UNITED NATIONS EMPLOYEE PERSPECTIVES ON LINKING HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT AID: TURKEY'S PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATION

SEVCAN HACILAR

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

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Sevcan Hacılar

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Turkey's Protected Refugee Situation

The thesis of Sevcan Hacılar

has been approved by:

Assist. Prof. Volkan Yılmaz _____
(Thesis Advisor)

Prof. E. Biray Kolluoğlu _____

Assist. Prof. Kristen Biehl _____
(External Member)

August 2020

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Sevcan Hacılar, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature S.Hacılar

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ABSTRACT

United Nations Employee Perspectives

on Linking Humanitarian and Development Aid:

Turkey's Protracted Refugee Situation

A catalyst for the renewed focus on linking humanitarian and development aid has been the scale and protracted nature of the Syrian refugee situation. While policy and academic literature has emphasized the necessity for the link and offered pathways to a coherent response framework, research on how aid employees perceive and negotiate this link remains restricted. In this regard, this thesis explores perspectives of the United Nations (UN) employees on how the link is perceived and negotiated in the context of the UN-coordinated response to the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey. This thesis relies on a qualitative study including 9 key-informant interviews with the employees of two UN agencies in Turkey. Applying thematic analysis to the interview data, the thesis offers a contextual analysis of their perspectives towards conceptual framing of the link between humanitarian and development aid, distinctions between these two worlds of aid, the relevance of the link in Turkey and roles of main stakeholders in implementing this link. The thesis finds that perceptions of the UN employees on distinctions between the two types of aid and conceptual framing of the link present diversity. In the Turkish context, institutional capacity development in the public sector is perceived as the response's overarching relevance and contribution to the link. However, a dilemma is observed between strengthening domestic institutions and building the resilience of people and communities.

ÖZET

Birleşmiş Milletler Çalışanlarının İnsani Yardım ve Kalkınma Yardım Bağlantısına İlişkin Görüşleri:

Türkiye'deki Uzayan Mülteci Durumu

Uzun süreden bu yana süregelen insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı bağlantısını sağlama uğraşına yeniden odaklanmasının ardındaki itici unsurlardan biri, Suriye mülteci krizinin ölçeği ve uzayan bir süreye yayılan bir hal almış olmasıdır. Alan yazın bu bağlantının sağlanmasının gerekliliğini vurgulamış ve tutarlı bir müdahale çerçevesi geliştirmek üzere yaklaşımlar önermiş olsa da; yardım alanında çalışanların bu çerçeveyi nasıl algıladıkları ve müzakere ettiklerine ilişkin çalışmalar sınırlı kalmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bu tez yardım alanındaki Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) çalışanlarının, insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı arasındaki bu bağlantıyı nasıl algıladığı ve bu bağlantıyı BM'nin eşgüdümünü sağladığı Türkiye sınırları içindeki insani yardım müdahalesi kapsamında nasıl müzakere ettiğine yönelik görüşlerini incelemektedir. Tez yöntembilim bakımından, Türkiye'deki iki BM kuruluşunun kilit bilgi sağlayıcı rolündeki çalışanlarıyla gerçekleştirilen 9 mülakata dayanan nitel bir çalışmadır. Mülakatlardan toplanan nitel verilerin tematik analiz aracılığıyla işlenmesiyle; tez, BM çalışanlarının insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı arasındaki bağlantının kavramsal olarak nasıl çerçevelediğinin, yardımın iki dünyası arasındaki farklılıklara, bağlantının Türkiye'deki müdahale açısından anlamlılığı ve uygunluğunun yanı sıra bağlantının uygulamaya dökülmesindeki başlıca paydaşların rollerine ilişkin görüşlerinin bağlamsal bir analizini sunmaktadır. Tez, görüşülen BM çalışanlarının iki yardım alanı arasındaki farklılıklara ve bağlantının kavramsal çerçevelenmesine ilişkin algılarının çeşitlilik gösterdiğini koymaktadır. Görüşmeciler

kamu sektöründe kurumsal kapasitenin desteklenmesini mevcut müdahalenin bağlantının uygulamaya geçirilmesine başlıca katkısı olarak algılamaktadır. Tez görüşülen BM çalışanlarının ulusal kurumlarının kapasitesinin geliştirilmesi ile bireylerin ve toplulukların dayanıklılıklarının artırılması arasında bir çelişki gözlemlediklerini saptamaktadır.

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ABBREVIATIONS

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
CCTE	Conditional Cash Transfer for Education
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DAC	Development Assistant Committee
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
DGoILF	General for International Labor Force
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EU	European Union
EWARN	Early Warning Alert and Response Network
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FRIT	The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
HAC	Humanitarian Action for Children
HDN	Humanitarian-Development Nexus
IFI	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labor Organization

INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services
MoH	Ministry of Health of Turkey (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sağlık Bakanlığı*)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NWoW	The New Way of Working
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDMM	Provincial Directorates of Migration Management
PDoFLSS	Provincial Directorates of Family, Labor and Social Services
RCM	Refugee Coordination Model
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SRH	Sexual Reproductive Health
STF	Syria Task Force
TAC	Temporary Accommodation Center
TEC	Temporary Education Center
TP	Temporary Protection
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
UTBA	Union of Turkish Bar Association
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
YÖK	Higher Education Council (Yükseköğretim Kurulu)
YTB	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Linking humanitarian-development aid has long been a prominent theme on the international aid agenda. Traditionally, humanitarian assistance is framed as designed to be short-term and delivered in response to a humanitarian emergency with a focus on saving lives while development assistance is designed to be long-term in response to ongoing structural issues and systematic problems (“From Humanitarian to Development Aid” , 2020).

There have been various interests that are driving international engagement in linking humanitarian and development aid in response to large-scale, protracted refugee situations. Firstly, economic development and self-reliance has been promoted for refugees as a remedy for dependency in protracted displacement situations, leading to prevalence of frameworks and approaches promoting self-reliance among a broad range of stakeholders including international donors and humanitarian and development actors. Besides, the current aid environment is characterized by a widening gap between humanitarian needs and the resources available to service them along with extreme competitiveness with an increase in the number of agencies vying for funds. Finally, a major catalyst for the renewed focus on the long- running endeavor of linking humanitarian and development aid has been the large scale and protracted nature of the Syrian refugee situation.

In the 10th year since the outbreak of the conflict, Syrians are today the largest refugee population in the world (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2020). While the international aid response has expanded in scale and depth, the protracted crisis continues to challenge the international aid

agenda. The governments and people of refugee host-countries in the region have provided Syrian refugees with protection and safety, however the crisis continues to place a huge strain on the resources of the local communities. For the sixth consecutive year in 2019, Turkey continued to host the world's largest number of refugees, reaching 3,6 million through both new registrations and births, by the year's end (UNHCR, 2020). In Turkey, the protracted refugee situation has been responded, under national leadership and ownership, with an ever-evolving aid and policy mix. The international community supported the response in Turkey mainly through the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) since 2015 and through The European Union Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) since 2016. The 3RP is a United Nations (UN) coordinated inter-agency response plan and appeal and has been applauded for representing a paradigm shift from previous regional response towards reinforcing the resilience of individuals, communities and institutions in host communities (3RP, 2015). The FRIT is also a coordination mechanism that ensures mobilisation of existing European Union financing instruments, either as humanitarian or development assistance, to address the needs of refugees and host communities in a comprehensive in Turkey (European Commission, 2019).

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly encouraged 'joint responses involving all such actors in order to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian and development actors, facilitate cooperation across institutional mandates and, by helping to build self-reliance and resilience, lay a basis for sustainable solutions' (UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 15). The New Way of Working (NWoW), which came out as a core commitment from the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, also represents an approach to put in practice the humanitarian-development nexus and is described as

working towards achieving collective outcomes that reduce need, risk and vulnerability, over multiple years, based on the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors (OCHA, 2017). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) further identifies this as a task that requires the pursuit of collective outcomes across silos, overcoming long-standing attitudinal, institutional, and funding obstacles (OCHA, 2017, p. 3.). The European Union defines the nexus as a shared vision, putting into effect the synergies between members of the humanitarian, development, and peace community ("European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations: Resilience and Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus", 2020).

Having served with organizations of the multilateral system in different capacities since 2012, including different agencies and funds of the United Nations system and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have firsthand been engaged in operational aspects of the debate on linking humanitarian and development aid in post-conflict and developing country contexts.

More recently, my professional experience includes my service with the Turkey country operation of the UN Refugee Agency from 2014 to 2018 where I worked in an operational environment with a large-scale refugee population moving beyond the emergency phase into a protracted situation. Besides, serving currently with the UN Population Fund, the need for responses to have faster and at the same time longer results in the context of COVID-19 including in extremely complex environments has also brought on the forefront again the urgency around humanitarian-development nexus, as the most recently-introduced framework for linking humanitarian and development aid. Last but not least, the debate on linking humanitarian and development aid has strong relevance to the UN Development

System Reform (UNDS Reform), which impacts the way that agencies and funds of the United Nations system that I have served with work through a set of far-reaching changes in the way the UN development system work.

Against this background, the objective of the thesis is to explore perspectives of the United Nations (UN) employees in aid to gauge how linking humanitarian-development assistance is perceived and negotiated in the context of the UN-coordinated response to the protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey through a qualitative study. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explains the research methods in which the units of analysis, the sample, and the methods of the thesis are introduced. The second section presents the outline of the chapters of the thesis.

1.1 Research methodology

This is a qualitative study, which uses key informant (KI) interviews employing semi-structured in-depth interviews to gauge perspectives of the United Nations employees on linking humanitarian and development aid in the context of the protracted refugee situation in Turkey. 9 in-depth interviews were conducted with international and national experts working at the Turkey operations of two United Nations (UN) agencies.

Qualitative in-depth key-informant interview, in view of the nature and scope of the research question, is deemed as the appropriate research instrument to explore and provide an understanding of the underlying motivations and perspectives of the target population. A semi-structured approach was used to explore common issues while allowing for issues of relevance and importance to emerge from key informants' experiences during the interviews. Thereby, each key informant was

presented with the opportunity to describe and frame issues from their personal perspective (Sandelowski, 1993).

A two-layered approach to developing the purposive sampling list has been employed, respectively regarding identification of the two organizations within the UN system among the many programmes, funds, and specialized agencies and then regarding identifying of the key informants employed within these organizations. The rationale behind the selection of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was the mandates of UNDP and UNHCR within the wider UN system and the roles they play within the UN-coordinated Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in response to the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey. First, within their core mandate responsibilities, UNDP is primarily mandated to support countries in their development path based on Member States' priorities and country context while UNHCR is primarily mandated to provide international protection and humanitarian assistance. Secondly, UNHCR and UNDP are co-leading the Turkey chapter of the two-pillar 3RP, respectively UNHCR with lead coordination role on refugee component and UNDP with lead coordination role on resilience component.

Respondents were selected purposefully from the experts working at the Turkey operations of the UNDP and UNHCR and taking part in the Inter Agency Coordination Structure. The respondents have been selected, mainly due to their lead roles within this structure, established at the national and sub-national level across the country. Key informants, each with more than a decade experience in national and international development and humanitarian aid contexts occupied lead roles within this structure with specific involvement and knowledge of the humanitarian and development interventions as part of the Syria Task Force co-chaired by

UNHCR and UNDP, including experts who are responsible for cross sectoral coordination along with those who lead, coordinate and guide a specific working group among 3RP partners. The sample included 9 key informants that are described further in Table 1 and Table 2 with regards to their gender and their affiliation with the inter-agency coordination structure. Due regard has been paid to select counterparts from the two agencies, both in terms of their role within the coordination structure and in terms of their areas of expertise within their respective agencies. Due consideration and efforts have been given to ensure a gender-balanced sample. The contact details have been gathered via information online (8 respondents) and snowballing (1 respondent).

Before the interview, the researcher intimated to the respondents that the goal of the interview is not to get their official perspectives based on institutional affiliations but rather more professional perspectives as experts who have years-long working experience in humanitarian and development contexts across the globe. Therefore, the respondent's opinions and views on participation did not require any endorsement by their organization.

Table 1. The Profile of Respondents

Organization	Male	Female
UNHCR	3	2
UNDP	2	2

Table 2. Respondent Profiles as per Their Affiliation with the Inter-Agency Coordination Structure

Organization	Number of respondents as per agency	
	Roles within the Inter Agency Coordination Structure	Outside of the Inter Agency Coordination Structure
UNHCR	4	1
UNDP	3	1

Interviews were either digitally recorded or audio-recorded except for one case where the respondent did not agree for a recording. For that interview, the researcher took notes during and after the interview. All respondents were sent and 4 signed a respondent consent form while others notified that they were unable to sign the form due to lack of access to scanning facilities during the lockdown period. In the latter case, e-mail correspondence where respondents acknowledged their receipt of an agreement to the electronic copy of the participant information and consent form have been kept. Interviews were conducted in English and Turkish (4 in Turkish, 5 in English), guided by a semi-structured interview guide. Employing responsive interviewing techniques, the researcher utilized a semi-structured questionnaire designed to include a series of predetermined but open-ended questions, while also maintaining a degree of flexibility to allow respondents to expand on certain issues most important to them.

The questions have been derived from the broad and rich body of literature on linking humanitarian and development assistance. Key informants were asked to respond to open-ended questions focused on four topics: humanitarian and development assistance as two assistance domains and the relationship between the two; perceptions of the humanitarian-development link; relevance of the link to the Turkish context and factors driving success for and challenges to implementation of the link.

Protecting the identities of the individuals who participated in the research has remained primordial to the researcher. Utmost care has been exercised in obtaining, handling, and storing data with regards to respondent confidentiality during research planning and throughout the research process including data collection and data cleaning. A set of measures has been taken to handle the risk of

deductive disclosure to protect research respondents from any harm. The personal data that needs to be collected was coded as early in the activity as possible and securely stored so that only the researcher and the thesis advisor might access it. This was done through use of a study code in place of the respondent's name or other identifying information. During data collection any identifying information (such as name, organization, title, phone number, or address) was saved in an encoded folder, in password protected computer. Once the data had been compiled and the data cleaning process started, any identifying information that was associated with the data was removed and when recorded key informant interviews were typed up, each respondent was assigned a unique number. A list linking names and codes was secured separately from interview notes and will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project (no later than September 30, 2020). Any responses included in the final thesis text have been kept anonymous; do not include any other potentially identifying information (such as title) and focused on the content of the discussion rather than identifying who said what. Interview notes and any printed documents have been in a secure place at the residence of the researcher.

Interview transcriptions and notes were then analyzed using thematic content analysis approach, through thorough and repeated reading of all interview transcriptions and notes, to identify overall patterns and relevant themes in the data and coding framework was thus developed, which was further developed by using quotes through a blended approach to coding.

As the UN system and thus the respondents were characterized by a high-level of internal discipline, one caveat is that the interviewees' responses may have been colored by the institutional positions of the organizations they work for. Besides, void is probable to exist between employees who work at the country

offices and those at higher political levels. Therefore, the findings may not represent wider perceptions in the headquarters of respective UN agencies and thus may offer limited generalizability.

The study was approved by the Committee on Ethical Conduct in Extramural Academic Relations at Boğaziçi University on 16 March 2020, with the document coded 26/06/2020. The ethics committee approval form is available in Appendix A. Respondent information and consent form is in Appendix B. A comprehensive list of semi-structured interview questions used in the interviews were listed in Appendix C. Turkish version of interview guide was shown in Appendix D.

1.2 Outline of the chapters

This introductory chapter is followed by the second chapter that presents an overview of the literature on linking humanitarian and development aid. In the second chapter, I outline five lines of literature on linking humanitarian-development aid a) its conceptualization b) the challenges to its operationalization c) strands of discussion on the link through the lens of key stakeholders in protracted contexts d) its theorization and e) areas of research interest on aid workers. The outcomes of the literature allow to place the response to the protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey within the context of existing literature and makes the case for why further study is needed. The third chapter focuses on three parts: background on the changing landscape of the global refugee response (to protracted situations), evolution of the response to the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey and current situation with a focus on statistics, needs, and capacities. The fourth chapter presents the qualitative analysis of the interviews with UN employees. The chapter is organized under two main headings: “General perceptions around linking

humanitarian and development aid" and "Negotiating the link in the context of the UN's response to the protracted refugee crisis in Turkey". The first is organized alongside with three thematic areas: 1) General perceptions around linking humanitarian and development aid 2) Perceptions of humanitarian aid, development aid and the link between the two 3) Perceived role of different stakeholders of linking humanitarian-development aid in the international community.

The second heading is organized alongside with two thematic areas: 1) The overall perception of the relevance and success of the nexus to the Turkish context and 2) Role of frameworks and actors in linking humanitarian and development aid. The fifth, final chapter discusses the findings of this study in relation to the literature on linking humanitarian and development aid.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study benefits from five lines of literature on linking humanitarian and development aid and outcomes of the literature review will inform development of an analytical framework to respond to the study's research question a) its conceptualization b) the challenges to its operationalization c) strands of discussion on the nexus through the lens of key stakeholders in protracted contexts d) its theorization and e) areas of research interest on aid workers. The literature review draws on the studies that reflect on these strands of discussion, from both the disaster and refugee responses realms. It relies on academic publications along with whitepapers and grey literature published by institutions, including governmental and non-governmental institutions, international organizations, as well as research institutions. The literature review aims to unravel the findings of previous studies with the aim of positioning and integrating this study in the global discussion. Differences have come to be cited in the literature to distinguish humanitarian and development assistance. Humanitarian assistance is framed as designed to be short-term and delivered in response to a humanitarian emergency with a focus on saving lives and alleviating suffering ("From Humanitarian to Development Aid", 2020). Humanitarian principles, which provide the foundations for humanitarian action, are humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence (The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], 2012).

Development assistance is designed to be long-term in response to ongoing structural issues and systematic problems with a focus on addressing issues that may hinder economic, institutional and social development in any given society and

building capacity to ensure resilient communities and sustainable livelihoods ("From Humanitarian to Development Aid", 2020).

Hinds (2015) note that the discussion on linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) dates to the 1990s and is originally emanating from the funding gap between the two different aid spheres (p.1). Macrae et al. (1997) highlight that linking relief-development is a product of the changes in relief policy (p. 225). Mosel and Levine (2014) underline that discussions around the LRRD is centered upon the question of how to define it conceptually, how to operationalize it (programme and operational ramifications) and its implications for the aid architecture (p. 4). Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005) note the attempts to link relief and development have been carried out at different layers ranging from the political context of aid and aid policy, to programmatic and operational challenges (p. 3).

2.1 The overview of the literature in conceptualizing linking humanitarian and development aid

This sub-section presents the conceptual debate around both natural disaster and conflict-related emergencies, mindful of the differences between natural disasters and complex protracted emergencies. Formulation and reformulation of the linkage between humanitarian and development aid has been a long-standing conceptual pursuit with policy and programme ramifications and has remained central in the debate.

A set of multi-faceted concepts have come on the frontline and then fallen in disfavor, only to be replaced by others. As concepts of linking humanitarian and development aid have been diverse, the link should therefore be considered within the long-standing conceptualization efforts, such as 'disaster risk reduction' (DRR);

LRRD and the ‘resilience agenda’ (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief [OXFAM], 2019.). From the disaster realm, Audet (2015) notes that the debate on linking humanitarian and development assistance, due to differences in the objectives, actors, timeframes and priorities, have revealed a ‘conceptual gray zone’ between the two forms of aid (p. 112). Audet (2015) underlines that this conceptual gray zone laid a fertile ground upon which versatile and associated intellectual frameworks have risen to prominence. Macrae et al. (1997) highlight that these conceptual frameworks are by no means academic constructs but are rooted in-depth analysis on the ground on affected communities and the response (p. 225). The conceptualization efforts have also been underpinned by different understandings of the relationship between emergencies and under-development.

As Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994) acknowledge, linking relief and development, due to a wide range of needs, is a spectrum (p.1). Mowjee, Garrasi and Poole (2015) group three different paradigms that shaped policy thinking and practice to enhance coherency of international engagement in protracted crises: first generation approaches of bridging the continuum, second-generation approaches of coherence in the contiguum and third generation approaches anchored in collaboration amid complexity (pp. 15-17). Providing historical background on the evolution of LRRD and discussing recent trends in the humanitarian aid domain associated with LRRD, Otto and Weingärtner (2013) highlight that, despite overlapping aspects of the concepts developed, the first set of concepts were directed at filling the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development while the later aimed to address the linkage debate with more-advanced awareness of the complexity (p. 31). Harmer and Macrae (2004) describe the first-generation conceptual endeavor

around linking relief and development, as primarily 'managerial', with a prominent focus on how relief could be more developmental and sustainable (p.3).

LRRD was initially conceived as a continuum model in the 1960s, stemming from natural disaster relief models of the 1980s, and this model was later dropped out in favor of contiguum approach –which will be defined later in this sub-section (Macrae et al., 1997, p. 224). Sollis (1994) traces the origin of the conceptual separation in relief and development sectors to donors' decision to set up separate units in charge of each domain, giving rise to two different disciplines and work cultures. He further underlines that the limitations imposed by this dichotomy led to the concept of relief-development continuum (pp.1-2). Mosel and Levine (2014) note that in the linear continuum approach, links primarily contained application of exit strategies to lay the ground for the next aid instrument (p. 1). The continuum approach preserves the dichotomous lens, where relief and development are located at extreme ends of a linear continuum sequence and complementary objectives can be pursed at certain points along the continuum, with a discursive focus on making relief more developmental (Sollis, 1994, p. 2). While framed initially with regard to aid programming in response to natural disasters, in particular drought and floods, these ideas were steadily adapted to respond to the demands of conflict-related crises, often described as complex political emergencies, protracted crises particularly in conflict-affected environments (Duffield, 1994). Smillie (1998) notes that this linear approach, viewing relief and development as essentially sequential types of effort, dominated the discussion for nearly two decades, from the 1960s into the 1980s.

The continuum approach does not offer a sophisticated lens to gauge the entangled links between development and relief. Analysts like Audet, Macrea and

Duffield challenge the idea of a linear LRRD model due to the shortcomings of its programme and policy ramifications. Audet (2015) takes a critical stance vis-à-vis operational and policy implications of the implementation of this approach, noting that it has derailed humanitarian activities away from its conventional track to the disadvantage of the people it aims to serve (p. 112). Macrea et al. (1997) undertake a critical analysis of the circumstances for linking relief, rehabilitation and development in complex contexts, through a case study of Sudan, and conclude that development-oriented approaches with uncritical embracing of the continuum approach can take the aid in direction to the disadvantage of the beneficiaries. Looking into constraints of the continuum model, Macrea et al. (1997) underline that conflicts and humanitarian crisis do not represent an interruption in a linear process and that when to shift to development along the continuum is within the discretion of donors and implementation of development approaches can deteriorate welfare of the conflict-affected populations (pp. 225-227). Duffield (1994) suggests abandoning the attempt to link relief to this hypothetical state of linear development, which considers emergency situations as temporary interruptions, and calls for an investigation into the de facto accommodation of relief with the reality of permanent emergency (p. 40).

The paradigm of a linear continuum was replaced by the continuum approach in the 1990s (Mosel & Levine, 2014, p. 1; Audet, 2015, p. 113). Contiguum approach is framed as simultaneous and complementary use of emergency and developmental instruments in the same crisis context (Audet, 2015, p. 113). The linear contiguum approach was abandoned as the contiguum promised complementarity with synergetic overlapping and greater linkage of programming. Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005) underline that applying the ‘contiguum’ into

planning and funding processes has proven challenging. They also highlight that the linearity that marked the continuum thinking persisted in terms of aid programming and funding (p. 5). In a policy paper investigating aspects of the European Union (EU) aid and development policy that provides opportunities to operationalize LRRD, Sapir and Viciani (2001) favor the contiguum approach; however, they underline that the approach lacks clarity whether it means simultaneity, leading to a concern with overlapping objectives (p. 11).

More recently, the scale and protracted nature of contemporary refugee crises has given new urgency to the decades-old debate on linking relief and development and this has brought about a shift of terminology from the concepts of continuum and contiguum to humanitarian-development nexus (HDN). As Zetter (2019) underlines, international community, and especially the Global North, have been mobilized in view of this urgency to devise new strategies to address the protracted situations (p. 3).

