THE RECONSTRUCTION OF "HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY:" AN ANALYSIS THROUGH *ERKEKÇE*, 1981-1990

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF "HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY:" AN ANALYSIS THROUGH *ERKEKÇE*, 1981-1990

by

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"The Reconstruction of 'Hegemonic Masculinity:'
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This thesis strives to delineate how "hegemonic masculinity" was *reconstructed* in the 1980s, especially through focusing on the economic and cultural atmosphere of the decade. The indispensable motive in designating the 1980s as a proper ground for this thesis lies precisely behind the notion of "social alteration" on account that its impacts on the *social codes* (morality, culture, and organizations) and on *social figures* (the image of woman and man, the perception of masculinity and femininity, and for sure, ideals concerning these images and perceptions) are precious sources in terms of putting forth a masculinity study for consideration. In brief, the "socio-economic structure" of the 1980s- maybe it does not give the appearance of an indisputable rupture in comparison with the previous years in which a liberal economic leap was materialized in Turkey, when it is considered together with the "*global* triumph of capitalism," had a conspicuous influence on the social configuration, in this connection, on the issues of "gender," "identity," and "lifestyle." Here it is why the 1980s were preferred as a case for this masculinity study; however, my main purpose is not to claim that the *neo-liberal discourse* spreading throughout the world contributed to a dramatic transformation in gender relations, but rather to insist that gender relations or "sexual politics," which have persisted in a certain way (homophobia and subordination of woman) for a long time, were reproduced in a different state within the discourse of *neo-liberalism*. At this point, to support my argument, throughout the thesis, the press will be regarded as an important mechanism of establishing hegemony to which is applied in the process of "persuasion." However, apart from the mechanism of establishing hegemony, one more definition of the press, especially of *Erkekçe* will be employed in the thesis; it is the network of "popular culture." In this manner, *Erkekçe*, as an important part of popular culture in the 1980s or as an important "persuasion" mechanism in creating the "consent," will have the privileged position throughout this thesis, especially while elaborating on how hegemonic masculinity was reconstructed in the 1980s within the *neo-liberal discourse*.

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Başlık: "Hegemonik Erkekliğin Yeniden İnşası:" *Erkekçe* Üzerinden bir Analiz, 1981-1990

Bu tez, "hegemonik erkekliğin"1980ler'de nasıl *yeniden inşa edildiğini* özellikle on yılın ekonomik ve kültürel atmosferine odaklanarak betimlemeye çalışmaktadır. 1980ler'i bu tez için uygun bir zemin olarak belirlemedeki vazgeçilmez neden kesinlikle "sosyal değişim" nosyonunun ardında yatar ki bu nosyonun *sosyal kodlar* (ahlak, kültür ve organizasyonlar) ve *sosyal figürler* (kadın ve erkek imgesi, kadınlık ve erkeklik imgesi ve elbette bu imge ve algılara ilişkin idealler) üzerindeki etkisi bir erkeklik çalışması ortaya koymak açısından kıymetli bir kaynaktır. Kısacası 1980ler'in sosyo-ekonomik yapısının- belki Türkiye'de liberal ekonomik atılımların gerçekleştirildiği önceki yıllara kıyasla kesin bir kopuş izlenimi vermez, "kapitalizmin global zaferi" ile birlikte düşünüldüğünde, sosyal düzen ve dolayısıyla "toplumsal cinsiyet," "kimlik" ve "yaşam biçimi" meseleleri üzerine çarpıcı bir etkisi olmuştur. Tam da bu nokta 1980ler'in bu erkeklik çalışması için neden temel bir çerçeve olarak tercih edildiğini vurgular, bununla beraber benim başlıca amacım dünyayı çepeçevre saran neo-liberal söylemin toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkilerinde dramatik bir dönüşüme yol açtığını iddia etmek değil aksine toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkilerinin veya çok zamandır belirgin bir doğrultuda (homofobi ve kadının ikincilliği) sürüp giden "cinsel politikaların" *neo-liberal söylem* içinde bir başka kertede yeniden üretildiği hususunda ısrarcı olmaktır. Bu noktada, tez boyuca savımı desteklemek için basın, "ikna" sürecinde başvurulan önemli bir hegemonya oluşturma mekanizması olarak ele alınacaktır. Bununla beraber, hegemonya oluşturma mekanizması dışında basının özellikle *Erkekçe*'nin bir betimlemesi daha yani "populer kültür" ağı şeklindeki tanımı sıkça kullanılacaktır. Buna ilaveten *Erkekçe*, 1980ler'de popüler kültürün önemli bir parçası olarak ya da "rıza" yaratmada önemli bir "ikna" mekanizması olarak tez boyunca öncelikli bir pozisyona sahip olacaktır bilhassa hegemonik erkekliğin 19080ler'de *neo-liberal söylem* içinde nasıl yeniden inşa edildiğini detaylarıyla incelerken.

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To My Mother
Nihan Farımaz

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

The aim of this thesis is to scrutinize how "hegemonic masculinity" was *reconstructed* in the 1980s, especially through focusing on the economic and cultural atmosphere of the decade. The emphasis on the term *reconstruction* here does not consist of such an unintentional endeavor, but rather it includes very significant clues concerning the 1980s. In this manner, the 1980s, not as a total differentiation but as a "new break"[1] in continuity,[2] was the setting for a rapid "transformation" related not only to the liberal economic policies which were declared on 24 January but also to a rooted social alteration. The essential reason in designating the 1980s as a proper ground for this thesis lies precisely behind the notion of this social alteration on account that its impacts on the *social codes* (morality, culture, and organizations) and on *social figures* (the image of woman and man, the perception of masculinity and femininity, and for sure, ideals concerning these images and perceptions) are precious sources in terms of putting forth a masculinity study for consideration. In brief, the "socio-economic structure" of the 1980s- maybe it does not give the appearance of an indisputable rupture in comparison with the previous years in which a liberal economic leap was materialized

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[1] Tanıl Bora, "Son Yirmi Yılı Ayrıştırmak İçin Notlar," *Birikim* 152-153 (December 2001- January 2002), p. 56.

[2] The definition of the 1980s as a "new break" in *continuity* stems from my intention in regarding the "model" of the 24th January not as an *original* economic model in point neither of the world nor of Turkey. It rather includes all known elements of "standard stability policy" imposed by the IMF on developing countries in the *1970s* and of "typical structural concordance plan" developed by the World Bank within the same decade. Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985* (Istanbul: Gerçek Press, 1990), p. 122.

in Turkey,[3] when it is considered together with the "*global* triumph of capitalism,"[4] had a conspicuous influence on the social configuration, in this connection, on the issues of "gender," "identity," and "lifestyle."[5] Here it is why the 1980s were preferred as a case for this masculinity study; however, my main purpose is not to claim that the *neo-liberal discourse* spreading throughout the world contributed to a dramatic transformation in gender relations, but rather to insist that gender relations or "sexual politics," which have persisted in a certain way (homophobia and subordination of woman) for a long time, were reproduced in a different state within the discourse of *neo-liberalism*, particularly in the case of Turkey. The importance of the 1980s in revealing the *sustained* "sexual politics" will appear especially while studying how "hegemonic masculinity" was reproduced on an institutional basis through disclosing the exclusion of different sexual identities (homosexuals, transvestites, and transsexuals) from social institutions because I will focus exceedingly both on how they were disclosed and instigated as one each "identity" by the civil power and on how they were rendered the "other" at the same time. At this point, my main argument will be that there was no difference between the civil power *promising* freedoms to them through the "identity politics" and the emphasis on "individualism" and the military power *prohibiting* their public appearance. While they seemed to be contrary to each other in terms of their approaches to different sexualities, they were in harmony with each other. Through the same motivation, it

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[3] The emphasized point here is that "there is an obvious parallelism between the [economic] model of the 1980s and liberal orientations experienced in the periods 1923-1929 and 1946-1953 (Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan).Ibid. In this manner, especially the congress of the RRP gathered in the 1947 constituted a turning point for Turkey in terms of its adaptation to liberal economy policies. Subsequently, the period of the DP was an absolute symbol of the transition to international market from national economy. See Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *Yirminci Yüzyılda Ortadoğu Ekonomileri Tarihi* (Istanbul: Sabancı University, 2002), pp. 143- 149.

[4] Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming," *Public Culture* 12, no 2, pp. 291.

[5] Ibid., pp. 293-294.

might be claimed that the process of absorbing the *post-modern cultural atmosphere* can not be regarded as separate from these two discourses; that is, as separate from the "prohibitive" discourse and "surrounding" *libertarian* discourse in the case of Turkey. In this way, the sense of *insecurity* implanted by the former and the emphasis on *individualism* pumped by the letter constructed the gate of post-modernism in Turkey;[6] accordingly, such cooperation had a great impact on the hegemonic masculine figures of the 1980s.

For sure, the field of gender or, in the case of this study, the field of masculinity, has such a broad field of literature that to take refuge under an absolute wing of masculinity literature is inevitable. Through this motivation, so as to examine masculinity perception in the 1980s, in the light of *neo-liberal discourse*, the concept of "hegemonic masculinity" in the words of Connell will be a great and precise guide throughout the thesis. However, to go into the concept of "hegemonic masculinity" deeply, without a doubt, touching on the masculinity as "a socially constructed" issue and elaborating on Gramsci's *hegemony* concept are incontestable necessities. In this manner, in the second chapter, especially in the first part (Theoretical Framework: Masculinity as a Socially Constructed Issue), by benefiting from Bourdieu's "habitus" formulation claiming that "masculinity functions as the 'habitus'" will shed light on my argument in the matter of how masculinity is a "socially constructed issue." At this point, from Bourdieu's point of view, the concept of "objective structure" defining the *social conditions* of the production of the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is operating, that is, to the *conjuncture*, as a second

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[6] Ahmet İnsel, "Türkiye: Kaybolan Güven Duygusu," *Birikim* 152-153 (December 2001- January 2002), pp. 20-28.

concept, will constitute the main framework of this thesis. Consequently, while Bourdieu's concept of "objective structure," which is a definite *social condition* of the production of masculinity practices, will be regarded as equal to the *neo-liberal discourse*; accordingly, his second concept "conjucture" in which "the habitus of masculinity" operates will point out the institutions such as *marriage*, relatively *family*, and, for sure, the *army*.

In this manner, the first chapter of the thesis is allocated to examining the *neo-liberal discourse* and *post-modern cultural atmosphere* as an "objective structure," which lead to the reproduction of "hegemonic masculinity." Nevertheless, the answer to the question like how the *neo-liberal discourse* is able to reproduce "hegemonic masculinity" on the institutional base (marriage, family, and army), that is, on the basis of "conjucture" will be handled in the second chapter, especially while elucidating the reproduction of "hegemonic masculinity" by relating it to the *subordination of woman* and to different sexual identities such as *homosexuals* and *transsexuals*, *transvestites*, and *androgynous*. In addition, in the second chapter through treating with great respect to Gramsci's "hegemony" concept, admired masculine figures- which is the basic trivet in establishing a hegemonic masculinity over men,[7] that is, the mechanism of forming *ideals*- of the 1980s will be discussed, which was related to the contemporary hegemonic ideology (*neo-liberalism*) of the 1980s.

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[7] "Hegemonic masculinity" is reconstructed in relation to the subordination of woman and to other masculinities such as homosexuality, transvestities and so on. It also is established through presenting the admired figures, ideals and hereos designated by the hegemonic ideology. Because of this, to focus on admired masculine figures, carries a great importance in illuminating the concept of hegemonic masculinity. The approach of Connell and Gramsci to these issues will be examined in detail at the begining of the second chapter (Theoretical Framework: Masculinity as a Socially Constructed Issue), so I will be satisfied with giving some clues as to "hegemonic masculinity" in introduction.

Last but not least, the reflection of the model of "New Woman" ("audacious," "working" and "self-confident" woman, especially in sexual meaning) coming on the scene with the discourse of *sexual freedom* (bursting on the scene in the 1980s) in Turkey, in this connection, the model of "New Man" (responsible man), which might be included in the "pro-feminist men's response" to *liberal feminism*, will be discussed in the second chapter. In this way, the point in question in this part will be whether or not the model of "New Woman" and "New Man" was able to wear out the "hegemonic masculinity" based on the subordination of woman or whether or not it was the reproduction of "hegemonic masculinity" at a different state and was the repetition of traditional masculinity and femininity perceptions (the discrimination between the *lover* image and image of *wife*). If that is the case, the last part of the second chapter, apart from the analysis of the image of "New Woman" and "New Man", also will constitute a significant case so as to criticize *liberal feminism*, especially by focusing on the issues of *abortion* and *sexual freedom* and to bring the light the *deception* of the image of "New Man" and "New Woman," from the radical feminist's points of view such as Millet, Firestone and Mackinnon, who was a supporter of the "New Feminist Morality."

In the third chapter, with the justification that the emergence of the *consumption society*, especially after the mid-1980s with the influence of "global" *neo-liberal ideology* on Turkey, led to the transformation of "leisure time," the concept of lifestyle concerning *how* the leisure time, which was regarded as an "economic value," was *consumed* will be taken under examination. However, the important point in the case of this study is not to list the patterns of leisure time and models of lifestyle in order, but to illuminate, in relation to the acceleration in the pace of the consumption and the diversification in them (Harvey), how "hegemonic masculinity" was reconstructed over

men by relating it to a definite lifestyle (yuppified) (Keyder) identified with the notion of "returning to house" (Sarıoğlu). In this connection, together with the profile of successful businessman (the admired figure of the 1980s), which will be examined in the second chapter, the "yuppie" will be described in the third chapter as another admired figure in relation to the *modern* leisure time activities and the preferred model of lifestyle. At this point, the aforesaid acceleration in the pace of consumption and the diversification in them will be regarded as a "new routine of exclusion" (Comaroff) contributing to the "social fragmentation," from Bourdieu's point of view. By relying on such a regard, the metropolis of the 1980s (Istanbul) will be considered as a base in order to depict this "social fragmentation." The basic question of this chapter, in the event that the yuppies were presented as admired figures, especially belonging to the 1980s and to the following years, will be molded around who was the "othered" masculine figure, which was put contrary to the "hegemonic masculinity" based on the *consumption patterns*? As an answer of this question, in response to the yuppified hegemonic culture, the arabesque culture and its absolute masculine figure, the *maganda* (yob) will be taken into consideration.

Why *Erkekçe*?

The thesis, especially in the second and relatively in the third chapters, the specialized[8] magazine *Erkekçe* published between the years 1981 and 1990[9] will

[8] The term "specialized" was used in order to imply a significant diversification in quantities and in target masses of magazines. In this manner, the 1980s was such a period that various magazines came on the scene addressing one by one to men, women, and children, moreover, to diverse occupational fields.
[9] Interview, Hıncal Uluç (April 206) (Executive Editor of *Erkekçe*).

constitute the primary source of this thesis arguing that hegemonic masculinity was reconstructed in the 1980s. However, before clarifying the reason in giving precedence to *Erkekçe* over other magazines, I first want to discuss the issue of the "popular culture" and its interaction with the concepts of "culture" and "hegemony." My intention inclined towards examining these issues and their mutual relations with each others springs from Gramsci's approach to the journalists, which regards them as one of "organizing intellectuals" or of "weavers of the fabric of hegemony." In this manner, the press, throughout the thesis, will be handled as the most prominent agent in establishing and sustaining the "hegemonic masculinity" in relation to the *neo-liberal ideology*. That is to say, this study does not regard the press as an autonomous unit that functions as separate from the hegemonic ideology, but rather it regards the press as one of "organizing intellectual [unit]," which plays a great role in designating ideals, in embedding the perceptions pertaining to the social figures, and as the last in constructing the "hegemonic masculinity." In this manner, *hegemony*, which was developed by Gramsci to explain "how sovereignty is maintained in the capitalist societies,"[10] is sustained through materializing it not only in the fields of *production* and *economy*, but also in the family and educational system, religious institutions and in *means of mass communication*; accordingly, these fields are the essential ones in which hegemony is completely accomplished through ideology. There is more to come: the "definitions of reality" (culture) preferred by the dominant classes and institutionalized in the fields of

[10] Meral Özbek, *Populer Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski* (Istanbul: Iletişim, 1991), p. 81

mass communication, through ideological discourse, constitute the "facts of experience" for the depended classes.[11]

Through moving from Stuart Hall's contextualization, which suggested a triangle in which the notions of hegemony, ideology, and culture (definitions of reality from commonsense to institutions) intersect with each other, it is possible to claim that the culture regarded as a "system of ideas, values, and meanings" completely belongs to the field of *ideology*.[12] In this manner, "hegemonic culture" which will be referred to occasionally in the third chapter, comprises the "emphasized" or "privileged" meanings and values, which is "remolded," "reevaluated," and "imposed" by changing ideological discourse because hegemonic culture, in words of Williams "dominant culture," in relation to the ideological discourse, is obliged to "reproduce" itself so as to "incorporate" the *oppose* values and meanings.[13]

At this point, in this thesis, the press will be regarded as an important mechanism of establishing hegemony to which is applied in the process of "incorporation." However, apart from "organizing intellectual [unit] and the mechanism of establishing hegemony, one more definition of the press, especially of *Erkekçe* will be employed throughout the thesis; it is the network of "popular culture." Accordingly, to not to give rise any misapprehension, it is imperative to state that the "popular culture" is not such a concept independent from the hegemonic culture or ideological discourse; on the contrary, "[it] is the area in which hegemony is hardened and protected,"[14] from Hall's

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[11] See for detailed arguments Stuart Hall, "The Rediscovery of Ideology: Return of the Repressed in Media Studies" in *Culture, Society, and the Media*, ed. M. Gurevitch (London: Routlage, 1982)
[12] Hall, "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms" in *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, ed. Geoff Eley, Nicholas B. Dirks, and Sherry B. Ortner (Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University, 1994), pp. 255-256
[13] Özbek, *Populer Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski*, p. 80.
[14] Cited in ibid., p. 90.

point of view. Moreover, the term *popular*, with its "commercial"[15] definition, amounts to one "prevalently consumed and preferred,"[16] and any *material* (*Erkekçe*) of popular culture are never anything other than the symbol of "consent" displayed in response to the hegemonic culture or other than the *myth*[17] (public acceptance/halk bunu istiyor) uttering this "consent;"[18] therefore, the relation between the popular culture and hegemony lies behind the notion of "consent" and such a relationship between them is in harmony with Gramsci's view concerning that hegemony is constructed through the "consent" instead of the "coercion."[19]

Taking these views into consideration, *Erkekçe*, as an important part of popular culture in the 1980s or as an important "persuasion" mechanism in creating the aforementioned "consent," will have the privileged position throughout this thesis, especially while elaborating on how hegemonic masculinity was reconstructed in the 1980s within the *neo-liberal discourse*. In this way, the reason of why *Erkekçe* will be used as a primary source in this thesis is that it first might be regarded as one of "organizing intellectuals" in imposing any ideal masculine figure, and it is the material of popular culture through which I can follow a trail of hegemonic discourse pertaining to the 1980s.

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[15] This term is used by Stuart Hall related to the definition of the "popular" regarding it as "one prevalently consumed and preferred." Ibid., p. 83. At this point, Gangs argues that popular culture reflects the taste of a great many of people; in this way, it is not a "commercial evil," but is a *culture*. See Herbert J. Gangs, *Popüler Kültür ve Yüksek Kültür* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2005).

[16] Siegelaub Seth, "Working Notes on Social Relations in Communication and Culture," in *Communication and Class Struggle: Capitalism, Imperialism*, ed. Seth Siegelaub and Armand Mattelart (New York: International General, 1983), pp. 11.

[17] Here the recent definition of popular and popular culture was used; however, it is possible to define it as "base" or "low" culture (Williams) for the case of sixteenth century, for example. However, with the appearance of the mass society, the concept of popular culture began to be used with that definition written above. Özbek, *Populer Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski*, p. 84.

[18] Siegelaub, "Working Notes on Social Relations in Communication and Culture," in *Communication and Class Struggle: Capitalism, Imperialism*, pp. 11-17.

[19] Özbek, *Populer Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski*, p. 81.

If that is so, then why *Erkekçe*[20] chosen among so many materials of the popular culture? Before all else, its circulation falls in line with the recent definition of "popular" in a way that it (popular) is "one prevalently consumed and preferred." If that is the case, *Erkekçe* was the "most popular" magazine of the 1980s because it was claimed that the circulation of this magazine was 151,000 and 65,000 of such a high circulation consisted of woman consumers.[21] Such a high circulation in comparison to the other magazines addressing men, such as *Playboy* and *Playman*,[22] brings the question to minds: what was the underlying reason for such a high circulation or what made it the most popular magazine "prevalently consumed and preferred?" In opposition to the widespread idea assuming that its high circulation stemmed from the photographs of naked women, which occupied its almost twenty pages, the Executive Editor of *Erkekçe* Hıncal Uluç claims that it was resolutely the outcome of *interviews*[23] made by Ahmet Kahraman.[24] In

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[20] Brief Curriculum Vitae of Erkekçe:
"The President of Board: Ercan Arıklı (who is the owner of Gelişim Publishing).
Executive Editor: Hıncal Uluç
Assistant Editor: Mehmet Y. Yılmaz
The Manager in Charge: Ali E. Kocatepe
Vice President: Deniz İnsel (administration and advertisement)
Sales Manager: Yıldırım Ünverdi
PR Manager: İnci Kurmuş
Technical Manager: Güman Birincioğlu
Technical Secretary: Aziz Yavuzdoğan
The Charge in Fitter: Fazıl Mecit
The Charge in Typesetting: Cihat Söylemez
The Charge in Correction: Necati Güngör
The Charge in Photograph: Nermi Erdur
Interviewer: Ahmet Kahraman." Available in any of *Erkekçe*, especially in the last page of it, also available at http://arsiv.sabah. com. tr/2002/02/14/y11.html

[21] Interview, Hıncal Uluç, Ibid.

[22] Playboy began to be published in 1986 and the letter in 1988. "Although they wanted to imitate the high circulation of *Erkekçe*, they have never got held of its circulation." Ibid.

[23] List of interview subjects: Turgut Özal (three times), Banker Kastelli, Adnan Kahveci, Sakıp Sabancı, Nejat Eczacıbaşı, Erdal İnönü, Özer Çiller, Cem Boyner, Çetin Altan, Orhan Pamuk, Murathan Mungan, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Atilla İlhan, Yaşar Kemal, Bülent Ersoy (her first photograph after she had unergone a transsexual operation) , Zeki Müren, İbrahim Tatlıses, Ahmet Özhan, and landlords of the home in Which Humeyni stayed for a while in Bursa in the 1980.

this way, "people already bought Erkekçe due to photographs of naked women; however, the most important point concerning this high circulation was that it was an *intellectual* magazine."[25] In a better expression, "an intellectual identity was dressed in it; the mass target was 'everybody' and 'everybody' was reached through the intellectual and erotic mixture of *Erkekçe*."[26] The secret of this high circulation lay behind such a "mixture" like *Playboy* published in America. Consequently, I believe that *Erkekçe* will foster my arguments throughout the thesis because I also believe that this magazine, which had a great "popularity" or "high circulation," had a great role in presenting admired masculine figures[27] and the perception of "emphasized femininity," (Connell) in relation to the hegemonic discourse of the 1980s.

Why the 1980s?

To depict the 1980s in Turkey, the concepts of the "end of words" and the "explosion of words"[28] constitute the most proper ground in putting forward an idea on how the decade was for Turkey, especially in terms of its socio-cultural structure. In this manner, it is possible to present such a description concerning the era: On the one hand, the living spaces, which was "suppressed," "prohibited," and "silenced" by the military coup, and on the other hand, the "explosion of words," "image," and of "display," which

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[24] "It took for days to make and complete these interviews. I owe a great deal to Ahmet Kahraman, especially for the interview related to Humeyni." Interview, Hıncal Uluç, Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Interview, Fatih Uğurlu (An editor who worked at in Gelişim Publishing in the 1980s) (May 2006).
[27] "It is the Magazine of Modern Man," "He, Who Lives in A *Manly* Way, Reads *Erkekçe*." These slogans appeared on all cover pages of *Erkekçe*.
[28] Nurdan Gürbilek, *Vitrinde yaşamak* (Istanbul: Metis, 2001), p.21.

developed in a state of disarray, moreover, which diffused into the each everyday experiences with a great appetite.[29]

There is the catch! It is required to state that my intention in touching on these concepts is not to reveal them as two different poles, which function as separate from each other, but rather it is to reevaluate them within the close context in which the former triggered the letter. Accordingly, here my essential intention again is not to depict the 1980s with a clear contrast; on the contrary, it is to handle this decade as a whole process because of the fact that the phenomenon of the "explosion of words" came on the scene within the market conditions which were completely rescued from the government intervention.[30] In this manner, by relying on the straightforward expression of Fredric Jameson "culture and economic is not a one way street, but a continuous reciprocal interaction feedback loop,"[31] it is possible to claim that the neo-liberal policies[32] which were absorbed during the period of military power and which came into power after the military coup in 1980 and were continued without a delay by the new-right experience (Özal cabinet), between 1983 and 1989, had a significant impact on the socio-cultural climate of Turkey.[33] In this way, the aforementioned concept, that is, the concept of "explosion of words" can not be considered without taking the cooperation of these two powers into consideration. In brief, the "explosion of words" was an inevitable

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[29] Ibid.

[30] That is to say, market conditions in which the "explosion of words" came into being, in the case of the 1980s, through the actors of each two discourses.

[31] Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University, 1991), p. 15.

[32] "New economic policies, which were put into practice, had three basic purposes: to regulate the balance of payments, to reduce the inflation rate in the short run, and to shape a new economic order directed towards the *export* and based on *market economy* in the short run." Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *Yirminci Yüzyılda Ortadoğu Ekonomileri Tarihi*, pp. 159-160

[33] Ibid., p. 159.

outcome of the submission to the market economy, which comprised the years of the 1980s.

In this manner, the main framework of this thesis the "reconstruction of hegemonic masculinity," in relation to the issue of the "explosion of words," will be handled within the concept of "incitement to disclose" in words of Foucault,[34] especially while focusing on the subordination of woman and the exclusion of different identities (homosexuals, transsexuals, and transvestites) in the second chapter. That is to say, some discourses such as "individualism," "sexual freedom," and the "identity politics" will be reevaluated in the perspective of *neo-liberal ideology* and, in this way, in which direction all these discourses had an impact on the "reconstruction of hegemonic masculinity" will be discussed. There is the catch again! As mentioned before, the integration with the market economy was not the novel issue for Turkey; however, there is a widespread view in a way that the discourses of "sexual freedom," "individualism," and the "identity politics," with the effect of global flow, led to a significant transformation (!) in gender issues, especially in terms of their reflections on the material of popular culture. Before passing to elaborate on these issues, I first want to mention general climate of the 1980s in Turkey in short.

"There is a general acceptance concerning that the world was passing through the postmodern era, while Turkey welcomed the 1980s."[35] Although this determination is valid for "developed" countries, some "peripheral" countries such as Turkey, which have been vulnerable to the *interference*, *influence*, and *orientation* of these "developed"

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[34] See for detailed information as to the concept of "incitement to disclose" Michel Foucault , *The History of Sexuality* (London; Penguin Boks, 1979), pp. 17-36.

[35] Ömer Laçiner, "Kapan(may)an Bir Parantez mi?" *Birikim* 152-153 (December 2001- January 2002), p. 10.

countries during their modernization process, this time, were subjected to the global "flow of postmodern elements."[36] For this reason, while studying the 1980s in Turkey, these postmodern elements should be taken into consideration because in the 1980s- as the "flow of history gained speed[37]"- the difference of "phase" between metropolises and peripheries of the world economy was nearly initialized. Accordingly, the scientific-technologic developments (products) and some forms related to the *popular culture* and *lifestyle* began to be included in everyday experiences of Turkey at the same time.

Meanwhile, apart from the neo-liberal economic policies first declared in 1980, Turkey experienced the military coup in the morning of 12 September.[38] Despite the fact that the civil power (ANAP) came to power through the elections in 1983, the political and legal regime established in accordance with the constitution prepared in 1982 has exercised its influence up to today.[39] The basic provision of such a political regime was to make the society be depoliticized. In this way, the most prevalent political movement[40] of Turkey, which embodied itself in the 1970s, was silenced, plugged, and wilted through the military coup.[41] Accordingly, the restoration of 12 September, which led to decline in "political sensitivity" of the society, brought up a social structure in which "will of the people" was extremely restricted, excluded completely from the political issues, and reduced solely to "economic matters." Following this, social units or individuals, with the effect of the vertiginous promises thrown into the air by the new-

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[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2000), p. 405.
[39] Ibid., p. 410.
[40] Here the "left facton" is especially emphasized, as for the right faction, it is ragarded as a reaction in response to this.
[41] Ahmet Çiğdem, "Yirmi Yılın Hikayesi: Devlet Kapitalizmi ile Türk Usülü Faşizm," *Birikim* 152-153 (December 2001- January 2002), p. 43.

right government, lost their belief concerning the "injustice of the opposite side"[42] (military power); therefore, if a "lack of belief" is discussed, it is inevitable to claim that the regime of 12 September fulfilled its main duty; that is, it completed its main mission in putting the process of depoliticization into practice. From a different point of view, apart from the "lack of belief," there is one more issue that triggered the process of depoliticization; it, however, was to regard the "economic development" only as "individual acquisition" rather than to consider it as a "dynamics of human, social, and ultimately political development." Precisely here, the issue of depoliticization replies to such a "shrinking" in meaning attributed to the economic development.[43]

In this manner, "neo-liberalism is also the name of this shrinking" because it favored each kind of "individual initiative" at the expense of human-social development. In the previous years (before the 1980s), while economic matters were handled in the perspective of different modernization, industrialization, and the improvement models; moreover, while it was evaluated in the axis of "production-based" understanding, the "export economy" gained a great dominance over other economic models.[44] Accordingly, with the declaration of 24 January economic policies, Turkey adopted the export economy model;[45] this transition meant nothing other than abandoning the "national economy" model or the transition to the "global economy."[46] At this point, as for the second significant transformation coming on the scene through this transition was that the wave neo-liberalism and the "export model" reduced the burden of wage to

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[42] Laçiner, Ömer, "Kapan(may)an Bir Parantez mi?" p. 14.
[43] Ibid., p. 15.
[44] See Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985.*
[45] Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *Yirminci Yüzyılda Ortadoğu Ekonomileri Tarihi*, p. 159
[46] Çağlar Keyder, *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası* (Istanbul: Metis, 1996), pp. 25.

"minimum"[47] and this kind of reduction was legitimized by relating it to the principle of "competition," whereas each kind of profit accounts had depended on the principle of the "fair distribution" in national economies.[48] In this manner, the principle of "competition," when the threat of exclusion and unemployment is taken into consideration, which was rendered possible through technological innovations, also weakened the organizations of solidarity between laborers; there is more to come, because the laws prepared by the regime of 12 September hindered "union rights," the outcome of such a socio-economic structure was obvious for Turkey: "individualism." Here the "corporation" between the civil power and military power mentioned before comes together again in that both were the most effective agents in imposing this neo-liberal economic policies on society; however, the military was also the significant bearer in spreading the "post-modern cultural" notions through creating an atmosphere in which the "loss of confidence" and the concept of "insecurity"[49] had a commanding influence over society. Consequently, I want to state that to relate the concepts of "individualism" and "insecurity" solely to the "loss of confidence" in political institutions is an incomplete definition of postmodernism. In this way, a vertiginous economic activity, the impact of scientific-technological developments on each kind of work, labor, and on economic activity, and the rapid rhythm of the markets leaving an impression of "instability" on someone are the basic factors which instilled a sense of "insecurity."[50] If that was so, in which way did all these concepts "individualism," "insecurity," and the "lack of confidence" have an influence on the reconstruction of

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[47] Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yentürk, *Türkiye Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: Remzi, 2001), p. 514.
[48] Laçiner, Ömer, "Kapan(may)an Bir Parantez mi?" p. 16.
[49] İnsel, Ahmet İnsel, "Türkiye: Kaybolan Güven Duygusu," p. 21.
[50] Laçiner, Ömer, "Kapan(may)an Bir Parantez mi?" p. 16.

hegemonic masculinity? The answer of this question will be given, especially in the second and the third chapters of this thesis in detail through analyzing *Erkekçe*.

