THE TRANSFORMATION OF MESS & TISK FROM FOUNDATION TO 2005: "A STORY OF REJOICING"

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF MESS & TISK FROM FOUNDATION TO 2005: "A STORY OF REJOICING"

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Title: The Transformation of MESS&TISK from Foundation to 2005: "A Story of Rejoicing"

This thesis scrutinizes the history of MESS and TISK, two representative organizations of big capital in Turkey from 1960s to 2005. Based on a discursive analysis of the publications of these organizations, it traces the changing mood of the capitalist class in social and political realms as well as in the area of industrial relations. Due to strong unionization and rising worker militancy, the associations were socially timid, ineffective in the political arena and unable to develop a strategy to confront the labor movement in the pre-1980 period. The military intervention in 1980, however, turned the power balance between capital and labor. This process lent the capitalist class a considerable social legitimacy and self-confidence. From 1980 to 2005, the associations enhanced their social prestige by increasing their cultural and social capital, augmented their political strength by developing closer ties with state officials and party leaders and enjoyed their superiority over labor unions that were seriously weakened by the new labor laws. The essential feature of this period is the fact that the capitalist class ceased to remain in defensive lines and initiated a counter-attack that further consolidated its hegemony.

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Başlık: Kuruluştan Bugüne MESS ve TİSK'in Dönüşümü: "Bir Gülme Hikayesi"

Bu çalışma Türkiye'deki büyük sermayenin iki önemli örgütü olan MESS ve TİSK'in 1960'lardan 2005 yılına kadar olan tarihini incelemektedir. Örgütlerin yayınlarının söylem analizine dayanan çalışma, sermaye sınıfının sosyal ve politik arena ile endüstriyel ilişkiler alanında değişen durumunu ele almaktadır. 1980 öncesinde güçlü sendikalar ve yükselen sol muhalefet nedeniyle, MESS ve TİSK sosyal alanda çekingen ve politik olarak etkisiz olmanın yanı sıra emek hareketine karşı mücadelede kapsamlı bir strateji geliştirmekten yoksundular. Ancak, 1980 askeri darbesiyle birlikte emek ve sermaye arasındaki güç dengesi tersine döndü. Bu süreç sermaye sınıfına kayda değer bir toplumsal meşruiyet ve özgüven sağladı. 1980'den 2005'e kadarki dönemde sözkonusu örgütler entelektüel ve sosyal sermayelerini arttırarak toplumsal prestijlerini geliştirdiler, devlet görevlileri ve parti liderleriyle daha yakın ilişkiler kurarak politik güçlerini arttırdılar ve yeni iş yasalarıyla ciddi biçimde zayıflayan sendikalara karşı pazarlık güçlerini arttırdılar. Bu dönemi karakterize eden temel olgu sermaye sınıfının savunma halinden çıkıp bir tür karşı saldırı başlatması ve bu sayede hegemonyasını güçlendirmesidir.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A Brief History of MESS and TISK

The 1960s

The foundation of employers' associations in Turkey dates back to the late 1950s. Law No. 5018, which was passed in 1947, allowed the establishment of trade unions by abolishing the principle of non-allowance for class-based communities yet in a highly limited manner. Although that act banned the right of strike, among other serious restrictions that rendered trade unionism practically impossible, many trade unions emerged during this period, especially in some key sectors, such as metal and textile. The first employers' associations were also founded in this period, as a kind of response to the organizational inclinations of the working class despite legal barriers. However, these, besides being small in scale, acted as economic cooperation organizations among employers rather than focusing directly on industrial relations.[1]

MESS, being one of these "pre-associations," was founded on 14 October 1959, by 11 prominent employers of the metal sector. The absence of a unionized working class rendered MESS and other associations redundant in the eyes of the bulk of the

[1] İsmet Sipahi, *Gelenek ve Gelecek V: 1* (Istanbul: BZD Yayıncılık, 2001) p. 15.

employers. The memoirs of the founders of MESS reveal that very few employers foresaw the potential of the working class, and thus the need to organize. [2]

The somehow early "consciousness" of the founders about that need mostly emanated from their links to foreign countries and their observations of the industrial relations in those countries.[3] They were exclusively Istanbul-based employers and were also close friends besides their involvement in the association. Another noteworthy point is that five of the founders, slightly less than 50 percent, were non-Muslim, a fact that gives an idea about the composition of that "vanguard" section of the class. Before the military intervention in 1960, which initiated a new era in Turkey's socio-political structure as well as industrial relations, MESS had only 17 members.[4]

The 27 May intervention and the constitution following the intervention brought in fundamental transformations in the juridical structure concerning labor relations that would soon manifest themselves in the situation of worker unions and employers' associations. The new constitution guaranteed the rights of union establishment, collective agreement and strike for workers, as a first in Turkey's labor history. The enforcement of these rights, however, would be possible with the Law no. 274 and 275, passed in July 1963.

It was 1961 when the working class began to hold its first massive movements, and showed itself off in the arena. The Saraçhane Meeting, where a hundred thousand workers came together to push for better wages and the right to strike in December 1961

[2] Ibid., pp. 25-27.

[3] Ibid., p. 29. See Figure 1

[4] Ibid., p. 23.

and the resistance at Kavel Factory, where 170 Maden-İş [5]-member workers went on an illegal strike for 1.5 months in early 1963, were two prominent demonstrations that attracted significant attention from public opinion, signaled more massive uprisings and caused a state of alertness on the side of the employers.[6]

In line with this process, the number of members of the employers' associations including MESS showed a dramatic increase. With the emergence of massive labor movements, several employers left behind their former reluctance to organize and joined in the associations. By 1965, MESS's number, for instance, had risen to 185, a sign of the increasing inclination for organization.[7]

The relations among various employers' associations also grew stronger in this period. Organized in local or sectoral base, six employer associations, led by MESS, felt the need to form an upper branch and founded the League of Employer Unions of Istanbul. This organization would soon expand and one year later, on 20 December 1962, would be converted to TISK, a nation-wide upper committee of employers' associations. In the process that resulted in the formation of TISK, MESS was indisputably the leading organization.[8]

It is vital to emphasize that the Istanbul Chamber of Industry generously backed the organization of the employers in an association. The chamber, founded as a "semi-official" institution on mandatory grounds, had severe constraints about facing the organized labor and was sympathetic to the idea of a separate organization that would

[5] Union of Metal Workers.

[6] Ibid., p.41.

[7] Ibid., p. 125. See Figure 1.

[8] See figure 3.

focus on this area.[9] Besides huge financial aids, it created a commission within itself to deal with the organization of employers in associations.[10]

Approximately about the same time, MESS, following the idea that a single, nation-wide association of the sector could more powerfully deal with national labor unions,[11] gained a national representation by merging the associations in other cities into its own body.

In the first half of the 1960s, MESS and TISK increased their organizational power, gained recognition from state bodies as a party in industrial relations on the one hand, and began to deal with the economic problems of their members on the other hand. By 1967, MESS, the biggest association of TISK then as now, had organized 55 percent of the sector.[12] The total number of workers employed by MESS-member workplaces was more than 53,000. Moreover, three large-scale public enterprises, MKE (Industry of Machine and Chemistry[13]), TDCI[14] (Iron and Steel Enterprises of Turkey), and Ereğli Demir Çelik Fabrikaları(Iron and Steel Factories of Ereğli) had also joined MESS that was for long pushing for the organization of public enterprises in order to achieve the organizational unity of the sector.[15]

1967 witnessed the foundation of DISK[16] (the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions), as a rival union confederation to Türk-İş. The founders of DISK,

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[9] Ibid., p. 51.

[10] Ibid., p. 52.

[11] *Türk-İş (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu),* the first union confederation of Turkey had been founded in 1952.

[12] Ibid., p. 127.

[13] "Makine Kimya Endüstrisi"

[14] "Türkiye Demir Çelik İşletmeleri"

[15] Ibid., p. 124.

[16] "Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu"

mostly socialist-leaning personalities, declared that Türk-İş had ceased to defend the workers' rights, and that an alternative unionism was necessary.[17] The foundation of DISK would mark a qualitatively new, and a more militant era, in the history of class struggles in Turkey. The existence of DISK elevated the demands of the working class, besides paving the way to more radical actions and more frequent strikes. Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası,[18] the pivotal element of DISK and the main respondent of MESS would acquire an unprecedented radicalism in the following years, and this situation would inevitably affect MESS' position.[19] In fact, Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası had been the most powerful and well organized union in Turkey when it had been a part of Türk-İş, as well. That is also probably why MESS was relatively stronger and better organized with respect to the associations in other sectors, since the existence of a strong trade union directly induced cohesion among employers and enhanced inclinations for collective action.

It is vital here to recall the events known as the 15-16 June incidents in which more than 1,500 workers around the city of Istanbul spontaneously gathered to protest a bill that aimed to close down DISK. The two days of protests, which resulted in four deaths and that could only be suppressed by massive police and army intervention, was a highly significant indicator of the power of the young working class of Turkey, for all, the capitalists, the state, and the workers themselves. MESS and TISK predictably

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[17] Yıldırım Koç, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi* (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1998)

p. 80.

[18] Union of Metal Workers of Turkey.

[19] Sipahi *V:1*, p. 169.

opposed the uprisings on the grounds of violation of the law and called for measures against the "union rivalry," of which they considered the events as a by product of.[20]

In 1969, MESS founded a "research service" that would deal with work evaluations for scientific planning and wage-determination systems. Seemingly, this then-modest service composed of a few professionals aimed to provide "know-how" about industrial matters. In time, however, it would be transformed into a huge research bureau employing hundreds of professionals including economists and conducting large-scale research on the whole field of industrial relations.

In this period, MESS also established a strike and lockout fund that would aim to help its members in case of long lasting strikes.[21] This fund would prove to be very useful during the fierce struggles of the 1970's.

Although the associations were growing in membership and power, the administrative board of MESS, however, still suffered the indifference of employers to the idea of organization, and that considerable number of them considered the association as a structure required merely in periods of collective agreements. The associations would have to wait for the next decade in order to prove their vitality on the side of individual employers.

[20] See figure 18.

[21] Ibid., p.130.

The 1970s

15-16 June, together with the ascending student militancy and peasant movements that manifested themselves with land occupations were considered by the military as "signs of anarchy" and constituted the main rationale of the second coup d'état of the republic, in addition to parliamentary upheavals and economic instability, approximately just a decade later than the first one. MESS and TISK's attitude towards the military intervention was far from cautious. They welcomed the coup on the grounds that it gave an end to "terror" and controlled strikes and excessive wage demands, thus provided economic stability. One of the most important developments of the so-called interim period between 1970 and 1973, was the constitutional reforms the aim of which was "to balance social awakening with economic awakening," as stated by one of the ministers of the time. TISK not only gave full support to this balancing act, but also issued a "memorandum" to the government and party leaders, emphasizing "the need to mobilize people in order to be successful in the efforts to prevent anarchy and implement reforms"[22] This gesture, I believe, should be read as a foresight of TISK about the potentials of working class militancy, that was called "anarchy." The associations were indeed right in their suspicion about the insufficiency of mere oppressive measures against "anarchy." Soon after the end of the interim regime, a huge wave of strikes, *de facto* general strikes, lockouts, occupations, demonstrations, and armed conflicts would storm the country by the end of the decade.

[22] Ibid., p. 267.

In this period, the unblockable ascendancy of the labor movement and the intensification of class struggles led to a steady increase in the membership rates of MESS and TISK.[23] Through time, the associations' recognition among individual employers, labor unions, and state bodies spread. The series of militant acts of DISK against the DGM's[24] (State Security Courts) in 1976 were a clear sign of the politicization of the union, and MESS's sanctions against the workers attending these demonstrations were a milestone in the formation of MESS's popular image. MESS took binding decisions against demonstrating workers and union activists which were fervently opposed by the unions. After this, MESS became a target for radical unionism to such a degree that the slogan "we have smashed DGM, now it's MESS' turn" had become quite popular among the workers of the concerned sector. This slogan should be considered as proof of the pivotal and leading position of MESS among the capitalist class.[25]

As the conflicts grew fierce, MESS' tone against radical unions and leftist militancy grew harsher. The association, for instance, published leaflets directly targeting Maden-İş, labeling it as a submissive, externally rooted actor, and calling "conscious and patriotic worker" not to join Maden-İş. On the May 1, 1977 events in which armed paramilitaries on the roof of the Intercontinental Hotel shot randomly at people and claimed 33 lives, MESS blamed radical unionism and the student movement

[23] The membership rates began to decline starting from 1976. Maden-İş had targeted MESS at that time and it exerted a great pressure on some MESS member-workplaces in order to separate them from MESS. MESS relatively high wage policy was also a reason for the decline, since small-scale enterprises could not afford those wage policies. See figure 1.

[24] "Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri"

[25] For instance, Atilla İlhan, writing in a daily of the time, would call MESS the "striking force of the capitalist class." Quoted in ibid., p 438.

as responsible for the catastrophic incidents. After 1978, MESS complained strongly about the weakness of the political authority and openly called for harsher measures from the security forces.

One of the significant events of this period was the appointment of Turgut Özal, the then-secretary general of MESS to the prime ministerial undersecretariat in 1979. The holding of this top bureaucratic position by a former administrator of MESS was undoubtedly a sign of the growing relation of the state with the associations in particular and big capital in general. While at this post, Özal led the commission that would publish the January 24 decisions, which proposed a dramatically new economic regime in line with the global trends. After 1980, he was appointed the minister of economy of the military government. He would win the first elections just after returning to civilian rule and become the prime minister, then the president, confirming the enhancing force of the private sector in political processes. It is important to note that Şahap Kocatopçu and Tahsin Önalp, well-known industrialists and administrators of TISK and MESS, also found places in the military government as ministers.

When the armed forces seized power in 1980, MESS and TISK unsurprisingly lent full support to the military for rescuing peace and ending the terror. The celebratory remarks of the associations just after the coup,[26] and the then-president of TISK, Halit Narin's (in)famous comments on the new labor legislation inured in the aftermath of the coup: "Up until today they (the workers) rejoiced, now it's our turn"[27] was indisputably expressing their sentiments as well the class nature of the military intervention.

[26] *İşveren*, no.12 (September 1980), no.1 (October 1980). See figure 23.

[27] "Şimdiye kadar onlar güldü. Sıra bizde."

1980's and after

Since various aspects of the post-80 period of the associations will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, I will only briefly talk about some organizational issues and important incidents concerning the associations.

The membership rates of MESS fell from 1977 until 1980 and did not change much until 1983. In 1983, MESS initiated an extensive campaign and achieved a considerable increase. The success of this campaign partly emanated from the fact that in 1984, the collective agreements cancelled in 1980 would start again, and MESS warned the employers that a stronger labor unionism was emerging. This increasing trend continued steadily until 1988, in which the number of MESS members reached 455. After this year, membership rates began to decline again.[28] The reasons for this will be analyzed in the following chapters.

Another significant development in this period was the establishment of the MESS Foundation of Education. This foundation aimed to develop the workers' technical capabilities and qualities in MESS-member factories by organizing seminars and courses, hence to obtain a more efficient and educated work force.[29] In addition to this objective, it contributed to the public image of the associations as well. One of the most important things MEV achieved was the cooperation of industry and education through joint programs with the Ministry of National Education.[30]

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[28] See figure 1

[29] Sipahi, V:2 p. 502.

[30] Ibid., p. 506.

Why MESS and TISK?

It is surprising that these two institutions that take a significant place in the history of not only industrial relations, but also of social life and general politics in Turkey have generally been exempt from scholarly interest. There is an abundant academic literature on the history of interest groups, employers' organizations and especially TUSIAD, as well as labor unions.[31] Among these, it is impossible to find satisfactory references to MESS and TISK, not to mention a systematic approach that first and foremost focuses on the associations. This thesis aims to realize this by analyzing the history of the associations from their foundation until the present, with a comparative approach that contrasts their characteristics before and after 1980, which unambiguously marks a milestone in the history of the associations, and of Turkey as well.

[31] Here is a brief list of important works on this issue. Korkut Boratav, *1980'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Sosyal Sınıflar ve Bölüşüm,* (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1991); Ayse Bugra, *Devlet ve Isadamlari*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2005); Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey*, (Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985); and *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991); Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, (London: Verso, 1987); Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Şebnem Gülfidan "Big Business and the State in Turkey: The Case of TUSIAD," (Ph.d diss. Boğaziçi University, 1990), Oya Köymen*, Sermaye Birikirken: Osmanlı, Türkiye, Dünya.* (Ankara: Yordam, 2007).

Methodology

The material of this thesis includes mainly the publications of MESS and TISK. The periodicals I made use of in my work are *İşveren*[32] , *MESS İşveren*[33] , *Mercek*[34] and *Kısa Bilgi Bülteni*[35].

İşveren is the main periodical of TISK, published monthly since 1964. This journal includes various news from the world of employers, as well as political and economics articles that reflect the demands and opinions of TISK. In 2000, the journal underwent a transformation and extended its coverage from mere industrial relations and economics to a much wider area. This transformation will be analyzed in the following chapters.

MESS İşveren is the main periodical of MESS, also published monthly since 1964. In this journal, the association focuses on "news from the metal sector," economic developments in Turkey and the world, and shares its views and suggestions concerning industrial relations. *İşveren* , "the voice of MESS," has a circulation of 8,500 every month and is widely distributed to public institutions, legislators, NGOs, universities, press members and associations.

Biz Bize[36] is a biweekly in publication since 2000, the byline of which is the "communication medium between the worker and the employer." This publication includes an article of the General Secretary of the union, opinions and short interviews

[32] Employer.

[33] MESS Employer.

[34] Lens.

[35] Brief Press Bulletin.

[36] Among us.

taken from workers, technicians, engineers and administrators of MESS-member workplaces and a back page story of a visit to a worker's family home, called *Çatkapı*. The periodical, which gives place to a wide range of subjects from industrial relations, education, and magazine to health and sports, has a circulation of 120,000 and is distributed to all workers of MESS-member workplaces.

Mercek is a seasonal publication that includes longer and more serious articles on economics, politics, and industrial relations since 1996. MESS defines *Mercek* as the first scientific journal of Turkey on industrial relations, with a motto of "following the requirements of the information society."[37] The contributors to the journal are overwhelmingly academics and experts.

Kısa Bilgi Bülteni is an irregularly published two-page press bulletin that conveys striking and brief comments about various issues. These communiqué-like bulletins are the ones that attract the most attention from the media and public opinion, among others.

I scanned all the issues of the main publications of TISK and MESS, *İşveren* and MESS-*İşveren* . I selectively made use of press bulletins, general assembly reports and *Mercek* and *Bizbize*, as well. *Gelenek ve Gelecek*,[38] a voluminous self-history of MESS that includes important documents and selected news about the associations in the press and the series *Medya'da MESS*[39] that include all news in the media about the association were other primary sources. I employed a thematic approach that separately traced the history of the associations with respect to the concerned area. Needless to say, MESS

[37] http://mess.org.tr/tc.asp?icid=36&itype=i [10 August 2008]

[38] Tradition and Future.

[39] MESS in the media.

and TISK are two separate organizations with different cadres and organizational structures. Since, however, MESS is the biggest and most influential constituent of TISK, and there is hardly any difference concerning their general approach vis-à-vis the themes I took into consideration, I neglected their difference and analyzed them together.

Relations with TUSIAD

TUSIAD, founded in 1970, just after the 12 March memorandum, was a narrow organization of the leading employers in Turkey. As a typical class organization, it aimed to consolidate the social basis of the employers, rather than follow their short-term economic interests.[40] Most of the founders of TUSIAD were also members of MESS or TISK, who held high positions in the organizational structure of the associations. Feyyaz Berker, the first president of TUSIAD, for instance, was a member of the High Advisory Board of MESS. The associations and TUSIAD, however, were the products of diverse concerns. While the former was motivated by the desire among employers to confront radical labor unions and socialist sentiments that supposedly "threatened" their existence, the latter, with a broader vision, was urged a more moderate approach that preferred "consensus" with the labor front in order to enhance their social status.[41]

Despite this divergence, the relation between the two was based on complementarity rather than rivalry or conflict. There was a sort of division of labor

[40] Ayşe Buğra, *Devlet ve Isadamlari*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2005) p. 337.

[41] Ibid., p. 334.

between them, where the associations undertook the task of labor relations, TUSIAD focused on macro-politics and a kind of public relations activity. The idea that employers, in an era of high political and economic instability, should develop their own political program and agenda to protect themselves and consolidate their position was shared by both organizations.[42] Representatives of TUSIAD often joined the general assemblies of MESS and TISK, sharing their views with the members of the associations who had to deal with the daily tasks of the class struggle. There was no conflict at all among them, again with respect to the righteousness of the military intervention in 1980. The cooperation between the two increased in the post-80 period, due to the absence of a threatening working class movement, which directly invalidated the divergent approaches with respect to how it should be dealt with. Concerning the international policy, economic model Turkey should follow, and the solutions proposed to major problems of Turkey, there were, and still are, only slight differences between the opinions of MESS&TISK and TUSIAD.

[42] Sipahi, V:1, p. 272.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

Launching of the Neoliberal Hegemonic Project

" Our Challenge is to make the politics of private enterprise, the politics of the majority."[43]

Just on the threshold of the twenty-first century, Perry Anderson called neoliberalism "the most succesful ideology in world history."[44] Taking into consideration the huge extent of such a claim, there will be those who will find it exaggerated if not totally irrelevant. It would be hard, however, to deny its dominant role in shaping the socio-political configuration of societies all over the globe, in the last three decades. It would be hard, as well, to deny neoliberalism's strength and prevalance as an ideology not only within the formal language of politics, but also among common-sense, popular perceptions. Although it encountered serious challenges from various political currents especially from the beginning of the mid 1990s,[45] neoliberalism, I

[43] Words of the Richard L. Lesher, the president of The United States Chamber of Commerce in 1979. Quoting from Richard L. Lesher, "Business Leadership: The Next Era in American History." *Vital Speeches of the Day 46* (1979) p. 551; Matt Ruben, "Neoliberal Manifestations: Cultural, Political, and Spatial Transformation in the Late Twentieth Century United States," (Ph.D. diss. Universiy of Pennsylvania, 2007) p. 58.

44 Perry Anderson, "Renewals," *New Left Review 1* (January-February 2000), p. 9.

45 The rise of popular leftist movements in Latin America and anti-globalization movements could be cited as examples. See Subir Sinha, "Neoliberalism and Civil Society: Project and Possibilities," in A. Filho and D. Johnston (eds) *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, (London: Pluto, 2005) p. 167-169.

would argue that it persists to be "the hegemonic mode of discourse,"[46] in the sense that it has a determining effect on the terms of public debates concerning social, political, economic and cultural issues. Before carrying out a discussion on the specific elements of neoliberalism with respect to the case at hand, I would like to focus on some of its general aspects, as well as the history of its emergence and its dramatic rise.

The origins of neoliberalism, as many scholars remark,[47] lie on the economic crisis which world capitalism encountered in the 1970s. This crisis, which at first manifested itself as a rampant increase in oil prices, but then extended and turned the economic balance of all of the world upside down, showed the limits of Keynesian policies that dominated the capitalist world after the Second World War. Keynesianism,[48] basically a set of measures against the possibility of the recurrence of a 1929-like world crisis that ended up with a catastrophic world war, aimed to elicit stability and peace through various national and international mechanisms.[49] Influential institutions such as the Bretton Woods System, the United Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank dealt with the solutions of international conflicts concerning political and economic issues and thus contributing to the stability of the capitalist system.[50] Within nation-states, on the other hand, a package of redistributive policies aiming to achieve

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46 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 3.

47 See for instance, David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, "The Neoliberal (Counter-) Revolution," in A. Filho and D. Johnston (eds) *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader* (London: Pluto, 2005), Thomas I. Palley, "From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Shifing Paradigms in Economics," in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*. Al Campbell, "The Birth of Neoliberalism in the United States: A Reorganization of Capitalism" in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*.

48 This era is sometimes referred as "embedded liberalism." See John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International ,Organization* 36(no: 2), (1982).

49 Harvey, pp. 9-10.

50 Ibid., p.10.

full employment, price stability, job security and welfare provisions established a class compromise between capital and labor.[51] Thanks to the high-level protection of customs and tariffs, individual nation-states were able to achieve relatively high economic growth rates and rapid industrialization.