The 2015 Grand Bargain, in response to the widening gap in humanitarian financing, introduced changes in the modes of working of donors and aid organizations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action (Inter-Agency Standing Committee [IASC], n.d.). This was followed by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), where the HDN was identified as a top priority area and a wide range of stakeholders including donor organizations, non-governmental organizations, crisis-affected States and others expressed commitment to The New Way of Working (NWOW).

The NWOW, introduced as an approach to put the pledge to strengthen the HDN into practice, called for joint efforts towards shared outcomes of reducing humanitarian need, risk and vulnerability over multiple years, based on the

comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors (OCHA, 2017, p.7). At first sight, with its call to all humanitarian and development actors to work towards collective outcomes, the NwoW seems to embrace a coordination and actors-based approach to operationalizing the nexus.

Zetter (2019) notes that this nexus reformulation remains an experimental and a practical pursuit and is not made up of a coherent model or add up to a concrete normative framework in the evolving humanitarian assistance paradigm (p. 3). It is important to investigate whether and if yes to what extent the nexus version of the linking debate distinguishes itself from the earlier conceptual and programmatic approaches. Some underline the distinguishing character of the nexus as going beyond a programmatic or conceptual approach since it is related to structural shifts across the aid system, which can change the planning and financing of the aid (OXFAM, 2019).

One could also argue that today's debate distinguishes itself by its strengthened focus on operationalizing of the humanitarian-development nexus as part of responses to protracted refugee situations in host countries. Besides, the demand for enhanced synergies in funding and programming come from both spheres of the aid agenda, respectively the humanitarian and development actors.

2.2 Discussions in the literature on challenges to operationalizing the link

This sub-section acknowledges that untangling and re-organizing challenges to the operationalizing of linking of humanitarian and development aid is a daunting task, but also sees it an essential stream of literature informing study's analytical framework. Hinds (2015) draws on the literature on the relationship between humanitarian and development aid and takes stock of the commonly referred

challenges to address these. He discusses these commonly referred challenges under four main headings, respectively (1) Conceptual, institutional and strategic gaps (2) Funding gaps (3) Challenges of partnerships and coordination (4) The perception that needs of persons forcibly displaced can be responded only through humanitarian aid (Hinds,2015, pp. 2-3). Mosel and Levine (2014) identify four main challenges to the operationalization of the LRRD: They agree with Hinds (2015) on the operational culture bifurcated into humanitarian and development work as representing the primary challenge. They broadly frame the constituents of this culture as encompassing 'institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and ways of working' that shape the humanitarian and development communities (Mosel & Levine, 2014). They go on to identify the following as the remainder obstacles ahead of successful operationalization of the LRRD: the tension arising around observance of humanitarian principles by practical application of the LRRD, the grey zone characterized by lack of agreement on the issues the LRRD addresses, the lack of clarity surrounding the definitions and the concepts concerned along with persistent lack of concern and focus on the needs of the beneficiaries (Mosel & Levine, 2014, pp. 6-7). In this regard, the question they raise on the substance of the debate on the LRRD is noteworthy: whether the LRRD refers to 'a bureaucratic or structural issue (e.g. a funding mechanism), a programmatic mechanism (a particular kind of programme content) or a modality (i.e. an exit strategy or the way in which assistance is delivered)' (Mosel & Levine, 2014, p. 7).

Otto and Weingärtner (2013) also discuss challenges that impede the operationalization of the LRRD and develop a matrix through a desk research conducted drawing on literature and evaluations. Otto and Weingärtner (2013) regroup these challenges under three main headings: 'challenges on the concepts and

definitions, challenge of the two worlds apart and the quick fix challenge' (p. 33). What Otto and Weingärtner (2013) frame as the challenge of two worlds apart unlocks the differences of the two aid spheres ranging from working cultures and different principles and values to different languages as well as by different working rhythms and speeds (p. 36). They point out that that the discussion on linkage largely takes place within the humanitarian sphere and is not much familiar to the development sector (Otto & Weingärtner, 2013, p. 36).

Audet (2015) agrees with Mosel and Levine (2014) and Otto and Weingärtner (2013) that the two distinct operational cultures characterized by the different paradigms of humanitarian and development aid, remain the primordial obstacle to operationalization of the LRRD. She highlights that the idea of a single continuum is operationally flawed since emergency relief and development aid continue to exist operationally as two different domains and this poses impediments to ensure transition between their specific phases. She traces the origins of this distinct and separate existence of two spheres of aid to external problems created by national aid policies characterized by donor rules that that precondition and sustain the bureaucratic distinction along with diff erent political and operational cultures of both aid domains, She highlights that the agenda is yet to be equally owned by the larger development community since the linkage debate continues to be driven by the humanitarian actors (Audet, 2015, pp. 116-117).

Macrea et. Al. (1997) point at the question of framing of development as a linear process; the foreign policy position of donor countries that dictates the threshold between budget lines for development and humanitarian aid and donor pressure to enhance aid efficiency characterized by a perception of developmental

programming as more efficient as the main constraints and contradictions in operationalization of the relief-development continuum (pp. 225-226).

2.3 Various strands of discussion on the humanitarian-development link initiatives

The objective of this sub-chapter is to present analysis from recent empirical literature and evaluations, from 2014 onwards, on the nexus-strengthening initiatives, from both humanitarian and development perspectives, as they relate to the role of the key stakeholders of the debate. Included in the review in a complementary function to the section presenting key findings of the literature on challenges to operationalizing the linking of relief and development, this section goes on to keep the focus on the gaps in the evidence reviewed. The literature included has been selected in consideration of its linking of the nexus debate with protracted situations, with a primary focus on forced displacement and refugee contexts. The reviewed literature consists largely of (evaluation) reports commissioned by governments, international financial institutions and/or INGOs and NGOs. The nature of focus of the reports on the nexus, whether primary or secondary, presents differences while the angle from which the nexus is approached, from humanitarian and development perspectives, also differs. Only one of the studies reviewed has a sectoral focus.

Kocks, Wedel, Roggemann & Roxin (2018) undertakes a systematic conceptual and empirical review of the literature on the nexus, with a primary focus on the international response to protracted Syrian refugee situation, to identify research gaps that are critical to link two streams of literature. With a view to formulating an analytical framework synthesizing the most relevant concepts, the researchers first conduct a qualitative content analysis of thirty studies that focus on humanitarian-development nexus from different conceptual perspectives (Kocks et

al., 2018). Through content analysis, they identify seven different dimensions of the humanitarian-development gap as follows: (1) a vision and strategy gap, (2) a planning gap, (3) a funding gap, (4) an institutional gap, (5) an ownership gap, (6) a geographic gap, and (7) a sequence gap (Kocks et al., 2018, p. 32). They go on to apply this analytical framework to look into empirical studies on the international response to the Syria crisis and conclude that a gulf between conceptual and empirical literature exists, with lack of clear attempts to provide an in-depth analysis and account of issues and questions raised in the analytical framework, Therefore, they conclude on a gap between conceptual knowledge and empirical findings. (Kocks et al., 2018, pp. 123-126).

In a 2018 study, Save the Children looks into operationalization of the New Way of Working (NwoW), as an initiative to bridge humanitarian and development aid divide, in the Ethiopia and Somalia contexts, as two pilot NwoW countries in the Horn of Africa, with a focus on its application in the education sector (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018). The agency draws on reports on humanitarian responses and a set of key informant interviews with representatives of different agencies including donors, UN and international NGOs (I-NGOs) to understand stakeholder perceptions and attitudes towards the NwoW and its operationalization in terms of progress and gaps (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018). Analyzing the qualitative data, Ndeda and Birungi (2018) note that the outcomes demonstrate a low degree of knowledge among the stakeholders in the region on the NwoW initiative with relatively higher level of awareness among the UN staff, reinforcing the UN-driven character of the process (p. 15). In the same vein, stakeholders' perspective on the actual outcomes with reference to anticipated outcomes also indicate a higher conviction on the part of the UN staff on their achievability in comparison with NGOs counterparts (Ndeda &

Birungi, 2018, p. 15). The study notes that the NwoW is perceived positively by the majority of the stakeholders with a focus on the multilateral dialogue it has kicked-off towards shared outcomes, with almost half of the participants referring to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as the overarching framework (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018, p. 17). Joint analysis and planning including engagement of development actors earlier in emergency contexts and ensuring alignment of the donor priorities and timeframes to achieve this was cited as a critical challenge to overcome for ensuring the success of NwoW (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018, p.17). Financing modalities which require shift in the funding dynamics and alignment of donor policies to prevent the siloed approaches in protracted crises was also cited by the stakeholders as critical to ensure greater coherence towards the nexus (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018, p. 19). With regards to risk-averse attitude, over 50 per cent of the stakeholders indicated a need for the development actors to abandon their long-standing risk adverse approach (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018, p. 21). Save the Children report goes on to highlight the need for ownership and system-wide approaches as critical for achievement of the NwoW agenda (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018, p. 26).

In a 2017 dissertation, Ekblad (2017) highlights that the discourse on the linking development and humanitarian aid has largely overlooked the perspectives of aid organisations and local communities operating in humanitarian and development aid sectors and turns the spotlight to them, aiming to gauge how different stakeholders conceptualize the linking, with a focus on the divisions and linkages of humanitarian and development aid in terms of phases, actors and actions (Ekblad, 2017). Ekblad builds his analytical framework on the basis of two perspectives on the humanitarian sector, namely ‘the humanitarian silo perspective’ and ‘the humanitarian ecosystem perspective’ and goes on to explore stakeholders’

perspectives at the local, national, and international levels, in Indonesia and Sweden through in-depth interviews and a survey (Ekblad, 2017, p. 12). He concludes that the stakeholders at the three levels discussed the relevance of humanitarian and development phases, where some pointing at the relevance of the continuum model's framework while some framing the phases not as dichotomous but as constituting a spectrum of changes to numerous contextual factors (Ekblad, 2017, pp. 76-77). He also notes that the stakeholders do not perceive a concrete divide between humanitarian and development organisations while their perspective diverge in relation to what constitutes humanitarian and development action. He therefore refutes the dichotomous approach and concludes that the perspectives of the studied stakeholders fit more in the humanitarian ecosystem perspective (Ekblad, 2017, pp. 79-80).

In a research paper published in 2017, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reflects on international co-operation and development assistance in refugee contexts and presents evidence and recommendations, drawing from evaluation findings commissioned by OECD DAC members, with regards to policy and programming with a primary focus on the Syrian crisis (Ruaudel & Morrison-Métois, 2017). Ruaudel and Morrison-Métois (2017) note that the evaluations reviewed for the study in relation to the international community's response to the Syrian crisis demonstrate the efforts by the humanitarian and development actors to achieve greater coherence, while acknowledging challenges to complementary and holistic programming in practice. The protracted nature of the Syrian crisis, characterized by its scale and complexity, along with diverging social and political dynamics in host communities are presented as the main obstacles in reports of donor countries in

several evaluation reports (Ruaudel & Morrison-Métois, 2017, p. 10). In addition, a set evaluations underline that the resilience agenda set out in the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) needs further consideration vis-à-vis the implications of refugees' protracted presence on host communities and calls into question the capacity of the international system and financial resources to deliver the results (Ruaudel & Morrison-Métois, 2017: p. 11). Ruaudel and Morrison-Métois (2017) go on to highlight that the discursive acknowledgement of the protracted nature of the crisis has not been translated into policy in all contexts and some donors maintain the separation of the aid management system and funding allocation for humanitarian and development streams (p. 14). Besides, structural and organizational weaknesses, lack of a whole-of-government approach by donor countries or the extent of the enabling environment that these strategies provide for sustainable development (where they exist) along with limited coordination with other donors on such approaches remain persistent challenges in the efforts to achieve greater coherence in international cooperation (Ruaudel & Morrison-Métois, 2017, pp. 19-20).

Bennett (2015), in an Overseas Development Institute working paper, also turns her spotlight to donors and looks into the obstacles they face in their efforts to link development and humanitarian assistance in response to protracted and recurrent crises through a review of grey literature and semi-structured interviews with donors, multilateral organisations and key informants (Bennett, 2015). Despite acknowledging the challenges that are peculiar to each donor, stemming from domestic politics, institutional arrangements and organization culture; she identifies a set of obstacles that she contends to be shared by the majority of donors: conceptual divides between humanitarian and development realms, architectural divisions in donor structures, the divide between policy and practice in the two worlds of aid, risk

averse approaches by the donors, rigid human-resources practices within donor institutions and political pressures (Bennett, 2015, pp. 11-13). Going beyond the technical solutions devised by donors to bridge the gap between reality and practice in linking humanitarian and development aid, Bennet (2015) calls them to challenge the underlying premises of donor behavior in protracted crisis, and underlines the importance of achieving conceptual coherence by aligning objectives, principles and approaches of the two worlds of aid while acknowledging the limits of coherent approaches in some contexts. Discussing the criticality of ensuring conceptual coherence, the need to reconcile cultural differences between humanitarian and development approaches and staff that derive mainly from a lack of mutual understanding (Bennett, 2015, p. 15). She calls for rational alignment of aid requirements, capacities and activities; embracing of an approach transcending traditional silos and emphasizing systems, not sectors as the organizing principle. She also underlines the need to decentralize decision-making to the ground and finding more sustainable financing models (Bennett, 2015, pp. 15-18).

Garnier (2014) turns the spotlight to multilateral agencies of the United Nations (UN) system, which have traditionally been one of the main drivers of the debate, and examines the interagency cooperation between the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the promotion of refugees' right to work between 1987 and 2007. Garnier (2014) identifies three main challenges to effective interagency cooperation: donor states' lack of interest in LRRD as it is characterized by a funding shortage for the relief-development continuum and the institutional competition between humanitarian and development actors whereby the agenda was not collectively owned by the two (p. 20). She acknowledges the agency of UNHCR and ILO despite limitations imposed by the

broader disabling environment; however, underlines the sporadic nature of the field cooperation, leading to a lack of visibility of the interagency fieldwork (Garnier, 2014, p.20). Thirdly, Garnier (2014) highlights the lack of visibility for the refugee labor within both UNHCR and ILO, strengthening the historical affiliation of the status of being a "refugee" with humanitarian situation. She concludes, by highlighting the solid normative basis built over the years underpinning effective interagency cooperation and technical collaboration, which was weakened as of 2007 due to enhancing bureaucratic pathologies (Garnier, 2014, p. 21).

Conducting review of evidence from the ground on humanitarian-development nexus and systematically reflecting, Care International warns against a one-size fits all approach, drawing in the contextual complexity and diversity in the Middle East and North Africa region and enlists the pillars of an integrated approach as follows: localization, local ownership and partnership, evidence-based analysis, political smartness, gender mainstreaming, resilience, adaptive management, piloting and program quality (Kittaneh & Stolk, 2018).

2.4 An overview of the attempts to theorize the link in the literature with a focus on the international responses to protracted refugee situations

An overview of approaches to theorize international responses to refugee crises is critical to lay the theoretical background for addressing the research question of this study. Theorization efforts reflect existing ideological divides and sit at an interdisciplinary axis, bringing approaches from politics, development studies, humanitarian studies and economics. Many theory-building efforts have geared to capture specific aspects of the restructuring of the refugee-assistance regime, such as resilience and the self-sufficiency with reference to broader neoliberal dynamics

(Easton-Calabria, 2019; Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018). Other scholars have claimed to go beyond this, striving to address broader structural questions in a bid to lay bare the determinants and interests catalyzing international engagement with humanitarian-development nexus (Zetter, 2019, p.2). Ofstad and Marin (2019) note, theorization attempts around the link through the lens of humanitarian studies, has remained very restricted (p. 433).

2.4.1 Approaches towards the link in the development studies literature

A first analytical approach tracing the roots of the development dynamics driving restructuring of the refugee-assistance regime anchors the theorization amidst the neo-liberal globalization processes (Zetter, 2019: p. 8; Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018). Easton-Calabria and Naohiko Omata (2018) reflect on the promotion of 'self-reliance' for refugees as a remedy for dependency and protracted displacement and contends that in tandem with the broader trends in development assistance the international refugee regime has adopted neoliberal principles into its policy-making processes, leading to prevalence of frameworks and approaches promoting self-reliance among agencies and policymakers supporting refugees. Easton-Calabria and Omata (2018) underline that self-reliance-centered refugee assistance unlocks the neoliberal premises that strive to contain the costs associated with the protracted refugee situations and that promote individual responsibility that shifts the responsibility away from states (pp. 1466-1468). They highlight that the self-reliance driven shift reveals overall a prioritization of the international community's agenda, primordially of donors (Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018, p. 1469). Zetter (2019) also agrees that the shift is the manifestation of the neo-liberal agenda of economic globalization. This analysis puts forth that the development-oriented shift seeks, on

one hand, to turn refugees from welfare recipients into market actors as consumers and producers through employment creation and cash-based assistance schemes (pp.8-9). On the other hand, it aims to manage the economies of the countries of asylum struggling with large influx of refugees through mitigation of the fiscal pressure, the protection of private investment and the safeguarding of public development and welfare gains (Zetter, 2019, pp.8-9).

A second analytical approach frames the theoretical discussion around the privatization of humanitarian space characterized by a shift from public-welfare model of refugee assistance to private-sector led initiatives. In a recent study, Easton-Calabria (2019), underlines that the widening impact of neo-liberal thought on development has manifested itself in the extension of the concept and practice of self-reliance to citizens and refugees alike (p. 4). Easton-Calabria investigates the refugee self-reliance assistance in Pakistan throughout the 1980s and argues that this response was characterized by the key premises of neo-liberalization (Easton-Calabria, 2019, p. 4). She presents the self-reliance-centered refugee assistance for Afghan refugees (Easton-Calabria, 2019). She concludes that these phases mirror shifts in wider economic trends from Keynesian full employment initiatives to neoliberalism and that the refugee response frameworks based on a prioritization of self-reliance has been instrumentalized as a means to export the economic policies of the Anglophone countries (Easton-Calabria, 2019).

Within the broader literature around livelihoods, the notion of dependency constitutes an analytical tool useful to gauge the shift to development-oriented approaches in refugee responses. Harvey and Lind (2015) reflect on the functions of dependency, as a persistent term in the context of humanitarian relief, and underlines that dependency discourses have served to justify to scale down relief along with the

shift from relief to development in protracted refugee situations (pp. 15-16). Beyond the discursive level, Harvey and Lind (2015) note that the concept undertakes functions for the relief actors, bringing about structural changes in assistance approaches (p. 17). Little (2008) explores the presumed countervailing effects of humanitarian aid and livelihoods by comparing livelihood and social activities among food aid recipients and non-recipients in Northeastern Ethiopia. He concludes that the data provides little evidence in favor of the existence of aid dependency (Little, 2008). Easton-Calabria and Herson (2019) borrow the term 'dispersed dependencies' from psychology and notes that it can provide a useful analytical lens to explore physical and economic dependencies in a positive vein (Easton-Calabria & Herson, 2019).

Zetter (2019) utilizes the concept and practice of humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) to frame what he describes a paradigm shift to development-led approaches in the current refugee-response regime (p. 2). Zetter (2019) puts the meaning of development in the HDN under spotlight through a political-economy approach. The central question that drives his theory-building quest is answered, through the lens of the core-periphery analysis, at the intersection of defiant interests of the Global North and the host countries of the Global South facing large-scale refugee influxes. He concludes that stakeholders from the Global North, encompassing a wide range of actors including donor countries, international non-governmental organizations (I-NGOs) operating in the areas of humanitarian and development work and multilateral agencies, replicate the discrepancy between the Global South and the Global North through a set of economic, social and political processes (Zetter, 2019,p. 9).

Zetter (2019) notes that the shift to development-oriented responses is driven by the aspirations on the part of the post-industrial Global North, via promotion of the right to work, to derive economic surplus from the host countries of the Global South, through gains reaped from the reduced labor cost along with other production costs (p. 10). From the policy front, he deems the recent initiatives built around the concept of HDN such as the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and other country-specific frameworks as examples of this pursuit (Zetter, 2019, p. 10). From a socio-economic point of view, he notes that the core-periphery analysis accounts for how the shift to development also serves to prevent social distress and reduce and threats to investment (Zetter, 2019, p. 13). From a political perspective, the HDN aims at preventing radicalization of the refugees by rendering them agency in the market and containing refugees in the countries of the Global South (Zetter, 2019, p. 13). He also reflects on the strategies utilized by the developing countries of the Global South, as hosts of large number of refugees, to respond the HDN. He contends that they employ their relatively restricted agency: first, via resistance to development-oriented approaches, such as the right to work and the promotion of employment for refugees: secondly, via commitment to containing the refugee response on humanitarian assistance and basic needs along with the 'refugee-burden' card of responsibility-sharing and securitization cards respectively (Zetter, 2019, pp. 15-16). It is noteworthy that resistance to development-oriented approaches is driven by an agenda to preserve the premises upon which the response is built on solution (Zetter, 2019: p. 15).

2.4.2 Approaches towards the link in the humanitarian studies literature

An important analytical lens, which represents a significant milestone in the rhetoric and practice of humanitarianism, is the 'new humanitarianism' approach. Fox (2001) outlines key components of the new humanitarianism, including the human rights approach and developmental relief, and identifies some of risk areas. Fox (2001) defines the character of the new humanitarianism as a rupture from the principle of neutrality of old humanitarianism, sitting at the intersection of and incorporating human rights and peace into humanitarian realm and removing the distinction between development and humanitarian relief (p. 276). She goes on to enumerate the inherent risk areas in the new humanitarianism, which she contends to have eroded the humanitarian space. She takes a severely critical stance towards the discrediting of the traditional humanitarian principles, especially neutrality (Fox, 2001, p. 276). Secondly, she notes that the linking of humanitarian and development-oriented objectives has given rise to a preoccupation on long-term consequences of intervening to save lives (Fox, 2001, p. 280). Besides, Fox (2001) underlines the human rights-based approach is not an easy fit with humanitarianism as this requires all aid to be judged in terms of its contribution to promotion of human rights (p. 278). Ofstad and Marin (2019) agree with Fox (2001) on this criticism and emphasize the countervailing implications of adopting human rights approach in linking humanitarian and development aid and contend that this brings extra conditionalities in the realm of humanitarianism, which used to be peculiar to development aid, and can be instrumentalized to justify political decisions (Ofstad & Marin, 2019, p. 432).

On the other hand, Slim (2000) adopts the human-rights based approach as a normative lens, which he contends to present a conceptual framework to put an end

to the perceived dichotomy between humanitarianism and development (pp. 493-494). Slim (2000) calls this a 'false dichotomy' and underlines that a human-rights based approach is needed to integrate contemporary conceptual frameworks, rhetoric and practice about international assistance for values upholding humanitarian action and development work (p. 494). He contends that human rights have lied at the core of both areas and the nexus can only successfully work around the normative framework of human rights scheme (Slim, 2000, p. 494).

Another analytical approach investigating how relief and long-term assistance is linked comes from within the humanitarian theory. Duffield (2001) and Molland (2019) note that humanitarianism has been on an expanding trend since the 1960s but this trend gained momentum in the general context subsequent to the end of the Cold War marked by heightened preoccupation on the side of humanitarian actors on the wider potential implications of humanitarian work in conflict settings within states (Duffield, 2001; Molland, 2019: p. 764). Molland (2019) then takes a temporal lens and goes on to contend that a set of changes brought about by this expanding scope of humanitarianism led to what he defines a remarkable 'temporal stretch' with regards to what constitutes humanitarian response (p. 764). Molland (2019) then elaborates his analytical lens to humanitarianism and notes that the expanded humanitarianism is characterized by what he calls two different 'temporal registers', 'respectively temporal immediateness and concerns that are longer term and broader in scope' (p. 765). More specifically, he undertakes a study in anti-trafficking sector to explore how different actors instrumentalize these different temporal registers and concludes that the first register relating with short-term emergency assistance has taken precedence in shaping their programmes, leading to an erosion of longer-term

development-oriented programmes in the sector over the last two decades (Molland, 2019, pp. 780-781).

