the payment of the Ottoman debts. A free zone with customs tax exemptions would lead to revenue losses to the Administration. But also, the Ottoman administration was skeptical about yet another concessionary company that would take over the construction of a free port and carve out another area out of the economic sovereignty of the Empire.[27]

After the promulgation of the Republic the main representative of the Turkified commercial capital,[28] the ICCI was pushing that topic into the political agenda by means of consecutive reports. The first report dated from 1924. The Istanbul Economic Commission established by the ICCI and Industry published a comprehensive report about the decay in the economic condition of Istanbul and how to overcome this. In this part a considerable part was dedicated to the analysis of the port of Istanbul, change in its hinterland, its operations, institutions, and the feasibility of establishment of a free zone.[29]

> In this case, it will be possible to allocate a free zone and open some workshops within this zone. It is necessary to try to realize this initiative as soon as possible, which will not only give the city a new economic activity, but will also make it possible for the ferries to dock at the quay in general, thus ensuring speed, safety, convenience and economy.[...]Especially with the free zone, it would be possible

27 Tekeli and İlkin, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Serbest Üretim Bölgelerinin Doğuş ve Dönüşümü*, 88; Kazgan, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Şirketleşme*, 196–97.

28 Keyder, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Türk Tüccarının 'Milli'Leşmesi"; Hamdi Genç, Murat Çokgezen, and Murat Koraltürk, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında İş Dünyasının Profili," *İktisat, İşletme ve Finans* 19, no. 216 (2004): 62–75.

29 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "1923 Yılında İstanbul'un İktisadi Durumu ve İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası İktisat Komisyonu Raporu," in *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi*, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003).

> to find jobs for many people and perhaps turn Istanbul into a new center for some goods and products.[30]

The sub-commission of the ICCI suggested Tophane as the future site of the free zone.[31] Other formations of special commissions on the port of Istanbul and free zone followed in 1925 by Ali Suad,[32] 1926, 1927 and 1928.[33] The economic and political periodicals of the period were filled with articles about the benefits, place and form of the free zone.[34] This period also witnessed an exceptional abundance of theses written about the Port of Istanbul.[35] Even the General Manager of the Copenhagen free port was invited to Turkey to compile a report about the port and the choice of the location of the prospective free port. His conclusion at the end of his one-

30 İstanbul İktisat Komisyonu, *Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasında Müteşekkil İstanbul İktisat Komisyonu Tarafından Tanzim Edilen Rapor - 29 Kanun-i Sani 1340 - 26 Teşrin-i Sani 1340 (1924)*, trans. Aynur Karayılmazlar (Istanbul: İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Yayınları, 1924), 124.

31 Ibid., 222.

32 Ali Suad, "İstanbul Limanı Hakkında Rapor," *1925*, no. 8 (April 1925): 199_211. For a leter analysis specifically on the free zone in Istanbul, see: Ali Suad, "Serbest Mıntıka Hakkında," *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 29 (1927): 258–62; Ali Suad, "İstanbul Limanları'nda Serbest Mıntıka," *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 24 (1926): 542–44.

33 Hüseyin Avni, ed., *İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası 1926-1927-1928 Seneleri Faaliyet ve Muamelatına Ait Umumi Rapor* (İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Neşriyatı, 1934); Mehmed Ali [Nafset], "Avrupa'da Serbest Limanlara Dair Ticaret Vekaleti'ne Sunulan Rapor, 1 Ocak 1928," in *İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası 1926-1927-1928 Seneleri Faaliyet ve Muamelatına Ait Umumi Rapor*, ed. Hüseyin Avni (İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Yayınları, 1934), 652–64.

34 İbrahim Fazıl, "Transit Ticaretinde İstanbul'un Vaziyeti," *Hayat*, no. 6 (1927); Vedad Nedim [Tör], "Serbest Mıntıka Meselesi," *Hayat Mecmuası* 90, no. 4 (1928): 231; Ali Suad, "İstanbul Limanları'nda Serbest Mıntıka," *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 24 (1926): 542–44; Ali Suad, "Serbest Mıntıka Hakkında," *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 29 (1927): 258–62; "Limanlarda Serbest Mıntıka Tedkikatı," *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 27 (1926): 161–78; Roger Lavalette, "Hukuki ve İktisadi Nokta-i Nazardan Serbest Limanlar," *Hukukî Bilgiler Mecmuası* 1, no. 4 (1926): 205–12.

35 Ethem, "Der Hafen von Stambul und seine Organisation"; Malcolm Jarvis Proudfoot, "The Commerce of the Port of Istanbul and of the Bosphorus" (PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1930).

month site inspection in Istanbul was that the most appropriate area for the free port would be between Moda and Fenerbahçe.[36]

What those prolific analyses of the period shared was first the constation that Istanbul had lost a considerable portion of its hinterland: [37] The Russian and Romanian trade were diverted from the Istanbul port because of the establishment of a Soviet trade monopoly in the former and the post-war revival in the latter. The Persian trade, especially the trade in carpets was diverted from the Black Sea to the Suez Canal to directly reach London trades houses. The competition from expanding ports like Piraeus, the free port of Salonica, Varna and Burgas were stealing away trade business from Istanbul. Greek and Armenian merchants who had to leave the country had established trade houses in Greece, Trieste, London and moved the commercial know-now westwards. The key conclusion of all those reports was the same if minor differences are not considered. The port of Istanbul was in decay[38] and to revive it a free zone would be in the best interest of the Turkish trade. Free zone was foremost to boost transit trade, to gain back the business in carpets, the manipulation of tobacco, fruit, and fish. Possible assembly activities and an industrial investment were just mentioned *en passant* as a fact to be endured -given that the Ford agreement was already there, imposed from above by Ankara-, that would do more good than harm given the low level of industrialization; as an industrial establishment that was not in a position to cause competition domestically.

---

36 Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Ahmet Hamdi Başar'ın Hatıraları: "Gazi Bana Çok Kızmış ...,"* ed. Murat Koraltürk (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 255ff; "İzmir, İstanbul, Samsun, Mersin Limanları ve Rıhtımları Hakkında Kopenhag Liman Müdürü, Kompmann ve Türk Kamu İşleri Bakanı'nın Yazışmaları Ile Deniz Taşımacılığı ve Ticareti Fiyat Tespitleri," March 2, 1928, 230-0-0-0 / 148-51-1, CCA.

37 Between 1911 and 1927, the number of ships entering the Port of Istanbul dropped from 21,331 to 15,074 and the total tonnage entering the port from 20,169,000 tons to 11,531,000 tons, almost halving (to 0.57%) the entire port trade; see: Hines et al., *Türkiye'nin İktisadi Bakımdan, Kitap II*, 2:350.

38 "Constantinople - The City That Is Dying. Merchants Are Moving Away and the Docks Are Idle, for the Turkish Republic Has Diverted Trade and Straits Traffic to Ports That Are Easier to Defend and the Political Center Has Shifted," *New York Times*, August 2, 1925.

The reports and articles of the time, nearly unanimously, were underlining the importance of the Port of Istanbul, advantages of a free zone for transit trade and the necessity of putting an end to archaism and polyarchy in the management of the port of Istanbul. We could take an article of İbrahim Fazıl [Pelin], a professor of economy at the Istanbul University in 1927 as a spokesperson of the Zeitgeist of the period. He defended the free zone in the form of a free entrepôt zone to facilitate transit trade and considered a free zone aimed at industrial production as an unrealistic idea.[39]

> In order to establish a free zone in this port, it is also necessary to examine its destinations and hinterland. Looking at Istanbul in this way, it plays the role of an important transit center, especially for Iran, the Soviet Union, and the Balkan countries. In addition, tobacco, fisheries, etc. and some production activities and assembly operations can be carried out in this region. However, we should not look at these and think that "big factories will be established in this region." No matter how many incentives are provided, goods whose raw materials are supplied from abroad will not come to a place like our country where there are various obstacles for the establishment of factories. On the other hand, it is not possible to permanently attract factories whose raw materials are sourced from within the

39 The usual periodization of the Economic History of the Republican Period takes the 'role of the state within the economy', put it differently the 'degree of state intervention in the market economy' as a criterion and arrives at the following periods: The liberal era (1923-1929) is followed by an étatist era (1930-38 or 1930-45), to be abandoned by the liberal Democrat Party. Then, came the populist phase of import substituting industrialization 1960-78, again dominated by state in the economy, to be dissolved by the market-dominant neo-liberal phase since 1980. Therein there is a permanent trade-off between state intervention and free play of market forces. An alternative approach that takes the capitalist economy as a social whole and tries to analyze the dominant form of accumulation and social context it is embedded in and it thus transforms, would underline that from the 1850's up until the 1960's the dominant form was a commercial type of accumulation with limited social mobility and commodification of labor. The industrial form of accumulation didn't prove to be all encompassing before that time, if we look at i.e. employment practices, capital-state relations etc. From that angle, the Istanbul merchants were the more influential segments of the capitalist class in the 1930's.

> country to free zones. The same goal can be achieved by providing some incentives within the country. Therefore, in Istanbul what is to be done is to keep our demands more modest and to lean towards the idea of free warehouses rather than free zones. The proper implementation of this program could bring much to the Istanbul transit trade.[40]

The 1924 Report, two other Istanbul Chamber of Industry and Commerce Reports (1926 and 1927) prepared at the time the Ford negotiations and Free Zone Law were formulated, the 1928 "Mehmet Ali Nafset" Report commissioned to the Chamber by the Ministry of Trade, and the 1930 Report published after the two Ford legislations entered into force, underlined the suitability of the Tophane pier for a free zone, which had the most developed infrastructure of quays and warehouses.[41] Tophane was seen fit to meet the demands of the immediate request, which was Ford's. But on the long term the Turkish Government needed to put on its agenda to invest - alongside with the ICCI and Istanbul Municipality in form of an autonomous port authority- in the outskirts of Istanbul where space was ample, with a direct access to the wider hinterland of Anatolia and where workforce was accessible and disposable because of the industrial background of those areas. The numerous, competing locations proposed witness of the lack of a stable spatial calculation basis that those reports exemplified: Lazönü area between Moda and Fenerbahçe, Yenikapı between Samatya and Yedikule, Kumkapı, Ahırkapı, Lake Küçükçekmece were among the possible locations proposed. Another spatial proposal was to eliminate the Galata Bridge and extend the inner harbor of the Golden Horn to Kağıthane, which was advo-

40 Fazıl, "Transit Ticaretinde İstanbul'un Vaziyeti".

41 For the transcription (and unfortunately simplified) versions of all three reports see: Mustafa Sönmez, "Türkiye'de Serbest Bölge Girişimleri 1923-1982," in *Uluslararası Yeni İşbölümü ve Serbest Bölgeler* (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1982), 214–31; For a detailed summary of report prepared in 1926, see: "İstanbul Limanında Serbest Mıntıka Raporu," *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 27 (1926): 161–78; Avni, *İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası 1926-1927-1928*; Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *İstanbul'un Liman ve Köprü Meselesi. İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasınca Teşkil Edilen Komisyonun Raporu* (Istanbul: Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Neşriyatı, 1930).

cated especially by the Istanbul Port (Monopoly) Company.[42] The search for the location and the many propositions emanated from Article 4, which stipulated that the location of the free zone would be decided only after serious investigation (Article 4 of the Free Zone Law, Appendix E).

In all these reports, the use of the Port of Istanbul as a "natural" transit center for trade, especially from Russia, the Balkans and Iran, was emphasized, and the free zone was in fact envisioned as a "free trade zone." Increasing Istanbul's share in world (transit) trade, which had been steadily declining since the end of the World War I and attaching possible light industrial activities in the free zone, which was conceived to strengthen its diminishing economic role due to the relocation of the capital to Ankara, were formulated as meaningful measures only to the extent that the goods attracted would be re-exported. As a matter of fact, the ports given as examples or examined in those reports and other analyses were port cities such as Trieste, Hamburg, Marseille, Genoa, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Port Said, Alexandria, Piraeus, Salonica, Varna and Burgas, some of which had been prominent for centuries as free trade zones/free ports and/or warehousing cities on world trade routes. In most of the analyses, there were references to the impending competition from the Port of Piraeus, the power of the Greek merchants who had emigrated from Anatolia and were based in Trieste, London, and Piraeus to attract the tobacco and carpet trade that used to pass through the ports of Istanbul and Izmir, and the fear of losing the Black Sea trade to the port cities of Romania and Bulgaria. It was emphasized that the industry supporting trade to be established in the free zone would be a re-export-oriented industry that would not compete with local industry that was meager anyway. These reports also carried the optimism of believing that a free zone, which would increase the attractiveness of the Port of Istanbul, could make Russia, Iran, and Bulgaria part of

42 Murat Koraltürk, "1930'ların Başında İstanbul'un Liman ve Köprü Sorunu Ile İlgili Bir Rapor," *İstanbul Dergisi*, no. 37 (2001): 94–97; "Limanı Tevsi İçin Karaköy Köprüsünü Kaldırmak Fikri Gene Ortaya Atıldı. Alâkadar Zevat Ne Diyor? İstanbulun Yeni Limanı Nerede Yapılmalı?," *Milliyet*, December 31, 1929; Başar, *İstanbul'un Liman ve Köprü Meselesi. İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasınca Teşkil Edilen Komisyonun Raporu*; "Serbest Mıntıka Nerede Yapılmalı," *Milliyet*, November 14, 1929, sec. Limanda.

the hinterland of this port again, that is, the possibility of Istanbul becoming again an important node for the import-export business of these countries.

When bill relative to the creation of a free zone came before the National Assembly in Ankara it was passed in June 1927 without any material changes and nearly unanimously by the votes of the present members of the parliament.[43] A very extensive list of activities was allowed to be carried out in the free zone, including industrial assembly, the site of which was to be determined after the promulgation of the Bill. Article Six stipulated that if an entity other than the Government, Istanbul Municipality, Turkish Chamber or any other Turkish entity was to establish a free zone a special law needed to be promulgated:

> The free zone may be established and administered directly by the Government, or it may be established and administered by or in conjunction with the Istanbul municipal administration, the chamber of commerce or other official institutions or companies and individuals. However, if the establishment and administration of the free zone is intended to be carried out directly or jointly by the Government or if the transfer to others involves a financial commitment, the conditions shall be determined by a special law.[44]

The Free Zone Bill was in fact just the first blueprint of the next "special law" (the Ford Law Nr. 1391/1929) prepared for Ford according to its business priorities and negotiated by Ford, facilitated by an opportune mindset of expectations by the ruling elite exposed to the realities of the competition from the world markets and shrinking of the hinterland of the port of Istanbul. The multiple commercial, and industrial activities permitted to be carried out in the free zone and exempted from taxes were regulated under the conditions that Turkish laborforce would be employed (Article 2, 7 and 15). [45] The stress on the employment of a solely Turkish laborforce was pretty much in the Zeitgeist, any economic policy could be justified by refering

43 "Stanbul'da Tesis Edilecek Serbest Mıntıka Hakkında."

44 "Serbest Mıntıka Kanunu," *T. C. Resmî Gazete*, no. 637 (July 19, 1927): 2887–88.

45 Ibid., italics are by the Author. "[Reports on Economic Conditions, 1919-29] Report of Colonel H. Woods (1928): Economic Conditions in Turkey," 1928, M353 / Roll 56, AIRC.

to its Turkification effects that would also leave its imprints in the following Ford Law.[46]

> Article Two - The following commercial and industrial activities and operations may be carried out within the free zone:
> 1 - Warehousing of all kinds of goods coming from within the country or from foreign countries and to be shipped abroad or imported into the country according to the need,
> 2 - Packaging, or repackaging; organizing, sorting and liquidation, washing, processing, changing the qualities or appearance of the stored goods and performing similar operations,
> 3 - Processing of all kinds of raw materials supplied domestically or imported from foreign countries into finished or semi-finished products,
> *4 - Installation of all kinds of tools, machines and equipment, parts of which are manufactured domestically or internationally*,
> 5 - Repair and construction of ships and other naval vessels with materials supplied internally or imported from foreign countries.
> Article Seventh -The provisions of the Customs and Incentive-Industry Laws, the municipal tax and all other duties and taxes, including the municipal tax, and the provisions of the Passport Law shall not be applicable in this zone. The municipal duties of the district shall be regulated separately. All laws and regulations other than the ones mentioned in the first article and the laws and regulations of the police and the judiciary shall be in full force and effect in the district.
> Article Fifteenth - It is obligatory that the workers to be employed within the district be Turkish. However, specialized foreign workers who cannot be employed in the country may be employed with the permission of the Ministry of Trade.

46 Murat Koraltürk, "Yabancı Sermayeli İmtiyazlı Şirketlerde İşgücünü Türkleştirme Uygulamaları (1923-1930)," *Tarih ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 7 (2008): 61–99; Murat Koraltürk, *Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde: Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011).

The "etui-law" for the prospective Ford investment and Ford Law was negotiated in Ankara and imposed on the influential actors in and of Istanbul, the ICCI, the Maritime Administration (TMA, or Seyr-i Sefain İdaresi), the Istanbul Port (Monopoly) Authority (IPMC, or İstanbul Liman Şirketi), la Société des Quais et Docks de Constantinople (CQDW, or Associated Company of Quays, Docks and Warehouses of Istanbul; İstanbul Rıhtım Şirketi) the concessionaire company of the Ottoman period, and the Municipality of Istanbul which, during that time, would sometimes show other economic inclinations than the Government, as can be seen from other cases where they have been at odds with Ankara.[47]

CQDW,[48] a concessionaire company established in 1890, a relic of Ottoman times was already feeling insecure in the new economic atmosphere of the 1920s and had a controversy with the TMA *a propos* the Tophane entrepôts in 1927, which were made available by the latter to the ICCI for its usage.[49] Now that it was clear that the Tophane entrepôts would be transferred to Ford, not only the CQDW but also the ICCI which had rented them from the TMA had to vacate them before the expiration of the lease.[50] The entrepôts allocated to Ford constituted a considerable part of the several dispatched warehouse facilities under the administration of three different administrations, the Customs Administration, the CQDW and the TMA.[51] As mentioned above, it was the part that was under the management of the TMA and had been rented just a year ago to the ICCI.

---

47 Eminalp Malkoç, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Kamuoyunda Demokratik Bir Tartışma: İstanbul Kömür Depoları Meselesi (1924-1926)," *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 17, no. 38 (2023): 745–73; Murat Koraltürk, "Ankara'nın Patronluğunun Sınırları: 1920'lerde Ankara'nın Sermaye Birikimini Yönlendirme Girişimleri ve Buna İstanbul'un Tepkisi," no. 36 (2001): 97–101.

48 Zihni Bilge, *İstanbul Rıhtımlarının Tarihçesi* (Istanbul: Devlet Denizyolları ve Limanları Matbaası, 1949).

49 "Tophane'de Seyr-i Sefain İdaresine Ait Antrepoların Ford Müessesine Devredilmesi Üzerine İstanbul Rıhtım Şirketi'nin Burada Bulunan Eşyaları Kuruçeşme'deki Antropolara Nakletmesi ve Vergi İtilafları İle İlgili," December 20, 1928, 230-0-0-0 / 70-11-2, CCA.

50 "Top[h]Ane Ambarları Boşalıyor," *Milliyet*, April 25, 1929; "Topane Antrepoları Boşaltılıyor," *Vakit*, March 9, 1929.

51 Avni, *İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası 1926-1927-1928*, 640–41.

This was implicitly but nonetheless severely criticized in an institutionally signed publication, penned by the General Director of the IPMC, Ahmet Hamdi Başar in 1929. After laying out the not less than fourteen different public bodies having a say on the affairs at the port of Istanbul on the sea and land,[52] the chapter on the ICCI stressed mainly the issue of the sudden reduction of the already scarce entrepôt space as if the latter would be in the position to counteract this situation: "Last year, the Chamber of Commerce ran the warehouses of Tophane. The Chamber of Commerce must have quickly tired of this situation, which it does best, because it gave these warehouses, which are an institution that will provide important services to the merchants and the nation in the port of Istanbul, to the first suitor, the Ford Company, and got out of the business."[53]

52 Ahmed Hamdi [Başar], *İstanbul Limanı, 1929* (Istanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1929), 126ff.

53 Ibid., 137.



MAP 4.1 Istanbul Port, 1929: " Areas that can benefit from the developments of today and tomorrow." source: Ahmet Hamdi, *İstanbul Limanı* (İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1929), appendix.

The implicit critique was evidently also shared by the TMA that had to give up on its nearly entire storing space, recently carved out and annexed from the concession area of the CQDW, but not as vocally pronounced as the Port Monopoly Administration. Neither did the concessionaire company Societé de Quais pronounced a protest, which has long been in a defensive position due to the questioning of its ancient privileges. CQDW had lost part of the pier to the newly established port institutions of the Republic well before the promulgation of the Free Zone Bill. The British ambassador, who always kept a close eye on the interests of foreign capital in the newly established Republic, summarized this as follows:

> [T]here has been a long controversy between the Constantinople Quay Company and the Turkish Government in regard to the occupation and exploitation of the Tophane site by the *Seyr-i Sefain* Steamship Administration and, later, by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce. The Quay Company has maintained that the utilization of bonded stores within the limits of the port of Constantinople by any organization but itself was a contravention of its concession, but the commercial secretary learnt some time ago that, although the transference of the Tophane site to the Ford Company was regarded, in principle, as infringing upon its rights, the Quay Company would not be, in practice, unwilling to come to a working arrangement with the American company.[54]

When the actual transference of the Tophane warehouses to Ford took place in 1929 the Turkish press was abundant with articles about the "Warehouse Crisis" (*Antrepo Buhranı).*[55].But the will of Ankara to grant Ford the free

54 "Turkey. Confidential. Dispatch by W. S. Edmonds British Embassy in Ankara, to Sir Chamberlain, London."

55 "Bu İşin Kabahati Kimde? Antrepo Buhranının Halli İçin Dün Toplanıldı," *Milliyet*, July 29, 1929; "Antrepo Buhranı[:] Müracaatlar Nazarı Dikkate Alındı ve Bir Komisyon Teşkil Edildi," *Milliyet*, July 23, 1929; "Bu Ne Olacak? Antrepo Buhranı Önüne Durulmaz Bir Hâl Aldı! Ticaret Odası Ankaraya Murahhas Gönderiyor, Bir Sandık Koyacak Yer Yok..," *Milliyet*, July 16, 1929; "İstanbulda Havuz Buhranı Yok. Gelecek Sene... Burada Bir Vapur Yapılacak - Forda Müracaatlar," *Son Saat*, February 26, 1929; "Antirepo Buhranı Yene

zone privileges against the will of the Istanbul merchants and port authorities were clear. What was a crisis and what was an opportunity was determined by Ankara, which had triumphed over Istanbul. The tailormade Free Zone Bill responded to the immediate requests of a "prominent" industrial company as well as to the inherited wishes of a part of the commercial capital in and of Istanbul. But the concrete shape it took did not content the inherited wishes.

Subsequent generations of capital, far from giving the Ankara government its due for this audacious historical decision for the Free Zone Bill, preferred to ahistorically redefine it in the mold of the "bureaucratic inert state" in their own current interests. Koç, who would grow his commercial capital also as the Ford dealer of Ankara and make industrial breakthroughs in the following decades, would again write off the failure of the free zone law as a failure of the "idle state" when in the 1990s time was rife for another round of export-oriented free zones.

> I believe in the benefits of a free port-free zone. These are not new issues for Turkey. In 1927, the Free Zone Law was enacted. The first foreign company to benefit from this law was the Ford Company. Ford branded vehicles were assembled at the plant in Tophane and a significant portion of them were exported to neighboring countries. At that time, our country was not a big market. As the Ankara Ford Agency, I could only sell seventy to eighty cars a year. The relations broke down in 1931 due to minor bureaucratic disagreements, and Ford, as a foreign capital, did not invest in Turkey for 50 years until 1956, when it became a partner in our Otosan Company. However, if the Tophane Assembly Plant had continued to operate, the Turkish automotive industry would have reached different levels today. [...]In this period when we are approaching the two thousand years and want to integrate with world trade, the "free port" and "free zone" system is still waiting for its mentor.[56]

Başladı," *İkdam*, July 4, 1929; "Antrepo Buhranı Kalmadı," *Akşam*, September 15, 1929; Şefik Memiş, *Tophane Ambarlar İdaresi*, İstanbul Yayınları (Istanbul, 2023), 154ff.

56 Can Kıraç, *Anılarımla Patronum Vehbi Koç* (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1996), 301–2.

§ 4.2 Ford Law 1929: Tailor-made Free-hand

Not surprisingly FMC would be the first and only to make use of the Free Zone Law of 1927. Given that the first contact of the FMC with the Turkish Government relating an assembly plant investment in Istanbul took place at the latest in 1925, if not before, it remains an open question how strong the direct influence of FMC was on accelerating the process of the promulgation of the Free Zone Law. What we know for sure is that the first formal negotiations between FMC and the Turkish Government have begun in 1928 because they left traces in the company, state, and diplomatic archives. The negotiations were carried out by the founding manager William G. Collins from FMC (the then Manager of Ford Alexandria) and Şükrü Saraçoğlu, the then Minister of Finance. According to the entry of S. Pickney Tuck, the First Secretary of the US Embassy in Ankara in his Angora diary on November 19, 1928, Mr. Collins' knowledge about Turkish politics from his time as an Assistant Trade Commissioner at the American Embassy in Constantinople back in 1921 served him well during the negotiations. The approval of the first draft of the contract fell on June 28, 1928.[57] The contract was countersigned on November 26, 1928.

A couple of days before this, on 19 November 1928 Mr. Williams Collins made a stop by the American Embassy in Ankara to give good news to S. Pickney Tuck who reported that

> [h]e [Collins] stated that negotiations with the Turkish authorities had been satisfactory up to the present, as he had only encountered several minor difficulties. The Turks, for instance, wished to make the Turkish copy of the contract the authentic text. Mr. Collins how-

57 "İstanbul Limanı İle Bir Gümrük Antreposunda Kurulacak İkmal ve Montaj Fabrikası İçin Ford Motor Company Exports and Imports A. Ş. İle Yapılan Sözleşmenin Onayı," June 24, 1928, 30-18-1-1/29-40-15, CCA.

> ever, wisely, claimed that the French text should also be considered as authentic.[58]

The same week, on November 25, 1928, when Collins dropped by the American Embassy in Ankara again, his self-confident undertone was unmistakable. His stance was undoubtedly boosted by the reality and discourse of the "competing production sites."

> The Council of Ministers, in today's session, had approved of the contract, and it was to be forwarded for the Ghazi's signature. Inasmuch as the contract in question is a 25-year one, Mr. Collins will not undertake to start work until the Grand National Assembly has passed upon the contract and it has become law. The Minister of Finance, however, assured Mr. Collins that this would be done before December 2. Collins, incidentally, holds the whip hand and has told the responsible officials that unless he can get immediate action, he has no intention of wasting any further time in Turkey, and that his General Manager will instruct him to abandon negotiations and to put up the assembly plant in some other country. To me this appears one of the most effective ways of dealing with the Turks. Collins has not been here long but has accomplished a great deal in a short space of time, always reminding those with whom he made any contact that unless unnecessary delay was avoided, he had no intention of wasting his own and his firm's time and money in prolonged and useless negotiations.[59]

The final version of the contract gave FMC the right to assembly cars, tractors, trucks, and planes within the Istanbul customs area for the duration of 25 years.[60] (see Appendix E, Ford Law). The concrete location of the plant

58 "[Records of the U.S. Embassy in Turkey 1928 / Angora Diaries 1928] Angora Diary by Pinkney Tuck, First Secretary of US Embassy in Ankara [20 November - 1 December 1928]."

59 "[Records of the U.S. Embassy in Turkey 1928 / Angora Diaries 1928] Angora Diary by Pinkney Tuck, First Secretary of US Embassy in Ankara [13 - 19 November 1928]," n.d., MC27 / Roll 6, American Information Resource Center (AIRC), Ankara.

60 "Ford Law."

was called "the free area" (*serbest mahal)* in the legal text and it was stipulated that any business activity in this area would be exempt from all duties linked to import and export trade, like "customs duty, octroi tax, transaction tax and all kinds of dues and imposts." (Art. 2). This exemption applied to imported and exported automobiles, trucks, tractors, airplanes spare parts, as well as to materials and machines pertaining to the same. (Art. 5)

> Said establishment will be created in a place to be agreed upon by the Government and the Company and be named in the text of the contract as a "free area" which will be considered as outside the country; and for the purpose of assuring the functioning thereof all requisite automobiles, trucks, tractors, and spare parts and other tools and implements and materials to be introduced into this place occupied by the Company, as well as transactions in its offices, shall be exempted, during the term of this contract, from customs duty and other import dues of any kind and all other taxes.[…][61]

The word "outside the country" was replaced by "outside the customs area" after the Consultative Council of Finance has objected to the formulation on the grounds that "In the second article of the agreement, the phrase (to be considered as outside the country) is susceptible to misinterpretation, and it has been deemed necessary to remove this phrase from the agreement."[62] Twisting of the generic term "free zone" into "free area" in the legal text was deemed necessary by the Council of Economy: "In the second article, it is stated (in a place that will be referred to as a 'free area' in the text of the agreement, etc.), but in the sixth article it is written (free zone), so the word (zone) in this article should be corrected as (area) in order to remove any doubt." This linguistic rigor and coherence were induced by the fear that this first application of the Free Zone Law of 1927 could pose a generalizing precedent case, bring the control of the customs area out of the control of the Government, causing many free areas to spread like an oil stain across

61 "Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul," *Levant Trade Review* 17, no. 2 (February 1929): 44. I will use the English translation of the Ford Law throughout the text unless otherwise mentioned.

62 "(1/296) Numaralı Kanun Layihası ve Maliye, İktisat ve Bütçe Encümenleri Mazbataları," 2.

the harbor of Istanbul claiming the entire application scope of the Free Zone Law. But the Government was still on the search for a site to officially designate as the Istanbul Free Zone outside the current customs area of the port of Istanbul as laid out in the previous chapter.

> Pursuant to the law dated July 16, 1927, the principle of free zone has been adopted [for the Ford Law]. Such installations shall be carried out in the free zone. After the free zone law has been applied and the free zone has been determined, it is deemed necessary and beneficial to stipulate in the contract that the transfer of this establishment to that zone. This is because, if the precedent applications are granted, there will be small areas outside the free zone that will be subject to a second non-customs regime, which will be difficult to enforce. It is necessary to include a clause in this way in the precedent agreements.[63]

This amendment proposition of the Consultative Council of Economy did not find its way into the Ford Law. This would for sure constitute a major change in the stipulated agreement between the Company and Government and Ford would most probably not accept such a costly and unrealistic move of the whole plant facilities to another location to be determined later by an agent other than Ford.

Not only the imports of entire automobiles, or knocked-down and spare parts into the assembly plant, but also exports from there outside Turkey would be exempt from any kind of taxes (Art. 3), but exports from the free port area into Turkey -which practically meant just to drive the automobiles a few meters to the other side of the gate which led to the Tophane square with its clock tower, just opposite of the Nusretiye Mosque- would be liable to usual import taxes. For the supervision and control of the custom provisions FMC had to pay the customs officers hired by the Turkish Government, deduct income tax from their wages and build barracks for them within the free area at its own expenses. (Art. 6)

63 Ibid., 4.

One of the most astonishing points in the contract is the 30 USD (around 60 TL) premium that the Turkish Government agreed to pay for every car, tractor, and truck exported from the Freeport into Turkey (Art. 7). This premium should not exceed 20% of the import tax that is charged for the vehicle exported into Turkey. The argument that justified this premium was mainly the transfer of know-how by Ford to the Turkish workforce. The Turkish Government was ready to pay a premium out of the tax money of Turkish citizens for the introduction of Turkish workers into the Fordian production methods. In fact, it is possible to say that the premium agreed to be paid is a price for the ideological investment into industrial modernism. It would not be wrong to interpret this clause as evidence that Ford was treated more like an institution providing industrial education for the public good than a for-profit, capitalist enterprise.

> [T]he Government in turn, taking into consideration the advantages which will result for the country's economic life from this establishment and especially the fact that the retouching: painting, assembling and other finishing operations of the automobiles will be executed by local labor, undertakes the payment of a premium of THIRTY Dollars for every one of any kind of automobile, truck, and tractor imported into Turkey (Art. 7).

The "argument of the National and the Turkish" was used at several instances in the legal text, sometimes as a justification and sometimes as an exemption. In terms of the Turkishness of the labor force to be employed the tendency of the justification was evident: 60% of the workforce employed at the plant in the first two years and after the completion of the first two years, 75% of the workforce had to be recruited among Turkish citizens. (Art. 8). Furthermore, the porter-workers to supervise the crane unloading and loading the boxes and finished automobiles inside the free area had to be Turkish citizens. (Art. 10). These workers should not be confused with the port workers outside the free zone who were organized in influential porters' guilds.[64] In the next chapter dealing with the factory regime we will

64 Akın Sefer, "The Docks of the Revolution: The Struggles of the Port Workers of Istanbul in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century" (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, The

furthermore delve into the question whether the term "Turkish" included Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin or not.

According to Art. 10, Ford gained not only the right not to deal with the porters, who, with their strict guild organization, were a thorn in the side of every institution in charge of the port, but also the right to carry out the loading and unloading operations with his own vehicles without paying any fees or rights to any (of the fourteen) Turkish establishments[65] of the port, by directly docking the steamers transporting its commodities directly on the shore of the free zone. So, Ford had to deal with the IPMC in very limited circumstances, too. The only time that Ford would have to deal with the IPMC would be in exceptional cases, such as transportation within the harbor or when Ford could not dock its own or its chartered vessels directly at the docks.

Since no local purchases, inputs were foreseen for the standardized assembly process at the Ford Istanbul plant some of the obligations that were made subject to vague definitions seemed to have been put in place only to increase the impact of the word "Turk," which was used frequently. By this we refer to Article 13, where the Company agreed to use Turkish coal only "in case technical reasons do not prevent the use of Turkish coal" and "under the condition that the prices are not high if compared to those for coal arriving from other places." During the short assembly lifetime of the plant the power houses were fueled with oil delivered from the Beykoz depots of the Standard Oil Company (see Figure Appx. E.8) and city power from the Turkish Joint Stock Electricity Company's Silahtarağa Power Plant (a foreign concessionaire company) for the offices and factory interior lighting.[66]

Another example is the stipulation of the Art. 11 that "Within the country the Company accepts and undertakes that it will give preference under

---

Atatürk Insitute for Modern Turkish History, 2009); Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *1908 osmanlı boykotu: bir toplumsal hareketin analizi*, İletişim yayınları Araştırma, inceleme dizisi (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004); Yaşar Tolga Cora, "1910 Kömür Hamalları Grevi: II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Emeğin Tarihi ve Sol Siyasetin Dili," *Kebikeç: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 52 (2021): 435–62.

65 [Başar], *İstanbul Limanı, 1929*, 126ff.

66 "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant."

equal conditions to Turkish merchants and registered Turkish establishments, for the transportation of its merchandise and goods as well as for the purchase of the goods which it will need." An assembly plant with no planned local purchases from which the exported fully assembled automobiles were planned to be shipped into the different countries in its territory with diverse flagged ships had but little room for ships with Turkish flag. Besides the exports into Turkey and the neighboring countries with close direct road connections were solely driveways from the gates of the free zone. Even if Ford preferred Turkish-flagged ships for the transportation of his goods -despite the fact that he has negotiated to be taken outside the Cabotage Law of 1926-[67], the limited number and lack of technical qualities of the Turkish merchant fleet would hinder this intention radically. The issue of the weak Turkish merchant fleet was dealt with in all kinds of publications as an insurmountable problem, especially after the promulgation of the Cabotage Law in 1926.[68]So both affirmative uses of the term "Turkish" in combination with "coal" and "ship flag" looked rather like minor cosmetic interventions added to the legal text for ideological and image reasons.

Articles containing the negation of the "Turkishness" on the other hand sight had concrete effects to the workings of the business. Ford was exempted from using the Turkish language as a working language (this meant to be exempted from the obligation to comply with the Law Nr. 805 from April 22, 1926 that made the use of Turkish language obligatory in enterprises, the so-called ("Law on the Compulsory Use of Turkish in Economic Enterprises" ("İktisadi Müesseselerde Mecburi Türkçe Kullanılması Hakkında Kanun")[69], from registering with the Turkish Chamber of Commerce (Art. 5), and from being made liable to any Turkish forced loan in case this would be imposed at some point.

67 "Kabotaj Konusunda Amerika Ford Motor Company."

68 Murat Koraltürk, "Hisar Vapuru Faciası ve Kabotajı Yeniden Düşünmek," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 260 (2015): 32–39.

69 "İktisadi Müesseselerde Mecburi Türkçe Kullanılması Hakkında Kanun," *T. C. Resmî Gazete*, no. 353 (April 22, 1926): 1290.

FMC was sensitive about the issue of forced loans which entered as Article 9 into the final version of the contract. As S. P. Tuck from the US Embassy stated on November 19, 1928:

> Mr. Collins informed us that his firm had been subjected to forced loans on three separate occasions in Greece, and that he wished to protect his firm against similar occurrences in Turkey. He feels sure that he could induce the Minister of Finance to retain this clause inas much as the United States had not signed the Treaty of Lausanne in which forced loans were mentioned.[70]

Apart from this, when the legal text was drafted the official diplomatic relations of USA in Ankara had been just recently re-established after a pause of ten years (in February1927). Furthermore, the US and Turkish Governments had signed a the Trade and Navigation Agreement the same year as the Ford Law, i.e. in 1929, which contained nearly the same conditions as the 1923 treaty and aimed to constitute an official basis for bilateral relations[71]. This Trade Agreement offered a better basis to protect Ford from forced loans. Although the protocol of the Consultative Council on Economic Affairs (İktisat Encümeni Mazbatası) was critical about the addition of this article to the contract,[72] it found its way without any changes into the final legal draft, then the Law text.

Şükrü Saraçoğlu, the main negotiator with Ford, had to justify this novel initiative at several instances at the Parliament. The two arguments that

70 "[Records of the U.S. Embassy in Turkey 1928 / Angora Diaries 1928] Angora Diary by Pinkney Tuck, First Secretary of US Embassy in Ankara [20 November - 1 December 1928]."

71 Semih Bulut, *Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri (1923-1938)* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2010), 78–111; Fahir H. Armaoğlu, ed., *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açıklamalı)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 90.

72 The argument of the Council was that a legal personality shouldn't be exempted from the forced loan, a sovereign act of the state, as if this personality were an equal, i.e. a state. This might lead to further claims by other legal and real personalities. Provisions like that are in fact only found in bilateral agreements, in: "(1/296) Numaralı Kanun Layihası ve Maliye, İktisat ve Bütçe Encümenleri Mazbataları." 28. 1. 1929 tarihli gündeme 75 no'lu ek.

Saraçoğlu had repeatedly put forward were that "[t]his establishment that has advanced in the field of mechanization" would provide Turkish workers with skills and constitute a pull factor (*namzet)* for rival companies. It was expected that "from the moment the Ford enterprise comes to Istanbul and starts to work, other large enterprises that see themselves in the same setting and in the same profession and that are working in the same field will come one by one and ask us for the same permission" (Saraçoğlu even claimed that some of the rival companies had already asked for the same permission and that there had been several applications by telegram).[73]

Moreover, Saraçoğlu repeatedly emphasized that they gave Ford a concession, but not a monopoly. While this defense-like clarification probably sounded good to the ears of Turkish parliamentarians who were sensitive to the fact that foreign capital monopolies drain away sources from the domestic elites, it is important to remember that Ford was not a company that claimed monopoly rights in any of the countries in which it invested and derived its competitive advantage from economies of scale in mass production and integrated plants.

Several protocols were prepared by different Consultative Councils (Maliye, İktisat ve Bütçe Encümenleri Mazbataları) of the National Assembly commenting on the contract signed between the Ministry of Finance, on behalf of the Turkish Republic and Mr. Collins, on behalf of FMC, but the contract was passed without noteworthy changes (except the substation of the term "area outside the country" by "area outside the customs") by the National Assembly on January 28, 1929 and became the Law Nr. 1391 dated February 2, 1929, namely the "Türkiye Cümhuriyeti Hükumeti ile Ford Motör Kumpani Eksports Enkorporeytet Şirketi Arasında Aktedilen Mukavelenamenin Tasdikına Dair Kanun" ("Law on the Ratification of the Contract between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and Ford Motor Company Exports Inc."). In those protocols the territorial scope of the plant was correctly cited as comprising Russia, Egypt, Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Iran, Afghanistan and at some instances a vague term such as "Asia."

73 Ibid., 82.

Yet it is important to note that in the parliamentary vote on the Ford Law, the number of votes against it (86) was significantly closer to the number of votes in favor (99),[74] and that it was passed in a much more polarized atmosphere than the Free Zone Law, which was passed unanimously with the exception of one abstentionist vote.

Another remarkable point that made it evident that this piece of legislation was quite out of the ordinary was the way Tophane was openly and directly mentioned, even addressed in the legal text. As in the 1927 Free Zone Law, instead of being left to a bureaucratic future "to be determined later," the Tophane quay was included in the text of the law in all its concreteness in two places. The first was within a "promise" in the preamble to the law as follows: "A further contract for the lease of the Tophane warehouses was signed on February 9th, and the evacuation of these buildings is now under way." And second the entire Art. 17 was dedicated to the prospective Ford-Tophane relationship:

> ART. 17.— The Company shall start repairs and preparations following the delivery to the Ford Company of the Tophane warehouses, which shall be caused by the Seyri Sefain Administration to be completely evacuated, and shall perform the activities set down in the contract nine months after the taking over of the building.

However, just two months earlier, on 12 November 1928 William Collins had told Milliyet newspaper that the location of the site was not yet determined and that it was likely to be located in the vicinity of Sirkeci or Kuruçeşme.[75] In another statement to the same newspaper three weeks later, he stated, without any correction of the latter statement, that the location of the assembly plant was Tophane and that the warehouses there, currently operated by TMA, would soon be emptied by the corporation and handed over to Ford.[76] Could this have been a strategic step to avoid putting the Government, which had promised Ford the Tophane premises already dur-

74 Ibid., 83.

75 "İstanbulda Neler Yapacaklar. Ford Şirketinin Mümessili İstanbulda Yapılacak Işler Hakkında Izahat Veriyor," *Milliyet*, November 12, 1928.

76 "Fotd Müessesesesile Yapilan Mukavelenin Esasları," *Milliyet*, December 6, 1928.

ing the early negotiations in the absence of the TMA, in a difficult situation? A newspaper article from an even earlier period, 29 October 1928 in the same newspaper, *Milliyet* witnesses this shift between negotiated reality and discoursive strategy. The negotiations between the Government and the Company for sure included the definitive decision about the choice of the plant location and Tophane was simply the only one on the list.[77] We can infer from that newspaper article that even a purchasing agreement instead of a leasing was thought within the limit of the possible. The institutions who had a say about Tophane and the port of Istanbul were only informed at that stage, expressed their dissatisfaction but could most probably only impede the sale but not the leasing of the entrepôts. The Manager of the Istanbul Port Monopoly Company, Ahmet Hamdi Başar was again, the most vocal one to express this discontent:

The Ford Company had applied to the government to buy the Tophane warehouses in order to use them for its Near eastern territories. The Ministry of Economy was deeply involved in this matter, and all the companies in Istanbul that were related to the Tophane warehouses were asked whether this sale would have any effect on the port of Istanbul. However, some of the enterprises belonging to the port of Istanbul are against this. For instance, the Port Company has stated that even the current warehouses are not sufficient for the needs, and that if the Tophane warehouses are given to Ford, a ware-house crisis in the port is certain to start.

Whatever had happened, as Collins said in his confidential report to his superiors in Dearborn, Ford was able to impose almost anything he wanted in Turkey with these sets of law from 1927 and 1929.

> The ground embracing our free port premises might well be regarded as bordering on extraterritoriality. We are not registered in Turkey, being exempted from this regular formality in accordance with the terms of our concession, therefore local laws concerning articles of incorporation or what not do [sic] not apply to us. As we pay no profits tax, no tax authorities will ever examine our books or rec-

77 "Antrepo. Fordun Müracaatı Mes'elesi Ne Oldu?," *Milliyet*, October 29, 1928.

> ords. The only records which the tax authorities can examine if they wish are our payroll records.[78]

Collins had every reason to believe that Ford had full support from the Turkish Government. The latter had faced a considerable silent opposition in the parliament as was visible in the results of the vote on the draft law. In Istanbul, there seemed to be no port-related institution the interests of whom were not adversely affected by Ford's investment in one way or another. The TMA and the ICCI, which had their warehouses; CQDW and the IPMC Administration, which had lost a part of their sphere of influence; the İstanbul Municipality, which had lost the area's octroi tax.

A physical demonstration of the government's support for Ford was Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's visit to Ford on October 2, 1929, accompanied by Sadullah Bey (the General Manager of the TMA), when the Tophane warehouses were still being converted into an assembly plant. When İsmet Pasha left the factory after inspecting the transformation activities, he got into the Ford Lincoln luxury car provided to him by the Ford management and inspected the Ford Airplane making a promotional flight to Istanbul in Yeşilköy.[79] For İsmet Pasha and the press, people and representants of institutions based in Istanbul who were following him that day was definitely a day full of Ford.

78 "Confidential Letter Sent by William G. Collins, 1929, September 23."

79 "İsmet Paşa Hazretleri Bugün Yalovaya Gidecekler[.] Gazi Nezdinde Bir Gecenin İntihalarından -2-," *Vakit*, October 3, 1929.

5

Tophane - Factory Scale: The Unfolding of the “Enclave” Investment

From the River of the Strait, Detroit River to the Strait of Bosphorus, vessels owned or chartered by Ford secreted in a piecemeal way, box by box the economic geography that the Istanbul Ford territory was planned to encompass in the Interwar period. Both straits marked the arteries of capitalist entanglement. The ports, quays and docks were the places where this artery system forked. From this perspective the story of Ford Istanbul includes the relational history of the -once formed, static- infrastructure that can only be understood not as a spot in itself but in the context of those flows, and within the tissue formed by those flows. This chapter starts with the attempt to grasp those historical flows that formed and informed today's structuration at the Tophane quay, even though they are lost to the eye of the everyday observer of the city in the form of an “industrial heritage.” Ford Motor Company Export Inc. Istanbul's lost material and spatial culture in Tophane quay of the port of Istanbul can be only made intelligible by looking at the period when and how this this lost memory’s material culture was created.

> At the beginning of the 20th century, Detroit's industrialization took off on an unprecedented scale. The Detroit River became the world's busiest commercial river and in 1908 was dubbed “the Greatest

> Commercial Artery on Earth" by *The Detroit News*. In 1907, the Detroit River carried 67,292,504 tons (61 billion kg) of shipping commerce through Detroit to markets all over the world. By comparison, London shipped 18,727,230 tons (16 billion kg), and New York shipped 20,390,953 tons (18 billion kg).[1]

The cargo ships that sailed from the Detroit River to the Atlantic via the Erie Canal, carrying goods to the Company territory's new "Eastern European, Near Eastern, Northeastern African" node, were sailing to a port that was now "in decline" or even called "dying."[2] Of course, a company based on rational calculation as much as Ford was clearly not chasing a lost Istanbul romance. Ford's choice of Istanbul as its territorial node had as much to do with the memory of commercial flows to the city's ancient geographical location as it had with a current spatial fix that attracted it. The attraction was literally based on an infrastructural space, which was legally (as shown in the previous chapter), physically and socially constructed over time, as will be shown in this chapter. Physically the metabolic flows transformed nature into infrastructural space, especially in the case of the construction of the quays in the end of the nineteenth century.[3] Socially Ford could base its calculations on workers' skills in mechanized and non-mechanized tool production accumulated over centuries in the existing guilds, workshops and factories of the Imperial city.[4] To this the next subchapter will be dedi-

1 Jenny Nolan, "How the Detroit River Shaped Lives and History," [News Portal], The Detroit News, February 11, 1997, https://bit.ly/3v8Yfcd.

