Diyanet in the Transnational Field:
DİTİB in Germany in the 1980s

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Declaration of Originality

The intellectual content of this thesis, which has been written by me and for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other examination or degree of higher education. The sources of all paraphrased and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly acknowledged herein.

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Abstract

Diyanet in the Transnational Field: DİTİB in Germany in the 1980s

Batıkan Bulut, Master's Candidate at the Atatürk Institute
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Professor M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Thesis Advisor

This thesis argues that the Turkish Islamic Synthesis (TIS) was re-produced in Germany by means of DİTİB, which was established by the Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) of the Republic of Turkey. The TIS, which was indoctrinated by the Intellectuals' Heart in the 1970s and acted as a glue for the Turkish right-wing politics, was obtained by the military junta and became one of the most important ideological tools for the regime. This research considers the 1980 coup d'état as a breaking point and examines the impact of Turkish-Islamic organizations on the Turkish society in Germany before the establishment of DİTİB. Besides that, this thesis also concerns the Turkish Republic's activities in Germany by empowering Diyanet to conduct a comprehensive policy towards Turkish society. As an alternative to the recent debates on the DİTİB, brought about by the current political conjuncture, this thesis research claims that DİTİB is not merely "Long arms of Turkish State" but an outcome of "historical debates on the religion and society in Turkey".

39,000 words

Özet

Ulusötesi Alanda Diyanet: 1980'lerde Almanya'da DİTİB

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Profesör M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Tez Danışmanı

Bu tezde, 1980 darbesi sonrasında Diyanet tarafından kurulan DİTİB aracılığıyla Türk-İslam Sentezi'nin Almanya'da yeniden üretildiği iddia edilmektedir. Özellikle 1970'lerde Aydınlar Ocağı etrafında şekillenen ve Türk sağı için adeta bir tutkal görevi gören sentez, darbe yönetimi tarafından benimsenmiş, Evren rejiminin en önemli ideolojik araçlarından biri olmuştur. Spesifik olarak 1980 darbesini bir kırılma tarihi olarak ele alan bu tez, Almanya'da DİTİB kurulana kadar geçen süreçte dini örgütlerin Türk toplumu üzerine etkisini inceler, darbe sonrasında ise Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Diyanet eliyle Almanya'da din alanında faaliyetlerini ele alır. Son yıllarda DİTİB üzerine güncel siyaset tarafından getirilen eleştirilere bir alternatif olarak, bu tez araştırması ile DİTİB'in salt bir "Türkiye'nin uzun kolu" olmadığı, aksine "Türkiye'de din ve toplum üzerine ortaya çıkan tarihsel tartışmaların" bir ürünü olduğu görülecektir.

39.000 kelime



Annem’e

Table of Contents

List of Tables *xiii*
Abbreviations and Acronyms *xiii*
Acknowledgements *xiv*

1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Religion and Politics in Turkey 2
1.2 Literature Survey 8
1.3 Methodology 13

2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 17

2.1 Conventional Approaches to the Immigrants 18
2.2 Transnationalism 20
2.3 Transnational Transactions 25
2.4 Diaspora and Transnationalism 28
2.5 Conclusion 34

3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 36

3.1 Turkish Migration to Germany 36
3.2 Turks in Germany 43
3.3 Conclusion 48

4 THE 1980 AND STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE DIASPORA IN GERMANY 51

4.1 The Military Intervention in 1980 52
4.2 The rising influence of Political Islam in the World 62
4.3 Securitization and the Diaspora 67
4.4 Germany's Attitude towards Turkish-Islamic Organizations 74
4.5 Conclusion 77

5 THE STATE IN THE TRANSNATIONAL FIELD: THE CASE OF DIYANET IN GERMANY 79

5.1 Turkish-Islamic Groups in Germany 80
5.2 Periodization of Turkish Diyanet's Approach to Germany 92
5.3 DİTİB's Standpoint in Germany 103
5.4 The Coup's Impact on the Process 108
5.5 Conclusion 111

6 CONCLUSION 113

BIBLIOGRAPHY 119

List of Tables

Table 5.1 The associations in comparative perspective 82

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ANAP	The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
AP	The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi: 1961-1980)
AYK	Atatürk High Council (Atatürk Yüksek Kurulu)
BYKP	Five Years Development Plan (Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı)
CHP	People's Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
DİTİB	Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği)
DP	The Democrat Party (1945-1960)
MHP	Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
MNP	National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)
MP	Member of Parliament
MTTB	National Turkish Student Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği)

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The idea of writing this thesis dates back to my wonderful experience in Cologne during my Erasmus (plus) vacancy. At the time, Turkish mosque names in different German cities attracted my attention. They were named "*Ayasofya*" (Hagia Sophia), "*Yavuz Sultan Selim*" (Selim I, Ottoman Sultan), "*Şehitlik" (martyrdom), and "Merkez" (central)*. I wondered why these historical, symbolic, and "Turkish" names (because you can say *"Central"* rather than *"Merkez" and that may also attract other Muslim groups)* are used in Germany.

One other interesting thing was that, while there was not a mosque named "Ayasofya" in Turkey, Turkish workers had already established mosques in German cities with that name (in Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Essen, etc.). I do not doubt that giving the name of "Ayasofya" to a Turkish mosque means more than just building a mosque. I found some historical relations and explanations during literature review of this thesis, and thereafter I focused on my thesis question.

In short, this thesis came out to find answers to the questions that sparked my curiosity. All my questions and findings found a response in this thesis, but I have to point out some important names, who encouraged, supported, and assisted me in my research and thesis writing processes.

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1

Introduction

In this thesis, I will first analyze the history of the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey) in the Federal Republic of Germany or (West) Germany, and secondly how the 1980 military intervention affected the formation of the state's interpretation on the Sunni Islam in the Turkish diaspora. I argue that Diyanet's institutionalization via DİTİB (Turkish abbreviation of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs) in Germany is directly related to the political and ideological balances of the 1970s and 1980s taking place inside Turkey. Therefore, the narrative of those years in Turkey and Germany shows the need to go into details for figuring out how Diyanet played an important role in people's lives in Germany.

In this research, I intend to find an answer to the question: What does the establishment and structure of DİTİB have to do with the 1980 coup in Turkey? The relations between religion and the state went hand in hand in a more intensive way. The state benefited from Diyanet to become more effective in the public sphere. Religious education was integrated into national education, and no interpretation other than Sunni-Turkish-Islam has been accepted by the state since then. As a state hosting the most populous Turkish immigrants, Germany could experience the reflections of this process.

I believe that as a result of the coup d'état of 1980, the Turkish-Islamic organizations or the Turkish-Islam in the public sphere in the diaspora witnessed a transformation with the active intervention of the post-coup regime into the affairs of citizens abroad. To understand that transformation, I will look at the policies and institutionalization of Diyanet towards Turks abroad.

§ 1.1 Religion and Politics in Turkey

The complex relationship between religion and politics in Turkey had begun with the late Ottoman period's westernization and secularization debate (Kucukcan 2003, 475–77). After the proclamation of the Republic, secular policies, which were carried out with the 'state populism', helped to make the state's power dominant in religion in the public sphere (Bora 2017, 143–44) of the single-party era of CHP. With the removal of the ulema from the social life in the early Republican period, the state continued to dominate as the only power in the religious field (Bruce 2019a, 17–18). However, new secular identity and the reforms made in the name of laicism were not appreciated by all segments of society, especially in the social periphery (Mardin 1973, 178). Thus, as a result of the disapproval, the opposition of the single party era emerged from the right-wing politics (Kaplan 2005, 666).

Since Diyanet was founded at the heart of the laicism narrative, I will examine the historical place of Diyanet, the state's place at the religious market, political parties, and their relationship with Islamic organizations. In doing so, I will better understand the transnational Turkish-Islamic religious movements' place in Turkey that were rooted in Germany and spread across Western Europe.

1.1.1 *The History of the Diyanet*

The administrating of religion in the public sphere has been one of the biggest debates in the secularization narrative. In that regard, Anglo-Saxon secularism and French laicism are two examples of the secularization of state-religion relations (Çelik 2018; Troper 1999; Ulutas 2010) . In

the Anglo-Saxon secularism, which promotes participation of the religious field in the secular space as an equal piece, it suggests a clear separation between state affairs and religious affairs (Çelik 2018, 191). The French laicism, which not only offers a 'separation' but also restricts the religious affairs in the public institutions, orders certain noninterference to the state assuring religious freedom in the private sphere, and prohibits religious education in public schools (Troper 1999, 1284).

In Turkey, where the state controls religion in the public sphere by strict mechanisms and applies exclusionist policies with state institutions, the French model was applied (Ulutas 2010, 390). As Diyanet is the most important component of the application of the French model, which was established in 1924, it represents the state's unrivaled weight in religious affairs. While institutions were being transformed from Ottoman state to the Turkish Republic, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (founded on the legacy of Sharia and Vak'f Department) was established to take up the Ottoman Shaykh Al-Islam's (*Şeyhülislam*) place to execute religious services (Erdem 2008, 207). Besides, the Dervish lodges and shrines were also banned in linking with the secular reforms, which profoundly changed social life. In compliance with strict secularism, the early republican period was a process of "*personalization of religion*" and "*socialization of political secularism*" (Tarhanlı 1993, 21). The notion that "The religion of the state is Islam" was removed from the constitution in 1928, and Diyanet became a tool of a "*lâdinî*" (non-religious) state's tool. According to Tarhanlı,

> *"[T]he biggest difference between Republican and Ottoman Westernization was the spectrum of their telos; laicité was the pillar for the Republican founding elite, which designed the Diyanet as an administrative tool to 'regulate' Islam. "Regulating" Islam was to "put orthodox Islam under the state control" and to nationalize it, while establishing secular systems of law and education, destroying the influence and power of the ulema (scholars of religion) within the state administration, banning the unorthodox Sufi orders, and outlawing the use of religious speech, propaganda or organization for political purposes."* (Gözaydın 2008, 217).

Diyanet functioned as an autonomous institution affiliated to the prime minister to serve the religious services of the young republic (Erdem 2008, 208). Besides, it also became a symbol of political transformation in Turkey. In the post-WWII era, in which right-wing opposition parties were established in Turkey, liberalization in the religious field took place and the ruling of the DP (1950-1960) accelerated lifting bans on the so-called religious "freedoms" that strengthened the Diyanet's capacity in the religious field. The 1960 military intervention opened a new chapter for Diyanet's place in the state mechanism. Diyanet was declared as a constitutional institution in general administration (Tarhanlı 1993, 30).

Nevertheless, until the 1980 military intervention, Diyanet served just as a state institution and did not satisfy both right-wing fractions' and different Islamist groups' expectations (Kutlu 2009). The most important development that concerns us here is the establishment of the offices of Diyanet abroad, established in 1971 under the "*the Department of External Services*" (*Dış Hizmetler Dairesi*) under the '*Department of Maturation of Religious Services and Officers*' (*Dinî Hizmetler ve Din Görevlilerini Olgunlaştırma Dairesi*), and institutionalized as "*Foreign Religious Services Consultancy*" (*Yurtdışı Din Hizmetleri Müşavirliği*) in 1978 (Erdem 2008, 210; Presidency of Religious Affairs n.d.; Tarhanlı 1993, 53). As it will be examined in the next chapters, DİTİB would be established under the '*Foreign Services Directorate'* (*Dış İlişkiler Müdürlüğü*) of Diyanet.

1.1.1.1 Political Parties and Religious Groups in the Secular Turkey

The Kemalist revolution in Turkey that had eradicated the power of ulema (cleric groups) and sufi orders' visibility in the public life, has had a profound effect on the public sphere in the Republican historiography (Houston 2013, 254; Kadıoğlu 2010, 491–92). Following the establishment of the Republic, the abolition of the caliphate and the Shayk al-Islam, and institutionalization of the presidency of Religious Affairs gave a strong role to the state in the religion in the public sphere (Kadıoğlu 2010, 492–93).

After the abolition of Dervish lodges and shrines (closure of religious convents and dervish lodges) in 1925, apart from Diyanet, there was no legal actor in the field of religion that could serve and educate Muslim Turks. In other words, the state has been the only legal actor in the religion in the public sphere. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Diyanet served as the only actor. There have always been institutionalized substate religious communities in Turkey such as illegal religious sufi orders.

For instance, Said Nursi's Nur Community, Naqshbandi Erenköy Community, Fatih İsmailağa Community, and İskenderpaşa Community are the examples of early republican era's sufi orders (Yapıcı 2019, 109). Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan is a different example, who rose as a preacher in Diyanet, which means he was a quasi-state officer and trained imams outside of the state authority (Bora 2017, 423).

These sufi orders were not at the center but left in the periphery, and most of them have been in connection with political parties up until today. Sufi orders were one of the biggest factors in the competition between right-wing parties and their support would directly affect the assembly's composition.[1] Especially the Süleymancı Community had strongly been in the political sphere since the second half of the 1950s (Çağlar 2006, 5). For instance, Kemal Kaçar, who was the second most influential figure in the community, had been an MP of Republican Nation Party, the successor of closed Nation Party, which later would be renamed as the MHP. Kaçar and another influential member, Hilmi Türkmen, had been an MP of the AP (Justice Party) of Süleyman Demirel (Çağlar 2006, 5–6). In short, since being accompanied with Süleymancı movement, Milli Görüş, and recently Gülen organizations reveal that sufi orders have always been a strong component of politics, and even one can claim that they stay at the cornerstones of parliamentary politics (Ahmad 1991, 13).

1 Religious orders' voting behavior deeply affected the assembly composition. Between the 1973 and the 1977 elections, the MSP lost 3% of total votes and half of its MPs, while the AP got 7% more total votes and 40 more MPs. Source: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/genel_secim.html

What about the diaspora? The religious groups in the diaspora have been composed of the movement of dispersion from the country of origin, emerged in historical evolution, and were shaped in the diaspora and transnational field as a politico-religious movement (Vertovec 2003, 318–19). The diaspora is a controversial concept by nature, where a parallel society is formed as semi-independent from the country of origin. What makes the Turkish diaspora special is hidden in the state's approach to communities and identities of citizens abroad. For a Sunni-Muslim Turkish, the state may request religious officials. However, as the state does not recognize Alevism as a religion, it turned a blind eye to the Alevi citizens in the diaspora. Therefore, the diaspora rose as a place of re-culmination of grievances.

1.1.1.2 Necmettin Erbakan and his legacy

Necmettin Erbakan and his parties can be seen as a continuation of the right-wing opposition of the DP before the 1960 coup.[2] Erbakan represents the continuous rise of political Islam since the MNP's inauguration, and he contributed to the debates of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a coalition partner of the National Front governments in the 1970s (Cetinsaya 1999, 373; Criss 2010, 48). Besides these, he also had a strong impact on the Turkish diaspora (Bilir 2004, 276; Ewing 2003, 423–24).

The biggest factor contributing to the closure of Erbakan's parties and establishing new ones was its conflictual relationship with the army and the mainstream political establishment (Ali 1998, 66–67). Because, as Bora underlines, Erbakan had adopted the "*Milli Görüş*" ideology, which interprets the nationality from the Ottoman Nation System instead of

2 Erbakan, who was not nominated from the Justice Party, and then participated in the elections as an independent candidate, then founded the National Order Party (Milli Nizam) in 1970, which was located to the right of the Justice Party in the political spectrum. His party was closed after the 1971 military intervention that took place a year later. He then founded National Salvation, Welfare, Virtue, and Felicity parties. His National Order, Welfare, and Virtue parties were closed by the constitutional court, because of accusations of attempting to eliminate laicism in Turkey. National Salvation Party was closed by coup d'état in 1980, in which all the political parties were faced with the same end.

Turkishness of the republican era, that builds an Islamist identity on the nationalist-conservative base, but on the other hand, defends a "*nationhood*" established on the Turkish identity with Islamic vision (Bora 2017, 470). His stance towards the historiography of the Muslim world includes an objection to Western-centric culture and his critic to the secularism in Turkey is justified by this appealing towards historical developments of the Republic's attitude towards secularism and revolutions for Westernization (Dai 2005, 26; Yang and Guo 2015, 22–23).

By appealing to the "periphery" rather than the "center" in the political spectrum, Erbakan had an economic program, which was later named as "just order"[3], that relied upon and supported by the small and medium-sized local capital beyond big business centers and Western capital (he had an anti-Semitist and anti-European perspective). Besides, he had a "third way" in his perspective instead of the left and right, and strong criticism over the CHP's statist left and AP's magnates' friendly right-wing policies (Bora 2017, 470–71).

Erbakan's MNP pursued more anti-secular and Erbakan-centric politics over the years, but it tried to find a balance between more radical young Islamists of MTTB and "*Akıncılar*" associations, and moderate members of the party (Bora 2017, 474). Nevertheless, when the junta of the 1980 military intervention ordered to close all political parties, moderate MSP members joined ANAP, while the supporters of the Milli Görüş movement established the Welfare Party (Lapidot 1996, 67).

The effect of Erbakan on the diaspora had been quite influential. Erbakan's political agenda, in which he placed himself against the left movements and communism -even if not much 'counter' like MHP-, represented Western skepticism of the first Generation Turkish Workers that lived in social anomie in Germany, as well his maintaining a stance against Turkish secularism, had found a euphoric response in the Turkish Diaspora in Germany, where Muslim Turks were in pursuit of getting together under a strong Islamic umbrella (Vielhaber 2012).

3 Just Order (Adil Düzen) was the party doctrine of the Welfare Party in 1991. Nevertheless, it was Erbakan's motto since his first entrance to the political ground in the late 1960s.

Having after his inauguration for the Milli Görüş Doctrine, first Milli Görüş associations (such as masjids) were established in the early 1970s within the associations (or masjids) of Süleymancı communities, and organizations of Turkish Unions in Germany and Berlin (Beaumont and Cloke 2012, 225; Rosenow-Williams 2012, 255). In light of the developments of the 1970s and early 1980s, some influential members of the Milli Görüş in Europe, such as Yusuf Zeynel Abidin and Rüştü Banaz, had institutionalized the organization as a European branch of Milli Görüş in Turkey by naming them "Europe Milli Görüş Organizations" (Özkan 2019, 40). In short, Erbakan's legacy shaped the Turkish-Islam in the Diaspora.

§ 1.2 Literature Survey

There is rising literature on DİTİB, which mostly examines the union's position in Germany after the 9/11 and evaluates it from the integrationist approach with its position towards the radical Islam in Europe. However, the union's founding and institutionalization processes in Germany were mostly neglected or simply explained to highlight recent debates.

DİTİB is a contentious institution with its undeniable ties with Turkey; therefore, it has been called "Erdoğan's long arms" in recent times. From this point forth, I realized that it was unfortunately considered based on the prejudices as a result of political tension in Turkey. On the other hand, this reality reveals my reason to have research on DİTİB. In that regard, I decided on the period between September 12, 1980 and the beginning of the 1990s as a time frame. In this period, Turkey was under the influence of general Evren's military regime, which profoundly changed the fate of the republic. Besides, the world was witnessing the rise of political Islam thanks to the tension in the greater MENA (the Middle East and Northern Africa) in the same period, which also changed the fate of the Islamic movements in the world.

A solid study on the Diyanet in Turkish Diaspora or DİTİB in Germany is really hard to find. The lack of a comprehensive primary resource in the 1970s and 1980s leaves this period rather rare. Therefore, three groundbreaking studies, which I will examine in the following part of the

section, attract attention in their affinity to the concern of this thesis and give some detailed studies on the Turkish-Islamic institutions. The book, "Rabıta"[4] is one of the most remarkable investigations of the Islamic groups and its complex relationship in the Diaspora (Mumcu 1987). Sunier and Landman's book "Transnational Turkish Islam" serves as a focal point to work on the relationship between Turkey's history with the Islamic groups and its adventure in Europe via examining some organizations (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014). Çıtak's study over the Turkish-Islamic groups in Europe also makes the similarities and differences clear between diasporic religious organizations in Europe, which presents one of the pillars of this thesis (Çıtak 2018).

The book "Rabıta" reveals the complex relations between Turkish-Islamic organizations in Germany and Europe (Mumcu 1987). This book uncovers Turkish-originated Islamic groups' agenda in the Diaspora with Mumcu's several conducted interviews and observations made in Europe, who has been one of the most prominent journalists in Turkey and also passed away because of an unidentified assassination. His assassination proves his quality and brave heart in his job, and also his power to reveal the hidden things with his research on the right-wing non-secular groups.

As it is known, the Milli Görüş organization of Germany has been both a haven and a financial backbone for Necmettin Erbakan and the Milli Görüş Movement in Turkey, therefore Erbakan paid great importance for the organization in Germany with supporting the administration of the organization via sending important preachers and directors from Turkey. One of them was Cemalettin Kaplan, who was sent to Germany by Erbakan after the coup in Turkey, tried to establish an Islamic State, and prepared a constitution of the Islamic State (Mumcu 1987, 65).

However, even the Milli Görüş's leading members in Diaspora had been a part of Süleymancı Community, which was one of the earliest

4 Rabıta is called (in a general manner) World Muslim League endorsed by Saudi Arabia, and it means "relation" or "tie" in Arabic.

groups among Turkish-Islamic organizations (Mumcu 1987, 78–86). Besides having a strong impact on the Turkish communities, Süleymancı Community in Germany also had some proceedings because of their anti-secular activities in Turkey (Mumcu 1987, 123). Milli Görüş and Süleymancı community were the largest organizations of the diaspora and they were exposed to different reactions in Turkey and Germany. Moreover, these organizations' members and facilities inspired the first organization of the Diyanet in Germany. Mumcu's book stands out in the 1980s as the most explicit one in describing the relations in the diaspora.

Written in 2015, Sunier and Landman's book dates back to the discussions on Turkish Islam in Europe starting from the founding years of the Republic (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 12). In the book, Necmettin Erbakan's Milli Görüş movement seemed like an Islamic 'political-religious movement', which was supported via economic principles (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 20). Despite Erbakan's great impact on Political Islam, the real efficacy was seen in the period of the 1980 coup in Turkey. In the context of Europe, Sunier and Landman underline that most of the guest workers came from the rural areas who were alien to political struggles, and also, they caused the process of "*ruralization*" in the Turkish Islamic movements (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 40).

Since the Diyanet has always been a monopoly in the legal field of religious affairs in the Turkish Republic, its existence in Europe has had a remarkable impact on the Turkish community abroad (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 47). Since the early years of the state, reactionary groups were perceived as the biggest concern against the existence of the Republic, so, even before the establishment of the DİTİB, the relationship between the Turkish State (and also Diyanet) and Turkish communities abroad had also been very strong (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 50). In short, Sunier and Landman's study underlines the actors and their historical developments of Turkish-Islamic organizations, and it emphasizes their roles. Since this thesis will address the in-depth relations between Turkish-Islamic groups and the Turkish State, this study will be very useful.

Taking measures towards the political Islam is a security reason, according to Özkan (Ozkan 2019, 32). Since Germany's very first experience with Islam dates back to the anti-Soviet Muslim refugees from Russia, German authorities were eagerly interested in Islam during the cold war to use it against the communist threat (Özkan 2019, 32–35). With the rising numbers of Turkish guest workers in Germany, Islam became a part of Germany's internal matters.

While the 1970s were the period of rising cooperation between Turkish-Islamic groups in Germany, which founded together with the German Turkish Union (*Almanya Türk Birliği*), especially under the impact of global events such as Islamic Revolution in Iran or 'jihad' declaration against Soviets. In Afghanistan, the 1970s atmosphere collapsed and competition between these organizations appeared (Özkan 2019, 44). Moreover, according to Özkan, Muslim Brotherhood's rebellion against Hafez Assad also triggered an Islamic awakening, especially within the Milli Görüş in Germany which had a strong relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood (Özkan 2019, 44–45). Therefore, after the military intervention in Turkey, military junta made an attempt to control the Turkish-Islam in the public sphere and eliminate the groups outside of the supervision of the junta. The junta filled up that field by founding and supporting to the DİTİB in Cologne (Özkan 2019, 47). This work reveals Cold War and political Islam's' relationship and contributes greatly to the studies of transnational political relations.

Avcı's article; "Religion, Transnationalism and Turks in Europe" draws important attention to the issue of transnationalism of Turks in Europe and the role of religion (Avci 2005). Although this article deals with the Netherlands and counts the immigrant transnational organizations in their relationship with the host society, Diyanet (Netherlands Diyanet Foundation and Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation) and Milli Görüş (just as IGMG of Germany, it has Northern and Southern regions) are its focal points, which is also served in Germany. Although the main principle of these two organizations was to provide religious services to the Sunni and Muslim Turks living there, the Diyanet represented the

more secular Islam interpreted by the state while the Milli Görüş represented a more pro-Sharia or conservative wing.

The weakening of workers' organizations in the 1980s and the strengthening of identity-oriented groups gave rise to an accumulation of power there (Avci 2005, 206–7). The primary difference here is that the Milli Görüş prefers a more moderate interpretation, which is highly acceptable in the Netherlands, as opposed to Germany's perspective where Milli Görüş is counted as a dangerous organization for constitutional order. A second reason is that Diyanet settled in these countries via cooperation between the host country and Turkey, therefore Diyanet was regarded as a more cooperative organization in the eyes of host countries. So, while the Diyanet encourages official ideology and pro-integration policies, Milli Görüş or non-state Turkish-Islamic organizations focus on more Islam-oriented activities and anti-assimilationist approaches (Avci 2005, 208). In short, while Milli Görüş tried to replace itself as an NGO, I can say that the Diyanet is at the center of bilateral relations and concerns (Avci 2005, 209–11).

