Ottoman Intelligence: The Second Branch and Its Operational Characteristics, 1914-1918

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Abstract

Ottoman Intelligence: The Second Branch and Its Operational Characteristics, 1914-1918

Somer Alp Şimşeker, Doctoral Candidate at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2021

Professor Cengiz Kırlı, Dissertation Advisor

This study is about the Second Branch of the Ottoman Empire's General Staff, which was originally established as a military intelligence institution and represented centralization tendency during the First World War. With the defeat in the Balkan Wars, the 1913 coup and the Martial Law administration along with the mobilization for the First World War, the Ministry of Defense became an important decision-making authority in the Ottoman Empire. These conditions contributed to the transformation of the Second Branch into a centralized structure in intelligence. With the Martial Law administration, the Second Branch carried out the duties of propaganda, censorship, domestic and foreign intelligence. Other intelligence institutions and their sources were canalized to the Second Branch, and all activities against espionage in the Empire was prohibited without its consent and the order. The control over propaganda and censorship activities were given to the Second Branch. Propaganda activities became a mortar of modern Turkey's ideological infrastructure. Second Branch gathered military, political and partly economic intelligence for foreign intelligence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The centralization tendency was assessed along with the administrative and organizational structure of the Second Branch. This study contributes to the intelligence studies by presenting a centralizing intelligence institution while many other states established separate institutions or new units regarding domestic and foreign intelligence during total war conditions.

101,000 words

Özet

Osmanlı İstihbaratı: İkinci Şube ve Operasyonel Özellikleri, 1914-1918

Somer Alp Şimşeker, Doktora Adayı, 2021
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Bu çalışma bir askeri istihbarat kurumu olarak kurulan ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı ile merkezileşme eğilimi gösteren Osmanlı Devleti Erkan-ı Harbiyyesi'nin İkinci Şubesi hakkındadır. Balkan Harbi yenilgisi, 1913 darbesi ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı seferberliği ile ilan edilen idare-i örfi ile Harbiye Nezareti Osmanlı Devletinde önemli bir karar verici merci haline gelmiştir. Bu şartlar İkinci Şube'nin istihbaratta merkezileşen bir yapıya dönüşmesinde etken olmuştur. İdare-i Örfi'nin ilanı ile beraber İkinci Şube propaganda, sansür, iç ve dış istihbarat görevlerini icra etmiştir. İstihbarat sağlayan diğer kurumlar ve kaynakları İkinci Şube'ye kanalize edilmiş, ayrıca ülke içerisinde casusluğa karşı yapılacak tüm faaliyetlerin İkinci Şube'nin onayı ve emri olmadan yürütülmesi yasaklanmıştır. Propaganda ve sansür faaliyetleri İkinci Şube'nin denetimine bırakılmıştır. Özellikle propaganda faaliyetleri modern Türkiye'nin ideolojik altyapısına bir harç olmuştur. İkinci Şube dış istihbarat için stratejik, operasyonel ve taktik seviyede sadece askeri değil aynı zamanda politik ve kısmen ekonomik istihbarat toplamıştır. Merkezileşme eğilimi tüm bu unsurlar ve İkinci Şube'nin idari ve teşkilat yapısı ile birlikte değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çalışma topyekün savaş koşulları ile bir çok devlet iç ve dış istihbarat için ayrı veya yeni birimler kurarken Osmanlı Devleti'nin bu görevleri bir istihbarat kurumunda merkezileştirdiğini göstererek istihbarat çalışmalarına bir katkı sağlamayı hedeflemektedir.

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To my Father

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ATASE	T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Arşivi
BDH	Birinci Dünya Harbi Kataloğu
BEO	Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası
BLH	Balkan Harbi Kataloğu
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
CA	Ceride-i Askeriyye
CUP	Community of Union and Progress
DH.EUM.1.Şb	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Birinci Şube
DH.EUM.3.Şb	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Üçüncü Şube
DH.EUM.5.Şb	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Beşinci Şube
DH.EUM.6.Şb	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Altıncı Şube
DH.EUM.EMN	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Emniyet Şubesi
DH.EUM.SSM	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Seyrüsefer Kalemi
DH.EUM.VRK	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Evrak Odası Kalemi
DH. KMS	Dahiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus
DH. ŞFR	Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi
HR.SYS	Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım
HR.İM	Hariciye Nezareti İstanbul Murahhaslığı
FO	Foreign Office
MFA	Mecmua-i Fünûn-ı Askeriyye
MV.	Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları
SB	Second Branch
SO	Special Organization
TNA	The National Archives
ŞD	Şura-yı Devlet
Y.PRK.ASK	Yıldız Askeri Maruzat
Y.A.HUS	Yıldız Hususi Maruzat

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1

Introduction

This dissertation is an institutional history about the Ottoman Empire's Supreme Command Headquarter's military intelligence section "the Second Branch" (hereon in referred to as the SB).[1] This dissertation is the first historical analysis of the institutional background of the SB during World War I. In this dissertation I argue that the SB, between 1914-1918, represented a tendency to a centralization of intelligence.

First of all, the SB was originally established as the military intelligence section of the empire, to conduct foreign military intelligence activities. However, between 1914-1918, it underwent a centralization process, by conducting different and diverse intelligence activities and taking control over other intelligence providers. The first reason for this tendency lies in the defeat in the Balkan Wars, resulting in political and military desires of reformation towards establishing a strong army. It was the belief of the Ottoman ruling elite that the reasons for the defeat in the Balkan Wars was due to the insufficiency of the army. In addition, the coup in 1913, when the Community of Union and Progress (from now

1 Başkumandanlık Karargâhı İkinci Şube.

on, CUP) established a single party regime, contributed to the acceleration of the reforms.

The second reason for the centralizing efforts was the conditions of the World War I. World War I was indeed a milestone for modern intelligence institutions, when new methods such as aerial photography and communication interception were put into use. It was also a period when foreign and domestic intelligence overlapped. The homefront became as significant as the battlefront as the necessity for civilian support and morale increased. In order to weaken the homefront, intelligence organizations took part in sabotage and psychological warfare through black propaganda. As World War I was unique in its destructiveness, mobilization and totality, states either established new sections within their intelligence institutions or new intelligence institutions responsible from different intelligence tasks that contributed to collecting different intelligence types. Different to their adversaries, the war became a reason for the tendency to centralizing the intelligence for the Ottoman Empire. Not to suffer the same defeats as the Balkan Wars, and the conditions of World War I led the CUP ruling elite to increase the SB's institutional power on intelligence.

This tendency to centralization increased with the declaration of mobilization on 2 August 1914 and the announcement of Martial Law, when the SB was also re-organized and rapidly continued to centralize. After the declaration of war, the SB not only became responsible from military intelligence, but also foreign intelligence (political, partly economic, military) and domestic intelligence (domestic security, counter-espionage, surveillance). This extension made the SB so effective that it became a control center over all other intelligence-providing institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Navy. Sources such as the ambassadors, consuls and chief consuls acting on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, police department and governors on behalf of the Ministry Of Internal Affairs and Naval Ministry began reporting to the SB for a final analysis of intelligence and also carried out orders given by this Branch.

As a result of this extension, the SB took part in the policy and strategy-making of the state.

Intelligence institutions are expected to be advisory to policy-makers. Unlike the intelligence agencies in Western countries which were responsible from different intelligence tasks, the SB had control over intelligence. This model was informed by the German case, where the *Abteilung IIIb*[2] also followed a tendency to centralization. Besides acting in an advisory capacity, the SB also took part in policy-making by assuming control over not only intelligence but propaganda, censorship and domestic security. Especially its role in propaganda left an ideological mark that shaped the national identity of modern Turkey.

This dissertation contributes to intelligence studies by introducing an institution that has not been studied amongst scholars. It gives an insight into the developments of a modern intelligence institution in the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

Drawing on the Turkish General Staff Directorate of Military History and Strategic Studies,(ATASE),[3] this thesis focuses on the tasks, intelligence network, successes and limitations of the SB. This introduction thus provides a justification for the study and its parameters, whilst setting it in its context.

The SB is an intelligence organization which has not been studied by scholars. The main reason lies within the very limited access to Turkish military archives. Hence, in the introductory chapter of this dissertation I start with justifying my reasons for choosing the period of the World War I, and an intelligence institution within that context. Secondly, the introduction focuses on the overall developments in intelligence in the nineteenth century, in both Western states and Ottoman Empire until World War I. The third section of the introduction presents a general insight into the political conditions and changes in the Ottoman empire,

2 The intelligence section of German General Staff also known as Section IIIb.

3 Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü Arşivi (Turkish General Staff Directorate of Military History and Strategic Studies, ATASE), Birinci Dünya Harbi Katalogu (First World War Catalogue, BDH).

after the defeat in Balkans. In general, the introduction part is critical to illuminate my choices for this dissertation, the establishment of intelligence organizations in the nineteenth century, shedding light on the impending necessity for centralization after the Balkan Wars defeat and mobilization during World War I. To put parameters on this dissertation, I only analyzed the institutionalization of the SB, rather than encompassing other intelligence institutions in the Ottoman Empire in nineteenth century. The introduction also focuses on the timeline between 1882-1914 to understand the causes and the rupture of the Balkan Wars. The last part of the introduction serves to explain the political conditions that caused the tendency to centralization. The reorganization of the SB is not included in the introduction as is presented in the next chapter along with theroetical discussions on intelligence. The sources and chapter by chapter outline will be presented at the end of the introduction.

§ 1.1 Reasons for Choosing World War I and an Intelligence Institution

Intelligence institutions were established in the late nineteenth century after a series of crises and extended further in the early twentieth century. Being a "long" and "multi-front" war, World War I was a turning point in the modernization and expansion of intelligence institutions different kinds of intelligence practices (political, economic, social, environmental, sanitary and cultural). Total war required total intelligence, as it required total participation. Therefore, before the Second World War, states already had experienced intelligence practices with different intelligence institutions that conducted various intelligence activities. [4] World War I was not only a war of armies as it required mobilization over all resources of the states from military to economic, as well as

4 Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25.

psychological. States had to rely on different types of intelligence in order to secure domestic conditions to support the large armies at the battlefronts.[5]

The industrial revolution and development of modern armies in the nineteenth century created the tendency towards totalization, which not only included armies but entire nations.

We can trace the foundation of intelligence services as institutions from the sixteenth century and onwards. The geographical discoveries, new trade routes, expansion of press and the development of postal systems increased the value of information. Another important factor was the creation of administrative-bureaucratic structures. These structures took the first steps to institutionalize the spying systems. However, these steps were not totally successful and it took until the nineteenth century to see this institutionalization.[6]

Total warfare is a concept created to analyze the relationship between the war and society after the Industrial Revolution. It was first based on the thoughts of Carl Von Clausewitz and Erich Ludendorff, about mobilizing the material and spiritual resources of the country. According to Ludendorff's ideas, there are four basic elements of total warfare.

- War covers the entire territory of a country and the concept of the front loses its importance.
- War requires participation of civilian society.
- As war requires citizens' participation, propaganda plays a significant role in increasing the morale and weakening the enemy.

5 Thomas Boghardt, *Spies of the Kaiser: German Covert Operations in Great Britain during the First World War* (London: Palgrave, 2004), 109.

6 Emrah Safa Gürkan, *Sultanın Casusları: 16. Yüzyılda İstihbarat, Sabotaj ve Rüşvet Ağları* (Istanbul: Kronik Yayınları, 2017), 19.

- Armies' intelligence- gathering capability, the opportunities for deception, quantitative superiority, friction, chance and also luck become decisive factors.[7]

Two factors were significant in the development of the concept of total war. The first of these was undoubtedly the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe. The mass production of weapons with high destructive power, the development of railways, the improvements in communication eased the dispatch of military units. As armies became easier to mobilize and civilians integrated, the war spread beyond battlefronts. The second factor was the centralization of the states and the development of a military conscription system. Easily transportable units were indeed effective for mobilized and mechanized mass armies. The war expanded from battlefronts to every part of the society. As a result, the destructive power of the war increased the significance of foreign and domestic security.[8] The volunteer role of the people became one of the greatest benefit in the formation of armed forces and war power[9]and States began to improve their institutions.[10] The concept of total war occurred especially after the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) and the middle of the nineteenth century. According to Clausewitz "war became a job of everyone who called themselves citizens."[11]

The Crimean war, the American Civil war and the Franco-Prussian wars were all examples of a tendency to totalization, due to the mobilization of manpower, economic resources, expanding of hot-zones and

7 Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: Topyekûn Savaşa İlişkin Alman Kavramı", in *Modern Stratejinin Ustaları*, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Istanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2007), 416-430.

8 Mehmet Beşikçi, "Bir Yenilginin Anatomisi: Balkan Harbi'nde Osmanlı Seferberliği 1912-1913" in *Yeni Bir Askeri Tarih Özlemi: Savaş Teknoloji ve Deneysel Çalışmalar*, ed. Kahraman Şakul (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013), 299.

9 Carl Von Clausewitz, *Savaş Üzerine* (Istanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2011), 229.

10 Jeremy Black, *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 100.

11 Carl Von Clausewitz, Ibid., 230.

communication tools.[12] Especially in the American Civil War, civilians were used as military power and were depended on for their economic and social help.[13] For the Ottomans, the Crimean War could be seen as a rehearsal of World War, due to its unfolding as a multifront war between the Ottoman Empire, France, Britain and Italy against Russia. The Russia-Japan war in 1905 was in addition an example of a total war and a morale for the Ottomans as for the first time a non-western country became successful.[14]

As for intelligence and total war, the late nineteenth Century and World War I caused a change in intelligence and its effects. Deriving from the innovation of military technology such as improved weapons, the use of railways, telegraph communications, destructive explosives and the introduction of radio, states set a path towards the institutionalization of intelligence. The different intelligence agencies of today generally grew out of military intelligence branches or military intelligence concerns. As the size of the armies increased, the necessity for precautions against the strategic, the operational and the tactical became essential. Therefore the states established military and naval institutions that also took part in mobilization, planning and support for their commanders. The establishment of permanent armies increased the necessity of receiving information about forces, movements, topography, railways, deployment and technology.[15]

The Prussian General Staff became an influence for such changes especially after the victories over Austria and France in 1866 and 1870. Many of the states' statistic and translation departments became the intelligence sections of the General Staff. The Ottoman Empire was influenced by some aspects of this system and the SB was originally estab-

12 Mehmet Beşikci, "Son Dönem Osmanlı Harp Tarihi ve 'Topyekûn Savaş' Kavramı", *Toplumsal Tarih* 198 (2010), 62-69.

13 Manfred F. Boemeke and Roger Chickering, *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914* (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999), 42.

14 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 62-69.

15 Michael Herman, Ibid., 16.

lished as *Statistics and Translation Department. SB* conducted foreign military intelligence activities and gathered information about the order and organization by military attaches and open sources such as newspapers.[16] Furthermore, Britain established an Intelligence Branch under the War Office in 1873.[17] The Intelligence services, after institutionalizing, became a significant part of the modern state. Various intelligence sections gathered political, economic, social, environmental, semitary and cultural intelligence for policy-makers.

As for domestic security, policing and surveillance of local citizens also increased after the French Revolution. Police forces took part in observing public opinion and set new procedures for surveillance, mail interceptions and informers. From Cengiz Kırlı's point of view, this surveillance not only derived from domestic security concerns but also the creation of the public sphere. In the Ottoman Empire the surveillance practices, especially after 1840, were conducted to understand public opinion to maintain control over society[18] This policing and surveillance was also undertaken in other countries as well. The Third *Section of the Imperial Chancery* in 1826 , and *Sûrete Nationale* in France, conducted policing and surveillance in the nineteenth century. However, World War I was a turning point for a whole raft of nineteenth century policies.[19]

With the mobilization and declaration of World War I, the states' intelligence institutions as well as their intelligence tasks extended, and today's modernized intelligence agencies were established. Today's dis-

16 Ceride-i Askeriye (CA), no. 122, year 25, 27 October 1887, 124-126.

17 M. Van Crevald, *Command in War* (Harvard University Press, 1985) 149.

18 Cengiz Kırlı, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu, Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde Havadis Jurnalleri 1840-1844*, (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), 25.

19 C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, *KGB: the Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990); According to Michael Mann, the policing also was another reason for class and state interaction in which the state used surveillance for possible threats against rulers, see; Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, The Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760-1914* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 404.

tinction of political, economic, social, semitary, military and many other types of intelligence tasks and intelligence institutions especially occurred in the early twenthieth century. For instance, Britain's *MI5* (responsible from domestic intelligence), *MI6* (responsible from foreign intelligence), and the USA's *FBI* (responsible from domestic intelligence) and *CIA* (responsible from foreign intelligence) all grew up in the early twentieth century. During WW1 foreign-domestic intelligence and security also became significant as they overlapped. As spying increased during World War I precautions for counter-espionage became more necessary and today's concept of counter-intelligence grew from the counter-espionage practices. Therefore, the distinction written in the latter was to fasten the intelligence activities. This distinction also continued as the contemporary internal security institutions such as the British *Security Service*, the *Canadian Security Intelligence Service* (CSIS), the German *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, the French *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST) emerged from the war period.[20]

Unlike other states, the tasks of the Ottoman Empire's SB extended with the mobilization and accelerated after the declaration of war for World War I. The Ottomans experienced the Balkan Wars as small total wars and the consequences of defeats were found in the inefficiency of the army. Therefore it was already the idea of the Ottoman ruling elite that the survival of the empire was indeed in establishing a stronger army. Combined with the total war conditions and military seizing over the government, the SB's powers were extended and this intelligence institution became responsible from not only military intelligence but also foreign, political, counter-espionage and security and took part in policy-making.

To sum up the discussion on World War I, even though different intelligence practices overlapped, different institutions with different tasks emerged. Policy-makers and intelligence officers did not only re-

20 Michael Herman, Ibid., 21.

strict themselves to thinking only about enemies—but also kept track of neutral, hostile, allied states and possible rivals.

§ 1.2 Reasons for Choosing the Second Branch

The primary motivation for the focus on the SB is the lack of research on this important arm of the army, despite what it can tell us about modern intelligence in the early twentieth century. Indeed, there is scant study of any intelligence organizations during the Ottoman period. For instance, there is not a single study about the intelligence service of Admirality (Bahriye Nezareti). There is not a clue about the intelligence organization of Ministry of Interior (Dahiliye Nezareti). Questions such as "which department of the Security General Directorate (Emniyet-i Umumiye) served for domestic intelligence?" are still not properly answered.

The second reason for choosing this institution is that not only did it represent a modernized agency, coherent with modern intelligence definitions, but also represented a tendency of centralization. As stated before, the military reforms after the Balkan War defeats, the coup in 1913 and World War I were crossroads to centralization. The Ottoman SB with its mission load, became the most effective intelligence institution of the Empire.

SB was established as the military Intelligence section in the nineteenth century. It did not take part in policy-making and acted advisory. As the war continued, the SB's tasks extended and it became so effective that it also took part in the decision-making process.

Before the Balkan Wars, Intelligence practices were limited to "detecting operations" and "communication". There was only a single military officer for intelligence services in the General Staff, army headquarters, corps headquarters and divisions. There were no intelligence units at the level of brigade and regiment. As a result, only higher units were

able to process intelligence.[21] In the Constitutional Period (1908), the SB collected information about the objectives of enemy armies and their plans through agents of military attaches and from press publications. The Balkan Wars showed that the capability of SB in gathering information was limited to open sources. Even ambassadors and consuls gathered more information on foreign military intelligence than the SB. With the mobilization for World War I, the duties of the SB became clearer.[22]

With the mobilization for World War I on the 2nd August 1914, the SB had the responsibility of foreign intelligence, domestic security, censorship and propaganda. Other intelligence providers and their main sources (such as ambassadors working on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Relations) began to report to the SB and counter-espionage practices could not be conducted without the consent of the SB. Also, the Security General Directorate was put under the command of the SB against counter-espionage. Foreign intelligence practices were not only military but political and partly economic. Domestic security was about counter-espionage. As in the modern definition, these intelligence types were divided into its levels as strategic, operational and tactical and to do so the SB used the seven phases of the modern intelligence process (identifying requirements; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination; consumption and feedback).[23]

Strategic intelligence reports were disseminated weekly and contributed to the policy-making of the state. Operational reports were either weekly or daily and contributed to long term military plans. Tactical reports, on the other hand, were either urgent or daily, as they contributed to momentary action in a battlefront or urgent counter-espionage activities. In order to do so, the SB established 4 different

21 *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi*, Vol. 3, Part 6: 1908-1920 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1971), 380.

22 Ibid., 381.

23 For the seven phases of intelligence process see; Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington: Cq Press, 2009), 76.

departments. The first department concerned with foreign intelligence, second department espionage, third department censorship and propaganda, fourth department political and confidential matters.

After reading these tasks, one could ask if these practices were conducted only by the SB. The answer to this question is definitely not. However the tendency to centralization accelerated when other intelligence institutions began reporting to the SB for analysis and dissemination. As a result, the SB became a control mechanism over all other intelligence providers. In addition, the SB assumed all responsibility for censorship and domestic security. No domestic or foreign publication could be made without the consent of the military censorship inspectorates under the control of the SB. Mail, telegrams and couriers were also checked by military censorship inspectorates and passport centers controlled the entrance and exits in the Empire. In order to conduct these activities, the Security General Directorate and the Ministry of the Interior were subordinated to the SB. As strict control was within the hands of the SB, propaganda activities were also put under the control of the SB. The SB established a *War Propaganda Branch* which acted to mobilize the people and shaped a war-time national identity which, as a result, became the national identity of modern Turkey.

The harsh conditions, and the extent of the war pushed the Ottoman ruling elite into towards a centralization, as the Empire remained on the battlefield throughout the four years of the war.[24] Although Empire's performance weakened in the second half of the war and was ultimately defeated, the SB performed surprisingly well at establishing an effective and efficient intelligence practices. In addition, as a military intelligence section, it was able to form an efficient intelligence network in a short period of time, while the Ottoman Empire fought on four main battlefronts (the Dardanelles, the Caucasus, Sinai-Palestine, and Meso-

24 Mehmet Beşikçi, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Seferberliği* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 5.

potamia-Iraq), as well as on minor ones (Arabia-Yemen, Romania, Galicia, Macedonia, Persia, Azerbaijan).[25]

In this turmoil, the SB had to sort out, qualify, process, and distribute the gathered information. The information collected by the SB was of strategic, operational and also tactical importance. It contained information on political, partly economic, military and domestic intelligence that could pose a threat to the Ottoman Empire. The SB collected the information systematically and exploited that intelligence. It was the duties of the SB to gather information from many of the sources that were both secret or open.

It was also the SB that was charged with cross-checking the information and processing it. This heavy workload was also implicated in the memoirs of Kazım Karabekir, who served as the director of the SB between August 1914-December 1914. According to Karabekir, it was the duty of the SB to prevent the infiltration, managing the newspapers by applying censorship, and gathering information and preventing information leakages about foreign-domestic politics, military and financial conditions, the condition of the health of the population, the amount of fuel, black propaganda, domestic security.[26] Such networks and workload of course did not develop in a single night. As the war proceeded, the centralization increased. Having too many responsibilities, finding reliable informants and also officers for analysis became harder for the SB.

25 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 5. For an insight of Ottoman Battlefronts see; *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi*, Vol.8 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1967-1996). Also see; Edward, J. Erickson, *I. Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı 1914-1918* (Istanbul:Timaş Yayınları, 2011).

26 Kazım Karabekir, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Anıları* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2011), 285-294.

§ 1.3 A Review of the Literature

One of the main reasons for the lack of research on the SB lies in the restricted access to archives. As most of the documents about the Ministry of War (Harbiye Nezareti) are kept in ATASE archives, this study was hard to accomplish. The lack of secondary studies on the topic is also notable as my study drew on sources from the western literature to contextualize the chapters of my dissertation. These studies gave insights into understanding intelligence before World War I, and changes afterwards. Contextualizing thus, I was able to come up with an analysis of what the SB meant as an institution. In this section, firstly I will evaluate the studies on intelligence. Although the timeline is the period of the First World War, I first evaluate some studies which cast our eyes back. These studies contribute to understanding how intelligence changed, institutionalized and what it meant, up until World War I. Amongst Turkish studies, the vast majority on intelligence are on the nineteenth century and presents some partial insight into the SB. Secondly, I will outline some theoretical studies on intelligence which contributed to the theroretical approaches of this dissertation. Although theoretical studies contain contemporary definitions of intelligence, the common idea is that the development of these theories shaped after two World wars. In another sense, the studies contributed to the assessment of the SB's position as an intelligence organization, not only in a modern sense, but also what its "meaning" during World War I. Thirdly, I will focus on studies that covers the relationship between intelligence-gathering and institutions. These studies gave an insight on what makes an intelligence institution. Fourthly, I explore the studies about different intelligence organizations to at least give a comparison between the Ottoman Empire and other states. Last of all, some sources that cover the intelligence types, functions and processes are assessed. This existing literature helped me to make an assessment to evaluate the SB as an intelligence institution, its position in a modern sense and its representation in World War I. In addition, these studies also contributed to un-

derstandings of the methods and processes of intelligence. All these studies contributed to my argument on SB's process of centalization.

1.3.1 Intelligence Studies: Prior to World War I

The secondary literature on the intelligence activities of the Ottoman Empire before the eighteenth century is quite limited. The most comprehensive study that discusses intelligence practices of the Ottomans in the sixteenth century was published by Emrah Safa Gürkan.[27] Safa's dissertation not only presents information about intelligence activities in the Ottoman Empire but also gives good insight into the meaning of intelligence in the sixteenth century. If read along with Safa's study, Pettegree's study[28] also contributes to understanding the development and transformation of information and being informed between 1400-1800. This study also shows that with the development of press publications, the concept of receiving "day by day" information slowly shaped the idea of intelligence. As newspapers were one of the open sources that provided intelligence, especially by the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, Pettegree's work is a good contribution to understanding the role of newspapers as sources of intelligence.

In addition, Bayly's research[29] provides good insight into political intelligence activities in India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Focusing mainly on espionage, it gives an insight into the East India company's attempts to secure military, political and social information through recruiting news-writers and spies. The study serves as a good source for understanding the fastening of trading procedures during the industrial revolution and shaping the intelligence. When these two studies are read along with Safa's study, it is possible to form an analysis of how intelligence proceeded from the sixteenth century onwards.

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27 Emrah Safa Gürkan, Ibid.

28 Andrew Pettegree, *The Invention of News* (London: Yale University Press, 2014).

29 C.A Bayly, *Empire & Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India 1780-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Literature about nineteenth century intelligence is much more varied in Turkey. The nineteenth century is also important for understanding the path that lead to the foundation of the SB and understanding the beginning processes of the institutionalization of intelligence in the Ottoman Empire. The technological developments after the Industrial revolution (in the form of railways, photography, telegraph, radio etc.),military defeats, economic and military necessities represent a tendency for a Western type of modernization in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The modernization practices caused a systematic and bureaucratic change in intelligence policies. Until the reign of II. Abdulhamid, there are few studies that draw attention to intelligence.

Ahmet Yüksel, who wrote about Ottoman intelligence in the era of Mahmud II, gives detailed information about the intelligence. According to Yüksel, after the abolition of the Janissary Organization and for the purpose of a new army organization, Mehmed Hüsrev Pasha was assigned to *Asakir-i Mansüre Seraskerliği*. Hüsrev Pasha established a spy network that could locate and suppress the opposition towards sultan Mahmut II. In practice, collecting information and intelligence was not only limited with precautions against domestic opposition, but also foreign threats. In the broad geography of the Empire, the chiefs (ümera) and high -ranking officers were kept under surveillance.[30] According to Yüksel, throughout history, the statesman and palace members had engaged in spying and counter-spying. The results of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution were the important rupture points for the modernization of intelligence.[31]

The establishment of modern armies and modern and mass weapons with the capacity of mass destruction[32] showed the necessity to collect information about the amount of coal or iron, manpower, sem-

30 Ahmet Yüksel, *II. Mahmud Devrinde Osmanlı İstihbaratı* (Istanbul: Kitab Yayınevi, 2013), 23.

31 Ahmet Yüksel, Ibid., 27.

32 Mehmet Beşiçi, Ibid., 4.

itary, weaponry and everything that a state could produce. The industrial and political innovations led the sources of intelligence to reach different objectives.

Taner Timur's study on the Ottoman Secret Police Organization is one of the studies that contributes to the relation between intelligence and domestic policy. It is implied by Timur that during the administration of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, an organized intelligence organization was established. Inspired by the French intelligence system, a man named Korfulu Civinis Efendi was appointed as the chairman. In the foundation of this organization the advice of an English diplomat Stratford Canning played a great role.[33] It is known that this organization observed pashas, the financial environment and diplomats' private lives.

Focusing on the reign of Abdülmecid, Hamit Pehlivanlı discusses an "inward-oriented secret service" (içe yönelik gizli bir teşkilat). Pehlivanlı states that this organization was based upon a report sent by a French citizen who served in the Ottoman Embassy in Paris. This could be considered a new model of French Secret Service.[34]

In the nineteenth century, the period of Abdülhamid II also attracts attention, especially regarding political intelligence. According to Mustafa Balcıoğlu and Taner Timur, the intelligence network had become more public and detailed. Intelligence activities were of vital importance to Abdulhamid II, due to their positive effect on battle succession and on prolonging periods of peace. This "intelligence agency" which Balcıoğlu describes as *Yıldız Intelligence Service* (Yıldız İstihbarat Teşkilatı, YSS), worked as a barricade against the aims of "Western countries". As a result it became a target to be removed.[35] According to Balcıoğlu, this organization had two main tasks. The first one was to

33 Taner Timur, "Osmanlı Gizli Polis Örgütü Nasıl Kuruldu", *Tarih ve Toplum* 6 (1984): 414.

34 Hamit Pehlivanlı, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: Türk Modern İstihbaratçılığının Başlangıcı mı?* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), 285-286, 293.

35 Mustafa Balcıoğlu, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Yahut Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi* (Ankara: Dinamik Akademi Yayın Dağıtım, 2011), 1-3.

analyze the political thoughts of officers and report them. The second one was to collect intelligence about the allies-enemies and also collect information to impose the authority of the palace on certain groups in political opposition. In a broader sense, the YSS served as a defense organization to prevent the campaigns against the reign of Abdulhamid II. To control this contraption, YSS used a method called report (jurnal) which consisted of notes for warning, branding and stigmatization.[36] Later, the responsibility of intelligence activities of the YSS were put under the responsibility of Zaptiye Nezareti (the Police Ministry). According to Halim Alyot, after the restoration of the Constitutional Monarchy in 1908, YSS was abolished and its duties were given to the Security General Directorate (Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti) under the administration of Colonel (Miralay) Galip Bey who acted as commander in the Staff Army (Harekat Ordusu) and later became the director of the Security General Directorate.[37]

All the studies mentioned give details of choronological changes in the Ottoman intelligence institutions. However, these institutions were not the only ones that provided intelligence. According to Mehmet Ali Beyhan, besides YSS, there were also other exceptional institutions that served as intelligence sources such as the permanent embassies that had been established since the 1790s.[38]

On the matter Muslimen Abacı's[39] study on the consulates and military attaches deserves attention. Her study focuses on the attaches and consulates' intelligence activities in the second half of the nineteenth century. Focusing on the years between 1876-1909, Abacı focuses on the Black Sea region and the role of consuls, ambassadors, military attaches

36 Mustafa Balcıoğlu, Ibid., 3.

37 Halim Alyot, *Türkiye'de Zabıta: Tarihi Gelişim ve Bugünkü Durum* (Ankara: Kozan Ofset, 2008), 488-490.

38 Mehmet Ali Beyhan, "II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Hafiyye Teşkilatı ve Jurnaller", *İlmi Araştırmalar* 8 (1999): 65-83.

39 Müslimen Abacı, "II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Karadeniz Bölgesindeki Şehbenderliklerin İstihbarat Faaliyetleri (1876-1909)" (master's thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2019)

and naval attaches. In her study, she states that the consuls and ambassadors (on behalf of Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and military attaches and naval attaches (on behalf of Ministry of War) gathered intelligence activities to develop strategy. If read along with Jovo Milodinovic's study[40] the whole picture on the fragmentation of intelligence in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century is illuminated. Milodinovic focuses on the Serbian and Ottoman intelligence activities between 1880-1912. He takes a comparative approach to the role of military attaches, in terms of gathering intelligence. Milodinovic generally focuses on the intelligence activities of attaches and the effects on planning possible war strategies. Milodinovic not only focuses on the intelligence activities in strategic terms but also focuses on the institutionalization of military intelligence, development and formation of an intelligence network. Milodinovic states that the institutionalization of military intelligence occurred within the Ministry of Foreign relations and the General Staff. In doing so Miladinovic not only focuses on the role of military attaches but also consulates' and ambassadors' role in military intelligence gathering. Therefore, his presentation of intelligence implies that intelligence gathering regarding "military intelligence" was fragmented and conducted by the two mentioned institutions.

Gültekin Yıldız,[41] focusing on the years between 1864-1914, focuses on the role of military attaches, ambassadors and consuls in gathering military intelligence and how the decision-makers made use of the gathered intelligence. Based on the reports from these sources of information, Yıldız analyzes how the Ottoman decision-makers made assessments on the Balkan States' operation plans regarding the Ottoman Empire and their intentions regarding Russia and Italy. He traces the institutionalization of military intelligence in the establishment embas-

40 Jovo Miladinovic, "Osmanlı-Sırp Karşılıklı Askeri İstihbarat Faaliyetlerinin Değerlendirilmesi 1880-1912" (master's thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2016)

41 Gültekin Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askeri İstihbarat 1864-1914* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2019)

sies and appointing ambassadors, consuls and military attaches. By doing so he puts the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign relations on the map in terms of conducting military intelligence.

Cengiz Kırlı's study[42] is another contributing study as he analyzes the relation between information gathering, the creation of the public sphere and the efforts of the "Palace" to observe the population. According to Daniel Larsen this kind of information could be counted as HUMINT (human intelligence).[43] Kırlı focuses on the reports (jurnaller) as a surveillance policy to keep track and have control over the public sphere. Kırlı separates the intelligence practices of the Hamidian era from earlier periods. According to Kırlı, the general purpose of the "Hafiye" during the Hamidian Era was to spot and report the oppositions towards the sultan and subjects in the reports were mainly political. However, the reports gathered by state officials in the 1840s were not gathered to punish the people who were doing "state conversation" (devlet sohbeti) but to observe and have control over society. Kırlı takes "Tanzimat" as a rupture point when surveillance practices became common to collect information for governing. According to Kırlı the observation of public thought was a consequence of the emergence of "public sphere". Although Kırlı focuses on these practices as "surveillance" rather than "intelligence", I respectfully take the liberty to analyze his work as a source of research that contributes to studies of HUMINT (Human Intelligence). Also Cengiz Kırlı's study on the role of coffee houses in the palace's attempts to control the "public sphere" is a a significant work to be considered in terms of the development of intelligence in the Ottoman Empire. Creating the authority of the palace over

42 Cengiz Kırlı, Ibid., also see his other studies; Cengiz Kırlı, "Surveillance and Constituting the Public in the Ottoman Empire", in *Politics and Participation: Locating the Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. S.Shami, (New York: SSRC, 2009): 282-305.; Cengiz Kırlı, "Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire," in *Public Islam and the Common Good*, ed. Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (Leiden: Brill, 2004): 75-97.

43 Daniel Larsen, "Intelligence in the First World War", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 29, issue2, (2014): 282-302.

other branches of government and administration, as well as over certain groups in society, had exercised some sort of practice of intelligence.[44] The term "practice of intelligence" for the Ottoman Empire existed even before Abdulhamid II and its modest structure was further developed by Abdülaziz. The palace once again became the main authority after 1878 and evolved into a more complex bureaucracy.[45]

1.3.2 Intelligence Studies: During World War I

In this section I introduce contemporary theoretical and historical studies of intelligence that focus on World War I. The theoretical studies enabled me to contextualize the SB in the modern definition of intelligence and also during World War I. The historical studies helped to make a comparison of the condition around the globe during World War I. Using these sources and the archival documents, I was able to trace the tendency towards the centralization of intelligence in the Ottoman Empire during World War I. These sources helped me to gain an insight into what was happening in the world regarding "intelligence", enabled me to assess the changes in the Ottoman Empire and to view the SB in the wider picture of intelligence.

Compared to Turkey, academic interest in intelligence studies in Western historiography is more extensive. Until the 1950s, restricted access to archives made it difficult for historians to conduct a research on intelligence. However, after the 1950s this area has taken the interest of some scholars. With the conceptual point of view of American Scholars, intelligence studies - and the role of intelligence in historical events came to scholars' attention in the 1970s. The USA, being in the Western

44 In addition to all his studies see; Cengiz Kırlı, "The Struggle Over Space: Coffee houses of Ottoman, Istanbul, 1780-1845" (Phd Dissertation, Binghamton University, 2001).

45 *Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları Sultan Abdülhamid* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990)

alliance, and with its strategic importance, was the most productive in intelligence studies.[46]

The 1980s was a period in which historians tried to gather information about the secret services' organizational functions. For a long time in Britain access to the archives was either forbidden or postponed. However the British National Archives could not resist the crisis for long. Christopher Andrew presents an example to these objections by stating:

> "*The proposition that the release of documents on British intelligence operations in Germany during the Agadir crisis of 1911 or in Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 might threaten national security in the 1980s is so absurd that probably only Whitehall is capable of defending it. The judgment of those ministers and officials who take this extraordinary view has, I believe, been sadly warped by ancient and irrational taboos.*"[47]

Although studies on World War I intelligence are increasing, still - according to Daniel Larsen - the Second World War and the Cold War period attract the uppermost interest in intelligence. The primary reason could be the lack of documents that survived two world wars.[48]

The rest also contains military, naval and other types of intelligence. For my dissertation, instead of using Larsen's categorizing , I will categorize them as theoretical, institutional, foreign, domestic and military.

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46 Some of the studies; Harry Howe Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Thomas Troy, *Donnovan and the CIA: A history of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick Md.: Universiy Publications of America, 1981); "The Study of Intelligence in the United States", in *Comparing Foreign Intelligence*: *The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World*, ed. Roy Godson (Virginia; Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988).

47 Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community* (New York, Elisabeth Sifton Books, 1985), XV.

48 Daniel Larsen, Ibid., 282.

The ground works for this study are Michael Herman's *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*[49], Mark Lowenthal's *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy.*[50] These two studies frame my dissertation by giving an insight into an analysis of modern intelligence. Herman's study in particular focuses on the development of intelligence institutions in the second half of the nineteenth century and the rupture points of World War I. Herman's insight is that a modern kind of intelligence specifically emerged after the two world wars. While giving a timeline of intelligence institutions, Herman also focuses on the types of intelligence, methods of collection, and establishment of different intelligence institutions. Lowenthal's study, if read along with Herman, presents an insight on shaping modern intelligence after the World Wars. His study gives an insight on "what makes an intelligence institution" and defines the types and functions of intelligence. He also focuses on the methods of collection and the entire process of information before becoming intelligence. These two studies thus contributed significantly to my dissertation, underpinning my assessment of the SB's representation as a modern intelligence institution, as well as in World War I.

As World War I was a period when domestic and foreign intelligence overlapped, Richard Posner's *Remaking Domestic Intelligence*[51] contributes to the matter by analyzing the nuances between foreign and domestic intelligence. All three studies give broad insight into the differences in types of intelligence, processes and helps the readers to categorize the intelligence in strategic, operational and tactic forms. Also Merve Seren's unpublished dissertation is a good addition to the Turkish literature that contributes to understanding strategic intelligence and policy-making.[52]

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49 Michael Herman, Ibid.

50 Mark M. Lowenthal, Ibid.

51 Richard A Posner, *Remaking Domestic Intelligence* (Hoover Institution Press, 2005).

52 Merve Seren, "Stratejik İstihbaratın Güvenlik Stratejileri ve Politikaları Açısından Yeri ve Önemi" (PHD dissertation, Police Academy, Ankara, 2016).

Michael Dockrill and David French's study contains many articles that focuses on the relationship between strategy-making and intelligence. It an insight to the theoretical approach between the long -term strategy of decision-makers and intelligence institutions.[53] Sherman Kent's Strategic *Intelligence for American World Policy*[54] is one of the first studies on intelligence that contributes to the relation between strategy and intelligence. Some parts of Douglas Porch's *The French Secret Service*[55] gives a broad review about understanding intelligence. Christopher Andrew's numerous books are top studies for beginners who are interested in the history of intelligence[56] His studies give a general overview of the topics of intelligence during the World War I. *The Secret World* contains information on the intelligence activities, establishment of different intelligence institutions, methods and contributions which should be read by any researcher on the history of intelligence. *Her Majesty's Secret Service*, *For the President's Eyes Only*, *Defend The Realm* and *Intelligence and International Relations* analyze the different intelligence institutions that established the "Intelligence Community" in Britain, their staff, methods and contributions.

In order to understand the role of intelligence institutions, the process that institutions grew up from and how they changed after World War I, some studies draw particular attention. Intelligence studies on

53 Micheal Dockrill and David French, *Strategy and Intelligence: British Policy during the First World War* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1996).

54 Sherman Kent, *Strategic Iintelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1949).

55 Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services; From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War* (London: Macmillan, 1996).

56 Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books, 1985); Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: Harper Collins, 1995); Christopher Andrew, The Secret World, (UK: Penguin Random House, 2018); Christopher Andrew, *Defend the Realm: The authorized History of MI5* (New York: Alfred A. Knolph, 2009); *Intelligence and International Relations 1900–1945*, eds. Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987).

Britain are numerous and varied, compared to other countries. Focusing on Nigel West's two studies[57] analyzing MI5 and MI6, what is foregrounded is the significance of World War I in terms of expanding the intelligence tasks after two world wars and the changes. Keith Jeffery's *Official History of MI6* shows the espionage efforts between Britain and the rival countries.[58]

As for methods of gathering intelligence, Matthew S. Seligman, Alfred Cobban and J. Finnegan's studies are central. Their studies reveal the role of spies and the army, spies and ambassadors and also air-reconnaissance. Seligman's and Cobban's studies also give good insight into espionage and counter-espionage activities which turned into counter-intelligence policy especially after the World War I.[59]

Espionage is also very limited in scholarly studies. Manfield Cumming's "*MI1 organization in Britain*" (which later became MI-6 or, in other words, the Secret Intelligence Service: SIS). Also "Thomas Boghardt's *Spies of the Kaiser* provides examples of espionage activities involving Germany against Britain.[60]

Studies on domestic intelligence and counter-espionage activities during World War I are generally undertaken in Britain. Richard Pop-

57 Nigel West, *MI5* (London: Triad Grafton Books, 1981); Nigel West, *MI6* (Great Britain: Grafton Books, 1983).

58 Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010)

59 Matthew S. Seligman, *Spies in uniform, British Military and Naval Intelligence on the eve of the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Alfred Cobban, *Ambassadors and Secret Agents* (London: Cape, 1954); J. Finnegan, *Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I* (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2006).

60 Thomas Boghardt, *Spies of the Kaiser: German Covert Operations in Great Britain during the First World War* (London: Palgrave, 2004); Also see Thomas Boghardt, "A German Spy? New Evidence on Baron Louis von Horst", *Journal of Intelligence History* 1/2, (2001):101-127.

plewell's *Intelligence and Imperial Defence*[61] serves as a good source for counter-espionage practices of Britain in India.

Some of the significant studies about MI-5, are the studies of Christopher Andrew and Nicholas Hiley and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. The aforementioned studies of Christopher Andrew are also good contributors to counter-espionage.[62] In addition, A.J. Plotke's study *Imperial Spies Invade Russia*[63] is on counter-espionage and spying in Britain and America against Russia. It is a study that analyzes correlation between spying and counter-espionage.

Regarding ciphering and intelligence, the *Codebreakers* by David Kahn[64] processes the ciphering and de-ciphering methods from the ancient times to the present. Although many countries had branches for code and signal-breaking, detailed studies of code-breaking requires attention. In addition, contributing to military intelligence and ciphering, Paul Gannon's *Inside Room 40* and Peter Freeman's article attracts attention.[65] These studies contain information about two bureaus; *Room 40* and *MI1* that dealt with signals and ciphering-deciphering

61 Richard J. Popplewell, *Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904–1924* (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Also Richard Popplewell, "The Surveillance of Indian ''Seditionists'' in North America, 1905–1915", in *Intelligence and International Relations 1900–1945*, eds. Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes, (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987), 49–76.

62 Nicholas Hiley, "Counter-espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War", *English Historical Review* 101/3 (1986): 635–670; Nicholas Hiley, "The Failure of British Counter-espionage against Germany, 1907–1914", *Historical Journal* 28/4 (1985): 835–862; Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5*,. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

63 A.J. Plotke, *Imperial Spies Invade Russia: The British Intelligence Interventions 1918* (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1993).

64 David Kahn, *The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing* (New York: Macmillan, 1996).

65 Paul Gannon, *Inside Room 40: The Code breakers of World War I* (Hersham: Ian Allen, 2010); Peter Freeman, "MI1(b) and the Origins of British Diplomatic Cryptanalysis", *Intelligence and National Security*, 22/ 2 (2007): 206–280.

practices. In addition, the studies of John Ferris provide a good introduction.[66] All the studies about ciphering and intelligence later contributed to the area of counter-intelligence after the two world wars.

For military intelligence, Polly Mohs' *Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt*[67] is worthy of note. Mohs deals with the policies of Britain in the Middle East during World War I. As the counter-intelligence evolved with the technological developments in the nineteenth century and started to take its modern form after the two world wars, its relation between the politics and diplomacy is another area of research for intelligence studies. In this regard, aforementioned studies contribute much to this area of research.

Focusing on the "Zimmerman Telegram," Thomas Boghardt and Barbara Tuckmans'[68] studies present detailed information on British intelligence solving a telegram of Germans that offered Mexico and the three states of America an alliance in return to support them against their Northern neighbors. Their studies show the significance of intelligence in terms of decision-making in diplomatic relations. Covering the relationship between military intelligence, counter-espionage and also propaganda issues, Yigal Sheffy's *British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign* is an important study. Sheffy's book has memoirs from one of the practitioners in the intelligence network. Also some other articles and book chapters listed in the footnotes are related to the subject.[69]

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66 John Ferris, *The British Army and Signals Intelligence during the First World War Army* (London:Records Society, 1992); John Ferris, "The British Army and Signals Intelligence in the Field during the First World War", *Intelligence and National Security,* 3/4 (1988): 23–48.

67 Polly Mohs, *Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War* (London: Routledge, 2008).

68 Barbara Tuchman, *The Zimmerman Telegram*, (London: Constable, 1958); Also see: Thomas Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into World War I* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012).

69 Yigal Sheffy, *British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914–1918* (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Also see, Richard J. Popplewell, "British Intelligence in Mesopotamia 1914–16", *Intelligence and National Security*, 5/2 (1990): 139–172.

Studies about German military intelligence are quite scarce compared to British ones. Eliezer Tauber's study, and Markus Pöhlmann's, cover German military intelligence. In addition, Pöhlmann's article is short but very helpful for comparing the Ottoman SB and Abteilung IIIb(Section 3b), as the SB was indeed very similar to the German model during World War I.[70]

Intelligence Services also implemented propaganda activities which are generally analyzed as a separate topic in intelligence studies (also in the Turkish literature see Mehmet Beşikçi.[71]). Gary Messinger's *British propaganda and the State* contains detailed information about role of intelligence organizations in propaganda activities. Keith Neilson also discusses the British intelligence services' propaganda activities in Tsarist Russia.[72] Although the main argument is not about intelligence, Erol Köroğlu's study is a good contribution, as it was the first study to imply that the intelligence section of the Ottoman General Staff published some journals and controlled the publication process of newspapers both for propaganda and also censorship.[73] Another topic of relevance is the relationship between cultural studies and intelligence as cultural studies are generally not linked with intelligence studies. However, there has been a rising interest in spy novels recently. Nicholas Hiley's article gives an insight about the effect of spy novels during the war years between 1914-18. Ernest May's "Knowing One's Enemies" consists of articles on intelligence practices in different countries .[74]

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70 Eliezer Tauber, "The Capture of the NILI Spies: The Turkish Version", *Intelligence and National Security,* 6/4 (1991): 701–710.; Markus Pöhlmann, German Intelligence at War, 1914–1918, *Journal of Intelligence History*, Vol 5, Issue. 2, (2005): 25-54.

71 Mehmet Beşikçi, *Birinci Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı Seferberliği*.

72 Gary S. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Keith Neilson, '"Joy Rides: British Intelligence and Propaganda in Russia, 1914–1917", *Historical Journal*, Vol.24, Issue 4 (1981): 885–906.

73 Erol Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey during World War I* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007).

74 Nicholas Hiley, "Decoding German Spies: British Spy Fiction 1908–18", *Intelligence and National Security*, 5/4 (1990): 55–79.; Ernest May, *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence*

In addition to the aforementioned studies, there are some studies that interpret the Special Organization (Teşilat-I Mahsusa, SO) as an intelligence section, such as from Şükrü Hanioğlu, Eric Jan Zürcher, Vahakn Dadrian, Taner Akçam and Philip Stoddard.[75]

İlhan Tekeli and Stanford Shaw on the other hand, see the SO as a secret organization acting on behalf of the government for strengthening the Muslim population and conducting propaganda activities.[76]

Tuncay Özkan, Emin Demirel, Cem Anadol, Ergün Hiçyılmaz and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir makes connection between the SO and secret services of the Republican Era of Turkey.[77] However there are also opposing studies from those by Polat Safi and Ahmet Tetik. Also Mehmet

Assessment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

75 Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1986); Eric Jan Zürcher's argument about the SO is in the context of the Armenian question. He implies that the SO was a troop that did the CUP's dirty work. However, the question why Talat Pasha did not use the Intelligence Section Of Security General Directorate remains unanswered. Eric Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905-1926* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984); Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu* (Istanbul: Su Yayınları, 2001); also see, Eugene Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great war in the East, 1914-1920* (UK:Penguin Books, 2015.)

76 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı, Birinci Kitap: Köktenci Modernitenin Doğuşu* (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003); Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye, Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu 1808-1975* (Istanbul: E Yayınları, 1994); Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa*, Vol. 3, (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005).

77 Tuncay Özkan, *MİT'in Gizli Tarihi* (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2003); Emin Demirel, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'dan Günümüze Gizli Servisler* (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008) Cemal Anadol, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'dan MİT'e Susurluk Dosyası* (Istanbul: Bilge Karınca Yayınları, 2009); Ergun Hiçyılmaz, *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete Gizli Teskilatlar* Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1994); Ergün Hiçyılmaz, *Belgelerle Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ve Casusluk Örgütleri*, (Istanbul: Ünsal Kitapevi, 1979).

Beşikçi analyses the SO as a secret organization that gathered volunteer recruits and conducted unconventional war.[78]

In Turkey the intelligence studies came to attention especially after the *Susuruk Incident* that formed a collaboration between intelligence and the deep state. With limited access to ATASE archives these studies lacked genuine primary research evidence.[79]

I would also like to mention some of the studies that cover the War of Independence and the Early Turkish Republic. As there were two governments, intelligence became much more complicated during the War of Independence. While these two periods are outside of the timeline parameters of my dissertation (1914-1918), they still require attention. In 1920, a "Press and Intelligence General Directorate" was established that conducted intelligence activities. There are also other secret organizations also contributed to some intelligence activities. For areas of future research and also to form a continuity to the republican period Mesut Aydın's, Selahattin Salışık's, Fethi Tevetoğlu's, Serdar Yurtsever's, Hüseyin Gülnar's and Musa Gürbüz' studies are noteworthy. These studies give insight to some secret organizations such as "Felah," "Military Police Organization (Askeri Polis Teşkilatı)", "Karakol Cemiyeti", "M.M. Group (M.M. Grubu) and the "Press and Intelligence General Directorate"[80]

78 Polat Safi, "The Ottoman Special Organization-Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: An İnquiry Into Its Operational and Administrative Characteristics" (PHD dissertation, Bilkent University, 2012); Ahmet Tetik, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Tarihi* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014). Mehmet Beşikçi, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Seferberliği*.

79 Polat Safi, "The Ottoman Special Organization: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: A Historical Assessment With Particular Reference to its Operations Against British Occupied Egypt 1914-1916" (Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, 2006).

80 Bülent Çukurova, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Haberalma ve Yeraltı Çalışmaları* (Ardıç Yayınları,1994); Mesut Aydın, *Milli Mücadele Dönemi'nde Tbmm Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul'da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar ve Faaliyetleri* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1992); Selahattin Salışık*, Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın Gizli Örgütü M.M Grubu* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınarı, 1999); Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988) Serdar Yurtsever, *Milli Mücadele İstihbaratında İstanbul'da Gizli Bir Grup Felah* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2015); Hüseyin Gülnar, "Psikolojik harekat ve

To conclude this section, I would like to highlight a statement from David Kahn. As Kahn states "intelligence gapes as the biggest hole in the historiography". Until the 1970s, non-academic historians filled the gap which was either unreliable or uncheckable.[81] Although there are studies on this broad area of research, and still much work needs to be done.

§ 1.4 The Institutionalization of Intelligence and the Ottoman Empire's Second Branch

In this section of the dissertation I will discuss the institutionalization of intelligence, with a comparative approach. First, I will present general information on the institutionalization of intelligence around the world, and then I will focus on the establishment of the SB in the nineteenth century and its organizational changes until 1914.

Although the SB served as a military intelligence section until 1914, still it was not the only intelligence provider. Military attaches served under the Second Statistics Branch(former name of SB), while ambassadors to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as sources that contributed to foreign intelligence. During the reign of Abdülhamid. II, these intelligence sources and reports were canalized to Yıldız Palace. For these reasons, the role of the SB in the nineteenth century is quite limited and the main contribution is its own publication, the Journal of Military Science (Mecmua-i Fünün-ı Askeriyye). As my dissertation is limited to the time period of 1914-1918 and sources about the role of the SB in the nine-

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk' ün Kurtuluş Savaşı'ında örnek uygulamaları" (Master's thesis, Ankara University, 2006); Musa Gürbüz, "Karakol Cemiyeti" (Master's Thesis, Ankara University, 1987); Hamit Pehlivanlı, "Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Askerî Polis Teşkilatı ve Faaliyetleri" (PHD dissertation, Ankara University, 1990).

81 David Kahn " World War II History: The Biggest Hole", *Military Affairs*, Vol. 39, April, (1975). After defining the intelligence studies as the gap in the historiography, by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, the inter-disciplinary, academic Journal of Intelligence was founded. Although the archival materials were restricted or forbidden in the 1980s, still academic studies of serious analysis started to appear.

teenth century are quite limited, I provide some general insight into the establishment and organization of the SB before the First World War. The other contributing intelligence organizations in the Ottoman Empire are beyond the scope of this section.

Technological developments and improvements in communication not only paved the way for mass-mobilized armies with destructive firepower but also allowed states to easily access information. Due to conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars (1795-1815), the Crimean War (1854-56), the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian (1870-71) war and many colonial wars including the Spanish-American War (1898), the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the progress of establishing a well-organized and institutionalized intelligence system accelerated. As access to information improved with photography, the telegraph, and mass-produced newspapers, the role spies in gathering intelligence extended. As access to information became easier and warfare became more obscure, the need for states to obtain the scenarios, intentions and plans of the other states became even more significant. Many of the latter wars caused a series of crises. In an environment of war and domestic turmoil, states began to institutionalize their intelligence systems.[82]

In 1850 Austria Hungary became the first country to establish an intelligence section: the "Evidenzbureu". This institutionalization, combined with Prussian victories over Austria and France in 1866 and 1870, became the model for other countries.[83]

Then followed Germany with *Abteilung IIIb* in 1860. France established *Deuxieme Bureau* in 1875 after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. In 1881, Russia established *Okhrana* which served as an institution for secret policing.[84]

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82 Douglas H. Wheeler, ''A Guide to the History of Intelligence 1800-1918'', *The Intelligencer - Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies*, vol. 19/ 1 (Winter 2014-2015): 47-51.

83 M. Van Crevald, *Command in War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 149.

84 Alex Marshall, "Russian military intelligence, 1905-1917. The untold story behind Tsarist Russia in the First World War", *War in History*, Vol 11 (2004): 393-423.

These intelligence organizations had separate functions of intelligence. For instance, IIIb in Germany was responsible from intelligence gathering and counter-espionage, whereas Okhrana predominantly focused on domestic surveillance against oppositions. IIIb, on the other hand, was a military intelligence section and it had branches responsible for gathering intelligence from various countries.[85]

In the nineteenth century states also established naval and other civilian organizations responsible for foreign intelligence. For instance, USA established its *Naval intelligence* in 1887 and Britain *Department of Naval Intelligence* in 1871.[86]

In Britain the MI5 and MI6 were firstly established as military intelligence sections than later evolved into a civilian character.[87] *Secret Service Bureau(MI5)* was established by the coordination of Foreign Office, War Office and Admiralty.[88]

The ambassadors, military and naval attaches also played a critical part in the institutionalization of intelligence. Legally they were not allowed to perform espionage activities in their host countries but still became valuable source of information. As the position of attaches was legal, but spying was considered illegal, it was quite risky for attaches to recruit spies. For instance, France's Intelligence department caught an attache named Colonel Max Von Schawrzkoppen who recruited spies to obtain French "war plans" and a list of weaponry. In addition, as the intelligence became institutionalized, double-agents also increased. For instance an officer of "Evidenzbureau" - named Alfred Redl - was discovered selling information about Austria to Russia, which contained the list of Austrian spies and war plans against Serbia.[89]

85 Markus Pöhlmann, Ibid., 28.

86 R. Jeffreys-Jones, *American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA* (London: Free Press, 1977), 24.

87 F. H. H. Hinsley with E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ransom, and R. C. Knight, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1979), 7.

88 Keith Jeffery, Ibid., 3-5. also see Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service., 59

89 Douglas H. Wheeler, Ibid., 47-51.

The increased usage of open sources such as newspapers, journals, magazines, maps increased spying activities which paved a way for spy-mania. Therefore, states not only institutionalized intelligence but also counter-espionage sections, either within a single intelligence institution or as a separate institution. In the United Kingdom this task was given to the MI5 (Security Service) that relied on police forces for conducting the investigation and arresting the suspects.[90] In France, the civilian agency *Sûreté Générale* was officially responsible from domestic intelligence. However, in 1899, counter-intelligence tasks were given to *Deuxième Bureau*.[91]

Another thing to raise is that with the "*law of war*" in 1899 and 1907, spying activities were legalized. The"law of war" decreed that:

"a person can only be counted as a spy if secretly collecting information or acting on false pretenses, obtaining information from a zone of war and sending it to the hostile party."[92]

In the Ottoman Empire, the SB was not as efficient in the mid-nineteenth century compared to World War I. The abolishment of the Janissary Organization, the establishment of a new army can be counted as the first steps for institutionalizing military intelligence. Similar to European countries, the Ottoman Empire also felt the need for an intelligence institution after a series of crises including the Crimean War (1854-1856) and the Ottoman-Russian War (1878-79). These two wars increased the need for an organized intelligence service rather than relying only on spies. These rehearsals of small-scal- but total - wars, shaped the intelligence service as well.