However, apart from the notion of "individualism" and the "sense of insecurity," which had a great impact on masculine figures of the 1980s, the diminishing of the sharp demarcation between the public sphere and the private life too contributed the sexual identities to be "denominated" and "categorized."[51] In this manner, homosexuals, transvestites, and transsexuals were the "particles" of this categorization and denomination processes. However, the infinite disclosure of sexual identities in the 1980s did not depend only on the disappearance of the clear boundary between private life and the public sphere, but also on the emergence of a "privatized" public sphere[52] or of publicized private life.[53] At this point, why I touch here on the issues of public sphere and private life is that because I firmly believe that there was a close link between the "abundant" disclosure of private life or the emergence of "privatized" public sphere and the postmodern culture internalized with the slogan of "no future" among the youth, especially in Western societies because the meaning of the emergence of "privatized" public sphere was nothing other than the reformulation of the depoliticization process,[54] in other words, other than the "lessening" of *political intensity* of the public sphere. Following this, while examining on masculine figures and the perception of masculinity in the 1980s, all these political "deprivations," the emphasis on the "individualism," and the sense of "insecurity," that is, postmodern and neo-liberal notions should be taken

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[51] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p. 54.
[52] Şükrü Argın, "1980'lerden 1990'lara: Şimdiki Zaman Diktatörlüğü," *Birikim* 152-153 (December 2001-January 2002), p. 36.
[53] Hannah Arendt argues that the reason of describing the modern societies as the "mass society" stems from the disappearance of the sharp demarcation between the public sphere and private life. See, Hannah Arendt, *Insanlık* Durumu (Istanbul: İletişim: 1994)
[54] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p. 63.

into consideration. In this manner, the sexual identities "incited to words," "the explosion of words, images, and display," "the privatized public sphere" were each one symbols verifying the process of depoliticization in Turkey. Therefore, the masculine figures and the perception of masculinity belonging to the 1980s, in my opinion, did not come on the scene different from the notions of postmodernism and neo-liberalism.

CHAPTER TWO

A PANORAMA OF SOCIAL POSTURES BELONGING TO THE 1980S

The 1980s in Turkey, maybe not as a rupture but as originality, provides significant materials on which to elaborate for the social sciences. Because global neo-liberal discourse blossomed in this period, new formations or contributions to existed form had an impact on social verity. Especially, two basic parts of this period, that is, the central military power together with the coup and the civil power embodied itself in cabinet of Turgut Özal, delineated the cultural conditions of Turkey. Although they were poles apart from each other in case of their strategies, they can not be envisaged as completely separate from each other in the process of depolitization. The neo-liberal discourse stressing on individualism, which was backed by the civil power, was in harmony with the military power which aimed at eradicating the collective activities. Therefore, the purpose of the latter in eliminating the right and the left political movements, and the interests of the former steering society towards consumption and display with richness-oriented promises accompanied to each other to a great degree.

Accordingly, while the freedom of thought, in relation to this, the freedom of press were restricted, the quantity of the press products, which address to each social figures of society such as women, men, and children, increased dramatically. Through the effect of neo-liberal discourse and the atmosphere of individualism, the posture of social figures changed; moreover, with the concept of "identity," various social figures, that is, transsexuals, homosexuals, and lesbians showed themselves in society as other identities. Because of the fact that the consequences of gay movements and woman

liberation surrounding America and the continental Europe influenced Turkey, the roles of women, and of men within society have been defined in different ways. In accordance with this redefinition, new masculine and feminine models came to being in the 1980s, and the press took the key responsibility both in terms of imposing these figures and orienting the masses towards them. In this chapter, I will focus on new masculine figures in illuminating the masculinity concept of the 1980s, and discuss whether or not the concept of masculinity experienced any transformation in association with the new masculine models through making use of the *habitus* concept of Pierre Bourdieu and Connell's *hegemonic masculinity*.

Theoretical Framework: Masculinity as a Socially Constructed Issue

"Sometimes masculinity has got nothing to do with it nothing to do, that is, with men. And when something is about masculinity, it is not always 'about men.'"[55] This quotation, from Sedgwick, discloses the intention that I will maintain throughout course of this study. In other words, this study considers masculinity as a *constructed* issue rather than one pertaining to nature. In this case, It is important to elucidate that gender arrangements connected with society may not respond to "what men actually are, or desire to be, or what they actually do."[56] Surely, masculinity can not be conceptualized as a social verity separated from men, but it more than implies "the pattern or

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[55] Eve Kiosk Sedgwick, "Gosh, Boy George, You Must Be Awfully Secure in Your Masculinity!" in *Constructing Masculinity*, ed. Maurice Berger, Brian Wallis, Simon Watson (New York: Rutledge, 1995), pp. 11-20.

[56] R. W. Connell, "Studying Men and Masculinity," *Resources for Feminist Research* ½ (Winter 2001), p. 44.

configuration of social practices linked to the position of men in the gender order, and socially distinguished from practices linked to the position of women."[57] Considering masculinity as a "social construction,"[58] it is, therefore, the *artificial imagery* attributed to the male body, and is the *intricate formation* arising from the relational social practices which surround man like a brick. From Sartre's point of view, "the gender categories, far from being externally given under a biological statute, are constantly under construction and are internally contradictory; indeed, a 'moving relation' between various sorts of practice."[59]

As for biological determination, its ground in illuminating the sense of masculinity may be articulated in a way that "bodily dimension remains a presence within the social practice. Not a 'base,' but as an "object of practice.""[60] Accordingly, the objectification of the body, in the context of social practices, justifies the fact that the male body constitutes the concrete structure for masculinity so as to enforce its social bond. That is to say, "masculinity invests the body."[61] Likewise, Brian Donovan states that "masculinities are not consequence of male biology, but sets of practices affected by power relations between men and women;"[62] in addition, by the "power of some men over other men."[63] These testimonies reveal that the conception of masculinity can not be reduced to sexuality which is assumed "as pre-social, a nature force belonging to the

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[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] R.W. Connell, "Class, Patriarchy and Sartre's Theory of Practice," *Theory and Society* 3 (May 1982), p. 316.
[60] Tim Carrigan, Bob Connell, John Lee, "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity," *Theory and Society* (Sep 1985), p. 595.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Brian Donovan, "Political Consequences of Private Authority: Promise Keepers and Transformation of the Hegemonic Masculinity," *Theory and Society* 6 (Des 1998), p.817.
[63] Michael S. Kimmel, "Invisible Masculinity," *Society* 6 (Sep-Oct 1993), p. 3.

realm of the biology."[64] In this way, the latter refers to body, whereas, the former is itself social practice and constitutive of the social world."[65] Therefore, masculinity, which is regarded as a socially constructed issue, may be appraised within the context of *social practices* attributed to man instead of considering it as an *absolute fact* given by the nature.

It will not be exaggeration to say that, masculinity, when it is studied on such a basis, "is a fiction or set of fictions;"[66] thus, the "*real* is men's attempt to live out these fictions."[67] Neither men nor masculinity itself, as a term, is adequate to comprehend the conception of masculinity; hence, the emphasis should be on men's performance, that is, on social practices over again. At this point, it is inevitable to assert that masculinities are characterized necessarily within the conception of gender, and gender, as a way in which social practice is ordered, "is a social arrangement which under different historical circumstances take vastly different forms."[68] In relation to the gender conception, "bodies are participants in a historical process; they are both agents and objects of practice."[69] As for masculinities, this point of view, "[they] are materialized as meaningful bodies and embodied meanings,"[70] and "through body-reflexive practices, more than individual lives are formed: a social world is formed."[71] Being parallel with the historical process, gender is "achieved status"[72] and "situational accomplishment."[73]

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[64] R.W. Connell, "The Big Picture: Masculinities in Recent World History," *Theory and Society* 5 (Oct 1993), p.602.
[65] Ibid.

[66] Lynne Segal, "Changing Men: Masculinities in Context," *Theory and Society* 5 (Oct 1993), p.630.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Connell, "Studying Men and Masculinity", p.46.
[69] Ibid, p.45.

[70] Ibid, pp. 45-46.
[71] Ibid, p.46.
[72] Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman, "Doing Gender," *Gender and Society* 2 (Jun 1987), p.125.

In this context, gender, and relatively, masculinity, may be regarded as entities which have been brought into being through historical dynamics; therefore, they are subject to change.[74] Mumby states this characteristic of masculinity most clearly:

> Such identities involve not fixed characteristics or roles carried complete with each individual, but rather are mundane and routine accomplishments of everyday social interaction enacted in context of power. In this sense, masculinity(s) is not a stable feature of specific, individual men, but is constructed in an ongoing fashion through various discourses, activities, and micro practices.[75]

The key point as to masculinity is its dynamism by way of social practice; indeed, individuals take action in associated with the particular situations within specific structures of social relations. Accordingly, "practice relates to this structure, generated as people and groups grapple with their historical situations, does not consist of isolated acts,"[76] that is, the most important issue that should be emphasized in examining masculinity is "the process of configuring practice"[77] In this context, the concept of masculinity may be accounted for by making good use of the term *habitus*. Bourdieu defines *habitus*, "the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations,"[78] is a set of "dispositions" that steers agents towards acting in a definite way. These dispositions, which constitute the fundamental origin of "practices," "perceptions" and "attitudes," in spite of their regularity, are not governed by any rule.

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[73] Dennis K. Mumby, "Organizing Men: Power, Discourses and The Social Construction of Masculinity in the Workplace," *Commutation Theory* 2 (May 1998), p.168.
[74] Robert Morrell, "Of Boys and Men: Masculinity and Gender in Southern African Studies," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4 (Dec 1998), pp. 605-630.
[75] Mumby, "Organizing Men: Power, Discourses and The Social Construction of Masculinity in the Workplace," pp. 125-126.
[76] Connell, "Studying Men and Masculinity," p. 46.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.78.

Moreover, they are "inculcated," "structured," "durable," "generative" and "transposable."[79]

On the basis of Bourdieu's view, it is possible to assert that masculinity functions as habitus. According to his statement, the habitus:

> The product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. The system of dispositions – a past which survives in the present and tens to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices structured according to its principles, an internal law relaying the continuous exercise of the law of external necessities (irreducible to conjunctural constraints) – is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism discerns in the social word without being able to give them a rational basis. And it is at the same time the principle of the transformations and regulated revolutions which neither the extrinsic and instantaneous determinisms of a mechanistic sociologism nor the purely internal but equally punctual determination of voluntarist or spontaneist subjectivism are capable of accounting for.[80]

Considering masculinity as the *habitus* both can be envisaged as conducive to reproduce practices and as an integrity including practices belonging to past experiences which will carry themselves into the future, represent past, future and present through not repeating fixed practices, rather reproduce favorable practices within an "objective structure" which is "molding" and "cognitive."[81] Thus, practices "can be accounted for only by relating the objective *structure* defining the social conditions of the production of the habitüs which engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is operating, that is, to the *conjuncture* which represents a particular state of this structure."[82]

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[79] Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p.12.
[80] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, p.82.
[81] Ibid, p.78.
[82] Ibid.

By focusing on the notion of structure, the point which has been put forth is that it is not the relationship that is immediate in social life, but it is rather one suggesting complicated interactions that have embodied themselves in institutions.[83] In this way, habitus is not a self-functioned mechanism; instead, it is one deriving its function from various institutions embedded in the structure. Precisely, making habitual actions (social practices) normal has been the upshot of functional institutions while they are normative, however. And thus, practices can not be scrutinized on the basis of *unconsciousness*, owing to the fact that "the 'unconscious' is never anything other than the forgetting of history, which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second natures of habitus."[84]

Therefore, masculinity and femininity, "historical and differentiated"[85] formulations, are not eternal givens penetrating human activities; they rather are the constructions endemic in power relations strengthening themselves within an objective structure through institutions which are able to maintain the power relations.

In accordance with the point of view suggesting the idea that human sexuality is not socially managed by definite individuals but rather is socially controlled by its institutionalizing throughout history;[86] it is significant to state that "three institutions – the state, the workplace/ labor market, and the family – are of particular importance in the contemporary organization of gender."[87] Furthermore, by and large, the educational

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[83] R.W. Connell, *Gender and Power, Society, the Person and Sexual Politics*, (Stanford; California: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 93.
[84] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, pp. 78-79.
[85] Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, [Electronic Bookshelf] (Stanford; California : Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 104.
[86] Peter L. Berger and Thomas LuckMann, *The Social Construction of Reality c. 2*, (Garden City; New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 55.

[87] Connell, "The Big Picture: Masculinities in Recent World History," p. 602.

system, the church, and army (which can be illustrated as a significant "homosocial"[88] group) are others conducive to foster the gender order. [89] At this point, it is necessary to discuss the sense of some concepts such as *gender regime* and *gender order*,

> The pattern that all these relations take within an institution (such as school or a corporation) may be called its 'gender regime'. The pattern of gender regimes, together with the gender pattern in culture and personal life, may be called the 'gender order' of a society. It is implicit in these concepts, that gender regimes and gender orders are historical products, and subject to change in history.[90]

Pointedly, examining masculinity amounts to elaborating on the history of agents and institutions in which masculinity is defined and sustained; that is, these institutions that may "vary, at different times, in their relative weights and their functions,"[91] or may take different means have contributed masculinity being redefined more or less from history.

From this straightforward point of view, it, therefore, can be concluded that masculinities are multiple. There is no one pattern of masculinity which is ready everywhere. Masculinities are constructed in different ways with respect to different cultures and different periods in history.[92] For instance, some cultures regard violence as an explicit feature attributed to masculinity, whereas others consider soldiering with great contempt. Differences in expression of masculinities may be observed in multicultural societies in that Latino and Anglo men in the United States display

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[88] Sharon R. Bird, "Welcome to The Men's Club: Homosociality and the Maintenance of Hegemonic Masculinity," *Gender and Society 2* (Apr 1996), p. 121.
[89] Connell, "Studying Men and Masculinity," pp. 46-47,50, Connell, "The Big Picture: Masculinities in Recent World History," p. 602 and Bourdieu, Ibid, p.83.
[90] Connell, " Studying Men and Masculinity," p. 47.
[91] Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, p. 104.
[92] Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne, "Dislocating Masculinity: Gender, Power and Anthropology" in *Dislocating Masculinity: Comparative Ethnographies,* ed. Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), p.18.

dissimilar patterns of masculinity; similarly, Greek or Lebanese and Anglo boys in Australia.[93] Furthermore, masculinity is identified with some place-based or class-oriented symbols in particular cultural order in the axis of social relations, in this way, various patterns of masculinity may appear in one society.

> More than one kind of masculinity can be found within a given cultural setting. Within workplace, neighborhood, or peer group, there are likely to be different understandings of masculinity and different ways of 'doing' masculinity. In the urban middle class, for instance, there is a version of masculinity organized around dominance, emphasizing 'leadership' in management, and another version organized around expertise, emphasizing 'professionalism' and technical knowledge. [94]

Connell, at this point, submits "multi-optional"[95] masculinities to the literature by borrowing this concept from Widersprüche; however, the actuality of multiple masculinities, either in different cultures or in a given cultural order, do not conceal the ubiquitous power of masculinity that have diffused into each stratum of society. This ubiquitous power has led men to an "invisible gender"[96] that enables us to assume masculinity as an *unquestionable superiority*. The advent of women's liberation, which puts focus on patriarchy and gay liberation, bringing about a vital critique of heterosexuality, has oriented gender literature towards the history of men together with women, that is, a history of masculinity. Taking these studies that elaborate on the history of men on consideration, it, therefore, is possible to articulate: from where this

[93] Connell, "Studying Men and Masculinity," p.49.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Kimmel, "Invisible Masculinity," p.2.

ubiquitous power of masculinity, accordingly, its invisibility that "reproduces inequality"[97] has sprung is its *hegemony*.

"Hegemonic Masculinity"

Hegemony, a vital concept in Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*, is concerned "the wining and holding of power and the formation (and the destruction) of social groups in that process."[98] The capability imposing "a definition of the situation," situating the expressions in which incidents are perceived and issues are argued, designating "ideals" and delineating "morality" is the crucial fraction of this process. More important are ways in which the ruling class establishes and sustains domination through which "persuasion" of the greater part of the population has been acquired. This persuasion is embedded in society by the organization of social institutions and media in ways of "normalization" and "naturalization." Moreover, the state, in these practices of negotiation and enforcement, applies to punishment for non-conformity, whereas society manifests its discontent through using the term "others" and ultimately exclusion.[99] In this case, in order to establish any hegemonic form within society, there has to be some "correspondence" between a cultural ideal and institutional power.[100] Following this, Brendan Gough and Gareth Edwards set forth their point of view as to hegemony by benefiting from Gramsci's crucial clarification:

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[97] Ibid.
[98] Mike Donaldson, "What is Hegemonic Masculinity?" *Theory and Society* 5 (Oct 1993), p. 645.
[99] Connell, *Gender and Power, Society, The Person and Sexual Politics,* p. 107 and Carrigan, Connell, Lee, "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity," pp. 593-594.
[100] R. W. Connell, *Masculinities*, (Los Angeles ; California : University of California Press, 1995), p. 75.

> The notion of strength or "hegemony" pertains to various discourses, since they often function in the interests of particular sections of society struggling to advance their own version of "reality" to benefit from its cultural acceptance. The dominance or "hegemony" of a particular version then has to defend its' position as "the most widely adopted frame of reference against challenges from the other, subordinated cultures."[101]

The opinion quoted above suggests that correspondence, between a cultural ideal and institutional power, does not embrace all of society or every part of a culture. The hegemonic form validates its practices, especially in some groups that have overlapping interests with the institutional power. In this way, the "hegemonic project ... does not demand the production of consensus ... [or] a process of incorporation. It does operate through the production of a certain convergence of interests through which subordination and resistance are contained."[102] What is more is that, alongside this challenge from others, hegemony constantly requires the subordination, in other words, the hegemonic form makes some groups into a subordinated structure for the purpose of reinforcing and reproducing itself.

At this point, it is essential to elucidate the notion of "hegemonic masculinity."[103] Explicitly, men are the hegemonic form in itself which subordinates women, and the struggling group is women as the others and the subordinated. Accordingly, the privileged group is men having similar interests with institutional power over women, that is, "it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that hegemonic masculinity is hegemonic so far as it embodies a successful strategy in relation to women."[104]

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[101] Brendan Gough and Gareth Edwards, "The Beer Talking: Four Lads, A Carry Out and The Reproduction of Masculinities," *Sociological Review3* (Aug 1998), pp. 414-415.
[102] Lawrence Grossberg, "Bringing It All Back Home," in *Cultural Studies*, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, Paula A. Treichler with Linda Baughman and assistance from John Macgregor Wise, (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 226.
[103] Carrigan, Connell, Lee, "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity," p. 587.
[104] Ibid, p.592.

Masculinity, as a successful strategy, is the hegemony within society. Therefore, at this juncture, "the term [hegemonic masculinity] is defined in relation to the legitimacy of patriarchy."[105] This patriarchal structure, embedded in social institutions, is the one held accountable for constructing men as the "*invisible gender*" and *unquestionable superiority*.

On the other hand, "the form of masculinity which is culturally dominant in a given setting is called 'hegemonic masculinity.'"[106] Here, the hegemony does not imply the ascendancy based on force, but it rather implies the ascendancy which is embedded in "religious doctrine and practice, mass media content, wage structures, the design of housing, welfare/taxation policies, and so forth."[107] The hegemony, between men groups, is acquired through regarding the others as dishonored (homosexual masculinities), as marginal (masculinities of disempowered ethnic minorities), or through displaying admired figures (masculinities of heroes, media images, publicized models).[108] In this way, most prominent agents of "weavers of fabric of hegemony," or "organizing intellectuals," named by Gramsci, are considered to be: priest, journalists, advertisers, politicians, psychiatrists, designers, playwrights, film makers, actors, novelist, musicians, activists, academics, coaches and sportsmen.[109] In addition, ideology is the one that triggers these "organizing intellectuals" to function, and "justifies the holders of physical power ('law and order')."[110] In this case, to speak and write as to hegemonic masculinity is to bring up the political discourse and to become connected to power and resistance, as mentioned above. The historical construction of

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[105] R.W. Connell, "Connell's 'Masculinities:' Reply," *Gender and Society* 4 (Aug 1998), p. 476.
[106] Connell, "Studying men and Masculinity," p.49.
[107] Connell, *Gender and Power, Society, The Person and Sexual Politics*, p. 184.
[108] Connell, "Studying Men and Masculinity," p. 49.
[109] Donaldson, "What is Hegemonic Masculinity?" p. 646.
[110] Connell, *Gender and Power, Society, The Person and Sexual Politics*, Ibid.

the gender order is a practice through which diverse forms of power are structured and reproduced. In other words, it is unfeasible to examine the historical construction of gender without speaking about power. Hegemonic masculinity, similar to gender order, is a constructed issue deriving its core from power relations. In this sense, hegemonic masculinity is a symbolic support that extends power, and is an ideological apparatus that, building up, sustains and legitimates power.

Both the Gramscian theory of hegemony and the Foucaultian theory of discourse are key indications for comprehending power as the determinant of masculinities, and of hegemonic masculinity. In this sense, for the former, by using making good use of the definition of hegemony and the account of "organizing intellectuals," "the emphasis is on popular representations (figures) producing and circulating common-sense notions, so that hegemonic masculinity is won not only through coercion but through consent, even though there is never a complete consensus." [111] For the latter, the emphasis is on masculine subject-positions (places), as an effect of discursive formations and how these positions are taken up or inhabited (practices of everyday life)."[112] In this way, Foucault states that, "'specifiable masculinities' are understood as the effect of specific regimes of visibility, and such representation are over determined by discursive formations and the interplay of signifying practices, social processes, historical forces, and the business of late capitalism."[113]

As a whole, hegemonic masculinity, which is constructed in relation to women and subordinated masculinities, confirms its practices in all social interactions with the

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[111] Robert Hanke, "Theorizing Masculinity with/in The Media," *Communicating Theory* 2 (May 1998), p. 190.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid, p. 189.

support of institutions that are in harmony with power relations. Power which diffuses into each unit of society produces hegemonic masculinity within its inculcated discourse, and subsequently, the hegemonic masculinity constitutes its discourse and imposes its own practices on society. That is to say, hegemonic masculinity is a practice in itself which functions in relation to power relations; however, is the resource of practices by becoming power all by itself.

The crucial feature of hegemonic masculinity is that it is heterosexual, connected to the institution of marriage at most[114] and to the state by the criminalization of male homosexuality. In other words, hegemonic masculinity is bolstered by the desultory subordination of homosexuality. This kind of subordination reveals how "hegemony" refers to a historical situation, a set of circumstances in which power is acquired and held owing to the fact that heterosexuality is a "historically-constructed" issue. Following this, "the construction of hegemony is not a matter of pushing and pulling between ready-formed groupings, but it is partly a matter of the formation of those groupings."[115] Thus, homosexuality has taken its place within process of this formation by reducing it to "perversion:"

> The pattern of exclusive adult heterosexuality is a historically-constructed one. Its dominance is by no means universal. For this to become the hegemonic form of masculine sexuality required a historic redefinition sexuality itself, in which undifferentiated 'lust' was turned into specific types of 'perversion.' ... A passion for beautiful boys was compatible with hegemonic masculinity in renaissance Europe, emphatically not so at the end of the nineteenth century. In this historical shift, men's sexual desire was to be focused more closely on women – a fact with complex consequences for them – while groups of men who

[114] Connell, *Gender and Power, Society, The Person and Sexual Politics*, p. 186.
[115] Carrigan, Connell, Lee, "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity," p. 594.

were visible not following the hegemonic pattern more were specifically labeled and attacked.[116]

The Complementary Concerns: Marriage, "Emphasized Femininity," and "Homosociality"

As a constant institution, marriage, which maintains hegemonic masculinity, is worth discussing. Its basic circle that enables women to be subordinated and its heterosexual structure pushing homosexuality out of internalized norms corroborates the idea that institutions are associated with power relations. In other words, in Bourdieu's terminology, they, as a conjuncture, constitute the cogent ground for the habitus of masculinity in which the habitus operates within a definite structure. Moreover, the institution of marriage might be examined on the axis of a class-based act of hegemonic masculinity. In this case, a contemporary ruling-class family is constructed around the professional career of the husband. "In a typical case, a well-groomed wife is subordinated not by being under the husband's thumb but by her task of making sure his home life runs on wheels to support his self-confidence, his career advancement, and their collective income." [117] As for the working-class home, the husband's dominance is not attained by the authority based on technological basis, it rather is the authority acquired by traditional ideology or force; that is, a working class man put the hegemony in practice through imposing himself on his wife as *breadwinner*, actually.

[116] Ibid, p. 593.
[117] Ibid.

David Collinson's study[118] on machinists examining multiple masculinities in the workplace and Gideon Kunda's research[119] were carried out in order to analyze how the construction of white-collar masculinity brings up the difference between mechanists and white-collars in construing family in terms of hegemony.

According to these studies, Collinson's workers identified their masculinity with the separation of the private sphere and the public sphere, and they sustained the patriarchal family structure. That is, in the case of the mechanists, there was an obvious bifurcation of public and private. In Kunda's case, self identity is very much tied up with work, and the boundary between private and public is obscured, and family responsibilities might be negotiated around work demands. In other words, here, the construction of hegemonic masculinity is dependent partly on the devaluation of family. Following this, for the former, work is the means to attain the goal to construct the hegemony in family relations, whereas for the latter, work is the goal in itself and the institution of marriage is the means as a support fostering hegemonic masculinity.[120] In addition, it is absolutely necessary to assert that "both are the form of patriarchy, and the husband's in both cases are enacting a hegemonic masculinity. But the situations in which they do so are very different, their responses are not exactly the same, and their impact on wives and on children is likely to vary a good deal."[121]

The second case, and relatively the first, draws us to a new notion of femininity: "emphasized femininity."[122] This form of femininity is defined "around compliance with

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[118] 'Managing the Shop Floor,' in 1992, see for details, Mumby, "Organizing Men: Power, Discourses and The Social Construction of Masculinity in the Workplace," p. 170.
[119] 'Engineering Culture,' Ibid.
[120] Ibid, pp. 171-178.
[121] Carrigan, Connell, Lee, "Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity," p. 594.
[122] Connell, *Gender and Power, Society, The Person and Sexual Politics*, p.183.

this subordination and is oriented to accommodating the interests and desires of men."[123] In this sense, the "fit" between emphasized femininity and hegemonic masculinity provides the essential basis for constructing hegemonic masculinity. What means is the continuation of practices that institutionalize men's dominance over women. [124]

Thus, the marriage or family is an essential institution both in term of its supplementary position in constructing hegemonic masculinity in relation to subordinated masculinities, and its origin that contributes to hegemonic masculinity in relation to subordinated women. Apart from the collective spaces that bring man and woman together, compositions that completely exclude women instead of subordination are the constitutive of hegemonic masculinity. In relation to these formations, the vital basis which perpetuates the competition among men and masculinities is the subordination of other masculinities. That is to say, at this juncture, hegemony is constructed through subordinated others corresponding to disfavored masculinities and to excluded women. The function that is based on these practices might be described as homosociality.

Homosocial structures, from small male groups (peer, neighborhood, and school), social organizations (coffee houses, football teams and their supporters), the workplace supporting division of labor (the finance sector) to state institutions (the army), include three basic principles: the sexual objectification of women, emotional detachment, and competition.[125]

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[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid, 185.
[125] Bird, "Welcome to The Men's Club: Homosociality and the Maintenance of Hegemonic Masculinity," p. 121.

In this case, Sharon Bird defines homosociality by benefiting from Lipman-Blumen; "homosociality refers specifically to the nonsexual attractions held by men (or women) for members of their own sex ... [It] promotes clear distinctions between women and man through segregation in social institutions;"[126] in addition, "between hegemonic masculinities and nonhegemonic masculinities by the segregation of social groups."[127] In this way, homosocial structures are based on identical practices with hegemonic masculinity. These are the exclusion of women and subordination of other masculinities through competition. At this point, it is necessary to assert that acquiring masculinity is a competition, in fact.

Throughout this study, as mentioned many times, masculinity and its hegemonic form are handled as a historically constructed issue and highlighted as subject to change. However, it is an obvious fact that history has constituted a very close weave between power relations and masculine domination. Although the transformation of the gender order and the reaction to hegemonic masculinity have been experienced, the continuity of masculine domination might be explained with embedded institutions shaped within power relations and, surely, the existence of homosocial groups. The historical process has maintained the subordination of women and its objectification in spite of women's movements enabling them to gain more portions in the division of labor or social organizations; furthermore, it, at the same time, has led hegemonic masculinity to take different forms without diminishing its hegemonic base. Therefore, the fundamental question should head towards different hegemonic forms changing with respect to their weight within the historical process. This approach also would draw us both into power

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[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.

holding capability in molding hegemonic masculinity and into its institutional structures, "organizing intellectuals." If the main purpose is to escape completely from essentialism, "one should not try to deny the permanences and the invariants, which are indisputably part of historical reality, but, rather, one must reconstruct the *history of historical labor of dehistorization*, or to put it another way, the history of continuous recreation of the objective and subjective structures of masculine domination."[128]

The Configuration of Masculine Figures in the 1980s

Through theoretical consideration on gender, making masculinity dependent on historical process and power relations requires an association between the historical background and its figures. The characteristic of the 1980s, a free market economy, free imports, a consumption society or blossoming consumption, and integration to the world economy, especially to the United States of America, have brought its required culture; accordingly, this cultural atmosphere molded its material for plastering and presented its cast. In this sense, the 1980s did all they could in constructing a favorable masculine model in accordance with its economic and cultural conditions. Surely, the process of constructing can not be accounted for only by the spontaneity of the 1980s; on the contrary, this period led its own discourse to be constituted that supported its functional mechanism.

More than ever, the press accompanied this neo-liberal discourse; moreover, it put on an act as a follower of the system by way of displaying encouraging models, and of assisting in the discourse. The press, apart from instigating consumption and praising

[128] Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, p.83.

imported goods, set forth the terms derived from the neo-liberal economy peculiar to the Turkey of the 1980s, and carried the terminology of the party in power (ANAP) into its columns. Together with this, because of the fact that technological innovations require more capital, ournalism was regarded as business and the press was transformed into lucrative sector; accordingly, the close relationship between the press and businessmen displayed its strong examples in this period.[129]

Following this panorama, the integration with America, both economically and culturally, and the America-oriented discourse affecting Europe surrounded the Turkey. Exactly like this, the term "yuppies," which came to being in America in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan[130], constituted the contemporary agenda in the business world and in the press in Turkey. In this manner, the preferred masculine figures consisted of yuppies*, who corresponded to "young, urban-based professional individuals,"[131] mostly, embodied in banking and management with the representation of language skills and technological sufficiency in computers, in addition to them, the profile of successful businessmen constituted the important part of the preferred masculine figures.