Although there were considerable variations pertaining to the implementation of Keynesian policies around the globe, the system was based on the active agency of the state as an actor that presumably had the right and responsibility to intervene in and regulate markets in order to achieve social good.[52] Generally speaking, this period, in a way, was one in which the "relative autonomy" of the state was unprecedentedly high.[53] To put it broadly, the capitalist classes of the world in the post-war era acquiesced to trade higher profits for long-term stability.

The economic crisis triggered by the oil crisis in 1973[54] halted the rapid growth of the previous decades and caused a rapid increase in inflation and unemployment, as well as leading to a novel economic problem called "stagflation."[55] In such circumstances, welfare policies that were once affordable through high rates of growth

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[51] As a simple example, between 1955-1970 the ratio of social expenditures in US national income rose from 14% to 26%. Paul Sweezy, "The Crisis of American Capitalism," *Monthly Review*, October 1980.

[52] Ibid., p. 10.

[53] For debates on the concept of relative autonomy and its relation with Keynesianism, see Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State" *New Left Rewiew* I, no. 58,(November-December 1969); Steve Valocchi, The Relative Autonomy of the State and the Origins of British Welfare Policy *Sociological Forum* 4, No. 3 (September, 1989) Claus Offe, Structural Problems of the Capitalist State: Class Rule and the Political System" *German Political Studies* I: 31-57 (1974) and Amy Bridges "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State." *Politics &Society* 4. no. 2. (1974)

[54] In 1973, Arabian members of OPEC(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) decided not to supply oil to the states which supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War and to rise crude prices dramatically, leading to a wave of rampant inflation all around the globe and turning the hitherto obtained economic balance upside down. For further details on the economic effects of this crisis, see Otto Eckstein, *The Great Recession* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979); and Alan S. Blinder, *Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation* (New York: Academic Press, 1979)

[55] Stagflation is defined as the simultaneous occurence of inflation and stagnation for a long time.

ceased to be sustainable. The severe effect of newly emerging economic problems on the living conditions of the masses, who had been accustomed to improvements, vehemently threatened the compromise between capital and labor. Moreover, the masses in several countries of the western capitalist world acquired a considerable political power through strong unions and socialist-communist parties.[56] Growing disquiet on the side of the working classes and other subordinated classes signalled "a political threat" for the ruling classes all around the world,[57] doubling their anxieties arising from the economic depression.

This multi-dimensional crisis urgently called for action, and the response of the capital to it was an overal restructuring of the capitalist system. This restructuring, which would later be called "transnational neoliberal revolution,"[58] was based on the assumption that free markets would be the best option for the well-being of human societies. It basically proposed the liberation of markets and trade from state regulation, the minimization of the role of state in economy, the reduction of welfare policies, and the privatization of state enterprises as an urgent recipe to overcome the crisis.

In fact, such proposals had been in circulation in one form or another well before the crisis of the 1970s, limited however, to marginal circles and far away from the

[56] Italy, France, Spain and Portugal could be cited as examples. In Portugal, in the afternath of the end of the dictatorship, Socialist Party had won the elections with 37.8%, and Communist Party had been the third leading party with %12.5 in 1975. In 1974, Spain witnessed the greates strikes of the post-war period while dictator Franco was still in power. In France, the total percentage of the votes by PCF (French Communist Party) ans PSF (French Socialst Party) amounted to 45%. Italy, throughout the 1970's continued to live under a kind of "low intensity '68" with massive strikes, factory occupations and student radicalism. *Sosyalizm ve Tarihsel Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi* (1988) pp. 1568-1597. For a critical evaluation of this period, see Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of Left in Europe, 1850-2000*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) Chapter IV, Michel Aglietta, *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation : the US Experience* (London : Verso, 1987) and Giovanni Arrighi**,** *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times***"** (London: Verso, 1994).

[57] Harvey, p. 15.

[58] Henk Overbeek, "Restructuring Capital and Restructuring Hegemony." In *Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy*, ed. H. Overbeek. (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).

possibility of being put into practice.[59] The Mont Pelerin Society formed by the prospective celebrities of neoliberalism, Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Karl Popper as well many others in 1947, was a kind of an indoctrination center for neoliberalism.[60] This center, supported by some powerful financial groups and with an overt hostility to socialism as well as Keynesian welfare policies, attacked the intervention of the state in the economy in the name of preserving "freedom" and "civilization."[61]

The crisis of the 1970s pulled this doctrine out of the margins and put it into the center of political debate as an increasingly possible path out of the crisis.[62] Although it had to wait till the end of the decade before gaining global reach, it was seriously "experimented with "in the literal meaning of the world, in Chile, during the "reign" of General Augusto Pinochet. The socialist president of Chile, Salvador Allende, who took power in 1970, was overthrown by a brutal military coup that was led by Pinochet, supported by the CIA, the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as well as the capitalist class of Chile. In 1975, President Pinochet called for the help of the so-called "Chicago Boys,"[63] in order to reorganize Chilean economy. What they did in a package,

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[59] Harry Magdoff says, for instance, that "the spirit and substance of neoliberalism" had been part of US politics since 1940's. Harry Magdoff, "A Letter to a Contributor: The Same Old State" *Monthly Review* (1998) p. 6. In addition to this some argue that Thatcherism existed in the conservative party since 1931, however in a dormant way. See Petcr Golding, "Rethinking Common Sense about Social Policy" in *Thatcherism and the Poor* eds. D. Bull and P. Wilding (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1983).

[60] Harvey, p. 20.

[61] Ibid., p. 22. For the most famous representations of neoliberal thinking see Friedrich Hayek, *Road to Serfdom*. (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1994) and Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*, (New York: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[62] Oya Köymen*, Sermaye Birikirken: Osmanlı, Türkiye, Dünya.* (Ankara: Yordam, 2007). p. 41.

[63] "Chicago Boys" is the name attributed to a group of young Chilean economists trained by Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago.

significantly called "shock therapy,"[64] was to severely cut back welfare expenditures and subsidies, to initiate a wave of extensive privatizations and wage decreases in order to create an "attractive" climate for local and foreign investors.[65]

The most prominent practitioners of neoliberalism, however, were Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan[66] who took office approximately in the same period in England and the US, respectively.[67] The recipe Thatcher employed to overcome the stagflation crisis that paralyzed the economy during the 1970s was in many ways similar to that of the Chilean experiment. Measures like monetarist policies, a rapid (almost as shocking as Pinochet's) undoing of welfare state provisions, an extensive wave of privatizations, and considerable reduction in taxes[68] that dramatically changed the face of English society in a surprisingly short period were succesfully implemented thanks to a well-orchesrated public relations campaign. The policies which came to be known as Thatcherism,[69] managed to gain a sound popular base by mingling together the longed

[64] This "shock" effect was typical in the implementation of neoliberal reforms. Supporters of neoliberalism argued that the reforms would not work unless put into practice at a dramatic speed. It was a succesful method to bypass public debate and eliminate any possible resistance. For a well-thought and well- organized evaluation of this issue, see Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (New York: Picador, 2008)

[65]Matt Ruben, p. xiv. For a detailed evaluation, see Peter Winn (ed.) *Victims of the Chilean miracle : Workers and neoliberalism in the Pinochet era, 1973-2002* (Durham : Duke University Press, 2004).

[66] Thatcher took power in May 19779 and Reagan, in October 1980.

[67] The politics itroduced by the two leaders is referred as "new right" as a novel political current.

[68] Harvey, p. 23.

[69] There is an extensive debate on the nature and essence of Thatcherism. For instance, see B. Jessop, K. Bonnett and S. Bromley, "Farewell to Thatcherism? Neo-liberalism and "New Times"", *New Left Review*, no.179 (1990), 81-102; B. Jessop, K. Bonnett, S. Bromley and T. Ling, *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations* (Cambridge, 1988); B. Jessop, K. Bonnett, S. Bromley and T. Ling "Authoritarian Populism, Two Nations, and Thacherism", *New Lelf Review* , no.147 (1984), 32-60; also "Thatcherism and the Politics of Hegemony: A Reply to Stuart Hall", *New Left Review*, No.153 (1985), 87-101; Stuart Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal* (London: Verso, 1988); also "Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al," *New Left Review*, No.151 (1985), 115-123; also "The Great Moving Right Show," *Marxism Today*, (January 1979); Robert Skidelsky (ed.), *Thatcherism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988); Andrew Gamble,

for expectations of the business elites, the latent discontent of the middle classes from the post-war settlement, and the desire for stability of the "establishment," and paved the way to an overall restructuring in an era marked by a deep economic and social crisis urgently calling for action.[70] The situation of crisis was extremely crucial in the development of that popular base for it was the main motive of the massive conviction that "there is no alternative."[71] The only obstacle to this overall reconstruction was the labor movement and the unions, whose power had already been reduced by long waves of economic instability, and rampant unemployment by then, and they were eventually defeated by the Thatcher government.[72] The unions were depicted as a "burden" on the people, and were scornfully labelled "the enemy within." This anti-union language became quite influential and the unions and the working class movement's prestige dramatically declined in this period. It is noteworthy that the mainstream media that had already been commited to the neoliberal agenda, played a crucial role in the fabrication of an image of a "parasitic" working class, and thus publicly marginalized them.

One specific notion that scholars of the Thatcherite period mention is that Thatcherism brought forward an understanding of a "two-nation" society.[73] What this term implies is that the Thatcher governments signified a clear rupture from the "one-nation" approach of the Keynesian welfare state that aimed to integrate society and

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The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism (Durham: Duke University, 1994); Shirley Robin Letwin, *The Anatomy of Thatcherism*, (London: Fontana, 1992)

[70] Jessop et. al., *Thatcherism: A Tale of,* pp. 61-62.

[71] It was a famous slogan used by Thatcher. This notion of "no alternative" was crucial in the construction of consent for neoliberal agenda in many other parts of the world.

[72] The Miner's strike in 1984-85 that ended with the defeat of the working class was a milestone in the struggle between unions and the Thatcher government.

[73] Stuart Hall, "Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to," p. ?

reduce, if not eliminate, the gap between the rich and the underpriviliged.[74] Thatcherism instead divided the society through a dichotomy of "productive" and "parasitic" elements and promised a reward to the former through free market mechanisms, while smoothly getting rid of the "burden" of the state to assist the latter.[75] This would supposedly force the parasitic elements, to realize their "harmful" situation and contribute to the economy. For instance, the tax reform introduced by the Thatcher government, which left aside the classical "proportional increase" and brought in "fixed rates," deepened and underlined the polarization between the "two nations." It should be added that the two-nation approach was the main base of legitimation for the huge wave of privatizations and welfare cuts realized by the Thatcher governments.

One of the most defiant declarations of Thatcher was "there is no such thing as society, only individuals."[76] This notion of individualism was an essential trait of the discourse accompanying neoliberalism. The breaking of collectivist sentiments and the atomization of the society by provoking individual success and desire for upward mobility played crucial role in the processes that constructed massive consent for neoliberal policies.

In the same era, general patterns of the political direction on the other side of the Atlantic was, in many ways, similar. Although neoliberal sentiments and ways of thinking had begun to find some attraction among the power elite of the USA, the governments preceeding the year 1981 did not or could not undertake an overall

[74] Jessop et al., *Thatcherism*, pp. 87-88.

[75] Ibid., p. 88.

[76] This saying was revized later by Thatcher as ".. only individuals, and their families."

breakthrough from Keynesianism.[77] It was Ronald Reagan of the Republican Party, who launched a systematic politics of neoliberal transformation, just after taking office in 1981. Reagan, in his inaguration speech, defined the US as "a political system which guarantees individual liberty to a greater degree than any other."[78] Strong and continous emphasis on "individual liberty" all as an aim to realize, a value to preserve, and a distinctive trait to celebrate was one of the characteristic discourses of the US governments starting from Reagan.

The triggering factor for the economic restructuring was, again, inflation. Paul Volcker, appointed to the chair of the Federal Reserve by Carter in 1979 and remained at that post during the presidency of Reagan, applied a strictly monetarist policy[79] that raised the real rate of interest, succesfully cut back inflation, but caused a drastic rise in the rates of unemployment. The neoliberal economies policies that came to be known as "structural adjustment" went on with the deregulation of markets, tax cuts favoring the wealthy sections of the society, undoing of welfare state provisions, and dismantling the organized labor power.[80] The Reagan administration acted at a shocking pace in order to realize all these. It took six months, for instance, to reverse 40 percent of the labor friendly legislation of the National Labour Relations Board, and to take back the gained rights of the organized working class, which then had been seriously damaged by rampant unemployment, deindustrialization, delocalization of the industry,[81] and

[77] In fact, attempts to deregulate the economy had begun during the Carter presidency. Harvey, p. 22.

[78] No president of the USA had hitherto stressed such a point. Matt Ruben, p. xvi.

[79] This policy was known as the Volcker schock.

[80] Harvey, p. 25.

[81] This term connotes the transfer of industrial locations from places with high-cost labor force to ones with cheaper labor force, within the country or not.

flexibilization of the work process.[82] These dramatic transformations, would lead to a 30 percent decline in real wages from 1980 to 1990, with bitter conseqences for the underpriviliged sectors of American society.[83]

A key notion of Reagan's neoliberal strategy, and neoliberalism in general as well, was to replace "social equality" with "economic growth." Economic growth in neoliberalism became an end into itself according to which the success and progress of a given society was measured. The interests of private enterprise could be presented as the interests of society, through this replacement. [84]

Besides the US and England, neoliberalism throughout the 1980s and later on as well, began to be put into practice in several different countries of Western Europe, needless to say with huge variations due to the specific situations of the national context. What was generally common in the western European context, however, was the fact that neoliberalism provided the establishment a vital relief and self-confidence by eliminating the socialist "threat" that had gained a sound popular base among intellectuals, the working classes and political power to such a degree so as to block the legislative routine and provoke social crisis in many countries of Western Europe. The dismantling of unions and the weakening or co-optation of the once-massive socialist-communist parties through systematic neoliberal policies ended the caution of the ruling classes and gave them the opportunity to counterattack.

[82] Ibid., p. 26

[83] Ibid., p.25.

[84] Ruben, p. xviii.

Characteristics of Neoliberalism

After this historical tour, a brief discussion is necessary on the essence, nature, and effects of neoliberalism, as an ideology and a political current. First and foremost, neoliberalism, as Harvey suggests, reasserted the class power of the bourgeoisie all around the world. "It was a political and ideological project that has taken advantage of the profitability crisis of the 1970s to reassert business class power."[85] This implies not only an increase in the act, initiative, and influence of the corporate leaders on the political or legislative routine, but also an increase in their material benefits. Capital freed from its former constraints such as welfare provisions, high wages, etc., elevated its net share of the overall wealth produced.[86]

Neoliberalism maintains that "freedom of markets" is the key aspect of a society's well being. It claims that the free market economy, based on private property, enterpreunerial freedoms, and free trade, is the best known option for human societies. All other alternatives are doomed to fail.

Neoliberalism puts aside "social equality" as a central and achievable goal for human societies, and replaces it with "economic growth" as the fundamental indicator of well being. The idea of freedom, in neoliberalism, is reduced to mere freedom of enterprise[87]

In contrast with its emphasis on "freedom," neoliberalism's discursive universe is full of conservative values such as family, religon, and tradition. The mingling of

[85] Ibid., p. ix.

[86] See figure 7-8.

[87] Harvey, p. 37.

these seemingly conflictual tendencies in a current was probably the most succesful aspect of the neoliberal ideology and was the key element of the consent taken from the masses. Free market fundamentalism allowed the discourse of freedom to go hand in hand with oppressive and coercive discourses and activities all over the world.

Neoliberalism, with its emphasis on "individual freedom" separates the urges for "freedom" and "equality." The 1960s and 1970s all over the world had witnessed massive social movements of intellectuals, workers, and peasants that demanded "more freedom and more social justice."[88] The neoliberal paradigm shift, however, "stole" the urge for freedom from those movements and rendered it an almost "void" ideological tool of the ruling class that can be employed in any context. Freedom became "a button that elites can press to open the door to the masses."[89] The unity of the demands for social justice and freedom, that was a serious threat to the system, was interrupted, by a provocative emphasis on a "market-based freedom of diverse lifestyles, consumer choices, and modes of expression."

With this "provocation of individual freedoms," neoliberalism gained considerable ground within the intellectual field. The formation of think-tank like institutions directly financed by capital, capturing the ownership of big media, and capital-funded "non-governmental organizations," were also important steps in recruiting intellectuals, once under the hegemony of the left, to the side of neoliberal ideology, thus to the ranks of capital.

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[88] For instance, '68 movement.

[89] John Rapley. *Globalization and Inequality: Neoliberalism's Downward Spiral* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2004) p. 55

The "neoliberalization of the intellectual field" played a crucial role in the reproduction and transmission of the neoliberal "doxa" to the masses. Through their priviliged status in the formation of public conviction, they rendered neoliberal ideology, which could once barely circulate among some marginal academic circles, a way of thinking that has the ability to diffuse into and determine (capture) the "ethos" of daily, common-sensical perceptions of the masses.

The consent taken from the masses did not of course rely on mere "illusion." The novel social configuration, breaking the old ties of solidarity and collectivity, provoked the upward mobility aspirations of the working class, and provided some betterment for some sectors of the social spectrum. The so-called "new middle class" that consisted of high-skilled, well-educated, white-collar professionals mainly from the finance or information sectors who gained access to usurious life standards, became the most enthusiastic sectors of societies to adopt the extremely competitive and flexible work ethic and neoliberal value system all around the world. These gave the "losers of neoliberalism," left to the mercy of free markets a feeling of inferiority and guilt for their own failure. The common-sensical perception that "it was their fault to be poor and unemployed," played a fundamental role in keeping the desperate masses passive.

The introduction and extension of post-fordist production and employment methods thanks to the absence of a strong union resistance further undermined the material basis of the working class movement. Increasing wage differentiation among workers and flexible modes of employment atrophied the collective power of the class, leading to a world-wide crisis among unions.

Capitalism was quite safe in its strongholds, such as the US and the UK, during the 1970s. Western Europe and much of the third world, however, were being stormed

by frequent strikes, factory occupations, worker and peasant movements, student revolts. Although an overwhelming majority of these capitalist regimes still protected their authority, socialism, with its several variants, enjoying the phsychological effect of the existence of the Eastern Bloc increasingly "threatened" the establishment for it could organize the massive discontent arising from the economic crisis. The rise of neoliberalism eliminated this threat by udermining, weakening, or co-opting these movements, and provided a vital feeling of security and confidence to the ruling classes.

Neoliberalism and the Sphere of Politics

More than anything else, I believe, neoliberalism has been remarkable for its novel reconfiguration of the act and understanding of politics. The last three decades have witnessed the dramatic rise of this novel reconfiguration that has replaced the perception of politics as known in the twentieth century.

At the heart of this reconfiguration lay the transformation of the state. As is well-known, one of the most popular mottos of the neoliberal discourse is the "roll-back" or "shrinking of the state." Departing from the assumption that market mechanisms free of regulation and intervention, and are the only key to prosperity and social betterment, neoliberals advocated a severe restriction of the role of the state in shaping various aspects and areas of society. The state's main task, they argued, should be to provide the necessary elements and institutions for the operation of free markets (and also creation of them, if they do not exist) based on "individual private property rights," "private

enterprise" and the "rule of law."[90] This implies that the state should leave former functions such as caring for the well-being of its citizens to free market, which supposedly was much more apt to deal with them. Hence, economic assets held by the state should be privatized, mechanisms of state interference in economy such as quotas, tariffs, and planning should be abolished, and welfare provisions should be eliminated. [91] Another assumption accompanying the first one was that the diminishing role and power of the state in favor of "civil society," (another popular motto widely employed by neoliberals) would inevitably pave the way for a more libertarian society where there was "less" oppression and "more" freedom.

What happened in reality, however, was not a prospering for all in line with neoliberal assumptions, but a rampant accumulation of wealth and privilege in the hands of those, as Karl Polanyi notes, "whose income, leisure, and security need no enhancing."[92] This process was rendered possible through the above-mentioned transformation of the state. For the sake of the freedom of markets, neoliberal practitioners cut the link between governments and "autonomized" them from public demands, rendering it an apparatus much more apt for the interests of the capital.[93] As Ronaldo Munck argues, the ideological cement of neoliberalism (was) the negative unity of the disempowerment of government."[94] It did not expand the sphere of freedoms by

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[90] Harvey, p. 64

[91] This was the case in theory though,. In reality, every national context reflected its own characteristics to the implementation of neoliberalism.

[92] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) p. 258.

[93] Joachim Hirsch, "From the Fordist to the Post-fordist State," in eds. B. Jessop, H. Kastendiek, K. Nielsen, O.K. Pedersen**,** *The Politics of Flexibility : Restructuring State and Industry in Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia*. (Aldershot, Hants : E. Elgar, 1991) p. 74.

[94] Ronaldo Munck, "Neoliberalism and Politics, the Politics of Neoliberalism," in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader* eds. eds**.** A. Saad-Filho and D.Johnston, (London ; Ann Arbor, MI : Pluto Press, 2005) p. 62.

eliminating oppressive and bureaucratic mechanisms of the state, but "disable(d) the state from interfering with the established order of society."[95] What was shrinking was not the state itself but the "left hand of the state," to speak with Bourdieu's terms.[96]

A seemingly peculiar paradox of neoliberalism is that the discourse of the shrinking of the state goes hand in hand with an emphasis on the necessity of authoritarian practices of the state in order to guarantee the smooth operation of free market mechanisms. "If the economy is to remain free, the state has to become strong"[97] goes the argument. The contradiction between the emphasis on freedom of choice and individual liberties and the notion of strong state, as well, is not an anomaly, but a norm of neoliberalism.[98] It is no coincidence that most practitioners of neoliberalism including Thatcher,[99] Reagan and in some ways Turgut Özal, not to mention Pinochet and Kenan Evren for instance, tended to employ oppressive policies against those opposing them.

Neoliberalism, with its fundamental emphasis on economic growth instead of social equality, produced and reproduced the delusion that economics is an interest-neutral, objective matter that should be outside the sphere of political conflicts, and "democratic pressures."[100] Hence, the argument continued, it should be dealt with by "experts." Key economic institutions[101] and decisions were autonomized from political

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[95] Ibid.

[96] Pierre Bourdieu, *Karşı Ateşler*, trans. Halime Yücel, (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006) p. 11.

[97] See Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State : the Politics of Thatcherism*, (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1988)

[98] See Shirley Robin Letwin, *The Anatomy of Thatcherism*, (London: Fontana, 1992)

[99] Thatcherism, as some scholar remark, was known for its "authoritarian populism." For the usage of this term, see Stuart Hall, "Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al," *New Left Review*, No.151 (1985), 115-123.

[100] Harvey, p. 66.

[101] For instance, central banks.

demands and control through novel modes of "governance" by the formation of boards or board-like institutions whose members were not elected by, thus not liable to the citizens. The empowerment of the execution vis-à-vis the legislation was also a parallel characteristic of the neoliberal transformation that impeded public demands intervening on the scene. Neoliberalism, in contrast with its "urge for freedom," has an overt inclination to "rule by elites and experts."[102] It tends to devalue public debate, consider it as a waste of time, and promote a pragmatic, technocratic approach to politics.[103]

Macroeconomic stability, a top priority in neoliberal way of politics, became an objective in itself, which superseded any other social concern. The high volatility of financial markets, on which global economy has become more and more dependent, rendered especially underdeveloped countries more vulnerable to crises, more dependent on international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Hence, they were easily put in the neoliberal line.

The rise of individualistic values, distinct lifestyles and the atomization of everyday life together with the erosion of massive unions, political parties, and movements led to a global apathy or indifference on the side of the masses to politics. Depoliticization was further extended by the elitist, technicist approach, rendering "mass-integrative" political movements obsolete and undermining the political will of masses.[104] This phenomenon reduced the chance and capability of the working class, the masses, to make demands and carry on a struggle for its own rights.

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[102] Harvey, p. 66

[103] In Turkey the way Turgut Özal was promoted as an expert of economics is an example of this Later on, Kemal Derviş was welcomed as a sort superhero of economics in 2001. Chicago boys' story in Chile resembles this.

[104] Hirsch, p. 79.