90 Andrew, Christopher, Ibid,. 28.

91 Malcolm Anderson, *In Thrall to Political Change: Police and Gendarmerie in France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 189-190.

92 International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4374cae64.html (accessed 2 November 2020).

After the regulations in 1878/1879 the Statistics and Translation Branch (İstatistik ve Tercüme Şubesi) was given the responsibility of gathering military intelligence and was re-named on 1880.[93] On 7th June 1880, the Ottoman Empire's General Staff (Erkan-ı Harbiyye) was established with the Special Branch (Şube-i Mahsusa) and six other branches under the management of the Offices of the War Ministry (Offices of the War Ministry).[94] The branches were: First Tanzimat Branch, Second Statistics Branch, Third Staff Operations Branch, Fourth Host and Range Branch[95] Fifth Science Branch and Sixth Communications Branch.[96]

The primary source that contains the tasks of this department is the Military Journal (Ceride-i Askeriyye). Based on the information in the journal, this branch gathered intelligence concerning the armies of the foreign powers. The branch received information mainly from military and naval attaches, consuls and their own spies. Commonly used open sources were domestic and foreign press publications. The branch was also given the duties and permission to publish handbooks, translate foreign press publications and present them to the different institutions such as the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Relations.[97]

Another source that we learn about regarding this branch is Goltz Pasha's *Vakt-i Sefer ve Hazarda Erkân-ı Harbiyye Vezâifi* published in

93 Kadir Acar, Seraskerlik'ten Harbiye Nezareti'ne: Türkiye'de Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ve Milli Savunma Bakanlığı'nın Temeli (Master's thesis, Anadolu University, 2002), 85-87.

94 Goltz Paşa, *Vakt-i Sefer ve Hazarda Erkân-ı Harbiye Vezaifi: Kısm-ı Nazarî*, translated by Mehmed Tahir, (Istanbul: Mekteb-i Fünun-ı Harbiye Matbaası, August 1313), 148.

95 Between the years of 1888-1908 it was named as "Dördüncü Konak Şubesi". See : *Salnâme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye* (1305-1326/1888-1908).

96 *Salnâme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye* (1298/1881), 174-175; between the years 1882-1886 it was re-named as "Altıncı Muhaberat-ı Umumiyye Şubesi", see: *Salnâme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye*, (1299-1303/1882-1886), 87, 162, 164, 165 and 187.

97 For a detailed analysis on the establishment of Second Branch see Jovo Miladinovic, "Osmanlı-Sırp Karşılıklı Askeri İstihbarat Faaliyetlerinin Değerlendirilmesi 1880-1912" (Master's Thesis, Istanbul University, 2016) also see; CA, number 122, year 25 (15 Teşrin-i Evvel 1303/27 October 1887), 124-126.

1891 and 1897. Goltz Pasha summarizes the task of the branch by stating that:

> "*The Second Statistics and Translation Branch collocates the military statistics, enquiries the conditions of foreign armies and publishes the Journal of Military Science (Mecmua-i Fünûn-ı Askeriyye)*".[98]

The path to this institutionalization of military intelligence also accelerated with the opening of permanent embassies and the assigning of military attaches. As stated before, what was different to previous periods was the usage of open sources such as newspapers, journals, magazines. Rather than using spies and covert methods, these open sources provided information for the attaches in embassies.[99]

Assigning attaches to embassies and mass-produced publications were indeed the former steps before the establishment of intelligence institutions. Sixteen years before the Second Statistics and Translation Branch was established, the Ottoman Empire had already started assigning officers to embassies.[100]

After its establishment, these officers served on behalf of the Second Statistics Branch. The attaches were tasked to gather intelligence about military organization, mobilization capacity, communication methods, semitary, provision, personnel numbers prepared tables that shows the strength, weapons, and disposition of foreign countries' armies.[101]

The attaches were assigned to embassies for two years and chosen amongst officers in the General Staff.[102] Goltz Pasha, also wrote about the duties of attaches in his book *Vakt-i Sefer ve Hazarda Erkân-ı Harbiye Vezaifi: Kısm-ı Nazarî*. The attaches had to inform the General Staff

98 ''Askerî istatistiği tanzim ve ecnebî ordularının tahkik-i ahvâli ile Mecmua-i Fünûn-ı Askeriyye'yi neşr eder''Goltz Paşa, Ibid., 149, 157-158. For a good assessment of the role of attaches and ambassadors please apply to the study of Gültekin Yıldız, Ibid.

99 Gültekin Yıldız, Ibid., 18.

100 Gültekin Yıldız, Ibid., 41.

101 ATASE, BDH, F:12, D:23, I:001. Kanun-ı Evvel 1331/Aralık 1919.

102 Salnâme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye, (1310/1892), 872-873., Also see Jovo Milodinoviç, Ibid., 12-13.

issues regarding military and support to the ambassador and his family. In addition to these duties, the attache had to have a deep knowledge about the changes or reforms in the armies of the other countries and recommend the General Staff to follow certain military publications.[103]

Until 1908 the Statistics and Translation Branch had 3 directors, Brigardier General Hüseyin Hüsnü (1880-1888), Brigardier General Yahya (1888-1889), Lieutenant General Ahmed Nuri (1889-1908). In 1881 there were twenty one officers in the branches' headquarters, but this number gradually declined until 1908.[104]

In the nineteenth century the Second Statistics Branch served as a military intelligence section. However, as the General Staff was dual executive, the strategic and political information gathered by the embassies was mostly transmitted to the General Staff at Yıldız Palace. Therefore, the role of in intelligence in the Second Statistics Branch was quite limited. As the focus of this thesis is the period of World War I, I will present some general insight into its role in nineteenth century.

The Military Science Journal (Mecmua-yı Fünün-ı Askeriyye) serves as the main source that provides knowledge about the role of the Second Statistics Branch. In the journal published by the Branch, the common topics of information about foreign armies' organization-equipment, war history analysis, battle scenarios, war analysis, law of war, education and training, technology, logistics, military leaders, possible conflicts, health conditions and services.[105] In addition, detailed information on geography, organization, equipment, deployment, volunteers, construction and other issues of concern to the military, were provided in detail.[106]

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103 Goltz Paşa, Ibid., 149, 157-158.

104 Mehmed Rüştü, *Devlet-i Aliyye Ordu Teşkilâtı* (Dersaâdet: Mekteb-i Fünun-ı Harbiyye-i ġahâne Matbaası, 1307/1891), 17. Jovo Milodinoviç, Ibid., 14.

105 Mecmua-i Fünûn-ı Askeriyye (MFA) (1298-1327/ 1882-1911).

106 To see a good analysis of the journal see; Mahmut Sami Sert, "Mecmua-i Fünûn-ı Askeriyye Dergisinin Analitik İncelenmesi (1882-1914)" (Master's Thesis, Istanbul University, 2016).

In the nineteenth century one of the important country that was followed was Russia. After the loss of the Otto-Russian war, the branch especially focused on territories of deployment, organization during mobilization, positioning of newly established corps, hospitals, barracks.[107]

In addition, during the Otto-Greek war in 1897, the Ottoman Empire gathered information and prepared for a possible invasion of the Russian Fleet at İstanbul. Naval-attache Mustafa's reports showed that Russians could invade the Bosphorus at any time, as it had 100,000 armed troops ready to attack in the Black Sea region.[108]

The countries that followed Russia were Germany Austria, Italy and France. Especially training programs of artillery, infantry and cavalry, budget, logistic services, reforms or discharges in staff officers, commanders, and the innovations in German Navy and army organization were kept under observation.[109]

Even though the Branch gathered intelligence, the information flow was to the General Staff in Yıldız Palace and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Second Statistics Branch in this case was not as efficient as the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Especially even ambassadors played a greater role. There were many embassies such as in Varna, Odessa, Rusi, Batum, Poti, Constanta, Tolcı, Sebastopol, Sukhumi, Rostov, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Vienna, Berlin that

107 "Rus Ordularında İstihkâm Ameliyâtı", *MFA,* Vol 13., Fascicle. 74 (Nisan 1304/April 1888), 146-152, "Rusya'da Orduların Tertib ve Teşkili", *MFA*, Vol 12., Fascicle. 69 (Teşrin-i Evvel 1303/ November 1887), 105-160.; "Rusya'da Yeni Tertib Olunan Kolordular", *MFA*, Vol 15., Fascicle. 85 (Mart 1305/March 1889), 53-64.

108 Gültekin Yıldız, Ibid.,BOA. Y.A.HUS. 367/27. 18 Şevval 1314/22 March 1897.

109 "Alman Piyadesinin Nişanında Tahmin-i Mesafât", *MFA*, Vol. 9, Fascicle 53 (Temmuz 1302/ July 1886), 250-257,; "Almanya'nın Kuvâ-yı Bahriyesiyle 1889- 90 Senesinin Bütçesi", MFA, Vol. 17, Fascicle. 96 (Şubat 1305/February 1890), 355-384. "Havadis-i Askeryiye", MFA, Vol. 25, Fascicle. 146, 511. As our topic was limited to World War one I had only accessed a few of the journals. For full, detailed and effective analysis, see Mahmut Sami Sert, Ibid.

provided intelligence directly to Yıldız Palace.[110] In terms of military intelligence, their role in the Ministry of Foreign relations was much greater.

The second half of the 19th century was period when the SB was in its infancy, due to the dual- executive form of the army. With the General Staff (Erkan-ı Harbiyye) on the one hand, and the General Staff (Maiyyet-i Seniyye Erkan-ı Harbiyyesi) in Yıldız Palace on the other hand, military intelligence became fragmented. [111]Therefore the number of officers in the Second Statistics Branch headquarters decreased and other intelligence providers (the Ministry of Foreign-Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Navy) made use of sources much more efficiently than the Second Statistics Branch.

1.4.1 Administrative Changes, 1908-1912

Due to the dual-executive structure of the General Staff during the reign of Abdülhamid, the SB did not enjoy a well-structured intelligence network. The sources reported to the General Staff in Yıldız Palace more than they did to the Second Statistics Branch, for this reason personnel decreased. Until 1908 the number of staff officers dropped from 21 to 5.[112]

After the declaration of the Constitution in 1908, with the reforms of Ahmet İzzet Paşa, the General Staff in Yıldız Palace was abolished and the double-executive system came to an end.[113]

The General Staff (Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye) had been subject to new changes before the outbreak of Balkan War and was divided into seven branches.[114]

Table 1.1

110 For detailed information see; Müslimen Abacı, Ibid. Also see; Gültekin Yıldız; Ibid., 88.

111 To see the fragmantation, apply Gültekin Yıldız, Ibid., 212

112 Salnâme-i Devleti-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye (1298/1882), 175.; Salnâme-i Devleti-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye (1324/1908), 236; Jovo Miladinoviç, Ibid., 14.

113 Kadir Acar, Ibid., 85-87.

114 ATASE, Balkan Harbi Tasnifi (BLH); F:1646, D:30, I:11.

General Staff(Erkân-ı Harbiyye-i Umumiye, 1911)	
First Branch: (Director: Colonel Pertev Demirhan)	Training, Maneuver, Military Record
Second Branch: (Director: Colonel Ali Rıza)	Intelligence
Third Branch: (Director: Ziya)	Operations and Operation Plans, Transportation
Fourth Branch: (Director: Colonel Mehmet Tevfik)	Organization, Security
Fifth Branch: (Director: Lieutenant Colonel Fevzi)	Laws and Budget
Sixth Branch: (Director: Brigadier Ismail Kamil)	Tasks of Officers and Promotions
Seventh Branch: (Director: Brigadier Zeki)	Maps and Topography

The Branch used two main methods to gather intelligence. One was through military attaches and others through espionage and informants. Intelligence about foreign countries was based on information obtained generally from officials, which was insufficient.[115]

In this period the SB was responsible for gathering military intelligence concerning the armed forces of different countries through a network of military and naval attaches, agents and open sources such as publications.[116] The *Codes of Service During Expedition* (Hidemat-ı Seferiye Nizamnamesi) translated from German to Turkish, explained the general tasks regarding intelligence. In the code it was written that the SB had to collect intelligence about the possibility of foreign powers' hostile activities. The SB had to gather information about the deployment, training, weaponry, roads and railroads, geography and climate, animals and livestock, the condition of offices, the personality of commanders, degree of mobilization, amount of expeditionary force, purpose of operations, and possible military operation plans.[117]

115 *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi*, 210.

116 Zeynel Abidin Küçük, "Osmanlı Askeri Salnamelerine Göre Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Riyaseti ve Harbiye Nezareti Teşkilatı" (Master's thesis, Kırıkkale University, 2002), 68-75.

117 *Hidemeat-ı Seferiye Nizamnamesi* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1328-1329/1912-1913)

The second method used by the SB was through espionage but a lack of funding prevented the SB from enjoying a good organized intelligence network.[118]

From the Constitutional period to the Balkan Wars most of the assessed threat was Bulgaria, Russia, Romania and Greece.[119] In the Military Science Journal the common intelligence gathered about Bulgaria, Greece and Romania were the regulations in their armies, commanders, telegram lines, railroads and weaponry, deployment and logistics, organization, and budget.[120]

Even though the Balkan countries were prioritized during the constitutional period, they were already kept under observation between 1880-1912. For instance, on the 11th December 1884, the Ottoman General Staff delivered intelligence reports to the Ottoman Empire General Staff Military Commission about the purpose, power, possible numbers of manpower to mobilize and the amount and kind of weaponry held by Bulgaria and Serbia.[121]

Although the prioritized countries were Balkan Countries, Russia was also kept under surveillance in case of a sudden attack in the case of a Balkan Conflict. In addition, especially after the Russian-Japan war, Ottomans followed the changes that occurred in the Russian army such as training about the usage of machine guns, logistics, uniforms usage of machine guns, duties of artillery corps and new innovations about cavalry corps and so on.[122]

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118 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 268.

119 Mahmut Sami Sert, Ibid., 105.

120 "1909 Senesinde Bulgaristan Ordusundaki Terakkiyat", *MFA*, no 6, (Ağustos 1326/ August 1910), 351-359, "Hareket ve İkamet Esnasında Emniyet Hıdematı", *MFA*, no. 9, (Teşrin-i Sânî 1326/November 1910), 559-581; "Ahz-ı Asker Kanunu Hülasası", *MFA*, (Eylül 1328/September 1912), 369-375.; "Ordu Teşkilatı Hakkında Layiha", MFA, (Eylül 1328/September 1912), 375-426. Also see; Mahmut Sami Sert, Ibid., 105-108.

121 BOA. Y.PRK.ASK. 24/62. 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1300/11 December 1884.

122 "Mançurî Harbinden Beri Rus Ordusunda Islahat", *MFA*, No. 9 (Şubat 1325/February 1909), 513-527.; "Rusya'da Efkâr-ı Tabiyeviye", *MFA*, No. 1. (Mart 1326/March 1910), 49-64. Mahmut Sami Sert., Ibid., 107.

The Chief of Defense Ahmet İzzet Pasha prepared the plans *Possible Wars that might happen in the Balkans*. The plans covered possible attack plans against countries such as Bulgaria, Greece small Slavic states.[123]

However the newly re-organized SB did not enjoy a good intelligence network to succeed these tasks. In general, the Ottoman Empire were deceived by the enemy about intelligence. Even Asım Bey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his confidence for Balkan states. When the General Staff in Yıldız Palace was abolished, the SB's development and organization was insufficient, as its personnel and capacity decreased after twenty years and it did not have a strong intelligence network at division, brigade and regiment level. As a result, defeat in the Balkan Wars revealed the need for a new establishment in the army. Thus, in the Balkan Wars, some commanders used the intelligence officers in their headquarters as liaison officers. By just looking at their job title, they were sent to the fronts with the idea that they would bring the necessary information.[124]

§ 1.5 The Balkan Wars Trauma, the Integration of Civilians to Warfare and the Re-Organization of the Army

In this section I will focus on the overall condition of the empire and society and reforms in the army after the Balkan Wars defeat. This section will help to clarify the first phase of the tendency to centralization in intelligence and also present insight into the situation in the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars. Understanding the changes and re-

123 Jovo Miladinoviç, Ibid., 19.

124 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Ibid., 260-283.

organization in the Ottoman General staff is significant, as the army was the primary source of operational and tactical intelligence on the battle-front during World War I. Understanding the practices that affected civilian life is also significant as many civilian organizations were used by the SB, both for recruiting spies and informants. As newspapers were totally under the control of the SB during World War I, it is also significant to understand the domestic policies of the CUP towards press publications. This last section of the introduction will give a perspective into military and societal changes in order to situate the tendency of centralization in intelligence practices in historical context. We should not see this part as a general political insight of the period, but read it along with future chapters to better understand the changes in intelligence. Although the re-organization of the whole army, mobilization and public sphere is not included in this dissertation it is still necessary to have a general explanation on the changes. By doing so we will be able to develop an insight into the idea of centralizing efforts in intelligence. In this section I begin to present a few examples of the SB, while detail about the entire re-organization of SB and the tendency to centralization will be discussed separately in future chapters.

Many researchers label the Balkan Wars as small great war that integrated civilian society with warfare.[125] Contrary to previous wars, the Balkan Wars were a set of wars that removed the division between the home-front and the battle-front. The Balkan Wars happened in two stages. The first one began on the 8th October 1912 where the Ottoman Empire fought against Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro and ended in total disaster, with the London Treaty on the 10th June 1913. In the second stage of the war the Ottoman Empire fought against Bulgaria

125 See; Mehmet Beşikçi, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Seferberliği*.; Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die, *A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (London: Greenwood Press, 2001); Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Milli İktisat 1908-1918* (Istanbul:Doğan Yayınları, 2012); Erol Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity*.; M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse* (Tauris, 2000).

and other Balkan countries and retaken Edirne in July 1913. After this war, Ottoman rulers saw the insufficiency of the army and the necessity of integrating society to warfare. From the end of the Balkan wars until the beginning of World War I, the rulers undertook a series of policies to support and reform the army.[126]

After the defeat the CUP based its policy on Turkish nationalism. This Turkish nationalism became stronger, especially after 1915. As the empire lost 80% of its territory in Europe and especially Salonica questions were triggered regarding the survival of the country.[127]

After the defeat, two radical changes of policy were put into practice. The first was a radical reform in the army and the second was integrating the society into warfare. In the ideology of the CUP ruling elite, the salvation of the empire was establishing a strong army.[128]

Therefore it is not surprising that CUP officials extended the tasks of the SB and paved a way to a tendency towards centralization. The CUP government used newspapers and organizations to increase awareness and support for the army within the society. Newspapers such as İkdam and Tanin published many articles headlining that supporting the army was the same as supporting the family.[129]

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126 Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans 1912-1913* (Westport: Praeger, 2003); Aram Andonyan, *Balkan Savaşı* (Istanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 1999)

127 Edward, J, Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 19.

128 According to Aksakal, the Ottoman policy of German-Ottoman alliance for World War I should be seen as a concern for long term international security and economic development and not as an eager attempt to join the War. Aksakal argues that the Balkan Wars, the July Crisis and the Sarajevo assassination, increased concerns that the CUP would not wait for another Balkan war to happen without having the necessary requirements to defend the country. Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.

129 See, for example, "Asker Aileleri Menfaatine", *İkdâm*, 8 Ağustos 1330/21 August 1914; "Seferberlikde Ahalinin Vazif esi", *İkdâm* (10 Eylül 1330/23 September 1914); "Asker Aileleri Hakkında", *Tanin*, (15 Teşrinievvel 1330/28 October 1914), Also see Mehmet

The CUP also arranged demonstrations in different provinces to gain support for the army. The news of these demonstrations was spread by the press to the citizens. The newspapers especially emphasized that the demonstrations showed the eagerness and promises of the people to give their economic and physical support. The policies of the CUP can also be seen in the reports sent from the British embassy. The report sent from this embassy implied that the demonstrations were prepared by the government with the purpose of gaining its former power and independence. The newspaper, Tanin, published bulletin as *national independence festivals*.[130]

In addition, associations such as the *Ottoman Navy League* (Donanma-yı Osmanî Muâvenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti), *the National Defense League* (Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti) and the *National Defense League* (Müdâfaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti) contributed to these demonstrations.[131] They also took part in conducting philanthropic enterprise to raise funding and support from society to contribute to the economic and manpower support for the army and the navy.[132]

After the July crisis in Europe, the Ottoman Empire did not wait long and on the 2nd of August declared mobilization. Until the end of October, the Ottoman Empire defined the mobilization area as armed neutrality (müsellah bitaraflık) and during this period it had prepared for war and conducted radical reforms. The idea of reform in the army was

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Beşikçi, Birinci Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı Seferberliği., 55. Also see Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid, 76.

130 "Tezahürat-ı Vatanperverane", *İkdâm*, (10 Teşrinisani 1330/22 November 1914); "Cihad-ı Ekber Yolunda", *İkdâm*, (6 Teşrinisani 1330/ 19 November 1914); Her Tarafta İstiklâl-i Millî Şenlikleri", *Tanin*, (30 Ağustos 1330/12 September 1914); Also see Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 67.

131 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 50-55.

132 Nadir Özbek, "Defining the Public Sphere during the Late Ottoman Empire: War, Mass Mobilization and the Young Turk Regime 1908-1918", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, no. 5 (September 2007), 795-809. Also see; Nâzım H. Polat, *Müdâfaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1991).

on the agenda of Community of Union and Progress when it staged the coup on 23 January 1913.[133]

According to the CUP ruling elite, the failure of the Balkan War was due to insufficiency in mobilizing manpower and the weakness of the army. Therefore, before World War I, radical reforms in the Ottoman General Staff and a better conscription system was necessary for an effective army.[134] The state that also contributed to these reforms was Germany. After signing a contract with the German military officials on 14th December 1913, a German Military Mission headed by Otto Liman Von Sanders arrived to İstanbul. The committee at first consisted of forty two people but increased to seventy and took part in reforming the reorganization, branches, recruitment and mobilization plans of the General Staff.[135] In addition, the 1913 coup hastened the military reforms and put the army in the place of a political ruling factor of the Empire.[136] After the 1913 coup, General Mahmut Şevket Pasha became the grand vizier and minister of war. During his viziership, a new regulation for the re-organization of the army was issued on 14th February 1913 and even though Mahmut Şevket Pasha was assassinated on 11th June 1913, the reforms continued. The most radical re-organization was made when Enver Pasha was assigned as the minister of defense (harbiye nazırı)[137]and German contribution increased, after signing a secret alliance with Germany on 2 August 1914. Immediately the elderly officers were made redundant and replaced by young pro-CUP officers.[138] It was the purpose of the CUP members to establish an army that could be mobilized efficiently but also contained soldiers that were not opposed

133 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 39.

134 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 111-113.

135 Liman Von Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Yıl* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 31-37.

136 M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse* (London: I.BTauris, 2000) 285-286.

137 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 112.

138 Hew Strachan, *The First World War* (London: Pocket Books, 2006) 105.

to CUP politics. The CUP elite integrated local civilian authorities in order to mobilize the people at village level.[139]

The army was re-organized, a conscription system hastened and the idea - that total war needs total participation - was put into practice. The militarization of society, and of the citizens is a reminder of the idea of Colmar Von Der Golts who wanted to create a *Nation at Arms* (millet-i müsellaha) meaning that all citizens should be educated as if the country would go into a war.[140] War conditions re-shaped the system by putting military concerns for top-level precedence over all other concerns. The newly shaped system changed the state policies for the success of the army.[141] With the Ottoman Empire declaring mobilization and war, the militarist approach of the CUP government to politics became even more rigid and authoritarian. The Great War mobilization expanded the state's capacity for control of society[142]and state dominion became equal to military dominion over politics. The restraints on the press through censorship and political surveillance of the society were set towards the public sphere.[143] It was the army of the Empire to conduct these policies, using different institutions. Therefore, in this case it was the SB which became responsible for political surveillance, censorship and propaganda issues. This militarization policy also shaped the na-

139 Beşikçi focuses on the conscription system and the CUP leadership trying to establish the draft system at the local areas by penetrating more into the deeper levels of the society, collaboration with local authorities and local dignitaries in order to justify military service. Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 194.

140 For detailed information look at Colmar Von Der Goltz, *Millet-i Müsellaha*, (trans.)M. Tahir, (Istanbul: Ebuzziya Matbaası)

141 State control over the society was not something that was special to the Ottoman Empire, but instead, my analysis finds that the military authorities became the policy-makers following the effects of the 1913 coup. Michael Mann, "The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism", in *States, War and Capitalism*, ed. Michael Mann (Blackwell, 1992), 166.

142 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908- 1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 120-121.

143 Geoff Eley, "War and the Twentieth-Century State", *Daedalus*, Vol. 124, No. 2 (Spring 1995): 166, 170.

tional identity of the empire through propaganda and control of the press and publications through censorship. As it will be revealed in future chapters of this dissertation, this policy-making was completely under the responsibility of the SB.

The idea of producing an armed citizen from a single nation was put into practice in economic policies as the innovation of capital was formed around the Muslim-Turkish citizens. The CUP made new leaps from national banks to national companies as establishing national banks together with national companies was one of the main ideas of the CUP. Firstly, local banks were supported and economic support gained from the Western parts of the country changed to Anatolia. Removal of the capitulations and CUP's attempts to corporatize and innovate the economy under the Muslim-Turkish citizens caused changes in the economic system in a short time. The investment areas passed to Turkish-Muslim citizens. Many companies were established by either members of the CUP or by its support.[144]

To form a national economy, propaganda activities increased and nationalistic slogans abounded as many magazines and newspapers published nationalistic articles for Muslim-Turks to encourage them away from public services and transfer into companies and trade businesses.[145] Although my dissertation is not about the mobilization of the economy, manpower or re-organization of the army, the important point to imply here is that, as we will see in the propaganda section of this dissertation, economic, political or war propaganda could not be made without the approval of the SB.

It was in this atmosphere that the army was re-organized. The reforms began with changes in the structure of the General Headquarters and the army. The conscription system changed and divided into zones and districts. The age for conscription was decreased to eighteen.[146]

144 Feroz Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2009), 53-58.

145 İlhan Tekeli and Selim ilkin, Ibid., 9.

146 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 149.

The CUP government opened three hundred and seventy four Recruiting Office Branches (Asker Alma Şubeleri).[147]

Interestingly, these offices did not only work for conscription. The SB used these Recruitment Offices as an application point for its Censorship Inspectorates. The applications made to these offices were first checked by the Security General Directorate, than reported to the SB. Than the second step began with the interview conducted by intelligence officers (istihbarat zabiti) of the SB. Without the approval of the SB, censorship members could not be employed.[148]

Although it is not a primary concern in this dissertation, the changes in the General Staff is significant as they became sources for the SB. The SB assigned intelligence officers in the armies and corps and gave them tasks to collect intelligence and disseminate the reports to headquarters.[149] In addition, along with the Martial Law (İdare-i Örfi) the Ministry of War became the top authority in the State and all the army commanderships and highest military unit became responsible from the provinces in their areas.[150] In this condition, they not only took part in providing intelligence regarding operations in battlefronts but also espionage activities in their provinces as I will present in the fourth chapter.

So it is important to at least to present the scope of the change to show how the SB received intelligence at the military level (armies,

147 *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi*, 210.

148 ATASE, BDH, F:443,D: H1,I: 001-03: "Orders on the Censorship officers chosen by an interview and approval with Second Branch officers and Directorate". 28 Temmuz 1330/10 August 1914

149 In each army, division, corps the SB had intelligence officers that reported to the SB for instance see; ATASE; F:303, D:1231A, I:007-04. "From the Second Branch to Intelligence Officers at the Army Commanderships", 10 Eylül 1332/23 September 1916. Also see Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid.,61.

150 BOA. DH.EUM.EMN. 90/10. "The Martial Law in the Ottoman Provinces". 21 Temmuz 1330/3 August 1914.

corps, divisions). Table 1.2 shows us the list of the re-organization of armies and corps during mobilization before the war.[151]

Table 1.2

General Staff(Karargâh-ı Umumi, 1914)	
ARMIES AND ZONES	CORPS AND TERRITORIES
First Army(Istanbul)	First Corps (1,2,3rd Divisions) (Istanbul) Second Corps (2,5,6th Divisions) (Edirne) Third Corps (7,8,9th Divisions) (Tekirdağ) Fourth Corps (10,11,12th Divisions) (Izmir) First Range Cavalry Bridage (Edirne)
Second Army (Istanbul)	Fifth Corps (13,14,15th Divisions) (Uskudar) Sixth Corps (16,24,26th Divisions) (Makri and Çekmece)
Third Army (Erzurum)	Ninth Corps (17,28,29th Divisions) (Erzurum) Tenth Corps (30,31,32nd Divisions) (Giresun, Samsun, Ünye) Eleventh Corps (18,33,34th Divisions) (Hasankale, Tokat) Thirteenth Corps and Sixth Regular Army Cavalry Division (Around Erzurum) Reserve Cavalry Divisions (1,2,3,4th Divisions) (Borderlines) Twelfth Corps 27th Division (Between Cizre and Hınıs) Van Gendarmerie Division (Van)
Fourth Army (Damascus)	Eight Corps (23,25,27th Divisions) (Damascus and Jerusalem)
Iraq Area Command	38th Division (Basra)
Fleet Command	Thirteenth Corps, 38th Division, Gendarmerie and Border Units.

151 The conscription system had gone through a strict reform process, especially after the Balkan wars, in order to use the human potentials more efficiently. For the table of military organization for mobilization see the documents: ATASE, BDH, F:1646, D:30 I:12-1,12-2,12-,3,12-4,12-5. 10 Temmuz 1330/02 August 1914. Also see Beşikçi, "Bir yenilginin Anatomisi: Balkan Harbi'nde Osmanlı Seferberliği"; Mehmet Beşikçi, "Son Dönem Osmanlı Harp Tarihi ve "Topyekûn Savaş" Kavramı", No.198, *Toplumsal Tarih* (2010)

	7th Independent Yemen Corps (39,40th Divisions) 22nd Independent Division 21st Independent Division
Dardanelles Fortified Area Command Bosphorus Fortified Area Command Çatalca Fortified Area Command İzmir Fortified Area Command	

War's mobility also increased the flaw of military intelligence reports For instance, the third army which gathered the most information about Russian army movements makes up probably 80% of the reports sent to the SB.

After the General Headquarters, the next step of re-organization was the establishment of the Supreme Command Headquarters (Başkumandanlık Vekaleti). The General Staff was put under the order of this headquarters and was separated into seven branches. Figure 1.1 shows the Supreme Command Headquarters:[152]

Figure 1.1 Supreme Command Headquarters



The Supreme Headquarters were divided into 7 sections in which all had to report to the SB about information that they had received. ATASE, BDH, F:4 D:H1, F.1-4 "Establishment document of the Supreme Command Headquarters", 20 Temmuz 1330/ 02 August 1914. Also see; Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Siyasi ve Askerî Hazırlıkları ile Harbe girişi* (Ankara:2014),330



The Map Office of the Seventh Branch, and Map Section of the First Branch was also put under the order of the SB as the war proceeded. These sections especially collaborated with the SB to locate possible attacks and prevent ambush. Before World War I intelligence mainly came from press publications, military attaches and consulates. However during World War I the usage of armies, corps, spies, informants, prisoners also shaped strategy, operations and tactics. In addition, the announcement of *Martial Law* (İdare-i Örfi)[153] and the establishment of *Martial Law Courts* (Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi) - which were all under the or-

153 The militarization policies, war economy practices, propaganda and the 1913 coup indeed increased the efficiency of army officials. Together with the martial law on the same day of mobilization, the army became a strong policy-maker of the state; for martial law see; BOA. DH.EUM.EMN. 90/10. 21 Temmuz 1330/3 August 1914.

der and of the army - increased the army's effect on policy-making[154] and the SB's administrative position. Therefore the tendency to centralization of intelligence is not surprising in a notion that the army "is the only way of survival" and Martial Law application.

As I will present in the third chapter, the SB became the top institution responsible from counter-espionage and domestic security. As the army commanderships became responsible from provinces with the announcement of Martial Law, the SB made use of the commanderships in domestic security. In addition, after the Martial Law administration, a regulation was made in which stated "every military or civillian unit had to have the consent of the SB or the intelligence unit before pursuing a spy". However this was mostly theoeretical as many units, under the fear of being stigmatized or convicted of helping espionage activities, began sending all types of domestic intelligence reports directly to SB headquarters instead to the nearest army intelligence officer assigned by the SB.[155] Of course these are topics in which I will deal with in the future parts of this dissertation.

In this introduction I discussed the following, in order. Firstly, I justified my reasons for choosing the topic, then I reviewed the existing literature and their contributions to my dissertation. Thirdly, I focused on the general structure of intelligence in different countries. While doing so I also gave a general insight into the establishment, development and limitations of the SB until World War I. The last part was devoted to an overview of changes in the Ottoman Empire, from the Balkan Wars to World War I. In this part I did not present the re-organization of intelligence but gave some limited examples of General Staff. From now on my focus will be solely on the SB.

154 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 61.

155 ATASE, BDH, F:3919, D:84, I:2. "Enver Pasha's orders regarding tasks of Second Branch" August 1330/October 1914

§ 1.6 Chapter by Chapter Outline and Sources

In the second chapter I present theoretical information on intelligence along with the administrative structure and tasks of the SB. Although there are many definitions and debate over the intelligence, this chapter focuses on the commonly accepted theories and approaches to intelligence after two world wars. Through these modern definitions I focus on the representation of SB during World War I. This chapter has two parts. The first part is devoted to conceptual definitions of the traditional intelligence cycle, intelligence gathering disciplines, sources, types of intelligence and levels of intelligence (excluding domestic Intelligence which is discussed in the fourth chapter). In the second part I analyze the SB along with the theorotical insight. Focusing specifically on the administrative structure within the SB headquarters, I present the changes in the administrative structure and tasks of the SB to illustrate the tendency to centralization. Further detail on the administrative structures and the organizations and committees that the SB established for foreign and domestic intelligence are discussed in subsequent chapters. I then present the processes of centralization regarding the intelligence sources under the SB, whereby all sources and institutions began to the SB. I then discuss the intelligence cycle within the SB headquarters, analyze the coordination amongst departments in the SB headquarters and the procedures of analysis- dissemination. In short, in the second part of this chapter I analyze the institutional position, sources, gathering principles, analysis and distribution of intelligence within the SB headquarters. In addition, I compare the SB and other states' intelligence organizations.

In the third chapter I focus on propaganda and censorship, the two responsibilities of the SB that contributed to its centralization. Although propaganda and censorship are an aspect of foreign and domestic intelligence, still I choose to present them in a separate chapter to accentuate their role in identity-making of the Ottoman Empire. The reason I present these two tasks together is that as censorship limited the publications for state policy, propaganda was a method to increase

the role of the state in policy-making. This chapter contains two parts. In the first part I conceptualize propaganda in terms of intelligence and also policy-making. Then I focus on the SB's practices in terms of preventing black-propaganda of other states and also deal with domestic propaganda practices to gather civilian support for the war effort. Lastly, I focus on the departments that the SB established to conduct propaganda. This part shows that propaganda activities were totally under the control of the SB and through pan-Turkish propaganda methods, the SB took part in identity-making of the state. The second part of this chapter focuses on censorship. Firstly, I conceptualize censorship and its relation with both policy-making and also domestic security. Then I analyze the application of censorship towards newspapers and its relationship with propaganda. I also present the departments or committees that the SB constructed, such as the military censorship inspectorates to control newspapers and committees in postal and telegram centers to deliveries and letters. This part shows that while conducting propaganda, censorship served as a method to prevent any publication that might harm interest of the state. However controlling letters, posts, telegrams and deliveries is not included in this chapter as it is a concern for counter-espionage and will be discussed in chapter four. This chapter overall presents that the SB was in full control of propaganda and censorship and the propaganda methods that it had conducted formed the ideological foundations for the modern state of Turkey.

In chapter four I focus on domestic intelligence, another task for which the SB also became responsible and accelerated its centralization. In the introduction, I present a general insight into domestic intelligence and how it derived from counter-espionage. I also present general insights into the domestic intelligence practices of other states for purposes of comparison. In a period when domestic and foreign intelligence overlapped, many states established separate intelligence organizations for these two tasks. Unlike its rivals, in order to form a totality under one organization, domestic intelligence in the Ottoman Empire underwent a centralization within the responsibility of the SB. I then analyze the preventive measures and applications of the SB. I first focus

on the preventive measures that the SB had taken in its own headquarters and the General Staff to prevent infiltration and information-leakage. Then I focus on the SB's imposition of law to decision-makers and new departments and organizations that the SB established to compete with counter-espionage. I move on to present the preventive measures and practices of the SB in Ottoman lands. I focus on the measures, regulations and orders that the SB gave to other institutions and domestic intelligence in practice. I focus on the restrictions that the SB conducted in coastlines, travelling, fishing, deliveries, telegrams and photographers, then I present the orders and surveillance policies for those who disobeyed. I go on to discuss the early-warning procedure of the SB regarding the methods of espionage. Last of all I present some collective reports that the SB obtained from many sources and institutions that showed that all the intelligence were canalized to SB. This chapter overall reveals not only that the SB conducted domestic intelligence, but also it was in an institutional position to impose laws, restrictions and regulations.

The fifth and last chapter is devoted to the foreign intelligence tasks of the SB. As the SB was originally established as a foreign a military intelligence section in the nineteenth century and expanded in World War I, I chose to analyze its position regarding foreign intelligence in the last chapter. This section shows how, in practice, the SB represented the centralization of intelligence during World War I, as it had not only conducted military intelligence activities, but also political and economic tasks. In this first part of this chapter I provide graphs and tables formed from ATASE archives about the commonly gathered types of intelligence and countries to give an overall picture. Secondly, I analyze the foreign intelligence practices at the level of strategic, operational and tactical and in relation to political, economic and military intelligence. In doing so, I provide an overview of grand strategy and policy-making, as well as operational and tactical features of the SB. The first part shows that at strategic level the SB did not only deal with military matters but also political and to some extent economic intelligence. In the operational feature I focus on tophography, SIGINT, disposition, or-

ganization and movements of the armies to show how SB kept trace of the foreign states and disseminated operational intelligence reports for the preparation of battleplans, organization, deployment. The reason will I analyze the tophograpy under operational intelligence is that SB used the tophography section to plan operations and provide early warning. Lastly, I discuss the combat intelligence that the SB conducted. Even though combat intelligence was conducted by intelligence officers assigned by to the military units by the SB, due to its necessity for momentary action, I show how all intelligence reports were sent to the SB. This chapter also reveals that unlike the Western states that had different intelligence agencies for different intelligence purposes, the SB demonstrated a tendency to centralization, in terms of foreign Intelligence.

In the conclusion I summarize the whole dissertation as well as presenting some literature on the war-of independence and the early republican period. I discuss some research that also shows a tendency to centralization during this period of another intelligence establishment very similar to the SB: the "Publications and Intelligence Directorate".

This dissertation did not make use of the archives of the Security General Directorate (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü), the National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı). I made use of President's General Directorate of State Archives-Ottoman Archives (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü-Osmanlı Arşivi). The documents of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Hariciye Nezareti), Ministry of Internal Relations (Dahiliye Nezareti) and the Security General Directorate(Emniyet-i Umum Müdiriyeti) presented the coordination amongst these institutions and the SB.

In the Ottoman Archives, the Yıldız Palace (Yıldız Evrakı) documents helped me to trace the relations between the SB and the Yıldız Palace. I especially made use of the Grand Viziership Peculiar Request Documents (Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı), Yıldız Military Requests (Yıldız Askeri Maruzat) and Various Requests (Mütenevvi Maruzat). Also , in order to analyze the SB' position in the 19th century, I made use of some publications from various libraries such as Military Journals

(Ceride-i Askeriyye) and Military Science Journals(Mecmua-yı Fünûn-u Askeriyye). For World War I, the documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dahiliye Nezareti) was especially useful to make a comparison with ATASE archives about the domestic security practices of SB. As the SB was responsible from the control of entrances and exits to the country, spying activities, censorship and propaganda methods, the documents in the Ottoman Archives of the Security General Directorate Travel Department (Emniyet-i Umumiyye Seyrüsefer Kalemi), enabled a crosscheck with the ATASE archives about the role of the SB in terms of entrances and exits to the Empire. Also documents from the Bab-ı Ali Document Department (Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası) provided me an insight into the legal precautions on spying after the SB conducted some restrictions. The Security General Directorate Fifth Branch documents (Emniyet-i Umumiye 5.Şube) and the Security General Directorate Third Branch (Emniyet-i Umumiye 3.Şube) documents provided the convictions and surveillance activities conducted by the police force who acted on behalf of the SB. Foreign Political (Hariciye Siyasi) documents pertaining to the Foreign Ministry served to follow the political intelligence that the SB conducted and its relation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the SB was under the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, most of the documents are in the ATASE archives. In addition, due to its position as an intelligence organization, many of the documents were not given to the Ottoman State Archives. The ATASE First World War catalogue contains a tremendous number of documents regarding the SB and its duties and tasks. From the catalog I managed to obtain the overall administrative structure of the SB and its sources and practices regarding intelligence, propaganda and censorship. Comparing with the ATASE archives, in order to make use of the propaganda and censorship section and to explore the general condition within the empire, I made use of newspapers such as Tanin and İkdam in the National Library in Ankara.

I must highlight that this dissertation is about an institution and an institutional history. Therefore it focuses on intelligence activities at the institutional level and presents intelligence practices accordingly. Wider

global intelligence practices are referred to as relevant, but are beyond the scope of this thesis.

§ 1.7 A Couple of Clarifications and Limitations

By centralization I do not mean that all institutions or units always only sent raw information to the SB. Other institutions also continued their intelligence activities and conducted their institutional relations. What is meant here is that all intelligence analyzed or not analyzed by the institutions was finally gathered and controlled by the SB. Consequently, the SB obtained intelligence in raw, semi-analyzed or fully analyzed forms. There is resemblance to the Abdülhamid II. period, where all the information, from foreign to political and military, was submitted to Yıldız Palace. Likewise, the SB of the General Staff became the place where all the information was gathered. This indeed was the consequence of the increased power of the War Ministry during World War I.

The deciphering and ciphering activities of the SB unfortunately are quite limited within the chapters of this dissertation due to restricted access to the archive documents. I will not be able to make contributing comments on deception or the sufficiency of intelligence regarding military intelligence and operations, as the access to ATASE archives is limited to the topic that a researcher presents in the application form. In order to make an analysis, one also has access to the dossier on staff operations to crosscheck the efficiency of the intelligence that the SB provided. Another limitation is the efficiency of the German Headquarters. As the documents between Germany and the Ottoman Empire are in a dossier that contains both German and Turkish, they are inaccessible. In addition, due to lack of classification in the archives, I will not be able to mention rewards and payments. Last of all, although there are many documents regarding clandestine operations, most were inaccessible, here, I present the few that I managed to obtain. In addition, I will not be able to make a contribution about SB's condition at the end of the

war as our access to archive documents is limited to time period of July 1918.

2

Conceptual Tools for Defining Intelligence and the Second Branch

In the introduction I focused on the development of intelligence agencies in the 19th century and the SB's establishment and tasks until World War I. In the first part of this chapter I will focus on the conceptual tools that define intelligence; the intelligence cycle; types of intelligence-gathering disciplines and levels of intelligence. In the first part I will provide the theoretical definitions on intelligence during World War I. Further detail about foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence will be presented within future chapters.

In the second part of this chapter I will present the administrative structure and tasks of the SB. By doing so, the SB's position in the larger picture of intelligence in this era will be clarified. Without conceptualizing the SB, it will not be possible to see the overall picture of intelligence at the beginning of the 20th century, as the 20th century witnessed the expansion of institutional intelligence services. Therefore this section will help us to make an assessment about the overall administrative and structural position of the SB. Unlike the British, French and American intelligence instutitutions, we can trace a tendency to a centralization of intelligence in the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

In the third part I will analyze sources that the SB used, and the fourth part of this chapter is devoted to the SB's role in the traditional

intelligence cycle as a modernizing intelligence institution and also its place in the Ottoman bureaucratic system. The administrative structure of the SB responsible for propaganda and censorship - both necessary for policy-making, public support and also domestic security - will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.

What makes the SB important for this dissertation derives from four issues. First we can state that it had become an institution that took part in the policy-making process by having control over censorship and propaganda. Secondly, the war conditions caused it to have extended tasks besides military intelligence, also conducting political; cultural and economic foreign intelligence, and - as well as domestic security - counterespionage and surveillance. Thirdly, it is an institution that reflects the governing ideology of that time, as after the defeat in the Balkans and the 1913 coup, military officers and pro-coup leaders took part in decision-making process and were in a power struggle.[1] Last of all, in this environment, the SB became the central intelligence section. It is normally expected that an intelligence organization to act as advisory to decision- makers. However the SB became so efficient as the war progressed that in the first half of 1918, when the Ministry of Interior pronounced to the Supreme Military Command to grant permission for traveling in the Black Sea regions, (convinced by the SB's report, in the ciphered telegram sent by Enver Pasha) it was stated that until the bandits, deserters and spying activities were prevented totally, setting the visits to Black Sea coasts and some other territories could cause serious problems. Therefore the decision-making process came from the SB, instead of the Ministry. In addition to that, the SB put traveling credentials to prevent the enemy spies in the southern coasts of Russia from

1 There are many scholars who focus on political and economic power struggles between Enver and Talat Pashas to gather power in their own institutions see; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkîlabı Tarihi*, Vol. 2, Part 4 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi,1952); Edward J. Erickson, *I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı 1914-1918* (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2011); İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Ibid.; Erik Jan Zürcher, *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005); Zafer Toprak, Ibid.; Polat Safi, Ibid.

entering the Black Sea and forbid travelling without the approval of the Internal Ministry and Military Passport Centers.[2]

In another instance, the SB was granted so much power that without its approval, Security General Directorate could not reture its officers without SB's consent. For instance, the Security Inspector of Urla requested his retirement from the Security General Directorate. However, his request was rejected by the SB in a response stating that, until the time when the necessity for the Security Inspectorates is no longer necessary and the safety of the harbors and borders are secured, the retirement applications will not be approved.[3] This example was just a small representation of the effectiveness of SB.

§ 2.1 Definitions of Intelligence and the Intelligence Cycle

According to Sherman Kent, the intellectual founder of the US intelligence community, intelligence is a vague term. In order to define intelligence, requirements and methods have to be clarified, as intelligence can be about anything. When everything becomes intelligence then nothing is intelligence. In a general sense, intelligence activity is a concern of the "well-being of a state".[4]

Intelligence has three different definitions. Firstly "intelligence is a process" in which the necessary information is required, gathered, analyzed and disseminated. The second one is "intelligence is a product" in which is disseminated from an intelligence organization to the regarding institutions. Lastly, intelligence is an "organization" in which an institution is responsible for gathering the necessary information and

2 BOA. DH. EUM. SSM. 33/47. 17 Teşrin-i Evvel 1334/ 17 October 1918

3 ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:403, I:006: "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate and Ministry of Interior about the Redundancy Procedures". 29 Mart 1333/29 March 1917.

4 Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), xxiii.

dissemination to other departments.[5] It is the third definition that we will focus as we deal with an intelligence institution.

The two world wars was a rupture for intelligence institutions. For each area of intelligence, states either established separate intelligence institutions or a new departments within their existing institutions. These new institutions or departments gathered intelligence from military to naval, political to economic, social to business. Each of these separate intelligence tasks constituted the "total assessment" and as a whole they contributed the well-being of a state.[6] Intelligence became an inter-agency process and information exchange between the institutions contributed to the whole picture. Of course, it would be a senseless thing to say that this was different in the late 19th century, however after two world wars this separation and institutionalization became even more distinct.

Nowadays there are many intelligence institutions that are concerned with different intelligence activities. In the USA, while the *FBI* is responsible from security intelligence, the National Security Agency(*NSA)* serves for signals intelligence and the *CIA*'s "Directorate of Operations" is concerned with human intelligence.[7] The British intelligence system is also very differentiated. The Defence Intelligence Staff (*DIS)* is responsible from the defense intelligence under the department of Ministry of Defense, *MI5* for foreign, and *MI6* for domestic security.[8]

Even though there are small differences, these intelligence organizations use a process called intelligence cycle. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to define all the contemporary intelligence cycles used by different institutions. The traditional intelligence cycle that occurred in the early 20th century is the most relevant to define the SB. Therefore my focus will be on the traditional intelligence cycle.

5 Mark M. Lowenthall, Ibid., 25.

6 Michael Herman, Ibid, 25.

7 Ibid, 30.

8 Christopher Andrew, *Defend the Realm* (New York: Alfred A. Knolph, 2009), 17.

Intelligence cycle is a continuing process that starts with identifying the requirements and continues with determining the objectives, collection, analysis-production, and ends with the dissamination-feedback. A small schema for the traditional intelligence cycle is provided in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Traditional Intelligence Cycle



The traditional intelligence cycle is also questioned by many researchers and scholars of intelligence studies. While the cycle can help to understand the general process, still it is not perfect, as it does not take different conditions into consideration, such as the relation between institutions, ensuing requirements, covert actions or counter-intelligence activities that can prevent the success of the cycle.[9]

9 For some criticisms and alternate intelligence cycles see; Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2013); Gregory F. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Thomas Quiggin, *Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing,

Therefore new cycles or amendments should be taken into account while conceptualizing intelligence, though the traditional intelligence cycle still forms the commonly accepted concept.

Nowadays there are many intelligence gathering disciplines for Foreign and Domestic intelligence such as HUMINT (Human Intelligence), MASINT (Geospatial Intelligence), OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), CYBINT (Cyber Intelligence). However during World War I most of the methods could not be performed, as technology was not as advanced as it is today. Common intelligence gathering practices of the era were as follows:

- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): used for gathering intelligence through intercepting radio satellites, telegrams, land-based phones.
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT): used sources such as spies, informants, deserters, couriers, double agents and surveillance activities by police force.
- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Imaginary Intelligence (IMINT) were other methods which involved collecting information from publications, books, brochures etc.[10]

These gathering disciplines are used within the traditional intelligence cycle to gather intelligence on specific topics such as political, military, economic, biographical, geography, population, semitary, natural resources, communication, technological innovation, transportation. The requirements and areas of intelligence can be endless and full defi-

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2007); Mark M. Lowenthal, Ibid.; Arthur S. Hulnick, "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle?", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 21, No.6 (2006): 959-979.

10 Conducting intelligence activities combined, from HUMINT, OSINT and SIGINT, enables an intelligence institution to create new opportunities to gain insight about adversaries, see: James J. Wirtz*, Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response, Deterrence* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 135. Although in modern meanings there are many types of intelligence based on technology such as GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence), CYBINT (Cyber Intelligence), DNINT (Digital Network Intelligence) my concern is with intelligence types that were valid during the First World War. For other types of intelligence also see; Merve Seren, Ibid., 306.

nitions are beyond the scope of this dissertation. The focus here is the common intelligence during the World War I. Detail will presented in future chapters. Befitting to the context of World War I, "military intelligence" is subsumed under the topic of "foreign intelligence". Figure 2.2 below shows the most common areas of intelligence during World War I.[11]

Figure 2.2 Common Areas of Intelligence in World War I.



When all these interconnected intelligence types are presented to decision-makers, they form the "total assessment". Total assessment is the definition of all gathered intelligence contributing and shaping long term policies of the states. They may be gathered by a single institution, different institutions or institutions with separate departments.[12]

11 Intelligence is the end product of required information in which intelligence organizations conduct and disseminate by using similar methods even if their targets are different. See; J. Ransom Clark, *Intelligence and National Security*, (London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 1-3.

12 Herman refers to all source analysis and production as "national assessment", however as the concept of nation was not active in the Ottoman Empire I chose to refer to it as "total assessment", Michael Herman, Ibid., 25.

- Under political intelligence, some of the common intelligence topics are information on governments, activities of political parties, political culture, propaganda practices, immigration and international relations.[13]
- Economic intelligence is related to the condition of the economic, agriculture, industry, financial structure and economic relations with other states.[14]
- Military intelligence on the other hand commonly encompasses military capacity, power, capabilities, deployment, landing, public areas, strategic locations, storage, battle plans, army formations and organizations, reconnaissance, logistics, food supplies, weaponry, reinforcements and medical services of naval, air and land forces. As geography is vital for military operations, intelligence on docks; land structure, railroads, climate and areas for deployment are important aspects.[15]
- Social intelligence is an important intelligence type, as the pulse of society towards war is checked by states. Therefore the categories under social intelligence such as cultural, historical, education, public health, social psychology, social dynamics, religion, population, public sphere and governmental and non-governmental organizations are important elements

13 Michael Herman, Ibid., 49.; Merve Seren, Ibid., 317. For some studies on political intelligence see; Erik Goldstein, "The Foreign Office and Political Intelligence, 1918-1920", *Review of International Studies*, 14/4 (October 1988): 275-288. Stephen R Bowers, "The Political Evolution of Intelligence", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, Vol. 114, No.2, (April 1984):168-177.

14 Loch K. Johnson, *US Intelligence in a Hostile World*, *Secret Agencies* (Yale University: 1996),145-170.

15 James P. Finley, *U.S. Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook* (Arizona: Fort Huachuca & U.S. Army Intelligence Center, 1995), 111.; K.C.Duncan, "Geographic Intelligence", *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (Spring 1959): 17-30.; Stephen R Bowers, "The Political Evolution of Intelligence", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, Vol. 114, No.2, (April 1984): 170-173.

> that shapes the government's action in certain ways. Biographical intelligence on the other hand is also necessary to gather information on influential leaders, commanders, politicians. In addition, biographic intelligence serves as a significant practice to prevent espionage from spies.[16]

All these intelligence types actually form the elements of national power. Through counter-espionage practices the states try to prevent information leakage that might threaten the grand strategy or operation. That's why activities such as propaganda and censorship became parts of intelligence activity during World War I as propaganda was and is a method that affects the sentiments of society. Conducting propaganda, while at the same time blocking the 'black' propaganda of other states, became a key element.

In the following figure, these intelligence domains are presented as levels, including *strategic*, *operational* and *tactical*. Finished reports are also divided as *basic*, *current* and *estimative*.

Figure 2.3 Levels of Intelligence and Types of Reports.



16 Peter Gudginn, *Intelligence-A History* (Sutton publishing, 1999); Alan DuPont, "Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 18, No 4 (Winter, 2003): 15-17.

Strategic Intelligence encompasses the long term planning of a state. Information on the capabilities, weaknesses, political actions of other states are gathered for long term planning, against possible threats that can lead to military conflicts. Strategic intelligence provides support and plans to deal with threats, possible diplomatic solutions or military actions. Political, economic, social, military, geographical and technological intelligence all form strategic intelligence.[17]

Tactical intelligence on the other hand is a short-term intelligence which mostly refers to ongoing operations. Tactical intelligence focuses on a specific area, whereas strategic focuses on many areas of intelligence. Tactical intelligence occurs at the level of individuals, whereas operational intelligence focuses on a location. For instance, while strategic intelligence focuses on the overall success of a war, operational intelligence might be about the operation on certain fronts, and tactical intelligence considers the operations done within a specific front. All these combined contribute to policy-making.[18]

Operational intelligence acts as a bridge between tactical and strategic intelligence. As tactical intelligence is a momentarily concern, operational intelligence is the background. As tactical intelligence is important during ongoing security operations, operational intelligence is the overall planning. For instance, during war when there is an ongoing battle, movements and deployment of a hostile army can be tactical intelligence, whereas operational intelligence is gathering information before the battle takes place. Before operational intelligence, an army

17 Sherman Kent, Ibid., 7-13.

18 According to John Ferris the categories of 'strategic', 'operational' and 'tactical' cannot easily be separated during a war period, especially for air reconnaissance. However in order to at least distinguish, I try to separate each of these to conceptualize intelligence gathering. See; John Ferris "Airbandit: C3 I and Strategic Air Defence during the First Battle of Britain" in *Strategy and Intelligence: British Policy during the First World War*, eds. Micheal Dockrill and David French, (London: The Hambledon Press, London, 1996), 25-26.

can gather some general information about the numbers, weaponary, possible deployment areas and weaknesses of an hostile army.[19]

Strategic intelligence is also political. For instance, gaining public support through propaganda can be a strategy[20]; preparing methods to gain support is operational, observing and taking action in the local areas is tactical. Also a states' strategy could be to remain neutral during war; then tactical and operational intelligence could serve to avoid making mistakes that could pose a threat of entering war.[21]

The intelligence gathered and disseminated by the military commanders are generally operational and tactical, concerning military movements and operations that concern military issues. However strategic intelligence is formed from the information that is gathered from diverse intelligence institutions in addition to the military intelligence section. Therefore military intelligence in the policy-making sense - different to diplomacy - is to provide information, rather than giving advice on policy-making.[22]

To sum up, tactical intelligence relates to smaller pieces of intelligence that concerns the situation in local terms. For example, movements of gangs, deserters small units or small operations. This can involve political, military or foreign intelligence. Based on strategy, tactical intelligence forms a method to reach the targeted strategy.

Regarding intelligence reports, I stated that intelligence reports contain three levels. Firstly, basic intelligence reports are not urgent and are gathered for long term policies. Current intelligence reports on the

19 Sherman Kent, Ibid., 3, 180.

20 According to Dockrill, many political intelligence organizations such as Political Intelligence Department (PID) also worked on adapting to new methods for propaganda and preparing counter-propaganda. See; Michael Dockrill, "The Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department and Germany 1918", in *Strategy and Intelligence: British Policy during the First World War*, eds. Micheal Dockrill and David French, (London: The Hambledon Press, London, 1996), 26-25.

21 For definition of Strategic, Operational and Tactical intelligence also see; Merve Seren, Ibid., 311-313.

22 Anthony Clayton, *Forearmed* (Avon: Bath Press, 1993), xv.

other hand focuses on "current" developments. For instance a report that is at the level of "tactical" intelligence is probably reported as "current" intelligence. Last of all the estimative intelligence predicts the possible consequences.

Each intelligence institution uses a cycle similar to a traditional cycle classifies-disseminates intelligence according to levels. Each intelligence can have levels of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence. There is a tendency to think of intelligence only in terms of military information, troop movements, capacity, weapons and surprising attacks, these are, of course, important elements of intelligence, but they are not the only ones. Policy-makers and intelligence organizations do not only think and act upon military intelligence, but also take into consideration other foreign intelligence activities such as political, social, health and cultural.[23] All together they form the "total assessment".

§ 2.2 Administrative Re-Organization of The Second Branch

In the first part of this chapter I gave descriptions of the traditional intelligence cycle, gathering disciplines, sources and levels of intelligence and defined "total assessment". In this part, I will present the administrative structure of the SB to show the extension of tasks and the tendency to centralization in SB headquarters. Then, in turn, I will present the sources, gathering disciplines and the intelligence cycle of SB. I will not present the levels of intelligence or practices of foreign, domestic intelligence and censorship-propaganda as they will be discussed in later chapters. Here, I only focus on the tendency to the centralization of intelligence in term of SB headquarters.