Admired Occupations and Masculine Figures

> He was one of those whose name appears within the first line in "the list of billionaires" of Turkey. He was the "super rich one" known by everybody from seven to seventy... He was the "super profile" for youth planning to get rich in the future... That expression was frequently being heard from youth having a

[129] Rıfat N. Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp. 20-21.
[130] Here, the important point that I want to emhasize, throuhg touching on the close relationship between the press and bussinessman is the "transformation of the pres sector into the holding company." Ibid, pp. 40-41
* This term and its hegemonic structure will be taken up in the next chapter.
[131] Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, p.40.

dream related to the future: "when I grow up, I will be as rich as Eczacıbaşı by hook or by crook.'[132]

This passage which is the presentation of Nejat Eczacıbaşı in *Erkekçe*, as seen, reveals how this magazine was in introducing his profile to the masses. The ambition of making money and the purpose of being rich, designated as the imagined ideal, are disclosed clearly by the way of illustrating the businessman who has already achieved them. In view of that, the current trend, to attain the (socioeconomic) status one has wished to achieve, is hardened in relation to the economic atmosphere of the 1980s. Actually, the ideal imposed on youth (I will be as rich as Eczacıbaşı by hook or by crook) is repeated through the youth's own language; that is, the discourse of magazine is attributed to youth by making them express the sentence written above.[133]

To shed light on the desired masculine figures and their features in the 1980s, the description of two names that appeared in the press, Özer Çiller and Cem Boyner, will be useful in examining *Erkekçe* in terms of elucidating fashionable masculine figures.

> Who is Özer Çiller? Engineer, banker, and the joint owner of Seven-Eleven in Turkey ...That is to say, a perfect man who pursues the success.[134]

> Here! A Complete Man: Cem Boyner ... Uneasy and ambitious... The hunter who always desires more and the man who is not satisfied with what he did. His targets are further on what he has acquired for all time. Because he does not want

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[132] "*O Türkiye'deki milyarderler listesinde ilk sıradakilerden biriydi. Yediden yetmişe herkesin tanıdığı bir 'süper zengin'di...Gelecekte zenginleşmeyi tasarlayan gençler için 'süper tipti' o. Geleceğe ilişkin düş kuran gençlerden sık sık şöyle sözler duyuluyordu: Büyünce ne yapıp edip, Eczaşıbaşı kadar zengin olcağım.*" *Erkekçe* 9 (Sep 1983), p. 135.

[133] "*Surely, it happened that we sometimes applied to the method of personification while preparing the spots of magazine.*" Interview, Hıncal Uluç, Ibid.

[134] "*Kimdir Özer Çiller ? Mühendis, bankacı ve Seven-Eleven'ın Türkiye'deki ortağı ... Yani başarıyı kovalayan kusursuz bir erkek...*" *Erkekçe* 3 (March 1990), p. 18.

to fall behind current topics and novel approaches, he takes education on specific topics for renovating himself each year, either one month or fifteen days.[135]

By making good use of these examples, it is valuable to bring to light the conception of masculinity attributed to the man of the 1980s. Before all else, there is a close link between acquired occupation and the man; that is, the capacity of man is determined with respect to job, which has the most consent in the 1980s. Accordingly, the words like *completeness*, *perfection,* and *superiority* are ascribed to them, though.

Likewise, the conception of masculinity, on account of the job-oriented precedence or domination over men, goes parallel with the idealized masculine figure. In that case, the success, the ambition, thinking big, and the ability of competing with time foster the conception of masculinity in the 1980s. The tie between historical context and masculinity, by relying on the masculine figures of the 1980s, verifies the social construction of masculinity in association with the historical process; thus, Segal's approach to masculinity considering it *as a set of fiction* finds its right niche again; that is, masculinity is men's performance trying to comply with this historical necessity. As a forth power, with popular idiom, the media are exceedingly active agents in orienting the masses towards an act in a definite way, especially from the middle of twentieth century on. In case of Turkey, the press of the 1980s, which was in cooperation with the hegemonic ideology (neo-liberalism), had an impact on men's attempt, that is, at masculinity not only through presentation of popular figures, but also through normalization, naturalization, and generalization of desired masculine figures of the neo-liberal discourse.

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[135] " *İşte Tam Bir Erkek : Cem Boyner...Huzursuz ve hırslı...Her zaman daha fazlasını isteyen bir avcı ve yaptıklarıyla yetinmeyen bir erkek. Hedefleri hep elde ettiklerinden daha yüksek. Her yıl, ama bir ay ama on beş gün, belirli bir konuda kendini yenilemek için eğitim alıyor çünkü yeni konuların ve yeni yaklaşımların gerisinde kalmak istemiyor*" *Erkekçe* 12 (Dec1990), p. 23.

> Successful Businessman! Not everybody is able to achieve success in business life, to know how to get what one wants, to make greater the richness day by day. Only, the "Successful Businessman" can do this. Who is the "Successful Businessman?" Which character does he have? What is his secret?[136]

Erkekçe, so as to discover the requirements of being a successful businessman, translated an interview made with Dr. Sidney Lecker in America, who was the psychiatrist and author of *Personality of Money*. According to Lecker, the cornerstone of being a successful businessman was "insensitiveness" and "competitiveness."[137]

Together with this, *Erkekçe* completed the interview with its own emphasis: "'Man of the Age: Far from Being Emotional and Ready for the Competition'"[138] At this point, apart from success as a key constitutive of masculinity in the 1980s, "ambition" and "wealth," "insensitivity" and "competitiveness" were highlighted as factors attributed to masculinity in accordance with the admired masculine figures of the neo-liberal discourse. However, at this juncture, these characteristics, used in envisaging the conception of masculinity, were the common *dispositions* which embraced the past, the present, and the future.

The central point here is the reproduction of these dispositions by relating them to the *objective structure*. Thus, by appealing to the view of Bourdieu, the decade of the 1980s, which embodied itself in the free market economy, constituted the grounds to masculinity functioning as the *habitus*; furthermore, the economic system and its cultural effects might be regarded as the objective structure on which the habitus

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[136] *"Başarılı İş Adamı! Herkes iş hayatında başarıya ulaşamaz, tuttuğunu koparamaz, her geçen gün zenginliğini çoğaltamaz. Ancak 'Başarılı İş Adamı' yapabilir bunu. Kimdir 'Başarılı İş Adamı?' Karakteri nasıldır? Sırrı nedir?" Erkekçe* 11 (Now 1981), p. 40.
[137] Ibid, p. 87
[138] "'*Çağın Erkeği: Duygusallıktan uzak ve rekabete açık*'" Ibid., p. 89.

operates. Therefore, it is accurate to evaluate the masculinity of 1980s in a way that dispositions, which prompted the habitus to perform, were not altered drastically, but they rather were transformed in accordance with the *neo-liberal ideology*; that is, the masculinity of man was reproduced within different discourses through transformed dispositions.

The examples quoted above, at the same time, are in contact with the hegemonic masculinity. Delineating Cem Boyner as a *complete man*, Özer Çiller as a *perfect man,* or Nejat Eczacıbaşı as a *super profile*, reveals the fact that the culturally dominant form of masculinity was identified with the successful businessman, absolutely. That is to say, "ambition," "success," "wealth," and "competitiveness"[139] were the basic factors conducive to hegemonic masculinity. In the case of this study, the hegemonic form between men is based on the ascendancy embedded in the press, which was one taking place among "organizing intellectuals" pointed out by Gramsci, of the 1980s. From Connell's point of view, hegemonic masculinity is constructed on two bases: the subordination of women and other masculinities. In the case of this analysis, hegemonic masculinity, through the idealized successful businessman, is constructed by displaying the publicized figures of society, whereas the others, who can not be described with the accepted components of masculinity, are subordinated. Following this, in *Erkekçe*, there is no article or essay related to the other occupations which are in disfavor (except for politicians, bureaucrats, and artists), even depression experienced by men related only to the profile of businessman, and regarded as the "exhaustion of manager."[140] Moreover, although 65,000 copies of the circulation of this magazine, which is said to have been

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[139] See Appendix , p. 123.
[140] "*Yönetici Tükenmesi*" *Erkekçe* (Feb 1984), p. 93.

151,000 in total, consisted of women,[141] similarly, there is no writing that includes women in the businesswoman depiction. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe some pictures which include women looking at well-dressed, young businessmen with admiration and sexual invitation.[142] In this way, two basic principles of hegemonic masculinity comprising the subordination of women, and of other masculinities (who can not reach the success and wealthy in business life) might be monitored; that is, the subordination of other masculinities by distancing them from being a "complete man," and the subordination of women by transforming the business space into a "homosocial integrity" based on the exclusion of women. In addition, the crucial point here is that women are the sexual objects of competition between men; thus, the hegemonic form of masculinity, at the same time, is based on the sexual objectification of women by making them subordinated. The picture envisaged above, is valuable so as to illustrate women's role in reinforcing hegemonic masculinity on account of the fact that the profile of the businessman who receives the sexual invitations of women contributes to the hegemonic form to be reproduced among other masculinities.

By relying on Gramsci's hegemony concept, it is significant to indicate that the construction of hegemonic form is connected with power holding and winning the ability of forming social groups. In the case of this study, power, which designates the ideals, affects the attributes and perception, might be considered as neo-liberal discourse; that is, in power, which has a close relationship with the business sector, and the press as a follower of this civil power established after the coup. Because of this, there is correspondence between cultural ideals and institutional power not relying on

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[141] Interview, Hıncal Uluç, Ibid.
[142] See Appendix, p.122.

complete consensus, but rather serving the interests of definite groups such as business sector. Hence, the hegemonic form of masculinity was embedded within society not through force, but persuasion by way of the press.

New Identities: Homosexuality and Transsexuality

The characteristics of the 1980s can be identified with great contradictions. In this manner, the 1980s, as a turning point for Turkey, was the scene of two different power projects, of two discourses, and of two cultural strategies which were contradictory to each other.[143] On the one hand, the repressive and prohibitive military power and the modern, constructive, and surrounding cultural strategy (embodied in the first elected government of explicit new-right rhetoric in 1983), which aimed at not prohibiting but transforming, not excluding but including, and not repressing but instigating all repressed desires, on the other hand. That is to say, the 1980s was a period including refusal and denial that could be attributed to military power. At the same time, the period which included opportunities and promises of civil power following the NSC administration.[144] From another aspect, the 1980s, instead of envisaging them as a ball of contradictions, they might be regarded as a period in which the more fragmented and partial characteristic of power, with Foucaultian point of view, were brought to light.[145]

The press of the 1980s, with the "surrounding" discourse, introduced new identities that had been repressed in the period of military power. In the words of

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[143] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p. 8.
[144] Ibid., p. 9.
[145] Ibid., p. 42.

Nurdan Gürbilek, these identities were accepted within the "explosion of words."[146] This surrounding discourse preferred to include them instead of excluding. Transsexuality, as an example of these repressed identities, was seduced by the press of the 1980s; however, to appear on the scene of the most famous transsexual figure of Turkey, Bülent Ersoy* was prohibited immediately after the coup. Quoting some sections, from an interview between Bülent Ersoy and *Erkekçe* made during Ersoy's banned years, might be worthwhile so as to enlighten the distinction between central military power and the surrounding cultural strategy, that is, the press. Some questions from Erkekçe, under "Neither a Man nor a Woman"[147]headline, are those:

> Before your operation, did you ever define yourself as a homosexual? Did you ever experience any homosexual relationship? Did you have sex like a woman after you had transsexual operation? If that's so then, can you reach orgasm? Have you ever regretted having a transsexual operation?[148]

On grounds that it causes to moral degeneration in Turkey, the central military power aimed at drawing homosexuals and transsexuals back from the visible spheres like *gazino* (a big night club), for sure, from government television –the Radio and Television Foundation of Turkey (TRT). Nevertheless, common or famous figures in private life were displayed on the pages of the press in the 1980s; moreover, their private

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[146] Ibid., p. 21.

* She is the most famous transsexual singer of Turkey, who was prohibitied by the military power in January 1981. She had undergone the transexual operation on 14 April 1981. After her prohibition was abolished on 8 January 1988, she was able to appear on the scenes, again. *Erkekçe* 10 (Oct 1984), p. 125, available at www.biyografi.net/aylar-ocak.asp

[147] *Erkekçe*, Ibid., p.25.

[148] *"Ameliyatınızdan önce kendinizi hiç homoseksüel olarak tanımladınız mı?" "Herhangi bir homoseksüel ilişkiniz oldu mu?" "Transseksüel ameliyat geçirdikten sonra bir kadın gibi seks yapabiliyor musunuz?" "O halde orgazma ulaşabiliyor musunuz?" "Transseksüel bir ameliyat geçirdiğiniz için hiç pişmanlık duydunuz mu:"* *Erkekçe*, Ibid., pp. 124-125.

lives were disclosed within detail. In addition, details about transsexual operations were given in columns to a great degree by way of answering reader letters,[149] or in articles.

> Transsexual Operation [...] For common people, to understand and to accept this concept, is so hard that the first reaction is either a giggle or to despise them whenever transsexuals become the matter anywhere, but transsexual operations have been carried out for a quarter of the century. In America alone, almost a thousand people have undergone this kind of operation. Who are those that can risk changing their sex? Who are those that take this step? With this article, we will try to shed light on this topic that has not been handled seriously until now.[150]

Erkekçe apprised the agents of these new identities in the category of social fighters by defining them as "brave individuals who did not conceal their sexual identities, objected to judgment of conservative society, and struggled against political and social pressure on them."[151] Furthermore, *Erkekçe*, apart from the famous figures and some information on transsexual operations, gave place to significant interviews made with some common transsexuals or transvestites that had been left no choice but to turn to prostitution. Accordingly, it assumed that there was a close link between the using of some novel terms in Turkish such as "transvestite," "transsexual," and "bisexual," "homosexual" and the struggle of those who were able to say "this is me."[152] In this manner, each of these terms symbolized a struggle of "identity" and this symbolization, at the same time, depicted the general atmosphere of the 1980s on account that the new extreme figures of this period and the following years were

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[149] *Erkekçe*11 (Now 1981) in "Manly Advice."

[150] "*Transseksüel Operasyonlar [...] Sokaktaki insan için bu kavramı anlamak ve kabul etmek o kadar zor ki ne zaman transseksüeller bir yerde konu olsa ilk tepki ya bir kıkırtı ya da onları küçük görme. Ancak transseksüel operasyonlar çeyrek yüzyıldır gerçekleştiriliyor. Sadece Amerika'da nerdeyse bin kişi böyle bir ameliyatı geçirdi. Kimdir cinsiyetlerini değiştirmeyi göze alanlar? Kimdir bu yola adım atanlar? Biz bu yazıyla, yakın geçmişe kadar ciddiyetle ele alınmayan bu konuya bir açıklık getirmeye çalışacağız.*" *Erkekçe* 3 (March 1981), p. 32.

[151] "*Erkekçe* 8 (August 1989) p. 19.

[152] Ibid.

composed of these new identities. In other words, these sexual identities that had emerged within the left in the 1970s began to constitute their autonomous ground in expressing their own rights in the 1980s. Accordingly, it is possible to monitor the problems and requests of these sexual identities the pages of *Erkekçe*, for sure, through the effect of popular discourse blooming in America and Europe with the slogan of "sexual freedom." One of interviews, made with a transvestite who was able to working as a prostitute under the name Demet Demir (Ramazan), is noteworthy from two points of view for the reason that her statements illustrate how the socio-economic conditions of other sexual identities subordinated to the hegemonic masculinity and clarifies their experiences during the coup, also, in the course of civil power.

> The night clubs started to close earlier after the coup. Bülent Ersoy was outlawed one year later. Why? As if they were bad examples to society, for they have an impact on children in terms of their sexual maturing. It is not true, why do not other people completely alter their appearance like a women, though? It is fully up to you, to your sexuality which you feel in your spirit ... Transvestites, which were not able to dance, to sing, were dragged into prostitution because of government pressure on them, later, the same government began to put them in prisons (I served eight months in jail after the coup), or send them to hospitals. For example, I was subjected to a bastinado three times; the ranking police officer and his team lynched my all body and sent me to a venereal hospital by hitting me with firewood. Furthermore, this government, that is, Özal's power is the copy of the former; the military left, but nothing has changed, this time it became the police state ... Similarly, I was faced with very coercive factors in the labor place; that is, I could not acquire any permanent occupation. Although I took pains in order to act like a man, could not be rid of exclusion in work places owing to my sexual preference. In addition, I was often harassed by imputations, like, "you are like a broad." I have no option but to do prostitution. Astonishingly, 70 percent of my costumers are teleferic,* most are married even they have grandchild, but, in respect of their talk, they had gotten married in order to create an impression on society as if they were man. When they come to bed, they are more woman than you and me, however.[153]

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* It implies costumers who are both active and passive in their spoken language. Ibid., p. 21.

[153] "*Darbeden sonra gece klüpleri daha erken kapanmaya başladı, bir yıl sonra Bülent Ersoy yasaklandı. Neden? Güya topluma kötü örnek oluyorlar, çünkü çocukları cinsel gelişimleri açısından etkiliyorlar. Doğru değil, neden diğer insanlar da kadın kılığına girmiyor? Bu tamamen sana bağlı, senin ruhundaki*

This passage from the interview, first, indicates, together with the right and the left political activities, how each lifestyle that jeopardized the homogeneity of society, or that impeded the continuity of some institutions based on an absolute sexual bifurcation was enmeshed by the military power in a way of criminalization and violence.[154] The criminalization and exclusion of other sexualities were carried out by the civil power although famous transsexual or travesty figures who had been banned attained their rights in this period; in addition, although the press took them under consideration. This contradictory situation can be accounted for by scrutinizing the position of the press within the discourse of sexual freedom. In this manner, it is likely that (in the case of *Erkekçe*) the press demystified the notion of sexual identities in a way that it exalted them within an *individualistic discourse* instead of presenting them on an ideological base. Indisputably, finding many documents about other sexualities the pages of the press in the 1980s might be not hard, but it, with the ideological deprivation, can be related to the surrounding wave that mounted rapidly during the 1980s: Diminishing the impenetrable barrier between the public sphere and the private one; following this, the public sphere conquered by the private sphere. This was the fulfillment of the 1980s; that is, "the disclosure of the private life," "the classification of sexual tendencies," and

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cinselliğe bağlı ... Dans edemeyen, şarkı söyleyemeyen travestiler devlet baskısıyla fahişeliğe sürüklendiler sonra yine devlet onları hapishanelere tıkmaya başladı (Ben sekiz ay hapis cezası çektim darbeden sonra) veya hastanelere yolladı. Mesela ben üç kez falakaya yatırıldım, komiser ve ekibi bütün vücudumu linç etti ve zührevi hastaneye yolladılar odunla döverek. Bu hükümet de, yani Özal iktidarı bir öncekinin kopyası; asker bıraktı ama hiçbir şey değişmedi bu sefer polis devleti oldu ... Aynı şekilde, iş alanında da bir sürü zorlayıcı şeyle yüzleştim yani bir işte daimi yer edinemedim. Erkek gibi davranmak için özen göstersem de, iş yerlerinde cinsel tercihimden ötürü dışlanmaktan kurtulamadım. Üstelik sürekli 'sen karı gibisin' gibi ithamlarla taciz edildim. Fahişelik yapmaktan başka olanağım yok. Asıl şaşırtıcı olan müşterilerimin yüzde yetmişi teleferik, çoğu evli hatta torun sahibi. Ama onların anlattıklarına göre toplumda erkek gibi görünmek için evlenmişler. Yatakta senden benden kadınlar oysa ki." Ibid., pp. 21-23.

[154] Rubina Saigol, "Militarizasyon, Ulus ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet: Şiddetli Çatışma Alanları Olarak Kadın Bedenleri" in *Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar*, ed. Ayşe Gül Altınay (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), p. 215.

"the transformation of the private life into a discourse."[155] Assertively, all these notions were glamorized with the impetus of individualism and liberation through the press. As a matter of fact, those, that is, different sexualities were "brave individuals" not advocates of any ideology in the gaze of the press.

The precise evidence of their hesitant approach might be traced in the socio-economic condition of other sexualities by relying on the interview made with Demet Demir; that is, the "military left, but nothing has changed, this time it became the police state." In this sense, the civil power, which preferred to transform but to not prohibit, included the famous figures excluded by the military power, but it did nothing so as to improve the socio-economic condition of common transvestites, homosexuals and so on. Therefore, the press and the civil power were in harmony in spreading the discourse of individualism and liberation throughout society and different sexual tendencies became the fragment of the private life which was displayed within this discourse. This neo-liberal discourse including the private life did not constitute any objection for the military power on account that *Erkekçe* was published immediately after the coup in 1981 even though it had set about taking place in the press in the 1970s: "We did not have any problem with the military power. If we did not get any support from them, there was nothing called *Erkekçe*."[156] Accordingly, surrounding private life and new sexual identities were not as risky as the leftist and the rightist activists of the 1970s, but, at the same time, they were taken got under control so as to not give rise to any departure in society. Consequently, they were both disclosed and criminalized, with similar contrast; they were introduced ostentatiously as "brave individuals" by the press,

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[155] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, pp. 21-22.

[156] *"Bizim askerle hiçbir sorunumuz olmadı. Eğer onların desteğini almasaydık, Erkekçe diye bir şey yoktu."* Interview, Hıncal Uluç, Ibid.

but their position remained as "others" in embedded institutions and in the standard of judgment of society.

Considering them as new identities without including them in the embedded institutions of society, undoubtedly, enabled the subordinated position of homosexuality to continue. Two basic principles of hegemonic masculinity on which it relied, from the perspective of Connell, are the subordination of women and its heterosexual structure that subordinates homosexuality to it. From this point of view, the institution of marriage and the army are the internalized provisions of society which bolster the hegemonic masculinity owing to their heterosexual structure and additionally homosocial construction peculiar to the army. In other words, these are the institutional means for men in proving their masculinity: The teleferic costumers of Demet Demir "had gotten married in order to create an impression on society as if they were man."

In the case of the press, whereas it presented the sexual identities within the discourse of sexual freedom, it perpetuated the constructed masculinity perception on the basis of institutions, however. For instance, the interview made with Zeki Müren* contained audacious questions as to his sexual preference and his sexual life that had never before been asked to him. These questions can be illustrated in this way: "There is a gossip about you, do you affirm these rumors?" "The long and short of it, are you 'homosexual?'" What about 'bisexuality,' in addition to women, have men ever had a

* He was the most famous homosexual singer who was considered like that in the eyes of society in Turkey. He was never excluded by scenes like Bülent Ersoy because he did not declare whether or not he was homosexual. In contrast, Bülent Ersoy underwent a transsexual operation and announced that she was a woman, but the military power considered her neither a man nor a woman. This was the reason for the prohibition, which was put in practice by the military power. As for the civil power, in the case of Zeki Müren, he acquired the significant title related to the state in performing his art in the period of ANAP (the party in power which abolished the prohibition excluding Bülent Ersoy from scenes, at the same time), available [http//www.sanatgunesi.com] at: www.sanatgunesi.com/0hakkimizda.htm

place in your sexual life?" [157] These questions and Müren's answers like "I have had sex with women in a real meaning, my contact with men has not gone beyond the bounds of platonic love, though"[158] represented the liberal approach to sexual issues in terms of their disclosure in the pages of the press, but at same time, the phrase, which belonged to *Erkekçe* in a way that "it is widespread view about you that 'you are not man enough to get married,'"[159] occasioned hegemonic masculinity to be reinforced through the institution of marriage; that is, marriage is the male institution inclined towards proving and strengthening the masculinity concept.

At this point, similar to masculinity, the fixed situation of marriage in this way is a constructed issue in that marriage, as an official agreement in creating a family, constitutes the fundamental social unit which enables the state to organize the "physiological reproduction" and "basic socialization of its citizens."[160] Accordingly, the prolificacy which should be materialized within the boundary of family might be considered as a struggle of the state aiming at getting its citizens under control; that is, "the institution of *family* represents the guaranty of the normal life for the state."[161] Especially, in the case of national ideology, the institution of family constitutes the significant basis in constructing the nation-state so as to embed the notion of "national unity" in society.[162] By relying on such a basis, marriage, made up of two "clear" genders (woman and man), is an institution which deserves an absolute shield against

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[157] *"Hakkınızda birçok dedikodu var, söylenenleri doğruluyor musunuz?" "Uzun lafın kısası, 'homoseksüel misiniz?'" " Ya 'biseksüellik,' kadınların yanında cinsel hayatınızda erkekler de oldu mu?"* *Erkekçe* 3 (March 1984), p. 113.

[158] *"Kadınlarla hakiki temasım oldu, erkeklerle olan temasım ise platonik aşktan ileri gitmedi."* Ibid., p. 114.

[159] *"Sizin 'evlenebilecek kadar erkek olmadığınız'* söyleniyor" Ibid., p. 110.

[160] Selda Şerifesoy, "Aile ve Kemalist Modernizasyon Projesi, 1928-1950" in *Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar*, p.157.

[161] Ibid.

[162] Ibid.

any jolt. For this reason, the institution of marriage is covered rigidly against any differences that could damage its function, as explained above such as homosexuality, bisexuality and so on.

Thus, it was not confusing to see phrases in the press affirming that it was the institution of man that helps him in proving his masculinity. Accordingly, marriage, as male institution of male society, has to sustain its masculinity. In the terminology of Bourdieu, the habitus of masculinity functions through various institutions embedded in the objective structure. Marriage, therefore, is the significant condition (conjuncture) in which the habitus operates, designated by the objective structure. Consequently, the press, which was in harmony with power relations, was interested in different sexualities within the discourse of sexual freedom, private life, and individualism without devastating the basic circle of marriage. Because of this, it used some phrases perpetuating the belief that marriage is an institution attached to masculinity; in addition, it is impossible to find any essay or statement in any way legitimatizing different kinds of marriage based on homosexuality, bisexuality in *Erkekçe* although it considered homosexuality a "social fact"[163] in its answer to a reader's letter claming that "*Erkekçe* incites society to homosexuality."[164]

After illustrating the close link between the family, which is one of three institutions delineating the gender order and the press, which is one of "organizing intellectual (units)" of Gramsci, it is inevitable to present another significant link between the institutionalizing of gender order and the contribution of the press to it, in other words, to present the hesitant position of the press. At this point, the army should

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[163] *Erkekçe* 6 (June 1982) in "Manly Advice."
[164] "*Erkekçe, toplumu eşcinselliğe teşvik ediyor.*" *Erkekçe* 11 (Nowember 1982) in "Manly Advice."

be examined in this context, that is, as an institution instilling masculinity in men.[165] The army represents the most evident homosocial construction in a way of excluding women and homosexuals, which is one of the non-hegemonic masculinities, from this institution; that is, it is an institution revolving about the circle of homosociality based on the "clear distinctions between men and women through segregation," in words of Lipman-Blumen. The army is a homosocial male institution in relation to the exclusion of women and homosexuals (the institution is completely based on heterosexuality), and it is a component of the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity by making "others" dishonored. In that case, the appearance of nation-state and nationalist ideology based on a standing, pure national army instead of an army of paid soldiers and volunteers strengthened the hegemonic masculinity because of the fact that nationalism is resolutely a "male ideology" and it relates the continuity of the nation and the state to masculine power.[166] Thus, "new nationalism that causes to nation-state has accompanied the construction of modern masculinity from beginning."[167] At the same time, the notion of nation-state conditioned the basis of masculinity and male citizenship to do military service through conscription. Because the army is a coercive institution puts the pressure on men, men should do military service in order to get married in view of society and to acquire any public occupation in view of the state. In this manner, homosexuals, in the event that they can manifest their homosexuality, are exempt from military obligation, from another aspect, if it is realized during military service, their families might face

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[165] See Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
[166] See Joane Nagel, "Erkeklik ve Milliyetçilik: Ulusun İnşasında Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Cinsellik" in *Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar*, pp. 66-68.
[167] George, L. Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 7.

denigration like "please come, take your *girl*."[168] This attitude of the Turkish Armed Forces towards homosexuals shows that they are considered "imperfect men," similar to girls who are sent home because they are not virgins.

The same hesitant approach of *Erkekçe* to different sexual identities on the basis of institutions, similar to the institution of marriage, illustrated in the case of the army; in other words, its liberal focus on sexual freedom, can be evaluated in a way of its role in spreading individualism, connected with the neo-liberal discourse, over other movements based on collectivity. For that reason, the press, which imposed the admired figures on other masculinities, contributed to the constitution of the hegemonic form of masculinity within society; however, it participated in the basic ossified determinations which are necessary for the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity; that is, it repeated the position of institutions which are capable of instilling masculinity in men. First, in accordance with the liberal approach to sexual freedom, it is possible to meet with the passage, especially focusing on "the taboo of homosexuality" under the headline of "To Say 'No' is the Right of Men, too!"[169]

> Homophobia begins at school age. It permeates everything deeply from the most hurtful swearword to various idioms such as "mother's pet" or "sissy." Men, beginning from the age of youth, start to get suspicious about their personalities and their sexual identities. They always worry about whether or not they are successful in their sexual experiences with women. If any experience of homosexuality happens to them, they think that they will be perceived as "perverts" throughout their lives ... The truth is that homosexuality is not such a thing which comes by way of experiencing homosexual relation one or two times just as alcoholics do not become alcoholics with two goblets. In scientific definition, homosexuals are only interested in those who have the same sexual identity as them. "We, as individuals of the new age, should behave such a sexual preference respectfully" ... To see two men in the street that are arm in arm brings

[168] "*Lütfen gelin, kızınızı alın.*" Interview, Emre Ak, (May 2006) (A soldier who has just discharged from the Turkish Armed Forces).
[169] "'*Hayır' Demek, Erkeklerin de Hakkı*!" *Erkekçe* 6 (June 1982), 42.

> "homosexuality" to our minds. Especially, in Western countries, this situation is found very strange whereas it is regarded as a closeness attributed to friendship in Latin countries and the Middle East ... "The taboo of homosexuality" in Turkey; that is, denying man-to-man relations completely, puts the pressure on us in a way that relations between man and women has to be a sexual relation at all costs. We believe that the breakdown in society related to "the taboo of homosexuality" will lead woman-man relations to go in a reliable way.[170]

Second, *Erkekçe*, which argued that the "breakdown related to the taboo of homosexuality" would improve woman-man relations, at the same time, agreed with an essay which explained a therapy associated with the process of making *a normal man* of a man; in addition, *Erkekçe* wrote a spot for this essay like "He was a man who suffers from *anxiety* about becoming homosexual. What about now?" [171] The underlying point of this essay is not the magazine's spot that defined homosexuality as a state of "anxiety," but also the content of the essay that enlightened the transformative and complementary role of the army in the process of making one a normal man. A passage from this essay, which described the therapy carried on by Psychologist Dr. Mahir Bozak, gives very important clues about how the army is regarded as an institution transforming man into a *normal* and a *complete* man even in the view of a psychologist. In the words of a psychologist,

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[170] "*Homofobi okul çağlarında başlar. En ağır küfürlerden 'ana kuzusu' ya da 'hanım evladı' gibi çeşitli deyimlere kadar her yere sinmiştir. Erkekler gençlik çağlarından itibaren, kişilikleri ve cinsel kimlikleri hakkında şüphe duymaya başlarlar. Kadınlarla olan cinsel deneyimlerinde başarılı olup olmadıklarından sürekli kaygılanırlar. Eğer başlarından herhangi bir eşcinsellik deneyimi geçmişse, ömürleri boyunca 'cinsel sapık' gibi algılanacaklarını düşünürler ... Gerçek şu ki, eşcinsellik bir iki eşcinsel ilişkiyle olunacak bir şey değildir nasıl ki alkolikler iki kadehle alkolik olmuyorlarsa. Bilimsel tanımla, homoseksüeller sadece kendileriyle aynı cinsel kimliğe sahip birilerine ilgi duyarlar. 'Bizler, yeni çağın bireyleri olarak böyle bir cinsel tercihe saygı duymalıyız' ... Sokakta el ele iki adam görmek bize 'eşcinselliği' çağrıştırır. Özellikle Batı ülkelerinde bu durum çok tuhaf karşılanır, Orta Doğu ve Latin ülkelerinde ise arkadaşlığa dair bir yakınlık olarak görülür. Türkiye'deki 'eşcinsellik tabusu,' erkek erkeğe ilişkilerin tamamen yadsınması, bizde kadınla erkek arasındaki ilişkilerin ille de cinsel bir ilişki olması yönünde bir baskı oluşturur. Biz toplumdaki 'eşcinsellik tabusuna' dair bir kırılmanın kadın erkek ilişkilerinin daha sağlıklı bir şekilde ilerlemesine neden olacağını düşünüyoruz.*" *Erkekçe*, Ibid.