2 "Constantinople - The City That Is Dying. Merchants Are Moving Away and the Docks Are Idle, for the Turkish Republic Has Diverted Trade and Straits Traffic to Ports That Are Easier to Defend and the Political Center Has Shifted"; "İstanbul Limanı Bomboş! Biz Hâlâ Serbest Mıntaka Yapmıyalım!," *Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1929.

3 Esra Sert, "Modern Kıyının İnşası: 19. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla İstanbul'da Dört Kıyı Dolgu Projesi Üzerinden Toprağın ve Kentsel Dönüşüm Atığının Metabolik Akışı," *Praksis*, Krizler Çağında Coğrafya ve Mekan, no. 60 (2023): 71–92.

4 Wolfgang Müller-Wiener, "Manufakturen und Fabriken in Istanbul vom 15. - 19. Jahrhundert," *Mitteilungen der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft*, no. 33/34 (1988): 257–320, in Turkish: ; Wolfgang Müller-Wiener, "15-19. Yüzyıllar Arasında İstanbul`da İmalathane ve Fabrikalar," in *Osmanlılar ve Batı Teknolojisi: Yeni Araştırmalar, Yeni Görüşler*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1992), 53–120.

cated along with the concrete analysis of the workplace, including its markets, the imaginations (created) about it, and its failure.

In the introduction of this chapter is not our aim to dwell into an exhaustive relational neighborhood history of Tophane, a genre quiet rare in Ottoman and Turkish historiography.[5] This is not due to time and space limitations of a PhD thesis but first of all due to the fact that Ford Tophane was an enclave investment that was isolated from the neighborhood pretty much like the quay named after the neighborhood was actually a passage of international trade and mobility, a "non-place."[6] Neither do we have evidence that the majority of workers of the Ford Tophane factory actually lived in Tophane. The factory was among the earliest and best-connected sites of Istanbul, through the electrical tramway by land,[7] (See Map 5.1 and Map 5.2) through the steamers of the Şirket-i Hayriye Company[8], Golden Horn Ship Company[9], by sea. We have all the reasons to assume that Ford workers lived in several workers districts scattered around the industrial zones of Istanbul (on both shores of the Golden Horn, in Fatih, Yedikule-Zeytinburnu etc.), including Tophane, walked or easily commuted to work by tram, ferry or train. (See Map 5.3) Nevertheless to stress the continuity in the industrial functions in Tophane as a point of attraction to Ford -despite the enclave character of its investment, a condensed history of the vicinity will be laid out here.

5 For an exceptional masterpiece, see Cem Behar, *A Neighborhood in Ottoman Istanbul: Fruit Vendors and Civil Servants in the Kasap İlyas Mahalle*, SUNY Series in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

6 Marc Augé, *Non-Places. An Introduction to Supermodernity* (London: Verso, n.d.).

7 Kayserilioğlu, *Dersaadet'ten İstanbul'a Tramvay*; Gülersoy, *Tramvay İstanbul'da*.

8 Koraltürk, *Şirket-i Hayriye*.

9 Koraltürk, *Haliç`te Ulaşım*.



MAP 5. 1 Hand drawn tram trains and ferry lines over Istanbul map accompanying a tourist guide, 1925. source: Henri Zellich, *Guide du Voyageur en Orient. Illustré.* (Constantinople: Zellich & Co., 1908), Appendix.



MAP 5.2 Tram trains and ferry lines, 1922. source: " Plan d'ensemble de la ville de Constantinople." [Plan Rouge] 1: 17,500 (Constantinople: Société anonyme ottomane d'études et d'entreprises urbaines, 1922)



MAP 5.3 Map of the industrial plants, 1900-1923. source: T. Gül. Köksal, " İstanbul' daki Endüstri Mirası İçin Koruma ve Yeniden Kullanım Önerileri." PhD thesis, Istanbul Technical University, 2005, Şekil C. 31.

Tophane, the neighborhood built around fifteenth century imperial canon foundry complex was one of the oldest military-industrial hubs of Istanbul located -because of the risks of industrial disasters- just outside the Galata Walls, built in the thirteenth century by the Genoese trading colony that held the commercial privileges of the area. Furthermore, it had a straight and longshore located alongside the southern tail of the Bosphorus coastline at the intersection of the natural harbor of the city, the Golden Horn Estuary. It was protected from the strong sea currents surrounding the area of Sarayburnu right across, for most of the days of the year, except when strong southwest winds of Istanbul *(lodos)* were blowing on an average ten to twenty fifteen days a year.[10]

Tophane was called *Metopon* ("the forehead") during Byzantine period of the city. It was indeed the forehead to the immense inner port of the city, the Golden Horn; its northwestern entrance. That natural port is in fact the "raison d'être" of the city of Istanbul, alongside with the long sea passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the Bosphorus. Port functions were always linked to military-industrial functions and port locations hosted the first factories comparable with urban industrialization processes in other parts of the world. Industrial activities were water-bound activities (either alongside a river or a sea) up until the construction of wider railway and road networks starting from the second half of the nineteenth century, which marked the passage to the carbon economy in the transportation networks.

Thus, the diachronic reading of the spatial history of Tophane gives us the lens through which we can scrutinize long term change in how industrial fabrication practices, use of nature, land and labor, and the ownership structures had changed with a *longue durée* perspective.

The first extra-*muros* neighborhood outside the historical peninsula, of the "other side of the historic city" the *Pera,* owed its existence foremost to the establishment of the Imperial Canon Foundry *(Tophane)* right after the

10 Wolfgang Müller-Wiener, *Bizans'tan Osmanlı'ya İstanbul Limanı*, trans. Erol Özbek (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 119ff; Mertcan Öztürk, "Distinction Versus Recognition: Making Sense of the Tophane Incidents in the Context of Gentrification" (PhD Diss., Manchester, UK, University of Manchester, 2019), 127ff.

conquest of Istanbul. Canon production required smaller workshop-type factories (*kârhane*), skilled work, very specific raw materials, technology transfer, and capital investment by the state. Different types of labor force organized in guilds co-existed in the same neighborhood around the canon factory, carpenters, and printers[11] or linked to port functions, like the travelling/partly sojourning seamen and the porters. Thus, canon production was an integrated complex comprising more than ten hectares at the second half of the nineteenth century triggering different types of industrial labor force in and around the factory itself.[12]

The modernization of the army in the beginning of the nineteenth century introduced new military factories, like the imperial small arms factory and a school to educate skilled workers for this kind of modern military factories, i.e., İmalathane-i Harbiye. Both manufacturing and repair were carried out in the imperial factories located in Tophane. Hand and engine-powered pumps, anthracite, steam, electric and gas engine repairs, ship and mill machinery repairs, iron and wood lathes, drill and milling machines, and steam boilers were manufactured and repaired. Manufacturing and repair of transmission shafts, wood and iron pulleys, automobile repair, manufacture and repair of hunting rifles, manufacture of saddlery and harnesses, manufacture of shoemakers' molds and heels, construction and installation of iron floors and roofs, manufacture of injector taps, valves and faucets for machinery was processed in the imperial military factories of Tophane, all for the needs of a modernizing, centralizing army.[13]

---

11 Nalan Turna, "Yeniçeri-Esnaf İlişkisi: Bir Analiz," in *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Ticaret Hayatı*, ed. Fatmagül Berktay (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları, 2012), 21–42.

12 "The main activities in the Tophane, such as cannon and the related production of cannonballs, cannon carts, cannonballs, *humbar*s and gunpowder, were carried out by the head of the artillery and the artisans in his retinue, such as the pourer (*rihtegan*), *haddad*, *errekeş*, *benna*, spinner, *kalemkâr*, *mücellit*, kefçeci, *şebkar*, *sengtıraş* and *neccar*. In addition to these, the Tophane also employed sailors, *peremeci*s, porters, farmhands, cartmen, watchmen, shiftmen, *duagu*, imams and timekeepers (*muvakkit*)." A. Y. Kubilay, "Tophane-i Âmire," in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), 255. [Translated by the author]

13 Ersoy Zengin, "Milli Mücadele Yıllarında İmalat-ı Harbiye Fabrikaları," *Mavi Atlas* 5, no. 1 (2017): 2011–2223.

The public space was re-organized to accommodate the needs of creating the modern worker along with the modern soldier: Huge drill fields organized as squares *(talimhane)*, dwelling facilities (military barracks), a neoclassical mosque, used by soldier-workers and other guild workers, and finally the first clock-tower in Istanbul,[14] making the modern time of the factory and army marked the urban space.



FIGURE 5.1 Detail from the map showing Tophane and its environs from J. J. Hellert's Atlas de l'Empire ottoman, 1836. SOURCE: "Plan de Constantinople et de ses faubourg d'après Kauffer, le chevalier Barbié du Bocage et Joseph de Hammer avec l'indication des quartiers et les changements qui s'y sont opérés depuis les années 1776 et 1786 jusqu'à l'année 1831," n. s. in J. J. Hellert, *Atlas de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris: Béllizard, Dufour, 1844), Planche XXXVII.

14 Elif Gelmez and Meriç Altıntaş, "Clock Towers as the Focus of City Square: The Changing Scale of Nusretïye Clock Tower," *The Turkish Online Journal of Design, Art and Communication* 8, no. 1 (2018): 79–96.

But Tophane was also home to non-formal spontaneous sociability of seamen, workers, and soldiers alike, like coffeehouses, brothels and pubs defying the temporal and spatial order in the modern military factories at the shore side.[15] An ethnic shift in the porter's guild around the end of the 19th century took place reflecting the concomitant demographic engineering processes on the imperial scale. With the loading ethnic conflicts and a bloody event alias "Ottoman Bank Raid" by the Armenian revolutionaries in favor of ethnic independence, the porter's guild's composition shifted from Armenian porters from the Anatolian provinces of Bitlis and Siirt to Kurdish porters from the same region.[16]

To understand the nineteenth century layers of the military-industrial complex of Tophane one must take into consideration another spatial determinant, i.e. the transfer of the Ottoman palace from the historical peninsula to the "other" Pera side to Dolmabahçe. In the mid nineteenth century the new, "modern" dwelling of the imperial dynasty, the Dolmabahçe Palace was constructed because of intensive social unrest to economic dependencies and shift of the center of the economic power. The Ottoman dynasty formed a "glacis" -a safe space- around the new palace. It was an area where construction was not permitted. On one side there was the Dolmabahçe palace, on the other side the Gümüşsuyu slopes. The triple military barracks around the palace were supposed to protect the Imperial system; Taksim barracks, Maçka barracks, and the Tophane barracks. Occupying land for anything else than military barracks, cemeteries, and market gardens (*bostan)* was not permitted.[17] This should provide the maximum security around the new Dolmabahçe Palace. The condensation of the military-industrial functions was reinforced by those political considerations up until the formation of the Republic. The first tram lines were also built

15 Noémi Lévy-Aksu and François Georgeon, *Osmanlı İstanbulu'nda Asayiş (1879-1909)*, trans. Serra Akyüz (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), 363ff.

16 Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire 1881 - 1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration*, New York University Studies in Near Eastern Civilization 9 (New York, N.Y.: New York Univ. Press, 1983), 157ff.

17 Interview with Murat Güvenç, June 2011.

alongside Azapkapı-Karaköy - Ortaköy line, passing by Tophane, motivated by the push factor of urbanization around the new Imperial Palace.



FIGURE 5.2 Detail from Necip Bey's plan showing the environs of Tophane (upper part facing north), 1918. SOURCE: Necib Bey, "Guide de Stamboul II. Feuille. 2ème Partie. [Béchiktache. Ortakeuy. Bomonti]," 1: 5000 [French Version] (Vienna: Hölzel Printing House, 1918)



FIGURE 5.3 Detail from Alexandre M. Raymond's map showing the environs of Tophane (upper part facing north), 1919. SOURCE: Alexandre M. Raymond, "Plan de Constantinople, Stamboul. Galata. Pera - Scutari – Kadı-Keuy" 1: 20,000 [French Version] (Prague: B. Heubert, 1919)

Just six years after the foundation of the Republic the preserved parts of the small arms factory, alongside with the twelve newly built, reinforced concrete buildings of the ICCI were transformed into the global plant of the multinational company Ford Motor Exports Inc. The Free Port Law in 1927 laid the foundations of the tailormade Ford Law in 1929. This means that two pieces of legislation promulgated out of a total of 1391 pieces in the first six years of the Republic were mainly shaped by the lobbying activities of the biggest corporation of that period. That plant was planned to be the center of automotive production serving a very large company territory. It failed comparable to the imperial small arms factory conceived to modernize the weakening Ottoman army. The twelve identical reinforced concrete build-

ings of the TMA,[18] added next to the old industrial buildings only in 1927, were situated temporally among these two failed industrial investments.



MAP 5.4 Map prepared as an advertisement for Gilchrist Walker Co. Ltd., a shipping agent company of Galata; showing activities and places of interest for shipping lines, 1925. SOURCE: J. Pervititch, "Limits of Port, with Compliments of Gilchrist Walker Co. Ld. Shipping Agents" n. s. (İstanbul: Caruano & Co., [1925])

18 Memiş, *Tophane Ambarlar İdaresi*.

The Ottoman small arms factory was transformed into warehouses,



FIGURE 5.4 "Imperial Ottoman Gun and Small Arms Factories: Gun Factory," 1880-1893. source: Abdullah Fréres, "Interior view of the Tophane Factory, Constantinople." [Photograph] [https://www.loc.gov/item/2003672022/]

the warehouses into an automobile assembling plant, and the assembly plant back into warehouses – after confiscations, mass clearance and another round of land-fill of the second half of the 1950s to "open space for a more speedy life with automobiles."[19] Historically unique buildings across the other side of the "rebaptized" Necati Bey Road, the Marshal's building (*Müşirlik Building*), the Vocational School of Masters for Military Industry, its mosque and the barracks of gun carriage troops (*top arabacıları*) shared

19 *Bir Semt-i Meşhur Tophane: Değişimin ve Yıkımın Hikayesi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Şehri Kültür Tarihi Araştırma Merkezi, 2009); İstanbul Vilayeti Neşriyat ve Turizm Müdürlüğü, ed., *İstanbul'un Kitabı* (İstanbul: İstanbul Valiliği Neşriyatı, 1957), 87–94.

the same faith as the assembly plant's building and were demolished all together in the end of the 1950s.[20] Motorways cleared out the first automobile factory of Turkey.

On the seaside, a coastal band of six hundred and ten meters was landfilled once more (after the landfill for the quay construction between 1890 and1895) to house three warehouses consisting of five-stories and four storage areas consisting of two-stories. These new storages of the 1950s constituted a joint project of the famous architect Sedad Hakkı Eldem with Campax Construction Company, appointed by the Turkish Maritime Bank. This plan had foreseen a public square between the two mosques with the Tophane Clocktower in the center and the preservation of the Müşirlik Building and the Vocational School for Masters in the Military Industry instead of the fourth storage building, but these were not carried through. [21] The colossal structures cut the neighborhood's relationship with the sea like a perforated Chinese wall. The six entrepôts built between 1956 and 1958 served indeed only for thirty years until 1986, the permanent closure of the port due to the extreme lack of capacity, intensive traffic jam caused by heavy trucks in the middle of the city after the passage to containerization. The area was transferred to the Administration of Privatization (*Özelleştirme İdaresi*) to be transformed for the needs of international cruiser tourism. Well into the 1990s the area was still called the "American Bazaar" carrying marks of its free zone past marked by a prominent American company and semi-formal movement of goods into the city based on that grey zone. Until 2015 some of the warehouses were used exhibition accorded to the Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University and as the venue of the Istanbul Modern Art Museum, to be destroyed -excluding the mentioned

20 Vecdi Akdağ, "19.Yy'dan Günümüze Modern Imar Uygulamalarının Tarihi Kentsel Doku Üzerindeki Olumsuz Etkileri: Meclis-i Mebusan Caddesi Aksı ve Yakın Çevresi Örneği" (MA Thesis, Istanbul, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 2008).

21 Bülent Tanju and Uğur Tanyeli, *Sedad Hakkı Eldem. II, Retrospektif: [Sergi, İstanbul, Osmanlı Bankası Müzesi, 8 Nisan-5 Temmuz 2009]* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2009).

two venues for cultural functions- all in all -when it was their turn- in favor of a gigantic cruiser-oriented project called "Galataport." (See Epiloque).

The Galata pier as part of the infrastructure of the industrial heritage was negated and erased by the 1950s public construction works whose main justification was introducing more automobility to Istanbul, creating major incisions in historical tissue, opening highway arteries. In sum, the neighborhood of Tophane witnessed the rapid substitution of five-hundred-year-old dominance of cultures of industry by the hegemony of cultural industries.

The first subchapter lays out the three means of production that made up the factory regime. The following subchapter deals with the output and markets of the factory, in its planned, advertised and realized forms. Finally, the last subchapter narrates in detail the customs smuggling case as the most poignant part of the exit of Ford from Istanbul, which spanned more than half of the enterprise's life in Istanbul. This smuggling case alone shows us how, in such a short period of time, the base of the (geographical, legal, political, and business) calculation under Ford Istanbul had radically shifted, and how a once gloriously justified privilege has been transformed into a presumed corruption in the political and legal perception.

§ 5.1 Factory Regime: The Organization of Production and the Labor Process

> The following details are now available in regard to the contract signed between the Turkish government and the Ford Company: The concession by which the Ford Company is granted a "free zone" at Constantinople is for 25 years. In the free zone the company will not be forced to employ the Turkish language in its correspondence and will be exempt from other formalities. Beginning with the assembly of 200 to 300 cars daily, it is hoped eventually to increase the assembly to 2000 daily. There is no doubt that the signing of this contract should have a beneficial effect on the economic life of Constantinople. The assembly plant will, it is said, be the largest in the

> world, and will supply the needs of the whole of the Near and Middle East as well as Central Europe.[22]

Reading this account from *The Times* dating from 7 December 1928 and being familiar to the history of factories of the Early Republican period about which it was deemed worth writing in Turkey, one wonders about what happened to that grandiose attempt. Sure, figures mentioned were exaggerated but the sheer scale of the prospective Istanbul factory justified the sensation of *The Times* reporter. Where was Ford situated among the glorious factories in the early republican period whose histories were amply documented? Why was its history not documented in all these years? But even if we can surely state that some factories, especially the state factories of the *étatic* period were documented amply as markers of the genuine, essential industrial policy of the "Golden Age," can we speak about the existence of factory history at all, comparable to business history in Turkey (see Chapter 2)? For this we must define the characteristics of factory history.

First and foremost, factory history is situated within the tradition of materialist and relational history. It offers a concrete scale of analysis pertaining to capitalism and not one that is constructed conceptually/abstractly to begin with. Thus, it has the potential to overcome the fallacy of "misplaced abstractions."[23] As such the factory is not only a physical space but also a web of structurally defined relationships that change slowly and in a contingent way. Factory level analysis entails starting from the conditions of the material existence and actions of real men and women in their social roles as workers, managers, or state officials. Instead of inferring working-class formation and consciousness, trajectories of state politics and management models from "allegedly given political-economic" structures, workplace-scale history begins with the depiction of the concrete activities of real people, their institutional affiliations and inclinations, constraints, and trajectories they exemplify relative to their position to the investment.

---

22 "New Ford Factory in Turkey Is Open," *New York Times*, February 23, 1930.

23 Görkem Akgöz, Richard Croucher, and Nicola Pizzolato, "Back to the Factory: The Continuing Salience of Industrial Workplace History," *Labor History* 61, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2019.1681632.

Thus factory or workplace history is not merely labor history defined as an area of specialization, concentrating solely on the lives of workers. The same holds true for the investment and management activities of the concretization of capital, i.e., the company. Looking at the factory level workplace we can scrutinize the "property relations" becoming tangible by means of analyzing the changes in the investment, ownership, or management patterns. Parallel to this questioning, one can look at the effects of the change in the investment, or ownership patterns on labor relations and the transformation of nature into space. The commodity supply chain approach, besides other spatially sensitive theoretical approaches, has shown us that no production unit is an alone-standing whole but a node within a web of global production system, interrelated to competitors, facilitators, and socio-natures. At the same time, it organizes and re-organizes the concrete locality it is physically embedded to.

Talking about the locality that a factory is embedded to and at the same time transforms we do not imply remaining within the borders of the classical neighborhood history, as stated above. The concrete locality comprises not only of the neighborhood as a mere space of reproduction, but also the production and circulation spheres. It has got the potential of integrating mostly separately executed analyses of the production sphere, built environment (circulation sphere) and living spaces (reproduction sphere). Concepts of everydayness like Harry Harootunian's concept of everydayness, [24] or Alf Lüdtke's *Alltagsgeschichte*[25] are ontologically and epistemologically compatible with this kind of workspace history approach.

Factory history does not necessarily need to re-strict itself to a narrowly defined worker's existence on the shop floor. In the case of the Ford Istanbul assembly plant, built into a free zone, the "enclave" position of the factory in relation to its immediate environment underlines twice this necessity: Through the factory level analysis, which takes the different types of space

24 Harry Harootunian, *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

25 Alf Lüdtke, "What Is the History of Everyday Life and Who Are Its Practioners?," in *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life*, ed. Alf Lüdtke, trans. William Templer (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3–40.

production, the differences between the lived place of the factory and the abstract space forming to facilitate a factory can be scrutinized.[26] This would require questioning also usage of time/rhythms of the makers of the factory space, rather than taking those for granted. This in turn requires meticulous archival work or labor ethnography, moving on the fringes of urban/neighborhood history and labor history. In the current situation of de-industrializing metropoles and the age of the factory-like service sector workplaces (call-centers, gigantic retail outlets, logistic centers, centralized urban hospitals, universities etc.), this type of social history would scrutinize the factory as a resurrected "realm of memory / lieu de mémoire."[27]

Relational factory history inquiries about the interrelations between the political regime and factory regime, when looking at a single production space. One can scrutinize how the changing political-economical and ideological parameters affect the basic relationships on the shop floor of which Ford Istanbul was an exemplary case. This becomes much more important if we recall that abrupt changes in the economic regime through global depressions, coup d'états, independence wars, liberation movements, anti-colonialist takeovers, wars, revolutions [and the existence of state factories] is common to many countries throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century. Again, factory history has the potential to contextually point out to the existing interrelations between the company and the state officials, the state policies implied in investment decisions and the public image that the factory aims to give from itself. The Chapter 4 and subchapter 5.2.1 on the advertising strategies of Ford of this thesis could give a humble example about this image-making of the workplace-scale under operation.

The case study on Ford Istanbul during the Interwar period nourishes from these potential strengths of factory, or workplace history mainly in combining critical questions about change in the space of capitalism (economic geography) and how this can be used to challenge the widespread deterministic and tautological historiographical periodization patterns. Such a challenge can successfully emanate from micro studies contextualized in

26 Brenner, "Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical," 135–67.

27 Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

their global entanglements. This level of abstraction also allows this thesis to deal with one of the most important and influential actors of the Interwar capitalism, the Ford Motor Company and still address its failures, exits, its costly trial-and-error phases which the company histories in form of company biographies are mostly silent on. Workspace-scale business history has the potential to grasp the no-name actors in the historywriting when examining world actors such as a multinational, FMC and a young national state, Turkey, but not as abstractions.

Yet this study's weakness in terms of classical labor history is evident. Unfortunately, the International Department of the Ford Motor Company Archives for the Interwar Period does not include local worker's files though it is rich in many other areas. The archives of the international branches including the employee records were either burnt sur place or sent to a paper mill "where they are thoroughly destroyed" as was the case in Ford Alexandria[28] or transferred to Ford's offshore Luxemburg company when their operations terminated and vanished, as was the case with the Trieste plant.[29] In the Istanbul branch, it became even more impossible to hope for the preservation of the boxes of documents submitted to a smuggling case that took up almost half of the branch's entire existence.[30]

Yet during the same period Ford ran a well-preserved Sociological Department for "homeland" workers at Detroit in which "the employee records" documented not only the working practices but also dwelling, family, consumption patterns and moral attitudes.[31] Therefore this study is admittedly weak in terms of the depiction of the everyday experiences of

28 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Conversation with Christopher Mataras, Assistant Manager of Ford (Egypt) S.A."

29 "Private and Confidential Letter by Percival Perry, Head of FMC Ltd. in London to the Attention of Mr. G Beros, Chief Clerk in Trieste [Sir P. Perry -Outgoing Correspondence - Trieste, Italy Sales July 1930]," August 13, 1930, AR98.213541 / 133, Folder 9, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

30 "Ford Davası," *Kurun*, July 30, 1935"[...] The expert witness felt the need to see the transactions that had taken place since the establishment of the factory, and two boxes of documents showing all the transactions of the factory were brought to the eighth specialized court." .

31 Loizides, "Deconstructing Fordism."

workers on the first electrically powered moving assembly line in their own perception and expression, which made up the so-called lived space of the factory. The most distinctive aims of any workplace-scale history, to recall workers' experiences of the factory regime and the metabolic flows of commodity production in the workplace will remain an unrealized one within the framework of this thesis. Yet the immediate vicinity in and around the factory enclave of Ford at the pier of Tophane is scrutinized to reconstitute the contradictions and encounters on the everyday routine of this factory.

The following subchapter is organized around the classical classification of any business enterprise, i.e. into the three means of production; land, capital and labor.

5.1.1 The Land and the Lack of Environment

The Galataport project, which today constitutes a sprawling horizontal hopping center around the cruise dock at the Tophane pier, has three refrefence points that have been preserved from the past, the Nusretiye Mosque, Imperial Pavilion and Tophane Clock Tower. The 25,617 square meters (6.33 ar.) of the area in the north of those triangulation points, which gave the mentioned mosque a corner and continued to the north of it, constituted the Republic's first "free zone" considered outside the country, and customs (See Appendix E). On the plant plan, the zig-zagged corner that rested upon the wall of the Nusretiye Mosque was a small but meaningful exception to the interior architecture of the plant which solely consisted of straight lines. Once, this military, industrial and habitational area integrated the mosque as the site with social functions to the site. Today the only traces left from this latest industrial layer from the interwar period are the mending traces on its body. Maybe the only remaining concrete industrial heritage traces from the Ford Plant are these mending spots.

The choice of the location for the Tophane quay meant yet that Ford had inherited a certain infrastructure to have a water-bound plant aimed mainly at international markets via the sea. Those quays were constructed by the French concessionaire company CQDW between 1892 and 1895 by regular-

izing the waterfront and filling the sea[32] with transported stones from newly opened quarries in the peripheries of Istanbul (namely from the hills of Bahariye, Kemiklidere (Pendik), Silahtarağa, Kınalı Island, Burgaz Island[33], Hayırsız Island, Kavaklar, close shores of the Black Sea and Marmara Sea[34]). The issue of rights of excavation and the concrete practice of the company were disputed by the Harbor Master of Istanbul on the grounds that "the natural structure of Istanbul would deteriorate."[35] The reclaimed coastal land at the Galata Port was 500 × 285 meters long in 1895 and the Company had the property rights over the 3 hectares of landfill it created[36] functionalizing the as docks as well as office warehouses and office buildings it then rented.[37] The construction works were interrupted and collapses with workplace casualties took place several times due extreme weather conditions, currents, cholera, the ongoing vessel traffic, protest of the guild of dock porters and, least but not last the Istanbul earthquake that took place in the middle of a hot working day on July 1894. The land of the Istanbul plant constituted a part of that nature transformed into space by former labor and extractive activities causing environmental degradationin faraway

32 Bilge, *İstanbul Rıhtımlarının Tarihçesi*, 1–17; Vilma Hastaoglou-Martinidis, "The Building of Istanbul Docks 1870-1910. Some New Entrepreneurial and Cartographic Data," in *14th IPHS Conference: Urban Transformation: Controversies, Contrasts and Challenges: Proceedings*, ed. Nuran Zeren Gülersoy et al., vol. 2, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Urban and Environment Planning and Research Center, ITU, 2010), 277–89; Vilma Hastaoglou-Martinidis, "The Cartography of Harbor Construction in Eastern Mediterranean Cities: Technical and Urban Modernization in the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Cities of the Mediterranean: From the Ottomans to the Present Day*, ed. Meltem Toksöz and Biray Kolluoğlu (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014), 78–100.

33 Ali Fuat Örenç, "Modern İstanbul Limanı'nın İnşası Sürecinde Galata ve Eminönü Semtlerinde Kentsel Değişim," in *Osmanlı İstanbulu Uluslararası Sempozyum 4 Bildiri Kitabı*, 2016, 218.

34 Bilge, *İstanbul Rıhtımlarının Tarihçesi*, 10.

35 Cited in: Esra Sert, "Urban Metabolism of İstanbul: Waterfronts as Metabolized Socio-Natures Between 1839 and 2019" (PhD Diss., Middle Easter Technical University, Department of Architecture, 2020), 79.

36 Hastaoglou-Martinidis, "The Cartography of Harbor Construction in Eastern Mediterranean Cities," 95.

37 Sert, "Urban Metabolism of İstanbul: Waterfronts as Metabolized Socio-Natures Between 1839 and 2019," 79.

parts from the port. [38] Whether the lease Ford paid to TMA, or the compensation paid to ICCI for untimely vacating the merchandise to Kuruçeşme[39] covered this past (and lost) labor and environmental degradation is a mystery since only calculations of lost warehouse space was part of the negotiations.

The area reserved to Fords' plant was defined in Article 17 of the Ford Law as mentioned before. The term "the Tophane warehouses" comprised of two generations of buildings. First vast, one-story masonry sheds covered in roofing which once were workshops producing cannons, carriages and various military munitions built on top of the military barracks which were destroyed in the fire of 1863. Second, the warehouses built in 1927 (Cf. Figure 5.5 with Figure 5.6) by TMA and rented to ICC in the form of twelve vast identically shaped compartments[40] with reinforced concrete right on the seaward side. [41] Whereby the free zone area in total was 25,617 square meters, the total plant floor space covered 13,434 square meters,[42] i.e., around the size of two football fields.

38 For a more thorough discussion of landfilling activities with the approach of metabolic flows see also by the same author, Esra Sert, "Mobility of Land in İstanbul: Production of Nature as Space in 2000's.," in *Livenarch VI. Liveable Environment & Architectures* (Replacing Architecture, Trabzon, 2019); Sert, "Modern Kıyının İnşası: 19. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla İstanbul'da Dört Kıyı Dolgu Projesi Üzerinden Toprağın ve Kentsel Dönüşüm Atığının Metabolik Akışı."

39 "Fort Mukavelesi Dün İmzalandı[:] Tophane Antrepoları 10 Sene Müddetle ve Senevî (35,000) Lira Bedeli İcar İle Fort Müessesesine İcar Edildi," *Cumhuriyet*, February 10, 1929.

40 Jacques Pervititch, *Jacques Pervititch Sigorta Haritalarında İstanbul = Istanbul in the Insurance Maps of Jacques Pervititch* (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; AXA OYAK A. Ş., 2000), 107–8.

41 Müller-Wiener, *Bizans'tan Osmanlı'ya İstanbul Limanı*, 119–20; Müller-Wiener, "Manufakturen und Fabriken in Istanbul," 260–63; Sedad Hakkı Eldem, *İstanbul Anıları = Reminiscences of Istanbul* (Istanbul: Aletaş Alarko Eğitim Tesisleri, 1979), 12, 319.

42 "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant."



FIGURE 5.5 Detail from Pervititch's insurance maps showing the area before the building of warehouses by TMA, 1926. SOURCE: J. Pervititch, "Pervouz-Agha Salı Bazar" 1:1000, Plan Cadastral d'Assurances (Constantinople: Ingenieur-Topographe des d'Assurances en Turquie, 1926)



FIGURE 5.6 Detail from Pervititch's insurance maps showing the area after TMA's warehouses, 1927. SOURCE: See fn.290

Those newly erected workshops, corresponding to 10.500 square meters, had been leased to ICCI) by the TMA in 1927, to compensate for the critical lack of storage space at the port of Istanbul. ICCI had made long-term projections and established a special (its first) affiliated company around them, namely the Tophane Warehouse Administration (Tophane Ambarları İdaresi)[43] and introduced the bonded warehouse system there with a capacity of eight to ten tons of goods, but only for around eighteen months.[44]

On February 9, 1929, William G. Collins signed a lease for 10 years with Sadullah Bey, the head of the TMA, with a yearly rent of 18,000 USD, which is ca. 35,000 TL.[45] The twenty-five years free zone concession was not entirely covered by the ten year lease agreement which hinted that the Government thought of installing free zone facilities elsewhere and possibly would try to move Ford to that area. According to that contract Ford committed itself to make a fixed capital investment in the amount of 100,000 TL in the two years following the conclusion of the contract. The ICCI emptied the merchandise in the warehouses to Kuruçeşme and handed them over to the Ford Company on April 27, 1929.[46] ICCI was compensated by TMA and Ford with 15,000 TL for renouncing to its newly established bonded ware-

43 Şefik Memiş, "İstanbul Ticaret Odası'nın İlk İştiraki: Tophane Ambarları İdaresi 1927-1929," *Mavi Atlas* 10, no. 1 (2022): 235–63; Memiş, *Tophane Ambarlar İdaresi*.

44 Ethem, "Der Hafen von Stambul und seine Organisation," 63; [Başar], *İstanbul Limanı, 1929*, 45.

45 "'Ford' Mukavelesi İmzalandı: Mukaveleye Göre Seyrisefain Tophane Rıhtımı İçin Senede 40,000 Lira Alıyor," *İkdam*, February 10, 1929, sec. Şehre ve Mülhakata Ait Müteferrik Haberler; "Fort Otomobil Fabrikası İçin Bugün Seyrisefainle Bir Mukavele İmzalıyor," *Vakit*, February 9, 1929; "Tophane Antreposu. Ford Ticaret Odasına 15,000 Lira Verdi Seyrisefain de 35,000 Lira Verecektir," *Milliyet*, February 18, 1929; "Fort Mukavelesi Dün İmzalandı[:] Tophane Antrepoları 10 Sene Müddetle ve Senevî (35,000) Lira Bedeli İcar İle Fort Müessesesine İcar Edildi."

46 "Seyrisefainde Tophane Anbarları Dün Fordun Mümessillerine Teslim Edildi," *Milliyet*, April 28, 1929; "Ticaret Odasiyle Seyrisefain Arasında Bir İhtilaf," *Cumhuriyet*, February 14, 1929, sec. Şehir ve Memleket Haberleri / İktisadi Mehafilde; "Tophanedeki Antrepoların Tahliyesi," *İkdam*, February 15, 1929; "Topane Antrepoları Boşaltılıyor."

houses.[47] In turn it compensated every merchant whose goods had to be transferred in the amount of 200 TL.[48]

The only administration of the port that was content with this situation was the French concessionaire CQWD. It was granted the concession to operate all the docks and warehouses on the docks for eighty-five years in exchange for building the quays in 1890. In fact, in 1927, the Company considered the ICCI's warehousing activities in the space it had rented from the TMA as a violation of its exclusive rights and unfair competition and filed several protest letters to the government. In this case, this was later taken to court, the State Council ruled in favor of the CQDW in 1928.[49] Without the need to implement the decision, by force of Ford the warehouse competition by the "national" ICCI to the foreign concessionaire CQDW was de facto terminated.

Following the complete evacuation of the Tophane warehouses, Ford committed to begin repairs and construction and to carry out the works specified in the contract nine months after the handover of the buildings. As noted on the Work Chart sent to the company headquarters, they started the works in the last week of May 1929 (see Figure Appx. F.1). The most time-consuming activities included repairing of parts of the quay, concreting the floor of the warehouses, changing the roof, raising the ceiling to accommodate overhead electric cranes, and replenishing the electrical and fuel installations.[50]

Although Ford was to assemble motor vehicles on a factory scale and with mass production techniques at the Tophane quay, assembly of motor vehicles and other equipment in smaller scales was common practice in the area around, the so-called Salıpazarı (Tuesday's bazaar) where the customs offices were located. Assembly helped to evade taxes for finished automo-

47 "Tophane Antreposu."

48 İstanbul Tophane Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Anbarı, Kâtibi Umumiliği, "İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Tophane Anbarından," *Milliyet*, February 13, 1929, sec. [Classified Ads].

49 Bilge, *İstanbul Rıhtımlarının Tarihçesi*, 45ff; "Tophane'de Seyr-i Sefain İdaresine Ait Antrepoların Ford Müessesine Devredilmesi Üzerine."

50 "Ford Fabrikası Günde 25 Otomobil Çıkarılacak," *Milliyet*, February 7, 1929, sec. Müteferrik Haberler; "Fort Mukavelesi Dün İmzalandı[:] Tophane Antrepoları 10 Sene Müddetle ve Senevî (35,000) Lira Bedeli İcar İle Fort Müessesesine İcar Edildi."

tives and Beltaş[51] and Tatko (Kemal Halil, Mehmet Rifat (Yalman) ve Şürekaları)[52] are among the many smaller enterprises, usually agents of foreign brands, which made use of this locational opportunity. There were parts depots of other brands in the immediate vicinity (see the Citroën Depot just across the administrative building of TMA, see Figure 5.6)[53]. In this respect, Ford was not the first but definitely the biggest assembler of the area marked by all the side functions of an assembly industry. The streetscapes of the shoreline around the Tophane quay and Salıpazarı in 1927 clearly exemplify this preponderance of commercial functions and small shops that provided sur place the equipment and institutions needed for assembly activities.[54]

51 Beltaş Makine, "Hakkımızda," accessed January 6, 2012, http://www.baltasmakine.com/sirketprofili.php.

52 Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü*, 22 Mustafa Vecit Yalman, the co-owner and brother of one of the most influential journalists of the time and himself also co-owner of the company, Ahmet Emin Yalman, narrates the locational advantages of Salıpazarı for assembly activities as follows: "The parts of our trucks used to come by ship from the USA and were assembled in a small factory on the dock in the Salı Bazaar. In other words, the work was finished while they were still at customs. Because all the parts and records were there, how could the customs officer understand whether they were missing or too much? The assembly was completed there and the trucks were brought to the agency." The Yalman brothers were the agents for Dodge automobiles. The agency was situated in Taksim. ; Şen Yalman, *Lastik Izinde 80 Yıl: Selanik'ten Avustralya'ya...: Gazetecilik, Ticaret, Sanat ve Futbol Hayatında Iz Bırakan Yalman Ailesi*, 1. basım, Genel Yayın 5476 (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları Kültür Yayınları, 2022).

53 Murat Güvenç, Murat Tülek, and Asya Ece Uzmay, "Jacques Pervititch ve Dönemi: 1930'ların Yitirilen Kent Peyzajlarının İzlerini Sürmek" (Kadir Has Üniversitesi, İstanbul Araştırma Merkezi, 2019), 108.

54 Güvenç, Tülek, and Uzmay, "Jacques Pervititch ve Dönemi: 1930'ların Yitirilen Kent Peyzajlarının İzlerini Sürmek."



MAP 5.5 Beyoğlu district in 1927: Differentiation of function at the street level. SOURCE: Based on the maps produced as part of "Pervititch Haritalarına Yeni Bir Bakış Açısı: 1927 Nümerotaj Verileri," Kadir Has Üniversitesi, İstanbul Araştırmaları Merkezi. Map by Murat Tülek for

Ford had its own "inbuilt" customs office, populated by officials from the Customs Administration, yet paid by Ford as stipulated by Article 4. They only checked whether the unloaded goods were within the scope of assembly activities, without much disturbing the work process. Ford's own ships (Ford Transports) or the chartered vessels could dock directly at the free zone, which occupied 182 meters of the Galata Quay, bypassing all the institutions involved in loading and unloading at the port of Istanbul like the IPMC, IBLA or the porter's guilds (Hamal Esnafı Cemiyeti). Here, semi-finished goods and spare parts were unloaded with the help of renewed rails and two three tons cranes, one belonging to TMA and the other a four tons crane, which we assume that was provided by Ford. Most of the knocked-down parts and spares arrived in standardized boxes in vessels below the capacity of 5,000 tons. So, this way, in a part of the Istanbul port partial containerization took place well before boxes were generally introduced alongside with the wider essential infrastructure starting from the second half of the 1950s.[55]

Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., between May 22, and December 15, 1929, rearranged the floor space of 13,433 square meters (144,600 square feet) to operate according to its assembly line technology by dividing and combining the area into six building units (see Appendix F). The interior height of the buildings varied between three and a half and ten meters were rearranged as follows: One unit became the main assembly building where the serial production line that functioned by means of electrical motors and the ovens for painting, and polishing were placed, two adjacent buildings housed the stocks for the assembling utensils, one unit was the stock building for finished cars and the other two units located near the docks and the four tonne crane were for the stocks of service utensils.[56] The plan, capacity

55 Marc Levinson, *The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger*, Second edition (Princeton Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016).

56 "Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant," March 11, 1932, Acc. 970 / Box 3, Benson Ford; "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant"; "Plant Photographs Before and After Arrangement," n.d., AR-65-5 / Box 24, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

and scale of the plant at Tophane were identical to the plant in Yokohama, Japan.[57]

The lack of environmental stipulations or even considerations neither in the legal text nor in the press concerning such a large-scale investment was remarkable. Yet the manager Collins had declared to the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* before the promulgation of the Ford Law that

> [a]n inspection was made by one of our engineers. Most of the investigations centered on the water, gas and electricity needs of the automobile assembly plant. As a result, the most important point was "Water". Because the daily need of the factory is 150 tons of water. For this, we will build air and underground "water" tanks, especially for the summer season.[58]

For this vast amount of daily water needed for the production process Ford was paying the foreign concessionaire water provision company, Terkos Water Company founded in 1895. Whether this price covered the actual costs infringed upon the ecosystem of the Terkos Lake in the north of Istanbul where the Company got the water from is an unanswered even unasked question until today.[59] The industrial waste of the plant was discharged into the Bosphorus. The only reason we knew about it is that the Turkish press of the time found it worth mentioning as part of the industrious works of Ford for the transformation of the warehouses into a spot of the collective utopia of a modern mechanized assembly line. "A canal is also opened to discharge water from the factory into the sea."[60]

---

57 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] FMC - Foreign Agencies and Plants"; "Topanedeki Tesisat. Ford Müessesesi Ne Vakit İşe Başlayacak?," *Milliyet*, August 24, 1929, sec. Milliyetin Şehir Haberleri.

58 "Bu İş Nasıl Olacak? Tophande Yapılacak Otomobil Kurma Fabrikası," *Milliyet*, January 2, 1929.

59 Koca Mehmet Kentel, "Assembling 'Cosmopolitan' Pera: An Infrastructural History of Late Ottoman Istanbul" (PhD thesis, Washington, University of Washington, 2018), Chapter 3 and 4.

60 "Fort Fabrikası[.] Tophanede Fabrika Bu Sene Başında Faaliyete Başlıyacak[.] Fabrikadaki Tesisatın Üç Sene Sonra Daha Ziyade Tevsii Muhtemeldir," *Cumhuriyet*, October 5, 1929.

The 120-tons underground water cisterns were visible adjacent to the assembly stock building No.3 only in the plant plan sent to Detroit (see Appendix E): Yet the water tower with a big Ford logo was visible for any ship as the first sight of the Pera when entering and leaving Bosphorus as a new constituent of the city silhouette. The water tower was not only functional to the production of automotives but also planned to enhance the brand name and enforce the ideology of the capital (see Figure Appx. F.12). Both the roof of the (assembly and service stock) buildings and the water tower were covered with the materials of the Ruberoid brand that used the cancer-causing hazardous mineral of asbestos as the magic formula for isolation. Advertisement catalogues of the period proudly put the images of the asbestos-containing Ford roofs and water tower.[61]

In case technical and financial reasons did not prevent the use of Turkish coal, the Company agreed to use it according to the Article 13 of the Ford Law, but the plant was an oil-based one. Ford built underground oil storage tanks for thinner, kerosene and benzine and four fuel oil and motor oil storages with immediate access to the quay for its generators and engines (see Figure Appx. F.8).[62] The oil products was purchased from Socony Vacuum Corporation (*Sokoni Vakum Şirketi*), the sales subsidiary of the Standard Oil trust in the eastern countries and shipped with Standard Oil Company's oil tankers berthing directly at the Tophane quay. During that period Socony Vacuum had several depots in the city, three in Kuruçeşme, eleven further north in Serviburnu at Beykoz and a small oil port and a "fortified pier" in Umuryeri at Beykoz, built in 1920s.[63] The aggressive strategy of Standard Oil of expanding oil storages in inhabited areas of the city (like Kuruçeşme) came many times under critique with reference to the risks of industrial disasters and license requests were rejected by the Istanbul Municipality. The

61 "Ruberoid Reklam Kataloğu (Üç Dilli: Türkçe - Almanca - Fransızca)" (Türkische Rundschau, n.d.), 9, 11 They read as, "The water reservoir of the FORD factory in Istanbul was covered and insulated with RUBEROID. The concrete roofs of the FORD factory in Istanbul were covered with 40 kilos of RUBEROID. ".

62 "Plant Photographs Before and After Arrangement."

63 Burcu Özgüven, "Erken Cumhurïyet Dönemïnde İstanbul'da Yakıt Depolama Tesïslerï," *Trakya Üniversitesi Mühendislik Bilimleri Dergisi* 24, no. 2 (2023): 78.

license for the Kuruçeşme depot was granted in 1911 directly by the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs by-passing the Municipality and this was in clear violation of the Regulation on Gas Depots published in 1904, which fixed that the depots had to be located outside the city.[64]

In terms of the office power in the beginning of the enterprise and even the more later when assembly activities came to a halt in 1933, Ford became customer to another foreign concessionaire company, the Turkish Electricity Joint Stock Company (*Türk Elektrik Anonim Şirketi*) when using the city power.[65] The latter company, located on the upper top of the natural port of the city, the estuary of Golden Horn, used Turkish coal from the province of Zonguldak in its power plant and, just like Ford, disposed of its waste water directly into the mentioned estuary for a total of seventy three years until its closure.[66]

The accumulated costs of the two main pillars to the city's populations, on which the concrete factory space was built, the land and the transformed environment, were never included in the legal and bureaucratic bargaining processes, or in the representations of the press during the period of establishment, neither in terms of the costs nor privileges. Ultimately during the Interwar period land as well as environment was just an externality never needed to be pronounced or counted for.

5.1.2 *Machines at Work: The Technology*

The total investment of the FMC in Istanbul was estimated by the Acting Commercial Attaché of USA at Istanbul of the time as 450,000 USD which is rather too conservative as an estimate.[67] Standard Oil Company of New

64 Büşra Karataşer, "Babiâli'nïn Amerïkan Petrol Şïrketï Standard Oil'e Bakışı," *Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi* 13, no. 2 (2018): 349ff.

65 "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant."

66 Sait Türkhan, "19. ve 20. Yüzyılda Haliç'te Çevre Sorunları ve Deniz Kirliliği," *Toplumsal Tarih, Osmanlı'da Çevre Sorunları Sayısı*, no. 169 (2008): 65; Ali Cengizkan, "Türkiye'de Fabrika İşçi Konutları: Silahtarağa Elektrik Santrali," *ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Dergisi* 20, no. 1–2 (2000): 34ff.