The transnationalization and comparative perceptions over the "Turkish Islam" have always been a remarkable point in the Western European social and political life since the late 1960s. Jeroen Doomernik's article "the Institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Germany and The Netherlands: A Comparison" reveals the requirement for comparative studies to understand how a national interpretation of religion can spread beyond borders (Doomernik 1995). Besides that, this article links the historical formation of a secular state in Turkey and its moving to the diaspora and compares these organizations with regard to their relationship with politics (Doomernik 1995, 49–50). For instance, despite their numerous supporters to less-political movements such as Süleymancılar, or more political groups such as Kaplan Community or Milli Görüş, Diyanet's rising power in the Turkish Diaspora cannot be linked with just politics. It should be noted that DİTİB in Germany is both a diplomatic institution which formally belonged to the Turkish State and is able to formally contact German authorities.

Additionally, DİTİB is an institution which represents the state in the eyes of Turks in Germany (Doomernik 1995, 56–57). In this perspective, Doomernik underlines the importance of states' behavior for immigrant organizations by comparing the Netherlands and Federal Germany (Doomernik 1995, 59). While German authorities do not accept Islam as an official religion before the law, the Dutch authorities institutionally count Islam and encourage these Islamic groups to behave in the public sphere to facilitate integration (Doomernik 1995, 60). Therefore, Doomernik's comparative study presents the importance of comparative studies to understand the similarities and differences of immigrant policies and religious groups in different states.

Transnationalism and the relationship between Turkey, Islam, and Europe was examined by Zana Çıtak in her article "National Conceptions, transnational solidarities: Turkey, Islam, and Europe" (Çıtak 2018). The "Turkish Islam" contains a national identity "Turkishness" and a transnational identity "Islam" within the same identity, which has been redefined in Europe. Moreover, Islam has a de-territorialized existence which consists of a transnational "ummah" (Çitak 2018, 377). Besides that, the Turkish state tried to preserve the Turkish-Islamic identity in Germany via a state apparatus, Presidency of Religious Affairs and via building a branch abroad, DİTİB. This effort was not only related to Turkey's ambition on controlling the diaspora but also backing the Turks in diaspora against assimilation and extinction of their identity (Çitak 2018, 381–82). On the other hand, dealing with a country rather than an organization was easier and Diyanet would be the best partner since Turkey is both a democratic and a secular state (Öner 2014, 385).

Since the post-1980s main ideology was the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which melts Turkishness and Islam into the same pot, Diyanet's role and capability have gradually become vital in both inferior politics and its transnational impact. DİTİB is the biggest sample or example of the examination of this role and capability, which controls the largest mosques in Germany where, after the Turkish Republic, most of the Turkish citizens live (Çitak 2018, 387–88).

However, DİTİB itself symbolizes the obstacle over the idea of constructing European Islam (Çitak 2018, 388). In that regard, although DİTİB serves as an intermediary organization between Turks in Germany and German authorities which is fully subject to German laws, the same organization prevents the formation of a common Islamic identity in Germany. Çıtak's article has a comparative perspective by comparing four countries' Islamic organizations by conducting one-to-one interviews and fills the gap in terms of comparative research on different Turkish-Islamic organizations, and also obstacles and opportunities in the formation of national Islamic identities.

To conclude, my findings on the studies on the religious aspect of the Turkish diaspora in Germany will address the 1990s and recent developments rather than examining the period comprehensively. This is because the following period witnessed several developments, such as changing of citizenship law in Germany, the end of the Cold War, and the 9/11 and its further effects, that drew more attention for scholars. Nevertheless, the relationship between the military regime's ideological attitude in Turkey and its echoes in the diaspora is the gap in the literature and this thesis aims to examine and reveal it comprehensively.

§ 1.3 Methodology

In this research, I use primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are the newspaper archives of *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Der Spiegel* and *Die Welt* between 1970s and 1990s, reports of Diyanet, assembly minutes of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), books including memoirs of immigrant workers, autobiographies of previous presidents of Diyanet, *Tayyar Altıkulaç* and *Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu*, and books and articles on the 1980s' atmosphere in the Turkish diaspora in Germany. As a secondary source, I use academic resources about Turks in Germany and their political-religious activism from 1990 to the present. I use transnationalism literature for writing this thesis. By using the concepts of "religious transnationalism" and "Long-Distance Nationalism", I examine my primary sources on the state's intervention in its diaspora.

1.3.1 *The Structure of the Chapters*

In the second chapter, I will present my theoretical approach to DİTİB in the 1980s. In that regard, I will explain why I prefer to do a Turkey-centric reading to examine Diyanet in Germany and Turkish Islam there. At this point, the most important issue is that Diyanet works as an institution to promote "Turkish-Islam" as well as its bureaucratic structure as a state institution. So how should Diyanet be studied in the transnational field? While I find a response to this question, I will describe a framework on the specific preferences of the conjuncture of the 1980s.

In the third chapter, I will examine the historical journey of Turkish workers' migration to Germany, and some important milestones that have developed as a result of this migration. I will critically evaluate the actors and important developments of the 1970s as they relate to religion in the public sphere of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. The main argument of this chapter is that the Turkish state was not an influential actor in the 1960s and 1970s, but it would shape the narrative of the 1980s with its involvement.

In the fourth chapter, I will look at the impact of the 1980 coup d'état in Germany within a wider perspective. In doing so, the coup and its ideological basis, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, will be examined through the rising of political Islam in the world, and its reflections in Germany.

Finally, I will examine religious organizations in the last chapter. There I will also consider the institutionalization of Diyanet in Germany in three different stages. After comparing the Diyanet and other organizations, I will debate the impact of military intervention on the process. In short, I will reread the relations between religion and the state in Turkey, which has developed in different forms from *the tanzimat* era of the late Ottoman to the present, by looking at the diaspora in the 1980s.

2

Theoretical Background

> *Since the early 1990s, studies on transnationalism have proliferated and transnationalism has become one of the fundamental ways of understanding contemporary practices taking place across national borders, especially when speaking of migrants.*
>
> – Janine Dahinden[1]

In this chapter, the emergence of the transnational field held by the "Turkish community lives in Germany" will be broadly elaborated in light of the developments of the 1980s in Turkey by examining Diyanet in Germany. The aim is to analyze theoretical approaches towards immigrant organizations and draw a framework to figure out transnational relations between the Turkish State and its diaspora in Germany in the 1980s.

The debates on the political, economic, and even climate-related (the World Bank 2018) current problems are leading to the increasing migra-

1 (Dahinden 2010, 51)

tion, which reveals a greater necessity over the theoretical contextualizing. As this thesis concerns, immigrants' cross-border social relations are of great importance. Although the relations of immigrants with their host states have been studied intensively from integration and assimilation perspectives, immigrants' and their institutions' ideological connection with the country of origin has not yet been well-represented in the studies over the migrant communities.

In migration studies, the relationship between the sender state and the immigrants mostly concentrated on interests and rights. For instance, the role of Turkey in the studies on Turkish immigrants in Germany have generally considered as a source of identity of immigrants or the place where workers' remittances to send (SAYAN 2004; Sezgin 2011). On the other hand, some scholars, such as Østergaard-Nielsen and Baser, focus on the Kurdish Issue in Turkey and its echoes in the diaspora by examining the host states and migrant associations (Baser 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Although the political dimension of the migration narrative broadly analyzed in these studies, the ideological dimension remains understudied.

Therefore, in this chapter, the main aim is to reveal the ideological aspect of the migration narrative and the role of the sender state in the formation of immigrant communities. To better understand the migrant communities, instead of only evaluating their relations with the host state, their social relationship with the sender state, and its impacts on their institutionalization in the diaspora should be considered as a significant side of migration studies (Çağlar 2006; Faist 2010; Levitt 2001; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). This is because the country of origin gets involved in its diaspora with formal agencies and policy choices. In doing so, the sender state secures this mutual interaction to prevent alienation of its abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 766). In a nutshell, policies, and instruments of the sender state stand out as pull-and-push factors affecting the developments of formal and informal institutions in the transnational area (Nonini 2002, 8–9).

§ 2.1 Conventional Approaches to the Immigrants

Conventional approaches cover three major methods that developed in unilateral perspectives in migration studies, which are integration, assimilation, and multiculturalism. Although all three approaches address different points, they meet at a common point in terms of looking at the relationship between the host state and immigrants. As in the Cesareo's (2009) conceptualization, the theory 'integration' contains a 'multidimensional and bidirectional process' that regards migrants and local people (Marini 2014, 308). In other words, it contains a bilateral relationship, which happens within the host state, between host society and migrant communities, in the case of immigrant integration.

According to Martiniello and Lafleur, multiculturalism and its echoes into the migration studies raised in the US, in which this trend has been explained with both African-American community's struggle to get their civil rights, and the power of ethnic communities in the US as committing ethnic lobbying (Martiniello and Lafleur 2008, 658). In contrast to the situation in the US, Western European scholars did not pay a strong interest in migrants' political rights, because they had seen as a temporary workers or late-coming minorities, which would not participate in political life with such a title (Lentin and Titley 2012; Martiniello and Lafleur 2008, 659). While multiculturalism found a response in the liberal and inclusive understandings (Horton 1993), assimilationist policies create a set of complex questions over the future of immigrant communities (Orgad 2010). Therefore, these three conventional approaches, deal with the immigrants' conditions and future in the host state by considering their existence from different backgrounds.

Although these approaches deal with immigrants to a certain extent, they are not enough to figure out how immigrants organize in the host society. The sender state can be also involved in the affairs of the integration of their citizens (Waldinger 2017, 3). However, they look upon the host state, but immigrants' social ties with the country of origin cannot be explained through them (Ehrkamp 2005, 346). Immigrant communi-

ties carry their institutions from the country of origin, which is not independent of their socialization in the host society cultivating in the home state in mind and developed with the experiences in the diaspora (Ehrkamp 2005, 354).

The country of origin can be involved in its diaspora as an agent. In case of the euphoric policy-making of the sender state towards its members abroad, long-distance policies come into the issue of the affairs of immigrants in the host state, which create a group of people as a parallel society of the sender state (Wimmer and Schiller 2002, 309–10). According to Vertovec, "*the political dimensions of migrant transnationalism inherently involve questions of identity and often raise contentious issues concerning civic order and the cohesiveness of 'host' societies*" (Vertovec 2009, 88). Thus, sender state inclusion into the diaspora should not be ignored and considered as an important factor in the affairs of immigrants.

Therefore, the abovementioned conventional theories are not unrelated to transnationalism, but they have different perspectives (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008, 167). Vertovec reveals that point by stating that transnational ties 'are prone to integration due to their structure and also suitable for segmented assimilation' (Vertovec 2009, 79). In other words, transnational ties would cause both the integration, as well as the segmented assimilation under the formation of social classes. Living places (Ghetto, suburban, outsiders, etc.), economic conditions (low-paid works, precarious employment, etc.) and level of education (technical or vocational high schools, low-level jobs-oriented training, etc.) bring not a successful integration, but a segmentation. Besides this perspective, as argued by Faist (2010), "*the link between integration and cross-border engagement has been pried open by transnational studies*" (Faist 2010, 20).

Therefore, transnational migration studies unzip the immigrants' existence in the host state via their existence beyond the borders. Although conventional perspectives may be beneficial to somewhat explain the narrative in the host state, immigrants' transnational activities should

also be studied to better understand the narrative of migration in the largest scope.

§ 2.2 Transnationalism

Transnationalism is a concept which analyzes a group of people that lives beyond the nation-states' borders and examines them into the sender state and the host state (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Vertovec 1999) In that regard, as opposed to the conventional perspectives, this concept deals with the 'continuing ties' of immigrants with the abandoned lands via their social networks (Levitt and Schiller 2004, 1002–4).

According to Vertovec, the word "*transnationalism*" points out to the sum of the ties conducted beyond the nation-states and its borders, and broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states (Vertovec 2004, 978–79). Faist also pays significant attention to the same reality of being "across the borders" by underlining the sum of established ties in 'at least two geographically and internationally distinct places' (Faist, 1998, p. 215).

The rising impact of the communication age and the media accelerates social interaction within the diaspora communities and piles up awareness in immigrant and minority communities (Vertovec 1997, 279). In this context, the political, social, religious and citizenship rights of migrants in the two countries become among the most important issues of transnationalism literature (Faist 1998a; Morawska 2003; Verdery 1998; Vertovec 2009). Hence, there is a certain consensus over the concept's concern in the literature.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to ignore the importance of the sovereign states in the transnationalism literature. In that regard, the monetary relations established between the country of origin and its expatriates are good examples of the place of states in the literature (Sayan 2004; Sezgin 2011). Especially for countries like Haiti, Mexico, India, and Turkey, whose economic leverages have historically been dependent on the remittances, the security of this source has been very decisive for the

future of the governments and regimes (Boruchoff 2019; Paine 1974). Thus, these abovementioned approaches that happen outside of the sphere of the sovereignty of the nation-state reflect great attention because these places are unable to be controlled by the state authority, as well as having the capacity to challenge the sovereign states when they remained uncontrolled.

2.2.1 *Scope of the theory*

It took a long time for the emergence of a broad literature on transnationalism to approach in migration studies. First of all, as it can be seen in the study of Nye and Keohane, the widespread use of the concept did not begin with migration studies (Nye and Keohane 1971). Portes et al. explain this situation by pointing out its inter-disciplinary nature (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999). In other words, the transnational space is not just confined to the migrants' movement, which also includes illegal-trans borders arm sales, human trafficking, smuggling, and even today's bitcoin transfers which cannot be controlled by the nation-states (Beare 2003; Leggett 2019). It can be inferred that, like the concept, the transnationality encompasses the people, which not only to have two homes in two different states but also to have economic, political and social relations between two different spatial entities, thus, it becomes an important focal point for several disciplines such as sociology, economy, political science, and anthropology (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999).

As I have discussed in the classical approaches, migrants' social relations in the host state is one dimension of transnational studies. In this context, some traditions, symbols, and relationships of immigrants inherited from the country of origin have led to serious controversy within the host society. For instance, the headscarf issue is an issue, which encompasses human rights, religious freedoms and states' perceptions in both Turkey, Germany and the rest of Western Europe, and is the most visible form of Islamic identity in the public sphere (Auslander 2000; Baykan 1993; Bowen 1991; Mandel 1989; MORUZZI 1994).

In addition to the cultural differences, some problems that were unsolved in Turkey were also re-produced in the Turkish diaspora. In that

regard, Korteweg and Yurdakul's research reveals a historical reality of the Turkish community, the honor killing in Germany and Netherlands, which was also carried by Turkish guest-workers and their family members (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009). These two points reveal the relocation of the issues and problems that continue in the outside of the territorial boundaries.

Another important point on the transnational theory is its relationship with globalization. The globalization refers to the elimination of borders and social ties, and the expansion of all social and economic interactions to the global scale (Mayall, 1998; Scholte, 1996). According to Lyons, `the "delinking" of social relations from territorial geography under globalization also creates the "world as a single place", with distanceless and borderless qualities as cardinal factors" (Lyons 2019, 59). In different words, as the transnational theory, globalization deals with the delocalization of a group of people, such as immigrants.

On the other hand, despite some similarities, there should be no confusion between transnationalism and globalization. As stated by Thomas Faist, they differ in three respects (Faist 2010, 14–22). Firstly, 'intense connections to national and local territories' occupies the ground of transnational studies, while studies on the globalization examine the relationship between global and local (Faist 2010, 14). In other words, Diaspora communities' and transnational groups' connection with the place where they came from, or where they located, is more decisive, since their national identity and group identity stem from the two countries.

Secondly, the organizational capacity of a diaspora community is a significant resource for the maintenance of a local or regional movement, which enhances the significance of the diaspora in the eyes of the sender state. Thirdly, the transnational field is a market, where several advocacy networks with similar interests come together to form a broader collective action. '*The broad definition of transnational spaces, fields, and formations as a set of dense and continuous social and symbolic ties encompasses all kinds of social phenomena*' (Faist 2010, 15).

The literature of transnationalism began to emerge around Diaspora studies in the mid-1990s in a more culturally-focused studies (Miyoshi

1993; Schiller, Basch, and Blanc 1995; Sharpe 1995; Verdery 1998). In that regard, the late 1990s and 2000s testified a significant rising in the numbers of transnationalism studies (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Verdery 1998; Vertovec 1999, 2004).

The rise in academic interest has also achieved in other approaches through studies on migration and immigrants (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003). As examined in this chapter, the possible assimilation and integration of migrants in host countries are subject to considerable academic interest and the cross-border activities of diaspora communities have been tested through several case studies (Gowricharn 2009). However, the context in which the concept is used stands out as a separate topic.

2.2.2 *Transnationalism from Above and Below*

By saying the transnationalism from above or below, the main motivation is to examine comparatively role of the state and immigrants' local ties that form the supportive or opposite of policies of the state (M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998, 22). The level of analysis in transnationalism contains the individuals (local organizations), global organizations and states. Diaspora communities, which can be defined as a sum of local organizations and below-resistance for community rights, symbolize the image of a nation-state in abroad, and as discussed in the previous chapter, sender states to play an important role in their abroad communities.

Since immigrants' activities affect both sender and receiving states, Smith and Guarnizo formulized to describe these transactions under the concepts of 'transnationalism from below" and "transnationalism from above" (M. Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Regardless of being from above or below, the 'transnational practices and discourses have on preexisting power structures, identities, and social organization' (M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998, 29). The main indicator of above or below distinction is the role of the state agency in the affairs of immigrants (M. Smith and Guarnizo 1998).

> "Rather, citizen agency and actions exercised "from below" are always constrained and shaped by the limits and possibilities presented "from above," as formal government structures and officials constantly take into account and respond to agency "from below," though of course, various parties at different levels differ significantly in the degree of power they wield to influence outcomes." (Boruchoff 2019, 50).

Political and ideological ties with the country of origin also lead to transnational interactions from below. Østergaard-Nielsen defines these interactions as *'political transnational practices'* to point out immigrants' interest to both home and sender states' politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 762). The case of political Islam carries this "political" aspect to the ideological and religious aspects, which cannot be easily defined as a political, ideological and religious phenomenon.

Therefore, communities abroad become a target for home associations, and also for the state. '*States of origin [...] are re-essentializing their national identity and extending it to their nationals abroad as a way to maintain their loyalty and flow of resources "back home"* (M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998, 10). So, 'political transnational practices' cannot be enough to define transnational Turkish-Islam and state's role in its formation and there is a need for a broader conceptual framework that does not ignore the ideological relationship of religion and politics, and of course structural connections of the two concepts.

§ 2.3 Transnational Transactions

The nation-state's stakeholders living outside establish relationships with both the society in which they live and their country of origin, which can also be described as the whole of the transnational and multi-locally institutionalized relations (M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998, 13). Multilateral relations of diaspora members can be examined through the political, social and economic transactions (Çaglar 2001, 606–8). These interactions occur between the homeland and diaspora communities, among

compatriots that living in different parts of the world, and among host societies and different diaspora communities living in the transnational area.

Diaspora communities and the sender state forms a set of formal and informal relations under several ways to strengthen the ties. These relations have been performed with formal ways; such as consular services, related ministries, money transfer mechanisms or state-banks, autonomous branches of the government and state-supported foundations, or informal ways; which is used to point out the sum of activities outside of the state power; such as independent foundations, associations, local ties, trade unions, political affiliations, and advocacy networks. However, it does not mean that all the relations mean a positive way of forming the ties. According to Wahlbeck;

> "[T]he relationship of migration-based transnational communities to their 'homes' is therefore often a deeply ambivalent one – on the one hand, the concept of 'home' provides a means of maintaining dense social networks and articulating social, cultural and political identities within new contexts. On the other hand, many of the transnational communities […] are in part as a consequence of severe economic dislocation, political repression or violent protracted conflict in their home states. The relationship of a transnational community to its 'home' is therefore as likely to be defined by a desire for transformation, contestation and political change as it is by nostalgia, continuity, and tradition."(Wahlbeck, 2002, p. 223).

In the case of political rights, transnational citizens' rights in the sender state have always been on the table of political negotiations and in the center of interactions between abroad citizens and the sender state (Vertovec 2009, 88). Some advocacy networks have developed in the diaspora on the abroad communities' citizenship rights. On the other hand, citizens in the diaspora construct some institutions in the transnational field to promote their rights and interests in the host countries. In line with common concerns and expectations, immigrants from different origins

build common advocacy channels to increase their impact in the host state (M. P. Smith & Guarnizo, 1998, p. 4). Many Muslim associations affiliated to the Milli Görüş in Germany can be shown as examples in the context of religious freedoms.

2.3.1 *Long-Distance Nationalism*

"Transnationalism (as long-distance networks) certainly preceded 'the nation'."(Vertovec 1999, 447). The place of the nationalism in the transnational studies has become a very heat debate (Bauböck 2010, 309–10). Today's world is a place where local identities and national belongings are being tested and have been testing with the reality of transnationality, thus the diasporic groups deteriorate the physical borders, and create a multiplicity of a single national cohesion. The invention of this concept dates back to the article of Benedict Anderson's usage of 'Long Distance Nationalism', which historically refers to the creation of the home and abroad communities in light of colonial experiences and post-feudal displacements (Anderson and Kligman 1992).

According to Anderson and Kligman, the internal and external became a meaningless differentiation, and pretty much the same trend occurred after the technological revolution in the global migration and formation of post-colonial world, which made the distances of subjects of a nation as an insignificant factor for members of a nation and more (Anderson and Kligman 1992, 9–11). Therefore, rather than assimilation in the host societies, immigrants became more tended to produce their identity and strengthen their ties with the place, where their origins come from (Anderson and Kligman 1992; Demmers 2002; Schiller 2005).

In other respects, the country of origin itself interferes affairs of abroad citizens in many ways. Demmers claim that this interest over the citizens living abroad is directly related to technological developments and the changing form of the locality (Demmers 2002, 90). In contrast to Demmers, according to Schiller, nation-state's interest over the citizens living abroad has been on the agenda since they contribute economically (Schiller, 2005, p. 570). According to Wimmer and Schiller;

> "Modern nationalism fuses four different notions of peoplehood that had developed separately in early modern Europe. These are the people as a sovereign entity, which exercises political power by means of some sort of democratic procedure; the people as citizens of a state holding equal rights before the law; the people as a group of obligatory solidarity, an extended family knit together by obligations of mutual support; and the people as an ethnic community undifferentiated by distinctions of honor and prestige, but united through common destiny and shared culture."(Wimmer and Schiller 2002, 308)

Transnational citizens, which diminish the importance of the centrality of territory and boundaries, create a shortcoming in theories of nationalism (Demmers 2002, 93). They are also a part of the national cohesion because of their constitutive role in the reproduction of the national identity (Vertovec 2004, 979). Lastly, the home state prefers to get involved in its diaspora to prevent the assimilation of its citizens and promote successful social integration with conserving its citizens' national identity(Waldinger 2017, 8).

According to Robert Horton's definition to be used in Myria Georgiou's article, the nation encompasses the intersection of three dimensions; which are the ideologies and practices, the formation of identities and communities, and defined borders and territory. (Georgiou 2010, 25) ''[*T]here is a key contradiction in the position of the nation in our times. On the other hand, culture and communication become increasingly deterritorialized and transnational, while at, on the other hand, the national political boundaries become increasingly reinforced'* (Georgiou 2010, 25). Thus, home states' euphoric actions play a great role in the formation of a mutual relationship between the sides and affect the receiving state, as well as maintain its existential concerns in the best way to take a role at the diaspora (Vertovec 2004, 89).

Since the transnational nationalism unveils the role of the home state as a source of identity and socio-cultural background, sender state's role in the socialization of its community gets strong attention. In the memory

of a diaspora, symbols also play an influential role in sustaining the narrative of nationhood. *"Since 'iconography' – in the Gottmannian sense – is the material and symbolic condensation of the intricate web of linkages between the members of a community and their territory, a perfect reproduction of its elements (e.g. reconstructing the Pontic monasteries in mainland Greece) is simply not possible: Territory cannot be moved from one location to another."* (Bruneau 2010, 38) Especially for the economy-based immigrants, remittances, direct investments, and charitable contributions are considered as a vital factor for economic sustainability and development of the sender state, therefore, sender states pursued to preserve its abroad communities' loyalty for itself with several ways (Faist and Fauser 2011; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007, 5).

§ 2.4 Diaspora and Transnationalism

According to Vertovec, the "diaspora" has three different meanings; which are; first, as "social form" where the experiences of diaspora members with the home, the globe and the land where the dream for return has been reshaped, secondly as type of consciousness which has been formed within the identity puzzling, and as the last "as mode of cultural production" where the multiple interactions of the diaspora members reshape them(Vertovec 1997, 271–92). In other words, the diaspora refers to a set of multiple interactions of a nation that takes place outside of the country of origin.

Although the scope and depth of the concept "diaspora" have changed in the post-modern era, agreed upon that diasporas have been constructed with some shared experiences, such as dispersion from the land where their ancestors came from or spreading across the more developed places due to the economic concerns (Bruneau 2010; Vertovec 1999, 449; Wahlbeck 2002). On the other hand, as being different from "classical diasporas" such as Jewish, Armenian and Greek diasporas, today's concept "diaspora" has often used to describe 'racial and ethnic minorities' with emphasizing on the cultural differences, and counted as a place

where recognition and assimilation experiences conflicts onto the multiplicity of identities (Faist 2010, 12; Vertovec 2009, 130–32).

Historically, these experiences appeared as the accumulation of tragedies of the dispersion for expelled communities and produced in a long time -Braudel's Longue durée-. Jewish Diaspora, who had fled from Palestine or (sub-Saharan) African Diaspora, who are the victims of mercantilism, can be the best examples for some different experiences of dispersion from the homeland (Dufoix 2008, 21).[2] In other respects, the Chinese diaspora or Indian diaspora can be categorized as an economic diaspora that cannot be counted as a dispersion experience, would be seen as an obligatory migration to survive (Vertovec 2009, 9).

The technological innovations created a more integrated and communicated diaspora communities (Vertovec 1999, 447). The telecommunication revolution made immigrants in the different parts of the world as a neighbor with its fast and effective facilitation of communication (Skrbis 2001, 134). These massive advances and the internet provided a rapid communication facility for the people in the diaspora and they facilitated transactions between the cognates (Carruthers 2013, 217). Thus, diaspora communities became more powerful to affect the country of origin.