All these phenomena had important effects on the practice of politics all around the globe. With the elimination of socialism as a real project through the decline or co-optation of the communist parties in Europe, and the fall of the Socialist Bloc, the whole political spectrum experienced a significant right shift. Neoliberal hegemony over politics induced a mainstreaming effect that led to a convergence of main political currents such as liberalism, social democracy or conservatism, which had been distinct movements with huge programmatic and ideological differences. It implied the eventual triumph of capitalism, and marginalized radical and alternative social imaginations, leading to a "dramatic closing in the political horizon."[105]

The overall story points indicates that neoliberalism should be understood as a matter of class struggle. Through the "transnational neoliberal revolution" the capitalist class restored its class power by eliminating, paralyzing, or co-opting its foes, enhancing its power of sanction by increasing its influence on the political processes and actors, took the consent of the masses by convincing them of the idea that "the politics of private enterprise (is) the politics of the majority," and enhanced its material benefits by elevating its net share of the total pie. Now, in the light of this background, the story of neoliberalism in Turkey, its coming into agenda, its achievement of hegemony, its practice, and the relation of all these with the capitalist class of Turkey will be discussed.

[105] Munck, p. 64.

Neoliberalism with Turkish Characteristics

The very beginning of the neoliberalization in Turkey dates back to the release of the 24 January 1980 austerity package. This package, prepared by a delegation headed by Turgut Özal, at that time the prime ministerial consultant and the former secretary general of MESS, included a draconian and extensive transformation of first and foremost the economy, but also paved the way to an overall reconfiguration of the socio-political structure of Turkey. It was an ambitious project that was brought on to the agenda as a response to the deep "hegemonic crisis" of the 1970s that manifested itself with an obstruction in the "import-substitution" based economy, growing foreign debt, economic recession, high inflation, rising unemployment, paralysis of the bureaucratic system, scarcity in basic products, an unprecedented level of political instability, massive social unrest led by labor-student militancy, and political violence.

The 24 January package aimed to replace the "accumulative strategy"[106] of the two preceding decades, namely the "import-substitution system," with "export-oriented growth" in line with the neoliberal tendencies ascending around the globe. Supported internationally,[107] it proposed, among other things, the liberalization of trade, the promotion of exports, the abolition of price controls, the elimination of state subsidies, the promotion of foreign investments, and a tax reform in favor of business. In essence, it was a typical neoliberalization package, similar to that of Chile, or England. Its

[106] The concept of accumulative strategy coined by Jessop refers to the economic growth model that the leading fraction of capital promotes and unites the interests of others under. Bob Jessop, "Birikim Stratejileri, Devlet Biçimleri ve Hegemonik Projeleri," in *Hegemonya, Post-Fordizm ve Küreselleşme Ekseninde Kapitalist Devlet*, (trans. by Betül Yarar and Alev Özkazanç) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005) p. 157.

[107] IMF and WB was urging for this package. Gülten Kazgan, *Yeni Ekonomik Düzende Türkiye'nin Yeri*, (İstanbul: Altın Kitapları, 1995) p. 164.

implementation, however, was not possible in the political atmosphere of the time, characterized by chaos and turmoil, and had to wait till the military takeover on September 12, 1980, that unambiguously marked a milestone in Turkish history.

The coup d'état justified itself on the grounds that it gave an end to "anarchy" and the "brothers' fight," by restoring "law and order." It also put an end to the "paralysis of the political process due to the incapability and inter-conflicts of politicians," and created the political will to carry on the necessary reforms that had to be realized urgently for "the sake of the nation." Not surprisingly, one of the first deeds of the Milli Güvenlik Konseyi[108] (MGK) was to implement 24 January decisions.[109] One of the champion international institutions of neoliberal policies at that time, the IMF, that gained the right to supervise the economy with these decisions,[110] gave covert support to the military regime,[111] a clear sign that the military was acting in line with the neoliberal agenda.

Another deed of the MGK was to crush the working class movement and its organizations, which were perhaps "the greatest obstacle" to the new economic reconstruction. In the sake of achieving "law and order," all union activities were halted, DISK was closed, thousands of union activists were arrested, the right to strike was removed, and wages frozen.[112] The collective contract system was abolished and a state

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[108] National Security Council.

[109] Tülin Öngen, "Political Crisis and Strategies for Crisis Management: From "Low Intensity Conflict" to "Low Intensity Stability" in *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey* eds. Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, (New York: Nova, 2002) p. 65. Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları*, p. 206.

[110] Quoting from Kazgan, (1995) Öngen, p. 65.

[111] Atiila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay and Birol Yeşilada, *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1993) p. 3.

[112] Öngen, p. 65.

institution took over its functions. The labor laws enacted during the military regime deprived the workers of the most fundamental rights gained through decades of fierce struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. The labor-hostile attitude of the regime was, as Sungur Savran points out, hinted that they were behaving somehow in a "mode of revenge."[113] The ruling class was clearly taking back what it had had to give to the workers in the former period.[114]

The great repression on any organized workers' movement, that began with the military regime, but went on with the labor law enacted by the civilian rule in 1983, suppressed the wages severely. By 1988, the real wages had fallen to its level in 1963, the year the right to strike and collective bargaining was first officially recognized in Turkey.[115] This turned Turkey, as Korkut Boratav points, into a "law wage economy" just in line with the demands of the economic restructuring projects supported by international neoliberal institutions and domestic capital. Throughout this period, the condition of almost all workers but especially public employees and small peasantry underwent a continuous deterioration which clearly increased the percentage of the pie held by capital in general.[116]

As will be noted in the following chapters, it was highly significant that all segments, fractions, and organizations of the bourgeoisie including MESS and TISK

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[113] Sungur Savran, "The Legacy of the Twentieth Century" in *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey* eds. Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, (New York, Nova, 2002) p. 16.

[114] For an extensive evaluation of the losses in workers' rights in this periods, see Şehmus Güzel, "1980 Sonrasında İşçi Haklarında Gerilemeler," *11. Tez* No:5 (1987).

[115] Savran, p. 16.

[116] Quoting from Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi: 1981-1994" in *Türkiye Tarihi, 5: Bugünkü Türkiye: 1980-1995*, Tanör; Boratav; Akşin(eds.) (İstanbul: Cem, 2005) Öngen, p. 66.

supported the military regime.[117] The capitalist class was in urgent need of a political will that would end labor and leftist militancy, guarantee stability, implement the neoliberal reforms at all costs, and thus, integrate Turkey into world capitalism. That was exactly what the military regime did, or paved the way for doing.

The most significant consequence of the military takeover for the bourgeoisie, however, was that it guaranteed and consolidated that Turkey's political and economic regime was based on free entrepreneurship and strict private property rights. As Buğra notes, the coup provided the capitalist class with "the establishment of the rights of private property and entrepreneur profits on a strong legitimacy basis and the marginalization of radical projects demanding a change of order."[118] The political sphere had been immuned to radical, socialist leaning currents that threatened the existence of the capitalist class. The legitimacy that was gained thanks to the coup d'état which decisively confirmed Turkey's commitment to a capitalist order led by the private sector, provided the Turkish capitalist class a solid self-confidence[119] that it never had before, due to several factors.

The process of neoliberalization signaled by the 24 January decisions and initiated by the coup d'état, was furthered by the ANAP[120] (Motherland Party) government led by Turgut Özal, the first civilian administration after the coup. Turgut

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[117] Buğra, Devlet ve İşadamları, p. 206. Savran, p. 15. Galip Yalman, "The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: A Relativist Paradigm or a Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies? in *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey* eds. Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, (New York, Nova, 2002) p. 39.

[118] Ayşe Buğra, "İşadamları ve Toplum" *Toplum ve Bilim* 104 (2005) p. 14.

[119] Various aspects of this self confidence will be analyzed in the other chapters.

[120] "Anavatan Partisi"

Özal was, in many ways, a typical neoliberal figure,[121] but he was an unprecedented leader for Turkey with his close ties to the business world,[122] his somehow informal style of politics, and his defiant personality.

During his term as prime minister from 1983 to 1989, and president from 1989 to 1993, Turkey's social, economic, political, and cultural landscape underwent a dramatic change, in the predetermined direction of neoliberalism.

ANAP represented a novel hegemonic project of the ruling class that aimed to integrate the masses to the establishment through a "national-popular agenda," and to unite different factions of capital under the rubric of an export-oriented, free market system. It was an umbrella organization that mingled together "liberalism, nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, and social democracy."[123] Its cadres consisted of traditional figures of the Turkish right who updated themselves in line with neoliberal transformations, a young generation of foreign-educated yuppies, publicly known as the "princes of Özal," and some elements of the former social democracy that had been blown by the "winds of change."

Özal and his party were well aware of the power of "neoliberal economism." He constantly reiterated that economics had its own scientific laws that had nothing to do with socio-political demands, and thus had to be dealt separately from politics in a technical manner.[124] Through this economist approach, he liberalized foreign imports

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[121] He was sometimes referred as the Thatcher of Turkey.

[122] He had worked as a high-rank administrator in Sabancı Holding and had been the general secretary of MESS from 1977 to 1979.

[123] Muharrem Tünay, "The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony," in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Eralp et. al. (eds) (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1993) p. 21.

[124] Ibid. p. 22.

and exports by reducing tariffs and establishing new subsidies, introduced a tax reform in favor of capital, and initiated a wave of privatizations in line with the demands of the IMF.[125] The privatizations were justified on the grounds that the state should not be involved in economic activities, and that the state economic enterprises were, by their very nature, inefficient. Privatizations were a part of the anti-statist campaign which, in rhetoric, urged a deregulation of the economy from state intervention, and promised the elimination of "bureaucratic red tape." What happened in practice, however, was not the termination of the state's intervention in economy, but a change in the "mode of intervention."[126] Export subsidies, for instance, that were intended to be the motor of the new economy, very soon turned out to be a grandiose rent mechanism that rendered the state's role persistent. [127] What occurred was not the elimination of the intervening state, but as Yalman argues, the loss of validity of the idea that "the state was a rational means to an end." To sum up, the state was, for many reasons, still active in economy, but the anti-statist rhetoric, which was a vital aspect of the neoliberal discourse, had gained considerable ground, smoothing the implementation of business-friendly transformations. It can thus be said that neoliberalism reduced the relative autonomy of the state which is itself a field of power relations among classes, rendering it a relatively more direct tool of the bourgeoisie.[128]

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[125] Pelin Başaran, "The Privatization of Culture and the Development of Cultural Centers in Turkey in the post-1980s," (master thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2007) p. 47

[126] Buğra, Devlet ve İşadamları, p. 207. Atilla Eralp, "İstikrar, Yabancı Sermaye ve Gerçekleşmeyen Beklentiler" *İkisat Dergisi*. No. 243, (1985) p.14.

[127] Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları,*pp. 207-209. Yalman, p. 22. Ziya Öniş, "Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism: The Political Ecoomy of Turkey in the 1980's" in Metin Heper, *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991) p. 31.

[128] Yalman, p. 38.

The 1980's also witnessed an increase in the power of the executive, especially of the prime minister, through the establishment new institutions under his office.[129] This process, in line with the above-mentioned neoliberal inclination, paved the way to a pragmatic approach violating the juridical and bureaucratic mechanisms, that manifested itself best in Özal's (in)famous words: "nothing happens if you violate the constitution once."[130]

On the other hand, ANAP employed a politics of, what some call, "degenerate populism" to maintain, expand, and consolidate its electoral basis. The essence of this policy was to provide an opportunity of upward mobility to a small, but well-presented minority through mostly informal, and mostly illegal methods. The phrase "making a quick buck"[131] was identified with the soul of Özalism, and Özal's own words "my civil servant knows the way"[132] were remarkable instances of this populism. This would provoke an unabashedly pragmatic individualism, feed the status and privilege seeking sentiments of the masses, recruit some segments of the society to neoliberal ideology through material benefits, and further weaken the collectivist, class-based bonds that had already been atrophied by the coup d'état. The increasing availability of consumer goods, thanks to liberation of exports, would contribute to this process, by creating an insatiable consumerism that would reveal itself in the minute details of everyday life.[133]

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[129] Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları*, p. 209. See Ayşe Öncü and Deniz Gökçe "Macro politics of De-Regulation and Micro-Politics of Banks" in Metin Heper, *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991) p. 103.

[130] Buğra, p. 207, 233.

[131] *"Köşeyi dönmek."*

[132] *"Benim memurum işini bilir."*

[133] For a well-documented source on this issue, see Meltem Ahıska, Zafer Yenal, *Aradığınız kişiye şu an ulaşılamıyor : Türkiye'de hayat tarzı temsilleri, 1980-2005*, (İstanbul : Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006).

The target population of Özal was what he called the *ortadirek*.[134] This term connoted a "deliberately ambiguous"[135] social category composed of mostly small peasants, public employees, shop owners, middle class professionals and so forth, and it was supposed to constitute the pivotal electorate of the ANAP.[136] This category of "ordinary people" was significant for two reasons: Its acceptance as a relevant entity would impede a class-based polarization among society, masses struck by poverty would be attached to the program of capital,[137] and being "the voice of *ortadirek*," which ANAP aimed to be, would directly imply a national hegemony, and would render the party the representative of the nation.[138]

In reality, however, the economic program of the ANAP was based on a two-nations project, similar to that of Thatcher. The party documents proposed a mechanism that would reward the social segments contributing to production while penalizing the lazy, parasitic elements. [139] The strict control over wages was realized thanks to the new labor legislation and, in line with the demands of the IMF, impoverished the working class by the end of the decade. Rampant inflation, which the government promised to cut but failed to do, deteriorated the social conditions of a significant majority of the whole population. The "winners" of this period were an extremely narrow segment of society including rentiers, speculators, and monopolies.[140]

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[134] Tünay, p. 22.

[135] Yalman, p. 43.

[136] Tünay, p. 22.

[137] Boratav, p. 164.

[138] Tünay, p. 22.

[139] Quoting from ANAP documents, Tünay p. 23.

[140] Even the members of big bourgeoisie voiced their objection to ANAP's policies that favored a particular, newly-rising segment of capital.

Moreover, the ANAP's resort to religious and nationalist values, and its well-known ties with Islamic sects (*tarikats*) induced an unprecedentedly strong wave of reactionism that increasingly manifested itself in every aspect of society. The military regime as well exploited these values as an antidote to leftist, socialist sentiments, but ANAP government took grandiose steps in diffusing them to daily life. Day by day, the peripheral neighborhoods of big cities which had been dominated by the left in the 1970s, became hotbeds of the Islamic *tarikats* that were favored by the state, rising in response to degenerate individualism of the new era, and offered material benefits to the poor masses through community ties. Growing Islamic fundamentalism together with chauvinist ultra-nationalism fed by the war against the Kurdish struggle, one of the most remarkable political phenomenon of post-80 Turkey, creating an atmosphere which rendered the voicing of working class demands extremely difficult, if not totally impossible.

The hegemonic project of the ANAP, four years after its formulation, lost its initial momentum. The conflicts of the project became visible, tensions among the constituent elements rose, and it eventually failed. The reasons for this failure do not need to be detailed in the coverage of this study, but the following points should be underlined. First, the working class movement undergoing a stagnation since the coup d'état made a strong upsurge by the end of the decade with the events called "Spring Actions,"[141] in which around one million workers took to the streets demanding more rights and better wages, seriously eroding the prestige of the government.[142] Second, the government was unable to unite the particular interests of different factions of capital

[141] *"Bahar Eylemleri"*

[142] Savran, p. 17.

that led them to search for alternative solutions.[143] Third, due to the lack of a cementing motive among various ideological orientations, the party dissociated and the constituents represented them in different political organizations.[144] To sum up, ANAP, in the long term, did not achieve the establishment a sound national hegemony that would fuse different segments of the ruling class under one program, and would neutralize, if not take the active support of huge masses. [145]

The significance of ANAP for Turkish history, however, lies not in their failure, but in the success of the abovementioned socio-political transformation it led, and has proven to be irreversible, at least until now. The convertibility of Turkish lira in 1989, the consumption boom following that, and the economic crisis of 1994 and 2001 were further important steps in Turkey's integration to world capitalism in the neoliberal direction. Needless to say, Turkey, throughout this period, experienced severe turmoil, social polarizations, a low intensity civil war, military memorandums, and the traditional socio-political instability somehow persisted. The essential endeavor of the ruling class in the post-1980 period which proved to be successful was, however, "putting an end to class-based politics."[146] In a situation where market ideology penetrated society more deeply than ever,[147] where class identity lost power vis-à-vis ethic, local, and religious ones,[148] where flexibility and differentiation paralyzed the capacity of the collective

[143] Tünay, p. 26.

[144] Ibid.

[145] Tünay, p. 25.

[146] Yalman, p. 41.

[147] Yalman, p. 47.

[148] Hirsch, p. 79.

class act,[149] where the left remained desperately marginal decades after the coup d'état, the subordinated classes became more and more detached from class politics, rendering variants of bourgeois politics unrivalled. This period was and is still marked by the unprecedented superiority of the power of capital over labor.

[149] Hirsch, p. 79, 80.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIAL ENDEAVOURS OF MES AND TISK

Construction of Hegemony

Conceptual Apparatus

Before inviting MESS and TISK to the picture, it is necessary to make a conceptual introduction and constitute an appropriate theoretical background to deal with the issue. The consent of the masses to the vast cleavage between the rich and the poor, I believe, calls for the well-known concept of "hegemony." This concept, which was put into circulation by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, has been employed in such varied and ambiguous ways, even by Gramsci himself, leave aside his followers, that it requires an evaluation of the concept's evolution. [150]

Russian Marxists and especially Lenin and Plehanov made use of the concept of hegemony to refer to the influence of the working class over other subordinated classes as a necessary condition for a successful proleter revolution.[151] Gramsci, who also had initially adopted this usage, employed it in a different vein and opened the path for a

[150] Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place*, (New York: New York University Press, 1982), p. ? Stuart Hall, "Authoritarian Populism: A Reply," New Left Review, I/151, (May 1985) p. 118-119.

[151] Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," New Left Review, I/100 p. 7

novel interpretation of Marxism that considered the conscious acts of really existing human forces rather than a supra-historical inevitability as the key element of history.[152]

This conceptualization of hegemony, unlike the former, was to comprehend the critical element of the power of the ruling class over the subordinated classes.[153] In this usage, Gramsci construed hegemony generally as the mechanisms of "consent" as a specific aspect of bourgeois powers in western Europe. Hegemony was "the process by which groups in society attempt to establish their power through exercising political, intellectual and moral leadership." [154] While in the east, he said, the ruling class owed its power to "domination," which refered to oppressive mechanisms contrarily to "consent," in the west, the mechanisms of domination was comparatively less significant, and the critical element of the power was the willing consent of the subordinated classes to the existing order.

A corollary of this usage was about *locus operandi* of these concepts. While domination is executed by the "state," which is defined as "political society," hegemony acts through the channel of "civil society."[155] This distinction has crucial implications with respect to the political strategy of the working class. While in the east, it is sufficient to dominate the political power, namely the state, in the west, such a domination without achieving a "counter hegemony" in the civil society would not imply a real revolution.

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[152] Roger Simon, *Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction*, (London: Electric Book Co. 2001), p. 14.

[153] Anderson, "The Antinomies," p.20

[154] Quoting from Bruce Jesson, *Revival of the Right: New Zealand Politics in the 1980s*, (Auckland: Heineman Reed, 1988) p. 5, Kirsten Kozalanka, Political Communication and the Construction of Neo-liberal Hegemonic Project: Ontario in Transition 1995-1997, (Phd thesis, Carleton University, 2003) p. 22.

[155] Anderson, p. 41.

One crucial characteristics of the concept of hegemony is its inherent incompleteness.[156] A given hegemony is always subject to challenges both from inside (within the ruling class) and outside (from the enemy class), and has to be constantly reproduced. Consent is not gained once-and-for-all, but has to be reiterated every moment. Construction of hegemony is a *process*. This dynamic approach, I believe, allows us to comprehend the complex, contingent, and open-to-contest nature of the political struggles.

These struggles are multi-faceted and operate in different but intertwined fields[157] and the increasing complexity of modern political and social structures proliferate this.[158] This definition underscores the importance of what can broadly be defined as the cultural sphere- traditions, social codes, everyday practices, "common-sensical" perceptions- and in this context, marks a milestone in the development of Marxist thought. This emphasis of culture is one of the most important contributions of Gramsci to social theory. Actually, hegemonic theory is grounded on the interaction and interdependence of economic, political and cultural spheres.[159]

This definition of hegemony, however, is highly problematic in some respects. First of all, the strict duality between the political structures of east and west has lost its, if any, relevance through homogenizing practices of capitalism. Moreover, the strict duality between the state and the civil society has ignored the mutual relation between the two realms and has paved the road to liberal understandings. Gramsci's later

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[156] Adamson, *Hegemony and revolution: a study of Antonio Gramsci's political and cultural theory,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) p. 174

[157] Ibid., p. 171.

[158] Stuart Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left*, (London: Verso, 1988) p. 168.

[159] Kozalanka, p. 22

conceptualization, however, has provided a thorough analysis that overcomes the weaknesses of the first definition.

In this second usage that supersedes the dualistic understanding of the former, hegemony is defined as a synthesis of consent and domination.[160] Every power, he argues here, needs different doses of both consent and domination in order to remain in power. The twin pair of consent and domination is not mutually exclusive, but constitutes the complementary parts of the hegemonic structure. They comprise a "historical dialectical totality."

This definition has crucial implications regarding the channels through which hegemony is exerted. In this extended definition, there are no clear-cut distinctions between the channels of hegemony and domination. Unlike the first definition, state, the political society, is not only the center of domination but also executes a critical role in the achievement of consent.

This understanding is also crucial for the comprehension of the historical specificity of the bourgeois power. All ruling classes have invoked and necessitated a degree of consent in order to exist. The source of the consent in pre-capitalist structures was the divine, or natural superiorities the rulers claimed to have. While modern ruling classes also make some use of this notion, the central and critical aspect of bourgeois mode of consent is not superiority but "equality."[161]

> The novelty of this consent is that it takes the fundamental form of a belief by the masses that they exercise an ultimate self-determination within the existing social order. It is thus not acceptance of the superiority of an acknowledged ruling class (feudal ideology), but credence in the democratic equality of all citizens in the

[160] Anderson, "The Antinomies," p. 22

[161] Ibid. p. 42.

> government of the nation—in other words, disbelief in the existence of any ruling class.[162]

In other words, the central "consent generator" of modern class society is not civil society but the political society equipped with free, democratic, parliamentary system. This second usage, as can be seen, supersedes the awkwardness of the first one. It allows us to overcome the state-civil society dichotomy and points to the consensuality and mutuality of the two in reproducing the class-based inequalities.

Gramsci's stress on culture in the formation of class positions recalls another influential scholar of this issue, Pierre Bourdieu. Before introducing the issue of associations, I would like briefly discuss his work.

Capital and Capitals

Bourdieu's perhaps most important conceptual contribution to class debates is his novel reconstruction of the concept of capital, in a rather proliferated manner.

Diverging from the economy-based definitions of capital, he employs the concept (in a different vein) into other spheres, lending us new and powerful insights into the complex relations between class and culture. Moreover, unlike the traditional theories of classification that predominantly focus on the production process as the definitive instance of class formation, he takes into account the "experiencing of class," providing us with the ability to apprehend "class in everyday life."

[162] Ibid., p.52.

Capital, in Bourdieu's understanding, which will be introduced below, is a social relation, a social energy that acquires its meaning in the field dynamics it operates within. [163] In his well known formulation, Bourdieu distinguishes three different forms of capital: namely, economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital. Economic capital simply refers to one's material possessions or wealth in its various forms, such as cash, bank accounts, and real property.[164]

Cultural capital is generally defined as a collection of traits such as general cultural background, information, educational qualifications, and capabilities of expression. Bourdieu elucidates this complex notion by arguing that it exists generally in three different states. "The embodied state," in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body (gesture, posture, ways of talking, ways of writing), "the objectified state" in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, paintings, furniture) or "the institutionalized state" in the form of educational qualifications (diplomas, certificates). Bourdieu defines cultural and economic capital together as the primary generators of hierarchy and inequality. Last, social capital refers to actual or potential resources defined by one's network of social relations. One crucial aspect of Bourdieu's formulation is that different forms of can capital be transformed into each other. [165]

Bourdieu offers a three-dimensional system of coordinates to determine one's position in the social space. On the first axis, lies the volume of its aggregate capital, on the second, the composition of its capital that is "the relative weight of the various forms

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[163] Emrah Göker, "Ekonomik İndirgemeci mi Dediniz?" in *Ocak ve Zanaat: Pierre Bourdieu Derlemesi* (eds.) Güney Çeğin, Emrah Göker, Alim Arlı, Ümit Tatlıcan (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008) p. 278.