67 "[Economic Affairs 1930-34] Report of Colonel Carlson Woods (March 1930): A Study of the Economic Life in Turkey," 1930, M1224 / Roll 12, AIRC.

York had the biggest American investment at that period with 2,200,000 USD and the FMC ranked according to the mentioned source as the second. The FMC belonged to the few stand-alone, greenfield investments of the 1920s in Turkey along with Standard Oil Company, Nestlé, HMV and Columbia, some pharmaceutical companies, and French and Belgian cement firms etc.[68] *Milliyet*,[69] on the contrary reports that the total investment amounted to three million (in USD), of which one million was in form of investment into buildings and two million for machines and other equipment. Mira Wilkins, states that in 1928 "in Turkey William G. Collins (also an American) was authorized to "locate, organize, manage a branch there, for which 150,000 USD was allocated." [70] But if we consider that Ford had to pay 18,000 USD yearly as the rent of the Tophane entrepôts the latter figure most probably comprised of the initial costs of the agreement but did not refer to the amount of the investment. There is news about the amount Ford committed to invest in the Turkish press, but no obligatory minimum amount for the investment stipulated in the Ford Law. Only the deadline by which the factory was supposed to start assembling was set.

The differences between the statements made about the daily assembly capacity of the factory were sometimes abysmal. However, the capacity of a production facility is one of the most fixed and planned types of quantitative data. The fact that these exaggerated and conflicting figures were continuously being produced by Ford representatives, statesmen and the local and foreign press makes us think that we are in a field of numerical fiction that legitimizes the existence of the factory and the exceptional company-specific financial, legal, and spatial privileges it had acquired for its existence. Another reason for this "capacity and production figure guessing game" was that the territorial and financial calculation base changed radically and in big steps from the moment the initial negotiations about the investment began until the factory opened, and assembly started. While *The Times* was

68 Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950*, 194ff; Keyder, *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy*, 80ff.

69 "Faydalı Bir İş: 3000 Türk İşçisi Çalışacak," *Milliyet*, January 31, 1929, sec. Günün Haberleri Arasında.

70 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 159.

reporting in December 1928 about "the largest assembly plant in the world," "capable of producing of 200 to 300 cars daily, with hopes to eventually to increase the assembly to 2000 daily," this was not only the optimism of the very initial phase.[71] It is highly probable that the British newspaper *The Times* was too focused on the size of the concession granted to a rival US company in Turkey, one of the UK's most important "ancient" spheres of influence, to pay concrete attention to the technicalities.

The capacity of the assembly plant might have been ca. 80 cars per eight-hour day.[72] Yet it succeeded to assemble at its best times between 35 and 45 cars a day[73] because it has started its operations within the three months after the peak of the Great Depression, i.e. in January 1930. FMC Istanbul is said to have assembled ca. 15,000 cars in total in two and a half years (1930-1932) in the memoirs of the Koç managers in the automobile affairs, a number that circulated so far without references.[74] Again total number of assembled automotives (cars, trucks, and tractors) can be roughly estimated and figures vary. Preserved company financial archives are not systematic do not deliver the correct estimation (analysis of those reports follows in Chapter 5.2). Trask refers to a personal interview with former Manager Molossi (Mac Murray Papers, assistant secretary of state in Turkey (1936-1942), and the report by the American commercial attaché Gillespie:

> For example, Julian Gillespie, the commercial attaché in Istanbul, reported that the large expansion in shipment of tires to Turkey in 1930 was due to the Ford plant. Gillespie estimated that 7,500 vehicles would be assembled during 1930. The world depression, trade restrictions in countries around Turkey, and devaluation of the dollar contributed to an operating deficit at the plant, estimated by a Ford official at about $1,000,000 between 1929 and 1936. In the mid-1930s

71 "The Ford Concession in Turkey," *The Times*, December 7, 1928.

72 "Report of Colonel Carlson Woods (March 1930)."

73 "'Ford' Fabrikasını Ziyaret[:] Memlekete Senevî 5-6 Milyon Bırakan Müessese: Ford Fabrikası[.] Günde 35 Otomobil Yapılıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, July 3, 1930.

74 Lale Duruiz, "Ford in Turkey: From imports to partnership," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, vol. 2 (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003), 487.

> the plant suspended assembly operations except for the final preparation of almost complete autos shipped from the United States for sale in Turkey. In these years the plant sold between 450 and 600 cars per year.[75]

Fords' set up, equipment and spare parts at the Alexandria assembly and service workshops were moved to Istanbul. The voices which rose against this move pointed to the potentials of the plant in Alexandria, which initally had taken over most of the territory of the old Trieste plant.[76] Not only the machinery, but also the judicial representation of Ford Motor Company Export Inc., connected legally and directly to Detroit, were moved to Istanbul.

Boilers and air compressors were obtained in Europe. Men from Detroit went to Istanbul to help Collins with the venture.[77] Turkish newspapers reports about the visits of Ford engineers from Detroit.[78] The only plant questionnaire of Ford Istanbul in the Ford Archives dates from 1938. This implies that information about the machines in it dates from a period where assembly had seized five years in advance and the main machinery had been already transferred to Alexandria and Romania: A note, reading "[c]hassis conveyor being dismantled for shipment to Ford Romana, Bucharest"[79] was marked on that questionnaire. Yet the capacities were still mentioned in the same document though there was no assembly activity in the plant anymore; reading "45 cars per eight-hour shift, 20 trucks per eight-hour shift".

Electrical motors were used to move the assembly line. Machines were imported from USA and Europe and a small model of River Rouge Plant in Detroit was built without resorting to any kind of modification or simplification of the Fordist production method. There are traces in the Turkish

---

75 Roger R. Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 138.

76 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt."

77 "Office of Sir Percival Perry - Langley Box 12," 1930, Personal Research Notes Mira Wilkins, sent to the Author.

78 "Ford Fabrikasının Makineleri Kuruluyor," *Milliyet*, August 7, 1929, sec. Müteferrik Haberler; "Ford Fabrikası Günde 25 Otomobil Çıkarılacak," 25.

79 "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant."

state archives about a "list of various machinery and equipment shipped from Belgium to Turkey received from the Germans, corresponding to a transit document", too.[80] Factory visits of Turkish journalists produced many newspaper articles about the speed, order, majestic noise, impressive industriousness, and the omnipotent moving machinery of the factory, through "infomercials." [81]

We have at least one trace of a local technician, Mahmut Fikri Baltaş who worked during the transformation of the warehouses into a Ford plant. He later served in the maintenance and assembly department of the factory. Following the cessation of assembly activities, Baltaş established his own company, *Baltaş Ticaret*, carrying out design and project studies including engine, mechanical and brake systems, also got patents and involved in import and export of machinery. This unique documented history of technological know-how transfer into a Turkish company continued well into the 2010s.[82]

Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., between May 22, and December 15, 1929, rearranged a building area of 13,433 square meters (144,600 square feet) to operate according to its assembly line technology by dividing and combining the area into six building units. The interior height of the buildings varied between three and a half and 10 meters were rearranged as follows: one unit became the main assembly building where the serial production line that functioned by means of electrical motors and the ovens for painting/polishing were placed, two adjacent buildings housed the stocks for the assembling utensils, one unit was the stock building for finished cars and the other two units located near the docks and the four-ton crane were for the stocks of service utensils.[83] The plan, capacity and scale of the plant at

80 "Belçika'dan Türkiye'ye Sevkedilen Muhtelif Makine ve Edevatın Almanlardan Alınan Listesi. Transit Belgesine Denk Düşer.," June 15, 1929, 230-0-0-0 / 70-11-2, CCA.

81 "Memlekete Senevî 5-6 Milyon Bırakan Müessese"; "Ford Otomobilleri Niçin Dünya Piyasasına Hakim? Topanedeki Fort Montaj Fabrikasını Bir Ziyaret," *Muhit*, no. 23 (September 1930): 348–49; "İstanbul'un En Çalışkan Bir Köşesi: Seyrisefain Vapurları ve Ford Fabrikası," *Servet-i Fünun* 67, no. 3 (March 13, 1930).

82 "Hakkımızda. Baltaş Makine," 2012, http://www.baltasmakine.com/sirketprofili.php.

83 "Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant"; "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant"; "Plant Photographs Before and After Arrangement."

Tophane were identical to the plant in Yokohama, Japan.[84] At the plant, many practices, e.g. bodywork, nickeling, upholstering, enameling and molding were being accomplished. For this, it had ovens for the painting and drying processes, and a "generator group, pneumatic rivet machinery, electric point source and conveyor lines. It also had a power plant generating its own electricity."[85] Mobile cranes were electrically manageable from air to location. In other words, single arm overhead cranes carried the parts that were to be assembled on the production line easily in all directions.[86]

The plant purchased its petroleum products from Turkeys' largest American foreign capital investor, Standard Oil Company, and sent them directly to the tanks it had constructed, two for diesel, one for kerosene and one for petrol. When working full capacity, the plant would use 150 tons of water daily. The water was preserved in aerial tanks, one 80 ton overhead tank bearing Ford's logo which could be seen from the sea, two overhead tanks each with capacity of twenty tons and one underwater tank (cistern) with a capacity of 120 tons.[87]

At the plant, apart from sand, gravel, wood for the transformation of the plant, daily laborers, small part of the office employees, water, and office power, which was partially supplied from the Silahtarağa Power Plant, no other "local inputs" were being used. This can be contrasted with the Trieste plant for the assembly of which local inputs like windshield glass, roller and ball bearings, tractor road bands and electrical light bulbs were acquired, though both legally constituted free zones.[88]

A brief analysis of the balance sheet of Ford's territory (including the former Alexandria plant as well as Istanbul after 1930) demonstrates that the -in order value in USD- value of merchandise, factory and miscellaneous equipment as well as the building, fixtures and structures were always way

84 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] FMC Turkey," March 22, 1929, Acc. 880 / Box 7, Benson Ford.

85 Azcanlı, *Türk Otomotiv Sanayiinin Tarihsel Gelişimi*, 57.

86 "Memlekete Senevî 5-6 Milyon Bırakan Müessese."

87 "Bu İş Nasıl Olacak? Tophande Yapılacak Otomobil Kurma Fabrikası"; "Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant."

88 "Territory Report from 1925."

above the value of machinery, even in the glorious year of the opening of the assembly plant in 1930 (Figure 5.7). The in-house power plant equipment was registered in the balance sheet only for the years 1929 and 1930. We might infer that already by 1931 the below-the-capacity assembly activities were carried out with city power to save on the costs of the plant's own power plant. The highest figure in the balance sheet was always the merchandise value, albeit descending alongside with other items in the company books. This proves that the Istanbul plant was rather a circulation platform of automotive parts and could hardly count as an industrial enterprise. Total assets, comprising of total liabilities plus the total equity decreased between 1930 and 1935, while losses decreased sharply after the assembly activities were stopped. The Istanbul operation was never a machinery-intensive one compared to the other assets of the plant and from the perspective of the company it seemed quite reasonable to stop the assembly activities and do away with the remaining transportable machinery to decrease the figure in red.

Thinking about machinery in industrial enterprises comes with a concrete imagination of a huge smokestack. And yet this was not the case with Ford. On Ford Istanbul's roofs refurbished by the Ruberoid Company there were several small-sized chimneys which were unobtrusive.[89] Years later, businessmen and the business press, looking for a striking and singular reason for the failure of Ford Istanbul, would cite the spillage of undeclared smoke from the -non-existing- smokestack outside the free zone as the reason for Ford's customs smuggling case.[90] This imagination must have been a fantastical excuse for the contradiction between Ford being welcomed with a red carpet and generous privileges in Turkey, only to be hounded by a relentless customs smuggling case only five years later, in an entirely new

89 "Plant Photographs Before and After Arrangement"; "Ruberoid Reklam Kataloğu (Üç Dilli: Türkçe - Almanca - Fransızca)."

90 Nermin Bezmen, *Fuad Bezmen: Bir Duayenin Hatıratı*, 4th ed. (Istanbul: PMR Ltd., 2002); "Serbest Bölgelerde Kriz Var Yatırımlar Bıçak Gibi Kesildi. AB Hakkında Basın Özetleri," January 23, 2006, http://eic-istanbul.org/dokumanlar/abm/bilgibankasi/ab/basin_bultenleri/subat_2006/20060223.htm; Deniz Gökçe, "Duman Kaçakçılığı ve Pancar Şekeri," January 11, 2004.

context where the use of the same privileges was an eyesore to the new economic policy.



FIGURE 5.7 Balance Sheets of Ford Istanbul between Dec. 1927 - Dec. 1935. SOURCE: Table Appx. H.5

5.1.3 The Labor: Skilled, Speedy and Imaginary

This study's weakness in terms of classical labor history is evident. Can one do labor history without labor archives? Unfortunately, the International Department of the Ford Motor Company Archives for the Interwar Period does not include local worker's files (such as worker registration files, worker lists, payrolls, and employment policy reports that usually contain valuable hints about the experienced labor process, workers' biographies, and shopfloor issues), but contains myriad data on other subjects. The archives of the international branches including the employee records were either burnt sur place or sent to a paper mill "where they are thoroughly destroyed" as was the case in Ford Alexandria[91] or transferred to Ford's offshore Luxemburg company when their operations terminated and vanished, as it was the case with the Trieste plant.[92] In the Istanbul branch, it became even more impossible to hope for the preservation of the boxes of documents submitted to a smuggling case that took up almost half of the branch's entire existence.[93]

Yet during the same period Ford ran a well-preserved Sociological Department for "homeland" workers at Detroit in which "the employee records" documented not only the working practices but also dwelling, family, consumption patterns and moral attitudes.[94] Therefore this study is admittedly weak in terms of the depiction of the everyday experiences of workers on the first electrically powered moving assembly line in their own perception and expression, which made up the so-called lived space of the factory. On of the most distinctive aims of any workplace-scale history, to recall workers' experiences of the factory regime and the metabolic flows of

91 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Conversation with Christopher Mataras, Assistant Manager of Ford (Egypt) S.A."

92 "Private and Confidential Letter by Percival Perry, Head of FMC Ltd. in London to the Attention of Mr. G Beros, Chief Clerk in Trieste [Sir P. Perry -Outgoing Correspondence - Trieste, Italy Sales July 1930]."

93 "Ford Davası," July 30, 1935"[...] The expert witness felt the need to see the transactions that had taken place since the establishment of the factory, and two boxes of documents showing all the transactions of the factory were brought to the eighth specialized court." .

94 Loizides, "Deconstructing Fordism."

commodity production in the workplace will thus remain an unrealized one within the framework of this thesis.

This chapter will try to briefly address three different approaches to the analysis of the labor regime in Ford Tophane, albeit in different depths:

1 The approach of comparing it with the home factory in Dearborn and other units of production within the internationalized production system of Ford,
2 another comparison, this time situating the labor regime in Tophane within the prevailing urban industrial labor regimes of the period,
3 And finally concentrating on the factory scale itself describing the workers' profiles and work processes in Tophane. Yet we shall recall that workers of the plant did not only live in Tophane, but were most possibly assembled from other workers' districts of Istanbul of that period whose skills were put to work in the Tophane plant. So we have to account for commuters to work and transportation routes available to them. Another important point we have to account for is the question of concrete skills put to work in the assembly plant. We can assume that during the plant's shortlived assembly period the workers of Ford Istanbul were the most skilled ones, including not only Turkish, but also foreign citizens [like White Russians, Italians etc. residing in Istanbul]. Expected deskilling of workers through assembly line work, which is part of the classical fordism at shopfloor theories, was not relevant for Ford in Istanbul.Given that the Ottoman's first labor organization "*Amele-i Osmani Cemiyeti*" (Ottoman Workers' Society) was founded by dockworkers in Tophane in 1894,[95] the area had already been familiar with a working class and even conflictual workplace practices. Yet the working-class presence in Tophane was mainly limited to the shore, having little to do with the residential site, separated by the military-industrial complexes at the waterfront. The graduates of Tophane Industrial School had been trained as the first Turkish drivers for French made Hockiss machine gun automobiles. An automobile troop was set up to train military drivers, some of whom were sent to Gaggenau factory in Germany to learn maintenance

95 Oya Sencer, *Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı- Doğuşu ve Yapısı* (Istanbul: Habora Kitabevi, 1969), 157ff; Kadir Yıldırım, *Osmanlı'da İşçiler (1870 - 1922): Çalışma Hayatı, Örgütler, Grevler*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 106ff.

and driving.[96]. This was comparable with the twent-five Turkish students which were sent to Dearborn to learn the intricacies of Ford's production system.[97]

In this subchapter, both the literature on the transition to the mass production line and the "Five-Dollar-A-Day" shift in the Detroit factory and the "Ford Sociology Department" established to train, or rationalize every aspect of the workers' lives there, and the published studies on the labor regime established by Ford in the aforementioned international production units will be briefly introduced in order to contextualize the historical data available on the concrete labor process in the Tophane Factory. The lack of workers' files will be counterbalanced with national and local sources such as local and foreign newspapers, magazine clippings from the period, scraps of information found in the American Consulate Archives, interviews with Ford workers and their relatives framed by a general tableau of the social history in and around Tophane, i.e. the laboring Istanbul

The unique labor regime in the parent workplace, Detroit (Highland Park and River Rouge), admired by many, was -on the technological level- due to the introduction of the moving assembly line in 1914. Borrowed from the meat-packing industry,[98] the assembly line facilitated both the division of labor and increased flow of product.[99] In addition, Ford, beginning in 1921 aggressively pursued a strategy of back-ward integration with the construction of the Rouge. According to Chandler,

> Ford was the world's most integrated automobile company. To be sure of constant, tightly scheduled flows of materials through his huge plants and thus to enhance the economies of scale, Ford made massive investment in the production of steel and glass, parts, and

96 Önder Küçükerman, "The Turkish Automotive Industry From Historic Roots Towards The 2000's," *Automotive*, 2000, 241.

97 "Detroit`te Bulunan Ford Motor Şirketi`ne Eğitim Için Gönderilecek Türk Öğrenciler.," March 28, 1925.

98 Hounshell, *From the American System to Mass Production*.

99 Alfred D. Chandler, *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1994); Chandler, *Giant Enterprise*.

> accessories. Therefore, as output declined, unit cost rose much more rapidly than did those of his competitors. Ford's integration was primarily within the plant.[100]

Ford Motor Company was the world's largest motor vehicle manufacturer in terms of production volume in the early 1920s when it decided to open an automotive assembly plant in Istanbul. In 1908, at its Highland Park plant in Detroit, it had started producing Model T Fords, or "Tin Lizzies," which would later become a symbol of mass production. In 1914, it not only introduced the "Fordist" moving production line to the industry, but also increased workers' wages by a full factor of five dollars. This "high wage policy," on the other hand, constituted one of the pioneering examples on the factory scale of the demand-driven policies that would be systematized by nation states after the World War II.

Certainly, systematically examining the two production facilities of very different scales (River Rouge and Tophane) but under the same legal roof of the same company in terms of the labor regime would provide us with important insights. Additionally part of the knocked-down parts shipped from Detroit to Tophane were produced by immigrant workers from the Ottoman-Turkish lands as documented in the memoirs of the journalist Sabiha Sertel, who was in exile in the USA in the 1920s, and of the Founder of *Himaye-i Etfal Cemiyeti* (Turkish Child Protection Agency) Mehmed Fuat Umay Bey, who was sent to the USA by the young Republic to enquire about American child policies and documented his visit to Highland Park to Turkish workers at Ford, among whom he organized a fundraising campaign.[101] The vast difference between the scales of the two production units does not simply explain all the differences in the labor regime between them. To contextualize this difference, it is necessary to look at labor regimes in other Ford plants established between the two World Wars. But at this stage, this attempt goes beyond the limits of this thesis.

---

100 Chandler 1990, p. 280, cited in: Pietrykowski, "Fordism at Ford," 391.

101 Umay, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluş Yıllarında Bir Devrimci Doktorun Anıları*; Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi (1919-1950)* (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1978).

For Ford had established quite different labor regimes according to different local priorities and local specificities, the whys and hows of which are impossible to analyze unless they are carefully compared in a team effort. For example Ford acted as a direct "missionary of civilization" in the Brazilian state of Pará and established a whole town alongside with plantations that produced rubber (raw material for tires) and called this vast enterprise "Fordlândia" (1927). This also inspired Ilya Ehrenburg's novel *Life with the Automobile*.[102] Ford imposed an open racially discriminatory labor regime in his assembly plants not only in Brazil but also in South Africa[103]. Ford could not directly invest in Soviet Russia because of the lack of property guarantees ownership, yet the Ford-Soviet Technical Assistance Agreement paved the way for the establishment of Russia's first proletarian city Nizhny Novgorod (later Gorkygrad) designed from the scratch by the American Austin Company.[104] Ford was also an employer in cities within nation-states with a relatively large demand (Manchester, Berlin, Cologne etc). Despite the standardization of the labor regime that Ford aimed for -which at the time was committed to centralization from factory layout plans to technology, from employment practices to raw material procurement policy-, different realities of labor regimes invite for a nuanced analysis. For sure they cannot be explained by a diffusionist model of "Americanization of labor."

Although we have already stated that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt an in-depth comparison of the labor regimes prevalent in Ford-established production units, we can briefly mention the step taken by Ford itself between the two wars to inquire into the standards of living of Ford workers in different countries. This information was first and foremost based on the motivation of Ford to have a sound basis to calculate the purchasing power of Ford workers. Contemporary and projected purchasing

102 Ehrenburg, *The Life of the Automobile*.

103 Elizabeth Bortolaia Silva, "Labour and Technology in the Car Industry: Ford Strategies in Britain and Brazil" (PhD Diss., London, University of London, 1988); Elizabeth Bortolaia Silva, "Brazilian Fordism in Historical Perspective," *Actes Du GERPISA*, no. 11 (1994): 141–62.

104 Richard C. Austin and Richard Cartwright Austin, *Building Utopia: Erecting Russia's First Modern City, 1930* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 2004).

power, especially for Ford vehicles, was a strategic piece of information for harmonizing mass production with mass consumption. The study was conducted by International Labor Organization (ILO) following the request of FMC:

> In April 1929 the International Labor Organization in Geneva received a rather unusual request. It came from Sir Percival Perry, chief of the Ford Motor Company's European operations, which was based in London. Sir Percival wanted the ILO to undertake a systematic study of "how much a Parisian, German, etc. worker would need to expend if his general standard of living was to be approximately equivalent to that of his Detroit counterpart." [The] ILO agreed to conduct the inquiry. Its investigators spent over two years compiling and assembling data from more than a dozen countries.[105]

International Costs of Living Survey was published by the ILO in 1932, which compared the average monthly wages and the cost of living of workers in fourteen Ford factories around the world, including Istanbul. It laid out a similar logic of the "Big Mac Index," the purchasing power parity calculation published by *The Economist* today.

Experts from ILO also visited Turkey during the report preparation process.[106] To check whether wages in Tophane were actually twice as high as the average labor remuneration we have at hand this comprehensive report of the International Inquiry into the Costs of Living. The results were also widely covered in foreign and national press.[107]

According to this report on the basis of a purchasing power parity calculation, a Detroit worker earned 1,550 USD, a Parisian worker 1,294 USD, a

105 Siegelbaum, *Cars for Comrades*, 1ff.

106 "Hayat Pahalılığı[.] Şehrimize Gelen Bir Mütehassıs[.] Cemiyeti Akvam Tarafından Gönderilen M. Dikson Ne Diyor?," *Cumhuriyet*, February 24, 1931.

107 "The Worker's Wages: Detroit and Abroad," *The New York Times*, January 10, 1932; "Barselon'dan Sonra En Ucuz Şehir İstanbul'dur! Muhtelif Memleketlerde Hayat Pahalılığı," *Cumhuriyet*, February 2, 1932; "An International Cost of Living Inquiry," *The Economist*, January 9, 1932.

worker from Istanbul 1,014 USD (2,154 TL) compared to a worker from Barcelona who earned 917 USD a year.[108]

Statements about the employment figures varied as much as the assembly capacity and production figures. This was mainly due to the fact that the assembly process stopped at several instances. There was never a stability work and a continuous flow of production, which led regular dismissals of workers: FMC Istanbul hired in its best times about 400 workers.[109] In the very first phase there were highly optimistic rumors of 3000 workers to be employed by the assembly shop in the subsequent months. Still the number of workers in a single assembly plant was impressive for contemporary standards of Turkey's in the labor market. A better understanding of the scale of Ford's Plant for Turkey's industrial history can be inferred from the industrial census in 1927, according to which only 155 establishments were employing more than 100 workers and these companies made up only 0.24% of all establishments.[110] The hopes that Ford's investment arouse in the Turkish state elite as a precedent case for a glorious industrial future could be understood in the light of this potential. A potential never realized and which lasted only for three and a half years in a decimated scale.

Yet in the initially optimistic phase, during the process of rearranging the warehouses into a plant in the second half of 1929, more than two hundred "Turkish workers and craftsman" worked for the project. Manager Mr. Collins boasted to the Turkish press that even at the recruitment stage of construction workers, the number of applicants were ten times more than what they needed.[111] For sure, the applicants for the manufacturing phase were not fewer than this figure. The plant started production in January in 1930 with three hundred workers paid on a daily basis and nearly hundred salaried personnel. The work schedule was eight to eleven hours a day, five

108 These figures on average daily wages in different segments of the labour market can be compared with the following contemporary study. Yet the render both figures comparable we need specifications about daily work hours and the tax situation, Hines et al., *Türkiye'nin İktisadi Bakımdan, Kitap II*, 2:249ff.

109 "Memlekete Senevî 5-6 Milyon Bırakan Müessese."

110 "Report of Colonel Carlson Woods (March 1930)"; *Sanayi Sayımı 1927* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1969).

111 "Ford, İstanbul'da Ne İşler Görüyor?," *Milliyet*, October 23, 1929.

days a week (the weekly rest days were Friday and Sunday). The lowest wage paid at the plant was two USD (ca. four TL) a day, was higher than the average of the worker's salary levels in Istanbul at the time.[112]

If the plant could work in rhythm - which it never accomplished - producing day and night, it could reach a capacity of assembling 150 cars a day. In 1930, the total number of cars in Turkey was 5,000, and the whole motor park was 8,000.[113] Other than cars, one and a half ton Ford trucks were also assembled in the plant.[114] In other words, the plant was an enormous investment, which could assemble the total number of motorized vehicles in Turkey within less than two months, when the plant could have been operated at full capacity.

In Tophane Ford introduced not only an over the average remuneration system but also work methods that were distinctive for that period in Turkey. Some labor disciplining requirements were written down formally in the work contract. The work ethics descriptions - the same as in the River Rouge plant - led to an imagination of a "small Detroit in Tophane", a Ford island chopped of the realities of workplace practices in Istanbul. A collective utopia, a corner of industriousness that shone out in Istanbul, as was described by *Servet-i Fünun*.[115]

When we examined the factory plans to get a sense of the labor regime Ford created, the first thing that caught our eye was the presence of a punch

112 Beginning 1930s' one *okka* flour was 2,5 kuruş, the price of a loaf of bread varied between 10 and 14 kuruş see, Cem Emrence, *99 Günlük Muhalefet, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 70.

113 "Belediyelerde Kayıtlı Bulunan Otomobil, Kamyon, Otobüs ve Motosiklet Miktarı Hakkında Yapılan İstatistik," May 18, 1933, 473, 24-136-5 / 30-10-0-0, CCA.

114 [Ford Motor Company Exports Inc.], "Ford Kamyonunda En Son Tekemmülat[:] Şimdi Daha Sağlam 4 Vitesli Transmisyonla Mücehhez," *Cumhuriyet*, June 29, 1930, sec. [Display Ads]; Ford, "1 1/2 Tonluk Yeni Ford Kamyonu[.] Ticari Nakliyatta Dünyanın En Kıymetli Vasıtası," *Vakit*, May 17, 1930, sec. [Display Ads]; [Ford Motor Company Exports Inc.], "Dört Ford Kamyonu Türkiye Dahilinde Seyahate Çıktı," *Cumhuriyet*, July 24, 1930, sec. [Advertorial]; Ford (Lincoln, Fordson, Aircraft), "Ankara Milli Sanayi Sergisinde Yeni Ford Kamyonları"; [Ford Motor Company Exports Inc.], "Dört Ford Kamyonu Türkiye Dahilinde Seyahate Çıktı."

115 "İstanbul'un En Çalışkan Bir Köşesi: Seyrisefain Vapurları ve Ford Fabrikası."

clock on the right of the entrance to the factory.[116]. Besides a refectory for joint lunches and a first aid room, there were dressing rooms where the workers would dress into their standard overalls before starting to work.[117] Workplace accidents were seen as an infringement of shopfloor discipline. Collins stated that "[They]do not turn a blind eye to even the slightest accident of a worker and investigate the cause of the accident. If the accident is due to his carelessness, we punish him. A person who hurts himself because of carelessness can also hurt others."[118] Before starting work, workers would receive "practical and theoretical courses and as long as positions would be available, applying craftsmen would be admitted".[119] Workers were required to sign a written contract stating that "they will not consume alcoholic drinks and tobacco."[120] Ban on Alcohol was in the legal sprit in both countries but a concrete shopfloor application covering the leisure times of the workers was quite rare. . But factory was seen as society or society was seen as a factory which justified the transcending of work discipling to the private lives of workers. A flowing assembly line required discipline, said the Manager. So Ford preferred workers who had a family and children[121] over those who had not. Yet despite those rigourous labor disciplining requirements Ford was never able to grant the stability of production and employment so that the interruption of the work flow was mainly rooted in the business rather than in the workers.

These workers, apart from a few newspaper clippings, have not left us any information either in Ford or Republican archives regarding to who they were and how they worked.

Yet we exceptionally know the life story of one particular Ford employee: The family of Mehmet Bahri Ergene, who worked as a company

116 "Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant."

117 "Ford Fabrikası. Amele Almağa Başladı. Şefleri ve Amelesi Yalnız Türk Olacak"; "Montaj Fabrikası[.] Tophane Fabrikaları Tess[e]Llüm Ediliyor. Ford Fabrikayı Mayıs İçinde Tesellüm Edecek ve Eyl[ü]Lde İşe Başlayacak," *İkdam*, April 20, 1929.

118 "Topanedeki Tesisat."

119 "Tophane Antrepoları Dün Bir Protokolle 'Ford'a Teslim Edildi," *Milliyet*, May 2, 1929, sec. Milliyetin Şehir ve Memleket Haberleri.

120 Ibid.; "Ford, Tophane Ambarlarını Dün Teslim Aldı," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, May 2, 1929.

121 "Ford Fabrikası. Amele Almağa Başladı. Şefleri ve Amelesi Yalnız Türk Olacak."

representative at Ford Istanbul, lived in Kumrulu Street in Cihangir on the tophill right behind the plant. His daughter Nurhan Ertem remembered that they used to calculate their time according to the factory whistles, which signaled lunch time and the end of the work shift. [122] Arab Ismail, who had worked as an assembly line worker in the factory when he was sixteen or seventeen years old, said that "the belts in the factory [the moving assembly line] moved fast and he and his friends in Tophane would tighten the screws to match the speed of the belt." [123] In short, Ford set a system of standardization in the Tophane plant which was -albeit shortlived- was a novel part of the everday life of the workers and their families.

While the concrete labor regime in the Tophane factory can be understood within the logic of the Ford empire's production network, it also provides clues as to how the political elites of the Early Republic viewed the "qualifications of the industrial worker of the period" and the value of the "trickle-down" effect of know-how transfer. The most important discursive legitimacy of both the Free Zone Law of 1927, which was enacted under the significant influence of the Ford Company's lobbying activities in Ankara, and the "Ford Law" of February 2, 1929, which gave Ford the right to open a factory in a free zone in Tophane by taking advantage of this law, was that "Turkish children [would] learn all the subtleties of art [in this factory]." This purpose alone was so legitimate that while Ford was exempted from the 'Law on the Compulsory Use of Turkish in Economic Enterprises' enacted in Turkey in 1927, the obligation to employ at least 60% of Turkish subjects in the first year and 75% in the first six years was literally engraved in the text of the Ford Law. In fact, the fact that production was carried out with 'local workers' was used as an argument to justify Ford's receiving a premium of thirty dollars from the state for each automobile import from Tophane into Turkey.

122 Ertem, [Ford İstanbul ve İskenderiye'nin 1930-1938 Arası Satış Mümessilliğini Yapmış Mehmet Bahri Ergene'nin Kızı İle Yazar Tarafından Yapılmış Mülâkat].

123 Arap İsmail, [1327/1909 Doğumlu, Eski Ford işçisi 'Arap İsmail' ile Tophane'deki Evinde Yazar Tarafından Yapılmış Mülakat], interview by Aslı Odman, Transcribed Sound Recording, September 9, 2011.

The Tophane free port was also exterritorial concerning the labor regulations. The Consultative Council on Economic Affairs of the National Assembly had raised in its protocol a concern about the hygienic, social, security and working hour standards that were going to be applied there. But apparently these concerns were obsolete: According to newspaper covering of 1929, the year when Ford recruited its workforce, the hygienic and social facilities are apparently at a higher standard than the average of the Turkish labor market.[124]

In the 1930s, when the factory went into a deep crisis right after its opening, this "domestic worker" argument would be expanded, the factory would be touted as the "National Factory" in Ford advertisements, and even cars and trucks, all parts of which were manufactured in the USA and only assembled in Tophane, would find a place in the 1931 "Ankara National Industry Exhibition," Galatasaray High School local products exhibition as the product of the "sweat and toll of the Turkish workers".[125] For these reasons, the Tophane factory constitutes a historical case that allows us to ask fruitful questions about the boundaries between worker-Turkish-citizen, or native-foreigner, which is one of the important problematics of labor history in the Early Republican Era.

Six months after the opening, a *New York Times* reporter visiting the plant talked about a "Ford School" in the free zone, where mechanics from the countries belonging to Istanbul's territory were sent to do a month's training repair work.

> Although Ford dealers are established in all of the twenty countries, agents, salesmen and other men connected with the company frequently visit Constantinople. A Ford school has been started at the port. Swarthy Egyptians and morose-looking Afghans could be seen rubbing shoulders with trim Rumanians and athletic Greeks were

124 "Topanedeki Tesisat."

125 Ford (Lincoln, Fordson, Aircraft), "Ankara Milli Sanayi Sergisinde Yeni Ford Kamyonları"; "İki Gün İçinde Yerli Mallar Sergisini 6000 Kişi Gezdi."

coming to this school, and 'they were all trying to decipher the fine details of the new Ford model.[126]

At the plant, apart from labor, water and office power, which was partially supplied from the Silahtarağa Power plant, no "local inputs" were being used, as mentioned above. The Ford Istanbul managers were appointed from the head office in the USA. They were moved between the international plants of Ford and enjoyed "global mobility" like the other higher ranking professionals of Ford, "These global managers did not speak the local language and did not have the need to learn it. All the internal correspondence" – the fifth article of the Ford Law exempted the Company from the Law for the Compulsory Usage of Turkish for Commercial Institutions dated 1927 – "was done in English".[127]

The memoirs of Jacques Abravanel, who worked for the plant between 1930 and 1935 as chief inspector -*directeur de contrôle* for a total of three and a half years with a short interruption in Ford Lusitana in Portugal (He would later became Honorary Consul of Portugal in Turkey between 1934 and 1993, until his death), the work atmosphere was described in rich detail. Abravanel had the status of local personnel as a controlling engineer, referred to the upper-level managers as a "caste," introverted and supportive of each other. A latent antisemitism was prominent in the corporate culture; he marked, feeling uneasy in his Jewish identity. He would later play the role of a shadow negotiator in the customs smuggling case between the Turkish Goverment and Ford executives and report amply about this incident in his memories.[128]

The introvertive cast of Ford employees was reinforced by the fact that thanks to the Free Zone and Ford Laws, Ford did not bother to encounter the local institutions and local porters of the port of Istanbul. Ford started dismissing workers nearly as soon as it started assembling due to the shrinking markets and the considerable gap between the planned and realized

126 "New Ford Factory in Turkey Is Open."

127 Jacques José Abravanel, *Mémoires Posthumes et Inachevées de Jacques Abravanel, Juif Portugais, Salonicien de Naissance, Stambouliote d'adoption*, ed. Alexandre Toumarkine (Istanbul: Editions Isis, 1999).

128 Ibid., 38, 41–44, 79–86.

production. Ford workers protests about the instability of employment there was echoed in the national press as early as beginning of 1930.[129]

The employment of executives hinted to organic ties with the state in the case of Galip Bahtiyar, who was former member of the Ottoman parliament, manager of Anatolian Agency, and former director of ICCI before entering Ford Istanbul.[130] It is worth nothing that he was one of the leading figures from ICCI who negotiated with the Government about the entrepôt crisis mainly caused by Ford. "With the allocation of the Tophane warehouses to Ford, and thus its inactivation, the port of Istanbul lost one-third of its warehouse capacity," ICCI complained to the Government.[131] Shortly after his post at Ford, Bahtiyar would become a MP from Istanbul in 1930.[132]

- The Lived Space of Factory, the narrative could start with reference to the streetscapes, urban tissue around the factory (1927 Building Survey).[133]
- The plant plan's worker's facilities more in detail, spatial analysis of the workflow
- The discourse of welfare and occupational safety/health and the many workplace accidents documented in the Turkish press (in total six fatal and non-fatal workplace accidents was news. Documented at least six fatal and non-fatal occupational accidents (a white Russian Naklekof, Italian engi-

129 "Fort Fabrikası İstanbuldaki Faaliyetini Tatile[]Mi Karar[]Vermiş[?]," *Yarın*, February 24, 1930; "Fort Fabrikası Son Günlerde Tediyatı Kesmiştir," *Yarın*, February 25, 1930; "«Bize Ne Zaman Cevap Verecekler?» Yeni Açılan Ford Fabrikasında İş İstiyenlerin Bir Şikâyeti," *Yarın*, January 14, 1930; "Şayialar Yalan! Ford Fabrikası Tatili Faaliyet Etmiş Değildir.," *Milliyet*, March 13, 1930; "Ford Montaj Fabrikası Kapanmamıştır," *Vakit*, March 11, 1930; "Ne İş Veriyorlar, Ne de Hesabımızı Kesiyorlar!," *Vakit*, March 4, 1931, sec. Vakit Okuyucularının Dert Ortağıdır Bize Yazınız.

130 "Gâlip Bahtiyar B. Ford Fabrikasına Girdi," *Milliyet*, September 30, 1929.

131 "Bu Ne Olacak? Antrepo Buhranı Önüne Durulmaz Bir Hâl Aldı! Ticaret Odası Ankaraya Murahhas Gönderiyor, Bir Sandık Koyacak Yer Yok.."; Memiş, *Tophane Ambarlar İdaresi*, 59.

132 Servet İskit, "Galip Bahtiyar Göker," in *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları*, Başvekalet Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü Yayınlarından, 1943, 227–28.

133 Güvenç, Tülek, and Uzmay, "Jacques Pervititch ve Dönemi: 1930'ların Yitirilen Kent Peyzajlarının İzlerini Sürmek."

neer Nicola Ferera, Hasan, porter Mehmet Çelik, "Ateşçi Yusuf," İsmail. Injured workers were brought to the Italian Hospital in most of the cases).

- Workflow and employment figures from the contemporary newspaper articles
- Employees from Plant questionnaire, oral reminiscence with Riedt, O'Neill, Cooper, Molossi, Scott, Collins, Hofinger.
- Names of employees encountered in archival and journalistic documents (Ahmet Ergin, General Foreman in 1928, Saim Antay, Service Stock Foreman -later established his own business-, Galip Bahtiyar, Muhittin Alkoç , Mehmet Şefik Ziya Bey, Ford executives at earlier stages of the negotiations, employment of "*artist ressam, telefoncu bayan*" in the advertisement department, former Ford workers putting adds in newspapers, "the neo-rural mecanic Osman Hilmi Bey," "*Ford boya mütehassısı Resul Bey ve oğulları*," "*Ahmet Hamdi Efendi, eski Ford boya işçisi, dışarda Aksaray'da araba daması boyar*;" names that were revealed during the detailed reports by the *Kurun* newspaper personnel as defendants in smuggling case (Artur Vuster, chief accountant, Efdal, Riedt, Molossi)
- Changing definition of the term "Turkish workers". Worker's complaints that foreigners and non-Muslims were prioritized. "They make the Turkish, Muslim worker wait, they said", scapegoating them for the instability of work.[134]

134 "«Bize Ne Zaman Cevap Verecekler?» Yeni Açılan Ford Fabrikasında İş İstiyenlerin Bir Şikâyeti"; Koraltürk, *Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde*; Koraltürk, "Yabancı Sermayeli İmtiyazlı Şirketlerde."



« Bize ne zaman cevap verecekler? »

Yeni açılan Ford fabrikasında iş istiyenlerin bir şikâyeti

Dün Matbaamıza gelen karilerden bir grup

Dün matbaamıza, aralarında Makinist Cemal, Tesviyeci Hasan Hüseyin, Marangoz Recep, Şakir, Tesviyeci yusuf, Montör Ahmet, Tesviyeci Ali, Mehmet, Boyacı Abdullah ve yusuf E. lerin bulunduğu bir grup kariimiz müracaat etti, bize şu şikâyette bulundular: Memleketimizde (Ford) otomobil fabrikası açıldı. Fabrikanın kapısı önünde binlerce Türk san'atkârları her gün toplanarak müracaat ettikleri halde işsiz bırakılıyor ellerinde birer iltimas mektubu bulunan gayri müslimler işçi sıfatile kabul ediliyor.

Devamı 5nci sahifede

FIGURE 5.8 Ford Fabrikası'nda iş arayanların şikayetleri hakkında, 1930. SOURCE: *Yarın*. "«Bize Ne Zaman Cevap Verecekler?» Yeni Açılan Ford Fabrikasında İş İstiyenlerin Bir Şikâyeti." January 14, 1930.

§ 5.2 The Markets for Ford Tophane's Automotives: the Planned, the Advertised and the Realized

Figures about the assembly capacity are conflictual and non-consistent, As mentioned above, figures in the company records from BMFC did not correspond to the ones in the news reporting in foreign and Turkish press. The difference ranged from 45 to 2,000 assembly capacity a day, in one to two

shifts a day. The following quantitative company records were compiled from scattered files at the BMFC folders on Turkey:

- Managerial Reports 1931-43
- Istanbul teritorry sales 1925-36 [alongside with the Visual material from Family Albums of Ford Roadman, Bahri Ergene all around the Ford territory, mention basics of Ford Romana and Ford Greece, the first two in the list]
- Sales, Production, Stocks Reports
- Domestic, Foreign, Production, Deliveries

There were no customs statistics for Ford imports and exports in the Turkish state archives since the company enjoyed free zone exceptions. The realized markets were divided into the countries and Russia was indeed absent in the list of the realized markets, since the technical agreement between Ford-Soviet Russia was already concluded in 1929. Romanian sales were the most conscipious of all sales in the first half of the 1930s which justified a separate plant with a separate incorporation there, the Ford Motor Company Romana (see Chapter 3.3.2.4., Figure 5.11, and Appendix H.2.). Already in March 1932 Percival Perry reported to Edsel Ford where in the Istanbul territory demand was stronger:

> The special treaty which was negotiated with the Turkish Goverment grants valuable concessions, so far the Republic of Turkey is concerned, but the potential sales in that country would not justify a small service plant. The large assembly plant is badly situated geographically for export. They have absolute free port facilities, when conditions improve he hopes to make the assembly plant profitable by selling through service stations established in Greece, Rumania, and Egypt, with other areas.[135]

The corresponding map of the shrinking territories (Map 3.17) is reflected in the downward slope of the sales figures (Fig. 5.12) and the number of

135 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Ford Englands' Manager Percival Perrys' Letter Dated 24th of March 1932 to Edsel Ford," March 24, 1932, Acc. 880 / Box 7, Benson Ford.

dealers in Turkey (Fig.5.10). The sales in Turkey were planned to comprise around five to ten percent of total sales, which was perhaps the only correct projections of Ford for the whole Istanbul operation (See Figure 5.11. and Appendix H.2, Istanbul Territory Sales 1925-1936).[136] Having studied the extension and quality of the road system at the outset of the investment, Ford could not have expected more.[137]. Assumptions that Ford demanded an automotive production monopoly in return for financing the expansion of the road system in Turkey[138] seemed unlikely. In fact, Ford did not make such an agreement in any country where it invested in form of an assembly or manifacturing in the Interwar period. Even before the Technical Agreement with Soviet Russia, Ford rejected the Soviet offer on the grounds that "Ford's philosophy is competitiveness".[139] In the 1920s, when Ford's production organization and prices were at their most competitive, there was no historical need for Ford to pursue monopoly privileges in production.

136 "İstanbul'da Ford Fabrikası Tesisine Çalışılıyor," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, July 1, 1929.

137 Tekeli and İlkin, "Türkiye'de Demiryolu Öncelikli Ulaşım Politikasına Geçiş"; Tekeli and İlkin, "1923 Tarihli 'Umur Nafia Programı'"; İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003); Umay, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluş Yıllarında Bir Devrimci Doktorun Anıları*.

138 Umay, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluş Yıllarında Bir Devrimci Doktorun Anıları*, 4.

139 Sorensen, *My Forty Years with Ford*, 193–217.



FIGURE 5.9 Vehicles sold/delivered from Istanbul Plant, 1931-1943. SOURCE: See Table Appx. H.1



FIGURE 5.10 Number of dealers over the years, 1931-1943. SOURCE: See Table Appx. H.1



FIGURE 5.11 Total cars and trucks sales to Istanbul territory, 1925-1930. SOURCE: See Table Appx. H.4



FIGURE 5.12 Total sale numbers of FMC Exports Inc., Istanbul plant, 1931-1943. SOURCE: See Table Appx. H.1

Ford Istanbul was getting knocked-down parts from Dearborn in the initial phase and then also from Dagenham starting from 1932 on. [140] Ford Motor Company Exports Inc Istanbul assembled and sold a total of around 8,049 automotives between 1931 and 1943 of which 63% percent were trucks, 36 % cars and only 1 % tractors (Fig. 5.9). Adding the first year of assembly in 1930 with 2,857 automotives (Appendix H.2.), during its entire existence in Tophane Ford Istanbul assembled and sold around 11,000 automotives.

The realized markets were far behind the projected sales starting from the very first year. In 1931 William G. Collins was removed from the post of the Manager of the Istanbul plant and transferred to Paris, soon to disappear from the managerial staff of the company completely. Thornhill Cooper

140 "Letter Sent by Percival Perry, 1929, March 22."

who was his main competitor in the company and against an investment in Istanbul from the very beginning on in favor of a plant in Alexandria, was charged to inspect to see what was wrong with the Istanbul territory. He arrived to the following conclusions about the state of the markets and what to do about this:

> I spent the first seventeen days of February in the Istanbul Territory, visiting Egypt, Greece, Turkey and Roumania. [...] However, in my opinion the Istanbul Territory as it exists today is much too vast for one organisation and if we are to make progress throughout these different countries, more direct, concentrated control must be organized. It is with these ideas in view that I have recommended that we established at the earliest possible moment, Sales and Service organizations in Alexandria and Bucharest. At a later date we shall probably find it advisable to put a similar Organisation into Athens, Greece. Both in Turkey and Bulgaria, the agricultural depression is largely responsible for the small volume of sales, not only of automobiles, but also tractors. Persia has practically closedown / as a market /, now the Government has issued a decree to the effect that goods may only be imported and exported with Government's permission.[141]

Meanwhile, the Advertising department could only throw glittering matchsticks into the huge gap between planned and actual sales, let alone bridge it.