The differences embedded in the reality of transnationalism and diaspora have been in the heart of transnational studies (Carruthers 2013, 221). Since these two concepts are interrelated with each other, before going through the religious phase of transnationality, the two concepts should be distinguished well. *'Although both terms refer to cross-border*

2 According to Dufoix, the African diaspora is called the "Black Diaspora" which came about by the colonial relationship (p.21). This term "black" explains the color of people for two reasons. Firstly, African diaspora has (estimated) 65-120 million people in Brazil and more than 46.3 million people in the US as a result of slavery trade and colonial resettlements, and these groups have almost wholly integrated to the identity of the two states. Secondly, unlike the Jews which is distinguishable with religious belonging within non-Jewish communities, African diaspora has no national or religious relations, and their most distinctive feature is their color of skin. For more: https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d4d32.html

; https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/cb17-ff01.pdf.

processes, diaspora has been often used to denote religious or national groups living outside an (imagined) homeland, whereas transnationalism is often used both more narrowly -to refer to migrants' durable ties across countries- and, more widely, to capture not only communities but all sorts of social formations, such as transnationally active networks, groups and organizations"(Faist 2010, 9).

Thus, all these facts lead us to Thomas Faist's comparative analysis of the transnationality and diaspora studies, which addresses the question of the usage of the diaspora by revealing to distinguish the old and new (Faist 2010, 14). The old, tragedy-embedded diaspora approach has been replaced by the new, out of the historicity of the concept, which is generally used to illustrate immigrant communities.

2.4.1 *Religious Transnationalism*

Religion is the most visible form of transnational space of the peoples, which is the oldest form of transnational existence of human-being (Vertovec 2003, 312). Since the Abrahamic religions have been developed with the practice of expulsion from the place of birth and coming together in different places of migration, all three religions developed in remote areas with different experiences (Sideri 2017, 43). Moreover, history is full of the transnational movement of religious groups for different reasons. Missionary activities, conquests in name of the religions, wars, and occupation of land where different religious groups live, displaced people with some catastrophes, and economy-based migration movements with the immigrants from different religions can be considered as subjects of the movement.

According to Vertovec, one of the important parts of religious transnationalism debates is whether religious groups can be counted as a different community (Vertovec 2009, 135). The subject of discussion is whether religious communities can become a diaspora on their own. If every immigrant religious community makes up a diaspora, does Arab origin and broadly Mecca centered Islam can form a diaspora community in Pakistan? (Vertovec 2009, 136) Vertovec, by problematizing Hinnells'

question, examines three different truths and traces religious transformation, which are migration and minority status, diaspora, transnationalism (Vertovec 2009, 136).

According to Benjamin Barber, the question on the way of religious transnationalism and the role of the nation-state is not about religious transnationalism, it is directly related to a strong uprising towards globalization and consumerism (Barber 2010, 23). In his debate, Barber defends a re-creation of civil society to repair the problems that appeared after the rising of global Islamic movement (or Jihad he called), and advocates to international institutions' "reconceptualizing and repositioning" (Barber 2010, 358). In his perspective, the rising impact of transnational religious movements can be prevented via empowering the voice of civil society in the global arena (Barber 2010, 359).

However, his perspective got a strongly critical view because of his blessing to the polarization. In the view of Karim, 'empowering the local' is a beneficial option to prevent the contradiction and radicalization of the diaspora (Karim 2007, 272–73). In that regard, the regime of the Turkish coup d'état in 1980 and its policies towards the diaspora illustrate that the behavior of the military regime includes a distrust rather than cooperation. In that regard, the "empowering the local" in the eyes of the regime shows control from above to the religious organizations in Germany.

The significance of religion among the immigrant communities is their ability to form a social movement within a society where they work to promote their rights as a minority (Vertovec 2009, 137; Wuthnow and Offutt 2008, 226). Thus, the relationship between cultural reproduction and religious practices, and the minority status of diaspora communities have been at the center of the agenda of diaspora issues (Vertovec 2009, 141). Communities built their sanctuaries to come together and to remember their past and identity; therefore, they formed "social spaces" in their surroundings. These include the Alevi community in Turkey, or Sunni Muslims in Iran which behave as a social movement and work to be recognized (Sökefeld 2008, 35–36). In other words, what can be seen

within a diaspora community is not a unique fact attributed to the diaspora, but these experiences are universal and possible for a group that is a minority (Vertovec, 2009, p. 154-155).

2.4.2 *Political Islam in the Turkish Diaspora*

Political Islam is an approach to the politics in which the principal motivation in the political sphere is considered via Islamic political identity and turning to Islamic values from the Western one (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri 2007, 13; Khatab and Bouma 2007, 2; Rabasa and Larabee 2008, 66). According to Akbarzadeh and Mansouri, the concept has developed through the modernization project, which can be both in a national form (such as Iranian Islamic Revolution and Jama'at-i Islami in Pakistan) or a supra-national form (such as Muslim Brotherhood, which was born in Egypt and spread across the Muslim world). These examples represent an uprising against Western values and reveal a euphoric action to return Islamic law (Sharia) and order (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri 2007, 6). Besides that, political Islam may function as a part of the big picture to be called the Ummah Movement or the Global Islam, as well as the local Islamist movements which work in pursuit of becoming globalized or politicized (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri 2007, 9).

The globalization of Islamic movements shaped the global Islam in different ways. Although Islam calls out to an identity that exists through a supra-identity beyond nationalities, Islam and its echoes in the transnational sphere were led by national movements (Kaminski, 2014). Islamic Revolution of Iran fits with this issue, which claimed as a revolution of oppressed Muslims, which triggered other Islamic groups, but took place just for Iranian ones (Saleh and Worrall 2015, 78).

After the revolution, nearly two-million Iranians had fled from Iran and the ones who remained voted in favor of an Islamic Republic (Dixon 2006; Hakimzadeh 2006). Since that, the state re-organized according to the political Islam and sharia values under the name of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, the government of Iran intervened in other states' affairs through Iranians and Shi'a population living abroad via the

Hezbollah and Iranian Intelligent Agencies (Azani 2009). Another example is the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Although they gradually became more visible with terrorist incidents globally, they also confined themselves within their localities (Tankel 2019). Thus, they have developed simultaneously in different places.

In the case of Turkey, while the globalization of political Islam has left too weak or at least too slight, local Islamic movements have also managed to be melted under the umbrella parliamentary politics, and political Islam in Turkey shaped under the strong impact of the laicism. In the transnational space, three different Turkish-Islamic organizations took place, which are the Gülen Movement, the Haydar Baş Movement, and the Milli Görüş Movement (Kuru 2005, 253). The Haydar Baş Movement contains the late 1990s' transformation in religious cults, which institutionalized in many ways, but with limited resources, which has been too far from universalism (Kuru 2005, 266).

On the other hand, the Gülen Movement has globally been in the affairs of "anti-communist" discourse, which actively participated in opening schools and dialogue initiatives, and never mentioned a universal uprising, left in localities (Kuru 2005, 261). The Milli Görüş had two-types of transnational existence; one way was through its diaspora organization, the other way was through its anti-Western, pro-Palestine and anti-EU discourse (Yildiz 2003, 201). Erbakan's initiative to establish D-8 with Muslim countries reveals the Milli Görüş's euphoric action towards the Muslim World and the method that Erbakan and the organization took on (Eligür 2010, 205).

In the case of the diaspora, which has been a place that religious groups had an opportunity to become more influential than their local ties in Turkey, religious organizations stay in between the parliamentary politics and local communities, as the Milli Görüş Movement (Vielhaber 2012). Consequently, these movements neither produced an aggressive and universal discourse nor remained outside the global political Islam.

However, especially after the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan War, political Islam reasserted its "global" vision over the Islamic

communities around the world. On the one hand, while the Islamic movements had risen towards the communist threat, which was a golden opportunity, on the other hand, they threatened the secular states of the Middle East and Turkey (Atteridge 2016, 7–8). For the diaspora, as this process affect the settled state, it also made an impact in the host state. Thus, the significance of the actors and the historicity of "political Islam" became apparent, which reproduced as a parallel truth, and of course, both sender and receiving states played an important role there.

§ 2.5 Conclusion

In this part of the thesis, I aimed to establish a theoretical basis to explain the narrative of the 1980s through transnational approaches. In doing so, I drew a framework by critically evaluating unilateral perspectives such as integration and assimilation, which only explain the migration narrative from one side. Then, in light of discussions around diasporas and transnational approaches in academic literature, I tried to give an insight into the ideological aspect of migration. In contrast with the “integration” literature, this research will consider the sender state, Turkey, as an actor in the history of the Turkish diaspora and reevaluate Diyanet with its transnational relations as a state institution for religious services. In light of this chapter, I will examine the “long-distance nationalism” and the “religious transnationalism” as two concepts to figure out Diyanet and other Turkish-Islamic associations.

Therefore, how the applications of political Islam took place in the Turkish diaspora will be examined through the events of the 1980s took place under the conditions of the cold war. In doing so, the Turkish State, which became a significant actor in the 1980s, will be at the center of our narrative. Thus, I can move on to the next chapter to figure out the structure of the 1970s and the 1980s in Germany to exhibit the rise of political Islam in Turkey and the place of Turkish Diaspora in this rising.

3

Historical Background

> *[…] (Towards Turkish Workers in Germany) The state has been so indifferent to the workers, who were left to take care of themselves in their lives in Germany, that face various difficulties in even sending their mortal remains to the homeland."*
>
> *- Gündüz Vassaf and Falay Çalkıvik[1], about the situation of 1970s*

In this chapter, the historicity of the Turkish-Islam in Germany will be evaluated. In that regard, first of all, the actors of the historicity of this thesis should be briefly explained. The involved states, Germany and Turkey, and its institutions, as well as sub-state institutions such as Süleymancı or Milli Görüş communities, Alevis and their semi-official organizations, and lastly individuals who migrated from Turkey to Germany. Besides, actors' positions differ by country. For instance, while the Milli Görüş represents an ideology which constituted a group of political parties led by Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey, the same "Milli Görüş" represents an organization which constructs mosques, organizes religious

1 (Vassaf and Falay Çalkıvik 2002, 192)

groups where a populous Turkish community was living and carries out activities for both political and religious purpose (Vielhaber 2012). Therefore, I will examine the historical background of the subject of this thesis by examining the actors' historicity in Germany, and their impact in the Turkish-German transnational area.

§ 3.1 Turkish Migration to Germany

After the post-war devastation of the German economy, Federal Germany made a breakthrough with a huge industrial investment, but they had a labor shortage (Chin 2007, 47). The first trial to tackle the shortage had been to get workers from Eastern Germany (Chin and Smith 2015, 36). However, the labor migration from Eastern Germany ended up after the construction of the Berlin Wall (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 2). In order to meet the labor force needs, Federal Germany signed bilateral labor recruitment agreements with southern European countries (Chin 2007, 33; Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 1–2). Before the agreement signed in 1961 with Turkey, which took place after two and a half months of the construction of the Berlin Wall, Italy, Spain and Greece had signed a bilateral labor recruitment agreements with Germany and sent their workers (Yükleyen and Kuru 2006, 29). With the agreement, approximately 2.5 million Turkish guest workers (Gastarbeiter) have settled in Germany.[2]

Although the year 1961 has been widely accepted as a milestone, Turkish workers began to move to Germany before 1961 via personal opportunities (Şahin 2010, 34). Nevertheless, 1961 bilateral workforce exchange agreement led an exponential increase on the numbers. Rising numbers brought rising public visibility and also led a strong sense of group identity for Turkish immigrants, which was represented within labor unions and migrant NGOs in Germany (Temporary worker programs, background and issues: A report / 1980, 128).

2 Author Yükleyen underlines that 3.3 million Muslims settled in Germany with similar labor force agreements, and the Turks constitute the majority of this Muslim population.

In fact, Germany's plan for Gastarbeiter recruitment was to establish a system based on the continuous exchange of workers, which called as "continuous rotation system" based on the return of the workers in Germany for a determined period and the replacement of new workers, but it could not be implemented (Yükleyen and Kuru 2006, 29). The rotation system was abandoned and never implemented since the cost of the rotation, factories' decision on keeping the workers, who adapted to the process, and the prevention of the possible delay in the changing process. Thus, rather than to return after a couple of years after saving a significant amount of money, Turkish guest workers became a part of the relations of production and consumption of West Germany.

When the recruitment system of guest workers was abandoned in 1973, the workers living there for years become permanent, because they did not prefer to return their home back (Miller 2008, 180–81). Despite several problems on the integration of Turks in Germany, most of them preferred to stay there, instead of repatriation to the home, where unemployment and political grievances shaped the public life. Thus, when it was understood that the Turks would not repatriate, it became clearer that social problems that left unspoken because of their temporariness came up in need of a solution.

3.1.1 *Early Research on the Religious Needs of Turkish Workers*

Although the case of religion was not so vital for the first groups of workers, Abadan-Unat and Ecevit warned about religious question of workers in their research in 1963. According to Abadan-Unat, %39 of Turkish workers stated that the lack of mosque was an important problem for them, and %84 of workers did not eat at halls of factories because of afraid of having pork in their food (Abadan-Unat 2011, 67). "[…] *Turks working abroad behave more pious and devout life in comparison with other immigrants, and even their living in Turkey*" (Abadan-Unat 2006, 247).

Prayer areas (masjids) in dormitories and work fields, which established by predominantly Turkish workers, provided fulfilling their religious obligations, as well played a great role in socialization of pious

Turks. Although these areas were difficult to control, it was obvious that social and political interactions could occur strongly in there. According to Ecevit,

> "I have concluded that our workers abroad have a growing need for imam (religious personnel). Although many employers have set up beautiful and large masjids for Turkish workers, our citizens who come to worship need these masjids only on religious holidays. (…) We should send imams (and of course religious officials) to Germany. (...) Imams to be sent to Germany should be chosen among intellectuals and vigilant ones, who are well known for their revolutionism (devrimcilik). "(Ecevit 2011, 71).

The Turkish state later sent imams and religious officials to Federal Germany. However, they send for short periods, and it took approximately two decades to institutionalize to appoint imams to Germany.

3.1.2 *State's role and position in the migration story*

According to the first five-year development plan, which came into force in 1963, Turkey's first and largest forecast from the workers' migration was to solve the shortage of skilled labor problems (Ecevit 2011). The "short term labor exchange" system that was based upon the rotation for a certain period of years for specializing in unskilled Turkish workers, who later would work in Turkey as skilled labor (İpekçi 1973). The rotation system collapsed as a result of workers' tendency to temporarily stay in Germany and employers' demand for their continuation (Tuna 2011, 6–7). To sum up, sending unemployed and low-skilled workers to Germany brought a reduction in the unemployment rate, and -if the rotation system worked well- to promote the Turkish Industry with returning of Turkish workers that acquired skills and training in Germany. Naturally, the immigration policy did not continue as planned.

Although seventy thousands of Turkish workers lost their jobs in the 1966-67 crisis, they preferred to stay in Germany (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 4). This case reveals that Turkey was not considered as a "home" but con-

sidered as "the last place to go" for Turkish workers, therefore it was realized that they would not return. When the German state officially stopped to get guest workers in 1973, the Turks migrated to Germany with family reunification, which provided with new foreigner law from 1965 (Orendt 2010, 169). In 1973, the Third Development Plan predicted that '*the number of workers to be sent abroad during the third BYKP period is estimated to be 350 thousand*', and thus, exporting workers had officially become an economic policy in the solution of unemployment (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 4).

From another perspective, workers' migration to Germany brought some political impacts. Governments in Turkey noticed that sending unemployed citizens to Germany reduces the unemployment rates and provides foreign currency, which was becoming more valuable day by day for the Turkish economy (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 4–5). Therefore, each government planned to send more workers to Germany and organized a system that functions well to get Turkish workers' savings into the Turkish economy, and this policy became a valuable tool on the hands of political parties. On the other hand, this system was too beneficial for Germany, since guest workers were working on the jobs that the Germans refrained from working for or not-preferred because of worse conditions (Çetin 1974, 6–9).

3.1.3 *The developments in 1973*

The year 1973 symbolizes the beginning of a radical transformation, which would shape the narrative of the later period. While the first group of workers was expected to work under the rotation system and return to their country after a certain period of years, it was left in 1964 by taking into account the costs of exchange and acclimation times of guest workers in the factories and workplaces. Consequently, Federal Germany provided limited rights to foreign workers in terms of political rights, group rights, and fundamental rights and freedoms on the 28th of April, 1965 with Law No. 2600-1 (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 52). By amending this code, the main intention was to provide at least minimum social integration of guest workers. In light of this development, Turks began to become more

visible by participating and establishing trade unions and associations there.

> "The gap of the state is filled by institutions with various jobs and purposes abroad, such as associations, mosques, and newspapers. Some of these organizations are an extension of political organizations in Turkey […]. Organizations that adopt "*left, progressive, democratic*" ideologies find the easiest possibilities to organize in Europe compared to others. For right-wing associations, […] they did not find enough support and possibilities in Europe, where nations fought against fascism in WWII, but received support in secret by underground and international organizations"(Vassaf and Falay Çalkıvik 2002, 192).

Until 1973, local mosque associations and trade unions were the source of Turkish workers' representation in the public sphere. Especially with the 1973 Ford Strike, it turned out that the Turks in the trade unions did not receive the same treatment as Germans, and the negative and suspicious attitude of the *IG Metall* towards the strike alienated Turkish workers in the factories (Der Spiegel 10.09.1973) . The strike collapsed the balance between two different public spaces in favor of mosques and created distrust towards trade union (Goeke 2014, 179–80; Yurdakul 2009, 30).

Turks in trade unions and left-wing organizations, who achieved to become a part of the class conflict of Germans, had more opportunity to organize than Turkish Islamist and nationalist organizations in Germany (O'brien 1988, 138). Nevertheless, guest workers did not treat equally as German workers, as seen in the Ford Strike in Cologne (Chin 2007, 63–64). The strike began with employers mistreatment towards Turkish workers, and dismissal of their demands in working conditions by their trade union, the IG Metall (Karakayalı 2017; O'brien 1988, 118). However, it was considered as a Turkish strike, and Turkish workers' belonged trade union did not work to prevent the dismission of them. Besides that, the strike increased the public visibility of MHP in Germany (Nowak 2014, 188).

> "The strike at the Ford plant reveals crucial contradictions between the sympathizers of the German MHP branch and its leaders, since the rank and file of these workers sympathizing with MHP joined the big strike at Ford, while the MHP newspaper went on to denounce the strike activities."(Schwenken and Russ-Sattar 2014, 200).

Thus, the MHP in Germany seemed like a good companion for the German state against the left-wing groups in there (Nowak 2014, 198–99). As a result, due to the unequal treatment to the Turks in the crisis and social exclusion towards them, the Ford Strike brought a profound socio-psychological crisis within the Turkish Community (Nowak 2014, 201–202). In that regard, the rise of identity-based movements accelerated after the strike

3.1.4 *Germany's rising as the second homeland: Family reunifications*

In the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1973, the guestworker system was abandoned and the family reunification system was adopted (Şahin 2010, 36). By family reunification law, German politicians expected to ease the immigrants' integration to Germany by bringing their families (Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009, 68). With the new system, workers' migration transformed from the private sphere to the public one. In other words, some problems faced by workers that considered a couple of small problems became bigger, which was waiting to be solved in the public sphere, such as living conditions, lack of mosques, halal food, etc. When the rotation system was abandoned, the workers, who have lived there for years and had no intention of repatriation, became permanent (Şahin 2010, 35).

The family reunification increased the numbers of Turks in Germany and changed the male-dominated Turkish workers population to a more gender-balanced one (Abadan-Unat 2011, 125).[3] Besides that, the German

3 Of course, this attempt is more than bringing of workers' families together under the act of family reunification. Germany had also adopted the women guest workers as a policy.

authorities expected to solve social problems of guest workers with the family reunification (Velling 1993, 18). However, workers' had already been living in bad conditions, and families would only increase this accommodation problem. Moreover, the education and social adaptation of the children of guest workers became the most crucial problem to solve (Abadan-Unat 1985, 125).

The social crisis that triggered rising pressure towards guest workers brought about solidarity practices and the production of social networks in a more intense way (Karakayalı 2017; Nowak 2014). In that regard, the social places and actors of solidarity practices become remarkable facts (Yükleyen and Yurdakul 2011; Yurdakul 2009; Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009). For Turks in Germany, these social spaces were the neighborhoods, workplaces and places of worship (mosques and cemevis). With the law introduced in 1975, the federal-state gave the states the right to impose a district ban if more than 6 percent of foreigners lived in a settlement (Castles 1985; Mortan and Sarfati 2011). Thus, the German state intended to prevent ghettoization, which was the policy of the pre-WWII story and targeted to meltdown the Turkish Community within German society. After that, the mosque and the *cemevi* turned out to be an area where social identity produced, and both places served as a space of socialization for the Turkish Community.

3.1.5 *Politics and the migration*

What I mean by politics and immigration is the political dimension of migration rather than immigration policy. Since voting rights of a foreign citizens did not provide with sufficient infrastructure before 2014 elections, political dimension of Turkish migration deals with Diaspora members' politicization in Germany and their reactions towards developments in Turkey. Politicization of the diaspora became the most important concern after the 1980s, since the number of Turkish political asylum-seeker in Germany rose dramatically. Therefore, Germany had

According to Çınar, this policy was obtained in a belief of repatriation of women workers, who left their families in Turkey and came in Germany for (2017, 6).

gradually become the space of conflict between the state and Turkish anti-coup groups. In order to interpret the developments of post-1980 in Germany, I should better examine the actors and their positions there.

Escalation of post-1968 developments had triggered Turkish right-wing in Germany (Nowak 2014, 14–17). In that regard, MHP's rising in the early 1970s is not a coincidence. Organizing of Turkish political parties in Germany began within the trade unions. Then mosques and religious organizations followed this trend. In the 1970s, MHP in Germany rose from workers' local ties (Nowak 2014, 14).

Especially for the Kurds, who do not consider themselves as Turkish, living abroad makes out the consciousness of being stateless diaspora (Majhail and Dogan 2018, 52). The imagined home for the stateless diaspora refers to a place where they cannot strengthen their ties with that place. In the case of Kurds, the diaspora reflects a transnational space, which was built by Kurdish migrants and refugees, and the place where they '*demand political and cultural autonomy in the Republic of Turkey*' (Faist 1998b, 229). For the Kurdish community within the diaspora of Turkey, the home means a country that they are not a majority and left underrepresented in the public sphere. Therefore, the differences between the home and the imagined home make the Turkish state much more cautious for its diaspora members. Therefore, Kurdish diaspora stands out as both a chaotic and problematic community in terms of its relationship with Turkey.

In short, the 1970s social crises affected the Turkish diaspora profoundly. These crises include grievances between Turkish groups, and their conflicts between anti-immigrant communities in there. In that atmosphere, the MHP in Germany, Alevi community, Islamic organizations, and Kurdish groups organized within themselves (Nowak 2014; Yükleyen and Yurdakul 2011; Yurdakul 2009; Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009). Thus, mosques, cemevis, Turkish neighborhoods and associations rose not only as a socializing area, but also as an organizing center in the face of problems.

§ 3.2 Turks in Germany

The 1980s came with the necessity of finding a solution for these social problems; such as houses (Heim), where Turks lived in bad conditions, education of children of workers, institutionalization of workers' associations, asylum-seekers of the 1980 military intervention, religious groups domination of public sphere in Germany, bringing visa requirement to the Turkish citizens by Germany, problems that guest workers faced with after repatriation, and Return Assistance Act of 1983.

The most important thing is that families in Germany had no desire to repatriate because of the harsh measurement of the military regime in Turkey. Although some of workers repatriated in the 1981-1983 period, the main purpose, to reduce unemployment rate and prevent further conflicts among the outnumbered Turkish immigrants, was not fulfilled, since most of returned immigrants were from the lower strata of payment, aged workers, and immigrants from the lowest socio-economic class (İçduygu 2012, 24–25). Moreover, the adaptation problem of the repatriated Turks affected the decision of Turks in Germany, which could have a desire to return, thus, the incentives for return migration did not bring a mass return movement. Besides these, Federal Germany became a place where Turkish immigrants' organizations' grievances took place, and both Turkish and German states faced with difficulties to cope with the escalation. Accompanied by the negative perception towards Turks in Germany, the marginalization of the Turkish community and political grievances shaped the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.

3.2.1 *German State's Attitude towards Turkish Community*

Politically, as it is mentioned in the history of Turkish organizations in Germany, the left-wing radicalism had been considered as a great focal point for both states' apprehensions. Turkish and Kurdish leftist groups would easily be melted under the flag of the German left, and to be integrated into the German social life. However, it also brought the radicalization of them, especially after the events took place in 1968. Rights of

workers such as rising of minimum wages, enhancing of dormitory conditions, provision of better social and political rights for them cannot be seen only as the demands of Turkish workers and their families. However, as Thomas Faist points out that '*Turkish interest groups who do not share any of the premises of the German organizations*' took up some demands in favor of group rights belonged to the their ethnic minority (Faist 1998b, 237).

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Turkish Community has been the representative of Muslims in Germany since its excessive numbers in there. According to Steinberg, the people who migrated from Turkey, occupy approximately two-third of Muslims of Germany, characterize Muslimhood and become the most identified migrant and minority groups in Germany (Steinberg, 459). Although some academics, such as Abadan Unat, consider this social exclusion with Turkish workers' Islamic faith (Abadan-Unat 1985, 17), this process should be examined with the German State's reluctance to apply an integrationist policy. This "disintegrated" image also made Turks in Germany more visible.

3.2.2 *Political Grievances*

As a result of the sociopolitical events in Turkey, some migrant associations were established by Turkish workers in Germany. In particular, the political structure of the 1970s and coup d'état of 1980 created a large group of illegal Turkish immigrant population and asylum-seekers in Germany, which created an integrated political refugee group into the immigrant civil society (Thomsen Vierra 2018, 51).