[164] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," (Trans. Richard Nice) in J. Richardson (Ed.) *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986) pp. 241-258.

[165] Ibid.

of capital in the total, and on the third the trajectory of its capital that connotes the evolution in time of the volume and composition of its capital.[166]

Another noteworthy point about this conceptualization related with the previous aspect is that it does not apprehend capital as a static structure. Underscoring the inherently incomplete, ever ongoing process of capital(s) accumulation, it provides a dynamic approach that emphasizes the need for the reproduction of one's position in the social space.

Bourdieu and Class Hegemony

Bourdieu's multi-dimensional conceptualization gives us the ability to analyze the various fields within which class difference operates and everyday forms of the reproduction of existing hierarchies in a given society. His work, however, does not, at least explicitly, mention much about the relation between capital differentiation, or *distinction* and the complex mechanisms of consent in the process of achieving class hegemony. In one such seldom example he argues:

> The dispositions (capitals) acquired in the position occupied involve an adjustment to this position, that... (can be called) " sense of one's place." It is this sense of one's place, which in a situation of interaction, prompts those whom we call ... "humble people"- perhaps "common folks" in English- to remain "humbly" in their place, and which prompts the others to "keep their distance," or to "keep their station in life. [167]

[166] Ibid.

[167] Bourdieu, "What Makes a Social Class?," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32, (1987) p.5

The notion of sense of one's place of which Bourdieu makes use, very much sounds like the Gramscian notion of *consent* that connotes the acceptance by the subordinate groups of their subordinate position. However, this inclination of "humbles to remain humbly in their place" and the inclination of elites to "keep their distance" is only a partial aspect of achieving consent in a society filled with inequalities. We will seek to tackle this problem of partiality, a probable weakness in Bourdieu's theory, and seek its epistemic sources with a more elaborate analysis.

The main presumption of Bouirdieu's theoretical approach, I argue, is an individual who constantly seeks to maximize his capital and thus climb up the social ladder. The "social space," made up of such individuals, favors the elites, while giving the subordinated classes a feeling of inferiority due to their limited access to these three forms of capital. This uneven distribution of various capitals and the "symbolic violence" it brings forward is the foundation of the "hegemony" of the elites over the whole society. The dominant classes, to put it in Gramscian terms, can rule without coercion, thanks to the legitimacy provided by the "distinctive" traits they own and the others not.[168] In this picture, the subordinated classes are given the role solely to "emulate" the elites, passively accepting the rightfulness of the social hierarchy and the privileges that the elites enjoy.

A further corollary of this proposition is the following: the more successfully the elites can distinguish themselves from other sectors of society, the less doubtful and uninterrogatable their hegemony and their privileged status is. To put it differently, the elites can enjoy a smoother, stronger hegemony if they can maximize their economic,

[168] For an extensive analysis of the distinctive traits I refer to in the context of France, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (London: Routledge, 1984)

cultural and social capitals which connotes, in simple terms, more money, a more refined lifestyle, and a more powerful network of relationships.

One exception to this individual-centered assumption is when he talks of what can be called as class cohesion. Theoretical classes, that are simply neighboring groups in the three-dimensional system of coordinates of capital accumulation,[169] Bourdieu says, become really-existing classes, when they form concrete groups "in the form of objective institutions, at once expressed and constituted by permanent organs of representation, by symbols, acronyms, and constituents."[170] Unlike in the previous debate, distinction in this sense, does not operate on the level of individuals seeking to maximize their capital, but on the level of collective social actors that seek to distinguish themselves as a well-organized coherent group, strengthen their collective identity and augment their acting power. This point, annexes another crucial element of hegemony establishment, namely class cohesion. However, there is still a different element, a vital one indeed, in the hegemony of the ruling classes that Bourdieu's approach to capital miss.

This vital element, can be defined as to convince the public opinion that "the interests of the capitalist class are the interests of the whole society," as Marx's puts it in *German Ideology*. As argued above, this is where the historical specificity of bourgeois hegemony lies. To recall, convincing the ruled to the idea that there is no ruling class and that all citizens are equal lies at the core of popular consent mechanisms of bourgeois rule.

[169] Bourideu, "What Makes a Social Class," p. 4.

[170] Ibid., p.4.

To sum up, three general strategies of the ruling class in their endeavor to achieve hegemony were discussed. The first one is proving and manifesting their superiority by maximizing their capitals in various fields and giving the subordinate groups a feeling that they and only they have got the ability, merit, sources, and the right to rule. The second one is augmenting their homogeneity, consolidating their cohesion, and increasing their acting power as an organized group. And the third one is to convince the society that there is no ruling class but that all are equal.

Now, I will seek to analyze thematically the publications of MESS and TISK with an approach that considers hegemony-seeking and consolidation as the fundamental motive of the associations' behavior in the post-1980 period.

Relations with the Academy

The post-80 period introduced a significant change regarding relations between the academy and business. Before 1980, pro-labor, radical, leftist ideologies had been quite influential on university campuses, and especially in big cities. A significant portion of the students as well as some academicians were somehow part of leftist movements. University students in fact had been very active in leftist organizations, both legal and illegal, and from the 1960's onwards, they had had a reputation among people for being the vanguards of leftist mobilizations.[171]

A considerable portion of the intellectual field was actually more or less under the hegemony of leftist ideology. An overwhelming majority of the cultural centers of

[171] Kerem Ünüvar, Öğrenci Hareketleri ve Sol, in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekingil (eds.) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007) p. 819. A. Bağış Erten, Türkiye'de 68, in Bora et. al. pp. 839-842.

the time, journals and books published were the vestiges of leftist or left-leaning intellectuals of various inclinations, a fact that clearly manifests the cultural hegemony of the left.[172] The influences of this hegemony were somehow felt in academia as well. Although the number of leftist academics, especially in high posts, was severely limited, the general atmosphere somehow impeded the relations between the business world and academia.

In this period, starting from the early 1960's and ranging to the year 1980, academics very seldom appeared in the pages of the publications of TISK and MESS.[173] Apart from contributing to the publications, hardly any academics were involved in researches of the associations, which were as well rare at the time. The only significant joint activity was the foundation of "the Board of Relations between University and Industry"[174] in 1975.[175] The main objective of this body was to build stronger ties between the two. However, its area of study was overwhelmingly limited to technical issues, such as synchronizing the technical formation of high school and university students in accordance with the demands of the industry and it remained insignificant until 1980. To sum up, the associations had weak relations with academia.[176]

In 1980, the military administration, which took power with a coup, launched a sophisticated and long-lasting strategy to eradicate leftist influence in the universities.

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[172] See Doğan Özgüden, "Türkiye'de Sol Yayıncılığın Gelimesi," in *Sosyalizm ve Tarihsel Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, (1988) p. 2002-3.

[173] Prof. Adnan Gülerman, for instance, was one of the few periodic contributors. See Figure 2.

[174] *"Üniversite ve Sanayi İlişkileri Kurulu"*

[175] Sipahi, V:1. p. 532.

[176] This is not viable for all organizations or sections of the bourgeoisie. A group of top businessmen led by Nejat Eczacıbaşı founded "Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Konferans Heyeti" in order to strengthen the ties with the worlds of business, academy, and politics. For more information about this organization see Ayşe Buğra, Devlet ve İşadamları, p. 131, p. 202.

Immediately after the coup, an army of leftist academics was banished from the universities, with the enforcement of the notorious Act no. 1402. The establishment of the Board of Higher Education[177] initiated a severe attack that aimed to undo the radical/leftist accumulation in the universities with various means, such as oppression and prohibitions of any political activity. After a while, the strategy was successful and the radical aspirations of the university campuses were replaced by a pragmatic, mainstream ideology that first and foremost prioritized individual success and class mobilization and that easily resonated with the demands of the ruling class.

In parallel with this process, the relations of TISK and MESS with the academia underwent a visible change. The number of academics appearing in the pages of the publications increased significantly.[178] Some were just giving interviews about various topics, others were writing articles and some almost became regular contributors. Of course, contribution to the publication did not automatically imply commitment to TISK's position. However, there were only rarely neutral analyses and the overwhelming majority of the academics' opinions overlapped with TISK's demands of the day, a phenomenon that signalled a close relationship between the two.

The initiation of the publication *Mercek* by MESS in 1996 is also significant in terms of the relation of concern. This journal, strongly populated by academics as well as prominent members of the association, was in the form of a theoretical one that includes lengthy and in-depth articles that went beyond the limits of *MESS İşveren*. Recently, the associations' influence in the academy has grown deeper and in 2006, TISK began to publish a refereed academic journal called "TISK Akademi," which

[177] Yüksek Öğrenim Kurumu (YÖK)

[178] See figure 2

focuses on industrial relations and economy. This journal is a good indicator of the progress the associations have covered concerning the relations with the academy from the 1960s until now.

Another crucial site of activity was public meetings like symposiums, panels, and conferences that had a significant role in TISK's public image. Through the period of concern, the number of these meetings gradually increased. They could be about diversified issues, such as industrial relations, EU integration process, Kurdish question, or, constitutional changes. Academics were an essential part of these meetings, and they, again overwhelmingly, supported TISK's stand on the issue of concern.

Another area of cooperation was particular research projects in which the academics cooperated with the experts in the associations' research bureau. The research teams usually led by academics conducted research about various issues, prepared reports and declared the results to the public. One last area, which did not reveal itself that frequently but was indeed significant, was the rewards given to the prominent businessmen and business organizations by the universities. In the post-80 period, many state officials, including Kenan Evren, received awards and honorary doctorates from various universities, a clear sign of submission in the side of universities to the establishment.[179] Similarly, in 1984, Eskişehir Anadolu University granted Vehbi Koç and Sakıp Sabancı, the two most famous and leading businessmen of Turkey, honorary doctorates.[180] Moreover, two leading figures of the associations, Jak V. Kamhi and Halit Narin, also got honorary doctorates, respectively, from İstanbul University in 1992 and

[179] İsanbul University granted Kenan Evren an honorary doctorate of law in 1982.

[180] *İşveren*, no:4/5/6 (January/February/March 2005) pp. 8-9.

from Eskişehir University in 2008.[181] In 1987, MESS was awarded a success plaque by the Istanbul University Faculty of Management. [182]

This strengthening relation with the academy can be construed in a number of ways. First of all, the academic support of TISK presented a "scientific" basis to the associations' position and demands, highly contributing to their legitimacy. Given the technocratic and "scientific" obsession of the neoliberal era about social issues, this institutional legitimacy should be quite influential. Second, close ties with the academy, brought, one way or another, the recruitment of academics to the ranks of the capitalist class, rendering them intellectual defenders of the class interests. This was, in a way, an effort to recapture the intellectual hegemony from the left and to create a business-friendly intellectual environment. Third, being close to academics and getting rewards from academic institutions was a matter of prestige. The ties of the world of business with the world of science lent the businessmen a significant amount of cultural capital, which in turn consolidated their cultural superiority.

Increasing Visibility

Before 1980, businessmen did not show themselves off in the public much. Only the two leading businessmen of Turkey, Sakıp Sabancı and Vehbi Koç were visually and publicly known figures. The rest preferred to remain strictly behind the doors. The highly conflictual character of the labor relations of the time, and the existence of

[181] http://tisk.org.tr/isveren_sayfa.asp?yazi_id=2067&id= [10 August 2008] http://www.mess.org.tr/tc.asp?ktid=88 [10 August 2008]

[182] *İşveren*, no. 10 (July 1987)

militant labor unions and armed leftist organizations were probably the main reasons behind this limited publicity of the businessmen.[183] Frequent strikes and occupations gave the businessmen a feeling of danger, even in big factories, where the high administrators and the owners did not generally come into face-to-face relations with workers.[184] Moreover, the comparatively underdeveloped situation of the mass media, its disinterest in the associations' activities, and the absence of private TV channels could be cited as other contributing factors to this phenomenon. In line with this, the publications of MESS and TISK, two institutions at the heart of the fierce industrial conflicts, included photographs of neither the leaders of the associations nor any prominent businessmen.

After the coup d'état, however, the picture changed significantly. Thanks to the eradication of radical leftist organizations and labor militancy, which gave an end to the blockbuster situation for the businessmen, they broke free from their former timidity and began to be seen around. It was October 1982, when *İşveren* firstly included a photograph of an association administrator, Halit Narin (the then-president of TISK). The photograph was under a small news article mentioning an interview of Narin by the daily *Tercüman*, another significant "first" in the history of the associations. In the November issue of the same year, on the cover was a photograph of Narin together with Kenan Evren at *Çankaya Köşkü*.[185] Within a small period, it became common to include photographs, and in every issue were plenty of them showing high ranking association

[183] Rıfat Bali*, Tarz-ı Hayattan Life-Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994) p. 35.

[184] *İşveren*, no: 4/5/6 (January/February/March 2005) p. 44

[185] Presidential Mansion.

administrators, usually with leading politicians, other top businessmen, and sometimes together with their wives[186] in the associations' celebration nights.

Another indicator of the increasing publicity is the relations with press and TV channels. The associations began to build stronger ties with all forms of media and gained abundant opportunities to make themselves heard. During the 1980s, for instance, the president of TISK, Halit Narin, became a very well-known public figure that was accepted as one of the few top representatives of the Turkish business world. During 1990s, the associations began to organize periodical dinners for members of the press. These meetings were utilized both to transmit the opinions of the associations to the public and to consolidate the close relations between the press and the associations. Thanks to these efforts, several newspapers published interviews with TISK and MESS leaders, and gave place to their public announcements. MESS's quite frequent press bulletins, especially those that responded to the hot agenda of the country and the world, took considerable attention from the press. Moreover, some columnists, especially in local newspapers, periodically wrote news about the associations' latest announcements, to a degree that hinted at a reciprocal agreement.[187] Furthermore, some MESS administrators even took columns, again in some local newspapers, as guest writers. This lent the associations a direct way of addressing the public, a fact significant enough to give an idea about the magnitude of their influence.[188]

They were also frequently invited to TV channels for panel discussions or to comment in behalf of the employers on single issues. Although quite a majority of the

[186] The administrative cadres of the association have been overwhelmingly filled with males

[187] Osman Gençer from Yeni Asır is a good example. MESS, *Medya'da MESS 7: 2000* , (MESS: İstanbul, 2000) p. 32.

[188] For instance, Şener Muter, executive board member of MESS in Yeni Asır.

issues at stake were industrial conflicts or problems in the periods of collective agreements, they were also invited to opine on general issues like EU integration, economic crisis and so on. In line with this, TISK defined itself as "an obscure, unknown organization in the 60s, a one whose voice was heard in the 70s, and a one whose words are accredited in the 80s."[189]

It is vital, however, to note that in terms of publicity, the associations have lagged far behind TÜSİAD, the top organization of the business world, roughly since the beginning of the 1990's. The leaders of TOBB, for instance, have also been more "visible" than TISK's and MESS's, from about the same period onwards. This is a crucial indicator of the division of labor between business organizations that I mentioned in the introduction. Despite this lag, however, TISK and MESS have achieved a considerable degree of publicity. A seminar organized by MESS in 28 January 1999 titled "Crisis: Effects, Precautions and Management," for instance, were broadcast by nine different TV channels in chief news programs, the same day.[190] Another example that could give idea about this issue is that the number of pieces of news about MESS only in 1999 amounted to roughly about 1.500.[191]

The strengthening ties with media and increasing publicity can as well be associated with the quest for hegemony. The 1980 coup eliminated the political threat to the existence of the capitalist class, and provided a safeguard for the future of the free enterprise system in Turkey. The social legitimacy of the bourgeoisie and its public prestige, however, still needed enhancement and media was an appropriate means for

[189] *İşveren*, no: 2 (November 1982) p. 4.

[190] MESS, *Medya'da MESS 6:1999*, (MESS: İstanbul, 1999) pp. 345-353.

[191] See Ibid.

this objective. Relations with the media, in fact, can be construed as a special and highly valuable form of social capital. The post-80 experience of the associations with the media has shown that they are quite aware of the contributions of a mediatic presence to attenuating their public profile, confirming and manifesting their self-confidence, and proving their potency. The more they were seen around, the less they were opposed.

Contestation of the Left

In this section, I will seek to analyze a very specific, but notably significant transformation in the association's discursive strategies, the one vis-à-vis leftist and socialist ideology. This transformation is highly important since it provides us a profound manifestation of capital's self-confidence and the degree of their achieved hegemony. I will tangentially mention the associations' attitude towards workers, which will be the concern of a separate chapter.

Before 1980, TISK and MESS were notorious among workers for their passionately labor-hostile attitudes and their fiery anti-communism. As noted previously, "We have smashed DGM,[192] now it is MESS' turn" was a well-known slogan of DISK-member workers of the metal sector, which manifested their response to this hostile attitude. Both associations blatantly alarmed the state authorities against the rise of radical left and worker militancy, which were considered the greatest threats the nation faced. [193]

[192] DGM is the Turkish acronym for State Security Courts.

[193] See for instance the issues of *İşveren* in late '70s. See figure 19.

The worker uprising in the 15-16 June 1970, the violently suppressed Mayday gathering in 1977, and other massive rallies of that era were all claimed to be rehearsals of an externally supported communist uprising.[194] In line with the official ideology about this issue, communism was claimed to be an external, modern epidemic that had no foundations in the mental world of Turkish culture. The associations' voice on this issue sounded remarkably conservative. Against the turmoil of the modern world, they appealed to the preservations of the national cultural values and demanding "law and order." To sum up, the business front, except TUSIAD,[195] overtly manifested its antipathy, and sometimes hatred, against discourses, slogans, symbols, rituals and personalities affiliated with socialism which used to be a center of attraction and influence among intellectuals, as well as workers.

In the post-80 period, this attitude underwent a remarkable transformation that was amplified by the collapse of the Soviet Union. What was changing was not, of course, the antipathy for socialism, but the relation of the businessmen with notions that used to be a part of the inventory of socialist ideology.

The celebratory comments made by the association's leaders about the collapse of Soviet socialism, for instance, sounded quite novel: "after collapsed walls, dissociated empires, and razed taboos, the world is surrounded by currents of peace and dialogue"[196] the chief writer of *İşveren* said, in a rather "progressive" tone. In another

[194] *İşveren* no:8 (May1977) ,*İşverenı* no: 9 (June 1978).

[195] TUSIAD was representing a more moderate approach towards labor militancy. Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları*, p. 337.

[196] *İşveren*, no:9 (June 1992).

article, another writer said:"we have got rid of the fanaticisms of yesterday, thank god, by rigid doctrines' becoming history"[197]

What is most noteworthy in these quotes, I would argue, is the tone and direction of criticism against socialist ideals. Although they had once been opposed for being revolutionary, subversive, radical, they were now opposed for being dogmatic, backward-looking, and antiquated. They had been proved, the associations claimed, to be irrelevant and were supported by no one except a few dinosaurs.

The way the past was remembered by the associations is also remarkable. The writers of the publications frequently recalled the "hard days" of the pre-80 period as a past that was celebratedly and "conclusively" over. They recurrently claimed that the world was in a process of inevitable change which left no space for the "weary ideological aspirations" of the old times. The cliché phrase "in our globalizing world" was generously uttered, implying that efforts to resist this process were handicapped by a hopeless "dogmatism." Any attempt to question the legitimacy of, say, the Özal period, EU integration or privatizations, was sniped at for being a plot by those who wanted to damage the industrial peace and to revert to "those days," that were pejoratively labeled as "ideological." They also put a special effort into giving place to interviews with formerly-socialist union leaders in the publications. The common theme in these interviews was again "the viciousness of those 'evil' days during which time the worker saw the employer as hostile," this time acknowledged by the other side.[198]

Another point is that on some occasions, leaving behind the fiery oppositional tone, the associations frequently expressed their "tolerance" and desire to "dialogue"

[197] *İşveren*, no:2 (June 1992).

[198] See several issues of *MESS İşveren* in the years 2001-2002.

with various sectors that "may be in different opinion with the association." The various gatherings with labor unions organized and hosted by TISK in various forms such as symposiums or discussion sessions were often promoted as signs of TISK's tolerance, open-mindedness, and magnanimity.[199] About such gatherings, Baydur wrote:
" it is nice that people who had abstained from us in the past, join our symposiums and express their opinions today"[200] The associations were proud of "creating a medium through which everyone would be able to tell his opinions."

A press bulletin MESS published in 1999, for instance, was titled as "Manifesto," obviously refering to the communist manifesto written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.[201] There were also many other references to Marx in which one gets a feeling that the associations made a special effort to show their interest in him.[202] Furthermore, MESS, at two seperate events, one a symposium the other a pressconference, used poems from Nazım Hikmet and Can Yücel, two poets who were well known for their commitment to the socialist movement in Turkey.[203] In the 1990s, MESS held a series of conferences about "flexibility" titled "From Modern Times to the Colors of Life" in which Chaplin's famous movie was also featured.[204] The most defiant example of this trend, however, occurred about Mayday. The Mayday celebrations, which had a historical significance for the working class of the world, and Turkey as

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[199] For instance, The conferences *Çalışma Hayatında 21. Yüzyılın Yeni Ufukları* and *Değişim '97* organized by MESS.

[200] *İşveren*, no: 4 (January 2005)

[201] *MESS Kısa Bilgi Bülteni*, (18 May 1999). Also see figure 28.

[202] For further examples of "Marxophilia" of the Bourgeoisie, see Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayattan*, pp. 70, 77.

[203] MESS, *Medya'da MESS 7: 2000*, p. 632.

[204] Ibid., p. 435.

well, as "the day of struggle" had previously been strictly opposed by the associations on the grounds that it provoked hostility towards capital and damaged industrial peace. This time, however, TISK itself organized a Mayday celebration called the "Mayday Ball" in 1993.[205]

"Creating a tradition" for the associations was a theme often seen in the publications and where a kind of "poetic" voice is most evident. The associations after the 1980s, did exert a special effort to writing a history of their own. They constructed the association's history as a glorified one with a bunch of idealist people undertaking great difficulties, worked day and night.[206] Although the founders of the association were, as may be expected, probably within the 0.5 percent of the wealthiest in the country, they proudly manifested that they had initiated the association in a small, one-room bureau. Similarly, after the coup where labor unions were subject to great suppressions and where DISK, for instance, was kept shut down for eight years, the three-day closing of MESS was emphasized as "a black era of suffrage."[207]

When Mehmet Mermerci, a prominent businessman had passed away, for instance, Refik Baydur mourned after Mermerci, calling him as "the thinker of the business world, a fighter of ideas and feelings."[208] In the former period, it was uncommon for businessmen to use such adjectives to describe themselves. They rather had used to look like hardworking, honest, or patriotic. This mourning was also a manifestation that the business world could also raise idealist thinkers, and fighters. In

[205] *İşveren*, no: 8 (May 93)

[206] Sipahi, V:1, pp. 25-32.

[207] Sipahi, V:2, p. 150.

[208] *İşveren*, no: 12 (September 1992).

1999, MESS published a three-volume book titled “From the Tradition to the Future.” This lengthy book was in a way the embodiment of this tradition-creating tendency.

These somewhat divergent quotations and remarks, I would argue, can by no means be considered as a chaotic and confused attitude toward leftist/socialist ideology. On the contrary, they should be considered as part of a systematic, deliberate, and fully conscious effort that revealed and at the same time reproduced the hegemony of the capitalist class.

What is witnessed here, I argue, is a trifurcated strategy of this class against an ideological stance that had given it trouble before the 1980s. On the first hand, there was an effort to “marginalize” and sometimes even criminalize, broadly speaking, some fundamental premises and principles of leftist ideology, scornfully labeling them parts of an unfashionable, timeworn system of thought that belonged to the trash heap of history. On the second hand, however, we can observe an endeavor to “contain” left-leaning sentiments, by inviting them to “dialogue,” and “mutual understanding.” Notably, this occurred in an era marked by the absence of a significant, let alone powerful or influential, left alternative, or a leftist “threat” that could question the social position and privileges enjoyed by the capitalist class. On the third hand, lastly, the struggle was to “appropriate” items that formerly had been counted as the property of the left. As noted above, the reiterated references to Marx, or verses from Nazım, were not random selections, but part of a “struggle over symbols and meanings.” The formerly conservative capitalist class was now “claiming” to be progressive, idealist, democratic, open-minded, taboo-breaker, radical, and even “revolutionary.” The employers who had

held a "defensive" position in the 60's and 70's were now making "ideological blitzkrieg attacks"[209] into the "enemy lines."