In the last part of the introduction of this dissertation, I discussed the overall condition of the empire and its policies. After the defeat in the Balkan Wars, the expectations of survival were based upon forming

23 Mark M. Lowenthal, Ibid., 21.

a powerful army. Therefore, as a strong army was the only solution, the society and economy was canalized to support the CUP government's plans to re-organize a strong and effective army. In addition, Martial Law adminisration made the General Staff the highest authority in the state as the highest military unit became responsible of the province. In this atmosphere it was not surprising that the SB extended its powers. The expectations from the SB were so heavy that Kazım Karabekir, who served as the director of SB between 02 August July- to the end of 1914, stated that:

> "*When intelligence and collection is a concern, it is easily understandable how tough a job it is in the Ottoman government. This work which required a strong coordination amongst Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs and General Staff was tasked completely to our branch… Even roads and railways, which was the task of third branch, was put under our responsibility*"[24]

The words of Karabekir clearly reveal that the SB did not only deal with military intelligence but extended its tasks to swallow up other institutions' intelligence departments. This was unlike Britain and France which had different intelligence agencies for foreign and domestic security, such as, in the case of Britain the *Intelligence Corps* in the land forces which served only military purposes; *MI6* for foreign intelligence;[25] *MI5* (the Secret Service Bureau) for domestic security and counter-espionage;[26] and France which had the *Sûrete Nationale* for domestic security.[27] The Ottoman Empire's SB showed a tendency to centralization above all other intelligence gathering departments. This does not mean that the Empire did not have other intelligence sections.

24 Kazım Karabekir, Ibid., 287.

25 Anthony Clayton, Ibid., xv.

26 Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service*, 59.

27 Adamthwaite Anthony, " French Military Intelligence and the Coming of War, 1935-1939" in *Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945*, eds. Andrew Christopher and Jeremy Noakes,(Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987), 191. Also see Douglas Porch, Ibid.

However, as I will also present in the future parts of this dissertation, they reported to the SB.

The SB was re-organized four times until the end of 1914. The documents regarding the first three reorganizations show that the SB at the beginning of the war was not properly established. The SB was firstly re-organized on the same day of the declaration of mobilization on the 2nd August 1914 and although there were new task amendments it was still not and extended as of the end of 1914. On the 2nd August 1914 the tasks of the SB were:

- to gather intelligence regarding the neutral, ally and hostile states' armies,
- to locate the war conditions on a map,
- to follow national or local publications and censor any publication that contain news about the army of the Ottoman Empire and its allies,
- to analyze the foreign press and gather information about ally and hostile states,
- to engage in matters of foreign correspondents and military attaches,
- to manage its own spies and prosecute enemy spies. The gendarmarie and police officers are under the command of the SB.[28]

The tasks of the first re-organization clearly shows that besides military intelligence activities, topography, censorship and counter-espionage tasks were given to the SB. Even though the tasks were extended, the staffing was quite limited. According to Karabekir, the German committee tried to limit the extension of the SB and increase the

28 The SB was first re-organized on the 2nd August 1914, see; ATASE, BDH, F:3437, D. 241. F:001 and ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:1, F:001 During the mobilization of the war, the SB had seven written tasks, which later was extended to six months. By the end of 1917 It had four departments and five desks concerning foreign intelligence and three other sections concerning domestic security, propaganda-censorship and surveillance; See ATASE, BDH, F: 321, D:569, I: 027,027a,028.

role of German intelligence practices in the Ottoman Lands. Karabekir, in his memoirs states that:

> "*A German director was assigned to my Branch and I was also left as another director. However, all the officers in my department were re-assigned at the Ministry of War. The only staff under my command was Bucharest attache Kadri Bey and Athens attache Hüsrev Bey. When Bronsart Pasha was assigned as the head of the General Staff he also tried to assign Germans officers to staff operations and transportation branches. The Germans did not want to deal with intelligence through our branch but thought it would have been more convenient for them to handle through intelligence channels in the Embassies. They left us with only three officers so that the Branch wouldn't seem totally abandoned. The Germans wanted to provide the intelligence that they would seem proper*."[29]

However Karabekir managed to convince Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, and took control over the organization of the SB. Karabekir refers to his actions in his memoirs stating that "*I imposed the structural changes of this Branch to Enver Pasha without the awareness of the Germans. I was relaxed because we would have an independent organization from the German committee*".[30]

The document on the second re-organization of the SB, probably a week after the first re-organization on the 2nd August 1914, seems to approve Karabekir's statements. In the second re-organization document - although the division between foreign and domestic intelligence and the responsible desks and sections are not clarified - the name of the officers and country desks were presented. The second re-organization structure was as follows:

29 Kazım Karabekir, Ibid., 228.

30 Kazım Karabekir, Ibid., 228.

Table 2.1 Administrative Structure of Second Branch[31]

Intelligence and Publications Branch(İstihbarat ve Matbuat Şubesi)	
ARMIES AND ZONES	CORPS AND TERRITORIES
Director	Major Kazım Bey (Karabekir)
Romania	Major Kadri in General Staff
Russia	Cavalry Major Sadık
Bulgaria	Regiment Major Mehmed Ali
Russia	Captain Hüsrev in General Staff
Greece	Regiment Major Tevfik
Bulgaria	Regiment Major Nusret
Serbia	Regiment Major Cemal
Greece	Regiment Major Hakkı
Iraq	Regiment Major Hayri
Germany	First Lieutenant Şevki
Germany	First Lieutenant Sabri
Police and Gedarmerie Commmitee	
Police Chief Inspectors	
Police Commissioners and Officers	
Gendarmerie Major Faik (-in General Staff)	
Lieutenant Abdulrahman	

In this second re-organization table, the SB was renamed from the Second Statistics Branch to the Intelligence and Publications Branch. The word "publications" clearly shows that the Branch had control over press and propaganda, as I elaborate on later in the dissertation. The end column of the table shows that the staff that took part in domestic security. Police officers and Gendarmerie were put under the order of the SB, instead of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In the third re-organization it can be seen that the SB was re-structuring and depending on the countries of contention. The third re-organization clearly shows that the primary focus in August 1914 was on the Balkan States and the Caucasus region. The re-organization table is below.

Table 2.2 Third Re-Organization of Second Branch[32]

31 At this time the Second Branch staff list and the countries that they were responsible from was written. However until the end of 1914 the staff were separated into four sections. ATASE, BDH. F: 241, D:H1, I:001a. Temmuz 1330/August 1914

Intelligence and Publications Branch Director Major Kazım Bey The Division of Countries	
I Balkans Under the responsibility of General Staff Major Kadri Bey	
ARMIES AND ZONES	CORPS AND TERRITORIES
Romania	Major Kadri in General Staff
Romania	Captain Nusret
Bulgaria	Major Mehmed Ali
Greece	Captain Tevfik
Greece	Captain Hakkı
Serbia	Regiment Captain Cemal
II General Situation Director, General Staff Major Kazım Bey	
Russia	Cavalry Major Sadık
Russia	General Staff Captain Hüsrev
Roads	First Lieutenant Sabri
Germany	First Lieutenant Sabri
III	
Mütenevvia (Çeşit)	Lieutenant Rıza Efendi
Censorship	Lieutenant Ali Şevik
Counter-Espionage Army Commanderships Police and Gedarmerie Commmitee Police Chief Inspectors Police Commissioners and Officers Gendarmerie Major Faik (-in General Staff) Lieutenant Abdulrahman	

Unfortunately we do not have the biographies or detailed information of the officers in the administration besides Kadri Bey(a former attache in Budapest) and Hüsrev Bey (former attache in Athens).[33] Still it is clear from the documents that they were chosen due to their capabilities of speaking the related countries' languages, awareness of the

32 ATASE, BDH. F:241, D:H1, I:001a-002a. "Administration of the Intelligence and Publications Branch". Temmuz 1330/ August 1914.

33 Kadri Bey and Hüsrev bey six months later became the chiefs of the first department responsible for foreign intelligence and the second department responsible for counter-intelligence and counter-espionage.

geographical position and possible threats they may cause, and also having a good insight of the area's political, economic and social status.[34]

The first three re-organization documents show that the SB was not properly established. A power struggle between German officials, or between the civilian leaders and military rulers of the CUP, appears to be the best explanation. According to Karabekir the increased power of the SB caused a tension between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Staff. Karabekir states that "*Talat Bey, the Minister of Internal Affairs, requested that this organization be affiliated with his own institution."*[35]

This was a critical comment that represented the power struggle. The SB's increasing control over intelligence caused a tension and Talat Bey wanted this organization to act on his behalf. In domestic security issues, it was expected that the 5th branch of the Police Force, under the order of the Ministry of Internal affairs, to conduct the domestic security and intelligence. However quite the opposite happened. This task was also given to the SB by putting the Gendarmerie and the Police forces under the command of the SB. One thing is certain that within three months the Branch was again re-organized, its tasks were clarified, broadly extended and divided into four departments. On the issue of the final re-organization we have two documents on the matter. The first document was undated,[36] but the second document dated 14th February 1915, shows the final organization of the SB and reveals that the SB's

34 See the dossier; ATASE, BDH, F:409, D:296. The personel of the Second Branch were chosen amongst people who are speaking at least another language. August 1330/ September 1914.

35 Karabekir, Ibid., 228.

36 ATASE, BDH,F:303, D:374, I:7-6. "Birinci Kısım ...bu kısmın vazîfesi düşman ve ecnebi ordularının kuvvet ve teşkîlâtına dâir elde edilen ma'lûmâtı cem' ve tedkīk ve bunlardan lüzûmlularını alâkadâr makamlara neşr ve tevzî' etmekdir. Şube'den mütebâkī kısımlar ki cephelerimizin hâricinde casus istihdâmı umûmmiyetle casusluğun men'i, sansür umûru, dâhilî ve hâricî askerî ve siyâsî propaganda icrâsı ve sâire ile iştigāl ederler."

administrative structure was completed as late as February 1915. A figure showing the final re-organization is provided below:

Figure 2.4 Final Re-Organization of the Second Branch[37]



Staffing and their responsibilities will be addressed in future section on the intelligence cycle (except for those in the "Political and Confidential" department as the page in the archive dossier was either classified or missing).

The first department of the SB was responsible for foreign intelligence and armies. Concerning foreign intelligence, the SB had gathered strategic, operational and tactical intelligence in terms of political, military and economic (in part) intelligence. In addition, the topography section was under the responsibility of the Staff Operations also became

37 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:001. The branch was divided into four departments: the first one was Foreign Intelligence (ecnebi istihbarat), the second one was Counter-Espionage (casusluk), the third one was Publications and Censorship (matbuat ve sansür), and the fourth one was Political and Confidential (siyasi ve mahrem). The document shows the extention of duties as late as the 14th February 1915. 1 Şubat 1330/ 14 February 1915.

a common part of the SB for detecting possible targets and preparing battleplans. The five desks gathered momentary or collective intelligence from army commanderships, corps and other branches of the Supreme Command and Ministries. For early warning, the locations, deployment and constructions of armies were spotted on the map and sent to, regarding corps and divisions. We can trace the changes and extension of the SB from the reports that it disseminated. In the 19th century, as I previously stated, the SB had the reports disseminated by its publication, the *Journal of Military Science* (Mecmua-i Fünün-ı Askeriyye) on military issues. However during World War I the SB published three different journals. The one that contained military movements and operational and strategic intelligence reports was referred to as the *Second Branch War Journal* (İkinci Şube Harb Ceridesi). For strategic and political concerns, the SB published *the Second Branch Political Intelligence Journal* (İkinci Şube Siyasi İstihbarat Ceridesi); and the *Intelligence Branch Censorship Desk War Journal* (İstihbarat Şubesi Sansür Masası Harb Ceridesi); and especially for propaganda, the SB produced the well known *War Magazine* (Harp Mecmuası). These four different journals were the basic intelligence reports that contained strategic intelligence and showed the extension tasks regarding foreign intelligence.[38]

More information regarding basic, estimative and current intelligence reports will be provided in future chapters.

38 The journals contains probably mora than 3000 documents and are allowed for access in ATASE archives. For some of them see ATASE, BDH, F:247 ,H1:2. "Second Branch War Journals", 27 Temmuz 1330- 09 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/9 August 1914- 22 November 1914.; ATASE, BDH, F:260, D:H3:5, "Political Intelligence Journals", 11 Mart 1331-02 Haziran 1331/21 March 1915-15 June 1915-, ATASE, BDH, F:433 ,D:12, ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:713-714A-1048A, ATASE, BDH, F:435,D:363-731A, ATASE, BDH, F:436,D:361-1048B-713B, ATASE, BDH, F:437, D:363-365-714, ATASE, BDH,F:438,D:364-713,713C, ATASE, BDH,F:439,D:364A, ATASE, BDH,F:440,D:347 362, ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H1, H2, H3, H4. "Second Branch(Intelligence Desk) Censorship Desk War Journals" 1330/1332-1914-1916.

The second department was responsible from counter-espionage practices. The gendarmerie and Security General Directorate was put under the order of the SB and no institution (civil or military) could conduct counter-espionage activities without the consent of this section. This section not only obtained domestic intelligence reports but all the institutions had to carry out the orders given by this department about domestic security(espionage). As I will present in the fourth chapter, this department gave orders to all institutions, set restrictions and conducted surveillance. As all the reports on domestic intelligence were presented to this department this department prepared collective intelligence reports from various sources and disseminated them to General Staff and various other institutions.[39]

The third department was responsible for publications and censorship. The Censorship Inspectorates controlled the press publications, telegram centrals, all means of delivery (from letters to cargo), and also propaganda activities and reported them to this department. All press institutions, journalists, deliverers were observed and had to report to the Censorship Inspectorates and Postal and Telegram Directorate Intelligence Committee under the command of the SB.[40]

The chief inspector at the inspectorates had to report to the SB and have consent before newspapers could publish any written material. In addition, the responsibility of propaganda activities were given to the *War Propaganda Branch*, which served under the command of the SB for propaganda activities.[41]

Censorship and propaganda were not only effective in terms of domestic security, but also shaped the ideology of modern Turkey, as I will present in future chapters. Although censorship and propaganda are part of domestic security. As the CUP government tried to gain support-

39 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:001. "Tasks of the Second Section",1 Şubat 1330/ 14 February 1915.

40 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:01. "Tasks and Units of the Third Section", Şubat 1330/ Şubat 1915.

41 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:004. "Duties of the War Propaganda Branch", undated.

ers for war and decrease the desertion of the army, the SB gathered intelligence about the "enthusiasm" of local populations on certain areas before preparing the propaganda methods.[42] Interestingly, the press directorate was, at first, a section of the Ministry of Foreign and Internal affairs.[43] But, as the war started, the control of this directorate was given to the SB. The "Postal and Telegram Directorate" was also put under the control of the SB and SB assigned intelligence commitees.[44] As a result the SB had control over the information flow amongts countries and provinces and became completely responsible from the newspapers (there were relatively no newspapers left independent). The SB took control of the press and was able to use it for propaganda, even counter-propaganda, or conduct censorship without consulting other ministries.[45]

The fourth department of SB dealt with politics and confidential issues in which we could not obtain many documents on the section.[46]

To sum up, as I presented in the introduction, the SB in the 19th century acted in an advisory role, and had generally gathered information from consuls, military attaches and ambassadors through overt sources such as newspapers, magazines and other press publications. Due to the dual executive system, of the two different general staff, these institutions, not only report to the SB, but also sent reports to other institu-

42 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:004-04. For example, in order to conduct oral propaganda, the war propaganda section under the order of the SB would choose preachers that knew the spiritual condition of the local population and methods that would gain their support. By evaluating, the best propaganda activity would be chosen for the district.

43 BOA, BEO., 4161/312031. During the Balkan Wars, the Press Directorate was under the command of the Foreign and Internal Ministries, 4 Nisan 1329/17 April 1913.

44 ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:288, I:002. "Telegram Committees of Second Branch", Ağustos 1330-Mart 1331/ November 1914-April 1915.

45 ATASE, BDH, F:443, F:H1, I:001-01a. Under the SB a censor inspectorship was installed. All the press publications and journalists were inspected and every day, the inspector had to report to the SB and directed the press and journalists about the news to publish. The SB directorate had the right to give legal punishment against those who did not obey the rules for publishing. 1330/1914.

46 ATASE, BDH, F: 321, D:569, I: 027. "The Fourth Department of Second Branch".

tions. Defeat in the Balkans resulted in the opinion that the tendency of totalization in mobilization for building a strong army for survival also seems to be reflected in the administrative re-organization of the SB.

What makes the SB significant in its administrative condition is that after 1914 it acted as the primary intelligence section of the state. Although the Ottoman Empire had different intelligence providers including the embassies and consulates under the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Hariciye Nezareti)[47] and the Gendarmerie and Police Force responsible for domestic intelligence under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dahiliye Nezareti)[48], their effectiveness decreased as the institutional power of the SB increased. The Navy Commandership also had a separate intelligence section which was also was subordinated to the SB.[49] This re-organization made the SB the top intelligence agency between 1914 and 1918.

This section has been solely on the administrative structure in the SB headquarters. The administrative structure of the SB represents a shift from a military intelligence institution to a more extended intelligence organization concerning military, foreign and domestic intelligence. The change in the administrative structure also required the sources to be centralized. The contributing sources and the intelligence cycle will be presented in the following sections. In this section I pre-

47 The Intelligence gathered by the Ministry of Foreign relations came from the Embassies by overt and covert methods, for instance see; ATASE,BDH, F:440, D:1729, I:001,"Intelligence reports sent from different embassies to the Ministry of Foreign Relations then to the Second Branch.", 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1333/ 18 November 1917.

48 The fourth and second departments of the SB gathered political intelligence and dealt with domestic security, therefore the police officers regarding political intelligence were put under the order of the SB. Amongst those in which the SB benefitted from, was the Security General Directorate, Police Section's 2nd Branch and 5th branch. See ATASE, BDH, F:1036, I:5-14, 5-14.

49 BOA. HR.İM..149/76. The intelligence section director was Ahmet Vehid Bey who also prepared an English-Turkish Dictionary which shows that intelligence sections in other departments were chosen amongst those who are billingual. The Intelligence section of Navy was also subordinated to SB's First Section's Fifth Desk. ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:001. 1 Şubat 1330/ 14 February 1915.

sented the descriptive formation of the SB headquarters from the beginning of the mobilization unit the declaration of war. At the administrative level, in the modern sense, the SB's administrative position represented a tendency to centralization SB gathered intelligence topics that are required for the "total assessment". Unlike its rivals seen in other intelligence departments in Britain, the USA and France, the SB arguably became the top intelligence institution above all other intelligence organizations. The policies of the SB, while conducting propaganda and censorship, played part in shaping the national identity of the empire which became an inheritance to modern Turkey, as I present in chapter 3.[50] Of course, as stated before, domestic security and foreign intelligence overlapped during the period of war. That's why the military intelligence section evolved to something much stronger. But the question is whether this would still happen if there was not a war. Based on my observation same evolution would have accurred as after pro-CUP officials and military personnel took control over policy and the decision-making process after the Balkan Wars.

The details of the departments' tasks, practices and its administrative place amongst other institutions will be analyzed in the further sections of this chapter and also in future chapters about propaganda, censorship, domestic and foreign intelligence. Without conceptual definitions these practices will be obscured. Therefore each topic will be analyzed within a conceptual framework.

2.2.1 General Sources of the Second Branch

In the previous section I focused on the administrative changes in the SB headquarters to show the extension of tasks and administrative structure. The administrative changes of the SB extended its position to a make it a more centralized intelligence institution. Section two revealed that, at the administrative level, not only military intelligence

50 It was decided that the censor inspectorship duty was given totally to the SB, also see: BOA. DH. EUM. 5. Şb.7/54. 27 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ 09 January 1915.

activities but also other types of intelligence became a concern for the SB.

As administrative power is not the only determinant for the tendency to centralization, the necessity to centralize the information channel and sources is necessary. In this section I will present this tendency, in connection with the SB headquarters. I will analyze the sources in the institutional, HUMINT and OSINT gathering disciplines. At institutional level I will analyze the intelligence providing institutions such as ministries, private organizations and military components. At the HUMINT level, I will provide a focus on human sources, such as spies and informants, that every intelligence organization made use of. Examples are abundant, so here I will present the most common sources. I focus on the sources that provided intelligence to the SB and I will provide a discrete number of examples of transmitted intelligence. This part aims to give a general insight into the sources, based on many documents observed in the ATASE archives. In future chapters, I will analyze, in detail, practices of intelligence. In this part I limit examples to sources that provided the SB with intelligence (either at the institutional, overt or covert level). This section will show us the tendency to centralization of both domestic and foreign information channels. In order to centralize intelligence, the sources or their institutions canalized their information to the SB. This section is devoted to demonstrating how the SB's administrative position affected the sources. This section will also contribute to understanding the intelligence cycle within SB headquarters. (the collection, process, analysis and dissemination).

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were many intelligence providing institutions in the Ottoman Empire such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Branches of the Supreme Command Headquarters andcomponents of the General staff. These institutions and their sources used their own methods to gather intelligence.

Due to its dynamic condition, World War I caused an increase in the usage of armies, corps and police officers. The conditions of war also increased the role of interrogations of deserters and soldiers, refugees,

captured spies, scouts, and covert methods such as spying, informants and double agents.[51] Confusion might arise about what is secret and what is open source. For instance, for the Foreign Ministries, an ambassador is an overt source, however ambassadors can have their own sources such as (covert) spies.[52]

Another issue in question is whether the overlapping spheres of domestic and foreign intelligence activities are two separate practices during war. For instance, counter-espionage is commony related to domestic intelligence. However, while states try to prevent information leakage, they also try to infiltrate spies to collect intelligence, rendering it the double-sided coin of intelligence activity.[53]

Although these two practices overlap and embedded during wartime, I choose to distinguish them to make it easier to classify foreign intelligence and domestic security. I previously revealed that ambassadors consuls and military attaches were amongst the common sources.[54] However, as war progressed, the role of deserters, prisoners, armies and corps also increased.[55] The embassies and consulates of both Ottoman and allied states also had different sources of their own, such as the press publications, spies and diplomatic observations such

51 According to Jeffery the role of spies became more important in war conditions and they took a more active part in MI6 by contributing the operations and movements of the armies, as they kept trace of the movements of enemy units and their order of battle. See, Keith Jeffery, Ibid., 73-74.

52 Ambassadors and attaches can have their own clandestine or overt sources while preparing intelligence reports, James Wirtz, Ibid., 132.

53 Michael Herman, Ibid., 47.

54 For the role of units under the Ministry of Foreign relations, please also see; Aydın Çakmak, "Hariciye Nezareti(1826-1924)" (PHD Dissertation, Marmara University, 2020)

55 The prisoners and deserters interrogated by the SB intelligence officers in divisions, corps or army commanderships provided tactical intelligence for smaller units about weaponary, supports from local population, reinforcements, constructions etc. These reports were first analyzed by the intelligence officers assigned to divisions, armies, commanderships and than transmitted to the general staff, for instance see; ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:1729, I:002. "Intelligence news from the Battlefronts", 1 Mart 1334/ 1 March 1918.

as interviews undertaken with other countries' political parties.[56]As World War I caused an overlap in intelligence, so did the sources.

After the re-organization in SB's administration, the second step of the tendency to centralization inevitably came to the sources. As SB became responsible from many areas of intelligence almost all institutions and sources provided information that could be valued as intelligence to the SB which is also clear in archive that it was only the SB that disseminated collective reports from variety of foreign and domestic intelligence, gathered from different institutions and sources. In addition, even if an intelligence arrived after a report was disseminated, still it had to be reported urgently to the SB in case of a change.[57]

In addition institutions began sending their sources to the SB, from spies to informants, their methods, qualifications and loyalties on behalf of the institutions.[58] However, these sources are in ATASE archives and the dossier regarding the sources are partial. (The lists regarding the Sources on behalf of institutions are propbably in folder numbered 313). But I was able to access a few documents on the matter. For instance, Seyfi Bey(Second Director of SB) commanded the Bucharest military attache to send a spy to Cyprus to obtain information on the production of cereal. In an answer it was stated by the attache that British forces prohibited the entrance of men and he could not find a woman to fulfil the task. Seyfi Bey then asked the attache to recruit a spy in Egypt as

56 Military attaches and ambassadors played a significant role in strategic intelligence to conduct policy about international relations, their observations on political relations especially between neutral states, for instance see ATASE, BDH, F:421,D:157, I:001, "Report from the Vienna Embassy on Austria-Italy Relations", 10 Kanun-u Sani 1330/ 23 January 1915.

57 As the SB became responsible from many areas of Intelligence. The SB also began to obtain information from different and diverse institutions. For the process of new intelligence right after the disseminated intelligence See; ATASE, BDH, F:269, D: 594, I:132, 19, Teşrin-i Sani 1330/ 2 December 1914.

58 "The Spies of other institutions sent to Second Branch", ATASE, BDH, F:303, D:1231A.

entrance from Egpyt was not prohibited and also report the spy's name and qualification.[59]

As stated, all the sources provided their covert sources of information to the SB. A sample is provided in table 2.3. As I only had access to eight documents in the archive, the table 2.3 is a representation. Once the documents are accessible, this could be further area of research.

Table 2.3 A Sample Report on Secret Sources.[60]

Collective Reports on Secret Sources of Institutions	
Bucharest Embassy	Informant : Liberman? And Nimkor Ova?
4th Army Command	Spy: Esknazi
Bern Military Attache	Spy: Sipaskarye?
Security General Directorate	Spy: Alko Bin Andrea?
Foreign Ministry	Spy: Andrea
Ministry of Interior	Spy: Herman

As the SB was aware of the sources of other institutions, the SB's agents were kept confidential. For instance, the Sofia embassy demanded information from the Security General Directorate about a person named Nuri Hafız who was arrested as a spy acting on behalf of the Ottoman government on the charges of espionage and demanded information if he was a spy of the Directorate.[61] As Nuri was not under the order of the Directorate, the directorate transmitted the report to the SB, which transmitted a reply that Nuri was not related to the SB.[62] Of course, the truth of the report is questionable, as the spies who were caught were mostly denied by the intelligence institutions.

59 "From Seyfi Bey to Military Attache in Bucharest", ATASE,BDH, F:313, 1271, I:012.

60 The dossier that contains the names and information of the sources of other institutions is; ATASE,BDH, F:313, D: 1271, 01 Mart 1330-26 Kanun-u Evvel 1333/13 April 1914/ 26 December 1917. The Dossier that I was able to have access to were; ATASE,BDH, F:313, D: 1271, F:045, F:036, F:003, F:002.

61 ATASE, BDH, F: 247, D:404, I:013. "From the Security General Directorate to the Second Branch", 5 Şubat 1330/ 18 February 1915.

62 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:404, I013-1. "From the Second Branch to the Sofia Embassy", 8 Şubat 1330/ 21 February 1915.

Although I will present foreign and domestic intelligence sources separately, it is worth mentioning that the sources also overlapped. In other words, neither foreign nor domestic sources only provided foreign or domestic intelligence. All the sources provided foreign, domestic and military depending on the condition. The reason for my distinguish is to provide a general scope on the commonly presented intelligence by sources. For instance, in a report obtained from the Bulgarian Embassy(counted as a foreign intelligence source), it was stated that the signatures of British Spies contained letters rather than shapes and they used American passports to conceal their identity. This warning was transmitted by SB to Security General Directorate. [63]

In addition, with the Martial Law administration, the army commanderships became in control of provinces. In order to conduct counter-espionage, other institutions had to have consent of the intelligence officer of SB in the nearest military authority, or directly from the second department of SB. Therefore the military units also became responsbile from domestic security. For instance, in a report transmitted from the Central Command to SB on 16 may 1917 stated that spies were shoving notes into bottles and throwing them into rivers for other spies who waited along the riverbanks.[64] These intelligence officers in army units were also responsible from interrogations of prisoners, deserters and refugees along with military intelligence.

By the centralization of sources, I do not mean that the information flow between institutions were interrupted. The SB became institution where all the intelligence was gathered and if necessary, re-analyzed. The ministries or other institutions kept on working in coordination. For instance, the Interior Ministry demanded information from Sofia and Austrian military attaches about a woman called Ebrahelberg(a reporter) who was arrested because of suspicious spying activity. On the contrary, both of the attachments provided information on the inno-

63 ATASE, BDH. F:3919, D:84, I:2-6.

64 ATASE,BDH, F:391, D:39, I:017-02. “From the Central Command to Second Branch”, 16 Nisan 1333/16 April 1917.

cence of the woman. This information flow was lastly presented to the SB for a final analysis and decision.[65]

Another example, the Security General Directorate transmitted a report about a woman[66] who worked as a reporter for a Swedish Newspaper. In the report it was stated that it was initially decided that the woman was to be deported out of Ottoman Lands however, the Austrian Embassy reported that the woman was harmless. The Directorate asked about the woman from the SB and the SB concurred.[67]

In an impossible situation, the institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Interior served as go-between, in terms of the sources and the SB. I will first analyze the sources at institutional level for domestic, foreign and military intelligence. I will than focus on HUMINT- OSINT and other contributors.

Figure 2.5 below shows the institution for foreign intelligence, and sources it made use of to provide the SB with intelligence.[68]

Figure 2.5 Institutional Source for Foreign Intelligence



65 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I: 038-13 "From the Ministry of Interior to Second Branch", 6 Nisan 1331/ 19 April 1915.

66 The woman's name was illegible in the document.

67 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:038-14. "From the Ministry of Interior to Second Branch and from the Second Branch to the Ministry of Interior".

68 These sources were prepared from many documents that I use in the future chapters. The chart represents the most common intelligence sources, See: ATASE, BDH, F:313, D:381, "Spies acting on behalf of Military Attaches"; ATASE, BDH, F:313, D:381, D:441, "Intelligence Obtained from the Embassies about Political conditions"; ATASE, BDH, F:475, "Reports from the Attaches and Embassies", ATASE, BDH, F:325, D:92, 1330-1334/1914-1918.

The Ministry of Foreign relations, rather than being a direct source, acted as a go-between amongst its own sources and the SB. During the war period, direct transmission of information was not always possible, therefore the Ministry transmitted the reports. The Ministry was not completely bypassed: in practice, only the reports that concerned the safety of the state were directly sent to the SB.[69] The remainder of the intelligence, before being sent to the SB was first analyzed within the Ministry itself.

The common intelligence providers, and overt sources in the Foreign Ministry were ambassadors and consuls and military attaches. As their original tasks were not only gathering intelligence, ambassadors and consuls generally focused on economic and political activities. In addition to their contributions, military attaches also prepared intelligence summaries about the power, dispositions, weaponary, and mobilization of armies. In addition, the intelligence institutions and embassies of the allied states reported to the SB.[70] the intelligence reports contributed to long-term strategy rather than being urgent. Attaches and Ambassadors position was also advantageous, as they were able to gather information directly from abroad.[71]

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69 ATASE, BDH, F:269,D: 594, I:132, 19 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/02 December 1914.

70 The embassies and military attaches transmitted daily intelligence reports gathered from different newspapers and other sources. For instance, see; ATASE, BDH, F:325, D:92, 001-,14 "From the Embassy of Bern to the Second Branch", ATASE, BDH, F:325, D:92, 001. 1330-1331/1914-1915. For other reports sent from Lahey, Bern, Stockholm, Selonica Military Attaches and Embassies to the SB, see, ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200,I:89, ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200,I: 93, ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200, I:086, ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200, I:076, "Political and Military intelligence Reports from Embassies and Attaches to the SB between Temmuz 1330-Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ August 1914-January 1915" Also the allies' embassies reported directly to the SB, see ATASE, BDH, F: 243, D: 1009, I:26-01 "From the Bucharest Embassy to the Special Branch on 20th September 1914 concerning weaponary trade agreement and deployment between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire." 1 Eylül 1330/20 September 1914.

71 The embassies and military attaches transmitted confidential, secret or top secret intelligence. They also reported their own sources to the SB under these reports. For

Ninety percent of foreign political information came either from the ambassadors or attaches in the neutral or allied states. However, as their reports were generally regarding strategic concerns, they were presented in weekly intelligence summaries by the SB. The reports were classified as political, military, war intelligence reports.[72] In the next part of this chapter I will discuss the types of reports in the intelligence cycle, however, I want to present some examples to clarify ambassadors, consuls and attaches roles.

From the beginning until the end of the war, the SB observed the political conditions and public sphere of allied, neutral and hostile states. As the grand strategy was "war strategy", the SB prepared weekly intelligence summaries that contributed to war-time policy. At the beginning of the war, the Ottoman Empire closely watched over the neutral states, especially the Balkan states because of their strategic position. For instance, at the beginning of the war, the SB disseminated a report to the on the political pressures made by the British and French governments to the neutral states. This report was summarized and gathered from the ambassadors and consuls. In the report it was stated that neutral states such as Romania and Bulgaria were threatened with an economic embargo if they did not take part in war against Germany.[73]

Public opinion was also another aspect that contributed to the war effort. Therefore, the embassies played a part in observing people's political persuasions. For instance, on the 19th June 1918, the SB disseminated a political intelligence report to the General Staff, that contained intelligence on the condition of public sphere in Austria and Bulgaria. This was a weekly intelligence summary presented by the ambassadors

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example reports sent from different embassies collected from print publications about the policitical and military conditions of the states on 11th November 1917, see ATASE, BDH, F: 440, D:1729, I:001. 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1333/ 11 November 1917.

72 For weekly intelligence reports please see the whole folder; ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:26. "Weekly Intelligence reports 1914-1918" 1330-1334/1914-1918.

73 This report was written in a very harsh diplomatic language. At the end of the report it was noted that this was a serious warning to be considered by disseminated administrations. see; ATASE, BDH, F:370,D:1475,I:003-I:01,02, undated.

in Bulgaria and Germany. In the report it was stated that the pan-Islamic discourse and domestic policy of the CUP government was causing doubt amongst the Bulgarian citizens and harming the alliance. The report also contained information about Austria, stating that the Bolshevik Revolution caused uprisings against the Austrian government.[74] These two examples, one from the beginning and one at the end of war, were a small representation of the types of intelligence that ambassadors and consuls provided to the SB. Therefore, their position was to provide the SB with diplomatic issues and the political condition of other states rather than military.

However, even today, the Foreign offices and other institutions do not have the intelligence discipline and capability regarding analysis for military concerns. The military intelligence sections' advice and assessment of intelligence are different from other institutions.[75]

In this condition the military attaches play an important part. The reports of attaches were more efficient for armed forces on the changes of the states' armies and policy.[76] During World War I, unlike the consuls and ambassadors reports, attaches' reports contained detailed information on the armies. For instance, like other Balkan States, Greece was observed very carefully when it was neutral. Its trade agreements and military deployment were marks about its possible entry to the war. Based on reports sent from the attache, a report concerning military movements, recruitment and training, disseminated by the SB on 27th February 1915, attracts attention. In the report it was stated that Greece was about to occupy Monastir/Bitola Macedonia and Greeks, along with Serbian officers, were producing propaganda to accustom the inhabit-

74 ATASE, BDH, F:437,D:1719, I:007. "Political Intelligence disseminated by the SB to all ministries and then later published in Political intelligence journals on 19th June 1918". 19 Haziran 1334/ 19 June 1918.

75 Michael Herman, Ibid., 128. Especially during wartimes, foreign and domestic intelligence is the least understood and a less theorized area, see: J. Der Derian, *Anti-diplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 19.

76 Matthew S. Seligman, Ibid., 16.

ants for war enthusiasm. In the report it was stated that the British were gathering volunteers in Greece and the volunteers would receive training for three weeks in Malta. In the churches of Salonica, sermons implied the salvation of Greece was depended on the success of triple entente.[77]

As it can be seen in the report, attaches also prepared similar reports to ambassadors and consuls. However, more than ambassadors and consuls they also prepared detailed reports on the general situation of the armies. For instance, provided by attaches in September 1916, the SB prepared a weekly report on the general condition of the hostile states' armies. The report begins with the French army. Table 2.4 summarizes the long report.

Table 2.4 Summarized Reports from Attaches on the French Army 1916[78]

French Army	
Total Amount of Soldiers	Between 2.300.000-2.600.000
In France	43 Divisions, 8 Cavalry Divisions
North Africa	70.000 soldiers
Reserve Army	17 divisions, 20.000 soldiers
Casualty	Estimated 350.000

Attaches also provided information about the assignments, deployments and new orders in the armies. For instance, in a report sent from an attache and disseminated from the SB to Staff operations it was written that General Tassoni, who had proven to serve well during the war in Tripoli, was assigned as a governor. Nine regiments of reinforcements and four thousand horses were deployed to the area. The personnel of the land forces and navy were forbidden to obtain permission and importing food was prohibited until a second order.[79] The sources were

77 ATASE, BDH, F:5,D: 200, I: 97. "Intelligence Summaries summaries from attaches, ambassadors and press publications", 14 Şubat 1330/27 February 1915.

78 ATASE, BDH, F:320, D:909, I:023. "Intelligence Reports from Attaches on the Condition of the French Army", August 1332/ September 1916.

79 ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200, I:95. "From the Rome Military Attache to Second Branch", 8 Şubat 1330/ 21 February 1915.

also implied in these reports as the information on Italy was transmitted by the military attache of Rome.

To sum up, I have outlined the types of information that ambassadors and attaches provided. As maintaining the war effort was on the shoulders of the army, it was not surprising that the intelligence channel that served under the foreign ministry was canalized to the SB.

Secondly in this section, I want to present the domestic intelligence sources at the institutional and organizational level. The second aspect of the tendency to centralization began with canalizing the sources of domestic intelligence. Within this category of domestic intelligence, for the SB, the top priority was counter-espionage, propaganda and censorship. Counter-espionage will be the focus here, as attention to propaganda and censorship will be given in later chapters.

Figure 2.6 below shows the institution for domestic intelligence, and sources it made use of to provide the SB with intelligence.[80]

Figure 2.6 Institutional Sources for Domestic Intelligence



80 As the struggle against espionage was given to the SB, it is not suprising that domestic sources were canalized to the SB. The chart represents the most common intelligence sources, for instance see ATASE, BDH, F:327 ,D:403. “Spying in the Ottoman Lands”; ATASE, BDH, F289: ,D:59. “Investigation of Spies and Suspected Citizens”. ATASE, BDH, F:247 ,D:404. “Prevention of Spying and Control” ATASE, BDH, F:494 ,D:599. “Precautions in Harbors against Spying”. All the dosiers contains documents between 1330-1334/1914-1918.

The units under the Ministry of Interior carried out orders of the second department of SB. The domestic security included the prevention of foreign spies, espionage and of foreign propaganda and political activities that could cause uprisings and conflicts within the society. As stated in the previous section, no institution civil or military could pursue a spy without the consent of the second department or the intelligence officer of SB in the nearest army unit. The units had to directly report to SB unless in an urgent condition such as catching a spy in the act,.[81]

The sources on the table not only carried out orders from SB but also had to report directly to the SB about the entrance-exits in the country, suspected citizens or organizations, all sort of propaganda against the Empire, and suspects of espionage. For instance the SB directorate sent an order to Security General Directorate to observe the singers in the streets if they were delivering cryptical messages through songs. On 21 November 1917, Istanbul Police Directorate caught a singer who used idioms in the songs and interrogated. This person was delivered to First Army Command intelligence officer and than sent to Martial Law Court(Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi). Both the intelligence officer and the Istanbul Police Directorate transmitted the report to SB. [82]

The control of Press Directorates (both from the Foreign and Internal Ministries) were also taken from the Ministries, and SB assigned inspectors and established *Censorship Inspectorates*.[83]

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81 These orders caused a chaos and did proceed as it was planned. Many of the sources began sending their reports directly to SB headquarters rather than the intelligence officers in the nearest army unit. This issue will be discussed in chapter 4. ATASE, BDH, F:3919, D:84, I:2. "Enver Pasha's orders regarding tasks of Second Branch" August 1330/October 1914.

82 ATASE, BHD, F:391, D:1549, I:019,21. "From Istanbul Police Directorate to Second Branch", Teşrin-i Sani 1333/ 21 November 1917.

83 A propaganda Branch was established under the Second Branch and was responsible from all kinds of propaganda activities. See ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H1, I:001-01a, Temmuz 1330/August 1914. A censorship inspectorship was established under the SB and an inspector was attained, every day the inspector gave a report to SB about the publi-

The *Censorship Inspectorates* were responsible from controlling and reporting to the SB regarding the postal and courier services, letters and newspapers that contained espionage activities. For instance, on 13th April 1915, the Istanbul Censorship Directorate transmitted a report to the SB stating that a letter was captured in Girit Coffeehouse which came to a man named Harambola Kazdağlı from another man named Nikola. In the letter it was written that Harambola did not have to return back to Greece because soon, the Greek prime minister, Venizelos, would declare war against the Ottoman Empire, and with the support of British and French Navy, would attack Edremit, Foça, Kuşadası and Urla coasts, and that Ottoman Empire was 'doomed'. So he ought to stay and continue delivering his reports. Harambola was suspected of being an agent sent to the SB headquarters for interrogation. He was later was sent to the Martial Law Courts to be judged and sentenced to prison.[84] The newspapers were also observed for possible information leakage or black propaganda. The Censorship Inspectorate reported to the SB that *Sada-i Sadakat* newspaper contained British forces propaganda. The SB disseminated the report to Security General Directorate and ordered for the arrest of the editors and their removal to SB headquarterfor interrogation, after which, the editor was sent to Martial Law Court.[85]

The Ministry transmitted any intelligence that could not be transmitted directly to the SB. For instance, on the 25th February 1915, the Ministry of Interior sent a report to the SB about a train machinist caught carrying letters without a stamp from censor inspectorate. In the report, it was stated that the person was an employee on the train

cations and their journalists. See; ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-01, Temmuz 1330/August 1914

84 ATASE, BDH, F:289,D:56,I:017-01,02. "From the Istanbul Censor Inspectorship to the General Staff Second Branch", 31 Mart 1331/13 April 1915.

85 ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:403, I:003-01. "From the Censorship Inspectorate to the Second Branch", 26 Kanun-u Sani 1330/8 February 1917. The second branch asked for the arrest after the interrogation on 29th March 1917. ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:403, I:006. "From the SB to the Security General Directorate", 29 Mart 1333/ 29 March 1917.

which traveled across the borders where he was caught by Security Inspectorate (Emniyet Müfettişliği).[86]

In addition, other sources such as harbor masters had to report to the SB regarding the movements of vessels, entrances and exits. For example, on the 19th January 1915, the Riva Harbor Master Şaban transmitted his daily report about the entrances and exits. The document reported that ships and crew had undergone strict identification control and the gendarmerie had checked the belongings and identifications of the passengers. The harbor master reported that there had not been a suspicious movement from a sea vehicle around the harbor.[87]

Where the Security General Directorate third and fifth Branches did not have an outpost, the Border Security Inspectorates(Hudud Emniyet Müfettişlikleri) were serving on their behalf. These inspectorates, along with the Security General Directorate, also came under the order of the SB for spying activities. For instance, on the 26th February 1915, letters were found on railway travelers and they were arrested by border security inspectorate. The letters were sent to third branch of the Security General Directorate and the directorate prepared a report to the SB. The SB required that carrying letters without a stamp was forbidden and ordered for the immediate arrest of the suspect.[88]

Photographers who took pictures of the soldiers were able to illustrate the positions of the armies. These sources provided good insights on the enemy fronts, trenches and locations, thus, they were also kept under observation.[89] For example, on the 14th July 1915, the Security

86 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:04-02. "From the Ministry of Internal Relations to the General Staff Second Branch", 12 Şubat 1330/25 February 1915

87 ATASE, BDH, F:494, D:599, I:011. "From the Riva Harbor Master to the Second Branch about the control of the entrance and exits from the Riva Harbor", 6 Kanun-u Sani 1330/ 19 January 1915.

88 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:04-01. "From the Border Security Inspectorate to the Second Branch", 13 Şubat 1330/26 February 1915.

89 J. Finnegan, Ibid., 173-176.

General Directorate reported the names, age, gender and ethnicity of the photograph shop owners in Istanbul to SB.[90]

For the third part of this section I will focus on the sources of military intelligence at the institutional level. Some of the common sources for military intelligence are presented in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7 Military Sources for Intelligence[91]



As stated before, the intelligence officers were also responsible from the interrogation of prisoners, deserters and refugees. Soldiers, who were captured during the war, played a critical role detecting the movement of armies, deployment, structures, supplies and reinforcements. Their statements in interrogations were crosschecked with other interrogations and sources. Captured documents, maps, messages and letters - which were taken either from the prisoners or their settlements - helped the SB to evaluate possible positions and prepare a de-

90 The names, gender and ethnicity of non-Muslim photographers in Istanbul, see: ATASE,BDH, F:263, D:18, I:005-01. "From the Security General Directorate to the Second Branch", 1 Temmuz 1331/14 July 1915.

91 The common sources were prepared amongst reports from different commanderships and Branches and they are easily accessible in ATASE archives. For instance; ATASE, BDH, F:507, D:225. " Intelligence Reports from the Second Army to Second Branch"1330-1334/1914-1918; ATASE, BDH, F:507, D:225 "Enemy Recoinnassance in the 2nd Army Battlefronts and Intelligence reports" 1330-1334/1914-1918; ATASE, BDH, F:523, D:938. "3rd Army Intelligence Reports on Russian Forces" and "Intelligence Reports on all Battlefronts" 1330-1334/1914-1918; ATASE, BDH: F:529, D:223, "4th Army Area General Intelligence Reports and Preparations Against Invasion of Egypt" 1330-1331/1914-1915, ATASE, BDH 531, D: 2074-22-24-25-27-28-31-33-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42, "Intelligence Reports from the 6th Army to Second Branch" 1330-1334/1914-1918.

fensive or offensive strategy. Due to the dynamic condition of war, these methods were challenging and required crosschecking. For instance, on the 23rd June 1915, the Third army command received information from the 11th division about Russian movements. Based on this information, on the 24th June 1915, the SB disseminated a report to Staff Operations. In the report it was stated that the Russian fifth border regiment arrived at Hasankale. The first piece of information that came from the third army command was from the interrogation of a prisoner. However, the SB's first section cross-checked this information with a document left behind by Russian troops in Süleymaniye. Based on this report the General Staff sent reinforcements to the area.[92]

Each of the army commands provided perpetual reports about the armies. A further pertinent example is from the fourth army command in Iraq. The main purpose of the Empire in Palestine Campaign was to keep the British forces occupied around Palestine, by posing a threat to the Suez Canal, to prevent the deployment of British forces to the Western Front. To gather intelligence from the area, the SB benefitted from the Fourth Army Commandership. In a report prepared by the Fourth Army intelligence officer, obtained from an informant, it was stated that 4000 Indian soldiers including 217 cannonballs and 350 tents were stationed in İsmailiye.[93]

The patrols under the command of the divisions and infantries had the advantage to obtain current intelligence. For instance, after the declaration of mobilization of the Ottoman Empire, the SB kept trace of navy movements in case of a possible surprise attack. On the 10th August 1914, a scout team from the Navy transmitted report to the Third Corps that approximately nineteen warships were sailing from Sakız to Midilli.

92 ATASE, BDH, F:552, D:2143, I:9-1,2. "From the SB to General Staff about the movements of the Russian Army." 11 Haziran 1331/24 June 1915.

93 ATASE; BDH; F:243, D:1010, I:7. "From the Fourth Army Commandership to the Second Branch" 8 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/ 21 October 1914. The report also contained detailed information about the number of cannonballs, soldiers, tents and weaponary that were dispatched along the line from İskenderiye to Kantara and to Port Said.

Mitigating a possible attack, the Third Corps commander, Esad, transmitted the intelligence to the SB.[94]

Another intelligence activity during wartime was of course the intelligence that came from the fronts and the roles of corps, divisions, scouts and air reconnaissance (in which the SB from the Germans).[95] In addition the intelligence officers acting on behalf of the SB hired spies and informants to gather information for double-checking and analysis.[96]

As stated before in this section, World War was a period when the sources also overlapped. For instance the Harbor Masters who served under the order of Ministry of Interior also transmitted intelligence reports. When the Ottomans wanted to ease the battle on the western front and keep the British army occupied in Iraq, the reports from the Beirut harbor master drew attention. Simultaneously, the report of the Harbor master was transmitted to General staff and then to the fleet command. In the first report it was stated that by the invitation of the captain of a British battle cruiser which made port at Jaffa (Tel Aviv), a Russian general got aboard to have discussion. This report was verified

94 ATASE, BDH, F:492, D:1929, I:2. "From the 3rd Army Corps To the Second Branch". 28 Temmuz 1330/10 August 1914.

95 As for air reconaissance, the Ottomans benefitted only from the German intelligence section which provided tactical and operational intelligence. See ATASE,BDH, F:535, D:2092A, I:1-1 25 Teşrin-i Sani 1332/8th December 1916."Tayyare keşfiyyâtı netâyici bervech-i âtîdir: Düşmanın şimendifer müntehâ noktası Bi'r-i Mezâr hizâsını geçmiş ve Bi'r-i Mezâr'ın beş kilometre şimâl-i şarkîsine vâsıl olmuşdur. Düşmanın en ileri kıta'âtı (takrîben üç süvari bölüğü) Bi'r-i Cerârâd'dadır. Bi'r-i Cerârâd, Mezâr'ın on üç kilometre şarkındadır. Sebketü'l-Mizâh (?) (Mezâr'ın on altı kilometre şimâl-i şarkîsindedir) ile Bi'r-i Mezâr arasında birçok çadırlar ve kollar görülmüşdür. Kuvvetli bir keşif kolu Bi'r-i Hevfre (?) civarına kadar gelmişdir. Bi'r-i Hevfre Ariş'in takrîben on iki kilometre cenûbundadır. Ariş'in on iki kilometre garbında kâin Ebû Fetih civarına kadar sekiz otomobil izi müşâhede edilmişdir."

96 The intelligence officers at the Army Commanderships also had to recruit spies for infiltration and report their names to the Second Branch. See; ATASE,BDH, F:303,D:1231A, I:7-6." From the Second Branch to Intelligence officers at the Army Commanderships."

by the Fourth army commander Zeki Pasha and the intelligence officer. In the final document it was stated that the British cruiser which made port at Jaffa, then took sail to the Port Said area (Iraq). This cipher letter was indeed an early intelligence document, which kept the army aware of possible attacks and enabled them to take precautions. The movement of navy and maneuvers of the army were indeed acts of significance.[97]

There are, of course, many methods and types of intelligence that sources provided to the SB. Those presented here are merely illustrative. As, in future chapters, I will present and analyze a large number of reports at the strategic, operational and tactic level. These examples should be sufficient to understand how the SB made use of these sources during war and the tendency of centralization of these sources. Last but not least, here, I will explore - perhaps the most oft used by every institution - HUMINT and OSINT and their direct connection with the SB.

Drawing on all documents presented at the institutional level, Table 2.5 shows the most commonly used sources.[98]

Table 2.5 HUMINT, OSINT SOURCES AND OTHER CONTRIBUTORS

Voluntary Organizations	Provided the SB with Spies
Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa)	Relayed intelligence to SB about the areas the formal army cannot access.
Refugees, Tradesman, Merchants, Local citizens, Deserters, Informants, Couriers	Presented their own observation about the military or political situation they witnessed
Newspapers, Magazines, Journals, Books.	Provided Political, Economic, Social, Military intelligence

As seen in the introduction, HUMINT- OSINT sources were amongst the common sources that nearly every institution relied upon. During World War I, the SB continued to use HUMINT-OSINT sources and pro-

97 Cipher telegram concerning early intelligence about navy maneuvres. ATASE, BDH, F:429, D:29, I: 020-001, 002. " From the 4th Army Command to Second Branch". undated.

98 The local citizens and tradesman not only reported to armies, or the passaport section, but also done spied under the intelligence officers assigned by the SB. ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:1729,I:001. undated.

vided weekly intelligence summaries to all institutions. These common reports contained the name of the sources including the name of the newspaper, or the status of the providing person. Books, newspapers and other press publications were one of the common open sources for foreign intelligence, especially during peacetime.

The SB summarized and categorized the intelligence gathered from the open sources and disseminated them in short reports to almost every institution. An example of the summarized report is provided in table 2.6.

Table 2.6 Summarized Intelligence Reports from Publications[99]

Reuter	In the House of Commons it was stated that the number of British soldiers at French borders had increased to one hunded and sixty thousand.
Lugano(Italy)	Disaster news are spread amongst Italian people.
Matin(France): Lugano(Italy)	Germans invaded 20.100 km of land in French lands.
Sudan Gazette:	Sudan Muslim Judge Muhammed Rutfa exclaims that Turkey joined war because of German pressure.
Independence	A negotiation is going on between France and Japan for a support of 5 thousand troops.

Spies became even more significant in wartime, as they not only provided political and public intelligence, but served as human intelligence by preparing intelligence reports about enemy armies and politics. As the war began, spies not only conducted intelligence activities in other states, but also at battlefronts. Therefore, spies were one of the common sources that conducted both foreign and domestic duties. They had to both provide intelligence and reduce exposure. That may also be another reason why the SB was given the responsibility of propaganda and censorship. For instance, as propaganda activities required war photographers, and spies could easily infiltrate this profession, and take

99 ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:26, I: 34. "Weekly Intelligence Summaries of Press Publications and Agencies", 5 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ 18 December 1914.

pictures of trenches, locations, morale and other information, and report them to their institutions. During wartime, spies had the potential to be disguised in other armies' uniforms, especially if the spy had a good knowledge of language.[100] Therefore their infiltration and prevention were amongst the highest concerns of any intelligence organization, in any state.[101]

As for the Ottoman Empire, defeats at the battlefronts led to significant changes to the intelligence activities of spies. After serious defeats on the Caucasus front, the General Staff decided to increase its intelligence activities at the level of the armies. In order to provide sufficient information about the Russian army in the face of the progressive Russian occupation, the director of the intelligence department of the Third Army received a an order to increase all kinds of intelligence activities and assistance. Following the order, there was then a serious flow of information about Russian maneuvers.[102]

For instance, in a report sent by the Second Caucasian Corps Commander Fevzi Çakmak to the Third Army Commander, it was emphasized that certain individuals were assigned to gather information about the Russian army and that they would be paid fifty *Lira*. With these orders, the Third Army started to investigate the conditions through freshly recruited spies. The spies prepared reports on the number of soldiers and about enemy forces. However, such recruitment was challenging in terms of funding as spies would be paid or resourced , for

100 For instance, on the date of November 1914, 4th Army Commander Zeki Pasha sent a report to the SB about trying to infiltrate two spies concealed as a war photographer into British army to gather intelligence" see ATASE: F531, D:024, I:002. "From the 4th Army Command to Second Branch";" Teşrin-i Sani 1330/ November 1914

101 J. Finnegan, Ibid.,176.

102 The SB requested the 3rd army command to increase the recruitment of spies in order to gain advantage in Caucasus Region. It was reported that predictions were extremely low and the advantage of defensive strategy was declining. see; ATASE, BDH, F:2899, D:408, I:1-1. "From the Second Branch to 3rd Army Commandership". undated.

example with a motor or a boat for safe and fast travel.[103] During war time perhaps one of the most valuable information source concerning intelligence organizations were refugees.[104] The local people who were in the middle of the warzone were both potential aids for the armies and also potential sources for intelligence institutions concerning military operations.[105] For instance, during the war in Egypt, the location of the British was reported based on refugees' statements. In a report sent on the 15th May 1917 to the SB, in the area there were the 42nd, 52nd, 53rd and 54th British divisions and two of the regiments were at the east (52nd division) and the rest of them had the possibility of being around the area of Egypt and the Suez. The cavalry was the 1st Monteit and 2nd Monteit divisions and the 5th settled Cavalry Brigade. Out of all of them, the 4th cavalry, 6th infantry division and 5th cavalry force had been spotted in the eastern side of the channel.[106]

Like spies, informants played an active role in gathering intelligence. Recruiting informants was also cheaper than using a spy. The SB recruited and sent informants to parts of the country. For instance, an informant sent to Bitlis (whose name is confidential in the report), transmitted intelligence that three battalions were marching towards the Caucasus front. Based on the report, the SB disseminated the information to the third army to take precautions.[107]

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103 ATASE, BDH, F:2899, D: 408, I:1. "From the Second Branch to 2nd Army Command".undated. It was noted that the spies were in fear of getting caught, therefore increasing the payment and transportation would serve as a good method for increasing the recruitment of spies. ATASE, BDH, F:2899, D: 408, I:1-4. "From 2nd and 3rd Army Commands to the Second Branch".

104 Refugees were amongst the straightforward HUMINT intelligence; Michael Herman, Ibid., 61.

105 Lieut.-Colonel B. Walcot, "Lecture on Intelligence for Regimental Officers and Non-commissioned Officers", in *Arthur L. Conger Papers* July 24th, 1916 (US Army Military History Institute).

106 "Report prepared from the statements of Refugees" the transmitting source was not stated, ATASE, BDH, F:291, D:907, I:23-2.

107 ATASE, BDH, F:552, D:696 I:4-1,4-2. "Intelligence Summaries",12 Haziran 1334/12 July 1918.

Spies and informants were not only active in terms of military intelligence but also in domestic security. Besides all the sources subordinated from the Internal Ministry, the SB had its own agents and informants that transmitted information regarding domestic security. For instance on 12 january 1916, a spy (name confidential in the document) of the SB transmitted a report about about a sabotage to Haydarpaşa-Konya railway line between two citizens named Leon and Şükrü in moda street. [108] Based on the spy's report, the SB ordered the Security General Directorate to arrest and interrogate the suspects. After the interrogation, the agents observation was confirmed. The SB than transmitted a report to General Staff stating that informants were sent around Haydarpaşa station and in addition SB ordered to Security General Directorate to provide informants with additional funding to who provided accurate information on the matter. [109]

The voluntary organizations such as the National Defense League and the Navy League were providers of informants and spies for the SB. The National Defense League, besides gathering volunteers and public support towards warfare from the beginning to the end of war, also took part in providing spies and informants for the SB. For instance, in a report sent by the chief of the National Defense League, it was stated that although lacking in experience, they had a number of people who had good use of foreign languages and could be sent to Europe to gather information about hostile and neutral states.[110]

In addition to the sources mentioned above, the SB established a special spy organization called "The Civilian Intelligence Committee".

108 ATASE, BDH, F:313, D:381, I: 017. "From a Ciphered Source Name to Second Branch", 30 Kanun-u Sani 1331/ 12 January 1916.

109 ATASE, BDH, F:313, D:381, I: 017. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 12 Kanun-u Sani 1331/ 25 January 1916.

110 SB made use of voluntary associations for recruiting spies and informants to conduct surveillance around Empire's lands. Amongst those were also the Donanma Cemiyeti, Also the Second Branch made use of committees such as Müdafaa-i Milliye Committee and installed agents in order to conduct surveillance within the Empire; See ATASE, BDH, F:421, D:774, I:085. 15 Kanun-u Evvel 1333/ 15 December 1917.