The Turks in Germany began to politicize in the trade unions and religious communities in the late 1960s (Çağlar 2006, 6). As I tried to illustrate that, their politicization was directly related to the changing paradigm in Germany. After 1964, when the rotation system abandoned to the longer residency of guest workers, Turkish workers established some networks that borrowed from the country of origin to enhance relationships within the Turkish community (Thomsen Vierra 2018, 35). Then, they institutionalized into the trade unions to defend their rights, but this trend was in favor of immigrant consciousness. Especially after the 1971

military intervention in Turkey and the implementation of the family reunification system in 1973, the Turks in Germany became more fragmented in parallel with the rising tension in Turkey (Thomsen Vierra 2018, 51–52).

Society in Turkey, and of course the Turkish community in Germany, is composed of a wide variety of ethnic and religious differences, which make these groups hard to bring together to a single form (Bruneau 2010, 44). These differences were reproduced in a borderless way and in some forms of identity formation, such as the Turkish-Islamic organizations which cannot be established in Turkey in such a way, or pro-Kurdish secessionist fractions which even not to be mentioned in Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). Therefore, the diaspora had gradually become a place, where radical-left wing groups, Kurdish organizations and fundamentalist or anti-laicité groups organized without significant intervention (Baser 2013).

Besides, the Turkish-Islamic organizations were not homogenous groups, they also included some radical and some moderate Islamic groups. Together with *Idealist* (ülkücü) community, Turkish-Islamic organizations became strong in the 1970s. Moreover, the MHP in Germany and Millî Görüş's rising in the 1970s should not be seen as a coincidence, both were represented in the National Front Governments (Miller 2018, 165). In other words, in addition to the counter-movements, transnational communities may also form some counter-movements against the groups that trying to change the political climate in the sending country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 35–36).

Nevertheless, state-friendly Turkish organizations also had a strong influence on the public sphere. The most prominent organization was the *Idealists* in Germany, which called as '*Grey Wolves of Alparslan Türkeş*', and it found a great opportunity to organize in Germany with the rising of the National Front Governments (Nowak 2014, 193). Besides, the Turkish-Islamic organizations were not homogenous groups, they also included some radical, and some moderate Islamic groups. Together with *Idealist* communities, Turkish-Islamic organizations became strong in the 1970s (Miller 2018, 165). Thus, the irrefutable existence of the sender

state's impact on the formation of diaspora communities and its transnational networks can be observed through the overlapping of two different spaces' histories (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b, 63–66).

3.2.3 *Islamic Religious communities in Germany*

The Turkish community in Germany, as a community from a different religion, experienced some problems there and established many religion-based organizations to fulfill their religious obligations and to obtain their religious rights. When the Turks first arrived, they did not come as a religious community, but as a guest, workers to get enough savings and return Turkey. However, after the collapse of the rotation system, they remained settled, and social problems began to arouse. Religious needs became one of the most important social demands, which were very easy to do in Turkey, but there were neither imam nor a sanctuary (mosque or masjid) in Germany. Thus, workers' religious rights and conditions became an issue. Moreover, in contrast to their experience in Turkey, where the only and most visible public actor was Diyanet, they had to establish their own religious organizations. As Vertovec says;

> 'Religious identities, [...] often (but not always) mean more to [individuals] away from home, in their diaspora, than they did before, and those identities undergo more or less modification as the years pass'. One reason this occurs, [...], is because 'the religious institutions they build, adapt, remodel and adopt become worlds unto themselves, 'congregations', where new relations among the members of the community – among men and women, parents and children, recent arrivals and those settled – are forged' (Vertovec 2004, 141).

Before Turkish immigrants' settling into the Federal Republic, Northern Caucasian and Central Asian Muslim refugees were already living in Germany (Abdullah 1989a, 440). They had escaped from the Soviets after the Second World War. Additionally, members of Muslim Brotherhood had also escaped to Germany. These two communities were relatively a fewer

numbers in comparison with the numbers of guest workers after bilateral agreements with Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, the real institutional impact of Muslim immigrants took place after the establishment of Islamic Center in Munich (Islamic Community of Germany) in the late 1950s by Said Ramadan (son-in-law of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna), therefore, before Turkish departure, the Muslim public sphere was organized under the influence of Muslim Brotherhood (Steinberg 2010, 459). On the other hand, although some organizations like Milli Görüş or Süleymancı community work in legal ways as an association, there was a Turkish-Islamic, but illegal organization in Germany, which is "Federation of Islamic Associations and Communities" (ICCB) founded in 1984 by Cemalettin Kaplan, who split from Milli Görüş Movement and sent to Germany by Necmettin Erbakan who was also an ex-mufti of Adana (Mumcu 1987; Steinberg 2010, 465; Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009).

Turkish community's religious initiatives began with Turkish Unions, and then the Süleymancı community rapidly organized within the mosques and became the biggest Turkish-Islamic organization in the first half of the 1970s (Karacuban and Azzaoui 2010, 24). The community established the first Turkish-Islamic umbrella association "VIKZ" (the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers) in 1973 (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 173). As being a close community and having a certain interpretation and division of labor within the family which are against the values of the German society, VIKZ seemed an uncooperative partner for the German State. Although Süleymancı community was in favor of language education of its members to participate the German economic and social life, there was an uncertainty against the economic activities of Süleymancı community which is an *'inward-oriented'* social organization (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 173).

After the Süleymancı community's institutionalization in the Turkish community in Germany, other Turkish-Islamic organizations created their spaces with their institutional ties in Turkey (Kübel 2008, 19–20). The Milli Görüş and the MHP in Germany are suitable examples for this

transnational institutionalization of Turkish-Islam and political grievances in Germany. As VIKZ, they had no obligation to comply with the official ideologies of the two states, which can be evaluated as a reactionary organization that would be dangerous for Turkey. Ironically, in contrast to its pro-nationalist image, the MHP was considered as a good partner by the German State to instrumentalize it against the Turkish left in Germany (Nowak 2014, 198–99). In that regard, Türkeş's Grey Wolves found a great response from the Turkish community and German politicians.

In contrast to Türkeş's influence in Germany, the Milli Görüş is observed by the intelligence agency of Germany because of their anti-integrative efforts via 'its insistence on the Islamic education of children' (Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009, 73). Despite the lack of evidence, the German branch of Milli Görüş's strong ties with Necmettin Erbakan and his anti-Semitist discourses presented a threat to Germany's attitude over the Jewish community (Pederson 2019, 92). In time, Milli Görüş overtook the VIKZ in terms of numbers of members and mosques and attached more public cautions, therefore the organization was monitored by the German intelligent agency (Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009, 73). Before the founding of DİTİB, the Milli Görüş was the biggest actor in the Turkish-Islamic community.

§ 3.3 Conclusion

The history of the migration reveals that the workers' migration to Germany and its developments cannot be understood with a unilateral history reading. Since the political developments in Turkey affected the Turkish community in Germany, their political and ideological motivations shaped their social behavior in their country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b, 35–36). After the 1971 military intervention in Turkey, the state took drastic measures against leftist organizations (Miller 2018, 165). In line with this development, Turkish right-wing got prominence in Germany and Turkish left groups fell behind them (Thomsen Vierra 2018, 51–52). After that, the main rivalry happened within the Turkish right-wing

organizations, and parallel with the National Front Governments in Turkey, Turkish-Islamic organizations appeared as dominant actors in the public space.

The German state had trouble to figure out how to tackle social problems. What I mean by social problems is not the integration and non-integration; these are problems of adaptation that took place between repatriation or living in Germany. Especially after the family reunification of 1973, Turkish workers' and their families' social problems became more visible in the public field via demonstrations and social movements (Karakayalı 2017).

With the developments of the 1980s, the social problems of Turkish immigrants changed dramatically with their decision for permanent settling. The Turkish immigrants fought and competed with each other, and their associations also served for fragmentation of them. Thus, in the next chapter, I will examine the 1980s in the diaspora to figure out the political conjuncture and particularly the competition in the religious public sphere.

4

The 1980 and State Involvement in the Diaspora in Germany

> *"There is no nation without religion. Religious affairs should be managed in a way that prevents the political parties to abuse them [religious affairs]."*
>
> – Vehbi Koç (The founder of Koç Company)[1]

This thesis hypothesizes that Diyanet's accession to the diaspora is directly related to Islamic organizations' radicalization or distrust of the Turkish state towards them. In that regard, three questions will organize this section; how the Turkish state's presence occurred in Germany, in which circumstances that presence occurred, and by which tools the Turkish state worked in there. The essential point in looking at these three questions will be the connection between different places and conditions within the same historicity.

In that regard, I will examine five main topics in this section; the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the rising influence of the political Islam in the world, Turkish State's securitization of diaspora

1 (Oprea 2014, 137)

by getting involved in German affairs, and the German state's attitude towards the Turkish-Islamic groups.

§ 4.1 The Military Intervention in 1980

The 1980 military intervention brought about one of the most significant paradigm changes in the history of the Republic of Turkey. According to Zurcher, the coup brought the establishment of the Third Republic, which founded as a third phase after 1908 (the second constitutional monarchy/ constitutional revolution) and the 1960 (the military intervention towards the DP government) (Zürcher 1993, 278; 2010, 26). The military junta justified the coup with rising violence and the outcomes of political and social conflicts. According to Taşkın and Aydın, in addition to the developments of the period, the most inconvenient event happened on the 6th of September 1980 and became the last step towards the coup:

> *"The event that the high-ranking commanders of the army considered as "the initiative that tried the army's patience" was the Konya Rally organized by MSP on September 6, 1980. At the rally, people refused to sing the national anthem and shouted slogans in favor of an Islamic state (one caliph-one state-one nation (the Ummah)). These impressions strengthened the perception of reactionary threats"* (Aydın and Taşkın 2014, 326).

The junta suspended all civil society organizations' and trade unions' activities, only the *Türk-İş*, which was a part of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, was allowed to function. This "anti-freedom" perspective of the military junta stemmed from the junta's consideration for the 1961 constitution. According to Taşkın and Aydın, the junta had accused of the constitution, which brought crisis with giving too many rights to the people (Aydın and Taşkın 2014, 333). In that regard, the coup brought about several human rights violations and brutality over the people.

Turkish citizens in the diaspora, who escaped after the coup, joined the advocacy networks in Western Europe, and those who could not escape were punished with torture and the death penalty. While the state

went into a more radical strong-state apparatus, it also led to the liberalization in the economy by applying the formula of the IMF, which accepted on the 24th of January 1980 (Mumyakmaz 2019). In short, the military regime followed the neoliberal rules with an authoritarian way.

The political structure collapsed by the closure of all political parties in Turkey. In other words, the military regime tried to eradicate its potential opposition at the first stance. State institutions underwent a terrible structural change and transformation. The opposition has disappeared for a long time and had not recovered up until the beginning of the 1990s. According to Yavuz, '*the leadership of the 1980 coup considered Islam a pacifying and submissive ideology preferable to the threat of communism*' (Yavuz 1997, 67). According to the Constitution of 1982, the culture of religion and knowledge of ethics lesson was ratified as a compulsory lecture in the national education system. This decision prevented the opening of Quranic schools, as also stated by Kenan Evren (Taslaman 2016, 219). After the coup, the state opened various high schools, namely Imam Hatip schools, to bring up imams and preachers, and the numbers of theology faculties increased in Turkey.

In the case of the Turkish diaspora, the coup changed the diaspora's traditional role in the social and political movements. Before the coup, Turkey had been a place where all the social movements of Turkish immigrants got inspiration and institutional support. With the military's harsh measurements, which eradicated the organizational capacities of all the political factions in Turkey, the diaspora turned as a safe port, and all the grievances of the Turkish politics re-produced in there (Clarkson 2017). The diaspora had already politicized in the 1970s, so the coup flared up the conflict within the fragmented Turkish diaspora.

Consequently, in contrast to the previous political atmosphere, the military junta intervened in the diaspora's Muslim dimension to maintain the Turkish State's legacy in there (S. Allievi and J.S. Nielsen 2003, 32). It is not a coincidence that the process of appointing imams to the diaspora, which entered into force by founding Diyanet's External Relations Unit *(Dış İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü)* in 1978, failed to implement because of

the politics of the 1970s. As a result, Diyanet's impact on the diaspora increased after the coup, and 775 Turkish imams were sent to the Turkish mosques (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c, 82).

4.1.1 *Turkish Islamic Synthesis*

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS), which had developed within the inter-coup period (1960-1980), symbolizes the rising of a new interpretation of Turkishness in more Islamic discourse (Güvenç et al. 1994, 38–39). Besides, after the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, the synthesis received acceptance and reputation at the state level (Güvenç et al. 1994, 38). The emergence of the TIS can be explained through three different conditions; historicity, conjuncture, and political atmosphere of the period. The historicity of the TIS refers to the harmonization of Turkish history with its interception with the history of Islam (Kafesoğlu 2017, 196–97).

According to İbrahim Kafesoğlu, who described the historicity of the TIS, Turks completed their identity building process right after obtaining the Muslim identity during the Kara-Khanid Khanate era, and since then, they undertook the flag of Islam in their own hands (Kafesoğlu 1996). According to Arıkan, this tradition brought the Turkishness and Islam into the same sentence with the "nationalist-conservative" consensus (Arıkan 2010, 52). This tradition establishes a romantic connection between Turkishness dating back to Islam and the Ottoman "granddaughter" of Muslim Turkism, which once held the Islamic flag (caliphate), demonstrated Islam for pre-Islamic Turkish religions at the last instance (Arıkan 2010, 56). This thought was a unifying discourse for the Turkish right in the adverse atmosphere of the 1970s and shaped the politics of the era.

Secondly, the conjuncture of the period is another important factor. The cold war era and the rising of political grievances brought an ideological crisis for the Turkish-right wing politics. The TIS came in sight after the military ultimatum of 1971. However, the logical interpretation of the synthesis stems from the developments of the 1950s. Bora approaches post-WWII's multi-party era by looking into the Islamist discourse of the opposition (Bora 2017, 438). The Nation Party and the Democrat Party, and their intellectuals were main critics of the ruling CHP - not only for

its authoritarian rule, but also its 'nurture enmity towards Islam' (Bora 2017, 438). According to Çağlar and Uluçakar, the MSP's experience in coalition governments with the CHP and the National Front (the AP and MHP) changed the mindset of the party (2017, 121). These coalitions made a consciousness in the party that '*to oppose the military does not give legitimacy for the party in the state affairs'* (Çağlar and Uluçakar 2017, 121). The TIS, which blended Turkishness with Islam, had been very valuable for pro-nationalist groups to establish a common ground with Islamist groups and to find an alternative against Islamic fundamentalism in the right-wing. The TIS also provided a broader area for representation and gave an opportunity to 'make peace with the army and the state' for the pro-Islamic groups.

Therefore, the TIS had been a manifestation of the republican 'nation' which offered intensive nationhood towards blessing the religion to shape the nationality (Güvenç et al. 1994, 52). The synthesis, according to the report of 1983, defines Turkishness as a secular nationalism, which does not evaluate Turkishness independently of Islam, suggesting that 99% is Muslim (although 1% is not explained well), and refers to the nation based on a common religious culture (Güvenç et al. 1994, 69–89). By applying the TIS, the regime found a way to unite the nation with its %99 of the subject, and to get their support. As a result, the TIS provided a civil-social agreement for the junta (Bora and Can 1990, 24).

The last condition is the political atmosphere, in which the MHP and the MSP raised their influence in the National Front Governments. The TIS, which emerged in the Intellectuals' Heart, was a unifying perspective for the Turkish right-wing parties of the 1970s and became the ideological common ground for the National Front Governments (MSP, MHP, and AP). '*The Intellectuals' Heart doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in its practical political meaning was an endeavor to set up common point and bridge between the MHP and the MSP and official ideology or official synthesis which united with Right Kemalism (Sağ Kemalizm) or conservative republicanism or national-conservatism*" (Kurt 2010, 117).

But most importantly, anti-communism has been the consensus point of the right-wing politics in Turkey, and the TIS developed around this

idea. Communism has become the main enemy for Islamism and Turkism, which has been considered as ungodliness thread and as an alternative for Turkishness, therefore, right-wing politics went hand in hand to overcome the rising of leftist movements (Bora 2017, 294).

In Turkish politics, the 'anti-communist' discourse was generally utilized by right-wing politics, in particular, nationalist fractions. However, as nationalism has always been a constructive theme for both left and right-wing politics in Turkey, it was used against another nationalist fraction, which is CHP, by the National Front Governments in the 1970s. Furthermore, even the revolutionary left fractions were also nationalist. For instance, Deniz Gezmiş, the most famous revolutionary symbol of the 1968s, had declared that his revolutionary march was the 'Second War of Independence'.[2] In short, the theme of nationalism was also utilized by all fractions, from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to Alparslan Türkeş, Necmettin Erbakan to Deniz Gezmiş. In the 1980s, it was reproduced with a coalition against "the anarchy order of the 1970s" between the military regime and Turgut Özal's ANAP party. Thus, as this idea was the main motto for the National Front Governments of the 1970s, it took place with the Kenan Evren-Turgut Özal dualism of the 1980s.

4.1.1.1 The Turkish Islamic Synthesis and the Junta

In light of the policies of the junta, the TIS functioned as a legitimacy tool for the regime. Although the nationalist-conservative flag got heavily wounded by the harsh measurements taken by the military, the Intellectuals' Hearth endorsed the coup d'état of 1980 (Bora 2017, 402). Moreover, their voice found a response at the state level and applied to the AYK's official 'National Culture' projection. According to the Report on the National Culture in 1983 (Güvenç et al. 1994, 48), the synthesis composed of three distinct components; that is 'Turkishness', 'Islam' and 'modernization' (Güvenç et al. 1994, 124–25).

2 This quotation was taken from his brother's interview. See also; https://odatv4.com/deniz-gezmis-ataturku-sevmez-miydi-1203121200.html

The most definite evidence for the value of the army in the TIS can be understood with the sections 'Turkish Army' and 'the mission of the army' of the book 'The Issues of Turkish Nationalism' written by İbrahim Kafesoğlu (Kafesoğlu 2017). Kafesoğlu reveals a broad range of historicity of the army from the Mete Han's ruling to Atatürk's successes by considering notable victories of the army in a heroic reading (Kafesoğlu 2017, 248). The book attributes holiness to the army, which has been reproduced in all stages of the historicity, to reach the holy goal named "*kızılelma*" and glorified it as a guardian of the '*novus ordo seculorum'* (Kafesoğlu 2017, 256–57)*.* Moreover, Kafesoğlu emphasizes the uniqueness of the "warrior" Turkish army, which has always been the most important guardian of Islam (Kafesoğlu 2017, 256–59). Thus, the Intellectuals' Heart's impact on the military junta can be observed in the case of its paying attention to the army. Nevertheless, the military regime did not fully adopt the synthesis for its policies but harmonized the TIS with its political discourse.

> "Yes, it is true that our Turkish-Islamic Synthesis thesis received acceptance and reputation at the state level after 1980. Because this is a fact revealed by reason and science. As a matter of fact, it has been a pleasure for us that the Atatürk High Council adopted the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Why is this happening? They look the left and the right, they come to this idea when they cannot find another way out. " (Güvenç et al. 1994, 39).[3]

However, neither the holy goal "*kızıl elma*" nor the "*carrying the holy flag of the Islam*" was the real concern of the junta. The best way to figure out this fact is to look at the 2020s Turkey. Today's ruling elite in Turkey pursues "*the motive of (Sunni) Muslim solidarity form of ummah-based understanding of the world*" (Öktem 2014, 5). However, the junta did not have such a desire. They needed a policy to get closer to the people who did not elect them but still had to endorse policies of the junta. In that

3 This quote takes place in an interview of the Nokta magazine with the Head of the Intellectuals' Heart on February 22, 1987.

regard, the 'right-Kemalism' or the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' was the most useful policy for the junta. In other words, the Islamic discourses of the junta was not a pro-ummah way of ruling, but a pseudo-policy or a byproduct ideology. I think this utilization can be best understood by looking at the diaspora.

The relationship between the TIS and the diaspora can be understood by examining the TIS's interpretation of the laicism that the coup is at the forefront. According to Toktamış Ateş, Turks in diaspora played a big role in the development of synthesis (Güvenç et al. 1994, 11). *"The reaction against the Turks, who were generally taken from the rural areas and left in the heart of Europe, caused a counter-reaction in our citizens. That counter-reaction happened in form of "radical Turkism" and "radical Islamism". And this situation ensured a great material and nonmaterial support for radical groups in the country (Turkey)".* (Güvenç et al. 1994, 11).

For the Intellectuals' Heart, and especially for Kafesoğlu, who had an aspiration to make up for an unrivaled discourse of the identity, Turkishness would be inadequate without the religious aspect (Güvenç et al. 1994, 14-15). Therefore, "laicism" was considered as a concept that should be defended, but also re-interpreted around the synthesis. While bringing the nationalist-conservative Turkishness with the laicism of Atatürk, Kafesoğlu innocently defended the laicism with 'rescuing the Islamic narrative that was a superstition in the pre-republican era' (Kafesoğlu 2017, 172–73).

Despite this flexible interpretation of laicism, the Turkish-Islamic organizations in the diaspora were too far from recognizing the laicism in their mindset. Their conflictual relationship with the state's interpretation and sympathy to the global Islamic movements revealed that the applications of the TIS would not be applied via these "Islamic Civil Society" organizations in Germany (Mumcu 1987, 49).

In the Congress of Nationalists in 1984, Turkish workers abroad were considered as people "detached from Turkishness, who lost their language and religion, or unable to hold" (Güvenç et al. 1994, 139). In the report of "The Commission of Turkey towards the 21st Century," which was

accepted in the same convention, the lack of intellectual religious officers, teachers for the Turkish language, culture, tradition and history, and lack of state's taking an interest in the diaspora were highlighted as the main problems that must be solved in the diaspora (Güvenç et al. 1994, 149). The report gives a sign for the need for the Turkish state to serve in the religious field to prevent the alienation of Turks.

The field of education, therefore, was designed to educate all Turks in Germany, rather than being limited to Turkish children and teens. As Çağatay Özdemir emphasized in his paper in the Nationalist Convention in 1987 titled "Education of Turkish Children Abroad and Adaptation to Turkish Society", since parents of Turkish students could not take care of their children due to their heavy working conditions and shifts, those Turkish students grew up with lack of primary education of family (Özdemir 1988, 227). Thus, their identity was constructed in German schools and Quranic courses of Turkish-Islamic organizations. In this way, he underlines that these schools and Quranic courses alienated those children for the sake of integration to Germany (Özdemir 1988, 228). To prevent assimilation, he suggests handling this issue by interfering with the syllabus of the lectures related to their Turkish and Islamic education (Özdemir 1988, 233). In linking with this suggestion, the Turkish state sent a considerable number of teachers to Germany (Gal, Leoussi, and Smith 2010, 234).

However, families were also intertwined with German society at least as much as their children, and they could also be split from Turkish culture and tradition. Therefore, Diyanet-affiliated mosques became an ideological tool to prevent their assimilation. In other words, imams of those mosques were working as a part of the process of cultural attaché for those people (Ogelman 2000, 139). As other Turkish-Islamic organizations served in contrast to the official Turkish-Islam, those organizations were getting the attention of their political indoctrination practices (Pinn 1999, 22). According to German sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer's research on the Turkish teens in the North-Rhein Westphalia in 1997, 38.3% of those teens were in favor of the opinion that "*Turkish politics must follow*

the Islamic law" (Kruse 1996; Pinn 1999, 22–23). In light of this information, it can be said that the idea that religious education cannot be left to these associations was the basis for the reproduction of consciousness forming around the TIS.

In this context, I can say that Turkishness that developed around the synthesis was a preventive feature against the rising global Islamic movements of the period. Benjamin Bruce presents the commemoration of "*Battle of Gallipoli*" in DİTİB mosques as an example of this policy (Bruce 2019a, 294). Even though it is not a National holiday in Turkey, it is commemorated with a strong national consciousness. In addition to this, the religious meaning attributed to this victory is enormous. As Etienne Copeaux underlines in this research, the Battle of Gallipoli was the victory of "*Turks who protected Anatolia and Islam against the Crusaders*" and "the blood of our martyrs lost in this war" was the color of the flag (Copeaux 2006, 258). In short, the TIS laid the groundwork for the production of national consciousness in Turkish mosques in Germany. Of course, this consciousness did not point to the Ummah consciousness but an identity that emphasized the Turkishness with Islam. Thus, in light of the impact of the synthesis, Diyanet's mosques in Germany became places for religious education and worship for Turkish-Muslims, not for all German Muslims.

4.1.1.2 Implementation of the Synthesis

Until the 1980s, the field of application of the TIS remained limited in the political discourse of right-wing politics. However, after the coup, discourse turned into action by the junta. The synthesis was applied in the field of education and indoctrination, in which the numbers of the theological schools increased, religious lectures became compulsory in the primary education, and the Turkish history re-interpreted following the politico-ideological turning of the 1980s (Arıkan 2010, 57; Bora and Can 1990; Copeaux 2006; Güvenç et al. 1994). Nevertheless, the most important impact of the synthesis was its role between the junta and the society, since the discourse around the TIS facilitated access to the ordinary people.

> "The Islam, which to read from the Turkish Culture, and identified with an accommodationist tone rather than a conflictual tone, was considered in the eyes of the junta of the September 12 as a tool to bring together the polarized Turkish society without making any concessions from the Atatürkism."(Arıkan 2010, 57).

The junta's decision on compulsory religious education should be examined in consideration of the developments of the post-1971 ultimatum, in which the Qur'anic courses of the foundations were prohibited. This development signs the interpretation of the laicism from the Right Kemalism. The junta's rising impact on religious education reveals the strict control of the state on the religious sphere, which also took place in the diaspora in the agency of Diyanet. Therefore, in terms of the strict laicism and its applications, Kenan Evren's attempts in the field of religion show the harmony between the TIS and the junta.