The associations, of course, were not alone in this struggle. A whole army of former-leftist columnists that obtained extremely influential positions in the media became the champions of the gilded discourse on "the winds of change." The world-wide radical demand for freedom that shook the globe in the 1960s as an ally of the demand for social justice had been ripped from its previous connotations, and had been appropriated as a mere tool of capital's restoration of power. [210] It was, indeed, their turn to rejoice.

Image-restoration Strategies: "From Merciless Exploiters to Intellectual Conviction Leaders"

The public image of the businessmen was not so popular in the 1970s. The fierce class struggles of the time, the existence of radical/socialist movements and worker militancy had led to a notable degree of capital-hostile sentiment among the masses, which diffused into common sense perceptions. The Yeşilçam[211] movies of time are an area where we can track the marks of such sentiments. In these movies, generally speaking, the figure of the businessmen or the employer was a merciless, greedy person who worshipped power and money and bore no sign of a conscience or an ethical

[209] Kozalanka, p. 9.

[210] Harvey, pp. 36-38.

[211] The name of the center of the Turkish cinema.

understanding.[212] In the grotesque distinction between "the good" and "the evil," a well-known characteristics of those films, he, with his insatisfiable hunger for more money, was usually depicted on the evil side.

Immediately after the coup, the military succeeded in dissociating all radical political mass mobilizations, eradicating the biggest threat for the bourgeoisie. The public profile of the businessmen, however, remained low and the negative perception of the businessmen was still there. In order to change this situation, the businessmen, together with figures in the media, exerted a considerable effort in the area of public relations, which almost hinted a collective campaign. This effort, that proved to be influential in time, played a significant role in the enhancement of the public prestige of the business class. Now, I will seek to trace the reflections of this endevaour of the businessmen in the publications of the associations.

Before 1980, the publications of the associations (*İşveren* and MESS *İşveren*) were generally "colorless." They included the associations' announcements, news from the sector or the business world, summaries of the political and economic developments of the day, some statistics, a section on law, articles on management, and some technical industrial issues.[213]

After 1980, a slow, gradual, but highly significant change occurred in the publications. First of all, the publications of MESS, for instance, proliferated. In 1996, MESS began publishing a new journal called *Mercek*. In 2000, *Bizbize*, a journal that targeted and massively delivered to, workers in MESS-member workplaces was initiated. The law journal titled *Sicil* began to be published in 2005. Furthermore,

[212] The fatherly businessmen figure represented by Hulusi Kentmen was an exception.

[213] See figure 30-31-32.

through the period of concern, MESS, every year, published vast number of books, in several different series. These series included publications on administration, promotion, personal development, industrial relations, research, and selections from the Harvard Business Review. MESS, with its extensive publication activities, began to take part in book fairs and the interest of the readers in the publications of MESS was promoted in the journals of the association as well as in the daily newspapers. MESS also regularly presented books to the employees of the member work places every New Year's Eve. This close affiliation with the "world of books" was a novel development for the associations.[214]

One significant change was that the leaders of the administration began to write articles in the publications. Although the articles, especially in the beginning, were predominantly about economic or industrial matters, it was an important development in that they themselves started to write articles. Moreover, in 1986, a column in *İşveren* began, written by the secretary general of the association, called *Görüş*. The initiation of a column, I believe, indicates the acquisition of a personal voice, and an increase in intellectual capabilities.

A frequent theme this novel way of column-writing adopted was "human relations." The writers systematically emphasized the role of human relations, "mutual respect and understanding" and dialogue "in a world directed at peace." MESS, for instance, published a whole series of books solely on the issue of "healthy" human relations. They frequently maintained that "money is not everything," and that other

[214] See figure 26.

values were as important as material gains in the search for a happier life. They began to share their insights and experiences about life with the readers.

Within time, the various other publications of the associations included columns and columnists, and the issues the columnists dealt with showed a considerable expansion. The administrators, who once had only been interested in economic and industrial matters, began to display interest in literature, arts, and the sciences. They began to share the latest books they had read, or the concerts they had attended with their readers.[215]

In 2005, TISK's main publication *İşveren* underwent a thorough renovation and acquired a "cooler" and more "stylish" appearance.[216] The content of the journal also changed dramatically and new sections like arts, travel, humanity, and archeology were added. These sections usually included interviews with prominent artists and intellectuals and informed the reader about contemporary arts and the opinions of the artists. This expansion of *İşveren* realized two separate objectives. On the one hand, it was publicly manifesting that businessmen were closely interested in cultural and artistic activities, and on the other, the publication edified the world of employers, making them acquainted with the world of art, thus providing them an opportunity to increase their cultural capital.

Another theme that we frequently witness in the publications is what can be called "the colors of life." The associations, that were formerly stuck in a highly profit-centered, materialistic vision, were now discovering the small details that gave meaning to the "art of living," and acquiring an almost "poetic" voice. A symposium organized

[215] See figure 24-25.

[216] See figure 30-31-32.

by MESS on a highly economic and quite "boring" issue such as employee security, for instance, was titled "Recruit the Flowers of Life." [217]

All these transformations in the form and content of the publications as well as of other activities, as argued above, should be considered as part of an image-renovation project. Through the period of concern, the associations, which had had a negative public image before 80, gradually left behind the notorious "merciless exploiter" image and assumed an intellectual one.[218] They had now become "captains of consciousness."[219] This fabricated typology was characteristically a benevolent one intellectual enough to have the potential to carry out a discussion about any matter, fond of literature and arts, and with a refined life style.[220]

Needless to say, this project was not specific to the associations, but was taken up by several other members and organizations of the capitalist class. The results of this extensive public relations activity were triumphant indeed. A study conducted by TÜSİAD in 1997 revealed that the percentage of the people that trusted big corporations had increased from 28% in 1990 to 62% in 1997.[221]

This process can also be read as the business world's transformation of its economic capital into cultural capital, in a favorable era for doing so. Increasing cultural capital meant a distinguished capitalist class with a sounder manifestation of cultural

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[217] *Medya'da MESS 7*, p. 413.

[218] See figure 26.

[219] This concept belongs to Stuart Ewen. Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of Consumer Culture*. (New York: Basic Books, 2007).

[220] See figure 24-25.

[221] Quoting from Yılmaz Esmer, *Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye'de Sosyal, Siyasal, Ekonomik Değerler*, (İstanbul: TESEV, 1999) p. 42; Rıfar Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayattan*, p. 109.

superiority. This manifestation, I would argue, contributed to the capital's achievement of hegemony and its remaining unquestioned.

However, the associations, at least for a considerable time, were very careful not to highlight their distinctively "high" culture. They, for instance, always stated their dislike of conspicuous consumption or a kind of arrogant elitism, which some individual members of the capitalist class were keen to manifest.[222] As an organization, they constituted the segment of the class which was most closely affiliated with the laboring classes. This was the main reason, I believe, behind their modest and "secondary" image in comparison to, for instance, TUSIAD leaders. However, after the halting of massive union movements which had been severely weakened by the coup and had made their last significant uprisings in the mid 1990s, the labor pressure on the associations diminished. This situation, I would argue, allowed them to care for the "appearance of equality" less and led them to underscore their distinction from the others more blatantly.

[222] For instance, Rahmi Koç and Cem Boyner.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I sought to construe the associations' behavioral patterns with respect to various different zones. My general argument is that the main motive behind the behaviors in these various areas through the period of concern is quest of the capitalist class for a more profound and smoother hegemony. As the associations' "investments" in cultural and social capital yielded its results, they further boosted their self confidence. By means of their attenuated public profile, they diffused their influence through executive organs and enhanced their acting power. The unquestioned legitimacy of wealth among masses, that I referred in the introduction, I would argue, is very closely related with such endeavors of various organizations of the class, rather than being an inevitable consequence of the 80 coup d'état. It was constructed step by step.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL ENDEAVOURS OF MESS AND TISK

The Associations and the State

The publications of MESS and TISK reveal a great deal about the relations of the employers vis-à-vis the state. Historically speaking, the Turkish bourgeoisie owed its very existence and development to the Turkish state from its birth. The state, both as a credit supplier and a giant client, supported certain families and groups that would soon constitute the core of the Turkish capitalist class.[223] From the beginning, members of this class knew very well that the sustainability of their profits depended on the support of the state. The inherent uncertainty in business life arising from various factors forced them to develop good relations with state bureaucrats and elected politicians. Although this uncertainty continues to exist in various ways, the nature of the relations between the capitalist class and the state encountered a significant transformation with the coup d'état on September 12, 1980.

Before 1980, the publications gave the impression that the associations were in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the state. It was not easy to come across articles that overtly criticized state institutions, legislators or government members. The few complaints were usually about the over-tolerance of the state of worker militancy or "the threat of communism." MESS and TISK *politely* demanded stronger measures against

[223] Ayşe Buğra, p. 54-55.

and less lenience towards these radicals whose goal was "to damage the industrial peace." There were only very rare criticisms against the excess interventionism of the state, favoring a more liberal economic regime. They apparently reserved their criticisms and attacks for worker militancy, which they saw as the major threat and did not want to disturb their perpetual ally, the state, against this threat.

A similar attitude could be seen by and after the coup d'état in 1980. No organization of the capitalist class voiced any criticism about the repression during the military regime.[224] Vehbi Koç's, the doyen of Turkish capitalists, (in)famous letter to the military administration in which he advised the destruction of DISK, is also significant in these terms.[225] The political mobilizations and upheavals of the pre-80 period were considered to be undermining the nation's stability and leading to an insecure environment for investment and development. There was full agreement within the class concerning the necessity of an iron fist that would radically bring an end to the chaos, terror and anarchy of the pre-80 period.

The then-president of TISK, Halit Narin's (in)famous comment about the coup d'état "Till now, they (the workers, the leftists) have rejoiced, now it's our turn to rejoice!" was highly significant, revealing the capitalists' opinion about military intervention. During the two-year military regime, the associations acted in full accordance with the agenda of the National Security Council. They enthusiastically supported the Atatürk year project, an extensive national campaign for the centennial of Atatürk's birth that was exploited as a massive holiday organized to consolidate the

[224] Savran, p. 16

[225] Ibid.

consent of the masses to the regime and encourage their participation to it.[226] In that year, every issue of *İşveren* started with an aphorism of Atatürk, and many articles discussed his role in the Turkish nation's history, giving significant weight to economic matters.[227] The issues gave place to the declining crime statistics reported by the MGK (National Security Council)[228], celebrating the security realized by the military.[229] More strikingly, TİS, one of the associations under TISK, made one of the first and greatest contributions to a campaign for supporting the military by donating a significant amount of money to the Foundation for Empowering the Armed Forces. During the ceremony of donation, it was underscored that the "Turkish employer will live as long as the Turkish state lives."[230]

A question of sincerity can be raised here regarding the associations' attitude towards the military regime. To put it in other words, might they not have just "seemed" to be supporting the coup d'état and the martial law in order to avoid the brutality of the regime, given the fact that no sector of society, including the formerly-militant working class, could raise its voice against the oppressive regime? I would argue that tracing this topic in the subsequent issues, we can say "no." There is abundant evidence revealing that the bulwark to the MGK was neither formal nor temporary. For instance, the associations lent full backing to the 1982 constitution written towards the end of the military rule and celebrated the overwhelming "yes" in the referendum.[231]

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[226] *İşveren*, no: 10 (July 1981)

[227] *İşveren*, no:10 (July 1981).

[228] "Milli Güvenlik Konseyi"

[229] See several issues of *İşveren* between the years 1980-1984.

[230] *İşveren,* no: 6 (May 1982).

[231] *İşveren* no: 2 (November 1982)

Parallel to this, while the military was ceding power to the civilian administration, MESS presented "its loyalty and gratitude" to Kenan Evren, the National Security Council, and the Turkish Armed Forces for "granting the nation the possibility to walk towards the future."[232] A more striking event occurred while a delegation of TISK led by Narin was visiting Kenan Evren in the first month of 1984, just after he took his uniforms off and took office as the seventh president of Turkey. "We, in the name of Turkish employers, have come before you in order to take your orders" Narin said to Evren, bluntly declaring their gratitude to the coup leader as well as their highly subordinate position.[233] Furthermore, the associations never revised their policy about the coup and continued to defend it more than a decade later. The president of TISK, Refik Baydur, addressing a delegation of European employers who were probably concerned about the frequency of military interventions, assured them that "the '80 coup was made not to undermine the free, democratic, and parliamentary regime but to protect it."[234]

Although two years of military regime were marked by the absolute consent of employers to the state, it was also the era that gave way to a novel attitude in the side of employers. This type of attitude sprouting out and marked by an unprecedented self-confidence and autonomy, would soon be dominant among employers and constitute an important characteristics of post-80 Turkish politics.

Soon after the end of military regime, a significant change in the tone and volume of the associations' declarations became visible. Even in late 1981, Narin,

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[232] Sipahi, *V:2*, p. 149.

[233] *İşveren,* no:4 (January 1984)

[234] *İşveren* no: 7 (April 1993)

commenting on social and economic issues, used a highly litigious language about the state, though the main focus of the publications at that time was the criticism of the "bad old days" of the pre-80 period. One year after, in a panel about industrial relations participated by a significant number of academicians, Narin mentioned "the necessity to overcome bureaucratic barriers" in order to reach success.[235] The diversified ways of addressing the society that emerged in the same period and the increasing relations with the academia was the concern of the previous chapter. Complaints about "bureaucratic barriers," however, would almost become an indispensable element of every statement from the employers, and be a kind of leitmotif for criticizing the state.[236]

The associations frequently depicted the bureaucracy as a bulky, cumbersome body that had become null and void "in the threshold of the century." Accordingly, it prevented the employers from competing with their international rivals and in this way undermined the national interests. The bureaucracy, however, was not the only source of "evil" and almost all of the laws and regulations that had a material cost were deemed "a burden on the back of the employer." The excessive intervention of the state in monetary politics, the lack of sufficient subsidies for industrialists, the premiums for social security, the existence of public enterprises, the disorders in the taxation system, the cost of electricity, the lack of a proper tripartite system, the low retirement age, the existence of regulation in general, the lack of democracy, the undervaluing of economics, the high rates of inflation, the public social security system, populism, the lower standards of the industrial relations compared to Europe, the higher standards of the industrial relations compared to Europe, the lack of stability, the lack of dynamism, the reluctance to realize

[235] *İşveren* no:3 (December 1982)

[236] See figure 13-14.

the demands of the European Union, the heavy burden on the employers in social security system constituted just some small portion of the extensive complaint inventory of the associations directed at the state as well their obvious contradictions. Someone reading about this period solely on these publications might not help imagining a socialist leaning, business-hostile state bitterly oppressing the capitalist class.

It would be misleading, however, to assess this litigious and unsatisfied tone as a reaction to the indifference of the state to the employers. On the contrary, the same period also witnessed an unprecedented vicinity and warmth between the employers and different segments of the political arena; leading politicians primarily, but also high-bureaucrats as well.[237]

The trail blazers of this fallacy, as well as of many other things, were Turgut Özal and his party, ANAP. This party formed as a new political actor after the resetting of the political arena by the coup was characteristically business friendly. Moreover, Özal himself had formerly been the secretary general of MESS from 1977 to 1979. Breaking free from the traditionally hesitant attitude of politicians to appear close to wealthy classes, the leading figures of ANAP developed overtly close relations with the employers.[238] Özal's well-known declaration, "I love the rich" was a defiant and quite sensational sign of this public proximity, which had not been dared by any other Turkish politician previously.

[237] The postures of presidents of TISK in photos with prime ministers are really nice representations of the increasing self-confidence of the former and warmth among them. See figure 33.

[238] Rıfat Bali, "Pragmatik bir Aşk Hikayesi," Birikim 114.

In fact, the relations between ANAP and the employers were "beyond" close, so much so that many employers joined the ranks of the party.[239] The more direct ways of intervention of employers to politics will be discussed later, but it is necessary to keep in mind that joining a party had also been a quiet marginal attitude among Turkish entrepreneurs previously.[240]

Concerning our case, no leading figure of the associations joined ANAP. However, it was obvious that TISK and MESS lent full support to the Özal government and its extensive neoliberal restructuring policies. Apparently, ANAP was the party that came closest to representing the capitalist class' own interests and that was the main reason behind the unprecedented backing of that party by the associations. There were, of course, matters of tension and they became apparent with time,[241] but for a considerable period they were out of consideration given the favorable main course of events. Especially in the first years of the Özal government, when the neoliberal agenda was put into practice at a "shocking" pace, the supporting tone was clearly dominant, and TISK, later on, would, refer to that period as "the spirit of 84-85,"[242] in a celebratory mood. The death of Özal, for instance, caused an unprecedented mourning on the part of the associations, revealing his unique place in their hearts. That issue of *İşveren* was entitled "The Man Who Brought Turkey to the Irreversible Place is No Longer with Us."

[239] Ibid.

[240] Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları*, p. 117.

[241] For instance, the associations addressed severe critics to ANAP government in 1988 period.

[242] *Işveren*, no: 3 (December 1989)

Some articles in that issue went even further to call him "a second Mevlana."[243] He and his party was definitely considered to be "one of them."

Increasingly close relations were not confined to ANAP, and the associations built stronger ties with other major parties, as well. Especially starting from mid-1980s and intensified by 1990s, they paid regular visits to party leaders and shared their concerns and demands with them. Moreover, the cocktails on the foundation day of the associations drew crowded groups of prominent politicians (as expected, ANAP took the lead in number for a considerable duration) and the photos taken at those events made the warmth and proximity between the associations and the politicians visible.[244]

More importantly, that proximity by no means consistied of a publicized coming together, a mere spectacle. It is not difficult to find evidence about the material benefits gained by the capitalist class in that period, thanks to their close relation with the world of politics.

To sum up, the period in which the capitalists began to severely criticize the state apparently overlaps with the one in which the state seemed closest to capitalists. This paradoxical situation begs a plausible explanation. The discussions in the second chapter on neoliberalism, its effects on the political sphere, and the neoliberal reconfiguration of the state, I believe, can provide the necessary insight into this phenomenon. As noted, the "shrinking of the state" in favor of "civil society" was in fact a process that inhibited the state's power to change the given order of society fixed as free-enterprise system.[245] This process lent the capitalist class an overwhelming legitimacy and a strong feeling of

[243] *İşvreren* no: 7 (April 1993) Mevlana is a historical religious figure known for his benevolence, magnanimity and peacefulness.

[244] See figure 33.

[245] See footnote 80.

security, rendering it an unrivalled force nearly all over the globe. Similarly, Ayşe Buğra, commenting on the the Turkish experience of neoliberalization, defines the central aspect of this process as "the establishment of the rights of private property and entrepreneur profits on a strong legitimacy basis and the marginalization of radical projects demanding a change of order."[246] The political sphere had become immune to radical, socialist-leaning currents. This legitimacy, which was gained thanks to the coup d'état which decisively confirmed Turkey's commitment to a capitalist order led by the private sector, provided the Turkish capitalist class a solid self-confidence that it had never had before, due to several factors. The TISK leaders were well aware of this commitment and they constantly exploited it by extending this preference to its logical ends. "If Turkey has made its preference on the side of free market system, then..." was a frequently-used method for demanding something.

I would argue that the main factor behind the rising voice of the capitalists against the state was this freshly-gained self confidence. It did not mean that the capitalist class, once and for all, had left behind its dependence on the state. On the contrary, as Buğra suggests, "businessmen were more dependent on the state than in the former periods, but the fear of change of regime in this dependency had vanished."[247] They could direct harsh criticism to various organs of the state because they were now certain that no matter how harsh their criticism was, the state or any other major political actor could not develop a business-hostile attitude.

It should be noted, however, that the majority of the politicians of the time also shared the anti-statist, anti-bureaucratic sentiments of the associations. The non-

[246] Ayşe Buğra, "İşadamları ve Toplum," *Toplum ve Bilim* 104 (2005), p. 14.

[247] Buğra, "İşadamları ve Toplum," p. 14.

existence of a self-defending state contributed to the defiance of the associations vis-à-vis the state and bureaucracy, as well. This point, as noted in the discussion of Gramsci, also confirms the consensual, rather than conflictual relation between the state and civil society in the implementation of neoliberal structural reforms.

Conscious of their increasing power, the associations began to behave more like a pressure group and extended the range of their demands. As they acquired more and more power, they took the initiative and soon after, they began to "possess" the state and render it a means of their own.

A parallel inclination related to the process of neoliberalization was their increasing interest in direct intervention in politics. The associations always claimed, and they still do, that they were out of politics, and claimed a suprapartiality. They frequently reiterated that they had no prejudice against any party or government, as long as they were in line with the principles of the regime. In November 1988 Narin was undoubtedly expressing this position when he said, "Our confederation is purified of politics."[248]

In line with this argument, the main focus of the association's interest was and is labor relations, and economic matters related to them. These topics constitute the overwhelming majority of the issues discussed in the articles published in *İşveren* . By the mid-1980's, however, we see that the areas of the associations' interest extended to matters that were not directly related to labor relations, and were more about general politics.

[248] *İşveren* no:2 (November 1988).

An early example of this trend can be observed in their attitude towards relations with the EU. In 1987, the association made its first comment about this issue, and underscored the urgent need to apply for membership. From the very beginning, they declared their full support of the EU integration process and have carried on this backing to the present. This phenomenon may not seem enough to talk about a direct intervention into politics, since the EU integration process is a matter on which all sectors of society comment on, and since it is closely related with economic matters. The associations' acts on this issue, however, were beyond a passive support. They rendered it a central component of their agenda. They organized meetings with EU representatives with European employers, as part of a kind of lobbying that aimed to catalyze the membership process. They assumed the role "to introduce Turkey abroad and to establish permanent relations with European capital"[249] Moreover, they organized panels and seminars in order to "inform" the inner public opinion about the EU.

Furthermore, their arguments for legitimizing their support of the EU gave the impression that they did not consider the integration process on grounds of pure economic benefits, but embraced it as an extensive, overall social project. Apparently, they did not leave the realization of this project to "unreliable" politicians, and themselves took initiative for it.

> "The second generation of businessmen should be eager to be involved in politics. I believe that industrialists and businessmen will be represented in various parties in the next elections. Anyway, I think that the parliament should be a kind of specialists' group."[250]

[249] See several issues of *İşveren* between the years of 1993-1995.

[250] *İşveren*, no:1 (October 1992).

This was stated by Baydur, revealing their perception of politics. The associations showed efforts of developing their independent politics on the Kurdish question and "the threat of Sheriat," as well. A more striking example is a news article with the title of "T.C. Holding" cited in Medya'da MESS, "If it were possible to transform Republic of Turkey into a holding, who would be on the board of directors?", proceeding with a list of famous capitalists led by Sakıp Sabancı.[251] The news continues, claiming that this board of directors would have the ability to restructure Turkey and adapt it to "the wind of change."[252]

These instances, I believe, present a sufficient picture of the associations increasing involvement in politics. Now, I will carry out a discussion on the content of this involvement and discuss their political mentality

Content of Politics

Here, I will seek to answer questions such as 'What kind of a world vision do the concerned groups have, if it is possible to talk about an ideological constellation or a social imagination that arises directly from class position and what other factors play a role in the formation of this world vision.'

I would argue that generally speaking, we can derive three main ideological motives that contribute to the associations' world vision: westernism, nationalism, and democracy. I will respectively analyze the adoption of these three motives by the associations and their employment in the articulation of class interests.

[251] *Medya'da MESS 6*, p. 9.

[252] Ibid.

From the very beginning, the associations have always declared their commitment to modern, western, social values and western-type, parliamentary democracy as the ideal political structure for Turkey. They frequently state that they took Atatürk's famous motto of "reaching the level of modern civilizations" as a sublime guide for themselves. On November tenth of every year, a top-ranking delegation of the associations visited *Anıtkabir* (Ataturk's Mausoleum) and reiterated their commitment to Atatürk's principles. During one such visit, for instance, they told Atatürk the good news of joining the Customs Union and presented it as a great leap in the course of that sublime objective.