[171] "*O, homoseksüel olma endişesiyle kıvranan bir erkekti. Ya şimdi?*" *Erkekçe* 10 (October 1984) p. 33.

> He asked me that "Is it understood if I am homosexual when someone gazes at me while I walk in the street?" We had been together during the therapy more than three years ... In this period, he was twenty-four years old and taking the university education, but was not successful because he was not able to concentrate on his lessons. He was paying attention to each striking woman to the extent of pictures that he saw in the street, and was testing whether or not they aroused him. The questions like "Can I be successful if have sex?" was the focal point of his all life. With the effect of therapy, there is an improvement in his psychology. He graduated from university, now had to do his military service, but this situation was making him worried. What would he do among so many *healthy* men? If it is understood that he was homosexual, what would happen? He was afraid "bad things" that would happen to him in the army ... When he returned; there was a big difference to the extent that he was not recognizable. He was purified from his entire phobia, and became a *complete* man. The military service was the most important test that he had passed ... He is *a successful businessman* now, and his sexual life is healthy like every *normal* man. [172]

By way of this passage, especially the way of attracting attention to adjectives that were used so as to define a man as a real man, it is clarified what the contrasts of these adjectives represent: It is homosexuality. According to *Erkekçe*, homosexuality as "a social fact," amounted to "incompleteness," "abnormality," and to "unhealthiness" on the basis of masculinity by giving a place to this kind of essay in its pages, however. Here, hegemony based on persuasion, which is embedded in society by the organization of social institutions and by the press in a way of normalizing and naturalizing the root of hegemonic form, was perpetuated through referring to the role of the army instilling masculinity in man and through ascribing the notions of completeness, healthiness, and normality to heterosexuality; therefore, hegemonic masculinity was reproduced. In a

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[172] "'*Sokakta yürürken bana bakıyorlar, homoseksüel olduğum anlaşılıyor mu?' diye sordu. Terapi boyunca üç yılı aşkın bir süre birlikte olduk ... Bu sırada yirmi dört yaşındaydı ve üniversiteye devam ediyordu. Fakat aklını derslerine veremediği için başarılı değildi. Sokakta gördüğü resimlere kadar her güzel kadını inceliyordu ve gördüklerinin onu tahrik edip etmediğini sorguluyordu. 'Eğer cinsel ilişkiye girersem başarılı olabilir miyim?' türünden sorular hayatının odak noktasıydı. Terapinin etkisiyle psikolojisinde bir düzelme oldu. Üniversiteden mezun oldu artık askere gitmek zorundaydı ama bu durum onu endişelendiriyordu. Onca sağlıklı erkeğin arasında ne yapardı? Homoseksüel olduğu anlaşılırsa ne olurdu? Askerde başına gelebilecek 'kötü şeylerden' korkuyordu ... Döndüğünde tanınmayacak kadar büyük bir fark vardı. Bütün korkularından arındı ve tam bir erkek oldu. Şimdi başarılı bir iş adamı ve cinsel hayatı her normal erkek gibi sağlıklı.*" *Erkekçe*, Ibid., p. 118.

contradictory way, the press had a direct impact on hegemonic masculinity in a way of imposing admired figures on society, as for this case, while *Erkekçe* naturalized and normalized homosexuality as an identity in its various issues, it, similar to the matter of marriage, reinforced the "persuasion" in a way of normalizing and naturalizing the masculine characteristic of institutions (the army), and it led to the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity, on the other hand. In addition, it did not avoid giving some parts of this essay as spots; "Now had to do his military service," "What would he do among so many *healthy* men? If it was understood that he was homosexual, what would happen?" "He was purified from his entire phobia, and became a *complete* man." From another aspect, the last significant point of this essay was the presentation of this man, who became a complete man after doing his military service, as *a successful man.* This presentation, in addition, was in harmony with hegemonic masculinity related to his occupation, which was regarded as a superior one within masculine figures by the press in the 1980s, as illustrated earlier in this study.

Apart from homosexuality and transsexuality, *Erkekçe* threw a new identity out for consideration, classified as "androgynous." By relying on the study of Elizabeth Badinter, it defines androgynous as "the transitivity of gender roles between man and woman." [173] Following this, "androgynous came to mean not the effeminacy of man or manliness of woman but it rather means becoming distant from the dominant gender roles." [174] The introductory paragraph of this essay was like that:

> The masculine and feminine characteristics of personality, which stems from social division of labor, are not regarded as two extreme points completely different from each other anymore because "the perfect one" can have peculiarities, related to

[173] "Erkek ve kadın arasındaki toplumsal cinsiyet rollerinin geçişliliği" *Erkekçe* 5 (May 1990), p. 66.
[174] "Androjen, erkeğin kadınsılaşmasını ya da kadının erkeksileşmesini değil de daha ziyade egemen toplumsal cinsiyet rollerinden uzaklaşmayı ifade eder." Ibid.

> other sexuality, in its own in an indistinguishable way. In other words, it is impossible to distinguish between man defined as "logical, independent, and ambitious" and woman defined as "emotional, sensitive, and dependent" from each other in a clear way this much anymore.[175]

The increase in the proportion of women in the division of labor, advanced methods connected with the birth control, the existence of the genderless educational system and mass media, and, for sure, the industrial mass production enabled women to take charge of the reproduction of society; in addition, the effect of women's liberation and mass media products led genders to resemble each other. As will be examined in the section of this chapter (The Position of Women), it is possible to see plenty of essays in *Erkekçe* about birth control, the social division of labor, and so on, with the effect of neo-liberal discourse. For that reason, it is usual to see with androgynous as an onward step in the arena of gender, especially when *Erkekçe* is considered as the representation of the 1980s in every respect. However, the paragraph putting forth the conception of androgynous for consideration paved the way for elaborating on the masculinity concept; with this presentation of androgynous, *Erkekçe*, above else, ratified the validity of the masculine (logical, independent, and ambitious) and feminine (emotional, sensitive, and dependent) characteristics; in this way, it reproduced them at one different state. Therefore, it, together with not eradicating the discrimination of female-masculine, perpetuated the imposed feminine and masculine characteristics by making reference to them while defining the androgynous. That is to say, by way of keeping dispositions, which constitute the center origin of practices, in an objective structure, the function of

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[175] *"Toplumsal işbölümünden kaynaklanan kadın ve erkek kişilik özelliklerine; günümüzde artık birbirinden tamamen farklı iki uç nokta olarak bakılmıyor. Çünkü 'mükemmel kişi', diğer cinse ilişkin özellikleri, ayırt edilmeyecek bir biçimde kendinde bulundurabiliyor. Başka bir deyişle, 'mantıklı, bağımsız, hırslı' olarak tanımlanan erkekle, 'duygulu, duyarlı, bağımlı' olarak tanımlanan kadını, bu kadar net olarak birbirinden ayırt etmek artık olanaksız."* Ibid., p. 65.

the masculinity habitus is sustained. Here, the crucial point which is under consideration is the transformation of the objective structure towards making masculine domination continue by way of repeating dispositions, which is regarded as peculiar to the habitus of masculinity. Similar to case of the "perfect one," *Erkekçe* did not avoid repeating clear dispositions attributed to women and man, while presenting androgynous as the most balanced personality,

> "The most balanced people" are those who blend both feminine characteristics such as "compassionateness," "tenderness," "sensitivity," "closeness," and "having an aptitude for cooperation" and masculine characteristics like "leadership," "taking the initiative," and "competition" in their personalities.[176]

Last but not least, the issue which might be scrutinized in this part of the study is the ironic headline of this essay related to androgynous. Similar to the case of marriage and the army, another ossified doctrine repeated in *Erkekçe* is "male fraternity" in constructing a nation,[177] ironically. The basic purpose of this essay, by relying on a poll*, is to reveal that 29.5 percent of men in Turkey have characteristics of androgyny.[178] However, in the case of this study, the importance of this essay does not underlie its disclosure of such a scientific finding but rather lies behind the ironic headline given by

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[176] "'*En dengeli insanlar,' 'merhametlilik,' 'sevecenlik,' 'duyarlılık,' 'yakınlık,' 'işbirliğine yatkınlık' gibi kadınsı niteliklerle; 'liderlik,' 'inisiyatif kullanma,' 'rekabet' gibi erkeksi nitelikleri kişiliğinde harmanlamış olanlar.*" Ibid., p. 66.

[177] Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Sevgili ve Ana Olarak Erotik Vatan: Sevmek, Sahiplenmek, Korumak" in *Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar*, p. 118.

* The poll is called Bam Scale because it was first developed by an American researcher Sandra Bam in 1974. Later, it was adapted to Turkey and carried out by a committee with the presidency of Şahika Yüksel, who was a Professor in the Department of Psychiatry, Istanbul University. The Bam Scale is made up of sixty characteristics that individuals define themselves: The fist twenty characteristic for women, the subsequent twenty for men, and the last for both. All characteristics were answered as seven graded, and the points of masculinity and femininity were acquired. According to these points, individuals, who intensely had both characteristic of masculinity and femininity, were classified as androgynous. *Erkekçe* 5 (May 1996) p. 66.

[178] Ibid.

Erkekçe: "It Is Not Like We Are A 'Male Nation' At All."[179] Potency, which provides the power to the masculinity, or brings forth the masculine domination, that is, which enables the habitus of masculinity to function in a hegemonic way, springs from the construction of nation upon a male manifestation. The male manifestation, which is concretized through institutions such as marriage, the army, envisages the homeland as a "female body." The imagination of homeland which is "possessed" and "protected" as a female body,[180] at the same time, like a sovereignty of nation (identified with man concept) over homeland, necessitates the subjugation of woman to man in social practices. Accordingly, the ideology based on such a basis excludes women from social agreement,[181] or subordinates them in social organizations. This construction is the artery of hegemonic masculinity from which it is cherished, and *Erkekçe* repeats the legitimacy of this artery in an ironic way.

Now and then, the perception of hegemony is more difficult when it is not extreme. This was the accomplishment (!) of the 1980; to weaken the extremity of hegemony by presenting, disclosing, glamorizing new identities such as homosexuals, transvestites, transsexuals, and androgynous, but hegemonic masculinity clung to embedded constructions so exceedingly that it was ridiculous to expect the press in the 1980s to demystify the notion of hegemonic masculinity, especially when it was conceived of as a fragment of these constructions. Consequently, each one of those was material for the market, particularly towards the 1990s, each was a particle of the discourse of private life, and a symbol of the classification of sexualities; however, all were "brave individuals" of the 1980s and agents of the neo-liberal movements. This hesitant

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[179] "Hiç de Öyle 'Erkek Millet' Değiliz" Ibid., p.65
[180] Najmabadi, "Sevgili ve Ana Olarak Erotik Vatan: Sevmek, Sahiplenmek, Korumak," p.118.
[181] Ibid.

approach of the press to subordinated masculinities was not rara avis for depicting the 1980s, in the same way, the *position of women* was very valuable issue to touch, especially so as to shed light on the 1980s.

The Position of Women

The habitus of masculinity might be delineated as a *severe battle* in which serious games of competition between men are performed that: "Real honor is determined by another man who is regarded as a rival in the process of the struggle for honor,"[182] from the straightforward view of Bourdieu. In this manner, man first has a tendency to establish power over other men; however, hegemonic masculinity is merely hegemonic in so far as it confines women to subordinate position from all institutional stratifications to mediocre interactions observed in society. Accordingly, the role undertaken by women in this gender order is never anything other than that of a "mirror" reflecting, verifying, and solidifying the hegemony of men.[183] In other words, by reckoning upon Bourdieu's estimable approach to masculinity, the process of becoming men or of constructing hegemonic masculinity can not be envisaged as independent from the continuous *submission* of women to men. In addition, the significant constituent factor of hegemonic masculinity is the infinite *appreciation* displayed by women,[184] or is the historic 'sexual politics'[185] that makes women "willing accomplices."[186] For sure, this

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[182]Quoted from Hilal Onur and Berrin Koyuncu, "'Hegemonik' Erkekliğin Görünmeyen Yüzü: Sosyalizasyon Sürecinde Erkeklik Oluşumları ve Krizleri Üzerine Düşünceler," *Toplum ve Bilim* 101 (Fall 2004), p. 33.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Ibid., p.35.
[185] The concept of "sexual politic" threw out for consideration by Kate Millett to define the "patriarchy." Josephine Donovan, *Feminist Teori* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), p. 276.

submission, appreciation, and, in general "sexual politics" are not women's own preference; the highlighted point here is that the necessity of hegemonic masculinity so as to be hegemonic is to reduce women to "mirror" positions that incessantly appreciate men. In this manner, the process of rendering woman to the mirror position or of making them "willing accomplice" is fulfilled by an "ideological persuasion" according to Kate Millett.[187]

With the theoretical framework of hegemonic masculinity, it was elucidated that there are three trivets that sustain hegemonic masculinity: sexism, homophobia, and racism.[188] However, today, masculinity studies more than ever focus on its construction on a social base, owing to the fact that there is a heated debate on whether or not hegemonic masculinity is in crises. This heated debate has surfaced within last thirty years with the effect of both women and gay, lesbian movements that triggers to rapid change and transformation in gender order. Accordingly, in the case of the 1980s in Turkey, I have tried to reveal how hegemonic masculinity was reproduced in relation to the subordination of such groups as homosexuals, transvestites, and transsexuals, despite *Erkekçe*'s tolerant attitude towards them. In that part, my basic purpose was to bring the rigid tie between hegemonic masculinity and power relations out into the open through accentuating the ossified structure of hegemonic masculinity on the basis of heterosexual (marriage) and homosocial institutions (army). In this way, I have converged on the ambivalent approach of *Erkekçe* to these subordinated identities by giving attention to its cooperation with the civil power, relatively the military power, and the market.

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[186] Sadja Goldsmith, "Birth Control and the New Women," Review, *Family Planning Perspectives* 2 (April 1971), p. 64.
[187] Josephine Donovan, *Feminist Teori* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), p. 276
[188] Kimmel, "Invisible Masculinity," p.3.

Beyond a doubt, considerable movements attributed to different identities such as gays, transsexuals, and bisexuals have paved the way for examining homophobic masculinity and proposed a threat against heterosexuality, which is the basic trivet of hegemonic masculinity, for the agenda. During the 1980s, these publicized social figures (different sexual identities such as homosexuals) were to be included but excluded, disclosed but concealed, and in a comprehensible way, they were individualized but collectivized. In the event of considering *Erkekçe* as a clear representation of hesitancy of the 1980s, it is clarified that the pile of hegemonic masculinity based on heterosexuality was not uprooted, albeit these different *identities* were approved as a social fact by *Erkekçe* because the heterosexual structure of hegemonic masculinity, constructed by subordinating homosexuals, transsexuals, and transvestites as others, was perpetuated; it, furthermore, was reinforced in a way of stabilizing institutional approvals that can be bestowed merely upon heterosexual masculinity.

As for the case of women, in the 1980s, the position of women might be evaluated from two aspects, or the posture of woman might be photographed with two different objectives. The former of these represents the type of the *New Woman* who "challenged existing gender relations and the distribution of power" and "fought for professional visibility and espoused innovative, often radical economic and social reforms,"[189] in the words of Smith and Rosenberg. Especially, "the rise of women's collages, women's increased literacy, delayed age of marriage, an ideology of upward mobility, and capitalist development"[190] led to the New Woman, who was an avowed feminist all over the world. At this point, within the same decade in Turkey, *Erkekçe* supported this type

[189] Quoted from Michael S. Kimmel, "Men's Responses to Feminism at the Turn of the Century," *Gender and Society* 3 (Sep 1987), p. 265.
[190] Ibid.

of New Woman by giving place to some issues considered as peculiar to women such as contraception, birth control in its pages and by keeping some legal arrangements like abortion and the headship of household on the agenda. In response to this type of New Women, *Erkekçe* presented the model of the New Men oriented towards giving support to women who demanded the right to limiting her own reproduction with the slogan "the uterus belongs to me,"[191] that had spread throughout America and who struggled in the matter of taking place in the public sphere and in the social division of labor. This type of New Woman undertook a significant function in undermining the traditional perception of femininity within society. In this manner, they adopted an attitude on the side of refusing the destiny of *prolificacy* imposed on them by the existing gender order, which portrays women as only a wife and a mother in the social configuration. They, in this respect, asserted the notion of "sexual equality" that indicates a social construction in which women would take on the diverse roles independent from their bonds of domestic life.[192]

When it comes to Turkey, the feminist movement breeding the type of the New Women broke out with the relevance of the publishing business, before all else. In other words, feminism, with the discovery of the mass named "woman reader," came to a state of popular material for the capital of the press,[193] for sure, the marketization of feminist elements contributed the ideological aspects of feminist theory to be dismantled, it,

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[191] Susan A. Watkins, Marisa Rueda, and Marta Rodriguez, *Feminizm* (Istanbul: AD Publishing, 1996) p.126.

[192] Ibid., p. 65.

[193] The discovery of the mass of *woman reader* materialized, especially with the publishing of the book "Kadının Adı Yok (Woman Do Not Have the Name)," written by Duygu Asena in 1987 and the book attained its tenth edition within one year; in addition, it was adapted to the cinema in the same year. It, however, was not escaped from being banned through the Law of Protecting Juveniles from Detrimental Publications. Subsequently, the ban related to the selling of the book was abolished with the court order and it accomplished its 53rd edition so far. www. biyografi.net/kisiayrinti.asp?kisiid=217

therefore, was popularized. That is to say, feminism, in the 1980s, expanded such a splendid deception of the press in the case of Turkey.[194] Following this, the conspicuous point in the case of women liberation was that the feminist discourse, in Turkey, did not come into being through a collective conscious which would pave the way for a social women's movement, but it rather greened through the incitement of the press. The feminist discourse that budded in the press might be accounted for by two reasons; the first, as mentioned above, was a purpose directed towards making a profit with the discovery of the mass of *woman reader* and the second, with the effect of the integration with America, was the carrying of the literature, which had a commanding influence over the American press.[195] In this manner, the model of New Man, similar to the New Woman, appeared in the Turkish press by being inspired by the origins of foreign press, accordingly, in the case of *Erkekçe*, it is possible to follow a trail of profeminist men's movement in response to feminism. In other words, *Erkekçe* held a particular part of the profeminist men's movement (!) within the feminist discourse which was respected in the Turkish press. At this point, in this part of study, my purpose is not to elucidate whether or not the attitude of the press in relation to the New Man led to any social transformation in the gender order, but rather it is to examine whether or not the Turkish press was engrossed in being the initiator of such a radical men's movement which is in harmony with the feminist women's movement. In reality, converging into the second matter would throw light on the first issue to a great degree. The point in question here is to what extent *Erkekçe* was independent from the embedded masculinity perception in

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[194] Ece Temelkuran, "'80'lerden Milenyuma Kadınlar ve 'Karşı-Kadının' Yeniden Tarifi İhtiyacı: Batik Elbiseden Süper Kadına...," *Birikim* 152-153 (December 2001- January 2002), p. 100.

[195] " In the matter of Erkekçe's success, we are indebted to Kurthan Fişek who rewrote the essays by collecting them from various American magazines." Interview, Hıncal Uluç, Ibid.

presenting the model of New Man, or whether or not the New Man and the New Woman consisted of a big misapprehension which brought about consolidating hegemonic masculinity at a different level. Did the position of women in the gender order transform into a different state in a way that would rescue them from the position in which they were subjugated, subordinated, and neutralized? If that was so, was this transformation able to unfasten the ties of hegemonic masculinity? From different aspect, did it imply to a new kind of "emphasized femininity" that was reproduced in response to hegemonic masculinity in the 1980s?

To put forward an idea as to these questions, it is necessary to elaborate on the admired feminine figures presented by *Erkekçe*, first of all. In this manner, there were two palpable women figures in *Erkekçe*: the first was the image of working woman as a participant in the public sphere and the second was an image tremendously sexualized as a component of the lust. In point of fact, it is not a proper approach to regard these woman figures as separate from each other because the feminist discourse exploded in the Turkish press with the boom of sexual freedom; that is, the contents of the feminist movement were identified with the image of the "audacious woman." To remove the inequalities of power between woman and man, "the more well-groomed, more cheerful, and more striking" type of woman was illustrated. In this way, the woman, by capturing the "power of becoming a desirable woman," would equalize the power between woman and man.[196] This urban-based and working woman, at the same time, was vigorous, smart, and sexy in the 1980s.

> You can be a "desirable woman" in the gaze of men. If that is the case, what are the apparent peculiarities of the type of this desirable woman? ... For men, a

[196] Temelkuran, "'80'lerden Milenyuma Kadınlar ve 'Karşı-Kadının' Yeniden Tarifi İhtiyacı: Batik Elbiseden Süper Kadına..." p. 101.

> woman who knows her own mind, feels sure of her personality, and takes pains over her body, also a woman who is conscious of her sexuality is an irresistible woman[197] ... Men, especially like the woman who is successful in her occupation and in her sexual life. For portraying the New Woman of the 1980s, there is only word; it is the "self-confidence."[198]

Erkekçe, in the same way, as a response to a reader letter related to this self-confident woman, backs the audacious woman of the 1980s by repeating the peculiarities that render a woman desirable to men. The reader letter, which includes this kind of passage, "At a party in that I went to recently, a woman, who invited me to her own flat to have sex, confused me very much. For a long time now, man takes the initiative in such cases. Actually, she is a 'well-bred woman,' but I regard such a behavior as unsuitable for her ...,"[199] takes the feedback, which is in favor of that woman, from *Erkekçe*. It is as follows:

> You should feel glad to meet such a woman who is not reluctant to do what she wants. Instead of finding her very strange, you should appreciate that woman because of her mighty personality. To consider sex as a thing which fires away with initiative of man points out that you do not notice that women began to claim to be owner of their sexualities to a great degree. Besides, what is the limit of being "well-bred?" Does the expressing by a person of what he/she wants without hesitating indicate that he/she is taught 'bad' manners? The number of women that you told is not such amount which is undervalued. It appears that you lag behind the times.[200]

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[197] *"Erkeklerin gözünde 'cazip bir kadın' olabilirsiniz. Öyle ise, bu cazip kadın tipinin belirgin özellikleri nelerdir?... Erkekler için, ne istediğini bilen, kişiliğine güvenen, vücuduna özen gösteren ve de cinselliğinin farkında olan kadın dayanılmaz bir kadındır. Erkekçe* 4 (April 1982) p. 36.

[198] *Erkekler özellikle, işinde ve cinsel yaşamında başarılı kadınlardan hoşlanırlar. 1980'lerin Yeni Kadını'nı tanımlamak için tek bir kelime var, o da 'özgüven.' Erkekçe* 7 (July 1984) p. 101.

[199] *"Geçenlerde gittiğim bir partide, sevişmek için beni kendi dairesine çağıran bir kadın kafamı çok karıştırdı. Bildim bileli , bu gibi konularda ilk adımı erkek atar. Aslında, 'terbiyeli bir kadın' ama böyle bir davranışı ona yakıştıramadım." Erkekçe* 11 (Nowember 1982) in Manly Advices

[200] *" İstediğini yapmaktan çekinmeyen bir kadınla karşılaştığınız için sevinmelisiniz. Yadırgamaktansa, güçlü kişiliğinden dolayı o kadını takdir etmelisiniz. Seksi, erkeğin inisiyatifi ile başlayan bir şeymiş gibi düşünmek, sizin, kadınların cinselliklerine büyük ölçüde sahip çıkmaya başladıklarını bilmediğinizi gösterir. Ayrıca, 'terbiyeli olmanın' ölçüsü ne? İnsanın isteği şeyi çekinmeden dile getirmesi, onun 'kötü' terbiye almış olduğunu mu gösterir? Anlattığınız kadınların sayısı öyle küçümsenir miktarda değil. Anlaşılan, siz zamanın epey gerisindesiniz.* Ibid.

The power of woman was stored in her sexuality and she, through this overstressed feminine sexuality, would be able to crush the power of man. Therefore, the position of woman as a sexual object was reproduced within different discourse; however, the sole meaning of woman was not being an agent of the sexual instigation, but her sexual appeal was a sine qua non notion so as to establish the power in itself over men in the social configuration.[201] As it is, the movies of this decade, which had a great influence on that period, albeit they reflected the feminist discourse of the 1980s, were mentioned not for their opposing positions but for their sexual images that drew a veil over that position. [202] In this connection, *Erkekçe*, through revealing the noticeable modification in the type of leading woman of the Turkish Cinema, presents the image of "free woman" in the 1980s like that:

> Henceforth, the types of "real woman" came to the fore in the cinema instead of the type of "delusive women," who do not strip, kiss, or have sex. In brief, the type of leading woman has changed in the cinema ... Relations between woman and men are not displayed with an exaggerated romanticism and affectation, anymore. The type of woman who experiences her sexuality has taken the place of the asexual, bashful, and "puppet-baby" type of woman ... Established molds have been broken down, smashed to smithereens. Although traditions and customs restrict the sexual and social life of women, woman is woman everywhere of the world, and has an undeniable sexuality. Especially, in the countries which are urbanized and industrialized, the "woman phenomenon" is an important matter. Woman is a universal issue... The New Woman of the Turkish Cinema, in the 1980s, has reached the type of this "modern woman," has identified with it, and the suppressed sexual feelings has come to light with the image of this New Woman ... The type of "free woman" has appeared in Turkey together with the 1980s and in order to observe the type of this free woman, there is not a more accurate ground but to the cinema.[203]

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[201] Ayşe Saktanber, "Türkiye'de Medyada Kadın: Serbest, Müsait Kadın veya İyi Eş, Fedekar Anne" in *Kadın Bakış Açısından 1980'ler Türkiyesi'nde* Kadınlar, ed. By Şirin Tekeli (Istanbul: İletişim, 1990),pp. 202-203

[202] Hilmi Maktav, "Türk Sineması'nda Yeni Bir Dönem," *Birikim* 152-153 (December 2001- January 2002), p. 226.

[203] "*Bundan böyle, sinemada, soyunmayan, öpüşmeyen, sevişmeyen 'hayali kadın' tipindense; 'yaşayan kadın' tipi öne geçti. Kısacası, sinemadaki kadın başrol tipi değişti ... Kadın ve erkek arasındaki ilişkiler artık abartılı bir romantizm ve yapaylıkla gösterilmiyor. Cinselliğini yaşayan kadın tipi, aseksüel, utangaç ve kukla-bebek kadın tipinin yerini aldı ... Yerleşik kalıplar yıkıldı, tuz buz oldu. Gelenek ve görenekler*

As seen from these examples, the conception of free, modern and self-confident woman completely amounted to the same thing with the image of woman who is embellished the sexual motifs.[204] The audacious woman in sexual meaning is presented as a woman type of the 1980s; at the same time, the man startled by this woman is charged with "lagging behind the time." In this way, *Erkekçe*, through negating that kind of man, gave a clue as to the type of man expected of the 1980s. In the words of *Erkekçe*, the "woman phenomenon" was only considered within the concept of sexual freedom. In addition to this, the image of the freed woman in terms of sexuality meant anything other than becoming a more desirable woman for men. Consequently, in the gender order molded with respect to a rigid masculinity construction, the perception of femininity was always constituted in a way of not making a hole in this masculine domination.[205] Accordingly, while the image of extremely sexualized free woman overshadowed the ideological and political sides of feminism in Turkey, it, at the same time, perpetuated the intensity of hegemonic masculinity because the impetus of such a woman image sprung from the gender order in which woman was envisaged as a sexual object. From this point of view, a statement quoted from *Erkekçe*, "A woman who has sexual self-confidence is the important symbol related to the prestige of the man whom she accompanies,"[206]clarifies that the woman image of the 1980s was nothing but to be

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kadının cinsel ve sosyal yaşamını kısıtlasa da, kadın dünyanın her yerinde kadın ve inkar edilemez bir cinselliğe sahip. Özellikle, kentleşmiş ve sanayileşmiş ülkelerde, "kadın olayı" önemli bir sorun. Kadın evrensel bir konu... 1980'ler de, Türk sinemasının Yeni Kadını, bu 'modern kadın' tipine ulaştı, onla özdeşleşti ve bastırılmış cinsel duygular bu Yeni Kadın imgesi ile gün ışığına çıktı ... Türkiye'de, 'Özgür kadın' tipi 1980'lerle birlikte ortaya çıktı ve bu özgür kadın tipini gözlemlemek için sinemadan daha doğru bir zemin yok." *Erkekçe* 11 (Nowember 1985) pp. 30, 103.

[204] Tahsin Yücel, "Özgür Kadınlar," *Defter* 35 (Winter 1999), p. 120.

[205] Cathrine A. Mackinnon, *Feminist Bir Devlet Kuramına Doğru* (Istanbul: Metis, 2003), p. 151

[206] "*Cinsel özgüvene sahip bir kadın, eşlik ettiği erkeğin prestijine ilişkin önemli bir semboldür.*" *Erkekçe* 10 (October 1981) p. 91

an object directed towards the display. The vigorous and self-confident woman of the 1980s, as a symbol of prestige, was of help to men at most such that if masculinity puts a strain upon man at most, or if it is constructed in a field of power like the power of some men over other men;[207] therefore, the woman image of the 1980s was the secondary character reinforcing the masculinity of men. That is to say, the power (sexual self-confidence) acquired by woman was again subordinated to man in a way of hardening the power of man. At this point, can we claim that there was a rapid change in the gender order in which woman were impelled to the *mirror position*? I firmly believe that woman, as a mirror, continued to reflect the power of man, but she was also convinced that her own power was reflecting on man, through the image of the New Woman pumped by the press, especially by popular magazines. Here, the aforementioned power, which was ascribed to woman, was never anything but to be a power that reevaluated woman all by itself as a sexual object. "As long as sexual inequality remains sexual; that is, to regard sexuality as an issue concerning women and to delineate women as if they were owner of it,"[208] would perpetuate old sexual politics in modern undress. In this manner, the discourse of *sexual freedom* consisted of a notion propping the hegemonic masculine power.[209] A meaningful sexual revolution requires a fundamental change in some institutions based on a strict sexual bifurcation to which set a limits women's and men's perceptions of themselves and of their roles in society. At this point, what was the approach of *Erkekçe* to such an institution within the discourse of sexual freedom?