New modes of transnational governmentality present another analytical lens to theoretically frame the discussion on linking humanitarian and development assistance. Ofstad and Marin (2019) problematize the intertwined relationship between NGOs, which rose to prominence and to the forefront of the development sector as alternatives to state-led approaches, and the donor states, which, through state-funding, largely account for the expansion in scope and space of the NGO sector. Ofstad and Marin (2019) flag the historical juncture where they locate their research question, one at which states bundle development policy with other fields of assistance, in the so-called age of the new humanitarianism. Taking a Foucauldian approach, Ofstad and Marin (2019) focus on the agency of humanitarian NGOs, in consideration of their reliance on state-funding. They treat the relationship between NGOs and donor state funding as an interesting case study to examine how state and NGOs mutually shape and influence their respective agendas and development practices (Ofstad & Marin, 2019, pp. 430-434). Their research shows that the state influences the NGOs through technologies of government and the NGOs influence, to a much-restricted extent, the state through lobbying, advocacy work and direct contact. They conclude that the embeddedness of Norwegian aid system within the global aid system characterized by the broader context of ‘new humanitarianism’ leads to a curtailment in the agency of the NGOs to change rhetoric and practices about humanitarianism and aid more generally (Ofstad & Marin, 2019, p. 446).

2.5 Agency and aid workers and mapping of areas of research interest in the humanitarian and development studies literature

An overview of the literature mapping out areas of research interest in relation to aid workers will be presented in this sub-chapter. The literature reviewed discusses the agency of aid workers from different perspectives, including constraints to this agency, but in unity agrees on their agency as an integral dimension of assessing the mechanism of aid delivery.

First, Hilhorst and Jansen (2012) investigate the use of different international normative frameworks by humanitarian agencies in legitimizing their operations and the agency of aid workers and beneficiaries in shaping the aid through their rights discourses. Focusing on the humanitarian agencies through ethnographic fieldwork, they highlight that humanitarian work plays a substantive role in the making of rights and competing international normative frameworks. The mechanism through which humanitarian agencies deploy, negotiate and/or alter these normative frameworks are found in everyday practices and encounters of aid workers and beneficiaries (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2012, p. 902). Based on ethnographic material compiled among aid workers in Cambodia, Fechter (2016) studies moral practices of aid workers in their professional and private lives and how they negotiate the moral entanglements. Framing 'moral labour' as a manifestation of immaterial labour, representing an essential and integral pillar of experiences and practices of aid workers, Fechter (2016) highlights some contexts where agency of aid employees is constrained by the policy framework and practices of the organization they work for (p. 36).

Crewe (2014) employs an anthropological lens and conducts an exploratory study drawing on examples from professional experience in an international NGO, to understand how development workers navigate the coercive practices of aid in ways

that benefitted their partners in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. She does this by exploring their everyday practices and their experience of challenging various orthodoxies (Crewe, 2014, p. 101). In a 2012 study, Fechter notes that development studies have not adequately covered the personal dimension of aid work and focuses on the investigation of this personal dimension, its intertwined relationship with the professional aspect and how this shapes the aid work (Fechter, 2012). She underlines, personal relationships, belief systems and values of aid workers in development do impact on the perspectives and practices of aid work and concludes that acknowledging the personal is essential for a more comprehensive understanding of development processes (Fechter, 2012). Finally, Seçkinelgin (2005) investigates the agency attributed to NGOs, centred around claimed and actual agency, to bring about long-term sustainable change and offers a theoretical assessment. Focusing on the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, Seçkinelgin (2005) concludes that the international system, or governance system, around the HIV pandemic constitutes also the agency of NGOs and does not allow them to influence and sustain a social change in the long run (p. 364).

2.6 Conclusion

Linking humanitarian-development aid has long been a prominent theme on the international aid agenda. The humanitarian-development nexus continues to be debated from different perspectives including from policy, strategy, operational, programmatic and contextual angles. The predominant focus of the reviewed strands of literature, from the two worlds of aid, has been on its conceptual boundaries, challenges to its operationalization, evidence/gap-oriented frameworks and theoretical frameworks to analyze its formation. Conceptual development of the

humanitarian-development nexus has been complex, and concepts of the nexus have been diverse. Drawing on the long-standing conceptualization efforts, this thesis will contribute to furthering conceptual understanding around humanitarian-development nexus in the context of the protracted situations and addressing the gap between conceptual knowledge and empirical findings on the nexus. There exists a large literature on challenges around operationalization of the nexus as a bureaucratic, structural issue and a modality. This study will strive to contribute to this discussion by investigating perspectives of the UN employees in aid at three different levels, namely at the overall response, inter-agency and agency levels around the challenges on operationalizing the nexus. The review conducted in the third section on the various strands of discussion on the humanitarian-development nexus (initiatives) through the lens of key humanitarian and development actors underline that different stakeholders continue to differ in the way they approach the nexus. As part of this debate, the perspectives of the UN employees in aid have been less investigated. Besides, the agency of aid workers is an area that remains largely uninvestigated in the studies on humanitarian-development nexus, from both streams, expect for a few studies that focus on the perspectives of aid workers. The study therefore aims to shed light on how this agency is manifested through their experiences, negotiations and contestations over the nexus. Finally, review of literature on the theorization efforts sit at an interdisciplinary axis, bringing approaches from politics, development studies, humanitarian studies and economics. Though the study does not aim to directly contribute to theorization efforts; it is believed to represent a strong empirical contribution for the ongoing efforts of theoretical elaboration. The literature review has explored the findings and outcomes of previous studies, positioning and integrating the research question this dissertation strives to address in

the global discussions on linking humanitarian and development aid. The literature review has also set the context for the next section where the dynamics and characteristics of the response to the protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey will be explored.

CHAPTER 3

SETTING THE CONTEXT SYRIAN REFUGEE RESPONSE IN TURKEY

This chapter focuses on three parts: background on the changing landscape of the global refugee response to protracted situations, evolution of the response to the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey and current situation with a focus on needs and capacities.

3.1 Protracted Syrian refugee situation and overview of international community's response

Having marked its 10th year in March 2020, the Syria crisis continues to account for the world's largest number of forcibly displaced people, making up a quarter of all refugees in the world. The conflict has displaced over half of Syria's pre-war population of 22 million since its outbreak in 2011 (UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2020c). As per UNHCR's Global Trends report, the UN Refugee Agency's flagship publication analyzing changes in global displacement on a yearly basis; a total of 13.2 million Syrians were forcibly displaced including 6.6 million refugees who fled into exile across the region and beyond, more than 6 million displaced inside the country at the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2020c). Though Syrians have sought and found protection in more than 125 countries, neighboring countries– namely Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt – continue to host the vast majority, which has heightened pre-existing vulnerabilities and put an overwhelming strain on basic social services, primarily education and health in these countries, as the war in Syria became protracted (UNHCR), 2019c: p. 14).

With continued failure in attempts to find a political solution; the global refugee response has evolved, given the myriad of internal and external factors, with shifts in aid landscape and role of various state and non-state actors.

In the context of the protracted refugee crisis, the discussion on the relevance and effectiveness of the conventional durable solutions in the international refugee law more and more takes place as a key humanitarian and development concern. UNHCR's durable solutions framework for Syrian refugees, considered an essential pillar of global refugee response and governance, is built on four main building blocks, namely: 'support host country and community resilience; enable refugee self-reliance; expand access to resettlement in third countries and other complementary pathways, and plan for the return of refugees to Syria, on a voluntary (UNHCR, 2020a).

Access to durable solutions remains a large gap in the international governance of refugee protection. Though Syrian refugees account for the population with the highest resettlement needs globally for the fourth year in a row in 2020 and their protection vulnerabilities have escalated over time, resettlement continues to be accessible to an increasingly smaller fraction of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2020d). Available resettlement places have seen a significant fall, with resettlement submissions by UNHCR from the five neighboring countries of Syria reduced by 52% in 2019 compared to 2016 from over 76,000 to less than 28, (UNHCR), 2020a). In addition, Figure 1 shows a gradual decrease in the global number of resettlement submissions and departures for the nationals of the Syrian Arab Republic between 2016 and 2020.

As per the 5th round of UNHCR's Return Perceptions and Intention Surveys conducted between November 2018 and February 2019 in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,

Jordan; some 69 percent of the of the respondents hope but do not intend to return to Syria within the next 12 months (UNHCR, 2019a, p. 1). The lack of predictable and sustainable physical safety, livelihood opportunities, access to shelter and basic services are among the determining factors influencing refugees' plans (UNHCR, 2019a, p. 3).




Figure 1. Total submissions and departures for Syrian Arab Republic

Source: https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-data.html

International community's engagement and support has varied across country strategies. Syrian refugee situation, as the world's biggest driver of forced displacement and one of the largest protracted displacement situations, continue to challenge the international aid agenda, and has thus given a renewed urgency to the debate on linking humanitarian and development assistance. Conceptualizing the humanitarian-development nexus, as progressive realization of rights, Türk (2016) notes that the nexus can offer building blocks for achieving longer-term solutions. The policies of host-countries of Syrian refugees and the international refugee

response have contributed to addressing protection and assistance needs, however the situation continued to deteriorate over time as Syrian refugees' assets and resources have progressively eroded. The international funding, not keeping up with the deepening protection needs, demonstrates that the humanitarian and development cost of the Syrian refugee situation has continued to be largely born by the host countries. As the funding levels in Figure 2 for the years between 2013 and 2019 demonstrate, financial support from the international community for the UN-coordinated response plans has consistently fallen critically short of the needs of refugees and host communities.




Figure 2. RRP and 3RP Funding Requirements and Funding Levels Between 2013 and 2018 for the Region

Source: Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in Response to the Syrian Crisis 2019 Annual Report

Recognizing conflict-induced forced displacement as a development challenge, World Bank (2019) underlines that forced displacement takes place within some of the world's most challenging environments exacerbating pre-existing development challenges influencing a variety of social, political, and economic drivers and outcomes (World Bank, 2019). In a 2017 report, OECD discusses

economic costs associated with refugees with a focus on largely less-investigated low and middle-income host countries. The report enumerates burden on public expenditures and service delivery, negative impacts on labour market outcomes including wages, employment of the host population and upwards pressure on prices in areas with dense concentration of refugees with constrained supply response (OECD, 2017, p. 12). The five countries hosting most Syrian refugees in the region including Turkey are in developing regions (according to the United Nations Statistics Division classification) (UNHCR, 2019, p. 6).

Lenner and Turner (2018) highlight a notable change since 2014 in international refugee response, regarding this as a shift from the approach viewing Syrian refugees as objects of humanitarian assistance (p. 65). They further contend that donors and international organizations have acted as catalysts of this development-oriented shift, moving the overall focus of the response from traditional humanitarian work toward labor market interventions (Lenner & Turner, 2018, p. 65). This rhetoric periodicity highlighted by Lenner and Turner (2018) parallel the structural change the UN-coordinated regional response underwent in 2015 in face of mounting challenges faced by host communities and refugees.This was presented by the plan itself as a paradigm shift with the response turning in a two-pillar construct, with refugee and resilience components (UNDP, 2016, p. 4.).

3.2 A brief overview of the evolution of the Syrian refugee response in Turkey

Turkey, historically and traditionally a transit country, has become primarily a destination country for refugees with the Syrian influx. Faced with an influx of refugees from Syria in need of international protection in 2011, Turkey responded with an open-door policy later accompanied by a temporary protection (TP) regime

and assumed the primary responsibility to provide protection and assistance. TP regime was followed by the TP Regulation, adopted in 2013 and coming into force in 2014, which has been lauded by the international community for providing a solid rights-based legal framework offering access to education, health care, employment and social security to Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Rights stipulated therein have been operationalized through legislative regulations by several line ministries. The country has so far led the overall protection and assistance response, with strong national ownership and spent significant resources (Yildizalp & Gundogan, 2019). However, international community reported in 2016, two years after entry into force of the TP Regulation, its observation of inconsistent interpretations and practices on rights and service provisions (Syria Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan [3RP] Partners 2016, p. 3). Protection and capacity gaps continued to be observed in implementation of the legal framework (UNHCR, 2019).

The escalating civil war has put Turkey's open-door policy under pressure over time, and the country started strictly managing its borders, primarily due to security concerns. In a press release published in November 2015, Human Rights Watch highlighted the official closure of the last two border-crossing points in early March 2015, only allowing some people with urgent medical needs to cross the border into Turkey ("Human Rights Watch", 2015). In January 2016, the country started implementation of visa restrictions through introduction of a visa requirement for Syrians arriving from third countries via air or sea ("Hurriyet Daily News", 2016). Despite a public commitment to maintain the open-door policy it has officially endorsed since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Turkey's borders are currently strictly managed in response to security concerns (3RP, 2020e, p. 5).

A party to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Turkey maintains the optional geographical limitation, whereby it only applies conventional 'refugee status' to those seeking asylum as a result of ‘events occurring in Europe’ (Law No. 6458, 2013). Therefore, despite the dedicated legal framework for asylum adopted in 2013, including the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Temporary Protection Regulation, the country cannot ensure uniform protection of all persons seeking asylum on its territory. UNHCR highlights that the existing legal framework in Turkey allows for social and economic inclusion of Syrian refugees; however, the main criticism levelled against TP regimes to which Syrian refugees in Turkey is subject to has been lack of perspective of local integration and any concern for durability (3RP, 2020e, p. 10; Rygiel, Baban & Ilcan 2016; Yılmaz, 2018, p.6). Biehl (2015) also highlighted that protracted uncertainty, in terms of its temporal and spatial dimensions, is a defining character of the Turkish asylum regime, which playing a central role in governing the everyday lives and future pathways of refugees protected under this system (p. 69).

Turkey has changed its policy mix as part of the state-led refugee response over the course of the protracted refugee situation whilst adhering, to a large extent, to the principle of non-refoulement. The authorities responded to the emergency by extending TP status on prima facie, group basis, to Syrian nationals and stateless Palestinians originating from Syria and accommodating in refugee camps, providing protection and humanitarian assistance (“European Council on Refugees and Exiles”, 2020).

As the numbers continued rising, pressure increased on the existing refugee camps and the national systems at all levels, and the struggle of the non-camp

refugees aggravated with exhaustion of their own resources throughout years in displacement. The number of refugee camps increased from 14 to 21, hosting close to 210,500 Syrian refugees by the end of 2013, while the number of non-camp registered Syrian refugees increased to some 350,000 (Syria Regional Response Plan Partners, 2014, p. 33). The response by the Turkish authorities maintained its focus on camps, and only ad hoc and limited efforts were made to address the needs of rapidly growing refugee population residing in urban areas, faced with challenges in accessing essential services and living in sub-standard conditions (Syria Regional Response Plan Partners, 2014, p. 33). For the growing non-camp refugee population; access to education remained a critical gap, local health facilities and the overall health system continued to be overstretched in their capacity and lack of employment and livelihood opportunities increased vulnerability (Syria Regional Response Plan Partners, 2014, pp. 34-40). Turkey experienced a substantial increase in the number of Syrian refugees, especially with the massive influx of close to 200,000 Syrians from Kobane or Ayn el-Arab in 2014 (Syria Regional Response Plan Partners, 2015, p. 58). By the end of the year, over 1.5 million Syrian refugees were registered, out of whom 229,000 were accommodated in the 22 refugee camps (Syria Regional Response Plan Partners, 2015, p. 58). By 2014, non-camp Syrian refugees still did not receive any structured assistance. National systems continued to be under overwhelmed pressure, far beyond meeting the growing vulnerabilities and needs of the non-camp refugee population. When the displacement grew more protracted, the issue of social cohesion between refugees and communities hosting them also came to the frontline. The earlier welcoming attitude of the Turkish host community started waning and led to sporadic incidents targeting Syrian refugees in some areas (3RP, 2020e: p. 8).

In 2015, some 850,000 refugees risked their lives to cross the Mediterranean, on board dangerously inadequate vessels run by human smugglers, from Turkey to Greece and sought asylum in the EU countries (Eurpean Comission, n.d.). Against this background, as a response to the hundreds of thousands of refugees using the Eastern Mediterranean route to seek asylum Europe, the European Union (EU) – Turkey Statement, which provoked significant controversy concerning its questionable compatibility with human rights and international refugee law along with its legal nature, was signed on 18 March 2016 (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2016). The EU Facility for Refugees (FRIT), a total of €6 billion, was introduced as the Statement's financial component in response to the onwards movement, mobilizing existing EU financing instruments focuses on six priority areas: humanitarian assistance, migration management, education, health, municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support (European Commission, 2020). The critiques levelled against the Statement highlighted that that it contributed to 'institutionalizing' the reduced opportunities to obtain refugee status and led to the erosion of legal protections, and finally turning refugees into a political bargaining chip in the region (Ulusoy & Battjes, 2017).

By February 2016, registered Syrian refugee population in the country increased to approximately 3 million. The year of 2016 represents a milestone in terms of responsibility-sharing by the international community towards Turkey with the donor support substantially stepping up, with an increase of approximately 52 per cent from USD 286 million in 2015 to USD 435 million in 2016 (3RP, 2017, p. 31). Urban refugees continued to face serious challenges in meeting their basic needs, while national and local institutions along with the municipalities continued to be overstretched, including health services stretched in its capacity in face of the sheer

scale of the mental and psycho-social difficulties needs (3RP, 2017, p. 33). Aid directed towards Syrians was largely designed as short-term projects till 2016 when the country, in face of the protracted displacement of Syrian refugees, faced with the need to develop a long-term strategy especially with regards to access to labour market and education (Hoffman & Samuk, 2016, p. 4). Education, employment, health and social assistance have come afore as two spheres for Syrian refugees, where the precarity has been gradually regulated and addressed to a certain extent through secondary legislation in line with Turkey's evolving policy framework.

Yılmaz (2018) explored the modes of interaction between humanitarian assistance programmes and domestic social policy responses in the area of social assistance, employment and health care and concluded that welfare mix for Syrian refugees, which he defined as a joint product of the two, vary significantly across the three domains with the public sector gaining dominance in social assistance and health care while NGOs appearing as the key actors in vocational training and mental health service provision (pp. 733-734). Bache (2020) acknowledges the shift in Turkish policy response towards Syrian refugees, but highlights that the perspective of strengthening livelihoods opportunities of the refugees and members of host community is dim in light of the lack of an overall rights-based approach, which would entail a participatory approach involving all concerned stakeholders, taking into account local dynamics and political sensitivities, In a research paper, Gündoğar and Dark (2019) discuss evolution of Turkey's Syrian refugee response in two periods, respectively 2011-2014 and 2014-2016 and identify the introduction of development-related policies, enhanced engagement of the international community and a move away from the focus of the temporariness of the refugee crisis (p. 4). They quote a migration policy expert, framing this shift as one from crisis

management to migration management, with the turning from a humanitarian issue to one of development (Senyücel Gündoğar & Dark, 2019, p. 4).

In quest for an analytical framework to account for the discursive and political shift of the Turkey's Syrian refugee policy, Memisoglu and Ilgit (2016) turn their spotlight to external factors. They conclude that while Turkish state continues to be the primary actor through a set of legal and administrative changes and policy developments; the national and international stakeholders along with developments taking place at the European and global levels remain to play equally important role in the shaping of the policy environment. They go on to point that the ambivalent policies in place are a product of domestic and external dynamics (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2016: p. 332). A working paper drafted by Hoffman and Samuk (2016) note that Turkey's policy response was distinguished by its unplanned pragmatism at both local and regional level, with an evolving legal and political steering. Hoffman and Samuk (2016) further note that the response was characterized by an innovation in regions hosting a large number of Syrian refugees, especially through a flexible implementation of the legal framework, the autonomy extended to municipal actors, the country's well-organized disaster response and the smooth-running collaboration between national bodies and the NGOs (Hoffman & Samuk, 2016: p. 4).

3.3 Current Situation

3.3.1 Needs and Capacities

This section focuses on developments on the priority areas of the response in Turkey since 2015 onwards with a forward-looking perspective, focusing concisely on institutional and legal framework, access to, availability and capacity of the services.

These areas of analysis include durable solutions, basic needs, education, healthcare, livelihoods-employment, protection, food security and agriculture. The analysis presented in this section with regards to needs and capacities builds primarily on secondary sources of quantitative information and data. The focus is placed on the period starting from 2015 onwards since this marks the point of recognition of the refugee situation starting as a protracted refugee situation with the government policy started steadily shifting towards a long-term strategic direction centred on inclusion with an enhanced emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of state actors in the response (GEOtest, 2018, p. 50).

For the sixth consecutive year in 2019, Turkey continued to host the world's largest number of refugees, reaching 3,6 million through both new registrations and births, by the year's end (UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2020c). As of 18 June 2020, the number of registered Syrian refugees reached over 3.5 million ("Geçici Koruma", 2020). Only a very small fraction of Syrian refugees, 63,906 currently live in the remaining seven official Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) while over 98 per cent live in urban and peri-urban areas (Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan [3RP] Partners, 2020: p. 5). Most Syrian refugees live in southeastern provinces such as Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa along with metropolitan cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir and Konya (3RP, 2020e: p. 5).

In the 10th year since outbreak of the conflict in Syria, the international community has failed to a large extent to respond timely and adequately within the frame of the internationally acknowledged durable solutions, namely resettlement, voluntary repatriation and local integration. Resettlement, as a durable solution and an integral part of more equitable responsibility-sharing among the international community, has become a non-solution for Syrian refugees in Turkey. Though

Turkey remains the operation of the UNHCR with greatest resettlement needs globally, there has been a decrease in overall resettlement quotas provided by the resettlement countries. Figure 3 shows the trend in the number of resettlement submissions and departures from Turkey between 2015 and December 2019. According to UNHCR's Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2021 report, current projections indicated that 423,600 refugees will need resettlement from Turkey in 2021 (UNHCR, 2020, p. 74). As the graph on UNHCR's resettlement submissions showcases, since 2016, the number of refugees submitted for resettlement has remained around 17,000, which puts the percentage of refugees submitted for resettlement vis-a-vis the needs at 0,5 per cent. UNHCR submitted a total of 17,552 refugees to 18 different resettlement countries in 2019, of whom Syrian refugees represented 67 per cent while Syrian refugees accounted for 78 per cent of the 10,558 refugees who departed for resettlement in the same year (UN High Commissioner for Refugees Turkey Office, 2020, pp. 9-10).

With regards to voluntary repatriation, an increased rate of returns to Syria over the 2017-2018 was observed even though significant security and socio-economic challenges remain for returning in safety and dignity on a large scale (UNHCR Regional Durable Solutions Working Group for the Syria Situation, 2019: pp 3-4). The pressure in Turkey to send Syrian refugees back to their home country has been on the rise, and Turkey's long-standing plan is to establish a safe zone in northern Syria to move around 1 million refugees, coupled with the threat to reopen the borders for refugees into Europe in case of lack of adequate international support for the proposal (Devranoglu & Gumrukcu, 2019; Gumrukcu, 2019). In a news piece published in late December 2019, a pro-government Turkish newspaper, citing the Turkish defense ministry as source, noted that the country's military operations on

the Syrian territories had enabled the return of 580,000 to Syria ("Daily Sabah", 2019). A statement, released in November 2019 following a bilateral meeting between the Turkish authorities and UNHCR, noted that both parties agreed on the importance and urgency of stepping up joint effort to ensure safe and voluntary returns of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2019). As part of its mandate in Turkey, UNHCR observes the voluntary return interviews and some key findings emanating from monitoring of interviews of over 34,300 families in 2019 in Turkey indicate that the main reasons for the return was to join family members and lack of financial/humanitarian support/assistance in Turkey (UN High Commissioner for Refugees Turkey Office, 2020, p. 10).




Figure 2. Total Submissions and Departures from Turkey

Source: UNHCR Resettlement Data

Turkish government has consistently assumed the primary responsibility and role in the provision of protection and assistance, leading the response with strong national ownership and shouldered the bulk of the financial burden, spending significant resources of its own national resources since 2011 (Yildizalp &

Gundogan, 2019). Turkey's call for stepped-up and sustained international responsibility-sharing has remained largely unmet and the authorities continue to openly criticize the international community's failure to provide enough support. A multiplicity of different actors, from various UN agencies to international, national and local civil society organizations, to international financial institutions (IFI), to the private sector, to refugees themselves have also been playing an important role in Turkey's refugee response.