This committee took part in spying activities for both domestic and foreign intelligence. The task of the committee regarding domestic intelligence was to follow both hostile or neutral states' spying activities. The spies of the committee would pursue other spies and officers by following their daily routines, the people they meet and their levels of succession. The spies would be was given an ID to correspond with the police. If the spy managed to find evidence of espionage activity, he was also given the duty and permission of arresting the suspect. The task of the committee regarding foreign intelligence was to send an officer or recruit a spy within the foreign states to gather intelligence regarding military and political conditions and present them to the committee. They were granted passports and domestic passports (mürur tezkiresi) and were chosen amongst traders so that they would not be suspected of spying. The foreign committee had a chief and nine officers at the central headquarters and were recruited mainly from Greek and Jewish brokers and merchants as the Muslim population would draw too much attention. Six of the officers remained in Istanbul, and the remaining three were chosen from those who were well educated, bilingual, and could travel under urgent circumstances.[111]

On the matter of overlapping condition, I would also like to highlight a report prepared on the 15th May 1915, about Romania's situation.[112] In the report - written in detail based on many interviews conducted with Romanian officials - it was stated that Romania was likely to enter the war in spring, even in spite of potential failures by German and Austrian armies. There were plans to convert the schools into hospitals before the 15th of January 1916 and to start training soldiers (prior to 1917). Quotations of Conservative Party leaders Marghilomand and Philipsko featured in the report. Philipsko was, to a certain extent, a "Hungarian enemy" as he was the leader of the "National movement "(Hareket-i

111 ATASE, BDH, F:269, D:1111, I:1,1-1. "The Civilian Intelligence Committee of the Second Branch", 16 Nisan 1331/29th April 1915.

112 ATASE, BDH, F:7, D:717, I: 004-1, 004-02. 2 Mayıs 1331/ 15 May 1915.

Milliye) in Romania, who tried to provoke entry to war. The report described him as a fame looking and exalted person.

The report presented by the Ministry of Interior to SB showed that it was clear from the report that Romania would declare war on Austria and all the patriotic sentiments, government officials and even Marghilomans' ideas were led in that direction. Supporting this prediction it was stated that, following the Russia's victory on Lumberg, Romanian officials felt a mistake not to have declared war against Austria and Germany. Attempts to help Russia by deploying ammunition, had not brought Romania sole control over the Transilvania area they had hoped for. I quote at length from the report, drawing on an interview with Philipsko:

"Question: If the Austrian and German armies get big victories and destroy the Russian army, will you still march against Austria? Would it not be smarter to join Germany and Austria and agree on annexation of Bessarabia (Moldovia) to Romanian lands?

Answer: Maybe we will be forced to do so. But still our intention is conquering Transylvania itself.

In the report it was stated that also the last interview showed that nothing had changed from his last opinion. But it was stated that he agreed with the opinions about a possible alliance with Russia would indeed cause problems between Russia and Romania in terms of Transylvania."

As it can be seen from this substantial example, the SB made use of many other sources regarding foreign and domestic intelligence and it is not suprising that SB files contains information from diverse sources in an environment when War Ministry became the uppermost authority. The theories on the report was fairly accurate in prediction, as Romania declared war on Austria on the 27th August 1916.

Merchants coincidently were be a valuable resource for early information about supplies and reinforcement. By their witness possible deployment and amount could be calculated. On a report sent on 9th March 1915, it was stated that a person called Cemal was travelling to Italy to buy health supplies had sent a telegram to his wife stating that

he couldn't move from Selonica to Romania to cross Italy because the trains of Salonica was busy with deploying Russian Troops.[113] This small piece of information was actually sent to the Ministry of Foreign relations to settle the problems about Cemil so he would be able to return home. However, the Ministry of Foreign relations relayed this information because it was also another resource showing that Greece was indeed helping the deployment of Russian troops. As the whole railway line was busy, predictions were made about the amount of deployed soldiers.

The civillians(who had good knowledge of military issues) also provided military intelligence to SB. In a report sent on 15th September 1915, (when Russian armies were moving further on the Caucasus Front and took over Batum and Kars and the Ottomans were trying to fortify the ninth corps near Erzurum) the committee provided details about possible reinforcements, weaponry and deployment for precaution. In the report firstly considered were naval and reinforcement activities which were analyzed and it was stated that more soldiers were deployed to Kobuleti (Çürüksu) Georgia but there was not any torpido ships around the area. Based on other included information, moving up for a possible attack, SB gave different information about the plantation of explosives and some constructed bulwarks to the third army. In the report, it was stated that explosives had been planted to two miles onwards of Batum's Burunbaş castle and in the east of Batum two or three miles to Sarısu tower. There were some constructions going on the Hapgara and Atamış Mountains which were six kilometers near to Batum. The report also contained numbers of workers for the estimation of finishing time, stating that there were six thousand workers on the construction site and around Batum there were a minimum of three hundred cannonballs, twenty eight cannonballs with twenty eight centimeter width, which were camouflaged and six thousand soldiers. The report stated that the total size of the army in the Caucasus was

113 ATASE, BDH, F:370, D:909, I:003-01. 24 Şubat 1330/ 9 March 1915.

approximately six hundred thousand and the ones around Kars were highly trained. The number of soldiers in Artvin were two thousand and the number of soldiers and around Batum were one hundred and sixty four and twenty five high ranking navy officers. The twenty five of them were the ones that were relied upon and in a higher position. They set up five cannons in between Maçahel and Çoruh's coast parallel to the railway construction. There was also a large cannonball near the Batum near the Public Garden ("Millet Bağçesi"). Even though it was unlikely to get near to them, from the damage they had done they were expected to be no smaller than twenty centimeter width. Also, they were concealed with a quilt and also filled some other sacks with rocks and prepared fake trenches. They also proposed to use militia forces derived from local citizens to blow up bridges.[114]

Interestingly, the reports or advice that the SB gave were not generally questioned by superior authorities. Even if they were, in my research I was not able to find any opposing reports from other departments. In addition, other institutions did not have any opposing ideas regarding SB's political contributions. Based on just one source, the SB adviced the nineth corps that, rather than a direct attack it would be better to spread up to the western part of Malazgirt for an ambush. This prediction transpired to be true as army was able to repel the attack from their posts.

A brief assessment of the sources shows how the intelligence activity could get complex during wartime as there were many sources, different types of intelligence and different ways to cross-check. However, under war conditions there was insufficient time to analyze the information. During wartime, analysis in the SB headquarters could not always be accomplished, especially regarding urgent issues in a warzone. That is another reason why the SB had assigned intelligence officers in

114 ATASE, BDH, F:511, D:933, I:2. "From the Second Branch to Staff Operations and Third Army". 2 Eylül 1331/ 15 September 1915.

other armies, divisions and corps to act in their place, in case of a need for early analysis.[115]

They had to prepare a report on trench organization and not only provide an assessment of the threat at a particular point in time, but their interpretations and assessments of army movements at the fronts proved a useful source.

The complexity and workload of the branch concerning its foreign, domestic, political and military intelligence tasks, is also illustrated from the sources. Similarly, these sources show the tendency to a centralization of the intelligence section of the Ottoman Empire into the hands of the military elite, which took part in policy-making after the 1913 coup, the defeat in the Balkans and World War I.

As it can be seen, all the other intelligence providing institutions and their sources became a source of intelligence for the SB. The SB acted as a flagship model, above all other intelligence organizations and sources. The duty became so heavy that Seyfi Düzgören(second director), director of the SB claimed that they did not have sufficient personnel to deal with everything.[116]

Although censorship and propaganda are part of domestic security, another aspect for the CUP government was to gain supporters for war and decrease the desertion within the army. Therefore the SB gathered intelligence about the "enthusiasm" of local populations in certain areas, before preparing propaganda methods.[117]

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115 ATASE, D:321,F:1296, I:027-01. Each Intelligence officer represented the SB in the institution that they had been assigned to; those who could not send the intelligence reports, depending on the urgency, could act instead of the SB. undated.

116 There are lots of reports sent to the General Staff about the work overload and insufficient amount of personnel to do the tasks. As the intelligence activities and duties extended the SB's personnel became insufficient and asked for further recruitment, see: ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:1639, I:003.

117 For example, in order to conduct oral propaganda, the war propaganda section under the order of the SB would choose preachers that knew the spiritual condition of the local population and methods that would gain their support. By evaluating, the best

As propaganda and censorship was also subsumed under the responsibility of the SB, in addition to policy-making, they also had contributed to domestic intelligence activities as the press inspectors had to report daily to the SB about the journalists and their activities in the press. Alongside Foreign intelligence (military, economic, political), domestic intelligence (counter-espionage, politics) and policy-making (propaganda, censorship), the SB also had to also deal with military intelligence. Foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, political intelligence, military intelligence, topography, propaganda, censorship, counter-espionage and preventions were hard tasks, as there was a dynamic movement during war. The military strategies, tactics and operations had to be analyzed alongside foreign and domestic policies from different sources.

The Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), hereonin, SO, was another source of intelligence for the SB. Although it is presented in many studies as the father of the modern intelligence organization of Turkey, due to sparse research and restrictions in the ATASE military archives, this area is lesser analyzed. However based on our observations, and some recently published studies, it can be said that the SO was indeed a kind of operational and tactical source for the SB.[118]

Furthermore the SB, as one of the seven branches under the Supreme Command Headquarters, was in a higher institutional position than the SO.

The correlation with the SO began with the directorship of Seyfi Bey.[119] and the SB used the SO as a source of intelligence which clearly shows that the SO was not a central intelligence organization. However,

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propaganda activity would be chosen for the district; see ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:004-04. "War Propaganda Branch of the Second Branch", undated.

118 One of the studies that gives a broad analysis about the Special Organization is from Polat Safi, according to Safi, the SO represented a unconventional war structure, instead of representing an intelligence agency., In his second Chapter he dealt with some parts of the SO related to Second Branch the SB, see: Polat Safi, Ibid., 47

119 Polat Safi, Ibid., 45.

I do not wish to imply that the SO did not do any intelligence gathering, propaganda or conventional warfare. Even if acted as an intelligence organization, it was the tactical side of intelligence, especially acting on behalf of the first and fourth section of the SB. Considering that the SB was a higher level institution within the Supreme Command Headquarters and also the amount of documents on the fourth department in which, regarding its name, "politics and confidential" the confidential part might also have had a direct relationship with the SO. Generally, some studies still represent the SO as the modern intelligence service.[120]

This aim actually derives from another terminology that became common especially after the Susurluk "deep state" incident. The term "deep state" implies "a state within a state" conduct the dirty work which could not be done publicly by official institutions.[121]

As the SO conducted unconventional warfare by recruiting armies from bandits and prisoners, volunteers, it could be viewed as a militia rather than an intelligence service. The SO's operational activities could be considered as covert operations conducted by intelligence agencies.

But, at the beginning of the World War I, conducting covert operations did not make that institution an intelligence agency. Tasks and expectations from an intelligence institution that were dealt with in the first part of this chapter, clearly shows that the SO did not fit into the definition of intelligence. Aside from the aforementioned descriptions, the relation between the SO and SB shows that SO was not in the position of analysis and dissemination.

Another question that could be asked then, is why the SO was established when the SB could prepare its own covert operational team. Based on my research and assessment of documents, having a covert operational force under an intelligence agency is questionable. Even if

120 See the literature review in the Introduction. 29.

121 Polat Safi, The Ottoman Special Organization: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: A Historical Assessment With Particular Reference to its Operations Against British Occupied Egypt 1914-1916., 04.

we are to frame the SO as an intelligence institution, they can only be a team of bandits that conducted unconventional war and covert team operations under an intelligence institution. It is also important not to forget that the SO was succeeded by the Office for Eastern Affairs (Umur-i Şarkiyye Dairesi) – hereon in OEA - in May 1915 just after SB began to centralize.[122]

In the foundation document from the archives regarding the creation of the SO, it shows that the SO was tasked with unifying the Turkish and Muslim population around Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, Somalia, China, Turkmenistan.[123] Therefore the SO conducted operations that could not be done by the regular forces due to the rules of "law" such as covert operations (as an example: guerilla attacks to the enemy fronts, and processes of deterrence towards the "untrusted" civilians in the country or force them to move elsewhere).

The activities to conduct propaganda with Pan-Islamic discourse was given to the SO to support the fourth army during the Canal campaign. The SO personnel, such as Dr. Fuat, Dr. Nasır and Dr. Tebit Maheab ,were assigned as SO agents to the area.[124]

The SO was also tasked by the SB to obtain information on the British force's location, intentions, capabilities, numbers of Australian and Indian Troops, and reinforcements to Port-Said Elkantara, İsmailiye. SO was also tasked with providing information on fortification, the types of cannons, machine guns, wire fences, the places for telegram and radios, reinforcements, railroad constructions and volunteer soldiers.[125] In addition, the SB demanded from the SO to provide the names of the refugees and propaganda activities and those who worked under the SO.[126]

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122 ATASE, BDH, F: 1846, D:79, I:13/2. "Establishmend Of OEA", Mayıs 1331/ May 1915.

123 ATASE, BDH, F: 1846, D:79, I:13/4 "Tasks of SO", also see Polat Safi, Ibid., 85.

124 Philip H. Stoddard, "The Ottoman Goverment and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa" (PHD Dissertation, 1963), 102-118.

125 ATASE, BDH, F: 1868, D: 174, I:1-2. "From the Second Branch to Special Organization", 5 Kanun-u Sani 1330/18 January 1915.

126 ATASE, BDH, F: 1857, D: 131, I: 1-20. "From the Second Branch to Special Organiation",undated.

After the closure of the SO and the opening of OEA, a Translation and Compilation Branch (Tercüme ve Telif Şubesi) was established under the OEA, that followed domestic and foreign press such as Tanin, İkdam, Lösvar (French), and the SB assigned officers such as Major Ali Rıza, Ziya Efendi, Hamdi Efendi to the directorate of the Translations Department to provide information from press publications and assist propaganda activities of the SB. [127]

Also, an example shows that the OEA translation department could not act before the approval of the SB. For instance, on a report on 3rd July 1915 from the SB to the SO it was said that the statements of Indian Soldiers regarding their captivity were given in their own language and although it was not permitted to send the statements to their homelands it would be beneficial to first let the Istanbul Censor Directorate to analyze the harmless ones and give permission to its transmission.[128]

Also, as it was stated before, the SB had control over domestic security in which a passport section was established and given under the command of the SB, which ultimately provided entrance and check within or outside the Empire. This domestic security duty was placed under the SB.[129]

As stated the German and Ottoman Army Model was very similar. According to Markus Pöhlman, who studied *Abteilung IIIb* (Section 3b), in 1915 the intelligence department of the German General staff, was centralized as it had also been given the task of domestic security, censorship and opened a press office, thus also dealt with press and propaganda issues.[130] Therefore, the SB and *Abteilung IIIb* are somewhat sim-

127 ATASE, BDH, F:1851,D:110, I:1. "Staffing of the Translation and Composition Branch".

128 ATASE, BDH, F: 1845, D: 76-A, I: 1-34. "From the Second Branch to the Special Organization". 18 Haziran 1331/1 July 1915.

129 Normally, under the responsibility of the Police Department, the passaports and the control of the entrances and exits to the empire was checked by the Military Passaport Branch established under the order of the Second Branch, the police department and the passaport section had to report the Second Branch about the entrances and exits as well as permissions, see ATASE, BDH, F:420, D:1655, I:003-006. undated.

130 Markus Pöhlman, Ibid., 32.

ilar. In addition, in the ATASE archives there is a document about a department, mentioned as the German SO (Alman Teşkilat-ı Mahsusası).[131] which also was tasked with preparing uprisings and weakening the enemy in terms of political, military and economic issues. From this analysis it could be stated that the SO was a source of intelligence and a band for unconventional warfare.

According to Safi, "*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa", the SO, resembled a sort of military organization, yet only for a short period of time. In due course, it acquired a political meaning as did the key element of the relations among the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, CUP), the Ministry of War (Harbiye Nezareti), and the Ministry of Interior (Dahiliye Nezareti), the precise limits of which have yet to be determined.*"[132]

2.2.2 Agents of the Second Branch

There is little information in the ATASE archives regarding the agents of the SB. However, there are a few I can make a comment on. Number one, there was an expectation that a spy is to be bilingual. Also, they require good knowledge regarding lands; are able to draw or sketch; drive a car or ride a bike or a horse; are physically strong and athletic; are able to be disguised and be a good actor. These are some of the requirements demanded from a spy. The spies, in order to transmit their reports, were given an education on ciphering methods (The details of which I could not find in the documents).[133]

The agents were also tasked with making relations to act on benefit of the empire. The SB agent in Stockholm (whose name is confidential) transmitted a ciphered telegram to the SB headquarters, stating that a military officer in Sweden named Lumberg would be sent to İstanbul. The director of the telegram agency of Ehlond(?) was the agent's friend

131 ATASE, BDH, F: 1831, D: 18, I: 1-26. 4 Kanunısani 1331/ 26 January 1916.

132 Polat Safi, Ibid., 2.

133 ATASE, F:303, D:374. (see full dossier, partially missing).

and he would help Lumberg to disguise as a reporter and transmit articles and pictures to be published for the benefit of the Ottoman Empire. The agent stated that both of the people were close friends and asked the SB director Seyfi Bey to issue the matter to the Minister of War and also help Lumberg to fulfil his tasks.[134]

The agents were kept confidential from other institutions and acted only on behalf of SB. For instance, an agent reported to the SB headquarters that a Swedish journalist named Helberg was going to travel to İstanbul. Based on the investigation of the agent it was stated that Helberg was in İstanbul during Balkan Wars and had been in touch with the British military attache at all times and in addition she tried hard to get in touch with Ottoman War Ministry. Based on the report of the agent, SB demanded from the Security General Directorate to pursue Helberg's movements, meetings all day and night and provide reports to SB headquarters.[135]

Unlike SB's agents, other institutions had to obtain a permit before recruiting their agents or spies from the SB. For instance when the Athens Ambassador Galib bey was recruiting a spy, he requested information from the SB director Seyfi Bey. In his report, Galib asked that the person named Epos Tanasyadi applied to the Embassy. Galib Bey asked for the opinion of Seyfi Bey regarding his recruitment.[136]

Also, the payments of informants and spies were presented to embassies, ministries and other components of the General Staff. Some of the payments are listed in table 2.7;

Table 2.7 Extra Payments for Spies[137]

Mobilization Plans	40000 Lira-i Osmani
Telegram Passwords	400 Lira-, Osmani

134 ATASE, BDH,F:289,D:56,I:38-1. "From Confidential Sender to Second Branch Director Seyfi Bey", 11 Mart 1332/24 March 1916.

135 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:038. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate". 3 Nisan 1332/ 16 April 1916.

136 ATASE, F:303, D:374, I:008. "From Athens Ambassador to the Director of Second Branch", 19 August 1915/1 September 1915.

137 ATASE, BDH, F:314, D:381, I:024-04, "Extra Fundings for Spies".

War/Navy Ministry Battle Plans	2200 Lira-i Osmani
Maps	5 Lira-i Osmani

The last thing to present is the delivery of information via HUMINT sources such as messengers, informants and spies. The only document that provides an insight on the matter is a book published by the General Staff, the "Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi". In the book it was stated that delivering the obtained information was provided by both living and non-living means. The messengers would be on foot, horse or motorcyle. Messengers on foot were asked to travel a kilometer in 10 minutes. The traveling time of a messenger on horse was secretly denoted via symbols on the envelope they had previously received. If the messenger saw a cross (x) on the envelope, he would understand that he would travel one kilometer in 7-8 minutes. When two crosses (xx) sign were seen on the news envelope, it was understood that one kilometer would take 6-7 minutes. Three crosses (xxx) indicated that one kilometer would take 3- 4 minutes. Communication posts, chained to each other, were also used in the delivery of the news. They would be not only on foot but also on horseback and motorized vehicles. The distances between horseback communication posts were 15-20 kilometers in common. The distance that motorized vehicles covered between posts would be no more than 30-40 kilometers. Other special messengers were also used such as pigeons and dogs, in addition to other technical or other means of communication, such as telegraph, telephone, radio, light, smoke and fire.[138]

To conclude, in this section, I focused on the sources of intelligence and I assessed their contribution to the SB. This section SB began to be the intelligence section where all other institutions and sources canalized their information. As other countries' intelligence organizations

138 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 384.

were divided into different institutions, the Ottoman Empire's political aim and war conditions merged all these tasks into one institution, inevitably giving it a right to take part in the policy-making process. Aside from some technological lack, the SB could be viewed as similar to a modern intelligence organization. Also, in modern Turkey, aside from the National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı), distinct and separate intelligence institutions responsible for intelligence gathering are missing. The SB shows a similarity to the centralization of intelligence within modern context. And in the larger picture, although SB was established in similar to different intelligence sections with different contributing sources, as in the British, French and American examples, SB represented the tendency to centralization. This chapter contributed to the notion of centralization through contextualizing the sources of intelligence and the SB.

§ 2.3 Intelligence Cycle in Second Branch Headquarters

In this section I will focus on the intelligence cycle within the SB headquarters. Previous sections focused on the theoretical description of intelligence; intelligence levels, the traditional intelligence cycle, administrative structure of the SB and the commonly used sources. In this section, I will present the intelligence cycle of the SB, and its relation with other institutions. In addition, this section will reveal how the SB made use of the sources and disseminated information to other branches. As previously illustrated, the SB was divided into four departments and these four departments analyzed information from variety of sources. Therefore in this section I will first present the coordination between the departments under SB, in order to understand the analysis and dissemination process. Subsequently, I will focus on the traditional intelligence cycle within the SB headquarters and present some cases. This section will help us to understand how all the theoretical and practical insight contributed to the intelligence flaw within the Empire, the tendency of centralization and how SB represented a modernizing intelligence institution in the early 20th century.

As stated before, the intelligence disseminated by intelligence organizations' contributed to the whole picture of policy-making. The intelligence types were gathered amongst different sources at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Tactical intelligence - being an urgent process - does not always require an institutional analysis but rather a momentary analysis that is mostly conducted in the warzone unit. However, operational and strategic information regarding foreign, domestic and political intelligence goes through a particular process in an institution's headquarter.

As stated in the first section of this chapter, the first process of the intelligence cycle is identifying the requirements. Once the requirement is detected then information-gathering from a variety of sources begins.[139]

These sources can be a single source, such as a spy, agent or informant. For instance, an embassy can make use of different sources[140] and cross-check the information before transmitting it to an intelligence organization.[141] As intelligence types differed in many ways, many institutions were established across various countries to process information accurately and rapidly.[142] Once an intelligence institution gath-

139 Intelligence is the processed form of information, therefore, the definition should not be considered the same. If all information is considered to be intelligence then everything would be intelligence. Therefore the distinction is significant between the two, see; J. Ransom Clark, Ibid., 1-3.

140 Even though espionage is legally forbidden, the attache and ambassadors' reports were also prepared from clandestine activities and sources. See; Markus Pöhlmann, Ibid., 25-54.

141 After identifying the requirements, the sources are organized for collecting information about those requirements, each of the institution gathers their own sources either for the required information and analyses the collected information and disseminates it as intelligence. See Matthew S. Seligman, Ibid., 83. The sources and methods are not always clandestine as they could be derived from a non-intelligence source such as newspapers; see, Michael Herman, Ibid., 43.

142 Sometimes a single source intelligence institution can benefit from other intelligence organizations' disseminated intelligence, while analyzing and disseminating their

ers enough data to make an assessment, the process of analysis starts. The contribution of the analysist is also significant especially atat a tactical level as they had to come up with an analysis in a shorter time.[143]

The collection process also derives from different necessities. Types of requirements define the collection methods and sources. For instance the information and sources for tactical intelligence could be different than operational intelligence. Tactical intelligence, on the other hand, could be analyzed and disseminated from a single institution due to its urgent condition.[144]

The collected information, if not tactical, generally comes in a raw form which needs to be analyzed before being disseminated. For instance, information could be transmitted about the political condition of a country, a city or a town. However, coming up with a prediction of intention, and contributing to grand strategy, requires good analysis before dissemination. Intelligence institutions can benefit from a single source or all source analysis while dealing with strategic intelligence.[145] Dissemination which is the last process of intelligence in which the information's analyzed and transmitted to regarding consumers.[146] During war period as SB's tasks extended in time, other institutions that provided intelligence to decision-makers also became sources for the SB.

Before presenting the intelligence cycle and some cases within the SB headquarters, I want to present the coordination and process of each department within the SB to clarify the intelligence process. The coordination I will present contains the coordination analysis and procedure within the SB headquarters. The urgent - or in other words "tactical" -

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reports. Also this cooperation is needed when information is received from multiple sources as an analysis can get complicated. Michael Herman, Ibid., 43.

143 Michael Handel, "Intelligence and Military Operations" in *Intelligence and Military Operations*, ed. Michael Handel (USA: Frank Cass, 1990), 27.

144 Mark M. Lowenthal, Ibid., 29.

145 Mark M. Lowenthall, Ibid., 82.; Michael Herman, Ibid., 100.

146 Dissemination is also called exploitation and is the process of gathering information by using a source and benefitting from that information. See J. Ransom Clark, Ibid., 174.

intelligence reports were mostly analyzed by intelligence officers in other institutions, on behalf of the SB and will be presented within the foreign and domestic intelligence chapters.[147]

As stated previously in section two, the SB was separated into four different departments:

1. foreign intelligence
2. counter-espionage
3. publications and censorship
4. political and confidential

The first department was tasked with the duty of following "foreign countries" and was divided into five desks (see Table 2.8).

Table 2.8 Administration and Tasks of the First Department of Second Branch.[148]

Directors of Desks	Responsible From
1st Desk: Major Sadık	Russian and Roman Armies, Caucasus Front, Germany-Austria and the Eastern Front(Bulgarian Border)
2nd Desk: Major Nazmi	British Army, Iraq and Sinai Fronts
3rd Desk: Major Ali Rıza	France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, America, Japan, Italy and the Western Front
4th Desk: Lieutenant Ali Rıza	Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Macedonian Front
5th Desk: Lieutenant Hüsamettin, Lieutenant Mustafa and Lieutenant Ahmet	Hostile Navy, indicents at sea fronts in hostile territories and Ottoman Allies.

Each desk officer was responsible from analyzing and preparing reports in the order written below.[149]

147 The SB had intelligence officers who acted on behalf of the SB in Armies, Navy, Censorship Directorates, Security General Directorate, see; ATASE; F:303, D: 374, I:007, Undated.

148 For the names and ranks of the officers who served under the foreign intelligence section of the SB see; ATASE,BDH, F:321, D:1296, I:027. "The First Department of the Second Branch", undated.

- Organization of the armies, political and economic conditions of states.
- Mobilization and deployment.
- Organization on battlefronts, predicted time and the size of deployment.
- The independent units of regiment and brigades, divisions and bigger organizations, orders, conditions and predictions of attacks.
- The amount of weapons, equipment and time needed for supply and reinforcements, provisions and time of construction, disposition and range.
- The type and amount of weapons and the names of the commanders and committees.
- The management and its methods, skills and the degree of adhibition.
- The construction or the percentage of devastation caused on occupied areas.
- Attitudes towards the local citizens, surveilance and arrangement.
- Maintenance of their military organizations and civil services.

It was the duty of the first department to track, record, inscribe and type the aforementioned issues in the war journals. Once the duty was complete, the journals had to sent to commanderships, military deputies, military attaches and the allies' general staff deputies. Telegrams and correspondence had to be delivered as daily and weekly, depending on the requirement.

For the second department (counter-espionage), in the archive documents, the number of desks and the name of personnel were missing. However, their tasks and the order of their reports were defined. The

149 The reports were kept in the dossier and also the weekly and daily reports were distinguished depending on their level of importance. ATASE,BDH, F:321, D:1296, I:027. "The tasks of the First Department of the Second Branch".

counter-espionage department had many tasks concerning domestic security. It had to analyze the police reports sent about political movements, sabotage, spying activities, and travelling details of suspected citizens and also conduct restrictions and policy-making for possible security concerns. The personal records of citizens of the empire and foreigners who were suspected of spying activities would be put into the dossier and kept hidden in the office of the directorate. Urgent reports - as in those the foreign intelligence department - did not require an approval from the intelligence director. The rest of the intelligence were distinguished as "daily" or "weekly" and was presented to the directorate. The officers at the counter-espionage department had to prepare intelligence reports in the following order.[150]

- Entrances and exits to ministries and general staff,
- Biographies of the suspects
- Entrances and exits from land, harbors and borders.
- Travelers, merchants, traders and international business people
- Influencing Local Citizens/leaders
- Reports sent from the Ministry of Internal Relations, Security General Directorate, Intelligence officers in Army Commanderships, Censorship Inspectorates, Censorship Committees, Martial Law Courts.

The department that possibly required the most coordination was the third department which was responsible for publications and censorship. This department's desks and names were also missing (possibly classified), but the names of the assigned officers' in Censorship Inspectorates will be presented in the next chapter on propaganda and

150 The counter-espionage department also benefitted from the other departments in the case of spying activity from the telegram centers, information leakage from press publications or illegal exits and entrances at the borders, see: ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:01-001. "Tasks and Duties of the Second Department of the Second Branch".

censorship. This department had to analyze and disseminate information gathered from domestic and foreign publications. It analyzed press publications that would be useful for the operations of the army, domestic security and foreign policy. This department also had to conduct the task of censorship procedures within the empire that contributed to domestic security.[151]

It also assigned intelligence officers and censorship inspectors at censorship directorates. As stated before in the re-organization of the whole army, all the personnel who would be recruited to the censorship directorates would also have to pass an interview with the department's intelligence officer.[152] Therefore the department for publications and censorship also took part in domestic intelligence by installing intelligence officers and inspectorates to control the entrance of letters and telegram directorates. Besides this duty, this department also had to transmit the daily bulletins of hostile states that concerned the Ottoman army. The order of gathered intelligence was as follows:[153]

- Political, military and economic condition of hostile and neutral states
- Suspicious columns in foreign press
- Suspicious columns in domestic press
- Information leakage
- Black propaganda activities
- Reports of letters delivered by couriers and telegrams

151 The publications department was probably one of the most used departments of the SB as it had not only followed intelligence on military and political issues but also it was responsible from all censorship inspectorships. All the recruitment for these inspectorates were chosen from an assigned intelligence officer recommended by the third department of the SB, see; ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:320, I:01-001. "Tasks and duties of the Third Department of the SB".

152 ATASE, BDH, F:443,D: H1, I:001-03. "Orders of the censorship officers chosen by an interview and approval with SB officers and Directorate", 28 Temmuz 1330/10 August 1914.

153 ATASE, BDH,F:366, D:420, I:001-01,001,002. "From the SB director Seyfi Bey to the all the departments of the Second Branch".

The fourth department, "politics and confidential" had to follow the political reports sent from the Ministry of Interior and police departments about the political situation within the country. Information on this department were not granted in the archives therefore I cannot present the desks, names or well-clarified tasks of the department. However one thing to be certain is that the Civilian Intelligence Committee that recruited spies and informants were hired by this department of the SB. In addition this department also controlled the foreign publications to see if it either included political or military issues that might violate state policies. For this purpose, the National Agency and Intelligence Committee of the SB would form a basis for its denial and make the necessary publications urgently within the state or abroad to conduct counter-propaganda activities.[154]

As stated before, war-time led to an overlap between domestic and foreign intelligence and all four of these departments analyzed the reports sent from the sources outlined previously. Different to western intelligence institutions, the SB had a position of increased institutional power. Therefore the coordination of the departments also overlapped, as did the types of intelligence. The foreign intelligence department also received information regarding spies and suspects, and it had to prepare a report to the counter-espionage department for analysis. As the publications and censorship department was responsible for controlling telegrams and mail (either sent or received) it transmitted the suspected mail or telegrams to the second department (counter-espionage) as a 'suspicious information' leakage or spying activity. Conversely, any publication, mail or telegram that might be a subliminal message, information leakage, a refugee or deserter that crossed the Empire's borders, were directly presented to the counter-espionage department. Also the first department (foreign intelligence) and the third department (publications and censorship) were coordinated. As the foreign newspaper reports were sent to the first department then transmitted

154 ATASE, BDH,F:366, D:1458, I:001-002,003."From the Second Branch director Seyfi Bey to the all the departments of the Second Branch", Kanun-u Sani 1330/ January 1915.

to the third department, the third department then gave the task to the censor inspectorates to publish beneficial newspaper bulletins in the national agency.[155]

Although the publications and censorship department gathered information from publications, the other departments also provided intelligence regarding publications and presented them to the third department. Even the publications that were censored - but contained either a military or political threat – had to be underlined and presented to the SB director.[156] There was a collaboration between each desk of each department. If information arrived to one desk that concerned another desk, immediately the information would be given to the desk in responsible. The officer who was responsible from the battlefronts had to record and locate the positions on the map.[157]

The intelligence reports considered as "urgent" could be disseminated directly without consulting the directorate or other sections. By "urgent" I refer to ones that needed immediate response from SB headquarters. Non-urgent intelligence reports were summarized and categorized as "daily" or "weakly" political-military intelligence reports and issued to the directorate. In modern parlance, the classification could be presented as "basic" and "current". The weekly reports were "basic" intelligence reports as they generally contained information that contributed to grand strategy rather than momentary or short term intelligence. "Daily" or "Current" intelligence, on the other hand served for a shorter time and contained operational intelligence rather than grand strategy.

155 For the correlation between the departments of the Second Branch directorate on received press publications from different administrations see; ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:001-004. Kanun-u Sani 1330/ January 1915.

156 ATASE, BDH, F:366,D:420, I:001-006. "From the Second Branch director Seyfi Bey to the all the Departments of the Second Branch", Kanun-u Sani 1330/ January 1915.

157 Document regarding, organizations, duties, departments (desks under the departments) of the Second Branch, see; ATASE, BDH, F: 321, D:569, I:027-01.

The information that came in raw form and required analysis was first recorded by the clerk of the SB. Secondly, the chiefs of the department had to distribute the information to the responsible desks. If a quotation was found on a ciphered document, then the chief had to discuss the context of the report with the desk officers before distributing to desk personnel for analysis. Before dissemination, the chief of the departments were responsible for presenting the intelligence reports to the director after 3p.m. and classify them. The "conditions of war" had to be specified on a map and disseminated directly to staff operations and the Minister for War.[158]

"Urgent" information had to be delivered from the departments to the directorate after 12a.m on the next day. Once was received from a source, each section had to classify the valuable information, categorize into subjects and report daily to the directorate. Letter "h" on the edge of the paper denoted that either telegrams or notes would be summarized by the directorate and letter "i" dennoted that it was summarized and ready for dissemination. Once the analysis of the desks were finished, draft versions were inspected by the assistant director, Edip Bey before presenting to the Director, Seyfi Bey.[159]

The departments, after their collaboration and analysis, disseminated the intelligence to the respective institutions, depending on the urgency. The weekly (basic) intelligence reports were disseminated under three journals: political and economic intelligence reports on foreign and domestic intelligence were within the *Political Intelligence Journals* (Siyasi İstihbarat Cerideleri) and the *Censorship Desk War Journals* (Sansür Masası Harb Cerideleri). Then weekly reports were presented within a publication of the SB called the *War Journal* (Harb Cerideleri).

158 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:001-001. "From the Second Branch director Seyfi Bey to the all the Departments of the Second Branch". Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ January 1915.

159 Edip Bey Served as the vice director of the SB. See: ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:001-001, Kanun-u Sani 1330/ January 1915.

The current and summarized intelligence reports were also presented as *Formal Communiques* (Teblii-i Resmi).[160]

As it was a period of war, dissaminated reports also overlapped. Almost all intelligence reports, either political or military, were also disseminated to different ministries and the Security General Directorate. For some of the disseminated intelligence reports I present examples within the footnotes.[161]

The intelligence summaries were also very similar to ones in the National Archives of Britain (TNA, FO). Their summaries, unlike the SB, were derived from different establishments within the War Office, however the reports in the era were similar. Figure 2.8 provides an example.

Figure 2.8 Intelligence Summary in TNA[162]

160 The intelligence journals were already presented in the second part of this dissertation. The Formal Communiques were transmitted to the telegram center of General Staff and sent to the National agency for publishing. Also they are translated into German and French. They are made into 5 copies and 4 of them also are sent to the German Telegram Center in Beyoğlu with a cavalry. Officer. See; ATASE, BDH, F:299, D:443, I:001. Undated-undated record.

161 ATASE, BDH, F:321, D:1296, I:006-01. "Intelligence report about the American Army to army commanderships and Supreme Headquarters", undated. This report was disseminated by the Supreme Command Headquarters to the Ministry of Foreign Relations see: BOA.HR.SYS. 2434/21. "Intelligence report sent by the German intelligence department about the condition of the US army, numbers and organization and the willingness of US citizens to join besides the triple entente", 23 Mart 1333/23 March 1917. BOA.HR.SYS. 2323/1. "The report from the director of the Second Branch about the movements of British and French Forces towards Çanakale", 11 Nisan 1331/29 Nisan 1915; BOA, DH, EUM. 3.Şb. 4/32. "Intelligence summary about Caucasus, Galippoli, Egypt, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece", 15 Mart 1331/28 March 1915". BOA. DH. EUM. 3.Şb. 14/71. "Intelligence Summaries on Syria, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece", 14 Şubat 1330/27 February 1915. BOA, DH. EUM. VRK. 14/71. "Intelligence reports on Caucasus, Black Sea, Gallipoli, Syria, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, 14 Şubat 1330/27 February 1915. BOA.HR. SYS. 2113/12. "Disseminated Report from the Second Branch about British preparations for a new attack on Jerusalem", 12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333/12 October1917.

162 TNA:PRO FO:371-2138. "Intelligence Summary". 4 September 1915



4th September, 1915.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

TURKEY --

No troops arriving at Constantinople from Asia.
Submarines busy in Marmora ; trains with troops leaving Constantinople for Uzun Koupri.
Shortage of bread in Constantinople.
Shells for heavy artillery arriving.
Submarine 54 left for Dardanelles.
10,000 tons of coal have arrived by steamers.
Location of Turkish troops.
Neighbourhood of CHATALJA reported flooded.

DARDANELLES --

Extracts from Meforce Bulletins.
Explosion on transport "Southland" near STRATI.
ISMID Railway bombarded by a submarine.
Turkish attack on SHUVLA position.
Extract from censored cablegram regarding printed matter being distributed from Allied aeroplanes.

BALKAN and POLITICAL --

Movement of troops in Austria.
Sale of gunpowder stopped in Roumania.

As discussed before, analysis represents the last stage that finalize the intelligence for distribution.[163] However, the extended tasks of the SB and the wartime conditions reduced the reliability of the sources. Therefore, intelligence summaries, especially ones regarding military movements were estimative.

Daily intelligence and urgent reports generally involved army commanderships, divisions and Security General Directorate as they were mainly operational and tactical. For military purposes, the departments firstly disseminated the intelligence reports to Staff Operations, other branches of Supreme Command, General Staff, Naval Ministry and Fleet Command, Third and Fourth Army Commanderships, Iraq Commandership and Iran mobile force Commandership. The political and foreign intelligence on the other hand were summarized weekly and disseminated in an orderly way to the, General Staff, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign affairs.[164]

The eagerness to a centralization of intelligence in the Ottoman Empire put the SB in a complicated place. As stated before, the SB became responsible for foreign intelligence, military intelligence, political intel-

163 Thomas Fingar, *Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security* (Stanford University Press, 2011), 11.

164 ATASE, BDH, F:366,D:320,I:001-002: "Document on administrations and institutions that intelligence would be given to". ATASE, BDH, F:321, D:436, I:001. Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ January 1915.

ligence and security, censorship, propaganda and they gathered strategic, operational and tactical intelligence on the regarding contents. Although these intelligence tasks overlapped, carrying the heavier burden, the SB's dissemination about these intelligence types were divided into different administrations. Due to an information overload, the SB processed and disseminated to almost every administrative, ministry and military unit. Unlike in western institutions[165], as all the sources were canalized to the SB and its administrative extension, the SB became a top -level institution for the total assessment of intelligence during World War I. The intelligence cycle in the SB, as in all intelligence institutions, began with identifying the requirements. The identifying process also represents the connection between the institutions and the SB. For long term planning and political concerns, the Grand Viziership (Sadaret) and the Ministry of War held the top level amongst institutions. As it was a period when Martial Law was administered, Ministry of War was the most effective institution in the state. Although the top institution responsible from counter-espionage was the SB, Ministry of Internal Relations and Martial Law Courts, also demanded information from the SB for its uppermost position in domestic security. As for operations and battlefronts, it was the components of the Supreme Command Headquarters that demanded and provided intelligence. Of course, these are general limitations. Although foreign and domestic intelligence overlapped, still it does not mean that Supreme Command Headquarters or other ministries did not request any information regarding domestic security or political information regarding foreign intelligence. From now on I will provide exemplification of the intelligence cycle, rather than detailing the intelligence reports' general contributions. The levels, contributions and practices of foreign and domestic intelligence will be presented in future chapters. By this way, besides the general

165 When compared with the USA, all source analysis is conducted by four different intelligence institutions as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, see Mark M. Lowenthall, Ibid., 32.

requirements in SB's tasks, the intelligence cycle can better be understood.

Although the SB became a control mechanism over all other intelligence providers (which included the ministries), still, ministries also demanded intelligence, making intelligence a double sided coin.

For instance, regarding grand strategy, the Ministry of Foreign relations required the SB to obtain information on secret political alliances that could change the course of war. We are not able to say if the SB was aware about all sorts of secret agreements, but we can surely state that it was their duty to follow such policies. One of these examples was the Maurienne Conference. [166] On the issue, the SB's first department on foreign intelligence received information from foreign press publications (unnamed) and military attaches and ambassadors (German and Viennese embassies) and prepared an analysis from their common opinions. Based on the disseminated report the main aim of Britain and France was to convince Italy to support the occupying German Army in the West and East. In the result of a success, İzmir would be given to Italy and Alexandretta to France and Syria would be a divided zone. In the report it was stated that, in such a new attack, the Ottomans would not only deal with problems in Gazza but would also increase the power and morale of Greeks in their operations towards the Aegan sea. In the report it was also stated that the entente governments - through this conference - were trying to reduce peaceful public opinion to gain more time in battle.[167]

The conference was held on the 19th April 1917 and the details of this agreement came to the SB a day later. It was later added to the report and was stated that this condition could turn into a real agreement unless precautions were taken. As a result the SB's predictions were accu-

166 In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs required analyzed intelligence regarding the possible trade agreements and diplomatic relations of the states. ATASE, BDH, F:488, D:367A, I:01. "From the Ministry of Foreign Relations to the Second Branch"

167 The information was derived from local newspapers and embassies (probably gathered from informants)". ATASE, BDH, F:488, D:367A, I:1,1-2,1-3.

rate, which resulted in the agreement signed in the *Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne* on the 26th September 1917.

As for domestic security, another case which was commissioned by the Ministry of Internal Relations is worthy of note. The Ministry demanded information about a suspect called Leon who was arrested and later set loose after interrogation by the police and later was not found.[168] After the demand, the second department of the SB on counter espionage, used informants to gather information about the person. In addition, after acquiring information from four different informants, Hüsrev Bey, the chief of the department, sent an urgent order to the Security General Directorate to seize the citizen called Leon, who was seen to take walks at nights.[169] Four different informants presented different information about Leon and the counter espionage analysists presented common information on his personality, physical characteristics and his address to the Security General directorate. In the report it was stated that Leon was dressing sometimes fashionable or old clothes, met women near the apartments or hotels and spoke British, French and Greek. Based on a report from a single informant who conducted interviews with ten different people and prepared their common insights, it was stated that he lived in an apartment named Pekmazek in front of the War College and traveled near military areas. Before the declaration of war he visited Egypt and the Caucasus regions. In addition, he visited a broker called Nikola who lived in Küçük Kırlangıç Street no:10, and was one of the informants who acted on behalf of a spying committee[170] in İstanbul. In the report Hüsrev Bey ordered for the arrestment of Leon

168 ATASE, BDH, F: 289,D:56, I:9. "From the Ministry of Internal Relations to the Second Branch", 10 October/ undated year.

169 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:9-1. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 14 October/ undated year.

170 The name of the committee was not presented in the report.

and Nikola immediately and demanded them to be brought to the First Army Command intelligence officer for further interrogation.[171]

The requirements were not always defined by other institutions. As it was a wartime period, the SB also identified its own requirements and came up with possible solutions, as it received many intelligence reports. On a report dating the second half of the war, on 13th July 1917, the SB disseminated a report that contained information on spying activities on railroads. In the report it was stated that spying activities were increasing in the railways to Sofia and warned the Security General Directorate. In this report it was stated that spying activities were conducted by drawing certain lines and symbols and also writing numbers on train wagons travelling on the railway line to Sofia.[172] Therefore the wagons would be checked at any cost and the travelers had to be interrogated by passport control centers and police officers.[173]

In terms of domestic security and policy-making, strategic intelligence also involved shaping the ideology and gaining public support towards war, under the perspective of the Ottoman government. The Ministry of Internal Relations and Supreme Command Headquarters demanded information from the SB on general public opinion about pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic policies.[174]

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171 In the report the details about the person was included stating that he was a tall, mustached, beetle browed, dental plated, the hand fingers were big and circled. ATASE, F:289, D:1177, I:9-2. "Disseminated report from the Second Section chief Hüsrev Bey to the Security of General Directorate", 18 October/ undated year.

172 In the report it was stated that the umbrellas of travelers should be checked at any cost, and that it was possible the spies would hide plans and pictures within the umbrella. During the check at the passport centers, the spies gave the umbrella to their friends or relatives and therefore were able to hide the documents. BOA. EUM. 5. Şb. 65/15. " From the Second Branch to the Security of General Directorate", 13 Temmuz 1333/13 July 1917.

173 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:010. "From Second Branch to Security General directorate", 14 Temmuz 1333/14 July 1917.

174 ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:1708, I:001-010. "From Ministry of Foreign Relations and Supreme Command Headquarters to Second Branch", 3 Mart 1334/03 March 1918.

The SB prepared a report on the matter by analyzing the information from domestic and also foreign sources.[175] The domestic reports were presented to the SB for analysis.[176]

The foreign sources were from the foreign press publications and presented to the second department such as the "Times" newspaper. Based on these reports analyzed by the coordination of both departments, the SB disseminated its reports. In the report it was stated that the pan-Turkish policies and discourse could only be successful with the contribution of 20 million Russian Muslims. However such unification was hard as 80% of the Russian Muslims spoke a different dialect of Turkish. Also, in the report it was stated that pan-turkish and pan-Islamic ideologies were two opposite opinions. While using pan-Islamic ideology as a weapon against Egypt and India, Pan-Turkish ideology was used against Russia. However, such a unification seemed to be an unlikely formation in the society and could cause political problems.[177] Based on such reports, even the supporters of the CUP government, amongst the press publications, were censored for untimely publications[178] which reminds us of Cengiz Kırlı's analysis[179]

For political intelligence I previously stated that conducting propaganda activities and press publications were totally under the control of

175 ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:1708, I:001-011. 8 Mart 1334/08 March 1918.

176 ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:1708, I:001-014. 11 Mart 1334/ 11 March 1918.

177 ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:1708, I:001-015a, 28 Mart 1334/28 March 1918.

178 Propaganda was a strong weapon that could easily manipulate the society, so at the beginning of the war when the Ottoman Empire declared mobilization, many war-supporting newspapers were censored about pan-Turkish publications as they would cause a decline in non-Muslims supports. Also at the beginning of the war, the propaganda activities increasing fondness of war was seen dangerous. The article "Türkün Yolu" in Donanma Mecmuası and Ziya Gökalp's "Türk'e Göre Millet" were seen as dangerous publications that caused untimely enthusiasm towards war. See, Karabekir, Ibid., 249-250.

179 The surveillance of politics changed after 1840 in the Ottoman Empire and the state infiltrated the everyday life of the society, to keep control over the public sphere, see Cengiz Kırlı, Ibid, p 25. Based on Kırlı's statements it is not surprising that an intelligence institution, especially at war, was taking the pulse of citizens in everyday society.

the SB. Therefore, censorship not only played a significant role in the prevention of information leakage and postal issues, but also domestic policies.

For military intelligence, General Staff and Staff Operations, especially, demanded intelligence on the hostile and neutral states' armies. The battle positions and the size of armies played a large part in planning for the possibility of a large conflict. For instance the SB requested the number of newly disposed Indian Brigades in India for a possible attack on the Palestine Border.[180] The SB, prepared a report sent from the German Intelligence Department, German Attache and deserter-refugees captured by the Fourth Army Commandership.[181] To do so, the second desk of the first department of foreign intelligence was prepared for an estimative number that was presented by these sources. The SB disseminated this report to staff operations.

Figure 2.9 shows a small part of the Indian Brigades. [182]

Figure 2.9 Battle Organization of the Indian Infantry Brigade

180 ATASE; BDH,F:252, D:1045, I: 1-12. "From Staff Operations to Second Branch"

181 ATASE; BDH,F:252, D:1045,I:1-15. "From German Intelligence Department to Second Branch"; BDH,F:252, D:1045,I:1-16. "From Attache to Second Branch".; ATASE, F:252, D:1045,I:, 1-17. "From "4th Army Commandership to Second Branch".

182 This disposition also was located on the map, which I analyzed as an early warning system in the Foreign intelligence and topography part of this dissertation. However based on the numbers of weapons, livestock, carriage and supplies, the SB disseminated this intelligence. It had a value of both tactical and operational intelligence. The one we gave as example here is in the brigade level, the second branch prepared a report about the disposition of the whole Indian army, from divisions to corps level and disseminated it to staff operations. For the whole organization and displacement of the Indian army please see; ATASE: BDH,F:252, D:1045, I:, 1-18,1-19,1-20,1-21,1-22,1-23,1-24, 1-25.

	Personel						Animals		Rifle and Machine Gun	
	Combatants				Recruits					
	British		Indian		Officer	Priv.	Load Carriage	Food Carriage	Rifle	Mach. Gun
	Officer	Indv	Officer	Indv						
HQ.	3	7	0	6	1	10	0	2	12	0
One British Battalian	28	810	0	0	37	46	12	6	810	2
Three Indian Battalian	39	0	51	2202	159	99	36	9	2199	6
Total	70	817	51	2208	194	155	48	17	3021	8
When the brigade moves freely, new arrivals are added.										
A platoon from the pointer company of division	1	12	-	28	0	2	6	0	333	0
A platoon of mobile British patients	1	6	0	4	47	7	0	0	0	0
Three units mobile Indian	3	1	0	15	118	17	0	0	0	0

patients										
C. Brigade food unit from shipping staff	1	4								
Brigade food unit from shipping staff	-	-								
Shipping HQ	1	2	2	10	0	4	0	0	0	0
Total	77	842	53	2270	378	196	54	17	3354	8

The SB also gathered intelligence on military technology, weaponary and supplies on a request of the Staff Operations. Against a possible attack from Romania, the SB was pressured by the General Headquarters to prepare a report to all administrative units. The SB gave overall numbers obtained from the press publications and military attaches and disseminated a report about the list of ammunition and other material supplies in the Romanian Army.[183] Table 2.9 below gives an example of the weaponary and supplies of the Romanian army.

Table 2.9 Intelligence Report on the Weaponary and Supplies of Romanian Army

Forty-Eight Pieces of Cannon	
100000	One hundred thousand 1893 model rifles
100000000	Hundred million ready to use cartridges
1000000	One hundred thousand kilogram bullets

183 The disseminated report contained detailed information that could be regarded as operational intelligence which showed the translation of the list of ammunition prepared by the Romanian Ministry of Military War and other materials that he Romanian army was trying to supply for. ATASE, BDH, F: 7, D:34, I:4-1,4-2, 4-3. undated.

1000000	One hundred thousand kilogram hand grenades
1000000	One hundred thousand kilogram shrapnel
40000	Forty thousand, for seventy-five milimeter cebel cannons arrangement shells
20000	Twenty thousand, one-hundred and fifty milimeter howitzer adjustment shells
20000	Three hundred thousand kilogram potassium nitrate
300000	Two hundred thousand kilogram oil for gunpowder manufacture
200000	Two thousand one hundred and thirty pieces of artillery horses
2130	Four thousand cavalry horses
4000	Two hundred thousand pairs of shoes
200000	Fifty thousand pairs of boots
50000	Cover for personal (one hundred thousand)
100000	One hundread thousand livestock
100000	One hundred thousand black tent fabrics
50000	Fifty thousand blac broad clothes

Of course, the requests came not only from institutions but also other smaller administrative units and even intelligence officers. For example, the intelligence officers in the armies and corps of the Ottoman Empire requested information from the SB. In a report written to the SB on the date of the 11th august 1917 intelligence officer captain Nazar Bey, who served at Yıldırım Army Group at the Palestine border, requested information about five soldiers who came from the fourth army command. Nazar Bey implied that he was busy trying to estimate the num-

bers of the opposite forces and it would be really helpful for him to receive information by a telegram sent from the commandership.[184]

The SB also crosschecked the information that were sent from attaches and its own spies. In an example, at the beginning of the war the SB prepared a report and possible numbers of the Serbian army and disseminated to Staff Operations. The report contained details about the number of soldiers, divisions, artillery and weaponry. This operational intelligence also tried to predict the potential as well as the estimated numbers and possible recruitment. The report was prepared for the long run, of course, trying to foresee possible plans and intention of the states through army movements and mobilization. Not only did it give an idea about the opponents capability for destruction but also - considering their nationality was of importance - The list was long but table 2.10 provides some detail.[185]

184 ATASE, BDH,F: 554, D: 2154, I:1. "From the Intelligence officer of Yıldırım Army Command to Second Branch", 11 Ağustos 1333/11 August 1917"; Again in another report On 20 December 1915, wanting information from the SB, a cipher sent from a messenger, carrying a message - sent from Sofia to Xahnti Greece to Naci efendi - was seized by the police. And this issue was transmitted to the SB. The SB sent a cipher message to Sofia Embassy regarding the matter. It was stated that the telegrams sent to this address by Seyfi (the director of the SB) would be accepted right away. But if couriers no longer work between Xahnti and Sofia he would like to learn the reasons for this seizure. ATASE, BDH, F:269, D:111, I:122-1. "From the Second Branch to Sofia Embassy". 7 Kanun-u Evvel 1331/ 20 December 1915.

185 ATASE; BDH, F:313,D:001, I:12 16. "Operational intelligence report disseminated to Staff Operations by the Second Branch". Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/ November 1914. 60000 soldiers and some batteries could be counted more regarding the table. Approximately the 30000 of the soldiers in the second division were deployed to Macedonia. The independent army was estimated to be 180 troops, 53 cavalry division and 137 artillery. Therefore the total amount of soldiers deployed around Maccedonia was 211,000. The report also estimated the number of soldiers that joined from Montenegro. It was stated that the Montenegrin force was approximately 30000 and half of them were deployed to Macedonia. In the latest situation, the amount of mobilized soldiers in Serbia was 300000 in which 270 thousand were deployed against Austria.

Table 2.10 The Organization of the Serbian Army

Commander Prince Regent Alexander
General Staff: Chief Radomir Putnik
Staff Operations Director: Zilov?
Independent Infantry Division: 16 Regiments, 16 Cavalry Divisions, 2800 swords and 8 Cannons
For the Defense of Belgrad: General Jakoziç? 16 Battalions, 4 Cavalry Division, 9 Rapid Fire Artillery, total 18000 soldiers, 2300 militia forces, 2000 reserve artillery
First Army: General Petar Bojovic I Timok Infantry Division-? II Timok ınfantry Division- 12 Battalions, 2 Cavalry Divisions, 6 Rapid Fire Artillery, Total 4000 soldiers. II Morava Infantry Division-12 Battalions, 3 Cavalry Divisions, 6 Rapid Fire Artillery- Total 140000 soldiers. Branicevo Detachment-16 Battalions, 3 Cavalry Divisions, 6 Rapid Fire Artillery- total 140000 soldiers. New Recruits: 8 battalions: 8000 soldiers
Second Army: Stepanoviç Estimated Numbers: 50000 Soldiers
Third Army: General Jurisic Sturm Estimated Numbers: 230000 Soldiers
Fourth Army: General Oyanot? Estimated Numbers: 180000

These few examples, justifies that from political to military and also domestic security, the SB gathered, analyzed, produced and disseminated intelligence to many institutions and units. By doing so, it had used different sources that were supposed to be working for other intelligence organizations. The traditional intelligence cycle mentioned in the first part of this chapter also worked within the SB making it a modernizing intelligence institution, around the globe..

§ 2.4 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter I focused on conceptual descriptions about the definition of intelligence, intelligence institutions' role in forming the total assessment, types of intelligence, traditional intelligence cycle, process and contributing sources. Through these conceptual frameworks I analyzed the re-organization of the SB and analyzed the tendency to cen-

tralization within its administrative structure and sources of intelligence. This section served to present that the SB adapted to the traditional intelligence cycle in the early 20th century.

Unlike some countries such as Britain, America and France, the Ottoman Empire had the tendency to the centralization in intelligence. The SB, in a short time, became the central intelligence as it had four major departments concerning foreign intelligence, counter-espionage, publications- censorship and political- confidential intelligence. Through censorship and propaganda - as they were tools in policy-making and early information gathering - SB was able to take part in policy-making. All the other institutions that gathered intelligence reported to the SB while the SB only disseminated intelligence to the relevant institutions. Subordinating the Security General Directorate to SB also represented the eagerness for intelligence. Also censorship, which provided both early information, as no postal, telegram or publications could be made without the approval of the SB intelligence officers in censorship inspectorates and telegram and postal directories, contributed to this centralization. This part of the section analyzed the SB's tendency to centralization within its administrative structure, intelligence cycle and representative cases about the sources. This section will serve as a foundation to understand the future chapters on foreign-domestic intelligence levels and practices.

3

Propaganda and Censorship

In the introduction of this dissertation, I focused on the establishment and development of modern intelligence institutions. In the previous chapter, I focused on the theories and analyzed tendencies towards the centralization of intelligence in the administrative level of SB and its sources. Lastly I presented the intelligence cycle within SB headquarters. In this section I choose to analyze the SB's tasks of propaganda and censorship, the first two extended tasks of SB and a result of its tendency towards centralization. In the first part I will analyze the significance of propaganda and contextualize its relation to intelligence. Based upon this contextualization, I will delve into the question "why the propaganda activities were given to the SB" and analyse SB's role within conducting propaganda. As propaganda was significant in identity making policies of CUP and also to gain citizens' support of the war effort, this section will not only contribute to an analysis between propaganda and intelligence but also SB's role in creating a national identity which also became an ideological heritage to modern Turkey. Censorship and propaganda are embedded topics as censorship delimitated the publications state's perspective and propaganda was a tool to increase the role of the state in policy making. In these two parts I will also present the institutional and administrative structures of SB for censorship and propaganda. However, as censorship practices did not only cover press

publications but also domestic security the detailed analysis of censorship inspectorates in terms of domestic security will be discussed in the next chapter on domestic intelligence.

§ 3.1 Propaganda

During mobilization for the First World War, the developed countries in Europe used propaganda to steer their societies towards the goals of government policies. The Ottoman Empire, being a multi-ethnic state, tried to leverage propaganda for gathering civilian support for warfare and prevent desertion. The propaganda practices and ideologic perspective later served as the foundations of the national identity of the Turkish Republic.[1]

Although the relation between propaganda and national identity, propaganda and mobilization is not a focus of this dissertation, it is significant to reference as it was the SB that became responsible for the control and conduct of propaganda and censorship. This illustrates that SB not only dealt with intelligence but also took part in the policy making of the state by having control, preparing the policies that were issued to press and publications, cinema, arts, selmons-preachers and exhibitions.