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[207] Kimmel, "Invisible Masculinity," p. 3

[208] McKinnon, *Feminist Bir Devlet Kuramına Doğru*, p. 179.

[209] At this point, the sexual freedom and the freedom of woman does not amount to each other. The discourse of sexual freedom is another cunning which lead to the subjugation of women. In this manner, "Sex" or, in the words of 'radical feminists,' "love" is the opium which cause women to submit themselves to masculine domination. Josephine Donovan, *Feminist Teori*, p. 271

The Institution of Marriage within the Discourse of Sexual Freedom

> Marriage, reduced to a "legal agreement" in which individuals participate with their reciprocal content, can be dissolved easily in comparison to the past. This, however, indicates that feelings that people mutually nourish to each other might change as time passes ... In brief, sometimes, extra-marital relations might appear. We should grant that some married couples, in order to "give a novel touch" to an insipid married life, increasingly go towards the extra-marital relations.[210]

Erkekçe, with the effect of such essays, was held responsible for "steering people towards extra-marital relations"[211] by one reader letter. On the other hand, the underlying point of the extra-marital relations with respect to women was that they, in *Erkekçe*, were discussed from the perspective of rights upon which were bestow woman. In this manner, "diversity" or "freedom of choice" was not an issue that solely favored men at the expense of women. In addition, the tendency of women towards extra-marital relations did not spring from "inadequacy in the virility of their partners;" that is, "diversity" or "freedom of choice" was the right of woman, too.[212]

> When most men understand that a woman has entered into relations with another man, they react because they suppose that this stems from the inadequacy in their own virility. However, it is a mistake. It is inevitable to accept unwillingly that women, like men, too might require "diversity." An idea, which states that the need of "diversity" is merely men's right, became antiquated in present days.[213]

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[210] *"Şahısların karşılıklı rızalarıyla girdikleri 'yasal bir sözleşmeye' indirgenen evlilik, geçmişe nazaran kolaylıkla bozulabiliyor. Bu, aynı zamanda, insanların karşılıklı olarak birbirlerine besledikleri duyguların zaman geçtikçe değişebildiğini gösterir ... Kısacası, kimi zaman evlilik dışı ilişkiler yeşerebilir. Kabul etmeliyiz ki, bazı evli çiftler, tatsız tuzsuz bir evlilik yaşamına 'renk katmak' için gittikçe evlilik dışı ilişkilere yönelmektedirler."* *Erkekçe* 11 (Nowember 1981) p. 83.

[211] *Erkekçe* 10 (October 1982) in "Manly Advice."

[212] The concept of "diversity" or "freedom of choice" (sexual freedom) were the important points of liberal feminism; however, they were criticized, especially by radical feminist (Millett) and supporter of a new feminist morality (Mckinnon) because they claimed that the discourse of sexual freedom was nothing other than redefination of subordinate position of women. (sexual objectification) See Josephine Donovan, *Feminist Teori*, "Radical Feminizm" and "A New Feminist Morality,"pp. 267-323, 323-351.

[213] *"Erkeklerin çoğu bir kadının başka bir erkekle ilişki kurduğunu öğrenince, bunun, kendi erkeklik güçlerindeki eksiklikten kaynaklandığını düşündükleri için tepki gösterirler. Oysa bu yanlıştır. Kabullenmek gerekir ki, kadınlar da erkekler gibi "değişikliğe" ihtiyaç duyabilirler. "Değişiklik" ihtiyacının sadece "erkek hakkı" olduğunu ifade eden bir düşünce, günümüzde geçerliliğini yitirmektedir."* *Erkekçe* 8 (August 1981) in "Manly Advice."

Erkekçe, by bringing up the concept of diversity, emphasized that "people and animals were polygamous and the marriage was a social institution disapproving polygamy."[214] In response to the restrictive structure of marriage, it proposed some kinds of marriage for the agenda such as "open marriage," "trial marriage," and "conditional marriage."[215] According to *Erkekçe*, individuals, through such marriages, would not enter into an obligation which derogates them from their right of freedom. There is the catch! Albeit the right of diversity and various marriages, aforementioned above, were presented in the perspective of woman's rights, which sexual identity at most would be emancipated through these "liberal notions?"[216] *Erkekçe* answered this question in itself: "Men, who have a monotonous sexual life, will feel better themselves because they will be able to do what they want with the woman whom they desire."[217] As seen in this quotation, such liberal notions was thrown out for consideration on the point of woman's right; however, the reflections of these on the material of popular culture affirmed that the discourse of sexual freedom, which makes women more "enthusiastic" and "effortless," was of value to men in activating their own freedoms. From a different point of view, "sexual togetherness" took precedence over everything else in essays of *Erkekçe* as to marriage and the position woman. For this reason, solutions related to the institution of marriage were inclined towards transforming the restrictive mechanism of this institution, which hinders men's and women's sexual freedom, into the condition in which men and women could live off their right of sexual

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[214] "*İnsanlar ve hayvanlar poligamdır ve evlilik poligamiyi reddeden bir toplumsal kurumdur.*" *Erkekçe* 10 (October 1981) in "Manly Advice."
[215] Erkekçe 12 (December 1981) pp. 41, 100.
[216] Ibid., p. 100.
[217] "*Monoton bir cinsel yaşamı olan erkekler, diledikleri kadınla dilediklerini yapabilecekleri için rahatlayacaklardır.*" *Erkekçe*, Ibid., p. 37.

freedom, especially in men's favor, as mentioned above. As a matter of fact, when marriage that legalizes the "sexual togetherness" of woman and man in the gaze of the public came to the state of *family*, *Erkekçe* repeated all of the tenets of gender which enabled masculinity to acquire a hegemonic form in the social order. Accordingly, it replied to a reader letter claiming that "the concept of family had gone out of fashion"[218] in this way:

> The concept of family is not merely a "sexual togetherness" but it also is a "school" in which the principles of hierarchy and authority concerning the state are taught and imbibed. The authority of the state can not be discussed without authority within family. Consequently, family serves as a basis of the state in modern societies and as long as the state exists, the institution of family will remain standing. [219]

The authority within family amounts to the authority of man and the aforesaid hierarchy is the hierarchy which centralizes the power of man and subordinates woman to this masculine power.[220] Therefore, when marriage, from *Erkekçe*'s point of view, is considered as a sexual togetherness, it might be revised in a way of taking women's right (!) into consideration; however, when the institution of marriage is regarded as a basic building stone of the state (family), it is inevitably molded by the authority of man.

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[218] "*Aile kavramının modası geçti*" Erkekçe 10 (October 1982) in "Manly Advice."

[219] "*Aile kavramı sadece "cinsel bir beraberlik" değil, aynı zamanda devlete ilişkin hiyerarşi ve otorite ilkelerinin öğretildiği ve benimsendiği bir "okuldur." Aile içinde otorite olmadan devletin otoritesinden söz edilemez. Dolayısıyla, aile, modern toplumlarda devletin temelini oluşturur ve devlet var olduğu sürece aile kurumu ayakta kalacaktır.*" Ibid.

[220] "Similar to the Marxist feminists who regards family as a proper ground for the reproduction of capitalist ideology, Millett and other radical feminists too regards it as a necessary institution for reproduction of patriarchy." Josephine Donovan, Feminist Teori, p. 277 See for details about how family is able to reproduce the patriarchal social order and how it might be regarded as an institution in which the first class struggle come on the scene, Friedrich Engels *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and The State* (London: Penguin, 1986), p. 66

Pro-feminist Men's Movement and the Type of New Man

> The world is falling into the hands of women! If the predictions of Professor Bede Morris from Australia John Curtin University come true (we do not hope so), in the near of future, women will manage the world completely and men will became the sexual toys of them. No, no, the reason is not feminism, but it rather is the science! The science assumed as if it is in the hands of men! That is to say, it seems that we dig our pit for ourselves ... According to Prof. Morris, if the technique of test-tube baby progresses so rapidly, women do not require men in the matter of reproduction. They will be able to keep their eggs, and to inseminate them in the laboratory of science, with the sperm of man whom they choose. When women get a monopoly on human reproduction, the world also will enter the control of women. Heaven forbid![221]

As seen in this quotation, albeit in a humorous style, what leads to the masculine power within society is the masculinity of man which is waiting to create his own manifestation. That is, masculinity might be identified with man's sperm; therefore, the sexual organ (penis) of the man represents his power, however. Almost all illustrations includes the boast of man through his sexual organ[222] ,whereas, in the case of woman, the sexual power of woman is regarded as equal to her ability to lure the attention of man. On the other hand, "To have a baby is the issue of a sexual power for men, is the issue of a continuity which could be deemed as a consolation in reply to his mortality. The desire of men in materializing themselves or their image [...] serves as a basis to their relations with babies."[223] The comprehension which leans the root of descent or "human reproduction" on the man image, at the same time, ruled over all institutional

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[221] *"Dünya kadınların eline düşüyor! Eğer Avustralya John Curtin Üniversitesi'nden Profesör Bede Morris'in kehanetleri doğru çıkarsa (inşallah çıkmaz), yakında dünyayı tamamen kadınlar yönetecek ve erkekler onların seksüel oyuncakları olacaklar. Hayır, hayır, sebep feminizm değil, bilim! Erkelerin elinde olduğu varsayılan bilim! Yani öyle görünüyor ki kendi kuyumuzu kendimiz kazıyoruz ... Prof. Morris'e göre, "eğer tüp bebek tekniği böyle hızla gelişirse, kadınların üreme konusunda erkeklere ihtiyacı kalmayacak. Yumurtalarını saklayabilecekler ve onları, bilim laboratuarlarında seçtikleri erkeğin spermi ile dölleyebilecekler. Kadınlar insan üremesini* tekellerine *alınca, dünya da kadınların kontrolüne girecek. Ağzından yel alsın!" Erkekçe* 5 (April 1984) p. 15.

[222] See Appendix, p. 126.

[223] McKinnon, *Feminist Bir Devlet Kuramına Doğru*, p. 215.

and social structuring and created a gender order based on masculine domination from radical feminist's point of view such as Firestone.[224] Women, same as being a uterus in the process of human reproduction, were never anything other than being a means sustaining hegemonic masculinity on social basis. Here, it is inevitable to explain that biological differentiation based on the sexual organ of man does not justify the gender order, which includes social hierarchy and inequalities; on the contrary, these differences between sexualities are excuses thrown out for laying the foundation stone to social inequalities between man and woman; in other words, they are artificialities laying the natural ground to the social power of man. However, if the conception of masculinity does not amount to a social power of man, the differentiation of sexualities might not be discussed and a difference, in epistemological meaning, does not come to light.[225] For this reason, the important point here is not to highlight the artificial differences but rather is to elaborate on the social and legal arrangements, which internalize these differences.[226]

When returned to the case of the 1980s, in Turkey, it is possible to see essays related to the renegotiation of gender relations in the pages of the popular magazines. According to Michael Kimmel, the debate on traditional gender relations "was set in motion by structural changes in social organization, especially the organization of work, the relationship of individuals to social and geographic space, and political changes."[227] Subsequently, these structural changes had an impact on some "micro-structural relations," such as relations between man and woman in marriage and family. In this

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[224] Shulamith Firestone, *Cinselliğin Diyalektiği: Kadın Özgürlüğü Davası* (Istanbul: Payel, 1979), p.11
[225] Ibid., pp. 250-251.
[226] Ibid.
[227] Kimmel, "Men's Responses to Feminism at the Turn of the Century," p. 262.

manner, the women's movement derived from some structural changes paving the way for some "socioeconomic and cultural changes" in woman position; accordingly, it lead to a redefinition of the perception of masculinity and femininity.[228] Gaining the economic independence of women or their "increasingly visible public presence" revealed the fact that when women participated in areas in which men could perform their masculinity games; they were regarded as a big threat by men because, they, at the same time, were considered as elements notching the chain, which constitutes hegemonic masculinity. To be included in men's areas necessitated the redefinition of femininity; however, the issue avowed as the crisis of masculinity came on the scene because redefinition of femininity mooted the need of redefinition of masculinity, too.

> Men ... were jolted by changes in the economic and social order which made them perceive that their superior position in the gender order and their supposedly "natural" male roles and prerogatives were not somehow rooted in human condition, that they were instead the result of a complex set of relationships subject to change and decay. [229]

At this point, the sense of men related their superior position, which oscillates on a slippery ground, impelled them to hit upon an expedient in response to the feminist movement. Accordingly, men's responses to feminism "can be organized into three ideological categories, which suggest three alternative strategies for the reconstitution of gender." The first (antifeminist response) included a "frightened retreat to traditional configurations;" the second (masculinist response) proposed "the demarcation of new institutional spheres for the vigorous assertion of a renewed masculinity; and the last was the *pro-feminist* response that "supports feminist claims."[230] All responses springing

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[228] Janet S. Chafetz , Antony G. Dworking, "In the Face of Threat: Organized Antifeminism in Comparative Perspective," *Gender and Society* 1 (March 1987), pp. 37-38.
[229] Cited in Kimmel, "Men's Responses to Feminism at the Turn of the Century," p. 266.
[230] Ibid., p. 262.

from the feminist movement were oriented towards rescuing men from the deep waters in which they found themselves. Following this, an approach claiming that masculinity depresses man at most[231] became the basic argument of man studies in response to feminist literature. It was the critical point that the pro-feminist men's movement implicitly appeared at this point in order to effect a reconciliation between feminist movement and men in a way that men, in this way, would cope with the gender drama jeopardizing their hegemonic position over women; moreover, they would also lessen the febrile burden of masculinity, which compels them to prove themselves in every respect. At this point, as mentioned above, in *Erkekçe*, essays, which are related to the renegotiation of gender relations, comprised the hard position of men deriving from their masculinity and the type of New Man coming to light in response to the New Woman. Examples of these essays are in the following way, respectively:

> To be a man is a privilege, isn't it? Men are more powerful than women, aren't they? Men have each right with the justification that they are men, don't they? ... Behold! The problem is here! The problem is the concept of masculinity! What is said from their childhood on? My brave son! Men do not cry, do not fear, and do not laugh! He has to be arduous, tough and has to eschew being emotional. That is, men take a step in masculinity with such rituals ... Man does not have any option like being unsuccessful because he is a man. He should work, earn money. He should support his wife and his children. If he works his wife, what says then? He is not able to support his family, he works his wife. Is it appropriate for man? ... And what if his wife is unfaithful to him? He and other men make improper overtures to women, included married ones. What about his own wife? He should not send his wife anywhere alone. God forbid! If she makes him a cuckold, what happens? ... He should not do cleaning; otherwise, his friends make fun of him. He should live his life up ... To be a man is not easy, not at all. What a pity for them! Don't they have right to cry, to laugh, to be unsuccessful, to show their feelings? Doesn't he count too? They too have human nature, don't have? ... The problem is here! They learn how to be a man before to be a person.[232]

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[231] Terence Real, *Erkekler Ağlamaz* (Istanbul: Kuraldışı, 2004), p. 135.

[232] *"Erkek olmak bir ayrıcalık değil mi? Erkekler kadınlardan daha güçlü değil mi? Erkekler erkek oldukları için her hakka sahipler değil mi? İşte! Sorun burada! Sorun, erkeklik kavramında! Küçüklükten itibaren ne denir? Benim aslan oğlum! Erkekler ağlamaz, korkmaz, gülmez. Metanetli olmalıdır, sert olmalıdır ve duygusal olmaktan kaçınmalıdır. Yani, erkekler erkekliğe böyle ritüellerle adım atarlar ... Erkeğin başarısız olmak gibi bir seçeneği yoktur. O erkektir çünkü. Çalışmalıdır, para kazanmalıdır.*

As things stand, even the sexual organ of man, from the point of view of masculinity burden, was considered as a factor that puts men under the constraint. That is to say, the power of man, nevertheless, is a burden for them. In such a manner,

> The penis is the most important source of power for men, isn't it? Don't they take pride in having it from their childhood? Don't their parents have their child's photo taken in order to show that he is a man? The penis is the symbol of masculinity, isn't it? The other side of the coin is not like that. Men sometimes are humiliated through their penis ... Man should be ready to have sex, all the time. Imagine that his penis was not erected. How's it possible! That's all very well, but man is not a machine.[233]

At this point, the pro-feminist men's response aimed at blending the internal crisis of men deriving from the perception of masculinity within society and their external crisis arising from the feminist movement with each other. Indeed, the pro-feminist men's movement, on the one hand, highlighted the misery of men stemming from masculinity pressure on them; on the other hand, they acknowledged that women are right in their struggle. Accordingly, they believed that the embedded perception of masculinity and femininity threw woman and man under some obligations and if woman burst the social order's fetters, man too would be able to rescue himself from the crises of masculinity, from two respects; that is, "men's support for women's causes would

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Ailesini ve çocuklarını geçindirmelidir. Karısını çalıştırırsa, ne denir o zaman? Ailesini geçindiremiyor, karısını çalıştırıyor. Yakışır mı erkeğe? ... Bir de karısı ona sadık değilse? O ve diğer erkekler kadınlara asılıyorlar, evli olanlar da. Ya onun karısı? Karısını yalnız başına bir yere yollamamalıdır. Allah korusun! Ya onu boynuzlarsa, ne olur? ... temizlik yapmamalıdır yoksa arkadaşları onla alay ederler. O, krallar gibi yaşamalıdır ... Erkek olmak hiç de kolay değil. Yazık onlara! Onların, ağlamaya, gülmeye, başarısız olmaya, duygularını göstermeye hakkı yok mu? Onun canı yok mu? Onlar da insan yaradılışına sahip değil mi? ... Sorun burada! İnsan olmadan erkek olmayı öğreniyorlar." Erkekçe 9 (September 1989) p.27

[233] "*Penis, erkekler için önemli bir güç kaynağıdır değil mi? Çocukluklarından beri ona sahip olmakla övünmezler mi? Anne babaları onun erkek olduğunu göstermek için çocuklarının fotoğraflarını çektirmezler mi? Penis, erkekliğin sembolüdür değil mi? Madalyonun öteki yüzü öyle değil. Erkekler kimi zaman penisleri yüzünden küçük düşürülürler ... Erkek her daim sevişmeye hazır olmalıdır. Farz edin ki penisi kalkmadı. Ne mümkün! Her şey iyi hoş da erkek bir makine değil.*" Ibid.

ultimately benefit men."[234] *Erkekçe*, after touching on the internal crises of men (masculinity depresses man at most), laid stress on the 1980s' man type, who was disgruntled and introverted. However, the type of *modern* man proposed by *Erkekçe* was not that introverted man, but rather it was a man "who ignores the stereotyped masculine merits," that is, in response to self-confident woman of the 1980s, the self-confident man of the 1980s,

> Man, who is left no choice but to change together with the woman consciousness, breathes the last breath of a five thousand-year-old empire. Man experiences difficulty in understanding woman, who has struggled for sexual freedom for the last twenty years and in grasping that the concept of freedom is not an issue merely concerning man ...Woman increasingly becomes aware of her sexuality and her freedom. In addition, to come to an agreement with this novel woman, a type of "New Man" occurs, but this type of man prefers to stay away from woman instead of drawing near to her.[235] However, the man of the 1980s should be distinct, should think differently. He should ignore "stereotyped masculine merits." If he becomes unsuccessful in his any of sexual relations, he should be able to express this easily. He should not have any complexes or phobias in sexual matters. As we said, he should be distinct.[236]

Erkekçe had a part in the pro-feminist response "providing support, especially for women's public participation and for their sexual autonomy"[237] through maintaining a conciliatory attitude between women and men. In this manner, it did not adopt a derisive or hostile attitude toward the women's movement, but rather it displayed an affirmative impression as to feminist claims. For this reason, in response to the "audacious woman" presented by *Erkekçe* on its own, it suggested a man image that was not startled by such

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[234] Kimmel, "Men's Responses to Feminism at the Turn of the Century," p. 273.

[235] "*Kadının bilinçlenmesiyle birlikte değişmek zorunda kalan erkek, beş bin yıllık bir imparatorluğun son nefesini veriyor. Erkek, son yirmi yıldır cinsel özgürlük savaşı veren kadını anlamakta ve özgürlük kavramının sadece erkekle ilişkili bir mesele olmadığını idrak etmekte güçlük çekiyor ... Kadın, gittikçe cinselliğinin ve özgürlüğünün farkına varıyor. Ve bu değişen kadınla uzlaşmak için bir 'yeni erkek' tipi meydana geliyor. Fakat bu erkek tipi kadına yaklaşmaktansa kaçmayı yeğliyor. Erkekçe* 6 (June 1989) p. 62.

[236] "*Oysa 1980'lerin erkeği farklı olmalı, farklı düşünmeli. 'Kalıplaşmış erkeklik değerlerine' aldırış etmemeli. Eğer herhangi bir cinsel ilişkisinde başarısız olursa bunu kolaylıkla dile getirebilmeli. Cinsel konularda kompleksleri ve korkuları olmamalı. Söylediğimiz gibi, farklı olmalı.*" *Erkekçe* 9 (September 1989) p.29.

[237] Kimmel, "Men's Responses to Feminism at the Turn of the Century," p. 262.

a woman type; on the contrary, the man of the 1980 was to stand shoulder to shoulder with women in the struggle for sexual freedom.[238] At this point, it is inevitable to state that *Erkekçe*, similar to other pro-feminist texts, perceived that men could by no means surmount the crisis of masculinity in this way. According to *Erkekçe*, the admired masculine figure, in the 1980s, was a man who "regards women as an individual having equal rights with men"[239] and who "considers the sexual satisfaction of women important instead of regarding them as a sexual object for his own pleasure."[240]

There is more to come: as mentioned in the former part, the audacious woman (in sexual meaning) of the 1980s was a working woman, however. The image of the working woman, similar to image of the woman with sexual self-confidence, constituted a big menace for men because it would undermine their role as "breadwinner",[241] which provide them a hegemonic role with their masculinity in the family and ultimately in society.

> The world is the male world from one pole to the other, from the topmost step to the first step. It's always been this way for centuries, but it never will be. Men, who have ascended the control throne for centuries, are uneasy because women have increasingly started to share in their incomes, status, and power. Men regard women more and more as a rival and as a threat. They become irritated by woman managers who breathe down their necks, especially when they think that secretary girls whom they often do practical joke with their hands. It may even be that, women should have remained as a secretary. Now just what are these woman managers?[242]

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[238] *Erkekçe* 11 (Nowember 1981) p. 36.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Jerome Rabow, Elizabeth A. Stanko, "What Do Men Want?" *Gender and Society* 3 (September 1989), p. 408.
[242] "*Dünya, bir kutuptan ötekine, en üst basamaktan en alt basamağa kadar erkek dünyasıdır. Yüzyıllardır böyle gelmiştir fakat böyle gitmeyecek. Yüzyıllardan beri komuta tahtına oturan erkekler, kadınların gittikçe onların gelirlerine, statülerine ve iktidarlarına ortak olmaya başlamalarından tedirginler. Kadınları artan ölçüde bir rakip ve bir tehdit olarak görüyorlar. Özellikle sık sık el şakası yaptıkları sekreter kızları düşününce, başlarına dikilen bu yönetici kadınlardan keyifleri kaçıyor. Belki de kadınlar sekreter olarak kalmalılardı. Bu kadın yöneticiler neyin nesi?*" *Erkekçe* 2 (February 1984) p. 39.

Erkekçe, in the case of women's public participation or the emergence of women in professional occupations, did not depart from the pro-feminist response in that in response to the man type "who become irritated by woman managers," it brought the man image "who supports working woman" to the foreground. However, it had a stipulation related to this working woman: she should not neglect her duties concerning womanhood (housework) and motherhood (childrearing) while working.

> We told that because of the reason that men regard women as rivals, they have a tendency to exclude them from working life. However, we advise men to support women's demands in the matter of working. They should encourage them for working, even for working in any occupation which they wish. They should believe that women can be both a good wife and a good businesswoman.[243]

The emphasis on the concepts of womanhood and motherhood or redefinition of woman as a wife and as a mother was the unavoidable destiny of woman, which gave rise to sustain the embedded perception of femininity in the gender order. However, because this point will be taken up in the next part of this chapter, I first want to focus on some legal arrangements including the 1980s, before all else. These aforementioned legal arrangements such as abortion, sterilization and some debates on the headship of household constituted the most important part of the pro-feminist response, as it did of women's movement. As clarified before, *Erkekçe*, by keeping such legal arrangements on the agenda, by giving responsibility to men in the matter of contraception,[244] and by informing men and women as to advances related to birth control[245] and to pregnancy (artificial insemination), gave support to both liberal feminist claims and to the pro-feminist men's movement. Accordingly, the legalization of abortion and sterilization

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[243] *"Erkeklerin, kadınları bir rakip olarak gördükleri için onları çalışma hayatından dışlama eğiliminde olduklarını söyledik. Fakat biz, erkeklere, kadınların çalışma konusundaki taleplerini desteklemelerini tavsiye ediyoruz. Onları çalışmaya hatta istedikleri işte çalışmaya teşvik etmeliler. Kadınların hem iyi bir eş hem de iyi bir iş kadını olabileceklerine inanmalılar. Erkekçe*, Ibid., p. 86.

[244] See Appendix, p. 131.

[245] See Appendix, p.130.

coincided with the liberalization process of Turkey; that is, Turkey, similar to some developing countries such as Greece, Portugal, Taiwan, and Spain (abortion-on-request was legalized until the middle of the 1980s in these countries) and to some developed countries such as America (in 1973),[246] "can be viewed as part of a trend toward liberalization of abortion laws throughout industrialized world."[247] At this point, a draft of a new abortion law in Turkey was prepared by the Ministry of Health and Social Services in 1981;[248] moreover, interviews made with the head of commission arranging this new abortion law Tandoğan Tokgöz, with the Minister of Health Kaya Kılıçturgay, and with the Head of Alteration Commission of Civil Law Esat Şener were given wide average in *Erkekçe*. The purpose of *Erkekçe*, by giving a place such interviews in its pages, was to stress the rights of women in matter of limiting their own reproduction[249] and to advise men to take responsibility for contraception, especially highlighting that, through this new abortion law, the sterilization of both woman and man would become legal.[250] From *Erkekçe*'s point of view, new abortion law* was presented from the perspective of woman liberation and of population planning. At this point, it is possible to claim that the attitude of *Erkekçe* concerning the conception of abortion was in harmony with that of liberal feminists regarding abortion or the limitation of reproduction as a necessary issue for sexual freedom and economic independence of

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[246] Arthur B. Shostak, "Abortion as Fatherhood Lost: Problems and Reforms," *The Family Coordinator* 4 (October 1979), p. 569.
[247] Stanley K. Henshaw, "Induced Abortion: A Worldwide Perspective," *Family Planning Perspectives* 6 (November- December 1986), p. 250.
[248] *Erkekçe* 1 (January 1982) p. 25.
[249] Ibid., p.96
[250] *Erkekçe* 6 (June 1982) p. 25, *Erkekçe* 10 (October 1982) p. 127
* The legalization of abortion and sterilization was provided with the amendment made in the Law on Population Planning on 27 May 1983. However, for abortion, the permission of the husband was laid down as a condition. http://www.die.gov.tr/tkba/kadin_haklari. htm

women.[251] Similarly, as mentioned above, because some structural changes had an impact on micro-structural relations between man and woman, Turkey too turned towards some domestic issues in the 1980s. In this manner, the apparent public presence of women made an amendment to the Civil Law inevitable, and, in this context, a commission gathered in 1981 proposed an amendment to the Council of Ministers in order to quash the decision assuming that the head of household was man.[252]

Within the perspective of such legal arrangements, the admired profile of man, in the case of *Erkekçe*, was he who had a sense of responsibility for the matter of birth control.[253] An essay with a headline like "The Contraceptive Pill for Men"[254] was addressed to this "responsible man." In addition, *Erkekçe*, together with a humorous photograph depicting a pregnant man (with a long thick mustache),[255] gave place to a short text claiming that men could get pregnant through the placement of the embryo, which was inseminated in a tube, in their abdominal cavity (womb). It even is possible to read some essays stating that unmarried women could have children through the method of artificial insemination without requiring a man.[256]

By relying on the hegemonic masculine figure of *Erkekçe*, it is possible to assert that the man of the 1980s, before all else, was the portrait of successful businessman and that portrait was in harmony with the press, the political power, and the economic model of this decade, which was already integrated with the market. Moreover, the press, which was regarded as one of "organizing intellectual (units)" by Gramsci, was the foremost creator of hegemonic masculinity. Now that the time seems ripe, there is value

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[251] McKinnon, *Feminist Bir Devlet Kuramına Doğru*, p. 213
[252] *Erkekçe* 12 (December 1981) p. 106
[253] *Erkekçe* 2 (February 1984) p. 53
[254] "Erkeklere Doğum Control Hapı..." see Appendix, p.132.
[255] See Appendix, p. 133.
[256] *Erkekçe* 5 (May 1984) p. 104.

to re-express that: A hegemonic form, in order to be hegemonic, does not need to embrace all society. Here, the key point is to put the persuasion mechanism into use; therefore, the press is the significant grindstone of this mechanism. Nothing other than the press has the power of normalization and naturalization as far as it has. Anything which is hegemonic, at the same time, is normal and natural. For that reason, it is necessary to appraise the hegemonic masculine figure of the 1980s by taking this persuasion cunning of the press into account. In this manner, neither the image of the "successful businessman" nor the profile of the "responsible man" was the predominant man model of the 1980s; they rather were displays of a neo-liberal discourse, which would enable it to maintain itself. Accordingly, in the competition between men, the admired figures of the 1980s often operated in the interests of a definite section of society. There is more to come: by analyzing the admired masculine figures of the 1980s, it is possible to state that hegemonic masculinity of this decade governed the definite man groups of society; however, albeit having some liberal notions in favor of women's right, it continued to cling to its indispensable derivation based on the subordination of women. In this case, the image of responsible man was anything but to be a man, who was more freed;[257] furthermore, the method of contraception or the birth control provided more opportunity to men in getting "unpregnant sex partners,"[258] from radical feminists'[259] point of view and the supporters of a new feminist morality such as

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[257] McKinnon, *Feminist Bir Devlet Kuramına Doğru*, pp. 213-217.
[258] Goldsmith, "Birth Control and the New Women," p.64.
[259] "Liberal feminism located the causes of women's subordination in the customary and legal constraints blocking women's access to the public domain and in prejudices (sexim) and stereotypes concerning their capabilities ... Radical feminists invoked the notion of patriarchy as a timeless, universal system of male domination perpetuating the opression of women as a group through the control of their sexuality and procreative capacity. Their research agendas reflected their theoretical premises with special attention to issues such as motherhood, compulsory heterosexuality, rape, pornography and domestic violence." Quoted from Deniz Kandiyoti, "Contemporary Feminist Scholarship and Middle East Studies" in

Mckinnon. Indeed, when the welcome perception of femininity and masculinity of the 1980s is scrutinized, it is possible to comprehend how the gender order, which describes someone as "the most masculine" or "the most feminine," was molded by the traditional perception of femininity and masculinity. That is to say, hegemonic masculinity is hegemonic so far as it can create its "emphasized femininity," and it can remain true to traditional masculine values. At this point, the image of the New Man did not undermine the hegemonic structure of masculinity, and it amounted to the reconstruction of traditional perception of masculinity in accordance with the 1980s.