Extent of involvement of state actors in the refugee response has further expanded in Turkey in recent years, including different state actors, ministerial or at the provincial and local levels. Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) is the main entity in charge of the implementation of policies, processes and strategies for all foreigners in the country and is assigned the mandate to lead coordination and foster cooperation among all relevant stakeholders, including public institutions and agencies, local government, international organizations and civil society organizations (Law No. 6458, 2013). Coordinating bodies of the refugee response in Turkey is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Vice Presidency (3RP, 2020, p. 13). Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (PDMMs) and Provincial Directorates of Family, Labour and Social Services (PDoFLSS) are increasingly active in leading the protection response at the provincial level municipalities (3RP, 2020, p. 13).

Protection and capacity gaps that need to be addressed are observed in the implementation of the legal framework despite the significant efforts invested in institutional capacity development. As Turkey strictly manages its borders, Syrian refugees are frequently compelled to resort to irregular means of entry into the country (3RP, 2020e: p. 18). Registration and documentation; identification, referral

and follow-up of refugees with special protection needs; availability and access to specialized assistance continue to lead to inadequacies in the protection afforded to Syrian refugees in Turkey (GEOtest, 2018, p. 29). 3RP enumerates language barriers, insufficient or lack of access to (formal) employment and livelihood opportunities, increased cost of living, lack of information about rights and available services (including legal counselling and legal aid services), and challenges posed by procedures on internal movement among obstacles refugees have faced in accessing protection (3RP, 2020e: p. 18).

The Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection adopted in 2016 grants Syrian refugees the right to apply for work permits and access to formal employment. Informal sector remains the main platform of employment for Syrian refugees, in low-skilled jobs such as seasonal agricultural work, construction, manufacturing and textiles. Despite lack of comprehensive and reliable data on Syrian refugees' labour market participation, the International Labour Agency (ILO) estimates that 1 million of the 2.16 million Syrians of working age in Turkey participate in the labour market, mostly informally in low-skilled and low-paid jobs (International Labour Agency, 2020). As of December 2019, the number of work permits issued to Syrian nationals (including those under temporary protection and those with a residence permit), as per data shared by the Directorate General for International Labour Force (DGoILF), stood at 132,497 (3RP, 2020e: p. 6). The staggeringly low number of work permits issued so far is flagged by UNHCR as a precursor of future problems while ILO points that informality has created a strong enabling environment for child labour, including its worst forms, among refugee children (International Labour Organization, 2019). Syrian children are found working in various economic sectors, including small and medium enterprises, such

as garment and shoe-making workshops, auto-mechanics, bakeries, as well as street-based work, and agriculture in Turkey (UNHCR, UNICEF & ILO, 2017, p. 9).

A needs assessment report, looking into the socioeconomic situation and the livelihood needs of Syrian refugees focuses on challenges posed by the current state of the Turkish economy, the structure of the Turkish labour market, access to formal employment and employability (GEOtest, 2018, p. 66). World Bank highlights demand and supply-side barriers hindering refugees' access to formal work, respectively employability challenges - mainly lack of language and vocational skills - and the knowledge gap of the occupations and skills most in-demand by employers (World Bank, 2019).

Having removed legal barriers to Syrian children's access to public education, Turkey continues to have two parallel avenues of formal education, Turkish schools and Temporary Education Centres (TECs) for Syrian refugees in grades 1-12. The Ministry of National Education is tasked to lead and coordinate action among relevant stakeholders, placing the priority on effective inclusion of refugees in the national education system, along with the Higher Education Council (YÖK) and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) assuming a key role in promoting access to higher education (3RP, 2020e: p. 50). There are more than 1.6 million registered school-age Syrian refugees in Turkey (UNICEF Turkey, 2019). The number of Syrian children enrolled in formal education including public schools and TECs was 684,253 at the start of the 2019/20 school year with approximately 94% of those enrolled are attending Turkish public schools while the remainder attending TECs (3RP, 2020, p. 50). Over 33,000 students access tertiary education (UNHCR, 2020, p. 5). One-third of school-age Syrian refugees (or around 400,000) continue to remain outside formal education

(3RP, 2020: p. 7). While primary education has high enrolment rate (87.8%), the rate drops in lower-secondary (72.7%) and dramatically in upper-secondary (34%) education levels (3RP, 2020, p. 50). Not representing a homogeneous group, Syrian children who are outside of formal education, vary in their profiles, requiring tailored approaches (UN High Commissioner for Refugees Turkey Office, 2020, p. 7). An assessment report focuses on accessibility, quality and inclusivity of education services delivered in the national education system (GEOtest, 2018, p. 109). Socio-economic obstacles along with lack of awareness of available services and language barrier have a pronounced influence on school access/enrolment, attendance and retention, particularly for older children (Humanitarian Action for Children [HAC], 2020).

The Temporary Protection Regulation allows Syrian refugees to access health care, with access free medical treatment and medication provided by the public healthcare system. The landscape of healthcare services for Syrian refugees was scattered till 2015, which were provided by various international, national and Syrian civil society organizations, and informal civil and private initiatives (GEOtest, 2018, p. 87). Today the large majority of healthcare services in Turkey are provided through the public healthcare system with the Ministry of Health (MoH) overseeing provision of services through state hospitals, Migrant Health Centres, which have been transformed from the Temporary Healthcare Centres previously run by humanitarian actors and provides primary health services that alleviate the pressures exerted on hospitals, and units that operate as part of the Turkish community health centres (3RP, 2020e: p. 64). Legal status, which is problems in registration for TP status, language and culture, health seeking behaviours, patient mobility, along with health inequity due to social, economic and demographic vulnerabilities and lack of a

gender-sensitive approach are counted among the main factors limiting refugees' access to and use of healthcare services (GEOtest, 2018, pp. 90-92). Besides, the existing support and treatment capacities are overstretched when it comes to the scale of mental health and psychosocial needs (3RP, 2020e, p. 64).

A response characterized by a move towards implementing nation-wide and government-led programmes; economic and social vulnerabilities that the vast majority of refugees are exposed to; the housing situation of refugees with many occupying dwellings with poor living conditions; inadequate access to hygiene and dignity products; growing but still limited access to basic needs services define the basic needs landscape of the Syrian refugees living in Turkey (GEOtest, 2018, pp. 50-59). With high population density, the municipal services have been overstretched, having to cope with the increased demand including the increased operational cost of waste collection, wastewater management and public transportation (3RP, 2020e: pp. 80-81). The 'Emergency Social Safety Net' (ESSN) project, funded by the European Union, was launched in 2016 a basic needs cash transfer programme, as the flagship humanitarian aid programme expected to enable refugees to satisfy their basic needs across sectors (Cetinoglu & Yılmaz, 2020, pp. 8-9).

3.3.2 Linking humanitarian-development assistance within Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis (3RP)

3.3.2.1 3RP structure

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) constitutes a platform for strategic, coordination, planning, advocacy, and programming for humanitarian and

development partners to respond to the Syria crisis at the regional level and in neighbouring host countries of Syrian refugees (3RP, 2020). When launched in 2014, the 3RP was defined as representing a paradigm shift in integrating humanitarian and development capacities and resources in a single plan, combining humanitarian assistance focused on alleviating the suffering of the most vulnerable with longer term interventions strengthening the resilience of refugee and host communities, while also capacitating national systems (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). As part of the 3RP, not only the most critical needs of refugees are responded by the partners, but the different facets of assistance to Syrian refugees and host communities are brought into a coherent framework linking humanitarian and resilience-building actions through a dynamic process of constant adaptation by the partners (3RP, 2019). It comprises one regional plan, with standalone country chapters covering Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq (3RP, 2020).

Under the leadership of the Government of Turkey and jointly led by UNHCR and UNDP, the refugee response is a collaborative effort between the donor community, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, community-based organizations, refugees and Turkish communities in Turkey. At the national level, the main framework and the primary strategic document on the international community's actions to support the Government of Turkey's response is the (3RP), which also constitutes a platform for coordination, implementation, advocacy, fundraising and reporting ("Regional Refugee and Response Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis", 2020). More precisely, the 3RP defines a collective framework under which the United Nations (UN) agencies and NGO partners appeal together. The 3RP has a refugee component, aiming to address the protection and assistance needs of refugees, and a resilience component, aiming to build the resilience capacities of

households, communities and national systems impacted by the protracted displacement of refugees (3RP, 2020g: pp. 10-11).

Firmly anchored in sustaining support to the response led by the Government of Turkey, the priorities and strategic direction of the 3RP are built on the Turkish legal framework, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Temporary Protection Regulation (3RP, 2019, p. 14). 3RP partners work under the direction of the Government of Turkey and in close collaboration with national institutions (3RP, 2020e: p. 13). The lead UN agencies for the sectors are as follows: UNHCR for the protection, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for food security and agriculture, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for education, World Health Organization (WHO) for health, UNHCR and World Food Programme (WFP) for basic needs and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for livelihoods (3RP, 2020e).

The support within the 3RP has evolved towards more support to national systems across 6 response sectors of protection, food security and agriculture, education, health, basic needs and livelihoods (3RP, 2019: p. 6). Figure 4 shows evolution of the budget requirements as share of total financial requirements by sector appealed for the RRP and 3RP Turkey chapters across the 6 response sectors between the years 2014-2020 on the basis of RRP and 3RP annual reports. As per a report focusing on progress in 2018 and 2019, support provided by the 3RP partners across sectors and agencies to over 15 different ministries and public institutions reached over USD 500 million since 2017, including important investments in public infrastructures, facilities, and staffing capacities along with strengthening public systems through capacity and policy development (3RP, 2019, p. 6). Besides, it is noteworthy that when 3RP support channelled through public institutions such as

cash transfers is added, total funding directed to supporting public systems in 2019 represents 90 per cent of the total yearly funding secured (3RP, 2019: p. 11).




Figure 3. Budget Requirements as Share of Total Financial Requirement by Sector Appealed for Turkey

Source: RRP and 3RP annual reports for the given years

3RP appealing UN Agencies and NGO partners call for USD $1,174,788,179 across 6 sectors in 2020 under two components (3RP, 2019: p. 104). Each sector appeals for funding under refugee protection and development components. As the Figure 5 with detailed breakdown of budget requirements by sector and component appealed for the 3RP Turkey Chapter in 2020 illustrates; protection, basic needs and livelihoods are the three sectors where the appealed financial requirements are highest among the 6 sectors of the response.

As shown in Figure 6, by the end of Quarter 1 covering the three-month period between January and March 2020, 37 per cent of the appealed financial requirement under 3RP Turkey has been funded (3RP, 2020).




Figure 5. Budget Requirements by Sector and Component Appealed for the 3RP Turkey Chapter in 2020

Source: 3RP Turkey: Refugee and Resilience Plan Overview 2020




Figure 6. The Funding Received and Allocated by Sector within the 3RP Turkey Chapter in 2020 in Quarter 1 (January, February, March 2020)

Source: Turkey: 3RP Funding Update- 2020/ Quarter 1

Within a comprehensive overview of the needs for international support through 3RP partners to Turkey's refugee response, an additional appeal document was developed and launched on 7 May 2020, which outlines complementary activities and interventions to address the additional needs provoked by the COVID-19 pandemic (3RP, 2020). Figure 7 shows original and new budget requirements for the financial complementary activities and interventions to address the additional needs provoked by the COVID-19 pandemic in Turkey for the 2020 within 3RP.

Total 3RP Turkey Needs Table

Original 3RP Requirements (USD)	3RP COVID-19 Appeal (USD)				Consolidated Total 3RP appeal [4] (USD)
	From Original Requirements	New Requirements		Total COVID-19 Appeal	
		Health	Non-health		
1,174,788,179	35,583,571	127,630,381		163,213,952	1,302,418,560
		10,610,050	117,020,331		

Figure 7. Original and New Budget Requirements for the Financial Complementary Activities and Interventions to Address the Additional Needs Provoked by the COVID-19 pandemic in Turkey for the 2020 within the 3RP

Source: Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) Partners, 2020a

3.3.2.2 Coordination within the 3RP

Coordination is critical for humanitarian and development actors working in refugee operations to enhance complementarities and to avoid duplications, to ensure better protection, assistance and durable solutions. Inter-agency coordination in supporting the refugee response in Turkey is created around the Regional Refugee and Resilience Response Plan (3RP) (Inter-Agency Coordination Turkey, 2018, p. 1). The aim of the 3RP is also set out as constituting a coordination platform for partners to work under the direction and leadership of the Government of Turkey and

in close coordination with national and local institutions to build a coherent and sustainable response, and provide efficient support to the Government of Turkey (3RP, 2019, p. 12).

The principles of UNHCR's Refugee Coordination Model (RCM), which aims to make refugee coordination more predictable, inclusive and collaborative, informs the basis for the UN's coordination efforts in the country (Inter-Agency Coordination Turkey, 2018, p. 1). Within the inter-agency coordination structure, coordination is decentralized and sector-based, meaning there are sectors that report to a higher-level strategic body, to connect to government-led, area-based humanitarian and development mechanisms. The main bodies under the inter-agency structure are as follows: Syria Response Group, co-led by UNHCR and UNDP, is the highest decision-making body of the inter-agency response and consists of appealing UN agencies and other partners such as OCHA (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2020). The Syria Task Force (STF), a strategic body with national coverage, provides oversight and guidance to the six sector working groups (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2020). The membership base of the Syria Task Force is broader, consisting of the UN agencies, sector coordinators, donor representatives and NGO representatives (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2020). Defining policy directions for endorsement, the STF serving as both an inter-agency and an inter-sector forum and convenes regularly with technical government counterparts (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2020). There are three inter-sector inter-agency coordination structures, entitled Task Force based in İzmir, İstanbul and south-east Turkey, which act as the regional inter-sector leadership group and constitute a forum for regional strategy. They are aimed at encouraging synergies between sectors, avoiding duplication, and working on common processes through ensuring technical coherence and consistency across all

sectors and areas of intervention, providing technical oversight and guidance to sector working groups and facilitate information management to support decision-making ("Operational Portal Refugee Situations", 2020). These regional structures work in close coordination with the government-led coordination structures and they have a broadly based membership, drawn from UN Agencies, NGOs, donors (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2020). The interventions of the humanitarian and development community are coordinated through six thematic sector working groups at national level: Protection, Food Security and Agriculture, Education, Health, Basic Needs, and Livelihoods (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2020).

The scale of the response and the multitude of actors and structures involved offer a glimpse into the complexities and challenges faced in achieving effective coordination. There is no comprehensive study conducted, looking into the spectrum of complexities and challenges in terms of ensuring coordination in the Turkey context. Coordination-related challenges pose obstacles to effective programmatic planning and perpetuate gaps or lead to overlaps in response mechanisms.

Coordination among the national institutions continues to present a challenge due to limited coordination between different governmental bodies and between central and provincial authorities (GEOtest, 2018: p. 61). Besides, the inter-sectorial coordination remains crucial, especially between protection, basic needs and livelihoods sectors for more comprehensive coverage and complementarity (GEOtest, 2018: p. 61).

3.3.2.3 3RP sectoral priorities

The 3RP is co-led by UNHCR and UNDP. The strategic objectives of the 3RP for the 2020-2021 period reflect the emphasis of the strategic priorities related to

inclusion into the national systems, support to self-reliance and promoting social cohesion (3RP, 2020e: p. 9).

The 3RP sector response in protection, led by UNHCR, aims to promote access to effective protection, supporting community members in identifying and accessing protection solutions, contribution to the reduction of risks and consequences of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and improving equitable access of girls and boys affected by the Syria crisis to quality child protection interventions (3RP, 2020d). Provision of dedicated, multi-layered support to public institutions, provision of specialized services for persons with specific needs, advocacy for consistent implementation of the Temporary Protection Regulation and access to services along with age, gender and diversity-sensitive protection interventions at the community level remain of key importance in the sector response.

The 3RP sector response in livelihoods, led by UNDP, aims to improve livelihoods, employment opportunities, including better and decent work conditions as well as job creation (3RP, 2020d). Support provided by 3RP partners on the implementation of this objective takes place through programmes directly benefitting Syrians refugees and host communities. These programmes focus on provision of technical and vocational trainings, job placement, provision of language training and support provided to businesses through management trainings, financial and non-financial services (3RP, 2020d). Besides, strengthening institutional capacities of partners, enhancing awareness and extending support to knowledge management and increasing coordination including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the private sector remain integral to the response provided by the 3RP partners within the livelihoods sectors (3RP, 2020e, p. 93).

The 3RP sector response, led by UNICEF and UNHCR, in education aims to ensure that all children aged 4-18 effectively enjoy the right to education and avail of a range of relevant educational opportunities, consisting of three pillars: supporting increased access to safe, protective learning opportunities; enhancing their quality; and strengthening a resilient national education system (3RP, 2020e: p. 51-52). Support provided by 3RP partners takes place through Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) programme, the provision of subsidized school transportation and other complementary services such as the provision of dorms (3RP, 2020e: p. 7). A major emphasis has been placed on supporting Syrian refugee children to access Turkish schools by providing Turkish language training to students, material assistance for Turkish schools, as well as guidance and support to Turkish teachers (3RP, 2020e: p. 7).

Ensuring continuation and strengthening of the capacity of essential health service delivery and referral health care, increasing access to sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services, strengthening communicable disease surveillance, detection, response (EWARN), and prevention and Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services (MHPSS) are the key objectives of the health sector led by WHO (3RP,2020d).

Support provided by 3RP partners takes place mainly through provision of transportation to health facilities, support provided to health care facilities providing services to refugees, training of Syrian health care providers and provision of SRH services (3RP, 2020d).

As agriculture is seen as a suitable entry point into the Turkish economic system, the key objectives of the food security and agriculture sector, led by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are as follows: improving the food security,

strengthening the resilience in the food and agriculture sectors; improving local and community-level public and private sector and civil society capacities for both refugees and host communities (3RP, 2020d). Support provided by 3RP partners takes place mainly through short-term employment in rehabilitation for agriculture infrastructure and interventions geared towards enhancing access to income generating opportunities in agriculture and forestry sector (3RP, 2020d).

Improved living conditions of the most vulnerable refugees in both camp and urban settings and members of impacted host communities and strengthening local and national capacities to respond to the increased demand for public services are the key objectives of the basic needs sector led by UNHCR and WFP (3RP, 2020d).

Support provided by 3RP partners takes place mainly through cash-based interventions, provision of core relief items, provision of hygiene kits, dignity kits or sanitary items, provision of infrastructure services for governorates and municipalities assistance to ensure access to adequate shelter solutions (3RP, 2020d).

3.4 Conclusion

With continued failure in attempts to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis; the global refugee response has evolved, given the myriad of internal and external factors, with shifts in aid landscape and role of various state and non-state actors. Access to durable solutions remains a large gap in the international governance of refugee protection especially with respect to displaced Syrians. When launched in 2014, the 3RP was defined as representing a paradigm shift in integrating humanitarian and development capacities and resources in a single plan, combining humanitarian assistance focused on alleviating the suffering of the most vulnerable

with longer term interventions strengthening the resilience of refugee and host communities, while also capacitating national systems.

Turkey, historically and traditionally a transit country, has become primarily a destination country for refugees with the Syrian influx that started in 2011. For the sixth consecutive year in 2019, Turkey continued to host the world's largest number of refugees, reaching 3,6 million through both new registrations and births, by the year's end (UNHCR, 2020). Turkey has been acknowledged for its welcome policy and legal environment for refugees, particularly in view of the key legal changes approved amid a mass refugee influx. Having led the overall protection and assistance response with strong national ownership; the country has been providing, through the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) a solid rights-based legal framework offering access to basic rights and services including education, health care, employment and social security to Syrian refugees and rights stipulated therein have been operationalized through legislative regulations by several line ministries across the years. Extent of involvement of state actors in the refugee response has further expanded in Turkey in recent years, including different state actors, ministerial or at the provincial and local levels. However, protection and capacity gaps continued to be observed in implementation of the legal framework.

While Turkish state continued to be the primary actor through a set of legal and administrative changes and policy developments; the national and international stakeholders along with developments taking place at the European and global levels remain to play equally important role in the shaping of the policy environment (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2016, p. 332). A multiplicity of different actors, from various UN agencies to international, national and local civil society organizations, to

international financial institutions (IFI), to the private sector, to refugees themselves have also been playing an important role in Turkey's refugee response.

Since 2015, Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), the main framework and the primary strategic document on the international community's actions to support to the Government of Turkey's response, have mobilized US$ 3.6 billion, supporting provision of public services and municipalities in support of refugees in Turkey (3RP, 2020e: p. 5).

The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, created as an integral component and financial dimension of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, manages a total of €6 billion in two tranches, with each tranche respectively funding projects that run until mid-2021 latest and until mid-2025 latest (European Comission, n.d.).

Firmly anchored in sustaining support to the response led by the Government of Turkey, the priorities and strategic direction of the 3RP are built on the Turkish legal framework. The 3RP is co-led by UNHCR and UNDP and the strategic objectives for the 2020-2021 period reflect the emphasis of the strategic priorities related to inclusion into the national systems, support to self-reliance and promoting social cohesion (3RP, 2020, p. 9). A set of challenges remain with regards to access to, availability and capacity of the services and due to institutional and legal framework, in terms of durable solutions, basic needs, education, healthcare, livelihoods-employment, protection, food security and agriculture. Besides, the scale of the response and the multitude of actors and structures involved offer a glimpse into the complexities and challenges faced in achieving effective coordination. Coordination among the national institutions, inter-agency and inter-sectoral coordination remain crucial to effective programmatic planning to avoid gaps or overlaps in response mechanisms.

The context chapter has explored the dynamics and characteristics of the response to the protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey, focusing on the evolution of the response and the current situation, primarily on needs and capacities. Among others, it has revealed the key role the UN system plays in Turkey in support of the response to the protracted refugee situation, especially through the Regional Refugee and Resilience Response Plan (3RP), co-led by UNHCR and UNDP,and the inter-agency coordination structure created around 3RP. Against this background, aware of the characteristics of the response in Turkey, the analysis in the next chapter will allow to explore how the UN employees in aid perceive and negotiate linking humanitarian and development aid and how their agency is manifested through their experiences, negotiations and contestations over the link.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This thesis explores the perspectives of the United Nations (UN) employees in aid to gauge how the linking of humanitarian-development assistance, in consideration of the humanitarian-development nexus as the most recently-proposed framework, is perceived and negotiated in the context of the UN-coordinated response to the protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey. In doing so, the thesis explores the perspectives of UN employees towards conceptual framing of the link, distinctions between the two worlds of aid, the relevance of the link to their practices in Turkey, roles of main stakeholders along with dynamics that may hinder, or provide opportunities for operationalization of the link.

The main research questions the thesis address are as follows: How do UN employees perceive and negotiate linking humanitarian and development aid in the context of the protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey? The sub-research questions are as follows: How do UN employees perceive the link at the conceptual level? Is humanitarian and development aid perceived as distinct worlds of aid? How do they perceive the relevance of this framework to their practices in the context of the protracted Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey? What are the perceived roles of the stakeholders, mainly donors, UN agencies, governments, in linking humanitarian and development aid? What are the perceived factors driving success for and challenges to implementation of the link?

The analysis in this chapter relies on the fieldwork that was conducted to collect the perspectives of the UN employees in aid around linking humanitarian and development aid. Semi-structured in-depth key informant interviews were conducted

with a purposive sample of 9 experts selected from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A two-layered approach to developing the purposive sampling list has been adopted, in order to identify the organizations to primarily focus among the many programmes, funds, and specialized agencies within the UN system and to identify the profiles of the key informants employed within these organizations. There are two reasons for selecting these two UN agencies. The mandates of UNDP and UNHCR within the wider UN system globally and the roles they play within the UN-coordinated Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in response to the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey have dictated this decision. First, within their core mandate responsibilities, UNDP is primarily mandated to support countries in their development path based on Member States' priorities and country context while UNHCR is primarily mandated to provide international protection and humanitarian assistance. Secondly, UNHCR and UNDP are co-leading the Turkey chapter of the 3RP, respectively UNHCR with lead coordination role on refugees and UNDP with lead coordination role on resilience. A purposive sample of respondents made up of experts working at the Turkey operations of UNDP and UNHCR have been developed and the Inter Agency Coordination Structure, which is created around the 3RP in Turkey, served as the primary basis to identify respondent profiles. The respondents have been selected, mainly due to their lead roles within this structure, established at the national and sub-national level across the country.