By calling 'strict laicism', I want to point out the historical adventure of the laicism in Turkey. The republican perception towards laicism deals with taking the religious activism under control in the public sphere by the state. Therefore, the Dervish lodges and shrines were banned, and mosques belonging to Diyanet became only legal public actors in public sphere. Additionally, the secularization narrative of Turkey and the state's role in public sphere reveals that Turkish laicism was designed as a solid principle against non-state actors.

However, the laicism has been tested with the changes in the ruling elite since it was introduced. Each ruling actor, including the army, elected parties, and coalitions, considered laicism according to their perception towards religion and politics. Laicism, therefore, has always been a problematic issue in Turkey. As a result of the competition between the right-wing politics and the military and CHP, laicism has become a field of battle, and the actors of Turkish politics merely focused on its status in public sphere. Although the state gained a strong control over the public sphere, it has never stood impartial to the sects and faiths and promoted Sunni-Islam utilizing Diyanet.

Taha Parla puts forward that military interventions in Turkey brought an 'anti-laic' policy (Parla 2017, 192). According to him, in each military

intervention, but especially the 1980 coup, generals neglected the separation between the religion and politics and privileged the Sunni Islam as a state organ by empowering Diyanet (Parla 2017, 192). Furthermore, that "anti-laic" or "strict-laicity" policy also deals with controlling the religion for the sake of Islam (Parla 2006, 76). As the junta obtained the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis to a certain extent, it also regarded religion as an integral part of Turkish nationalism. In the 1980 coup d'état, the junta endorsed the Sunni interpretation of Islam by bringing compulsory religious education, referring to the Qur'an in the discourses that generals adopted and opening new mosques in Alevi and Kurdish villages. Moreover, all these attempts and attitudes were also applied in the diaspora.

Despite the Islamic movements of the 1960s and early 1970s, which had no competition with the state in the field of religious services, the state became influential with its pro-active attempts in the field. Moreover, these attempts had also affected the diaspora. According to Karakaşoğlu, the TIS, which brought the moderate Islam with the Turkish identity with the indoctrination of the state, facilitated Diyanet's rising among the Turks in the diaspora, who were fed up with ideological debates between the Süleymancı and the Milli Görüş organizations (Karakaşoğlu 1996, 167).

Thus, the TIS was developed under Atatürk's principle of laicism, since the military junta was in favor of controlling the religious field. The applications of the TIS triggered both Turkey and its diaspora in Western Europe and appeared as a social and ideological base for the junta's policies. The late 1970s and 1980s had become the years of rising political Islam in the world, and the TIS facilitated to obtain the Turkish identity in the rising identity politics of the period. In short, the process led the "Islamization from above" via the state-controlled laicism had become a counter-manifestation towards the global Islam, and the state resorted to following the manifestation of the TIS to get more control on the religious sphere (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008, 37).

§ 4.2 The rising influence of Political Islam in the World

One of the cornerstones of the thesis is that Diyanet's accession to Germany and Western Europe was due to the rising influence of Political Islam in the global sphere, which brought radicalization to the Islamic communities, that empowered by the US's green belt, right after the Soviet-Afghan War. According to Parla, the green belt policy of the US and its allies encouraged both the Islamic communities in the greater middle east (the Middle East and Northern Africa) and secular regimes to adopt a new approach to the relationship between religion and politics (Parla 2017, 193).

There would be two different approaches for the secular states, the first is that the rising would directly threaten the existence of the secular regime, or the second is that this rising would diminish the state's capacity towards the Islamic organizations. The first choice was impossible for the Turkish State, where laicism was defended by the military at the cost of its own life, however, the second would seem as more possible. Therefore, to figure out how this transnational expansion of the Diyanet took place, the conjuncture must be well-examined.

Peter Mandaville considers the developments after the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 as the '*new Islamic Awakening' in the global political Islam* (Mandaville 2013, 106). In addition to the Mandaville's perspective, Kepel interprets this 'awakening' in Europe, where Islamic groups' public visibility increased after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (Kepel 1997, 48). As a common point, both perspectives illustrate that Muslim communities in different places demonstrated their solidarity with the victims of the war and established some solidarity networks in their surroundings. Therefore, these solidarity networks and civil society initiatives created a reaction all over the Muslim world and became more powerful after the neoliberal identity politics of the post-1980 era (Rodríguez V. 2019).

The strongest Islamic transnational actor of the 1980s was the MB, but this organization did not have such a strong influence in Germany because of low numbers of Arabs in there (Vidino 2010, 147). Therefore, the

MB organized around the Islamic Center Munich, and established the "Islamic Community of Germany" (IGD) in 1982. However, due to their low numbers and limited influence, significant numbers of mosques of the MB organized under the Milli Görüş organizations (Mumcu 1987, 55). As a result, unlike other Turkish organizations, the Milli Görüş was monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Vielhaber 2012). According to Vidino, the IGD's and Milli Görüş's organized around more radical Islamist activism, and their activities made the German state feel uneasy about controlling them (Vidino 2005).

Lastly, although there is no evidence that the global Islamist movement has found institutional networks in Germany, it would not be wrong to say that it has triggered radicalization and encouraged Islamic groups to organize beyond national identities. According to Vidino's interview with Udo Ulfkotte, "the Erbakans and the Zayats lead networks of organizations that aim at the radicalization, respectively, of the Turkish and Arab communities in Germany' (Vidino 2005). Thus, in this context, the rise of political Islam in Germany can be seen as an indirect effect.

The anti-communist discourse is another point of view to explain the rise of political Islam. The "anti-communist" discourse is a political narrative, which belonged to the cold war's atmosphere. The 1970s witnessed serious political and social crises caused by the Arab-Israeli War, which even damaged the Turkish workers in Germany with its impacts, changed the course of history by alienating the Islamic groups against the Western world (Duman 2018, 93–94). However, after the US's "green belt" policy, in which the US supported and equipped Afghan *mujahideen* against the Soviets, this trend changed by reversal, and the political Islam also became popular among the Muslim communities in Europe.

4.2.1 *Political Islam from below: Soviet-Afghan War*

In spite of some major political Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood against the Ba'ath regimes and the HAMAS against the occupation of Palestine (Mandaville 2013, 220), the main event to change the course of history in the 1980s took place in Afghanistan, the Vietnam of the Soviets. Afghan mujahedeen, who had disorderly lived as tribal

groups and local forces, established a resistance movement right after the Soviet soldiers' landing to Afghanistan in 1979 (Mandaville 2013, 263). For the mujahedeen, this fight was against the infidel-atheist Soviet soldiers, which would indicate the holy war, *'gaza',* in the Muslim world against their "infidel" or at least non-pious leaders, such as Hafez-Assad in Syria, or Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.

The war triggered the awakening of Political Islam from below. In other words, the jihadist resistance movement towards the Soviets gained an advantage for the anti-communist bloc and provided a ground for the propaganda of Political Islam. Although they had different forms and methods, Islamic Revolution in Iran had brought a further belief for the consciousness of "Ummah", and enhanced the motivation of dispersed Muslim groups in the world (Mandaville 2013, 319).

According to Özkan, the Milli Görüş had organized protests against the USSR's military intervention of Afghanistan, while also holding demonstrations in support of the Iranian revolution (Ozkan 2019, 45). The Islamic movements in the region, named "Afghan-Arab belt", brought the disconnected Muslim communities into a dispersed transnational religious movement under the perception of the identity of the "Ummah" (Mandaville 2013, 263). Nevertheless, rethinking of the Islamic identity with national identities or reproduction of the Islamic identity by transnational Muslim communities unearthed the issue of the inability of uniting the Ummah (Mandaville 2013, 319).

Lastly, Turkish-Islamic groups had been establishing closer ties with other Islamist organizations. The most famous one is the Milli Görüş's relations with the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany (Öymen, 1980, 7). Islamic groups in Germany were not in the sphere of influence of the Turkish state and had strong transnational ties with their counterparts in Turkey. Therefore, according to Altıkulaç, the state had to act to prevent further radicalization and fragmentation by making a "September 12 operation" to Germany (Milliyet, 03.02.1981, 7).

4.2.2 *Political Islam from above: Iranian Revolution*

On contrary to the Afghan resistance movement, which was carried out with tribal groups, the Islamic Revolution in Iran was carried out by social classes and clerics, and the Iranian revolution triggered the process of "political Islam from above". This top-down project of the revolution was the source of inspiration for Muslim communities all over the world, who had a desire to unite these 'deterritorialized' groups under the same notion, the 'Ummah' (Mandaville 2013, 361–62). However, in the way of the idea of uniting all Muslims under the same notion, the biggest problem was about the national identity of these communities. In that regard, another impact of the revolution is that, according to Fuller, the revolution revealed the 'flop of the secular nationalism' (Fuller and Acar 2005, 135).

The revolution demolished the Persian nationalism with an Islamic identity, where the new state identified itself as an "Islamic Republic". Additionally, *"with the rise of Islamic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa since the Iranian revolution of 1979, European countries became uneasily aware that many of their ethnic minority workers and their dependants were also Muslim"* (Peach and Glebe 1995, 26). This situation had brought a possibility of cooperation for diminishing the impact of the revolution, and German politicians' successful official visits to Turkey in the same period reveals this trend. In these visits, instead of Ministry of Finance or Interior Affairs, they rather preferred to conduct meetings with the presidency of Religious Affairs or the Ministry of National Education, which ultimately signaled that German politicians had expectations from the Turkish state (Cumhuriyet 24.07.1983, 2; Diyanet Gazetesi 04.1985, 20; Kıvanç 1983, 7; Milliyet 30.03.1983, 5; Milliyet 17.07.1983, 7).

The 1979 revolution triggered the leadership of the Islamic groups in Europe, as well as European states. Muslim immigrants in Europe was inspired by Imam Khomeini's cassettes, which indoctrinated and mobilized anti-Shah movement in Iran, and cassettes of the leaders of Islamic groups were circulating among the Muslims of Europe. These cassettes were also popular among the Turks in Germany. In that regard, the cassettes of Cemalettin Kaplan were too influential among them, who

claimed that since Turkey is not an 'Islamic State', it could not appoint imams of Muslim communities (Mumcu 1987, 13).

Especially after the 1980 coup, Kaplan and his community raised their impacts on the Turkish society thanks to increasing supporters of his cause. As a result of this rising, he declared himself the caliph of the Anatolian Federated Islamic State which was also established by Kaplan himself. Thus, the diaspora had gradually begun to threaten the laic regime in Turkey. If the state could not take any measurements against the diaspora, it would have risked its existence as a laic state.

4.2.3 *Refugees*

According to Özkan's study, before Turkish presence in Germany, 'there was already a Muslim population living there, consisting of two distinct groups: Soviet Muslim Refugees who had gone over from the Red Army to the Wehrmacht and then remained in West Germany after 1945; and Muslim Brotherhood members who had arrived from the Middle East in the 1950s' (Ozkan 2019, 32). Although they consisted of a small group in comparison with Turks of the 1980s in Germany, their existence was evaluated by the German state in the Western side to propagate against the Eastern Germany, and the Eastern Bloc. As Johnson states that, these refugees were utilized by the US to criticize Soviet Islam, and the mosque construction project in Munich used as a tool for the propaganda of Western Islam (Johnson 2010, 135).

The Islamic Society of Germany was established in 1960 around the mosque constructions in Munich and Hamburg, which was led by the MB in Germany (Vidino 2010, 152; Ozkan 2019, 39). The members of the MB had fled from Egypt and Syria with ideological and political reasons and established a ground for Islamic organizations in Germany. The greatest impact of the refugees arriving in Germany before the Turks is that, during the academic visitations of Necmettin Erbakan to the Aachen Technic (RWTH) between 1951-1953, he was able to interact with these groups in several opportunities (Ozkan 2019, 40). These interactions inspired Erbakan's ideas on the Turks in the diaspora, which led him to establish the Milli Görüş-Germany in the 1970s. The organization's relationship with

these groups further played a major role in enlarging its impact hub in Germany.

§ 4.3 Securitization and the Diaspora

By referring to the concept "securitization", I would like to mention the relationship between the issues of the diaspora and the security concerns of the sender state, that is Turkey, in a broader scope. "*Securitization and domestication of Muslims and Islam describe forms of political management and disciplining directed at them as threats understood to be globalized through international migration and the formation of a Muslim diaspora, the emergence of a politicized global Islam, the circulation of itinerant radical clerics in the diaspora, and internet witnessing of Muslim suffering by the globalized Ummah" (Humphrey 2009, 138).* The 'security' encompasses the threat perception of the state, and laic Turkey's main concerns in Germany were directly related to the Islamic groups in there. However, thanks to the post-coup process and allegations of human rights abuses, the Turkish state also spent a significant effort to overcome the anti-coup propaganda.

The practices of deprivation of citizenship and seizing the passports of opponents were the most frequently used policies towards the Turkish citizens abroad. The asylums that came in the 1980s were composed of leftists and anti-coup communities that fled from Turkey (Yurdakul 2009, 34–36). In a parliament inquiry held on October 7, 1986 on the question about the seizing the passport of Turks abroad, the General Directorate of Security replied that "*we seizure opponents and the citizens, who behaved anti-Turkey*" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 23.12.1986, 456-457). This response reveals the wideness of the securitization in the 1980s. The Turkish state's policies towards its citizens in Europe had caused a poor image of the post-coup Turkey in Germany and in the EEC (Türkiye Postası, 1988). Moreover, when these negative policies applied towards a member of a trade union, mass demonstrations and rising tension between Turkish communities would occur.

With the aftermath of socio-political crises and military intervention, a significant anti-coup population migrated to Germany. This situation had brought an "anti-coup" civil movement and campaign in Germany, which put the junta on the spot with criticisms of human rights abuse. According to Aydın Güven Gürkan's motion of censure on April 21, 1987;

> "The sensitivity of basic rights and liberties in Western European and Scandinavian countries was exploited in these countries by groups of enemies of Turkey, who participated in several anarchical activities before the September 12 and fled to Europe. These groups also work to affect negatively to overthrow the reputation and security of Turkey. However, our citizens, who went abroad to work and make revenue have not participated in these activities. Most of these people, as a silent majority, do not participate in this anti-propaganda, as well as they do not approve of them. The campaign and attitude of our worker brothers, who love his motherland and nation, and never forget his Turkishness, was appreciated against these separatists." (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 24.3.1987, 289-290).

Another concern of the Turkish state was the collaborations between anti-government groups in Germany. For instance, when the issue of headscarf was dominating Turkish politics after the coup, Turkish organizations in Germany were organizing demonstrations towards the decision of the ban of the headscarf in universities (İşçinin Sesi, 1987, 14). These demonstrations had a great repercussion in politics. According to Minister of State, Hasan Celal Güzel's speech in the assembly, "*the cooperation between the FIDEF, offshore of TKP in Germany, and AMGT, offshore of the banned-MSP in Germany, is based on making a front with bringing the left and the right together, and a trying of turning back to the pre-1980 atmosphere into the politics*" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 21.4.1987 , 126).

In this period, Turkish consulates in Germany were the symbols of the ideological transformation in Turkey. According to the Türkiye Postası published in Germany by Turkish workers, one of the biggest functions

of Turkish consulates was to take away passports of some Turkish citizens, who were considered as a threat for the state (Türkiye Postası, 1987, 5). Besides that, according to the speech of Gürkan concerning the trial against Turkish citizens, the Turkish state revoked the citizenship of thirteen thousand Turkish citizens abroad (Tutanak Dergisi 21.04.1987, 315). Thus, the Turkish diaspora witnessed a large group of stateless Turkish people, and rising asylum applications to Western European countries raised criticisms towards the military intervention.

According to the framework that Murat Çakır drew in his research, Turkey's standpoint towards the security of diaspora was determined under the name of "*Operation of Tranquility*", which aimed to curb the activities of the leftist groups and construct pro-state lobbying activities in Germany (Çakır 1998, 40). In doing so, consular services and intelligence activities of the Turkish state were used to polish off the leftist groups (Çakır 1998; Ozkan 2019).

The second purpose is the lobbying to make propaganda for pro-state candidates in the elections of the Foreigners Consultancy Assembly (Çakır 1998, 41-42). In this process, DİTİBs and coordination committees were involved in the campaign to tackle with anti-coup bloc in Germany (Çakır 1998, 42). Moreover, Mortan and Sarfati claim that the state's rising investments towards the Turkish-Islam in Germany were also directly related to the representation of the state in these associations and prevention of the politicization of devout Turks (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 213).

While Turkish consulates had an indirect collaboration with the MHP in the 1970s, they did it by involving in DİTİB's local mosques in the 1980s to control the flow of information from local organizations to Ankara. Since there was a significant number of people in Germany, the Turkish state got significantly involved in the affairs of Turkish groups through its embassy in Bonn and consulates in several cities in Germany. Additionally, the MHP-affiliated groups were often considered as an agency of consulates, so local Turkish communities were observed through that organization (Türkiye Postası 1988, 6). Nevertheless, the MHP's impact on the affairs of consulates was substituted by DİTİB's sub-branches. According to Turkey Post that was published by workers' organizations, the Turkish

consular-general of Mainz conducted a meeting with its responsible area's nine imams, and underlined that "*voting in favor of DİTİB in the election of Foreigners Assembly is equal with smacking factious leftist*" (Türkiye Postası 1987, 7).

With regards to transnational expansion of the TIS in Turkey, the TIS appeared as a policy choice of the Turkish state towards the people in the diaspora, because a significant percentage of them became socialized in Turkish mosques, which became radicalized and behaved against the interests of the state with the anti-laic discourses of Turkish-Islamic communities in there, such as Milli Görüş and Süleymancılar (Vassaf and Falay Çalkıvik 2002, 196). Beyond their roles in the religious services, mosques and Quranic schools had vital roles in the identity-building of the Turkish community. According to the research of Abadan-Unat, Turkish citizens in Germany were more devout than the ones living in Turkey (Abadan-Unat 2006, 247).

> "Mosques in Germany, as different from their functions in Turkey, were multifunctional social spaces for Turkish citizens, who look for shelter from own world in modern Western society. […] Mosques, alongside its function as a place of worship, functioned as cultural centers, where all kinds of courses to hold, and several cultural and social activities took place. In these spaces, all the problems would be debated, and relations with the German official offices were resolved with citizens, who were better in speaking German, in there." (Erkan Perşembe 1996, 161).

Besides, according to Turan, "*Mosques functioned as Quranic courses, student dorms, library, sports club, canteen, eating-house, barber, bathhouse (Turkish bath) where needs of the Turkish community resolved […]. Sects and religious orders' mosques (…) had political and economic basis additionally the religious affairs, and these bases were more convenient in Germany compared to their circumstances in Turkey*" (Turan 1997, 120). Thus, for the first-generation workers, the mosque was a social space where they felt themselves in the "motherland" and remembered their Turkish and Islamic background.

The state's toughness towards religious organizations is directly related to the role of religion in the securitization of state affairs in the 1980s. According to Çitlioğlu's research on Hezbollah in Turkey, the TIS contributed to the security of the state in the broadest perspective (Çitlioğlu 2001). In the post-coup atmosphere, the state utilized the religion against the rising terrorist actions of PKK in southeastern Turkey by constructing mosques and appointing more imams to there with instrumentalizing Diyanet as an antidote against 'irreligious' PKK (Çitlioğlu 2001, 95–96). Ironically, although this policy preferred to overcome all leftist groups, the PKK became more powerful with the coup and its policies due to the elimination of its rival communities (Sarigil 2018).

On the other hand, the TIS was also applied against the Kurdish identity in Turkey. According to Jacoby and Tabak, 'Islam is generally deployed as not only a justification for national consciousness but also as a singular civilization built, in part, by the Turkish 'people' (Jacoby and Tabak 2015, 348). In that regard, "Kurds" are not represented as "people", but a part of 'Turkish people'. This "Turkishness" was an asset of the state, which was claimed against those who do not belong to this asset with the monopoly of violence. Additionally, after the coup, the Kurdish language and culture was prohibited from public life in Turkey. Thus, the diaspora turned as a place, where the Kurdish community can communicate in Kurdish, and express their cultural roots without state repression. In this context, the TIS would not bring any positive outcome but conflict for the Kurds in the diaspora. Therefore, the TIS was unable to be effective on Kurds in Germany.

The conditions in the diaspora were different from southeastern Turkey. The rising transnational activities of the Turkish-Islamic groups were the biggest obstacle for the Turkish state to establish a lobbying organization with the devout Turks. There were several Turkish-Islamic communities organized within Turkish civil society initiatives and mosque associations since the mid of 1960s. The Turkish state also had no significant impact on the diaspora, which facilitated the organization of religious civil society initiatives. Especially, in the Turkish Federations and Unions, Milli Görüş's popularity and public visibility increased in the

Turkish community in the first half of the 1970s (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c, 88).

> "(Turkey based religious organizations' shifting to Germany) This move is partly, as in other European countries, motivated by the needs of the first migrants to reconstitute the basic conditions of practicing their faith (basically halal food circuits and places of worship, being firstly prayer rooms then proper mosques, during the second half of the 60s). But partly, it is also the consequence of the political repression against religious political organizations in Turkey at the time of the coups in 1970 and 1980 for example.".

These organizations' transnational expansions from Germany to Western European states had disturbed the Turkish state. According to Abadan-Unat, the Turkish community was seeking for representation in the public sphere with their rising population thanks to the family unification process and newcomers that fled from the coup, therefore, the way of their political motivation directed to the other Western European countries, where Turkish people were living in (Abadan-Unat 1985, 125). Especially Milli Görüş's and Süleymancılar's rising influence in Belgium and the Netherlands was the main reason for the junta to establish state-led transnational Diyanet-affiliated associations in Western Europe and Scandinavia (B. M. Rubin 2010, 437).

Therefore, the rise of these organizations took strong attention in the Turkish assembly. According to Sabri Irmak, an MP from Konya, religious organizations in Germany were providing "*sharia education*" and brainwashing the Turkish children and adults in there. Irmak further criticized the government with his remarks; "*although it is known where many of them are located, what kind of activities they do, unfortunately, what the government does is unknown*" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 18.03.1987, 578).

Besides these, Irmak also underlined that the "reactionary activities" took place in Germany was threatening laic Turkey's existence (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 18.03.1987, 578). "*Unfortunately, it seems that neither domestic nor international reactionary activities are disconnected individual events from each other. On the contrary, there is serious evidence that*

it is an interconnected and organized activity like the links of a chain. These activities are political activities that unable to link with the reasons such as religious activities of devout citizens, and purpose to translate the Republic of Turkey into a sharia state." (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 18.03.1987, 578).

The debates on Turks in Germany received attention after the publication of various series of Uğur Mumcu's research on relationship between the Rabıta (World Muslim League) and the Turkish state (Mumcu 1987; Mumcu, 11.03.1987, 6). According to Mumcu's findings, the state paid the salary of state imams with the funding of the Rabıta. Since Rabıta is an agency of SA, supporting global Islamic groups, this relationship was criticized by public opinion. After Uğur Mumcu's research revealed the relationship between the Turkish state and Rabıta organization, MP Aydın Güven Gürkan brought into question the issue of reactionary groups and their activities towards Turkish citizens in Germany (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 21.04.1987, 299).

Gürkan, in his speech, emphasized the relationship between Rabıta organization and the Turkish state and emphasized the principle of laicism as an existential principle for the republic (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 21.04.1987, 299). In that regard, he described the Turkish-Islamic associations as "organized forces against democratic and secular republican principles and the unity and integrity of the country", which utilized the "dereliction" and "loneliness" of the Turkish people in there and exploited them materially and spiritually (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 21.04.1987, 299). Gürkan's proposal for the prevention of the rise of these organizations included a broader approach to the securitization of the diaspora (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 21.04.1987, 309-310). In this sense, he recommended sending more religious officers and teachers to teach language, history, and cultural background of Turkey to the Turkish community in Germany, hoping to prevent them from joining other Turkish-Islamic groups' activities (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 21.04.1987, 312).

As a result, the Turkish community in Germany faced political and ideological debates, which originated in Turkey. Since the 1980 coup d'état took place to eradicate these debates, the diaspora had appeared

as a reality that the junta had no chance to control. The continuing tension in the diaspora had come up as a problem that needed to be solved immediately by the junta, which built its legitimacy on eradicating the conflicts in society. As explained in this chapter, the junta and politicians in Turkey developed different methods to prevent the increasing Turkish-Islamic organizations' influence on Turkish society.

§ 4.4 Germany's Attitude towards Turkish-Islamic Organizations

Federal Germany's attitude towards foreigners was based on its desire for their immediate repatriation. Both the popular support behind the CDU's coalition government and the social reasons that the government put forward enforced the process of repatriation with a judicial mechanism under the "law of encouragement to repatriation" in 1983. Besides these legal efforts, attempts on both voluntary and involuntary repatriations were subjected to involuntary repatriation for workers and their families. With this mechanism, more than 300.000 Turks repatriated to Turkey in a way (FİDEF 1983, 4). However, the settled population was still more than 1.5 millions of Turks in Germany in 1983, and political asylums were also added that community (FİDEF 1986, 7). Thus, Helmut Kohl's government preferred to prevent further family reunification by complicating the process (FİDEF 1986, 14).

The most logical policy towards remained foreigners, who could not be enforced to repatriate due to their rights, would be to get that community under control. Therefore, Germany and Turkey got closer to cooperate towards their common security problems, which came from reactionary groups in Germany. Diyanet's rise in Germany and the German government's compliance with that institutionalization exhibit this cooperation. On October 1, 1982, the German government changed from the SPD-led coalition to the CDU-led coalition. The most obvious difference between the two governments in the affairs of foreign workers was that the SPD-led coalition had a way to convince to return via providing a good deal for them and delivering the citizenship rights for those who settled

in Germany for a longer period (Öymen, 20.04.1982, 7). However, the CDU-led Kohl government was too far from that kind of granting more rights for them. Nevertheless, the debates over the way of conduction of that kind of cooperation were made in German politics. In that regard, both governments preferred to establish some collaboration mechanisms with Ankara, the states and the Bonn government.