The west is idealized as the cradle of free market and modern civilization and on these grounds are Turkey's route directed towards west rendered unquestioned. The associations frequently declare their aspirations for a western-type "mature" democracy and a stable political climate. The west is the eventual horizon. Foreign policy issues such as integration process with EU and alliance with the USA are supported by the associations on these grounds. Turkey is a part of the western civilization and other directions in foreign policy such as making effective alliances with Middle Eastern or Asian countries are deemed as mere "adventure."[253] In one such example, Baydur describes Turkey as "the eastern security guard of Europe in the NATO alliance."[254]

Comparisons of various statistics and indexes with the west are a highly frequent theme. Here, the west is the ultimate reference point to which the measure of success or failure was determined by the proximity to. These statistics are also used to calculate how many years Turkey lagg behind western countries, a popular, common-sensical

[253] *İşveren,* no:12 (September 1988).

[254] Ibid.

notion in Turkish politics. The demands or the objections of the associations about taxes, energy prices, social security payments are also grounded and legitimized through comparisons with the west.

An interesting example shows a table comparing the strike durations of Turkey and of several European countries. According to the table, strikes in Turkey often last for weeks, sometimes even months, causing great losses while in Europe the duration is usually 15-20 minutes and very rarely more than a few hours. This table is presented apparently to show how uncivilized, immature and backward the working class of Turkey was in comparison to its European counterparts.

It is necessary to note that the notion of backwardness is not only used with respect to western countries. A cartoon in *Kısa Bilgi Bülteni* depicts the trade union leaders who did not want to accept MESS's offer in collective bargaining, which were claimed to conform to European standards, in Janissary costumes, saying *"İstemezük,"*[255] overtly accusing them of being reactionary and anti-modern.[256] It is argued frequently that "the nation" might have to take some bitter pills for this sake, especially for European Union integration process, which is considered a kind of "final station" in westernization.

The relations with and representations of the "west" and "westernization" in Turkey are never solely matters of foreign policy, but on the contrary contribute to the definition of the political axis within the society.[257] Representations of "the west" are also deployed to "construe" and "legitimize" "the distinction between the elites and the

[255] "We do not want" in the old Ottoman style.

[256] See figure 12.

[257] For an extensive discussion about this issue, see Meltem Ahıska, *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (İstanbul: Metis, 2005)

people."[258] The fear of falling down to the league of "undeveloped," "nonwestern" nations was exploited to label the masses as "uneducated, ignorant, and traditional" and inferiorize them.[259] This point, I believe, is one of the most effective fields in which the elites produce and reproduce their hegemony over the masses.

The examples mentioned above show that MESS effectively made use of westernization as a hegemonic ideology. Put forward as a supreme ideal, the notion of catching up with the west was crucial in the legitimization of MESS's many policies. The "westernization" aspirations of the associations, however, did have a limit. Although they vehemently supported EU norms and the integration process in general, they voiced a rather different discourse when the issue was the demands of labor. When national labor unions or international organizations such as ILO demanded the improvement of labor standards in accordance with European norms, the associations left aside the supreme objective of reaching the level of modern civilizations and emphasized Turkey's specific characteristics and specific conditions.[260] European standards, they claimed, were not yet applicable to Turkey, which urgently needed rapid growth. "Turkey's strength of competition in an era of globalization" was prioritized on the contrary to the supreme objective.

One other major ideological stance was nationalism. The associations extensively make use of nationalist themes and discourses in various forms. Generally speaking, seemingly they are engaged with the official nationalist ideology of the Turkish Republic. They back the state's position on many events of concern. The associations'

[258] Ahıska, p. 305.

[259] Ibid., 307-308.

[260] Sipahi, V:3, p. 9.

active support to the '80 coup d'état is one such example. They evaluated the military coup as an indispensable intervention against the threat the nation faced.[261] Later on, the associations lent full and active support to the nationalist stance of the Turkish state in conflictual foreign policy issues. They made lobbying activities through their international business networks on the controversial issues of the Armenian massacre, the problems of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, the problems with Greece, and the Cyprus problem.[262]

On Greece's reluctance to accept Turkey as an EU member, Atasayar, the secretary general of TISK, called Greece "our peculiarly thinking neighbor" and "the small and peculiar Balkan country," in an obviously chauvinist manner. EU reports about Turkey were also criticized in a similar vein, for they were "injuring the national honor."[263]

That language is not confined to international issues and is available also in internal problems. In 1983, the associations objected to Türk-İş demands on the grounds that "unions cannot be against the state and should remain under national policy."[264] Türk-İş's criticism about the problems of labor in Turkey at ILO conferences were opposed for undermining national unity and betraying the nation.[265]

The associations frequently declared their subscription to Kemalist nationalism, which defines Turkish nation as "a fused community without classes, or elite circles." "We are passengers of the same boat," they addressed the unions, implying a shared

[261] *İşveren*,

[262] *İşveren*, no:1 (October 1988)

[263] *İşveren*, no:3 (December 1997)

[264] *İşveren,* no:5 (February 1983)

[265] *İşveren*, no: 5 (February 1989)

interest. The associations' position against the Kurdish unrest, which for a considerable period constituted the hottest political agenda after 1980, was also in line with the official stance. They supported the state's method of solving the problem through coercion and violence, and stated that "we are not sympathetic to the idea of a political solution."[266] During the mid-90's when the conflict reached a climax, their tone became more overtly aggressive, to such degree to become a part of the propaganda machine of the state. In 1994, TISK presented a plaque to Ertürk Yöndem, whose long-lasting TV program on the official TV channel presented one of the most chauvinist and militarist forms of nationalist propaganda, for "his valuable contributions against terror."[267]

Approximately about the same period, TISK declared its support of the police forces, and especially the riot police, in a time when unlawful and violent acts of the police had begun to induce a response. "Don't mind what some so-called democrats say, your heroic deeds are celebrated by the Turkish nation," they declared.

Again in 1994, TISK organized a symposium to discuss the "southeastern question." The dominant themes of this panel, such as "our thousand-year glorious history," "the non-existence of a Kurdish language," "fight fire with fire," were well known theses of official nationalism. More strikingly, in the news of *İşveren* about the symposium, the word "Kurdish" was written in lower case letters, a sign of the denial perspective concerning the issue.

Generally speaking, the "nationalism" of the associations played a significant role. The myths of "nation" and the "national interest" were tools of key importance in the legitimization of the employer's demands. They suppressed the demands of labor by

[266] *İşveren*, no:3 (December 1994).

[267] *İşveren*, no:3 (December 1993).

referring to the notion of national interest. The supreme task that united laborers and employers, before their particular interests, they argued, was the well-being of the nation. Laborers should not ask for the improvement of wages or working conditions, because in the era of fierce competition; it atrophied Turkey's economic power and undermined growth.

Although nationalism, with its various forms, constituted a major axis in the political imaginary of the associations, just like secularism, it was hardly a determining one. The associations, "in the age of globalization," were careful not to push nationalism too far. Although they sometimes complained about the EU's impositions on Turkey about some issues, they never considered revising their pro-EU stance and preferred to pass over it mildly. Macroeconomic stability or the attitude of foreign investors towards Turkey was prioritized in comparison to the Cyprus problem or other "national causes."

The last ideological motive I would like to mention is democracy. The associations, especially with the 1980s, declared their commitment to "democratic ideals." They frequently called for a "free, democratic, parliamentary regime based on free elections" as the indispensible principles of a modern political structure. They claimed that they considered the "rule of law" a principle that had to be protected with no exception. Especially with the Susurluk accident, which revealed the illegal and secret links between politicians, state officials, and paramilitary groups and triggered a popular response, the associations' democratic aspirations acquired a more active style and they declared their demand for a "clean society."[268] On various other issues, as well, they generously exhibited their desire of democracy.

[268] *İşveren*, no:5 (February 1997). See figure 15.

The democratic aspirations of the associations, as might be expected, were highly constrained as well. In reality, they were apparently content with the practice of democracy in Turkey and were not eager to promote a more developed one. Their understanding of democracy did not have a sound structure and was quite "image-oriented." In other words, they seemingly did not approach the issue as a matter of principle, but cared more for the "image of Turkey in Europe" rather than the results of actual practices.

Moreover, they developed a clearly selective attitude towards demands of democratization. While they were hastily pushed for the democratic reforms demanded by the EU, they showed no sign of sympathy for the movements of democracy or human rights activists. The clearest sign of this understanding was, as discussed above in a different context, the associations' response to the military intervention in 1980. In contrast to their belief in "parliamentary democracy based on free elections," they supported the military coup that disbanded the parliamentary and halted elections for two years, besides a series of abusive, unlawful and violent acts. They never revised this attitude, and continued to consider it as a necessary action against the threats the nation was facing. They also lent full support to the military's declaration in 28 February 1996, which led to the overthrowing of the government, referred to as a postmodern coup by some.[269] More strikingly, in 1993, on the increasing reactions to the police forces for their unlawful activities, they supported the police and assured them "do not pay attention to what some so-called democracy apostles, you have gained a unique place in

[269] *İşveren*, no: 6 (March 1997)

the heart of the Turkish nation."[270] The demand for the abolition of the notorious Acts 141 and 142, which were about "thought crimes," was also opposed by the associations.

Here, we again witness a pragmatic approach regarding the issue of democracy. The associations employed the concept when it was in line with their short and mid-ranged interests, and retracted it in opposite circumstances. When the issue was the restructuring of the state in line with the neoliberal agenda, they criticized the central state for its ineffectiveness and anti-democratic, oppressive character, and demanded a decentralized state on the grounds of achieving transparency, rule of law, and participatory democracy.[271] However, when the issue was the democratization of the laws regarding election, they prioritized "stability" or "indivisible unity of the country."

Concluding Remarks

The associations' stance on these three areas, I believe, gives an idea about their political imaginary. Generally speaking, I would argue that although the associations are committed to nationalism, westernism, and democracy, none of these ideological lines have acquired a significance so as to acquire a determining effect on their political attitudes. In other words, we can say that their stances with respect to these ideological lines were all mediated by the more powerful "ideology of the market." This ideology was a highly influential product of the neoliberal project and prioritized market stability, and economic growth in to the disadvantage of other social issues.

[270] *İşveren*, no: 7 (April 1997)

[271] *İşveren*, no: 10 (July 1997)

The associations had the tendency to reduce politics into a matter of mere "management," and adopted the dominant technocratic discourse of neoliberalism. Even in 1996, when Turkey was overwhelmed with problems associated with the nature of the regime, the Kurdish question and the Susurlukgate on one side and the ascending Islamic fundamentalism on the other, the associations were demanding that the economy's priority should not be overshadowed by such incidents.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ACTS OF MESS&TISK
IN THE AREA OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

This chapter will examine the attitude and acts of MESS and TISK concerning industrial relations, and specifically employer-worker relations.

Generally speaking, a firsthand observation reveals that the associations' policy concerning labor relations tended to feature a relative continuity with respect to other areas. In other words, it was not possible to mark a sharp rupture point concerning this issue as in social and political areas discussed in previous chapters. The sharp transformation witnessed in these areas by the early 1980s did not occur in the area of labor relations. The mid-1990s could be seen as a kind of turning point, but the change occurring at that time was one of tone rather than of essence. Now, I will seek to elucidate this argument through a tour of the associations' record of the concerned area.

The Emergence of Employer Associations

I will start with the emergence and development of labor unions, since this issue, first and foremost, necessitates a bilateral discussion that takes into consideration the "other side of the coin." The emergence of labor unions in Turkey dates back to no earlier than the 1940s. There had been, needless to say, significant organizational

activities of the working class since the beginning of the twentieth century.[272] These, however, could not go enough to enforce a legal, institutional basis for labor organizations.

1946, the year in which the "constitutional prohibition of the establishment of class based associations" was abolished,[273] allowed the establishment of unions, although without the right to strike. This year witnessed a hasty unionization, especially among the workers in İstanbul, but many of them were immediately shut down by the Martial Law Command on the grounds of alleged links with illegal communist organizations. Despite these difficult conditions, many labor unions emerged in this period and their leading demand was the right to strike. Türk-İş, the first and still biggest labor confederation of Turkey, was founded in 1952 by ten union federations organized in various sectors. The unions organized in this period were not influential due to the lack of the right to strike. After the coup d'état in 1960 that brought forward a new constitution, however, the working class increased its voice especially in cities with industries, demanding freedom for unionism. Three massive events taking place in this period: the Saraçhane Meeting,[274] the protest of construction workers[275] and the Kavel resistance,[276] were especially significant in that they attracted the public opinion and manifested the increasing power of the workers.

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[272] Especially the year 1908 witnessed massive labor unrest including strikes with the aim of gaining new rights in the new regime. Kemal Sülker, *Türkiye Sendikacılık Tarihi*, (İstanul: TÜSTAV, 2004) p. 29

[273] Yıldırım Koç, *Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Tarihi: Olaylar-Değerlendirmeler*,(Ankara: Türkiye Yol-İş Sendikası Yayınları, 1996. p. 183.

[274] Ibid., p. 264.

[275] *Sosyalizm ve Tarihsel Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, p. 2009.

[276] Ibid.

Modern labor relations based on collective agreements including the right to strike and lockout were established with the enactment of laws no. 274 and no. 275 laws in 1963. Only after this juridical change did the working class movement begin to acquire power so as to become a significant national actor that has to be taken into consideration.

The first employer associations emerged in mid-1950s especially in cities with developing industries. They were local-based and small-scaled organizations due to the absence of a powerful and organized working class that could induce an organizational cohesion among employers.[277] MESS, being one of these so-called "pre-associations," that was founded in 1959 remained so until 1963. Despite this undeveloped organizational activity, some of the employers' associations, MESS being the pioneer of them, acquired a national representation in key economic sectors, and together founded a national upper branch, TISK, by late 1962. The objective of foundation was defined by MESS as "to establish an organization of not struggle, but of unity and togetherness with labor unions."[278] This was quite natural, since organizations of the capitalist class always had the tendency to deny the existence of the class categorically.

Before 1963, MESS did not gain an official recognition before state bodies due to its lack of national character. Because of this, it transmitted its demands to the ministry of labor via the Chamber of Industry in Istanbul.[279] The first of these demands articulated in 1960 included "the organization of unions in single work divisions," "non-

[277] Sipahi, V:1, p. 15

[278] Ibid., p. 20.

[279] Sipahi, V:1, p. 63

allowance for professionalism in labor unionism," "non-allowance for politics in labor unionism," and "prohibition of union activities during work hours."[280]

These demands reveal the general strategy adopted by MESS at the very beginning of its history and which have preserved its relevance one way or another until the present day. This strategy could be formulated as: "Workers are organizing and this is an inevitable phenomenon that we cannot deny or oppose. What we have to do is to do our best in order to prevent them from gaining strength, imposing their demands and getting politically radical." In line with this strategy, MESS developed a kind of hostile attitude to labor demands and gained a (in)fame for being the toughest organization of the bourgeoisie,[281] an infame that lasted for decades and is still viable in some issues.

The labor laws of 1963 initiated the era of collective agreements that would be negotiated between labor unions and employers' associations biannually. The first of these negotiations held by MESS and three labor unions of the sector[282] for 1964-1966 period, passed without major conflicts. The reasons for this relative ease were the ongoing martial law in Istanbul that banned strikes, the absence of enough strike funds in labor unions, and MESS's lack of a binding, proper wage-increase strategy.[283] MESS urged work-branch level collective agreements rather than workplace level, and this demand has remained as part of their strategy. Insufficient organization, however, did not yet allow for realizing this objective. Instead, MESS had to settle for determining

[280] Ibid., 63-64.

[281] Ibid., p. 438.

[282] Ibid., p. 141.

[283] Ibid., p.134, 152.

general principles for its members in collective agreements that would lead to a convergence in their conditions and augment their collective power.[284]

The following period, 1967-1968, passed more or less similarly with generally rare strike activity. Confronted with only two strikes, MESS was especially comfortable. Some events outside of the metal sector, however, revealed the ascending unrest among the working class and heralded the turbulent period that was marked by fierce class struggle until 1980. During the three-month strike in the textile industry in Izmir, the second industrial center of Turkey, the workers took to the streets and clashed with the police.[285] This indicated that the strengthening unions were remaining within legal borders and would mobilize the workers for better wages and conditions.

The Emergence of DISK and the Beginning of the Era of Fierce Struggles

In 1967, five unions within Türk-İş decided to resign from the confederation and to found DISK on the grounds that "Türk-İş had become a yellow and pro-imperialist organization that had ceased to defend workers' rights and an alternative unionism was urgently necessary".[286] The foundation of DISK would mark a qualitatively new, and a more militant era in the history of class struggles in Turkey. The existence of DISK would amplify the strength and the demands of the whole working class, besides paving the way to more radical actions and more frequent strikes. *Türkiye Maden-İş*

[284] Ibid., p. 154.

[285] Ibid., 160-61.

[286] Koç, p. 81.

Sendikası,[287] the pivotal element of DISK and the main respondent of MESS, would acquire an unprecedented radicalism in the following years, and this situation would inevitably affect MESS' position.[288] In fact, *Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası* had been the most powerful and well organized union of Turkey when it was a part of Türk-İş, as well. That is also probably why MESS was relatively stronger and better organized with respect to the associations in other sectors, since the existence of a strong trade union directly induced cohesion among employers and inclinations for collective action.

MESS, from the very beginning, did not hesitate to voice its disturbance from the existence of DISK. MESS was concerned about the so-called "union inflation" that would induce rivalry among unions and provoke "unsatisfiable and irrational demands" and was supporting the idea that unions should come together under one, single national confederation. Moreover, it was criticizing DISK for "preferring doctrinarian unionism."[289] Indeed, with its declared socialist cadres, its overt proximity to TIP,[290] and its class-based unionism, DISK was just the opposite of the labor union MESS with which wanted to deal.

After the foundation of DISK, MESS and TISK would deal with stronger unions and that would render the negotiations for collective agreements tenser and fiercer. Conscious of this fact, TISK determined a novel strategy to be adopted by its members in the new era, at the beginning of 1968. This strategy foresaw measures like "increases

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[287] "Union of Metal Workers in Turkey"

[288] Sipahi, V:1, p. 169.

[289] Ibid., p. 169.

[290] TIP was the first legal socialist party of republican Turkey. Founded by unionists and becoming a center of attraction for leftist intellectuals, it turned out be a significant political actor in the 60's by gaining seats in the parliament in 1965 elections. For more information see Doğan Özgüden, "Türkiye İşçi Partisi'nin Kuruluşu," in *Sosyalizm ve Tarihsel Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, (1988), p. 1999.

in minimum wages, satisfactory wage increases that would preserve the workers' conditions, "bonus wages for successful workers, possibility of vertical promotion, and wage increases through qualification."[291] The essence of this strategy was to weaken the cohesion among workers through differentiation of wages and qualifications. "Across-the-board (*seyyanen*) wage increases" were opposed by TISK on the grounds that wage increases should be correlated with productivity and efficiency.[292] This strategy, however, would fail because of the unions' insistence on "across-the-board increases" and the associations would go through the hoops for a long time due to the high pressure exerted by the unions.

In this period, MESS also established a strike and lockout fund that aimed to help its members in the case of long lasting strikes.[293] This fund would prove to be very useful during the fierce struggles of the 1970's.Beginning from 1968, DISK initiated a militant organizational onrush and gained authorization for collective agreements by driving many Türk-İş member unions out. Generally speaking, workers were attracted by DISK not because they were sharing its socialist sentiments, but for it was able to carry out more beneficial agreements for workers. The fight for authority rendered unions that were not members of DISK, more militant and more demanding, as well. Hence, in a short while, the whole union field was radicalized.

Demonsrations in the Zonguldak mines against the collaborationist union and the employer, the occupations in Emayetaş and Türk Demir Döküm and Ereğli Demir Çelik

[291] Sipahi, V:1, pp. 170-71.

[292] Ibid., p. 171.

[293] Ibid., p.130.

factories were the first signs of this radicalization.[294] These novel methods of struggle that were beyond the legal processes were not always culminating positively for the side of workers. The successful attempts, however, provided the working class an unprecedented confidence and courage, which led to more radical actions. Without a binding strategy, and a satisfactory organizational strength, the front of employers was unable to confront this wave of the labor movement. Moreover, under the high pressure of economic crisis and the threat of strike, some MESS-member employers had to violate the general principles of the association and accept the demands of the union, which MESS declared "unacceptable."[295]

One the most important events of this period, and probably of any period in Turkey's working class movement, was the so-called "15-16 June Incidents." In these two days of massive demonstration, approximately one 1,500 workers from various industrial regions around Istanbul, came together spontaneously to protest a bill that aimed to close down DISK. The "threatening" level of strikes and labor unrest fed fears of the capitalists as well as the AP government. On the grounds that union inflation led to a paralysis in Turkey's industrial relations, thus excessive ones should be eliminated for the sake of "strong unionism," the bill of concern would make some important changes in law 274 that would harden the establishment and management of unions and would first and foremost give way to the closing of DISK.[296] TISK opposed the bill on the grounds that it would not be a solution to the fundamental bottlenecks of the

[294] Sipahi, V:1, pp. 173-183.

[295] Ibid., p. 186.

[296] Koç, p. 345.

industrial relations.[297] The union inflation and labor unrest, they argued, were two substantial problems calling for action, but that given the delicacy of the issue, the expeditious proposal was not a smart way to solve the problem.[298] In other words, it was opposing not the end but the means to this end. TISK probably had made a better assumption about the power of the response of the working class, than politicians.

After two days of demonstration that claimed four lives, and could only be controlled with force, and led to martial law in and around Istanbul, the bill was withdrawn. TISK's response to the demonstrations was not surprising. It blamed the anarchists for provoking the workers to get involved in unlawful acts and called for respect to the authorities. Significantly however, it did not blame or condemn the DISK administration for the events, a fact that gave an idea about the caution of employers from the radical union movement.[299]

The incidents were proof that the working class that had been accumulating power since the 1960s had unambiguously transcended the realm of mere economic interests and become a major political actor with the ability to impose its demands. It also indicated that the ruling class lacked the necessary resources and capability to control this massive power. This feeling of fear and panic from the working class, as well as student radicalism[300] accompanied with parliamentary instability and economic crisis would be the main reason for the second military intervention in 1970.

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[297] Sipahi, V:1, p. 207.

[298] Ibid.

[299] Ibid., pp. 105-106.

[300] This period witnessed a rapid increase in student militancy that transcended the borders of university campuses and acquired the form of armed struggles. For more information ,see *Sosyalizm ve Tarihsel Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, pp. 2068-2109.

Unlike the coups in 1961 and 1980, the military regime of 1970 did not undertake an extensive reform project that would restructure the whole socio-political life. It represents rather a brief suspension of the dynamics of crisis of the late 1960s. That is why, a short while after the turn to civilian regime, all these dynamics, labor unrest, economic depression, and political instability reared their heads, paving the way this time to a deeper and sharper crisis that lasted till the end of the decade.

In the early 1970s, MESS initiated a preparatory period to determine the general principles for the oncoming era and agreed on a document in the general assembly held in 14 November 1972.[301] It is not necessary to carry out a detailed discussion on the content of this document, but it was a significant phenomenon that MESS for the first time determined a monotype sample of collective agreements that binded its members.[302] Moreover, the document was generally in a quite defensive mood in the sense that it designated the last point of retreat against labor unions. Seemingly, they were well aware of the difficulties with which they would have to cope through a whole decade.

The labor front was rather quiet in the aftermath of the coup. Thanks to the martial law[303] that continued until 1973 and the juridical pressure on DISK,[304] occupations and demonstrations became rare, and strike activity encountered a significant decline.[305] Starting from this year, however, working class organizations, this

[301] Sipahi, V:1, p. 395.

[302] Ibid.

[303] The Martial Law Commandship had the right to postpone strikes on the grounds of national secuirty and frequentky used this right in this period.

[304] Leaders of DISK were on trial in this period.

[305] Sipahi, V:1, p. 400.

time allied with a stronger left movement, began to raise their voices again. The strikes in the automotive sector of Bursa in 1973, however, was replied with a well-organized lockout by MESS and ended with consensus within a relatively short period.[306] A self-evaluation of the association's performance in the collective agreements of his year would reveal that MESS members tended to be appeasers in material interests, but stood strong against issues like side-payments,[307] and sharing of the administrative authority.[308] Nevermore, MESS would not be able to respond the successive strikes so easily and the psychological superiority would be in the hands of the labor front until 1977.