In the following section, the analysis of the interview data is presented under two main headings: "General perceptions around linking humanitarian and development aid" and "Negotiating the link in the context of the UN's response to the protracted refugee situation in Turkey".

4.1 General perceptions around linking humanitarian and development aid

4.1.1 Perceptions of humanitarian aid, development aid and the link between the two

To explore their perceptions of humanitarian aid and development aid, the relationship and the link between the two, I asked the respondents if they see humanitarian assistance and development assistance as two separate domains and if yes, how they would differentiate the two. Besides, to understand their personal take on link, I asked them what they understand from linking humanitarian and development aid. I have found that the respondents presented diversity along two main lines in their perceptions of distinctions between humanitarian and development aid and in their understanding of the link.

A number of respondents I interviewed claimed that the line between humanitarian and development aid interventions is increasingly blurred in responses to protracted refugee situations, meaning that the categorised phases of 'humanitarian' and 'development' which establish clear-cut distinctions between the two types of aid are inadequate to describe the reality of the people and of the response on the ground. Though acknowledging the literal difference between these two types of aid, with humanitarian aid being short-term and meant for immediate needs to save lives and development aid being long-term and focused on responding to systematic problems, the respondents converged around an understanding of the link as actions meeting immediate needs at the same time as looking at long-term solutions.

One respondent underlined that the old way of doing things is over and the new way of responding to complex situations transcends the traditional lines between humanitarian aid and development aid, rendering the divide artificial.

> I find the divide, humanitarian vs development, by and large, almost like artificial divide. It is something which I think stems a little bit from the old way of doing humanitarian work, where humanitarian work was extremely life-saving, and as such people called this humanitarian whereas development in the old days let's say was then maybe something which came in at a much later stage.
> (Respondent 7, UNHCR)

Another respondent, giving an example from the response to the Syrian refugee situation, referred to the programmes where humanitarian and development aid blend into one another, making it very challenging to clearly differentiate between the two. The respondent noted that a programme, which could be categorized prima facie as development aid, as it aims to enhance the capacity of the Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), also serving to meeting emergency needs as DGMM is the national entity responsible for registration of Syrian refugees. It is important to highlight that the very same respondent, when asked to describe what an ideal link would consist of in a later question, noted that the humanitarian and development divide creates a conceptual barrier to more progressive programming.

> With that having been said you could say that what we are doing for example in support of DGMM to enable refugees to be registered, you can also say that that is lifesaving. Because if they are not registered, then they do not have access to the services that are provided by the state. But at the end of the day it is also capacity development. So, I think this is what is making it very challenging to clearly differentiate between the two.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

One respondent pointed out that compartmentalization of aid between 'humanitarian aid' and 'development aid' and the traditional definitions attributed to them are not helpful in understanding the link, contending that what humanitarian

and development aid consists of are constantly redefined and are to overlap. The respondent explained that this approach of compartmentalization leads to classifying an intervention as humanitarian or development based on where it falls within the compartmentalized response frameworks, rather than what the intervention on the ground consists of.

> So, I mean there is the general let's say definition on short-term, life-saving activities and then development on more longer-term, self-reliance, service-provision, systems strengthening approach. That will not really tell you a lot about the transition from one to the other because that is just redefined and would overlap eventually. So, in that regard, if you like a simple livelihood project, which you will find under humanitarian aid and under development aid, and somebody will call it resilience, that is just something that is just based on how you define it. But at the end of the day, the person who receives it probably won't care that much.
> (Respondent 2, UNHCR)

Several respondents perceived development and humanitarian aid more as distinct processes. Several respondents placed focus on complementarity, highlighting that developing greater complementarity between humanitarian and development actions and programming would allow for a more coherent response framework to achieve the link. Few respondents, who perceived development and humanitarian aid as distinct processes, perceived the link more like a transitioning of assistance programming effectively from humanitarian assistance (emergency relief) to development, while attributing different interpretations to the transition, mainly in terms of specific types of response activities. Their perception of the link in terms of transition from emergency assistance to development was rarely linear.

A respondent clearly perceived development and humanitarian aid as distinct processes, and underlined that the link, which he framed as nexus, lied at

interventions that can promote greater complementarity between humanitarian and development programming in a sustainable manner.

> Yes, they are distinct processes, but it is necessary to design projects and programs in a complementary and sustainable manner in order to reach the desired point and obtain the most effective result. And at this point lies what we call the nexus[1]
> (Respondent 9, UNDP)

Another respondent noted that humanitarian programming should incorporate thinking about long-term development, and development programming should incorporate thinking about humanitarian needs. Giving an example in terms of response activities, the respondent noted that a livelihoods programme that aims at creating employment should factor that vulnerable individuals, who cannot take part in the labour market and who thus should be supported through social assistance programmes to ensure credibility of the given programme.

> All elements of humanitarian aid must foster development, but development should have a pillar in rooted in humanitarian aid - meeting basic needs - in a program that aims to create employment as part of a development program, there will be vulnerable people in every population - which is not only in situations of (forced) displacement but also natural disasters – the needs of these people should also be considered (including) through provision of social assistance to those who are unable to work, which would ensure the reliability of the system.[2]
> (Respondent 4, UNHCR)

[1] "İkisi evet birbirinden ayrı süreçler ama, arzulanan noktaya gelinmesi ve en etkili sonucun elde edilmesi için birbirini tamamlayıcı şekilde ve sürekliliği olacak şekilde projeler ve programların tasarımlanması şart. Bu noktada işte, bu nexus dediğimiz de tam da burası."
[2] "İnsani yardımın tüm unsurları kalkınmayı beslemeli, aynı zamanda kalkınmanın bir ayağını da insani yardım oluşturmalı – temel ihtiyaçların karşılanması – kalkınma programları kapsamında istihdam yaratılmasının hedeflendiği bir programda, her nüfusun içinde hassas durumda olan kişiler olacaktır - ki yalnızca yerinden edilme durumlarından değil aynı zamanda doğal afetler de olabilir -, bu kişilerin ihtiyaçlarının dikkate alınması, çalışamayacak durumda olanlara sosyal yardımlar sağlanılarak, sistemin güvenirliliğinin sağlanması."

One responded perceived the link as a twin-track thinking around humanitarian and development programming. The respondent perceived the two types of aid as performing a complementary function whereby humanitarian and development actors apply in parallel interventions belonging to the two different types of aid operations.

> So, the point is humanitarian-development does not, so I mean the old thinking was it was sequential – you know there was a crisis, there were humanitarian needs, those humanitarian needs kind of stabilized, and then there was development. So, I think it is important that we have this twin track – so it is not sequential but is a twin-track thinking.
> (Respondent 5, UNHCR)

Similarly, another respondent highlighted a long-term perspective should be present and development programming should kick in from the very start for resilience and development programming to reach a scale to address the humanitarian needs.

> So, to reach that scale where the kind of resilience and development programming is cutting down the humanitarian needs, you need to start them early, you do not wait for the humanitarian stuff to be well in place to then start the resilience thing, then it will take another five years.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

One respondent perceived the link as transitioning of assistance programming, referring to exiting from a humanitarian assistance programme. The exit that the respondent refers to is from a humanitarian assistance programme, the Emergency Social Safety Net, which is a multi-purpose cash transfer scheme to cover essential needs of refugees (the highest budgeted humanitarian aid funded by the European Union in its response to the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey), with a transition into development assistance programme. Therefore, the respondent

interpreted the link as a transition with reference to specific types of response activities, namely from cash assistance programme to a livelihoods programme targeted at enhancing the skills and employability of refugees. It is important to highlight that the respondent has a nuanced approach to transitioning, acknowledging that an exit strategy based on demographic criteria can jeopardise protection of refugees with protection concerns including gender-based violence.

> ... I have been saying from the beginning that it is necessary to decide who will exit when phasing out ESSN, after a purely protection-based assessment... We might be facing a case of domestic violence. If we say, these two adults can work and act only based on the numbers and demographic information, then this might pose a severe risk. There is room for such a problem to arise. Therefore, this has to be worked out very well.[3] (Respondent 8, UNDP)

In a similar way, another respondent also shared the perception of the link as primarily transitioning to the next phase, while underlining the need for a twin-track thinking in view of continuing humanitarian needs. The respondent pointed out that development processes become more important while humanitarian interventions become less necessary over time, but interventions belonging to the two different types of aid may be operating in parallel for some time where both needs are present.

> So, I think the challenge for the humanitarian community is to keep the focus of humanitarian funding on humanitarian needs and look to in a way exit, almost you exit from the humanitarian perspective. Because the situation after 5 years, 9 years you know there will be some humanitarian protection needs for example.
> (Respondent 5, UNHCR)

[3] "... ben başından beri söylüyorum ESSN den de phase out yapılırken kimlerin çıkış yapacağının tamamen koruma odaklı bir değerlendirmeden sonra karar verilmesi gerektiği... yani orada bir bir aile içi şiddet vardır. bu iki yetişkin çalışabilir deyip sadece rakamlar üzerinden, demografik bilgiler üzerinden hareket edilirse bu çok büyük bir risk getirir. Öyle bir sıkıntı olma ihtimali var. o yüzden bunun çok iyi çalışılması gerekiyor."

4.1.2 Perceived role of different stakeholders of linking humanitarian-development aid in the international community

To explore factors driving success for and challenges to implementation of the link, I asked the UN employees that I interviewed to reflect on any tensions that they have come across in linking humanitarian and development aid, framing this around the concept of operational reconcilability. Besides, I asked them to reflect on the specific factors, across the board, which threatened to obstruct the attempts to achieve this link and critical factors that brought about success based on the work of the respondent's respective agency to operationalize the humanitarian-development link. To explore the dynamics within the UN system, I also asked them if they think linking humanitarian and development aid should be pursued as an inter-agency agenda or individually by respective agencies. The respondents by and large took an actor-based lens in responding to these questions. The main actors that they have identified as having leverage in linking humanitarian and development aid is as follows: donors, the UN system and host country.

4.1.2.1.1 Donors

Discussing linking of humanitarian and development assistance in responding to protracted refugee situations, the respondents perceived donors as a central actor. A large majority of the respondents perceived obstacles around donors and donor strategies as one of the largest challenges to linking humanitarian and development aid, but one that remains key to resolve to achieve a successful link. The perceived obstacles can be grouped under institutional set-up, funding practices and overall administrative framework.

Several of the respondents perceived the internal institutional arrangements of the donors, which present divisions between their humanitarian and development branches, as a major obstacle to effectively linking humanitarian and development aid. The respondents underlined that the clear division of labor in most of the donors undermines the endeavor of strengthening linking of humanitarian and development aid. Different administrative requirements and funding cycles which are often not in sync and lack of donor internal coordination were among the perceived challenges cited by the respondents as undermining the efforts to ensure effective linking.

> …when we had to push a bit to go beyond, to strengthen the humanitarian-development link, still the obstacle that we faced the most was the donors, I think. Quite compartmented, some but not all donors. But some donors are quite compartmented.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

> I think quiet often that divide continue to be used because many of the main donors are still built up along that humanitarian-development divide.
> (Respondent 7, UNHCR)

Several respondents perceived donors' funding practices, including lack of multi-year funding and the silos of funding and as presenting a significant obstacle to linking humanitarian and development assistance.

One respondent perceived lack of multi-year funding as a donor practice not allowing the flexibility to meet long-term needs and support longer-term planning and programming, posing an obstacle to a more coherent approach. The respondent also alluded to the lack of predictability around humanitarian funding which also poses a challenge to strategic planning and programming.

> So, these funding cycles of course also limit us quite a lot on how we can plan our projects and if we can plan a transitioning project, we'd need secure funding for several years to do that. Some development funding is of course available to do that but if you look at the humanitarian funding, it is short-term, it is maximum a year, even not, to gear that kind of projects towards more development phases are difficult.
> (Respondent 2, UNHCR)

One respondent perceived donor's failure to provide adequate levels of development funding early and quickly enough in protracted displacement situations, as an obstacle to tackling longer-term goals and thus to effectively linking humanitarian and development aid. Besides, the respondent noted that it remains still largely the humanitarian branches of a government which are interested in protracted situations and therefore lack of interest by developmental branches of donors in these environments presents itself as another challenge to the endeavor of ensuring an effective link. The respondent also alluded to lack of joint strategic planning and internal coordination between development and humanitarian branches of a single donor.

> I think, again the challenge is perhaps in operationalizing the humanitarian-development nexus in a way that really links I mean practically speaking- so you could have sort of significant development funding kicking in at a much quicker speed and even in the way they engage with government. … the sources of funding are still largely humanitarian. So, you know, people coming to coordination meetings, the donors interested in that refugee situation, they are largely the humanitarian branches of government.
> (Respondent 5, UNHCR)

One respondent pointed out that field level representation of donors allows for a higher degree of flexibility in terms of funding, alluding that the degree of authority delegated to donor staff in country offices can play out positively for effective linking of humanitarian and development aid, in terms of funding and programming decisions.

> The thing is there is a bit of blockage at capital level, because when you talk to donor staff here, they would all try to understand, be flexible and get the money to you, yeah to be flexible.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

4.1.2.1.2 The UN System

Few respondents perceived that principles governing the UN's engagement with host governments along with the relationship of the UN organizations with a host government in view of the differences between countries play a role to what extent the UN can influence how the link is being operationalized in a given context. One respondent perceived that strategies of the UN agencies play a major role in determining how the humanitarian-development nexus will be operationalized. The respondent pointed that a standard operationalization of the link is not possible, as the UN engagement with host governments presents diversity in each country.

> The strategy set out by the UN agencies is also decisive on how humanitarian-development nexus is operationalized. Humanitarian development nexus has no standard application. The fact that the governments you face are different makes it difficult to pursue a single way of application. There is plenty of room for improvement on this front.[4]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

Another respondent underlined that existence of effective collaboration and cooperation between the UN system and the host government is critical, as the UN cannot work despite or against a host government.

> But if we turn to the main question, it is a must that these processes be coordinated with the state (of the respective host country). So, the UN cannot

[4] "BM teşkilatlarının stratejisi de humanitarian development nexus un nasıl uygulanacağı konusunda belirleyici oluyor. Humanitarian development nexus un standart bir uygulama şekli yok. Karşınızdaki hükümetlerin farklı oluşu tek bir uygulama şeklini zorlaştırıyor. Bu noktada kat edilmesi gereken daha çok yol var."

> act despite or against the preferences of a country that is a member state of the United Nations.[5]
> (Respondent 9, UNDP)

A good number of respondents perceived institutional factors, presenting divergences in priorities and operational calendars, including differences in mandates and planning cycles in between the UN agencies along with attitudinal obstacles as hindering effective linking of humanitarian and development aid.

One respondent perceived the UN agencies as differing in their understanding, approaches and management of the transition from emergency response to development, which does not allow for joint planning with a view to strengthening the link between humanitarian and development aid.

The respondent alluded that the divergence vis-à-vis the transition (from humanitarian to development aid) results from the fact that each agency has specific mandate and functions, that requires it to proceed in a different time and policy framework.

> So, it is easy if all actors agree this is what we need to and that we need to look at a transition strategy and then implement that. As I mentioned, the actors are quiet apart on what they do. Unless it is now, if you look at a very specific protection transition within UNHCR, yes, there would be some ideal on how UNHCR sees the progression between humanitarian aid and development. UNICEF would have a separate one.
> (Respondent 2, UNHCR)

Several respondents perceived short-term planning cycles, usually annual, of humanitarian organizations as one of the biggest internal obstacles to ensuring effective alignment with longer-term planning processes. One respondent noted that short planning cycles limit the organizations' ability to think longer-term

[5] "Ama esas soruya dönersek, bu süreçlerin devlet, oradaki devletle koordineli yapılması şart. Yani BM bir ülkedeki kendisine üye olan devletin tercihlerine rağmen veya onlara karşı yapamaz."

systematically and pursue a longer-term vision. The respondent found it promising that two-year planning cycles will be put in place in the following year to address this constraint.

> So even if we wanted to have a much more development-oriented approach to the way we work, the fact that we have a one-year planning cycle, and programming-cycle is already limiting our ability to think long-term. Am I making sense? This is probably the big challenge that we must be able to shift a little bit our thinking, trying to think longer-term systematically, at least from UNHCR's perspective. We should be soon starting to embark on two-year planning, which is a big thing, but it is nothing like that UNICEF that already has their five-year strategic thinking with different line ministries. We are far away from that.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

One respondent noted that the fact that development actors, both inside and outside the UN system, are slow in engaging in protracted situations is another obstacle impeding strengthening of the link. They perceived their engagement as neither timely nor large scale enough to address the scale of the needs.

> In practice, development actors, UNDP and others, are very slow to wake up and react in my opinion. Yeah, it takes time and it is at a very small scale that you manage to do that and you gradually, you have examples to show that it could work, but it not a massive success story. We could have done better, earlier, bigger type of things.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

Few respondents perceived personal traits along with attitudes and behaviors engrained in development and humanitarian actors as a factor that could influence progress towards linking humanitarian and development aid, particularly when it comes to mutual learning. One respondent noted that it is the personality of the individuals working for the organization, beyond the institutional traits, which exert a large influence.

> At the end of the day everything boils down to the personality of the people that you have around the table have - and it is not so much the agency or the relevant skills, that a given agency has or technical expertise that a given agency has - to me it is how as individuals we can constructively share that. (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

Several respondents turned their attention to inter-agency coordination across linking humanitarian-development assistance within the UN System, and to the deficiencies that pose an obstacle to ensuring effective linking of humanitarian and development aid.

Majority of the respondents perceived the endeavor of linking humanitarian and development aid as an inter-agency agenda. One respondent noted that the link should be mainstreamed in the planning and programming of each individual agency while underlining that inter-agency coordination across humanitarian and development aid is critical to prevent unanticipated gaps and ensure that the linkages and referral required to ensure an effective transition between the two types of aid are in place.

> Of course, it is an inter-institutional issue (agenda), because it concerns all institutions, such as the UN, NGOs, etc. Inter-institutional and, of course, each institution, if it is writing a project or if it is working on a new project, the project needs to be developed in such a way that it targets ESSN beneficiaries or those who need protection. Taking it up both as an individual and inter-institution agenda is important, but the inter-institutional dimension is critical, ensuring that the referrals and links are established, in terms of the relations amongst the UN agencies and all other relevant institutions."[6] (Respondent 3, UNDP)

[6] "Tabii ki hem kurumlar arası, çünkü BM, STK'lar vs. bütün kurumları ilgilendiren bir konu bu. Kurumlar arası ve tabi ki her kurumda kendi projelerinde bunu mesela proje yazacaksa yeni bir proje üzerinde çalışıyorsa ESSN beneficiery'lerini de ya da korunmaya muhtaç olanları da hedefleyecek şekilde projelerini geliştirmesi lazım. (Her ikisi de) ama kurumlar arası çok önemli yani o yönlendirmelerin ve o bağlantının sağlanması hem kamu hem UN hem diğer bütün ilgili kurumlar arasındaki ilişki çok önemli."

Another respondent perceived lack of commitment by the individual UN agencies to achieving collective outcomes yet another obstacle to ensuring effective inter-agency coordination towards strengthening the link. The respondent noted that the new rhetoric around collective outcomes is not being matched by a reality which is underpinned by collective outcome-oriented planning and programming by individual UN agencies. The respondent underlined that if collective outcomes are to be achieved, UN agencies need to move from mandate-driven isolated projects to collaborative interventions. Besides, he alluded that collective outcomes are not integrated in planning processes by individual agencies, but agencies demand integration and reflection of mandate-driven isolated projects as contributing to collective programmes.

> Oh yeah there are new buzz words around, we need to make it look like we have collective outcomes, or we need to make it look like that we have coherent plan, that we work together, but then at the end of the day, like everyone comes with their little piece and say that – yeah that's my program, I need to reflect it there. Is there a thinking of UNICEF, is it going to do that part of the program or UNFPA is going to come here and complement it that with part? That is what we need to do to reach this goal
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

Another respondent underlined that planning tools such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), providing a sound basis for planning collective outcomes and processes such as the UN Development System Reform, underpin collective identity of the UN Development System, with potential to positively contribute to strengthening of the link. It is interesting to note that the respondent did so, while highlighting that this would not undermine the role of individual agencies. This might be interpreted as revealing that the link is being negotiated between the collective outcomes as a reflection of the

collective identity of the UN system and priorities emanating from the mandate of individual UN agencies. UN Development System Reform consists of a set of far-reaching changes in the way the UN development system works and aims to reposition the United Nations development system with a stronger, better-defined collective identity (United Nations Development Group, n.d.). UNSDCF is the most important instrument for planning and implementation of the UN development activities at country level, determining and reflecting the UN development system's contributions in the country and guides collective UN support for achieving the 2030 Agenda (United Nations, 2018).

> Does that mean the role of individual agencies is being undermined? No, individual agencies work towards their own annual work plan. I think with UN Reform it is quite ambitious, I do not know what that will be like, a lot of the agency, what we in our agency call it Country Operations Plan, I do not know how other agencies call that, but they need to be aligned with this UNSDCF, five-year plan. They need to be aligned with that, at times, they need to even copy the same outcome statements in there. You see that that coordination will be important and yes at an individual agency level, you have your own plans, your operational plans whether they are humanitarian, and/or development focused, and they are parts of a bigger system, I think that makes a lot of sense.
> (Respondent 7, UNHCR)

A good number of respondents perceived UN's leverage in influencing the strategic orientation of key development actors and the broader agenda around linking humanitarian-development aid as constrained by bilateral state-centric nature of development cooperation.

One respondent called into question the targeting of bilateral development assistance, noting that it fails to consider refugees and their well-being in allocating development funds to programs.

The respondent thus underlined that the bilateral development assistance might mean that refugee concerns are not placed and incorporated along with those of the host communities in development agendas by host governments and the donor community and leaves the UN system with little leverage.

> And I think that mind shift, again, has happened to a large extent but then when it comes to bilateral development systems, I think it does not always consider the refugee population that exists side by side and amongst the host population. So, I think the UN coordinates well, I think the question is sort of how much the UN affects the humanitarian and the development world. (Respondent 5, UNHCR)

Another respondent perceived UN's leverage in influencing development aid agenda as constrained by the diffuse development aid structure characterized by poor cooperation, including among multilateral development and humanitarian actors. The respondent noted that this stood as an obstacle to the endeavour of linking humanitarian-development assistance.

> … is like the coordination of development work, is a different beast than coordination of humanitarian world, still in this divide. Like UNHCR, as an organization, is more accustomed to, more familiar with and more what shall I say more confident or less suspicious of coordination within more humanitarian field, the development field is a big unknown. (Respondent 7, UNHCR)

4.1.2.1.3 Host county

Several of the respondents perceived the role of the refugee-host country as critical to successfully linking humanitarian and development assistance.

A large majority of respondents perceived the host country as the key driving force behind the collective action geared towards linking humanitarian-development assistance. One respondent perceived the host government as the actor to provide

strategic guidance for a holistic long-term lens including infrastructure, legal framework to bring about and assume primary responsibility across the humanitarian-development link.

> And so, where I think in terms of, and then there would be questions regarding capacity or not, but the primary driver on that process (transition) should be the government of the country, to say ok, now we are going through this difficult period of an emergency but we are planning in five-year and ten-year steps, and then that is where we want to go and how we want to achieve that in terms of infrastructure, legal changes, that would bring economic development or provision of services, education and all of that. (Respondent 2, UNHCR)

Similarly, another respondent perceived transparent and open data sharing on refugees by the authorities of a host country as critical to understanding their needs and concerns to drive collective development and humanitarian responses. The respondent added that a strategy on how and through which mechanisms the linkages between humanitarian and development assistance will be established should be laid out and a coordination mechanism, which according to the view of the respondent had better be a public entity, should guide the UN and the non-governmental organizations operating as humanitarian and development actors towards the link.