According to Amiraux, in the report of Auslaenderbeauftragte (Foreigners' Representative), the German government recognized the requirement to figure out Islam's place and Islamic activists' networks of Koran schools (Amiraux 1996, 37). However, German Islam meant mainly a '*Turkish Islam*' (Amiraux 1996, 37), and Turks were the biggest foreign group in Germany. Therefore, the questions over Islam were not independent of the Turkish community in Germany, whose existence was the biggest debate in German politics. According to Clarkson, decreasing Cold War conditions in the 1980s brought to pay attention to 'Islamist networks that were now entrenched among a significant minority within the Turkish diaspora' (Clarkson 2017).

The reason for that mutual collaboration between the two states was, as it is discussed in the previous part, the role of mosque in the Turkish community in Germany (Lemmen 2000, 25-26). In these mosques, Turkish children, whose families were working in long shifts in factories, were getting religious and language courses, as well as socializing in there. Thus, the mosque became the representation of both the motherland and the family for them (Gorzewski 2015, 113). Moreover, the relationship between Islamist organizations and the German state was based on distrust of each other. For instance, according to the SPD's report, children who attended to the Quranic courses were often missing their schools, and this annoyed the German authorities, but they had nothing to do *(Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 1980, 7).*

The very first consciousness on the need for the mosque had appeared in 1965. Turks requested to have a vast place to have a holiday prayer therefore, they did their prayer in the cathedral of Cologne (Akat 2011, 206). After a year, they attended the holiday prayer in the *Cologne Sports Halle*, which became popular in the news agencies and national

TV Channels. (Akat 2011, 186). However, this popular interest in the religious rights of workers highlighted some political and social questions towards them. Together with the rising public visibility, the rising numbers of Turks in Kreuzberg (West Berlin) irritated the mayor of the town, who complained about Turks' booming in there (Duman 2018, 112). It is not a coincidence that, following the rising strikes and mosque associations, in 1975, Willy Brandt's government decided on a ban for new settlements, where 12% of the total population consisted of foreign inhabitants (O'brien 1988, 119). This policy irritated the foreigners, and they organized against the pressure in religious associations and identity-based communities.

In these conditions, the best way for Helmut Kohl was to take control of the question of foreigners (FİDEF 1984, 7). While he encouraged them to return with voluntary and involuntary ways, he tried to prevent the "extremism" of foreigners. In doing so, the government distinguished the obvious extremism (the activities against the national security) by the legal instruments (FİDEF 1984, 17).

However, especially in the field of religion, the German state had trouble establishing a mutual relationship with Islamic associations. In that regard, the state resorted to the Turkish government to find a way to prevent that question. Especially in the case of education and religious services, the German elites had nothing to do without the help of the Turkish government. Therefore, the year 1983 witnessed German politicians' visits to Turkey. In the visit of the mayor of West Berlin and state minister of Germany, Richard von Weizsaecker's to Ankara, he made interviews with the State minister, the minister of National Education, and the President of Diyanet in March (Cumhuriyet, 31.03.1983, 7). Besides, in the visit of Lower Saxony's Minister of Culture, George-Berndt Ochatz, he made interviews the Turkish minister of National Education and the President of Diyanet in August (Cumhuriyet, 05.07.1983, 8).

After these two visits, the minister of interior affairs of Germany, Zimmermann, paid an official visit to Ankara in July (Milliyet, 20.07.1983, 6). In the visit, Zimmermann declared to work on establishing the Turkish Diyanet Foundation in Germany and stated that uncontrolled Quranic

Courses annoy the German state (Milliyet, 21.07.1983, 6). Thus, it can be inferred that German officials' visits and interviews with the president of Diyanet were directly related to their changing perception towards the Turkish-Islam in the public sphere in Germany.

On the other hand, the 1980s witnessed an anti-Turkish sentiment in German politics and media, which was justified with religious and cultural differences. In that regard, mosques and religious associations became the lifesaver for the Turkish community in there. These communities enhanced the community consciousness with the anti-Turkish propaganda in the public sphere. Therefore, instead of integrating with the German society, mosques appeared as an alternative reality for socially excluded Turks. This anti-Turkish atmosphere was also debated in Turkey. In the Turkish assembly's meeting on April 21, 1987, Gürkan underlined that Turks in Germany were the most disliked community in Germany (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 1987, 314-315), and this xenophobia towards Turks gradually appeared as a fact in the public sphere. Moreover, this exclusion in the public sphere would naturally bring a spiritual siege mentality and cause a rising interest to the religious associations. Thus, the post-1980 developments signed the rising xenophobia of the 1990s, and these developments strengthened the Turkish-Islamic communities (Der Spiegel 1993).

§ 4.5 Conclusion

The 1980s was a period of the harmonious dance of the political Islam and state policies in Turkey, and this chapter drew a framework to investigate in which conditions the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was institutionalized in the Turkish diaspora in Germany. Mosques in Germany appeared as places for the socialization of Turkish immigrants. Each different group within the Turkish community in Germany organized around their symbols, or rather, their national symbols that politically facilitate their socialization. In that regard, to maintain its interests in there, the Turkish state developed policies to prevent the rising of anti-laic Turkish-Islamic groups. Therefore, mosques became places where the conflict between

the state policies and grievances between Turkish-Islamic groups overlapped.

Consequently, in this section, I discussed developments in Germany in the 1980s, which began in Turkey in the 1970s. The 1980 military intervention led to a serious structural transformation, and a different state-society relationship model introduced with the TIS. Moreover, secular states and states that hosting Muslim immigrant communities were deeply concerned with the rising of political Islam in the global sphere, which would trigger their existence.

At the end of this process, both Turkey and Germany re-interpreted its security concerns and required precautions with the rise of the Turkish-Muslims civil society initiatives in Germany. While Turkey conducted the process with Gramscian consent and coercion mechanisms, German authorities had no tool to do it through a consent mechanism. Thus, as an expected result of this complex process, DİTİB, which came into force with the possible collaboration of two counties, was established in Germany.

5

The State in the Transnational Field: The Case of Diyanet in Germany

It is an undeniable fact that modern nation-states establish ties with its citizens abroad with its ideological tools. In the Turkish case, mosques have become prominent as social spaces, where the main opposition of the republic formed and organized. In light of this reality, the state preferred to eliminate the possibility of an opposition organized in mosques, therefore controlled the religious public sphere by way of Diyanet (Taslaman 2016, 127). Taslaman also underlines that the state also empowered Diyanet to control and restrict other religious communities in Turkey with the state ideology (Taslaman 2016, 128). Tarhanlı highlights Diyanet as an institution that consolidates the nation-state by referring to the nation/people, rather than the authority of God (Tarhanlı 1993, 148). Therefore, the developments of the 1980s were not independent of the founding perspective of the Turkish Republic. "Diyanet was entrusted with protecting and propagating this state-Islam as central to Turkish national identity. Not surprisingly, following the coup, many adherents of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis landed in important positions, especially in the educational and cultural sectors." (Zürcher, 2004, p. 51).

In this context, the same process took place differently in Germany. Therefore, in this chapter, I will examine the Turkish-Islamic Groups in Germany, the periodization of Turkish Diyanet's approach to Germany,

DİTİB'S standpoint in Germany, Diyanet's transnational expansion to Turkish citizens in Western Europe and the 1980 military intervention's impact on the process. In doing so, I will try to figure out how that process happened, in which chronology these policies and events occurred and why the 1980s is essential to make out the current discussions on DİTİB.

§ 5.1 Turkish-Islamic Groups in Germany

In this part, I will examine the Turkish religious groups, which had social, economic and political weight in Germany. Despite the code on the abolition of dervish lodges officially banned the religious orders in Turkey, they have never been out of the religious public sphere. The religious orders, which established unofficially in Turkey, had organized in Germany with official headquarters and organized out of the control of the Turkish state.

The rise of Islamic organizations in Germany can be explained on several grounds. Some academics claim that since the Turks had a different faith determining their way of life from clothing (headscarf) to place of worship (mosque, cemevi), their existence brought a marginalization in the German public and that triggered their religious fundamentalism (Karakaşoğlu 1996, 160; Tan and Waldhoff 1996, 141). However, it is hard to say that all Turkish Muslims support these associations. As Abdullah underlines, the Turkish-Islamic organizations were only the lowest strata's fanatism, in which "decent people" were outside of them (Abdullah 1989b). They were defined as 'Turks came from the rural of the Anatolia', which considered as the main reason for the rising interest towards the Turkish-Islamic organizations (Beilschmidt 2013, 2015; Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 15; Hayit 1981; O'brien 1988; S. Allievi and J.S. Nielsen 2003). In short, in comparison with their living in Turkey, the Turks were more devout in Germany because of the social and cultural alienation and social isolation.

The main issue to shape the Muslim public sphere was the reluctance of the German state to recognize Islam as an official religion there (Der

Spiegel, 31.12.1979). In Germany, the state collects the church tax for Synagogues and Churches, but Muslims had no chance without their associations. In other words, the German state had a problem to behave equal treatment towards Muslims (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 19). This fact led these associations to rely on their followers' support and to have more opportunities, it also encouraged them to collect more members for their associations (Der Spiegel, 11.04.1983) .

Therefore, the Turkish-Islamic associations in Germany organized with their resources. It should be noted that, as the Turkish state has applied the strict laicism since its establishment, all Islamic groups, except for Diyanet as a state institution, were prohibited from formal activities. Thus, these organizations benefited from religious freedom in Germany, and spread across Turkish-Muslim society in there. However, they did not unite under a strong umbrella association. Grillo explains this reality with the nature of Islam (Grillo 2004). According to him, there was no "one" Islam, there are several Islamic interpretations and fractions that organized in competition with other ones (Grillo 2004, 862).

Therefore, plurality in Islam triggered the disintegration, in which different interpretations split from each other (Grillo 2004, 864). In that regard, each Turkish-Islamic organization had a different way of organizing. The biggest asset of these Turkey-origin associations would be the Turkish state's lack of capacity to respond to the needs in the diaspora. According to Arkılıç, when Turkish communities had asked imams from Turkey in the 1970s, the state had not enough monetary and institutional capacity to response the demand (Altıkulaç 2011, 18–19).

Yakup Coştu examines these organizations according to their source of organizing. According to him, their affiliation can be classified as sufi movements, religious movements, religious-political movements and official religious discourse in Germany (Çoştu 2017, 790–91). In that regard, Schifflauer applies a different classification, in which their relationship with the state considered with their method of indoctrination (Schiffauer 2007, 74). Lastly, Lemmen also applies another consideration, in which he examines the way of organizing (Lemmen 2000). Thus, these three differ-

ent approaches establish a complex table in that regard. Nevertheless, Diyanet in Germany stands in a very different position compared to other groups in the table.

Table 5.1 The associations in comparative perspective (Çoştu 2017; Lemmen 2000; Schiffauer 2007).

	Coştu	Schifflauer		Lemmen
	Type of Organization	Relationship with the State	Line	Way of Organizing
Süleymancılar	Religious Movement	Revolutionary Community	Training Programme	Center to Organizations
Milli Görüş	Religious-Political Movement	Revolutionary Community	Parliamentary Party	Combined
MHP-led Groups	Religious-Political Movement	Loyal to State	the TIS	Federational
Nur Community	Religious Movement	Revolutionary Community	Training Programme	–
Alevi Community	Religious Movement	–	–	Federational
Diyanet-led (DİTİB)	Semi-Official Religious affiliated with Official Religious	Loyal to State	Context to Laic State	From Organizations to Center
Kaplan Community	–	Revolutionary Community	Revolutionary Movement	–

Since each of them had a different outlook and methodology, the German state had not enough power to prevent their rising, which brought a new organization to tackle these associations' rising impact with a state-led association, DİTİB. In Germany, there were plenty of anti-laic organizations, which conducted their campaigns against the laic order in Turkey with Turkish citizens in Europe (Çakır 1998, 40). Therefore, both the Diyanet and the junta would have agreed upon the requirement for a counter-mobilization towards these associations. According to Sunier and Landman;

> "Tayyar Altıkulaç, the president of Diyanet at that time, visited the Turkish immigrants in Europe, and upon his return to Turkey he recommended to President Kenan Evren to launch a counteroffensive to Turkish Islamic movements that according to him 'exploited the religious needs of the Turkish migrants and mobilized them against the interests of the Turkish republic'" (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 50).

Before going into details of the debates over Diyanet and DİTİB in Germany, I will illustrate main approaches, methods and differences of main Turkish-Islamic organizations in Germany. These organizations are the Süleymancı Community, the Milli Görüş, the ICCB, the MHP-led groups, and Alevi communities. As the very first organized Turkish-Islamic association, the Süleymancı community is the first organization that I will examine.

5.1.1.1 The Süleymancı Community

The Süleymancı community is named after its founder, a Naqshbandi leader, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (Ortega and Jonker 2014, 221). In the single-party era, Tunahan's thoughts on the laic state had irritated the CHP and he could only gather up his followers through unofficial ways. To achieve this goal, as an influential preacher, he opened Quranic courses in Turkey and raised religious officers in his schools (Manaz 2017). After the death of Tunahan, his son-in-law, Kemal Kaçar organized the community. Since the community is notable with complex, but disciplined, aggressive economic policies in the field of Islamic education, its relationship with the Turkish state- was shaped by the state's critics on these activities.

The community is the first Turkish-Islamic union in Germany, which directly carried its institutional structure from Turkey. In that regard, according to the report of the SPD, the institutionalization of the community began with the sending of the 12 high administrators from Turkey to Germany to organize its communion *(Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 1980, 7).* The organization's formation dates back to the late 1960s with the "Turkish Unions" in Germany. In 1973, the community

formed the first "Islamic Cultural Center" in Cologne. In the late 1970s, popular support to the association led to the establishment of other centers belonged to the Süleymancı community, and people's rising interest over these centers led an umbrella association in 1980, named "Union of Islamic Cultural Associations" (VIKZ) located in Cologne, which became the headquarter for other Turkish unions and centers of the community in Western Europe. The imams of the community are composed of the dismissed Diyanet imams, who had a strong relationship with the Süleymancı community in Turkey and appointed to Germany by the headquarter in Turkey (Cumhuriyet 08.03.1987, 6).

In 1979, the association applied to the North Rhein Westphalian (NRW) government to be recognized as a "public benefit association" in the state of the NRW, which meant to be recognized as a representative of the Islam in the state, but if failed (Mumcu 1987, 100). Ironically, the embassy in Bonn also had praised this application (Mumcu 1987, 110). As the Süleymancı community had a controversial relationship with Diyanet, the indirect endorsement of the embassy seemed too weird.

The debate between the Süleymancı community and Diyanet dates back to the 1971 military intervention, in which the "the Regulation on the Qur'anic Courses" amended, in which all the Qur'anic courses, including the previous civil initiatives (most of them had owned by the Süleymancı community) to be transferred to Diyanet (Mumcu 1987, 94). Since this development was deprived of the main revenue of the community, it compensated its loss from the amendment by organizing Qur'anic courses in the diaspora (Mumcu 1987, 95). The community had a strong revenue from its courses, halal food activities and in-mosque aids with a disciplined and aggressive civil entrepreneurship in the financing of the community (Mumcu 1987, 86).

The methodology of the Süleymancı community is that they perform their activities through a 'successful educational work (concentration on the establishment of Qur'an courses) in their top-down excellent hierarchical structure (Schiffauer 1997a, 169). However, this excellence brought some questions for the head of the union. "*A growing number of Muslims had apparently discovered that his movement, instead of serving the*

whole of Islam, intends to back up but the "chosen few", whom the intercession of its founder -allegedly removed to heaven without ever having died- is supposed to protect on Doomsday, whereas the rest of humanity are bound to be sent to Hell by their Creator" (Abdullah 1989b, 442).

5.1.1.2 Milli Görüş

The Milli Görüş represents the complex relationship between religion and politics in Turkey. It was based on the doctrine of Erbakan, reflecting the green money (Yeşil Sermaye) of Anatolian Islamic capital and the social and political expectations of conservative groups, which was highly welcomed by the Turkish society. Despite the fact that Erbakan's way of politics had also a strong impact on Turks in Germany, this was based on religion rather than politics.

The Milli Görüş organization in Germany dates back to the Turkish Unions of the late 1960s, as the VIKZ, and began to organize in Germany in the 'Germany Turkish Union' (ATB) in 1969 (Ozkan 2019, 43). The organization was renamed of AMGT (European Milli Görüş Organizations) in 1976, which identifies itself as "the biggest non-state Islamic association" in Europe (Amiraux 1997, 247). The rising of organization coincides with the political transformation in the 1970s, in which Erbakan's MSP had become a part of a coalition with the CHP and formed the National Front Governments with the AP and MHP. Moreover, in those years, Erbakan had also a strong pressure on Diyanet's officials to join into the political sphere (Altıkulaç, 335).

The Milli Görüş organization had a strong relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, leading transnational political Islamist movement. Abadan-Unat underlines that Yusuf Zail al-Abidin founded the AMGT, '*who is of Iraqi origin and closely connected to Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Egypt's Muslim Brothers*" (Abadan-Unat 2011, 130). According to Mumcu, in the AMGT, several Muslim Brotherhood members had become members of the board of management (Mumcu 1987, 55). Moreover, Clarkson emphasizes that, in the '*local Islamic associations linked to Milli Görüş, younger Turkish Islamists came into contact with extremist networks in Arab diaspora mosques more radical factions within this milieu*

also began to gain the attention of German security services' (Clarkson 2017).

The AMGT, which was the biggest stakeholder of the Islamic Council of Germany in 1986, appealed to Muslims in Europe with its belonged associations from different parts of Islamic communities in Germany (B. M. Rubin 2010, 463). Therefore, the organization had followed a weak and complex hierarchical structure. According to Perşembe, they had not such an institutional seriousness in the mosque associations that led to a communication problem between the headquarter and local associations (Erkan Perşembe 1996, 169). Thus, these local mosques would split from the AMGT and join to the "tebliğ" movement in the 1980s (Mumcu 1987, 44).

In other respects, the Milli Görüş's transnational relations beyond Germany attached great attention to Turkey and Germany (B. M. Rubin 2010, 462–63). The AMGT, which institutionalized in Germany and opened its nation-wide umbrella associations to bring together local mosques in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, established a strong and inseparable relationship with Erbakan as a sub-part of his movement in Turkey. The organization was against the strict laicism in Turkey (Ogelman et al., 2002, 148), therefore it concerned about appealing to all Muslims. According to the memoirs of Altıkulaç, 'the MSP's was distributing its stylographic pens that into the diaspora, and "European Islamic Youth Organization Hijri 1400 Islamic Nation, Sharia State" was written on these pens', which he presented to the 6th martial corps commander in 29th September of 1980 (Altıkulaç 2011, 651).

The association was also concerned by the German state and its intelligence agency with its skepticism towards Western democracy and euphoric actions towards the laic state in Turkey (Tabarani 2011, 318). Besides, it had a strong economic power with its company under the name of "Selam Ticaret" for provisioning the halal food in the shops under the mosques of the organization, and 'Yeni Neşriyat' printing house for printing its newspaper 'Milli Gazete' and other publications (Mumcu 1987, 73-74; Erkan Perşembe 1996, 170). However, these activities were far from an

accountable scheme, which annoyed both states. For instance, the organization sent pilgrim candidates from Germany by way of its agency and collected a fee from pilgrim candidates with a 400 USD surplus and that amount became a source of Welfare Party's elections expenses in Turkey, and organization's revenue in Germany (Çetinkaya 1994, 5; Cumhuriyet 10.02.1994, 17). This example reveals that was too far from being a reliable partner for both states.

5.1.2 *Cemalettin Kaplan and His Followers (ICCB)*

Cemalettin Kaplan, who entitled "kara-ses" (black voice), is the founder of the ICCB (Union of Islamic Associations and Societies) in 1984 (Bindi and Angelescu 2011, 103; Mumcu 1987, 43; Vielhaber 2012). Accompanied by the Süleymancı and Milli Görüş communities, Cemalettin Kaplan represents the non-laic flag in the mosques in Germany. He was the most prominent figure against the laic state, and sent by Necmettin Erbakan under the title of "the Head of Guidance and Fatwa issues" to put the stakeholders of the Milli Görüş associations together, but split the organization and went through a more radical interpretation of the Sunni Islam (Mumcu 1987, 43–44; Vielhaber 2012). He had also nominated from the MSP in the elections in 1977, but not elected (Bruce 2019, 84; Chapin 1996, 287).

According to Kaplan, who was a former mufti of Adana, Diyanet is the obvious example of the state Islam, however, since the Turkish state is not an Islamic or sharia state, he claimed that the state is irreligious, cannot appoint imams or organize Qur'anic courses (Mumcu 1987, 2). He also claimed that laicism is another religion and means irreligiousness (Mumcu 1987, 2). Kaplan's value system and standpoint towards laic Turkey can clearly be understood by his following statement: "*Islam means both religion and state, both worship and politics. In Islam, worship even translates into politics, its politics is worship. It is impossible to think about the Islamic religion that exists without politics and state*" (Piricky 2007, 17).

Kaplan's way of getting more membership was based on the method named 'tebliğ' (to invite non-believers to Islam) to convince people to

join the association. Since Kaplan was an admirer of the Iranian revolution, he followed the way that Imam Khomeini did through cassettes and diffusing his ideas through his followers as Kaplan would do (Mumcu 1987, 5). The ICCB had a similar economy as the Milli Görüş, which additionally included cassettes of Kaplan, a Cologne-centered import-export company, and payments from Iran (Mumcu 1987, pp. 71-72).

Kaplan had a cult of leadership, which he was never questioned by his followers (Lemmen 2000, 63). However, his community faced with a division and a severe decline of memberships in 1987, in which the moderate followers left the society (Erkan Perşembe 1996, 176). In 1992, he announced the establishment of the Anatolia Federal Islamic State and declared himself the caliphate in 1994 (Abadan-Unat 2011; Erkan Perşembe 1996, 177). Thus, over the years, the community went through a more radical interpretation, and also took the mighty attention of both states in case of security concerns (Anwar, Blaschke, and Sander 2004, 103–4).

5.1.3 *MHP-Affiliated Groups*

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which was established adopting the "*nine lights doctrine*" (dokuz ışık doktrini) and had organized members named "Idealists" (Ülkücüler), became one of the key actors of the 1970's Turkey. As the party represented the Turkish nationalist flank of the right-wing politics in Turkey, it was the civil pillar of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis with its strong discourse power and powerful organization. Besides these, MHP-affiliated groups in Germany organized in local mosques and factories in a disciplined way (Milliyet, 24.03.1976, 6).

The MHP in Germany began to organize in the organizations, such as cultural center, Qur'anic courses, and mosque associations under the name of "Turkish" in the 1960s (Arslan 2004, 121). Later on, these local organizations collected under some central institutions such as the Turkish Hearts, Idealists' Associations, Greater Ideal Association (Arslan 2004, 124). They were quite influential in factories; therefore, together with Türkeş's rising in Turkey within the National Front Governments, his 'Grey Wolves' in Germany seemed a reliable partner for the Turkish state in the 1970s (Der Spiegel 23.08.1976). According to a bulletin of a Turkish union

association, the Turkish consulates and the MHP-organizations had a warm relationship, in which they were in mutual collaboration in the indoctrination of workers' children (Türkiyeli İşçiler Birliği 1977, 4).

In the visit of Alparslan Türkeş to Germany in 1978, these nationalist associations came together under the umbrella organization, the ADÜTDF (The Federation of European Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations) (Abadan-Unat 2011, 172). In the 1980s, the ADÜTDF came up with 10 Western European countries' idealist organizations and re-organized at the Europe-level. Besides, these communities had a strong control regime over other Turkish associations' administration, and they were taking hold of local mosques of Diyanet as the closest community to the TIS (*Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 1980, 5*; Cumhuriyet 10.03.1987, 6).

The MHP's rising in Germany shows us the alliance between the anti-communism and order in the factories, in which MHP's conformity was favorable for both states. In other words, the rising of the MHP was not independent of the context of the cold war, in which the party was a strong voice for combating communism (Bora 2017, 290–91). In that regard, Türkeş represented the "*anti-communist*" bloc of the Turkish politics and respected by the German politicians. In his visit in 1978, he met with CSU politician Franz Josef Strauß, and German employers, and got Strauß's and his party's strong support for the MHP's Germany branch, and he led to the establishment of MHP's umbrella organization to serve in Germany (Clarkson, 2017; Nowak, 2014, p. 200; Cumhuriyet 28.02. 1980, 5).

Jörg Nowak interprets the MHP's rising as a "post-colonial nationalism" towards class politics, which fought against leftist movements and unionists (members of trade unions) in the 1970s (Nowak 2014, 199). *They continue to operate in cooperation with the MHP. The Federation's ideology based on taking a stance in opposition to integration into a German society that they believe considers Turks a second-class race"* (Abadan-Unat 2011, 172). Although MHP's presentation of an alternative identity to class politics was preferable for both countries in the 1970s, MHP's identity-oriented and anti-integrationist attitude lost its popularity in the 1980s. After the military intervention, the MHP's position and Türkeş's

popularity in the German politics was torn down by Kenan Evren and Diyanet. For instance, when Alparslan Türkeş paid a visit to the Turkish community in West Berlin, he was protested before the gathering, and he could not talk to the community because of the protest (Türkiye Postası 1987, 5).