More important than individual or sector-based strikes, however, was the "general warning" action of Türk-İş in İzmir in 1975.This was a demonstration protesting the negative attitudes of the employers and the government against workers.[309] Considered in material terms, it was an insignificant action that began with the closing down the city's electric station that lasted only eight hours. Symbolically, however, it was of utmost importance. First of all, it was an unprecedented "rehearsal for general strike," targeting the whole front of employers and the government, thus a milestone in the history of the working class of Turkey. Second, it indicated that Türk-İş, which had formerly put a distance between itself and general politics and preferred to confine itself to the area of industrial relations, was becoming highly politicized thanks

[306] Ibid., pp. 402-403.

[307] Payments besides main salary.

[308] Ibid., p. 412.

[309] Ibid., p. 286.

to the rivalry with DISK. MESS and TISK strictly condemned the action, but did not attempt to impose sanction on striking workers or union administrators.[310]

One year later, a similar but more massive action was attempted by DISK. This confederation, partly due to the influence of the illegal TKP (Communist Party of Turkey)[311] that took the lead among its administrative posts and its member base, had acquired an unprecedented radicalism and a revolutionary politicization in the early 1970s that directly targeted the government. In 16 September 1976, DISK launched a kind of general strike[312] protesting the bill for the foundation of "state security courts" on the grounds that it would "harm the independency of the judiciary, and target the working class." The five-day strike was supported by many Türk-İş member unions as well, with marches and meetings in many big cities. Afterwards, the confederation leaders were detained but then released to be tried on "attempt to unlawful strike." Since DGM's were abolished after a month, however, the overall results of the action were undoubtedly successful for the union front. This success confirmed the power and self-confidence of the working class, paving the way for more radical actions. The responses of TISK and MESS against this strike, which they called "illegal and ideologically motivated," were harsher this time, and 691 workers' acts who were claimed to provoke workers, were unilaterally annulled.[313] This indicated an increase in the defensive capabilities of the associations.

1977 was the year where the conflicts between the working class and the front of employers, as well as student radicalism and political violence, reached their appex,

[310] Ibid., p. 289.

[311] "Türkiye Komünist Partisi"

[312] Ibid., p. 290.

[313] Ibid., p. 296.

leading to a chaotic atmosphere throughout the country. One of the most significant events of this year was the May Day incidents. May Day, which had been celebrated as the struggle day of the working class throughout the world since 1899, had been banned in the Turkish Republic since 1924. The first legal May Day celebration was held in 1976 in Taksim square, by a group of 150,000 from all over the country under the leadership of DISK. This demonstration was unprecedented with respect to the size of the mass and its national level. The gatherings of 1977 when approximately a half million came together again in Taksim and again under the leadership of DISK, however, ended with bloodshed claiming 38 lives, rendering the gathering one of the most tragic incidents of the history of the republic. The gunfire opened by paramilitaries located in the Intercontinental Hotel across the Taksim square was unambiguously a violent act of the establishment that felt threatened by the growing labor movement, but the offenders could never be found. The mainstream press reflected the issue as a consequence of intra-left conflicts. MESS and TISK also blamed the illegal groups and rising anarchy for the incidents, and said it was outcome of the unlawful actions of the unions. They developed a sharply anti-communist stand against the DISK administration and condemned the workers for carrying red flags and instead of the Turkish flag.[314]

Just after this tragic incident Maden-İş , the most powerful, best-organized and most radical union of Turkey, and the main counterpart of MESS went on a strike on 30 May that very soon included almost 40,000 workers from the sector, an unprecedented number.[315] The slogan of this strike was “We have smashed DGM, now it’s MESS’

[314] Ibid., p. 299. See figure 17.

[315] See figure 20.

turn!"[316] But MESS was more prepared for this strike than ever. The general assembly in 1976 had ended with a strict commitment among members that they would defend the determined principles of the association, at all costs. The association had accumulated a considerable strike and lockout fund as well that decreased the former vulnerability of the members to strikes.[317] After the beginning of the strike, MESS declared a lockout that soon included 44 workplaces.[318] Moreover, MESS initiated a kind of public relations campaign that attacked Maden-İş and informed the press about "its rightness" on the issue.[319] The long-lasting strike that caused uneasiness among workers and amplified the tensions within Maden-İş was finally ended on 3 February 1978, after eight months, generally in line with MESS' demands.

This strike was a very important milestone in the history of the industrial relations of Turkey. The severe conditions that the workers were subjected to during the eight months of strike dropped void the equation "struggle and strike mean better wages and conditions," through which the working class could enjoy increasing real wages throughout the concerned period. The failure deepened the conflicts within Maden-İş and DISK, leading to splintering and divisions, thus weakening the organization. The acceleration of leftist movement that had been gaining grounds since the early 1970s did stop, leading to a loss of direction and strategy in many legal or illegal organizations. Although, especially small scale employers were severely affected by the strike, the front of employers, however, gained a vital self-confidence and courage that would turn the psychological balance of the preceding period favoring the working class upside

[316] See figure 21.

[317] Ibid., p. 424.

[318] Ibid., pp. 430-432.

[319] See issues of *MESS İşveren* in 1977.

down.[320] From that moment onwards, they would leave their defensive positions behind and pave the way for a counter attack.

1978 passed with relatively fewer conflicts in labor relations, despite increasing political violence embracing the whole country. As a consequence of the failure of the Maden-İş strike, both the number of strikes and unlawful demonstrations in the industry declined, and intra-conflicts within unions rose.[321] One of the most significant events of this year was the "Social Agreement" (*Toplumsal Anlaşma*) signed by the then-prime minister, Bülent Ecevit and the president of Türk-İş Halil Tunç. This document was a kind of consensus to determine the principles of the relations between unions and the government. Although most of the articles such as the consideration of knowledge and capability in wage rises were in line with TISK's demands, TISK complained about the mechanism of the agreement, since it had not been invited to the negotiations.[322] In fact, one of the primary demands of TISK and MESS was to establish a council of labor-employer-government representatives for ordering industrial relations. MESS was glad that the government and labor front began to care for "industrial peace," but strictly criticized the article foreseeing the public enterprises' leaving employer unions.[323] One year later, the agreement lost its validity due to the conflicts that arose between the sides. The associations, however, included the demand for the establishment of a long-term tripartite organization and made several attempts to realize this.

1979 and 1980 witnessed more massive strikes as well as a climax in political violence. Encouraged with its victory in 1978, MESS' tone towards Maden-İş was more

[320] Quotin fromYüksel Işık, Ibid., p. 438.

[321] Ibid., p. 446.

[322] Ibid., pp. 448-450

[323] Ibid., pp. 451-452.

aggressive than ever during the negotiations in late 1979. They blamed the union for being subversive under the influence of externally-rooted, communist organizations that were determined to bring down the Turkish state and had nothing to do with the demands of the labor. MESS even published banners addressing the "patriotic worker" to stand against Maden-İş, which was claimed to "instrumentalize them in its ideological struggle."[324] Maden-İş began a strike on 13 March 1980 that was soon joined by some other unions like Otomobil-İş and covered approximately 15,000 workers. The union was determined to impose its demands as far as possible. However, the slogan "We have smashed DGM, now its MESS's turn" had turned into "No pasaran to MESS," a significant difference that reveals the change of the power relations between the working class and the front of employers.[325] Although in June, some unions ended the strike, Maden-İş [326] continued to resist until the coup d'état on 12 September 1980, which immediately ended all strikes and lockouts.

The End of Union Radicalism and the Beginning of a New Era

The coup and the military regime following that suspended union activity for a long time, rendering labor unions and employer associations passive in this process. The response of MESS and TISK to the coup has been discussed in preceding chapters, and need not be reiterated here. Apart from few exceptions, the associations began to voice

[324] *MESS İşveren*, (Mayıs 1980). See figure 22

[325] Sipahi, V:1, p. 460.

[326] Apart from Maden-iş, textile sector witnessed massive strikes in this period.

their demands again during the debates concerning the new constitution that was approved by a landslide "yes" in 7 November 1982. The new constitution made vital transformations in line with the demands of the front of employers concerning the union activity. The recognition of the right to lockout, the prohibition of unions from involvement in political activities, the responsibility of the union for the material harm during strikes, the prohibiton of political, solidarity, warning and general strikes, as well as workplace occupations were some of the changes introduced by the new constitution.[327]

More importantly, in 1983, the fundamental laws concerning labor relations, articles no. 274 and no. 275, that had been criticized by the associations for favoring the labor front was changed with articles no. 2821 and no. 2822 in 1983. These changes that strictly isolated the unions from the political sphere, and introduced a ten percent quota in the branch for unions to gain license in collective agreements were legitimized with the aim of cutting back "union inflation" that was claimed to be one of the sources of chaos in the pre-80 period. This was just the argument of MESS and TISK. Indeed, the president of TISK, Halit Narin, celebrated the inuring of these new laws with the phrase "up to now, they (the workers) have rejoiced, now it's our turn"

The absence of DISK until 1991 was one of the factors that rendered the labor front passive in this period. In this situation, Türk-İş administration, which had supported the coup, was far from raising the demands of the working class, and was more compliant than ever. Employers were contented with this, enjoying the "industrial

[327] Sipahi, V:2, p. 104

peace" for which they had been longing. Vehbi Koç, for instance, wrote a letter to the MGK, demanding the destruction of DISK.[328]

During the eighties the new union laws were criticized by the Türk-İş administration, the only significant actor of the labor front, albeit its passivism, on the grounds that it rendered strike activity next to impossible, and violated the ILO agreements. Although MESS and TISK had always voiced their commitment to modern labor relations based on the freedom of organization for both the employers and the workers, they supported these laws on the grounds that they were a necessity of the extraordinary situation of Turkey, and that they reduced union inflation.

Indeed, the number of unions with which MESS dealt fell from 40 to four in 1980s.[329] The attitude of these unions whose capability of resistance atrophied by the new legislation was far from the militancy of Maden-İş . Thus, MESS dealt with the collective agreements from 1984 to 1989 with an unprecedented ease.

The labor movement did not raise its voice until 1989. This year witnessed the so-called spring demonstrations in which thousands of workers took to the streets demanding better wages in an atmosphere in which rampant inflation had severed the living conditions of waged masses, as well as their rights back that were lost by the coup.[330] These demonstrations were, however, led by workers in public enterprises which had ceased to be members of TISK in 1983 and were under the administration of the government. Therefore, MESS and TISK were only tangentially interested in this movement. Nevertheless, it created a psychological effect for the working class and the

[328] Savran, p. 16.

[329] Sipahi, V:2, p. 350.

[330] Savran, p. 17.

realization f those workers' demands paved the way for a relative regeneration within the class, which in turn raised the expectations of the workers in MESS-member workplaces.

It should be noted, however, that this relative regeneration never took the form of a radical, ideological unionism that targeted the foundations of the socio-political system. It was rather an attempt to extend the interests of the class within the existing structure.[331] However, MESS opposed the demands of the unions for wage increases in proportion with the rate of inflation on the grounds of preserving the power of survival and competition in an era of economic depression.[332] That was the main reason behind the TDÇİ strikes in Ereğli and İskenderun that mobilized huge masses, but were halted by the government thanks to the new legislation.[333]

In 1990, MESS redefined its strategy in collective agreements. This strategy opposed "excessive" labor demands, and legitimized this approach by citing increased competition and unemployment. Moreover, it introduced new concepts such as "flexibility." This term, which would become the main motto of the association in the succeeding period, mainly represented a novel style of employment in which the employer had the right to change the working hours according to the intensity of production.[334]

MESS' attitude during the negotiations for collective agreements in the metal sector in 1990 was harsh again. Not only did it oppose the demands of the unions, but also it threatened to apply juridical procedures in case of an unlawful strike or action.

[331] Sipahi, V:2, p. 262.

[332] Ibid., p. 419. See figure 11.

[333] Ibid., p. 418..

[334] *MESS İşveren*, (June 1990).

This attitude was criticized even by some MESS-members for being too rigid.[335] It also proposed to classify the workers in nine different groups of efficiency and increase their wages accordingly.[336] Obviously, this was an attempt aiming to divide the workers and reduce their capability of collective action. This proposal was not accepted, but remained in the agenda of MESS for a long time.

In line with its "flexible" approach, MESS opposed the law proposal for seniority right that would enhance "job security" in 1992. This opposition was legitimized by the arguments of increasing competition and rising unemployment, as well.[337]

One of the most important developments of the 1990s in industrial relations was the implementation of post-fordist methods of production and employment. In line with this, at the heart of MESS' agenda in this period lay the defense and support of these novel methods. Labor unions were against this transformation that would undermine their organizational basis and further weaken their bargaining power. MESS carried out a fierce struggle against these unions and won this battle. The widening power balance between the front of employers and workers, the widening gap between the conditions of unionized workers that had already become a minority and huge unemployed mass, and the lack of a class-based left-wing opposition to represent the rights of workers were the main reasons behind the success of this transformation.

In the general assembly in 1992, MESS emphasized the need to end expansive collective agreements, to establish an Economic Council with representatives from labor-employer organizations, government, and university, to accelerate privatizations,

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[335] Sipahi, V:2, p. 460-65.

[336] Sipahi, V:2, p. 464.

[337] Ibid., pp. 490-91. See figure 10-16.

and to raise the age of retirement.[338] ILO contracts were also opposed in an unprecedentedly daring tone, for they reduced Turkey's competitive power.[339]

‘ In this period, MESS confronted a weaker union resistance than it had in the late 1980s. Again, public employees were the leaders of the union movement[340] and the private sector did not come across an intense strike activity. After 11 years of trial, DISK was found "not guilty" and began its activities again. Although it claimed to preserve its approach of "class-based unionism," as Savran remarks, it was a shadow of its former self, lacking the power and radicalism of the pre-80 period.[341] In the absence of a strong union activity confronting itself, the associations extended their area of interest and began to produce politics in a wider area, yet with a focus on industrial relations and economy in general.

The municipality strikes during the summer of 1992 were an important milestone concerning industrial relations. These strikes, where weak and increasingly marginal unions were unable to convince the public opinion that they were right, ended with the failure of the workers. MESS, together with other advocates of flexibility, exploited the popular discontent arising from the halting of municipality services to promote the efficiency and cheapness of subcontracting.[342] After this failure, the implementation of flexible production and subcontracting accelerated, reaching a significant portion of total

[338] Sipahi, V:3, p. 10.

[339] Ibid., p. 9.

[340] These fierce struggles paved the way to the foundation of KESK (Confederation of Public Employees' Union, which obtained important freedoms for the organization of government employees.

[341] Savran, p. 17.

[342] See figure 9.

employment, led to a decline in the average wages, hence rendering the wage demands of the unions harder to defend.

By the mid-90's, MESS launched a novel and very important strategy to be implemented in its relations with the labor unions. The first step of this strategy was a grandiose seminar called "New Horizons of the Labor Relations in the 21st Century" (*21.yy'ın Çalışma İlişkilerinde Yeni Ufuklar*) held in 1995.[343] 250 participants of the seminar included representatives of employer and labor organizations, as well as bureaucrats, academics and journalists. The motto of the seminar was "dialogue and cooperation," and it implied that the "winds of change" were opening up a new era in the industrial relations based on "harmony," rendering the old confrontational style redundant.[344] The focus point of the meeting was flexibility, and various representatives of the employer front as well as the academics and journalists argued the urgent necessity for the implementation of flexible production.

This seminar and other similar meetings of the employer front after this had the following objectives. First of all, hosted by MESS, it aimed to restore the historical image of MESS from the most rigid and uncompromising organization of the employers to a modern, innovative, and consensual organization. Second, supported by academics and journalists in line with MESS' world vision, it exerted an intellectual pressure on the unions, the bargaining power and organizational strength of which had undergone a dramatic decline in the preceding 15 years, rendering their resistance to neoliberal flexibilization futile.

[343] See figure 27

[344] Sipahi, V:3, p. 307

Significantly enough, Kemal Nebioğlu after the above mentioned seminar would say "we could not tolerate the employers, and they could not tolerate us. We took the dialogue to a healthy status, now we should develop it," celebrating the consensual attitude of MESS.[345] Similarly, another DISK administrator mentioned their famous slogan "We have smashed DGM, now it's MESS' turn!" in an ironic way, implying that those confrontational days were happily over.[346] Moreover, in 1997, MESS was awarded the "most successful institution" of the year by the daily *Dünya*, for its consensual approach to industrial relations. These examples show that such meetings were successful in convincing the unions of the invalidity of the antagonistic approach in industrial relations, hence weakening their objection to the agenda of the employers, as well as enhancing the public image of the association. In an era of dramatic asymmetry between the powers of the front of employers and unions, "dialogue and cooperation" unambiguously implied the subordination of the former to the interests of the employers.

Concluding Remarks

The summary of this historical tour of industrial relations in Turkey reveals, I believe, the continuity of MESS' attitude towards labor demands. As argued, MESS and TISK recognized the institutional legitimacy of the labor unions from the beginning while seeking fiercely to prevent the unions' getting strength, as much as its power allows. From 1963 to 1977 was marked by the superiority of labor over capital in terms of the psychological balance and the will to impose its demands over the other. Starting

[345] Ibid., p. 316

[346] Sipahi, V:3, p. 326.

from 1977, the front of employers turned this balance upside down and began to acquire power. The coup d'état in 1980, and the legislative changes following that only accelerated this process, paving the way to a situation where unionized workers became a small minority of the total labor force, unable to defend the interests of the class. This process accompanied the introduction of post-fordist methods of production and employment further weakened the unions, rendering the associations at ease in the negotiations for collective agreements. Even in such situations, however, MESS and TISK maintained their fierce objection to the demands of labor. The call for "dialogue and cooperation" of MESS and TISK in the mid-1990s was, in fact an attempt to co-opt the labor front, that turned out to be successful. Since this period, MESS and TISK have enjoyed the "industrial peace" for which they had longed for and relations with labor unions have become a sub-activity of the associations, which have extended their range of interests to other areas.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This study scrutinizes the history of MESS ans TISK, as two organizations of the capitalist class of Turkey, spanning almost five decades. Analysis of the deeds of the associations have shown that beginning with the late 1970s, the capitalist class underwent an overall transfromation with respect to its social psychology, its position vis-à-vis the working class, and its stance vis-à-vis the state. My main thesis is that this period marks a sharp turning point in which bourgeoisie ceased to remain in defensive lines vis-à-vis the working class and launched an overall counter-attack that aimed to consolidate its social position.

The associations' publications reveal various aspects of this transformation with respect to the three areas of concern, namely social, political and industrial relations. The associations had a low public profile in the 1960s and 1970s that were marked by the ascending power of working class organizations as well as various factions of left-wing movements that were hotbeds of business-hostile sentiments. MESS was especially notorious among militant workers for its stance against labor unions. This situation induced timidity and caution among employers that further atrophied their public image. By the mid 1970s the associations decided to launch a public relations strategy that aimed to restore this negative image via establishing links with press and academia. This strategy, however, was not realized until 1980. The military junta ended the worries of the bourgeoisie by crushing the labor unions and left movements. Hereafter, the administrative cadres of the associations which defeated their worst enemy, labor

militancy, began to show themselves off publicly. Increasing visibility accompanied with developing ties with the academia and the press enhanced their prestige. It is noteworhty that the associations gave considerable weight to exhibiting their intellectual capacity and wide range of cultural interests. This was a crucial aspect of the image restoration strategy which aimed to replace the former sterotype of money-worshipping, exploiter capitalist with a one of distinct tastes and a refined lifestyle. The more their intellectual and social capital augmented, the higher their public profile became.

Beginning with the late 1970s, the associations aggravated their level of intervention in political processes. They ceased to limit themselves in the area of industrial relations and extended the range of their demands to the political agenda of the day. Another indication of this increased interest and intervention was that many administrative cadres of the association assumed high-positions in bureacracy and government. Again in this period, the bourgeoisie left off being mere spectators of the political arena, beginning to develop a definite political program of its own to protect and enhance its interests. After 1980, the associations' position vis-à-vis the state also encountered a significant transformation. The inferior tone of the former period was left behind, giving way to a self-confident and more daring attitude towards state officials and politicians. This novel attitude emanated from the fact that in this period it had been guaranteed that Turkey's socio-political regime was and would be a free market economy based on private entrepreneurship, eliminating the fears of a possible regime change. The neoliberal transformation of the state also decreased the relative autonomy of the state, rendering it an apparatus more apt to the demands of the capitalist class.

The political attitudes of the associations in the post-80 period exactly followed neoliberal modes of thinking. The strict priority they gave to economy, their support of the autonomy of economy from political demands, their leaning to the rule of experts, their advocation of "law and order" undoubtedly confirm this inclination. Generally speaking, the associations' political constellation is shaped by three main ideological orientations, namely nationalism, democracy, and westernism. My analysis, however, reveal that none of these orientations had a dominance over others. Rather, they were all mediated by neoliberal doxa and can be withdrawn or emphasized in line with the requirements of this mode of thinking.

Similar to the above mentioned areas, the associations faced huge challenges within the field of labor relations in 1960s and 1970s. Throughout this period, the working class movement accumulated power via well-organized massive unions and acquired a radical militancy, thanks to the new legislation and ISI policies that rendered unionism able to flourish. In the absence of an organizational unity, the front of employers for a long time was in retreat vis-à-vis the labor unions, unable to formulate a relevant strategy to maintain themselves. By the mid-1970s, however, they enhanced their cohesion and consolidated their organizational power and by doing so, managed to defeat Maden-İş in the long strike of 1977. Hereafter, the front of employers acquired the psychological superiority in class struggles and began to gain position. The coup d'état of 1980 revoked the rights and material benefits gained through decades of struggle, creating an almost smooth climate for employers. This process was further advanced by the new labor-hostile legislaton and the introduction of post-fordist employment methods, undermining the organizational potential of the working class. By the mid-1990s, unionized working force had been reduced to a marginal section of the

class, unable to resist the demands of capital. The associations in this period adopted a new strategy to co-opt the already weakened unions through a discourse of dialogue and cooperation, that turned out to be succesful. It is noteworthy, however, that even in such situations they persisted their fiery objection to most modest labor demands.

All these phenomena, I believe, count for the uncontested hegemony the capitalist class enjoys in contemporary Turkey, despite the grave discrepancy and injustice in wealth distribution. It can be said that Halit Narin was felicitious, at least yet, in his assumption that it was "their turn to rejoice" in the post-1980 Turkey. In the preceeding chapters, I emphasized the contingent character of hegemony. The story of MESS and TISK should be considered as a confirmation of this character, in the sense that hegemony was achieved step by step rather than once and for all. I believe that contemplating on these steps as well as the substantive mechanisms, strategies, and discourses accompanying them harbors the possiblity to "undo" them. This is the sole motivation of this study.

APPENDIXES

A. GRAPHS AND STATISTICS



Figure 1: Number of MESS Member Workplaces from 1960 to 1999



Figure 2: Number of Articles Yearly Written by Academics in İşveren from 1977 to 1997.

TİSK'E BAĞLI İŞVEREN SENDİKALARI,
İŞYERİ VE ÇALIŞANLAR SAYISI (1970)

İşveren Sendikası	İşyeri sayısı	İşçi sayısı
T. Gıda Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	230	17.346
T. Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri Sendikası (MESS)	280	73.666
T. Tekstil Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	144	43.832
T. Kimya Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	81	11.229
T. Matbaacılık Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	50	2.016
T. Ağaç Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	37	1.591
T. İnşaat ve Tesisat Müt. İşveren Sendikası (İNTES)	60	8.015
T. Maden İşverenleri Sendikası	11	1.053
T. Gazete Sahipleri Sendikası	19	2.054
T. Şeker Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	26	14.218
T. Banka İşverenleri Sendikaları	9	16.220
T. Cam Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	8	4.412
T. Tekerlek Lastiği Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	3	3.500
T. Petrol İşverenleri Sendikası	4	8.800
T. Deri Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	83	1.529
T. Toprak, Seramik ve Çimento San. İşveren Sendikası	60	8.318
T. Lastik ve Plastik Sanayii İşverenler Sendikası	6	745
Çimento Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	12	4.177
T. Enerji Sanayii İşverenleri Sendikası	17	16.850
TOPLAM	1.130	241.571

Figure 3: Number of work places member to employer unions under TISK. [347]



Figure 4: MESS' power of representation among the metal sector.[348]

[347] Sipahi, V:1, p. 106.

[348] Sipahi, V:2, p. 168.



	1985	1988	1991
■ Toplam işçi sayısı (bin kişi)	100	149	111
▫ İşletme başına işçi sayısı	237	328	313

Figure 5: Average and total number of workers in MESS-member workplaces in 1985, 1988 and 1991.[349]



	1994	1997	1999
■ Toplam işçi sayısı (Bin kişi)	94	111	98
▫ İşletme başına işçi sayısı	338	401	353

Figure 6: Average and total number of workers in MESS-member workplaces in 1994, 1997 and 1999.[350]

[349] Ibid., 376.