> In the beginning, information must be clear, data must be shared, there must be a strategy, it must be clearly determined how these connections and mechanisms will be established, and a public institution or a coordination mechanism (but I think this must be a public entity) should also be guiding the UN or the NGOs and setting out the strategy.[7]
> (Respondent 3, UNDP)

[7] "En başta bilginin açık olması lazım, verilerin paylaşılabiliyor olması lazım, bir strateji olması lazım, bu bağlantıların ve mekanizmaların nasıl kurulacağının açık olarak belirleniyor olması lazım ve bir kamu kurumunun ya da bir koordinasyon mekanizmasının (ama bu bir kamu olmalı bence) BM'yi ya da STK'ları yönlendiriyor ve stratejiyi belirliyor olması lazım."

A good number of respondents perceived the socio-economic stability of the host country along with the wider operational environment, as key factors influencing the endeavour of linking humanitarian-development aid.

One respondent perceived a host country's policy framework as crucial for a strong link, noting that funding opportunities should be aligned to support the policy framework to ensure that the programmes implemented by the UN agencies support the government in its response in a resource-constrained world where several humanitarian crises are competing for funds.

> So, I think that is the challenge of working, operationalizing the humanitarian-development nexus, is less the normative framework, LNOB, 2030 agenda, all states signed up to this, but as I say there is a reality as well which we face, whether it is the difficult socio-economic situation we are currently live, or now the public health situation, and you know this is how it plays out and we need to be very alert to this and use our programmes you know in support of the government to sort of reinforce the positive messaging and reinforce these normative frameworks but by tapping into, by sort of aligning government policies with funding opportunities, so that they get enough resources as needed; of course, every situation in the world is also competing for similar funds, humanitarian and development. And I think that is where the difficulty is. (Respondent 5, UNHCR)

Similarly, another respondent perceived that the conjuncture of the host countries and their institutional capacity influence the operationalization of the link.

> ...It may be possible to create a set of principles that should be taken into consideration and should be taken as a basis for humanitarian-development nexus and this should be built upon, in view of the conjuncture and capacities of each country. Expecting each country to reach the same level through same processes and within the same timeframe is not realistic."[8]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

[8] "...belki işte yine temel standartlar hani humanitarian development nexus ta baz alınması gereken, dikkat edilmesi gereken prensipler yapıp, onun üzerinden, ülkelerin konjonktür ve kapasitelerini de göz önünde bulundurarak onun üzerine koyarak gittiği bir ortam yaratılabilir. Her ülkeden aynı seviyeyi beklemek mümkün değil. Aynı düzeyde, süreçlerde ve zaman aralığında geçişini yapmasını beklemek... "

4.1.2.1.4 Other stakeholders

Several respondents perceived non-government organizations, private sector, international financial institutions as stakeholders which are integral to the success of endeavours geared towards strengthening the link between humanitarian and development aid. With reference to the Global Refugee Forum, one respondent highlighted that the resources and power of these stakeholders, when convened around the same table, can be leveraged to facilitate holistic responses to protracted refugee situations. However, as none of the respondents elaborated on any aspect of engagement of these actors, which can prove facilitating and hindering, it can be argued that these stakeholders remain a peripheral concern in the perception of the UN employees around the link.

> I think it needs to be driven by an inter-agency approach. That is also, I do not know if you have investigated that a little bit, but it is also the spirit of the Global Refugee Forum. So, importance of bringing around the table all the actors, all the actors where there is the private sector, development-oriented UN agencies, international financial institutions, the broader civil society and so I think collective we are moving in that direction.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

One participant perceived civil society as an important actor playing a function complementary to that of a government in development where and when needed, underlining the importance of capacity building geared towards civil society actors to strengthen the link between humanitarian and development aid.

> Nonetheless, we should also look at when we talk about development that civil society will play a role in development and we also need to look at how we can strengthen civil society organizations to be able to fulfil this role in a development process in terms of being more specific on various specific cases that a large government programme would not be able to cover because it is just specialized or that given the linkages to communities that civil society must create the referral pathways to state services to ensure that

> linkages can be made. So, it is not only building of state, but it should also look at civil society, and eventually also private sector can probably be on board.
> (Respondent 2, UNHCR)

4.2 Negotiating the link in the context of the UN's response to the protracted refugee situation in Turkey

4.2.1 The overall perception of the relevance and success of the nexus to the Turkish context

4.2.1.1 Perceptions around conceptualization of the link

The respondents have diverged along two main lines in their conceptualization of the link in the context of the response led by the United Nations to the protracted refugee situation in Turkey.

A few respondents perceived the link around complementarity, whereby actors apply a parallel array of interventions belonging to the two different types of aid operations across different sectors, primarily basic needs and livelihoods. The respondents also perceived humanitarian aid as providing a foundation for development and for the creation of sustainable livelihoods.

> I think these two areas (of aid) are complementary. Without meeting the basic needs of people, you cannot expect a development-oriented programme (to be implemented) or these people to participate in the labour market. That would constitute a barrier.[9]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

[9] "Bence bu iki alan birbirini tamamlayıcı. Kişilerin temel ihtiyaçlarını karşılamadan kalkınma odaklı bir çalışma yapılmasını ya da bu insanları istihdam piyasasına katılmasını bekleyemezsiniz. Yani o bir engel olur."

One respondent perceived the link more like transitioning of assistance programming from humanitarian assistance (emergency relief) to development with a focus on self-reliance, underlining that a referral mechanism needs to be in place to ensure an effective transition between the two types of aid. The respondent also noted that both types of aid should be mutually supporting each other, recognizing the fact that what is traditionally described as emergency assistance needs might persist years into a protracted refugee situation.

> There should be a mechanism for referrals from humanitarian aid to development in order to provide guidance and to ensure that more people become self-sufficient. What can be done in the domain of development aid that would contribute to humanitarian front? The impact of employment (formal employment) – awareness should be enhanced about the benefits of reducing informality and increasing self-sufficiency. And this is what is being done. They must feed each other on the aspects (of the response) that intersect.[10]
> (Respondent 3, UNDP)

Another respondent perceived the transition as a shift from emergency and relief to promoting livelihoods and self-reliance. Reminiscent of the 'relief-development continuum approach', the respondent sequenced these two types of assistance, humanitarian and development, in a more linear fashion.

> The Turkey thing is really to at what point do you transition from like in-kind support to a more livelihood support. Of course, if you look at livelihoods, people would have to be able to spend time working, and not worrying about having enough, there is, first you need to stabilize somehow the situation, which will be the first. And I mean there are also the like, I mean, in your research, you would probably have seen timelines on how long usually a

[10] "birbirleri arasında yönlendirme ve daha çok insanın kendi kendine yetebilirliğini sağlamak için insani yardımdan kalkınmaya bir yönlendirme mekanizmasının olması lazım. Kalkınma tarafı da insani yardıma neler yapılabilir. İstihdamın etkisi (kayıtlı istihdam) kayıt dışılığın azaltılması, kendi kendine yetebilirliğin arttırılmasının faydalarının anlatılmasına yönelik bilinçlendirme yapılması lazım. Ve yapılıyor da. Öyle çok ortak kesişen yönlerde iki tarafında birbirini beslemesi lazım."

> humanitarian aid period is and when development starts. But again, that will be very contextual on the situation.
> (Respondent 2, UNHCR)

4.2.1.2 Relevance of the link to their programmes

To explore their perspectives on the relevance of the link to their programmes, I asked the respondents if they find the framework of linking humanitarian and development aid as an approach theoretically and practically relevant and beneficial in responding to the situation in Turkey. I also requested them to provide an example about a programme implemented by their respective agencies which they think has successfully linked humanitarian and development aid. Besides, I asked them to reflect if they think this framework has become a mainstream concept for their work or whether it is still experimental when it comes to their respective agency.

A good number of respondents perceived that the shift of execution primarily by actors of the multilateral system and the international community to execution primarily by national institutions as the response's overarching relevance to linking humanitarian and development aid.

One respondent noted that pattern of assistance provision was mainly for the UN agencies and international non-governmental institutions to design and implement the bulk of programmes following the influx of refugees. The respondent highlighted that the role of the international community has since then shifted to investing in long-term capacity development, focusing on strengthening national authorities to ensure effective and efficient provision for services for refugees, instead of developing parallel systems to deliver assistance.

> Also if you look at where we started out on providing a lot of services as either the UN or NGOs in terms health, in terms of education right after the first influx started, where we now are very focused how we work in complementarity with the state, and how we are not building parallel systems but always looking at what the state can provide and how we can strengthen that in the state systems and how we can refer cases when we find them to state systems.
> (Respondent 2, UNHCR)

In a similar vein, another respondent perceived the channeling of humanitarian assistance through state institutions when the national and local systems can support it, as where synergies between short-term humanitarian interventions and longer-term development programs are created. The respondent referred to the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme. The respondent highlighted that cash-based humanitarian interventions, channeled through national and local systems, can be used as building blocks for the development of social safety nets, strengthening capacities of institutions involved including staff of the Turkish Red Crescent.

> …. you build around cash assistance, you can really build all kind of social safety net that goes with it, here it is naturally called ESSN, the Emergency Social Safety Net, it is building on the Turkish system and they are trying to but when you do that, you build the capacity of the state, of Kızılay in that case, to do the type of programming they did not necessarily know how to do before that then you are almost in development. Because that skills that they'd be able use to serve for the host communities as well.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

Similarly, another respondent, addressing a question inquiring perspectives around what the ideal link would look like, also clearly perceived enhancing national capacities to ensure effective delivery of services, in the context of the shift of execution to national institutions, as the response's overarching relevance to linking humanitarian and development aid. However, the respondent took a cautious stance

around the premises of this shift in the context of the response in Turkey. The respondent noted that the funding that would be channeled to the non-governmental organizations to aid and services to refugees, including outreach and identification, has shifted to national institutions. The respondent went on elaborating the many ways the multilateral system has invested in strengthening central and local capacities including the provision of staffing, staff training, equipment support, and improving infrastructure. However, while recognizing that the primary responsibility to provide protection and assistance rests with the state, she retrospectively acknowledged the pace at which the shift took place was too fast as the state institutions were known to lack adequate capacity to assume the responsibility to respond and provide quality services.

> .... And so, we have shifted, decreased our support to NGOs to identify persons, to do reach out and identify the persons, to building the capacity of the Ministry of Family to do that. And we have been doing that through technical support, through material support, through financial support and through human support - so we have been providing staffing, we have been training the staff, we have been providing equipment, and we have been refurbishing a certain number of structure. Now, has that been successful? I am not sure, because we have not been able yet to assess the impact of that work. … That being said, where I think we have been struggling a lot is that we have been making that shift very quickly, by saying oh it is the responsibility of the national institutions and they have been willing to take that responsibility for refugees, so we should support that, but we have not been very good in assessing the benchmarks, so at what moment is it ok to say the national authorities have the capacity to respond and we are going to continue supporting the national authorities when we know that they are a bit stretched in their ability to provide quality services.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR).

One respondent also recognized the role of strengthening national capacities in terms of linking humanitarian and development aid, while perceiving the framing of development as refugee and community empowerment through institutional capacity building in a refugee context as a negotiation area especially when

development planning and programming are shaped according to the needs of a given public institution. The respondent pointed at that this could bring about a possible gap between empowering individuals and institutions, when local branches of an institution where investment has been made in terms of capacity building cannot deliver satisfactorily for refugees on the ground.

> When there is a matter of development, when the countries the UN operates are considered, the focus of development for all the UN organizations is also the focus of that country. On the other hand, there has always been an idea that there is a need to do a development-oriented project or support a local economy here only because refugees have arrived. Therefore, I think development-oriented projects are also shaped to a certain extent according to the needs of the institutions. Frankly speaking, I see a risk there. There is a continuous focus on increasing institutional capacity. But if you are unable to ensure that the local branches of the institution where you are investing for capacity building deliver services for refugees, I think this is a failure. I think this is the situation we face...[11]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

Another respondent also perceived the response's overarching relevance to linking humanitarian and development aid as programming that simultaneously integrate components of empowering individuals and institutions in a complementary way. The respondent referred to a project which established partnership with the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (UTBA) in context of the agency's judicial engagement strategy as part of protection delivery. The respondent noted that while the project aimed at empowering individuals, through cooperation with UTBA, to improve access to legal aid, it missed out on engaging the Turkish Ministry of Justice

[11] "Kalkınma meselesi olduğu zaman, bizim de çalıştığımız ülkeleri göz önünde bulundurduğun zaman bütün BM kuruluşlarında kalkınma odağı o ülkenin kendi odağı da bir taraftan. Yalnızca mülteciler geldiği için kalkınma odaklı proje yapmak ya da burada bir yerel ekonominin desteklenmesine ihtiyaç duyulduğu fikri zaten baştan beri var o yüzden bence orada biraz kalkınma odaklı projeler kurumların ihtiyaçlarına göre de şekilleniyor. Ben orada öyle bir risk görüyorum açıkçası. Sürekli bir kurumsal kapasitenin arttırılması kısmı var. Ama siz o kurumsal kapasiteni arttırdığınız kurumun yereldeki ofislerinin mültecilere hizmet vermesini sağlayamıyorsanız bu bence başarısızlıktır. Yani böyle bir durum var... Ama bu çok ikircikli bir durum. Bir taraftan da BM kuruluşunun temel misyonu nedir? ülkeyi desteklemek. Yani o ikisi arasında bir denge tutturulması ve bunun içinde uğraşı verilmesi gerekiyor. "

to enhance institutional capacity. The respondent described programming incorporating empowering individuals and communities and strengthening institutional capacity through capacity development as making up a nice package, linking humanitarian and development assistance.

> ...So you have this element of working at community level, of making people aware of legal aid, and that these things exist - so that is really the strengthening at personal level or community level vs strengthening institutions, in this case UTBA in order to be able to guide in a certain way or to provide that legal aid and the financial resources that go with it. The element slightly missing, and as such I cannot really say that the flagship programme is, the institution strengthening, working with the Ministry of Justice and the judge itself to do that - so that is something that I cannot really say. For me that is like a nice package project, you would have what people would call probably more humanitarian, which I do not think is the case, but we like the individual legal aid, legal support and legal counselling to people, making them aware that there are lawyers to bridging that gap through the lawyers in provision of that legal aid. Institution strengthening is development in itself - so that link there I think is a beautiful one. (Respondent 7, UNHCR)

4.2.2 Role of frameworks and actors in linking humanitarian and development aid

4.2.2.1 The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)

Few respondents perceived lack of clarity around how the “refugee” and “resilience” pillar distinguish, in terms of programming, and how the components integrate, as posing an obstacle to strengthening the link between humanitarian and development aid within the 3PR Turkey Country Chapter. One respondent noted that the capacity development interventions programmed under the refugee pillar make the two-pillar conceptualization inconsequential.

> ...from different things one is the 3RP as such, where you have the refugee pillar and the resilience pillar and in a lot of people's minds the refugee pillar is the humanitarian pillar, which does not make much sense, if you look at

> what is coming under the refugee pillar where there is still a lot to do with capacity development and in the mind-set of a lot of humanitarian and development workers, anything to do with capacity development is already long-term, and it is already sustainable and it is already in the development side of things.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

Likewise, one respondent perceived conceptualization of the 3RP as susceptible to reinforcing the divide between humanitarian and development aid in case this possibly leads to a disconnect in terms of programming, with the two types of assistance operating in parallel, without necessary synergies being created and realized through planning and programming.

> I think it is also the same in the way just this 3RP is being designed – we have one refugee pillar, one resilience pillar, they just work in parallel. Then you also lose a lot if you do not create any synergies, any connection then it is quite artificial.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

In a similar vein, another respondent perceived programming under the 3RP as not contributing to linking humanitarian and development aid, since UN organizations continue to focus on mandate-driven isolated programming. The respondent noted that UNDP does not really mainstream humanitarian concerns in development programming, and instead shapes programming as aligned with the national development priorities. The respondent further underlined that it is a big unknown whether and to what extent this programming aims at empowering refugees.

> No. Obviously, I cannot speak of any humanitarian dimension for the UN agency I work for. We are rather trying to implement development-oriented and national development program-oriented projects. If we are working with the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR), we are focusing on improving its

> processes. As I noted earlier, there is still a question mark over how many refugees will be impacted in the long term for us.[12]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

Another respondent pointed at the marginal contributions in terms of addressing needs of the host communities as a programming and priority-related challenge posed by the 3RP in contributing to linking humanitarian and development aid. The respondent noted that livelihoods programming, in the context of promoting economic inclusion, aim to target refugees and host communities on an equal basis, but the interventions on the ground are by no means sufficiently addressing the needs in view of the scale of unemployment in the Turkey. The respondent also framed efforts geared towards enhancing resilience of host communities as a way to create synergies with the national development priorities and noted that, in comparison with Turkey, the 3RP country programme in Lebanon, with a bigger share of programmes directed at the communities where refugees reside, has made a larger contribution in terms of the development priorities of the country.

> ...on the development side is that here in the refugee response, there is not that much done for the host communities, and except in livelihoods, where because of tension and stuff, you want to do fifty and fifty. But fifty per cent of what we do at livelihoods compared to the scale of unemployment and unemployment in Turkey is very limited whereas in Lebanon really a much strong focus on the host community, there a lot more gains in terms of the development priorities of the country, potentially.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

One respondent perceived the 3RP as a broad-based partnership platform, facilitating linking of humanitarian and development aid. The respondent noted that

[12] "Yok. Açıkçası ben kendi BM kuruluşum için hiç humanitarian taraf neredeyse hiç yok. Daha çok kalkınma odaklı ve işte ulusal kalkınma programı odaklı bir proje yürütmeye çalışıyoruz biz. Ya da işte İŞKUR ile çalışıyorsak İŞKUR un kendi süreçlerinin iyileştirilmesi ile ilgili bir şeye odaklanıyoruz. Dediğim gibi sonrasında ne kadar mülteciye dokunacakları kısmı hala bizim için bir soru işareti."

3RP also constitutes a learning platform allowing for exchange of lessons-learned and good practices.

> I think in the context of Turkey, again I am going to be insisting a lot on the 3RP, because to me is the tool, that should be used, and it is in use to share lessons-learned and good practices, that brings around the table, and is a forum where there can be an exchange of good practices and lessons-learned and where we should be able to learn from other actors, and the other actors should be able to learn from the other people around the table
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

Another participant perceived the 3RP as allowing for convergence of stereotypical humanitarian programs and development programs.

> I think all of this worked quiet well in this 3RP in the sense that you have more stereotypical humanitarian programs and development programs converging.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

4.2.2.2 The UN System

When asked whether linking humanitarian and development aid has become mainstream or remains yet an experimental pursuit, one respondent perceived linking of humanitarian and development aid as being evoked mainly for advocacy purposes at higher levels of the UN system, vis-à-vis a number of stakeholders including donors, and did not perceive it as having programming ramifications in the way the UN agencies respond to the protracted displacement situation in Turkey. The respondent further noted that the pursuit of linking humanitarian-development aid is not placed on the agenda within the inter-agency coordination structured around the 3RP in terms of the operations of the agencies of the UN system or in the partnerships established.

> From an institutional perspective, (there is still a question mark over) to what extent humanitarian-development nexus is discussed at the inter-agency fora or within the 3RP, in a way that then feeds into formulation of a strategy... Or, when we discuss with donors to introduce this (humanitarian-development nexus), in my opinion, this is something advocated for at a higher level, at a global, regional or the headquarters level, such as Global Refugee Compact etc. I think it (humanitarian-development nexus) is a process that takes place at a high level – I mean expressing this, saying that we are shifting to development.... But it is not an issue that we talk in terms of our operations in a general sense; in terms of cooperation we are engaged in with other UN agencies or in sector meetings. As I said, it remains a bit higher level. [13]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

Likewise, another respondent perceived the endeavour of linking the two types of aid as not mainstream for either UNDP or UNHCR, noting that programmes do not serve to creating the necessary linkages. The respondent acknowledged that existing programming, directed at state institutions to strengthen their institutional capacities and thereby contribute to development, remain limited. Elaborating on why the UN system is not able to create linkages, the respondent noted that stronger coordination is required to ensure complementarity between programmes implemented by various agencies within the UN system in the context of linking humanitarian-development aid in view of the scale of needs.

> I don't think it's (linking humanitarian-development aid) already mainstream. Projects implemented by UNDP do not achieve this link. We strive to contribute to development through (a set of forms of) support such as providing equipment in its investments. It wouldn't be true if we say it works greatly. There is coordination, but these are not projects that complement

[13] "Kurumsal anlamda humanitarian development nexus u inter agency de ya da 3RP de ne kadar oturup tartışılıp ona göre bir strateji... ya da biz donöre giderken bakın böyle bir şey var dediğimiz bence o daha üst düzey, daha global, bölgesel ya da hq bazında biraz advocacy si yapılan bir şey. Global refugee compact ler vs hani global compact for refugees ler falan... o biraz daha bence üst düzeyde giden bir süreç... hani bunu dillendirmek. Biz zaten development a kayıyoruz zaten artık vs. demek... ama bizim genel operasyon anlamında ya da iş birliklerimiz ile kurduğumuz BM kuruluşları ile ya da oturup sektör toplantılarında konuştuğumuz bir konu değil. Daha biraz bir tık... dediğim gibi ben o biraz hala daha üst düzey kalıyor."

> each other. Considering the sheer scale of the needs, there is no room for an overlap, but stronger coordination is needed.[14]
> (Respondent 4, UNHCR)

Another respondent referred to effectiveness of the inter-agency coordination structured around the 3RP and pointed out that a weak horizontal coordination, leading to flaws in creating inter-sectoral linkages, poses a significant obstacle to effectively linking humanitarian and development aid. The respondent noted that a member of the protection sector working group is not necessarily attending sector group meetings of the livelihoods and education sectors, which hinder significantly creation of inter-sectoral linkages. Therefore, the respondent suggested that the appropriate approach would be to pursue mainstreaming humanitarian-development aid as an agenda within individual agencies. It is still important to note that the respondent acknowledged the inter-agency coordination is operating successfully at a higher decision-making level in terms of convening heads of the UN agencies and providing a forum for them to discuss programming and priorities.

> The inter-agency (structure) and the inter-agency team, the 3RP model, and the head of UN agencies are useful in terms of discussing needs by various agencies engaged and their planning. No one is saying "You don't need that much in the field of health." since all agencies are focusing on their mandate area. This (humanitarian-development link) is of course useful when you are meeting with the Office of the Presidency, other (line) ministries or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Well, how should I put this? There are sector coordination meetings. As you know livelihoods sector convenes on a monthly basis, just like education and protection sector does. However, someone who attends livelihoods sector meeting does not necessarily join protection or education sector meeting; or someone who attends education sector meeting is not

[14] Halihazırda (anaakım) olduğunu düşünmüyorum. UNDP'nin projeleri bu bağlantıyı sağlamıyor. Biz yatırımlarda devlete techizat sağlamak gibi desteklerle, kalkınmaya katkıda bulunmaya çalışıyoruz. Harika işliyor dersek doğru olmaz. Koordinasyon var ama birbirini tamamlayan projeler değil. İhtiyaçların büyüklüğü düşünüldüğünde, overlap olmaz ama daha sıkı koordinasyona ihtiyaç var."

> necessarily joining protection sector meeting. I'd say coordination and knowledge management needs to take place within each agency.[15]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

Another respondent perceived linking of humanitarian and development assistance as mainstream for the UN in the Turkish context, however acknowledged that disconnect between humanitarian and development approaches is possible to arise and connections might be loose, particularly in terms of job creations.

> Here it is mainstream, but sometimes there is a bit of disconnect what we would do in kind of long-term development where with the Syria response, sometimes the way you try to connect, it is a bit loose. It makes sense in practice especially in job creation, to do that things like value chain, transformation and everything that is the right thing to do and there are not that many ways to create jobs.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

Similarly, another respondent perceived linking of humanitarian and development aid not as experimental for the UN, but framed it as phased, gradual mind-shift in progress, which has permeated the higher decision-making of the organizations.