Before analyzing the SB's role in propaganda activities, it is essential to focus on the significance and methods of propaganda at the beginning of the World War I to clarify the control given to the SB. This general insight will not only help to clarify the extent of SB's tasks but will also give an overview to its role in the policy making process.

Propaganda was not created in World War I. In the 19th century, propaganda methods became a tool for the interest groups to influence public opinion. In order to conduct propaganda activities, surveillance of the population about "state discussion" became essential. According to Cengiz Kırlı, the Ottoman State not only intervened into the tradition-

1 Erol Köroğlu, Ibid., xxi.

al political discourse but also the low levels of society in order to manage public control.[2] Thereofre, propaganda became a method and mechanism of control over the society and public sphere.

Propaganda, as a method to influence the public sphere, played an important part in the shaping of public opinion towards the aims state policies. The wartime conditions increased the state control over the society more than ever.[3]

During World War I, propaganda was under the control of the states even in developed countries such as the United States of America. A former journalist named George Creel, the chief propagandist of the state, said

> " *what was needed, and what we installed, was official machinery for the preparation and release of all news bearing upon America's war effort- not opinion nor conjuncture but facts…. Newspapermen of standing and ability were sworn into the goernment service and placed at the very heart of the endeavor in the War and Navy departments, in the War Trade Board, the War Industries Board, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Labor*".[4]

Therefore, propaganda was significant in canalizing the public opinion for gaining supporters and their economic contribution. Propaganda activities in Europe was conducted to put aside the political and social differences and unite towards a common objective.[5]

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2 Cengiz Kırlı, Ibid., 25.

3 Hew Strachan, Ibid., 143.

4 The only military intelligence section that conducted propaganda activities was not only the Second Branch. In the USA although the military had no say in policmaking, MI-2 (2nd military intelligence battalion) maintained close liaison with Creel's organization to canalize the military strageties with national effort. James. L.Gilbert, *World War I and the Origins of U.S Military Intelligence* (UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2012), 105-106.

5 For the propaganda activities conducted in European countries see; Peter Buitenhuis, *The Great War of Words: British, American and Canadian Propaganda and Fiction, 1914-1933* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987); Garry S. Messinger,

As for the Ottoman Empire, the shaping of propaganda also changed after the defeat in the Balkans and the 1913 coup. Along with the belief that a strong army was the solution to salvation, the state sympatized towards nationalistic opinions on a single ethnicity policy.[6]

So associations such as Ottoman Navy League (Donanma-yı Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti) and National Defense League (Müdaafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti) actively took part spreading nationalist ideas and raising public support for war in terms of donations, funding refugees, medical support, volunteers and recruitment. The purpose of Ottoman Navy League was mainly economical and aimed to contribute for the construction of a new and strong navy. Discourses were set in the context of giving donation was an act of patriotism.[7]

From press publications, many newspapers and journals such as İkdam, Tanin, Tasvir-i Efkar and journals such as Donanma Mecmuası, Harp Mecmuası, Türk Yurdu, Yeni Mecmua contributed to state propaganda for raising public support. In additon to printed methods, oral propaganda also played an important role as the illiteracy was common in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore acts, music and marches, demonstrations, selmons-preachers, the tools of oral and visual propaganda, were significant to reaching illeterate subjects of the Empire.[8]

The effect of press publications increased with the expansion of schools and railways in the 19th century. In 1914, publications provided an effective tool in directing public opinion for war enthusiasm and aligning citizen aims to the state. This crucial method to mobilize people

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British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (New York: Manchester University Press, 1992); Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Alfred (New York: A. Knopf, 1923); Aviel Roshwald and Richard Stites, *European Culture in the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment and Propaganda, 1914-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

6 Erol Köroğlu, Ibid., 119.

7 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 50-52.

8 For full assessment of the newspapers and writers that conducted nationalist propaganda activities see Erol Köroğlu, Ibid.; and for the role of oral propaganda and methods see Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 89-96.

towards war was also effectively used by other countries such as Britain, France, Germany and USA. As a total war, the state needed the support of the civilians more than ever. This meant that imprinting the idea of mobilization into regular citizens needed not only the assistance of press publications but also control over them.

Compared to Ottoman Empire, the well-developed Western European propaganda was much more beneficial due to the literacy rates amongst the population. However, Ottoman Empire suffered not only from lower literacy rate. but also the efforts for creating public propaganda had few contributors. Only a small percentage of institutionalized propaganda activities were conducted within the Empire.[9] The detailed success or failures of propaganda are not included in this dissertation, as I analyze all the aforementioned insight strictly within the context of Intelligence and SB.

The SB's path to conducting and controlling propaganda activities began with Martial Law (idare-i örfi), with the duty of censorship being given to Central Headquarters. The Publishing Directorate (matbuat müdüriyeti) was normally under the order of the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs. Due to mobilization, the censorship increased and Central Headquarters became responsible for censorship practices.[10] This duty was later taken from the Central Headquarters and given to the SB.[11] After the SB was re-organized, it also became responsible for the control and censorship of all press publications conducting and controlling propaganda activities.[12]

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9 See Erik Jan Zürcher, "Little Mehmet in the Desert: The Ottoman Soldier's Experience", in *Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced*, eds. Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (London: Leo Cooper, 1988), 230-232.

10 Erol Köroğlu, Ibid., 13. But this duty was just on paper; although at the beginning of the war the Censorship was given to General Staff, still the General staff gave the task to Second Branch see: ATASE, BDH. F:443, H1, I:1-1. 24 temmuz 1330/6 August 1914.

11 DH.EUM.5.Şb. 7/54. 27 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ 9 January 1915.

12 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:004-01. "The establishment of War Propaganda Section under the Command of the Second Branch". Undated.

SB was able to to gain public support for the war due to its capacity for gathering intelligence about public opinion, culture and condition within the Empire grounds. It is normally expected to be The Ministry of Interior would normally be responsible for such policy making. However, the political thought after the defeat in Balkans, the beginning of the First World War and soldiers becoming the decision makers in the state after 1913 coup, made this Branch's effects even stronger. As Karabekir stated the SB was not only responsible for organizing domestic propaganda for mobilization but also dealing with foreign propaganda activities. [13] Propaganda as a tool, allowed the army to align local populations thoughts for their own interest as well as to gain international support from other neutral states.

It is also essential to make an analysis of propaganda and intelligence activities. As stated in the second chapter, covert action is an activity that is done by intelligence communities. Propaganda, can also be considered a method of covert action if it is used to blame and accuse other countries political, military or even economic activities, also known as *black propaganda*.[14] Propaganda is also a part of political intelligence as it could affect both domestic and foreign policies.[15] It could also be used as a method to decrease hostile countries' citizens from further mobilization by decreasing their morale and to manipulate the local citizens in a warzone.[16]

Civillians living around the areas of battlefield are targeted by the state for support. Therefore, propaganda does not only effect the central cities in a country but also the periphery. In order to create a global propaganda in international policies, the press publications and spies also served covertly to manipulate the relationships among countries.[17]

13 Karabekir, Ibid., 292.

14 Michael Herman, Ibid., 55.

15 Merve Seren, Ibid., 317.

16 Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: Topyekûn Savaşa İlişkin Alman Kavramı", 427.

17 Political action, propaganda and paramilitary activities are all concerns of intelligence institutions and covert action. See; J. Ransom Clark, Ibid., 93. ; Karabekir stated that

Propaganda is not only a domestic tool but can be implemented in foreign policies through the use of black propaganda.[18] For instance, Karabekir states in his memoirs that " *At the beginning of the mobilization, the German and French newspapers distributed in Beyoğlu started publishing their own successes and the enemies defeat. We had to struggle against both of them*".[19] Therefore not only propaganda of the hostile states but allies became a problem for the Ottoman Empire. For solution, SB sent an order to Internal Ministry and General Staff that even German or Austrian military officers or civillians were prohibited from any sort propaganda activity, even in favour of the Empire. In case of an attempt, it was requested from the Ministry to send the identity tand the degree of those who engagement in propaganda activities directly to SB headquarters.[20] This struggle kept going in the directorship of Seyfi Bey who was the successor of Karabekir. In another report sent by the director, Seyfi Bey, to the commanderships it was stated that German officers were tasked with only conducting military activities within the army. Neither the soldiers or other state officials had the right to form relations with civillians for the purpose of propaganda. Neither German nor Austrian had the right to conduct propaganda even if it was for the benefit of the Ottoman Empire's. Seyfi Bey had seen it as a method of Germans to gain an advantage in the Ottoman public sphere. For Seyfi Bey, even an allied states officials should not be permitted to engage in such practices. Seyfi Bey demanded the names and

Germans even had spies in Ottoman Lands who conducted oral propaganda methods that manipulated the Society towards joining the war, Karabekir, Ibid., 286.

18 The German Intelligence Bureau for the East also set a propaganda section in Arabia to conduct propaganda against British. James Noone, "The Role of Military Intelligence in the Battle for Beersheba in October 1917", *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (March 2018):13.

19 According to Karabekir, the Germans Propaganda methods were dangerous as it opposed the other ethnic societies in the Empire, Karabekir, Ibid., 290.

20 ATASE, BDH, F:303, D:374, I:007. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Internal Relations". Undated- undated record.

occupations of those who conducted propaganda activities be sent directly to himself within a confidential report.[21]

SB not only dealt with domestic propaganda activities but also with foreign states. In order to prevent news that might be against the Ottoman Empire, SB also took part in international relations between neutral states and the Ottoman Empire. For instance, at the beginning of the war, SB transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a ciphered report about the denial of certain foreign press publications. In the report it was written that in order to prevent defiling the operations of the Ottoman army and to sow a discord between the allies, the SB wanted to redact certain press publications along with Bulgarian and Romanian national agencies about the articles in the hostile states agencies. The SB officials tried to set the course between the two countries' agencies in order to prevent them from making news that might be against the Ottoman Empire and requested not to publish any hostile articles and deny the claims. However, the Bulgarian and Romanian agencies did not accept the terms. As a result, another recommendation came from Seyfi Bey that the Bulgarian and Romanian journalists in the Ottoman lands could be paid in secret to deny hostile news. By doing so, the journalists could also coordinate with Press Directorate under the control of SB and the General Staff Staff. Seyfi Bey demanded their payments to be given by the state as long as they published according to SB's declarations.[22] As it can be seen from this report, the SB not only contacted with other countries' press agencies but also use the foreign journalists against their own agencies to conduct counter-propaganda.

Another report sent by the SB to all embassies requires attention. The report covered a copy of a retraction concerning a battlecruiser sent to National Agency was also distributed to embassies. Seyfi Bey asked all the embassies to distribute the news to other states' agencies.

21 ATASE, BDH, F:303, D:374, I:007-001-002. "From the Second Branch to Army Commanderships and Ministries", 09 Mayıs 1331/22 July 1915.

22 ATASE, BDH, F:543, D:156, I:005. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Internal Relations", 6 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ January 1915.

In the retraction, it was declared by the General Staff that the Midilli battle cruiser damaged a Russian torpido ship on 10 June, 1915, in the Black Sea. On the contrary, the national agency in Petersburgh published on 2 June that no Russian torpedo ships were damaged. Seyfi Bey demanded the distribution the news everywhere and imply that this was a Russian plan to hide the damages and casualties to their armies as to not lose the trust of their public support.[23]

The SB also urged that foreign "black propaganda" could cause a dispute amongst allies and might trigger a rebellion or decrease the morale of troops. As Karabekir states that *"...although we spotted that they deployed ten times more forces against us, their propaganda was so strong by using their press that we were not even able to convince our superiors about the matter. They implied that their forces were really small and were afraid of our attack and always made everyone believe their propaganda."*[24]

Another report was sent after Russian forces occupying Erzurum in order to prevent potential dispute between the allies, and to avoid inner conflict and desertion. As the SB was responsible for propaganda, this task included the prevention of "black propaganda" against the state. The SB transmitted a report to the Foreign Ministry that encouraged precautionary measures. In the report, it was stated that Erzurum was not arbitrarily more important than the Russians stated and the importance it deserved. The use of old cannons dating back to 93 expeditions, and providing only enough food for two days was clear evidence that Ottomans did not want to use Erzurum as a castle. In addition, as the Russians declared that they took it in a month in constant 5 day attack, this was a lie that Ottoman soldiers abandoned the city in two days giving Russians lots of casualties. The Russian soldiers therefore could not attempt a new operation and tried to cover their own casualties with propaganda. In addition, the SB also gave information about the

23 ATASE, BDH, F:543, D:156, I:005-015. "From the Second Branch to all Embassies", 22 Mayıs 1333/10 June 1915.

24 Karabekir, Ibid., 292-293.

location of the retreat and stated that the army repositioned a few kilometers west of Bitlis, Yavi, Aşkale, İspirle, Rize.[25] In fact, on February 21, 1916, almost a month before the report about Russians' propaganda, a report was transmitted by the SB to Foreign Ministry to give information about the reasons of not defending Erzurum.. It was stated in the report that it was unnecessary to preserve the city as Erzurum was not a fortified location. It was in a vulnerable and open condition surrounded by old roads that did not have a military value.[26]

As stated in the previous chapter, SB also used OEA (Umur-ı Şarkiyye Dairesi) the successor of SO (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) for conducting propaganda activities to infiltrate where the regular army could not. For instance, The Embassies of Stockholm and Copenhagen delivered press publications to SB from the national agencies that contained articles titled *French Atrocities in Morocco*.[27] The SB presented a report to General Staff that the translation and distribution of this news in Algeria and Tunisia would be for the political interest of the Ottoman Empire.[28] Having approval from the General Staff, the SB ordered OEA directorate to distribute the published articles amongst the citizens in the aforementioned areas to cause protests and uprisings against the French and British soldiers.[29] Another report I would like to highlight here is that when the Ministry of Foreign Relations requested from the OEA directorate to distribute some press publications in Caucasus region, the Di-

25 Two weeks after occupying Erzurum it was noted that Russians were conducting black propaganda and exaggerating the victory, see; BOA. HR. SYS. 2112/1. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Foreign Relations", 3 Mart 1332/ 14 March 1916.

26 BOA. HR. SYS, 2111/12. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 8 Şubat 1331/21 February 1916.

27 ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:403, I:020. "From the Embassies of Stockholm and Coopenhagen to Second Branch", 12 Ağustos 1333/ 12 August 1917.

28 ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:403, I:020-01. "From the Second Branch to General Headquarters", 13 Ağustos 1333/ 13 August 1917.

29 ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:403, I:020-01-001. "From the Second Branch to OEA directorate", 14 Ağustos 1333/ 14 August 1917.

rector Ali Bey (Başhampa) replied that the Ministry had to have the consent of SB which is another indicator of SB's institutional position.[30]

In addition, SB not only kept track of propaganda activities within the Empire, but also within its allies. For instance, on 23 March, 1918, SB's counter-espionage department at Sofia transmitted to German military officials stating that an Austrian revolutionist named Otto Bader was conducting propaganda activities under order of Lenin against Germany.[31]

The second important reason between intelligence and propaganda was the tendency to centralization process. An intelligence institution having control on all press publications shows that besides acting in an advisory capacity, it became a part of the policy-making process as it became the decision maker on censorship and oversee the publications and propaganda activities.

Thirdly, in order to gain popular support for war, propaganda played an important role in domestic policies of the state. As stated, the militaristic policies in the state increased after the defeat in the Balkans along with the 1913 coup, and the application of martial law with the mobilization for World War I. This resulted in the Ministry of War becoming a strong actor in the decision making process. In addition, by giving such responsibility to an intelligence institution, General Staff also benefited from having information about social culture, values and morale and how to canalize their opinions towards the policies of the states.[32] As the embassies and other institutions reportd to SB about any information that could be counted as an intelligence, SB either received the summaries or the newspapers that were published. For instance the

30 ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:1317, I:020-01. "From the OEA director to Ministry of Foreign Relations", 9 Eylül 1332/ 9 September 1915

31 ATASE, BDH, F:303, D:374, I:1-26. "From Sofia Counter-Espionage Section of Second Branch to German Military Command", 23 Mart 1334/23 March 1918.

32 There are other examples from the world concerning intelligence and propaganda, for instance when CIA was established it had worked together with Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) which conducted the duties of recording, translation and propaganda broadcasts.see; J.Ransom Clark, Ibid., 29.

military attache in Switzerland sent many copies of newspapers and their prices in Franc for subscription. Table 3.1 below serves as an instance.

Table 3.1Subscription fees of Newspapers and Prices in France[33]

0.25	Temps
0,20	Figaro
0,10	Lum Anişte?
0,10	Matin
0,15	Victoria
0,10	Echo de Paris
0,20	Earmondial
16 (3 month membership price)	French Illustrasione

As these tasks could have been done by General Staff or other departments, based on our own analysis, this could have been the reason why the SB gained such prominence in the policy making process.

Fourth reason, the policies conducted during the World War I was pretty similar to Colmar Von Der Goltz ideas of a nation at arms, in other words creating a soldier society (Asker Toplum). The militarization of the society was therefore given to the intelligence branch as it had spies that also collected political intelligence from the society. Even nowadays, physical education classes still represent such ideas as the training and warm-up exercises resemble the military education of an infantry soldier.

Propaganda was conducted not only to increase the commitments and support for war but also took part in shaping the political and national ideology. According to many reseachers and scholars, establishing the national identity of modern Turkey began after the Balkan Wars and completed in the republican period. Based on the general view, different from the Western states, the propaganda policies between 1914-1918 in the Ottoman Empire was conducted not only to gain support for war or prevent desertion from the armies but also shaped a national identity.

33 ATASE, BDH, F:325, D:1310, I:1-28 "From the Switzerland Military Attache to Second Branch", undated.

Like the militarist and nationalist ideas that shaped the army, the prominent reason for shaping the propaganda began with the Balkan Wars defeat and the sympathy of CUP administration to Turkish nationalism during the First World War. As a result, the propaganda activities also shaped politics and culture.[34] Therefore, propaganda played an important role in the creation of national identity, war support and struggling with foreign publications.

Establishing such a section and putting it under the SB had another reason, which was security. During war, spies were disguised as photographers, actors or musicians. For instance, a spy conceiling himself could disguise as a street photographer in order to capture images of artilerry units just before they were relieved of duty. As the soldiers are eager to give photos standing next to their weapons, the spy could take the picture of the location of the cannon while the soldiers were posing next to it. By establishing a platoon, under the leadership of an officer, the SB worked to prevent such infiltration. Mobile theatre companies were also established to be involved in espionage. The actresses of the theatre staff would get close to soldiers in order to use various medicinal drugs that rendered them unconscious, allowing the women to search the belongings of the soldiers while they were asleep.[35] There-

34 Erol Köroğlu, Ibid., 13. Besides Köroğlu there are many other researchers and scholars who supports the idea that CUP's propaganda policy shaped the national identity of modern Turkey. See: Edward, J, Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, Mehmet Beşikçi, "İktidarın Çelik Sembolleri: I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Donanma Sembolizmi ve Milliyetçi Propaganda", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 127 (July 2004): 92-95.; Zafer Toprak, *İttihad – Terakki ve Cihan Harbi;* François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri Yusuf Akçura 1876- 1935* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996); Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A study of Irredentism* (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1981); Carter Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom, a Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1985); Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, İttihat ve Terakki, Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000).

35 Walter Nikolai, the Director of Abteilung IIIb presented a conference in the Military Academy in Istanbul in 1926. In the conference he discussed some methods on propaganda. See; Hasan Ateş, *İstihbarat Konferansları* (Detay Yayınları,2016), 36-39.

fore, civilians and organizations who were not vetted and approved by the SB were less likely to be granted access to the trenches and soldiers.

To control and conduct propaganda activities a new branch called Domestic War Propaganda Branch (Dahili Harb Propaganda Şubesi) was established under the command of the SB's third Section *Publications and Censorship*. In the document regarding the tasks of this branch, it was clearly stated that the personnel for conducting propaganda activities in newspapers would be recruited by this branch, and those who were not approved were forbidden from conducting propaganda activities. Those who did not obey the law would be punished by the regulations of the SB[36] or would be trialed in the Martial Law Courts.[37]

The purpose of the branch, according to the establishment document, "*was to publish and explain the possible effects victory or defeat, sacrifices to Ottoman Islam World and work for the success of the war by showing the sacrifices that people made behind the troops*". The branch, in other words, tried to boost patriotic ideals among the people to unite and work towards achieving victory in the war. While conducting the propaganda activities, the main message would be that "*that the sacrifices made would not be forgotten by the people, and that those sacrifices were praised and welcomed with pride.*"[38] This indeed could be seen in *War Magazine* (Harb Mecmuası) which was published by the SB and under the supervision of the War Propaganda Branch. The Journal was issued twice a month, with a total of 27 publications between November, 1915, and June, 1918. In the journal, each volume contained the names and bibliographies of those who died during war.[39]

36 ATASE; F:443, D:H1, I:001-01a. "Regulations of Second Branch on Propaganda and Censorship", 25 Temmuz 1330/ 7 August 1917

37 "Memâlik-i Osmaniyede İdare-i Örfiye", *İkdâm* (21 Temmuz 1330/ 3 August 1914).

38 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004. "Tasks of War Propaganda Branch", undated.

39 For instance see; " Yaşayan Ölüler: Merhûm Hafız Hakkı Paşa", *Harb Mecmuası*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1 Teşrin-i Sani 1331/14 November 1915.

Conducting propaganda activities relied on several sources. Among them were the press publications, cinema, paintings and photographs, selmons and preachers, war music, theatre and the exhibition of the spoils of war.[40]

The Branch had a section responsible for press publications. This section chose newspapers located in the central region of the Empire. The newspapers had to be weekly, include photographs and were chosen among those with large distribution areas. They would be under complete control of the SB's press publications department, permitted only to publish approved articles. While the names of the writers were included in their articles, their affiliation to the SB were kept confidential. According to SB documents, many writers who supported the war policies of the Empire were part of the sanctioned propaganda endeavors. The known writers are among those who participated directly in the *War Magazine*, published by the SB. The writers who contributed to the *War Magazine* include Ziya Gökalp, Ahmed Nedim, Midhat Cemal, Süleyman Nazif.[41]

As it was stated before, the SB was responsible for all press publications and had the right to censor newspapers, as well as the power to close them. This made the SB an efficient policy maker on a societal level with unprecedented control of the media, allowing it shape information and canalize the society. For instance, while we cannot see any news regarding the defeat in Sarıkamış, the pictures of the Ottoman Navy bombing other ships were still published. A figure below from the

40 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-01, "The Methods and Sections of the War Propaganda Branch", undated.

41 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-02. "Authors and Poets recruited for Press and Publication Section of the War Propaganda Branch", undated. Also see; Ziya Gökalp "Galiçya Yolunda", "Kafkas Cephesinde", "Irak Yolunda Enver Paşa", *Harb Mecmuası*, Vol 10, No 11, Haziran 1332/July 2016; Süleyman Nazif "Dağıstani Mehmed Fazıl Paşa" , *Harb Mecmuası*, Vol. 1, No. 7, March 1332/ March 1916, "Ahmed Nedim "Çanakkale'nin ölmez hatıralarından", *Harb Mecmuası*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Teşrin-I Sani 1332/ November 1915. Erol Köroğlu also states Harb Mecmuası was published by the SB. Erol Köroğlu, Ibid.

Navy Journal (Donanma Mecmuası) of the Yavuz Sultan Selim bombing the Imperatritsa Mariya serves as a good example.

Figure 3.1 Yavuz Sultan Selim Bombing the Imperatritsa Maria[42]



Writers were chosen among those who were openly supportive of the war effort. Amongst writers the SB formed a committee for weekly newspapers and war journals. This committee was also responsible for shaping the messages in cinema and theatre shows that portrayed the events of the war. While the identities of the committee members were kept confidential during this time,[43] they still maintained firm influence over their readers. The SB used this press section and the committee for influencing policies and gaining support for war by establishing a corre-

42 "Yavuz Sultan Selim bombing the Imperatritsa Mariya", *Donanma Mecmuası*, no 126/77, 14 Kanun-u Sani 1331/27 January 1916.

43 On the matter an analysis from Köroğlu draws attention, Köroğlu in his book stated that Türk Yurdu published articles named "The Thoughts of Our Allies" containing the reviews of German books which were propably written by Yusuf Akçura but the name was not specified. Köroğlu, Ibid., 89.

lation between its own official publications and those read by the people.[44]

Those who wrote in support of the war effort were granted special access in exchange for their support. Writers and journalists such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali Canip, Hamdullah Suphi, Ömer Seyfettin, painters such as İbrahim and Nazmi and musician Ahmet Yekta were invited to see and document the frontlines by the General Staff Headquarters Intelligence Office.[45]

War Magazine (Harb Mecmuası) contained many pictures and was published on behalf of the SB. It was the last publication to have rigid censorship and served as a valuable source for propaganda. For instance in a dialogue between Karabekir and Enver Pasha about sending troops to the Galicia front, Enver Pasha stated that "*We have to support the Austrian Army, and if we cannot win the war in Europe we are doomed*". After the Russian attack, sending troops to Galicia was delayed for a year.[46] But at the moment of the decision, Ziya Gökalp published in the War Journal a poem, "On the Road to Galicia", which served as propaganda to gain public support.[47]

However, literacy was not ubiquitous in the Empire, therefore visual sources also played a significant role in propaganda. Under the Branch, a Painting and Photograph section was established in order to influence illeterate citizens. This section employed painters and sorted them into groups based on their to be a mobilile or stationary asset. The painters who were sent to the frontlines would prepare war paintings, while those who remained were responsible for painting images that celebrated the spoils of war. These works were published in albums and distributed on postcards to every corner of the Empire. In order to achieve a full spectrum of the war, the committee dispatched photog-

44 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-01, "The Recruitments of the War Propaganda Branch", undated.

45 Köroğlu, Ibid., 29.

46 Karabekir, Ibid., 252.

47 Ziya Gökalp, "Galiçya Yolunda", *Harb Mecmuası*, Vol. 1, No:11 (Temmuz 1332/July 1916)

raphy squads to each front and corps to capture the conditions of the war.[48]

To show the paintings and pictures, exhibits were opened in Istanbul, Edirne, İzmir, Konya, Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Trabzon, Erzurum, Diyarbakır and Sivas. The stationary photograph platoons had to support the mobile platoons by developing and distributing the shots taken by their mobile counterparts. The photos were assessed and selected by the committee for their potential to influence the society. Upon selection, prints were enlarged and displayed at exhibition rooms that operated under the SB. Military photos were especially useful when published in newspapers and brochures. The war photo studio in General Staff was responsible for the development, pressing and distribution of the images.[49]

A famous image of Seyyid, said to have carried 200 kg of bullets on his back, represented a soldier's willingness and commitment. As such, it was placed on the front page of the *War Magazine* as propaganda.

Figure 3.2 Picture of Seyyid in the War Magazine[50]



48 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-02. "Painting and Photoraph Section of War Propaganda Branch", undated

49 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-03. "Painting and Photograph Section of War Propaganda Branch, undated.

50 "Çanakkale istihkamında "215" kıyye ağırlığındaki mermiyi sırtında taşıyan güçlü bir kahraman nefer: Mehmed oğlu Seyyid, Ordumuzda harb aşkından bir örnek", *Harb Mecmuası*, Vol.1, No.2 (Teşrin-i Evvel 1331/November 1915)

This picture of Seyyid was also sent to the Bucharest Embassy to serve as propaganda for the strength and willingness of Ottoman Soldiers on the Battlefronts.[51]

The war pictures were also exhibited in the *Galatasaraylılar Yurdu* in 1915[52] and Panorama of the Great War (Harb-i Umûmi Panoraması), published in 1914 by the National Defence Association (Müdaafa-i Milliye Cemiyeti).[53]

The photos were not only used for gaining domestic support. The SB also sent photos of Ottoman Soldiers to the Vienna Embassy . In the report, it was stated that there were many inaccuracies concerning the Ottoman soldiers' uniforms, however it would benefit the Ottoman Army to display photos portraying the perfection of the Ottoman Army among their allies. Hostile states were also conducting propaganda activities through the publishing of photos, albums and books of their own soldiers in order to influence public opinions for the cause of war.[54]

The team that controlled cinema was also separated into stable and mobile sections. A temporary cinema platoon, under the supervision an Officer (whose identity remained confidential) was established and dispatched to the frontlines . The platoon's duty was to record genuine films regarding the events and conditions of the frontlines. Once the

51 ATASE, BDH, F:263, D:180, I:017. "From the Second Branch to Bucharest Embassy", Teşrin-i Sani 1331/ November 1915.

52 Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, "Türklükte Nefis Sanatlar: Son Resim Sergisi," *Türk Yurdu* Vol 4, No. 89 (30 Temmuz 1331/12 August 1915), 195.

53 Köroğlu, Ibid., 79, Köroğlu analyzed all the publications and associations under conducting propaganda activities, however in his dissertation the publishing and responsible institution was out of context. We are putting forward that all these exhibitions and publications were conducted by the personel on behalf of the Second Branch.

54 ATASE, BDH, F:293, D:31A, I:026-1. "Telegram between Second Branch and Vienna Embassy", 22 August 1331/4 September 1915. "Ordumuz hakkında inkar- hamdiyyede pek az malumat vardır. Hatta kıyafeti askeriyemize dair bile pekyanlış fikirler mevcuttur. Hal bu ki müttefik buluduğumuz bir memleketin payitahtında derece-i intizam ve mükemmelliyetini irae eden resimleri tabloları gerek gazetelerle ve bahusus sinematograf ile neşr ve teşrif etmek menafi-i mühimmemizdendir."

recordings were taken, they were sent to war photography for development and reproduction. From the footage available, the committee selected the movies which could inspire, and raise "love of war" (harp sevgisi) among the viewers. The films were sent to larger towns of the provinces and presented to the subjects of the Empire. The stable cinema section was responsible for dispatching and managing the mobile platoons. The platoons would use couriers to transport the films to the stable section where the films were prepared and sent to mobile platoons and significant locations for broadcast. Another committee was created to focus on the "life conditions of war" (menakib-i harbiyye), and this commitee approved subjects before filming. Based on the committee's subjects, these recordings were about significant events on the frontlines, civillian officials and preparations. The army cinema in Istanbul Central Command would be responsible for the development and production of the movies.[55] The Central Army Cinema Office was established by a reserve officer, named Fuat Özkunay, in 1915. This was a slower process for propaganda compared to the publishing of paintings and photographs.[56]

Religion was another and easier propaganda activity under the SB that was used to mobilize people. Religious preachers and sermons played an active role in conducting propaganda activities as they had the potential to reach many citizens in the Empire.[57]

Through preachers and sermons, there were several means to canalize people's ideas into war enthusiasm by using mosques, coffeehouses and other places in the public sphere. Considering the high rate of illiteracy among the population, and that religious preachers were highly active within the society, they were good methods for influencing people's ideas in line with the State's goals. Friday prayer sermons

55 "ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-003". "Cinema Section of the War Propaganda Branch", undated.

56 Köroğlu, Ibid., 80.

57 Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I: Triumph and Tragedy, November 1914-1916*, Vol.2 (Publications of Turkish Historical Society, 2008), 758-759.

played a significant role in spreading messages to local citizens about sacrifice, support and saving the Islamic world. In other words, they blessed the war as a means for redemption to the citizens.[58]

The SB was keenly aware of the cultural values held by the society and using those values as a tool was extremely beneficial for the mobilization process.

The preachers served as freelance employees, and were financially compensated for each sermon that supported the war effort. These preachers were dispatched to war zones and districts near the frontlines. They organized with other preachers to hold conferences, and gave sermons and advice from within the mosques. During the conferences, the sermons would be printed on brochures and distributed to the people, further spreading their propaganda.[59]

Another effective method was theatre and musical productions. Considering the literacy rate of the citizens, visuals were a more effective method to mobilize and direct the public opinion towards State policies as they would leave much more imprint and rememberence on people thoughts and ideas.

In musical propaganda, marching parades were one of the most effective. Military bands and marches during public performances significantly boosted public support of the war. According to Selim Deringil, Western style of music was already part of the Ottoman public sphere in the 19th century. However, by adding cultural values and adapting the music into more nationalist and locally-oriented forms, citizens were more receptive to the propaganda across the Empire.[60]

By 1908, these domestic parades were used extensively, as they became the tool through which the State addressed the public. For the call to arms on the eve of the war, the Ottomans had a specific march, com-

58 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 93-96.

59 "ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-003". "Tasks of Preachers of the War Propaganda Branch", undated.

60 Selim Deringil, "19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Resmi Müzik", *Defter,* no. 22 (Fall 1994): 31-35.

posed by İsmail Hakkı Bey. It was called "the Patriotic March: Calling to Arms." However, the use of music as a call to arms was not limited to Western style marches. There were also songs composed in "local" styles, which featured more "national" lyrics.[61]

Music and theatres symbolized both oral and visual propaganda methods. Under this Branch, another section was established for preparing musical notes and melodies. The section chose different poets and writers to prepare the notes and melodies. These written notes and melodies were delivered to military schools and civilian recording centers. As in the previous propaganda methods, this section also had a stable committee and mobile platoon. The committee formed a national music platoon and sent them to frontlines and significant areas. The platoons played the recorded music to soldiers and local citizens. These platoons also had the responsibility to gather songs and melodies composed during the First World War and the Balkan wars. These musical compositions would be prepared as melodies, played across every province.[62]

As for theatre, the *Menakıb-ı Harbiyye Committee* prepared small theatre plays about war, and discussed the contents of these plays with other scriptwriters and actors. Theatre plays would be played by freelance actors who were recruited and compensated for each performance. Areas that did not support the war, or were home to deserters were often chosen as the location for these perfomances. A theatre committee was established to dispatch the cast to these areas. The commitee followed the performances and printed the play scripts onto brochures, which were distributed across the Empire.[63]

The last section established under this branch was the *Mobile War Exhibition*. This section established exhibits to display the spoils from

61 Beşikçi, Ibid., 91-93.

62 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004-04. "Music and Theatre Section of War Propaganda Branch", undated.

63 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004,05. "Menakıb-ı Harbiyye Committee of War Propaganda Branch", undated.

war zones. These spoils were gathered on the frontlines and distinguished into four pieces among able-bodied soldiers. Photos of the spoils were also distributed across the Empire. The spoils would be exhibited by four mobile platoon in the center of each province and as well as inner cities which was considered to be vital to the mobilization efforts. During these displays, veterans accompanied the platoons in order to elicit emotional connections with the citizens, further encouraging support for the war effort.[64]

The officers, clerks and recorders of the Propaganda Branch Directorate, under the guidance of SB, was as follows in table.

Table 3.2 The Administration of War Propaganda Branch

	Officers	Clerks	Recorders	Equerries
Press and Publication Section	8	3	4	8
Cinema Section	13	4	13	13
Painting and Photograph	7	3	5	8
Rhetorician and preachers	3	1	2	4
Music and Theatre	4	2	3	4
Spoils of War Exhibition	6	1	5	6
Total	41	14	32	43
Branch Directorate	4	2	4	7
Total	45	16	36	50

The defeat in the Balkans, 1913 coup and mobilization for World War I were of course not the only reasons for the state to engage in domestic propaganda. The extension of the SB as an intelligence service allowed

64 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:004,05. "Mobile War Exhibition on behalf of War Propaganda Branch", undated.

it to maintain the information in the public sphere also contributed to these efforts. It was the idea of the military officials that in order to cope with hostile states' propaganda activities, the only way to manage was the military to struggle against the hostile propaganda activities. Karabekir, first director of the SB, stated in his memoirs that while dealing with the harmful propaganda of the enemies, even before the war, the British and French pressured to convince the Ottoman Empire to join the war as an ally to the Germans.[65]

3.1.1 Section Conclusion

The interesting issue in this chapter was that the press and propaganda activities were kept under SB's observation. A substantial amount of musical, theatrical, poetic, oral and press published propaganda activities were overseen by the SB. Those engaging in the propaganda under the SB were highly chosen amongst those considered to have a significant effect on society. As there were domestic black-propaganda activities that SB directly could not have control over, the SB tried to control other local and national press agencies through censorship. While there has been no documented evidence that every poet, rhetoric, actor and photographer who engaged in propaganda were hired by SB, it is certain that SB did not interfere with the unsanctioned propaganda activities as they were still considered to be helpful for the war effort.

In this section, I discussed how propaganda and shaping support in the public sphere were under the responsibility of the SB. This was due to SB's capacity, stemming from the desire to centralize, as it gathered political intelligence throughout the Empire from many sources. Based on the provided reasons that I have discussed in this section, it is clear that SB therefore showed an extension beyond the powers of their former intelligence agencies. These propaganda activities also guided the national identity into what has become modern Turkey.

65 Karabekir, Ibid., 285.

§ 3.2 Censorship

In regards to censorship, the defeat in the Balkans, 1913 coup and mobilization for World War I continued to serve as top reasons for having military's control. Having established a single party regime, along with replacing goverment officials with pro-CUP soldiers, the CUP inevitably transferred the control of the press from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of War. Another political reason was the Balkan War defeat, which inserted the idea of establishing Turks as the main ethnic group that would ensure the survival of the State, which could also be seen in the senior ranks after 1915.[66]

The war also contributed to the militarist perspective of the state and empowered the military institutions. As a result, censorship practices came under the responsibility of the Central Headquarters[67], which not only controlled the press, but also postal and telegram offices through censor inspectorships.. However, as the war progressed this task was taken from the Central Headquarters and given to the SB.

Censorship allows the institutions to gain knowledge about the material before it reaches to the owner. Under this system, letters, newspapers and telegrams were sources of information and putting a censor on those materials meant having exclusive access to information, and limiting those who could view and access.[68] Censorship is also connected with the idea of secrecy. It is not only a method of prevention, but also a method of learning. Therefore conducting censorship is not only related

66 Erol Köroğlu, Ibid., 119.

67 Although, during mobilization, this task seemed to be under the responsibility of the Central Headquarters on paper, the central headquarters assigned this task to the Second Branch.

68 Matthew S. Seligman, Ibid., 10.

to propaganda, but also in line with learning and prevention.[69] Censorship could be used to control information leaks, in other words, it is a method of counter-espionage. During wartime conditions, preventing information from reaching the enemy was a primary concern of the states. The censorship policies were used as a means to secure vital political or military information. In wartime, controlling and censoring political information to the public was a critical component in the power of policy making.[70]

In addition, censorship is closely associated with propaganda, as propaganda functions as a method for manipulation. Where propaganda controls what inflated information is provided to the public, censorship would come to control what factual information is kept out. In this way, they both serve to prevent unwanted effects on the morale and participation of the society.[71]

Either political or cultural, censorship draws from two sources: fear and control. Authorities feel threatened when a source, such as a publication or movie, is exploited for having contained sensitive information. For this reason, especially during the First World War, governments attempted to ban the things that they believed dangerous.[72]

As in other centralization efforts, the cause for strict censorship was the military's impact after the defeat in the Balkans, coup in 1913 and World War I conditions. According to Karabekir, the censorship was so strict that the banning and closing were applied to both of all who were not firm supporters of the CUP propaganda and vise versa, such as *Tanin*. However, For instance, articles by Ziya Gökalp encouraged discourse in his poems such as "The Sultan will be the Ruler of Turan!" and

69 Jacob Soll, *The Information Master: Jean Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System* (United States of America: The University of Michigan Press, 2012), 43,130.

70 Christopher Andrew: The authorized History of MI5., 61.

71 Robert Cole, *Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutralisty in the Second World War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 3.

72 Jonathon Green and Nicholas J. Karolides, *Encyclopedia of Censorship* (New York: Facts on File Inc, 2005), xvii.

"Kur'an Will Have The Vengeance". These were considered to be dangerous by the Karabekir, who advised against their focus on "Turanism" or "Unification of Islam", instead opting to focus on "Anatolian Turkism." In response to this advice, Enver Pasha ordered Karabekir to censor all the publications for propaganda that may contradict their goals.[73]

The SB was not the only institution to control over censorship at the time. In April, 1914, Britain's intelligence organizations formed a censorship bureau under War Department.[74] States applied censorship in not only their own countries, but also at their war fronts. For example, British General Staff estalished a censorship office for international communications under the authority of military intelligence officials. Their main concerns were observing the telegraph, postal and press in Egypt.[75] The war increased the effectiveness and authority of the Supreme Command in Germany. The taskings of Abtelung IIIb, the military section of German General Staff, were also extended . Commanded by Colonel Nicolai, this section not only served as an intelligence and counterespionage service, put took part in press censorship and domestic propaganda.[76] Under Abteilung IIIb, a Censorship Coordination Board and a Press Office was established, which extended the IIIb's Powers on press and propaganda.[77]

The United States army also took part in censorship a year before entering the war by establishing a Bureau in order to prevent "black propaganda" that might impact military interests. In addition,

73 Karabekir, Ibid., 242.

74 Christopher Andrew, Ibid., 261.

75 Unlike the British forces, Ottoman forces at the fronts did not enjoy a well constructed censor system concerning the lack of telegram lines. Also it was easy for censorship officers of Britain as they understood that information on events was transmitted through, governmental, commercial, private and press methods.Yigal Sheffy, Ibid., 219.

76 Heike Bungert and Jan G.Heitmann, Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 28.

77 Markus Pöhlmann, Ibid., 32.

their navy began monitoring transoceanic cables, land-based telegraphs and telephone lines.[78]

Open sources were important for intelligence before the war as military journals and international daily press were easily accessible and had a general overview of military policies or state strategies. However, with the beginning of the First World War, access to open sources became limited as censorship became active in not only the Ottoman Empire, but also in states such as Britain and Germany. During the constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire, there were almost 730 press publications. By the end of the First World War only 14 newspapers remained as a result of the strict censorship caused by the authoritarian regime and wartime conditions.[79]

This rigid censorship began on 6 August, 1914. All information regarding the Ottoman Army and Navy, foreign and domestic policies of the state, movements of merchant ships, health conditions, social conditions, and foreign and domestic events that might impact the society had to be approved by censor inspectorships.[80]

The newspapers were divided into two categories, those who published the news in the morning, and those who published at night. The editors of the morning newspapers had to bring two drafts to the censor inspectorates the day before publishing, between the hours of 21:00-00:00, to receive a stamp of consent. The newspapers which were published in the evening had to be presented to censor inspectorships between 12:00-15:00 to be stamped for consent. After being approved, any extra additions, changes, or publications were forbidden and the newspapers could only be published once per day.[81] These rules were de-

78 James L. Gilbert, Ibid., 50.

79 Erol Köroğlu, Ibid., 12.

80 ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H1, I:001-01. "Second Branch's tasks on Censorship", 24 Temmuz 1330/ 6 August 1914.

81 ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H1, I:001-02. "Censorship Procedures of Second Branch", 25 Temmuz 1330/ 7 August 1914.

clared to the owners of the newspapers. On 7 August, 1914, the existing censorship became even stricter through a temporary law.[82]

What was especially rigid, was that even a single infraction where the newspaper published news that did not abide by these rules were closed instantly and the director was submitted to a Martial Law Court.[83] Additionaly, any newspaper that was closed could not be re-opened by using another name as they were thoroughly investigated by inspectors. This rigid procedure resulted in a rapid decrease of newspapers.

From that point on, SB kept check of those who were sent to Court Martial for disobeying censorship procedures. For instance, SB requested an investigation and a report from the Publications General Directorate about a Greek newspaper breaking the censorship rules by secretly publishing and distributing a newspaper from within Istanbul Churches. In the same report, a newspaper named Afiyet was reported for publishing without the approval of censor inspectorates. As a result, the newspaper was banned from publication.[84]

Foreign press was controlled by the SB's censor section, as well as domestic. For instance, SB demanded information about "Aziz Nuri", the editor of a newspaper called "Sada-i Sadakat". In the report, it was stated that British forces were distributing this newspaper to tribes

82 Stanford Shaw, Ibid., 763.

83 ATASE, BDH, F:443, D: H1,I:001-02. "The Procedures declared by The Second Branch to Newspapers Before Publications". 25 Temmuz 1330/ 07 August 1914.

84 ATASE, BDH, F:410, D:269, I:004. "From the Second Branch to Publications General Directorate". 24 Eylül 1330/7 October 1914. The regulations were not that strict at the beginning of mobilization as many newspapers editors were first warned instead of being punished, for instance the editor of Afiyet newspaper was only warned and kept under inspection for each publication of his newspaper, also another Armenian newspaper called Paymir in which changed its name to Verçepin? in which was closed for disobeying censor reguations was permitted and re-opened because the name was changed before the censor regulations. See; ATASE,BDH, F:410, D:269, I:004. "From the Second Branch to Press General Directorate", 7 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/ 20 October 1914.
also See; ATASE, BDH, F:410, D:269, I:004,01. "From the Publications General Directorate to Second Branch", 7 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/20 October 1914.

(aşiretler) around Samawah (Iraq) and Nasiriyah. Based on this information the SB ordered the Secretary of the General Director himself to prepare a report on the background of Aziz Nuri.[85]

Censorship played a part in four major areas. It controlled public opinion-information, served as counter-intelligence and increased the sovereignty of the State. This applied to almost all nations that were involved in World War I.

Through the lack of telegram lines, and insufficient paper supply for the newspapers, the censorship's effectiveness increased. In a telegram sent from the El Telgraf newspaper to SB, the editor wrote that due to the scarcity of paper, the newspaper could only be published 3 days a week: Monday, Wednesday and Friday.[86] Along with the rigid censorship and pressure, the newspapers got into difficult condition.

The martial law administration and courts also were controlled by the War Ministry, resulting in the military becoming the top echelon of local administration. Martial law allowed the war Ministry to have the right to prevent publication, resulting in closure, if the material did not serve the interests of CUP policies.[87]

The censor directorate was colocated with SB at the Headquarters. The censor inspectorships were tasked with censoring news that might have an impact in both foreign and domestic issues (Train or boat accidents, and fires). The communication and telegrams between merchants about food products, gasoline, cots and delivery were controlled. Unsigned, non-sheated, abbreviated or ciphered telegrams were censored. The embassies and consuls were free to communicate using two official cyphers, while the rest of the telegrams had to be in Turkish,

85 ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:403, I:003-01. "From the Second Branch to Security General Director", 21 Mart 1333/ 21 March 1917.

86 ATASE, BDH, F:410, D:1621, I:066. "From the Press Directorate to Second Branch", 12 Kanun-u Sani 1330/25 January 1915. "Kağıt kıtlığından dolayı Bedama gazetesini haftada 3 defa yani pazartesi Çarşamba Cuma neşretmek meccburiyetinde bulunduğunu mübeyyin musevice El Telgraf gazetesi müdiri mesulü İshak imzasıyla beyanname ita kılındığı beyan olunur."

87 "Memâlik-i Osmaniyede İdare-i Örfiye", *İkdâm* (21 Temmuz 1330/ 3 August 1914).

Arabic or French. Those who did not apply to this rule had to be censored. All written materials of the citizens and the military autorities(without credential) were checked in these inspectorships and the letters had to be sent in unsealed envelopes.[88] In this part of this dissertation, we did not dig deep into censorship procedures about postal and telegram offices as they are an overlapping concern of counter-espionage. Therefore, the censorship practices under these titles will be analyzed in the next chapter.

However some descriptive structure is necessary and demands explanation. The couriers were separated into two categories as Political Couriers (Siyasi Kurye) and Random Couriers(Rastgele Kurye). SB categorized these couriers to have further strict censorship and to control closely in case of an information leak. Couriers were banned from delivering any product from foreign and domestic sources that were against the Censor Regulations (Sansür Nizamnamesi).[89] The political couriers were chosen amongst the Ministry of Foreign Relations' active embassies, ,officers, embassy staff, official couriers. The political couriers were exempted from censor inspections in the customs. However they had to have a special passaport obtained from the SB Military Passport Center (İkinci Şube Askeri Pasaport Merkezi). The political couriers were also limited with an access to only one country to carry and deliver the permitted products. The Random Couriers were defined as those who carried products and were included in censor inspectations. The Random Couriers who worked on delivery to other countries were also under rigid inspections. They were chosen among the foreign citizens who lived along the borders of the Ottoman Empire. No other couriers were permitted to carry or deliver any packages from hostile countries'

88 ATASE,BDH, F:443, D:H1, I:001-01. "Document regarding the duties of censorship officers and civillian officers under the order of Second Branch Censorship Desk", 24 Temmuz 1330/6 August 1914". "Mektuplar Açık Yollanacak", *Tanin* (23 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/5 November 1914), Sansür Talimatnamesi (Matbaat-i Askeriye, 1914), 7.

89 Sansür Talimatnamesi (Matbaat-i Askeriye, 1914), 5.

citizens. This also an indicator to why foreign citizens living in the Empire were easier to track down and bring into custody.[90]

The censor directorate, under the orders of the SB, was responsible for communication and publications. It consisted of a Censorship Committee which was comprised of 4 officers that were chosen from the Publishing Directorate, 3 civillian officers and an inspector. The inspector was responsible to the Intelligence officer. The inspector had to carry out the censorship orders word by word and deliver significant information from their department in dialy updates to the Director of the SB. Inspectors also conducted daily inspections on the censor commitees and controlled their degree of effort. The censor officer on watch issued urgent and significant news over land-based telegrammes or telephones to the equerry of the SB.[91]

SB also chose the significant news, which the inspector would then deliver to the newspapers for publication. Inspectors also had to see meet the foreign journalists in person to declare the terms set by the SB. All foreign journalist had to obey the censorshipr rules and only the ones working newspapers neutral countries could conduct journalism. Journalists and writers had to present two drafts of the newspaper prepublication for analysis. If there was content that could be considered in opposition, the journalist would be deported from the Empire.[92]

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90 ATASE, BDH, F:366,D:420,I:008. "The Regulations Sent by the Second Branch to all Ministries on the Tasks of Couriers", 27 August 1330/ 9 September 1914.

91 ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H1, I:001-01, 001-01a. "Document regarding the duties of censorship officers and civillian officers under the order of Second Branch Censorship Desk", 24 Temmuz 1330/6 August 1914.

92 ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H1, I:001-02. 24 Temmuz 1330/06 August 1914. Müfettiş aynı zamanda uygun vakitlerde vazifedar olacak ve hükümet-i askeriye (doğrudan doğruya istihbarat şubesinin tensib ve kararıyla) neşr-i arzu edilecek havadisi alıp gazetelere tebliğ edecektir. Müfettiş memleketimizin mevcut ecnebi muhabirlerini şahsen görüp ve tanımak ve onlara aşağıdaki şartları taahhüd ettirmek mecburiyetindedir."
"Muhabirlere taahhüt ettirelecek şartlar:
1- Sansür talimatına tevfikan hareket edecekleri
2- Savaşa girip girmediği münkati olmayan memleketlere ait muhabirlere mensup bulundukları gazetelerden muntaman ikişer nüshayı getirip müfettişe takdim edekleri

SB was responsible for the censorship of all sections, although their tasks were divided. The first section concerned foreign intelligence, reporting the necessary and valuable news to the censor directorate for publication. The Censor Directorate had a "Censor Desk Journal" (Sansür Masası Harb Cerideleri) in which valuable news was published.[93]

For instance, in the Censorship Desk War Journal, published by the Censor Directorate, useful information was published from various foreign press publications. In the Journal, an article from the Times newspaper was specifically selected from 26 March, 1918, as it discussed the Turanism idea of CUP officials. In the article, it was written that Turks using Islam and Turan could only succeed if the Turkish government formed a unification with Russian Muslims. The article cautioned that Turks should be eliminated before making such a unification.[94]

The military officers at the censor directorates and inspectorships reported to the inspectors. Under orders of the SB, the civilian inspectors had to be treated as ranking military officers. These civillian officers had to inspect the press publications and reports of the military officers. In Istanbul, Turkish, Arabic, German, French, Armenian and Greek newspapers editors had to present two drafts to the censor inspectorships showing that they obeyed the regulations and the civillian officers had to inspect the newspapers and report to the intelligence officer.[95]

Should these departments require additional funding, the inspectorships and couriers had to issue the request to the SB directorate, where the final approval was determined by the Director.

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gazetelerinde muhalif ve mugayir (aykırı) talimat olarak bir mektup ve buna benzer bir haber görülürse muhabir mumaileyhin bila itiraz memleketinden ihraç edilecekleri."

93 The Journals were published every day between 1915-1918. See; ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H2,H3,H4. "Intelligence Branch Censorship Desk War Journals", 1915-1918.

94 ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:713, I:001-015a. "War Journal prepared by Censor Desk from various press publications", 26 Mart 1334/26 March 1918.

95 ATASE, BDH, F: 443, D:50, I: 02. 24 Temmuz 1330/ 6 August 1914.

For instance, a courier named Naci Bey who worked at the Greece embassy, reported to the SB that he delivered the drafts of three telegrams that were sent through İskeçe postal office. After the delivery, he submitted a request for funds in order to pay for these deliveries. Although it is not a concern for this section, couriers also served as a good Human Intelligence (HUMINT) resource both for domestic and foreign intelligence.[96]

The second department of the SB concerned with "counter-intelligence." the third department, for "press publications," worked cooperatively with the inspectorates as censorship was another method of preventing counter-intelligence. Personnel who sent telegrams and parcels considered to be suspicious were arrested by the police under the orders of the Second Department Chief, Hüsrev Bey.[97] The third section of the branch had to inspect the Censorship Directorates and inspectorships on the degree and performance of their tasks. The third section left a night watch on each of its desks to inspect the reports about the evening newspapers sent from the Press Directorate. The third section presented the bulletins and information from the publications that contained important information to the director of SB. [98]

The list below shows of some staff recruited by the SB to censorship directorates.. There were many inspectorates in the country but the following would serve as an example for the recording and information of the staff. The table also gives us the information that the number of non-muslim citizens in the censor desk decreased significantly after 1915.

96 ATASE, BDH, F:260, D:594, I: 122-2. "Cipher from the Courier Naci Bey to the Second Branch Directorate", 18 Kanun-u Evvel 1331/31 December 1915.

97 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:001-01,001-02. "Censorship Application in Second Branch Headquarters", undated.

98 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:001-01,001-02. "Censorship Application in Second Branch Headquarters", undated.

Table 3.3 Galata Censorship Directorate: Censorship Officers' Division of Newspapers, Recruitment Office and Residency[99]

Greek Recruitment Office: İsmail Ağa District. Residency: Piyasa Street/Kadıköy Name: İshak Hüsnü(Son of Ahmet) Date of Recruitment:30 November 1914	Greek Recruitment Office: Kasımpaşa Residency: Aynalıçeşme Samancı Street no 22. Name: Dimitri (Son of Yorgi(Greek)), Date of Recruitment:14 December 1914
Hungarian Recruitment Office: Süleymaniye Residency: Moda/Kadıköy no 64 Commercial Building Name: Ahmed Kemal(Son of Mehmed) Date of Recruitment:22 November 1914	English Recruitment Office:Kadıköy Residency: Kuzguncuk no 26 Mansion Name: Vahit (Son of Fikri) Date of Recruitment:-------
German Recruitment Office: Cihangir Residency: Beyoğlu Cadde-i Kebir no 68 Name: Mıgırdıç(Son of Agop(Greek)) Date of Recruitment:13 December 1914	Italian and French Recruitment Office: Teşvikiye Residency: Nişantaşı Hacı Mansur Street no 18. Name: Aram(Son of Gabril) Date of Recruitment:-----
Armenian Recruitment Office: Cihangir Residency: Beyoğlu Cadde-i Kebir no 48 Name: Jordan (Son of Ohannes) Date of Recruitment:10 November 1914	Armenian Recruitment Office: Teşvikiye Residency: Bangaltı Bilecik Street no 38 Name: confidential Date of Recruitment:10 november 1914
Spanish/Hebrew/French Recruitment Office: Hasköy Residency: Hacı Şaban District no 1 Name: Elyazar(Son of Nesim)	English/Arabic Recruitment Office: Kadıköy Residency: Kadıköy Kadri Bey Mansion Name: Hikmet(Son of Nahit)

99 ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:288, 002-01a,02,03. "Officers at Galata Censorship Inspectorate", 1330-1331/1914-1915. These examples were amongst a few out of many documents regarding the names, responsibility, recruitment, date of employment.

Date of Recruitment:13 December 1914	Date of Recruitment:16 December 1914
Turkish	French
Recruitment Office: Emirgan Residency: Çemberlitaş Atikalipaşa District Name: Süleyman Sırrı(Son of Ahmet) Date of Recruitment:15 November 1914	Recruitment Office: Kadıköy Residency: Kadıköy Osmanağa District Name: Vahan(Son of Stephan) Date of Recruitment:15 November 1914
French	Turkish
Recruitment Office: Hasanpaşa Residency: Teşvikiye Ali Fuat Bey Apartment Name: Ali (Son of Ali Fuat) Date of Recruitment:22 December 1914	Recruitment Office: Beşiktaş Residency: Beşiktaş Sarraçaşı no 10 Name:Mehmed Cevdet (Son of Hasan) Date of Recruitment:

Unlike the ones in Galata Censor Directorate, the Istanbul Military Inspectorate personnel identities and residence were confidential. Their information is currently unavailable in the archives. However, from the lists it can be seen that many bilingual or multilingual people were chosen for the censor procedures, and as stated in the footnotes, their numbers increased rapidly to show that the censor served a very important part in policy making and war mobilization process.

Table 3.4 Staff of İstanbul Military Censor Inspectorate's Publication and Intelligence Committee[100]

8 people whose names were confidential- Turkish Newspapers
4 people whose names were confidential- French Newspapers
4 people whose names were confidential- German Newspapers
4 people whose names were confidential- Greek Newspapers
2 people whose names were confidential- Arabic Newspapers
5 people whose names were confidential- Armenian Newspapers
1 Person people whose name was confidential-Persian Newspapers
2 people whose names were confidential-Italian Newspapers

100 ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:288, I:002-04,05 "Officers working at Istanbul Military Censorship Inspectorate". 1330-1331/1914-1915. These examples were amongst a few out of many documents regarding the names, responsibility, recruitment, date of employment.

Besides the newspapers, telegrams and postal centers were also checked by the inspectorates and also the intelligence officers working on behalf of the SB. Each letter or telegram, unless they belonged to consuls or ambassadors, could not be sent in a closed envelope.[101] Therefore, control over the information of the SB increased. The table below serves as an example.

Table 3.5 Military Inspectorate of Galata Postal Center[102]

Bulgarian/French
Recruitment Office: Süleymaniye
Residency: Not stated (In an Apartment of Non-Muslim Residents/Confidential
Greek and Italian
Recruitment Office: Bakırköy
Residency: Not stated
Name: Alexander (Son of Petro)
REST OF THE OFFICERS WERE TOTALLY CONFIDENTAL

Lastly, another table below shows the names of some personnel who were dismissed. The significance here is that those whose jobs were ended had been interviewed by people who did not serve under the SB. They were checked right away and were dismissed from their duties or sent to another unit for serving.

Table 3.6 Dismissals from Censorship Inspectorates[103]

Recruitment Office: Sultanahmet
Residency:---
Name: Server (Son of Hayrettin)
Recruitment Date: 12 December 1914
Date of Dismissal: 5 January 1915

101 ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:50-H1,I:001. 24 Temmuz 1330/ 6 August 1914.