5.2.1 *Advertising Ford: Universal, Paternal, or National?*

The advertising strategies, tools and discourses, to build up a "brand image" of Ford in Turkey were mostly derived from universal strategies of Ford

141 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers], Letter Sent by Thornhill Cooper in Trieste to Edsel Ford in Dearborn," March 20, 1931, ACC 880, Box 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

prepared in Dearborn.[142] Nevertheless, we should not ignore some small but meaningful steps adapted to the Turkish context.

- A vast advertising department wa established which -among others hired an "*artist ressam*"(technical draftsman).[143] Ford was omnipresent in all the newspapers of the time with standardized and adapted ads, integrating slowly concrete depictions of the Tophane quay into the ads (Fig. 5.13 and Fig. 5.14.).

142 Hubert Bonin, Steven Tolliday, and Yannick Lung, "The Ford Brand's Image. Its Evolution in Europe from the 1930s to the 1980s," in *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, Editions P.L.A.G.E (Paris, 2003), 443–588.

143 Advertising Dept., Ford Motor Company Istanbul, Tophane, "Acele Aranıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, September 5, 1930, sec. [Classified Ads].



İstanbul Tophane'de tesis edilen
BÜYÜK OTOMOBİL fabrikası

Ford otomobilleri ile kamyonlarının Türkiye'de imal edildikleri ve şimdi kendi memleketimizde ilk defa olarak vücuda getirilen bu tesisat dolayısile bu memlekette sanayi âlemine doğru büyük bir hatve atılmış bulunduğuna dair malûmata ihtimal vakıf olmamışsınızdır.

Türkiyede otomobil ve kamyonları imal ve bunları satmak üzere yalnız sanayi teşkilatının inkişaf ettirilmesi için Ford kumpanyası tarafından milyonlarca türk lirası sarfedilerek Tophanedeki Ford fabrikası tesis edilmiştir. Bittabi, bu fabrikada imal edilen otomobiller ile kamyonlar diğer memleketlere de ihraç edileceği cihetle bu memleketin refahı saadeti mühim bir surette neşvü nüma bulacaktır.

Dünyanın her tarafında tesis edilen Ford fabrikalarında pek mükemmel olarak imal edilen Ford otomobil ve kamyonları ile ayni derecede fevkalâdeliği haiz olmak üzere Tophanedeki Ford fabrikasında da imal edilen Ford otomobil ve kamyonları bilhassa mütehassıs müşavirlerin tahtı nezaretinde olarak zeki ve gayyur türk sanatkârları tarafından imal edilmekte olup bunlar dahi ayni ileCemahiri Müttehidei Amerikada Detroitte, imal edilen Ford otomobil ve kamyonları derecesinde bir mükemmeliyette ve kâfi derecede mükemmel servisi her tarafta mevcut bulunmaktadır.

Binaenaleyh Türkiyede imal edilmekte olan Ford mamulatı hususî, taksi, otomobilleri ile kamyonların Türkiyede de satılması bu memleketin refahı saadetile pek kat'î bir surette alâkadar bulunacağı cihetle vesaiti nakliyeleri iştira etmeden mukaddem Ford mamulatını nazarı dikkate almanız mucibi menfaattir.

Figure 5.13 Hand drawn illustration of Ford Tophane, Istanbul, 1930. SOURCE: [Ford Motor Company Exports Inc.]. "İstanbul Tophane'de Tesis Edilen Büyük Otomobil Fabrikası." *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, July 6, 1930, sec. [Infomercial].



FIGURE 5.14 Hand drawn full page display ad for Ford Motor Company. SOURCE: Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul. "Yunanistan – Romanya – Bulgaristan – Türkiye – Mısır - Sudan – Suriye – Efaganistan – Rodos – Kıbrıs – İran – Fransız ve İtalyan Müstemlekâtı – Filistin. 14 Muhtelif Memleket." *Vakit*, July 7, 1931, sec. [Display Ads].

- "Infomercials," advertisements disguised in news reporting were prominent especially in *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers.



FIGURE 5.15 Full-page display ad announcing the parade of Ford automobiles, 1930. SOURCE: Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Ford Freeport, Istanbul. "Bugün Büyük Ford Resmi Geçidi Olacaktır." *Cumhuriyet*, November 30, 1930, sec. [Display Ads].



“Ford„ fabrikasının otomobilleri dün büyük bir geçit resmi yaptılar

Ford Motor Company

İŞTE BEKLEDİĞİNİZ RESMİGEÇİT

FORD

İŞTE BEKLEDİĞİNİZ RESMİGEÇİT

Ford Fabrikası mamulâtından muhtelif tiplerde otomobiller dün şehir içine güzel bir geçit rsmi yapmışlardır. Resmi geçitte For müessisesi tarafından yapılan en lüks otomobiller, eski tipte kamyonlar merasim mahsusa ile şehrin muhtelif semtlerinde dolaşmışlardır. Resmi geçide Tophaneden başlanılmış, önde mozika ve bayraklarla süslenmiş bir kamyon olduğu halde zır zır otomobiller fabrikadan çıkmışlar. Karaköy, Köprü, Eminönü, Sultanahmet, Şehiremaneti, Şehzadebaşı tarikile Fatihe kadar gitmişler ve oradan yine Beyazıt, Cağaloğlu, Eminönü, Köprü tarikile Galataya gelmiş oradan da Taksim, Harbiye, Şişliye geçilmiştir.

Şişliden de Maçka, Akaretler, Beşiktaş, Dolmabahçe, Kabataş tarikile Tophaneye dönülmüştür. Bu suretle otomobiller gayet büyük bir tur yapmıştır. Resmigeçitteki intizam herkesin nazarı dikkatini celbetmiştir.

Resmi geçitte otomobillerin en önde eski tipteki otomobilleri arkada da yeni ve lüks otomobilleri bulunuyordu.

Dünkü resmi geçitten üç intiba

FIGURE 5.16 “The cars of the Ford plant made a grand parade yesterday”, 1930. SOURCE: *Akşam*. “‘Ford’ Fabrikasının Otomobilleri Dün Büyük Bir Geçit Resmi Yaptılar.” December 2, 1930.



Şehrimizde ilk defa olarak

Kuvveden fiile isal edilen büyük bir teşebbüs

DORT FORD KAMYONU

Türkiye dahilinde seyahate çıktı

Avrupa ve Amerika'nın her tarafında halk için büyük kamyon kervanları tertip edildiği gibi şehrimizde de ilk defa olarak dün; Ford Müessesesinin Topane'deki fabrikasında Türk işçilerinin el ve emeğile vücude getirilen kamyonlardan dört adedi Türkiye dahilinde bir devir seyahatine çıkmışlardır ki bu teşebbüs Türkiye sanayiinin inkişafında mühim bir devrenin mebdei addedilebilir.

Seyahate çıkan Ford kamyonları

Cidden şayanı iftihar olan bu muazzam teşebbüs; Türk topraklarında Ford'un Türk işçiliğine ve Türk emeğine yarattırdığı güzel eserlerin pek canlı bir delilidir.

Şekillerinin zerafet ve inceliği ile üzerlerindeki yazıları büyük caddelerde ehalinin merakla alâkasını celbeden bu kamyonlar hem uzun seferlere mütehammil hem de her türlü esbabı istirahati cami ve ayni zamanda en ucuza malolan birer vasıtai nakliyedir. Zira Ford Müessesesinin prensibi, öteden beri her keseye elverişli bir halk vasıtai nakliyesi temin etmekten ibarettir.

Bilhassa rekabetin hâkim olduğu bu zamanlarda kamyon, otomobil gibi zevki selimi okşıyacak bir vasıta değil belki hayatı kazanmanın en mühim amillerinden biri oddediliyor.

Binaenaleyh nakliyat vasıtalarının iktisadiyattaki büyük ehemmiyetini takdir edenler ve müessesenin Tophane'deki fabrikasında Türk işçilerinin emeği ile vücude getirilen Ford mamulâtına alâkadar olmak istiyenler Türkiye'nin başlıca şehir ve kasabalarını dolaşacak olan bu kervanı görüp tetkik etmelidirler.

Şayanı kayıt bir nokta da, seyahate çıkan bu kamyonlar münhasıran (Pratts) benzini ile (Socony) motör yağı kullanmakta olmalarıdır ki bu da Ford arabalarından azamî semere ve neticeler temin etmek istiyenler için cidden nazarı itibara alınacak mühim bir cihettir.

Şu halde nakliyat müteahhitleri ve umumiyetle kamyon iştira edeceklerin her şeyden evvel Ford mamulâtını tercih ve onları mubayaa ettikleri takdirde kendilerine hem daha ucuz daha sağlam ve daha mükemmel bir vasıtai nakliye temin etmiş olurlar.

FIGURE 5.17 "Four Ford trucks travel within Turkey", 1930. SOURCE: [Ford Motor Company Exports Inc.]. "Ford Kamyonlarının Memleket Dahilinde Seyahati." *Milliyet*, July 24, 1930, sec. [Infomercial].

- Official parades of trucks in the country and cars in the city were organized. (visualising progress, routes alongside the main arteries) (Fig. 5.15., Fig. 5.16., Fig. 5.17)
- Car races were financed and were reported about in newspapers (Mr. Hofinger, Ford Istanbul Manager participated at Touring Sports Events)
- Marketing the plant's automotives as "national" products, produce of Turkish workers,[144] "fruit of national sweat and ingenuity", providing "speed and order," participating at fairs of national products (*yerli malı fuarları*), in Galatasaray High School[145], Ankara *Yerli Mallar Haftası*
- Price dumping
- Organization of events at agencies at central places (The showroom of Ford Istanbul was at Taksim Square[146] where Ford shows were held (*Ford meşheri*)
- Factory tours to journalists, businessmen, bureaucrats etc.
- Lotteries advertised by popular names, like Keriman Halis, Miss Turkey of 1932
- Trial tours at agencies
- Ford airplane visits
- Applying for monopoly sales rights of the urban taxis (*tek taksi talimatnamesi*), urban busses at the Istanbul municipality and of vehicles for civil state institutions (*devlet müessesatı)* (The last concession was indeed granted to Ford).[147]
- Providing prominent statesmen with Fords (İnönü was driven in a Lincoln when visiting the plant)

144 Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Ford Freeport, Istanbul, "Milyonlarca Milyonlarca Türk Lirası," *Cumhuriyet*, October 23, 1930, sec. [Display Ads].

145 [Ford Motor Company], "Ayağınıza Gelen Bu Kârlı Fırsatı Kaçırmayınız," *Vakit*, August 23, 1930, sec. [Display Ads].

146 "Fordun Satış Salonu Açıldı[.] İstanbulda İmal Edilen Arabalar Her Cihetçe Çok Mükemmeldir," *Akşam*, January 7, 1930.

147 "Devlet Müesseseleri Ford Otomobili Kullanacaklar," *Son Posta*, December 11, 1930; "İş Otomobilleri. Devair ve Müessesatta Kullanılacak Otomobiller İçin Vekiller Heyetinin Kararı," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, January 10, 1931; Ford Motor Company, "İttihaz Edilen Bir Karar," *Cumhuriyet*, October 4, 1931, sec. [Display Ads].

- Movie shows (*Sinema müsabahası*)[148]
- Sound movie of the factory
- Advertisement in form of paternalistic letters by Henry Ford, "a personal brand, the personal cult of the collective utopia of speed and order". There were numerous news pieces about speculations whether and when Henry Ford would come to Turkey, through which an enigmatic character was constructed.
- Addressing different consumer segments "why do women, businessmen, upper class families, farmers..." would want to buy Ford?
- Ford's declared intention to buy carpets for its cars in Turkey, calling them, "*otomobil seccadeleri*"
- Bonus sale of cars[149]

The Leitmotifs of the advertisement discourse were "the universal car", speed (Fig. 5.18), order, robustness, frugality and noise of the machinery silencing the disorder in the factory.

148 "Ford Fabrikası Dün Bir Film Gösterdi," *Son Posta*, December 21, 1930.

149 Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul, "Bedava Otomobil," *Son Posta*, July 25, 1933, sec. [Classified Ads].



Sür'at.. Her şeyde sür'at!

İstanbul'da otomobilcilik faaliyetinin merkezi "Ford„ fabrikasıdır...

"Asrımız sür'at asrıdır„ diyenler çok doğru söylemişler. bugün bir dakikanın kıymeti gayet büyüktür. Zamanın kıymetini anlayanlar otomobilciliğe pek ziyade ehemmiyet vermektedirler.

Bizde otomobilcilik ne haldedir? Son günlerde İstanbulda göze çarpan bir otomobilcilik faaliyeti vardır. Bu mühim faaliyetin merkezi de İstanbulda açılan Fort fabrikasıdır. Bu fabrikayı boş bir zamanınızda gezerseniz sür'atın manasını anlarsınız. Kapıdan içeri girer girmez hümmalı bir faaliyet sizi karşılar. Çarkların cehennemi bir süratle döndüğünü görür, birbirini kovalayan çekiç sesleri işitirsiniz.

Tophane fabrikasında, Amerikada Detroit şehrindeki Fort fabrikasında tatbik edilen fevkalâde usullerle otomobiller, kamiyonlar imal edilir. Bunun için Tophane fabrikasında yapılan bir kamyonun bir otomobilin Detroit fabrikasından çıkan bir kamyon ve omobilden hiçto bir farkı yoktur.

Tophane fabrikasında tatbik edilen en son ve en fenni usuller memleketimizdeki mühendislerin ve bir çok hükûmet erkânının nazarı dikkatini ve taktirini celbetmiştir.

Tophanedeki fabrikada otomobiller nasıl imal edilir?

Fabrikanın içinde gayet büyük dolaplar, muazzam depolar vardır. Bu depolar ve dolaplarda yapılacak otomobillerin aksamı, parçaları istif edilmektedir.

Otomobiller kurulmuş bulunduğu halde iken, elektrik motörü ile müteharrik seyyar alet üzerinde dakikada bir kaç kadem ağır hareket ettirilerek her bir parça istif edilmiş bulundukları mahallerden çıkarılarak otomobillerin üzerlerindeki mevkii mahsuslarında techiz edilmektedir.

Bu seyyar techizat hattı üzerindeki otomobil ve kamyon şasileri yavaş yavaş hareket etmekte iken yardımcı makineler ianesile nakledilen motörler şasiler üzerindeki mevkilerine raptedilmektedir.

Techizat hattı istikametince mevki olan her bir işçi kendisine teretüp eden işle iştigal etmektedir. Tekerlekler, çamurluklar, basamaklar, direksiyon makanizmaları, akümülâtör ve sair aksam ve karoseri dahi bu suretle şasi üzerine teçhiz edilmektedir.

Otomobil bu suretle takriben itmam edilmiş bir hale kalbedildiği vakit, seyyar techizat hattının nihayetine takarrüp etmiş olur, ve bu lâhzada, otomobilin dahiline bir işçi girerek makanizmaları, klaksonu, ön fenerlerini, pencere kontrollarını ve saireyi tecrübe eder.

Bundan sonra makine çalıştırılır, otomobil harekete getirilerek bir kaç mühim tecrübe daha yapılır. Artık otomobil kumpanyanın acantelerine satılabilecek bir hale gelmiştir.

Bütün bunlar için bir çok çarklar döner, yağlı kayışlar makineleri dolaşır. Büyük çarkların süratli hareketleri durduğu zaman bir otomobil vücuda gelmiştir.

Meselenin asıl mühim tarafı bütün bu faaliyetin başında türk işçilerin bulunmasıdır. İşte caddelerde gördüğümüz ve şıklığı ile nazarı dikkatimizi celbeden, metanetini her otomobil sahibinden dinlediğiniz yen imodel Fort otomobil ve kamyonları böyle imal edilir.

FIGURE 5.18 "Speed... speed in everything", 1930. SOURCE: [Ford Motor Company Exports Inc.]. "Sür'at... Her Şeyde Sür'at! İstanbul'da Otomobilcilik Faaliyetinin Merkezi 'Ford' Fabrikasıdır..." *Akşam*, August 6, 1930, sec. [Infomercial].

§ 5.3 Customs in Corruption and Closure

In 1949-1950, the state archives documents a series of intensive inter-institutional correspondence documenting the confusion more or less with the following naive wording: "We had a big Ford factory, why did it close down, now we are calling American companies to invest in Turkey, but they ask, what should we say to them?". The Ministries of Finance and Economy and Trade, the Governorship of Istanbul, and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry all confirmed this amnesia by saying that they had "no information about the Ford case". Only the Ministry of Customs and Monopoly wrote back with substantial information, stating that "Ford might have been offended by the 10,000 lira customs smuggling case against him". "But they had already finalized all assembly activities two years before this case was filed". The customs ministry was right to think that "offense" was not the real reason, even though it was also trying to exonerate its organization.[150] The investigation took place on the eve of the draft law preparations of the Foreign Capital Incentive Law beginning of 1950s. The Turkish goverment was also closly observing the next investment plans of Ford in Middle East, especially in Alexandria and Haifa.[151]

150 "Türkiye`de Yatırım Yapmaya Ilgi Duyan Amerikan Iş Adamları ve Sermaye Sahipleri, İstanbul`da Kurulan Ford Asamble Tesislerinin Şirket Tarafından Bir Süre Sonra Kapatılmasının Sebeplerinin Araştırılması.," November 16, 1949, Dışişleri_Diplomatik-502 -23967-105091-20, CCA; "Amerikan Özel Sermayesinin Ülkemize Getirilmesi, İstanbul`da Kurulan Ford Asamble Tesislerinin Şirket Tarafından Bir Süre Sonra Kapatılmasının Sebeplerinin Araştırılması.," November 23, 1949, Dışişleri_Diplomatik-502-23967 -105091-19, CCA; "İstanbul`da Kurulan Ford Asamble Tesislerinin Şirket Tarafından Bir Süre Sonra Kapatılmasının Sebeplerinin Araştırılması, Türkiye`de Yabancı Sermayenin Emniyeti Tasarısı.," February 1, 1950, Dışişleri_Diplomatik-502-23967 -105091 -15, CCA; "İstanbul`da Kurulan Ford Asamble Tesislerinin Şirket Tarafından Bir Süre Sonra Kapatılmasının Sebeplerinin Araştırılması.," February 24, 1950, Dışişleri_Diplomatik-502 -23967 -105091 -12, CCA; "İstanbul`da 1929 Yılında Ülkemizle Yapılan Mukavele Gereğince Kurulan Amerikan Ford Müessesinin Şirket Tarafından Bir Süre Sonra Kapatılmasının Sebeplerinin Araştırılması.," April 6, 1950, Dışişleri_Diplomatik_502 -23967 -105091-8, CCA.

151 "Ford Firmasının Orta Doğu`da Kuracağı Tesisler.," January 7, 1950, Dışişleri_Diplomatik-502 -23967 -105091-17, CCA; "Amerika`daki Ford Otomobil Firmasının Değişik Ülkelerde

What really happened to the Ford assembly plant at Tophane that has been erased from our memory of the quarter? The plant could assemble 150 cars when working full capacity with two shifts, and 80 cars in an eight-hour working day. But within the first month of its operation, it could assembly only 45 cars a day. This number declined the following six months to 35 cars a day. In 1934, its production came to a full halt when assembly activity only comprised of six cars and trucks a day. What really happened? How was it downgraded to a plant that could only assembly only ten days a month as early as in 1932?[152] A couple of months after its opening worker's complaints about dismissals, the possibility closure and relocation to Greece or Romania found media coverage.[153] A year after its opening, the number of the employees was halved to 200.[154] In April 1933 assembly activities were halted and in 1934 it had fully stopped assembly and became a "service facility only."[155] In the same year it sold 422 nearly completely imported cars and trucks, and had only 50 employees on its payroll, yet a fixed capital of 408,480 USD (in form of building fixtures, building structures, machinery, equipment and tools) stuck in the spatial fix.[156] How could Ford Istanbul accumulate an operating loss of over one million dollars in the first seven years between 1929 and 1936, considering the projections in the initial phases?[157]

As the projection of the plant was suited to a liberal capitalism with permeable economic borders and a customs regime without restrictions, it fell on the arrangements in the post-1929 crisis such as the protective controlling of currency rates, bilateral clearing and barter agreements, the state monopoly on imports, export quotas and documentation obligation of the

---

Kurulan Veya Kurulacak Olan Asamble Tesisleri.," December 20, 1949, Dışişleri_Diplomatik-502-23967 -105091 -18, CCA.

152 "Percival Perrys' Letter Dated 24th of March 1932."

153 "Fort Fabrikası İstanbuldaki Faaliyetini Tatile[]Mi Karar[]Vermiş[?]"; "Şayialar Yalan! Ford Fabrikası Tatili Faaliyet Etmiş Değildir."; "Fort Fabrikası Son Günlerde Tediyatı Kesmiştir."

154 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt."

155 "Ford Plant Ceases Work in Turkey," *Los Angeles Times*, February 18, 1934.

156 "Istanbul, Turkey," 1934, Acc 660 --Industry-- Autos-- FMC --Bidgs --Turkey --Istanbul, The Henry Ford Online Archives.

157 Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform*, 138.

attestation of origin. The shortage of foreign currency and the diminishing demand for automobiles and tractors deserted the territory and Ford Motor Company Export Inc., Istanbul was officially liquidated in June 1944.[158] Beginning with protracted, mostly unrecorded negotiations with high state officials and continuing with euphoric reporting, not a single news item was published in the Turkish press about the closure of the Ford Istanbul plant.

Until well into the beginning of 1940s Ford tried to find remedies to the sudden shift in the attitude towards itself and the changing environment. It applied for monopoly rights to deliver the taxis in the city of Istanbul, but also to be the unique supplier of automobiles to public establishments (except military bodies) in 1930 and 1931. It succeeded to acquire the monopoly rights in the latter request, but not in the former.[159] This was severely protested by the agencies of other brands on the grounds that "Ford was not even creating values and acting like a sales facility."[160] Los Angeles Times criticized this protest and stated -wrongfully- that "the local competition" was the reason behind the termination of the assembly activities.

> The Ford assembly plant has ceased work, due largely to complaints of rival firms that the company was not fulfilling conditions of its establishment here. These conditions were said to require that Ford should manufacture automobiles in Turkey, whereas the plant has

158 Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 435.

159 Ford Motor Company, "İttihaz Edilen Bir Karar"; "Şoförleri Alâkadar Eden Bir Mesele: Umumî İhtiyaçlarda Herhangi Bir Marka Otomobil Kullanılamıyacak[.] Hükûmete Yeni Bir TEklifatta Bulunulduğu Şayidir," *Son Posta*, April 5, 1931; "Taksi Meselesi Fort Fabrikası Belediyeye Bir Teklif Yaptı," *Vakit*, September 7, 1930; "Otomobilciler Tek Taksiye İtiraz Ediyorlar," *Milliyet*, September 24, 1930; "Ford Taksi İnhisarı İçin Müracaat Edilmediği Söyleniyor," *Vakit*, September 9, 1930; "Ford, Taksi İnhisarını İstiyor," *Cumhuriyet*, September 6, 1930; "Tek Taksi[.] İtirazların Ref'i İçin Tetkikat Yapılıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, March 10, 1931; "Belediyede Tek Taksi Talimatnamesi," *Vakit*, March 10, 1931.

160 "'Ford' Fabrikası. Bazı Otomobil Acentaları İktisat Vekâletine Müracaat Ederek Forda Verilen Rüçhan Hakkının Kaldırılmasını İstediler," *Cumhuriyet*, January 9, 1934.

> merely assembled cars here since it began operations two years ago.[161]

Also in other domains, like monetary policy Turkey was moving into a direction, typically called "a hostile environment for business." Turkey had joined the "beggar-my-neighbor" policy and introduced quota regulations, exchange controls, barter and clearing agreements. Ford tried to save the enterprise from its free fall by negotiating for being put outside the new quota regulations and it managed to exclude itself from this regulation between 1932 and 1934, if not without some diplomatic help.[162]

But it became harder and harder to obtain foreign currency to pay for Ford's goods and parts because of currency restrictions and import permits.

> Actually, Istanbul effected during the year a number of C.S.P. transactions. However due to the various currency restrictions in Turkey, the system developed gradually to direct deliveries to dealers, or more precisely to a system, according to which the dealers themselves had to remit in advance, before receipt of units, to the Turkish National Bank the countervalue of the units in Turkish currency, whereupon the respective dollar amount of pound amounts were liquidated, in case import permit were available.[163]

To overcome the currency restriction Ford tried to enter into barter agreements. Chief clerk of Ford Istanbul since the opening of the plant until pretty much the end of the enterprise, Gustav Riedt remembered that period

---

161 "Ford Plant Ceases Work in Turkey."

162 "Ford Müessesesi'nin Amerika'dan Getirip Monte Edeceği Yedek Parçalarda Kontenjan Usulünün Tatbik Edilmesi," January 13, 1932, 30-18-1-2 /25-3-18, CCA; "Ford Motor Company İncorporeted Şirketi'nin İstanbul'daki Montaj Fabrikasına Getireceği Ford Arabaları ve Parçaları Hakkında Kararname," October 11, 1934, 030.18.01.02.48.69.09, CCA; Mehmet Asım [Us], "Türkiye ve Amerika," *Vakit*, January 2, 1932, sec. Başmakale; "Şapka Kutuları[.] Şapkacılar İktisat Vekâletine Şikâyet Edecekler," *Cumhuriyet*, January 31, 1932; "Ford Fabrikasının Getireceği Arabalar," *Vakit*, October 19, 1934; "Ford Fabrikasına Gelecek Malzeme," *Akşam*, November 30, 1934.

163 "Description of Credit Schemes Bucharest - Istanbul, from the Office of Sir Percival Perry to Stanford Cooper in Dearborn," January 24, 1938, AR98.213541 / 137, Folder 33, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

in the interview with Mira Wilkins as follows. "In 1934-35 there were particularly bad foreign exchange problems. [...] We bought gumtraganath (*kitre*), a flower used to manufacture sweets and sold it to England. With that money we got foreign exchange to buy English trucks."[164] The most important reason why Riedt could not leave Ford Istanbul despite all these troubles was that he was one of the main defendants in a customs smuggling case that lasted a total of six years. In 1940, when the case ended in acquittal, he could only leave.

This customs smuggling case span the whole period between August 1934 and April 1940, which accounted to half of the whole existence of the company in Turkey. Allegations of customs smuggling and cooperation of corrupt customs officers in the free zone with Ford control officials were brought to the Penal Court. This customs smuggling case was reconstructed based on three types of sources.

- Confidential correspondence between Percival Perry and the highest ranks of the Detroit company,
- The memoirs of Jacques Abravanel, who worked for the plant between 1930 and 1935 as chief inspector - *directeur de contrôle* for a total of three and a half years with a short interruption in Ford Lusitana - (in Portugal. He would later became Honorary Consul of Portugal in Turkey between 1934 and 1993, until his death) played the role of the shadow negotiator in the customs smuggling case between the Turkish Government and Ford, and reported amply about this incident in his memories.[165]
- The newspaper *Kurun*[166] (former *Vakit*) of the Founder and Editor-in-Chief Mehmet Asım Us[167], was called "the mouthpiece of the Republican People's Party." He was a MP from Çoruh and Artvin, starting from 1931 in several different legislative periods. *Kurun* reported about the Ford lawsuit directly from the "courtroom." The newspaper did not miss even one audi-

164 "Mira Wilkins' Interview with F.G.Riedt."

165 Abravanel, *Mémoires Posthumes et Inachevées de Jacques Abravanel*, 38, 41–44, 79–86.

166 Ahmet Emin, "Vakit (Kurun) Gazetesi," in *Ataturk Ansiklopedisi*, n.d., https://ataturkansiklopedisi.gov.tr/bilgi/vakit-kurun-gazetesi/?pdf=3281.

167 "Mehmet Asım Us (1884-1967)," in *Atatürk Ansiklopedisi*, February 18, 2021, https://ataturkansiklopedisi.gov.tr/bilgi/mehmet-asim-us-1884-1967/.

ence of the case.[168] This could be seen that the RPP had already given up on Ford and wanted this case as an indirect message that they were not welcome anymore.

What was just a couple of years ago a privilege (to be given absolute free hand in the Tophane quay and dedicate itself to industriousness and know-how transfer to Turkish workers with nearly no control) turned to be perceived and designated as corrupt and criminal. We see that the discourse of corruption as something in which a "public," which is idealized by normative codes and independent of space and time, is corrupted by "private interests,"[169] was used during the trial by completely forgetting the memory and tone of the time when the Free Zone and Ford laws were discussed. What was perceived and propagated as being in the interest of the public and national welfare just four years ago had now been declared corrupt. This sharp U-turn within such a short span of time undermined the minimal conditions of existence of the enterprise in Istanbul. What were the underlying causes of this radical change in the perception and reception of Ford in Turkey?

168 "Ford Davası," *Kurun*, October 25, 1935; "Ford Davası," *Kurun*, December 10, 1935; "Ford Davası," July 30, 1935; "Ford Kumpanyasında Yapılan Gümrük Kaçakçılığı," *Kurun*, June 26, 1935; "Ford Kaçakçılığı Duruşması," *Kurun*, June 18, 1935; "Gümrük Kaçakçılığı. Eşyalar Bir Amma Ağırlıklar Başka!," *Kurun*, May 23, 1935; "Duruşma Bugün. Ford Acentasında Yapılan Kaçakçılık," *Kurun*, May 14, 1935; "Ford Müessesesinin Bütün Hesaplarına Bakılacak," *Kurun*, May 6, 1935; "Ford Davasında İhmalleri Görülen Memurlar," *Kurun*, May 15, 1935; "Ford Davasında Dünkü Safha Çok Hararetli Geçti! Müddeiumumî, İki Kişinin Tevkifini İstiyor," *Kurun*, April 19, 1935; "Ford Fabrikasında Yapılan Kaçakçılık. Dün İhtisas Mahkemesinde Duruşmaya Başlandı; Fabrikanın Umum Müdürile Nakliyat Müdürü Sorguya Çekildi," *Kurun*, April 14, 1935; "8inci İhtisas Mahkemesinde İki Dava. Kaçak Kumaş Getirtmek Suçuyla Terzi Jan Olivya Sorguya Çekildi. Ford Fabrikası Davasına Bakıldı," *Kurun*, April 23, 1935, sec. Şehirde; "Ford Fabrikasındaki Gümrük Kaçakçılığı," *Kurun*, April 7, 1935; "Ford Otomobilleri ve Gümrük Resmi," *Kurun*, March 13, 1935; "Ford Davası," *Kurun*, August 27, 1936; "Şehir Meclisinde Son Toplantı. Un Nümunesi Fırınlardan Nasıl Alınacak? Münakaşalara Rağmen Bir Karar Verilemedi," *Kurun*, November 25, 1936.

169 Cengiz Kırlı, *Yolsuzluğun Icadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, Iktidar, ve Bürokrasi*, Verita/Tarih (İstanbul: Verita, 2015), 9–18, 105ff.

The changing global order and the increasing role of the state after the crisis, made the legal basis which Ford was acting on, very fragile. In 1935, the customs smuggling investigation that started a year ago was brought to court against Ford Istanbul. The advocacy of the court case, which continued for five years, was taken over by the renowned attorney at law "Maitre" Gad Franko from the town of Milas[170]. Ford accepted customs "irregularity" in its internal correspondence, but was referring to the "irregularity" originating between a Turkish plant employee and customs officer who had agreed to debit money to their own account without their knowledge. At the end of this very expensive and difficult court case Ford was found not guilty.[171]

170 Rıfat N. Bali, "Gad Franko," in *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Ekrem Çakıroğlu, vol. 1, 2 vols. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008), 464; Anthony G. Bigio, *A Sephardi Turkish Patriot: Gad Franco in the Turmoil of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic* (Lanham; Boulder; New York; London: Hamilton Books, 2023).

171 "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Memo on 'Discussion with Mr. H. Stanford Cooper,'" October 27, 1936, ACC 880, Box 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers], Letter by H. Stanford Cooper from Dagenham to B. J. Craig, Ford-US Auditor," December 24, 1937, ACC 880, Box 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Private and Confidential Letter by H. Standord Cooper in London to Edsel Ford in Dearborn," May 4, 1937, ACC 880, Box 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers], Letter by H. Stanford Cooper from Dagenham to B. J. Craig, Ford-US Auditor," May 4, 1938; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Letter by H. Standford Cooper to B. J. Craig in Dearborn," May 25, 1938, ACC 880 / Box 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Letter by B. J. Craig in Dearborn to H. Stanford Cooper," June 1, 1938, ACC 880 / Box 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Memo Discussion by Mr. Herman L. Moekle from the Auditing Departmen Dearborn with Mr. H. Standford Cooper," November 15, 1938, ACC 880 / Box 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Letter of H.Stanford Coopers Dated April 8, 1940 to H. L. Moelke," April 8, 1940, Acc. 880 / Box 7, Benson Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Letter of H.Stanford Coopers Dated May 4, 1927 to Edsel Ford," May 8, 1940, Acc. 285 / Box 2025, Benson Ford; "[Mira Wilkins Research Papers] Letter by H. Stanford Cooper in London to Herman L. Moekle in Dearborn," April 8, 1940, ACC 880, Box 7, FMC Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

The failure of Ford in Istanbul compared to what it projected and its exit was not unique. Other serious miscalculations of Ford in the interwar period in Italy, Greece, Romania, Japan, and Dagenham witnessed of an "erratic and prolonged process of internationalization."[172]:

> Year by year Perry, surveying his wide territory, was able to compensate for losses in one area by profits in another, and usually to emerge a gainer. In 1934, for example, the Italian, Turkish, and German companies (with the lastly-named writing off some debts) operated at a loss.[173]

Ford England had to carry the financial burden of the losses of the Istanbul operation because of the internal agreement made in 1931 between Dagenham and Dearborn since it had become the "regional center" of Europe for all assembling, service, and sales units within the Decentralization Program of 1928 of the Ford Motor Company. In the framework of this program, in August 1931 the London based Ford England, had taken over the authority to control all the assets of Ford Motor Company Export Inc. Istanbul which itself was granted the government concession as an American-based company in 1928. The Dagenham plant near London, whose construction began in 1928 to "supply" all the assembly plants in Europe with the Model A Fords and which was planned to have a capacity of 250,000 automobiles yearly, shared a similar faith with the Tophane plant. Dagenham was left with its imperial yearly production estimates and with bitter actual sales numbers. It was also Ford England who had to cover up the whole investment costs and the expenses and carry primarily the distress of the penal case. The physical and economic basis that existed during the stage of the planning for both plants had changed drastically within two years' time. Dagenham and Tophane had lost their territories to protectionist customs regulations and were being squeezed to a small "national market." Thus, they were like "Gulliver in Lilliput."

---

172 Toninelli, "Between Agnelli and Mussolini," 336; Wilkins and Hill, *American Business Abroad*, 1964, 260; Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:104ff.

173 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 3, Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962*, 3:86.

Ford Istanbul stopped its production entirely in the beginning of 1934. The next ten years, the estimated million-dollar plant remained inert and was used only as a storage area for motor vehicles and sales place of spare parts. The assembly line equipment and the machinery left the Galata port for trips to Alexandria and Bucharest. Those long trips of the "wandering machinery" ended partly at the Fords' service and sales unit in Alexandria in 1932 and partly (the assembly line equipment) in Bucharest in 1938.[174] Tophane, the "Small Detroit," witnessed the dusk of an era in which industries were ascribed to ports and the deliveries to a global market with universal cars.

The era of shipping standard American Fords to vast areas without customs barriers through assembly factories was over, and the era of national(ist) protectionism had arrived. The rise of European protectionism and the shift in FMC's policies from multinational regionalization to multidomestic production cut across the international strategic aims of both Tophane and Dagenham plans. In the 1930s, those who could move from the global assembly industry to a "national factory" transformed and survived, while those who could not were eliminated on the way. What a "national factory" meant was above all using more national workforce and inputs in the production process, applying national symbols and names to their original brands and models adapted to the local tastes and needs. While Mussolini's Italy was supporting Fiat, Ford was launching "German-made" Ford Köln, Ford Rheinland, and Ford Taunus in Germany.[175] The huge Soviet market was filled not with imported automobile parts from Istanbul, as imagined, but with Soviet copies of these cars, forced by the foreign exchange bottleneck. The Soviet export market had diminished due to substitution of Ford imports by Soviet copies. From the very first day on it was evident that Turkish market on its own couldn't absorb the production of FMC's Istanbul plant. Istanbul was neither Köln, nor Paris; therefore, Ford couldn't afford a shift from export-oriented assembly to domestic production in Turkey.

174 "Plant Questionnaire of Istanbul Plant."

175 Thomas, "Searching for Identity"; Link, *Forging Global Fordism*.

The 1929 crisis that struck Tophane was not only a financial or an overproduction crisis, but also an indication of the radical transformation of the economical geography of the industrial investments. The political and economic borders were renegotiated on a global level. The end of these negotiations was to come to a terminus with a big world war. Walter Benjamin was right, *L'automobile c'est la guerre*.[176]

176 Benjamin, "Theories of German Fascism."

6

Conclusion and Outlook

While this thesis meticulously pursued the question of how the Ford Istanbul plant, capable of turning out 37,000 cars annually,[1] if it had utilized its planned capacity to the limit, came into being, it was constantly pursued by the question "why did it fail so miserably?". The question "how?" is a kind of "pattern recognition" question about identifying the forms in which socio-economic relations "take place." If the impulses, motivations, orientations, and boundaries that constitute spatial patterns are identified rather than derived from theories that constitute preferred abstractions, this can lead us in a more appropriate way to the question of "why?" and "how can these reasons change?"

In this way the following two questions are intrinsically linked to each other: How was the Istanbul plant as the assembly node for a vast company territory made and unmade and why did it fail for all actors involved in it compared to what they expected in the near future? The failure of Ford in Istanbul triggered an exit and the development of new investment strategies adapted to the economic autarchy tendencies leading to militarization of economies. After the War with the exits from failed markets and the accumulation during the war period it was ready to pass to the next spatial strategy of multidomestic assembly in protected markets. Ford became ford-

1 Nevins and Hill, *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*, 2:554.

ist through the failures and exits from markets supplied with "global cars" from territorial nodes and became "fordist" in the widely used meaning of the term after the 1970s.

Exactly to make that change in the spatial strategy and economic geography of Ford intelligible, we tried to trace how the Company changed its territorial organization of the mass production of automobiles during the Interwar period in the first instance. Ford, as the biggest industrial enterprise of the world in 1920s, "inventor" of the moving assembly line adapted to changes in the economic geography of the world market and the crisis of overproduction. But Ford was more than just the executer of a spatial policy. It drafted a clear model of factory-scale social and moral policy[2] and worked actively for its diffusion which was adapted at the scale of the society after the World War II, transcending industrial hubs.

In this thesis we tried to follow closely the company's perspective, spheres of influence, calculations and motivations in this very volatile trial and error process in the moment of its "contingent" production. Only from that level of spatial description the successive miscalculations, the path dependencies on which those miscalculations were based could be inferred. Ford's organization of production and work was rational, planned, resourceful and but the shape of the business was determined more by those trial and error processes rather than the calculations of the "rational company." For us, this is a strong invitation not to start from the premise that the plans and inclinations of the corporations, which are the most powerful determinants of the socio-economic structures we live in, and the statesmen they sit at the same tables with and negotiate, are "ultimately" the determinants of the structures. The so-called "anarchy of markets" leads not only to ever deeper crises and ever more destructive and widespread wars, but also to the possibility of imagining a world outside of individualized mass automobilization that can seep through the cracks opened by these very failures in their moment of formation.

The failure of Ford Istanbul fed into the contemporary success of Ford Werke that started producing the "German cars and military vehicles" even

2 Maier, "Society as Factory."

during the World War II when USA and Germany were in a state of war. The projected Istanbul territory that united nineteen independent, semi-colonial and colonial countries through the civilizing tractor, weekend car and industrious truck turned out to be a dream. The dream of the Interwar period actively produced the catastrophe of the World War II in the pursuit of the capital for a new spatial-fix -with a new round of carbon economy and new energy geographies-.The fact that many of the Ford executives (Collins, Knudsen, Sorensen, T. Cooper) who entered and exited the story of Ford Istanbul come from military backgrounds or served in or for the US army during the World War II is more than a coincidence, it points to this continuity.

David Harvey offers a brilliant analysis for this destructive search of capital (and the corporations as its institutionalized form) and the challenge of the historical geography of capitalism to grasp its forms, tendencies, and outcomes. "Spatial and temporal displacements (through long-term investments in the formation of physical and social infrastructures) offer provisional solutions to the accumulation crisis."[3] Re-scaling by way of trial-and-error processes to navigate competition and provide for the continuity of capital accumulation culminate in

> [t]rade wars, dumping, tariffs and quotas, restrictions on capital flow and foreign exchange, interest-rate wars, immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation and domination of tributary economies, the forced reorganization of the territorial division of labor within economic (even corporate) empires and finally, the destruction and forced devaluation achieved through military confrontation and war [...].[4]

The "sailing machinery" or "circulating fixed capital" of Ford between Alexandria, Istanbul and Bucharest within such a short time span of less than ten years was -in a literal sense- the perfect example for this search of a new spatial fix. On top of this, Ford compared to other automakers of the period had the highest fixed production costs as the most vertically integrat-

3 Harvey, "The Geopolitics of Capitalism," 135.

4 Ibid., 156–57.

ed company not only in its own sector but in general. While the Ford managers of the time were seeking maximum privileges for its investements, travelling from one port city to another, they were intensifying the competition between ports for investment locations. By playing one city against the other, they were in fact trying to shape a spatial fix in such a way as to serve the largest territory in the most profitable way for the longest period of time. However, this speed also increased the speed at which small crises could turn into a general economic crisis. Against profit-squeeze, underconsumption, and the falling rate of profit, Ford looked like a cowboy who could not outgun his shadow. In a war economy, military automobilization provided the greatest exit from this critical situation for all firms in the industry.

Ford Istanbul constituted a node within the global production network of Ford in the interwar period, the biggest automotive company of the time, marking not only the organization of production but also a "collective utopia" of mass-produced industrialism.[5] The factory level analysis facilitated us to lay out tendencies of the spatial and ideological organization of industrial capitalism on the eve of the catastrophe. Ford's outlook was never only spatial but also ideological which Greg Grandin,[6] historian of work, life and nature around the rubber plantations of Ford in Brasil, has called "international utopianism". He states that this outlook was

> reconfigured in the 1920s as the basis for a series of projects to organize communities of work and life outside of Detroit [...] That many of these projects never materialized, and others ended in dismal failure, reminds us that the Ford Company's many programs to produce a new world of mass production and consumption were always only aspirational.[7]

With this perspective we tried to describe in detail the "real-existing relationships" between the mightiest multinational corporations of the time and a nationally consolidating government, its plant and the urban socio-environment, its workplace, and the workers.

5 Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe*.

6 Grandin, *Fordlandia*.

7 Ibid.

There are three methodological accents in this thesis:

First is the invitation to "bring back the capital and its entanglements" into the historywriting (and sociology) of the Republican history instead of the foreign versus national capital dichotomy. This thesis' conviction was that workspace-scale history, reconstructed from Ford's perspective provided as with the tools of "transnational historicization"[8] instead of methodological nationalisms or injecting anachronic and deterministic spatial categories or temporal labels (like Middle East, developmental state, etc.) upon the historical case. The story of a single factory of Ford, namely the concrete scale of the factory in Tophane was an inter-relational space formed by entanglements. The national, regulatory framework set in Ankara, the global outlook of the investing actor in Detroit and the local space of concrete labor recruitment and urbanized environment in Tophane interacted with each other, to form a single factory as a lived, perceived, and conceived space.[9]

Second, it is my conviction that workplace-scale analysis offers considerable advantages to unlock the patterns of global entanglements compared to research agendas that emanate from theoretical concepts. As such it has the potential to make visible and overcome methodological fallacies such as the linearizing, or determinist chronological approaches to the history of capitalism, the fallacies of misplaced abstractions of capital and state and the fallacies of attributing infallibility to the rational business decisions of resourceful multinational corporations.

The last is a special sensitivity to "stories of unclaimed failures" is essential for a historiography that explicitly engages with current social relevancy of research questions. A period, a case, an institution, or a person is not remembered anymore if it is in one way or the other outside the hegemony of memory regime today. That is exactly why they are especially worth scrutinizing closely.

Yes, Ford Istanbul constituted a failure for all actors involved in it compared with the initial calculations, projections and even hopes. That case was an untold story because it was the reference of identification of none of the

8 Link, "Transnational Fordism," 2012, 33.

9 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 38ff.

glorious enterprises and projects of today. None of the winners of today could locate retrospectively an "origin" for itself. The failure of that time remained unclaimed and so the history of this very interesting chapter of the Turkish economic, business, and urban history had not been written until now. Yet it constituted the first free zone application, the first automotive factory and the first application of the electrical moving assembly line in a sector other than food production in Turkey. For this spatial-fix Ford used its influence, both official and unofficial, to have these two laws passed. The Company lured the statesmen with whom it negotiated by investing into rival port cities and had two tailor-made pieces of legislation out of the one thousand three hundred-odd laws enacted in the first six years of the Republic, right down to their articles. It is significant that topics that one would expect to be of interest to many professional or popular historians thematically, remained untouched until the early 2000s.

Yet, writing about the exit of Ford from Istanbul paved a way of a non-deterministic understanding of the historical context of the Interwar to this thesis. And this type of historywriting focusing deliberately on failures is diametrically opposed to the "narrative of cumulative success" or its twin-sister, the "epistemology of absence" that is prevalent in the dominant historywriting taking a Turkish "dependent" and "catch-up" capitalism for granted. Yes, Ford Istanbul was an atypical foreign direct investment compared with the bulk of other types of investments of foreign capital into the railways, banking sector, urban facilities, commercial and mining sectors.[10] But the peculiarity of its industrial spatial fix, sheer scale and the relationship it formed with the Goverment was rooted in a rationality of its context. At the micro level of narration we opted for we hope that we could put both its existence and its miscalculations in relationship to the original plans and expectations, indicate paths that were deemed to be possible but not taken, the intentions of historical actors in the light of the future unintended consequences. On the level of the economic history, the factory was the micro cosmos par excellence where Ford's projections of accumulation "met" the

10 Altun, *Türkiye'de Yabancı Sermayenin Tarihsel Gelişimi*, 94.

ground' and came into touch with the real existing factors of production, namely the natural and processed environment and people.

EPILOGUE: TOPHANE FROM GALATAFORD TO GALATAPORT

> By focusing on particular themes of the politics of space in Beirut, we may bring out vital modes of social change and urban experience that a chronologically arranged city biography would have failed to notice or deemed insignificant details of a distant past. Beirut's spatial past matters because it resonates with the city's post-war present.[11]

This is how the nineteenth century historian of Beirut; Hansen explained the link between spatial history and the resonance of the urban past with the present. This is true also for the relationship of the spatial past of the Tophane quay that is dominated presently by another mega project of global scale, the Galataport. The Salıpazarı customs area, in which the Ford plant was located during the Interwar period, was closed to cargo ships in 1986. Right after the handing over of its property from the TMA to the High Council of Privatization Administration, 1,500 meters of its coastal stripe was declared as a Tourism Area. This was the legal preparation for the global cruiser project, baptized Galataport. It aimed towards the global cruise tourism and in this competed with ports such as Barcelona, Rome, Venetia, Piraeus, Napoli, and Livorno in the cruiser business territory. Its investors were global capitalist actors and, as it was in the case of Fords' free zone, the project conceptualized the waterfront only as a functional instrument, filling the sea for the third time in the last hundred and fifty years. This time a tourism enclave was designed instead of an industrial one.