> So, I think, I would not say it is experimental, I think that is not correct. I just think I think it is what I say, it is a phased, I think it is a gradual, a gradual mind shift. I think the organization has I'd certainly say at the top has shifted mind set.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

[15] "Şöyle inter agency yani o 3RP modeli şey anlamında iyi, en azından o inter agency dediğimiz ekip ve head of UN agencyleri diyelim... kimin neye ihtiyacı var? neyi planlıyor vs onu görebiliyor. O anlamda iyi. Şey olarak kimse kimseye "senin sağlık alanında bu kadar da şeye ihtiyacın yok" demiyor zaten herkes fokusunu yapıyor. Hani bu şey anlamında iyi işte varsayalım Cumhurbaşkanlığı ile konuşurken iyi, bakanlıklar ya da Dış İşleri Bakanlığı ile konuşurken iyi tabi ki de. O anlamda şey... ama... nasıl diyeyim bir de sektör koordinasyon toplantıları var. Biliyorsunuz işte livelihoods sektörü ayda bir yapıyoruz. education protection... ama mesela livelihoods sektöre katılan birisi illa protection a katılmıyor. Anlatabiliyor muyum? ya da işte education a katılan protection a katılmayabiliyor. O biraz kurumların kendi içinde yakalaması gereken bir koordinasyon ve bilgi akışı diyeyim, yani..."

4.2.2.3 Donor practices and perceptions

A good number of respondents perceived pressure from donors on an exit/transition strategy for humanitarian programmes they support and increased pressure on exit management as an obstacle to effectively linking humanitarian and development aid. In doing so, none of the respondents discarded effective exit strategies as an appropriate component of linking humanitarian and development aid, but underlined that exit strategies should factor continuing humanitarian needs and incorporate protection and gender concerns in their planning and management to avoid errors of exclusion when transitioning.

With regards to the Turkish context and with reference to the ESSN, one respondent contested the donor pressure to exit, in face of the sheer size of the Syrian refugee population and the scale of continuing humanitarian needs.

> I think this is where we are struggling a lot, development donors included. Because when you talk to the European Union, their biggest concern of the last couple of years, is ok how are you planning phasing out, what is your phase-out, exit strategy etc. We have been telling them, ok you're talking about an exit strategy but there are 4 million refugees in this country. What kind of an exit strategy you have in place when we are talking about such a massive number of refugee population.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

Another respondent underlined that identification of beneficiaries eligible to exit from the cash assistance should be based on a set of exit criteria, allowing for an adequate analysis of protection and gender concerns, including exclusion risks.

> ... I have been saying from the beginning that it is necessary to decide who will exit when phasing out ESSN, after a purely protection-based assessment... We might be facing a case of domestic violence. If we say, these two adults can work and act only based on the numbers and

> demographic information, then this might pose a severe risk. There is room for such a problem to arise. Therefore, this must be worked out very well.[16] (Respondent 8, UNDP)

One respondent perceived donor decision-making favoring partnership with UN agencies on a bilateral basis posed an obstacle to linking humanitarian-development aid, in excluding joint proposals from within the UN system. The respondent noted that under the first tranche of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT), serving to fund projects that run until mid-2021 latest, the EU was not in favor of proposals on joint action. Besides, the respondent viewed the abundance of funding as alleviating the competition over funding in between UN agencies, but not really allowing to move beyond the silos.

> And the problem is that the EU, under the first The Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) tranche, they did not want to have joint proposal. That was a big problem for the UN, then the UN, I was not there but what I heard, then the UN was quite keen to present joint proposals to the EU
> … EU refused. They wanted to have one agency in charge of one component with one ministry, they did not want five agencies dealing with the Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Policy.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

> The specificities about Turkey because the EU thing, that there was so much money, you did not really have this, everyone had too much money to do what they wanted to, and just spending it was the priority, not so much trying to get more by positioning yourself a bit outside of your area of, what you are doing. So, in that respect, that alleviated a bit the silo. Or the competition thing, it did not necessarily alleviate the silo thing; especially because here almost all the money come from the EU.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

[16] "... ben başından beri söylüyorum ESSN den de phase out yapılırken kimlerin çıkış yapacağının tamamen koruma odaklı bir değerlendirmeden sonra karar verilmesi gerektiği... yani orada bir bir aile içi şiddet vardır. bu iki yetişkin çalışabilir deyip sadece rakamlar üzerinden, demografik bilgiler üzerinden hareket edilirse bu çok büyük bir risk getirir. Öyle bir sıkıntı olma ihtimali var. o yüzden bunun çok iyi çalışılması gerekiyor."

Several of the respondents perceived the internal institutional arrangements of the donors, presenting divisions between their humanitarian and development branches, as a significant obstacle to linking humanitarian-development aid in the Turkish context.

One respondent pointed that there is a clear division in the institutional arrangements of the EU, as the largest donor of the response in Turkey, built along the humanitarian and development divide. The respondent underlined that development demarcates a clear line in the responsibilities in the case of Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), mandated to provide emergency assistance and relief. The respondent noted that this revealed weak internal coordination between the EU Delegation in Turkey and the ECHO, which can also be read as a capital-country office divide.

> (It is a question mark) To what extent ECHO is communicating this with the EU Delegation... I think a clear line is drawn for ECHO when one starts speaking of socio-economic development. I think we are faced with a picture (environment) where everyone is taking care of its own (mandated) area. I think most probably this is the situation we face."[17]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

Similarly, another respondent perceived donor decision-making on which institutional branch funds a specific action as a challenge in ensuring effective linking of humanitarian and development aid. The respondent noted that the EU is providing funding to UNHCR, through ECHO, which is funding on a short-term cycle, for capacity development of the Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). The respondent noted that capacity development for DGMM

[17] "...ECHO ile AB Delegasyonu ne kadar paslaşıyor bence sosyoekonomik kalkınma deyince bitiyor orada, ECHO için bir çizgi çizilmiş oluyor. Bir noktada herkes kendi işi ile ilgileniyorlar tablosu ortaya çıkıyor. Büyük ihtimal böyle bir durum var diye düşünüyorum."

to strengthen the domestic asylum system would take several years, therefore highlighting that this funding cannot be sustained through an institution representing humanitarian branch of the donor.

> I think it is also challenging, here because if you look at the way donors are functioning in Turkey is that the donor who has been providing support to UNHCR for capacity development of DGMM on the registration front is ECHO, so that is the humanitarian arm of the Commission, it is not the longer-term funding of the Commission. Even though we know that to support DGMM will take many years for them to have a system in place. So, and it cannot be sustained by funding from a humanitarian donor.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

Another respondent perceived donors' funding practices, particularly the lack of multi-year development funding, as a major obstacle for effective programming in terms of linking humanitarian action and development programming in the Turkish context and to achieving desired outcomes in development programming. The respondent pointed out a clear imperative for multi-year development funding in protracted situations, especially when it comes to livelihoods and employment creation programmes.

> Donors need to be convinced. They need to provide long-term funds (finance). They should be supporting two-year, three-year, four-year projects, instead of one-year projects. Because UNDP has an ongoing project in terms of job creation. The project has a goal of creating 2,000 jobs over a period of two years. This is very challenging. However, it is being done, but it's indeed, hard (to achieve this). Creating 2,000 jobs is difficult over a period of two or three years. I can put it this way. Therefore, longer-term funds should be channeled.[18]
> (Respondent 3, UNDP)

[18] "Donörlerin ikna edilmesi gerekiyor. Fonlarını daha uzun süreli vermesi lazım. Hani bir senelik proje değil de, iki senelik üç senelik, dört senelik projeleri destekliyor olmaları lazım. Çünkü iş yaratmak ta UNDP nin yürüyen bir projesi var. 2000 istihdam yaratma hedefi var iki sene içerisinde. Bu çok zor. Yapılıyor ama, zor gerçekten. Hani 2000 istihdam yaratma iki, üç sene içerisinde zor bir iş. Öyle söyleyeyim. O yüzden daha uzun süreli fonların yönlendirilmesi lazım."

Another respondent perceived the bilateral nature of development aid coupled with lack of predictable, multi-year financing as constraining the endeavour of linking humanitarian and development aid. The respondent noted that despite the multi-year response plan in the Turkish context, the partners of the response plan strive to influence donors year after year, due to lack of multi-year development funding commitments by donors and concerted coordination amongst donor countries of development aid.

> I think that is why, practically, that is why we are trying to come up with a plan, we try to do, we do multi-year plans, the current 3RP is 2020-2021. So, of course, we try to put something on the table, and this is our strategy, our plan for two years. So, if a donor comes in this year, we can influence them. If the donor comes in next year, a development donor, we can influence the next year. And so, we are trying to again influence development, but I think that habit of development coordination joined up, collaborative sort of planning, operational coordination does not really exist to the same extent. It is much more of a bilateral conversation between the donor and the institution being supported with it.
> (Respondent 5, UNHCR)

4.2.2.4 Host government

One respondent perceived that lack of provision of refugee mapping and profiling data, particularly on skills and education, by the Turkish government, as an obstacle to transitioning into development. The respondent referred to the focus placed on enhancing resilience of refugees in need of assistance through inclusion in labour market, adding that this was not followed by provision of adequate data to develop evidence-based programming.

> However, suddenly a new agenda has arisen to ensure access to labour market for people in need of assistance so they could stand on their own feet. But it has not been followed by this. The Directorate General of Migration

> Management has carried out the verification, (but) has not provided us with data on the profile of refugees, (specifically) with regards to their skill-set, educational background and place of their residence, that would have facilitated devising strategies targeting this population. Instead, the UN and NGOs did what they were used to doing and they directed their attention to provinces where they were already operating or where they had established partnerships that would allow them to operate effectively.[19]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

The same respondent perceived the humanitarian and development aid as proving operationally irreconcilable in the Turkish context characterized by a lack of formal employment opportunities worthy of human dignity, particularly with regards to access to livelihoods and cash assistance. The respondent noted that refugees remain confined to low-paying jobs, working in tough working conditions but still struggle to purchase even the most fundamental needs. Given that the regulatory framework in Turkey allows refugees to obtain a work permit through their employer, refugees prefer to work unregistered, to maintain their eligibility for humanitarian assistance.

> Okay, we provide vocational training, but the discussions around where the graduates of these training programs will find employment came at a later stage. This is the stage we reached over a period of 4 years. However, this did not change the fact that these people had basic needs to meet. This did not change the fact that people who have access to the labor market work in difficult conditions and with low wages.
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

[19] "Bununla birlikte bir anda yardıma ihtiyaç duyan insanların istihdam piyasasına eriştirebilmeliyiz ki kendi ayakları üzerinde durabilsinler olgusu ortaya çıktı. Ama bu şunu takip etmedi. Göç idaresi zaten onaylamasını yaptı, göç idaresi bize bir profil vermedi hangi illerde hangi becerilere ve eğitime sahip kişilerin olduğunu ve bu kişilere yönelik hangi stratejilerin geliştirilebileceği kolaylaştıracak bir veri vermedi. Onun yerine BM kuruluşları ve NGO lar bildikleri şeyleri yaptılar. Hangi illerde faaliyet gösteriyorsalar veya hangi illerde bu işi kotarabilecek partnerleri varsa onlara yöneldi."

> Employers say that refugees who do not want to be deprived of humanitarian assistance do not want to work as registered employees. We see areas where humanitarian aid and development contradict each other.[20]
> (Respondent 8, UNDP)

Another respondent perceived the difficult economic situation in Turkey hit hard with increased unemployment as an obstacle to the link, in terms of enhancing resilience. The respondent noted that access the labour market and finding job opportunities remains challenging for refugees in Turkey.

> But that requires for people to become self-reliant a context that where jobs are accessible, where the state can provide the right services, which within the context of Turkey is not possible at this point of time given the economic situation, let alone the Covid-19.
> (Respondent 6, UNHCR)

One respondent perceived political will on the long-term perspective for the refugees and the desired durable solution as closely related with linking humanitarian and development aid. The respondent noted whether the desired durable solution is local integration or return would change a lot the nature of the discussion around linking humanitarian and development aid in each country.

> It is a bit, it depends also for a refugee situation, always on the where do you see the end point as I mentioned in regard to durable solutions, of course that discussion is different if you think of a situation where you integrate a lot of people. That discussion would be different to when you say like no, they will all return at some point, and that would be your end point. So, if you look at it, and say they will all return, your development discussion is of course different to when you say they would be integrated. If they are integrated, they need services, your population is bigger...

[20] "Tamam mesleki eğitim veriyoruz da bu insanlar nereye yerleşecek gibi şeyler sonrasında geldi. 4 yıl içerisinde bu noktalara gelebildik. Ama bu insanların temel ihtiyaçlarının bulunduğu gerçeğini değiştirmedi. İş gücü piyasasına erişim sağlayan kişilerin zor koşullarda ve düşük ücretlere çalıştığı gerçeğini değiştirmedi. İşverenler bünyesinde çalışan mültecilerin insani yardımdan mahrum kalmamak için kayıtlı çalışmak istemediğini söylüyorlar. İnsani yardım ve kalkınmanın birbiri ile çeliştiği yerlerde görüyoruz."

(Respondent 2, UNHCR)

In a similar vein, another respondent perceived the inevitably political nature of the development aid and the fact that incorporating refugees in development plans involves political decisions, which might post an obstacle to effectively linking humanitarian and development aid.

> Yeah, the problem also it is quite difficult in a refugee context, to talk about development. Because, and that is also the conversation that we are having here with the development plan, how much we try to make the link with this. It is quiet sensitive for government, even a government as open to refugees as Turkey, to make refugees as a development priority or even just as a beneficiary… Yes, long term presence. It means that development is for the citizens and the host community, and if you start to integrate refugees, it means you are sharing the development path with people.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

One respondent perceived the progressive policy framework in Turkey vis-à-vis refugees, in supporting refugees and integrating them into national services as facilitating effective linking of humanitarian and development aid. The respondent noted that Turkey stands out with its progressive inclusion of refugees within national services.

> I think there has been a very genuine sort of collaboration in the Turkey context, which is not seen maybe so much elsewhere. … I think it is also because of very sort of progressive policies by the government of Turkey to include refugees and I think that makes such a massive difference. I think having refugees included, integrated within national systems just makes the response and that connection between development – humanitarian much easier to bridge.
> (Respondent 5, UNHCR)

Another respondent perceived the political space and broader policy perspective, even though Turkish state does not publicly acknowledge its policy as

one of integration, allowing for inclusion of refugees and thus positively impacting linking of humanitarian and development aid.

> The political space, definitely, here, they are not talking openly about integration but it is still the perspective, it is much easier than to work of sustainably expanding the system for refugees to be part of that whereas in Lebanon it is completely out of question.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

> For the humanitarian one, what you need to do for them to evolve and typically be like not distribution or not parallel services but gradually link with existing systems and system is quiet flexible. In Turkey, I think the system is state institution has the capacity to do it so, again you close your refugee education centres and you put Syrian children in Turkish schools. You do the same in the health. And I think Turkey is a very nice story and it is happening to a large extent.
> (Respondent 1, UNDP)

Another respondent perceived Turkey's ownership of the development-oriented thinking and framing refugees as positively contributing and positively impacting effectively linking of humanitarian and development aid.

> You know, so that development thinking. I think that development thinking really needs to be owned also by the government, and again I think it does exist in Turkey, not so much elsewhere, where they see refugees as a positive contributor.
> (Respondent 5, UNHCR)

4.3 Conclusion

The perceptions of the UN employees on distinctions between humanitarian and development aid along with conceptual framing of the link are shaped mainly through a phases-based lens. In addition, their perceptions of the dynamics that may hinder, or provide opportunities for operationalization of the link between humanitarian and development aid are shaped through an actor-based lens. Their

diverse perceptions do not neatly fit either continuum or nexus approaches across the spectrum of conceptualization discussed in Chapter 2. They perceive donors, the UN and refugee host countries as key stakeholders with leverage in linking humanitarian and development aid.

The respondents presented diversity along two main lines in their perceptions of distinctions between humanitarian and development aid and in their understanding of linking the two types of aid. A number of respondents underlined that the line between humanitarian and development aid interventions is increasingly blurred in protracted displacement situations, pointing out that the categorised phases of 'humanitarian' and 'development' which establish clear-cut distinctions between the two types of aid are inadequate to describe the reality of the people and of the response on the ground. These respondents converged around an understanding of the link as actions meeting immediate needs at the same time as looking at long-term solutions. Secondly, several respondents perceived development and humanitarian aid more as distinct processes while their perception of the link is rarely linear. In their perception of the link, some of these respondents placed focus on complementarity along with their distinctive characters, highlighting that developing greater complementarity between humanitarian and development actions and programming would allow for a more coherent response framework to achieve the link. Few respondents perceived the link more like a transitioning of assistance programming effectively from humanitarian assistance (emergency relief) to development, while attributing different interpretations to the transition, mainly in terms of specific types of response activities.

Discussing linking of humanitarian and development assistance in protracted situations, the respondents perceived donors as a central actor and downplayed their

own agency in putting the link into practice. A large majority of the respondents perceived obstacles around donors and donor strategies as a significant challenge to linking humanitarian and development aid, but one that remains key to resolve to achieve a successful link. The perceived obstacles can be grouped under institutional set-up, which present divisions between their humanitarian and development branches; funding practices including the silos of funding, lack of multi-year funding and failure of providing adequate levels of development funding early and quickly enough along with overall administrative framework. It can be concluded that the respondents' perceptions around donors and donor strategies in terms of linking humanitarian and development aid reveals a contradiction between what the donors have signed up to, especially as part of their commitments within the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) around the newly-proposed framework of humanitarian-development nexus, and what they actually do on the ground. It seems that policy commitments are there, but donors, mainly due to their institutional set-up and funding behaviour and practices, have not caught up.

Discussing linking of humanitarian and development aid in protracted situations, the respondents recognized that the United Nations (UN) has an important role to play in linking humanitarian and development aid. Respondents noted that UN's leverage in influencing operationalization of humanitarian-development aid may be limited or dependent on a set of internal and external factors. Respondents perceived that basic principles governing the UN's engagement with host governments and the relationship of the UN organizations with a host government, in view of the differences between countries, play a role to what extent the UN can influence how the link is being operationalized in a given country. Respondents also perceived institutional factors, including differences in mandates and planning cycles

in between the UN organizations along with attitudinal obstacles as hindering effective linking of humanitarian and development aid. Several respondents turned their attention to the deficiencies of the inter-agency coordination, including lack of commitment by the individual UN agencies to achieving collective outcomes within the UN System, and deficiencies that pose an obstacle to ensuring effective linking of humanitarian and development aid. Lastly, respondents also perceived UN's leverage in influencing the strategic orientation of key development actors and the broader agenda around linking humanitarian-development aid as constrained by bilateral state-centric nature of development cooperation including the targeting of bilateral development assistance and diffuse development aid structure characterized by poor coordination.

Many respondents perceived the role of the refugee-hosting country as critical to successfully linking humanitarian and development aid. Majority of the respondents reflecting on the role of the host country perceived it as the key driving force behind the collective action geared towards linking humanitarian-development aid. Several of the respondents perceived the link as contextual, highlighting that the ability of a country to operationalize the link may be limited by or dependent on the socio-economic stability of the host country characterizing the wider operational environment for the link along with host country's policy framework vis-à-vis refugees. Some perceived transparent and open data sharing by the host government as critical to achieve the link.

Several respondents perceived non-government organizations, private sector, international financial institutions as stakeholders which are integral to the success of endeavours geared towards strengthening the link between humanitarian and development aid. With reference to the Global Refugee Forum, one respondent

highlighted that the resources and power of these stakeholders, when convened around the same table, can be leveraged to facilitate holistic responses to protracted refugee situations. However, as none of the respondents elaborated on any aspect of engagement of these actors, which can prove facilitating and hindering, it can be argued that these stakeholders remain a peripheral concern in the perception of the UN employees around the link.

When it comes to the Turkish context, the respondents diverged along two main lines in their conceptualization of the link in the context of the response led by the United Nations to the protracted refugee situation in Turkey. A few respondents perceived the link around complementarity, whereby actors apply a parallel and simultaneous array of interventions belonging to the two different types of aid operations across different sectors, primarily basic needs and livelihoods. Some respondents perceived the link more like a transitioning of assistance programming effectively from humanitarian assistance (emergency relief) to development.

Respondents largely converged that linking humanitarian and development aid is relevant in the context of the international community's response, underlining that this is indeed necessitated by the reality of protracted refugee situation in Turkey. They also largely converged in how they perceive the relevance of the link to their programming. They largely perceived strengthening capacity of the Turkish public sector as the response's overarching relevance and contribution to linking humanitarian and development aid along with a relatively limited focus on livelihoods. They perceived that the shift of execution primarily by actors of the multilateral system to execution primarily by national institutions coupled with channelling of funding through state institutions has shifted the programming focus of the international community to strengthening capacity in a bid to enhance

institutional capacities and interventions targeting at strengthening national capacities to ensure effective and efficient assistance and service delivery. A good number of respondents took a cautious stance when reflecting to what extent integration of two different levels of the process of strengthening capacity, namely empowering individuals/communities and building up institutional capacity, is achieved through the response. They perceived this as posing an obstacle to effectively linking humanitarian and development aid and discussed particularly what this entails with regards to delivery of efficient services and the gap between enhancing institutional capacity and strengthening individuals when the national institutions lack the required capacity to respond in the first place.

Some respondents perceived Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) as significant to the endeavour of linking humanitarian and development aid in the context of the response to the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey. Several respondents perceived conceptualization of the 3RP as having two inter-connected components in terms of programming, respectively refugee and resilience, as built up along the traditional humanitarian and development divide and as leading to a lack of clarity on how the two components integrate and how synergies are created in between the two. Respondents perceived programming under the 3RP as not sufficiently strengthening the link between humanitarian and development aid due to the continued focus on mandate-driven programming and limited focus on addressing needs of host communities. However, some respondents also perceived the 3RP as a broad-based partnership platform where stereotypical humanitarian programmes and development programmes converge, thus contributing to linking of humanitarian and development aid.

Respondents presented diversity in their perceptions of the UN's contribution to strengthening humanitarian and development link in the Turkish context. One respondent perceived that linking humanitarian and development aid is not really on the agenda of the UN agencies in terms of programming in the Turkish context and thus does not have programmatic ramifications on how agencies respond. Some respondents perceived some aspects of the inter-agency coordination structure co-led by UNHCR and UNDP as limiting the UN's ability to contribute to the link, including a weak coordination between agencies and weak horizontal coordination amongst the sector-level working groups in terms of creating inter-sector linkages. Only one respondent perceived the link as mainstream for the UN in the Turkish context, however acknowledged that disconnect between humanitarian and development approaches, particularly in terms of certain programmes exist. Few respondents perceived the relevance of linking humanitarian-development aid in responding to protracted situations is more widely internalized among the UN staff at the headquarters level, than those at the country level.

Discussing linking of humanitarian and development assistance in the context of the Turkish response, the respondents perceived donors as a central actor and obstacles around donors and donor strategies as a significant challenge to linking humanitarian-development aid. Some respondents pointed at the increasing pressure from donors on an exit/transition strategy as an obstacle, in face of the continuing humanitarian needs and exclusion risk from humanitarian aid. Besides, one responded perceived donor decision-making favouring partnership with the UN agencies on a bilateral basis and thus excluding joint proposals from within the UN system as an obstacle to linking humanitarian-development aid. Respondents perceived the internal institutional arrangements of the donors, presenting divisions

between their humanitarian and development branches, donor decision-making on which institutional branch funds a specific action and funding practices, including the lack of multi-year development funding as significant obstacles to linking humanitarian-development aid in the Turkish context.

Respondents perceived lack of provision of refugee mapping and profiling data by the Turkish government, economic situation in Turkey, the structure of the labour market and the absence of stable long-term perspective envisioned for refugees as obstacles to the link. However, the respondents also perceived the progressive policy framework in Turkey vis-à-vis refugees, in supporting refugees and integrating them into national services, the political space and broader policy perspective and Turkey's ownership of the development-oriented thinking as facilitating effective linking of humanitarian and development aid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis offers a qualitative analysis of perspectives of the United Nations (UN) employees on linking humanitarian and development aid, in consideration of the humanitarian-development nexus as the most recently-proposed framework, in the context of the UN-coordinated response to the protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey. In doing so, the thesis specifically focuses on the following components of UN employee perspectives on the link: how UN employees perceive the link at the conceptual level; whether they perceive humanitarian and development aid as distinct worlds of aid; how they perceive and negotiate the relevance of this framework to their practices in Turkey; how they perceive the roles of the stakeholders in linking humanitarian and development aid and what their perceptions around factors driving success for and challenges to implementation of the link are. To understand the perspectives of the UN employees on linking humanitarian and development aid in Turkey, this thesis relied on a qualitative research that included semi-structured in-depth key informant interviews with a purposive sample of 9 experts selected from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) representing humanitarian and development angles within the UN.