102 ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:288, I:002-01a. "Military Inspectorate of Galata Postal Center", 1330-1331/ 1914-1915.

103 ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:288, I:002-04. "Dismissals from Censorship Inspectorates", "1330-1331/1914-1915". These examples were amongst a few out of 28 documents regarding the termination of their duties.

Reason: Resignation- Assigned to Navy Command
Recruitment Office: Hasköy
Residency:---
Name: Benison?
Recruitment Date: ---
Date of Dismissal: ---
Reason: not legal of age
Recruitment Office: Bakırköy
Residency:---
Name: Sahak? (Son of Agob)
Recruitment Date: ---
Date of Dismissal: 28 December 1914
Reason: Wanted for Frauding
Recruitment Office: Bakırköy
Residency:---
Name: Misak
Recruitment Date: 23 July 1914
Date of Dismissal: 13 January 1914
Reason: Insufficient Performance

By the end of 1915 there had been a large decrease in the amount of non-Muslim citizens who worked at these two inpectorships. Therefore, the focus of the CUP policy makers on Turkish citizens can be an explanation on in the amount of decrease as which many of the non-Muslim workers were removed from the job. This issue took place especially after the inspectorates were aligned under the intelligence branch and the non-muslim individuals were likely viewed as untrustworthy regarding sensitive information.

Non Muslim Officers in Istanbul Censorship Directorate: 4 people for French newspapers, 2 for Greek newspapers, 3 for German newspapers, 2 for Hebrew newspapers, 2 for Armenian newspapers[104]

Non Muslim Officers in Galata Censor Committee: 2 people for French newspapers, 2 for German newspapers, 1 for Greek newspapers and 1 for Hebrew newspapers.[105]

104 ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:288, I:038. "The Non-Muslim officers in the Istanbul Censor Inspectorate", 7 Kanun-u Evvel 1331/ 20 December 1915.

3.2.1 Section Conclusion

In this part of this dissertation, I focused on the censorship activities of SB through contextual and institutional analysis. I have shown the establishments of censorship committees, inspectorates where the staff were selected and tasked by the SB. In our assessment, the main reason for these establishments were to control early information as the telegrams and deliveries could be inspected. Another purpose was to to mitigate security concerns over potential information leakage. In terms of domestic policy, this could also have been done under the Security of General Directorate. However, the military becoming a decision maker in state policies inevitably contributed to SB to gain such power. This chapter contributed to this dissertation by illustrating that SB not only acted as a miltiary intelligence section, but also contributed to the policy making of the public sphere.

105 ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:288, I:038-01 "The Non- Muslim officers in the Galata Censor Inspectorate, 7 Kanun-u Evvel 1331/20 December 1915. There is no clue in the archives about how SB dealt with the decreasing numbers of non-muslim officers at the inspectorates.

4

Domestic Intelligence and The Second Branch

In the previous chapter I focused on propaganda and censorship, the first two tasks that the SB carried out in its early processes of centralization. In this chapter I will focus on domestic intelligence, another aspect that extended the SB's tasks and paved the way to centralization. In this chapter firstly I will focus on the theoretical information on domestic intelligence as domestic and foreign intelligence overlapped during World War I. I will present that the concept domestic intelligence, which is an even more separate function of intelligence organizations, derived from the concept of counter-espionage. Then, I will provide an overview of intelligence institutions in other countries, as many of them witnessed new establishments and separate institutions regarding foreign and domestic intelligence. With this contextualization, the position of the SB during World War I will be clarified. Then I will discuss the domestic intelligence practices of the SB in two sections. The first section will deal with the preventive measures that the SB took regarding its own headquarters and officers and present the laws that the SB enforced to decision-makers regarding domestic security. These laws will also illustrate that the SB took a serious role in the deportation of non-Muslim citizens and observed them as a possible threat to the Empire. The last part of the first section is devoted to other establishments that

the SB established in order to carry out counter-espionage activities and the problems regarding the personnel shortages.

The second section of this chapter is devoted to the practices of counter-espionage. Firstly, it focuses on the precautions that the SB had taken in the Empire lands such as the prohibition of travelling, deportations of civilians from coastlines, controlling post-telegram activities, deliveries, photography and warnings-surveillance against espionage. In the last part of the chapter I will focus on the problems that the SB encountered during its centralization process. This part will show that the regulations made the SB not only a provider of intelligence but the top institution that carried out domestic security, as all the security units were subordinated to the SB regarding domestic precations.

§ 4.1 Theoretical Insight into Domestic Intelligence and the Organizations During World War I

Nowadays as the countries and societies are more connected by the improved transportation and communication. Even the departments such as the ministry of foreign relations can find itself dealing with domestic matters which requires a collaboration amongst institutions as a result of information's overlapping condition.[1]

By foreign and domestic intelligence, the main concern and topics that distinguish the practices are related to its targets. For instance, as domestic intelligence is concerned with domestic security and conducting intelligence activities within a nation's borders, its aims can be preventing other countries' espionage, provocation or sabotage activities. Therefore, the concern for domestic intelligence is "people" rather than the "system" itself. Cooperation with laws in investigating and sentencing espionage activities are also aspects of national security.[2] Therefore domestic intelligence is a part of national security which serves domes-

1 Sherman Kent, Ibid., 91.

2 Sherman Kent, Ibid., 211.

tic purposes. The state produces the defensive formation, protection of valuable information through counter-espionage and counter intelligence,[3]

Domestic intelligence can be defined as attempts of governments to collect, analyze and act upon the analyzed intelligence by the intelligence agencies. The intelligence contains, information of espionage activities and institutions that conduct intelligence activities within the borders of the state.[4] The tasks of counter-intelligence and counter-espionage are interconnected. While counter-intelligence is an activity undertaken by infiltrating other countries' intelligence organizations and also having different methods in modern parlance, counter-espionage focuses on spying activities, detecting and preventing espionage.[5]

In addition, contributing to strategic policy, domestic intelligence institutions' intelligence-gathering and dissemination are more based on threat analysis and tactical intelligence. Of course, while conducting domestic intelligence, an intelligence institution might find itself dealing with concerns that requires an analysis of foreign intelligence.[6] This overlapping condition becomes even more complicated in war conditions, as I will present in this chapter.

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3 Michael Herman, Ibid., 381. As I discussed in the second chapter the "total assessment" gathered from different intelligence institutions contributed to national security. The national security is formed from both foreign and domestic security threats and generally contributes to defense intelligence by protecing the domestic parts of the states from security threats. Also see; L. Lustgarten and I. Leigh, *In from the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), chapter 1.

4 Brian A. Jackson ed., *Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence agency in the United States* (Rand Corporation, 2009), 3.

5 Michael Herman, Ibid., 20. Counter-espionage, as part of Counter-intelligence concentrates on individuals that conduct espionage activities to hostile states and can give information about the intelligence organizations that recruited them. Michael Herman, Ibid, p 53.

6 Sherman Kent, Ibid., 218.

Counter-intelligence or counter-espionage have two different measures and defined as *active* and *passive*. While counter-intelligence mostly contains passive measures, counter-espionage exploits active measures.[7] The passive measure is related to secrecy and protection of top secret and confidential information. Therefore, passive counter-intelligence aims to prepare and conduct measures to prevent an hostile organization or an individual obtaining information that could endanger national safety. Active measures on the other hand, are conducted to prevent espionage practices by targeting, neutralizing and preventing the threat itself. Therefore surveillance, arrests and interrogation are part of the active measures. [8] I would like to highlight that at the beginning of World War I, the Ottoman General Staff, despite engaging in the act, did not use the term counter-intelligence but instead used "counter-espionage".

In the modern world, to conduct all these activities, there are different intelligence organizations contributing to national assessment by conducting foreign and domestic intelligence activities. For instance, the concern of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) is domestic rather than the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However as stated before, in overlapping condition, the CIA and FBI corroborate an inter-agency procedure in order to conduct valid analysis.[9] Also in Britain, the three common contributors to national security, MI5, MI6 and Government Communications Headquarters conduct intelligence activities contributing to the whole intelligence picture. MI5 is responsible from domestic security through preventing threats such as terrorism, spying, covert action and supporting law enforcement agencies.[10]

USA and UK are not the only two states that developed separate intelligence organizations for domestic intelligence purposes, for instance

7 Shulsky N. Abram, *Silent Warfare* (Washington D.C: Brassey's Inc, 1993), 98-100.

8 Also for modern definitions see; U.S Marine Corps, *Counter-intelligence*, (Washington: Department of the Navy Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 7 october 1998).

9 Sherman Kent, Ibid., 87.

10 Mark M. Lowenthal, Ibid., 345.

in France *Direction de la Surveillance du Territorie* (DST); *Shin Bet* in Israel; *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (BfV) in Germany; *Public Security Investigation Agency* in Japan; *Security Intelligence Organization* in Australia; and *Security Intelligence Service* in New Zealand are some of the intelligence institutions that conduct and provide separate domestic intelligence and practices.[11]

In the modern world the methods for gathering intelligence such as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Measurement and Signature intelligence (MASINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) are large contributors to counter-intelligence as oppositely increasing the numbers of threats. However, during the expansion period of World War I, the common practices amongst these intelligence types contained photography for (IMINT) and Human intelligence (HUMINT.)[12]

World War I and developing technology was a great contributor to establishing and separating intelligence organizations. During World War I counter-espionage activities mainly focused on HUMINT methods whereas counter-intelligence focused on recently developing SIGINT. However, as Ottomans did not have a well-structured landline for telegrams[13], rather than SIGINT, methods of HUMINT was a significant method. The World War I being different from the previous wars regarding the area, duration and battlefronts, required the necessity of a well-organized structure for defending the countries against espionage.

In France this distingtion amongst departments were also significant. As the *Deuxième Bureau* of the General Staff General Staff was tasked with assessing external military threats and the counter-

11 Richard A. Posner, Ibid., 3.

12 In the modern World the methods for gathering intelligence such as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), İmagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) are large contributers to counter-intelligence as opposingly increase the numbers of threats. However while modernizing, the common practices amongst these intelligence types contained photoraphy for (IMINT) and Human intelligence (HUMINT).

13 I present the SIGINT activities in the next chapter.

espionage activities were at the responsibility of *Sûrete Generale* of the Ministry of Interior. The war conditions show the necessity of another institution resulting from the German threat to national security within the borders of France. During World War I the French army had control over the intelligence. Commanded by Colonel Zoppf, a new service named *The Service Des Renseignements* was established and the police officers from *Sûrete Generale* were assigned to this department. However, during wartime as intelligence types overlapped, the General Staff and other commanderships provided information regarding counter-espionage in civilian matters by providing IMINT through the usage of cameras.[14]

Also in Italy, in order to separate military intelligence from civilian concerns, different types of intelligence organizations were established. While *Carabinieri* which was tasked to conduct counter intelligence activities such as tracing spies, this gendarmerie force was not able to keep track of civilian matters. Although the king of Italy relied on *Carabinieri*, still another intelligence agency under the Ministry of Interior was installed. The newly established *Ufficio Centrale di Investigazione* was tasked with conducting counter intelligence inside the country that did not participate in combat areas or fronts.[15]

The Bolshevik seizure of power also marked a major turning point in intelligence history. The first communist security and intelligence agency - known as *Cheka* - was founded on 20th December 1917, only six weeks after the Bolshevik revolution and was centralized during 1918.[16] Another reason for such establishments - as Christopher Andrew calls it

14 Malcolm Anderson, "Section de Centralisation du Renseignement (SCR)", in *Thrall to Political Change: Police and Gendarmerie in France*, ed Malcolm Anderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011):189-190. also see; Meir Zamir, *The Secret Anglo-French War in the Middle East: Intelligence and Decolonization 1940-1948* (London: Routledge, 2015), 54-55.

15 Alessandro Massignani, "The Regi Carabinieri: Counter-intelligence in the Great War" in *Intelligence History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (UK: International Intelligence History Association, Transaction Publishers, 2001): 134-136.

16 Christopher Andrew, *The Secret World*., 555.

- was the increasing the 'spy mania' that affected all elements in World War I. The spy mania of World War I revealed how little the public in combatant countries, in many cases misled by spy novels, understood about the role of intelligence.[17] in Britain, the Security Service expanded greatly following the declaration of war and the influx of new talent helped to to develop unusual techniques. In Britain, as *MO5* pursued spies, double agents, saboteurs and intelligence gathering elsewhere was divided between SIS and the NID. Another department named *Room 40* was established in the Admiralty which focused on counter-intelligence through decrypting telegrams.[18]

Also in the United states, the distinction began with military intelligence during World War I. By the end of 1917, the Military Intelligence Section (MIS) had two different sections for counter-intelligence and espionage activities. Military Intelligence 3 (MI-3) for counterespionage considering military and MI-4 for counter-espionage in the civilian sector. [19]

As I stated in the propaganda chapter of this dissertation, the tasks of the department *Abteilung IIIB* in Germany extended in an similar manner to the SB of the Ottoman Empire. It also had the tasks of conducting censorship and propaganda activities. Besides these tasks, IIIB also had the counter-espionage duty above all other intelligence institutions which granted this section high institutional power which showed a total resemblance with the SB. In this case the German effect on the tendency to centralize intelligence under military institutions can be something to make comment on.[20] In order to conduct counter-espionage activities another counter-intelligence section named *Spionageabwehr* was established under the order of IIIB. Also, the military

17 Christopher Andrew, Ibid., 504-505.

18 Nigel West, *MI 5.*, 45.

19 James L. Gilbert, Ibid., 83-87.

20 Heike Bungert and Jan G.Heitmann, Ibid., 27-29.

secret police called the *Geheime Feldpolizei* worked for the security of the troops at the fronts and conducted counter-espionage activities.[21]

The German Military Intelligence director of *Abteilung IIIB*, Walter Nikolai, when he presented the intelligence conference stated that *IIIB* was tasked with checking the newspapers, censorship, controlling passport centers and conducting counter-espionage practices. He also stated in the conference that Germans, unlike other countries, centralized intelligence to a single channel under *IIIB*.[22]

§ 4.2 The Second Branch: Passive Measures and Counter-intelligence

In this section I will first present the passive measures that the SB conducted to prevent counter-espionage inside the SB headquarters. These passive measures contain common orders to prevent infiltration and information leakage from the General Staff and the SB headquarters. Then, I will focus on the role of the SB in terms of imposing laws on state. This will illustrate that the SB not only was a centralizing institution but also strong enough to impose laws to decision-makers and verify whether the laws were implemented or not. In addition, it will also show that those most commonly affected people by these laws were the non-Muslim groups as they were stigmatized as a possible spies during war. The last aspect of the first section will be about the new organizations established by the SB against espionage.

In the Ottoman Empire, as stated in the previous chapter, the defeat in the Balkans, 1913 coup, the application of Martial Law along with the declaration of mobilization for the World War I, the tasks of preventing espionage were given completely to the SB. The second department un-

21 All these sections dealt with espionage issues as well as deserters, observing the press. As a result, many citizens who were suspected of spying activities were arrested, trialed and even sentenced to death by German military courts. Markus Pöhlman, Ibid., 48-49.

22 Hasan Ateş, Ibid., 27-29.

der the directorship of Hüsrev Bey was the responsible unit for counter-espionage activities. The gendarmerie and Security General Directorate was put under the order of the SB to prevent spying activities, prepare reports and carry out all the arrests ordered by this department.[23] The tasks and authority given to intelligence officers and the SB increased its power regarding domestic intelligence, surveillance, counter-espionage. With an order, the pursuit and arrest of people suspected of being a spy was prohibited without the consent of the nearest intelligence officer in the army or the SB headquarters. However a permission was not required for the spies who were caught in the act, as they had the possibility of disposing of the evidence. The spies, once caught, had to be interrogated by the spying committee established by the SB or by the nearest intelligence officer in the army unit and then sent to Martial Law Courts. The pursuit and conviction of informants, photographers, merchants, reporters and travelers were permitted but the reports had to be sent to the SB headquarters and to the nearest intelligence officer. In the order it was also stated that the sole institution responsible for counter-espionage was the SB of the General staff and all the institutions regarding domestic security had to carry out the orders of this institution and provide reports to the SB headquarters or to the intelligence officers in different military units.[24]

In order to deal with all the reports and cases, the SB assigned intelligence officers to all levels of the army from the commanderships to corps, divisions, brigade and regiment. The intelligence officers also became responsible for the interrogations of prisoners and refugees to prevent spying activities. The intelligence officer had to present the reports to the higher unit depending on its urgency, or to the intelligence

23 The following is the latest re-organization document: ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:001. "Tasks of the Second Department", 1 Şubat 1330/ 14 February 1915.

24 ATASE, BDH, F:3919, D:84, I:2. "Enver Pasha's orders regarding tasks of Second Branch", August 1330/October 1914.

SB directorate.[25] The convicted suspects, once interrogated by an intelligence officer, were sent to martial law courts.[26]

In order to conduct domestic intelligence activities, there were many sources, which I discussed in the first chapter. Even though the Foreign Ministry provided foreign intelligence, due to the conditions of World War I, it also took part in domestic security. The Foreign Ministry and its sources provided information and carried out orders especially obtaining information about spying organizations at the institutional level. The Ministry of Interior and governors, sub-governors, commissariats, harbor masters and the police departments provided information about espionage activities within the Ottoman lands and carried out the orders of the SB. All the components of the General Staff reported to intelligence officers and the intelligence officers interrogated the prisoners, deserters and refugees on the battlegrounds. All the institutions, unless a direct and general order was given, had to report to the SB and have the approval before sending the suspected citizens to Martial Law Courts. For instance, as stated in the previous chapter, the Military Censorship Inspectorates were under the order of the SB. When the duty of sending the suspect to Martial Law Courts was not given to Censorship inspectorates the inspectorates demanded the SB's orders.

For instance, in a time when sending letters to hostile states was prohibited, Istanbul Military Censorship Inspectorate intercepted an espionage letter to a person in Britain. The censorship asked the final decision regarding the issue.[27] However after a general order was sent from the SB, the sources did not need to apply to the SB directorate. For instance, the SB sent an order to the Fourth Army Commandership, İzmir Fourth Corps and the Police Directorate. In the order it was stated that after Sunday evening on 20th December 1914, after the sending of

25 ATASE, BDH, F:303, D:374, I:7-6. "Document of that contains assigned Intelligence Officers",

26 ATASE, BDH, F:3919, D:84, I:2. "Enver Pasha's declarations about the Second Branch", undated.

27 ATASE,BDH, F:409, D:275, I:013. Temmuz 1914/August 1914.

letters approved by the censor inspectorates, passenger travel was forbidden and those who were caught traveling could directly be sent to Martial Law Courts.[28] This was just a small example I provided. I will delve more into the orders and the role of the other institutions in further parts of this chapter. The centralization also caused major problems amongst institutions, as each institution or their sources misunderstood the order and began sending reports in a raw status.

For instance, in a report sent to SB it was questioned that a ferry with a Bulgarian Flag was caught by the Harbor inspectors. The captain of the ferry, before voyage, presented a chart with the name of its crew. However, it was found out that five of the crew were changed along the way. The director of the ship's agency was summoned for interrogation and it was revealed that this was the second repeat of the same condition. The Harbor Master asked what was to be done on the matter.[29]

As each source was canalized to the SB, even the Sofia Military Attache did not want to share information with Enver Pasha, the Minister of War. Based on a report, an agent named Ali who served under the *Sofia Prevention against Espionage Section* reported to the SB that Enver Pasha demanded information regardibg Hedjaz incidents but he did not tell anything to the minister due to the regulation. In the report Ali stated that it was the decision of the SB to inform the minister on the matter.[30]

These two cases were also additional examples I wanted to provide. However, they will all become clear when I discuss about the problems that along with the centralization process. These problems were also solved as temporary laws on counter-espionage were applied and the

28 ATASE, BDH, F:409,D:275,I:014. "Orders on Travelling from the Second Branch", 7 Kanun-i evvel 1330/20 December 1914.

29 The location of the Harbor was not specified in the document, it is probably in the previous document which I could not obtain from the archives. ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:404, I:05. "From the Harbor Master to Second Branch", 24 Şubat 1330/ 9 March 1915.

30 ATASE, BDH, F:416, D:169, I:060. "From Sofia to Second Branch", 3 Haziran 1332/ 16 July 1916.

institutions had been much more independent as they only had to report to the SB rather than requiring consent. Then all the sources described above, coordinated and sent analyzed reports to the SB for final analysis.

4.2.1 Precaution in the Second Branch Headquarters

The first precaution against espionage and infiltration was in the SB headquarters. Neither civil nor military personnel could enter the SB headquarters without permission and approval. Those who demanded information from the sections of the SB had to make an appointment. The oldest room in the SB headquarters was chosen for the accepted visitors and those who required an audience.[31]

These rules seemed to confirm Karabekir's statement that:

"*My greatest aim was to prevent the entrance to the General Headquarters and information leakage from within. This was not an easy task as the great hall next to Enver Pasha's room got full by different people every day…. My orders were applied in the General headquarters and no foreigner and no-one without a duty were permitted. In addition I had conducted controls in the cipher office (şifre kalemi) and the branches of the General Staff for possible information leakage.*"[32]

The officers and staff in the General Headquarters were also followed by the SB agents. Karabekir stated that: "*One of our agents caught one of the civilian staff recruited within the staff operations, while he was talking about what he had heard during his office hours.*"[33] In order to prevent information leakage from the General Staff or other commanderships or military units, a formal communique was declared. It was stated that the military staff were forbid-

31 ATASE, BDH, F: 366, D:1458, I:01. "The entrance and visitor procedure in Second Branch Headquarters", 26 July 1330/ 08 August 1914.

32 Kazım Karabekir, Ibid., 286.

33 Ibid., 287.

den to carry out any document from the General Staff that regarded the army, and military officers were forbidden to write letters that contained any information on the army. The staff of the army were also forbidden to talk about the army in public areas and those who did not obey these orders would be judged according to the law of espionage and treason.[34] These regulations were indeed very strict.

For instance, it was asked from the SB directorate from the Central Command that in Yıldız First Battalion, a soldier sent a letter with a sign "*pishahosi*"(?)[35] to another soldier in Izmir. The letter was found suspicious by the intelligence officer and the SB demanded that the Central Command present a report on the soldier.[36]

In another instance, a report sent from the telegram center in Istanbul to the SB is worth of note. In the report, it was stated that a woman named Marlo (Russian) was caught sending letters to her family in Russia which contained information on the Ottoman army.[37] The SB asked the Security General Directorate to investigate and interrogate Marlo. After the interrogation it was stated that Marlo lived in an apartment number ten in Yedikule near İmrahor station. During her interview she stated that her son was a military officer and she only wrote about herself and her son.[38] Based on this report the SB directorate demanded that the General Staff provide information on the soldier's name and duty and had him judged for providing information about himself and the army. [39]

34 ATASE, BDH, F:3919, D:84, I:1. "Official Decree for Military Staff".

35 The signiture was not clear as the part of the document was hole punched.

36 ATASE, BDH, F:313, D:381, I:015. "From the Second Branch to Central Command".

37 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:047. "From the Censor Inspector in Istanbul to Second Branch and From Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 26 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ 08 January 1915.

38 ATASE, BDH, F:280, D:56, I:047-01. "From the Security General Directorate to Second Branch", 28 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ 10 January 1915.

39 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:56, I:047-01a. "From the Second Branch to General Headquarters", 28 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/ 10 January 1915.

Another precaution was about the travelling procedures of SB agents. Before the Military Passport Centers was established by the SB, the SB demanded from the Security General Directorate to provide SB officers with special passports, in order to prevent their interruption by police officers. The Security General Directorate confirmed that, on behalf of the SB, the agents would be provided with travelling credentials from the Grand Viziership. However this condition changed as a Military Passport Department was established by the SB. The Military Passport Departments were opened in each province and the travelers had to obtain *official permit* (mürur tezkiresi) or a passport before their voyage.[40]

4.2.2 The Second Branch and the Imposition of Law

Along with the declaration of mobilization during World War I, the immediate and necessary precaution was indeed a law against espionage. With Martial Law, as I already stated, the Ministry of War gained an upperhand in policy-making in the state. The SB, being tasked with domestic intelligence, not only took part in counter-espionage but also became administratively powerful, so as to impose laws on the state which contributed to its centralization.

In order to prevent counter-espionage the SB obtained other countries' laws regarding spying activities to impose a temporary law to struggle against espionage. On the matter, a report transmitted to the Ministry Navy right after the application of Martial Law draws attention. The SB ordered the Ministry of Navy to obtain and present to the SB, a copy of the law for espionage (casusluk kanunnamesi) through the channel of navy attaches.[41] In addition, the SB also sent a telegram to the Paris and Berlin military attaches to obtain French and German laws

40 Official Permit (mürur tezkiresi) provided the travellers to travel within the provinces of the Empire lands, in other words it is kind of a domestic passport. ATASE, BDH, F: 420, D:282, I:11-1. "The establishment of the Military Passport Department".

41 ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:30, I:001. "From the Second Branch to the Ministry of Navy".

against espionage.[42] The Paris Embassy in return, transmitted a report stating that there was not a special "law against espionage against the army" but just a general "law against espionage".[43] Also, the Berlin Embassy transmitted the law against espionage in Berlin.[44] Unfortunately we do not know if the SB obtained information on Britain as the archival documents could not be accessed. However, by analyzing different laws regarding espionage the SB managed to impose the law. The twenty one articled temporary law Exposing Military Secrecy and Espionage and War Treason (Esrar-ı Askeriyeyi ifşa ve Casusluk ve Hıyanet-i Harbiye) was administered on the 29th October 1914.[45] The SB demanded that the military officers and security general directorate hammer the warning adverts on the poles and to distribute them as leaflets at restaurants, clubs, railway stations, tunnels, wagons and docks.[46]

There were other temporary laws in that directly targeted the non-Muslim citizens, right after the law against espionage. This can either be interpreted as the SB's own threat assessment on non-Muslim citizens especially after the Balkan Wars defeat, or it can be interpreted as in the light of the pan-Turkish ideology of the CUP government. However, which ever it is the result in the same. With the recommendation of the SB, another temporary law was applied on 23rd November 1914 and the

42 ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:30, I:002. "From the Second Branch to Paris and Berlin Military Attaches", undated.

43 ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:30, I:003. "From the Paris Embassy to Second Branch", 1 Ağustos 1330/14 August 1914.

44 ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:30,I:005."From the Berlin Embassy to Second Branch", 3 Ağustos 1330/16th August 1914.

45 These articles were also distributed in İkdam see; *İkdam*, No. 6361 (23 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/ 23 November 1914). Some of the crimes that the law contained were as follows: delivering information about weaponary, ammunition, explosives, battleplans, sabotage, guiding foreign officers; getting in touch with hostile states armies; navy, delivering the officers into enemy hands, freeing the prisoners. The temporary law was passed with the signature of the ministry of the navy, minister of justice, minister of war and the Grand Vizier, BOA. ŞD. 659/20. 16 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/ 29 October 1914.

46 ATASE, BDH, F:382, D:1521, I:16, "From the General Staff to Ministry of Internal Affairs", Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/ October 1914.

subjects (tebaa) of hostile states who lived near military zones and railway stations were deported to inner parts of the cities against a possile spying activity on behalf of the hostile states.[47] In addition to this report, on 25th November 1914, an order enforced that all the subjects of hostile states near critical military positions were deployed to different provinces.[48] In another report sent from the General Staff and signed by the director of the SB to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was written that the subjects of hostile states were a threat to the Ottoman navy and the deportation of the subjects from coasts to inner parts was required.[49]

After the orders, the SB also followed and demanded information from the Internal Ministry about the deportations. In a report dated 9th January 1915, the SB demanded "urgent" information on the deportation of hostile states' subjects who lived in on Mediterranean and Blacksea coasts. In the report, the numbers of the deported and the who were not yet, was demanded from the ministry.[50]

The ministry sent the numbers and the names of the citizens. Table 4.1 shows an instance of the numbers who were not yet deported.

Table 4.1 Amount of Hostile States' Subjects (Teba-i Muhasama Miktarı)[51]

Istanbul	4130	Konya	11

47 BOA. BEO. 4323/324170. "From the General Staff to Ministry of Internal Affairs", 10 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/23 November 1914. For a good analysis of domestic precautions als apply; Servet Avşar, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Casusluk Okulları, Casusluk Uygulamaları ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin Casusluğu Önleme Faaliyetleri, in Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, Vol 2, November, 2018), Abdulrahman Bozkurt, "I. Dünya Savaşı Başlarında Osmanlı Devleti'nde Casusluk Faaliyetleri ve Güvenlik Algısı" in *OTAM* 36 (2014), 1-44

48 BOA. MV. 195/12. 12 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/25th January 1915.

49 BOA. DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 9/3. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Internal Affairs", 22 Kanun-u Sani 1330/ 4 February 1915.

50 BOA. DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 7/56, "From the General Staff to Ministry of Interior", 27 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/9 January 1915.

51 BOA.DH.EUM. 5.Şb, 7/56. "From the Ministry of Interior to General Staff"27 Kanun-u Evvel 1330 /9 January 1915

Çanakkale	144	Sivas	20
Kastamonu	144	Menteşe	1
Izmit	18	Ankara	22
Bolu	2		
Edirne	23		
Aydın	3116		
Diyarbakır	3116		

Two years later, it was requested from the Internal Ministry to obtain the numbers of deported subjects of hostile states from provinces for a prisoner exchange with hostile states.[52] In 1917, the non-Muslims became a tool for a bargain on exchange for the captured Ottoman soldiers. As the list was too long, I will just present a sample of the report in table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Deported Subjects of Hostile Countries[53]

Province: Ankara	Kastamonu: 4 people
Name: Amede?(Ayaş)	Mersin: 1 Person
Owen (Ayaş)	Konya: 2 People
Stephan(Osmancık)	Bolu: 12 People
Gurji(Çorum)	Edirne: 11 People
Nicola (Osmancık)	
Report from 4th Army in Jerusalem Commandership: " No subjects remain in Jerusalem due to deportation"	Antalya Sub-governor: "3 People who lived in Fethiye were deported to Muğla central."

Besides the temporary laws that mostly affected the non-Muslim groups, there were other regulations as well. An application called Kapu Mahalleri was constituted on 20th November 1914 by the pressure of the SB. It was required for both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens to obtain approved credentials and use the designated lands or harbors for en-

52 BOA. DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 53/37. "From the General Staff to Ministry of Internal Relations"

53 The Prisoner Exchange Branch(Esir Muamelesi Şubesi) of the General Staff also demanded the names and numbers but the Ministry transmitted a reply stating that the current numbers were requested from the provinces but the names and their status had already been transmitted to the SB. BOA. EUM. 5.şb. 36/3 "The Deported Subjects of Hostile States in Menteşe, Aleppo, Ankara, Eskişehir, Teke, Trabzon, Jerusalem, Ordu, Kastamonu, Mersin, Konya, Bolu and Edirne". 7 Kanun-u sani 1332/ 20th January 1917.

trances or exits. With this application, the citizens who were to leave the Ottoman lands were first checked by the officers in Kapu Mahalleri and once they arrived, their credentials were re-checked by the embassies.[54]

The exits and entrances to lands also became especially strict for the non-Muslim citizens, as the war progressed. Also, the SB's position became so strong that, on 31st January 1915, another report containing the signatures of Enver Pasha and Seyfi Bey was sent to the Ministry of Interior about the exits and entrances to Ottoman Lands. In the report it was stated that the subjects of hostile states who lived in Ottoman lands frequently traveled and, having the potential of interaction with spying organizations and spying activities, their travelling had to be restricted and even prohibited. With another temporary law, exits and entrances for these groups were prohibited. This issue caused some problems between institutions as I will also dig into in the future sections.[55]

4.2.3 Problems of Personnel Shortages

As the tasks extended, personel shortage became a certain problem for the SB. Due to the heavy task load of the SB the redundancy of inspectors, police officers, commissars, sub-commissars, gendarmarie officers and intelligence officers was prohibited. Already stated at the beginning of chapter two, a security inspector who worked at Urla requested his retirement from the Security General Directorate. As all the security personnel were required under the order of the SB to fight against espionage, his request was rejected by the SB due to insufficient staffing.[56]

54 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:404, I:009. " From the Second Branch to Ministry of Foreign and Internal Affairs", 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/20 November 1914. The non-Muslim citizens were also prohibited to go outside from their houses before sunset and after 9 p.m BOA. DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 4/1. "From the General Staff to Ministry of Internal Affairs", 6 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/ 19 November 1914.

55 From the General Staff to Ministry of Internal Affairs", BOA. DH. EUM. 5.Şube, D:9, G:6 18 Kanun-u sani 1330/31 January 1915.

56 ATASE, BDH, F:327, D:403, I:006 "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate and Ministry of Interior about the Redundancy Procedures", 29 Mart 1333/ 29 March 1917.

As the workload got heavier, Seyfi Bey presented his complaints to the General headquarters regarding the insufficiency of staff at all levels, from censorship inspectorates to passport centers.[57] In addition, with a demand regarding the conviction and surveillance of suspects, the SB demanded staff from other institutions such as the the Ministry of War by additional payment.[58] On the matter, I cannot specify the budget spared for the SB, but considering all its workload and sub-establishments and its sources, it was unlikely to be scant. The only information that I obtained regarding recruited spies, is that they were paid a thousand Ottoman *guruş*.[59]

The insufficiency of staff caused problems and interruption in counter-espionage practices. For instance, a cigarette paper that carried notes was captured and brought to the intelligence officers in the censorship inspectorates. The inspectors could not read the French letters on the cigarette paper and it was demanded from a civilian named François to de-cipher. However as François could not read it as well, the Izmir inspector sent the letter to the SB headquarters and demanded additional officers to ease the job in censorship inspectorate.[60]

To ease the job, the SB director Seyfi Bey requested additional officers from the General Staff to serve in the censorship inspectorates. However the General Staff reported to the SB that there were no other bilingual officers left as most of them were already assigned to the SB. There were only some reserve army officers who had good knowledge

57 ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:1639, I:003. "From the Second Branch Director Seyfi Bey to General Staff", undated.

58 BOA. DH. EUM. 5. Şube D:65/15. "Document on providing additional personel to the SB", Temmuz 1334/ 24 Temmuz 1918.

59 ATASE, BDH, F:269, D:1111, I:1-2. "Amount of money to be paid for spies, civillian officers", undated.

60 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:021. "From İzmir Censor Inspectorate to Second Branch". 22 Mayıs 1331/ 4 June 1915

of French. In the General Staff's report it was stated that from the provided list, the SB director could choose and assign any of them.[61]

The amount of staff was also a problem for the Military Passport Centers. For instance, the Istanbul-Bağçekapı Military Passport Director transmitted a report to the SB headquarters stating that although it was proclaimed in the establishment list that there were 15 soldiers and corporals for security, only nine soldiers were assigned. The director of the passport center demanded the necessary number of soldiers to be in order to conduct the duties. The reply that came from the SB was interesting. It was implied by the SB that there were not enough educated and trained military officers to conduct the duty and as soon as their training was complete they would be assigned to the passport center.[62] The problem of the scarcity of staff continued throughout the war.

4.2.4 The Second Branch's Other Establishments

The SB also opened up counter-espionage sections in other states as well, which illustrates the overlapping condition of foreign and domestic intelligence during warfare. The *Sofia Prevention of Spying Department* was established with the coordination of the SB and Abteilung IIB in Sofia, in order to prevent spying activities against the Ottoman Empire and Germany in the Balkans and especially to control the travelers.[63]

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61 In the report the officers were classified as Muslims and Non-Muslims. The Muslims were: Kamil Efendi (istanbul), Emin Efendi (Bolu), İbrahim Efendi (Bilecik), Aladdin Efendi (İstanbul), Vehbi Efendi(Yozgat), Orhan efendi (Üsküdar), Süreyya Fahri Efendi (Cihangir)…Non-Muslims: Zara Efendi (İstanbul), Hayım Efendi (İstanbul), Yuda Efendi (İstanbul), Paroh Efendi (Edirne), ATASE, BDH, F:409, D:296, I:013. "From the General Staff to Second Branch", 27 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/9th January 1915.

62 ATASE, BDH, F:420, D:283, I:11-1. "From the Istanbul Military Passport Center to Second Branch"and "From the Second Branch to Istanbul Military Passport Center", 10 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333/ 10 Kasım 1917.

63 We are not sure on the exact establishment date of the department as it is mentioned in a document that contained information on the department in Sofia. ATASE, BDH,

For instance a telegram was captured by the Sofia Security Directorate and interrogated by the Sofia Prevention of Spying Department. The interrogation reports were first disseminated to the Sofia Embassy of the Ottoman Empire. In the report it was stated that a person called Leon transmitted a telegram with a fake signature as "Yusuf". The Sofia Embassy transmitted the report to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry transmitted the report to the SB headquarters.[64] The third department of the SB headquarters, responsible for censorship, demanded from the Beyoğlu Censorship Inspectorate to send the names of the sender and receiver of the telegram, along with the letter itself.[65] The intelligence officer within the inspectorate sent a report that the telegram was not recorded and it was a possible spying activity.[66] An order was disseminated to the Security General Directorate to capture Leon and interrogate, for possible spying activity.[67]

In addition, the SB also established different committees in different areas. For instance, the SB established a Civilian Intelligence Committee which also took part in the surveillance of the suspected spies or informants. These committee members were mostly chosen amongst the non-Muslim citizens in order not to draw too much attention. The agents of the committee pursued the spies and informants of foreign states, followed their daily activities, the people they met and had been given the task of arresting.[68]

F:325, D:92, I:24-2. "From the German General Staff to Ottoman General Staff", 23 Mayıs 1332/ 5 July 1916.

64 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:037. "From the Sofia Embassy to Second Branch", 7 Kanun-u Sani 1331/ 20 January 1914,.

65 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:03-01. "From Second Branch to Beyoğlu Censor Directorate", 16 Şubat 1330/ 10 March 1915.

66 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:03-02. "From Beyoğlu Censor Directorate to Second Branch", 5 Mart 1331/ 18th March 1914.

67 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:03-04. "From Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 7 Mart 1332/20th March 1916.

68 ATASE, BDH, F:269, D:594, I:1-1, 1-2. "The establishment of the Civillian Intelligence Committee", undated.

The SB also assigned new officers. For instance, the SB assigned intelligence officers to censorship directorates and post- telegram centers in order to check belongings, telegrams or deliveries. I already mentioned in the previous chapter the Censorship Inspectorates in the Ottoman Provinces, therefore I will not detail these again. However, what I did not present was the Censorship Committee responsible only from domestic security in the SB headquarters. The SB also established a Censorship Committee within the SB headquarters which consisted of eight officers. These eight people were responsible from presenting the censorship reports, obtained from intelligence officers and inspectors in the Censorship Directorates in Ottoman provinces, to the director of the SB regarding counter espionage.[69] The telegraph centers which communicated with foreign countries were limited and underwent strict censorship procedures. Some of the telegraph centers were located in the following cities: Kal'a, İzmir, Edirne, Trabzon, Erzurum, Kötek, Beirut, Fav, Hanekin, Cidde[70]

§ 4.3 The Second Branch's Passive and Active Measures: Regulations, Warnings, Surveillance and Conviction

In the previous section, I focused on SB's precautions at the institutional level, laws that it had imposed for preventing espionage, new establishments and regulations within the existing institutions. In this section I will first present the SB's passive and active measurements in Ottoman lands. Briefly, I focus on the information that the SB gathered regarding other spying organizations as they were quite limited and inaccessible in the archives. Secondly, I will focus on the SB's restrictions in coastlines, fishing, travelling, deliveries, telegrams and photographers. In addition, I will also present the surveillance that the SB

69 ATASE, BDH, F:443, H1, I:1. "Instruction on the Organization of Censorship Committee", 14 Temmuz 1330/6 August 1914.

70 ATASE, BDH, F:443,D:H1, I:1-1. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Interior", 20 Temmuz 1330/ 2 August 1914

conducted for those who did not obey the restrictions. Third, I focus on the espionage methods that SB made other institutions aware of and the orders that the SB gave against espionage. Lastly, I focus on the collective reports of domestic intelligence. In this part I also illustrate that as the SB centralized, it prepared collective reports regarding domestic intelligence from variety of sources. This section, along with the previous section shows that the SB adopted a very strong position to impose laws and orders to other state institutions as a result of the tendency to centralization. As stated in the previous part, surveillance was conducted by the SB's agents, its HUMINT sources and other institutions. As stated, those suspected of being a spy had first to be reported for permission to pursue. Other institutions, unless a spy was caught in the act, had to apply for a consent from SB headquarters or the nearest intelligence officer in the area. All the other surveillance and information, either raw or analyzed, were reported to the SB.

4.3.1 Spying Organizations

The SB obtained information regarding spying organizations such as the *Macedonia Spying Organization*, the *Russian Spy Organization*, the *Bucharest Spying Organization*, the *Sweden-British Spy Organization*, the *Constanza Spy Organization*.[71] Then it kept record of the travelers' possible interaction with these organizations and the organizations attempts in the Ottoman lands. For instance, the SB transmitted a report, sent from the Bucharest ambassador, to the Security General Directorate about a person called Agop Hovagyan. In the report it was stated that Hovagyan moved from Russia to Bucharest (Krinolu? street number

71 For a large the assessment of spying institutions in Ottoman Lands please see; Abdullah Lüleci, "I. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Osmanlı Devleti'nde Casusluk Faaliyetleri 1914-1918" (PHD Dissertation, Sakarya University, 1914); Abdullah Lüleci focused on the spying activities rather than the institutions. However, he showed that the embassies played a significant role in gathering information about the different establishments and transmitted the information to the General Staff. The component in the General Staff to obtain that information was indeed the SB.

9) and frequently visited the British Embassy. Hovagyan was also carrying an Ottoman passport and credited as a nut trader. He was born in 1871 in Trabzon and a fluent speaker of English, German and French. He frequently traveled to Constanza (in Romania) and was possibly in communication with the *Constanza Spy Organization*.[72]

As stated, World War I was a period when domestic intelligence and foreign intelligence overlapped and embassies became a good source for the SB, both for domestic and foreign intelligence. For instance, during the battle of Dardanelles, it was stated by the Constanza Ambassador, that the main purpose of the *Constanza Spy Organization* was to conduct propaganda activities to cause uprisings within the society for the failure of Ottoman army during the Dardanelles campaign and also obtain information regarding the coasts of the Empire.[73]

Another instance was *Sweden British Spy Organization*. The Bern Ambassador, Selim, transmitted a report on 8th May 1917, stating that an assassination plot was conducted by some *London Balkan Committee* members against the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War. Therefore, it was demanded until a second order, that the telegram transmits and deliveries of newspapers and exits and entrances between Sweden and Ottoman Empire were put to a halt.[74]

The military units were indeed active in revealing spying organizations. In October 1916, two spies were caught by the gendarmerie on action in Fethiye and they were found carrying letters. After deciphering the letters there was suspicion of a spying organization in İzmir. The letters carried information on the ammunitions, deployment and names of outpost in İzmir and the letter was written to the British consulate in Rodop Island. Based on the report sent to the SB, Seyfi Bey

72 ATASE,BDH,F:310,D:1260,I:12-1. "From Bucharest Embassy to Second Branch", Şubat 1331/March 1916.

73 Regarding the spy organization see; Abdullah Lüleci, Ibid., 11. BOA. HR. SYS. 2264/6. "From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Second Branch", 30 Mart 1331/13 April 1914.

74 BOA. EUM. 1.Şb. 6/37. "From the Bern Embasssy to General Headquarters", 8 Mayıs 1333/8 May 1917.

ordered both the Security General Directorate First Branch director Mustafa and the Muğla-Antalya District Commander (Muğla-Antalya Havalisi) to uncover the spying organization and provide a report to the SB.[75] At the level of capturing and interrogating the spies in other countries' intelligence services, there were not any accessible documents in the archives. But it is unlikely that the SB did not have any dossier on the other intelligence departments. The documents written in different languages are inaccessible in the ATASE archives and that leaves it to another area of research.

4.3.2 Precaution in Coastlines and Travelling

With the centralization process, the SB was given the power to conduct preventive measures in terms of domestic security. Firstly, the SB sent an order to all the gendarmerie commanders, harbor masters and governors about spying activities against the Ottoman fleet. In the report it was stated that spies were easily obtaining information on Ottoman navy vessels and very strict precautions should be taken. The security units had to arrest the suspects without hesitation and report them to the SB headquarters (especially if they were not a citizen of the Empire). There is an important statement in the report called "bloody example". In the report it was stated that all the sea vessels which did not carry credentials had to be seized. If the owners of the vessels did not accept or apply to the rules than they had to be granted a "bloody example"(kanlı bir misal gösterilmeli) which would forestall spying activity.[76]In the report it was also stated that the fishers would be granted a credential and without the credential no fisher could catch fish and also that would require another "bloody example".[77] By this report it is quite

75 Abdüllah Lüleci, Ibid., 26-27. BOA. DH. KMS. 41/32 "From Ministry of Interior to Security General Directorate", 6 Eylül 1332/19th September 1916.

76 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:404, I:008. "From the Second Branch to all Gendarmarie Commanders and Harbor Masters", 25 Kanun-i Evvel 1330/7 December 1915.

77 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:404, I:008-01. "From the Second Branch to all Gendarmarie Commanders and Harbor Masters", 25 Kanun-i Evvel 1330/7 December 1915.

clear that the suspects were not always sent to Martial Law Courts but were probably shot by the units. In addition, in the Blacksea region, fishing was completely forbidden and the fishers in other provinces were forbidden to fish around one mile away from the permitted area.[78]

This order also caused a panic amongst harbor masters, as with the slightest mistake, being suspected of helping, they had the possibility of being sent to Martial Law Court. After this order, there were huge amount of reports sent from the harbor masters to the SB headquarters and the reports not only contained information regarding the credentials or shipping vessels but sometimes worthless information. On 31st January 1915, the Harbor master of Sinop sent an urgent telegram to the SB headquarters stating that nobody without a certificate was found by the gendarmerie and police, and there were no vessels without credentials. However in the area there were influential members of the Greek Committee named Vasil, Nikolai, Limyos and Yorgaki. Although there was no solid proof, the harbor master stated that he was certain that especially Vasil was conducting "poisonous" talks in the area to cause uprisings amongst Greek citizens. The Harbor Master asked the SB for Vasil to be deported to an area which did not contain Greek citizens.[79]

Another instance, two people who were caught spying near Reşadiye coast confessed that another man in Izmir named Adil was conducting espionage in İzmir, then they last knew him as having gone to Lesbos Island. The SB demanded the report on Adil from the Security General Directorate and Adil was not found in Lesbos. Then, by the order of SB, his mother's house in Sultanahmet (Istanbul) was taken under surveillance and Adil was caught. In the report transmitted from Istanbul Police Directorate to the SB it was stated that Adil was a soldier during the Dardanelles campaign and he was taken as a prisoner. It was probably

78 BOA. DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 10/2. "From the General Staff to Ministry of Interior", 28 Kanun-i Sani 1331/ 10th February 1915.

79 ATASE, BDH, F:494, D:599, I:18. "From Sinop Harbor Master to Second Branch", 18 Kanun-ı Sani 1330/ 31 January 1915.

then Adil began working under a British subject who owned a sock shop and learned how to manufacture socks.[80]

In terms of travelling, first of all, the SB ordered the Ministry of Interior to order the Security Officers in provinces to send the passanger lists on trains and ferries. In addition, the SB also requested the names of the captains and the crew of ferries and the machinist and other technicians who worked on railway lines.[81] The Border Security Inspectorates (Hudud Emniyet Müfettişlikleri) sent all the name and files of the machinists to workers on the railways, as well as the planned list of passengers before each journey.[82] It was ordered by the SB to search the belongings of the machinists and other workers before travelling and if they were carrying letters, the SB required their names and immediate arrest.[83] For instance, a machinist named Stephan was caught carrying a letter that contained information about a brigade, the general condition and the types of uniforms and asked information from the Security Directorate.[84] In addition, the SB transmitted a warning report to wardens on stations to check the labels of people of who carried newspapers, as inside the labels there could be secret notes on the Ottoman army.[85]

The Security General Directorate also demanded certain precautions from the SB. For instance, espionage through making pinpricks on newspapers was hard to check. Therefore the Security General Direc-

80 In the report Adil was described as a tall, medium sized, hazel-eyed, rare and yellow moustached, black haired and 25 year old person, BOA. DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 58/8. 16 Nisan 1334/ 16 April 1918.

81 ATASE, BDH, F:289,D:56, I:014 "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Interior", 10 Mart 1331/ 23 March 1915. The names of the passanger list and workers were sent to the Second Section of the SB; ATASE, BDH, F:366,D:420,I:001. "Tasks of the Second Section".

82 ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:001. "Reponsibilities of Second Branch Departments"

83 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:404, I:16-05. "From Harbor Master to Second Branch".

84 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:04-01.

85 ATASE, BDH, F:285, D:406, I:24.

torate demanded from the SB to prohibit carrying newspapers while traveling.[86]

In addition, especially for train voyages the SB demanded to consistent control of Jewish citizens as they were frequent travelers. It was reported that in the first station in Bulgaria the citizens stamped the letters with Bulgarian stamps, which were counted as normal by the Bulgarian wardens and inspectors. Therefore, after obtaining the names of the passengers, it was especially notified to Sofia Embassy and Security General Directorate to seize the letters of those who got on the train and got off at the first stop in Bulgaria for a possible spying activity.[87]

The same process occurred for those travelling by ferries. All the ferries had to obtain credentials from the harbor masters and those who did not apply, were sent to Martial Courts. It was ordered by the SB that Harbor Masters, police directorate and gendarmerie search every belonging of the passengers. For instance, in Trabzon a passenger was caught carrying letters in a ferry named Dastbenkon and the person along with the traveling agency director of the ferry had been sent to the Tenth Corps intelligence officer for interrogation.[88]

In addition, it was ordered by the SB that no man under eighteen and women were allowed to travel beyond Ottoman lands.[89] This order was applied until temporary law that forbid citizens from travelling abroad was applied.

86 ATASE, BDH, F:391, D:1549, F:003-01. "From the Security General Directorate to Second Branch".

87 ATASE, BDH F:247, D:404, I:10. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 1 Kanun-i sani 1332/ 14 February 1917.

88 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:010. "From the Second Department of Second Branch Hüsrev Bey to Director of Second Branch", undated.

89 ATASE, BDH F:247, D:404, I:007-20. "From the Second Branch to Station Commanderships", Teşrin-i Sani 1330/ November 1914

4.3.3 Post, Telegram and Photography

Telegram centers were indeed institutions that provided the fight against ciphered documents. A guidebook was sent about preventing espionage through telegram to all telegram centers and their staff. [90] On 24 November 1914, formed and assigned telegram committees were assigned to serve on behalf of the SB in telegram centers. These committees, in a year, recruited many personnel and worked in coordination with censorship inspectors. An example of the personnel who worked are detailed in table 4.3

Table 4.3 Galata Telegram Committee[91]

Languages	Names
French and Turkish	Sedat (son of Reşad) Cemaleddin (son of Ali Rıza)
Turkish	İbrahim (Son of Hacı İzzet) İbrahim(Son of Hüseyin) Kenan (Son of Tahir) İbrahim(Son of Şükrü)
8 Turkish, 4 French, 7 German, 1 Spanish, 5 Armenian, 2 Italian, 2 Arabic, 1 Indian	Confidential

As staff in Censorship Inspectorates, Passport Centers and Post and Telegram Directorates increased, more people were arrested. For instance, two telegrams were seized and analyzed by the Galata Telegram Center and sent to the SB. The telegrams belonged to two brothers called Volto and Ephrano in Istanbul and they were sent from Trabzon and Samsun. It was predicted by the censorship inspector and a telegram committee member that the senders used nicknames. The SB's second department director Hüsrev Bey ordered the Security General

90 Abdullah Lüleci, Ibid., 50. Also see ; BOA. DH.EUM.6.Şb, 2/24 "From the General Staff to Telegram Centers", 30 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/ 13 December 1914.

91 The document contains names, birthplace, residence, age and date of recruitment of the commitee members who were recruited between 1914-1915. ATASE, BDH, F:415, D:288, I:002-05. "Cadre of the Telegram Committee under the order of Second Branch", November 1914-April 1915.

directorate to arrest Volto and Ephrano, interrogate and learn the name of the sender.[92]

By a denouncement from the SB's Civilian Intelligence Committee agent, a report about a telegram activity between Ereğli and Istanbul also draws attention. On 2nd July 1915, the SB transmitted an order to the Istanbul Censorship Inspectorate, to seize and analyze a letter addressed to a woman named Dasi in Istanbul, that was sent from a woman who signed the letter as "Anna" in Ereğli.[93] The letters contained ciphered letters. The censorship officer deciphered the phrase which contained strange sentences. The officer noted that the words in the letter "Nikola" and "Nikolaidi" implied the "Nicola Navy", the word "nöbet" implied "bombardment" and "hap" the "cannon balls". Based on the report, Hüsrev Bey, the director of the second department of SB, demanded the arrest and interrogation of both of the women by the Istanbul Police Directorate.[94]

Although in the ATASE archive the access to documents on ciphering is limited, there is one more document that the SB disseminated to the

92 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:1177, I:010. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate", undated.

93 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:023. "From the Second Branch Directorate to Istanbul Censorship Inspectorate", 20 Mayıs 1331/ 2 July 1915.

94 The document did not contain the full deciphered letter, therefore I was not able to write about what espionage it contained. ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:023. "From the Second Branch Directorate to Istanbul Police Directorate." 20 Mayıs 1331/2 June 19915. The letter contained strange and awkward sentences; "Bugün sevgili hemşiremizin yevm-i mahsusu olması münasebetiyle ifa-i tebrike müsaraat eylerim. Biz panovapostolidi? ile hala kırda bulunuyoruz çünkü her daim ikolanın nöbetlerine tutuluruz. Bundan dolayı evimizde oturamıyoruz. Çok rahatsız oluyoruz lakin ne çare bu sarı illetin hitamına kadar sabır edeceğiz. Nikola laidi hemen her gün geliyor. Bize verdiği haplar patlayıp midemizi pek çok sarsıyor. Bize haplarının kuvvetli olduğunu anlatmak istiyor ve kır da bir müddet daha kalmamızı tavsiye ediyor. Siz bize hiçbir şey yazmıyorsunuz. Sıhhatte misiniz? Yoksa sizde de böyle sarı bir illet mi vardır? Hemşireniz Anna" Answer from the intelligence officer; "Bâlâda tercümesi arz edilen mektubdaki Nikola ve Nikolaidi kelimeleriyle "Nikola donanmasını" nöbet kelimesiyle "bombardımanı ve hap kelimesiyle " gülleleri" telmih ediyor."

censorship inspectorate and the Security General Directorate on deciphering. In the report it was stated that the commonly used method for ciphering was a German-French dictionary. Each of the words were ciphered with the number of page and line. For instance the word "today" was on the 164th page and 78th line of dictionary, in that case the numbers 16478 would reveal the word "today".[95]

Another precaution was indeed regarding the postal centers and cargos. As stated in the previous chapter, the couriers were separated into *political* and *random* couriers, where the political couriers worked for the institutions, whereas random couriers were for citizens. The political couriers travel permits were given by the SB. For instance, Yusuf Ziya Efendi who worked as a courier between the German General Staff and the Ottoman General Staff needed to travel through Sofia and Vienna and the official permit was given by the SB itself.[96]

Photography was also a very common method for espionage. As stated in the propaganda section, no photographer besides the ones acting on behalf of the Propaganda Branch could enter military areas. However, as spies could conceal themselves as a war photographer, the SB tried to take measurements. With a regulation imposed by the SB, in order to open up a photoshop or a cinematography, the citizens had to obtain a permit from the SB headquarters. The local wardens (mahalli zabıta) became responsible from checking the permits[97] and the SB demanded from the Security General Directorate to report all the photoshop owners' names and addresses and ordered that they be kept under surveillance at all times.[98]

95 BDH, F:391, D:1549, I:018-01. "From Second Branch to Security General Directorate and Censorship Directorates".

96 BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 16/48. "Travel Permit for Yusuf Ziya Efendi", 10 Kanun-u Sani 1334/ 10 January 1918.