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis had established the ideological ground of the MHP, but at the same time, it triggered the separation from the party. Moreover, the report of the SPD reveals that the MHP was not successful in the affairs of Qur'anic courses, therefore it pays its attention to the mosques and associations (Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 1980 ,5). Thus, while the MHP was organizing in Germany with local mosque-associations, on the other hand, more Islamic wing within the party split from the party and formed the BBP (Great Unity Party). Besides, a group of ADÜTDF members organized the ATİB (Turkish-Islamic Union in Europe), which obtained mosque-centric organizing, in 1988 (Dierckx 2009, 81). In that regard, the ATİB was also in line with the TIS, therefore it had an ideological affinity to the Turkish state (Erkan Perşembe 1996, 173). However, 'the attempted assassination of the pope by Musa Serdar Çelebi (the head of Germany Turkish Federation between 1979-1982) and the linkages of the MHP to organize drug trafficking' brought the decrease in membership and financial support to the movement (Nowak 2014, 201)

5.1.4 *Alevi Community in Germany*

Alevism is a sectarian interpretation of Islam, which has remained "unrecognized" or at least "never accepted at the state level" in Turkey. Therefore, it has always been recognized as a culture and has never been respected as a religious belief. According to Çamuroğlu, Alevi rituals dating back to Ottoman times have never been forgotten; moreover, it continued to be reproduced after the migration from rural to urban and Alevi massacres in Anatolia (Çamuroğlu 1997, 25). In light of the collective memory of the community, most of the Alevis in Turkey turned to a socialist political vision and abandoned their religious identity (Çamuroğlu 1997, 25). Alevis arrived in Europe as guest workers and asylums, and they

formed "Alevi diaspora" with the Alevis who fled from Turkey because of the political violence and the 1980 coup d'état.

The Alevi Community organized in Germany with two push factors; which are the rising numbers of them, and horrific social and political crises which took place in Turkey. Like other Turkish organizations, the community organized through local communities, and spread across different places in Germany where Turks lived, and then access to the other places in Western Europe. However, this institutionalization had also directly affected the events in Turkey. The Maraş and Sivas massacres had encouraged the community, and the 1980 coup increased the numbers of Alevi-Turkish asylum in there (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 224). Therefore, the Alevi organization found greater support right after the asylum applications of Alevis in the post-1980 era (Abadan-Unat 2011, 133).

The Alevi Community's associations date back to the 1970s, and organized under the umbrella of "Union of Patriotic from Turkey", which later renamed as "Alevi Cultural Centers in Germany" in 1980, and "the Confederation of Alevi Communities in Germany" in 1991 (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 224). The unionization of local federations took place in the Frankfurt meeting of the Unity Party of Turkey in June 1979, in which the "Federation of Patriotic Union" (YBF) was established (Mortan and Sarfati 2011, 52). However, Alevi associations were mostly organized in the trade unions, rather than religious communities, and the YBF signs the turning point from class-based community formation to identity-based one. *"Alevis tended to become involved in social and political organizations such as trade unions, committees of Turkish workers, and left-wing political parties. The first Alevi organization in the south of Germany was called the Union of Workers of Turkey."(Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 101).*

*According to the SPD's report in 1980, Alevis were "communities that have less difficulty on the integration than Sunnis" (*Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 1980*, 5). Besides, in contrast to the ideologically and politically separated Sunni groups, Alevis were united under a strong federation structure (*Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 1980*, 5-6).*

*Moreover, while living of Alevis in Germany was shaped with the politicization of them in Turkey, Sunni communities were tightly coupled with their religious rituals and strongly politicized according to their associations' standpoint. (*Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 1980*, 6).*

After the coup, the state alienated Alevis in Turkey, which also found a response in the diaspora. *'The introduction of the compulsory subject Knowledge of Religion and Morality in state schools in Turkey was seen by Alevis as an instrument of assimilation and exclusion. Also, initiatives of the Turkish state to found mosques in Alevi villages and not least the attempts to organize religious life in Europe were seen as an indication to prioritize Sunni Islam.'*(Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 101–2). Also, the TIS had no positive and integrative reading towards the Alevis, which considered a part of Shi'ism that accepted as a troublemaker in the Islamic union (Kafesoğlu 2017, 377–79). Diyanet also claimed that the special rituals (djem) of Alevis are 'cultural expressions, that does not concern their Islamic identity'(Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 96).

In that regard, "In 1986, the European Parliament decided to subsidize associations that promote immigrant cultures and identities across Europe, and this permitted Alevis to coordinate their activities at the European Level"(Abadan-Unat 2011, 133). *In Hamburg, discontent about this Islamization and 'Sunnification' motivated Alevis to form an Alevi Culture group. Similar initiatives were taken elsewhere. The German government facilitated these initiatives by offering to fund for Alevi cultural manifestations. Thus, in Hamburg, an 'Alevi Cultural Week' was organized in 1989, with lectures about the history of Anatolian Alevism, a festival with Alevi poets and singers, and a cem-ceremony.* (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 101–2). Consequently, the failure of the recognition of the Alevi community in Turkey led the Alevis in Germany to take care of themselves.

§ 5.2 Periodization of Turkish Diyanet's Approach to Germany

The absence of the Turkish state's policy on the workers abroad in the 1960s and 1970s was felt by the military regime right after the rising asylum applications and negative campaign done by Turkish citizens in

Western Europe. Therefore, in addition to the intelligence activities and legal obstacles, the junta and its leader, Kenan Evren, tried to conduct a positive campaign before the citizens in the diaspora. In that regard, '*three months after the coup Kenan Evren addressed the diaspora directly in a speech justifying military intervention and defending his government's record broadcast on ZDF, one of the two main German television channels* (Clarkson 2017). However, these campaigns did not bring a positive image for the coup, and the junta realized that it had to construct its lobbying group in the diaspora. In that regard, the regime felt that nothing is the same as in Turkey.

> *"Because of the socio-economic and social developments, the Turkish Muslim communities in Europe can no longer be seen as simply an extension of those in Turkey. Over the years, the Islamic landscape in Europe has developed its own dynamics that have increasingly been disentangled from the traditional migration patterns. Not only the Turkish Islamic movements but also the Turkish state face this new reality and act upon it. Attempts to maintain redefine and revive these ties, both by Turkish Islamic movements and by the Turkish state, must be understood against the background of this new reality." (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 43)*

The German state was also in trouble to prevent Islamic fundamentalism, which was also a problem for Turkey, and disturbed from the escalation of radical Islamist associations, but, had no chance to control them because of the right of the freedom of expression (Nielsen 1999, p. 69; Zarif 1987, 14). In that regard, in 1983, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reported the "Extreme Islamist-Turkish Associations" chapter in the report on extremism in Germany (Zarif 1987, 14). Therefore, the new era was favorable for both sides to go into a collaboration to give the control of mosques into a trustable ally in Germany, Diyanet. However, as Bruce points out, just one year before the coup, Diyanet had not enough facility and opportunity to serve in there (Bruce 2019b, 86).

As a justification, the 1982 constitutions' 62nd article had a legal basis to serve to the 'Turkish citizens working abroad'; "*The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of the children, the cultural needs, and the social security of Turkish citizens working abroad, and to safeguard their ties with the home country and to help them on their return home.*" (1982 Turkish Constitution, article 62)

Thus, the state played an ideologically constructive role after the coup with Diyanet. In my periodization, the years between 1978-1982 reflects the lack of enough capacity to serve in Germany, the years 1982-1985 illustrates the institutionalization of Diyanet, and after 1985, Diyanet serves with rising support from both Turkey and the associations in the diaspora.

5.2.1 *The Period of Lack of Enough Capacity: 1978-1982*

Diyanet's services to the diaspora had a long history before the establishment of the organization in Western Europe. The first initiative of Diyanet in Germany had done for the training of approximately 50 voluntary candidates for being religious servants within the Turkish society in Germany in 1969 (Milliyet, 24.12.1969, 3). *Before the inauguration of the external services branch, the applications for the short-term imams had begun in 1972 under the sub-department for religious services abroad and Diyanet began to send seasonal imams (religious officers) from the staffs of Ministry of Labor as a "Social Assistant"* (Bruce 2019b, 81; Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 7). After the establishment of the external services branch in 1978*, 'the Turkish community in Germany and other countries have requested religious officers (imam) for their mosques'* (Demir 2010, 32)*, and these mosques-associations named "Diyanetçi" mosques* (Erdem 2008; Presidency of Religious Affairs; Schiffauer 1997, 159; Tarhanlı 1993, 53).

> *"The fact that the general mosque was now in the hands of one particular group triggered off a process of segmentation. In 1978 a mosque of the 'office of religious affairs', or DİTİB representing official Islam in Turkey was founded. This mosque was taken over*

by the Grey Wolves (a fascist movement fighting for a kind of synthesis of Islam and Turkism) by shifting majorities and was later taken by the Diyanetçiler (Diyanetçis). This again led to the setting up of a mosque exclusively for the Grey Wolves in 1987."(Schiffauer 1997b, 159)

Nevertheless, until the Altıkulaç's presidency, Diyanet had not done anything enough to satisfy the needs of people in the diaspora (Altıkulaç 2011, 336). In that regard, In the 1979's Ramadan month, Diyanet had sent 26 religious officers to Germany for giving religious assistance to the Turkish community in there. However, at the same time, the Süleymancı, the Milli Görüş, and MHP had already been serving in Germany with 400 imams in total (Cumhuriyet, 08.03.1987, 6). Moreover, other associations have never been respected by the state and subjected to the control mechanism of the state apparatus (Schiffauer 1997, p. 162). Even in the most basic debates on the interpretation of a religious affair, these organizations divide as '*Diyanet*'s opinion and others' opinion', and these debates re-produced in the mosques in the diaspora (Altıkulaç 2011, 359–60).

Until 1985, Diyanet's external services were too far from being successful for a number of reasons. First of all, it was quite impossible to establish strong institutional relations with unstable governments in Turkey. According to the memoirs of Altıkulaç, Diyanet had been into trouble to convince each government, and after that, the process to prepare a law for external branches took more time than the duration of unstable governments' rulings (Altıkulaç, 2011, p. 387-389).

Secondly, Turkish politics had been an obstacle itself with its associated partners of the 1970s, the AP, the MSP, and the MHP. The National Front Governments' partners had already established their ties with the diaspora. While the AP had it through Süleymancı and Nur communities, the MHP and the MSP had it with their branches abroad. Thus, Diyanet had a must to deal with organizations, which had already organized in Germany. In that regard, the initial concerns came from the MSP, which would prevent the accession of Diyanet to the diaspora communities as a

partner in government, or its acquiring influence in Diyanet and Diyanet's external communities (if it permits).

Thirdly, Diyanet had a lack of infrastructure, enough religious officers and imams to serve in Germany (Gorzewski 2015, 18). In the case of the lack of skilled imams, Diyanet preferred to appoint its most skilled imams to the diaspora as a religious affairs advisor (Altıkulaç 2011, 376). Most of the imams of Diyanet were primary school graduates, almost all of them had no German language skills, and Diyanet had not enough mosque to access in Germany for some ideological reasons (Beaumont and Cloke 2012, 228). Even in the inauguration of DİTİB, Altıkulaç had only 110 imams to send to Europe (Gorzewski 2015, 18).

Lastly, Diyanet had not had enough capital power. In 1978, Diyanet got a staff budget for four imams to appoint to the diaspora and used the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget to appoint more staff to abroad mosques, under the substance of "Expenses on the Protection of Turkish Cultural Heritage", which had appointed by Atatürk for *"salary of hodjas, imams, dersiâm (religious teacher) and preacher in foreign countries"* (Altıkulaç, 2011, p. 376-378). Also, during the National Front Government in 1979, Diyanet went into a collaboration with Turkish workers' associations for payment of Diyanet's imams (Altıkulaç 2011, 376). According to the plan, each workers' associations would pay 1.000 DM annually to contribute an imam's salary in Germany, which would not be a burden for both sides (Altıkulaç 2011, 376; Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 8). In another plan, Diyanet offered to get 500 DM from mosque organizations (mosque and its association) for a fund to appoint imams from Turkey, which plan also worked well (Altıkulaç 2011, 384–85; Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 8). With these methods, Diyanet sent 150 imams to Germany in 1981 (Milliyet 21.06.1981, 3).

Nevertheless, these were not talked enough as the Diyanet's collaboration with the Rabıta (Altıkulaç 2011, 380). One of the most crucial debates on the Diyanet was the payment of the salary of Diyanet's imams by the Rabıta organization led by Saudi capital, that was unveiled by Uğur Mumcu in 1987 (Mumcu 1987, 189–91). According to Altıkulaç, this attempt was preferred because of the state's economic conditions, which had no

power to pay the salary of all imams in diaspora (Altıkulaç 2011, 381–82). Also, the military regime preferred to benefit from the Rabıta's budget to prevent criticism towards the junta from the Islamic wing (Altıkulaç 2011, 435-436). In the decision held on 10th September 1981, post-coup "National Security Council" decided on the appointment of 41 imams to the Turks abroad with payment for 21 of them by the Rabıta (Altıkulaç 2011, 435). Thus, the lack of capital power had tried to solve via Saudi capital, which was later criticized by Mumcu and secular newspapers.

In light of these developments, President of Religious Affairs, Tayyar Altıkulaç, accompanied by ministers and Turkish delegation in Bonn leaded to establish an umbrella organization to collect Diyanet-controlled mosques in Germany under its control. However, it did not happen as planned for the Turkish delegation.

5.2.2 *Institutionalization of the Turkish Diyanet: 1982-1985*

The most serious impact of the military intervention on the Turkish-Islamic organizations in Germany had been the state's transition from passive positioning to active intervention. From the Turkish State's side, this intervention happened *to cease the fight among brothers*, but it was not perceived as the state expected. As it is underlined in the Uğur Mumcu's interview with Ali Yüksel, Diyanet's institutionalization in Germany had caused a negative impact on the other Islamic organizations, and even brought conflicts in there (Mumcu 1987, 54).

> *"The 12th September (the coup) caused some developments in this regard (conflict between Süleymancılar and Diyanet). Especially the strict attitude of Diyanet has caused of getting closer to each other of the organizations serving religious services. Diyanet's strong pressure on these organizations caused that. In the past, these kinds of contacts among them would not have been possible. We have not witnessed any of the Süleymancı members' discourse against us (AMGT) recently." (Mumcu 1987, 61).*

After the coup, Altıkulaç paid an informal visit to Germany to find a method to establish Diyanet's external branch in there (Altıkulaç 2011,

390). Altıkulaç did this vacancy without a state budget, which took place with taking his annual leave (Altıkulaç 2011, 390–91). Altıkulaç, who faced unpleasant experiences in his visits to Turkish mosques in Germany, narrowly escapes a lynching attempt in a Milli Görüş mosque (Altıkulaç 2011, 393). Moreover, in his memoirs, he says that he even had no chance to visit a Süleymancı mosque in there (Altıkulaç 2011, 375). After the visit, he stated that the mosques in Germany were divided according to political views, and the state must conduct an operation in Germany to prevent the escalation of struggle among Turkish mosques (Milliyet, 03.02.1981, 7).

Germany had plenty of Turkish-Islamic associations and Altıkulaç had prepared the legal basis of the "Germany-Diyanet Foundation". However, the German Civil Law had prevented to establish that kind of a foundation, and therefore it failed (Altıkulaç, 2011, pp. 391–393). In addition to the legal problems with Germany, Diyanet had not come to an agreement with the Turkish State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Altıkulaç 2011, 395). Thus, the German-TDF failed even before establishing.

In Altıkulaç's visit to Cologne and Western Germany, he was invited to West Berlin by Undersecretariat of Culture to solve the discontent in the mosques (Altıkulaç 2011, 390). In the visit, he led the establishment of an association to bring pro-Diyanet mosques together (Altıkulaç 2011, 390). The first Diyanet-affiliated mosque opened in Berlin on the 12 January 1982 (Beilschmidt 2015, p. 49). After the legal process, DİTİB-Berlin was established in 1982 and Diyanet achieved access through its branch in there. Nevertheless, West Berlin was an exclave of Federal Germany within East Germany, therefore, it had not an institutional opportunity to access the Turkish community on the Western side.

It should be noted that before the establishment of the union, Diyanet had an indirect control over 'diyanetçi' (pro-Diyanet) mosques in Germany. Religious officers of Diyanet were serving in these mosques in connection to Ankara (Diyanet Gazetesi 02.1985, 22). These officers that were sent to these mosques were not appointed directly by Diyanet, but sent to the embassy in Bonn (Diyanet Gazetesi 03.1985, 18).

Most of the Turkish population were living in the North Rhine-Westphalia, and almost all the Turkish-Islamic organizations were settled in there. Therefore, without accession to there, Diyanet would not serve as it expected to do so. Diyanet' and Ministry of Foreign Affairs' attempts to access had prevented with Germany's reciprocal request to establish a foundation of Diyanet in there (to establish a foundation by Germans in Ankara[1]), but DİTİB was established on the 5 July 1984 (Altıkulaç 2011, 399–400).

Although DİTİB was established as a registered association, not a foundation, Diyanet had found a way to control the association's affairs. Therefore, DİTİB was established by Diyanet-appointed trustees under the tutelage of Turkish Diyanet Foundation (Altıkulaç, 391-393). According to Altıkulaç, Diyanet's decision on DİTİB stems from establishing this tutelary regime and the empowering Turkish religious attaché to Bonn (now, Berlin) (Altıkulaç, 391-392). Additionally, Diyanet relied on the autonomy of the appointed Turkish imams in the local mosques, thereby monitored both the head of the union and the mosque-communities. Moreover, in the institutionalization of DİTİB, the Turkish embassy and religious services counselors played an important role to prevent for a possible change in the structure and to preserve the power of the Turkish state in DİTİB (Gorzewski 2015, 56).

5.2.3 *The Rise of DİTİB: 1985-1990s*

DİTİB was established on 5th of July 1984 with 135 religious associations in Germany (*DİTİB website*). The opening meeting was made with the participation of the Minister of State of the Republic of Turkey, Kazım Oksay in a sports center in Cologne on the 12th Mai 1985 (Gorzewski 2015, 7). According to the Gorzewski's compilation from the Turkish newspapers' Germany edition, Minister Oksay and of course the Turkish state expected to remember its weight to the Turkish community in Germany:

1 This attempt contradicts with the Lausanne Treaty.

> *"We expect from you and ask that you continue to strengthen unity and not allow the seeds of discord and disunity to spread so as not to fall into the trap of external provocation. […] Who is the enemy of the Turks is known. Unfortunately, they also include traitors with a Turkish passport. In their personal papers, it says that they are Turks and Muslims" (Gorzewski 2015, 9).*

After such a firm beginning, it would be impossible to expect an independent religious association from DİTİB (Gorzewski 2015). Therefore, the union preferred to institutionalize in line with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and the thoughts of the junta, which symbolizes the 'national unity' and the 'nation consciousness'. DİTİB, which was organized under the attempt of 18 Turks from Cologne, acted as a shield against other Turkish-Islamic associations in the diaspora.

The institutionalization of the union has a linear relationship with paying of salaries of Turkish imams. As the German state was unable to pay salaries of the imams of Muslim communities, they paid it by collecting donations from their congregation. Turkish-Islamic communities earned a significant income from these donations, which were utilized for a broad spectrum of transnational activities such as supplying Bosnian Muslims, Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Egypt, Erbakan's election campaign, and political propaganda of other associations (Mumcu, 1987). By establishing DİTİB in 1985, Turkish state paid salaries of mosques belonging to DİTİB (Diyanet Gazetesi 09.1985, 26); thus, this uncontrolled economy was indirectly brought under control by the state.

DİTİB's institutionalization process reveals the learning process in a broader context. For instance, between 1985 to 1992, DİTİB had worked to organize the funerals with its limited capacities, but it faced with several obstacles to send the mortal remains to Turkey (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 49). After seven years of the founding, the Funeral Assistance Fund was organized to solve the question by the union (DİTİB website). Another example is the publishing policy of the union. DİTİB, which published in Turkish to serve Turkish citizens, realized that to protect

non-Turkish Muslims from the missionary activities in Germany, the union ought to publish in German, and these documents should also appeal to the people from every walk of life (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 48).

This learning process was also debated by the public opinion and policymakers in Turkey. Although the method and the scope of the religious services of DİTİB or Diyanet in Europe did not discuss in Turkey, main debates were turning around the other Turkish-Islamic associations, which was an insight for not-to-do.

> *"The main image of the Turks in Germany was that an image, in which Turkish children between the ages of seven-eight are trying to learn German and Turkish, who are taught with medieval thinking methods by wearing headscarves and hats, with small pouch, rahles on the ground, and be taught Arabic and Quran by beating them. This image shared in the press and televisions in Germany, and all the German public interested in this medieval age images described the Turks in Germany. Among those who created all these negative perceptions, together with many former deputies, the AMGT and the Süleymancı movement took place. Together with these facts, Turkish families in Germany concerned about their children to the second and third generations' integration to the German way of life, and they feared losing their children, therefore these families sent their children to the religious courses (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 17.12.1986, 548-549)*

Therefore, the policy of DİTİB was based on preventing the rise of other associations and accessing more Turkish families in Germany. The union had sent 413 imams to the mosques abroad in 1986 (Milliyet, 12.09.1986, 11). Besides these, to meet the demand of the mosque-associations in the diaspora, Diyanet worked to send 250 more imams by bringing more qualified imams with the faculties of theology and the High Islamic Institute (Milliyet, 12.09.1986, 11). According to Lemmen, the union had a decentralized and loosely connected structure with its local associations

with Diyanet's imams, whose salaries paid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and these associations were organized by these imams (Lemmen 2000). Thus, the union reveals a dual structure in organizing.

In that regard, in addition to its reflection on the Turkish-Islam or the laic Islam, DİTİB was standing in the power struggles among the Turkish-Islamic association in the diaspora. Jorgen Nielsen emphasizes on that, right after the establishment of the DİTİB, at the end of the decade, DİTİB's registered mosques and associations outnumbered the rest of the Turkish-Islamic associations with 'between half and two-thirds of the Turkish mosques' joined the umbrella organization DİTİB (Nielsen and Otterbeck 2016, 34). According to the Diyanet's report on its activities abroad, Diyanet was serving with 720 imams in the diaspora in 1991 (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 8, 51).

According to the same report's chapter "real estates donated by Turks abroad to Diyanet", Turks were so generous for DİTİB's rising in Germany (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992). According to the report, 367 mosques, 191 buildings, 337 club-houses, and 273 public housing (for the accommodation of Diyanet's imams) were donated to DİTİB (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 1992, 185). All these donations were the public spheres that Turks constructed in the 1970s, where they brought together such as mosques, Qur'anic courses and facilities of these associations (Duman 2018, 106). In other words, the Turks, who were away from the influence of the state for 24 years, continued their relations with the state under the roof of Diyanet's communion in Germany, DİTİB.

DİTİB was functioning as an umbrella association, with working in accordance with the local mosques and associations (Beilschmidt 2015, 223). In other words, the Turkish government had no direct impact on the local mosques but the appointment of local mosques' imams and the institutional policies were directed to the Cologne and the direction shared by the headquarter to the regional unions (Beilschmidt 2016, 237). Thus, it can be inferred that local mosques of the union had an impact on the regional unions, not directly to the local mosques and associations. Nevertheless, imams of these mosques were appointed by the Turkish state and selected with a set of bureaucratic procedures.

The imams appointed to the DİTİB-mosques were paid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. According to the report for Diyanet's services abroad in 1991, Diyanet had 434 religious staffs in Germany and 418 of them was imams of local mosques (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 87). Furthermore, the salary of 415 imams had paid by the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 87). In other words, these imams had overwhelmingly sent under the diplomatic staff, which represents the Turkish State and state's perception towards the diaspora and the Turkish-Islam.

Therefore, before appointing an imam to a mosque in the diaspora, Diyanet was asking the declaration of conformity to the MİT (National Intelligence Organization of Turkey), and this declaration was not a formality (Altıkulaç 2011, 499–500). According to Altıkulaç, in this presidency, the MİT gave a negative report for three imams and did not allow them to send to Germany (Altıkulaç 2011, 500). This example reveals the importance of the Turks in the diaspora for the state and Kenan Evren's regime's political tutelage towards the ideological apparatus of the state. Alexander Clarkson confirms this tutelary regime and the legacy of the military intervention in the diaspora;

> *"By the late 1980s, Ankara managed to consolidate influence over diaspora communities by providing imams and language teachers that were trained and certified by the Turkish state. Promoting a state-backed blend of traditional nationalism and Islamic conservatism based on the so-called Turkish-Islamic synthesis, Diyanet mosques and German school programs using Turkish Education Ministry textbooks backed a worldview that emphasized the Turkish language and Sunni Islam as defining elements of Turkish identity." (Clarkson 2017).*

In linking with the security concerns of the state, the securitization of the diaspora in a broader context was institutionalized with DİTİB. According to the Gorzewski's references to Metin Gür's research, the state also had a control mechanism on the religious officers appointed to Germany,

and these officers both informed the state and involved in the indoctrination of the TIS and the propaganda of the state Islam against the other Turkish-Islamic associations in the diaspora (Gorzewski 2015, 110). Regional DİTİB associations were coordinated by the "coordination committees" under the presidency of the consul general that was responsible for the region (Lemmen 2000, 47). Moreover, the presidency of DİTİB was held by the undersecretary for the religious affairs of the Turkish embassy to Bonn, and the president of Diyanet represented as the honorary president and the head of the advisory committee (Lemmen 2000, 48).

According to Lemmen, DİTİB-Cologne served as an unofficial 'coordination committee in Europe' and managed Diyanet's overseas services with a close collaboration with Turkish diplomatic services in Europe (Lemmen 2000, 48-49). Lastly, DİTİB's staying out of the "Islamic Council of Germany" reveals the associations' loyalty to the state ideology, in which the union never disregards the Turkish background of the Turkish-Islamic community (Lemmen 2000, 49).

Thus, Diyanet served in Germany under the union named DİTİB, which formed in (West) Berlin and Cologne. In line with this historical development, I should examine the standpoint of DİTİB to figure out why the state interfered with the affairs of the Turkish-Islamic community in Germany.