All this brings Tophane of the 1920's into mind though this is not the only "afterlife" of Ford Istanbul as exemplified with flashforwards into the later investments of Ford in Turkey after the 1950s and the latter's new set of accumulation rounds in relation to decentralization of industry from Istan-

11 Hanssen, *"Fin De Siècle" Beirut*, 12.

bul to the neighboring provinces, and take-over of markets and factories in Egypt and Romania.

The Galataport project was halted in 2006 by the Council of State upon the objection of the Chamber of City Planners. Another "trademark project" for the same area was brought back to the agenda by way of hastily amending the Coastal Law.[12] Before transforming the Galata Pier again with the blast of another global project, it would have been wise to look back to the past investment experiences and disappointments despite the lack of physically conserved traces. Even the Galataport project could not tear the veil of amnesia around the Ford Tophane factory, with which it shared the same space ninety years apart. It may be the overshadowing caused by the fact that both capital projects look at the space from the same perspective that perpetuates the forgetting.

Galataport, when finally opened in 2021 in the middle of the pandemic adversely effecting cruiser tourism, covered sixteen times the area Ford Free zone used to cover. The international cruiser tourism as its main function supported the occupation of the space with luxury hotels, entertainment parks with shopping and duty-free areas, cineplex cinemas, restaurants and a museum of modern arts. The international consortium of the real estate project consisted of mainly foreign transnational navigation, construction, and retail trade companies. Both the lack of transparency during the tender process and the planning of the area have been subject to severe criticisms by professional chambers. Lack of transparency was common to both projects whereby only the later one was openly pronounced. The current transformation of the Tophane quays has a lot in common with the historical example of the Ford Motor Company's Interwar investment at the same spot.

Firstly, both the GalataFord and Galataport[13] constitute deterritorializing investments. Both investments aimed at producing abstract spaces, selectively integrating, and largely cutting off the investment area

12 "[Galataport Özel Dosyası]," *ELECTROui, Quarterly Electronic Publication of Observatoire Urbain d'Istanbul, Insitut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes (IFEA)*, no. 22 (2005).

13 I would like to thank my dear friend Nevâ Şellaki, who is no longer with us, for inspiring me to use this analytical pun.

from the experienced spaces of everyday life and the urban tissue. A comparison in terms of lack of local demand and inputs, employment and work practices and furthermore the way which this specific city space used by the citizens in their everyday practices are relevant comparisons where the spatial past resonates with the current space. In both cases the export-orientation is outstanding. Ford Tophane's exports of assembled vehicles were planned to target Soviet, Balkan, Near-Eastern, Northeast- African markets. Galataport targets at attracting a larger share of international cruiser flows, but also raising the real estate values of the area by integrating them to the global real estate markets using the visibility of the megaproject. Thirdly, both investments are global also in terms of its actors, FMC in the former, a global consortium with a major participation of international capital in the latter. Lastly both investments use the waterfront to enhance their brand image.

Ford's de-territorialized investment turned out to be a failure for all the parts involved in it and Ford exited the Galata quays. Perhaps telling the story of Ford in Tophane, which has been widely erased of the local memory, might shed light to the current gap between the projected aims and realities of Galataport.

Appendix A Chronology of Making and Unmaking of FMC Exports Inc., Istanbul, 1911-1960

1903	Incorporation of the Ford Motor Company in Dearborn/Detroit (Model Ford A).
1904	First step of internationalization: Incorporation of Ford Canada, across the Lake Erie, in Oakville/Ontario.
1908	Special Commission initiated by the Ottoman Government on the feasibility of a free zone at the port of Constantinople.
Oct. 1, 1908	Launching of the Model Ford T, the "Tin Lizzie"
Oct. 23, 1911	Production began in a former tram and railway carriage works at Trafford Park / Manchester, the first Ford factory outside North America.
1913	Commission to study feasibility of a free zone in Constantinople, initiated by the minister of commerce, Süleyman el Büstani.
1917	Henry Ford & Son was incorporated in April with headquarters in Cork, Ireland to manufacture Fordson Tractors. It would become the first purpose-built Ford factory in the Old World.
July 3, 1919	The First Fordson tractor leaves Cork production line.
1919	Knudsen Plan for the Restructuring of European Operations into six Zones
March 1921	Initiation of New Economic Policy (NEP) in Soviet Russia by Lenin, open for credit and concessionaire type relationship with foreign capital.
Aug.2, 1922	Fiat's request to the Turkish Government of monopoly rights for transportation with Fiat cars and trucks on specific routes (Mardin-Samsun, Samsun-Ankara and İnebolu-Ankara); in return of building garages, repair shops, motor exhibition rooms and educating Turkish workers in the art of automotive techniques. [the same

	year in October, as Mussolini becoming prime minister in Italy]
Dec. 1, 1922	Ford Motor Company d'Italia was incorporated, as a branch of Société d'Investissement de Ford (SIF), Luxemburg, wholly owned subsidiary by the FMC. First simple assembly plant is opened in the free zone, in a former sugar warehouse.
May 1923	The Soviet Government banned the import of passenger cars for one year but canceled this impractical decision in September.
Sept. 1923	Gabriel B. Ravndal, American attaché in Istanbul in his report on Turkey: "It is believed that the government will consider the application of a foreign firm of good repute for a free port in Istanbul".
May 1924	The American Trading Corporation, AMTORG was inaugurated in NY and Moscow, the sole Soviet agency for trade with USA, acting under the secret guidance of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the USSR, the NKVT.
Nov. 1924	Report by Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Commission on the Economy of Istanbul, one policy suggestion is parceling out a free zone at the quay of Tophane
June-July 1925	Visit of Ford representatives for European operations to Trieste, Piraeus, and Constantinople for expanding operations, new assembly plants and free zone privileges (Territory Report from 25 July 1925)
By 1925	Population of the territory covered by Trieste Company reckoned at 173.375.814, around % 75 of all the motor cars in the vast region are Fords. (*Ford Industries)*
July, 20 1925	News in Cumhuriyet: "Ford representative Harrington will come to Ankara to negotiate Ford investment in Turkey"

July 29, 1925	Foundation of the Istanbul Port Monopoly Company, joint enterprise by Ministry of Industry and Mines, Turkish Business Bank, Turkish Maritime Administration, Maritime Affairs Inc, Istanbul Barge and Lighter Association of Loading and Unloading, General Manager is Ahmet Hamdi Başar.
Aug. 1, 1925	Los Angeles Times news according to Turkish Anatolian Agency: "Plant in Turkey Said to be Plan of Ford"
Aug. 2, 1925	New York Times article: "Constantinople-The City that is Dying"
Dec. 2, 1925	FMC and AMTORG, the Soviet trading corporation for USA, agreed to ship Fordson tractors to the USSR on credit terms and to admit students to Ford plants.
Dec. 14, 1925	Conclusion of AMTORG-FMC contract about education of fifty Russians per year to study tractor building and repairing in the Rouge Factory - Detroit, Soviet Government became the largest of all Fordson buyers.
1925-1926	Boom period of establishment of many Turkish joint stock companies, dealing with import of motor vehicles, spare parts / motor vehicle parts like Milli Oto Türk Anonim Şirketi (1925), Otomobil Ticaret A.Ş, İstanbul Otomobil T.A.Ş (1926), Anadolu Otomobil ve Otobüsleri A.Ş. (1925).
Feb. 15, 1926	FMC receives the largest single tractor order from USSR through AMTORG, 10.000 vehicles in total
April 6, 1926	Ford Representative Mr. "Jozef Gorifar" visited Turkey to negotiate a transit "of Ford automobiles to be delivered to the Balkans, Russia, Egypt, Iran and Afghanistan" (CCA)
June 2, 1926	New York Times news on Edsel Fords five week long trip to Europe"Edsel Ford Returns - Says Plants in Turkey and Egypt Will Be Started at Once". Edsel Ford: "The sale of Ford cars in Europe last year' he continued 'was approximately 200.000 and 35.000 tractors, of which 17.000 were sold in Russia.

April- Aug. 1926	FMC delegation's visit the USSR to study conditions for Ford business.William Collins, the future Istanbul plant's first manager, was part of this six-men delegation.
July 1, 1926	Ankara Protocol between USSR and Turkey on the exchange of ratification of the contract from 17/12/1925
Sept. 9, 1926	Final determination of the Turkish-Russian border.
Nov. 2, 1926	Report of the Turkish embassy in Athens to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the visit of Ford representatives in Athens to establish a assembly facility at the port of Piraeus. Ford representatives also visited the Embassy of Turkey in Athens. Turkish Ambassador gently reminds the Turkish Government to respond to the requests of Ford for a plant in Istanbul and to beat the competition from (prospective) (CCA)
End of 1926	FMC established a branch in Alexandria, attached to the Delaware Company FMC Exports Inc. as Ford warehouse and simple assembly.
Nov. 5, 1926	Final determination of the Turkish-Greek border
Dec. 11, 1926	The first specific report during the Republic of the Istanbul Chamber for Commerce and Industry on the Free Zone in Istanbul *(Serbest Mıntıka Tetkikleri)*
1927	Ford Egypt transformed a warehouse into an assembly facility
Jan. 13, 1927	Report by the Turkish Ambassador in Athens to the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the visit with the FMC representative Monsieur Lange at the Turkish Embassy in Greece on a possible production site in Istanbul. (CCA)
Aug. 17, 1927	Changeover of production from Model T to Model A caused the temporary shutdown of the Detroit plant, but also many other international plants, among them the Berlin plant. Model T production also ends in Manchester, with 300,000 cars built in total.

June 22, 1927	Law of Free Zone enacted in Turkey (Nr: 1132). The Free Zone was limited to the right of the government to establish or outsource free zones only in Istanbul, a special law needed in case if other institutions then Turkish institutions would make use of it. Location of the free zone to be established later. Formation of a special commission to determine the concrete location.
Dec. 2, 1927	Model A was released at the Highland Part in Detroit. Model A was the first model to be assembled in Ford Istanbul.
1928	Mr. Chent, a Ford employee responsible to find out new dealers came to Ankara along with Muhittin Alkoç and contacted Vehbizade Koç Bey, offering him the dealership of Ford in Ankara and its hinterland.
Jan. 1, 1928	Report by Mehmet Ali Nafset, Director of the Maritime Section of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry on free ports and zones in Europe to the Ministry of Commerce, mentioned Ford "would invest" in the free zone and this would not harm the petty industry in Turkey
July 10, 1928	Official announcement of the intention to build a huge new factory at Dagenham. The proposed Dagenham plant would be the center of manufacture for Europe, serving assembly plants in Manchester, Cork, Paris, Berlin, Antwerp, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Trieste, Stockholm, Helsinki, Rotterdam and Istanbul.(Foreign Press)
Sept. 7, 1928	First round of negotiations between Soviet delegation headed by the Soviet Auto Trust chair M.L. Sorokin and Ford top managers in Dearborn about construction of Ford-type automobile plant, first draft of an agreement accepted by the Politburo in November. The terms of the negotiations ranged from a mere Ford branch to granting 40% stock to FMC, from giving Ford 7% profit on investments, free export of hard currency from the USSR

coupled with state distribution of automobiles at fixed prices to invalidating all profit to be Soviet compensating the Ford contribution with purchase of parts from the Company. The Soviets proposed the same offer to General Motors.

Oct. 1, 1928 Break with NEP in USSR, the First Five Year Plan announced by Stalin, defined key sectors: heavy industry, increased coal and oil output, more electrical energy, and automobile, tractor, and machining plants. In the presence of the lack of advanced industrial technology in USSR the basis of the following 'technical assistance agreements' with American corporations like Ford, Radio Corporation of America, Du Pont, Bethlehem Steel, General Electric, Westinghouse was laid.

Nov. 27, 1928 The Contract between the representative of the Turkish Government, the Minister of Finance, Şükrü Bey and the representative of the FMC, William Collins was signed in Ankara.

Dec. 1, 1928 Letter by Finance Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu to the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü from Athens, about the state of the Piraeus port and the positive prospects of the Ford contract for the revival of the port of Istanbul. (CCA)

Dec. 7, 1928 The Ford Motor Company Ltd. formed as the institutional core of the 1928 Restructuration Programme of the European Operations. : Ford Motor Company Ltd. (UK) floated with a capital of £7 million. It would own 60% of all the European subsidiaries plus the plant in Egypt. The American Company in turn held 60% of its shares and 40% were allotted on the London market.

Dec. 11, 1928 New York Times news: "The English Company will have the sole exclusive right of manufacturing, assembling, distributing and marketing Ford and Lincoln motor cars and other Ford products in Great Britain, Ireland and Europe, with the exception of Soviet Russia, but not in Asia Mi-

nor, Syria, Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt and certain other parts of Africa"

Dec. 24, 1928 Mr. Edmons from the British Embassy in Angora to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in London on Ford plant in Istanbul: (TURKEY confidential): "Plant will be the distribution center for Italy and Russia as well as the Near East."

Dec. 26, 1928 Turkish Council of Minister gave the permission to the Turkish Maritime Administration to conclude a rental contract with FMC and step over the Tophane entrepôts. (CCA)

Dec. 31, 1928 End of Model T assembly in Cork (10,000 cars built), the concrete end of production with almost 16 million cars built by all Ford plants worldwide.

1929 The Office of Sir Percival Perry, Ford Motor Company Ltd. (UK) set up to coordinate Ford's European activities. Perry toured Europe with Charles Sorensen, production manager from Ford Detroit to consider sites for new assembly plants.

Feb. – May 1929 FMC and Ford delegation, negotiated about Ford-type auto plant in the USSR, headed by V.I: Mezhlauk The state corporation, or trust Autostroy, was created to supervise the auto plants' construction.

Feb. 2, 1929 Contract between Ford and the Turkish Government was enacted into Law Nr. 1391: "Türkiye Cümhuriyeti Hükumeti ile Ford Motör Kumpani Eksports Enkorporeytet Şirketi arasında aktedilen mukavelenamenin tasdikına dair kanun."

Feb. 9, 1929 William Collins, Manager of the FMC Exports Inc. Istanbul signed a rental contract with the manager of the Turkish Maritime Administration, *Seyrüsefain İdaresi,* Sadullah Bey for the duration of 10 years. Yearly rent is 18.000 dollars, 40.000 Liras. Yearly rental increase was 500 dollars.

March 22, 1929 Recommendations from Dearborn to W. Collins in Alexandria on technical equipment: air compressors, boilers, transformers to be installed in Istanbul, should be obtained in Europe. The capacity of the transformers was compared to Yokohama plant which is the same size and capacity as Istanbul.

Feb. 1929 Soviet policy changed in favor of technical assistance agreement with Ford and a state-owned plant producing 100.000 autos a year.

April 5, 1929 FMC announces its Trieste plant (FMC Company d'Italia) will be transferred to Constantinople.

March - April 27, 1929

The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry who had rented the entrepôts from Turkish Maritime Administration for 20.000 TL a year, started vacating them and move the stored goods to Kuruçeşme. On the 25th of April they handed over the entrepôts to Ford.

May 1929 Construction began at the Dagenham site. Construction of the Dagenham Plant began which was designed to be an on-tenth scale version of the River Rouge plant in Detroit. Dagenham would have the same relation to the Europe assembly plants and markets that the Rouge had to the US branch plants to tap economies of scale by integrating European operations.

May 22, - Dec. 15, 1929

Construction works by Ford Motor Company Export Inc. Istanbul to transform the rented workshops and warehouses into an assembly plant

May 31, 1929 Technical assistance agreement between FMC and the Supreme Council for the National Economy of the USSR (VSNH SSRR) for nine years, to create Soviet plants or plants for manufacturing *Fords A* and *AA*. Ford licenses Model A cars and AA trucks in exchange for auto parts and sub-assemblies equivalent in cost to 72.000 knocked-

down Ford cars and trucks, exclusive of tires, within four years. FMC granted to VSNH an exclusive license to manufacture, use and sell in the USSR and not to export them until expiration of the agreement.

Aug. 1929 Trip of Charles Sorensen (Detroit) and Percival Perry (London) to Russia to become familiar with industrial conditions there.

Sept. 14, 1929 The Ford Company d'Italia in Italy through its Manager Thornhill Cooper purchased a plot of land in the industrial zone of Livorno. An Italian legislation on Industrial Zones to encourage foreign enterprises to locate in Italy had recently been created.

Oct. 2, 1929 The Prime Minister İsmet Pasha visited the Ford premises at the free zone at Tophane during his trip to Istanbul. He was driven by a Ford Lincoln, provided by the Company to visit a Ford airplane in Yeşilköy.

Oct. 11, 1929 Ford's attempts to expand in its newly acquired Livorno plot were blocked by Mussolini's Government and Fiat's lobbying. Ford called this "trade jealousy because of trade jealousy on the part of Fiat, the İtalian Government has gone back not only upon its direct invitations to us to establish a plant in Italy but has made it impossible for us to conduct the plant with any chance of commercial success'."(BFRC)

End of 1929; Beginning of 1930

Spare parts, equipment, factory fittings were transferred from the Alexandria branch to Constantinople, eight cars were assembled during this month, production started on the 21st of December.

Jan. 5, 1930 Projected opening ceremony of the Istanbul plant with an official parade of Ford cars in the city, opening postponed.

Feb. 23, 1930 New York Times article: "New Ford Factory in Turkey is open, capable of assembling 80 cars daily, eight hours a

	day, five days a week working, 2 Dollars a day wage, 40.000 demands for work have been received, all assembly material and spare parts come from America, ships owned by Ford are able to berth alongside the Tophane quay, discharging their cargo straight into the works."
Feb. 1930	Ford car and truck assembling operations started at the Nr. 1-smaller plant in Nizhny Novgorod (300 miles east of Moscow on the Volga River) from imported parts, Nizhny Novgorod plant still under construction.
April 1930	Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüşdü Aras expressed to the Ambassador of USA, Mr. Grew that Turkey wants to secure capital from American sources in form of loans.
May 1930	Construction of the big Nizhny Novgorod (later GAZ plant) for manufacture of Ford model A cars and AA trucks in the Soviet Union began. Since Ford was going to substitute the Model V8 for the Model A, it sent the Soviets much of the used equipment that otherwise would have been discarded
June 17, 1930	The Smoot-Hawley Act raising U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels was enacted.
Aug. 10, 1930	Separate company, Ford Motor Company (Egypt) is founded with headquarters in Alexandria.
Aug. 15, 1930	FMC d'Italia S. A. started the plan the Trieste plant to Genoa or Bologna.
1931	O'Neill, Assistant Manager of Ford of France was transferred to Istanbul to become assistant manager of FMC Export Inc. M. Hofinger took W. Collins's place as Manager of the Istanbul branch. William Collins replaced the general manager of the French Ford, Hyslop.
April 1931	Trieste branch was closed
June 30, 1931	Liabilities of the Istanbul plant are taken over by FMC Ltd., London.
1931	Ford establishes a Romanian sales company in Bucharest.

Aug. 10, 1931	Production of the Model Y, a smaller, more adapted car to British conditions / the competition from Austin and Morris, started in Dagenham. A model never marketed in USA.
Aug. 5, 1931	Agreement between FMC Exports Inc., U.S.A and FMC Co Ltd. providing that, although the property in the assets at Istanbul had been conveyed to the English Company, it is the Export Company which is carrying on the business there through their duly appointed Attorney – Lord Perry, Head of Ford Motor Company Ltd. (UK).
Oct. 1, 1931	Production began at Ford's Dagenham plant in Greater London, Europe's largest factory. The Manchester plant is closed. Cork remained for tractors.
Oct. 7, 1931	A delegation headed by Şükrü Saraçoğlu, former Minister of Finance, left for the USA to make contacts to obtain a private loan from 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 USD for public works and bank credits and interest Americans in the development of the cotton industry in Turkey, without success.
Nov. 18, 1931	Ford Romana SAR is duly registered. Operations would begin Jan.1, 1932. It was at first a sales and service operation.
1929 - 1931	Due to the technical agreement and assembly of the new Model A cars and AA trucks Ford would become the Auto King in Russia. These two motor vehicles contributed to 80% or the total automobile imports in 1929-31
Feb. 1932	Law on the Protection of Turkish Currency
Jan. 13, 1932	Ford Istanbul received the right to remain untouched by the new quota regulations, regulating the commodities allowed to be imported, by way of being declared a "domestic" enterprise (CCA).
End of Jan. 1932	The big Soviet plant at Nizhny Novgorod turned out its first all-Russian Model AA unit. The plant was shortly renamed the Gorky Automobile Works (GAZ). By then

Ford had lost the market for tractors completely to all-Russian Fordzons produced in Putilov plant, the Stalingrad plant, opened in 1932, the Kharkov plant and the then projected giant Chebliabinsk plant. There was no further market for the foreign-built Fordson in Russia any more.

First seven months of 1932

Ford Romana SAR began operations in Bucharest, headed by Wachner, an Austrian manager who was previously the head of the Lincoln Department and also handling airplanes in Constantinople. In Alexandria the Ford Motor Company (Egypt) started handling sales and service. The New Egyptian Company was created in 1932 by M. Hofinger, an Austrian who then became the Austrian economic counselor in Buenos Aires in 1960's. A sales company was incorporated in Athens. They all reported directly to Ford Ltd in London. Early returns from all these operations, except the Turkish operation, were encouraging.

March 24, 1932 Perry to Edsel Ford: "Istanbul factory works only ten day a month. The whole organization is therefore top heavy."

June 6, 1932 Sorensen is trying to get 100 Model A units to Russia from German Ford plant. 'We consider Russia one of our best customers. To date they have purchased 27.808 units from us. Please help us hold this business.'

April 1933 Assembly stopped at the Istanbul plant.

July 15, 1933 FMC pointed out the Russian failure to comply with the purchase of previously agreed number of Ford automobiles.

Nov. 1933 USSR was officially recognized by US Government.

July 9, 1934 Per decree of the Council of Minister, FMC Export Inc. Istanbul is allowed to import from the USA 400 cars, 800 trucks and 400 tons of spare parts outside the legal quota regulation. (CCA) .

Oct. 7, 1934 Turkish Office of the Ministry of Economy obtained a decree of the Council of Minister to consider Ford Istanbul outside the quota regulation.

Feb. 1, 1934 Facilities were granted to the Ford Romana SAR for the assembly of knocked-down materials in Romania. Ford Romana also received the advantages granted to national industries. Plans to erect a plant were approved in June 1935.

Aug. 1934 A customs inspector started investigating a possible customs fraud at Ford Istanbul upon a tip-off./

March 14, 1935 Termination of the first technical agreement between FMC and USSR concluded in May 1929, or cancelled since USSR bought only less than half the quantity of vehicles they were obliged to take. The Russian engineers were asked to leave the Rouge plant.

April 7, 1935 Customs smuggling case of the Ministry of Customs against Ford Motor Company Exports Inc is aired in the Turkish press. The customs inspector, Zeki Bey oversaw the file. The special inspection committee wrote a eight hundred pages long report on the allegations.

1935 "The Istanbul operation suffered not only unprofitable days, but official allegations of dishonesty, for the government in 1935 accused its heads of evading some customs duties and cheating on others. Litigation ensued which finally vindicated the company but drained all its cash reserves. Only Romania and Egypt, the former with an assembly plant, and the latter with merely a sales and service organization, were substantial profits achieved in the later nineteen-thirties" (Nevins/Hill, Vol2, p. 104).

1935 Extraordinary profits in Egypt stemming from sales in Italian Somaliland due to the preparation of Italy to invade Ethiopia: Around 500 trucks were sold by a Ford Dealer in Mogadishu attached to Ford of Alexandria. The Egyptian Company had the rights of territorial exclusivity

to sell to Italian Somaliland, though this right has been violated by some NY dealers who have shipped to Mogadishu directly, by-passing Ford Egypt.

May 1936 Ford's first Eastern European plant begins operation in Bucharest in May, assembling 2500 cars and trucks annually.

May 25, 1938 Ford Istanbul executives report: "Supplies of dollars have entirely ceased and that the Exchange Permit granted to our company has been cancelled. It is rumored that a unilateral clearing arrangement will be adopted whereby 80 % of the proceeds of Turkish exports to the U.S.A. will be made available for the payment of U.S.A. material supplied to Turkey."

April 8, 1940 Acquittal of Ford Istanbul after a five-year trial: 'The Tribunal hearing the case brought against FMC Istanbul there by the Customs Officials, has decided that the accusations were unfounded and the Company has been acquitted in respect of the charges." Gad Franco was the lawyer of Ford.

1944 Year of the official termination of the activities of Ford Istanbul.

Since 1944 – 1959 With the closure of the Ford branch in Istanbul, Turkey had become part of the Egyptian company's territory until the establishment of Ford Otosan in Turkey in 1956. During this period Ford was considered an Egyptian product so that it could be paid with the tobacco that Turkey sold to Egypt. Ford trucks were exchanged against Turkish tobacco. As a result, Ford Egypt got big Turkish orders.

1947 The emphasis of Egyptianization of the economy was made palpable by the enactment of a 1947 law. At the same year Egypt withdrew from the sterling exchange area.

1949 FMC of Egypt SAE, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Britain-based Ford Investment Company via the Ford Investment Company based in Guernsey, until 1949 became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the FMC, U.S.A.

1950 Ford established a new and larger plant in Alexandria, called the Smouha plant with a total floor space of 217.000 square feet, 399 employees, and 1.200.000 USD issued capitalization. The Smouha plant could assembly vehicles from a completely knocked-down condition at a rate of 10 to 12 units a day.

1951 The European Associated Companies were transferred from the property of FMC Ltd.(London) back to FMC USA.

1954 Vehbi Koç, Bernar Nahum and Kenan İnan from Koç Company attempted at establishing a joint venture with FMC to open an assembly plant in Turkey. Their contact person was Andrew Masset, the General Manager of the Alexandria plant after Thornhill Cooper, who visited Turkey that year.

1956 *Koç Ticaret,* the Ankara dealer of FMC won the competition among the Ford dealers of thirty four Near Eastern countries. He was invited to Dearborn. There in November of 1956 he met Henry Ford II and brought with him a letter written by the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in favor of a cooperation of Ford with Koç for an assembly plant.

Nov. 1956 Business sequestration in Egypt on foreign import firms following the Egyptian-Israeli War and the Suez crisis with Britain and France. The fifty-five dealerships in the arena which dealt with Alexandria before broke their ties with Ford Egypt. They were arranged directly under the jurisdiction of Ford USA.

1957 The First Five-Year Plan in Egypt designated automobile manufacturing as one of the three major industries to be

	developed. Ford planned to shift to local manufacture of automobiles, a difficult task given that Egypt lacked a foundry, forge, and strip mill. Nevertheless, Ford Egypt submitted the Egyptian Government a proposal to increase the number of Egyptian-manufactured parts in passenger cars. The government rejected the proposal on the grounds that the rate of locally made parts in the manufacturing scheme was too small. Thus, the Alexandria plant is idled in the 1960's.
End of 1958	FMC and Koç Group agreed on the principles of the cooperation. The first protocols were signed by FMC, Koç, the Turkish Government, and the chrome-importing US company Greg Gary. The latter would be the guarantee that the 3.000.000 USD currency demanded for the importation of machinery and parts would be covered.
Jan. 12, 1959	The Turkish Government ratified the abovementioned agreement.
May 12, 1959	Ford-Koç cooperation is dealt out: a dealer assembler agreement.
July 13, 1959	Ford Otosan was established officially. The chosen location for the plant is Kadıköy, in a former vineyard of the priests of Saint Joseph College in Uzunçayır.
July 14, 1960	Production started in the Ford Otosan plant. The parts imported are CKD (completely knocked down). The port of entry of imported parts is the port of Haydarpaşa on the Anatolian side of Istanbul. The main product was the F Model truck. Between 1960 and 1965 1208 trucks were assembled in total.

Appendix B Neighborhood Scale Chronology of Spatial and Functional Change of the Factory Site, Tophane

1453 - 1470	Construction of the first layer of the Imperial Canon Foundry (*Tophane-i Amire*) extra-*muros* of the Galata city-walls, during the reign of Mehmed II
1578-87	Building of the Kılıç Ali Pasha Mosque complex as an important urbanization drive
1650s	Evliya Çelebi wrote in his famous travelogue about Tophane and stresses its military functions.
1719	The military barracks built by Beyazid II (1500's) and enlarged during Süleyman (1550's) are burnt down in a fire.
1730 - 1740	The Tophane building, a stone building of ca. 28. m. length covered with a multi-layered wooden roof burnt down in the beginning of the 18th century. 1730/40 it has been rebuilt to take today's form with five big vaults. The complex consisted then in a iron foundry, the sultan's pavilion for reasons of representation of the military power of the Empire to the foreign diplomats, and a cistern. Later a small weapons factory was added .
1732	The Fountain of Tophane was built, within the context of 18th century changes, i.e., revitalization of the open space as a focus for social life, surrounded by coffee shops. Mahmud I's new water distribution system, water pipes reaching down from Taksim square on the top-hill.
1745	First landfill of the coastline *(dolgu)* under the supervision of Mustafa Ağa
1764	Another big fire destroyed the military barracks
1791 - 1792	New barracks at the coastline were constructed for gun carriages (*toparabacıları*) which was a technical branch along with the canon masters (*topçular*) of the janissary infantry corps and the cavalry (*kapıkulu ordusu*). Former-

ly the *toparabacıları* barracks were in Ahırkapı on the Historical Peninsula.

1793 - 1800 New confiscations in the vicinity and removal of the trophy artilleries from the open space to make space for new constructions of artillery workshops under Sultan Selim III; Broadening of the Tophane Square; cutting of the trees in the square to make space for new military barracks for the artillery, right at the seashore and for a drill court / military training ground, the *Talimhane*

1813 - 1819 Iconic Gravure by Ignace Melling of Tophane showing, Canon Foundry and on its east casern for the gun carriages corps (*Toparabacıları Kışlası*).

1804; 1823 Two big fires burnt down casern for the gun carriages corps. It was rebuilt afterwards.

1823 - 1826 The construction of the Nusretiye mosque on the place of the former *Toparabacılar Kışla* mosque; active between 1789-1807; and The Imperial Pavillon (*Hünkar Kasrı*).

1920s TMA and later FMC, Istanbul would use part of the body of the mosque and the western and eastern walls of the *Hünkar Kasrı* attached to it partly as the western external walls of the workshops, entrepôts, assembly factory and western delimitation line of the free zone accorded to FMC.

1830 Steam power replaced animal power at Imperial Canon Foundry.

1846 Coffee shops and an abandoned garden along the Tophane shore were expropriated to build a wide quay. All construction was forbidden on the new waterfront square, justified by the argument that the nearby sea traffic required extensive open areas.

1847 A new carpentry (*marangozhane)* was built underside of the imperial foundry.

1826 - 1846 In the context of the military reforms, Janissary Corps were abolished, a reserve army was introduced (*redif*) in

1834; In 1843 the universal conscription was introduced, parallel to the changes in the military organization towards a centralized one, the appearance and external representation of Tophane had changed..

1850 The clock tower was built by Amira Balyan, set apart from the *muvakkithane* (lodge of the timekeeper of the mosque) of the Nusretiye Mosque..

1852 Construction of the Tophane Pavillon as a reception mansion for ambassadors

1843-56 The Imperial Court moved from Topkapı (on the historical peninsula) to Dolmabahçe. Palace at Beşiktaş (on the Pera site, on the nothern extension of Tophane).

1864 - 1865 Demolishment of the Galata City Walls, Tophane becoming an unrestricted part of urban Pera and not only limitrophe to it.

from 1863 on Another big fire destroyed part of the shoreline barracks in 1863, leading way to the regularization of the water shore from Karaköy to Tophane. New commercial buildings –custom houses and warehouses- which were large, structures of neoclassical style longitudinal (of stone and brick, but not of reinforced concrete), were erected parallel to the embankments. *Toparabacıları Kışlası* at the shore were replaced by a (one-story, arms and artillery producing) industrial units, Imperial weapons and ammunition factory (*İmalathane-i Harbiye*).

1879 First concession granted to Michel Pasha to rebuild the waterfront in exchange for a certain percentage of the tax collected on imported and exported goods, which would be transformed into the company CQDW

1881 Strike of the workers of *Imalathane-i Harbiye*

1883 Comprehensive study of a Greek-Ottoman merchant, Jorciadis in the journal *La Turquie,* defending free warehouses and bonded storages and organization of the port of Istanbul to include free zones.

1890	Second contract of concession with the company of Michel Pasha, establishment of the CQDW. The concession included to establish and operate the docks and the warehouses for a period of 85 years, providing rail transportation was also part of the company's responsibilities.
1892	Construction of the quays in Galata and Sirkeci started
1892 - 1895	The Azapkapı-Tophane strip was constructed, the:20 m. strip was established between the new quays and the residential areas; 3m. pedestrian, 9m.vehicule, 8m.loading strip, Galata Quay, including Tophane, was in total 758 meters long.
Dec. 1895	A big earthquake, leaving the quay infrastructure under construction intact. Customs building were erected
After 1893	The Tophane disinfection facility against epidemics (*tebhirhane*) was opened in Tophane and was intact with the same function until 1980's, the year it burnt down. The traces might be still there.
Until 1894	The Tophane pier was the gate leading to the hill of Beyoğlu before the construction of the Galata quay. Diplomats used to embark here to go to Topkapı Palace for diplomatic visits. The pier was also used by the Pera elite to move to their summer houses along the Bosphorus during summers.
1895	The first ship embarked directly at the Galata quay is Memphis, a ship of the *Messageries Maritime Lines.* Unrest by the guild of barge and lighter owners (*mavnacılar and kayıkçılar*) to protest the infringement of their benefits by the construction of the quay and direct clearing of goods.
1898	The Prussian Emperor Wilhelm was welcomed in the Tophane Pavillion.
1910	The French CQWD constructed two new entrepôts in Eminönü and Karaköy

1912 - 1914	The Company constructed other two big buildings in Karaköy: Merkez Rıhtım Han and Çinili Rıhtım Han. The latter would later become the headquarter of the TMA to be brutally demolished by the Governmental expropriations in the 1950's.
Nov. 1924	Report by ICCI on the Economy of Istanbul, one policy suggestion is parceling out a free zone at the quay of Tophane
July 29, 1925	Foundation of the IPMC, joint enterprise by Ministry of Industry and Mines, Turkish Business Bank, TMA, Maritime Affairs Inc, IBLA, General Manager is Ahmet Hamdi Başar.
Nov. 1926	Insurance map of Pervititch, planche: Pervouz-Agha/Salı Bazar with the designation for the future Ford plant's buildings: "Usine, Ateliers Tophane, Casernes Bureaux en maçonnerie ordinaire" (Factory, Tophane workshops, barracks offices in ordinary masonary). A clear palimpsest of military-industrial to commercial functions.
Jan. 1927	Insurance map of Pervititch, Tchikour-Bostan/Top-Hane: "Nouveaux Entrepots de Sefain, en ciment arme, en cours de construction", *compartements identiques,* (new Warehouses of the Maritime Administration, in reinforced cement, under construction, identical compartments)
July 1927	TMA leases the recently transformed buildings (from Tophane workshops / small arms factory into warehouses) to the ICCI
Aug. 1927	Letters of complaint sent by the French Associated Company of Quays, Docks and Warehouses of Constantinople to the Ministry of Public Works on the issue of Tophane entrepôts, two other on the 14 and 28 December 1927: "The state ignores the commitment it made towards us in 1925, since it opened warehouses in Top-Hane, we are unable to accomplish, on our side, the obligation that we had accepted in return for his, and we are temporarily re-

	nouncing the idea of completing the construction of the Istanbul warehouses. December 14, "[the State] gives us competition like that of the Chamber of Commerce in Tophane, and Customs which contrary to all principles operate warehouses in several places themselves and the shipping companies are seriously harmed"
1927	Assembly operations of other automotive brands were concentrated in Salıpazarı, Tophane, inside the customs-zone to by-pass customs taxes, like the activities of the Dodge truck dealer TATKO, a company owned by Yalman brothers. The trucks were delivered on ship to Mudanya, Bursa and via Trabzon to Iran, and by train to Ankara.
Until 1928	The Turkish Customs Administration and the concessionaire Company of Quays, Docks and Warehouses of Constantinople remained in serious competition as to whether the goods should be landed in customs warehouses or subject to the warehouses regime and landed in the Company's warehouses.
June 22, 1927	Law of Free Zone enacted (Nr: 1132). The Free Zone is limited only to the Istanbul Municipal Region.
January 1, 1928	Report by Mehmet Ali Nafset, Director of the Maritime Section of the ICCI on free ports and zones in Europe to the Ministry of Commerce, mentioned Ford "would invest" in the free zone and this would not harm the petty industry in Turkey
1928	CQWD constructed three new entrepôts in Kuruçeşme and Camialtı.
Nov. 27, 1928	The Contract between the representative of the Turkish Government, the Minister of Finance, Şükrü Bey and the representative of the FMC, William Collins was signed in Ankara.
Feb. 2, 1929	Contract between Ford and the Turkish Government was enacted into Law Nr. 1391: "Türkiye Cümhuriyeti Hü-

kumeti ile Ford Motör Kumpani Eksports Enkorporeytet Şirketi arasında aktedilen mukavelenamenin tasdikına dair kanun."

Feb. 9, 1929 William Collins, Manager of the FMC Exports Inc. Istanbul signed a rental contract with the manager of the TMA, Sadullah Bey for the duration of 10 years. Yearly rent is 18.000 dollars, 40.000 Liras. Yearly rental increase was 500 dollars.

March - April 27, 1929

The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry who had rented the entrepôts from Turkish Maritime Administration for 20.000 TL a year, started vacating them and move the stored goods to Kuruçeşme. On the 25th of April they handed over the entrepôts to Ford.

April 1929 CQWD diverted the merchandise vacated from the warehouses run by ICCI to its own entrepôts in Kuruçeşme. ICCI and CQDW were remunerated for this by Ford.

May 22, - Dec. 15 1929

Construction works by Ford Motor Company Export Inc. Istanbul to transform the rented workshops and warehouses into an assembly plant

Oct 1, 1929 The new customs regulations were valid. Merchants import in big quantities in anticipation of the higher custom walls. The entrepôt-bonded merchandise totalling to 15.000 tons in 1928 increased to 40.000 tons in 1929.

End of 1929 - Beginning of 1930

Spare parts, equipment, factory fittings were transferred from the Alexandria branch to Constantinople, eight cars were assembled during this month, production started on the December 21.

Feb. 23, 1930 New York Times article: "New Ford Factory in Turkey is open, capable of assembling 80 cars daily, eight hours a day, five days a week working, 2 Dollars a day wage, 40.000 demands for work have been received, all assembly

material and spare parts come from America, ships owned by Ford are able to berth alongside the Tophane quay, discharging their cargo straight into the works."

April 1933 Assembly stopped at the Istanbul plant.

Dec. 23, 1934 The Government nationalized both the French CQWD and IPMC, merged it as Istanbul Port Works General Directorate (İstanbul Liman İşleri Umum Müdürlüğü), later merged into Denizbank.

1944 Year of the official termination of the activities of Ford Istanbul.

Starting from 1953 – 1960

The extensive expropriations in the framework of Menderes urban transformations, land fillings and construction of six Salıpazarı entrepôts, of 600 m. longitude, designed by the famous architect Sedad Hakkı Eldem, developer Campax Construction Company..

1957 The 600 m. long Salıpazarı docks and facilities, which were completed in 1957 during the operation of Istanbul Port Management within the structure of Denizcilik Bankası T.A.O., were transferred to the Bank by the Ministry of Public Works.

1982 The area of the quays is declared "tourism zone."

April 1986 The quay of Galata in its entirety, including Tophane pier was closed to the boarding of cargo ships after ninety-one years of having served as quays.

Sept. 1987 Galata Quays were closed to truck circulation. All merchandise circulation was moved to Haydarpaşa, Derince and Tekirdağ (later to Ambarlı and Pendik ro-ro ports). The *Galata Quay* is only open to the embarquement of touristic cruisers.

1993 The Quay area was declared an "Urban Protected Area" by the Urban Conservation Board.

2004 A prestigious urban museum was opened, occupying one of the entrepôts (No. 4) built in the 1950s, the Istanbul

Modern. The other entrepôt under protection was the modern arts museum to be under the administration of the Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University (No. 5).

2005 The Galataport cruiser and gentrification project was launched.

2008 The Galataport project cancelled by court decision after a case filed by the Istanbul Chamber of Urban Planners.

2010 Major change in the Coastal Law.

2013 Second tender for the Galataport project.

2015 Construction started, a gentrification project around a cruiser port, hotels, gastronomy, and shopping.

2021 The Galataport project was concluded.

Appendix C Timeline of Internationalization of Production of FMC[1]

Branch (BR)
Assembly Plant (AP) or Assembly Facilities/Service Plants /Factory Branch(AF)
Incorporation of First Local Company (CO)
Manufacturing (MA)
Freeport (FP)
Credit Companies (CC)
Holding Companies (HC)

Important Structural Changes / International Developments

- 1904 (CO): Oakwille / Canada: FMC of Canada, Ltd.
- 1904 (AP): Oakwille / Canada: FMC of Canada, Ltd.
- 1908 Introduction of the Model Ford T
- 1908 (MA): Walkerwille - Windsor / Canada
- 1908 (BR): Paris / France
- 1908 (BR): London / UK
- 1909 (BR): Geelong / Australia
- 1910: Highland Park Plant was opened (designed in 1908 by A. Kahn Assoc.)
- 1911 (CO): London / UK: FMC England, Ltd.
- 1911 (AP): Manchester / UK
- 1912 (MA): Sandwich East - Windsor / Canada
- By 1913 (BR): London-Ontario, Montreal, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Vancoover, Saskatoon, Calgary / Canada

1 Compiled by Aslı Odman from the sources: Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill. *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964., esp. Appendix II and "Ford in Europe, 1903-2003, A Chronology," In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 1:9–24. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003. This timeline excludes the dates of the appointment of dealers and opening of sales branches and focusses on the spread of the productive capital of FMC and its financial infrastructure

- 1913 (AP): Toronto / Canada
- 1913 (BR): Buenos Aires / Argentina
- 1913, October 7: Introduction of the MAL (Moving Assembly Line)
- 1914, January 5: Introduction of the Five Dollar Day
- 1914 (AP): Bordeaux / France
- 1916 (CO): Paris / France: Ford (France) SA, Société Automobiles
- 1916 (AF): Buenos Aires / Argentina
- 1916: the New York Branch Manager Gaston Plantiff proposed to create a Russian Ford Company and build assembly plants in Russia
- 1917 (CO): Cork /Ireland: Henry Ford & Sons, Ltd.
- 1919: Present-day FMC re- incorporated in Delaware / NY
- 1919: Ford Production Manager Knudsen's reorganization plan of European operations into six zones supplied by four assembly plants and with the head office of Foreign Department moved Copenhagen was not applied.
- 1919 (CO): Copenhagen / Denemark: FMC Aktieselskab, Denemark
- 1919 (AP): Copenhagen / Denemark: FMC Aktieselskab, Denemark
- 1919 (FP): Copenhagen / Denemark: FMC Aktieselskab, Denemark
- 1919 (MA): Cork / Ireland (tractors only)
- 1919 (BR): São Paolo / Brazil
- 1920 Automobile assembly was moved from Highland Park to River Rouge Complex
- 1920 (CO): Cádiz / Spain: FMC SAE
- 1920 (AP): Cádiz / Spain: FMC SAE
- 1920 (FP): Cádiz / Spain: FMC SAE
- 1920 (AP): São Paolo / Brazil
- 1920 (BR): Montevideo / Uruguay
- 1920 (AF): Montevideo / Uruguay
- 1922 (FP): Trieste / Italy
- 1922 (AP): Trieste / Italy
- 1922 (BR): Trieste / Italy
- 1922 (CO): Antwerp / Belgium: FMC (Belgium) SA
- 1922 (AP): Antwerp / Belgium: FMC (Belgium) SA
- 1922 (BR): La Habana / Cuba
- 1923 (CO): Trieste / Italy: FMC d'Italia Società per Azioni

- 1923 (AP): Cork / Ireland (cars)
- 1923 (AP): Barcelona / Spain
- 1923 (FP): Barcelona / Spain
- 1923 (CO): São Paolo / Brazil: Ford Motor do Brazil
- 1923 (CO): Port Elizabeth / South Africa: FMC of South Africa, Ltd.
- 1923 (AP): Port Elizabeth / South Africa: FMC of South Africa, Ltd.
- 1923: The chairman of Allied American Corporation that had a concession distributing Ford automotives in USSR unsuccessfully tried to persuade Henry Ford to build plants in Russia.
- 1924 (BR): Santiago / Chile
- 1924 (AP): Santiago / Chile
- 1924 (CO): Rotterdam / Holland: FMC of Holland Naamloze Vennootschap (NV)
- 1925: Ford Motor do Brazil became a branch of FMC, Exports. Inc.
- 1925 (CC): Paris / France
- 1925 (CO): Berlin / Germany: FMC AG
- 1925 (AP): Asnières sur Seine/ France
- 1925 (CO): Stockholm / Sweden: FMC Aktiebolag
- 1925 (AP): Stockholm / Sweden: FMC Aktiebolag
- 1925 (CO): Mexico City / Mexico: FMC SA
- 1925 (AP): Recife / Brazil
- 1925 (CO): Geelong /Australia: FMC of Australia Proprietary, Ltd.
- 1925 (AP): Geelong /Australia: FMC of Australia Proprietary, Ltd.
- 1925 (AP): Granville, Brisbane, Adelaide, Fremantle /Australia
- 1925 (CO): Yokohama / Japan: FMC of Japan, Ltd.
- 1925 (AP): Yokohama / Japan: FMC of Japan, Ltd.
- 1926 (AP): Berlin / Germany
- 1926 (CC): Germany
- 1926 (AP): Hoboken / Belgium
- 1926 (CC): Belgium
- 1926 (CO): Helsinfors / Finland: FMC of Finland, Ltd.
- 1926 (BR): Alexandria / Egypt, owned by FMC Exports, Inc.
- 1926 (CO): Bombay /India: Ford of India, Ltd.
- 1926 (AP): Bombay /India: Ford of India, Ltd.

- 1926 (AP): Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Colombo, Ceylon /India
- 1926 (CO): Singapore /Malaya: Ford of Malaya, Ltd.
- 1926 (AP): Singapore /Malaya: Ford of Malaya, Ltd.
- 1926 (AP): Mexico City / Mexico
- 1926 (BR): Lima /Peru
- 1926 (AP): Pôrto Alegre / Brazil
- 1926 (BR): San Juan / Puerto Rico
- 1926 (BR): Caracas / Venezuala
- 1927: Replacement of Model Ford T by Model Ford A, Automobile Production begain at River Rouge Complex (construction began 1917)
- 1927 (CC): England
- 1927 (CC): Italy
- 1927 (AP): Rio de Janeiro / Brazil
- 1927 (BR): Cristóbal / Canal Zone
- 1928 Legal Restructuring of European Operations of FMC: all European plants are owned now by FMC of England, Ltd.
- 1928 (BR): Shanghai / China, owned by FMC, Exports Inc.
- 1928 (CO): Fordlândia in Pará / Brazil: Companhia Industrial do Brasil (rubber only)
- 1928 (MA): Fordlândia in Pará / Brazil: Companhia Industrial do Brasil (rubber only)
- 1929 (CO): Berlin/Germany FMC AG's 40% share is bought by IG-Farben
- 1929 (CO): FMC SAE changed its title to Ford Motor Iberica Company FMI
- 1929 (BR): Istanbul / Turkey, owned by FMC, Exports Inc.
- 1929 (AP): Istanbul / Turkey, owned by FMC, Exports Inc.
- 1929 (FP): Istanbul / Turkey, owned by FMC, Exports Inc.
- 1929: Plans of erecting a Ford manufacturing bridgehead in the industrial zone of Livorno / Italy failed due to resistance by Fiat.
- 1929: Technical Assistance Agreement, import of factory equipment and auto parts for assembly between FMC and the Supreme Council for the National Economy of the USSR (VSNH SSRR)
- 1930 (HC): Liechtenstein: Liechtenstein Holding Company: formed by FMC England, Ltd.