97 BOA.DH.EUM.VRK. 28/51. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Interior".

98 ATASE,BDH, F:263, D:180, I:5,5-1. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 28 Temmuz 1331/10 August 1915.

The Security General Directorate sent a list of all the photoshop owners. The one regarding Beyoğlu is an example (see table 4.4)

Table 4.4 Photoshop Owners in Beyoğlu[99]

No.	Name Surname	Subject	Race	Age	Address	Address of Photoshop
1	Greguvar veled-i Artin	Ottoman	Armenian	53	Poyraz Street Kârban Apartment No.:3 Pangaltı	Doğruyol, Kamer Hatun Street Beyoglu
2	Sirak veled-i Mir Oşriki Yervant veled-i Onnik	Ottoman Ottoman	Armenian Armenian	36 35	İcâdiye Street Apartment No.:10 Pangaltı Kaya Street Apartment No.:42 Pangaltı	Doğruyol, Tamtam Street No.:305 Beyoglu
3	Febus Efendi	Ottoman	Armenian	49	Febus Photo shop	Doğruyol Street Beyoğlu
4	Apollon	Ottoman	Latin Armenian	50	İcadiye Street Pangaltı unknown number	
5	Pozant veled-i Bedros	Ottoman	Armenian	35	Sakızağacı Karanlık Street unknown number	Doğruyol Street No.:429/430 in Beyoğlu
6	Vahan Boşnakyan	Ottoman	Armenian	32	Cedîdiye Street No.:102 Pangaltı	Doğruyol Street No.:414 in Beyoğlu
7	İskender	Otto-	Arme-	42	House op-	Doğruyol

99 ATASE, BDH,F:263, D:180, I:5-2. "From the Istanbul Police Directorate to Second Branch", undated.

	veled-i Tatyos	man	nian		posite Harbiye Pangaltı	Street No.:439 in Beyoğlu
8	Nikoli veled-i Yani	Hellenic	Greek Protestant	32	At Foto shop	Doğruyol, Ahmedli Mescid Street No.:430
9	Romato Hasref	Otto-man	Latin	36	At Foto shop	Cadde-i Kebîr Street, Roman Fotoshop, No.: 404 Beyoğlu
10	Nikolaki Andriyo Menos	Otto-man	Greek	65	At Foto shop	Cadde-i Kebîr Street, No.: 162, Beyoğlu
11	Arthur Volko veled-i Nikola	Hellenic	Latin	31	Mavi Street Kalyoncu No.:14	Kamer Hâtun, Çeşme Street No.:2
12	Apostol veled-i İstilyani	Otto-man	Greek	35	Karnaval Street No.:7 Beyoğlu	Bereketzâde Old Voyvoda Street No.: 92 Galata
13	Kosti Kurucapolis	Otto-man	Greek	36	Aynalıçeşme No.:49 Beyoğlu	Yüksekkaldırım, Street, No.:75 Galata
14	Kostandi veled-i Tanaş	Otto-man	Greek	42	Aynalıçeşme German Church Street Beyoğlu	Galata Yüksekkaldırım street number 21
15	Vasil İstavri	Yunan	Greek	33	In house, Yazıcı Street Yeniyol No.:9 Beyoğlu	Kemankeş Helvacı Street No.: 29 Galata

16	Leon Gomidas	Ottoman	Armenian	39	Pangaltı Afet Street No.:6 Beyoğlu	At the inn next to the Abdullah Efendi restaurant No.:11
17	Oseb oğlu Mıgırdıç Çobanyan ve biraderi Kiğork	Ottoman	Armenian	56 44	In house, Büyük Bebek Takvîmhâne Street " " " " "	Performs art in a room of written address. " " " " "
18	Kostantin Nedra	Yunan	Greek	30	In house, Kebîr' Street No.:33 Beyoğlu	Performs art in a room of written address.
19	Sofyanos	Ottoman	Greek	54	Bayat Pazarı Beşiktaş	Performs art in a room of written address.
20	Jozef veled-i Marko	Avusturya	Australian	58	Dolabdere Minkasar Street No.:56	Performs art in a room of written address.
21	Ohannes Ekmekciyân	Ottoman	Armenian Catholic	42	Frenk Neighborhood Tarabya	Performs art in a room of written address.
22	Balcıoğlu Aram Efendi	Ottoman	Armenian	56	On the first floor of Hâlis Bey Apartment Pangaltı	Performs art in a room of written address.
23	Manlagos Mejaki veled-i Ale-	Ottoman	Greek	48	Çifteceviz-ler Kömürcü	Pangaltı/ Büyükdere Street no 93

	ksandri				Street Şişli Unknown number	
24	Mösyö Jozef	Ottoman	Armenian Catholic	54	Büyükdere Street No.: 259 Şişli	Performs art in a room of written address.
25	İcrayan Karabet müteveffâ Takfor	Ottoman	Armenian		Bağlarbaşı Street No.:136 Yenimahalle	Bağlarbaşı Street No.:136 Yenimahalle
26	Ohannes Aronyan Efendi	Ottoman	Armenian		Kayserilioğlu Street No.: 49 İcâdiye	In store on Kerpiçhane Street No.:5
27	Refail Handemyan	Ottoman	Armenian		In the house above Foto shop	Muvakkithâne Street No.:36 Kadıköy
28	Hayk Hamparsomyan	Ottoman	Armenian		Mühürdar Street No.:46	In store on Mühürdar Street No.:41 Kadıköy
29	Todori Sirvanidi veled-i Yorgi	Ottoman	Armenian		Opposite to German Hospital Sıraservi Street Kuruçeşme Beyoğlu	In store on Moda Street No.:45 Kadıköy

4.3.4 Orders and Early Warnings on Other Methods of Espionage

The tendency to SB's centralization can also be seen in the orders and the early warnings to other institutions. As not all the personnel in the Internal Ministry were qualified in the deciphering process, there were many reports sent directly to the SB headquarters for analysis. For instance, the İzmir Security Directorate obtained a cigarette paper on 6th May 1915 which contained ciphered Greek letters. As it was ciphered and the paper was in a very bad condition the Security Directorate inspectors could only read three ciphered letters which were *gunpowder*, *bombing* and *war tax*(tekalif-i harbiye), therefore, they sent the report to the SB headquarters for analysis.[100] As the paper was analyzed by the SB, it was stated that although the paper was de-ciphered, there was not enough information on the paper for conviction.[101]

Secondly, in order to prevent information leakage, it was ordered that the pigeons of residents who lived near army zones were killed.[102] It can be observed in archives that German Headquarters sent reports to the SB headquarters, warning of pigeon usage in spying. For instance, on 27th February 1917, the German Headquarters transmitted a report about the French army. In the report it was stated that the French army was using spies near the rare of the German Battlefronts and were mostly using pigeons. The German Headquarters sent a report of an Intelligence officer who interrogated a french spy that used pigeons. In the interrogation report it was written that the spy firstly sent a pigeon to show his location to French troops, then sent his reports.[103]

100 ATASE, BDH, F:256, D:56, I:021. "From İzmir Security Directorate to Second Branch", 24 Nisan 1331/7 May 1915.

101 ATASE, BDH, F:256, D:56, I:021-1. "From Second Branch to İzmir Security Directorate".

102 ATASE,BDH,F:383,D: 1521,I:2-3. "Order on the Execution of Pigeons". This order was also carried out by the Minister of Internal Relations Talat Pasha himself see; BOA. DH. ŞFR.47/291., 19 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/ 2 Aralık 1914.

103 ATASE, BDH, F:391, D:39, I:15-1 "From German Intelligence officer to SB", 7 Mart 1333/ 7 March 1917.

It was ordered by the SB that all the phones or radios, in the houses or workplaces, of those who lived near shores or military zones were removed.[104] All the monasteries in Istanbul were searched for radio or telegram and the priests, who were considered as influential people amongst non-Muslim society, were kept under surveillance. For instance, the SB presented a report on a French spy named Joseph (a priest) who carried a letter of the French speaker of the assembly (meclis-i meb'usan reisi) and some maps that he carried. He was interrogated by the fourth army intelligence officer and the report was sent to the SB. The SB reported the Foreign Ministry implying that the documents contained information about Ottoman troops and it was evident that priests were one the tools of espionage. In addition, the action was also a representation of the intention of France on the Ottoman Lands. The SB demanded the letter to be illustrated and published as evidence in the National Press and requested from the Ministry to spread it through embassies..[105]

Perhaps amongst all the warnings, letters and postcards draws attention. Based on a warning from the SB to censorship inspectorates, the spies could even give a signal from the opening and closure of the envelopes and postcards, use different ink that could fly with a wrong opening, and indeed could conceal the notes under the stamps. This was also implied by the *Sofia Prevention against Espionage Section* as it first transmitted the warning to the SB [106]

It was also demanded that citizens arrived from foreign countries to be observed by wardens at all times.[107] The SB's second department director Hüsrev Bey transmitted a report to the Security General Direc-

104 BOA, DH.EUM.SSM. 25/21. "From the General Staff to Ministry of Internal Relations".

105 ATASE, BDH, 247, F:404, I:012. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Internal Affairs".

106 ATASE, BDH, F:391,D:39,I:8, 8-1. "From Sofia Prevention Against Espionage section to Second Branch" 24 Kanun-u Evvel1332/ 6 January 1917; "From the Second Branch to Istanbul Censorship Inspectorate" 11 Kanun-ı sani 1332/ 24 January 1917

107 BOA. DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 4/1. "From the General Staff to Ministry of Interior", 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/20th November 1914.

torate to take precautions regarding travelers. Hüsrev Bey stated that the passengers who used the boats and trains should be kept under check from their clothing to their luggage. Especially if they carried a hat, umbrella or had cigarette papers in their belongings.[108]

According to the SB, vegetable merchants and deliverers who came from other provinces were also common couriers for letters and notes. For instance, the SB sent a report on the warning method to the Security General Directorate about vegetable merchants (sebze tüccarı).[109]

In the report, it was stated that both Muslim and non-Muslim vegetable distributors were used as couriers for espionage activities and a man named İsmail in Maltepe talked with a tall, Russian-speaking man and took a pack of papers from him. While the SB ordered the Istanbul Police Directorate to seize and interrogate İsmail, it was ordered in the same report that the vegitable carriages were suitable for carrying notes as they could be easily hidden. It was also stated that the most proper place for such activity was the Eminönü Bazaar, as the distributor could easily give or receive notes within the crowd without being notified. Therefore, the SB demanded from the Security General Directorate to search the carriages with a "bust and pursue". This order was carried out immediately and also the Istanbul Security Directorate investigated İsmail's movements. In the reply report sent from the police to the SB, it was stated that the orders about vegetable distributors were received and was being fulfilled. In addition the police directorate stated that they could not achieve any results from the investigation of İsmail yet and were waiting the next orders of the SB.[110] Another method was also prositution. The SB sent a report to the Istanbul Censorship Inspectorate that two prostitutes were suspected of spying and by a

108 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:010. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate".

109 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:59, I:20. "From the second department director of Second Branch Hüsrev Bey to Istanbul Police Directorate", 13 Mayıs 1331/26 May 1915.

110 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:59, I:20. "From the Istanbul Police Directorate to Second Branch", 14 mayıs 1331/31 May 1915.

general order women who were credited for prostitution were forbidden to send or receive deliveries or letters.[111]

4.3.5 Collective Reports and Surveillance

The spy-mania that Christopher Andrew discussed in his study also seemed to tear the Ottoman SB. The SB ordered the Interior Ministry, commanderships and harbor masters to investigate almost everything about the entrances and exits to within the Empire. For instance a man named Hans, aged 22, who worked in a club named "Gardenbar" in Tebebaşı frequently travelled to Germany between March and August 1915. Although Hans obtained his necessary permits for travelling, based on the orders of the SB to Ministry of Interior, the Security General Directorate followed Hans' movements. In the report provided from the Security General Directorate to the SB it was stated that Hans, during his visit in Germany, sent many letters to a woman in Istanbul but the letters did not contain any suspicious correspondence. From the directorate's report the SB also asked from the German military attache to observe Hans' movements in Germany and attached a copy of the letters. Based on the investigation in Germany it was reported to the SB that the last letter was written on 5th July 1915 and the recorded address within the post center was crosschecked and Hans did not change did place he stayed.[112] Another instance that SB requested an observation was of a women named Herkans who traveled by an Austrian boat. The woman was first notified during her stay in a hotel and had a hasty character. On the day of her travel she bought a ticket from the third class as she was poor. She was investigated by the Istanbul police and a

111 ATASE, BDH, F:285, D:1161, I:049. "From Second Branch to Istanbul Censorship Inspectorate", 13 Şubat 1332/26 February 1917.

112 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:026. "From the Security General Directorate to Second Branch", 18 Haziran 1331/1 July 1915.

letter was collected from her belongings. Istanbul Police directored noted that further investigation would be carried on.[113]

Due to the tendency to centralization, the SB not only conducted preventive measures, but also became the top institution where all the intelligence reports were gathered and totally disseminated to many institutions both regarding foreign and domestic intelligence. Even when observed in Ottoman Archives, the Foreign Ministry reports from the ambassadors and attaches on intelligence are sent to SB aswell. Same could be said for domestic security. In addition, as stated in a previous chapter, the sources - either at institutional or HUMINT level - canalized their intelligence reports to the SB headquarters. Through these, the SB presented general reports to decision-makers. In case of domestic intelligence, after obtaining all the information from different sources, the SB disseminated them on record books called the "interrogation of denounced spying suspects." Figure 4.1 is a summary, from some150 other tables presented by the SB from different institutions. In the table it can clearly be seen that the SB followed many people as suspects regarding travelling, hiding and censored telegrams and noted the procedures. From the examples it can be seen that the SB ordered many sources to interrogate suspects such as those who did not stick to traveling procedures, disobeyed censorship regulations, conducted spying activities through cipher letters and false statements.[114]

Figure 4.1 Collective Espionage Summaries of Second Branch

113 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:026-01. "From the Istanbul Police Directorate to Security General Directorate".

114 ATASE, BDH, F:252, D:375. "Record Books of the Interrogation of Denounced Suspects as Spies" " Casus oldukları ihbar edilen eşhas hakkında icra kılınan tahikat hakkındaki kayıt defterleri", 1330-1331/1914-1915.

No.	Name	Nationality	Job	Nationality	Hometown	Address	The source of the Report	Date	Incidents	Procedures	Date
9	Yorgiyaris	Greek	Lawyer	Hellenic	Girid	Greek Embassy	Name seen on passenger list	Investigated by Interior Ministry on 29 September 1914	Came from İzmir through Bandırma without any permit. (One of Venizelos's friend) A member of Property Exchange Commission	Asked to the Police Directorate Reply: Yorgiyaris is not a member of Commission. Doubt about the identity of the accompanying clerk Mavro (?). Investigation is on going	1.10.1914
10	Semila from the Indian Government	A telegram sent from Semiha to British Consulate in Baghdad: "Please provide information to Suehmois(?)on the condition of Seyyid Muhammed Nasi the son of Mevlevi Said Nazir Hüseyin. Estimate the cost. The cost will be covered by the consular treasury.								Asked to the Interior Ministry for the investigation on Muhammed Nasîr. Also asked from Iraq Command. Reply: Informed as Head of Islamic Society in India, spreading Islam, son of Bahfa an enemy of British.	4.10.1914
11	Valeşenko Papanova	Russian	Unknown Woman	Russian	Moscow	Moscow	Reported to the Ministry of Interior because of his telegram due to cipher letters in the following: "From Moscow to Consulate General of Jerusalem, I would like you to try to send Pilgrims, who were left without money in Jerusalem recently, to Moscow.				5.10.1915
12	Prince Muhammed Amilakof (?)	Islam	Prince	Russian	Russia	Otel Royal	In accordance with a note written to Nazır Pasha I dared to bother Sultan for negotiation on a major issue by coming to Dersaadet. I would like an informal interview for a neutral issue. It was also necessary having a translator in Russian language and having your trust in this negotiation.			The Police Directorate asked the people he met and whether he was spending money or not. Reply to the Central Command: "He talked with the Circassian officer who was not identified.	Undated
13	Gavril Veled-i Yovan	Russian	...	Russian	Caucasia 1st Regiment	Erzurum ...	He was sent from Erzurum to Ankara Martial Law Court. However, he was acquitted. He was again caught while traveling around Kayseri and brought to SB headquarters for interrogation.				12.10.1915
14	Leskoz, Russian Subject	Jewish and Greek	... busy with farming .			They came to Istanbul to take their families to Russia		On October 16, 1915	They came to İstanbul but did not leave.	Written to the Police Directorate Reply: They sent their families to Russia and they returned to their old places. They were from the suspect.	20.10.1915

As it can be seen in the figure above, the collective reports contains information from a variety of sources. For instance, Semila's (suspect numbered 10) telegram was obtained through German officers' interception (landline not mentioned) and the German officials (source unnotified) presented the report to the SB. The SB demanded from the Iraq Area command to obtain information on Seyyid Muhammed Nasi, the person whom Semila was trying to obtain information about. In the report provided by the Iraq Area command, it was stated that he was a rich and influential person who could unite the Islamic society and also a supporter of Ottoman Empire. By following Semila, the SB tried to prevent an assassination against Muhammed Nasi.[115]

Especially after 1915, the necessity for bilingual officers increased along with the collective reports with all the deportations. The SB especially were in need of Armenian speaking officers who had a good knowledge of linguistics and translation to analyze the surveillance reports. The SB employed Armenian officers and assigned 522 officers to different positions in the army. Table 4.5 is an illustration of the list in SB headquarters.

Table 4.5 List of Armenian Officers Assigned by Second Branch.[116]

Record	Name	Duty
12	Kigork	6th Army
54	Kirkor	4th Army
85	Artin	4th Army Machine Gun Squad
91	Kirkor	4th Army
92	Kenegam	4th Army
94	Karakasyan	6th Army
95	Agob	5th Branch
96	Kirkor	5th Aeroplane Squadron
99	Vebrober	6th Army
174	Alir? Çermikyan	4th Army Machine Gun

115 ATASE, BDH, F:252, D:1049, I:2-1. "From the SB to Iraq Area Command", undated,

116 ATASE,BDH, F: 373, D:1484, I:8-1,8-2. "From the Second Branch to Personnel Division", undated.

		Squad
175	Andon Çermikyan	4th Army Machine Gun Squad

Especially with the forcible deportation of Armenians and later the Greek citizens, intelligence reports on these two subjects increased and the reports were presented mostly as Armenian spies or propagandists who acted on behalf of the Russians.[117] For instance, the SB sent a report to the Security General directorate about a photographer who was obtaining many photographs of the Armenians which were used by Russian Spies in Bucharest. In the report it was stated as "the names of the spies and propagandists who served for the Russians were presented". The names provided by the Security General Directorate, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Relations is shown in table.[118]

Table 4.6 Russian Spies in Bucharest

The reporter of Reç Newspaper and the person who started Armenian and Russian Propaganda: Libaryet Nazaryan
Jan Bazaryan: who was sent from Russia to Bucharest
Jernak: an Armenian revolutionist who is a member of Taşnaksütyun Party
Dedeberyan: A famous baker
Vantura: a Russian secret police

The SB also gathered intelligence on the Armenians who were away from the Ottoman grounds and were prohibited to enter Empire grounds as being suspects of espionage activity. For instance, in another report obtained from the Bucharest Embassy and transmitted from the SB headquarters to the Security General Directorate on 15th August 1916

117 The documents numbered between 200-600 in the ATASE archives are the documents about the SB. In these documents, not only the reports between SB and other institutions but also the reports between other institutions can be found. For a detailed amount of reports also see the 7 Volume series: "Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri," published by the General Staff in 2005 which contains reports transmitted by, or from, the SB to other units.

118 ATASE, BDH, F:310, D:852, I:12. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 2 August 1332/15th August 1916.

commands attention. In the report it was stated that a person named Agop Ohannes claimed that he was born in Istanbul, immigrated to USA and was a reporter for the World newspaper. When he went to Sofia to meet with the Bulgarian King he was deported from Bulgarian lands by the order of the Bulgarian government. In the report it was stated that the permittance of his entrance to Ottoman Lands was improper.[119]

The SB kept track of the Armenians and also prepared collective reports regarding the total population and those who were deported. A summary is provided in table 4.7.

Table 4.7 Collective Report on Deported Armenians[120]

Province	Number of Armenians	Number of Deported	Route and Place of Deportation	Explanations
Ankara	47.224			
Erzurum	128.657	120.000	To Mosul and Zor through the route of Elazığ	Rest of the population some died during combat and some escaped
Adana	46.031			
İzmit	54.370	50.000		Rest of the population escaped, hide or died.
Bitlis	109.521			
Canik	26.374	20.000		Rest of the population died in combat and some of them es-

119 ATASE, BDH, F:310, D:852, I:12-2. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 23 Mart 1332/5th April 1916.

120 "The List of the Deported Armenians transmitted to Secon Branch From Various Sources" ATASE, BDH, F:361, D:1445, I:1-6,1-7,1-8, also see *Arşiv Belgeleriyle ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918*, Vol 1 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2005.) 147-170.

			caped
Aleppo	34.451	26.374	
Hüdavendigar	66.413		
Diyarbekir	61.002		
Sivas	141.592		
Trabzon	34.500	141.592	Rest of the population escaped
Karesi	8.290	28.000	
Afyon	7327		
Kayseri	47.617		
Mamüüretülaziz	74.206		
Kahramanmaraş	27.101		
Niğde	5101	27.101	
Van	67.792		
Total	987.569	413.067	

To many scholars mentioned in the literature review, the Ottoman Empire was conducting deportation policies in order to remove the Armenians totally from Ottoman Lands through massacre and genocide,[121] whereas some other scholars defend the Ottoman point of view and support the view that the Armenians were forcibly deported due to their alliance with the Russian forces. My contribution is that intelligence regarding the armenians was also sent to the SB and gathered at that SB headquarters.

The tasks of counter-espionage not only put the SB into a position of a centralized intelligence institution but made it top institution regarding domestic security as it had to right to give orders to other institutions and the other institutions merely became subjects to its tasks. The SB's position also represents the institutional power of the War Ministry and the ideology that a "strong army is the only survival of the country". As I state in my argument, after the defeat in the Balkans and the mobilization for World War I, the pan-Turkish ideology and canalizing all the belligerents of the Empire to establish a strong army inevitably increased the SB's institutional part.

121 See the Introduction part on literature review. 29.

4.3.6 Some Problems During Centralization

With the order that made the SB the sole responsible institution which demanded other institutions' sources and information to be reported to the SB caused a disturbance. The statements in the order that: "other institutions could not carry out investigation or surveillance without the approval of the SB or the intelligence officers," further accelerated the disturbance. Other institutions' sources desperately began to report directly to the SB headquarters without applying to nearest intelligence officer or provided irrelevant reports to the intelligence officer. The meaning of the order meant that all institutions had to send at least a little analysed information, rather than in a raw form and requiring a final analysis or problematic solutions in investigations. In short, the aim was that the SB became the section where all the intelligence was gathered and carried out. The problematic conditions were solved as the SB transmitted general orders on behalf of the law espionage act. However, until the system was set there were quite a lot of problems.

As the orders were not clear, many institutions began reporting directly to the SB headquarters, asking for the procedure. For instance, the Istanbul Military Censorship Directorate asked from the General Inspectorate in the SB headquarters whether to publish the opening of the Ottoman Parliament or apply censorship.[122] Another problem was in the telegram centers. Although the consuls and ministers were exempted from censorship procedures, on the date of 24th May 1916, German and Austrian Embassies were checked by a censorship inspectorat and their communication was disrupted. Due to its urgency, Hüsrev Bey dis-

122 ATASE, BDH, F:409, D:275, I:004. "From the Military Censorship Inspectorate to General Censorship Inspectorate in Second Branch Headquarters".

seminated a report on the matter and asked for the enforcement of the issue regarding the communcation of ambassadors and attaches.[123]

When the temporary law on espionage was enforced, some police officers understood it as a general order and started sending people to Martial Law Courts for awkward reasons. For instance, a police officer in Istanbul sent a person named Nikola to Martial Law Courts just because he frequently traveled to Caucasus before the war and he only provided the court with information about his physical appearances. The SB transmitted a report on the issue stating that the physical features were not sufficient and not an evidence. To conduct such arrests, detailed information had to be obtained. After the incident, SB ordered the Security General Directorate to relay the same order to police officers to prevent such disruptions.[124]

As civilian units began sending their reports to intelligence officers and SB also ordered all the intelligence officers to relay the obtained information directly to SB headquarters.[125]

As the role of army units in provinces increased, convictions became rigid. When the law regarding the entrance and exits of hostile states' subjects were issued, the İzmir 5th division captured Greek couriers who brought letters to the German Embassy in İstanbul. Even though they presented their official permit, the İzmir Fifth Division put them under custody and reported to the SB for further investigations. The

123 ATASE, BDH, F:268, D:1106, I:12-6. "Orders to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th Army Commanderships and Postal-Telegram and Telephone Ministry by the Chief of Second Section Hüsrev Bey of the Second Branch", 11 Mayıs 1332/24 May 1916.

124 ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:9-2. "From the Second Branch to Security General Directorate", 23 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331/ 5th january 1915.

125 Another problem was that the institutions began sending their reports to different departments of the SB. Many documents regarding domestic security was transmitted to the first section. The SB also had to provide another report to all institutions that the first department was only responsible for foreign armies and disseminating intelligence on the matter. ATASE, BDH, F: 303, D:374, I:7-6. "From the Second Branch to Intelligence Officers",

order from the SB headquarters demanded the immediate release of the couriers.[126]

The same complication happened in the Censorship Inspectorates. For instance, without analysis, the Galata Censorship Directorate just sent raw letters to the SB for analysis and a denouncement to the Security General Directorate. The SB sent a notice to Galata Censorship stating that if the letters arrived from the citizens of Hostile Countries and did not have an approval, it had to be directly eradicated and those that belonged to allied embassies or officers could be delivered. The SB implied that without necessary proof and detailed analysis, a denouncement to the Security General Directorate was not something proper.[127]

All the tendency to centralization of the SB and the heavy work load also caused problems amongst institutions. For instance, when *Kapu Mahalleri* was applied, the Italian Embassy requested from the Ottoman Foreign Ministry for certain citizens to exit from the Mersin Harbor and the Ottoman Ministry granted permission and transmitted the order to the Ministry of Interior. However, the citizens were denied their exit by the intelligence officers. As they delivered their question on why they were not granted permission, , they received a response stating that the Italian citizens could only exit the lands through Beirut (which was under the control of the 4th army).[128] In this disturbance, the Ministry demanded information from the SB and requested a permit for Italian passengers to exit, implying that it was a dual agreement between embassies. However, the SB denied Ministry's application and imposed that the Italian citizens had to use the entrance in Beirut. This was also an-

126 The report was ciphered as urgent which could cause a diplomatic crisis about the travelling freedom of Greek citizens; see: ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:404, I: 001. "Cipher from İzmir 5th Division Commander Kasım to the Second Branch".

127 ATASE, BDH, F:409, D:275, I:59-1. "From the Second Branch to Galata Censorship Inspectorate", 4 Kanun-ı Sani 1330/ 17th January 1915.

128 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:1024, I:009-03. "From the Interior Minister Talat Pasha to Second Branch", 5 Mart 1331/18 March 1915.

other small example of the institutional position that the SB had during war.[129]

§ 4.4 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, I firstly focused on the definition of domestic intelligence along with the establishment of new intelligence agencies responsible from counter-intelligence. Second, I discussed the difference between counter-intelligence and counter-espionage, the two aspects of domestic intelligence. I have shown that the concept of domestic intelligence became much more prominent with the establishment of separate intelligence institutions or departments solely responsible from counter-espionage. I also specified that counter intelligence practices were *passive* and related to protecting the secrecy whereas counter-intelligence was an active measure that aimed to neutralize the direct physical threat towards secrecy. Then I have analyzed the SB's domestic intelligence practices through passive and active measures of domestic intelligence in two sections. In the first section I focused on the passive measures of intelligence in the SB headquarters. Then I focused on its institutional position and power as being able to impose laws on decision-makers. Then I focused on some new establishments of the SB for the struggle against spying.

The second section contained both passive and active measures of domestic intelligence, but in this part rather than laws, I focused on the orders, regulations and applications aiming to prevent espionage. In the second section I first claimed that for prevention, the SB obtained information about spying organizations and their espionage activities. Then I focused on some of the prevention such as on coasts, traveling and focused on some warnings, orders and methods against counter-

129 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:1024, I:009-04. "From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Second Branch and From the Second Branch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs". 6 Mart 1331/ 19 March 1915.

espionage. I illustrated how the sources canalized their reports to the SB about domestic security issues and carried out the tasks given by the SB. I have also shown that the SB became the top institution where all the gathered intelligence was transmitted to.This section also showed that the main suspects regarding espionage were mostly non-Muslim citizens. CUP government's support the pan-Turkish ideology also seems to trigger the suspicious perspective. This chapter along with the previous on propaganda and censorship served to present the tendency to centralization in intelligence in this context.

5

Foreign Intelligence and the Second Branch

In the previous chapters, I focused on the general definition of intelligence, intelligence cycles and sources. Through conceptual analysis, I focused on the administrative structure, sources and intelligence cycles within SB headquarters to illustrate the tendency to a centralization in administrative levels during World War I. Secondly, I focused on propaganda and censorship, the two other tasks that extended SB's administrative position, compared to the 19th century. I also implied their effect in terms of shaping the national identity. Later, I analysed the domestic intelligence operations in terms of counter-espionage and counter-intelligence, that contributed to the centralizing position of the SB.
In this section I will analyse practices of SB regarding foreign intelligence according to the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In a time when SB's tasks and position in the administration represented a focus towards centralization, along with the sources of intelligence, I will delve into the centralization's reflection to the practice of foreign intelligence according to levels.

Prior to making an analysis on the levels of intelligence, I will provide graphs and charts on the political[1], social, military and partly eco-

1 The reason I categorized these as political, military and partly economic is because the intelligence reports were presented under three topics regarding foreign intelligence.

nomical intelligence that SB gathered. The graphs and tables in the first section are the culmination of thousands of documents from within the ATASE archives, with the sources annotated for future research. While there are roughly 100,000 documents regarding ATASE, I found most of them to repeat similar information. For this reason, I believe that my dissertation could be adequately shown through the data from a pool of these documents. These graphs and tables will not only provide the general scope of the data, but their analysis will become more specified when focusing on the military, political and economic aspects of the intelligence practices in the future sections. After presenting the general scope, I will first analyse SB's foreign intelligence activities about the neutral, hostile and allied states in terms of political (partly economical) and military levels regarding the strategies, operations and tactics. As it was a war period, the political strategy was based on carrying out the warfare strategies. This will show how SB conducted intelligence by providing relevant examples of political intentions and relations amongst states. I will also focus on the military strategic intelligence, which will relate to the military intentions of the states, along with general information about their armies. Then, I will analyse the operational level of intelligence within the SB. In the operational section, I will focus on topography, SIGINT, disposition, organization and movements of the armies to show how SB kept track of the foreign states and disseminated operational intelligence reports to be used in preparing battle plans. The reason that I will analyse the topography under operational intelligence is due to the SB's use of the topography section for planning operations and early warning systems for the fronts. Last, I will focus on tactical/combat intelligence through examples from the frontlines of the war. This chapter will show the contributions of the SB regarding foreign intelligence. It will also show how it's execution rep-

However within these documents other types of intelligence were highly presented such as cultural, historical, health, psychology, religion, population, public sphere, organizations, biography, natural resources, trade agreements, international relations, propaganda etc.

resented the shift towards centralization regarding foreign intelligence at the beginning of the 20th century through political, social and economic intelligence activities. I would like to highlight that I cannot make any comments regarding the overall successes or failures of operational and tactical intelligence. In order to do so, it is necessary to have access to the materials concerning the Staff Operations in ATASE archives. For the purpose of my research, I will limit the data to the available documents that I was able to access. These sources do not provide sufficient information for ascertaining the success or failure of the intelligence operations.

Before World War I, as the intelligence organizations were recently established, the concept of gathering seemingly unrelated forms of intelligence and viewing them as a whole was questionable. Since World War I relied on several factors , these factors shaped the grand strategy to observe the country from every conceivable metric. Therefore political, social, financial and military components were observed collectively in order to carry out the war strategy.[2] Military institutions, due to their strict nature, carry out their intelligence operations differently when compared to their civilian counterparts. Due to the complexity of World War I, with its total level of intelligence process to carry out war diplomacy and battle, these institutions tend to put higher value towards a disciplined approach.[3]

As stated in the introduction, establishing foreign intelligence departments grew up from military concerns. For instance, established in 1903 under the command of the War Office, MO2 and MO3 conducted foreign and counter-intelligence activities in Britain. MI5 which became the security service for domestic intelligence directly evolved from MO3. Today's Security Service (S.S, formerly MI5) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, Formerly MI6) all came about from military concerns at the

2 Ernest R. May, "Cabinet, Tsar, Kaiser: Three approaches to assessment," in *Knowing One's Enemy: Intelligence Assessment Before the two World Wars*, ed. Ernest R. May (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984): 11-36., also see; Markus Pöhlmann, Ibid.

3 Ransom Clark, Ibid., 25.

beginning of the 20th century.[4] Foreign intelligence and intelligence institutions, are critical aspects of intelligence.[5] Observing other states' conditions, and their policies towards other states plays a significant part in policy making.[6]

The transformation of the SB from a military intelligence section to a more centralized structure was heavily influenced by the significant defeat in the Balkans, the mobilization and declaration of World War I and Martial Law application. As wartime increased the efficiency of the Ministry of Defense, conducting warfare and having a strong army were a source of pride in the Empire. This resulted in the heavy reliance on the military's experience in the Empire's strategy. Seeing the opponent as a whole, the Ottoman Empire tried to mobilize its citizens to contribute to war efforts and strategy. This notion was also reflected in intelligence gathering as a whole, and strategically used to carry out war policies.

Foreign intelligence, as defined in this chapter, is formed by gathering other countries political and military situations in order to determine their capabilities and intentions. However, as stated in previous chapter, forms of intelligence overlap when domestic security is concerned. For instance, propaganda or espionage are not only domestic concerns but also relate to foreign intelligence.[7] During war, this distinction becomes a more complex issue. When battlefronts are taken into consideration, the combat area becomes a concern for both domestic and foreign intelligence. Thus, in order to set a degree of separation between these departments, I will analyse foreign and domestic intelligence according to their levels in different chapters. Although the battlegrounds that are within the border of the Ottoman Empire could be considered in domestic intelligence, I chose to include them under the

4 Christopher Andrew, *Defend the Realm*, 18.

5 Michael Herman, Ibid., 28.

6 Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community* (CO: Westviews Press, Boulder, 2012), 2-3.

7 Michael Herman, Ibid., 47.

foreign intelligence in order to facilitate continuity among the levels of intelligence. Even though counter-intelligence is a part of a foreign intelligence process, gathering and analysing information regarding potential threats, its relies on different practices where domestic intelligence is concerned. Domestic intelligence activities, conviction of spies or suspects, coincides with the efforts of police departments. This overlap in responsibilities allows the cooperative efforts in surveillance methods.[8]

The strategic, operational and tactical intelligence reports contributed to early-warning systems, which are a primary concern to any intelligence organization. Early-warning was crucial for planning operational and strategic activities for both the government and the military. The SB made use of the topography section to present maps to army commands for use in preparing their battle strategies.

The failure of an early warning system can overhaul a country into extensive security reactions, especially if the information is provided by an independable source. This will significantly impact intelligence operations, as analysts would have a hard time establishing trusting relationships with new sources. The political, military and economic results will also be impacted by the failure of intelligence sources. This magnitude of this failure is considerably higher during wartime. Intelligence for early warning has always been highly valued. In cultural, political and economic terms, states have always relied on deception and maintaining the element of surprise. If an early warning system succeeds, depending on the level and the type of the battle, this can change military activity during war as it can directly influence the outcome of significant battles or engagements.[9]

Having a good intelligence system during wartime can be compared to a competitive game of cards. If one player can see what the other has in their hand, they will have a significant advantage when anticipating

8 Michael Herman, Ibid., 101.

9 James Z Wirtz, *Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence* (Newyork: Routledge, 2017), 10.

their opponent's next move. The intentions can be better analysed and strategies could be based upon the early warning intelligence, either for offensive or defensive purposes. While the raw data is important, the officers who interpret the information plays a critical role in its usage.. As information could be endless or none, it is still based on the analysists capabilities to predict and form a strategy by coordinating with other branches. During war, uncertainty becomes more complicated. The fundamental rules for analysing the information may shift unexpectedly as other armies' capabilities for deception and counter-intelligence can change rapidly. This can result in hundreds of modifications to intelligence operations during a war. The uncertainty and capabilities of the hostile armies become unknown as their movements are carried out simultaneously. As factors constantly change, such as the availability of reinforcements, supplies and allied support, the ability to adapt is imperative when pursuing the objectives.[10]

The concept of early warning systems from intelligence gathering was not something that developed during World War I. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was a separate function of intelligence that was typically relied on during times of an active conflict. [11] This chapter will also give an insight into understanding strategic, operational and tactical levels of early intelligence activity.

I would like to highlight that the title is not "foreign military intelligence", but "foreign intelligence" due to expansion and centralization of the SB. In summary, this chapter delves into the role of SB regarding foreign intelligence activities through intelligence sources and types according to their levels (strategic, operational, tactic). Responsibility for foreign intelligence, along with domestic security, propaganda and censorship, put SB into the position of a provider of "total assessment". Therefore, this chapter serves to understand the foreign intelligence

10 Michael Handel, Ibid., 7.

11 Cynthia Grabo, *Handbook of Warning Intelligence, Assessing the Threat to National Security* (UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2010), 2.

duties and tasks conducted by the SB within the concept of "total assessment".

§ 5.1 A Scope of Foreign Intelligence: Overall Statistics and Charts from Archive Documents

In this section, I will provide graphs and tables that derived from the analysis of thousans of documents from the ATASE archives. My focus will be on Foreign Intelligence activities conducted by the SB during World War I. I will present a general scope of the intelligence activities conducted by the SB by analysing the threat assessment and intelligence activities performed on hostile and neutral states. This small part will give descriptive information about the SB regarding the countries it observed. It will contain tables that illustrate the percentages regarding countries and the types of intelligence under political, economic and military components. This part will give an overall insight into the documents in the ATASE archives, as well as the intelligence practices of the SB. The general information presented in this part are vital to the following section, allowing a clear understanding for the analysis of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence.

In the Ottoman Empire, the mobilization, intelligence, army and planning had already started prior to the declaration of war on 2 August, 1914, and was significantly impacted by the series of defeats in the Balkans. The mobilization measures focused on the threat that may come from Russia and the Balkan states. The war plan was primarily built to accumulate most of the army against Thrace and the Caucasus region against Bulgaria, Greece and Russia.[12] Especially in the intelligence reports, we can observe this condition after the mobilization.

From a variety of documents that present daily and weekly intelligence reports, we were able to analyse form a data. Based on this analy-

12 Edward J Erickson, *I. Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı 1914-1918*, 26,29. Fahri Belen, *Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi*: *1914 Yılı Hareketleri*, Vol. I (Ankara: 1964), 39-40.

sis, it can be seen that each year the percentage of the states which the SB focused on can give an idea about the Empire's threat assessment. Based on these intelligence reports, the graph below shows the focus on countries. The figure below shows general estimated percentage of gathered intelligence between 1914-1918.

Figure 5.1 Gathered Intelligence Percentages of Countries[13]



The countries that were deemed less significant as threats included the United States, Sweden, Switzerland, and Denmark.

However, this percentage changed each year depending on the condition of other states neurality. The countries that were the highest be-

13 For those who would like to conduct a statistic about the degree and and countries of the intelligence in years between July 1914-1918 one can look up these folders in which contains daily intelligence reports collected by the second branch and categorised as countries, armies, battlegrounds. ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H1:2, ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:010, ATASE, BDH, F:427, D:1685, ATASE, BDH, F:433, D:1708, ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:1709, ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:1708, ATASE, BDH,F:434, D:1710, ATASE, BDH, F:434, D:1711, ATASE, BDH, F:435, D:1712A, ATASE, BDH, F:435, D:1712, ATASE, BDH, F:436, D:1714, ATASE, BDH, F436, D:1715, ATASE, BDH, F:436, D:1716, ATASE, BDH, F:437, D:1717 , ATASE, BDH, F:437, D:1718, ATASE, BDH, F:437, D:1719, ATASE, BDH, F:438, D:1720, ATASE, BDH, F:438, D:1713, ATASE, BDH, F: 438, D:1722, ATASE, BDH, F: 438, D:1723, ATASE, BDH, F:439, D:1726, ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:1729, ATASE, BDH, F:441, D:1732, ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H1, ATASE, BDH, F:443, F:H1-001, ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H2,H3, H4

tween 1914-1915 were Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Serbia. After 1915, Britain and Russia were reported to be the highest intelligence threats, following the Ottoman Empire suffering a series of significant defeats.

The intelligence was gathered and disseminated under three topics; political, army and war conditions. Most of the strategic reports were weekly an daily, while the operational and tactical reports were categorized into weekly, daily or urgent.

In the political context, the SB mainly focused on politics of information, agreements or possible agreements amongst states, propaganda, morale of the society, domestic conflicts and economic conditions. Table below summarizes the basic political intelligence gathered by the SB.

Table 5.1 Basic Political IntelligenceReports[14]

POLITICAL (1914-1918)	
RUSSIA	Public opinion and public sphere, morale, uprisings.
BULGARIA	Its politics in Macedonia, uprisings, gangs, religious activities, social dynamics, economic condition, population.

14 For those who would like to conduct a statistic about the degree and and countries of the intelligence in years between July 1914-1918 one can look up these folders in which contains daily intelligence reports collected by the Second Branch and categorised as countries, armies, battlegrounds. "Second Branch Political Intelligence Summaries", 1914-1918, ATASE, BDH,F:241, D:H1:2, ATASE, BDH, F: 243, D:30, ATASE, BDH, F:427, D:578, ATASE, BDH,F: 433, D:12, ATASE, BDH,F: 434, D:713, ATASE, BDH,F: 434, D:1048 , ATASE, BDH, F: 434, D:714A, ATASE, BDH,F: 434, D:1048A, ATASE, BDH,F: 435, D:363-1712A, ATASE, BDH,F: 435, D:731A, ATASE, BDH,F: 436, D:361, ATASE, BDH,F:436, D:1048B, ATASE, BDH,F: 436-713B, ATASE, BDH,F: 437,D:714, ATASE, BDH,F: 437, D:365, ATASE, BDH,F: 437, D:363, ATASE, BDH,F: 438,D:364, ATASE, BDH, F: 438, D:713, ATASE, BDH,F: 438,714C, ATASE, BDH,F: 438, D:713C, ATASE, BDH,F: 439, D:364A, ATASE, BDH,F:440, D:362, ATASE, BDH,F: 441, D:347, ATASE, BDH,F: 443-D:H1, ATASE, BDH,F:443,D:H1-001, ATASE, BDH,F: 443,D:H2, ATASE, BDH,F:443,D: H3, ATASE, BDH,F: 443,D: H4.

ROMANIA	Diplomatic and economic relations with triple entente, social dynamics, religion, organizations.
GREECE	Economic and military pacts between USA and the triple Entente, gangs, diplomatic relations with France and Britain.
ITALY	Relations with England and Germany and Austria, public morale, social dynamics, Political debates in Parliament,Intentions on Ottoman Lands.
FRANCE	French-British Diplomatic relations, Intentions on Ottoman Lands, Diplomatic relations with Greece and Romania.
GERMANY	Diplomatic relations, economic condition, public sphere.
BELGIUM	Diplomatic relations with Britain.
BRITAIN	Diplomatic relations with France, Belgium and Italy, biographies of influential people, political debates, political pressure against neutral states.

In the context of armies, the SB focused mainly on mobilization, deployment, structure, location, livestock and armoury. Particularly concerning navy movement, deployment, weapon trade agreements, trade agreements between states, gang activities and constructions are included in the political intelligence reports. Prior to the Ottoman Empire declaring war, the SB had closely observed the states listed below, and gathered information about the size of their army, conscriptions and mobilization capacity regarding their army. Table below shows the overall context of intelligence on armies in alphabetical order till the declaration of war.

Table 5.2 Intelligence Context on Armies(August 1914-November 1914)[15]

	Austria	Belgium	Britain	Bulgaria	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Romania	Russia
Livestock	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mobilization	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Deployment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Operations	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Capacity	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Weaponary	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Communication	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Officers	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Position	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Navy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Only the countries with the highest perceived threat were included in this list. In terms of military intelligence, the country with the highest perceived threat to the Ottoman Empire was Russia. At this point, the Ottoman Empire had not entered the war but only declared mobilization. As Russia and Germany were at war, the Ottoman Empire deemed it necessary to gather intelligence on Russia.

As having a military intelligence section, SB had acquired information from the frontlines when Russia and Germany declared war. Alt-

15 The information on the table was put into percentage from weekly military intelligence reports disemminated in between 04 August 1914- November1914 see, ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H1,I:001,(1-08a-full dossier), ATASE, BDH, F:241, H2, I:002(002-1-07a-full dossier), ATASE, BDH, F:260, H3, I:001, (001-013a, full dossier), ATASE, BDH, F:260, H:4, 001, ATASE, BDH, F:260, H5, I:001,also see for "" Intelligence war journals derived from daily intelligence reports to Staff Operations" ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200, I:001, (01-113 full dossier)

hough the Ottoman Empire was neutral at the beginning of the war, it-still gathered intelligence from the ensuing battles. The figure below shows us the percentage of gathered intelligence from the battlefields from August 1914 until the Ottoman Empire joined the war in November.

Figure 5.2 Intelligence Reports on Battlefronts During Ottoman Neutrality.[16]



Relative to their importance, the countries that were followed (or provided information from Germany or Austria) by the SB in statistical order derived from the documents were Germany, Russia, Austria, Serbia, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy and Netherlands (as Italy was neutral, it mainly depended on diplomatic intelligence).

16 The fronts presented in the graph contains information during the armed neutrality of the Ottoman Empire. Even though Ottoman Empire was neutral, still Second Branch gathered information on the battlefronts. Amongst the fronts the intelligence mostly gathered between Ottoman Empire's neutrality were as follows; In the Western Front: Austria-Germany against France-Belgium and Britain, Eastern Front: Austria Hungary against Russia, Balkan Front: Austria Hungary against Serbia. See ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H1,H2,H3,H4,H5, ATASE, BDH,F:256, D:763, ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:46, ATASE,BDH, F:252, D:375, ATASE, BDH, F:252, D:987, ATASE, BDH, F:258, D:356, ATASE, BDH, F:268, D:140, ATASE,BDH, F:269, D:140, ATASE,BDH, F:272, D:201, ATASE, BDH, F:281, D:201, ATASE BDH, F:281, D:568, ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:425." "Military Conditions of Triple Entente" and "Maps, Organization, Condition of Foreign Countries". October 1914/November 1914.

From the same documents addressed for the graphs above, the SB's military intelligence during armed neutrality shows us the related information, country by country in the table below.

Table 5.3 Intelligence Reports from Battlefronts During Mobilization

	Austria	Belgium	Britain	France	Germany	Russia	Serbia
Manpower	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Operations (attack and defence)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Deployment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Casualty	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Logistics	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Reserves	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Navy (maneuver and casualty)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Objectives	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Plans	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Equipment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

The most significant military intelligence activities took place after the Ottoman Empire's declaration of war. The war consisted of four major fronts for the Ottoman Empire (the Dardanelles, the Caucasus, Sinai-Palestine, and Mesopotamia-Iraq), as well as several minor ones (Arabia-Yemen, Romania, Galicia, Macedonia, Persia, Azerbaijan).[17] The figure below shows the annual percentage and shifts in priority from when the Ottoman Empire declared war in 1914 until the end of the war in

17 Mehmet Beşikçi, Ibid., 5.

1918. As the dossier on 1918 is quite limited, I was able to form a graph until 1917.[18]

Figure 5.3 Intelligence Flaw From Battlefronts



The common countries and collected information in the table below.

18 The statistics were derived from collective and daily intelligence reports sent and published by the Second Branch. To those who would like to analyse them can just request the Folder and Dossier numbers regarding War intelligence summaries and battlefront intelligence summaries- 1914-1918: ATASE,BDH, F5-D:H1:2, ATASE,BDH, F:243,D:43,ATASE,BDH,F:256,D:763,ATASE,BDH,F:260,D:H3:5,ATASE,BDH,F:269,D:594,ATASE,BDH,F:289,D:425,ATASE,BDH,F:291,D:907,ATASE,BDH:F:313,D:1270,ATASE,BDH,F:325,D:92,ATASE,BDH,F:357,D:135,ATASE,BDH,F:370,D:909,ATASE,BDH,F:427,D:578,ATASE,BDH,F:433,D:12,ATASE,BDH,F:434,D:713,ATASE,BDH:434,D:1048,ATASE,BDH F:434,D:714A,ATASE,BDH,F:434,D:1048A,ATASE,BDH,F:435,D:363,ATASE,BDH,F:435,D:731A,ATASE,BDH,F:436,D:361,ATASE,BDH,F:436,D:1048B,ATASE,BDH,F:436,D:713B,ATASE,BDH,F:437,D:714,ATASE,BDH,F:437,D:365,ATASE,BDH,F:437,D:363,ATASE,BDH,F:438,D:364,ATASE,BDH,F:438,D:713,ATASE,BDH,F:438,D:714C,ATASE,BDH,F:438,D:713C,ATASE,BDH,F:439,D:364A,ATASE,BDH,F:523,D:938,ATASE,BDH,F:5,D:223,ATASE,BDH,F:531,D:2074,ATASE,BDH,F:531D:2074,ATASE,BDH,F:531,D:2074,ATASE,BDH:F:531,D:2074,I:22-24-25-27-28-31-33-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42,ATASE,BDH,F:533D:52, ATASE,BDH,F:535,D:315,ATASE,BDH,F:536,D:1229,ATASE,BDH,F:543,D:156,ATASE,BDH,F:551,D:636,ATASE,BDH,F:552,D:6,ATASE,BDH,F:552,D:696,ATASE,BDH,F:554,D:608,ATASE,BDH, F: 564,D:828

Table 5.4 Military Intelligence Reports After Declaration of War

	Russia	Britain	France	Italy(especially after 1915)	Bulgaria	Germany	Austria	Greece	Serbia	Romania	America
Live-stock	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Man-power,Militia and Re-cruits	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
De-ploymet	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Opera-tions	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Capaci-ty	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Wea-ponary	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Com-muni-cation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Officers	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Re-coinas-sance	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Casual-ty	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Storage	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Railway con-struc-tion	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Loca-tion	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Organi-zation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Navy move-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

ment											
Propaganda	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Weather and land conditions	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Military Technology	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

In this section, I have presented visual datapoints prepared from the common topics within the intelligence reports presented in the footnotes. This section provided a descriptive analysis and a general insight for the role of the SB, from beginning of the mobilization to the end of war. In the next section, aforemention issues will be analysed and contextualized in regards to the levels of intelligence. This will clarify the changes in the Ottoman Empire caused by total war conditions, in terms of current intelligence methods and the modern methods developed by the SB.

§ 5.2 Foreign Political and Military Intelligence: Strategic Level

In this section, I will present some cases of strategic intelligence practices that the SB conducted in terms of political (partly economical) and military intelligence. This will show in practice that SB did not only deal with military matters and became an expanded intelligence agency. As intelligence reports were canalized to the SB, its position with political intelligence became significant. First, I will deal with the political intelligence regarding the neutral, hostile states. Next, I will present the military intelligence on a strategic level. (regarding neutral, hostile and allied states.)

War policy became a concern for strategic intelligence, especially during World War I. As countries such as Bulgaria, Greece and Italy remained neutral at the beginning of the war, the war-diplomacy required

the strategic intelligence of neutral states as concerns for possible alliances, conflicts and territorial integrity. Here, I will explore the strategic intelligence provided to decision makers. The answer will provide further reasons for the centralization efforts of intelligence in the Ottoman Empire. As war time strategy was conducted mostly by the military rulers in the Empire following the defeat in the Balkan wars, the 1913 coup and martial law along with the declaration for mobilization, which were also contributing factors in centralization efforts in intelligence.

In the early 20th century, the grand strategy was to fulfil the tasks of national policy by analysing threats, alliances, industrial capacity, manpower and natural resources.[19] The strategic intelligence provided decision makers with early warnings and predictions about possible conflicts, forecasting uncertainties, and the protection of political, economic and security goals in the international arena. Strategic intelligence was therefore not only conducted by open sources, but also employed covert methods. The strategic intelligence was distributed to decision makers as "basic", "current", "warning" and "estimative" reports to aid in the preparation of diplomatic or military planning.[20] The concept of "grand strategy" in intelligence was shaped from World War I due to its thorough observation of countries and consideration for all potential adversaries in preparation for a possible war. [21]This grand strategy of "being ready for a war", after two world wars, became a tool for "keeping peace" and "deterrence against warfare". Today, the grand strategy serves for following all aspects of a country and is a vital part of national security.[22]

During wartime, as strategies change, the targets of intelligence also overlap. While troop morale, disposition, mobilization and weaponry

19 Thomas Quiggin, *Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2007), 159-164.

20 Kevin P. Stack, "Competitive Intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter 1998), 191-200.

21 J.F.C Fuller, *The Reformation of War* (London: Hutchinson&Co.,1923), 213-215.

22 Merve Seren, Ibid., 87.

are key aspects of military intelligence, other factors such as social groups, minorities, government officers, public sphere, international trade and financial agreements also become significant determinants for war time strategies.[23]

As the "grand strategy" is defined as gathering information on all resources of a country for national survival[24] , the intelligence gathered had to be observed in total. As discussed in the introduction, unlike the Ottoman Empire, Western states established different intelligence institutions to conduct and contribute intelligence in specified areas. However, the political condition of the Empire after the defeats in the Balkans and Pro-CUP military officers gaining power increased the drive towards a centralized policy.

5.2.1 Political Intelligence according to Strategic Level

As carrying out the war policies was mostly on the shoulders of the army, the SB became effective at contributing the political intelligence. From Karabekir's point of view, "*At the beginning of the war, intelligence meant one thing. Learn everything, alive or dead, about the Balkan States and Russia*."[25]

With this goal, the SB gathered intelligence about the neutral states' domestic policies, public opinion, economic conditions and attitudes towards war. The main purpose was to prepare "basic" strategic intelligence reports on neutral states' possibility of their entrence to the war, as it pertained to their social and economic condition. These intelligence reports in a modern sense were predictive, generalized and descriptive.

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23 Other contributing factors such as embargo, loans, trade agreements, public support, domestic condition, uprisings that could be counted as risk factors for war. On the total, all phrases that can effect a governments policy, society and economy, vulnerability becomes a determinant during a total war period. Sherman Kent, Ibid., 20.

24 For another definition of grand strategy see; Michael Howard, "Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century",*Defence Studies*, Vol.1, No.1(Spring 2001),1-3.

25 Kazım Karabekir, Ibid., 227.

Prior to Romania declaring war on 27 October, 1916, Greece on 27 June, 1917, the United States on 6 April, 1917, Italy on 23 May, 1915, and Bulgaria on 14 October, 1915, they were kept under observation as a means to form a strategy, should they join the war.

At the beginning of the war, the Branch gathered political intelligence and disseminated the information to many ministries and General Staff. The political intelligence was indeed strategic intelligence in a modern sense, giving analysis and point of view on long term strategic planning, such as political discussions within the parliaments and public opinion that might affect war maintenance. The SB, during mobilization, primarily focused on neutral countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and Greece and considered them as a potential threats or allies. Based on the reports, at the beginning of the war, the Empire also built its strategy on the possibility of neutral states entering war. An intelligence report about Italy, gathered from Italian newspapers and other sources, was dissaminated by the SB. In the report, the SB focused on the status and opinions of state officials. It was stated in the report that the Prime Minister of Italy intended to remain neutral, but the Minister of Foreign Relations strongly recommended the mobilization of their army in order to convince France secure an alliance with France.[26]

Two months later, On 18 October, 1914, the SB disseminated a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff which came from the observation of Egypt's Sub-Governor and Italian press publications. The Sub-Governor managed to obtain interviews from the Italian Ambassador to Egypt.[27] In the report, it was stated that the public opinion of Italy was turning against Austria. Italian public sphere was being canalized by influential people within the society that if the Ottoman Empire declared war, Benghazi and Tripoli would be in danger. Although the success of Europe could not be anticipated, once Italy joined, Romania would also take side with Italy, and therefore the Romanian officials would act together with Russia. In the report, such union was

26 ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H1, I: 001-01, 20 Temmuz 1330/02 August 1914.

27 The source of the sub-governor was not specified in the document.

compared to Napoleon Bonaparte, stating that that such an alliance would place the Ottoman Empire and Germany in a lonely position, and lead to an inevitable defeat.[28]

As the grand strategy required the countries to be seen as a whole, not only were public opinion and political debates observed, but the political relations with other neutral states as well. For instance, on 30 January, 1915, when Italy and Romania were neutral towards war, the SB kept track of their relations. In a document sent from military attaché in Romania, it was stated that the Italian factory from which Romania had ordered armour, had been blown up by dynamite. Two Austrian Officers, disguised as travellers, were arrested and held responsible. This action was considered to be sabotage by Italian parliament in order to negatively impact the relations between Italy and Romania.[29]

In addition, another report gathered from the Vienna Embassy to the SB stated that although the Austrian Emperor, Franz Joseph, intended to provide financial support with the hope of developing the relations between Austria and Italy. The Austrian divisions were are also making preparations for an attack against Italy. Therefore, an operation plan for the Ottoman Empire must take into consideration that while Italian officials currently declared neutrality, Italy would inevitably join the war siding with hostile states.[30]

Balkan states, especially Bulgaria, being close to Ottoman lands and a direct threat for a possible ground invastion, were also kept under observation. Focusing on the opinion of citizens, the SB sent spies and informants disguised as traders to observe the general conditions in Bulgaria.

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28 ATASE, BDH, F:258,D:356, I:7-1, , "From the subgovernor of Egypt to Second Branch", Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/ 18 October 1914. ATASE, BDH, F:258,D:356, I:7-2, "From the Second Branch to General Staff",

29 ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200, I:76, 17 Kanun-u Sani 1330/30 January 1915.

30 ATASE, BDH, F: 421, D:774, I:001. "From Second Branch to Staff Operations and Ministry of Foreign Relations", 10 Kanun-u Sani 1330/ 23 January 1915.

In a report disseminated about the public opinion of Bulgaria on 9 August, 1914, it was implied from the report that large majority of Bulgarian citizens in Macedonia openly rebelled to join the war by burning bridges in Macedonia.[31] In January, 1915, the SB disseminated another report that the Bulgarian king was not in the control of public situation. Even throughout coffee houses, fights were ongoing between those who support Germany and those were against them. The SB initially made an estimative analysis that there could be another Balkan Alliance. However, the analysis on Bulgaria began to change once the protests and demonstrations turned against Russia and Romania. In a report provided by an attaché in Sofia, and disseminated by SB to all ministries and General Staff, it was stated that the diplomatic conditions between Bulgaria and Romania were getting worse as Bulgarian parliament prohibited other ethnic groups to arm themselves with a loyal decree.[32] Another report stated that the *Russian-Bulgarian Organization* in St. Petersburg was dissolved over anti-Russian policies in Bulgaria.[33]

Intelligence reports regarding economic conditions and agreements were also significant as product import and export could affect the economy of another country. This would impact the available supplies of a country, serving as a possible indicator for mobilization or declaration of war. For example, on a report written on 21 February, 1915, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was noted that Bulgarians prohibited the import of beans, while a civilian organization called "Heroes Society" had begun adapting military training essentials. The SB estimated in the report that the demonstrations and deployment to battles would soon begin.[34] These conditions disturbed the Romanian officials. As the SB

31 ATASE, BDH, F:241, D: H1, I: 001-01, "Intelligence Summaries on Neutral and Hostile States", 27 Temmuz 1330/ 9 August 1914.

32 ATASE,BDH, F:5, D:200, I:76, "Second Branch Political Intelligence Summaries", 17 Kanunisani 1330/30 January 1915.

33 ATASE, BDH,F:443, D:H4, 4-1."Political Intelligence Summary".

34 ATASE, BDH:5, F:200, I:77. "Second Branch Intelligence Summary", 25 Kanun-u Sani 1330/07 February 1915.

obtained information provided from "undisclosed" sources, it was disseminated to ministries and the General Staff that the political condition in Bulgaria was increasing concerns in Romania, and that the Romanian public sphere was suspicious towards Austria and the Ottoman Empire.[35]

The Austrian and Romanian political relations were also used as indicators for the SB's estimations. In a report containing the political relations between Austria and Romania on 21 February, 1915, it was declared by Austria that no hostile activity against the Romania would come from the deployment of Austrian troops, and that this information had positive impact on the Romanian people. Interestingly, in the report it was written that Romania would remain neutral until one side starts to lose. Romania would wage war against the losing side, and prefer to remain neutral even despite both sides offering plenty of pledges. Some opposing newspapers such as *Yuna Sako* wrote that there was an agreement between Bucharest and St. Petersburg but the Romanian officials denied having such an agreement.[36]

The SB also tried to advise the ruling elite on political solutions. On this matter, Karabekir's statements draw attention. During the time of the Ottoman army's mobilization, Karabekir opposed to the idea of sending troops to Odessa before waiting a strike from Greece. Karabekir suggested that it still was possible to deal with this matter in without military solutions. He stated that as long as Bulgaria stayed neutral, declaring war against Greece first would result in deploying the Ottoman' First and Second armies from the Bosporus area, leaving it without defense. Rather than attacking, a diplomatic solution from the Minister of Foreign Relations would have been more appropriate.[37]

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35 ATASE, BDH, F:241, D: H1, I: 001-02-03 "Intelligence Summaries on Bulgaria, Greece, Romania", Kanun-u sani 1330/February 1915.