Invariants in the Perception of Masculinity and Femininity

> Nobody knows who threw these rules out for consideration. But all men put them into practice, although they are not written anywhere ... Yes, masculinity has some rules, which are unwritten, but known by everybody. If that's so, from where these rules emerge? From our fathers, our teachers, our elders, football players or from Ben Cartwright etc. Scientists consider the emergence of these rules as a natural result of evolution. Could we exist today if man were not protective and strong in ancient times? Modern man too has such rules. If you are a man, you should know these.[260]
>
> - Do never talk about your emotional life in man-to-man meetings.
> - Do never cry right beside a woman or a man.
> - Appear not to mind physical pain.
> - Do never pour out your wounded heart to men.
> - Do never talk about your fears and your expectations concerning the future to your male friends.
> - Earn more money than your wife does and pay attention to separate your private life from your occupational life.[261]

Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: Syracuse University Pres, 1996), p. 4.

[260] *"Kimse bu kuralları kimin ortaya attığını bilmiyor. Ama bütün erkekler bu kuralları uyguluyor, yazılı olamasalar da ... Evet, erkekliğin yazılı olmayan ama herkes tarafından bilinen bir takım kuralları var. Peki, nerden çıktı bu kurallar? Babalarımızdan, öğretmenlerimizden, büyüklerimizden ya da Ben Cartwright'dan vs. Bilim adamları, bu kuralların ortaya çıkışını evrimin doğal bir sonucu olarak görüyorlar. Eğer erkek ilk çağlarda koruyucu ve güçlü olmasa, biz bugün var olabilir miydik? Modern erkek de böyle kurallar sahip. Eğer erkekseniz bunları bilmelisiniz. Erkekçe* 11 (Nowember 1990) p. 50.

[261] *"Erkek erkeğe toplantılarda asla duygusal yaşamınızdan bahsetmeyin.*

These rules, which are necessary to be known by a modern man, are those conducive to hegemonic masculinity, at the same time. In order words, they are the rules that enable masculinity to acquire hegemonic glance in society. In addition, these are the severe burdens of masculinity, as mentioned in previous part. There is the catch again! If these rules, which were defined by *Erkekçe* as a burden in the context of supporting women's right (pro-feminist response of men), are also those which a modern man should have; therefore, the primary point here is that these embedded masculinity perceptions, although the responsible, self-confident and pro-feminist image of man was presented by *Erkekçe*, were reproduced through liberal notions. That is to say, woman should work, but should be a good wife and a good mother at the same time.[262] Man should support this working woman, but should earn more money than she does, however. Indeed, the admired feminine figure was a woman "who, both at home and outside, does her job without making her husband uneasy and who represent him in the best way, without making him feel ashamed."[263] Because the highlighted man image of the 1980s was the successful businessman, the sole duty of woman was to prop up this man, who was determined, ambitious, and far from being emotional. In actual fact,

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Ne bir erkeğin ne de bir kadının yanında asla ağlamayın.
Fiziksel acıları umursamıyormuş gibi görünün.
Yaralı kalbinizi erkeklere asla açmayın.
Korkularınızdan ve geleceğe ilişkin umutlarınızdan erkek arkadaşlarınıza asla bahsetmeyin.
Eşinizin kazandığından daha fazla para kazanın ve özel yaşamınızı iş yaşamınızdan ayırmaya dikkat edin." Erkekçe, Ibid., pp. 50-51.

[262] This type of woman might be named "The Balanced Homemaker," who "has some outside intersts, or has held a job before turning exclusively to homemeking." Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique*, Copyright (New York: Vail-Ballou Pres, 1963), p. 210.

[263] *Erkekçe* 3 (May 1983) p. 39.

according to *Erkekçe*, man could "develop a personality of his own" in his occupational life; moreover, his home was nothing more than a "watering hole."

> Imagine a man an exhausted from working. When he returns home, his wife is agitated. "Our boy failed a class, the siphon is broken, and chest pain of my mother has returned" and so on. Man shouts: "That's enough! I have been tired all day. As well, I do not want to endure your unending chatter. Don't I have any freedom from anxiety in this home?" After he eats, he goes to his workroom with great pleasure. See the same man, when he goes to work the next day. You say, who is this? He changes so very much that he is not the same man ... His boss comes close to him and says like that: "we are in trouble, my son; nobody can rescue this company other than you..." His home is the "watering hole" for him where he stops to have a rest, to be straightened up, and to have his clothes washed and ironed. Whereas, he lives his heart's desires at work, develops a personality of his own ... Occupational life precedes domestic life, for men.[264]

There are two important points in this quoted passage. The first is the emphasis on the image of the successful, ambitious, and hardworking man, who is identified with his company. As for the second, it is what domestic life came to mean in the mind of man, it was "watering hole." In this manner, the living space of man is his occupational surroundings, whereas the living space of woman is her home. At this point, it is fairly possible to claim that the position of woman was to provide man with ease in this "watering hole" in so far as she was able; that is, it came to mean a redefinition of the subordinate and domestic position of woman. However, the image of the audacious woman of the 1980s was not in applicable for the woman in this scenario, who was labeled as wife and mother. It rather applied to the image of lover, who was the "effortless," "unpregnant" sex partner of men, as clearly examined before. In this

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[264] *"Çalışmaktan bitkin düşmüş bir adam düşünün. Eve döndüğünde karısı telaşlıdır. 'Bizim oğlan sınıfta kaldı, sifon bozuldu, annemin göğüs ağrıları nüksetti' ve dahası. Adam bağırır: 'Yeter artık! Bütün gün yoruldum. Bir de sizin vıdı vıdılarınıza tahammül etmek istemiyorum. Bu evde benim hiç huzurum yok mu?' Yemeğini yedikten sonra büyük bir zevkle çalışma odasına gider. Aynı adamı, ertesi gün işe gidince görün. Kim bu? dersiniz. Öylesine değişir ki tanıyamazsınız ... Patronu yanına yaklaşır ve şöyle der: "Başımız dertte oğlum ve senden başka kimse bu şirketi kurtaramaz..." Erkek için evi, onun dinlenmek, toparlanmak ve çamaşırlarını yıkatıp ütületmek için uğradığı bir "mola yeridir." Oysa, işte hayatını yaşar, kendini bulur ... Erkekler için mesleki yaşam aile yaşamından önce gelir. Erkekçe* 12 (December 1983) p. 103-104.

manner, the concepts of "diversity" and "unfaithfulness," which was related to the "glory of masculinity,"[265]at the same time, were the rights of woman, too. However, which woman image could benefit from these rights? For sure, the woman image avowed as a lover by men. If the concept of "unfaithfulness" was the symbol of masculinity,[266] woman might condone this situation because the primary cause here was the "fatherhood duties" of man. However, for the same reason, it was not possible for men to condone his wife's extra-marital relations. In such a manner that:

> Sex, so as to acquire the relevance and protection of man, is the most efficacious chance on which is bestowed women by the nature. As for the second chance, it is making a man have a child. However, if a man will undertake fatherhood duties, he has to believe that he is really the father of that child or those children. In the event that man gets suspicious about that the child or those children were sired by another man, he might withdraw his protection from child and its mother. No man wants to bring up the "bastard" of someone else.[267]

A question like what changed in the 1980s is not a congruent one in terms of examining the image of woman and man of the 1980s. As for the more fitting question, it by no means should be like upon which background hegemonic masculinity was reproduced in the 1980. Albeit this background was embellished with some liberal notions, did it resolutely aim at wearing the hegemony of masculinity out? To what extent was the image of New Woman attributed to the 1980 new? Did the New Man of this decade free himself from traditional perception of masculinity? Such a

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[265] *Erkekçe* 3 (March 1982) p. 77.

[266] At this point it is valuable to mention that *Erkekçe* gave a headline like "The Most Male Prime Minister" for an essay concerning Adnan Menderes (he was the prime minister of Turkey during ten years, with the power of Democratic Party 1950-1960) because this essay included his relationship with the diva Ayhan Aydan although he was a married man. In other words, a description like "The Most Male Prime Minister" was regarded as suitable for him because he has a "mistress." *Erkekçe* 11 (Nowember 1984) p. 28.

[267] "*Seks, erkeğin himayesini ve ilgisini elde etmek için, doğa tarafından kadınlara verilen en etkili silahtır. İkinci silah ise bir erkeği çocuk sahibi yapmaktır. Ama eğer bir erkek babalık görevlerini üstlenecekse, o çocuğun ya da o çocukların gerçekten babası olduğuna inanmak zorundadır. O çocuğun ya da o çocukların başkasından peydahlandığına dair bir şüpheye düştüğü durumda, himayesini çocuktan ve annesinden çekebilir. Hiçbir erkek başkasının 'piçini' yetiştirmek istemez.*" Erkekçe 8 (August 1984) p. 106.

comprehension of the gender order, which discriminates between the image of "lover" and image of "wife"[268] (mother), which sets a domestic demarcation to this image of wife and also confines it to earn less money than her husband does if she, however, is a working woman, for sure, was not able to turn the traditional perception of masculinity and femininity upside down; therefore, it also was not deprived from reproducing hegemonic masculinity.

[268] To comprehend better the discrimination between the image of lover and image of wife, see "Playboy Joins the Battle of the Sexes" excerpt from Barbara Ehrenreich, *The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and Flight from Commitment* in *Retrieving the American Past: Readings from the Ohio State University*, Electronic Bookshelf, compiled by Instructor Hahn (Simon & Schuster Custom Publishing, 1996)pp. 203-211.

CHAPTER THREE

A TWO-SIDED APPROACH TO THE METROPOLIS OF THE 1980S

The 1980s, as a turning point of Turkey, might be depicted with two different paintbrushes. If the metropolitan elements are taken into consideration on behalf of this depiction, two different photographs of Istanbul come on to the scene. One of these two photographs leaves a good impression on someone concerning that, together with the economic and cultural globalization of Turkey, Istanbul was a global city: In this connection, it was also a city which has homogeneous and sterile structuring in terms of its *cogent* lifestyle, which was consumed in this metropolis. In this manner, this city, in accordance with the contemporary economic and cultural discourse, hosted a flamboyant lifestyle and social figures which embodies them in that lifestyle. In other words, "Istanbul in the 1980s lived through its own version of casino capitalism and yuppie exuberance."[269] The luxurious hotels, modern office blocks, and, for sure, the big shopping centers were indispensable fragments of this yuppie exuberance. There was more to come, the fast food series, all kinds of foreign and domestic magazines, newspapers, amusing night life, and some cuisines belonging to various cultures were vivid showcases of Istanbul, which enable someone to consider it as a global city.

They, without a doubt, were also significant signs of a clear lifestyle (yuppified),[270] which was hegemonic because they, at the same time, recapitulated the social and economic condition desired by neo-liberal discourse in the 1980; that is, the consumption society, which would be structured as "the society of spectacle" in the

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[269] Keyder, ed. "Introduction: The Setting," in *Istanbul: Between The Global and the Local* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), p. 15.
[270] Keyder, "A Tale of Two Neighborhoods" in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, p. 182.

1990s, and people who consume and display. Therefore, these aforementioned metropolitan characteristics (listed above) symbolized the habits of these people consuming and displaying. The passion in acquiring these habits was the most important struggle of the 1980s, and this struggle necessitated more money, more wealth, and more ambition for the sake of more money and more wealth.[271] In a qualified sense, this profile was defined as yuppie in the literature. As mentioned in the former chapter, the hegemonic masculine figure of the 1980s was molded around this yuppie model, together with the profile of successful businessman.[272] While they represented the "insider" of the capitalist development and international capital, which had a commanding influence over the 1980s, this period was such a period that it, at the same tame, got some identities which were confined to be "others" by the modernization project, together with those who were the hegemonic figures attributed to 1980s, which were presented by its own.[273] For sure, the basic intersection point of them was the metropolis; therefore, the second photograph, which was mentioned at the beginning, was describing the provinces of Istanbul, that is, was shining a light on its local side instead of global.[274]

However, the important point here is not the existence of two different photographs belonging to the 1980s; on the contrary, it is the existence of a third photograph disclosing why the local side of Istanbul and the provinciality of it burst

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[271] Bali, *Tarz- ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar,* p.34.
[272] Ibid., pp. 40-42.
[273] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, pp. 103-107.
[274] At this point, I have to clarify that "globalization and localization are not singular and homogeneous processes to be characterized neatly by their opposing essences. Rather than, being mutually exclusive, they are 'in' one another in ways that make their interpenetration as important as their differentiation." Quoted from Ayşe Öncü, "Introduction: Struggles Over Lebensraum and Social Identity in Globalizing Cities" in *Space, Culture and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities*, ed Ayşe Öncü, Petra Weyland (London &New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997), p. 2.

together with the rise of the global and liberal notions. In other words, the important point here, similar to the case of homosexuality, bisexuality, or to the free woman image which was exceedingly sexualized, is to discuss why the suppressed provinciality was instigated again in the 1980s. That is to say, by acknowledging that "metropolitan culture is everywhere the locus of hybrid forms,"[275] why did the "hybridity of Istanbul" become so visible in the 1980s, especially with the "rediscovery of the provinces?"[276] At this point, the analysis of the third photograph or the answer of this question is its very self of the 1980s, actually. That is, the "promises" oriented towards being rich, earning money, and thinking big, all of which were made possible by the 1980s.[277] Accordingly, if it is required to concretize the concept of *promise* by relating it to other concepts belonging to the 1980s, these concepts might be exemplified as the "mass culture,"[278] market economy, and the consumption society.[279] In other words, these made up the economic and cultural background of the 1980s, which made possible these promises.

Also, there is one more important question in the case of provinciality; if that was so, then was the instigated provinciality identical to the suppressed one?[280] For sure, the 1980s, especially towards the 1990 molded its metropolitan provincial, and it was named the *maganda* (yob), briefly. The reason in discussing the term maganda here is not to explain the "rediscovery of the province" in the 1980s, but to point out the fact that a hegemonic form sustains its own hegemony through making definite sections of society

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[275] Ibid.
[276] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p. 106.
[277] Ibid., p. 108.
[278] Here, the emphasized point through the concept of "mass culture" is that: "The Mass culture is produced through the function of creating an illusion assuming a 'social reality,' which regards someone who is wealthy, happy, and able to manage as identical to other who is poor, unhappy and managed." Quoted from Ünsal Oskay, *Yıkanmak İstemeyen Çocuklar Olalım* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Publishing, 2004), p. 152.
[279] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, pp. 103-107.
[280] Ibid.

"others," through holding these "others" up to ridicule, and through making them dishonored. However, in the case of the1980s, there was a departure in the matter of positioning the non-hegemonic form as others such that it, before all else, recognized the presence of the non-hegemonic form as an identity, as discussed in the former chapter in the case of women, homosexuals and of so on, but it also did not remain behind subordinating them at a different state. This ambivalent approach of the 1980s to different identities (non-hegemonic) might be accounted for with the concept of the "identity politics," that is, with its "emphasis on difference and pluralism,"[281] apart from the encouragement of this decade on individual development. Accordingly, when it comes to the construction of hegemony again, it is possible to assert that the weakness of the hegemony lay behind its need of the "another" so as to define itself.[282] In this manner, in the matter of the reconstruction of hegemonic masculinity in the 1980s, it is unavoidable to elaborate on the concepts of "yuppie" and "maganda," especially by considering the metropolis as a ground for this articulation.[283]

The Transformation of Leisure Time

Hegemony is such a specter that it has influence on each social unit, social figure, and social interaction; that is, it underpins all economic, cultural and political formation and transformation, which bring a social entity into being.[284] In this manner, if my main purpose in this study to elaborate on social images which was constructed in a definite

[281] Meltem Ahıska, "'Kimlik' Kavramı Üstüne Fragmanlar" *Defter* 27 (Spring 1996), p. 13.
[282] Sibel Demirtaş, Bülent Diken, and İştar B. Gözaydın, "Mekan ve Ötekiler," *Defter* 28 (Summer 1996), p. 39.
[283] "'A city is composed of different kinds of men; similar people can not bring a city into existence'" Richard Sennett, cited in ibid., p. 43.
[284] Chris Rojek, *Decentring Leisure: Rethinking Leisure theory* (London: Sage, 1995), pp. 18-20.

historical section denominated with respect to hegemonic ideology;[285] in other words, if it is to shed light on the sub-hegemonic constructions (masculinity) designated by the super-hegemonic structure (ideological discourse); therefore, it is necessary to mention some issues, which was subjected to transformation by the hegemonic ideology. The long and the short of it is that hegemonic masculinity molded, presented, or imposed by the neo-liberal discourse in the 1980s, in the same way, also was constructed through a cultural transformation, which appeared in the context of the same discourse. Accordingly, apart from the subordination of different sexual identities, the hegemonic masculinity of the 1980s was reconstructed, especially through the emphasis on the concept of lifestyle, for sure; this type of reconstruction was in harmony with the elements which hardened the subordination of "others." However, so as to enlighten the concept of lifestyle in the 1980s, fist of all, it is necessary to discuss the transformation of leisure time activities, which could be held identical to the understanding of lifestyle in the 1980s, from Bourdieu's point of view.[286]

Leisure "has generally but vaguely been sense as a source of satisfaction and even of delight."[287] However, the concept of the leisure time is not such a self-determining formation far from relational cultural and socio-economic impulses, or not such a thing, which solely would be formulated by relating it to the sense of "recuperation,

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[285] Here, I meant to say that the reason of the tendency in denominating a definite historical section in axis of the dominant ideology attributed to that section stems from the desire of a definite group of society, which would benefit from the yield of that dominant ideology, in the matter of establishing a hegemony over society, that is, stems from their victory in this matter. Argın, "Boş Zamanın Anlamı Üzerine Notlar" in *Nostalji ile Ütopya Arasında* (Istanbul; İletişim, 2003), p. 142.

[286] Bourdieu's approach to the concept of life style will be discussed in the next chapter.

[287] Robert J. Havighurst, Kenneth Feigenbaum, "Leisure and Life Style," *The American Journal of Sociology* 4 (January 1959), p. 396.

entertainment, and to development of personality,"[288] as stated by J. Dumazedier. On the contrary, what leisure time means and how it should be spent is designated within the complexity of hegemonic relations. By relying on Max Kaplan's concoction, it, first of all, might be scrutinized in general in that way,

> The essential elements of leisure, as we shall interpret it, are (a) an antithesis to "work" as an economic function, (b) a pleasant expectation and recollection, (c) a minimum of involuntary social-role obligations, (d) a psychological perception of freedom, (e) a close relation to the values of the culture, (f) the inclusion of an entire range from inconsequence and insignificance to weightiness and importance, and (g) often but necessarily, an activity characterized by the element of play. Leisure is none of these by itself but all together in one emphasis or another.[289]

In this manner, the key points of this concoction considered as "the values of the culture," the meaning of the "weightiness and importance," and "elements of play," respectively are issues in which was blocked by hegemonic ideology of a definite historical section, however. At this point, the basic point in question in this part of the study is that, in the 1980s, when it is considered as any historical section in which hegemonic masculinity was reconstructed, which kind of transformation was observed in the matter of leisure time activities with the effect of hegemonic ideology and its apparatuses. At this point, Turkey, especially in the 1980s, experienced the rise of neo-liberal economic tendencies, which was regarded as replies of the new right governments to the crisis of the fordist mode of production; however, the consequence of the post-fordist modification of production can not be rendered to the realm of economy. It also threw a novel socio-cultural verity into consideration and necessitated the redefinition of social relations; moreover, this novel socio-cultural verity bestowed to the literature a new term; it was the "consumption society," especially after the mid-

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[288] Rhona Rapoport, Robert N. Rapoport, "Four Themes in the Sociology of Leisure," *The British Journal of Sociology* 2 (June 1974), p. 218.
[289] Cited in ibid.

1980s (Turkey). The reason of repeating this term here deprives from my intention to highlight that such a tendency directed towards consumption blazed a trail in terms of modern leisure time activities and the concept of lifestyle, that is; in other words, it contributed to the "acceleration" in pace of consumption and to the "diversification" in the consumption patterns.[290] Nevertheless, the "diversification" in the consumption patterns was never anything other than an illusion leading to the redefinition of "others." That is to say, while the consumption society brought "diversity" in the characteristics of consumption patterns, it, at the same time, restructured the "new routine of exclusion."[291] Pointedly, the "internalization process of hegemony in itself" began at this point, that is, at point of "excluding others" in terms of reconstruction of hegemonic masculinity.

When the topic related to the "acceleration" in consumption and "diversification" in the characteristics of consumption patterns is brought up, it should be taken into consideration that modern leisure time, which considered as an "economic value" by capitalism, ultimately "commodified;" furthermore, it was marketed by culture industries, which competed for the "money" and for the "time" of the costumers.[292] In this way, the "commodification" of leisure time and its transformation into the "industrial material," at the same time, make it a sign of "purchasing power." That is, modern leisure time, which came to a state of a consumption item of the consumption economy, was never anything other than a symbol of a "status," which would distinguish *someone* from the *others*. Furthermore, apart from income, occupation, and education,

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[290] David Harvey, *The Condition of Post Modernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), p.285.
[291] Jean Comaroff, John L. Comaroff, "Alien –Nations: Zombies, Immigrants, and Millenial Capitalism," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101 (Fall 2002), pp. 780-782.
[292] Argın, "Boş Zamanın Anlamı Üzerine Notlar," p.142.

the leisure time activities, even more influential than these indicators, began to play a vital role for those who wished to be included into the hegemonic structuring so as to gain a visual respect, acceptance, and priority in society. To tell the truth, they were not so mistaken that the social profiles of the 1980s was positioned with respect to their "consumption patterns," consequently, to their leisure time activities in the end. In this manner, the consumption of the leisure time, as a novel means of "inclusion" and "exclusion," at the same time, was an expression of "social fragmentation" based not on the issue of class or race but on how someone spent its leisure time. At this point, the question *how*, together with itself, put forward the lifestyle, which was admired by hegemonic ideology of the 1980s, moreover, delineated the hegemonic male figure "imbibing" this lifestyle.

The Concept of Lifestyle and Yuppies

Bourdieu uses the notion of "lifestyle" to denote patterns of taste and consumption used by social groups to distinguish themselves as distinct and coherent class formations.[293] In this manner, it is clearly possible to claim that social stratification depended not solely on patterns of economic relation, but also on the degree of status attached to the patterns of living and cultural preferences of different social groups. Following this, in the 1980s, a construction of lifestyle concerning *how* the modern leisure time should be spent, at the same time, was the runner of a hegemonic form, which would be structured with respect to the patterns of leisure time consumption, for a lifestyle in which a definite section of society embodied itself was a notion of lifestyle

[293] See Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (London: Routledge, 1986)

imposed by those who acquired the mechanism of establishing hegemony. That is, both a clear lifestyle was determined and, for sure, was presented by the hegemonic ideology so as to frame admired social figures; accordingly, social figures in society began to vie with each other in the matter of being included in the hegemonic structuring through absorbing patterns of lifestyle insisted on them, especially by the materials of popular culture (like magazines, books, and advertisement), that is, through becoming adapted to the "American lifestyle." From where the vast appearance of America-oriented lifestyle on the pages of popular magazines and newspapers stemmed might be accounted for not only with a rapid increase in the variety and in the number of magazines, which had American origin, but also with the rise of "modern professional managers" in business life.[294] If the finance sector[295] is given as an example so as to examine the profile of these "modern professional managers," it was clear that because "bankers were working in 'an atmosphere in which [imported coffees] was drunk, correspondences and telephone communications were made in English,'" consequently, they soaked up such a life style (Western, especially American), however.[296] A quote from an interview made with Zeynep Atikkan, who was appointed to the Genborsa (a joint-stock company) as a general director while she was just thirty -six years old, gives important clues in analyzing their lifestyle:

> I come to the work around 9.00-9.30. The work always compels me to pay attention to my clothes. We have lunch at a good place. We can leave work in the evening at 18.00 o'clock and, [in this way], enjoy our social life. In which places does that social life materialize? They are either friend meetings or bars of Zihni, Bebek Hotel. We meet friends working at the bank or in other companies. They too are young, dynamic, and like-minded people ... We have a drink or go to

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[294] Bali, *Tarz- ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, p. 42.
[295] The banking was one of the most favorite occupations in the 1980, for sure, with the effect of the economic integration (international finance) with America, Ibid.
[296] Ibid.

> dance in the evenings. In respect of my observations, almost all of the people whom we can call name "yuppie," in the circle, are the same. Because they come from the same "origin," the relation in the working life continues in social life, too. Vacation trips are adjusted with respect to the programs of each other on the weekends.[297]

What was the "same origin" mentioned above, which led us to denominate some one as *yuppie* or what were the some important formative experiences shared by yuppies? The answers of these questions would enable the concept of yuppie, which was hegemonic masculine form of the 1980s in terms of their occupations and their lifestyle, to be enlightened; moreover, it also would reveal that their opening out into the American lifestyle sprung not only from their habits inclined towards consuming imported goods or from their office atmosphere in which English words fly off, but also from their common peculiarities in matters of "education," "income" and from their clear approaches to the issues of "personal freedom," "gender," and etc. Therefore, it is required to elaborate on the concept of *yuppie* so as to grasp what meant by the expression of "yuppified lifestyle." At this point, the term yuppie first appeared in 1983 in the East Bay *Express*[298] and later the "explosion of yuppie" was experienced in American press with the proclamation of *Newsweek* avowing that "1984 [was] 'their' year" and "they were becoming the dominant political and cultural force in American

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[297] "*Saat 9.00-9.30 gibi işe gelirim. İş sürekli giyimime dikkat etmeye zorluyor. Öğle yemeğini iyi bir yerde yeriz. Akşam saat 18.00'de işten çıkabiliyoruz ve [böylelikle] sosyal hayatımız olabiliyor. O sosyal hayat nerelerde gerçekleşiyor? Ya arkadaş toplantıları, ya da Zihni, Bebek Oteli'nin barları. Bankada ya da diğer şirketlerde çalışan arkadaşlarla buluşuyoruz. Onlar da genç, dinamik, aynı kafada kişiler ... Akşamları bir içki içiyor ya da dansa gidiyoruz. Benim gözlemlerime göre, çevrede 'yuppy' diyebileceğimiz kişilerin hemen hemen hepsi aynı. Aynı 'orijinden' geldikleri için, çalışma hayatındaki ilişki sosyal yaşamda da sürüyor. Tatil gezileri, hafta sonları birbirimizin programlarına göre ayarlanıyor.*" "Veznenin Arkasındaki İnsanlar (People, who are Behind of Cashier's Office)," *Güneş* 21 August 1987 cited in ibid.

[298] "It [Yuppie] became current as a description of the people who voted for Gary Hart in the 1984 primaries, especially in New Hampshire and Massachusetts." Guoted from John L. Hammond, "Yuppies," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 4 (Winter 1986), p. 496, Gary Hart, "the hope of liberals," was one of former senators in Amerca, who was left no choice but to give up the dream of presidency in 1988 campaign for US because it was procalimed that he had a relationship with a young model named Donna Rice. Available at www. Washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/Clinton/frenzy/hart2.htm

society."[299] In this manner, the *yuppie* phenomenon, which was fired by the American press in the mid 1980s, completely related to the American culture and it brought more things to mind than the "young, urban, and ambitious professionals," especially those working in the finance sector. They, first of all, were "children of the baby boom," who, in the 1980s, had high educational levels, occupational attainments, and salaries "which match their ambitions;" furthermore, this huge "birth cohorts of the baby boom," according to the American press, "crowd[ed] the country's labor and real estate markets, health clubs, and boutiques."[300] The press accounts also suggested that yuppies, which were regarded as the "dominant and cultural force" of American society in the 1980s, rejected high taxes, social spending, and government regulation. These approaches of the yuppies to the political and economic issues were accounted for by those, "who ascribed a unique patterns of beliefs to them," like that "declining trust in political institutions, generally attributed to Vietnam War and to the Watergate, led people to oppose all forms of government intervention"[301] and impelled them to "find satisfaction in self-expression than in fulfilling social roles or adhering to institutional requirements."[302] Apart from economic issues, the clearest behavior of yuppies, which distinguished them as a distinct social fragment, was their infinite support for gender issues, especially for "liberal feminism." "The loosening of cultural restrictions,"[303]

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[299] Hammond, "Yuppies," p. 487.
[300] Ibid.
[301] Ibid., p. 489.
[302] Ibid., p. 488.
[303] 'The loosening of cultural restrictions,' that is, the breakdown of traditional gender roles or other issues concerning sexual preferences and a radical threaten to economic, political, and social constructions, first sprouted in the 1960s. Why I now focus on this decade (the 1960s) is to scrutinize from where the origin of the word yuppie came from and to put forth the basic difference between the 1960s and the 1980s, that is, between *Yippies* and *yuppies*. In such a manner that: "These new norms burst forth in the 1960s as part of a movement which was antiauthoritarian and politically left. The term yuppie resonates, after all, because it evokes the Yippies who nominated a pig for president in 1968. The affluent flower children, encouraged to believe that they could accomplish whatever they wanted, demanded freedom from

especially since the 1960s in gender issues, had an influence on yuppies, that is, on the new cultural and political force of American society in the 1980, in the matter of taking a position concerning women's movements. Yuppies, "well-educated, well-off, urban members of the baby boom generation," as a hegemonic social figure (usually masculine) of society, were hand-in-hand with women; in this way, "they support[ed] equal rights for women; they reject[ed] restrictive sexual mores, and accordingly endorse[d] freedom of sexual preference and abortion rights."[304]

As for the case of Turkey, the term yuppie, first of all, was an "imported term," which was imported from American culture; [305]accordingly, it was used to define "a profile of a young manager, who was very ambitious, hardworking, and pragmatist; moreover, who adored the power of money and intended only to have it and to be promoted in his/her occupation."[306] The rolling of the term yuppie to Turkish culture might be accounted for, first of all, with the political, economic, and cultural climate of Turkey attributed to the 1980s. In this manner, it, for sure, would be a mistake to establish a close link between American and Turkish cultural, political, and economic conditions. Consequently, the aforesaid yuppie generation in the case of Turkey was never the "birth cohorts of baby boom;" however, Turkey, in the 1980s, had a proper ground so as to imbibe the model of yuppie; in other words, the "wave of neo-liberalism" which manifested itself in the 1980s constructed yuppies, who corresponded the stratum of a new middle class, as the most "valuable" and the most "privileged"

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restrictive norms. But they also equal opportunity and a decent standard living for minority groups, and fuller democratic and communal participation in decision making; they rejected wealth as the standard of social status ... But media accounts suggested that yuppies are different: they are nonconforming and antiauthoritarian, but they are also very concerned with income, consumption, and possessions." Quoted from Ibid., pp. 488-489.

[304] Ibid, pp. 487-488.

[305] Can Kozanoğlu, *Cilalı İmaj Devri* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1992), p. 90

[306] Ibid., p.92.

social figures in society.[307] At this point, neo-liberal ideology, in Turkey, with its basic impulse directed towards "being an individual," fostered the structural frame of yuppie. While the yuppie generation in America, which had lost confidence in national, political institutions, found satisfaction more in "self-expression than adhering to institutional requirements" and objected to each kind of government intervention in economic issues; moreover, while they were avowed as "pessimistic" and "self-absorptive," which would account both for their rejection of conventional norms,"[308] the yuppie cohorts in Turkey, in the same way, had a lack of confidence in governmental institutions with the effect of the military coup experienced in 1980. Nevertheless, the yuppie youth of the 1980s in Turkey represented such a generation that for them, "being an individual" was the most cogent justification so as to be situated in the "circle"[309] through getting shut of all collective liabilities.[310] For this reason, to define the yuppie generation of Turkey as "pessimistic" or "self-absorptive" is a big oversight; on the contrary, they were very "hopeful" and "avid" through the pompous promises falling abundantly on them. The long and short of it is that the yuppie generation peculiar to Turkey was not a yield of two decades preceding itself; it rather was the "marketing target" of the 1980s, which came on the scene with the consumption society. Therefore, it is possible to put forth the other and essential reason for the rolling of the term yuppie to Turkish culture, especially to the Turkish press. This reason might be accounted for in a way that "yuppies came of age in imposing numbers. They visibly transformed the American cityscape with health

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[307] Meltem Ahıska and Zafer Yenal, *Aradığınız Kişiye Şu Anda Ulaşılamıyor: Türkiye'de Hayat Tarzı Temsilleri, 1980-2005* (Istanbul: The Archives and Research Center of Osmanlı Bank, 2006), p. 60.