- 1930 (HC): Luxemburg: Société d'Investissements Ford: formed by FMC England, Ltd.
- 1930 (AP): Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow / USSR (within the framework of the technical assistance agreement in 1929, owned by USSR)
- 1930: Ford rejected Fiat's proposal of a joint-venture in production of 120,000-150,000 cars in Turin.
- 1931 (MA): Dagenham on Thames / UK
- 1931 (MA): Cologne / Germany
- 1931 (CO): Bucharest / Roumania: Ford Romana SAR
- 1932 (AP): Amsterdam / Holland
- 1932 (MA): Nizhny Novgorod / USSR (within the framework of the technical assistance agreement in 1929, owned by USSR; i.e. 'GAZ cars')
- 1932 (CO): Alexandria / Egypt: Ford SAE (Société Anonyme Egyptienne)
- 1932 (CO): Athens / Greece: FMC of Greece, Ltd.
- 1932 (AP): Amsterdam / Holland
- 1932 (CO): Lisbõa /Portugal: Ford Lusitana
- 1933 (AP): Bologna / Italy (tractors only)
- 1934 (MA): Strasbourg / France
- 1935 (MA): Barcelona / Spain
- 1935: Technical Agreement between FMC and Soviet Russia terminated untimely
- 1936 (AP): Bucharest / Roumania
- 1936 (CO): Wellington / New Zealand: FMC of New Zealand Ltd.
- 1936 (AP): Wellington / New Zealand: FMC of New Zealand Ltd.
- 1938 (CO): Budapest / Hungary: FMC of Hungary, Ltd.
- 1939 (HC): Guernsey: Ford Investment Co.: formed by FMC England, Ltd.
- 1939 (MA): Poissy / France
- 1939 (CO): Köln / Germany: FMC AG renamed Ford Werke Aktiengesellschaft Köln (FAG)
- 1941 (AP): Budapest / Hungary: owned by Ford Werke Aktiengesellschaft Köln (FAG)
- 1941 (CO): Algiers /Algeria: owned by Ford (France) SA, Société Automobiles

- 1944 (MA): Nizhny Novgorod / Russia (FMC's River Rouge Tire Plant was transported to USSR)
- 1944 Official Closing of the Istanbul Branch
-

Appendix D Visual Timeline and Time-map of Internationalization of Production of FMC, 1904-1944



FIGURE Appx. D.1 Visual timeline of internationalization of production of FMC, 1904-1944. SOURCE: Compiled by the author using: Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill. *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964., esp. Appendix II and "Ford in Europe, 1903-2003, A Chronology," In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 1:9–24. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003. Made by Sinan Çetin.



MAP Appx. D.1 Ford's Oversea Sales - Assembly – Manufacturing Expansion 1904-1944 SOURCE: Compiled by the author using: Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill. American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964., esp. Appendix II and "Ford in Europe, 1903-2003, A Chronology," In Ford, 1903-2003: The European History edited by Hubert Bo-nin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 1:9–24. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003. Map by Ahmetcan Alphan.

Appendix E "Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant," March 11, 1932. Acc. 970 / Box 3. Benson Ford.



MAP Appx. E.1 Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant, March 8, 1932 SOURCE: "Plot Plan of Istanbul Plant," March 11, 1932. Acc. 970 / Box 3. Benson Ford.



MAP Appx. E.2 Floor Plan or Buildings 1, 2, 3, and 6, March 11, 1932. SOURCE: Ibid.



MAP Appx. E.3 Floor Plan of Buildings No 4, 5 and the Offices, March 15, 1932. SOURCE: Ibid.

From the collections of The Henry Ford



FIGURE Appx. F.1 Work Chart made in order to control progress of re-arrangement of buildings and installation of equipment. The work on the first tender started on May 22, 1929. Photo taken on August 15, 1929. SOURCE: " Plant Photos," March 11, 1932. Acc. 970 / Box 3. Benson Ford.



FIGURE Appx. F.2 Second section Front of Plant facing North: Intended Show Room and Service School (Building no. 4, before re-arrangement). May 26, 1929. SOURCE: Ibid.



FIGURE Appx. F.3 Part of Yard (Alley) pointing to South-West; showing main entrance; to the left part of intended General Office and Service School Building (building no. 5); to the right part of intended Service School and Finished Car Storage (building no. 4); scrap iron laying in yard comes from former power-house (Before re-arrangement). May 26, 1929. SOURCE: Ibid.



FIGURE Appx. F.4 Sea Front, Quay, Cranes and Sea Side of Intended Service Stock Building and General Office (building no. 5 and 6) pointing to South-West before re-arrangement). May 26, 1929. SOURCE: Ibid.



FIGURE Appx. F.5 Interior of first section of Intended General Office (building no. 5) shown in photo No. 1 pointing to South-East (before re-arrangement).May 26, 1929. SOURCE: Ibid.



FIGURE Appx. F.6 Front view of the plant with workers, 1929. SOURCE: *Benim Adım Ford Otosan*, 24-25.



FIGURE Appx. F.7 Roof repairs, looking down assembly line. SOURCE: " Plant Photographs Before and After Arrangement," n.d. AR-65-5 / Box 24. Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.



Figure Appx. F.8 Standard Oil Company's Oil tanker discharging first consignment of oil to Ford Motor Co.'s tanks. Istanbul, Turkey. source: Ibid.



FIGURE Appx. F.9 " The place where the assembled cars come down from the line." SOURCE: *İstanbul'da Yeni Açılan Ford Fabrikası*, photo no. 14 (1930) [Milli Kütüphane, Kitap Dışı Materyaller Koleksiyonu / 1994 FOTO ALBÜM 7]



FIGURE Appx. F.10 " Factory docks and cranes" SOURCE: *Ibid.*, photo no. 25



FIGURE Appx. F.11 " First semester students of the service school - February 1930 - instructors on the right"
SOURCE: *Ibid.*, photo no. 27



FIGURE Appx. F.12 Istanbul: From the " North East," water tower with Ford logo. source: " Plant Photos," March 11, 1932. Acc. 970 / Box 3. Benson Ford



FIGURE Appx. F.13 Istanbul: from the " North," oil tanks. SOURCE: Ibid.

Appendix G Translations of and Ford Law (*Ford Kanunu*) and Free Zone Law (*Serbest Mıntıka Kanunu*)

Ford Kanunu / Ford Law:[1]

BİRİNCİ MADDE — Amerika Ford Motor Kampani Eksports Enkorporeytet Şirketi ile teşrinisani 1928 tarihinde Ankarada aktedilen mukavelename ile merbut mektubu tasdik edilmiştir.

İKİNCİ MADDE — Bu kanun neşri tarihinden muteberdir.

ÜÇÜNCÜ MADDE — Bu kanunun ahkâmını icraya Maliye ve İktisat Vekilleri memurdur.

2 Şubat 1929

MUKAVELENAME

Bir taraftan metni mukavelenamede (Hükümet) diye tevsim edilecek olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine izafeten hareket, eden Maliye Vekili Saraçoğlu Şükrü Beyefendi;

Diğer taraftan, musaddak vekâletname ile, metni mukavelenamede (Şirket) diye tevsim edilecek olan Cemahiri Müttehidei Amerikanın Niyojersi Hükümeti kanunlarına tevfikan tescil edilerek icrayı faaliyet eden Ford Motor Kampani Eksports Enkorporeytet Şirketini temsil ve namına harekete salâhiyettar bulunan Wilyam J. Kolnis;

Meyanelerinde hususatı âtiye takarrür etmiştir:

Şöyleki:

As of general interest in connection with ultimate free port activities of Constantinople, we give below in translation the full text of the agreement recently closed between the Turkish Government and the Ford Motor Company Exports, Inc., a New Jersey corporation. This contract, published in the Turkish Official Journal in Angora on February 14, 1929, law No. 1391, was passed on February 2, 1929.

A further contract for the lease of the Tophane warehouses was signed on February 9th, and the evacuation of these buildings is now under way.

1 "Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul," February 1929; "Ford Law."

ARTICLE I— The contract signed at Angora in November 1928 with the American Ford Motor Company Exports, Inc., and the letter attached thereto have been ratified.

ART. 2.— This Law is effective from the date of its publication.

ART. 3.— The Ministers of Finance and Economy are charged with the enforcement of the provisions of this law.

CONTRACT

BETWEEN

Saradjoglou Shukri Bey, Minister of Finance, acting for the Government of the Republic of Turkey, to be named in the text of the contract as the "Government",

on the one part,

AND

William G. Collins, representing and empowered to act, as per legalized power of attorney, in the name of Ford Motor Company Exports, Inc., incorporated and operating upon the laws of the State of New Jersey of the United States of America, and to be named in the text of the contract as the "Company",

the following has been agreed upon:

Law No. 1391, passed February 2, 1929

MADDE 1 — Hükümet, Şirkete İstanbul gümrük hududu dahilinde otomobil, kamyon, traktör, tayyare ve malzeme ve aksamı ve mütemmimatını parça parça getirerek burada ihzar ve itmam ve ikmal etmek ve karoserisini de ihzar eylemek üzere bir monte fabrikası ve bu işi idare için icap eden yazıhane ve idarehanelerini inşa ve tesis ile işletmek hakkını, aşağıda müsurrah şerait dairesinde, bahşeder. Fakat tamamen ikmal ve monte edilmiş otomobiller işbu mahalle ithal	ARTICLE I.— The Government grants the Company under the conditions clearly set forth below, the right to construct, establish and operate, within the boundaries of the Constantinople Customs, with offices of ad-ministration required for this work, an assembly plant for the local preparation, completion and finishing of automobiles, trucks, tractors, airplanes and material and parts and accessories and for the preparation of bodies, from material brought here unassembled

edilmez. Yalnız prime tabi olmıyan otomobiller bundan müstesnadır. İşbu mukavele tarafeynce imza ve teatisi tarihinden itibaren yirmi beş sene müddet için muteberdir.

and in pieces. Completely finished and assembled automobiles, however, shall not be introduced into this area. Only automobiles which are not subject to the premium are exempted from this stipulation. This contract is valid for a period of 25 years from the date of its signature and exchange by the two contracting parties.

MADDE 2 —- İşbu tesisat Hükûmet ile Şirket arasında tekarrür edecek ve metni mukavelenamede Serbest Mahal diye tevsim olunacak bir mahalde yapılıp o mahal memleket harici farz edilecek ve bunların temini faaliyeti zımninde muktezi olup Şirketin tahtı işgalinde bulunacak olan işbu mahalle ithal edilecek olan bilumum otomobil, kamyon, traktör ve yedek aksam ile sair alât ve edevat ve levazımından ve gerek yazıhanelerindeki muamelâttan naşi işbu mukavele müddetince gümrük ve sair her türlü ithalât rüsumundan ve diğer bilumum tekâlifi saireden muaftır. Emniyet ve sıhhati umumiyeyi alâkadar edip ithali kanunen memnu malzemei harbiye ve müstahzaratı kimyeviye Şirket tarafından celp ve idhal edilmez. Ancak montaj ameliyesinde istimali icap eden kimyevî ve sair

ART. 2.— Said establishment will be created in an area to be agreed upon by the Government and the Company and be named in the text of the contract as a "free area" which will be considered as outside the country; and for the purpose of assuring the functioning thereof all requisite auto-mobiles, trucks, tractors, and spare parts and other tools and implements and materials to be introduced into this area occupied by the Company, as well as transactions in its offices, shall be exempted, during the term of this contract, from customs duty and other import dues of any kind and all other-er taxes. War material and chemical preparations which involve the public surety and general health, the importation of which is prohibited by law, shall not be supplied and introduced by the Company. The Company is permit-

müstahzarat ve levazımın ithaline Şirket mezundur.

ted, however, to introduce such chemical and other preparations and materials the use of which is required in the assembly operations,

MADDE 3 — Şirketin ikinci madde mucibince celp ve ithal edeceği bilcümle eşya ve malzeme ve alât ve makine ve sairenin tekrar harice sevkine Şirket mezun ve bunlar için gümrük ve oktoruva resminden ve her nevi rüsum ve tekalifi saire itasından muaftır. Ancak bunlardan marüzzikir Serbest Mahalli muayyenden çıkarılıp memleket dahiline sevk ve ithal edilen otomobil, kamyon, traktör, yedek aksam, tayyare ve saireden hini ithalinde alelusul istifası icap eden gümrük resmi, muamele vergisi ve sair tekâlif ve rüsumun tediyesi mecburidir.

ART. 3.— The Company is permitted to reexport all goods, materials, tools, machines and other supplies which it may bring in and import according to Article 2, and for which it is exempted from the payment of customs duty and octroi tax and all kinds of dues and imposts. Of these, the payment of customs duty, transaction tax and other dues and imposts usually collected at the time of importation is, however, compulsory on automobiles, trucks, tractors, spare parts, airplanes, etc., which are brought out of the "free area" mentioned above and introduced into the country.

MADDE 4 — Şirket, Rüsumat İdaresinin vazifei nazaret ve murakabesini teshil etmek üzere Rüsumat muhafaza memurlarının ikametine mahsus bir veya bir kaç baraka Serbest Mahalde inşa etmeği ve kontrol vazifesile muvazzaf olacak memurların maaşlarına tekabül edecek bir meblâğı aynı sınıf ve derecedeki memurların Hükümetten aldıkları maaş nisbetinde

ART. 4.— In order to facilitate the supervision and control duties of the customs administration, the Company undertakes to construct in the free area one or more barracks to serve as lodges for the customs guards and to pay into the treasury a sum to meet the salaries of the employees which will be charged with the control, in proportion with the salaries received

hazineye tediye etmeği taahhüt eder.

Fakat muahharan Hükümet İstanbulda serbest liman tesis idip Şirketin işgal edeceği Serbest Mahal işbu serbest liman dahilinde bulunursa Şirket için hususî nezaret ve murakabe merfu olup serbest liman dahilinde tesisata sahip diğer müessesatın tabi olacakları usul ve ahkâm Şirkete de tatbik edilecek ve o taktirde Şirket işbu maddenin birinci fıkrasında mevcut barakaların inşasına ve memurlara maaş itasına dair olan mecburiyetlerden kurtulmuş olacaktır.

from the Government by officials of the same class and rank.

In case, however, the Government establishes at a later date a free port at Constantinople and should the free area to be occupied by the Company come within this free port, the private supervision and control over the Company will be removed and there will be applied to the Company the rules and provisions to which will be subjected the owners of other establishments created within the free port, in which case the Company will be released from the engagements relative to the construction of the barracks and payment of salaries to the employees mentioned in paragraph one of this article.

MADDE 5 — Ford müessesesi Serbest Mahaldeki idarehanece sipariş edilip Cemahiri Müttehidei Amerikadan doğruca ecnebî memleketlere sevkedilen bilumum otomobil, kamyon, traktör, tayyare ve yedek aksam ile bunlara müteferri levazım ve makineden hiç bir verği alınmıyacağı gibi Serbest Mahaldeki fabrika ve yazıhanelerden Türkiye haricine sevkedileck otomobil, traktör, tayyare ve yedek aksam ile teferruatı için defatirde mukayyet olsa dahi hiç bir vergi ile mükellef

ART. 5.— No taxes will be collected on any automobiles, trucks, tractors, airplanes, and spare parts, as well as on materials and machines pertaining to the same, ordered by the administration of the Ford Establishment in the free area and forwarded directly from the United States of America to foreign countries, nor will it be liable to any tax whatsoever on automobiles, tractors, airplanes, and spare parts and accessories to be shipped outside of Turkey from the factory in the free

olmıyacaktır.

Şirket Serbest Mahal dahilindeki muamelâtı için defatir ve muhabereyi türkçe ifaya mecbur olmıyacağı gibi kendisini tescil ve beyanname ahiz ve ticaret odasına kayıt gibi külfetlerden azadedir. Ancak Serbest Mahalden çıkarılarak memlekete ithal edilen emtia için üçüncü maddede mezkûr rüsum ve tekâlifi vereceği gibi onları satmak üzere memleket dahilinde bir yazıhane açarsa dahili memlekette bilumum ticaretaneler misilli tekâlif ve vezaifi ifaya ve muamelât ve muhaberatını türkçe olarak icraya mecburdur.

Şirket, işbu Serbest Mahal dahilinde bir meşher tesis edebilip, satış yapabilacek bir mağza bulunduramıyacak, yalnız acentalarına satış yapabilecektir.

MADDE 6 — Şirket, Serbest Mıntakadaki montaj fabrikasile yazıhanesinde istihdam edeceği memurin ve müstahdeminin kanununa tevfikan kazanç ve sair vergilerini maaşlarından kat ile Hükümete itaya mecburdur.

area, although they be entered in the registers.

The Company will not be bound to keep in the Turkish language its books and correspondence covering its transactions within the free area and it will be exempt from obligations such as registration and obtention of permit and membership in the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

On goods imported from the free area into the country, however, it will pay the duty and taxes mentioned in Article 3, as it will also be liable to the same taxes and subject to the performance of the same duties and to keep its transactions and correspondence in Turkish as all firms in the country, if it opens an office for their sale within the country.

Although the Company may open a showroom within this free area, it shall not maintain a sales store; it may affect sales only to its agents.

ART. 6.— The Company is obliged to withhold from the salaries and turn over to the Government, according to the law, on clerks and employees, the income and other taxes, for those employed in the assembly plant as well as in the of-

MADDE 7 — Her nekadar Serbest Mahalden memlekete berayı füruht sevk ve ithal edilecek makine ve malzemenin gümrük resmine tabiiyeti lüzumu üçüncü maddede tespit edilmiş isede mukabeleten dahi bu tesisattan memleketin iktisadiyatı için husule gelecek fevait ve bahusus otomobillere ait retüş, telvin, montaj ve sair mütemmim ameliyatın yerli işçileri marifetile icra edileceği nazarı itibare alınarak Hükümet, Şirketin Türkiyeye ithal edeceği hernevi otomobil, kamyon ve traktörlerin beheri için otuz dolarlık bir prim itasını deruhte eder. Şirketin bu prime kesbi istihkak etmesi için montaj, telvin, retüş ameliyatının kısmı mühiminin Serbest Mahal müessesatında icra ve ikmal edilmiş olması şarttır. Hükümetin Şirkete vereceği işbu otuz dolarlık prim, Şirketin Hükümete tediye edeceği gümrük resminin yüzde yirmisini tecavüz etmiyecek ve tecavüz ettiği taktirde o nisbette tenzil olunacaktır.

Esasen ithalât rüsumundan muaf olan malzeme için Hükümetin hiç bir prim vermiyeceği tabiîdir.

Mütemmim ameliyattan makfice in the free area.

ART. 7.— Although the liability to customs duty of machines and material forwarded from the free area and imported into the country for sale has been set down in Article 3, the Government in turn, taking into consideration the advantages which will result for the country's economic life from this establishment and especially the fact that the retouching, painting, assembling and other finishing operations of the automobiles will be executed by local labor, undertakes the payment of a premium of THIRTY Dollars for every one of any kind of automobile, truck, and tractor imported into Turkey. It is a condition, for the Company to become entitled to this premium, that the major part of assembling, painting and retouching shall have been executed and completed in the establishment in the free area

This premium of THIRTY Dollars which the Government will pay the Company, shall not exceed 20% of the Customs duty the Company will pay to the Government, and in case it exceeds same, it will be reduced to such a proportion.

It is understood that the Gov-

sat, bizzat umumî montajdan maada döşemeciliğe müteallik doldurma ve dikme gibi imalât ile dahilî tefrişat ve karoseri aksamının ve demir veya çelik levhaların bağlanması, telvin ve karoserinin birleştirilmesi, ön ve arka dingillerin montaj ve ihzarı, karoseri ve sair aksamının bazı levhaların alektirik ile kaynatma ameliyesi, otomobil ve kamyonların bazı aksamının emeyorı, açık veya kapalı arabaların tezyinatı, açık ve kapalı otomobillerin tente ve tavanlarının yerleştirilmesi v. s. gibi ameliyattır.

Hükümetin işbu otuz dolarlık priminden, alelumum mütemmim ameliyatı Serbest Mahalde icra edilen makineler müstefit olup fayton todor rodester ve ihdas edeceği modellerdeki otomobiller ile kamyonların tamamen serbest mahalde telvinleri ve montajları icra edileceğinden bu pirime kesbi istihkak edecekler isede; Ford teşkilâtına dahil olmıyan muhtelif karoseri fabrikaları tarafından ihzar edilen kupa ve fordör tiplerinin karoserileri tamam olarak İstanbuldaki Serbest Mahalle gelebileceklerinden bunlar için Hükümetin vereceği prim beherine yalnız onbeş dolar olacağı gibi ileride bu günkü mevcut tiplerden başka bir tip otomobil

ernment will pay no premium for materials which, in principle, are exempt from import duty.

Finishing operations are understood to be, besides the general assembling itself, processes such as; upholstering connected with seats, floor covering, and sewing, interior furnishing: the setting together of the body parts and iron and/or steel sheets; painting; assembling of the body; the preparation and assembling of the front and rear axles; the operation of soldering by electricity certain sheets of the body and other parts; the enameling of certain parts of the automobiles and trucks, the decoration of open and/or closed cars, the putting on of the tops of open and closed cars, etc.

While machines of which the general finishing process has been affected in the free area benefit from this premium of THIRTY Dollars of the Government, and although Phaetons, Tudors, Roadsters and automobiles of models to be adopted, as well as trucks, will become entitled to this premium because their painting and assembling has been entirely affected in the free area, and as bodies for Coupe and Fordor models, made by body factories which are not in

vücuda getirir ve keza bunların yalnız karoserisini hazır bir halde Serbest Mahalle ithal ederse bu tiplerin memlekete ithalinde verilecek prim keza onbeş dolar olacaktır.

Ancak bu gibi otomobillerin yalnız karoseri kısım hazır geleceği ve şasi ile sair aksamının bermutat İstanbul müessesatında ihzar ve monte ve ikmal edileceği tasrihan beyan olunur.

Primin her arabanın gümrükten müruru esnasında Şirkete tediyesi meşrut olup Hükümet bu hususta bir usul vaz'ını ve Gümrük İdaresine tebliğini kabul eder.

MADDE 8 — Şirket Serbest Mahaldeki tesisatında Türk tabbası olarak istihdam edeceği memurin ve müstahdemin miktarını icrayı faaliyete başladığı tarihten bilitibar ilk iki

the Ford organization, may come complete into the free area in Constantinople, the premium which the Government will pay for the latter will be only FIFTEEN Dollars each, and should any automobile model other than those existent at present be created in the future, of which again only the body in a complete state is introduced into the free area, the premium which will be paid at the importation of such models into the country will also be FIFTEEN Dollars.

It is clearly expressed, however, that of such automobiles the body only will arrive ready-made and that the chassis as well as the other parts will be prepared, assembled and finished in the Constantinople establishment as usual.

The payment to the Company of the premium at the passage of each car through the customs is stipulated, and the Government agrees to draw up regulations in this connection and to communicate same to the Customs Administration.

ART. 8.— The Company shall raise by progressive increases the number of officials and employees of Turkish citizenship which it will employ in its establis[h]ment in the

sene müddet zarfında alettedriç tezyit ile yüzde altmış nisbetine iblâğ ederek bilahara, tedricen tezyit etmekte olduğu işbu nisbeti, altıncı senenin hitamında yüzde yetmiş beşe iblâğ edecektir.

free area to a proportion of 60% within a period of two years from the date it starts its activity and shall have advanced this proportion to 75% at the end of the sixth year.

MADDE 9 — Türkiyede mecburî bir istikraz aktinde Serbest Mahaldeki Şirket bundan muaf tutulacaktır

ART. 9.— In case a forced loan is issued in Turkey, the Company in its free area will be exempt therefrom.

MADDE 10 — Ford Şirketi, emtiasını nakleden vapurları Serbest Mahal sahiline yanaştırmak suretile tahmil ve tahliye ameliyatını hiç bir kimseye ücret ve bir hak tediye etmeksizin kendi vesait ve Türk amelesile icra eder. Ancak liman dahilindeki nakliyat ile açıktaki vapurların tahmil ve tahliye işini ifa edemiyecek ve İstanbul Liman İnhisar Şirketi ile bir itilafname aktederek icra edecektir.

ART. 10.— The Ford Company will conduct its loading and unloading operations by letting the steamers carrying its goods come alongside the shore of the free area, with its own means and Turkish workers, without paying to anyone whomsoever a fee or royalty. It shall not be permitted, however, to perform transport operations within the harbor nor the loading and unloading operations of steamers anchoring off the port, which operations shall be executed by concluding an agreement with the Monopoly Company of the Constantinople Harbor.

Mezkûr inhisarın ref'i taktirinde tahmil ve tahliye işlerini 815 numaralı kabotaj kanununa tevfikan icra ettirecektir.

In the event of the suppression of said monopoly, it (the Company) will have its loading and unloading operations carried out according to the Cabotage Law No. 815.

MADDE 11 — Dahili memlekette gerek emtia ve eşyasının nakli ve

ART. 11. — Within the country the Company accepts and undertakes

gerekse kendisine lâzım olacak emtianın iştirası için şeraiti mütesaviye dairesinde türk tüccarlarile müsaccel türk müesseselerini tercih edeceğini Şirket kabul ve taahhüt eyler.

MADDE 12 — Hükümet, Şirketin seyyar memurlarının Türkiyeye serbestçe girip çıkması için bir sene müddetle muteber olmak üzere pasaportlarını vize edecek ve müteakiben bu vizeler bir senelik olmak üzere tecdit edilecektir.

MADDE 13 — Türk kömürünün istimaline esbabı fenniye mani olmadığı taktirde, fiatları sair mahallerden gelen fiatlara göre gali olmamak şartile, Şirket türk kömürünü kullanmağı kabul eder.

MADDE 14 — Hükümet muahharen başka otomobil müesseseleri ve bu gibi işlerle meşgul eşhası saire ve kumpanyalara her hangi serbest mıntaka dahilinde daha fazla hukuk ve teshilât bahşederse Ford Kumpanyası da bundan tamamen müstefit olacaktır.

MADDE 15 — Hükümet Şirketin işgal edeceği Serbest Mahalden lâakal dört yüz metro muhitindeki bir sahada ayni muamelâtı ifa edecek bir otomobil fabrikasının

that it will give preference under equal conditions to Turkish merchants and registered Turkish establishments, for the transportation of its merchandise and goods as well as for the purchase of the goods which it will need.

ART. 12.— The Government will visa the passports of the Company's travelling officials for their free entrance into Turkey and their exit, to be valuable for a period of one year, which visa will be successively renewed for one year.

ART. 13.— In case technical reasons do not prevent the use of Turkish coal, the Company agrees to use Turkish coal, under the condition that the prices are not high if compared to those for coal arriving from other places.

ART. 14.— In case the Government grants, at a later date, more rights and facilities to other automobile establishments and to other persons and companies engaged in similar business within any free zone, the Ford Company also will benefit fully therefrom.

ART. 15.— The Government will not give permission for the establishment of an automobile factory to be engaged in the same operations, within a circumference of at

tesisine müsaade vermiyecektir.

MADDE 16 — İşbu mukavelenamenin tefsin ahkâmından naşi Hükümet ile Şirket arasında tahaddüs edecek her türlü ihtilâfat tarafeynden birisinin vukuu davetinden itibaren on beş gün zarfında tarafeynce tayin edilecek iki hakem tarafından hal ve faslolunur.

İki hakem ittifak edemezler veya tarafeynden biri mehli mukarrer zarfında hakemini tayin etmezse mes'ele Türkiye Mahkemei Temyiz Birinci Reisi veyahut mumaileyhin tayin edeceği bitaraf bir hakem tarafından hal ve faslolunur.

İki hakemin müttefikan veya üçüncü hakemin müstakillen vereceği karar kat'i ve mecburiyülitübadır.

MADDE 17 — Seyrisefain İdaresi tarafından Topane antrepolarının tamamen tahliye ettirilerek Ford Şirketine teslimini müteakip Şirket tamirat ve istihzarata başlayacak ve binanın tesellümünden dokuz ay sonra mukavelenamede derpiş edilen işleri yapacaktır. Esbabı meşrua dolayısile bu müddetin tezyidi icap ederse Hükümet esbabım bittetkik lüzumu kadar temdide muvafakat

least 400 meters from the free area the Company will occupy.

ART. 16 — All kinds of disagreements which may arise between the Government and the Company as resulting from the interpretation of the provisions of this contract, shall be settled and decided by two arbiters appointed by both parties within 15 days from the date of application of one of the parties.

Should the two arbiters not come to an accord or one of the parties not designate its arbiter within the fixed term, the matter shall be settled and decided by the First President of the Court of Cassation of Turkey or by an impartial arbiter appointed by him.

The decision given by the two arbiters unanimously or by the third arbiter independently is final and binding.

ART. 17.— The Company shall start repairs and preparations following the delivery to the Ford Company of the Tophane warehouses, which shall be caused by the Seyri Sefain Administration to be completely evacuated, and shall perforin the activities set down in the contract nine months after the taking over of the building. In case a prolongation of this delay is ren-

edecektir.

Bu müddet zarfında da ikmal ile faaliyete geçilmediği taktirde işbu mukavelename münfesih olacaktır.

MADDE 18 — İşbu mukavelenamenin Türkçe metni asıl olup nüshateyn olarak tanzim ve tarihi imzadan muteber olmak üzere Ankarada tarafeyn arasında taati kılındı.

dered necessary by legally-admitted causes, the Government will consent to a required extension after due examination of said causes.

In case said preparations are not completed and activity has not been started within this latter delay, the contract shall be cancelled.

ART. 18.— The Turkish text of this contract is the original; it has been drawn up in two copies and exchanged in Angora, and shall be valid from the date of the signature.

Serbest Mıntıka Kanunu / Free Zone Law:[2]

BİRİNCİ MADDE — Şehremaneti hududu dahilinde veya civarında bir serbest mıntaka ihdasına Hükûmet mezundur.	ARTICLE ONE - The Government is authorized to establish a free zone within or around the boundaries of the City Administration.
İKİNCİ MADDE — Serbest mıntaka dahilinde berveçhi âti ticarî ve sınaî hareket ve ameliyeler icra olunabilir:	ARTICLE TWO - The following commercial and industrial activities and operations may be carried out within the free zone:
1 - Dahilden veya ecnebi memleketlerden gelib bilâhare ihtiyaca göre harice sevk veya memlekete idhal edilecek her nevi mevaddın depo edilmesi,	1 - Warehousing of all kinds of goods coming from within the country or from foreign countries and to be shipped abroad or imported into the country according to the need,
2 - Depo edilen mevaddın yeniden veya tebdilen ambalâjı, tanzim ve tasnif ve tasfiyeleri, yıkanmaları, işlenmeleri evsaf veya eşkâlinin değiştirilmesi ve bunlara nümasil ameliyeler icrası,	2 - Packaging, or repackaging; organizing, sorting and liquidation, washing, processing, changing the qualities or appearance of the stored goods and performing similar operations,
3 - Dahilden tedarik veya ecnebi memleketlerden celbolunan her nevi mevaddı ibtidaiyenin işlenerek mamul veya nim mamul hale ifrağı,	3 - Processing of all kinds of raw materials supplied domestically or imported from foreign countries into finished or semi-finished products,
4 - Parçaları dahilde veya hariçte imal olunan her nevi alât ve makineler ile edevatı muharrikenin kurulması,	4 - Installation of all kinds of tools, machines and equipment, parts of which are manufactured domestically or internationally,
5 - Dahilden tedarik veya ecnebi memleketlerden celbolunan malzeme ile gemilerin ve sair merakibi bahriyenin tamir ve inşası.	5 - Repair and construction of ships and other naval vessels with materials supplied internally or imported from foreign countries.

2 "Serbest Mıntıka Kanunu." Translation belongs to the author.

ÜÇÜNCÜ MADDE — Serbest mıntaka dahilinde ikinci maddede muharrer hareket ve ameliyelerin icrasını temin ve teshile hadim olan ve mıntakanın zarurî ihtiyacat, icabat ve mütemmimatından bulunan bilcümle inşaat ve tesisat ve teçhizat vücude getirilebilir.

ARTICLE THREE - Within the free zone, all kinds of constructions, installations and equipments, which are necessary for the execution of the activities and operations mentioned in the second article and which are among the essential needs, requirements and components of the zone, may be realized.

DÖRDÜNCÜ MADDE — Serbest mıntakanın mahal ve hududu bir defaya muntasır olmak üzere İcra Vekilleri Heyeti kararile tayin ve tesbit olunur.

ARTICLE FOUR - The location and boundaries of the free zone shall be designated and determined by the decision of the Council of Executive Agents for once.

BEŞİNCİ MADDE — Serbest mıntaka hududu dahiline müsadif Devlete veya hakikî veya hükmî eşhasa aid her nevi arazi ve emlâk hakkında menafii umumiye için istimlâk kararnamesi ahkâmı tatbik olunur.

ARTICLE FIFTH - All kinds of land and property belonging to the State or real or legal persons within the boundaries of the free zone shall be subject to the provisions of the expropriation decree for the public good.

ALTINCI MADDE — Serbest mıntaka doğrudan doğruya Hükümet tarafından tesis ve idare edilebileceği gibi İstanbul şehremaneti ve ticaret odası veya diğer resmî müessesat veya şirket ve eşhasa devir suretile veya onlarla biliştirak tesis ve idare olunabilir.

Ancak serbest mıntaka tesis ve idaresi doğrudan doğruya veya biliştirak Hükûmetçe ifa edilmek istenildiği veya ahare devir taahhüdü maliyi mutazammın olduğu surette şeraiti bir kanunu mahsus ile tayin edilir.

ARTICLE SIX - The free zone may be established and administered directly by the Government, or it may be established and administered by or in conjunction with the Istanbul municipal administration, the Chamber of Commerce or other official institutions or companies and individuals.

However, if the establishment and administration of the free zone is intended to be carried out directly or jointly by the Government or if the transfer to others involves a financial

YEDİNCİ MADDE — Serbest mıntaka arazisi Türkiye Cümhuriyetinin lâyünfek bir cüzüdür. Bu mıntaka derununda gümrük ve teşviki sanayi kanunlarıyle belediye rüsumu dahil olduğu halde bilcümle rüsum ve tekâlife aid kavanin, pasaport kanunu ahkâmı tatbik olunmaz. Mıntakanın belediye vezaifi ayrıca tanzim olunur. Mıntakada vezaifi zabıta ve adliye ve birinci fıkrada zikrolunanlardan maada bilcümle kavanin ve nizamat ahkâmı tamamile meri ve caridir.

SEKİZİNCİ MADDE — Mıntakanın gerek dahilindeki gerek deniz ve kara taaflarından hududlarındaki inzibat, muhafaza ve kontrolün temini mahallî gümrük idaresine aid olub bu hususta icab eden talimatnameler Dahiliye, Maliye ve Ticaret Vekâletleri tarafından müştereken tanzim edilir. Devletin asayiş ve inzibatı ile alâkadar olan bilûmum makamat ve memurin mahallî gümrük idaresine muavenetle mükelleftirler.

DOKUZUNCU MADDE — Serbest mıntaka dahilindeki arazi gayrikabili ferağ olmak ve hiç bir suretle âhare intikal etmemek üzere Devlete aiddir. İşbu arazi ancak şerait ve müddeti mucommitment, the conditions shall be determined by a special law.

ARTICLE SEVENTH - The land of the free zone is an integral part of the Republic of Turkey. The provisions of the Customs and Incentive Industry Laws, the municipal tax and all other duties and taxes, including the municipal tax, and the provisions of the Passport Law shall not be applicable in this zone. The municipal duties of the district shall be regulated separately. All laws and regulations other than the ones mentioned in the first article and the laws and regulations of the police and the judiciary shall be in full force and effect in the district.

ARTICLE EIGHTH - The local customs administration shall be responsible for the security, protection and control of the area, both within the area and at the sea and land borders, and the necessary instructions shall be issued jointly by the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Finance and Commerce. All authorities and officials concerned with public order and security of the state are obliged to assist the local customs administration.

ARTICLE NINTH - The land within the free zone belongs to the State to be irrevocable and not to be transferred to others in any way. This land can only be leased with conditions and for

ayyene ile icar edilebilir.

ONUNCU MADDE — Mintaka dahilinde ikinci maddede muharrer hareket ve ameliyelerden maada makasid için sarf ve istihlak edilecek mevaddan kavanini mahsusasına ve bu babda tanzim edilecek bir nizamnameye tevfikan vergi, rüsum ve ücurat alınır. Vergi, rüsum ve ücuratı tediye edilmeksizin sarf ve istihlâk olunan mevad kaçak addolunur.

ON BİRİNCİ MADDE — Serbest mintaka dahilinde tesisat vücude getirmek depo açmak veya mahal işgal etmek ruhsat istihsaline mütevakkıftır. Hilâfına hareket edenler bu tesisat ve depo ve mahallerden istifade etmek hakkına malik olmayacakları gibi bir gûna zarar ve ziyan iddia eylemeksizin derhal mıntakayı terke icbar olunabilirler.

ON İKİNCİ MADDE — Serbest mıntaka dahilinde icra olunacak ticaret envâî ile mıntakaya idhal edilecek mevad nizamnamesinde tayin olunur. Nizamname hilâfında hareketle memnu ticaret yapan veya memnu eşya idhal edenlerden beş yüz liradan on bin liraya kadar ağır cezayi nakdî alınacağı gibi eşyayi memnua da müsadere olunur.

a fixed period of time.

ARTICLE TENTH - Within the free zone; taxes, duties and fees shall be collected from the goods to be consumed and used for purposes other than the activities and operations mentioned in the second article, in accordance with the laws and regulations and a regulation to be issued in this regard. Any goods consumed and consumed without payment of taxes, duties and fees shall be deemed to be contraband.

ARTICLE ELEVENTH - To build installations, open warehouses or occupy spaces within the free zone is subject to obtaining a license. Those who act contrary to this shall not have the right to benefit from these installations, warehouses and places and may be compelled to leave the area immediately without claiming any damage or loss.

ARTICLE TWELVE - The types of trade to be carried out within the free zone and the goods to be imported into the zone are determined in the regulation. Those who engage in prohibited trade or import prohibited goods in violation of the regulation shall be subject to a heavy fine ranging from five hundred liras to ten thousand liras and the prohibited goods shall be confiscated.

ON ÜÇÜNCÜ MADDE — Serbest mıntaka dahilinde nizamnameye irayet mecburidir. Muhalif harekette bulunanlardan beş yüz liraya kadar cezayi nakdî alınacağı gibi mükerrirler başkaca mıntaka dahilinde bir daha is yapamamak üzere mıntaka hududu haricine çıkarılır.

ARTICLE THIRTEENTH - Compliance with the regulation is obligatory within the free zone. Those who violate the regulations shall be fined up to five hundred liras, and repeat offenders shall be expelled from the boundaries of the free zone, never to work in the free zone again.

ON DÖRDÜNCÜ MADDE — On bir, on ki, ve on üçüncü maddelerde mezkûr cezalar mıntaka nizamnamesine tevfikan idarî olarak tatbik edilir.

ARTICLE FOURTEENTH - The penalties mentioned in articles eleven, twelve, and thirteen shall be administratively enforced in accordance with the district regulations.

ON BEŞİNCİ MADDE — Mıntaka dahilinde çalıştırılacak işçilerin Türk olması mecburidir. Ancak memleket dahilinde buhinmaları kabil olmayan mütehassıs ecnebi işçiler Ticaret vekâletinin müsaadesile istihdam olunabilirler.

ARTICLE FIFTEENTH - It is obligatory that the workers to be employed within the district be Turkish. However, specialized foreign workers who cannot be employed in the country may be employed with the permission of the Ministry of Trade.

ON ALTINCI MADDE — Mıntakanın sureti idaresi bir nizamnamei mahsus ile tayin olunur.

ARTICLE SIXTEENTH - The administration of the district shall be determined by a special regulation.

ON YEDİNCİ MADDE — Bu kanun neşri tarihinden muteberdir.

SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE - This law is effective from the date of its publication.

ON SEKİZİNCİ MADDE — Bu kanunun ahkâmını icraya Dahiliye, Maliye ve Ticaret vekilleri memurdurlar.

EIGHTEENTH ARTICLE - The officials of Ministries of Interior, Finance and Trade shall be authorized to execute the provisions of this law.

MUVAKKAT MADDE — Serbest mıntaka mahal ve hududunun tayini için yapılacak tedkikatın istilzam eyle-

EXCEPTIONAL ARTICLE - All expenses to be incurred by the surveys to be conducted for the determination of

yecegi bilumum masarif yirmi beş bin lirayı tecavüz etmemek üzere 1927 Maliye bütçesinin masarifi gayri melhuza tertibinden tesviye olunur.

the location and boundaries of the free zone shall be paid from the non-cost-incurred expenses account of the 1927 Finance budget, not exceeding twenty-five thousand liras.

Appendix H Company Financial Records on FMC Exports Inc., Istanbul

TABLE Appx. H.1 Total sale numbers according to Ford Managerial Reports, 1931-1943

Years	Passenger Cars	Commercial Vehicles	Tractors	Number of Dealers[3]	Total
1931	1066	1542	23	129	2640
1932	702	549	14	150	1243
1933	272	404	2	53	678
1934	130	297	2	38	429
1935	139	260	4	36	404
1936	86	261	1	14	358
1937	248	818	14	14	1090
1938	36	349	4	13	460
1939	123	475	2	16	639
1940	20	30	0	20	61
1941	2	44	0	21	47
1942	0	0	0	21	0
1943	0	0	0	20	0
Total	2824	5029	66	545	8049

SOURCE: "Managers Reports to Directors, Monthly, (1931-1943)," Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

3 Representing the average of car dealers for a year.

TABLE Appx. H.2 Sale numbers for cars to Istanbul Territory, 1925-1930

Istanbul Territory	Y. 1925	Y. 1926	Y. 1927	Y. 1928	Y. 1929	Y. 1930	*Total*
Egypt	1570	1073	553	558	1485	755	5994
Roumania	855	1083	1046	669	1755	119	5527
Greece	1430	203	718	368	968	274	3961
Turkey	1064	623	291	245	460	243	2926
Syria	974	519	270	173	477	161	2574
Jugoslavia	913	597	228	263	199	347	2547
Persia	372	589	467	181	592	281	2482
Mesopotamia	340	239	299	81	416	189	1564
Egyptian Sudan	167	NA	NA	NA	213	183	563
Bulgaria	16	35	11	114	288	1	465
Palestine	188	73	23	44	99	31	458
Albania	117	46	23	20	86	57	349
Arabia	4	25	33	41	66	102	271
Cyprus	NA	41	42	54	89	31	257
Bahrain	24	15	15	13	35	13	115
Itl. Somaliland	0	5	3	21	56	18	103
Malta	15	26	9	3	23	20	96
Eritrea	9	12	9	11	27	5	73
Rhodes	1	1	24	12	21	5	64
Abyssinia	10	8	8	12	8	15	61
Oman	0	NA	NA	NA	14	NA	14
Fr. Somaliland	NA	NA	NA	4	0	7	11
Afghanistan	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	5
Azerbijan	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Crete	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mytilene	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	8069	5213	4072	2887	7382	2857	30,480

SOURCE: "Istanbul Territory Sales," (1925-1930), Acc. 38 Box 7-Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

TABLE Appx. H.3 Sale numbers for trucks to Istanbul Territory, 1925-1930

Istanbul Territory	Y. 1925	Y. 1926	Y. 1927	Y. 1928	Y. 1929	Y. 1930[4]	*Total*
Roumania	788	1092	849	190	1128	[40]	4007
Egypt	1079	613	192	151	454	305	2794
Greece	971	124	213	87	802	380	2577
Turkey	638	322	207	91	572	65	1895
Jugoslavia	253	153	85	67	80	189	827
Persia	34	142	113	103	380	[102]	670
Egyptian Sudan	128	NA	NA	NA	246	176	550
Bulgaria	99	37	3	44	238	2	423
Syria	46	112	20	30	136	40	384
Palestine	187	86	10	16	68	1	368
Mesopotamia	56	101	71	49	34	43	354
Arabia	0	25	40	39	60	37	201
Malta	21	14	8	1	25	66	135
Albania	15	5	15	10	38	46	129
Cyprus	NA	11	4	40	44	22	121
Itl. Somaliland	2	4	1	2	32	29	70
Eritrea	1	3	3	2	14	4	27
Rhodes	0	0	3	2	14	7	26
Bahrain	0	0	4	0	12	8	24
Abyssinia	2	4	2	2	6	4	20
Fr. Somaliland	NA	NA	NA	0	2	3	5
Afghanistan	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	2
Oman	0	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	2
Azerbijan	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Na	NA
Crete	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mytilene	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	4320	2848	1843	926	4389	1285	15,611

SOURCE: "Istanbul Territory Sales," (1925-1930), Acc. 38 Box 7-Turkey, Benson Ford Re-search Center, The Henry Ford.

4 There are discrapancies for the year 1930 in the documents. Brackets indicate "returned" items

TABLE Appx. H.4 Sale numbers for cars and trucks to Istanbul Territory, 1925-1930

Istanbul Territory	Y. 1925	Y. 1926	Y. 1927	Y. 1928	Y. 1929	Y. 1930	Total
Roumania	1643	2175	1895	859	2883	79	9534
Egypt	2649	1686	745	709	1939	1060	8788
Greece	2401	327	931	455	1770	654	6538
Turkey	1702	945	498	336	1032	308	4821
Jugoslavia	1166	750	313	330	279	536	3374
Persia	406	731	580	284	972	179	3152
Syria	1020	631	290	203	613	201	2958
Mesopotamia	396	340	370	130	450	232	1918
Egyptian Sudan	295	NA	NA	NA	459	359	1113
Bulgaria	115	72	14	158	526	3	888
Palestine	375	159	33	60	167	32	826
Albania	132	51	38	30	124	103	478
Arabia	4	50	73	80	126	139	472
Cyprus	NA	52	46	94	133	53	378
Malta	36	40	17	4	48	86	231
Itl. Somaliland	2	9	4	23	88	47	173
Bahrain	24	15	19	13	47	21	139
Eritrea	10	15	12	13	41	9	100
Rhodes	1	1	27	14	35	12	90
Abyssinia	12	12	10	14	14	19	81
Oman	0	NA	NA	NA	16	NA	16
Fr. Somaliland	NA	NA	NA	4	2	10	16
Afghanistan	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	NA	7
Azerbijan	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Crete	NA	NA	NA	Na	NA	NA	NA
Mytilene	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	12,389	8061	5915	3813	11,771	4142	46,091

SOURCE: "Istanbul Territory Sales," (1925-1930), Acc. 38 Box 7-Turkey, Benson Ford Re-search Center, The Henry Ford.