[350] Sipahi, V:2, p. 376



Figure 1.2 The wealth crash of the 1970s: share of assets held by the top 1% of the US population, 1922–1998

Figure 7: The wealth crash of the 1970s: share of assets held by top 1% of the US population, 1922-1998.[351]



Figure 1.3 The restoration of class power: share in national income of the top 0.1% of the population, US, Britain, and France, 1913–1998

Figure 8: The restoration of class power: share in national income of the top 0.1% of the population, US, Britan, and France, 1913-1998.[352]

[351] Harvey, p. 16

B.CARTOONS



Figure 9[353]



Figure 10[354]

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[352] Ibid., 17.

[353] MESS Karikatür Albümü: 1992-1998, p. 8.

[354] Ibid., p. 11.



Figure 11[355]



Figure 12[356]

[355] Ibid., p. 19.

[356] Ibid., p. 52.



Figure 13[357]



Figure 14[358]

[357] Ibid., p. 127.

[358] Ibid., p. 151.



Figure 15[359]

[359] MESS Karikatür Albümleri: 1998-2001, p. 38.

3 Ekim 2010

MESS Kısa Bilgi Bülteni

Bir Daha Düşünün!

İş Güvencesi Yasa Tasarısı mevcut kalem ve ihbar tazminatı ile birleştirilirse, dünyanın hiçbir yerinde görülmemiş bir modeli oluşturmaktadır.

Ödü - bütüye getirip böylesine ölçüsüz, aşırı bir ANTİKA MODELİN pazarlanmak istenmesi SORUMSUZLUKTUR.

Sen kime öğütsemdeki garabbi? Bu ne hatalı,
Yapar Gökgözü'ne sorarsanız ezeğü — kor-kazalı! — *dir.*

100

Figure 16[360]

[360] Ibid., p. 100.



Figure 17: Cover of MESS Gazetesi, May 1978.



TİSK'İN 15-16 HAZİRAN OLAYLARINA BAKIŞI

TİSK Başkanı Halil Kaya'nın
27 Haziran 1970 günkü basın toplantısından

Türk olarak hepimizi üzen bu olayların birinçosu anarşistlerin lehine olmuştur. Kardeş kanı dökülmüş, işçilerle işçiler, esnafla işçi ve öğrenciler birbirlerine düşman hale gelmişlerdir.

Olaylardan hemen sonra konuşmamamız, esasen çok gergin olan ortamı daha fazla gerginleştirmemek içindi. Hislerden ziyade mantığın hakim olduğu ve işyerlerinin çalışmaya başladığı şu anda görüşlerimizi belirtmeyi daha yararlı bulduk.

Olaylardan hemen sonra birbirini tutmayan beyanlar olmuştur. Bu meyanda DİSK'in işverenle ihtilâfları olmadığını bildirdiği günlerde, işyerleri tahrip edilmiş, çalışma bırakılmıştır. Anayasaya aykırılık iddası ile anayasa çiğnenmiştir. Örfi İdare Komutanlığının basiretli tutumu ve işçilerimizin vatanperverane hareketleri sayesinde çalışmaya başlanmıştır.

İşverenler olarak bu kanunların muhtelif hükümleri ile mutabık değiliz. Bizler kanunlara karşı bu tutumumuzu, tasarılar Meclise verildiği andan itibaren belirtmiş ve itirazlarımızı bildirmiştik. Nitekim, Karma Komisyonundaki çalışmalarımıza ilâve olarak, Parlâmento üyelerine birer muhtıra ile Kanunun bize göre sakat taraflarını bildirdik. Ancak biz gürültü yerine sükuneti, anarşi yerine kanun hakimiyetini istediğimiz için itirazlarımızı meşru yollardan açıkladık. İki meclis ve Anayasa mahkemelerinin bulunduğu bir düzende, anarşik hareketlere lüzum olmasa gerektir.

Bütün olup bitenlerin bize yeni dersler vermesi icap eder. Biz daha evvel tehlikeyi işaret ettiğimiz halde sanki aydan ses geliyormuş gibi susan Üniversite ve Siyasi Partiler can ve mal kaybına sebep olan olaylardan sonra uyanmışlardır. Fakat bu uyanışın maalesef anarşiye prim verme şekline dönmesinden endişe etmekteyiz.

Kanunsuz davranışlara karşı bundan önce takip edilen teşvikkâr tutumun son neticesi ortadadır.

İstanbul'da vuku bulan olaylarda, can ve mal kaybının yanında yalnız 4 işkolunda her gün için 9757 işgünü ziyana uğramıştır. Ayrıca turist mevsimi dolayısıyla memleketin uğradığı maddi ve manevi kaybı buna katarsak ne kadar zarar ettiğimizi sayın halk efkârının takdirlerine bırakıyoruz.

TİSK- İşveren, Haziran 1970

Figure 18: TISK's evaluation about 15-16 June Incidents.[361]

[361] Sipahi, V:1, p. 106.

EN ÖNEMLİ KONU ANARŞİNİN ÖNLENMESİDİR

Şükrü Elî
MESS Başkanı

Figure 19: The opening speech of the XX. general assembly of MESS in 4 November 1976.[362]

[362] Ibid, p. 367.



Figure 20: Scene from a union meeting.[363]



Figure 21: Workers on strike against MESS.[364]

[363] Ibid., p. 426.

[364] Ibid., p. 428.



MESS Gazetesi, 16 Mayıs 1980

Figure 22: Illustration against Maden-İş in *MESS İşveren.*[365]

[365] Ibid., p. 475.



MESS

TÜRKİYE MADENÎ EŞYA SANAYİCİLERİ SENDİKASI GAZETESİ

ATATÜRK YOLUNDA

TÜRK; ÖĞÜN ÇALIŞ, GÜVEN

MESS İŞÇİLERİMİZİN ÇOCUKLARINA

OKUL KİTAPLARI GÖNDERİYOR

Başbakan Bülent Ulusu'ya MESS Başkanı Yük.Müh. Şükrü Er'in Gönderdiği Telgraf

NELER BEKLENİYOR?

İşverenlerden

İşçilerden

Figure 23: Cover of *MESS Gazetesi* in 6 October 1990.[366]

[366] Ibid., p. 479.



EDEBİYAT, İNSANI YENİ YARATIMLARA GEBE BIRAKIR

İŞADAMIMIZIN SANAT DÜNYASI

TÜRKAN TAYANÇ

Tuğrul Kudatgobilik

Koç Holding Sanayi İlişkileri Genel Koordinatörü **Tuğrul Kudatgobilik** sanata yakın bir sanayici ve profesyonel yönetici olarak, **"Sanayici ve işadamının toplumun bir genel parçası olarak, o toplumdaki sanat etkinliklerinin bilincinde ve içinde olması lazım gelen bir kimse"** olduğunu vurgulayarak, özellikle sevk ve idarecilerin kendi ülkelerinin tarihi, edebiyatı ve folkloru ile ilgili ve uyum içinde olması gerektiğini belirtti.

İyi bir okur ve sanat faaliyetlerini yakından takip ettiğini söyleyen Kudatgobilik, şiir ve romanın yalnız ulusal boyutta değil uluslararası alanda da kendini hissettirdiğini, sanayici ve işadamının olaylara artık uluslararası boyutta yaklaşmak zorunluluğu üstünde durdu. Türk sanayicisinin Ortak Pazar'a girme uğraşlarını yalnız sanayi hizmetleriyle değil sanat etkinlikleri ile bütünleşmesi gerektiğini savunan **Kudatgobilik**, diğer işadamlarının çoğu gibi, sanayinin sanata sahip çıkmasından gerektiği kadar sahip çıkmamasından şikâyetçi. Yaklaşık 33 bin sanayi işçisinin sevk ve idaresini yürüten Koç Holding yöneticisi, Türk olayını anlamak için Türk ve Osmanlı tarihini iyi bilmek gereğine inanıyor ve insan idaresi sanatının, toplumun tarihi, sosyolojisi ve kültürüyle kavranabileceğini savunuyor.

Kudatgobilik'in son üç aylık okuma listesinde, geçtiğimiz yıl Nobel Edebiyat Ödülü alan **Gabriel Garcia Marguez**'in hemen hemen tüm eserleri var. Fırsat buldukça çağdaş yazarlarımızın kitaplarını da okumaya çalışan **Tuğrul Kudat gobilik**'in elinden düşürmediği Türk yazarlarının başında **Ferit Edgü, Selim İleri ve Salah Birsel** geliyor. **"Anadolu uygarlığının kökenlerini araştıran Azra Erhat'ın eserlerini"** dikkatlice takip eden **Kudatgobilik**, ayrıca **Sait Faik** hayranı.

Şiiri, **"özellikle insan gizini taşıması bakımından"** ön plana alan **Tuğrul Kudatgobilik**, yine de şiir anlayışının biraz klasiklerde kaldığını söylüyor. **Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Cahit Sıtkı, Cahit Külebi** ve "tabii ki **Orhan Veli, Kudatgobilik**'in hâlâ ilgisini çeken şairlerimiz.

Makina, hammadde, insan üçlemesini birleştiren sanayinin en büyük potansiyelinin insan olduğunu vurgulayan **Kudatgobilik**, şiiri özellikle **"yaşam özeti vermesi"** açısından ön plana alıyor ve **"derinliği olan, düşündüren ve yeni yaratımlara gebe bırakan"** şiir sanatının insanoğlu varoldukça gelişerek süreceğini savunuyor.

Güneş, 7 Nisan 1983

Figure 24: Article in a daily about the "world of art of businessmen."[367]

[367] Sipahi, V:2, p. 164.



İŞADAMIMIZIN SANAT DÜNYASI

TURKAN TAYANC

İYİ BİR İŞ ADAMI MATEMATİKLE ŞİİRİ BİRLEŞTİRMELİDİR

Cavit Çıtak

Ercan Holding Yürütme Kurulu ve MAN Yönetim Kurulu Üyesi Cavit Çıtak, sohbete eski 6. Filo komutanlarından birinin sözüyle başlıyor: "Herkes Hoşmemo'yu okusaydı, savaşı önlemek için denizlerde bekleyen filolara gerek kalmazdı."

Yoğun çalışmaları sırasında kısıtlı zamanının bir bölümünü bize ayıran Cavit Çıtak ile sade bir konuk odasında söyleştik. Konuyu hayli ilginç bulduğunu özellikle belirterek, önde gelen sanayi kuruluşlardan birinin profesyonel yöneticisi olarak aktüaliteyi pek takip etmediğini, ancak okumayı da kesintiye uğratmamaya özen gösterdiğini söyledi.

Şiir ve edebiyatın verdiği insan sevgisi, ufuk genişliği ve rengin yaratılacak ekonomik modele de yansıyacağını belirterek ..... işadamının başarısından özellikle matematik ve edebiyatın başarısında sentezine değindi. "Matematiksel katılıkta kurulacak modeller kuru, verimsiz ve toplumdan kopuk olacaktır. Edebiyat, şiir ve diğer sanat yaratımları hayal ve fikir zenginliğini arttıran vazgeçilmez elemanlardır" derken, okumayı yaşamının bir parçası haline getirmeye çalıştığını belirtiyor.

Yoğun çalışma hayatının içinde sürekli seyahat ettiğini de söyleyen Çıtak, "herkes havaalanlarından içki ve sigara alır, ben ise hep kitap reyonlarına uğrarım. Zamanımız çok değerli olduğundan, seyahatlerim sırasında okumayı kazanç sayıyorum" diyor.

En son okuduğu kitabı sorduğumuzda aldığımız yanıt, Halikarnas Balıkçısı'nın "Aganta Burina Burinata" kitabı oldu. Şiirde son onbeş yılı izleyemediğini söyleyen Çıtak'ın en çok etkilendiği şiir Cahit Sıtkı Tarancı'nın "Otuz Beş Yaş"ı. Resimde ise empresyonizm hayranı olan Çıtak, "şiirde o espriyi bulmak zor" diyor ve ekliyor "Haşim'in dediği gibi şiir şiir içindir."

KÜTÜPHANESİZ İŞADAMI OLMAZ

"Kütüphaneler milletlerin hafızasıdır" özdeyişini benimsemiş sanayi yöneticisi olarak Cavit Çıtak, işadamlarının da hafıza ve yaratıcılıklarının kütüphaneleriyle özdeş olduğunu vurguluyor.

" *Güneş, 5 Nisan 1983*

Figure 25: Article in a daily about the "world of art of businessmen.[368]

[368] Ibid., p. 165.



Figure 26: From the booklet of MESS Foundation of Education.[369]



Figure 27: Scene from the meeting "New Horizons of the 21st Century in Labor Relations."[370]

[369] Ibid., p. 561.

[370] Sipahi, V:3, p. 313.

MANİFESTO

Biz, bilgi çağını yakalamış, üretken zenginliği paylaşan, gelişmiş, çağdaş bir Türkiye peşindeyiz.

İnanıyoruz ki:

1. Türkiye'nin toplumca benimsenen demokratik, çağdaş ve gerçekçi bir vizyona sahip hükümetlere ve peşinden koşacağı bilge liderlere ihtiyacı vardır.

2. Türkiye hükümetleri popülizmden uzak, toplumsal değerlerimizi korumayan, çağdaş, uluslararası seviyede ve kalitede tutarlı ve istikrarlı politikalar üretmelidir.

3. Siyaset alanı toplumun ihtiyaçlarına cevap veremez hale gelmiş, siyasi partiler ile toplumun arasındaki mesafe açılmış, halkın siyasetçiye olan güveni erozyona uğramıştır. Tevfik Olgaçsından beslenen siyaset-mafya bürokrasi üçgeni, bir ülkede "demokrasinin alarm çanlarının çalıyor" sayılması için yeterlidir.

4. Global rekabet yarışında, ekonomi ve siyasette yeni bir sayfa açılmalı, toplumun her kesimi doğru hedefler etrafında kenetlenmeli, rekabetçi stratejiler belirlenmeli, doğru ve hızlı kararlar alınarak hem özel sektörde hem de kamu sektöründe eksikliklerimiz süratle giderilmelidir.

5. Yüksek enflasyon sorunu çözülmeden Türkiye'nin hiç bir sorunu çözülemez. Çözümler bilinmekle birlikte bunun için de siyasi irade gerekmektedir.

6. Bütçe açığı kapatılmadan başta enflasyon olmak üzere hiç bir ekonomik kriterde dünya standartları yakalanamaz.
Kaynaklarımızı israfa, kamunun verimsizliğini kapatmaya değil, modernizasyona, teknolojik yatırımlara, Ar-ge'ye, ihracata ve eğitime yönlendirecek hükümetlere ihtiyaç vardır.

7. Ülkemizin en başta gelen sorunlarından birisi olan işsizliğin tek ilacı yeni yatırımlar; yeni işyerleridir.

8. Hükümetler, rekabet kaynağımız olan genç işgücümüze yönelik, ekonomiye katkı sağlayan üretken girişimciliğin önündeki bütün engelleri kaldırarak yatırımlara destek vermelidirler.

9. Toplumsal huzur ve güven Sosyal Güvenlik Sistemleri ile doğrudan bağlantılıdır.
Sistem siyasi iktidarların popülist müdahalelerinden soyutlanmalı, mevcut çözümler yerine sil baştan aktüeryal dengenin esas alındığı çağdaş bir yapıya kavuşturulmalıdır.

10. Giderek büyüyen ve devlete bir baş kalkan olan kayıtdışı birliğin temizlenmesi hem ekonomiyi rahatlatacak hem haksız rekabeti engelleyecek hem de toplumsal değer yargılarımızı güçlendirecektir.

11. Çağımızda vasıflı, yetenekli, bilgi ve beceri sahibi, liyakatli, lider vasıflı insan yetiştirmek, bu insanları yetiştirecek saygın kurum ve mekanizmaları geciktirmeden oluşturmak ve bunun ortamını hazırlamak ülkemiz için yaşamsal önem taşımaktadır.

12. Endüstri ilişkileri alanındaki sorunlar hükümet-işveren-işçi temsilcileri arasında karşılıklı duyarlılık, güven ve işbirliği ortamı içinde çözülebilir. Çalışma hayatının kararları beraber alınmadıkça ve herkes kendi köşesinde bekledikçe problemlerimize bulunacak çözüm yollarının başarı şansı yoktur. Ülkemizin ihtiyacı ve toplumsal uzlaşma ancak sürekli, katılımcı ve karşılıklı yararlanmış bir diyalog ile sağlanabilir.

13. AB ile ilişkiler sağduyulu, dengeli, onurlu ve karşılıklı çıkarlar doğrultusunda yönlendirilmelidir.

14. Neler yapmak istediğimizi net biçimde tanımlayarak, işi kitle dalkavukluğuna götürmeden, insan ve sermaye kaynağımızı zenginliğe dönüştürmeliyiz. Yapmak istediğimiz şeyi hayata geçirecek hünerler ve yetenekler geliştirmeliyiz.

Bunları sıralarken bilgisiz bir kesimden yalnız değiliz. Gelişmiş bir Türkiye peşinde olan sorumluluk sahibi, bilinçli, geniş bir toplum kesiminin aklını ve desteği de bu yönde.

Toplumsal sorumluluk bilinci içinde, tüm ülke varlarının hakkaniyetli vergilendirilmesi gereken bütün değerlerin kaynağına götürücü değil, sağlıklı gelişen, birlik ve beraberlik sağlayan, adil ve çağdaş değerler olmasını istiyoruz.

Daha hep birlikte geçmişin sorumluluğunu değil, geleceğin rotasını birlikte çizelim, toplumu tazelikle başlangıç alanına verelim.

MESS
İstanbul, 1998

Figure 28: Manifesto of MESS.[371]



"Endüstri İlişkileri" oturumu. Soldan sağa: Emre Kocaoğlu, Prof. Dr. Toker Dereli, Prof. Dr. Adnan Gülerman, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Altan, Prof. Dr. Polat Soyer.

Figure 29: Scene from the meeting "Change '97."[372]

[371] Ibid., p. 80.

[372] Ibid., p. 322.



işveren

CİLT : XII SAYI : 1 EKİM 1973

Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu tarafından yayınlanan aylık dergi

İDARE YERİ : Mithatpaşa Caddesi No : 46/1 Yenişehir-Ankara Tel : 18 32 17 — 18 32 18 — 12 49 02

ABONE : Yıllık 60 TL. dır. Dergide yayınlanan bütün yazılar kaynak adı gösterilerek iktibas edilebilir.

Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu adına
İMTİYAZ SAHİBİ : Halil KAYA

Sorumlu Yayın Müdürü : Halil KAYA

İLÂN FİATLARI

	12 Ay Devamlı İlân	YEK RENK Geçici İlân	İKİ RENK
Tam Sayfa	800.— TL.	1.000.— TL.	1.500.— TL.
Yarım Sayfa	500.— TL.	600.— TL.	800.— TL.
Çeyrek Sayfa	250.— TL.	300.— TL.	400.— TL.

İşveren Basın Ahlâk yasasına uymayı taahhüt eder.

Bastığı Yer : ÖNGÜN Kardeşler Matbaası — Ankara
Bastığı tarih : 31.10.1973

İÇİNDEKİLER

■ MİLLÎ SEVİYEDE İŞÇİ - İŞVEREN İŞBİRLİĞİ 3
■ ORTAK PAZARIN (AET) SOSYAL DÜZENİ 25
■ TÜRKİYE'DE MESLEKİ VE TEKNİK EĞİTİM 47
■ TÜRKİYE'DE İŞVERENİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ SORUNU 60

Figure 30: Contents page of İşveren, October 1973.



işveren

TÜRKİYE İŞVEREN SENDİKALARI KONFEDERASYONU
tarafından yayınlanan aylık dergi

CİLT : XXVI SAYI : 11 AĞUSTOS - 1988

HALİT NARİN
T. İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu
Adına Sahibi

İSMAİL HÜSNÜ ÇUBUKÇU
Sorumlu Yayın Müdürü

İDARE YERİ
Meşrutiyet Cad. No: 1/4
06650 Kızılay - ANKARA
TEL: 118 32 17 - 118 32 18
118 96 84 - 125 62 34 - 125 80 09
TELEX: 42122 TİSK-TR
FAX: 118 44 73

Dergide yayınlanan bütün yazılar kaynak adı gösterilerek iktibas edilebilir.

Dergide yayınlanan yazılar yazarların kişisel görüşüdür, Konfederasyonu bağlamaz.

İŞVEREN BASIN AHLÂK YASASINA UYMAYI TAAHHÜT ETMİŞTİR.

Baskı Tarihi : 31.8.1988

ABONE
Yıllık abone bedeli 6.000.-TL.'dir.

İLÂN FİYATLARI
• Arka Kapak Dış Tam Sayfa
Renkli 430.000.-TL
Siyah—Beyaz 350.000.-TL
• Arka veya Ön Kapak İçi Tam Sayfa
Renkli 365.000.-TL
Siyah-Beyaz 280.000.-TL
• İç Sayfalar Tam Sayfa
Renkli 235.000.-TL
Siyah-Beyaz 140.000.-TL
• İç Sayfalar Yarım Sayfa
Renkli 190.000.-TL
Siyah-Beyaz 100.000.-TL

Bu dergi
AJANS-TÜRK Matbaacılık Sanayii A.Ş.'nin grafik tasarımı digital ve modüler fotodizgi bölümünde dizilerek sayfa düzenlemesi elektronik ekranda yapılmış, grafik ve elektronik film bölümlerinde hazırlanarak bilgisayarlı ofset bölümünde basılmış ve kapak lâke bölümünde parlatılmıştır.

2
TİSK BAŞKANI NARİN : YATIRIM VE ÜRETİM YAPAN MÜTEŞEBBİS DESTEKLENMELİDİR

4
HÜKÜMET-ÖZEL SEKTÖR ZİRVESİ

6
TİSK'İN "1987 YILI ÇALIŞMA İSTATİSTİKLERİ VE İŞGÜCÜ MALİYETİ ARAŞTIRMASI" YAYINLANDI

10
YABANCI SERMAYETİ TEŞVİK KANUNU GÜNCELLEŞTİRİLECEK
Devlet Bakanı Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, Hükümetin yabancı sermaye politikasını değerlendirdi

12
"YABANCI SERMAYE GELİŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKELER AÇISINDAN İKİ YANI KESKİN BIÇAK GİBİDİR"
Doç. Dr. Cevdet Erdost : "Kimine göre kalkınma için gerekli, kimine göre de geri kalmışlığın nedeni."

14
"TÜRKİYE YABANCI SERMAYEYİ CEZBEDECEK GENİŞ BİR POTANSİYELE SAHİPTİR"
TİSK Başkan Vekili Ali Nizamoğlu : "Uygulanan yabancı sermaye politikasında önemli bir değişikliğe ihtiyaç duyulduğunu zannetmiyorum"

15
"1980 SONRASI DÜZENLEMELERİ YABANCI SERMAYE KONUSUNDA OLUMLU SONUÇLAR VERDİ"
DPT Yabancı Sermaye Başkanı Dr. İbrahim Çakır : Yabancı Sermayeli kuruluşlar arasında 154 firma ile Federal Almanya ilk sırada bulunuyor"

17
HUKUK BÖLÜMÜ

21
"YABANCI SERMAYE AÇISINDAN 1980 YILI DÖNÜM NOKTASI OLDU"
YASED Başkan Vekili Erdoğan Karakoyunlu : "Alınan olumlu tedbirler yabancı çevrelerde ilgi ve güven yaratı"

23
"TÜRKİYE YABANCI SERMAYE İÇİN BİR SÜREDİR İLGİNÇ BİR ORTAM HALİNE GELDİ"
Türk-ABD İş Konseyi Başkanı Sedat Aloğlu : "Yabancı sermaye hareketleri uzun yıllar süren bir arayış ve bekleyiş sonucu gerçekleşir"

24
DPT SERBEST BÖLGELER BAŞKANI ALAYBEYOĞLU :
"Türkiye serbest bölgeleri yatırım cennetli olacaktır"

31
HABERLER

35
İSTATİSTİK

Figure 31: Content page of İşveren, August 1988.

Figure 32: Contents page of İşveren, Jan/Feb/March 2005.



Figure 33: Photos of presidents of TISK with prime ministers.[373]

[373] İşveren, no: 3 (December 1987)

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