[308] See Richard A. Easterlin, *Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers on Personal Welfare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[309] I use the "circle" so as to imply the new economic model of Turkey embodied itself in Özal's administration, that is, the market economy, also the neo-liberal discourse pumping the individualism.

[310] Sezai Sarıoğlu, "Değişmek de Değişmemek de Yordu Beni," *Birikim* 152-153 (December 2001-January 2002), pp. 63-64.

clubs, gourmet delis, and remodeled houses. In the process they became marketing target, and since newspapers, magazines, and televisions are marketed, journalists had to pay attention to them."[311] At this point, the lineage of yuppie, which came to the fore with the American media for the sake of the transformation of the American cityscape, in other words, for the sake of illustrating modern consumption patterns, was utilized by Turkish press so as to embed a hegemonic lifestyle pattern in the metropolis, and it, for sure, was anything other than imposing the "American lifestyle" on Turkish culture. However, the important point here is not to examine the model of yuppie in Turkey, but rather to put forth which kind of lifestyle construction was materialized upon the model of yuppie.

When we come to the 1980s, so as to examine how modern leisure time was spent and to reach a broad depiction related to the everyday experiences, there is no better space other than the "house," [312] as the most proper ground for this research. At this point, I should clarify that it, that is, taking "home" as the case in order to scrutinize the construction of hegemonic masculinity based on the concept of lifestyle, was not my own preference; on the contrary, because the 1980s was a period in which a notion of "returning to house"[313] was observed visibly, I was left no choice but to converge on the concept of "house." For sure, the notion of "returning to house" or escaping into the "home-centered"[314] leisure time consumption was a yield of propaganda which reduces the everyday experiences of the 1970s to "street violence," that is, it was a yield of such

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[311] Quoted from Hammond, "Yuppies," p. 498.

[312] Here, the concept of "house" was used, by being inspired by Sezai Sarıoğlu, in order to describe "places" in which public life materilalized, that is, in response to the "streets" of the 1970s, the "houses" of the 1980s in which all political, sociological, and humanitarian (or personal) actvities were enjoyed. Sezai Sarıoğlu, *Nar Taneleri: Gayriresmi Portreler* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp. 32-33.

[313] Ibid.

[314] See for the differences between "home-centered" and "community-centered" patterns of leisure time consumption Robert J. Havighurst, Kenneth Feigenbaum, "Leisure and Life Style," pp. 388-400.

kind of "rancor" concerning the 1970s. There is more to come, while the concept of "streets" represented on the one hand the "chaos" and on the other hand "collective memory," the concept of "house" amounted both to "privacy," "tranquility," and "protection" and, for sure, to "individualism." That is to say, the primary purpose of the 1980s, consequently, was to pull the human away from historical context and to make him/her enter into to a state of "unconscious." The feeling of anxiety and the ground of "unconsciousness" brought together with themselves "silence," "isolation," and "alienation."[315] At this point, as mentioned before, concept of "house" included all place in which public life[316] materialized and these places, led to separate the "inside" from the "outside," such as shopping malls and offices, closed-to-the-outside suburbia, business centers, and residences.[317] When it comes to the construction of hegemonic masculinity based on the concept of lifestyle, it, precisely here, that is, in these covered places was processed. In such a manner that:

> There are lots of bar, restaurant, and discotheque, which were opened for [yuppies and businessmen.] For example, restaurants opened by Metin Fadıllıoğlu as if they were designed for them: Plaza, Etiler 29, and Vaniköy 29. Besides, restaurants such as Şamdan, Dört Mevsim too are among their much-frequented places. They who are more "intellectual" have a whole lot of acquaintances in Ziya and Ece Bar. They can eat frog legs at Körfez by getting on the private boat of restaurant, which leaves from Hisar. They usually do not make *dansöz* (female professional) dance and do not spend a lot of money on her (this honored tradition sometimes happens in each Turk's life, without a doubt.) They know about Worcestershire sauce and use it.[318]

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[315] See, for a broader debate on these issues, Fredric Jameson, "Nostalgia for the Present" in *Postmodernism or the Cultural of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University, 1991), p. 286.

[316] There is one more important point which should be mentioned here, that the point in question here is not the maintaining of public life in covered places but it rather is the diminishing of the barrier between the public and the private; moreover, is being "privatized" of the public sphere. Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p. 120.

[317] Öncü, "The Myth of the 'Ideal Home' Travels across Cultural Borders to Istanbul" in *Space, Culture, and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities*, p. 56-60.

[318] " *[yuppiler ve İşadamları] için açılmış bar, lokanta ve diskotekler var. Örneğin Metin Fadıllıoğlu'nun açtığı lokantalar sanki onlar için yaratılmış: Plaza, Etiler 29 ve Vaniköy 29. Ayrıca Şamdan, Dört Mevsim gibi lokantalar da uğrakları arasında. İyice 'entellerinin' Ziya'da, Ece Bar'da bir yığın tanıdığı var. Hisar'dan özel lokanta motoruna binip Körfez'de kurbağa bacağı yiyebiliyorlar. Genellikle dansöz*

Apart from being wealthier, being more "intellectual," more "occidental," or the "yuppie" was identified with the "places"[319] in which his leisure time was consumed. As for being more "masculine," there was a rigid parallelism between masculinity and the consumption of drinks[320], foods peculiar to those places, like "Worcestershire sauce." The 1908s was such a period that it constructed a sort of hegemonic masculinity through the much-frequented places and consumption of distinct foods or drinks, usually pertaining to Western culture. Moreover, this kind of hegemonic masculinity was established over other men, who were not able to go to such places or unable to conceal that they did not belong to there. It also a meant appearing in these places with a figure of "classy women,"[321] who would accompany him for a short time because this kind of hegemonic masculinity could make itself complete such a representation (here! an unpregnant sex partner, mentioned in the previous chapter.) There is more to come, the consumption-oriented construction of hegemonic masculinity contributed to the symbols of masculinity to spreads over different fields of leisure time activities and lifestyles

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oynatmıyor ve orasına burasına para yapıştırmıyorlar (bu soylu gelenek her Türk'ün bazen vuku bulur şüphesiz). Worcestershire sosunu biliyor ve kullanıyorlar." "İş Alemi'nin Jön Türkleri (Young Turks of the Bussiness World)" Yeni Gündem 22 July 1990 cited in Bali, *Tarz- ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, p. 48

[319] See Appendix, pp. 134-136.

[320] See Appendix ,pp. 137-138.

[321] These men, above all everything, were "bachelor," or men who should remain as a bachelor. See Bill Osgerby, *Playboys in Paradise: Masculinity, Youth, and Leisure Style in Modern America* (New York: Berg Publishing, 2001), pp. 149-179 In this manner, what was the means of status for that single man: "not the well-groomed wife, but the classy companion who could be rented (for the price of drinks and dinner) one night at a time. "Playboy Joins the Battle of the Sexes" excerpt from Barbara Ehrenreich, *The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and Flight from Commitment*, p. 209 The bachelorhood was not a impenetrable rule, but a hegemonic lifestyle, which was came to the fore by those holding the mechanism of establishing hegemonic masculinity. Besides, the "one-child family," (see appendix, p.144, *Erkekçe* 6 (June 1982) was also the admired lifestyle avowed as a "new lifestyle" by Charles Tilly. See for details Charles Tilly, "Occupational Rank and Grade of Residence in a Metropolis," *The American Journal of Sociology* 3 (November 1961), also see as an example of the "one-child family depiction" *Erkekçe* 6 (June 1982), p.37 (Available at Appendix, p. 124).

such as sports, personal electronics.[322] In this manner, for the case of the 1980s, playing "golf"[323] and "skiing,"[324] similar to the "Worcestershire sauce," were the indicators of being included in hegemonic structuring, or were the showcases of hegemonic masculinity in which it embodied itself. At this point, ski and golf clubs, together with big hotels in which such kind of sports activities were materialized should be evaluated in the context of the covered places through which a definite section of society distinguished, isolated and protected itself from the "outside" or the "others." In the same way, concepts of "car"[325] and "house" undertook the same mission of "isolation" and "protection," as much as they were the "symbol" of masculinity,"[326] especially the "size of car"[327] and the "location of house"[328] were the conducive to the construction of hegemonic masculinity, which was identified with the "occupation" and "status" of man.[329] In this manner, such an emphasis on the "location of home" and on the "home decoration," at the same time, paved the way for a social fragmentation[330]surfacing,

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[322] See for the diversification in leisure time and lifestyle activities Harvey, *The Condition of Post Modernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, p.285.

[323] See Appendix, p. 139, *Erkekçe* 4 (April 1990), p. 60-62.

[324] *Erkekçe* 2 (February 1982), p. 41.

[325] "Gaining prevalence" of the car in Turkey came on the scene in the 1950s; it was the symbol of "wealthy" and "being privileged" for that years. When it comes to the 1980s, it appeared as the representation of "individualism" and "freedom;" moreover, the interest of Özals's administration on highways contrary to the railways; that is, its emphasis on individual transportation rather than on the mass transportation hardened the relation between the using of the car and its symbolization related to "individualism" and "freedom." Ahıska and Yenal, *Aradığınız Kişiye Şu Anda Ulaşılamıyor: Türkiye'de Hayat Tarzı Temsilleri, 1980-2005*, p. 149

[326] "How should a modern man decorate his home (Modern bir erkek evini nasıl döşemeli)?" *Erkekçe* 10 (October 1982), p. 91, "Do you wonder about to what extent a 'man' is he (Onun ne denli bir erkek olduğunu merak ediyor musunuz?)" "Look at his car (Arabasına bakın!)" Erkekçe 3 (March 1982), p. 80

[327] See Appendix, pp.140-141.

[328] See appendix, pp. 142-143.

[329] "Domesticated men [escaping into home-centerd leisure time activities] had their own commodity ensemble, centered on home appliances and hoby hardware, and for a long time there had seemed to be no alternative. A man expressed his status through the size of his car and location of his house." Quoted from "Playboy Joins the Battle of the Sexes" excerpt from Barbara Ehrenreich, *The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and Flight from Commitment*, p. 209.

[330] "Households use part of their incomes to acquire housing of a sufficient grade to distinguish them from others lower in occupational prestige." Tilly, "Occupational Rank and Grade of Residence in a Metropolis," p. 324.

especially through the appearance and the dramatic rise of closed-to-the-outside suburbia, especially after the mid-1980s, furthermore, through the consumption of technological appliances* pertaining to home decoration.[331] There is more to come, "the closed-to-the-outside suburbia" represented the "homogeneity of a lifestyle cleansed of urban clutter – of poverty, of immigrants, of elbowing crowds, dirt and traffic – a world of safe and antiseptic social spaces where the 'ideal home' signifies clean air, clean water, healthy lives; a homogeneous setting and a cultural milieu where adults and children lead active lives, engage in sports, socialize with each other around their barbecue sets in the gardens"[332] Accordingly, It is possible to meet such kind of representation concerning the closed-to-the-outside suburbia in contemporary advertisements in Istanbul's lucrative home market,[333]

> Istanbul ... The legendary city of splendid architecture which has inspired songs, poems, books ... The gate across continents and the cradle of ancient civilizations ... But unfortunately a city which has lost much of its former beauty to become a metropolis of ten million today ... Istanbul's pollution has become oppressive ... It contaminates not only the air, water, soil of city, but its traffic, its people, and its culture ... Those who have to continue working in this polluted environment are moving away to escape its influence in their living spaces. They are searching for clean, happy, peaceful settings ... And in Istanbul's hinterland new towns are emerging to answer this need ... But GARDENCITY is very special for them ...
>
> - Luxury villas in gardens with 500 square meter
> - Only 20 minutes to Istanbul

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* The abundance of the consumption concerning "color television," "video," and "stereo music set" were the sine qua non indicators on the one hand of being included to the global myth and on the other hand of disclosing the difference of status, moreover, of hegemonic masculinity based on consumption of "home appliance" and "hobby hardware." Öncü, "The Myth of the 'Ideal Home' Travels across Cultural Borders to Istanbul," p.61, "Playboy Joins the Battle of the Sexes" excerpt from Barbara Ehrenreich, *The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and Flight from Commitment*, p. 209, "The Video Revolution (Video Devrimi)" in *Erkekçe* 11 (November 1984), p. 35.

[331] Öncü, "The Myth of the 'Ideal Home' Travels across Cultural Borders to Istanbul," p.61.

[332] Quoted from Ibid., p. 61.

[333] "In the inflationary environment of the 1980s, real estate became the highest profit sector in Istanbul, where political corruption, capitalist development, and international finance intersected." Quoted from Keyder, "The Housing Market from Informal to Global," in in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, p. 153.

- Swimming pool, tennis courts, sports club, children's park, Country Club
- Entries and exist guarded by special security system[334]

Taking everything into consideration, against "whom" did they protect themselves? When yuppies were regarded as the new "Istanbulities," to which social strata were the "others" attached? What was the social figure, which sheltered all peculiarities of being "others" in it? While the "mass culture" and "consumption society" presented opportunities (democratization of consumption) to everybody and impelled every part of society to consumption and display, which profile did hegemonic masculinity, constructed upon the same notions, put contrary to it as an absolute "other"? Who was the "gluttonous" social figure which led the social fragmentation to be worn down through its "appetite?" In other words, if yuppies were the "insiders" of hegemonic ideology and Istanbul, who, therefore, were the "others" both bred and exposed to the process of "othering" by the same ideology? Consequently, who was put on the showcase so as to reflect the hegemony of hegemonic masculinity? However, the indisputable point here was not subordination, but it rather was the "othering," and reducing them to a "ridiculous position."

Looking at a Different Landscape Belonging to Istanbul

> The core of the world history is no longer the evolution and devolution of world systems, but the tense, ongoing interaction of forces promoting global integration and forces recreating local autonomy. This is not a struggle for or against global integration itself, but rather a struggle over the terms of that integration. The struggles is by no means finished, and its path is no longer foreordained by the dynamics of western expansion that initiated global integration ... These matters

[334] Cited in Öncü, "The Myth of the 'Ideal Home' Travels across Cultural Borders to Istanbul," p. 56.

> lead to the question of who, or what, controls and defines the identity of individuals, social groups, nations and cultures.[335]
>
> Globalization does not signal the erasure of local difference, but in a strange way its converse; it revalidates and reconstitutes place, locality, and difference.[336]

Precisely here, the third photograph belonging to Istanbul, which was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, becomes a current issue again; that is, a photograph which included global and local "identities" or "differences"[337] in dissimilar places departed from each other with an absolute demarcation,[338] but also a photograph which disclosed both of them with the same intensity. By relying on the existence of such a photograph, this "simultaneous disclosure"[339] might be accounted for with three justifications; it, first of all, springs from the own "core of globalization" as stated through two quotations written above; second, from the intention of mass culture and consumption society, which considers each unit of society as an "potential consumer;" and last but not least, from the social background of politicians, who came to power after the 1983 elections. Accordingly, these new politicians underpinned the "blossomed manifestation" of

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[335] Charles Bright and Michael Gayer, "For a Unified History of the World in the Twentieth Century," cited in Ayfer Bartu, "Who Owns the Old Quarters? Rewriting Histories in a Global Era" in *Istanbul: Between The Global and the Local*, p. 31.

[336] Michael J. Watts, "Mapping Meaning, Denoting Difference, Imagining Identity: Dialectical Images, and postmodern geographies," cited in Ibid.

[337] As for the detailed explanation of these "identities" and "differences," Çağlar Keyder's straightforward approaches to the issues of global actor, "alien," and of "native," moreover, of "Western" and "authentic" would provide a strong basis in grasping the clear bifurcation between "insider" and "other." "Globalization subjects populations to cultural flows of many kinds that shape the nature of the conflict, the lines of defense, and the potential for compromise or hardening. Social groups who are in a position to ride the wave of economic transformation are the advocates of Istanbul's globalization. They feel themselves to be the privileged recipients of the global massage and the chosen manipulators/consumers of the 'dizzying array' of cultural signs that are available in the flows of media and signs." Keyder, "conclusion," in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, p. 191 Moreover, "the urban came to be seen by immigrants to represent an alien legal system where property was regulated on the basis of imported law. Hence, all the vectors that divide the conceptual universes along axes of Western and native, alien and authentic, imposed and home-grown, were overlaid with the dimension of space, where the urban proper was counterposed to the illegally occupied, not really urban, the shantytown." Keyder, "The Housing Market from Informal to Global," in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, p. 149.

[338] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p.68.

[339] Gürbilek uses the expression of "rediscovery of provincial" instead of "simultaneous disclosure" in order to justify the explosion of provinciality and localness. See Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p. 106.

"localness" and "provinciality" within the popular discourse because they were themselves from "rural origin" and they boasted of their "non-Istanbul backgrounds" without being burdened by any "complex of provinciality." At this point, according to their own expressions, their essential "mission" was not constructed on the basis of "solving the peasant problems," but it was directed towards "solving the problems of the newly urbanized peasants."[340]

As a matter of fact, the essential importance of this "simultaneous disclosure," in the case of this study, lies behind the manipulation of these local and provincial identities (the uncultured immigrants) for the sake of defining the true Istanbulite.[341] However, "a true Istanbulite is a myth" and "contemporary myth making[342] is a cultural activity that presumes the existence of makers and users, who are not themselves a homogeneous collectivity. The discursive constructs of a *hegemonic culture* are continuously *undermined* and actively *renegotiated* within the contours of lived experience and practices of everyday life."[343] In this manner, such discrimination between "Istanbulites" and "others" or the process of "othering" to which was applied so as to bring a "true Istanbulite" into being might be validated in the matter of constructing hegemonic masculinity. In this connection, since the "practices of masculinity" and the "elements of hegemony" are constructed in respect of hegemonic

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[340] Sema Erder, "Where Do You Hail From? Localism and Networks in Istanbul" in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, p. 162. See Bali, *Tarz- ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, pp. 35-38.

[341] See Öncü, "Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of Being Middle Class in the Era of Globalism" in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, pp. 95-98.

[342] "Contemporary myths ... are not expressed in long, fixed narratives of the primitive epic but in phrases and forms of speech whose meanings appear self-evident and hence 'natural.' They are linguistic expressions through which a dominant cultural discourse floods the hidden the hidden corners of ever day existence, presenting itself as universal and ideal. *An 'Istanbulite,' then is a myth* ... It is a figure of speech that insistently and repetitively circulates through daily life – in conversations among friends, in newspaper articles, television commentaries, captions of photographs in weekly magazines, films, jokes." Quoted from Ibid., p. 95.

[343] Ibid., p. 96.

culture pertaining to a definite historical section, they too are subject to the "negotiation" and to the "shake."

In the case of the 1980s, hegemonic culture, without a doubt, consisted of a notion of "global lifestyle" and "westernized Istanbulities;" accordingly, such kind of hegemonic culture, which was metropolitan and very urban-based, was not delayed in manifesting a different configuration as "other" to define and strength itself; it was the "arabesque culture," which bred again from the city, especially from the metropolis on its own.[344] There is more to come, when the profile of yuppie was taken into consideration as the primary actor of this global culture[345] and depicted as the new owner of Istanbul (westernized Istanbulites), the figure which was put contrary to yuppie hegemony was the maganda. Here, there is the catch! The maganda was such a description that it sheltered all "cultural degeneration" in itself, which could be attributed to the 1980s; that is, all of the instigation and exaggeration of this decade. In this manner, the most popular masculine figure of the 1980s would derive from the mixture of these maganda stereotype and arabesque culture; he, even, let alone being a mixture of them, was the very self of the arabesque culture and the stereotype of maganda (yob).[346]

The Meaning of Arabesque Culture

> [Especially, in the 1980s] Istanbul was the emergent growth pole of Turkey's rapid integration into world markets, riding on a wave of foreign investment and buoyant

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[344] Meral Özbek, *Populer Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski*, pp. 109-114.
[345] See Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 19, Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, p. 332.
[346] Here, the aforesaid popular masculine figure was not someone other than Ibrahim Tatlıses.

> exports. Almost overnight, the consumer markets of city were flooded with goods from around the world – available for purchase on installment. In open-air-vegetable and food markets that dot the poor neighborhoods of the city, stalls now displayed electronic goods from Taiwan and tableware from Germany, beneath overhanging racks of cheap clothing of every imaginable variety, ranging from lacy women's underwear, to T-shirts and jeans with fake designer labels. Everybody seemed to be on the move: in the language of Istanbulities, arabesk culture had invaded the city.[347]

Through benefiting from Ayşe Öncü's broad approach to the culture of arabesque, it, first of all, is inevitable to disclose that the essential reason in using of the concept of arabesque culture, in this study, is not to highlight the "hybrid music genre,"[348] which gained enormous popularity among recent immigrant populations of Istanbul, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970, but both to express that arabesque culture, when the date pointed to the 1980s, symbolized the "impure," "hybrid," and "vulgar" lifestyle and to redefine it as a "special kind of kitsch."[349]

At this point, the portrait of Istanbul which was drawn up by Çağlar Keyder's point of view put forth a sharp "dichotomy" or "duality" for consideration in terms of both the housing market and cultural stratification.[350] In this sense, on the one hand the "yuppified" urban structuring and, on the other hand, the conspicuous "slummification" showed them off in Istanbul of the 1980, with the effect of global flood.[351] For sure, the "immigration phenomenon" and "slummification" were not things peculiar to the 1980s; on the contrary, *Istanbul*, as a city, experienced them more intensely, especially during 1960s and 1970s.[352] However, when it is come to *Istanbulities*, they were confronted

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[347] Öncü, "Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of Being Middle Class in the Era of Globalism," p. 104 .
[348] Özbek, *Populer Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski*, pp. 116-117.
[349] Öncü, "Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of Being Middle Class in the Era of Globalism," p. 104.
[350] Keyder, "The Housing Market from Informal to Global," pp. 148-150.
[351] Ibid., p. 157.
[352] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p. 103.

most with the provincials and local elements of this metropolis in the 1980s.[353] The high walls and isolated "places" of globalized and yuppified lifestyle thrived in separating the city into the poles in geographical meaning, but they could not impede the standing out of individuals who had a burning desire for "consumption," that is, the standing out of people, which might be regarded as the figures of "tackified" overconsumption.[354] Accordingly, precisely here, the concept of arabesque, so as to define the form of 'tackified' overconsumption was put into use in the 1980s or, with a better expression; it was reformulated and revalidated for the sake of such a description. In such a manner, the term arabesque represented a kind of "lack of aesthetic," "vulgarism," and the sense of "*sonradan görme* (new rich)."[355] Furthermore, this sort of a representation was in vogue not only for a definite social sector or class, but also for all individuals who "disregarded distinctions of taste without compunction or embarrassment."[356] Consequently, if the yuppified hegemonic culture necessitated possessing an outstanding taste, the othered one, therefore, should have pointed to the "deprivation" from such kind of taste.[357]

Following this, the reformulation of arabesque in the 1980s did remove it from being solely peculiar to the lower culture or to the slum; in this context, the concept of

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[353] Ibid.

[354] Öncü, "Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of Being Middle Class in the Era of Globalism," p. 110.

[355] "By the end of the 1980s, the new channels of accumulation and upward mobility associated with the ear of neolibaralism had given birth to a new category of rich in Istanbul. This is a novel breed of 'new rich,' however, who couldn't care less about matters of taste. They just luxuriate in their newly found wealth and look on their own hybridity with delight, so to speak, totally devoid of the status anxieties commonly associated with the term *nouveau riche* in French. In the absence of a name, the label *arabesk* expanded to capture this new syndrome." Ibid.

[356] Ibid.

[357] At this point *Lahmacun* is very clear representation concerning the redefinition of arabesque culture in the 1980s, in this manner it represents the "easterner who succeed in being rich, but still regarded as the 'other;'" that is, it is a food which is identified with the profile of "*sonradan görme* (new rich)." Ahıska and Yenal, *Aradığınız Kişiye Şu Anda Ulaşılamıyor: Türkiye'de Hayat Tarzı Temsilleri, 1980-2005*, p. 137

arabesque was not regarded as suitable for only the "oppressed" section of society; on the contrary, it represented the profile of "ripped" individual with the accompaniment of "promises," "instigations," and the "patterns of consumption." For this reason, the most popular arabesque singer of the 1980s did not represent a "voice of conscience" attributed to the oppressed common people, but it rather a clear expression of succeeding in getting opportunities, which had been withheld from him so far, in earning money, and in altering completely someone's class belonging. The new symbol of arabesque culture was rather a winner than a loser and ripped one than oppressed.[358] However, the hegemonic ideology, which impelled everybody to win and rip, did not remind behind othering the "ripped" arabesque figures through declaring them an "aesthetic anomaly,"[359] that is as a maganda.

An Absolute "Other:" Maganda

The cultural blooming in the 1980 especially witnessed through the various magazines, together with it brought the deception of "modern type of man," though. In this sense, a description concerning modern type of man, at the same time, clearly expressed all peculiarities of "othered" masculine figure. Therefore, it was necessary, for being a modern man or an admired masculine figure, to stay away from all characteristics, which was identified with the profile of maganda. This modern type of man was described thus:

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[358] See for the difference between Orhan Gencebay and Ibrahim Tatlıses, Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, pp. 92-101.

[359] Öncü, "Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of Being Middle Class in the Era of Globalism," p.111.

> [A man] who does not wander at home with the striped pajamas,/ does not find meeting with his wife very strange in any restaurant, he goes, / believes that it is possible to be a man without growing a mustache,/ does not drink whisky while eating *kebap* (kebab),/ does not force the women, who works under his service, to go out,/ brushes his teeth properly instead of chewing his dentist out,/ does not stand up before opening the doors of plane,/ behaves like westerner while purchasing technology, but does not being easterner in the process of using them,/ goes to a theatre by buying a ticket when he is not invited/ does not show his golden necklace from among his hairs through untying the all buttons of his shirt down to his belly/ ... knows where and how he should park his car,/ does not begin to tell how we conquered Istanbul while the dirt of toilets is being talked about.[360]

The process of othering or to emphasis the true (admired) one through throwing the antithesis of it for consideration is the sine qua non provision in establishing a hegemonic form. In this manner, the concept of arabesque which was reformulated in the 1980s, that is, all peculiarities ascribed to it such as "vulgarism," "new richness," and "impurity" was embodied in the profile of maganda when the date was about the 1990s,

> And the Maganda ...
> One of the necessary rules in the formation of post-modern tribes is substantial financial worth. The only tribe that constitutes an exception to this rule are the maganda. These maganda are members of the arabesk culture that emerges when the traditional culture of immigrants in the fringes of megalopolitan Istanbul, is fused with urban culture. They do not have a lengthy history. They answer the social needs of the past twenty years. The coming together of the maganda is also an identity. But unlike the other post-modern tribes, they have suburbs, intellectual circle, nor labels. The sense of belonging of this lumpen tribe is established in stadium benches, neighborhood coffee houses and evening strolls on the streets.[361]

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[360] "*Evde çubuklu pijamayla dolaşmayan,/ Gittiği lokantada eşiyle karşılaştığında yadırgamayan,/ Bıyıksız da erkek olunabileceğine inanan,/ Kebapla viski içmeyen,/ Emrinde çalışan bayanları yemeğe çıkmaya zorlamayan,/ Dişçisini fırçalamak yerine dişlerini doğru dürüst fırçalayan,/ Uçağın kapıları açılmadan ayağa kalkmayan,/ Teknolojiyi satın alırken Batılı olup, kullanırken Doğulu olmayan,/ Tiyatroya davetiye dışında bilet alarak da gidebilen,/ Gömleğini göbeğine kadar açıp kıllarının arasından altın kolyesini göstermeyen,/ ... Nereye, nasıl park edileceğini bilen,/ Tuvaletlerin pisliği konuşulurken, Istanbul'u nasıl fethettiğimizi anlatmaya başlamayan.* Bali, *Tarz- ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, p. 51

[361] *Hürriyet*, 13 December 1995 cited in Öncü, "Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of Being Middle Class in the Era of Globalism," p. 115

As seen, the press, similar to the case of constructing hegemonic form of masculinity (the model of yuppie and successful businessman), played a great role in the process of denigrating the maganda. At this point, while the press, on the one hand illustrated the maganda as an "outcome" of all cultural degeneration and instigation attributed to the 1980s, it, on the other hand, presented the profile of yuppie as an "ideal type;" that is, the ideal masculine type of the 1980s should have been yuppies. If that so, then now just what was the maganda? For sure, it was a "cultural deviation" and "unexpected event!" Consequently, "maganda [was] a figure of brute strength, hairy body, and *unbridled sexual appetites*, who infects and pollutes the cultural atmosphere of the social settings, he appears in."[362]

> *Maganda* [invariably depicted as a man] is an assault on emotions, an aesthetic aberration. He is an anomaly which corresponds to ignorance, to brute force, to social climbing, to all degenerate values. We created him. He is the animal in us ... we allowed him to flourish. He is a stain which can not be removed. He is like a plastic bottle which never degrades, never disappears.[363]

[362] Ibid., p. 111
[363] *Hürriyet*, Sunday Supplement, 12 January 1992 cited in Ibid., p. 112.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

What was the hegemonic masculinity of the 1980s? Through such a question, it is already accepted that the concept of hegemonic masculinity exercised its influence on the society in the 1980s. At this point, it is required to keep in mind that hegemonic masculinity is constructed by relating it to the subordination of woman, to the exclusion of different sexual identities such as homosexuals and transsexuals, transvestites, and relatively androgynous, moreover, through the imposition of the admired masculine figure (ideal). If that is the case, the answer of this question written above means more things other than only "yes." Accordingly, it means that the "subordinated position" of woman, the "exclusion" of different sexual identities, and the designation of definite masculine figures as ideals" *continued* in the 1980s. Unequal "sexual politics" has been so absorbed that such a consequence might not seem surprise to us; however, the important point here is not the continuity of basic trivets, which sustains hegemonic masculinity, but rather it is the continuity of their subordination and exclusion although the actors subjected to this subordination and exclusion were *instigated* to a great degree within the discourse of "sexual freedom." If that was so, then how the subordinate position of woman was reproduced within such a discourse? This question had a precise answer in that the image of woman (audacious and self-confident) in the 1980s presented within the discourse of sexual freedom was nothing other than that of "lover" image. In this manner, "extra-marital" relations, "sexual freedom," or "self-confidence" in sexual meaning was validated for the image of "lover." However, the New Man

(responsible man) coming on the scene within the pro-feminist men's movement, which gives the support for the issue of *abortion* and *birth control*, in this manner, was reunited with the "unpregnant," "effortless" sex partners through the image of "audacious woman." As for the second woman image, seen easily in the pages of *Erkekçe*, that is, the woman positioned as a "wife" was the representation of the "family" for man, was the "watering hole," and resolutely mother of *his* children, that is, his "manifestations" on the face of the world. Therefore, what did woman acquire through such discrimination between the images of woman? For sure, sexual freedom, but actually for the man! Accordingly, the subordination of woman continued for each two woman images, too; that is, sexual objectification for the former, domestication for the letter.