TABLE Appx. H.5 Balance Sheet of Ford Motor Company Inc, Istanbul, December 1927 – December 1935, in USD

Year	Merchandise	Buildings, Fixtures and Structures	Factory and Misc. equipment	Machinery	Durable Tools	Power Plant Equipment	Total Assets	Accrued Payrolls	Employees Investments	Profit/Loss
1927	570,885.25		26,313.20	1,698.81	2,444.65		1,093,494.16	1,376.92	10,231.15	429,776.89
1928	533,934.40		24,526.27	674.91	2,444.65		1,138,630.25	1,510.50	15,450.53	322,676.59
1929	913,027.88		204,632.62	4,583.10	7,973.08	91,039.37	3,188,042.75	6,370.61	13,335.78	637,484.96
1930	2,258,674.20	1,020.76	228,428.46	15,222.93	32,431.66	101,109.64	3,530,021.87	5,409.58	16,997.50	-236,536.83
1931	1,234,014.38	96,224.61	237,816.23	16,284.31	26,403.18		2,402,399.29	4,184.69	21,868.10	
1932	475,206.95	96,194.23	217,570.96	15,950.68	23,878.02		1,943,060.59	4,114.42	19,131.09	-219,697.39
1933	251,930.60	96,194.23	207,723.66	15,815.70	15,626.95		1,384,215.98	3,045.46	507.52	-156,477.27
1934	215,644.76	96,194.23	204,686.76	15,815.70	9,767.30		1,106,072.97	2,979.14	1,460.00	-44,981.46
1935	172,035.15	96,194.23	203,993.39	14,029.06			762,040.84	2,134.85		-48,996.09

SOURCE: "Balance Sheet," AR-68-16:3 US Currency-Istanbul-Credit, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

TABLE Appx. H.6 Sales, Production and Stocks, 1929-1932

Year	Production During Year (Car)	Built-up Stock on Hand at the End of the Year (Car)	Deliveries to Dealers from Plant during Year (Car)	Retail Sales by Dealers during Year (Car)	Production During Year (Truck)	Built-up Stock on Hand at the End of the Year (Truck)	Deliveries to Dealers from Plant during Year (Truck)	Retail Sales by Dealers during Year (Truck)	Production During Year (Total)	Built-up Stock on Hand at the End of the Year (Total)	Deliveries to Dealers from Plant during Year (Total)	Retail Sales by Dealers during Year (Total)
1929	0	264	1442	1746	0	232	466	972	0	496	1908	2718
1930	32	289	269	814	0	103	112	439	32	392	381	1253
1931	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1932	698	1546	690	0	434	1256	402	0	1132	2802	1092	0

SOURCE: "FMC Ltd. Dagenham, England Sales, Poduction Stock Reports, Istanbul (1929-1932)," Acc. 98-213-541 Box 108-Turkey, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

TABLE Appx. H.7 Domestic and Foreign Production Numbers of Ford Motor Company, 1933-1936

Production Places	Passenger and Commercial (V8)	Passenger and Commercial (4-Cyl)	Trucks (V8)	Trucks (4-Cyl)	Tractors	Lincolns	Y	C	Total Units
Amsterdam	8419	2900	4572	2035	0	0	0	218	18,144
Antwerp	8054	2216	3164	1500	0	0	57	813	15,804
Asnieres	17,768	2768	2656	3523	0	0	2780	16	31,967
Barcelona	3990	2573	4128	3739	0	0	3298	2009	19,737
Buenos Aires	19,590	1545	5542	1401	0	0	0	0	28,078
Cologne	5542	6777	1563	13,617	0	0	11,121	9565	48,185
Copenhag	13,347	2425	6985	2566	0	0	0	255	25,578
Cork	1910	981	997	988	0	0	9603	1697	16,176
Dagenham	12,898	11,770	13,593	27,358	28,217	0	130,390	49,869	274,095
Mexico City	8548	439	4950	723	0	0	0	0	14,660
Santiago	1480	176	600	260	0	0	0	0	2516
Sao Paolo	11,287	556	7722	1296	0	0	0	0	20,861
Yokohoma	16,098	6740	22,628	8245	0	0	0	217	53,928
Canada Dom.	116,654	11,471	20,971	5313	0	0	0	0	214,691
Canada Exp.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alexandria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Athens	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bologna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bucharest	326	0	117	0	0	0	0	0	443
Cristobal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Havana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Helsinfors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Istanbul	96	89	0	218	0	0	0	0	403
Lisbon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manila	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Montevideo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Production Places	Passenger and Commercial (V8)	Passenger and Commercial (4-Cyl)	Trucks (V8)	Trucks (4-Cyl)	Tractors	Lincolns	Y	C	Total Units
Permanbuca	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Porto Alegre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rio de Janiero	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shanghai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stockholm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
US/Domestic	272,3384	23,436	326,573	16,907	0	32,651	0	0	3,122,951
BU Export	36,988	4678	24,726	6075	0	203	0	0	72,670
KD Export	121,527	21,374	75,932	31,748	0	390	0	0	250,971
Total	3,042,353	81,540	47,1110	95,764	28,217	32,854	157,249	64,659	3,980,887

SOURCE: "FMC Ltd. Dagenham-Report of Deliveries by Country-Istanbul, Turkey," AR-98-213-541 / Box 106 / Folder 44, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

TABLE Appx. H.8 Domestic and Foreign Delivery Numbers of Ford Motor Company, 1933-1936

Production Places	Passenger&Commercial (V8)	Passenger&Commercial (4-Cyl)	Trucks (V8)	Trucks (4-Cyl)	Tractors	Lincolns (Zfr-1935-6)	Y	C	Total Units
Amsterdam	7990	2789	3878	2146	339	320	388	456	18,306
Antwerp	8693	2142	3944	1562	328	126	1060	949	18,806
Asnieres	20,143	3294	3518	3668	214	280	3020	231	36,637
Barcelona	3466	2499	3767	2968	198	10	4125	2066	19,099
Buenos Aires	19,446	1890	5615	2268	0	115	354	233	29,923
Cologne	6313	6867	1641	13,474	71	18	11,234	9285	48,908
Copenhag	6725	1503	2888	1243	990	32	2187	1821	17,391
Cork	1884	1564	1022	1287	351	1	9586	1695	17,390
Dagenham	19,468	11,069	13,204	25,987	14,496	327	111,509	31,484	227,547
Mexico City	9145	900	5331	836	47	85	0	0	16,350
Santiago	2039	231	686	802	24	19	5	0	3806
Sao Paolo	6817	419	4690	667	13	86	50	2	12,750
Yokohoma	14,291	6566	20,521	7374	104	63	168	260	49,351
Canada Dom.	44,137	3844	7504	48	199	294	91	4	56,122

Production Places	Passenger&Commercial (V8)	Passenger&Commercial (4-Cyl)	Trucks (V8)	Trucks (4-Cyl)	Tractors	Lincolns (Zfr-1935-6)	Y	C	Total Units
Canada Exp.	79,101	7399	20,400	2023	2612	417	6529	10,664	129,287
Alexandria	4435	1680	6836	1119	199	54	414	453	15,194
Athens	219	70	745	206	23	9	20	12	1305
Bologna	184	52	269	193	1153	1	206	19	2078
Bucharest	1530	678	804	628	72	41	95	161	4012
Cristobal	17,639	1270	8625	1825	82	321	248	172	30,198
Havana	3499	78	1996	129	13	87	2	0	5806
Helsinfors	965	157	1830	713	460	19	186	320	4651
Istanbul	563	270	643	413	6	11	40	0	1946
Lisbon	782	186	765	673	31	16	620	459	3533
Manila	2541	212	2058	825	0	78	102	2	5820
Montevideo	1621	115	613	113	9	9	12	11	2503
Permanbuca	1462	195	1614	364	1	6	19	0	3661
Porto Alegre	970	81	489	77	3	1	28	0	1649
Rio de Janiero	3134	179	1371	325	9	42	69	0	5129
Shanghai	2946	504	2256	1216	13	31	245	147	7359
Stockholm	7001	716	2651	633	1957	120	1716	2153	16,950
US/Domestic	271,1673	23,436	317,851	16,907	0	27,689	0	0	3,099,609
BU Export	36,988	4678	24,726	6075	0	81	0	0	72,670
KD Export	121,527	21,374	75,932	31,748	0	390	0	0	250,971
Total	3,009,821	82,855	450,025	91,712	24,017	30,709	154,338	64,069	3,912,066

SOURCE: "FMC Ltd. Dagenham-Report of Deliveries by Country-Istanbul, Turkey," AR-98-213-541 / Box 106 / Folder 44, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford.

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

Benson Ford Resarch Center at the The Henry Ford, Dearborn

Acc. 49 / Box1A

Acc. 660

AR-65-5 / Alexandria F. 2; Trieste F.1; Box 20; Box 20; Box 24

Acc. 970 / Box 3

[Territory Reports]

Acc. 6 / Box 256; Box 401

[FMC Dagenham - Office of Percival Perry]

AR-98.213541 / 137, F. 33; 133, F. 2; 133, F. 9; Box 108

[FMC Limited – Dagenham England Manager Reports to Directors]

Acc. 98-213541 / Box 110

[FMC Limited - Dagenham]

AR 98.213591 / 110, Folder 23

[FMC Correspondence 1929-31]

Acc. 281 / Box 1

Acc. 282 / Box 1

[Manager's Report to Directors]

Acc. 712 / Box 3

[Mira Wilkins Research Papers]

Acc. 880 / Box 3; Box 5; Box 7

Acc. 285 / Box 2025

[Mira Wilkins Personal Research Notes]

American Information Resource Center (AIRC), Ankara

[Economic Affairs 1930-34] M1224 / Roll 12.

[Reports on Economic Conditions, 1919-29] M353 / Roll 56

[Records of the U.S. Embassy in Turkey 1928 / Angora Diaries 1928] MC27 / Roll 6

T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi (CCA), Ankara

Başbakanlık / Muamelat Genel Müdürlüğü

154-87-3; 171-187-12; 171-187-15

Başbakanlık / Kararlar Daire Başkanlığı

48-69-09; 25-3-18; 29-40-15; 1-5-12

Nafia Vekaleti

70-11-2; 30-10-0-0

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı

103-507-40

Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Türk Diplomatik Arşivi

ABD

23967-105091-18; 23967-105091-19; 22384-99314-2; 22384-99314-3; 23967-105091-8; 23967-105091-12; 23967-105091-15

SSCB

34930-137929-1; 34930-137929-2

T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (COA), Ankara

HR. IM 130/40

Journals and Newspapers.

Akşam (1929-1943)

Cumhuriyet (1929-1941)

Hakimiyet-i Milliye (1929-1934)

İkdam (1928-1929)

Kurun (1935-1936)

Milliyet (1926-1933)

Son Posta (1930-1937)

Son Saat (1929)

T. B. M. M. Zabıt Ceridesi (1925-1942)

T. C. Resmî Gazete, (1927-1930)

Yarın (1930-1931)

Vakit (1929-1940)

Los Angeles Times (1925-1930)

New York Times (1925-1930)

The Times (1925-1930)

The Economist (1925-1930)

Private Archives

Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives

"Photograph Albums, Taken and Compiled by Mehmet Bahri Ergene, Chief Roadman in Ford Istanbul (1920-24) and Ford Alexandria (1934-39)"

"Autobiography of Mehmet Bahri Ergene, Chief Roadman in Istanbul and Alexandria," 1986. Mehmet Bahri Ergene Family Archives.

Oral Histories

Arap İsmail. [1327/1909 Doğumlu, Eski Ford işçisi 'Arap İsmail' ile Tophane'deki Evinde Yazar Tarafından Yapılmış Mülakat]. Interview by Aslı Odman. Transcribed Sound Recording, September 9, 2011.

Ertem, Nurhan. [Ford İstanbul ve İskenderiye'nin 1930-1938 Arası Satış Mümessilliğini Yapmış Mehmet Bahri Ergene'nin Kızı İle Yazar Tarafından Yapılmış Mülâkat]. Interview by Aslı Odman. Transcribed Sound Recording, May 12, 2011.

SECONDARY SOURCES

1933 Chicago "Century of Progress" World's Fair - Part 1. YouTube / @johnmeyer77. Accessed November 18, 2023. https://bit.ly/3uvxGgI.

1933 Chicago "Century of Progress" World's Fair - Part 2. YouTube / @johnmeyer77. Accessed November 18, 2023. https://bit.ly/46ngo2X.

1934 Chicago World's Fair in Technicolor Century of Progress International Exposition 98534. YouTube / @PeriscopeFilm. Accessed November 18, 2023. https://bit.ly/40INrx0.

"A Ford Plant in Constantinople." *Levant Trade Review*, published monthly at Constantinople by the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, 13, no. 8 (1925): 328.

Abravanel, Jacques José. *Mémoires Posthumes et Inachevées de Jacques Abravanel, Juif Portugais, Salonicien de Naissance, Stambouliote d'adoption*. Edited by Alexandre Toumarkine. Istanbul: Editions Isis, 1999.

Afyoncu, Erhan, and Coşkun Yılmaz, eds. *Cumhuriyet İstanbulunda Otomobil*. Istanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 2020.

————, eds. *Osmanlı İstanbul'unda Otomobil*. 2nd ed. Istanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 2020.

Ağır, Seven. "Economic History Discipline in Turkey: A Review of the Existing Literature and Links to the Business History'." Yalova, 2014.

Agnew, John. "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory." *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80.

Akçura, Gökhan. *Aspirin: Türkiye Tanıtım Serüveni (1925 - 1944)*. Istanbul: Bayer Türk, 1994.

———. *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye Matbaacılık Tarihi*. Edited by Derya Bengi. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2012.

———. *Türkiye Sergicilik ve Fuarcılık Tarihi [=Exposition and Fair History of Turkey]*. Edited by Gürel Tüzün. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; TÜYAP, 2009.

Akçura, Gökhan, and Lowe Lintas. *Koç Topluluğu'nun 75 Yılı*. İstanbul: Koç Holding A. Ş., 2001.

Akdağ, Vecdi. "19.Yy'dan Günümüze Modern Imar Uygulamalarının Tarihi Kentsel Doku Üzerindeki Olumsuz Etkileri: Meclis-i Mebusan Caddesi Aksı ve Yakın Çevresi Örneği." MA Thesis, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 2008.

Akgöz, Görkem. *In the Shadow of War and Empire: Industrialisation, Nation-Building, and Working-Class Politics in Turkey*. Studies in the Social History of the Global South, volume 4. Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2024.

Akgöz, Görkem, Richard Croucher, and Nicola Pizzolato. "Back to the Factory: The Continuing Salience of Industrial Workplace History." *Labor History* 61, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2019.1681632.

Akhtar, Saima. "Corporate Empire: Fordism and the Making of Immigrant Detroit." PhD Diss., University of Berkeley, 2015.

Akpınar, Özkan. "Geographical Imagination in School Geography During the Late Ottoman Period, 1876-1908." MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2010.

Aksoy, Asu, Funda Açıkbaş, and Ayşenur Akman, eds. *Silahtarağa Elektrik Santrali, 1910-2004 / Silahtarağa Power Plant, 1910-2004*. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007.

Akyıldız, Ali. *Anka'nın Sonbaharı: Osmanlı'da İktisadî Modernleşme ve Uluslararası Sermaye*. Istanbul: İletişim, 2005.

Al, Hüseyin. *Uluslararası Sermaye ve Osmanlı Maliyesi: 1820-1875*. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2007.

Ali Suad. "İstanbul Limanları'nda Serbest Mıntıka." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 24 (1926): 542–44.

————. "Serbest Mıntıka Hakkında." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 29 (1927): 258–62.

————. "Serbest Mıntıka Hakkında." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 29 (1927): 258–62.

————. "İstanbul Limanı Hakkında Rapor." *1925*, no. 8 (April 1925): 199_211.

Alp, Ruhat. *Bakraçtan Şirkete: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Süt ile Imtihanı (XIX. Yüzyılın Son Çeyreğinden XX. Yüzyıla)*. 1. basım. Tarih 425. İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2021.

————. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bir Endüstrileşme Hamlesi: Modern Konserve Sektörünün Doğuşu (XIX. Yüzyılın Son Çevreğinden XX. Yüzyıla)*. İstanbul: Libra, 2022.

Altun, Mehmet. *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Hayallerin Gerçekleştiği 100 Yıl: İ. E. Ulagay İlaç Sanayii Türk A.Ş. 100 Yaşında*. Edited by İlhami Mısırlıoğlu and Rauf Kosemen. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003.

Altun, Şafak. *Türkiye'de Yabancı Sermayenin Tarihsel Gelişimi*. Istanbul: Uluslararası Yatırımcılar Derneği, YASED, 2008.

————, ed. *Türkiye'ye Enerji Verenler*. Istanbul: Gama Holding; Elma Yayınları, 2010.

Amatori, Franco, and Geoffrey Jones, eds. *Business History around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

"American Export Lines Inc." Accessed December 7, 2023. https://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/americanexport.shtml.

"American Foreign Trade Corporation." *Levant Trade Review* 11, no. 3 (1923): 348.

"American Influence in the Levant." *Levant Trade Review* 11, no. 3 (1923): 111–15.

Anastakis, Dimitry. "From Independence to Integration: The Corporate Evolution of the Ford Motor Company of Canada, 1904-2004." *The Business History Review* 78, no. 2 (2004): 213–53.

Antonio, Robert J., and Alessandro Bonanno. "A New Global Capitalism? From 'Americanism and Fordism' to 'Americanization-Globalization.'" *American Studies* 41, no. 2/3 (2000): 33–77.

Ardeleanu, Constantin. "Europolis – from a Piratical Republic to a Collective Colony." In *The European Commission of the Danube, 1856-1948*, 267–307. Brill, 2020.

Ardıçoğlu, Rüya. "Kıyı Dolgusunun Kent Morfolojisine Etkisinin Mekan Dizimi Yöntemiyle İncelenmesi: İstanbul Tophane Bölgesi." PhD Diss., Ankara University, 2019.

Armaoğlu, Fahir H., ed. *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açıklamalı)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Askar, Mohamed, Karim Assabghy, and Syed Imam. "A Business Dynamics Exploratory Model for Reviewing Industry Evolution in Developing Countries: The Case of the Egyptian Automobile Industry A Business Dynamics Exploratory Model for Reviewing Industry Evolution in Developing Countries: The Case of the Egyptian Automobile Industry." *Proceeding of the The American University in Cairo*, 2005. https://proceedings.systemdynamics.org/2005/proceed/papers/ASKAR448.pdf.

Aslan, Şükrü, Songül Aydın, and Zeliha Hepkon, eds. *Dersim'i Parantezden Çıkarmak: Dersim Sempozyumu'nun Ardından*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013.

Atilla. "Türkiye'de Otomotiv Sanayii Gelişme Perspektifi." Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2002.

Augé, Marc. *Non-Places. An Introduction to Supermodernity*. London: Verso, n.d.

Austin, Richard C., and Richard Cartwright Austin. *Building Utopia: Erecting Russia's First Modern City, 1930*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 2004.

Automotive News. "Auto Personnel." May 14, 1945.

Avni, Hüseyin, ed. *İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası 1926-1927-1928 Seneleri Faaliyet ve Muamelatına Ait Umumi Rapor*. İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Neşriyatı, 1934.

Ayata, Sencer. "Bir Yerel Sanayi Odağı Olarak Gaziantep'te Girişimcilik, Sanayi Kültürü ve Ekonomik Dünya İle İlişkiler." In *İlhan Tekeli İçin Armağan Yazılar*, edited by Selim İlkin, Orhan Silier, and Murat Güvenç, 559–90. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2004.

Aytemur, Janset Özen. *Türkiye'de Yönetim Düşüncesinin Erken Dönemleri: Sümerbank (1930-1945)*. Istanbul: Libra Yayıncılık, 2010.

Azcanlı, Ahmet. *Türk Otomotiv Sanayiinin Tarihsel Gelişimi*. İstanbul: Panel Ltd. Şti., 1996.

Bakic, Dragan. "The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1919-1941." *Balcanica* 2012 (January 1, 2012): 191–219. https://doi.org/10.2298/BALC1243191B.

Balcı, Ramazan, and İbrahim Sırma, eds. *Memalik-i Osmaniye'de Osmanlı Anonim Şirketleri*. Istanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası Yayınları, 2012.

Bali, Rıfat N. "Gad Franko." In *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, edited by Ekrem Çakıroğlu, 1:464. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008.

Bali, Rıfat N., and Murat Koraltürk, eds. *Türkiye'de Özel Girişimciliğin Gelişimi ve Iş Insanlarının Ağzından "Başarı" Hikayeleri (1930'lardan 1960'lara)*. 1. basım. Tarih 437. İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2021.

Bali, Rıfat N., Murat Koraltürk, and Akansel Yalçınkaya. *Kurum ve Sektör Tarihi, İş İnsanı ve Yönetici Hatırat, Biyografi ve Otobiyografi Kitapları Bibliyografyası (1932 - 2018)*. Istanbul: Libra, 2019.

"Balkan, Rusya, Mısır, İran ve Afganistan'a Sevkedilecek Ford Otomobillerinin Transit Merkezi Kurulmasına Dair Görüşmelere Katılmak Üzere İstanbul'a Gelen Jozef Gorifor'un Eşinin de Gelmesine İzin Verilmesi," April 6, 1926. 30-18-1-1 / 18-24-8. CCA.

Barth, Boris. "Politische Bank wider Willen: Die Deutsche Orientbank vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg." *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* 42, no. 1 (1997): 65–88.

[Başar], Ahmed Hamdi. *İstanbul Limanı, 1929*. Istanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1929.

Başar, Ahmet Hamdi. *Ahmet Hamdi Başar'ın Hatıraları: "Gazi Bana Çok Kızmış ..."* Edited by Murat Koraltürk. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007.

————. *İstanbul'un Liman ve Köprü Meselesi. İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasınca Teşkil Edilen Komisyonun Raporu*. Istanbul: Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Neşriyatı, 1930.

Başkutlu, Salih. *Osmanlı devleti'nde değirmencilik endüstrisi ve buhar değirmenleri*. 1. basım. Libra kitap Tarih, 525 448. İstanbul: Libra, 2022.

Batmaz, Eftal Şükrü, Kudret Emiroğlu, and Süha Ünsal. *İnşaatçıların Tarihi: Türkiye'de Müteahhitlik Hizmetlerinin Gelişimi ve Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği*. Istanbul; Ankara: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği, 2006.

Bayırbağ, Mustafa Kemal. "Local Entrepreneurialism and State Rescaling in Turkey." *Urban Studies* 47, no. 2 (2010): 363–85.

————. "Pro-Business Local Governance and (Local) Business Associations: The Case of Gaziantep." *Business and Politics* 13, no. 4 (2011): 1–37.

Bayly, Christopher A. *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

Baytop, Turhan. *Eczahane'den Eczane'ye Türkiye'de Eczaneler ve Eczacılar (1800-1923)*. İstanbul: Bayer İlaç Yayını, 1995.

Becker, Howard S. "'Casing' and the Process of Social Inquiry." In *What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*, edited by Charles C. Ragin and Howard Saul Becker, 217–26. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

————. "Orada Ne Oluyor: Bir Vakadan Yola Çıkarak Her Şeyle İlgili Akıl Yürütmek." In *Peki ya Mozart? Peki Ya Cinayet? Vakalar Üzerinden Akıl Yürütmek*, translated by Özlem Alioğlu Türker and Ebru Arıcan, 17–65. Ankara: Heretik Yayınları, 2017.

Becker, Joachim. *Akkumulation, Regulation, Territorium: Zur Kritischen Rekonstruktion Der Französischen Regulationstheorie*. Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 2002.

Becker, Joachim, and Aslı Odman. "Von den Inneren zu äußeren Grenzen. Die Auflösung von Habsburger Monarchie und Os-manischem Reich im Vergleich." In *Grenzen weltweit: Zonen, Linien, Mauern im historischen Vergleich*, edited by Joachim Becker and Andrea Komlosy, 75–100. Vienna: Promedia Verlag, 2004.

Behar, Cem. *A Neighborhood in Ottoman Istanbul: Fruit Vendors and Civil Servants in the Kasap İlyas Mahalle*. SUNY Series in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.

Bekaroğlu, Erdem. "Modern Dünya-Sisteminin Bilgi Yapıları Bağlamında Coğrafya Disiplini Için Bir Dışsal Tarih Okuması." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 136 (2016): 117–45.

Bélis-Bergouignan, Marie Claude, Gérard Bordenave, and Yannick Lung. "Ford Est-Il Toujours 'Fordiste'?" *Revue d'economie Industrielle*, no. 52 (1990): 23–38.

————. "Ford: Une Sratégie Trans-Régionale." *Réalités Industrielles: Une Série Des Annales Des Mines*, October 1991, 39–45.

————. "Le Mirage de La Territorialisation de La Grande Entreprise. Le Redéploiement Spatial de Ford." *Révue d'économie Regionale et Urbaine*, no. 3 (1993): 527–44.

Bélis-Bergouignan, Marie-Claude, Gérard Bordenave, and Yannick Lung. *Les Métamorphoses de La Ford Motor Company: De l'entreprise Pyramidale à La Firme-Réseaux ?* Bordeaux, France: IERSO, 1991.

Beltaş Makine. "Hakkımızda." Accessed January 6, 2012. http://www.baltasmakine.com/sirketprofili.php.

Benjamin, Walter. "Theories of German Fascism: On the Collection of Essays War and Warrior." Edited by Jünger Ernst. *New German Critique*, no. 17 (1979): 120–28.

Berghoff, H. "Business History." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, 2:1421–26. Amsterdam; New York: Elsevier, 2001.

Bezmen, Nermin. *Fuad Bezmen: Bir Duayenin Hatıratı*. 4th ed. Istanbul: PMR Ltd., 2002.

Bigio, Anthony G. *A Sephardi Turkish Patriot: Gad Franco in the Turmoil of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic*. Lanham; Boulder; New York; London: Hamilton Books, 2023.

Bilge, Zihni. *İstanbul Rıhtımlarının Tarihçesi*. Istanbul: Devlet Denizyolları ve Limanları Matbaası, 1949.

Bir Semt-i Meşhur Tophane: Değişimin ve Yıkımın Hikayesi. İstanbul: İstanbul Şehri Kültür Tarihi Araştırma Merkezi, 2009.

Birdal, Murat. *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Library of Ottoman Studies 18. London ; New York : New York: Tauris Academic Studies ; Distributed in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Blachford, Kevin. "Revisiting the Expansion Thesis: International Society and the Role of the Dutch East India Company as a Merchant Empire." *European Journal of International Relations* 26, no. 4 (2020): 1230–48.

Bloch, Ernst. *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*. Zürich: Verlag Oprecht & Helbling, 1935.

Bonin, Hubert, Steven Tolliday, and Yannick Lung. "The Ford Brand's Image. Its Evolution in Europe from the 1930s to the 1980s." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, Editions P.L.A.G.E., 443–588. Paris, 2003.

Boratav, Korkut. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985*. Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1988.

———. *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*. Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982.

———. *Türkiye'de Devletçilik (1923-1950): İktisadi Düşünceler ve İktisadi Mevzuat*. Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü, 1962.

Braatz, Werner E. "Junkers Flugzeugwerke A.G. in Anatolia, 1925-1926: An Aspect of German-Turkish Economic Relations." *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* 19, no. 1 (1974): 28–41.

Braudel, Fernand. *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*. Translated by Sian Reynolds. 3 vols. London: Harper & Row, 1979.

————. *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. The Perspective of the World*. Translated by Sian Reynolds. Vol. 3. 3 vols. London: Harper & Row, 1979.

Brenner, Neil. "Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 16, no. 4 (1998): 459–81.

————. "Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre's Geographies of Globalization." *Public Culture* 10, no. 1 (1997): 135–67.

————, ed. *Implosions/Explosions: Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization*. Berlin: JOVIS Verlag, 2014.

————. "Introduction. Urban Theory Without an Outside." In *Implosions/Explosions: Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization*, edited by Neil Brenner, 14–36. Berlin: JOVIS Verlag, 2014.

Brinton, Willard Cope. *Graphic Presentation*. New York: Brinton Associates, 1939.

Brooks, Jeffrey G. "The Press and Its Message: Images of America in the 1920s and 1930s." In *Russia in the Era of NEP. Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture*, 231–53. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991.

Bryan, Ford R. *Henry's Lieutenants*. Wayne State University Press, 2003.

Buck-Morss, Susan. *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West*. 1st MIT Press paperback ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002.

Buğra, Ayşe. "Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no. 4 (1998): 521–39.

————. "Non-Market Mechanisms of Market Formation: The Development of the Consumer Durables Industry in Turkey." *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 19 (1998): 1–28.

————. *State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Buğra, Ayşe, and Osman Savaşkan. *New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship Between Politics, Religion and Business*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014.

————. "Yerel Sanayi ve Bugünün Türkiye'sinde İş Dünyası." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 117 (2010): 92–121.

Bulut, Semih. *Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri (1923-1938)*. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2010.

Burgess-Wise, David. *Ford at Dagenham: The Rise and Fall of Detroit in Europe*. Derby: Breedon Books, 2001.

————. "Perry, Percival Lee Dewhurst." In *Dictionary of Business Biography: A Biographical Dictionary of Business Leaders Active in Britain in the Period 1860-1980*, 4:639–43. London: Butterworths, 1984.

Can, Bilmez Bülent. *Demiryolundan Petrole Chester Projesi, 1908-1923*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000.

Castree, Noel. "The Limits to Capital (1982): David Harvey." In *Key Texts in Human Geography: A Reader Guide*, edited by Phil Hubbard, Rob Kitchin, and Gill Valentine. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2008.

Cebeci, Ayşe. *Bilmediğimiz Kapitalizm Gizli Elin Kurumsallaşması: YOİKK*. İstanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2012.

Cengiz, Kurtuluş. *Yav İşte Fabrikalaşak. Anadolu Sermayesinin Oluşumu: Kayseri-Hacılar Örneği*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013.

Cengizkan, Ali. "Türkiye'de Fabrika İşçi Konutları: Silahtarağa Elektrik Santrali." *ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Dergisi* 20, no. 1–2 (2000): 29–55.

Chandler, Alfred D. *Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors, and the Automobile Industry: Sources and Readings*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964.

————. *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1994.

Chandler, Alfred D., and Bruce Mazlish, eds. *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History*. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Chandler, Alfred D., Thomas K. McCraw, and Richard S. Tedlow. *Management: Past and Present: A Casebook on the History of American Business*. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western College Publications, 1996.

Christensen, Lars. *Between Denmark and Detroit. Ford Motor Company A/S and the Transformation Af Fordism*. Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2021.

Christensen, Lars K. "Between Denmark and Detroit: Unionized Labour at Ford Motor Company, Copenhagen, 1919–1939." *Labor History* 55, no. 3 (2014): 326–45.

Cohen, Jean-Louis, Christina E. Crawford, and Claire Zimmerman, eds. *Detroit-Moscow-Detroit: An Architecture for Industrialization, 1917-1945*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2023.

Cohen, Yves. "The Soviet Fordson. Between the Politics of Stalin and the Philosophy of Ford, 1924-1932." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 2:531–58. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

Cora, Yaşar Tolga. "1910 Kömür Hamalları Grevi: II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Emeğin Tarihi ve Sol Siyasetin Dili." *Kebikeç: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 52 (2021): 435–62.

———. "Female Labor, Merchant Capital, and Resilient Manufacturing: Rethinking Ottoman Armenian Communities through Labor and Business." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 61, no. 3 (2018): 361–95.

———. "'The New Worker in The New Era': Entrepreneurship and Labor Control in Turkey in the 1950s**." *Reflectiv Journal of Social Sciences* 2, no. 3 (2021): 343–64.

Coşar, Nevin. "Demirbank: The History of a Small Commercial Turkish Bank." *Business and Economic History* 28, no. 1, Papers presented at the forty-fifth annual meeting of the Business History Conference (1999): 125–32.

———. *Geçmişten Geleceğe Demirbank*. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999.

Cox, Kevin R. *Political Geography: Territory, State, and Society*. Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002.

Crawford, Christina E. "From Tractors to Territory: Socialist Urbanization through Standardization." *Journal of Urban History* 44, no. 1 (2018): 54–77.

———. "Soviet Planning Praxis: From Tractors to Territory." Accessed December 19, 2023. https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/centerpiece/spring2015/feature-crawford.

———. *Spatial Revolution: Architecture and Planning in the Early Soviet Union*. Ithaca [New York]: Cornell University Press, 2022.

Çakmakçı, Ufuk, and Beyza Oba. "The Role of Employer Unions in Hegemonic Struggle, Interest Representation and Promotion of Managerial Perspectives in Turkey." *Business History* 49, no. 5 (2007): 695–716.

Çavdar, Tevfik. *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Tarihi, 1900-1960*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003.

Çetiner, Yılmaz. *Otomobilin Öyküsü: Türkiye'de Otomotiv Sanayii Nasıl Kuruldu? Anılar-Belgeler-Fotoğraflar*. Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996.

Çetinkaya, Y. Doğan. *1908 osmanlı boykotu: bir toplumsal hareketin analizi*. İletişim yayınları Araştırma, inceleme dizisi. İstanbul: İletişim, 2004.

Çizakça, Murat. *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives*. Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1996.

————. *Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution and the Future*. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.

Damlıbağ, Fatih. *Yedikule Pamuk Ipliği Fabrikasi*. 1. basım. Libra Kitap ; Tarih, 379. 348. İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık Ticaret A.Ş, 2020.

Débarre, Ségolène, and Jean-François Pérouse. "Dire et faire le territoire en Turquie: entre idéologie unitariste et obsession de la rente." *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 23 (2016).

Delaney, David. *Territory: A Short Introduction*. Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

————. "Territory and Territoriality." In *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, edited by N. J. Thrift and Rob Kitchin, 11:196–208. Amsterdam; Boston: Elsevier, 2009.

DeNovo, John A. "A Railroad for Turkey: The Chester Project, 1908-1913." *The Business History Review* 33, no. 3 (1959): 300–329.

Desjardins, Jeff. "Great Lakes Economy: Examining the Cross-Border Supply Chain." News Portal. Visual Capitalist, October 19, 2017. https://bit.ly/40Oun0j.

Diamandouros, Nikiforos P., Thaleia Dragōna, and Çağlar Keyder, eds. *Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2010.

Dicke, Thomas S. *Franchising in America: The Development of a Business Method, 1840-1980*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.

Dicken, Peter. *Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy*. 7th ed. New York: Guilford Press, 2015.

Dinler, Demet. "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi." *Praksis*, no. 9 (2003): 17–54.

Dığıroğlu, Filiz. *Memalik-i Osmaniye Duhanları Müşterekü'l-Menfaa Reji Şirketi: Trabzon Reji İdaresi (1883-1914)*. Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2007.

Dölen, Emre, and Murat Koraltürk. *Aslan Çimento: İlk Çimento Fabrikamızın Öyküsü 1910-2012*. Istanbul: Lafarge Aslan Çimento; Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2004.

Dündar, Can, ed. *Özel Arşivinden Belgeler ve Anılarıyla Vehbi Koç*. Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2006.

————. *Özel Arşivinden Belgeler ve Anılarıyla Vehbi Koç, Vol. 2 (1961-1976)*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008.

Dündar, Can, and Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı, eds. *Bir Yaşam İksiri: Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı*. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003.

Duran, Faik Sabri. "Sergide Gezenlerin Gözü Önünde Otomobiller Bir Saatte Kuruluveriyor, On Dakika İçinde Lâstik Tekerlekler Yapılıyor." *Akşam*, May 5, 1935, sec. Bir Türk Kızının Amerika Yolculuğu, No: 27.

Duruiz, Lale. "Ford in Turkey: From imports to partnership." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 2:485–505. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

"Edgar B. Howard." *Levant Trade Review* 11, no. 3 (1923).

Ehrenburg, Ilya. *The Life of the Automobile*. Translated by Joachim Neugroschel. London: Serpent's Tail, 1999.

Eldem, Edhem. *A History of the Ottoman Bank*. Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası, 1999.

————. *Osmanlı Bankası Tarihi*. Translated by Ayşe Berktay. Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası, 1999.

Eldem, Sedad Hakkı. *İstanbul Anıları = Reminiscences of Istanbul*. Istanbul: Aletaş Alarko Eğitim Tesisleri, 1979.

Elden, Stuart. "How Should We Do the History of Territory?" *Territory, Politics, Governance* 1, no. 1 (2013): 5–20.

————. "Territory." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Human Geography*, edited by James Stuart Duncan and John A. Agnew. Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

————. *The Birth of Territory*. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013.

Emin, Ahmet. "Vakit (Kurun) Gazetesi." İn *Ataturk Ansiklopedisi*, 3, n.d. https://ataturkansiklopedisi.gov.tr/bilgi/vakit-kurun-gazetesi/?pdf=3281.

Emrence, Cem. *99 Günlük Muhalefet, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.

Eraydın, Ayda. "Sanayinin Anadolu'ya Yaygınlaşması ve Son Dönem Gelişen Yeni Sanayi Odakları." In *75 Yılda Çarklardan Chip'lere*, edited by Oya Baydar, 257–78. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999.

Erçek, Mehmet, and Öner Günçavdı. "Imprints of an Entrepreneur and Evolution of a Business Group, 1948–2010." *Business History* 58, no. 1 (2016): 89–110.

Ergin, Osman Nuri. "İktisadi Kısım." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası*, no. 8 (1925): 26.

Ergüder, Başak. *Galata Hanları, 1868-1945: Paranın Serüveni*. Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2011.

Ergüneş, Nuray. *Bankalar, Birikim, Yolsuzluk: 1980 Sonrası Türkiye'de Bankacılık Sektörü*. Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2008.

Ertem, Nurhan. [Ford İstanbul ve İskenderiye'nin 1930-1938 Arası Satış Mümessilliğini Yapmış Mehmet Bahri Ergene'nin Kızı İle Yazar Tarafından Yapılmış Mülâkat]. Interview by Aslı Odman. Transcribed Sound Recording, May 12, 2011.

Esmen, Ahmet. "Analysis of the Turkish Automotive Industry and Factor Affecting Its Develepment." MA Thesis, Robert College, Faculty of Industrial Administration, 1968.

Estapé Triay, Salvador. "Ford in Spain: The First Stage (1920-1954). A Multinational Confronts Political Constraints." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 2:427–38. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

Ethem, Muhlis. "Der Hafen von Stambul und seine Organisation." PhD Diss., Leipzig University, 1929.

Ethington, Philip J. "Placing the Past: 'Groundwork' for a Spatial Theory of History." *Rethinking History* 11, no. 4 (2007): 465–93.

"European Associated Companies." *The Ford Industries; Facts about the Ford Motor Company and Its Subsidiaries*, 1924, 145–46.

European Stability Initiative. "İslami Kalvinistler. Orta Anadolu'da Değişim ve Muhafazakarlık." Berlin and Istanbul: European Stability Initiative, September 19, 2005. https://bit.ly/3sOAANk.

Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. "Preface." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, vii–x. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

"Everything from America. American Foreign Trade Corporation." *Levant Trade Review* 11, no. 4 (1923): 205.

Farias, Ignacio, and Thomas Bender, eds. *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies*. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Fazıl, İbrahim. "Transit Ticaretinde İstanbul'un Vaziyeti." *Hayat*, no. 6 (1927).

Ferguson, Niall. "Sinking Globalization." *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2005): 64–77.

Filiztekin, Alpay, and İnsan Tunalı. "Anatolian Tigers: Are They for Real?" *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 20 (1999): 77–106.

Ford Motor Company. "Ford - Romanian Expansion. Ford Motor Company," May 5, 2008.

————. "Purchasing Abroad: Development of Foreign Industries Permits Expansion of 'Local' Purchasing Program." *Ford News* 6, no. 15 (1927): 4–5.

————. *The Ford Industries: Facts About the Ford Motor Company and Its Subsidiaries*. Detroit, Mich.: Ford Motor Company, 1927.

Ford Motor Company d'Italy. *Fordson Traktörü*. Trieste: Ford Motor Company, n. d.

Ford Motor Company Exports Inc. *Fordson Çiftçilik*. İskenderiye, Mısır: Ford Motor Company, n. d.

———. *Fordson Kitabı*. Istanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1927.

"Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul." *Levant Trade Review* 17, no. 2 (February 1929): 41–46.

"Ford Motor Company Exports Inc., Istanbul." *Levant Trade Review* 18, no. 2 (1930): 41–46.

Ford Motor Company. Photographic Department. *Globe in Court of the World, Ford Exhibition Building, Century of Progress International Exposition, Chicago, Illinois*. 1934. 64.167.232.973. From the Collections of The Henry Ford. https://bit.ly/3swpX1D.

Ford News. "Purchasing Abroad: Development of Foreign Industries Permits Expansion of 'Local' Purchasing Program." March 8, 1927.

Ford News. "Russian Tractor Order Completed by Company. Amtorg Trading Corporation Orders 3,500 Fordsons; Brings Total in Russia Over 24,000." February 15, 1927, sec. Vol 7, Number 8.

"Ford Otomobilleri Niçin Dünya Piyasasına Hakim? Topanedeki Fort Montaj Fabrikasını Bir Ziyaret." *Muhit*, no. 23 (September 1930): 348–49.

"Ford Otosan Takes Ford Plant in Craiova into Electric Future." Accessed February 22, 2024. https://www.fordotosan.com.tr/en/media/press-kits/ford-otosan-takes-ford-plant-in-craiova-into-electric-future.

Ford Otosan and VTR Araştırma Yapım Yönetim, eds. *Benim Adım Ford Otosan*. İstanbul: Kesişim Yayıncılık, 2010.

"Ford Plant in Constantinople." *Levant Trade Review*, Published Monthly by the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, 16, no. 11 (1928): 432–33.

"Ford Romania." In *Wikipedia*, February 8, 2024. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ford_Romania&oldid=1204866941.

Freysennet, Michel. "Histoires et Hybridisation Du Fordisme." *Actes Du GERPISA*, no. 11 (1994): n. p.

Fuhrmann, Malte, and Vangelis Kechriotis. "The Late Ottoman Port-Cities and Their Inhabitants: Subjectivity, Urbanity, and Conflicting Orders." *Mediterranean Historical Review* 24, no. 2 (2009): 71–78.

Furtado, Celso. *Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution*. Translated by Suzette Macedo. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Gaebe, Wolf. "Räumliche Auswirkungen Der Internationalisierung in Der Automobilindustrie." *ERDKUNDE* 45, no. 2 (1991): 95–107.

"[Galataport Özel Dosyası]." *ELECTROui, Quarterly Electronic Publication of Observatoire Urbain d'Istanbul, Insitut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes (IFEA)*, no. 22 (2005).

Gelmez, Elif, and Meriç Altıntaş. "Clock Towers as the Focus of City Square: The Changing Scale of Nusretïye Clock Tower." *The Turkish Online Journal of Design, Art and Communication* 8, no. 1 (2018): 79–96.

Genç, Hamdi. "Özel Girişimle Sanayileşme Döneminde Sanayide Yabancı Sermayenin Boyutu (1923-1932). Ford'un Montaj Fabrikası." In *TMMOB Sanayi Kongresi 2001: "Küreselleşme ve Sanayileşme" Bildiriler Kitabı: [30 Kasım -1-2 Aralık 2001, İstanbul]*, edited by TMMOB Makine Mühendisleri Odası, 35–44. Ankara: TMMOB Makina Mühendisleri Odası, 2002.

Genç, Hamdi, Murat Çokgezen, and Murat Koraltürk. "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında İş Dünyasının Profili." *İktisat, İşletme ve Finans* 19, no. 216 (2004): 62–75.

Geyikdağı, V. Necla. "The Evolution of British Commercial Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire." *Conress* 1, no. 1 (2017): 9–46.

————. *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Yabancı Sermaye: 1854-1914*. Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 2008.

Geyikdağı, V. Necla, and M. Yaşar Geyikdağı. "Foreign Direct Investment in the Ottoman Empire: Attitudes and Political Risk." *Business History* 53, no. 3 (2011): 375–400.

Gökçe, Deniz. "Duman Kaçakçılığı ve Pancar Şekeri," January 11, 2004.

Goodman, Robert Carey. "The Role of the Tobacco Trade in Turkish-American Relations, 1923-29." University of Richmond, 1988.

Gordon, Leland James. *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932.

Gramsci, Antonio. "Americanism and Fordism." In *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 277–321. London: International Publishers Co., 1971.

Grandin, Greg. *Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009.

Greenstein, David E. "Assembling 'Fordizm': The Production of Automobiles, Americans, and Bolsheviks in Detroit and Early Soviet Russia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 2 (2014): 259–89.

Grimes, Thomas. "Starting Ireland on the Road to Industry: Henry Ford in Cork." PhD thesis, National University of Ireland Maynooth., 2008.

Gülersoy, Çelik. *Tramvay İstanbul'da*. Istanbul: İstanbul Kitaplığı, 1989.

Gültekin-Karakaş, Derya. *Global Integration of Turkish Finance Capital: State, Capital and Banking Reform in Turkey*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2008.

Gürboğa, Nurşen. *The Zonguldak Coal Basin as the Site of Contest, 1920-1947: Mine Workers, the Single Party Rule, and War*. Istanbul. İstanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2009.

Güvenç, Murat, and Oğuz Işık. *Emlak Bankası: 1926-1998*. Istanbul: Emlak Bankası, 1999.

Güvenç, Murat, Murat Tülek, and Asya Ece Uzmay. "Jacques Pervititch ve Dönemi: 1930'ların Yitirilen Kent Peyzajlarının İzlerini Sürmek." Kadir Has Üniversitesi, İstanbul Araştırma Merkezi, 2019.

Haberler. "Yalova'da 'İşletmecilik Tarihi' Çalıştayı." News Portal, May 27, 2014. https://bit.ly/4a0Jnwu.

"Hakkımızda. Baltaş Makine," 2012. http://www.baltasmakine.com/sirketprofili.php.

Hanssen, Jens. *"Fin De Siècle" Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Harlaftis, Gelina, and Vassilis Kardasis. "International Shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea Istanbul as a Maritime Centre 1870–1910." In *The Mediterranean Response to Globalization Before 1950*, edited by Sevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 233–65. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

Harms, Robert. "The World ABIR Made: The Margina-Lopori Basin, 1885-1903." *African Economic History*, no. 12 (1983): 125–39.

Harootunian, Harry. *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Harootunian, Harry D. *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Harvey, David. *Explanation in Geography*. 3rd ed. London: Arnold Publishers, 1986.

————. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

————. "The Geopolitics of Capitalism." In *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, edited by Derek Gregory and John Urry, 128–63. London: Macmillan Education, 1985.

————. *The Limits to Capital*. New and Fully Updated 2nd Ed. London: Verso, 2006.

Hastaoglou-Martinidis, Vilma. "The Building of Istanbul Docks 1870-1910. Some New Entrepreneurial and Cartographic Data." In *14th IPHS Conference: Urban Transformation: Controversies, Contrasts and Challenges: Proceedings*, edited by Nuran Zeren Gülersoy, Hatice Ayataç, A. Buket Önem, Zeynep Günay, Kerem Arslanlı, Kerem Koramaz, and İrem Ayrancı, 2:277–89. Istanbul: Urban and Environment Planning and Research Center, ITU, 2010.

————. "The Cartography of Harbor Construction in Eastern Mediterranean Cities: Technical and Urban Modernization in the Late Nineteenth Century." In *Cities of the Mediterranean: From the Ottomans to the Present Day*, edited by Meltem Toksöz and Biray Kolluoğlu, 78–100. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014.

Hatch, John B. "Labor Conflict in Moscow, 1921-1925." In *Russia in the Era of NEP. Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture*, 58–71. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991.

Hegel, G. W. F. *Philosophy of Right*. Translated by S. W. Dyde. Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001.

Held, David, and Anthony G. McGrew. "The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction." In *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, edited by David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, 2nd ed., 1–50. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005.

Held, David, Anthony McGrew, Jonathan Perraton, and David Goldblatt. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999.

————. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999.

Heper, Metin. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Beverley, North Humberside ; Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Eothen Press; Humanities Press, 1985.