§ 5.3 DİTİB's Standpoint in Germany

Since DİTİB is an external branch of Diyanet in Turkey, it represents the Turkish state's position over the Islamic and Turkish community in Germany. Although the state has always had strict control over religious education and indoctrination in Turkey (Milliyet, 10.02.1987, 7), it does not mean that the same occurred in Germany over the Turkish community, mosques, and religious courses. "*A religious attaché is appointed to the president of the association to serve a four-year term, and the imams sent to Germany are funded by the Turkish state; other activities, such* as youth groups, the mosque itself or women's groups are funded by associational resources." (Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009, 70).

Very first organizations were established to meet the religious needs of the first generation (Schiffauer 1997, 348). "*Our people, who migrated to different countries, religion, language, culture, briefly, to work under very difficult conditions, experienced many difficulties. Our citizens had to take care of themselves economically and socially as well as worship and all other religious beliefs in their countries*." (Yazıcıoğlu 2013, 226). As they formed around purely their religious affairs, as Vertovec theorizes (Vertovec 2009, 137), they became a part of religious civil society that established in needs of Turkish Muslims in Germany. Thus, the 1960s Turkish associations turned to the "Süleymancı" associations (Schiffauer 1997b, 351). Later on, other groups joined to the competition, and the local mosques became places of political struggle.

In that regard, as Beilschmidt points out, DİTİB emphasized the apolitical side of Islam, and clearly distinguish itself from politics, as well as from global political Islam (Beilschmidt 2016, 227). DİTİB represents the Sunni Islam, but with the interpretation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and drawn framework of the state Islam. In other words, it follows a Diyanet's method, which had an official, but also ideological, interpretation of Islam to serve in daily activities of Muslims in Turkey, rather than the political Islam of other associations in Germany (Beilschmidt 2016, 227). Therefore, instead of joining the Islamic Council in 1986, it pursued a policy to stand out in between the Turkish state and German state, and worked as a dialogue partner, which made the union as a representative of Turkish-Islam in Germany.

On the other hand, since DİTİB represented the official Islam, it faced with a strong anti-laic or anti-republican propaganda in Germany. According to Altıkulaç, other associations' members were generally accusing of the DİTİB as "*the imams of Diyanet of this regime cannot be trusted, who cannot say haram to haram, halal to halal*" and this propaganda was roaming in Germany (Altıkulaç 2011, 650).[2]

2 In the memoirs of Altıkulaç; "the Milli Görüş's members warned the people at the entrance of the hall where we organized a religious program in Munich and said that the program was canceled. Then we noticed, then corrected it. Later, a bomb notification

However, Sunier and Landman underlines that 'Diyanet (in Germany) conveys guidelines for life in accordance with Islamic principles, which is a sensitive issue because Diyanet is bound to the secular principles of the Turkish republic' (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 54). Thus, it is obvious that the black propaganda of the period was directly related to the bi-sided historical legacy of the institutionalization of Diyanet. While Diyanet has never competed with any religious organization in Turkey, it had to compete with other Turkish-Islamic associations in Germany (Altıkulaç 2011, 649–51).

Instead of serving the needs of the Turkish-Muslims in there, the union worked towards figuring out the reasons of rising of the other Turkish-Islamic associations. In that regard, the next president after Altıkulaç, Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu's remarks on his memoirs corrects the understanding towards other associations;

"Turks in Germany had to pray and take religious advices (nasihat) from those who had some religious knowledge. Over time, some factions emerged, and people began to cluster around them in order not to lose their identity in their foreign environment. This was a very natural and humanitarian behavior" (Yazıcıoğlu 2013, 226). Thus, Turkish-mosque associations paid a strong attention to the union with joining it.

> *"Representatives of Islamic extremism are benefiting from the right to form association in Germany and these associations are trying to convert the secular order in Turkey. These institutions, besides their own supporters, can also influence Turkish citizens who go to their mosques only to fulfill their religious duties. (...) The establishment of a central institution affiliated with Diyanet in recent years and the joining of nearly 300 mosques to this organization shows a positive development as a countermeasure." (Milliyet 29.01.1990, 13).*

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was made in the same hall. The police searched everywhere and said no bomb. No one was gone and the event continued from where it left off".

The board of supervisors in DİTİB was consisted of five religious officers appointed by Diyanet, which had a tutelary power on the charter of the union, to prevent a change in the charter (Altıkulaç 2011, 405-406). Moreover, DİTİB's ordinary members were the religious attaches and Diyanet's officers in Europe (Altıkulaç 2011, 407), therefore, whatever the degree of independence of DİTİB from Diyanet would occur, Diyanet has always controlled DİTİB. Therefore, DİTİB was not a democratic association and its internal democracy was a serious debate in those years. According to Yazıcıoğlu; *"the factions abroad were tougher and sharp due to the more favorable democratic environment there. Therefore, it was more difficult to serve. For this reason, meticulousness has always been shown in sending skilled and successful staffs."* (Yazıcıoğlu 2013, 227).

In that regard, similar to Altıkulaç's concerns over the politization of Diyanet in the 1970s, Yazıcıoğlu and Altıkulaç had the same concerns on DİTİB in Germany. According to Çakır's interview with a religious officer, Yusuf Kalkan, DİTİB was a state institution directly ordered from Turkey (Çakır 1998, 40). " *The number of citizens who love their homeland and nation, apply their customs and traditions, and who want to raise their children within this framework without being assimilated in practice and moral values are very fluffy there*" (Çakır 1998, 41). Thus, DİTİBs mosques became a place where the *'Turkishness'* taught to the Turks in the diaspora.

> *"Our national and religious feelings are interwoven, Diyanet seeks to consolidate and cultivate national and religious consciousness at the same time. Our task is not confined to religion only, but it also includes preservation of Turkish nationalism. The Turk in Germany needs to know the history of the War of Independence along with Islam" (Yavuz 2005, 70).*

In this context, according to Cafer Tayyar Sadıklar, the Minister of National Education and Youth, DİTİB's mosques were a part of the process of indoctrination. In his speech in the assembly minutes, there were 1 millions of Turkish children abroad in 1986, and Germany had 679 thousands of them, 391.415 of these children had a chance to go to school (TBMM

Tutanak Dergisi 18.12.1986, 657). The state agreed with the German authorities for their Turkish, Turkish Culture and culture of religion and knowledge of ethics lectures in schools. In his consideration, together with state's mosques, these children would be protected from other organizations, and taught the state Islam (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 18.12.1986, 658). This example reveals the state's determination to organize its diaspora.

Lastly, one interesting point is that, according to the Diyanet's external services report in 1991, Diyanet had a concern over Turkish-Muslims' marriage to foreigners (of course non-Muslims). These marriages worried Diyanet because of the issues of "*unlawful cohabitation*", "*parental rights of the child after divorces*" and "*religion of the child*" (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 23). Furthermore, Diyanet also realized the loneliness of Turkish (-Muslim) woman workers in Germany (Diyanet Gazetesi 01.1983, 13). Their possible marriages with a Christian German man were considered as "dangerous" and they were advised not to marry a non-Muslim man (Diyanet Gazetesi 01.1983, 13). "*In any case, it is a disappointment in the name of Turkishness and Islam to deprive a child who was born as an Islamic creation, from the Islamic Religion*" (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992, 23). Therefore, Diyanet paid great deal of attention to the education of Turkish children and their families, and the atmosphere of the 1980s made it easy for the administrators of Diyanet to convince the junta to access Germany with growing numbers of officers. Lastly, other Turkish-Islamic associations were considered as 'abusers' in their activities by Diyanet (Diyanet Gazetesi 04.1983, 11).

5.3.1 *Diyanet's transnational expansion to Turkish citizens in Western Europe*

The transnational expansion of Diyanet points out an expansion from the headquarter in Turkey, not from one European sub-branch to another one. The expansion to Europe occurred in the post-1980 atmosphere, in which the non-laic Turkish-Islamic associations were dominant not only in Germany, but also in the Europe where Turks live (Mumcu 12.03.1987,

6). Nevertheless, except for the Milli Görüş, all Turkish-Islamic associations were appealed to Turkish community.

In that regard, since Turkish-Islamic groups were overwhelmingly focusing on serving the Turkish-community in Europe, they were not active in the global Islamic movements as of the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, their transnational expansion was limited to Turkish society in Europe.

However, after the coup, the state began to involve in the religious affairs in the diaspora. The TDF (Turkish Diyanet Foundation) was established in purpose of accession to Europe, which Diyanet would not access as a state institution (Altıkulaç 2011, 387). The Belgium-TDF's proposal was planned in Altıkulaç's visit in 1980, in which the German TDF was also planned (Altıkulaç 2011, 391). Since the foundation in Germany and France had failed due to their laws, Altıkulaç's efforts had brought two different models in the diaspora, the DİTİB model, and the foundation model (Altıkulaç 2011, 401; Arkılıç 2015, 20). Today, as DİTİB-France has a better relationship with the French state, it serves with more religious officers (151 imams) in comparison to the Algerian religious officers in France (100 imams) (Arkilic 2015, 25). It is worth to remind that, there are more Algerian lives in France than Turks. However, DİTİB-France also shares the Turkish-Islamic public sphere with Milli Görüş and Süleymancılar in France, which located their headquarters in Cologne, Germany and spread across the places where Turks live. For instance, according to Milliyet's news in 1990, DİTİBs and Diyanet could not keep up with the demand of Turks for imams and the Milli Görüş was settling in mosques which DİTİB (France and Germany) did not go (Milliyet 29.01.1990, 13).

The TDF institutionalized in Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands in the period of Altıkulaç's presidency (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1992). The TDF has accessed most of Western European countries in cooperation with religious attachés of the state in these countries. Therefore, since the establishment of Diyanet-affiliated organizations were directed by the Turkish state, they present the "transnationalism

from above" which explains the role of the state in formation of a transnational organization.

§ 5.4 The Coup's Impact on the Process

In light of the debates over the religious transnationalism and the long-distance nationalism, the coup d'état of 1980 reveals as a milestone. Turkey is not the only country, which works in its diaspora to serve its citizens (Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2014, 55–56). However, Turkey is in a unique position in the case of organizing in its diaspora. This thesis claims that, DİTİB is a *sui-generis* example, which worked to serve the citizens, and to limit other associations' activities without complying the policies of the state. Therefore, DİTİB, which was the choice of the 1980 coup members, stands out as an ideological choice rather than a diaspora policy.

Diyanet and its imams in the transnational field rise as a state-oriented religious actors, which shows up the ideological transformations of the 1980s' Turkey in the diaspora (Gorzewski 2015, 110). In that regard, an article in a special issue for youth in Diyanet newspaper attracted my attention (Diyanet Gazetesi 05.1985, 16-17). In the article, the author Aktimuroğlu comments on Nutuk, Atatürk's speech at the second congress of CHP, by referring to Qur'an and Islamic values (Diyanet Gazetesi 05.1985, 16). Furthermore, in the same issue, Dr. Ayhan points out the importance of 'history' on national consciousness, and of course this 'national consciousness' does not refer to a nation that belonged to the Turkish nation, but refer to a nation with its Islamic roots (Diyanet Gazetesi 05.1985, 18-20). Lastly, Dr. Ayhan also paid a great attention to the importance of family for national consciousness, which also overlap with the republican understanding of religion as confining it into private sphere (Diyanet Gazetesi 05.1985, 19).

Beilschmidt explains Diyanet's expansion with the state's policy to keep the religion in the private sphere in the Turkish community abroad (Beilschmidt 2016, 239). Both Gorzewski and Beilschmidt reveal the rela-

tionship between the state and religion in Turkey, which tried to be implemented via DİTİB. In that regard, during opening speech of DİTİB, the Minister of State, Kazım Oksay's discourse would give an idea:

"Our other responsibility within these societies (Europe) is to represent our supreme religion and our nation, of which we are proud to be a member. (…) We especially ask you to strengthen your unity and not to allow the spreading of corruption and discords in order not to fall into the trap of external provocations." (Diyanet Gazetesi 05.1985, 55).

Therefore, in contrast to the other Turkish-Islamic associations, Diyanet's expansion under the military regime could be understood within the frame of "transnationalism from above" (Martiniello & Lafleur 2008, p. 652).

In this context, rather than a transnational religious association, DİTİB exhibits as a state institution to implement state's political choices and preferences in the diaspora. According to Piricky; "[*G]iven the scope of these symbolic meanings one could even speak about the export or incursions of Turkish Kemalist 'culture'. The export of laicism belongs to the transnational activities of Turkish authorities as much as delivery of imams for the places of worship in Germany.*" (Piricky 2007, 12).

The military intervention revealed its raison d'état that pays great importance to the transnational Turkish citizens. According to Bülend Ulusu's, the junta's Prime Minister, speech in the National Security Council after 15 days of the coup;

> *"It will be ensured that the Presidency of Religious Affairs and all religious officials are excluded from all kinds of political conflicts and influences. Every effort will be made to educate Atatürkist and intellectual religious officials. In-service training of religious officials will be accelerated. Turkish children abroad will be provided with national and religious education. The exploitation of beliefs and sectarian differences between our citizens at home and abroad will be prevented, and protective measures will be taken for our citizens' loyalty to their national ideal. (…) The protection*

of the principle of laicism will be taken to protect and any behavior contrary to that principle will never be allowed." (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi 27.09.1980, 91).

In contrast to the expected effects of the accession of the state to the diaspora, it made some side-effects. In the discourse of Cemalettin Kaplan, the military intervention was like litmus paper for the Islamic associations (Mumcu 1987, 4). According to Cemalettin Kaplan; "*(Kenan) Evren did a kindness (for Islamic associations in Germany). We (Islamic Associations) lived one-two years without political parties. Such a comfort is that, membership to the association (ICCB) was raising, because the community (Cemaat) worried from this partisanship.*" *(Mumcu 1987, 4).*

It is obvious that the coup d'état accelerated the process of the transnational expansion of Diyanet. In doing so, the military regime directed this expansion towards in the right-Kemalist way of instrumentalization of religious in the political sphere. As of the instrumentalization of Diyanet to control the religious public sphere by the state, DİTİB was organized to do the same, which functioned as "anti-reactionary" and "Atatürkist", and also reflects the ideological debates of the 1980s (Güllapoğlu 1991, 108).

The political impact of the coup is worth to analyze. According to Güllapoğlu, beyond daily religious services, Diyanet's imams were sent to Germany to join the "psychological battle" against other Islamic associations in Germany (Güllapoğlu 1991, 82). In that regard, the media was used to highlight the danger of "reactionary" discourse and the 'Presidency of Public Relations' was established to keep the process of the battle (Güllapoğlu 1991). Therefore, according to claims of Güllapoğlu, in the surveillance of the National Security Council's Presidency of Public Relations, the institutionalization of DİTİB took place in care of the Idealist-Islamic community in Germany (Güllapoğlu 1991, 107).

On the other hand, Diyanet was also a reliable source for the local mosque associations, which had a lack of imam in their mosques. Even though the imams of the mosques were appointed by a state institution, providing educated imams to local mosques is an example of the state-sponsored religious transnationalism. In this context, the response of

Turkish community to this policy can be seen in the statistics on the numbers of imam in the diaspora. While Diyanet had been serving its services abroad with 81 imams in 1981, at the end of the 1980s, it was serving with 600 personnel (Rubin and Çarkoğlu 2013, 66).

§ 5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the institutional history of Diyanet in Germany was written in detail. In doing so, firstly the Turkish-Islamic public sphere was examined to the broadest extent. In that regard, the Milli Görüş, the Süleymancı community, the MHP, the ICCB and Alevi associations were analyzed in a comparative perspective. Thus, before going into details of DİTİB, the atmosphere in Germany was figured out. In light of the memoirs of Tayyar Altıkulaç, the president of Diyanet at the end of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, as well as the parliamentary minutes, newspaper archives and the reports and publications of that period were unfolded to enlighten the historicity of Diyanet and DİTİB.

Thus, there was three different phenomena in the history of Diyanet in Germany. Firstly, between 1978 and 1982, Diyanet's limited capacity is revealed due to the lack of enough sources, political stability, and legal obstacles. Since the military intervention removed all the democratic processes and interest groups in the political scene, Diyanet joined the competition within the Turkish-Islamic public sphere in Germany via establishing an independent branch in Germany. Because of the lack of harmony between the ministry of foreign affairs and Diyanet, and the legal obstacles in Germany, Diyanet established a union, not a foundation within its institutional structure. Therefore, DİTİB was formed as an NGO (non-governmental organization) with independent participants from local Turkish people in Germany. Nevertheless, DİTİB can be considered as a GONGO (Government-organized non-governmental organization) rather than an NGO (non-governmental organization) because of its state-oriented nature. This leads DİTİB open to evaluation from both transnationalism from below and from above.

Besides, the institutionalization of Diyanet in Germany (and also in Western Europe) reveals the changing policies of Turkey and indirectly sets out the impact of the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey and the applications of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Therefore, due to the fact that DİTİB's developing within the conditions of Turkey and Germany with a multi-layered structure, it is normal to derive an integration or disintegration debates over DİTİB's policies. In linking with the rising other associations in the Turkish diaspora in Germany, Diyanet also accessed field with a euphoric action. As mentioned in this chapter, this action was directed by the junta in Turkey, and reflected the raison d'état of the state.

6

Conclusion

As the most influential Turkish-Islamic organization in Germany, DİTİB was established in 1985 with a magnificent opening ceremony in Cologne. Before its establishment, all Turkish-Islamic associations, except for the MHP (Frankfurt), were also established in the same city on the banks of the Rhine river. Except for the Nur community, I examined the Turkish-Islamic associations in Germany by considering their ties to Turkey, global Islam, and other communities in Germany.

In the second chapter, I examined the theoretical approaches and the transnational literature to understand how to evaluate the role of the Turkish state in their complex relations with the diaspora. The Turkish state had been unable to do anything in the religious public sphere from 1961 to the early 1970s in Germany. The Turkish Unions and mosque associations, which were born in response to the daily needs of Turkish Muslims, came to the forefront as a problem-solving tool for the Turks. In the 1970s, the Turkish communities began to organize within these Turkish Unions and mosque-associations. The first nation-wide association was the VIKZ established by the Turkish Süleymancı community. The transfer of Süleymancı Quranic courses to Diyanet after the 1971 Turkish military memorandum was directly related to this institutionalization process.

After this, the local mosque associations began to join the political and ideological polarization in Germany. In this atmosphere, Turkish religious groups rapidly organized through regional and local unions. This religious transnationalism took place without Diyanet, which held a monopoly on acting in the religious public sphere in Turkey, and other non-state religious actors gradually dominated in the Turkish-Islamic public sphere in Germany.

The peculiar characteristics of the 1970s prevented this process from developing under state control. As discussed in the third chapter, grievances among religious groups increased in this period, and each organization solidified their methodology while increasing their supporters. The Turkish political parties' position towards these religious groups became more apparent with alliances between religious groups. While the AP was in close contact with the Süleymancı community, Alparslan Türkeş and Necmettin Erbakan organized their influence through their own supporters. In these years, the social and economic consequences of the Arab-Israeli war were influential, worker immigration was replaced by family reunification, and it was understood by German authorities that Turks would no longer leave Germany. Thus, the diaspora become the center of conflicting relations between the Turks and the German society, as well as among the Turks. As both a state institution and a religious authority in Turkey, Diyanet felt the pressure of political impact of the rising of right-wing politics. During the National Front Governments, Diyanet was working on dealing with the political influence of the MSP on the religious officers of Diyanet, and it was in the failure to show any effect against religious organizations in Germany. Although Diyanet succeeded in sending the religious officers to Germany in a very limited way due to budgetary and institutional deficiencies, it could not show any presence among other organizations.

As mentioned in the fourth chapter, in the 1980s four main factors provided space and opportunity for Diyanet in the diaspora. First of all, with the 1980 coup, Diyanet became the ideological lifesaver of the junta. Religious education became an indispensable part of national indoctrination

within the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, and a specific Sunni version of Islam was reinterpreted as a vital component of "Turkishness" in the post-coup period. Secondly, global Islam was on the rise in the same period. Although there was not a radical Islamist organization in Turkey except for Hezbollah, the Milli Görüş became an active community in the religious public sphere, and the ICCB raised support dramatically with a more radical and fundamentalist method, called "*tebliğ*". Thirdly, Diyanet took some organizational initiatives in the 1970s to prevent increasing ideological division in the Turkish-Islamic public sphere in Germany and collaborated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Labor to send more religious officers. As associations institutionalized around the issues that they had in common and, mosques and mosque-associations in Germany had no chance to remain neutral or independent from hegemon ideologies within the field. Thus, Diyanet aimed to close the gap of approximately two decades on the religious affairs of Turkish-Muslims and to take control over the socialization of them within other Islamic groups. Finally, the German government promulgated the repatriation act, but it failed. Thus, the perception changed towards accepting that Turks would not leave Germany.

In the fifth chapter, I explained the organization process of Diyanet in Germany and its relationship in light of the coup d'état in Turkey. According to the memoirs of Tayyar Altıkulaç (1978-1986), former head of the Diyanet, he tried to send imams on his initiative until the coup but was partially successful. There was religious transnationalism of Turkish-Islam that took place in Germany, and Diyanet took the initiative to protect other Islamic groups' rising impact on the Turkish Muslims in there, despite it being a state institution.

However, after the coup, Diyanet was seen as an integral part of the state organization and became a powerful tool in the state's actions for controlling religion in the public sphere. At the same time, the military regime began to pursue a stronger path around Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the education and socialization of Turks abroad, whose situations were frequently discussed in the public during the 1980s. Following this process, DİTİB-Berlin and DİTİB-Germany were established in Germany,

DİTİB-France in France and Diyanet foundations were also organized in other European states. DİTİBs in Germany has been a very important topic of discussion due to the number of members and the large Turkish population in this state.

The 1980 military intervention is a turning point in the history of the republic in terms of the relationship between the state and religion. However, the junta of the intervention did not have pro-Ummah solidarity. Therefore, instead of contradicting the republican values, they had an agreement with the political Islam to utilize it conveniently to provide a basis for their policies. Forming a transnational Turkish-Islamic organization is the extension of this policy to Germany to take Turks abroad under control. The Islamic discourse seems to be a byproduct tool of the regime.

However, in contrast to the 1980s complex relations among Islam, Turkishness, globalization of Islamic movements, and the legitimization of the coup regime, the AKP era reveals a change in this policy in a radical way. In contrast to the 'religious-nationalism' of the 1980s' generals, the AKP's ideology deals with the 'national religion' by applying a wider political agenda towards the global Islamic community, which is the Ummah.

Furthermore, this radical turning from the Kemalist laicism to the religious-nationalism was not independent of the conjuncture of the 1980s. According to Parla, the junta's "reinventing the religion or the 'traditional' through bureaucratic-authoritarian ruling" reflects the third world's modernization with authoritarian regimes of the 1980s (Parla 2017, 245). Therefore, it was not just left to the Kemalist laicism, but kept up with the global developments of the 1980s. Similarly, the AKP's reaction to the Arab Spring reflects the same method as the junta used, but their motivations were different. In short, today's conflictual agenda exhibits some similarities between the 1980s and 2020s developments, but the most crucial difference is the position of the ruling elites of these years.

The union's main goal was to bring together as many mosques as possible under its umbrella. In that regard, for instance, a local mosque, which joined DİTİB's institutional structure, that opened in the first half

of the 1970s, could be served earlier for the Süleymancı and Milli Görüş associations. In other words, the local mosques that joined DİTİB reflect the success of the policy of Diyanet in Germany. Therefore, the union left the local mosque associations to make their own decisions. (Beilschmidt 2015, 235). In doing so, imams of these mosques were appointed by Diyanet and paid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and these imams were at the head of the administration of these local mosques. Moreover, these imams were a part of the coordination committee of their respective consulates in Germany. In other words, the state also had a decisive power on the local mosques. Nevertheless, the administration of the union had been a great issue for the Turkish state. Thus, these points reflect a form of "long-distance nationalism", in which the nation-state seeks a way to access its national domains abroad by developing several policies towards them (Vertovec 2004, 89).

The strongest point of the Turkish state here was that Turkish Muslims were remained outside of the rise of global Islamist movements. I can explain this fact with one of the concepts of Steven Vertovec's classification of Muslim diasporas (Vertovec 2009). According to his work, Turkish Muslims of Germany can be considered as 'ethnic-religious' communities, which include a specific interpretation of a national form of Islam (Vertovec 2009, 154). As Diyanet is the only legal actor in the field of Turkish interpretation of Islam, it served as a constitutive actor at least in the background of Turkish immigrants in Germany. I examined the impact of this historical background on the rising support for DİTİB in the first years.

After Diyanet's accession to the diaspora, its education and culture policies, which are the reflection of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the transformation of the 1980s into the diaspora, caused the loss of reputation of the Milli Görüş and Süleymancı mosques in these fields. DİTİB was not founded as a Turkish Diyanet Foundation but founded as an initiative of Turks in Germany, with the support of religious attaché from Turkey. I can explain the German state's objection to the establishment of the foundation and its minimum tolerance to the establishment of the association with its inactive position towards Turkish-Islamic organizations.

This thesis research reveals two results: First, DİTİB cannot be considered as a simple long-distance nationalism tool. As DİTİB is an institution originating in Germany and serving with religious officers of Diyanet, the sole actor in the religious public sphere in Turkey and a state institution controlling the Turkish-Islam. For this reason, it was institutionalized only after the coup that made away off the complex relations of the 1970s. Secondly, the 1980 coup had a serious institutional and structural impact on DİTİB, which was a role model for the external services of Diyanet. Developing around the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, DİTİB became a prominent institution with mosque associations where religious education and national education were brought together and received great support within the diaspora.

This study can give the inspiration to examine the role and position of the Diyanet in Germany during the AKP era. Finally, DİTİB is in the spotlight whenever Turkish-German relations deteriorated. Especially in the recent period, it is considered as an extension of President Erdoğan's power and often criticized accordingly. Thus, both sides are still undecided about the place of DİTİB and this indecision is due to continue for the foreseeable future.

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