When it comes to the second trivet of hegemonic masculinity, by relying on the exclusion of the different sexualities, it is inevitable to claim that hegemonic masculinity is constructed, especially by relating it to "heterosexuality," in this manner, hegemonic masculinity is *absolutely* heterosexual. In the case of the 1980s, although homosexuality and transsexuality were "incited to words" in almost every type of material of popular culture, was rendered visual in everyday life or in "privatized" public sphere, from where they were excluded was the institutions such as the "marriage (heterosexual)," the "army (heterosexual and homosocial)." In this manner, different sexual "identities" regarded as a "social fact" in the press, at the same time, was not deemed as suitable for the institutions by the same press. Because they were still the "incomplete" and "abnormal" masculinities and because the concepts of "completeness," "normality," and "masculinity" (meant by this expression is the physical reproduction) was attributed to "heterosexual" masculinity, homosexuals or transsexuals were held distance from institutions; in this way, hegemonic masculinity was reproduced in them at most, while

they (different sexualities) were also instigated through the discourse of sexual freedom and identity politics.

In this manner, what was the importance of these institutions? For example, marriage, as an official agreement in creating a family, constitutes the fundamental social unit which enables the state to organize the "physiological reproduction" and "basic socialization of its citizens." Accordingly, the prolificacy which should be materialized within the boundary of family might be considered as a struggle of the state aiming at getting its citizens under control; that is, the institution of *family* represents the "guaranty" of the normal life for the state. By relying on such a basis, marriage, made up of two "clear" genders (woman and man), is an institution which deserves an absolute shield against any jolt. For this reason, the institution of marriage is covered rigidly against any differences that could damage its function, as explained above such as homosexuality, bisexuality and so on.

As for the case of imposing admired masculine figure, through regarding postmodernism and neo-liberalism as the "objective structure," it became definite that the admired masculine figures of the 1980s was the "successful businessman" and "yuppies;" moreover, "ambition," "competitiveness," and "success" were the dispositions ascribed to the "habitus" of masculinity. The important point here was that the concept of hegemonic masculinity and the perception of masculinity were oriented extremely towards the "wealth" and "money," "display," and "consumption" in the 1980s (job-oriented); accordingly, all these notions was in harmony with the postmodern and neo-liberal socio-economic structure of Turkey. In this case, if the yuppies were the admired masculine figures of the 1980s, especially with the rise of consumption society, who, therefore, was put contrary to them? Here there is one more question related to this

matter: if the hegemonic culture designated the yuppified lifestyle as a hegemonic form, what, therefore, was the othered culture? Similar to these questions, their answers too are related to each other. Yuppies, apart from becoming the symbol of "ambition," "competitiveness," and "success," they also were presented as an admired masculine figure in terms of their consumption patterns. Accordingly, such a construction of hegemonic masculinity was exceedingly related to the "places," most frequently preferred by them, moreover, to "drinks" and "foods," "the location of their home," and the "size of their car." If that is case, the "othered" culture (arabesque) and the absolute "other" (maganda) was not different from the notion of consumption society; however, it did not represent the "outstanding" taste, but rather it was discovered to describe the "vulgar," "impure," and "hybrid" one, moreover, to describe the "tackified" overconsumption

APPENDIX

olduğunu nasıl

ıe zaman, nere-
ğduğunu bilirse-
in gökyüzündeki
ak çok kolaydır.
'teyim, doğduğu
dikasına bilmek
Amerika ve Av-
ıtlarına saat ve
ür. Bu yüzden,
gi nüfusa kayıtlı
ir araştırmacı,
saat, dakikasını
n ve saatte belli
rede olduğunu
ıtronomi harita-
Bugünse, dev
ıelerine basıldı-
ri veriyorlar.
nızda gezegenle-
numlarından söz
lüşük Yoğunluk"
unluk" deyimle-
. Bu kavramlar-
ekir?
ımıza göre, ge-
ıdeki konumuyla
ıdaki korelasyo-
ğu an, gezegen-
ı aştıkları, ya en
ştıkları anlardır.
korelasyon da
e geçtiği ya da
ğimiz en düşük
an gözlenmekte-
diği, yok olduğu,
a vardığı ve en
ı inişe geçtiği 4
luk Anı" dediği-
n dışında kalan
Yoğunluk Bölge-
ız. Gözlediğimiz
üstüne etkileri
la söz konusu...
ıelli bir korelas-

n doğduğu sıra-
ökyüzündeki ko-
ileride meslek
r mi?
Böyle bir etki
nut kanıtlarımız
umuyla meslekte
üçlü korelasyon,
ırılı" kişiler için
lılardan daha az
e, aradaki kore-
yor. Bu konuda
ütülebilecek yar-
Yüksek Yoğunluk
ığu sırada doğan
ıamlarında başa-
ğının çok yüksek
bunu her mes-

bulunması gereken yetenekler hızlı ve doğru karar verme, gerçekleri görme, inatçı bir sabırlılık, azim ve mücadeleciliktir. **Bu tipik bir Merih Kişiliği'dir.** Aynı kişilik tipine Olimpiyat şampiyonları ve generaller arasında da rastlarsınız. Özetle

arasındaki ilişkidir. İş başarı yalnızca yeter kişiliğe de bağlıdır. A isteyen çok yetenekli b vardı. Ne yazık ki, tüm ne rağmen Jüpiter kişili

Devamı &



Erkekçe 11 (November 1981), p. 41.

TEST

Yönetici olabilir misiniz?

Yönetim bilimcilerin kullanmaya bayıldıkları bir deyişle, yönetim, "hem bilim, hem sanattır".

Ama, iş bu kadarla kalmıyor.

Sanatın kavrayamadığı, bilimin kapsayamadığı unsurlar da giriyor yönetimin içine... Yerine göre "Fesupanallah" çekmeyi, yerine göre "insan sarraflığı" yapmayı gerektiriyor. O kadarla da bitmiyor iş... Yöneticiliğe sıvanan kişiler, sapla samanı ayırt edemediklerinde, çorbaya dönüyor, yönetmeye çabaladıkları iş... Bilge kişilere bütün saygımızla, yönetimin yalnızca bilim ve sanat olmadığını, bunlardan belki daha da önemli, bir **hüner**, bir **marifet** olduğunu biliyoruz.

İnsan vardır, tuttuğu işin üstesinden kolayca gelir. En güç ve çözümsüz görünen sorunların içinden tereyağından kıl çeker gibi sıyrılır. Parmak ısırtır yönettiklerine...

Ama, "hasbelkader" yönetici olmuş öyle kişiler vardır ki, başları dara girdi mi, ya işi kotaracak yardımcılarına "imdat" diye bağırır, ya başarısızlığın sorumluluğunu üstüne yıkacak "garibân" sırtlar ararlar.

"Yönetim" dediğimiz gizemli dünyada başarılı olabilir misiniz? Kendi işlerinizi ustalıkla yönetmekten öteye, başkalarına yön vermeyi becerebilir misiniz?

Yöneticilik ve organizatörlük yeteneklerinizi sınamanız için küçük bir test hazırladık sizlere... "Kişi kendini bilmek kadar irfan olmaz" özdeyişinden yola çıkarak, akkoyunla karakoyunu ayıracak, belki de geleceğinizi belirleyecek temel sorunun cevabını almış olacaksınız.

Niye geldiniz bu dünyaya?

Yönetmek mi, yoksa yönetilmek için mi?



SORU 1. Tehlikeli bir durum ya da bunalım karşısında hemen paniğe kapılır mısınız?
( ) EVET ( ) HAYIR ( ) ???

SORU 2. Randevularınızı hiç unutmadığınızı söyleyebilir misiniz?
( ) EVET ( ) HAYIR ( ) ???

SORU 3. Arkadaşlarınızın doğum ve evlenme yıldönümleriyle önemli tarihleri bir kenara not eder misiniz?
( ) EVET ( ) HAYIR ( ) ???

SORU 4. Bugüne kadar el attığınız işlerde şansınızın iyi gittiğini söyleyebi-

Devamı 120. Sayfada

Erkekçe 7 (July 1984), p. 83.



Erkekçe 6 (June 1982), p. 37.



Erkekçe 6 (June 1982), p. 54.



Erkekçe 1 (January 1984), p. 56.



Erkekçe 9 (September 1989), p. 51.



Erkekçe 2 (February 1987), p. 93.



Erkekçe 8 (August 1983), p. 47.



Erkekçe 8 (August 1981), p. 42.

(15)

İSLAMDA SEVİŞME VE SEKS

Doğum kontrolü

Arzulanmayan gebeliklerin, çocuğa kalındıktan sonra değil, hamilelikten önce üzerine eğilinilmesi gerekir.

Yazan: Dr. Ahmet Yılmaz

Kadını kısırlığa götürmemek, cinsel ilişkiye engel olmamak, eşler tarafından kabul edilmek, sağlığa zarar vermemek koşuluyla ilaçla ve herhangi bir kimyasal bileşim kullanılmasıyla gebeliği önlemek İslam fıkıhçılarına göre caizdir.

Niçin evlenilir?" "Her evliliğin amacı çocuk mu?" sorularının irdelenmesi ve cevaplandırılması, bu yazı dizisinin kapsamı ve maksadı dışında kalmaktadır. Böyle bir konu, ayrı bir araştırmada sergilenecek boyutta ve önemde bir diğer meseledir. Fakat "GEBELİK" ve "ÖNLENMESİ" sorunu, hamileliğin, cinsel ilişki sonrasında meydana gelen bir hadise olması, evliliğin çocuğu amaçlayıp - amaçlamaması gayesi ile doğrudan ilgisinin bulunması, sorunun aile planlamasından ayrı düşünülememesi... gibi olgu ve nedenlerle, gündeme çok yönlü problemler zinciri getirmektedir. Bu yüzdendir ki, dinsel değerlendirme gereğinin yanı sıra, gebelik ve önlenmesi olayının, çiftlerin idealleri, imkanları, istekleri, eğitimleri, gelecekteki ya-



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Erkekçe 9 (September 1984), p. 30.



Doğum kontrolünde yeni ufuklar:

ERKEKLERE HAP...

Çin ve Brezilya'da pamuktan elde edilen gebelik önleyici bir kimyasal bileşikle erkekler üzerinde yapılan deneyler "geçici" olarak başarı sağladı...

Doğum kontrolunun "dişi" ve "erkek" liye ayrılan belli yöntemleri olagelmiştir seks tarihinde... Örneğin, prezervatif kullanımı ve **coitus interruptus** (dışarıda gelme) klasik bir "erkek" yöntemidir. Doğum kontrol hapları, rahimici araçlar ve köpüren tabletler de "dişi" araçlardır. Kadınla erkeğin ortaklasa başvurabilecekleri tek yöntemse, doğum kontrolunu doğurganlığa kesin son vererek gerçekleştiren kısırlaştırmadır.

Kısırlaştırma ve "bütünüyle seksten imtina" yöntemlerini bir yana bırakırsak, etkisi yüzde 100'e en yakın yöntemin doğum kontrol hapları olduğu biliniyor. Çok yazılıp çizildi bu konuda... Yan etkileri olduğu söylendi, hatta kadınlarda kansere yol açtığı bile iddia edildi. Aslıfaslı yok bunun... Ama, kadınların zihinlerinde bir soru işareti bıraktı bütün bunlar...

Gebeliğin önlenmesinde bütün sorumluluğun kadının sırtına yüklenmesine karşı çıkan "özgürlükçü" kadınlar var. Erkeklerin de sorumluluk üstlenmesini ısrarla istediler, tezlerini basınyayın organlarında enine-boyuna geliştirdiler.

"Müşteri daima haklıdır". Piyasa ekonomilerinin ilk kuralı budur. "Talep olan her yerde arz da vardır". İkinci kural da bu...

İşte, bilim adamlarıyla sanayi el ele vermişler, yıllardır erkeklerin etkin biçimde kullanabilecekleri bir doğum kontrol hapını gerçekleştirmeye çalışıyorlar. Şimdilik başarı uzak görünüyor, ama, önemli adımlar da atılmış durumda...

ERKEK HAPINA DOĞRU

Erkeklerin kullanabilecekleri bir doğum kontrol hapının arayışı aslına bakılırsa yeni değil... Bilim merkezlerinde, sanayi kuruluşlarında yıllardır sürüyor bu yöndeki çalışmalar... Gerçi bu güne kadar pek başarı elde edilemedi, ama ilginç bazı gelişmeler de gözden kaçmıyor.

Vanderbilt Üniversitesi laboratuvarlarında erkek gönüllülerin yer aldıkları bir çalışmadan söz edelim örneğin... Bu deneyler çerçevesinde, gönüllülerin vücutlarına bazı kimyasallar zerkedilerek sperm sayısının düşürülmesi denenmiş. Sonuçları "geçici" olan bazı başarılar elde edilmiş. Çin ve Brezilya'da da benzeri deneyler yapılıyor, pamuktan elde edilen gebelik önleyici bir kimyasal bileşikle...

Devamı 102. Sayfada

Erkekçe 2 (February 1984), p. 53.



Erkekçe 10 (October 1982), p. 18.

RESTORANLAR





Ristorante İtaliano'nun sahipleri Aler ve Şerafettin Kardeşler..



İzzet Usta, İstanbul'un ünlü şeflerinden.. Bir zamanlar Perapalas'taydı.

İtalyanlar "Napoli'yi gör ve öl" derler.. Aslında söylemek istedikleri "Napoli'yi görmeden ölme" dir ya... Napoli'yi görmeden güzel Napoliten yemekler yemek isterseniz, İtalya'ya değil, Elmadağ'a kadar uzanmanız yeterli..



RİSTORANTE İTALİANO



Barmen İdris Zorlu'yu, barının müdavimleri, Karakaş diye anarlar.. Karakaş İdris'in Royal Kokteyli ünlü.. Yarım kadeh dry vermut, yarım kadeh cin, yarım kadeh cherry brandy, 2 damla angustra çiçeği özü.. Karıştırılıp buzla servis yapılıyor, bir dilim limonla da susleniyor.

"Napoli'yi görmeli, sonra ölmeli" diye İtalyanların dillerinden düşürmedikleri bir söz vardır.

Gelin biz bu söze uymayıp İtalya'yı görmeden onların gerçek ve nefis yemeklerini İstanbul'da yiyelim ve, Akdeniz'in sıcak ve pırıl pırıl sularını yalayan Capri ve Napoli şehrine yolumuz düşmedi ve İtalyanların kendilerine has yemeklerinden, bilhassa VENEZİA "Venedik usulü ciğer" ki krema ve şarap karışımı yapılıyor, yemedik diye üzülmeyelim.

PİCCATA "Spagetti, mantar, maydanoz, domates sosu, sarmısak, bonfile, kaşar peynirinin fırında pişirilmesi", tabii bunların yanında "Patates, havuç, bezelye, salam, jambon, soslu mayonez, hardal, ketçap, limon suyundan itina ile yapılmış "İTALYAN SALATASI"da var listemizde.

İstanbul'un Cumhuriyet Caddesi, Şan Sineması karşısında ne Roma'daki, ne Floransa'daki, ne Venedik'deki, ne de Milano ve Torino'daki lokantaları aratmayacak bir İtalyan lokantası var.

Uğrarsanız... Gerçek İtalyan yemeklerini tadar, napoliten müziğinin ferahlatıcı havasında, nefis ye-

Devamı 80. Sayfada

Erkekçe 11 (November 1981), p. 17.

RESTORANLAR

Marmara Etap Oteli'nin giriş katındaki Etap Cafe, "cafeteria"dan çok bir restoran havasında... Mevsim zeytinyağlılarının her örneğinden Anadolu'nun meşhur "Dürüm"üne kadar birbirinden lezzetli yemek çeşitleri var. 700-800 lira civarında ödeyerek iyi bir öğle yemeği yiyebilirsiniz.





ETAP CAFE

"Cafe" denilince aklınıza ne gelir? Kahve-çay-meyve suyu gibi alkolsüz ya da hafif alkollü içkilerin içildiği, pasta v.s. gibi hafiften alafranga "iaşe"nin yendiği bir yer mi?

Yoksa, biraz Paris kaldırımı çiğnemişlerdenseniz, en basitinden, en lüksüne yetmişyedi milletten insanların geçerken oturdukları, yorgunluklarını giderirken çevreleriyle "sosyal" ilişkiler kurdukları bir yer mi?

Hangisi olursa olsun eğer yolunuz Marmara Etap Oteli'nin giriş katındaki Etap Cafe'ye düşerse bildiklerinizin mi yanlış olduğunu, yoksa otel işletmecilerinin mi hatalı olduğunu düşünür düşünür ve kafanızdaki soru işaretleri artarak kapıdan içeri adımınızı atarsınız.

Girer girmez kapının hemen solunda yer alan boylu boyunca vitrinli, self servis tablalı tezgahı görünce kafanızdaki sorular çözülmeye başlar gibi olur. "Burası 'cafeteria' olmalı" diye düşünürsünüz. İki üç adım daha ilerleyip size doğru koşturan şefi karşınızda görür ve bir masaya doğru "sürülürken" kararı verirsiniz: Burası ne cafe, ne de teria.. Basbayağı bir lokanta...

Siz gittiğinizde neler düşünürsünüz, bilemeyiz ama biz gittiğimizde aklımızdan geçenler aynen böyleydi. Masamıza oturduktan sonra son verdiğimiz kararın doğruluğunu kanıtlayıcı manzaralarla karşılaştık.

Birincisi, öğlen yemeklerini kebap kokuları arasında, omuz omuza yemek alışkanlığının giderek arttığı bir memlekette böyle masalarının arası "mesafeli" bir yer olsa olsa bir restoran olurdu.

İkincisi, şık ve temiz giyimli garsonları ve masalarının arasında "ye beni" diye bağıran bir tatlı arabası olan yer "iyi" bir restoran olurdu.

...Ve nihayet üçüncüsü, eğer yemekleri de "havası" ve yan masalarda oturan genç kız müşterileri gibiyse burası "harika" bir restoran olurdu.

Hem karar vermeyi çabuklaştırmak, hem de artık ziller çalmaya başlayan midemizi yatıştırmak için garsonların elimize tutuşturduğu menüye sarıldık. "Boş beklemeyelim" başlığı altındaki cinli, votkalı, biralı bölümü atlayıp "Kutup Rüzgarları" olarak sunulan soğuklara geldik. Geldik ve gelmemizle de ilk hatanın nerede olduğunu anladık.



"Mevsim Zeytinyağlıları" istedik garsondan. Gele gele karşımıza koskoca bir araba geldi. Aman tanrım o ne manzara.. Zeytinyağlıların en "baba" örnekleri değil mi arabanın üstündekiler.. Barbunya, çalı fasulyesi, yer elması, kereviz, pırasa,yaprak sarma, biber dolma..

Devamı 138. Sayfada

Erkekçe 2 (February 1983), p.23.



Erkekçe 2 (February 1982), p. 36.



DÜNYA NELER İÇİYOR

Meraklıları için, bu sayıdan itibaren yeni bir köşe açtık... Sizlere çeşitli kokteyl tarifleri vereceğiz. İçine konanları bulabildiğiniz ölçüde yapabilir, bulamadıklarınız yerine, kendi zevkinizi kullanıp, başka şeyler koyarak yeni kokteyller yaratabilirsiniz.

Eğer içki içmiyorsanız gene de dünyanın neler içtiği sizin için ilginç olacaktır.

"Dünya Neler İçiyor" başlığı altında, sizlere 20 ülkenin alkollü ve alkolsüz kokteyl tariflerini getirmemiz aslında zor olmadı. Hatta hiç de zor olmadı. Hergün dünyanın bir yerine 500'den fazla uçak indiren Alman Hava Yolları'nın, her dinden ve ulustan müşterileri için, en ünlü barmenlere hazırlattığı "İçkiler" başlıklı broşür, işimizi hayli kolayladı.

Vereceğimiz tariflerin hepsi bir kadeh, ya da bardaklık. Birden fazla kişiye servis yapacaksanız, ölçüyü ayarlamanız kolay olacak. Birden fazla kadeh için verilen tarif olursa, bunu ayrıca not ettik.

Şimdi haydi şerefe... Ya da, Cheers, Prost, Salud ve Sante!..

1 AMERİKA

MİNT JULEP

Birkaç taze nane yaprağı
2 çay kaşığı şeker
60 cc burbon viski

İki kaşık şekeri biraz su ile daha önceden soğutulmuş viski bardağında eritin. Üç nane yaprağını içine atın. Bir kaşıkla naneyi iyice ezin ki, kokusu şekerli suya çıksın. Sonra naneleri çıkarıp atın. Bardağı ağzına kadar parçalanmış buz doldurun. Üzerine Burbonu dökün. İyice karıştırın. Servis yapmadan önce, kalan nane yaprakları ile içkinizi süsleyin.

2 FRANSA

FRANSIZ İSTİRİDYESİ (Alkolsüz)

1 istiridye
1 çay kaşığı zeytinyağı
50 cc ketçap
24 cc Worcestershire sosu
Birkaç damla limonsuyu
Kereviz tozu, kara biber
1 çay kaşığı çırpılmış yumurta sarısı.

Bir şampanya kadehine, bir çay kaşığı zeytinyağı koyun. 50 cc. ketçapı ilave edin. Birkaç damla limon sıkın. Worcestershire sosu, kereviz tozu ve biber dökün.

Seçtiğiniz büyücek bir istiridyenin içini, bu hazırladığınız domatesli sosun üzerine yatırın. Yumurta sarısını da, süsler gibi etrafına dökün.

3 BREZİLYA

RIO SOUR

50 cc. Sugar Cane Brandy
40 cc lime suyu
1 yumurta beyazı
8 cc şekerli su
Süslemek için bir dilim lime (Bir çeşit limon) ve iki maraschino kirazı.

Lime dilimi ve kirazlar dışında herşeyi bir kokteyl shakerında ya da elektrikli bilenderde karıştırın. Karıştırmadan önce buz eklemeyi ihmal etmeyin. Köpüklenince, viski bardağına doldurun. Süsleyin.

4 YUNANİSTAN

KALAMATA HIYAR İÇKİSİ

(Alkolsüz)

100 cc taze hıyar suyu
100 cc. greyfrut suyu
Yarım çay kaşığı kurutulmuş dereotu
Bir siyah zeytin
Bir tutam tuz, beyaz biber
Taze dereotu.

Kokteyl shakerını yarıya kadar buzla doldurun. Meyve sularını ve baharatı ekleyin. Çalkalayın ya da karıştırın. Meyve suyu bardağına boşaltın. Zeytini bir kürdan ile hıyar dilimine tutturup, bu dilim ve taze dereotu ile bardağı süsleyin.

Erkekçe 6 (June 1982), p. 45.

İÇKİ

VİSKİ DEYİNCE

SCOTCH

MEHMET YALÇI



"TİTO VİSKİ SEVERDİ VE sabah onda içmeye başlardı. Chivas Regal viskisine düşkündü. Ben de devlet başkanlarının âdetlerini öğrenir, bunları cevaplamaya çalışırdım. Tito'nun da odasına bol miktarda Chivas Regal koydururdum. Bana bir gün dedi ki, 'Dünyanın en iyi viskisi Chivas Regal değildir. Fakat ben buna alışmışım, bunu seviyorum. Siz de en iyisini koyuyorsunuz...' Keyifliydi. Cesaret aldım. Kendisine özel bir soru sordum: 'Sizden sonra Yugoslavya ne olur, bunu düşünüyor musunuz?'... "

Ve Tito'nun birbirinden ilginç cevaplarıyla konuşma sürer gider... Ünlü devlet adamı İlhan Sabri Çağlayangil'in Dışişleri Bakanlığı sırasında yaşadığı ilginç olaylardan biridir bu. Çağlayangil, tüm dünyaya kafa tutan bu ilginç lideri ağırlamakta ve onunla son derece özel bir sohbet y pabilmeyi arzulamaktadır. birkaç şişe viskinin yarattı sıcak atmosfer, ona bu olan ğı sağlamıştır... Yine 1973' Cevdet Sunay'ın görev sür sinin dolması üzerine yaşan cumhurbaşkanlığı bunalımı da, Başbakan Süleyman D mirel ile Genelkurmay Başk nı Semih Sancar, gazet Mustafa Özkan'ın evinde g lice buluşmuşlar ve ülker kaderini belirleyecek kon malarını buzlu Chivas Rega lerini yudumlayarak yapm lardır. Viski, gerçekten önemli toplantıların ve kri buluşmaların vazgeçilmez unsuru olmasıyla, yakın t he de damgasını vurmuş içkidir.

Viski denince akla İskoç İskoçya denince ise viski lir. İngiltere'nin kuzeyi yer alan bu bölge, insanl nın dillere destan cimrilii den ya da erkeklerinin u konçlu çoraplar üzerine dikleri ekose eteklerinden yüzyıllardır adeta bir sanat linde üretilen viskisiyle nır. Haksız bir şöhret de ğildir bu: İskoç dilinde yat suyu" anlamına gelen ge behtha'dan adını alan ki, üretildiği kuş uçmaz ke geçmez vadilerden ve adalardan çıkıp tüm dün fethetmiş, zaman zaman mode olduğu yolundaki y

Erkekçe 5 (May 1990), p. 84.



Erkekçe 4 (April 1990), p. 80.



Erkekçe 12 (December 1984), p. 22.



Güç, konfor ve estetik.
Sizi tamamlayan BMW'niz KOSİFLER'de.

Uygarlık tarihinin ilk tekerleği ve bugünün BMW'si. Aradan binlerce yıllık süre geçmesine rağmen zamanın sonsuzluğunda küçük bir an. Dünün klasik çizgisi bugüne, bugünün modern çizgisi ise yarına hep BMW tasarımcılarınca ulaştırıldı. BMW yarını hep diğerlerinden önce yakaladı.

Estetik, güç ve konfor. Bu üç özellik, BMW serilerince yaratılmıştır. Güç ve konfor BMW kullananlarca yıllardır denenmekte olan iki ayrıcalıktır. Estetik ise BMW ile doruk noktasına ulaşmıştır.

Seçkin ve size özel BMW'niz, Çiftehavuzlar'da, KOSİFLER OTO Teşhir ve Satış Merkezinde sizleri bekliyor. Ayrıca Kosifler Servis, Küçükyalı'da 1800 metrekarelik kapalı bir alanda 55 uzman mühendis ve teknisyeni ile "Üstün özelliklerine tekrar kavuşturulması gereken" BMW'niz için hizmetinizde.

KOSİFLER OTO'da BMW'nin çağdaş çizgisini takip edebilmeniz için kullandığınız BMW'leriniz yepyeni BMW'lerle değiştirilmekte.

KOSİFLER OTO, sizlere 1990 model BMW'leri tanıtmaktan, ayrıntılı bilgi vermekten ve BMW sahibi olmanın ayrıcalığını yaşatmaktan mutluluk duyacaktır.

Kosifler Oto

BMW Borusan Oto Yetkili Satıcısı
Kosifler Oto Servis ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Bağdat Caddesi No. 242/5
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Kosifler Servis Yedek Parça
Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Mavi Evler Durağı Kaptan Sok. No. 17
Küçükyalı/İSTANBUL
Tel: 366 68 80 366 96 53 367 22 21

Erkekçe 4 (April 1990), p. 89.

İstanbul'u Yeniköy'deki villanızda yaşayın...

EMRE İNŞAAT'TAN YENİKÖY'de SÜPER LÜKS VİLLALAR, DAİRELER



Boğaz'ın en seçkin semtlerinden YENİKÖY'de tümü Boğaz manzarasına sahip süper lüks villanızı ya da dairenizi seçmekte ve İstanbul'u daha kolay, daha rahat yaşamak için ilk adımı atmakta geç kalmış sayılmazsınız.
Tümü bitmiş olarak hemen teslim alabileceğiniz villalar 800 m² olup dubleks'tir. 4 katlı 3 bloktan oluşan süper lüks daireler 300 m²'dir. Özel yüzme havuzlu, kaloriferli, saunalı, şömineli, özel parklı ve garajlı villa ve dairelerin iç döşemeleri Avrupa malzeme ile müşterilerin arzusu doğrultusunda döşenecektir. Uydu anteni ve diğer sosyal olanaklarıyla "Emre İnşaat Siteleri"ni bir an önce gezin görün ve seçin...



Detaylı bilgi almak için:

EMRE

İNŞAAT ve TİCARET SANAYİ A.Ş.

BÜYÜKDERE CAD. OCAK APT. NO 91/2 MECİDİYEKÖY–İSTANBUL Tel 175 14 55 (4 Hat) Santiye 162 07 96

Erkekçe 2 (February 1988), p. 56.

Sizler için...



ulus evleri

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Erkekçe 9 (September 1988), p. 52.



Video devrimi

Kasetler yoluyla evlere giren seks, korku ve vahşet filmlerinin dağıtım, satım ve kiralanmasını kısıtlamak için hükümetler düzeyinde önlemler alınıyor...

Mahalle bakkalına bakıyorsunuz, vitrininde "Kaporasız video kaseti kiralanır" diye bir yazı... İki adım öteye geçiyorsunuz, süpermarketin bir bölmesi sırf bu işe ayrılmış. Sonra yola çıkıyorsunuz, adım başında bir "Video Kulübü"...Yolunuz 2-3 bin nüfuslu bir kıyı kasabasına düşüyor, sekiz kahvesiyle iki birahanesinin her birinde "müşteri çalmak" için video var.Edirne'den Ardahan'a her kentte,her kasabada,televizyon programı bittikten, sinemalar kepenklerini indirdikten sonra, sabahlara kadar en son yabancı filmden bağrıyanık türkülü yerli filme kadar programın envaisini kasetten izleyebiliyorsunuz.

Burası Türkiye...

Dünyanın başka ülkelerinde de aynı salgın var. Bir devrim yaşanıyor sanki... Video devrimi...

Batı Almanya Video Enstitüsü Müdürü Klaus Müller-Neuhof olayı şöyle anlatıyor: "Video merakı önce İngiltere ve Japonya'da köklesti, sonra Avrupa'ya, oradan da Amerika'ya yayıldı. Yaptığımız saptamalara göre, İngiltere ve Japonya'da her üç evden birinde video cihazı var. Videolar, düdüklü tencere, fırın, buzdolabı, televizyon, mobilya gibi demirbaş ev eşyaları arasında yer almaya başladı. Yakın gelecekte her televizyon kendi videosuyla birlikte satılmaya başlanırsa hiç şaşmayın."

Şaşacak bir şey yok bunda... Gurbetten "kesin dönüş" yapan işçilerimiz aracılığıyla birkaç yıl önce tanıştığımız video cihazları, şimdi bizim de evlerimizde baş köşeyi tutuyor, kendi fabrikalarımızda seri halde üretiliyor.

Sinemaya gitmekten kolay video seyretmek... Hiç değilse ayakkabılarınızı çıkarabiliyor, içkinizi yudumlarken sigaranızı tüt-

Devamı 121. Sayfada

Video sanayii süregiden devrime yeni boyutlar kazandıracak bir arayış içinde... Yeni ürün, yüksek vasıflı TV. Düz bir ekranda iki boyutlu beliren görüntüye üç boyutluk izlenimi vermeye çalışan bir çaba bu...

Erkekçe 11 (November 1984), p. 35.



Erkekçe 7 (July 1985), p. 32.



Erkekçe 10 (October 1984), p. 23.



Erkekçe 6 (June 1984), p. 44.



Erkekçe 5 (May 1985), p. 54.


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Interviews

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