A two-layered approach to developing the purposive sampling list has been employed, respectively regarding identification of the two organizations within the UN system among the many programmes, funds, and specialized agencies and then regarding identifying of the key informants serving with these organizations.

A major catalyst for the renewed focus on the long- running endeavour of linking humanitarian and development aid has been the large scale and protracted nature of the Syrian refugee situation. For the sixth consecutive year in 2019, Turkey continues to be the largest host country of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2020c). The refugee situation has been responded, under national leadership and ownership, with an ever-evolving policy and aid mix. 2015 marks the point of recognition of the situation as a protracted one with the government policy starting steadily shifting towards a long-term strategic direction centred on inclusion with an enhanced emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of state actors in the response (GEOtest, 2018, p. 50). From 2015 onwards, education, employment, health and social assistance have come afore as main spheres for Syrian refugees, where the precarity has been gradually regulated and addressed to a certain extent through secondary legislation in line with Turkey's evolving policy framework with significant persistent challenges to long-term integration.

While Turkish state continue to be the primary actor with an extending role at all levels; international stakeholders continue play equally important role in the shaping of the policy and aid environment with involvement of a multiplicity of different actors (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2016, p. 332). While Turkey first strived to manage the crisis on its own resources, it later developed an uneasy relationship with the international community (Ferris & Kirisci, 2016, p.49). The international support has thus assumed a more prominent role in Turkey's response and remains critical in facing the increasing challenges of long-term integration. The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), which is a UN coordinated inter-agency response plan, and the European Union Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT), implemented in cooperation with the agencies of the UN system, has been the two largest schemes

through which the international community continues to support the response in Turkey.

Against this background, given the key role the UN system plays in Turkey in support of the response to the protracted refugee situation, understanding how the UN employees in aid perceive and negotiate linking humanitarian and development aid and how their agency is manifested through their experiences, negotiations and contestations over the link remains critical to furthering the understanding around linking humanitarian-development aid in the context of protracted situations.

Firstly, this thesis provides extensive contribution to the long-standing conceptualization efforts around linking humanitarian and development aid in policy and literature, in support of the previous literature tackling conceptualization efforts from various angles. To start with, the analysis here shows that the 'conceptual gray zone' between humanitarian and development aid persists. Besides, it demonstrates that conceptualization constitutes a dynamic and evolving process, grounded in the realities of the affected communities, including refugees and members of the host community and the everyday functioning of humanitarian and development aid actors. The thesis offers supporting evidence to Audet (2015) who noted that the debate reveals a 'conceptual gray zone' and Macrae et al. (1997) who highlighted that the conceptual framework is an evolving construct (Audet, 2015, p. 112; Macrae et al., 1997, p. 225).

The analysis demonstrates that the diversity of the perceptions around conceptual framing of the link do not neatly fit into the three different paradigms mentioned in the literature that have come to frame policy thinking and practice to develop a coherent response framework to protracted displacement situations. As discussed in the Chapter 2, three different paradigms that shaped policy thinking and

practice to enhance coherency of international engagement in protracted crises are as follows: first generation approaches of bridging the contiguum, second-generation approaches of coherence in the contiguum and third generation approaches anchored in collaboration amid complexity (Mowjee, Garrasi & Poole, 2015, pp. 15-17). Acknowledging overlapping aspects of the concepts developed in support of the previous literature (Otto & Weingärtner, 2013, p. 31), the analysis here shows that the perspectives around conceptual framing incorporate ramifications of second generation approaches of coherence in the contiguum, based on the premises of complementarity with synergetic overlapping and greater linkage of programming, and third generation approaches anchored in collaboration amid complexity. In addition, perspectives reflect that the response in Turkey is shaped with a more-advanced awareness of the complexity of the link.

In view of the humanitarian-development nexus as the most recent framework for linking humanitarian-development aid, which falls under third generation approaches, the thesis provides evidence that this nexus reformulation, in the Turkish context, is still an evolving and largely experimental pursuit, far from being mainstream and is still loosely related to structural shifts across the aid system with regards to funding and programming. The perspectives vis-a-vis endeavors of operationalizing the link in the context of the response in Turkey reveals some elements of the linear continuum approach, which were discussed extensively in the literature by Smillie, Mosel and Levine (1998, p.1) along with Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005, p.5). The thesis demonstrates that the Turkish context, under the influence of donor strategies in terms of exiting from a large-scale cash-based humanitarian assistance scheme and transitioning into livelihoods programming, incorporates elements of the linearity that marked first generation continuum-

thinking approach, which views relief and development as essentially sequential types of effort and conceives the link primarily as an application of exit strategies to lay the ground for the next aid instrument in terms of aid programming and funding.

Secondly, this thesis provides substantive contribution to the literature that is striving to untangle the challenges to operationalizing humanitarian-development link. The contribution of the thesis builds on and enriches the findings of previous empirical literature while adding innovative elements with a focus on the three actors identified with considerable leverage in the debate: donors, the UN and host countries of refugees.

To start with, the analysis reveals that the lack of clarity surrounding the definitions and the concepts continue to be perceived as a challenge to operationalizing the link. Though some respondents clearly acknowledged that the line between humanitarian and development aid interventions is increasingly blurred in protracted displacement situations, distinct operational cultures continue to present an obstacle. The field study brings empirical evidence to the findings of Audet et al. (2015) and Otto and Weingärtner (2013) that the two distinct operational cultures characterized by the different paradigms of humanitarian and development aid, remain the primordial obstacle (Audet, 2015, pp. 116-117; Otto & Weingärtner, 2013, p. 36). Besides, the thesis revealed an opinion largely shared by both development and humanitarian realms of aid that the ownership level of the linking agenda by the development sector continues to be weaker than the level of ownership demonstrated by the humanitarian sector. Audet (2015) also highlighted that the agenda is yet to be equally owned by the larger development community since the linkage debate continues to be driven by the humanitarian actors while Otto and Weingärtner (2013) pointed out that that the discussion on linkage largely takes place

within the humanitarian sphere (Audet, 2015, p. 117; Otto & Weingärtner, 2013, p. 36). Following the previous insights in the literature, Cetinoglu and Yılmaz's (2020) study also highlights the limits of programming in protracted refugee contexts to mainstream protection concerns into development assistance schemes (p. 18).

The insights, which this thesis offers, support the former emphasis in the literature around the central role of donors in linking humanitarian-development aid, which plays out in a way that downplays the agency of the UN as part of the multilateral system. The findings demonstrate an unequivocal consensus on the institutional set-up, which continue to present divisions between the humanitarian and development branches of most donors for the response in Turkey, as posing a significant challenge to linking humanitarian and development aid. The literature, since the early days of emergence of the debate on linking humanitarian-development aid, has widely spoken of the consequences of the institutional set-up as an important donor-related barrier to the success of the link. In a recent research paper published in 2017 by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reflecting on international co-operation and development assistance in refugee contexts; Ruaudel and Morrison-Métois (2017) also highlighted that the discursive acknowledgement of the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis has not been translated into policy in all contexts and some donors maintain the separation of the aid management system and funding allocation for humanitarian and development streams (p. 14). Besides, the findings of the field study provide strong insight into the ways through which funding decisions and practices are downplaying the endeavour of linking humanitarian and development aid: including through the silos of funding, lack of multi-year funding and failure to provide adequate levels of development funding

early and quickly enough. This supports the findings of a 2018 study by Save the Children, looking into operationalization of the New Way of Working (NWoW), as an initiative to bridge humanitarian and development aid divide, in the Ethiopia and Somalia contexts (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018, p.17). Parallel to the analysis in this thesis, this study also highlighted that financing modalities which require shift in the funding dynamics and alignment of donor policies to prevent the siloed approaches in protracted crises was cited by the stakeholders as critical to ensure greater coherence towards the nexus (Ndeda & Birungi, 2018, p.19).

The thesis also offers a set of innovative insights into how the UN agencies negotiate their leverage in influencing operationalization of the link and how their agency is limited or dependent on a set of internal and external factors. Given the fact that multilateral agencies of the UN system have received limited attention in the literature with regards to their agency in linking humanitarian-development aid and the UN system continues to play a key role in many contexts where the response of the international community is coordinated by the UN, the findings of the field study presents valuable contribution to the literature on how this agency plays out. The thesis provides supporting evidence that institutional factors among the many funds and agencies of the UN system, including differences and overlaps in mandates and differences in planning cycles along with attitudinal obstacles restrict UN's leverage to influence and implement the link (Ndeda & Birungi,2018). Otto and Weingärtner (2013) also framed what they referred as the challenge of two worlds apart as unlocking the differences of the two aid spheres ranging from working cultures and different principles and values as well as by different working rhythms and speeds (p. 36). Besides, the field study shows that the deficiencies of the inter-agency coordination, including lack of commitment by the individual UN agencies to

achieving collective outcomes within the UN system, as significantly constraining UN's leverage in operationalizing the link. Additionally, the analysis here also demonstrates that the single most important factor cited by the UN employees has to do with donor strategies in general and particularly bilateral state-centric nature of development aid and cooperation as constraining UN's leverage in influencing the strategic orientation of key development actors and the broader agenda around linking humanitarian-development aid. Garnier (2014), who examined the interagency cooperation between the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the promotion of refugees' right to work between 1987 and 2007, also identified donor states' lack of interest in the link with a focus on the funding shortage and a lack of ownership by the agencies in an environment characterized by institutional competition between humanitarian and development actors as the main challenges to effective interagency cooperation (Garnier, 2014, p. 20).

Following the previous insights in the literature, Cetinoglu and Yılmaz's (2020) study highlights the importance of contextual analysis that incorporates the broader policy context in examining linking humanitarian and development aid (p.18). In support of previous findings in the literature Memisoglu and Ilgit (2016) highlights that the Turkish state, through a set of legal and administrative changes and policy developments, and the European Union, as the most influential external stakeholder and the largest donor of the refugee response in Turkey, play equally important role in defining the environment where response frameworks striving to link humanitarian and development aid are implemented (p.332). The protection environment for refugees in Turkey characterized by protracted uncertainty, in terms of its temporal and spatial dimensions, lack of perspective of local integration and

any concern for durability and the donor pressure in view of the EU-Turkey Statement which has turned refugees into a political bargaining chip in the region leads to a complex, politically-charged and almost impossible environment in Turkey (Biehl, 2015, p. 69; Rygiel, Baban & Ilcan 2016; Yılmaz, 2018, p.6; Ulusoy & Battjes, 2017).

Besides, the findings of the field study show that strengthening capacity of the Turkish public sector is perceived as the response's overarching relevance and contribution to linking humanitarian and development aid along with a relatively limited focus on livelihoods. In order words, the findings show that the meaning of development in the context of Turkish response is to a large extent institutional capacity building for the public sector. In this sense, the thesis diverges from a broad body of literature that takes on an analytical approach with regards to development in protracted refugee situations around the privatization of humanitarian space characterized by a shift from public-welfare model of refugee assistance to private-sector led initiatives in view of the widening impact of neo-liberal thought on development. Besides, the field study demonstrates that donor's funding decisions in terms of channeling assistance through state institutions with a view to enhancing effective provision of protection and services has contributed to strengthening the national capacities, however has not necessarily translated into strengthening of the people and communities. This reveals a dilemma between strengthening domestic institutions and building the resilience of people and communities in the Turkish context. With regards to livelihoods, the fieldwork shows that the discourse around livelihoods is many times accompanied by a focus on exiting from humanitarian aid and despite rarely with reference to aid dependency. This provides evidence to earlier work in the literature including by Harvey and Lind (2015) that reflects on

the functions of dependency, as a persistent term in the context of humanitarian relief, and underlines that dependency discourses have served to justify to scale down relief along with the shift from relief to development in protracted refugee situations (pp. 15-16).

In conclusion, this thesis finds that the perspectives on the UN employees on linking humanitarian and development aid present diversity at a conceptual level. Institutional capacity development in the Turkish public sector is perceived as the overarching relevance and contribution of the international community's response in the context of the 3RP to linking humanitarian and development aid along with relatively limited focus on livelihoods. In the actual practice, UN employees identify a dilemma between strengthening national institutions and building the resilience of people and communities. Finally, UN employees perceive the link as being mainly shaped by the negotiations between donors and the government of the host country rather than through an inclusive approach bringing together diverse actors operating in both worlds of aid.

APPENDIX A

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

HUMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTIONAL EVALUATION COMMITTEE

APPROVAL

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 26/06/2020-52

T.C.
BOĞAZİÇİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER YÜKSEK LİSANS VE DOKTORA TEZLERİ ETİK İNCELEME KOMİSYONU
TOPLANTI TUTANAĞI

Toplantı Sayısı	:	2
Toplantı Tarihi	:	16/03/2020
Toplantı Saati	:	14:00
Toplantı Yeri	:	Skype Sanal Toplantı
Bulunanlar	:	Prof. Dr. Feyza Çorapçı, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen, Prof. Dr. Özlem Hesapçı Karaca, Doç. Dr. Ebru Kaya, Prof. Dr. Fatma Nevra Seggie
Bulunmayanlar	:	

Sevcan Hacılar
Sosyal Politika

Sayın Araştırmacı,

"Perspectives of the UN employees in aid in operationalizing humanitarian- development nexus: Protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey" başlıklı projeniz ile ilgili olarak yaptığınız SBB-EAK 2020/09 sayılı başvuru komisyonumuz tarafından 16 Mart 2020 tarihli toplantıda incelenmiş ve uygun bulunmuştur.

Bu karar tüm üyelerin toplantıya çevrimiçi olarak katılımı ve oybirliği ile alınmıştır. COVID-19 önlemleri kapsamında kurul üyelerinden ıslak imza alınamadığı için bu onam mektubu üye ve raportör olarak Fatma Nevra Seggie tarafından bütün üyeler adına e-imzalanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla, bilgilerinizi rica ederiz.

Prof. Dr. Fatma Nevra SEGGIE
ÜYE

e-imzalıdır
Prof. Dr.Fatma Nevra SEGGIE
Raportör

APPENDIX B

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Institution supporting the project: Boğaziçi University

Title of project: Perspectives of the UN employees in aid in operationalizing humanitarian-development nexus: Protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey

Project manager: Assoc. Prof. Volkan Yılmaz

E-mail: vyilmaz@boun.edu.tr

Telefonu: +902123597563

Researcher: Sevcan Hacılar

E-mail: sevcan.hacilar@boun.edu.tr

Phone: +905557604405

Consent: Linking humanitarian-development aid has long been a prominent theme on the international aid agenda and the humanitarian-development nexus continues to be debated from different perspectives including from policy, strategy, operational, programmatic and contextual angles. This study aims to gauge, through the perspectives of the UN employees in humanitarian and development aid, on how the humanitarian-development nexus is evoked and capture their perceptions of the dynamics that may hinder, or provide opportunities for operationalization of the nexus in protracted refugee contexts. Against this background, your participation involves talking about your perspectives on the humanitarian-development nexus in protracted refugee contexts, with reference to your experience within UN's response to the Syrian refugee situation, and on the dynamics that may hinder, or provide opportunities for operationalization of the nexus. Your interview is expected to last around 45 minutes.

You should voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. A copy of the consent form provided here is yours to keep, if you do decide to take part. Even if you agree to participate now, you can still decide to withdraw at any time without giving a reason, or refuse to answer any question without any consequences of any kind. You can withdraw permission to use data from your interview within two weeks after the interview, in which case the material will be deleted. You will be asked if you would agree to your interview being audio-recorded. In case you feel uncomfortable or unwilling to be recorded, the researcher will take notes of the interview. You agree to disguised extracts from your interview being quoted as part of the study.

All information you provide for this study will be treated confidentially. In any report on the results of this research your identity will remain anonymous. This will be done by disguising any details of your interview which may reveal your identity or the identity of people you speak about. The signed consent forms and original audio recordings (in case you agree) will be retained in a secure location until the exam board confirms the results of this dissertation. A transcript of your interview in which all identifying information has been removed will be retained till 30 June 2020.

You will not benefit directly from participating in this research. The methods and procedures of the research will by no means bring about any physical risks including physical discomfort, pain, injury, illness or disease and the participants will not be engaged in a social situation which could involve violence. No social and economic risks, as a consequence of participation in the research, are foreseen.
Please feel free to ask any questions before you sign this consent form. You are free to contact the project manager and researcher involved in the research to seek further clarification and information.

Please kindly notify us if your phone details and/or address happen to change.

I have read and understood the information above. I have received a signed copy of this form or do not want to receive (in the later case, the researcher will keep the copy).

Signature of research participant

I voluntarily agree to take part in the study.

I voluntarily agree/disagree that my interview being audio-recorded. (Please circle your preference)

Full name: ……..
Signature: ……..
Date (dd/mm/yy): ……..

Signature of researcher

I believe the participant is giving informed consent to participate in this study

Full name: ……..
Signature: ……..
Date (dd/mm/yy): ……..

APPENDIX C

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FORM

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FORM

Institution supporting the project: Boğaziçi University

Title of project: Perspectives of the UN employees in aid in operationalizing humanitarian-development nexus: Protracted Syrian refugee situation in Turkey

Project manager: Assoc. Prof. Volkan Yılmaz

E-mail: vyilmaz@boun.edu.tr

Telefonu: +902123597563

Researcher: Sevcan Hacılar

E-mail: sevcan.hacilar@boun.edu.tr

Phone: +905557604405

Project subject: Linking humanitarian-development aid has long been a prominent theme on the international aid agenda and the humanitarian-development nexus continues to be debated from different perspectives including from policy, strategy, operational, programmatic and contextual angles. Within the framework of this study, it is aimed to gauge, through the perspectives of the UN employees in humanitarian and development aid, on how the humanitarian-development nexus is evoked and capture their perceptions of the dynamics that may hinder, or provide opportunities for operationalization of the nexus in protracted refugee contexts. A purposive sample of 12 individuals occupying roles with specific involvement and/or knowledge of the humanitarian and development interventions within the UN Inter-agency Coordination Structure, with structures established at the national and sub-national level across Turkey, will be interviewed. The interviews are conducted after granting of consent by the Ethics Committee for Master and PhD Theses in Social Sciences and Humanities of Boğaziçi University (date: XX).

I have read and understood the information above. I have received a signed copy of this information form or do not want to receive (in the later case, the researcher will keep the copy).

Signature of research participant

I have read and understood the information above.

Full name: ……..
Signature: ……..
Date (dd/mm/yy): ……..

Signature of researcher

I believe the participant has read and understood the information above.

Full name: ……..
Signature: ……..
Date (dd/mm/yy): ……..

APPENDIX D

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. As you know, there has been an increasing interest especially from the donor community in linking humanitarian and development assistance. How do you evaluate this interest?
2. Do you see humanitarian assistance and development assistance as two separate domains? If yes, how would you differentiate the two?
3. Do you think linking humanitarian and development assistance agenda offers an opportunity of mutual learning between humanitarian assistance and development assistance communities?
4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each? Which one should learn what from the other? Could you please give examples?
5. What do you understand from linking humanitarian and development aid? I would be glad to hear your personal take on this.
6. As an expert working at UNHCR/UNDP, do you think linking humanitarian aid/relief and development has become a mainstream concept for your work or is it still experimental? In either case, could you please elaborate how it affects your work?
7. Can you reflect/elaborate on the (internal and external) factors that have driven UNHCR/UNDP to embrace this approach?

8. Do you see the current normative frameworks such as Agenda 2030, Leave No One Behind (LNOB), UN System Reform link with the humanitarian-development nexus? If so, how do they link?

9. Do you think humanitarian and development aid is operationally reconcilable? Have you come across any tensions in bridging these two approaches in your work? Alternatively, does the two easily come together?

10. Considering the protracted refugee context in Turkey, do you find this approach (theoretically/practically) relevant and beneficial in responding to the situation?

11. In your opinion, should linking humanitarian and development aid be pursued as an inter-agency agenda or individually by agencies? Or both?

12. Can please you give me an example about a programme implemented by your agency which you think has successfully linked humanitarian and development aid? Can you speak about the critical factors that brought about this success?

13. Thinking your agency's work to operationalize the humanitarian-development link, what have been the specific factors, across the board, which threatened to obstruct the attempts to achieve this link?

14. In your opinion, what does (an ideal) humanitarian-development nexus that works look like?

15. How would an expert like yourself who works to bridge humanitarian-development aid and operationalize the nexus, would observe the recent developments where Syrian refugees are moving onwards to Europe?

APPENDIX E

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (TURKISH)

1. Son yıllarda insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı bağlantısının sağlanmasına, donörler başta olmak üzere, gösterilen ilginin artığını görüyoruz. Bu artan ilgiyi nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
2. Siz, insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımını birbirinden farklı iki alan mı görüyorsunuz? Eğer öyleyse, sizce bu iki alanı birbirinden ayıran temel farklar nedir?
3. Sizce insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı bağlantısını güçlendirmeye yönelik gündem/çalışmalar, insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı alanında çalışanların birbirlerinden öğrenmeleri için bir fırsat mı?
4. Sizce, insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımının her birinin güçlü ve zayıf yanları neler? Hangi alanın bir diğerinden öğrenmesi gerekiyor? Birkaç örnekle açıklayabilir misiniz?
5. Peki sizce insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı bağlantısının sağlanması ne anlama geliyor? Sizin bu konudaki kişisel görüşünüzü duymak isterim.
6. UNHCR/UNDP'de çalışan bir uzman olarak, sizce insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı bağlantısının sağlanması, sizin işiniz için mainstream bir konsept haline gelmiş durumda mı yoksa hala deneysel çalışılan bir alan mı? Bu bağlantının sağlanması gündemi, çalışmalarınızı nasıl etkiliyor?
7. UNHCR/UNDP'nin bu yaklaşımı benimsemesindeki (iç ve dış) etmenler/faktörler sizce nelerdir, biraz bunlardan bahsedebilir misiniz?
8. Şu anda konuşulan 2030 Gündemi, Leave No One Behind, BM sistem reformu gibi normatif çerçeveler sizce insani yardım-kalkınma yardımı bağlantısıyla ilişkileniyor mu? İlişkileniyorsa nasıl?

9. Sizce insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı operasyonel açıdan birbiriyle uzlaşabilir/bağdaşabilir mi? Çalışmalarınızda bu iki yaklaşımı birleştirirken gerilimle karşılaştınız mı? Yoksa bu iki alan kolaylıkla bir araya gelebiliyor mu?

10. Türkiye'deki uzayan mülteci durumunu düşündüğümüzde, bu yaklaşımın, teorik ve pratik anlamda, mevcut durumdaki ihtiyaçlara cevap verme noktasında ilgili/alakalı ve faydalı buluyor musunuz?

11. Sizce, insani yardım ve kalkınma yardımının sağlanması kuruluşlar arası (inter-agency) bir gündem olarak mı hayata geçirilmeli, ya da her bir kuruluş kendi bünyesinde mi bu bağlantıyı hayata geçirmeye yönelik olarak çalışılmalı? Ya da sizce her ikisi birlikte mi?

12. Peki, UNDP/UNHCR'nin uyguladığı ve insani yardım kalkınma yardımı bağlantısı başarılı bir şekilde hayata geçirmiş olan bir programdan bahsedebilir misiniz? Sizce bu başarıyı getiren kritik faktörler nelerdi?

13. İnsani yardım ve kalkınma yardımı bağlantısının sağlanmasında UNDP/UNHCR'nin çalışmaları düşününce, bu çerçevedeki girişimlerinin başarılı olmasının önündeki engeller nelerdi?

14. Sizce tam anlamıyla işleyen yani ideal bir insani yardım-kalkınma yardımı bağlantısı nasıl olmalıdır?

15. (sınır kapılarının açılması) Mültecilerin Avrupa'ya doğru hareketine tanıklık ettiğimiz son gelişmeleri, insani yardım-kalkınma yardımı bağlantısını hayata geçirmeye çalışan bir uzman olarak siz nasıl değerleniriyorsunuz?

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