Hiç, Mükerrem. "Türk Otomotiv Sanayiinin İktisadi Yönü ve Sorunları." In *Türkiye'de Otomotiv Sanayii ve Otomotiv Yan Sanayii*. Istanbul: İktisadi Araştırmalar Vakfı, n.d.

Hines, Walker D., Edwin Walter Kemmerer, Goldthwaite H. Dorr, Brehon Somerwell, C. R. Whittlesey, H. Alexander Smith, O. F. Gardner, W. L. Wright Jr., Vaso Trivanovitch, and Bengt Wadsted. *Türkiye'nin İktisadi Bakımdan Umumi Bir Tetkiki, 1933-1934. Kitap II.* Vol. 2. 5 vols. Ankara: Mehmed İhsan Matbaası, 1936.

Hirst, Samuel J. "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s." *Slavic Review* 72, no. 1 (2013): 32–53.

Hirst, Samuel J., and Onur İşçi. "Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian-Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development." *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 5 (2020): 834–59.

History of Ford Motors at the 1934 World's Fair [Vintage News Reel]. YouTube / @ClassicCarChannel. Accessed November 18, 2023. https://bit.ly/49EnrH7.

Hodges, Michael H. *Building the Modern World: Albert Kahn in Detroit*. 1st edition. Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 2018.

Hounshell, David A. *From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Hülagü, M. Metin. *The Hejaz Railway: The Construction of a New Hope*. New York: Blue Dome Press, 2010.

Hulkiender, Murat. *Bir Galata Bankerinin Portresi: George Zarifi, 1806-1884*. Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2003.

Hyde, Charles K. "Assembly-Line Architecture: Albert Kahn and the Evolution of the U.S. Auto Factory, 1905-1940." *IA. The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archeology* 22, no. 2 (1996): 5–24.

"İktisadi Müesseselerde Mecburi Türkçe Kullanılması Hakkında Kanun." *T. C. Resmî Gazete*, no. 353 (April 22, 1926): 1290.

İleri, Nurçin. "A Nocturnal History of Fin De Siècle Istanbul." PhD Diss., State University of New York, 2015.

————. "Nationalism on the Shop Floor: The Silahtarağa Electric Power Plant in the Early 1920s." Billet. *TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research* (blog), May 18, 2021. https://trafo.hypotheses.org/28794.

————. "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e İstanbul'da Elektriğin Yolculuğu." In *Elektrik ve İstanbul Elektriğin Geçmişten Günümüze Serüveni*, edited by İBB Kültür A.Ş., İBB Kültür A.Ş. Istanbul, 2021.

————. "Picturing the Labor Landscape: The Silahtarağa Power Plant and Istanbul's Electrical Infrastructure." Billet. *TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research* (blog), October 26, 2022. https://trafo.hypotheses.org/42129.

————. "Rewriting the History of Port Cities in the Light of Contemporary Global Capitalism." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 47 (2012): 185–209.

Işık, Oğuz, and Melih Pınarcıoğlu. "Turkey: Uncertain Emblem of the Future? Development and Conflict: Two Faces of Local Transformation: The Case of Denizli, Turkey." *City: Analysis of Urban Change, Theory, Action* 1, no. 3–4 (1996): 63–70.

İskit, Servet. "Galip Bahtiyar Göker." In *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları*, Başvekalet Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü Yayınlarından., 227–28, 1943.

İstanbul İktisat Komisyonu. *Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasında Müteşekkil İstanbul İktisat Komisyonu Tarafından Tanzim Edilen Rapor - 29 Kanun-i Sani 1340 - 26 Teşrin-i Sani 1340 (1924)*. Translated by Aynur Karayılmazlar. Istanbul: İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Yayınları, 1924.

"İstanbul Limanında Serbest Mıntıka Raporu." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 27 (1926): 161–78.

İstanbul Mıntıkası Sanâyi'i ve Mesâ'î Müdîriyeti. "[Ford Fabrikasına İ'zâm Edilecek Talebenin ...]." *Cumhuriyet*, June 14, 1925, sec. [Classified Ads].

İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Mecmuası. "Advertisment Section. Agent Oficiel. Furdson Ford Lencoln. Muhurdarowitch." January 1, 1926.

İstanbul Vilayeti Neşriyat ve Turizm Müdürlüğü, ed. *İstanbul'un Kitabı*. İstanbul: İstanbul Valiliği Neşriyatı, 1957.

"İstanbul'da Bir Türk Müessesesi Ferdi Acentesi A. Vefa." *Servet-i Fünun*, no. 1498_24 (April 30, 1924): 385.

"İstanbul'da Tesis Edilecek Serbest Mıntıka Hakkında (1/1054) Numaralı Kanun Lâyihası ve Ticaret ve Bütçe Encümenleri Mazbataları." *T. B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi / Tutanak Dergisi* 33, no. Devre II, İçtima IV (June 21, 1927): 438–45; 475–77.

İstanbul'da Yeni Açılan Ford Fabrikası'na ve Çalışanlarına Ait Fotoğraflar. Istanbul: Ford Motor Company Export Inc., Istanbul, 1930.

"İstanbul'un En Çalışkan Bir Köşesi: Seyrisefain Vapurları ve Ford Fabrikası." *Servet-i Fünun* 67, no. 3 (March 13, 1930).

"İstanbul'un Karadaki Vesait-i Nakliyesi." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 34 (1927): 616–18.

"İş Bankası, 51 yıl sonra yeniden Mısır'da." June 22, 2010. https://www.dunya.com/gundem/is-bankasi-51-yil-sonra-yeniden-misir039da-haberi-118140.

İşçi, Onur. "Başbakanlık ve Milli Şef Döneminde İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası." In *İsmet İnönü*, edited by Mehmet Ö Alkan, 402–45. İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Kültür ve sanat Ürünleri Ticaret A.Ş, 2021.

————. "Interwar Territoriality and Soviet-Turkish Convergence across the Aras River." In *Borders, Boundaries and Belonging in Post-Ottoman Space in the Interwar Period*, edited by Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, 225–40. Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2022.

"İzmir, İstanbul, Samsun, Mersin Limanları ve Rıhtımları Hakkında Kopenhag Liman Müdürü, Kompmann ve Türk Kamu İşleri Bakanı'nın Yazışmaları Ile Deniz Taşımacılığı ve Ticareti Fiyat Tespitleri," March 2, 1928. 230-0-0-0 / 148-51-1. CCA.

Jessop, Bob. "The Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix and the Tendential Ecological Dominance of Globalizing Capitalism." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 24, no. 2 (2000): 323–60.

Jongerden, Joost. *The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War*. Leiden; Boston, Mass.: Brill, 2007.

"Kabotaj Konusunda Amerika Ford Motor Company Exports Incorporated Şirketi Ile Yapılacak Sözleşmeyi İmza İçin Maliye Vekaleti'ne Yetki Verilmesi," November 25, 1928. 30-18-1-2 / 1-5-12. CCA.

Karakışla, Yavuz Selim. *Women, War and Work in the Ottoman Empire: Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women (1916-1923)*. Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2005.

Karakoç, Ercan, and Hasan Küçük. "Turkish-American Commercial Relations (1908-1930): The Success of Trade-The Failure of Investment." *Journal of History Culture and Art Research* 9, no. 4 (2020): 1–18.

Karaömerlioğlu, Asım. "Bağımlılık Kuramı, Dünya Sistemi Teorisi ve Osmanlı/Türkiye Çalışmaları." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 91 (2002 2001): 81–99.

Karataşer, Büşra. "Babıâli'nin Amerikan Petrol Şirketi Standard Oil'e Bakışı." *Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi* 13, no. 2 (2018): 343–63.

Karatzoglou, Giannēs. *The Imperial Ottoman Bank in Salonica: The First 25 Years (1864-1890)*. Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2003.

Karlıklı, Şaziye, ed. *45 Yılın Öyküsü: Migros*. İstanbul: CamEv Yayıncılık, 1999.

Kayhan, Aslı, Fatma Gül Eryıldız Şenvardar, M. Hakan Koçak, T. Gül Köksal, and Örgen Uğurlu. *İZMİT SEKA'NIN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ*. Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2024. izmitteseka.com/Arsiv.

Kayserilioğlu, R. Sertaç. *Dersaadet'ten İstanbul'a Tramvay*. 2 vols. Istanbul: İ.E.T.T. Genel Müdürlüğü, 1998.

————. *Dersaadet'ten İstanbul'a Tünel*. 2 vols. Istanbul: İ.E.T.T. Genel Müdürlüğü, 2007.

Kayserilioğlu, R. Sertaç, Mehmet Mazak, and Kadir Kon, eds. *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Havagazının Tarihçesi*. 3 vols. Istanbul: İGDAŞ Genel Müdürlüğü, 1999.

Kazgan, Gülten. *Tanzimat'tan XXI. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi: Birinci Küreselleşmeden, İkinci Küreselleşmeye*. Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1999.

Kazgan, Gülten, Alkan Soyak, and Murat Koraltürk. *Cumhuriyet'in 75 Yıllık Sigortacısı Koç Allianz*. Istanbul: Koç Allianz, 1998.

Kazgan, Haydar. *Galata Bankerleri*. Istanbul: Tük Ekonomi Bankası Yayınları, 1991.

————. "İmparatorluğun Son Devirlerinde Dış Ticaret Politikası." In *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Şirketleşme*, 185–218. Istanbul: Creative Yayıncılık ve Tanıtım, Vakıfbank, 1999.

————. *Osmanlı'da Avrupa Finans Kapitali*. Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995.

————. *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Şirketleşme*. Istanbul: Vakıfbank, 1999.

Kentel, Koca Mehmet. "Assembling 'Cosmopolitan' Pera: An Infrastructural History of Late Ottoman Istanbul." PhD thesis, University of Washington, 2018.

Kepenek, Yakup, and Nurhan Yentürk. *Türkiye Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1994.

Keyder, Çağlar. "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Türk Tüccarının 'Mil-li'Leşmesi." *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, no. Özel Sayı: Türk İktisat Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar II (1980 1979): 239–55.

————. *Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye, 1923-1929*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993.

————. "Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and in Republican Turkey, ca. 1900-1950." In *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950*, edited by Donald Quataert, 123–64. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.

————. *Memâlik-i Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003.

————. *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London and New York: Verso, 1987.

————. *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929*. Cambridge; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press ; Editions de la Maison des sciences de Íhomme, 1981.

Keyder, Çağlar, Y. Eyüp Özveren, and Donald Quataert, eds. *Doğu Akdeniz'de Liman Kentleri, 1800-1914*. Translated by Gül Çağalı-Güven. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994.

————. "Port-Cities in the Ottoman Empire: Some Theoretical and Historical Perspectives." *Review* 16, no. 4 (1993): 519–58.

Keyder, Çaglar, and Faruk Tabak, eds. *Osmanlı'da Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım*. Translated by Zeynep Altok. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998.

Keyman, Emin Fuat, and Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı. *Kentler: Anadolu'nun Dönüşümü, Türkiye'nin Geleceği*. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010.

Kılıçaslan, M. Emre. *Osmanlı Kıyılarındaki Batı: Avusturya Lloyd Buharlı Kumpanyası*. 1. basım. Tarih 312. Osmanbey, İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık Ticaret A.S, 2019.

Kıraç, Can. *Anılarımla Patronum Vehbi Koç*. Istanbul: Milliyet, 1996.

————. "Otomobil 100 Yaşında." Accessed December 11, 2023. https://www.cankirac.com/otomobil-100-yasinda.

Kıray, Mübeccel. *Ereğli: Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası*. Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Yayınları, 1964.

Kırlı, Cengiz. *Yolsuzluğun Icadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, Iktidar, ve Bürokrasi*. Verita/Tarih. İstanbul: Verita, 2015.

Knox, Paul L. "World Cities and the Organization of Global Space." In *Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World in the Late Twentieth Century*, edited by R. J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor, and Michael J. Watts, 232–47. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2002.

Knox, Paul L., and Peter J. Taylor, eds. "World Cities and Territorial States: The Rise and Fall of Their Mutuality." In *World Cities in a World-System*, 48–62. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Koç, Vehbi. *Hatıralarım, Görüşlerim, Öğütlerim*. Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfı; Hürriyet Ofset, 1987.

Kocabaşoğlu, Uygur, Aydan Bulutgil, Fahrettin Çiloğlu, İlker Evrim Binbaş, and Nesim Şeker. *SEKA Tarihi: Türkiye Selüloz ve Kâğıt Fabrikalarının Tarihsel Gelişimi*. İzmit: SEKA Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 1996.

Kocabaşoğlu, Uygur, Güven Sak, Sinan Sönmez, Funda Erkal, Özgür Gökmen, Metin İlker, and Murat Uluğtekin. *Türkiye İş Bankası Tarihi*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001.

Kocaeli Dayanışma Akademisi. Online Research Project. İzmit'te SEKA'nın Dönüşümü, 2018. https://www.izmitteseka.com.

Koçak, Cemil. *Umumi Müfettişlikler: 1927-1952*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003.

Koçak, M. Hakan. *Camın İşçileri: Paşabahçe İşçilerinin Sınıf Olma Öyküsü*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014.

Köksal, T. Gül. "Haliç Tersanelerinin Tarihsel-Teknolojik Gelişim Süreci ve Koruma Önerileri." MA Thesis, Istanbul Technical University, 1996.

Köksal, T. Gül, and Zeynep Ahunbay. "İstanbul'daki Endüstri Mirası İçin Koruma ve Yeniden Kullanım Önerileri." *İTÜ Dergisi/a* 5, no. 2 (2006): 125–36.

Koraltürk, Murat. "1930'ların Başında İstanbul'un Liman ve Köprü Sorunu Ile İlgili Bir Rapor." *İstanbul Dergisi*, no. 37 (2001): 94–97.

————. "Ankara'nın Patronluğunun Sınırları: 1920'lerde Ankara'nın Sermaye Birikimini Yönlendirme Girişimleri ve Buna İstanbul'un Tepkisi," no. 36 (2001): 97–101.

————. *Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde: Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011.

————. *Haliç`te Ulaşım ve Haliç Vapurları Şirketi, 1909 - 1941*. Istanbul: Degrade Ajans Reklamcılık ve Yayıncılık, 2005.

————. "Hisar Vapuru Faciası ve Kabotajı Yeniden Düşünmek." *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 260 (2015): 32–39.

————. *Şirket-i Hayriye (1851-1945)*. İstanbul: İstanbul Deniz Otobüsleri A. Ş., 2007.

————. *Türkiye'de Ticaret ve Sanayi Odaları: 1880-1952*. Istanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2002.

————. "Yabancı Sermayeli İmtiyazlı Şirketlerde Işgücünü Türkleştirme Uygulamaları (1923-1930)." *Tarih ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 7 (2008): 61–99.

Koraltürk, Murat, and Osman S. Arolat. *Sümerbank: Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bir Öncü*. İstanbul: Sümerbank A. Ş.; Creative Yayıncılık ve Tanıtım Ltd. Şti, 1996.

Köse, Ahmet Haşim, and Ahmet Öncü. "Dünya ve Türkiye Ekonomisinde Anadolu İmalat Sanayi: Zenginleşmenin Mi Yoksa Yoksullaşmanın Mı Eşiğindeyiz?" *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 77 (1998): 135–59.

Köse, Yavuz. "Nestlé: A Brief History of the Marketing Strategies of the First Multinational Company in the Ottoman Empire." *Journal of Macromarketing* 27, no. 1 (2007): 74–85.

————. *Westlicher Konsum Am Bosporus: Warenhäuser, Nestlé & Co. Im Späten Osmanischen Reich (1855 - 1923)*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010.

Krane, Charles K., and Henry Churchill King. "Report of the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey," August 28, 1919. Paris Peace Conf. 181.9102/9. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv12/d380.

Kubilay, A. Y. "Tophane-i Âmire." In *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, 7:279–80. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994.

Küçük, Hasan, and Ercan Karakoç. "An Important Figure in the Development of Turkish-American Trade Relations: Consul General Gabriel Bie Ravndal (1865-1950)." *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 2, no. 44 (2020): 183–220.

Küçükerman, Önder. *Anadolu Tasarım Mirasının Ayak İzlerinde Türk Otomotiv Sanayii ve 40. Yılında Tofaş 1968-2008*. Istanbul: Tofaş Türk Otomobil Fabrikası and Arkeoloji ve Sanat Yayınları, 2008.

————. *Anadolu'nun Geleneksel Halı ve Dokuma Sanatı İçinde Hereke Fabrikası: Saray'dan Hereke'ye Giden Yol*. Ankara: Sümerbank Genel Müdürlüğü, 1987.

————. *Batı Anadolu'daki Türk Halıcılık Geleneği Içinde İzmir Limanı ve Isparta Halı Fabrikası*. Ankara: Sümerbank Genel Müdürlüğü ; SümerHalı, 1990.

————. *"Feshane", Defterdar Fabrikası: Türk Giyim Sanayii Tarihindeki Ünlü Fabrika*. Ankara: Sümerbank Genel Müdürlüğü, 1988.

————. *Geleneksel Türk Dericilik Sanayii ve Beykoz Fabrikası: Boğaziçi'nde Başlatılan Sanayi*. Ankara: Sümerbank Genel Müdürlüğü, 1988.

————. *The Company from 1847 to 1997: 150 Years of Siemens – Turkey*. Istanbul: Siemens Publishing, 2008.

————. "The Turkish Automotive Industry From Historic Roots Towards The 2000's." *Automotive*, 2000.

————. *Türk Otomobiliyle 50 Yıl*. Istanbul: Rahmi M. Koç Müzesi; MAS Matbaacılık, 2004.

Kulin, Nusret. *Cep Muhtırası. Türkiya Otomobilci ve Şöförlerine 1929-1930*. Istanbul: Emel Matbaası, 1929.

Kupferschmidt, Uri M. *European Department Stores and Middle Eastern Consumers: The Orosdi-Back Saga*. Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2007.

Kurmuş, Orhan. *Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi*. İstanbul: Bilim Yayınları, 1974.

Lacher, Hannes. *Beyond Globalization: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity*. London; New York: Routledge, 2006.

Landes, David S. *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Lauder, Adam, and Lee Rodney. "Albert Kahn's Five-Year Plant and the Birth of 'Uncertain Space.'" *Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism* 12, no. 2 (2015): 39–61.

Lavalette, Roger. "Hukuki ve İktisadi Nokta-i Nazardan Serbest Limanlar." *Hukukî Bilgiler Mecmuası* 1, no. 4 (1926): 205–12.

Lefebvre, Henri. *The Production of Space*. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford and Cambridge, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1991.

Leigh, Randolph. "The New Turkey." *Los Angeles Times*, May 21, 1935.

Levinson, Marc. *The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger*. Second edition. Princeton Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016.

Lévy, Jacques, and Michel Lussault. "Espace." In *Dictionnaire de la géographie et l'espace des sociétés*, edited by Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault, 353–59. Paris: Belin, 2013.

Lévy-Aksu, Noémi, and François Georgeon. *Osmanlı İstanbulu'nda Asayiş (1879-1909)*. Translated by Serra Akyüz. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017.

Lewis, David L. *The Public Image of Henry Ford: An American Folk Hero and His Company*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1976.

"Limanlarda Serbest Mıntıka Tedkikatı." *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası* 3, no. 27 (1926): 161–78.

Link, Stefan. "Rethinking the Ford-Nazi Connection." *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington DC* 49 (2011): 135–50.

————. "Transnational Fordism. Ford Motor Company, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union in the Interwar Years." PhD Diss., Harvard University, 2012.

————. *Forging Global Fordism: Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and the Contest over the Industrial Order*. America in the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.

Loizides, Georgios Paris. "Deconstructing Fordism: Legacies of the Ford Sociological Department." PhD Diss., Western Michigan University, 2004.

Ludden, David. *India and South Asia: A Short History*. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass.: Oneworld Publications, 2002.

Lüdtke, Alf. "What Is the History of Everyday Life and Who Are Its Practioners?" In *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life*, edited by Alf Lüdtke, translated by William Templer, 3–40. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Maier, Charles S. "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era." *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 807–31.

————. *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

————. *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

————. *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I*. Revised Ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.

————. "Society as Factory." In *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy*, 19–69. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

————. "Transformations of Territoriality 1600-2000." In *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, edited by Gunilla-Friederike Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, 33–55. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006.

Malkoç, Eminalp. "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Kamuoyunda Demokratik Bir Tartışma: İstanbul Kömür Depoları Meselesi (1924-1926)." *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 17, no. 38 (2023): 745–73.

Massey, Doreen B. *Power-Geometries and the Politics of Space-Time: Hettner-Lecture 1998*. Heidelberg: Department of Geography, University of Heidelberg, 1999.

Mather, James. *Pashas: Traders and Travellers in the Islamic World*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

McMurray, Jonathan S. *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001.

————. *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001.

"Mehmet Asım Us (1884-1967)." İn *Atatürk Ansiklopedisi*, February 18, 2021. https://ataturkansiklopedisi.gov.tr/bilgi/mehmet-asim-us-1884-1967/.

Melnikova-Raich, Sonia. "The Soviet Problem with Two 'Unknowns': How an American Architect and a Soviet Negotiator Jump-Started the Industrialization of Russia, Part I: Albert Kahn." *IA. The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archeology* 36, no. 2 (2010): 57–80.

Memiş, Şefik. "İstanbul Ticaret Odası'nın İlk İştiraki: Tophane Ambarları İdaresi 1927-1929." *Mavi Atlas* 10, no. 1 (2022): 235–63.

————. *Tophane Ambarlar İdaresi*. İstanbul Yayınları. Istanbul, 2023.

Merrifield, Andrew. "Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 18, no. 4 (1993): 516–31.

Mitchell, Don. *The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

————. "The Lure of the Local: Landscape Studies at the End of a Troubled Century." *Progress in Human Geography* 25, no. 2 (2001): 269–81.

Mitchell, Timothy. *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil*. London: Verso, 2011.

"Mısırdan Türkiye'ye İhracat." *İskenderiye Türk Ticaret Odası Mecmuası* 1, no. 3 (1934): 15.

Müller-Wiener, Wolfgang. "15-19. Yüzyıllar Arasında İstanbul`da İmalathane ve Fabrikalar." In *Osmanlılar ve Batı Teknolojisi: Yeni Araştırmalar, Yeni Görüşler*, edited by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, 53–120. İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1992.

————. *Bizans'tan Osmanlı'ya İstanbul Limanı*. Translated by Erol Özbek. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998.

————. "Manufakturen und Fabriken in Istanbul vom 15. - 19. Jahrhundert." *Mitteilungen der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft*, no. 33/34 (1988): 257–320.

Nacar, Can. "'Our Lives Were Not as Valuable as an Animal': Workers in State-Run Industries in World-War-II Turkey." *International Review of Social History* 54, no. Supplement 17: Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labour History (2009): 143–66.

[Nafset], Mehmed Ali. "Avrupa'da Serbest Limanlara Dair Ticaret Vekaleti'ne Sunulan Rapor, 1 Ocak 1928." In *İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası 1926-1927-1928 Seneleri Faaliyet ve Muamelatına Ait Umumi Rapor*, edited by Hüseyin Avni, 652–64. İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Yayınları, 1934.

Nahum, Bernar. *Koç'ta 44 Yılım: Bir Otomativ Sanayii Kuruluyor*. Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1988.

NEHT. "Sources." Institutional Blog, October 11, 2018. http://www.envhistturkey.com/sources/.

Nevins, Allan, and Frank Ernest Hill. *Ford. Vol. 1, The Times, The Man, The Company*. Vol. 1. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1954.

————. *Ford. Vol. 2, Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933*. Vol. 2. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1957.

————. *Ford. Vol. 3, Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962*. Vol. 3. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1963.

Nişanyan, Sevan. *Hayali Coğrafyalar: Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye'de Değiştirilen Yeradları*. Edited by Özge Genç and Mehmet Ekinci. Istanbul: TESEV, 2011.

Nolan, Jenny. "How the Detroit River Shaped Lives and History." [News Portal]. The Detroit News, February 11, 1997. https://bit.ly/3v8Yfcd.

Nora, Pierre. *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*. Edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. 3 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

NTVMSNBC News Portal. "Ford Kocaeli Fabrikası Resmen Açıldı." [Online Archive], April 20, 2001. https://bit.ly/3Sa1okS.

O'Brien, Anthony Patrick. "The Importance of Adjusting Production to Sales in the Early Automobile Industry." *Explorations in Economic History* 34, no. 2 (1997): 195–219.

Odman, Aslı. "Dev-Şirketler Ve Güçlülerin Suçları." In *Salgın Sonrası Dönemde İnsan Hakları Gündemi - Sempozyum Bildirileri, 20-23 Mayıs 2021*, 20–31. Istanbul: Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, 2021.

————. "Tophane'den Mersin'e, Ford'dan Foxconn'a Türkiye'de Serbest Bölgeler." Mersin, 2010. https://bit.ly/46soI1g.

Ökçün, Ahmet Gündüz. *1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1971.

Öktem, Kerem. "Nationalism and Territory in Post-Ottoman Space." *RAMSES Working Paper*, no. 2 (2006).

————. "Reconstructing the Geographies of Nationalism: Nation, Space and Discourse in Twentieth Century Turkey." PhD Diss., University of Oxford, 2005.

————. "The Nation's Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of Toponymes in Republican Turkey." *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 7, Thematic Issue: Demographic Engineering (2008).

Önsoy, Rifat. *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayii ve Sanayileşme Politikası*. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1988.

Örenç, Ali Fuat. "Modern İstanbul Limanı'nın İnşası Sürecinde Galata ve Eminönü Semtlerinde Kentsel Değişim." In *Osmanlı İstanbulu Uluslararası Sempozyum 4 Bildiri Kitabı*, 205–58, 2016.

Özbek, Nadir. "Alternatif Tarih Tahayyülleri: Siyaset, İdeoloji ve Osmanlı-Türkiye Tarihi." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 98 (2003): 234–54.

Özdek, Emine Yasemin. *Şirket Egemenliği Çağı: Sosyal Devletten Ceza Devletine*. Istanbul: Notabene Yayınları, 2011.

Özdemir, Biltekin. *Osmanlı Devleti Dış Borçları: 1854-1954 Döneminde Yüzyıl Süren Boyunduruk. 1854-1914 Borçlanmaları Galata Bankerleri ve Osmanlı Bankası Düyun-u Umumiye İdaresi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kabul Ettiği Osmanlı Devlet Borçları*. Ankara: Ankara Ticaret Odası Yayını, 2009.

Özdemir, Metin. *Türk Traktör Tarihi: 1954-1997*. Ankara: Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş., 1998.

Özgüven, Burcu. "Erken Cumhurïyet Dönemïnde İstanbul'da Yakıt Depolama Tesïslerï." *Trakya Üniversitesi Mühendislik Bilimleri Dergisi* 24, no. 2 (2023): 71–84.

Özkan, Hande. "The History of Geographical Perceptions in the Turkish Republic: A Spatial Interpretation of the Republican Regime During the Single-Party Era." MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2002.

Öztürk, Mertcan. "Distinction Versus Recognition: Making Sense of the Tophane Incidents in the Context of Gentrification." PhD Diss., University of Manchester, 2019.

Öztürk, Özgür. *Türkiye'de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*. Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2010.

Özuğurlu, Metin. *Anadolu'da Küresel Fabrikanın Doğuşu: Yeni İşçilik Örüntülerinin Sosyolojisi*. Istanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, 2008.

Özveren, Yaşar Eyüp. "The Making and Unmaking of an Ottoman Port-City: Nineteenth-Century Beirut, Its Hinterland, and the World-Economy." PhD Diss., State University of New York, 1990.

Paasi, Anssi. "Territory." In *A Companion to Political Geography*, edited by John A. Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal, 109–22. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.

Pamuk, Şevket. "Globalization, Industrialization and Changing Politics in Turkey." *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 38 (2008): 267–73.

————. "Turkey's Response to the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective, 1929-1939." Working Paper. European University Institute, 2000. https://bit.ly/3QW0lmY.

Pamuk, Şevket, and Reşat Kasaba, eds. "Economic Change in Twentieth-Century Turkey: Is the Glass More Than Half Full?" In *The Cambridge History of Turkey. Turkey in the Modern World*, 4:266–300. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Patrick, Andrew. *America's Forgotten Middle East Initiative: The King-Crane Commission of 1919*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2015.

Pérouse, Jean-François. "Le Discours Sur Les Disparités Territoriales En Turquie: Remarques Terminologiques, Contexte Idéologique, Cadres Administratifs et Modalités de Formulation." [unpublished paper], 2006.

————. "Nouveaux enjeux territoriaux et environnementaux: le cas d'Istanbul." In *La Turquie au tournant du siècle*, edited by Ali Kazancıgil, 88–112. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 2004.

————. "Türkiye'de Coğrafyanın Yansımaları." Translated by Nuri Yavan and Sengün Acar. *Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi* 10, no. 1 (2012): 1–8.

Perroux, François. "Economic Space: Theory and Applications." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 64, no. 1 (1950): 89–104.

"Personalia." *Levant Trade Review* 13, no. 7 (1925): 310.

Pervititch, Jacques. *Jacques Pervititch Sigorta Haritalarında İstanbul = Istanbul in the Insurance Maps of Jacques Pervititch*. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; AXA OYAK A. Ş., 2000.

Pietrykowski, Bruce. "Fordism at Ford: Spatial Decentralization and Labor Segmentation at the Ford Motor Company, 1920-1950." *Economic Geography* 71, no. 4 (1995): 383–401.

Pohl, Manfred. *Von Stambul Nach Bagdad: Die Geschichte Einer Berühmten Eisenbahn*. Munich: Piper; Sonderausgabe für die Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank, 1999.

Popica, Lavinia. "Ford Motor Company in Romania." *Revista Muzeul Național*, no. 12 (2010): 120–40.

"Port History - ThPA S.A. Port of Thessaloniki," May 9, 2023. https://www.thpa.gr/the-port-history/.

Proudfoot, Malcolm Jarvis. "The Commerce of the Port of Istanbul and of the Bosphorus." PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1930.

Quataert, Donald. "Limited Revolution: The Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation and the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890-1908." *The Business History Review* 51, no. 2 (1977): 139–60.

————. *Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire: The Zonguldak Coalfield, 1822-1920*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006.

————. *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire 1881 - 1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration*. New York University Studies in Near Eastern Civilization 9. New York, N.Y.: New York Univ. Press, 1983.

Quataert, Donald, and David Gutman. "Coal Mines, the Palace, and Struggles Over Power, Capital, and Justice in the Late Ottoman Empire." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 2 (2012): 215–35.

Raff, Daniel M. G., and Lawrence H. Summers. "Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 5, no. 4 (1987): 57–86.

Ravndal, G. Bie. "Automobiles in Turkey." *Levant Trade Review* 5, no. 4 (1916): 397–403.

————. "Supplement to Commerce Reports, Published by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce - United States Department of Commerce," 1922.

Reill, Dominique Kirchner. *The Fiume Crisis: Life in the Wake of the Habsburg Empire*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020.

Robins, Nick. *The Corporation That Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational*. Electronic resource. 2nd ed. London: Pluto Press, 2012.

Ross, Steven J., and Edwin J. Perkins. "Integrating Business History and Labor History." *Business and Economic History* 15, Papers Presented at the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Business History Conference (1986): 43–52.

Rothermund, Dietmar. *The Global Impact of the Great Depression, 1929-1939*. Nachdr. London: Routledge, 2010.

"Ruberoid Reklam Kataloğu (Üç Dilli: Türkçe - Almanca - Fransızca)." Türkische Rundschau, n.d.

Sanayi Sayımı 1927. Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1969.

Sarıkaya, İbrahim. "Work and Work Accidents in the Flexible Working Regime: The Zonguldak Hard Coal Basin Case." MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2012.

Sassen, Saskia. *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Saya, Mehmet. *Denizcilik Sektöründe Bir Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsü: Denizcilik Bankası Türk Anonim Ortaklığı (1952-1983)*. İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2022.

Sayre, N. F., and A. V. Di Vittorio. "Scale." In *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, edited by N. J. Thrift and Rob Kitchin, 10:196–208. Amterdam; Boston: Elsevier, 2009.

Schlögel, Karl. *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit: Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik*. 3rd ed. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2003.

Schultz, Kurt S. "Building the 'Soviet Detroit': The Construction of the Nizhnii-Novgorod Automobile Factory, 1927-1932." *Slavic Review* 49, no. 2 (1990): 200–212.

Schwanitz, Wolfgang G. *Gold, Bankiers Und Diplomaten: Zur Geschichte Der Deutschen Orientbank 1906-1946*. Berlin: Trafo Verlag, 2002.

Scott, Howard and Continental Committee on Technocracy. *Introduction to Technocracy*. New York: John Day Company, 1933.

Sefer, Akın. "Labor in the Heart of Empire: Workers, Industry and the State in Ottoman Imperial Naval Arsenal, 1839-1876." PhD thesis, Northeastern University, 2018.

————. "The Docks of the Revolution: The Struggles of the Port Workers of Istanbul in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century." MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, The Atatürk Insitute for Modern Turkish History, 2009.

Sencer, Oya. *Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı- Doğuşu ve Yapısı*. Istanbul: Habora Kitabevi, 1969.

"Serbest Bölgelerde Kriz Var Yatırımlar Bıçak Gibi Kesildi. AB Hakkında Basın Özetleri," January 23, 2006. http://eic-istanbul.org/dokumanlar/abm/bilgibankasi/ab/basin_bultenleri/subat_2006/20060223.htm.

Sermaye-İktidar İlişkileri Üzerine Kolektif Veri Haritalama. "Mülksüzleştirme Ağları." Online Project, 2013. https://mulksuzlestirme.org/.

Sert, Esra. "Mobility of Land in İstanbul: Production of Nature as Space in 2000's." In *Livenarch VI. Liveable Environment & Architectures*. Trabzon, 2019.

————. "Modern Kıyının İnşası: 19. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla İstanbul'da Dört Kıyı Dolgu Projesi Üzerinden Toprağın ve Kentsel Dönüşüm Atığının Metabolik Akışı." *Praksis*, Krizler Çağında Coğrafya ve Mekan, no. 60 (2023): 71–92.

————. "Urban Metabolism of İstanbul: Waterfronts as Metabolized Socio-Natures Between 1839 and 2019." PhD Diss., Middle Easter Technical University, Department of Architecture, 2020.

Sertel, Sabiha. *Roman Gibi (1919-1950)*. Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1978.

Sezgin, Ahmet. "From Imperial Imprints to National Markers of the Homeland: Süleymaniye, Selimiye, and Commemorating Sinan in Turkey, 1930-1950." *Journal of Historical Geography*, (*forthcoming*).

Shpotov, Borris. "Ford in Russia, from 1909 to World War II." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 2:505–29. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

Siegelbaum, Lewis H. *Cars for Comrades: The Life of the Soviet Automobile*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Silva, Elizabeth Bortolaia. "Brazilian Fordism in Historical Perspective." *Actes Du GERPISA*, no. 11 (1994): 141–62.

————. "Labour and Technology in the Car Industry: Ford Strategies in Britain and Brazil." PhD Diss., University of London, 1988.

Slobodian, Quinn. *Crack-up Capitalism: Market Radicals and the Dream of a World without Democracy*. UK USA Canada Ireland Australia India New Zeeland South Africa: Allen Lane, 2023.

Smith, Neil. *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Soja, Edward W. *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*. London and New York: Verso, 1989.

Sorensen, Charles E. *My Forty Years with Ford*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006.

Sönmez, Mustafa. *Kırk Haramiler: Türkiye'de Holdingler*. Istanbul: Gözlem Yayıncılık, 1987.

————. *Türkiye'de İş Dünyasının Örgütleri ve Yönelimleri*. İstanbul: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2010.

————. "Türkiye'de Serbest Bölge Girişimleri 1923-1982." In *Uluslararası Yeni İşbölümü ve Serbest Bölgeler*, 214–31. Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1982.

Srougo, Shai. "Core–Periphery Interactions in the Late and Post-Ottoman Periods: Dependency and the Uneven Development of Thessaloniki: 1870–1936." *European Review* 21, no. 3 (2013): 422–34.

————. "The Fall of the Balkan Port: Geopolitical Dynamics and the Decline of the Free Zone in Thessaloniki (1923-1939)." *Journal of Historical Geography*, January 1, 2021.

Stites, Richard. *Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution*. 1. issued as paperback. New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991.

Stivers, William. *Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1982.

Şenalp, M. Gürsan. *Ulusötesi Kapitalist Sınıf Oluşumu: Türkiye ve Koç Holding Örneği*. Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2012.

Şeni, Nora, and Sophie Le Tarnec. *Camondolar: Bir Hanedanın Çöküşü*. Translated by Yaman Aksu. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997.

Tabak, Faruk. "Imperial Rivalry and Port-Cities: A View from Above." *Mediterranean Historical Review* 24, no. 2 (2009): 79–94.

Tahsin, Hamit, and Remzi Saka. *Sermaye Hareketi*. Istanbul: Türk Ocağı Koleksiyonu; Amedi Matbaası, 1930.

Tanju, Bülent, and Uğur Tanyeli. *Sedad Hakkı Eldem. II, Retrospektif: [Sergi, İstanbul, Osmanlı Bankası Müzesi, 8 Nisan-5 Temmuz 2009]*. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2009.

Taşkın, Rahime İpek. *Orosdi-Back Mağazaları*. Libra Kitapçılık. Istanbul, 2024.

Tayanç, Tunç. *İLK - Geçmişten Geleceğe STFA*. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Offset Yapımevi, 2012.

————. *İnşaatçıların Coğrafyası: Türk İnşaat Sektörünün Yurtdışı Müteahhitlik Hizmetleri Serüveni*. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı; Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği, 2011.

Taylor, Peter J. "A Materialist Framework for Political Geography." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 7, no. 1 (1982): 15–34.

————. "Embedded Statism and the Social Sciences II: Geographies (and Metageographies) in Globalization." *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 32, no. 6 (2000): 1105–14.

Taylor, Peter J., and Ben Derudder. *World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis*. London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2004.

Taylor, Peter J., Michael J. Watts, and R. J. Johnston. "Global Change at the End of the Twentieth Century." In *Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World in the Late Twentieth Century*, edited by R. J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor, and Michael J. Watts, 1–11. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2002.

Tekeli, İlhan. *Birlikte Yazılan ve Öğrenilen Bir Tarihe Doğru*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007.

Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin. "1923 Tarihli 'Umur Nafia Programı.'" In *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*, 3:217–33. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003.

———. "1923 Yılında İstanbul'un İktisadi Durumu ve İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası İktisat Komisyonu Raporu." In *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi*, Vol. 2. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003.

———. "Birinci Sanayi Planı'nın Hazırlanışında Sovyet Uzmanlarının Rolü." In *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları., 201–38. Istanbul, 2004.

———. *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*. Vol. 3. 3 vols. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003.

———. *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Serbest Üretim Bölgelerinin Doğuş ve Dönüşümü*. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1987.

———. "Tarımsal Teknolojide İlk Gelişmeler. İlk Makineleşme." In *75 Yılda Çarklardan Chip'lere*, edited by Oya Baydar, 6–10. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999.

———. "Türkiye'de Demiryolu Öncelikli Ulaşım Politikasına Geçiş (1923-1957)." In *Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*, 3:369–432. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003.

Tezçek, Özlem. *Düşünce Fabrikaları: Sermayenin Haricî Belleği*. Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2011.

Tezel, Yahya Sezai. *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*. Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi, 1982.

———. *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950*. Rev. 3rd Ed. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994.

The Business History Conference. "The 2015 Joint Meeting of the Business History Conference and the European Business History." Conference Announcement. BHC-EBHA Meeting Miami, Florida, 2015. https://bit.ly/3SVvucK.

Thomas, Paul. "Searching for Identity. Ford Motor Company in the German Market (1903-2003)." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 2:151–89. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

Tignor, Robert L. "In the Grip of Politics: The Ford Motor Company of Egypt, 1945-1960." *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 3 (1990): 383–98.

Tilly, Charles. "Space for Capital, Space for States." *Theory and Society* 15, no. 1/2 Special Double Issue: Structures of Capital. (1986): 301–9.

Tolliday, Steven. "The Origins of Ford of Europe: From Multidomestic to Multinational Corporation, 1903-1976." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 1:151–89. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

————. "The Origins of Ford of Europe: From Multidomestic to Multinational Corporation, 1903-1976." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 1:151–241. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

————. "The Rise of Ford in Britain: From Sales Agency to Market Leader, 1904-1980." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, Vol. 2. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

————. "Transferring Fordism: The First Phase of the Overseas Diffusion and Adaptation of Ford Methods, 1911-1939." *Actes Du GERPISA*, no. 11 (1993): 51–67.

Toninelli, Pier Angelo. "Between Agnelli and Mussolini: Ford's Unsuccessful Attempt to Penetrate the Italian Automobile Market in the Interwar Period." *Enterprise & Society* 10, no. 2 (2009): 335–75.

Toprak, Bedirhan, Nalân Sakızlı, and Enis Rıza. *Mamulattan Markaya: Arçelik Kurum Tarihi, 1955-2000*. Istanbul: Arçelik A. Ş.; Mepa Medya, 2001.

Toprak, Zafer. *Sümerbank Holding A.Ş.* İstanbul: Sümerbank A. Ş. YAyınları; Alaş Ofset, 1988.

————. "Türkiye Tarımı ve Yapısal Dönüşümler (1900-1950)." In *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar: Bildiriler*, edited by Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak. Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi, 1988.

————. *Türkiye'de "Millî İktisat", 1908-1918*. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982.

[Tör], Vedad Nedim. "Serbest Mıntıka Meselesi." *Hayat Mecmuası* 90, no. 4 (1928): 231.

Trask, Roger R. *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971.

Tunca, Halil, and Nihat Batmaz. *Doğrudan Yabancı Sermaye Yatırımları ve Türkiye*. Istanbul: Beta Basım Yayım A. Ş., 2005.

Turna, Nalan. "Yeniçeri-Esnaf İlişkisi: Bir Analiz." In *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Ticaret Hayatı*, edited by Fatmagül Berktay, 21–42. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları, 2012.

¶ Tutel, Eser. *Gemiler... Süvariler... İskeleler...* Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998.

————. *Seyr-i Sefain: Öncesi ve Sonrası*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997.

————. *Şirket-i Hayriye*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994.

Türkhan, Sait. "19. ve 20. Yüzyılda Haliç'te Çevre Sorunları ve Deniz Kirliliği." *Toplumsal Tarih, Osmanlı'da Çevre Sorunları Sayısı*, no. 169 (2008): 60–67.

Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı. "Kurum ve Sektör Tarihi Projeleri." Tarih Vakfı, September 10, 2018. https://bit.ly/47m6aB0.

Uluışık, Seçil. "A Nineteenth Century Sarraf in the Ottoman Empire: Mıgırdıç Cezayirliyan." MA Thesis, Koç University, 2011.

Umay, Mehmed Fuad. *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluş Yıllarında Bir Devrimci Doktorun Anıları*. Edited and translated by Cahit Kayra. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006.

Unremembered: A History of the Famously Interesting and Mostly Forgotten. "1933 Chicago World's Fair Ford Rotunda." Blog, December 5, 2008. https://bit.ly/3MQg4m2.

[Us], Mehmet Asım. "Türkiye ve Amerika." *Vakit*, January 2, 1932, sec. Başmakale.

Ülker, Erol. "Class, Nation, and Workers: The Silahtarağa Power Plant in Istanbul, 1914-1928." Torino, Italy, 2015.

Üner, Cemal. "Türkiye'de Otomotiv Sanayiinin Tarihçesi." *Mühendis ve Makine*, no. 166 (1971): 261–67.

Üsdiken, Behlül, and Alfred Kieser. "Introduction: History in Organisation Studies." *Business History* 46, no. 3 (2004): 321–30.

Üsdiken, Behlül, Alfred Kieser, and Peter Kjaer. "Academy, Economy and Polity: *Betriebswirtschaftslehre* in Germany, Denmark and Turkey before 1945." *Business History* 46, no. 3 (2004): 381–406.

Üyepazarcı, Erol. *TSKB'nin Öyküsü*. Istanbul: Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası, 1995.

Velipaşaoğlu, Didem Yavuz. *Crafting an Empire: The Hereke Factory Campus (1842-1914)*. 1st edition. Libra Kitap Tarih, 558 475. İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2023.

Volpato, Guiseppe. "Ford in Italy: Commercial Breakthroughs Without Industrial Bridgeheads." In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, Vol. 2. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

Warf, Barney. “From Surfaces to Networks.” In *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, edited by Barney Warf and Santa Arias, 59–77. London; New York: Routledge, 2009.

Warf, Barney, and Santa Arias, eds. *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

————, eds. *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

Weitzman, Hal. ‘Delaware is everywhere’: how a little-known tax haven made the rules for corporate America - ICIJ. Interview by Nicole Sadek. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, June 27, 2022. https://bit.ly/3tmtgJ8.

————. *What’s the Matter with Delaware? How the First State Has Favored the Rich, Powerful, and Criminal - and How It Costs Us All*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022.

Wilkins, Mira. “Ford among Multinational Companies.” In *Ford, 1903-2003: The European History*, edited by Hubert Bonin, Yanning Lung, and Steven Tolliday, 71–93. Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003.

Wilkins, Mira, and Frank Ernest Hill. *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964.

————. *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964.

Yalçınkaya, Akansel. “Türkiye’de İşletme Tarihyazımı: Mevcut Birikime Eleştirel Bakış ve Yeni Bir Tarihyazımı İçin Muhtemel Açılımlar.” *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 19 (2022): 104–44.

Yalman, Şen. *Lastik Izinde 80 Yıl: Selanik’ten Avustralya’ya...: Gazetecilik, Ticaret, Sanat ve Futbol Hayatında Iz Bırakan Yalman Ailesi*. 1. basım. Genel Yayın 5476. İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları Kültür Yayınları, 2022.

Yankaya, Dilek. *Yeni İslâmî Burjuvazi: Türkiye Modeli*. Translated by Melike Işık Durmaz. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014.

Yenal, Oktay. *Cumhuriyet'in İktisat Tarihi*. Istanbul: Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası, 2001.

Yıldırım, Kadir. *Osmanlı'da İşçiler (1870 - 1922): Çalışma Hayatı, Örgütler, Grevler*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2013.

Yılmaz, Celali, ed. *Osmanlı Anonim Şirketleri: Ticaret ve Zıraat Nezareti Tarafından 1918 Yılında Yayınlanmış Olan "Memâlik-i Osmaniye'de Osmanlı Anonim Şirketleri" Başlıklı Katalog*. Istanbul: Scala Yayıncılık, 2011.

Yılmaz, Koray R. *Mahalle Bakkalından Küresel Aktöre Arçelik: İşletme Tarihine Marksist Yaklaşım*. Istanbul: SAV Yayınları, 2010.

Yurdakul, İlhami. *Aziz Şehre Leziz Su: Dersaadet, İstanbul Su Şirketi, 1873-1933*. Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2010.

Zeitlin, Jonathan, and Gary Herrigel, eds. *Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking Us Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Zengin, Ersoy. "Milli Mücadele Yıllarında İmalat-ı Harbiye Fabrikaları." *Mavi Atlas* 5, no. 1 (2017): 201–23.

Zogby, James. "Opinions Matter: A Lesson From History." *HuffPost*, July 11, 2008, sec. U.S. News. https://bit.ly/3ROIZKv.

"«Τα Λιμενικά Άεργα» (The Lack of Works in the Port [of Thessaloniki)." Εφημερίς των Βαλκανίων (Efimeris ton Valkanion [The newspaper of the Balkans], March 19, 1934.