36 ATASE, BDH, F:5,D: 200, I: 98,"Second Branch Intelligence Summary", 26 Kanun-u Sani 1330/ 08 February 1915.

37 Karabekir tried to advice Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha that even though many countries declared mobilization still it was witnessed so serious news had been re-

Karabekir supported his political solution with another military action that might put the borders under threat. According to him, attacking Greek lands might end with Bulgaria joining alongside the Entente Powers. Therefore, the worst possible scenario would be that Bulgaria would march towards Çatalca, and the Greeks would send troops to the Mediterranean and İzmir. This might result in Bulgaria taking over Çatalca, and Greece Bolayır. Greeks also could use Epirus gangs in such operations. [38]

These statements came from the memoirs of Karabekir, but are supported by archive documents. Two months following his advice, the SB sent a ciphered report to the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Based on the SB's analysis about Epirus gangs on 21 November, 1914, gangs had the possibility of attacking Anatolia or going to Egypt the help the British armies in the event of an Ottoman Attack. The SB gave a recommendation in the report to the Ministry of Foreign Relations to get in touch with the Greek government and try to prevent such an attempt.[39]

Another thing to mention is that trade agreements between states are indicators of possible war scenarios. The SB also kept track of military agreements between the states and their delivery because they could show the extent of military weaponry, supplies and power. For example, in the report written on 29 July to the Ministry of War, it was

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ported that neither Germany nor Russia, nor great powers had made tough decisions to mobilize their armies yet. So the area of activity had not been closed for diplomacy yet, therefore hope was not ruined and all diplomatic channels must first be used Kazım Karabekir, Ibid., 236.

38 Karabekir stated that these conditions might ocur even without putting Romania into consideration. It was possible that Bulgarians might leave a division in Sofia and Greece in Selonica which would secure the Serbian army and pose an even bigger threat. Kazım Karabekir, Ibid., 374.

39 In the report it was noted that Greece was under pressure of British officials and asked the Ministry of Foreign Relations to prepare a report after their attempts and the extent of effect of this attempt would have on Greek government. Also in the reported it was asked from the Ministry to report on the reaction of British consulates after their communication with Greek officials. BOA. HR. SYS. 2101/3. 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/ 21 November 1914.

stated that Greece imported the Limni battleship from the United States of America.[40] As the USA was a neutral state at the time, it was not a significant impact. However, SB perceived that Greece was diplomatically close to the Entente Powers. Obtained from the Bulgarian newspapers, the SB also disseminated information that before the ships were imported to Greece, Greece and Britain was already in a bargain for a debt of 200 million Francs.[41]

Another thing to mention is the diplomatic pressure which was followed by the SB. A document sent with a cipher telegram from the Bucharest Embassy to the SB on 3 August, 1914, stated that Russia, France and Britain attempted to forbid the Ottoman Empire's delivery of military ammunition to Romania. According to the report, the Romanian government was under pressure by the countries to seize Ottoman ammunition. In the report, it was stated that rumours about a Bulgarian-Ottoman Alliance against Romania were spreading in Romanian Government as an attempt to manipulate the Romanian government to seize Ottoman army's ammunition. It was also stated that the ambassador denied such an agreement. The SB directly warned the Staff Operations before informing the Ministry of Foreign Relations. It was requested from the First Branch (Staff Operations) that in order to avoid political outbreaks, the ammunition that would be transported to İstanbul must be well-packed. The report implied that the ammunition not being well-packed was causing fierce controversies in the publications, and put stress on the diplomatic relations.[42]

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40 ATASE, BDH, F:241, H:1, I:001-06. "Intelligence Summary", 29 Temmuz 1330/29 August 1914.

41 ATASE, BDH, F: 5, D:200, I:99. "Second Branch Intelligence Summary", 28 Kanun-u Sani 1330/10 February 1915.

42 This report was a serious warning to the Staff Operations in order not to cause a diplomatic crisis. Before beign transmitted, the Staff Operations director was given information on the matter by the Director of Second Branch himself. ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:430, I:25-01."From the Embassy of Bucharest to Second Branch", 21 Temmuz 1331/3 August 1914. The dissemmination date from Second Branch to Ministry of Foreing affairs and the Staff operations was undated.

Aside from the diplomacy and public sphere of the Neutral States, the SB also kept the hostile states' political and social situations under close analysis. The analyses were always urgently disseminated, as they would be impact on war. For instance, the SB disseminated a report originating from the embassy at Den Haag, Netherlands on 26 March, 1916. The report contained information which was given by a person (likely an informant and defined as "well-connected") whose identity remained anonymous. The informant went to England to observe the general public opinion about war. This report stated that the Lord Kitchener's (Minister of War) value increased, and that the Prime Minister's and Minister of Foreign Relations' feelings towards Germany were extremely hostile. Many of the politicians shared the same feeling and although the British are famed to have an earnest political attitude, they seemed to express it differently in a harsh manner. The order and shock in the British public was increasing due to concerns about difficulties the army was facing, and started to raise suspicion regarding the degree of success. However, the British government was strongly willing to continue the war under idea that Germany and Austria will not be able to maintain war conditions and inevitably surrender. The report also contained information concerning public opinion in France. As for France, concern for war among the people and politicians was increasing every day. The increased casualties among French soldiers put France in a difficult position and the Germans' attack on Verdon was more devastating than anticipated.[43]

A country that has not yet been mentioned in these regards was the United states of America. In a report sent from a spy of Foreign Ministry in Venice on 22 March, 1917, when the Ottomans were enduring difficulties on the frontlines, one declaration turned the concentration of the SB to the USA. It was stated that the president, Woodrow Wilson, made a motion to Congress, stating that Germans were violating the laws of World, was thereby declaring war against America. Based on this no-

43 ATASE, BDH, F:370, D:909, I: 9-1. "From the Ministry of Foreign Relations to Second Branch and From the Second Branch to General Staff" 13 Mart 1332/26 March, 1916.

tion, the US Congress would declare that America and Germany "were in a war", but that Congress would not officially "declare war" against Germany. However, after this declaration the Government would attempt to maintain the offshore waters.[44]

In this way, the SB also considered the public atmosphere after successions or failures, as they are indicators that can shape public opinion. As the Ottoman Empire tried to keep its local population mobilized and away from enemy propaganda at all costs, and learn about the opponents' weaknesses for possible propaganda activity to contribute to war policy, a report was disseminated from the SB that stands out. After the Battle of Caporetto, in a political intelligence report from the SB, which contains the reports from military attachés and embassies, it was stated that peril was increasing among the people of Italy, and it was devastating for the people when the news of defeat came right after the Minister of War declared that the Italian army was prepared for all sorts of hostile activity. This had caused rebellions in Northern Italy, and people who joined socialist groups made demonstrations against war which was indicated as a perfect opportunity to use black propaganda to initiate uprisings among Italian citizens.[45]

The SB kept observing after the neutral states joined the war. As Greece entered World War I on the opposing side, intelligence reports concerning their domestic politics draws attention. While Greece was having uprisings, and the French and British using Greek lands to attack Germany and Austria in 1918, a report sent by the SB stated that although the public opinion in Greece was in favor of joining the war with Germany, they were too afraid of the current administration to ex-

44 In the same report it was stated that newspapers such as the Washington Post and newspapers in New York published that the American government declared the war plans and training to fight against Ottoman sub-marines was completed and although the representatives in US parliament was not in favor of joining the war, they will conduct meetings with the British and French admirals. ATASE, BDH, F:413, D:367, I:7 "From the Press Directorate to Second Branch and Second Branch to Ministries", undated-undated record.

45 ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:43, I: 025-01. "Telegram Summaries of the Second Branch".

press their opinions. Even the ruling elite were excited about the bulletins of newspapers containing the victories of Germany and Austria. In the report it was also state that provision could not be given by the Entente Power, and everything was rationed except meat. The Prime Minister of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos, secured his position as a result.[46]

In summary, I have presented cases of political intelligence conducted by the SB. The SB received information from several sources as they were canalized to SB. SB also had to analyse the political reports and disseminate them to other institutions. From parliaments to public sphere, morale, opinion, uprisings, gangs, economic agreements and international relations, the SB kept track and tried to maintain the war effort on these political and economic reports. While the Foreign Ministry did conduct intelligence activity, the final analysis was processed by the SB and it was the SB that classified the intelligence reports and summaries from a variety of sources.

5.2.2 Military Intelligence According to Strategic Level

In this section, I will discuss the strategic level of military intelligence. Strategic level provides states the information regarding cooperation of allies, objectives and capabilities in terms of long-range political benefits.[47] World War I also increased the importance of strategic intelligence due its long-duration character.[48] Therefore, political strategic intelligence, along with military strategic intelligence, the World War I was the beginning of a new military perspective that included long term strategic planning in which social, logistic, technological aspects were

46 The report gave a good amount of detail on nutrition, press publications and public opinion of Greek citizens see; ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:362, I:0021. Mart 1334/1 March 1918"

47 Michael Handel, Ibid., 27.

48 World War I with its consumption of resources and manpower as well as heavy casualties, was different from the unlike the previous wars in its total character, Micheal Dockrill and David French, Ibid., xvi.

taken into consideration.[49] The SB had to carry out the tasks of gathering strategic intelligence both for military and political purposes in order to carry out the war effort.

Strategic military intelligence also focuses on the staff, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, logistics and supplies of the army for the long course. It also serves as an early warning system for intelligence practices.[50] In the strategic level, the SB mainly focused on aiming for achievements through military movements. In other words, the operation's political contribution. Therefore, besides long term planning, strategic military intelligence also contributes to operational intelligence.[51]

In the previous section, I presented some cases of strategic political intelligence that the SB conducted. Now, I will present the strategic military intelligence on Neutral, Hostile and Allied states. The political aims of military operations were also one of the strategic aims of a military operation. The SB kept track of such strategic aims. For instance, the SB disseminated a "predictive" intelligence report to General Staff when Italy declared war on the side of the Triple Entente. In the report, it was stated that Italy's intention was to occupy İzmir, British Alexandretta and France intented to occupy Syria. Therefore, Britain's effort to support the French army through Egypt was to secure the route to India, defeat the German army in the Eastern and Western front which would would leave the Ottoman Empire vulnerable.[52] For this reason, the SB demanded the 4th Army's Command to obtain information on the British Army. On 19 September, 1914, just over a months before Ottoman

49 Avi Kober, "Military Decision in War: A Framework for Research", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.22, No.1, (Fall 1995): 60-70.

50 Alan Dupont, " Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol.18, No.4 (Winter, 2003): 14-15.

51 For strategic military intelligence also see; Don McDowell, *Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook For Practitioners* (The Scarecrow Press, 2008), 5-10.

52 Even though the record is undated, from the information provided by the report we can understand that it was prepared after Italy's declaration of war beside the triple entente. ATASE, F:488, D:367A, I:2. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and General Staff".

Empire declared war, a cipher was sent to the SB from the 4th Army Commander, Zeki Pasha. In the report, an estimation of deployed British soldiers and their intention was presented to the SB. It was stated that 5000 British soldiers travelled from Egypt to Alexandria and Suez. Another 5000 soldiers that arrived from India to Egypt were expected to be deployed to France. However, by the SB's analysis, it was reported that the second group would most likely be used for military operations in the Channel. The report not only dealt with a possible military attack, but also kept track of the public opinion, should they need support from civilian volunteers. In the report, it was stated that in order to soothe the local citizens regarding the forces coming from Sudan to Rafah, the British sent two battleships and an aeroplane (tayyare). However, their intentions did not receive any support from the public and the two vessels were recalled. The analysis also illustrated that the public opinion was in favour of the Ottomans. Prince Aziz Pasha and some soldiers, and a contraction between public to gather public opinions, were all shown evidence for possible attack, intentions and early warning.[53]

The SB also kept its allies' military intentions, such as Germany's attack on Poland. Gathered and analysed from different attaché and ambassador reports, it was stated that the intention of Germany for occupying Poland was to declare independence in Poland in order to mobilize a Polish army and recruit support in the Western Front.[54] This

53 This analysis was put into report by other evindences as along the area bew cannons were set, movements towards the destination increased, immigrations from Alexandria to Al Arish(located near Sina peninsula) and Egpyt increased. Therefore it was predicted that the intention of British army was planning to send the other lot to Western front but keep and use them in the Channel operation and therefore it was a warning to take the necessary precautions. ATASE,BDH, F:492,D:29, I:026-001 "From the 4th Army Commander Zeki Pasha to Second Branch", 6 Eylül 1330/19 September 1914. The report included detailed analysis of British air-recoinnassance, public opinion and military intentions of the British army that served as an early warning.

54 ATASE, BDH, F:439, D:364A, I:001-13. "Intelligence Summary", 9 Eylül 1332/9 Eylül 1916.

was accurately predicted by the SB, as stated on another report. Germany occupied Poland, Germany opened up recruitment offices. [55]

As they were in political intelligence, Bulgaria and Romania were also observed by the SB in terms of military strategy. This was due to their neutral positions at the beginning of the war as they were a bridge between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. As such, intelligence (especially from Bulgaria) about deployment, possible attack plans and predictions was an area of concern. As the political leanings of Bulgaria shifted towards an alliance with the Ottoman Empire, the SB obtained possible attack plan from an unspecified source about the movement of the Bulgarian army against Romania. It was stated that Bulgaria was arming bands with the intent of inciting a revolution in Macedonia, in order to weaken Romania's position.[56]

Another contributing factor of strategic military intelligence is the capacity of the armies. The limitations, numbers and estimated supplies of enemy armies were also considered by the SB. A report on the 08 August, 1914, evaluated the limitations and expectations about the Russian army. It assessed the manpower and destructiveness of the troops. In the report disseminated to General Staff, it was stated that "including the armies in Siberia and Turkistan, the Russian army was expected to reach 4 million with supplies that could last 25 days".[57]

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55 ATASE, BDH, F:439, D:364A, I:001-14. "From German Military Attache to Second Branch", undated.

56 In response to Bulgarians actions, Russia prohibited trains' entrence from Bulgaria to Russia. In the report the strategy of Greece was also assessed. It was stated that Greek fleet was gathering around Çanakkale and fleet will gather in the Mondros port and use it as an Operating Base. ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H2, I:001-02. "Second Branch War Journal"; In addition it was stated that there was no alliance between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, there was a propaganda going on to raise concern amongst Romanian people that the Ottoman Empire would send the 3rd corps along with Bulgaria to attack romania. ATASE, BDH, F:243, D:1009, I:025-1. "From the Bucharest Embassy to Second Branch" 20 September 1914.

57 On the continuing report in the same dossier, on 10 August 1914 another prediction regarding Germany and Austria and of the Empire was shared with the German Intelligence department. In the report it was stated that "the Russians were patrolling in

These numbers were compared with the allies' armies. On a related matter, a report that provided information about the overall condition of the Austrian and German armies draws attention. Based on information from the German Ambassador and the Sofia and Venice Attachés, the SB prepared a general report concerning the armies of the allied states. In the reprort it was stated that Austria had 2 million soldiers on the Russian border. 800,000 of the soldiers formed the first line on the border, while the remaining formed the second line. Germany had just over a million soldiers on the Russian border, in which 540 thousand formed the first line, the remaining formed the second line. In total, Austria had the capacity to mobilize at least 3 million, Russia to 4 million, Britain to 3 million, France to 2 million soldiers.[58]

From these estimations of the organization and deployment of hostile and allied states' armies, the SB recommended possible solutions. Regarding an attack plan towards Russians , considering their defeat in the Russo-Japanese war, Karabekir's suggestion drew attention to the morale of the Russian soldiers against the Ottoman Empire. According to Karabekir, a Russian attack could mean the annihilation of the Otto-

Batum in case of a naval attack. Also will send its 2 divisions to the border of Austria. The regiments in Batum will probably be sent to Austria." This document shows that not only it kept track of the movements and send early warnings to the Germans, ATASE BDH, F:241, D:H1, I:001- 01-05. "Intelligence Summary on Russian Army". Temmuz 1330/August 1914. It was also stated that Russia was moving its forces to the North and deploying them from Iran to Austria borders. The batallions in Batum were already deployed. The Rostov ambassador also sent a telegram to Second Branch stating that half of the mobilized soldiers gathered in the Rostov area was sent to Caucasus location. It was Russians begin to provoke the people in Batum against the Ottomans to seize control over the area.

58 ATASE, BDH F:241, D:H1, I: 05a. "From Vienna Ambassador to Second Branch", Temmuz 1914/August 1914. Germans also tranmitted intelligence regarding the Ottoman Empire through their general staff. Warning the Ottomans, in the report that was later disemminated by the Second Branch was written on 10 August 1914 that the Russian fleet was swarming in the Blacksea and the soldiers had the intention of building sewers in the entrance of bosphorus. ATASE; ATASE; BDH, F:241, H3, I: 006. 28 Temmuz 1330 /10 August 1914.

man armies. Even if they could defeat the initial army, Russia could bring larger reinforcements by using the railways and ambush on Ottoman troops from high mountains. Therefore, open war on Russian lands would be too risky.[59] This open war prediction would be highly accepted when Enver Pasha was defeated in Sarıkamış. The debate between Director of General Staff, Bronsart, and Hafız Hakkı Bey was already triggered when Karabekir presented his own opinions. The Ottomans at the beginning of the war did not want to have a multi-front battle against Britain, because the Ottoman Empire would have to deploy a majority of their forces in Palestine and Mesopotamia, leaving the Caucasus region without a proper backup.[60]

This could also be seen in the intelligence report of the SB. Although the source of the information was not given in the report, it was stated that Russians were afraid of the Ottomans by remembering their defeat against the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905, and as a precaution it was highly possible that Russia could deploy at least 100 thousand soldiers to the borders of Ottoman Empire in the event of an attack. In the report, it was clearly stated that as long as the Ottoman Empire remained neutral, and that Russian troops had a direct order not to engage unless the Ottoman forces initiated.[61]

59 Karabekir in his memoirs always seemed to support defensive policies instead of offensive policies. On the possibilities of early attacks on Russia or Greece, he seemed to have shown to recommend a diplomatic solution rather than military operations, Kazım Karabekir, Ibid., 343. These memoirs are also supported by the archive documents. Especially in the reports, Russia's movements was focused mainly on the-movements and deployment of its army in case of an attack towards Austria or Caucasus. SB also kept track of the Russian military movements in Iran and sent a report to Genera Staff that it would not be a good strategy to directly attack Russian troops. ATASE, BDH,F: 241 D: H2, I: 001-05. Temmuz 1330/August 1914.

60 Edward J. Erickson, Ibid., 33.

61 Especially psychology was given importance as a part of black propaganda stating that Russian soldiers would be afraid remembering their defeat, see; ATASE, BDH, F241, D:H1, I:001-03a. August 1330/ September 1914.

The SB also presented strategic reports on the capacity, weaponry and organization of hostile state armies. A symbolic report on the matter, disseminated by the SB to General Staff, serves as an example. In the report, the condition of Australian (which was presented as a commonwealth of Britain), and Union of South Africa (which was named as protected area of Britain) forces can be seen in the table below. The charts were too long, therefore I prepared the smallest chart. For the charts on other armies please see the footnotes.[62]

Figure 5.4 Intelligence Report on Capacity, Weaponry and Organization

62 It was stated in the report that in organization, the written armies were no different than the British Army. ATASE, BDH, F:252, D:987, I:1-15. "From the Second Branch to General Staff",undated; "Hindistan'dan mâ'adâ, İngiltere'nin taht-ı himâyesinde bulunan mevâki'le eyâlât-ı mümtâzedeki kuvâ-yı askeriyyeyi irâe eder cedveldir." The charts were too long thats why we provided a smaller example, for other information regarding different states please see ATASE, BDH, F:291, D: 1185, I:001, "The organization and weaponary of Serbian Army" "From the Second Branch to German Headquarters", ATASE, BDH, F:299, D:1217, I:013, "The Organization and Weaponary of the Italian Army" , "From Second Branch to War Ministry, ATASE, BDH, F:321, D:1296, 005-02, "The organization and Weaponary of the British Army" "From the Second Branch to General Staff", ATASE, BDH: F:320, D:1975, I:023. "The Organization and Weaponary of the French Army".

	Names of the Commonwealth or Protected Area of Britain	Branch of force	Military time Year	Weapons and Delivery (Excluding fixed ones in defense positions)	Organization
Commonwealth in Australia	Australia	Administration and advisory committees (Permanent)	-	-	A branch was created for the purpose of command, control, administration and advise. Military staff from Commonwealth member nations may apply for this branch by having an exam.
		Ready Force	5	18 lb. Automatic	This branch, named garrison artillery consisted of 3 field battalion, 1 state staff and 13 companies, S. MM. companies and electrical detachments, was responsible for mentioned basic services.
		Militia	3	12,5 cm. automatic 18 lb. automatic howitzers, old rifles, defective ones and	This force was organized for current needs: 1- Mobile force (Militia) consisted of opponent ve infantry brigades and the same as in the

			other machine guns	British army organization. 2- Regular forces and militia. Forces were organized in 6 command posts forming one of 6 banners of Commonwealth New staff were added to militia forces every year in accordance with Training Law. The content of all was as follows in 1913-1914: 23 Regiment light cavalry 22 Field artillery company 13 Garrison artillery company 6,5 Fortification company 6 Marking company , fortification 5 Marking company, and 3 Fortification platoon in organization of brigade 8 Castle company, fortification 50 Infantry battalion and 2 private soldier partial 1 Intelligence group 20 Service company 20 Field hos-

				pital 2 Company and 2 half company medic and veterinarian units At present, volunteers organize patient carers with the army car units.
		Reserves and Shooting Club	ME LE rifles	Reserves consisted as follows: Rifle shooting club sworn members and individuals served in regular force, would sign up for reserved membership. Forces, consulted with the defense council and at the disposal of the Defense Minister, were actually under control of Commonwealth Prime minister who chair Military service.
	All men aged 18 to 60 can be called under armament at the time of the battle. According to the newly published law, young people from 18 to 26 are obliged to train on the militia continent.			
South Africa Government	South Africa Union	Ready Forces 5 year	13 lb. automatic 6,5 cm. automatic howitzers, old rifles,	Administration and advisory committees 5 South Africa opponent infantry regiments 5 Battalion field artillery

Union				regiments (organized in South Africa opponent infantry.)
	Coast guards	4	-	Cap Garrison artillery Duryan Garrison artillery Cap coast defense units Duryan coast defense units
	Regular force consisted of public	4	Artillery 13 lb. automatic and 15 lb. manual loaded	9 Opponent infantry regiments (increased as 16 regiments and 6 detached company) 4 On foot regiments (increased as 11 regiments and 6 detached) 3 Battery field artillery 3 Brigates (12 Divisions) Infantry Air Force 4 Opponent Brigade transport train,(Constitute from captured.) 3 On foot heavily armed Brigade transport train, (Constituted from captured.) 3 Infantry Brigade transport train, (Constitute from captured.). 2 Opponent Brigade field hospitals (In-

			crease to 7) 2 Field hospitals (Constitute from captured.)
	Reserves and Shooter Society	-	-	Defence force, chaired by Prime Minister, administered by the Defense Assembly.

SB also gathered intelligence about weaponry and technology, which is another aspect of military intelligence. SB disseminated a report about the list of ammunition and other materials that the Romanian army was attempting to supply. This report was disseminated to other administrative units, such as Ministry of Interior and to Security of General Directorate.[63]

Also, navy vessels' technological specifications such as their speed and weapons were under observation for an estimation of possible attack time, and to gauge it's destructive capabilities. Regarding this matter, a report prepared by the SB was presented to the Naval Ministry. The SB tracked the submarine (unnamed) which could move at a rate of 16 knots (nautical miles per hour) on the surface, and 10 knots when submerged. It was armed with three torpedoes. The engine had 1750 horsepower, with two propellers. It had a length of 53.6 meters and width of 7 meters.[64]

In conclusion, I have explained military intelligence according to its strategic level by providing examples on the political intentions of military strategy through estimative reports on mobilized troops, organiza-

63 The technologic example can be seen in chapter two about the Romanian Army's weaponary. The disemminated report contained detailed information that could be regarded as an operational intelligence which showed the translation of the list of ammunition prepared by the Romanian Ministry of Military War and other materials that the Romanian army was trying to supply for. ATASE, BDH, F: 7, D:34, I:4-1,4-2, 4-3.

64 ATASE, BDH, F:268, D:140, I:1106-2.

tion of the armies, weapons and navy technology. As the SB was originally established as a military intelligence section, strategic intelligence was also carried out by the SB for achieving total assessment. These plans were provided to decision makers for planning operations.

§ 5.3 Foreign Military intelligence: Operational/Tactical

The primary focus of this section will be on the SB's contributions to operational and tactical intelligence. Modern understandings of operational and tactical intelligence are quite different due to advancements in technology. Today, the distinction between the two is clear as tactical intelligence is more urgent than operational intelligence. For instance operational intelligence happens during the planning phase, where tactical intelligence can support an operation in real-time with roles, such as air support, and is treated similar to combat intelligence.[65] In World War I, the operational and tactical levels were not separate as technology was not yet able to support tactical intelligence. Reports from the ATASE archives show that tactical intelligence was integrated into army commands, divisions and corps whereas operational intelligence was in the Supreme Command Headquarters and the SB. The tactical intelligence therefore was conducted by the intelligence officers assigned to the operation theater by the SB. While tactical intelligence targets a smaller, specified area or an individual target, operational intelligence provides information on long-term operational planning and considers a larger area. For instance, if we consider the position of an army in Mesopotamia, it provides an operational advantage whereas a position around the Suez Canal could provide a more specific and tactical advantage.

The operational intelligence reports during World War I generally contained information about long term dynamic movements, disposition, numbers, position, and supplies of armies during battle. Addition-

65 Michael Haldel,Ibid., 27.

ally, operational intelligence gives information about the dynamic logistic, morale. The analysis for operational intelligence was significantly less when compared to strategic military intelligence.[66]

The main sources for operational and tactical intelligence are refugees, informants, deserters and captives. Maps and battle-plans from retreating forces could also be considered as sources for tactical intelligence. When compared to strategic intelligence, the differences are the time and processes as there is a dynamic movement in battle that requires a fast analysis of information.[67]

The operational/tactical intelligence is therefore more up-to-date and does not require a long term analysis when compared to strategic intelligence. Tactical intelligence is even more precise. As a result, the contributions of tactical and operational intelligence are well-suited for military and police operations.[68] The operational intelligence provides the ability for a commander to carry out operations with greater ease and creativity, changing the pace or direction by limiting uncertainties in a battle.[69] In operational intelligence, reducing the risks and uncertainty in order to have better control over the conditions are primary concerns in warfare.[70]

In this section I will first analyse Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which is necessary for both operational and tactical intelligence. However, the SB did not have a well-established landline system for communications at this time so this section will be quite limited. Secondly, I will analyse topography practices of the SB in terms of planning operational features and providing early warning in terms of the organization, dis-

66 Don McDowell, Ibid., 11-13.

67 Antony Clayton, Ibid., 112.

68 R. V. Jones, "Intelligence and Command" in *Leaders and Intelligence*, ed. Michael Handel(London: Rougledge,1988), 287-289.

69 Donald McLachlan, "Intelligence: The Common Denominator I/II", *The Fourth Dimension of Warfare: Intelligence, Subverstion, Resistance*, Vol.1. ed. Michael Eliot Bateman (New York: Praeger, 1970), 50.

70 Joseph A. McChristian, *The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1974), 3.

position and movements of opposing armies. Third, I will focus on intelligence gathering on the disposition, movements and organization of the armies in the context of operational intelligence. Finally, I will explain tactical and combat intelligence regarding the battlefronts in which the Ottoman Army engaged, as they required precise and urgent intelligence support. All togather will present the last form of intelligence that SB conducted during World War I, and contribute to the understanding of a modernized intelligence agency.

5.3.1 SIGINT and Interception

Based on information from the archives, the SB did not benefit as much from SIGINT as the British army.[71] The Ottoman's landline system was quite limited with seven lines in the Eastern Mediterranean. Five of those lines were installed between Istanbul and Syria, with the remaining lines between Aleppo and Damascus.[72] This condition is also presented in intelligence reports from the SB. In a report focusing on the condition of Iraq and Syria, it was stated that the British forces had a very good intelligence network. They were able to intercept the telegram lines, providing awareness of every movement. Even the phone calls between Jerusalem Headquarters and Beersheba were being tracked by the British army.[73]

The Ottomans were able to deliver intelligence between General Staff's departments, however when it came to intercepting foreign communications, we can see that Germans had the upper hand. Based on observations, the Ottomans benefited from Germany's ability to intercept telegrams. On 1 May, 1918, Germans managed to intercept a telegram from an unspecified location, containing discussions between the British Prime Minister and an unidentified Governor. During this com-

71 According to Anthony Clayton signals interception against Ottomans proved highly effective during the third battle of Gaza in which captain Allenby was able to intercept the German battleplans, Anthony Clayton, Ibid, 48.

72 Yigal Sheffy, Ibid, 220.

73 ATASE, BDH, F:554, D:608, I:32-1.

munication, it was stated that Indian forces needed to contribute more to the war effort, as their livelihood was equally at risk. The Germans possibility of moving forward from Ukraine to Caucasus, and having a pact with Russia, would allow the Germans to roam freely across Iran and Afghanistan and would pose a significant threat to India. The Governor stated that great sacrifice and effort must be invested in defense of India, and the real defense stems from Europe, Palestine and Iraq. For this reason, he requested India to prioritize the latter regions.[74] Another report also contained information concerning a possible attack on Romania's reserve armies. From the German Intelligence Branch it was noted that the Romanian divisions did not move two steps in the Romanian divisions settlements, and they did not show any concern for attacks from rear. The Romanian reserves could be easily attacked by deceiving them with radio communication.[75]

The final point covers how the Ottoman General Staff tried to protect communications from interception. The archives do not provide any documentation regarding the technical methods of preventing interception, if any existed. However, we managed to have access to some reports that contained the general precautions for interception. As seen in a report sent on 14 May, 1915, in order to avoid deceitful information and prevent the deciphering or interception of communications, the Ottoman army commonly changed their communications methods. It was stated in the report that the communication between expeditionary forces would be done from "Seyyitgan Telegram Center" until a second order. This document was transmitted to each branch of the Headquarters, in which the SB recommended that all orders from the Supreme

74 This report was transmitted to Second Branch to keep closer attention to military activities around India for a possible attack. As again the Second Branch disemminated this early intelligence to Yıldırım Army Command on the next day the telegram was intercepted. Also the Ministry of War and Ministry of Foreign Relations was given information about the matter. ATASE, BDH, F:435, D:713A, I:001-26. "From the Second Branch to General Staff", 1 Mayıs 1334/1 May 1918.

75 ATASE, BDH, F:523, D:938, I:057. "From Second Branch to General Staff", 2 Teşrin-i Sani 1330/2 November 1917.

Command Headquarters go through this communications center in order to limit opportunities to be intercepted.[76]

5.3.2 Operational Intelligence and Topography

Topography played a significant role in operational intelligence during World War I. As a provider of early intelligence for battleplans, the SB benefited from the topography section when it came to planning offensive and defensive strategies.[77] Topography provided the armies, corps and divisions with the location of the armies, corps, cannons, construction and railways that enabled both operational and tactical information. In the beginning, the First Branch's (Staff Operations) Topography section and Seventh Branch's Map section were realigned under the SB in order to consolidate the intelligence concerning organization, deployment, reinforcements, disposition and constructions onto the maps, which flowed into the defensive or offensive strategies.[78] From the archives, there are many examples of maps and corresponding attack plans.

To discuss this topic further, telegram activity between Iraq's Yıldırım Army Command and the SB serves as a good illustration. At the beginning of the war, the main goal for the Ottomans was to keep the British military occupied in Baghdad, Iraq.[79] Despite many early warnings provided by the SB, necessary defensive strategies were not always conducted. Baghdad fell on 11 March, 1917, and the British soldiers marched towards Jerusalem. At that time, Ottomans tried to prevent the

76 ATASE, BDH, F:269, D:594, I:036. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of War, Supreme Command Branches and Army commanderships. 1 Mayıs 1331/14 May 1915.

77 For instance; ATASE, BDH, F:269, D:594, I:036. "From the Second Branch to Ministry of War, Supreme Command Branches and Army commanderships", 1 Mayıs 1331/14 May 1915.

78 For instance see; ATASE, BDH, F: 252,D:987, I:001-12 and ATASE, BDH, F:313, D:1270, I: 001-32. "Map on the disposition of the Indian army in Mesapotamia", undated.

79 Benjamin C. Fortna, *Kuşçubaşı Eşref* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2018),215-216.

British advance to keep them occupied in Gaza and Beersheba. It was then that the Ottoman Army established the Yıldırım Army Command, reinforcing it with German troops. Even with the reinforcements, Beersheba fell on 31 October, 1917. On the 9th of December, 1917, Jerusalem was captured, forcing Ottoman troops to retreat.[80]

The failure of military operations turned intelligence and topography priorities towards this region in order to prevent the enemy from advancing further, and to recapture, if possible. First, the SB wanted the Yıldırım Army Command to gather intelligence on the British army and send the information for analysis. The reports consisted of intelligence from different moments during the battle. Their statements were evaluated and disseminated with a map showing potential avenues of attack against the Yıldırım Army Command. The report contains a large amount of analysed information concerning transportation requirements for supplies and possible reinforcements. In the report, it was stated that British forces were prioritizing the construction of railways, with larger railways being constructed over old tracks. The transportation of soldiers and workers was being carried out by British locomotives and wagons on former Ottoman railway tracks. Based on the interrogation of four different soldiers who verified the construction, it was reported that four construction units were involved in the railway projects. Additionally, five new trains were operating on the railways, with wagons and locomotives arriving from Egypt.[81]

The figures below compares the archived maps alongside modern maps of the region. This is to serve as a frame of reference when dis-

80 Eugene Rogan sees the losses of Mecca, Baghdad and Jerusalem as an important symbolic value as the two of them were considered as holly cities. These losses not only were symbolic but from onwards the Ottomans had to retreat back from their poistion in Mesopatima and Palestine. The target of "victory" at the beginning of World War I turned into "survival", Eugene Rogan, Ibid., 353.

81 "From the Second Branch to Yıldırım Area Command"ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:362, I:002 7 Kanun-u Evvel 1333/ 7 December 1917.

cussing the construction operations, and how it pertains to the military strategies at the time.

Figure 5.5 Map on British Railway Construction.[82]



82 On the map, in latin alphabet I wrote Port Said to explain it in English, on the top right of the map I also wrote Jerusalem. As it can be seen from the map the construction of the railway started from Port Said. The double thick lanes showed a large railway that consisted of a double railway track. The one following to right at the middle of the railway towards Hala. The sketch was delivered the next day after the information was received by the Second Branch, "Cipher sent from the Second Branch to the Yıldırım Army Command on 7 Kanun-u Evvel 1333/ 7 December 1917" See; ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:362, I:002-03. The source for the modern map. "Google Earth"

The information gathered from the captives were confirmed through the interrogation of another captive. Starting from Port Said to Rafah, the Egyptian railroad consisted of two tracks. Another 12 km track was constructed from there to Halda. From Rafah to Halda, the railway was used for transporting supplies, while the soldiers moved on foot. Based on the interrogations, Indians and Arabs were working on the railway lines, completing 1.5-2 km of construction each day.[83] The single line on the map represented the broad railway line and the two lines represented the British army's dual-track railway. The continuous straight line above Jerusalem represented Ottoman Fronts.

The map and movement of the army give the Yıldırım Army Command the information about possible enemy reinforcements and resupplies. It also provided potential follow-on operations from the British army. According to the report, a prediction was stated that it would not be advantageous for the British to conduct an attack, but fortifiying their front lines would be more beneficial.[84]

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83 "From the Yıldırım Army Command to Second Branch", ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:362, I:002-01, "6 December 1917"; Before capturing Rafah, British army's position was weak due to air-reconnaissance provided by Germans and Ottoman army fortified its position down the Al-arish valley. Although the condition was presented to Harry Chauvel, he still assaulted the Ottoman lines that resulted in the retreat of Ottoman Army. And finally on 9 january 1917 British forces were successful to capture Rafah that was the Egypt frontier of the Ottoman army. Eugene Rogan, Ibid., 317.

84 To crosscheck another information, a new captive was interrogated and stated that 265, 266 and 267th artillery battalions joined the division and each battalion had 6 cannons, 3 field guns, 4 howitzer and 2 large cannons. It was stated that the 160th brigade always carried the heavy cannons with them. Also at the beginning of December 500 supplies arrived. Based on the statements of the captive from the 162th division it was stated that each 3 battalions was near to the North side of Yafa and generally reported to the 52nd division.

Based on the last interrogation of another captive from the 20th corps, possible communication of British army was reported. In the report it was stated that the 20th corps contained the 10th,53rd, 60th and 74th divisions. The 160th brigade was on the right side and on the left side and there was the 160th brigade. 53rd and 60th divisions

On preparing battle formations, the SB also used topography to form a defensive strategy. After Greece joined the war alongside the Triple Entente Powers on 27 June, 1917, the SB expected an attack from Salonica and prepared for a possible attack and contingencies along with the Bulgarian 2nd Army. Using a clear map and reporting chain between the Bulgarian 2nd Army and the Ottoman General Staff, reports were presented to Sb for analysis regarding the Second Bulgarian Army. The army had three infantry sections, three ammunition posts, two light and three heavy provision sections. However, based on analysis, more would be needed. Therefore, a support of three infantry sections, 44 horse drawn carriages, an ammunition post, two light and two heavy provision posts were requested.[85]

After this reinforcement, the second precautions concerned fortifications. A document regarding fortifications done with the Ottoman 50th Division and Bulgarian 2nd Army reported that on 1 July, 1917, the fortifications from Dola Dzaumaja (Bayraklıcuma, Greece, 2 km from Serres) to Didymoteicho were warned of a possible attack. The 50th Division sent from the Ottoman Empire would barricade from Doksanboz Village to Strumica (partly) and from the Drama Plains to Nestos.[86]

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were the main communication centers. "From the Yıldırım Army Command to Second Branch" ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:362, I:002-02 "6 December 1917"

85 ATASE, BDH, F:299, D:864, I:011. "From the Bulgarian Second Army to Second Branch", Haziran 1333/ June 1333.

86 Cipher document cycle amongst Bulgarian Second Army, Ottoman General Staff, Second Branch and 50th Victory Division Command about the positions for defense" ATASE, BDH, F:299, D:864, I:012. 1 Temmuz 1333/ 1 July 1917.The battalion, deployed on the left side of the Ottoman 50th division would barricade the area in the Nestos River (a river starts from bulgaria and ends up in the aegean sea in Greece) which is also the border between Western Thrace and Macedonia. In the report it was written that for precaution, on the right side of the Ottoman 50th division there was the 28th infantry regiment, total amount of 4 infantry battalions, 10 machineguns, 22 cannons, 2 cavalry division and 2 engineer team was settled to barricade a possible attack that may come from Serres to Drama plains.

The modern map below shows the fortified area by the Second Bulgarian Army and Ottoman Forces, to provide further context to the archived map that follows.

Figure 5.6 Fortified Areas by the Second Bulgarian Army and Ottoman Forces.[87]



The black line at the bottom-left showed where a perceived attack might come from. The red shapes illustrate the Ottoman army's barricades. The smallest rectangle shapes represented battalions, while the larger rectangles represented divisions. A division was comprised of three battalions.

87 Ciphered document cycle between Bulgarian Second Army, Ottoman General Staff, Second Branch and 50th Victory Division Command on the dates between 1 July and 5 July 1917. ATASE, BDH, F:299, D:864, I: 013-01, 02,03, modern map prepared from google earth image.

This prepared deployment was arranged through the use of several maps provided by the SB. The map above shows us the positions of the Bulgarian 2nd Army and where Ottoman reinforcement troops should be deployed at the rearmost border in the Entrance of Thrace, Babaeski, Yeniköy.[88]

Another map and report, disseminated to Staff Operations, stated that, based on information from the Iraq Area Command and analysis of the SB's own intelligence scout agents there was not a change in the disposition of the British forces in the Iraq Front. The disseminated map is shown below.[89]

Figure 5.7 British Forces in Iraq Front



As seen above, the SB not only supported the armies with operational advice, but also used topography to anticipate possible attacks. As the battle was prone to constant changes, topography activities consisted of weekly reports containing intelligence data for supply, reinforcement, construction and deployment activities.

88 ATASE, BDH, F:313, D:1270, I:001"From Iraq Area Command to Second Branch",20 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333/ 10 December 1917.

89 ATASE, BDH, F:313,D:1270, I:001-032. "From the Second Branch to Staff Operations", 22 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333/22 December 1917.

5.3.3 Disposition, Movements and Organization

During World War I, the SB fulfilled tasks of operational intelligence regarding military movements, along with dynamic deployment and dispositions of armies, to provide the military front lines with battle-plans. These operational intelligence features were provided to corps, divisions and brigades with updates on the war conditions, advising them with necessary precautions.

In a report disseminated from the SB to the Caucasus Army Group and intelligence officers from the 2nd and 3rd Armies, stated that that Russian cavalry division retreated to the Belgrade area during the Serbian Campaign. German aerial reconnaissance revealed that the 8th and 9th Russian Corps had been sent in as reserves. The SB warned that it was not clear whether the 71st Division was included in this corps and warned that a possible counter-attack was possible. Subsequently, scout sections were advised to proceed with caution.[90]

Operational intelligence collection and distribution was not limited to the Ottoman Empire's own sources. The SB also provided and received operational intelligence between their allies. In a report on August 1914, the German General Staff provided SB various intelligence from different fronts. It was stated that German and Austrian forces had successful campaigns in Poland, Russians retreated some of their troops from Rostov to Caucasus, Serbia was receiving weapons from Russia through Danube, and Germans were heading towards France from Bel-

90 ATASE, BDH,ATASE, BDH, F: 523, D:938, I: 48-3. From the Second Branch to Caucasus Group and 2nd and 3rd army intelligence officers". Another report also provided information to 2nd Army about supplies and possible clothing and nutrition of the armies as it would effect their physical abilities in case of a battle. In the report it was stated that winter equipment and supplies arrived to certain locations for the Russian army. Based on some investigations(the sources were not presented), the equipment were in good amounts. However the Romanian divisions and corps were in poor condition and wearing worn off equipment and did not yet receive winter equipments. The subsistence in Russian army was in good amounts but the Romanians rarely consumed meet and a little amount of bread, ATASE, BDH, F:523, D:938, I:057

gium using the route of Alsace. The Prussian platoon installed a wireless radio station in Vienna, establishing connections between the German and forces. This allowed for more efficient collaboration between their armies.[91]

The SB conducted early intelligence activities on the Ottoman Army, as well as on the Entente Powers. While forming strategic predictions, spies and deserters played a large role, as open sources could be deceiving. SB obtanied intelligence reports from its own sources. In an intelligence summary report written on 31 July, 1916, it was stated that Austria was dealing with Russia at the Eastern Front, suffering significant defeats. The SB, concerned about the Russian military, gathered intelligence on the movement and encampments in an attempt to predict the condition of the army. In the report it was stated that:

- The 32nd and 12th Russian Infantry Divisions were in the presence of the 9th Army in Bukovine.
- -The 27th Infantry Division was in the presence of 3rd Army.
- -The 16th Infantry Division was in the presence of the 7th Army in Bukovine

91 The report also gave details about German army, it was stated that Germans won a battle against the French troops that entered southern Alsas from Belfor and were forced to retreat, it was forecast that the defeated was the 7th Division of French Army and German soldiers captured 700 prisoners. It also kept track about the Germans stating that Germans had sieged and took over the Liege Castle in Belgium. ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H1, I:001-04a. Temmuz 1330/August 1914. The agreements about the deployment of armies amongst neutral states also drew attention. In order to follow up the military movements, SB also kept a close look on the relations between its allies and neutral countries. For example, on the same day that permission was given, it was noted and reported daily that Netherlands gave permission for German troops to deploy their armies by using their routes. ATASE, BDH, F:241, D: H1, I: 001-02-03. Temmuz 1330/ August 1914.

Therefore, the 27th Division was just in front of Lizinken. Considering the same quantity of troops was Tils, then it was highly possible that reinforcements had arrived.[92]

Early intelligence warnings about movement and the possible location of the armies came from informants and spies. Using this information, the SB relayed the possible amount of enemy soldiers to the General Staff and allies concerning their battlefront. In the table below, the possible disposition of the Russian infantry and divisions in Austria-Hungary Front until Italy's attack on Brosilof is displayed.

Table 5.5 Intelligence Report on Russian Formation in Brosilof Offensive[93]

Pesko	Venden	Vinnitsa	Sakharov	Minsk	Selon
96th Infantry Division 2 Cavalry Division	15th Infantry Division 2 Cavalry Division	21 Infantry Division 3 Cavalry Divisions	2 Infantry Divisions 3 Cavalry Divisions	17 Infantry Divisions 1 Reserve Army	6 Infantry Divisions 3 Cavalry Divisions
Rowno	Tornopol	Stanislau	Podolsk	Letchitsky	
13 Infantry Divisions 61 Cavalry Divisions	9 Regiment Division and 1 Cavalry 1Reserve Army	9 Infantry Divisions 1 Cavalry	11 Infantry Divisions 4 Cavalry Divisions	11 Infantry Divisions 4 Cavalry Divisions	6th ARMY ON RESERVE

To summarize, I have presented some operational levels of intelligence conducted by the SB. The operational level was more dynamic and specific than strategic intelligence. It mostly contained information to support war in terms of operational planning. In order to accomplish, the SB made use of the topography in order to provide staff operations and army commands with visual guidence to help them coordinate their

92 ATASE: BDH, F:370, D:909, I: 14-1. "Intelligence reports on political and military of Entente Powers", "Operational intelligence disemminated by the Second Branch", 18 Temmuz 1332/ 31 July 1916.

93 ATASE, BDH, F:370, D:909, I: 14-1. "Intelligence report on the battle formation of Russian Army in Eastern Front".

battle formations. Updates to organization, disposition and movements of friendly and opposing forces sent to the SB for analysis to better optimize their planning operations.

5.3.4 Tactic/Combat Intelligence and Battlefronts

In this part, I will analyse the battlefront intelligence that the SB conducted. As the quantity of intelligence from battlefronts can be substantial, the approach to analysing the reports can be complex. I will analyse these intelligence reports within the realms of tactical and combat Intelligence, in order to provide an analytical explanation. Today's understanding of tactical intelligence is somewhat different from World War I methods. Modern "tactical intelligence" is often referred to as "combat intelligence" which is conducted by aerial radar surveillance to provide temporary support to ground forces during an operation.[94]

Tactical intelligence is a level of intelligence mostly required in an operational theatre, and is used during combat to provide support through location, capacity, movements, casualties, terrain and climate reconnaissance.[95] Today's tactical intelligence plays an important role in supporting the ongoing fight against terrorism and is derived from the methods and practices developed during the two world wars, particularly through the use of air reconnaissance.[96]

Tactical intelligence tasks during wartime are to relay combat data for analysis as quickly as possible. Therefore, tactical intelligence are mostly under control of intelligence personnel and the "operations"

94 Tactical intelligence is also provided by task-forces in the combat areas. Lawrence H. McDonald, "The OSS and Its Records", in *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II*, ed. George C. Chalou (Washington DC: National Archives and Record Service, 2002): 92-93.

95 Jon Moran, *From Northern Ireland to Afghanistan: British Military Intelligence Operations, Ethics and Human Rights* (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 5-8.

96 Merve Seren, Ibid., 311.

staff within the theatre.[97] As technology was limited during World War I, tactical intelligence was not conducted as rapidly as it is today.[98]

As stated in the previous sections, the tactical intelligence was mostly analysed by the SB's intelligence officers and those within the affiliated military units. The sources for tactical intelligence for the SB, rather than being their own recruited spies and informants, came from the Army. The Army acquired most of their tactical intelligence through prisoner interrogation, German air-reconnaissance, and refugees. The resulting information was relayed to the SB for analysis. Since tactical intelligence operated mostly within the combat area, the focus of this section will be the summaries of tactical intelligence sent to the SB headquarters. This will limit the scope of information to only the facts relevant to this dissertation.

According to David Kahn, tasks of tactical intelligence, rather than contributing to offensive policies, focus on the defensive strategies and victories. As the aerial reconnaissance could not provide real-time intelligence, or provide kinetic support for operations in World War I, its role was limited at the time to providing information towards defensive operations.[99]

I will analyse some of the tactical information transmitted to the SB headquarters from different sources on the front lines (Caucasus, Mesapotamia, Dardanelles and Sinai Palestine) that was later disseminated by the SB headquarters to other components of the General Staff. While doing so I will provide a general insight into major Ottoman battlefronts.

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97 Michael Herman, Ibid., 30. Also see; R. Smith, 'The Gulf War: the Land Battle', *Rusi Journal*, Vol. 137, No. 1 (February 1992): 1-4.

98 B. G. S. Bidwell and D. Graham, *Fire-Power* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). 104. According to Michael Herman, tactic intelligence is mostly used at operational and tactical command, Herman, Ibid., 123.

99 David Kahn, "A Historical theory of Intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security* (Autumn 2001), 4-5.

Tactical intelligence was considered to be "urgent" information in the SB's dissemination procedure. The information contained reports that were already analysed in the operations theatre. In the dissemination procedure, the urgent reports were disseminated in the following order in the following table;[100]

Table 5.6 The Dissemination of Urgent Battlefront Intelligence Reports

First(Operations) Branch and General Staff(Birinci Harekat Şubesi ve Karargah-ı Umumi)
Fleet Command and Navy Ministry(Donanma Kumandanlığı ve Bahriye Nezareti)
Army Commanderships (Ordu Komutanlıkları)
Iraq Area Command(Irak ve Havalisi Kumandanlığı)
Iran Mobile Force Command(Iran Seyyar Kuvvet Kumandanlığı)

Finally, I want to explain my decision to limit the analysis to the Caucasus, Mesopotamia and Dardanelles in this part. The intelligence regarding the Western and Eastern Fronts in Europe were mostly not analysed in SB headquarters as were not considered to be urgent, and were mostly received from Austrian and German General Staff's. However, the SB also disseminated these tactical intelligence reports, along with other intelligence reports, in summaries to General Staff. A summarised intelligence report can be seen in the following table.

Table 5.7 Intelligence Summaries From Battlefronts

Western Front: France Battle (Fransa Dâru'l-Harbi)	A great pitched battle begun in Flander and British and French Forces attacked a 25 km battlefront near Ypres. The German and Austrian forces tried to destroy Britain Navy in Flander Coasts. French forces were re-enforced by artillery units managed to push back the German forces. The weather

100 ATASE F:366, D:1458, I:001. "The Procedure for Dissemination of Urgent Intelligence Reports",undated day and month 1330/1914.

	was rainy and foggy. Approximately 600 troops arrived to the area for re-enforcements.
Iraq Front: (From the Ottoman 6th Army):	Russian army sent the second and fourth border regiments and sixteen fieldguns and 4 howitzers.
Macedonia	High artillery fire around Vardar. 12 artillery re-inforcemens arrived from Bulgaria.
Army Group German Crown Prince(Alman veliahdi grubu):	The bulwark around the La Bovel Farm was taken from the French forces and more than 1500 soldiers were taken as prisoners. Their interrogation would soon begin.
Palestine Front:	A British force marched towards Lut with the escort of automobiles. The weather: estremely windy. Two enemy aeroplane had to land.

As can be seen from the chart, the intelligence obtained from other states were not as tactically urgent to the Ottoman leadership, and were usually summarised.

5.3.4.1 Dardanelles

According to Eugene Rogan, the British War Council was unaware of Russia's success over Enver's forces in Sarıkamış. They seized the opportunity to attack Dardanelles to relieve pressure. An attack towards Dardanelles was not a priority to Britain, but they were aware of the Russian forces having suffered serious defeats prior to 1914 in the Western Front.[101]

On contrary, Edward Erickson states that Lord Herbert Kitchener, India's Commander-in-Chief, refused an offer of help from Russia. In-

101 Eugene Rogan, Ibid.,130. For those who support these statements also see; Sean McMeekin, *The russian origins of the First World War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 129. C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli* (London: William Heinemann, 1929), 51.

stead, he requested of Churchill to perform demonstration of power. As for the Ottomans, they had an outer, middle and inner line of defense. [102] The inner line of defense was significantly fortified. The outer line and air reconnaissance provided by German aviation contributed to tactical intelligence.

Between 18 March, 1915, and 9 January, 1916, combat intelligence priorities were on the Dardanelles front when the British initiated a naval attack. According to documentation, combat intelligence reports were updated every hour, giving details of navy movement, attack, weather conditions and intentions. The hourly reports were transmitted to the SB headquarters. These tactical intelligence reports were summarized by the SB and disseminated to the Navy Ministry, First Branch and General Staff. A report containing combat intelligence on the Gulf of Saros on 27 February 1915, included situational updates with corresponding times. Naval and military movements, weather condition, scouting activities and expected attacks were all summarised. The table below is the short representation of a tactical intelligence summary disseminated by the SB.[103]

Table 5.8 Intelligence Report from the Dardanelles Front

09:00 a.m.	5 battleships arrived to Bosporus/ Weather: rainy-windy and foggy
11:30 a.m.	No expectancy of attack Weather: Foggy
01:40 p.m.	A British reconnaissance team tried to Disembark around Seddulbahir to scout the area. Team had to retreat back to their ships with the ambush of Ottoman Scouts.
07:00 p.m.	-Enemy torpedo ships and 4 battleships bombed the Ottoman Troops. - 2 battlecruisers left the area

102 The outer line of defense: two were on the Asian side in Kumkale, the other half in Seddülbahir. Edward J. Erickson, Ibid., 33.

103 ATASE, BDH, F:5, D: 200, I:100, "From the Second Branch to Staff Operations". 14 Şubat 1330/ 27 February 1915.

Ottoman Troops greatly benefited from the aerial reconnaissance activities, which prevented attacks during the battles of Dardanelles. This information has been thoroughly documented in the ATASE archives. For example, on 20 May, 1915, when enemy troops attacked Ottoman forces in Arıburnu, an official record disseminated by the SB to General Staff states that aerial reconnaissance observed enemy ships. Reports were analysed, believing that they were going to bomb and support the enemy troops to the left of Ottoman forces on Arıburnu. With the help of this report, the Ottoman Troops were able to repel the attack and forced the enemy to retreat.[104]

Tactical intelligence was also provided by the SB when the armies could not obtain information. In one example, the SB disseminated a report based on the statements of a ship captain who travelled from Lesbos Island to Dardanalles Bosporus. The report stated that a cargo boat containing Indian soldiers was moving towards Dardanelles as possible reinforcements. This information was transmitted as "urgent" to all harbors and the Navy Ministry.[105] Tactical reports also contained information on the technology of the weapons, and casualties. For instance, it was written that eight British and French dreadnoughts bombed the bastions in Dardanelles for seven hours. From the bombings, it was observed that the dreadnoughts used 600 cannonballs with wide diameter, along with 15 cm cannonballs. Three dreadnoughts were highly damaged, with one soldier wounded and two killed.[106]

Movements of military personnel was thoroughly reviewed to investigate or predict possible actions. For example, in a report sent by the Ambassador on 23 August, 1915, it was written that Marshall Kitchener

104 In the same report, the names of the ships were also provided as Lord Nelson, Henry Father and Sharlman. ATASE, BDH, F: 260, D:H3, I:1-10a. 7 Mayıs 1331/20 May 1915.

105 ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:26, I:19."From SB to Harbors and Naval Ministry", undated.

106 The damages and bomb types also gave a possible prediction about the destructiveness and effectiveness of navy vessels, ATASE, BDH, F: 241, D: 455, I:62-2

(Ministry of War) himself was about to cross Athens en-route to Dardanelles, with enemy forces expected to be around 70 thousand.[107]

During the Dardanelles campaign, the hours of bombing, location, navy movements, damage and casualties were all presented in the reports.

5.3.4.2 Caucasus

Caucasus was a significant front between 1914 and 1917. Until 1917, Russian forces attacked and occupied many places, such as Van, Malazgirt and finally Erzurum in 1916. 1917 was also a critical year because the Russian forces occupied the ports around the Black Sea (Riza and Trabzon). Between 1917-1918, the intelligence activities in the area decreased due to political circumstances and the revolution in Russia.[108] It should be noted that the tactical intelligence reports primarily contained information on the successes of the Ottoman Army, in regards to intelligence data. This limitation provides challenge when evaluating the successes and failures of tactical intelligence.

Until 1917, when Russia withdrew from the war, it can be seen that the highest concentration was on the Caucasus front. Tactical intelligence reports show that a vast amount of data was transmitted to the SB headquarters regarding terrain, construction, disposition, navy, scouting and ambush.

For instance, in a report sent on 2 January, 1915, the condition of Çoruh and Ardahan is included after a successful Ottoman operation. The information was reported by the SB to Range Inspectorship and later to the Ministry of War. In the report, it was stated that although Ardahan was occupied by three thousand infantry, carrying six field guns and two machine guns, and heavily reinforced by bombardiers under the command of a general (name not mentioned), the Ottoman

107 ATASE, BDH, F: 256, D: 76, I:47. "From the Athens Embassy to Second Branch" 10 August 1331/ 23 August 1915.

108 Edward J. Erickson, Ibid., 33-36. Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *Osmanli Askeri Tarihi* (Istanbul, 2014), 491.

army did not hesitate to attack. The area was successfully retaken due to intelligence reports provided by informants who observed the movement of Russian troops. It was also included in the report that the battle was fierce, forcing the Russian troops to retreat with significant casualties.[109] The next report informed of an attempt by Russian forces to retake the area. It was stated in early intelligence provided by a scouting group of the Ninth Corps, the re-attack of the Russian forces was repelled to the edge of Çoruh, and Ottoman forces maintained control of the area.[110]

Additionally, the maps and plans left by the retreating army provided tactical intelligence. For instance, in a report disseminated on 12 February, 1915, it was written that an enemy corps, that attacked Ottoman battalions in Artvin, had been repelled. During their retreat, many supplies were left behind by the opposing forces. Ottoman troops managed to obtain a map regarding troop movements near Kurna. With the help of the map, a small battalion achieved to make a sudden attack, resulting in significant damage to the enemy forces.[111]

The naval focus was not limited to the Dardanelles campaign, but naval activity was actively tracked for weapons, number of bullets, attacks and observations. As regarding information was reviewed, reports were sent to staff operations at once allowing the First Branch to stay informed of the ongoing situation at the front lines. In a related report dated 30 January, 1915, a casualty report on the attack of a torpedo ship to Rize was transmitted, stating that a torpedo ship fired 8 bullets to Kalecik Port and Çayeli, while another enemy torpedo ship observed in

109 This report was disseminated to range inspectorship in which deals with logistic systems and supported the troops; ATASE, BDH, F:321, D:346, I:001-013. "From the Second Branch to Range Inspectorate", 20 Kanun-u Evvel 1330/2 January 1915.

110 ATASE, BDH, F:321,D:436, I:002. "From the Second Branch to Range Inspectorate", undated.

111 ATASE, BDH, F:247, D:1027, I:59. 30.11.1330/ 12 February 1915.

front of Hopa throughout the night.[112] The sources that provided intelligence were not always from the operation theatre but also from army commands. Army commands also gathered and summarised intelligence reports. For instance, on 10 July, 1916, the Second Army Command sent a report to the SB stating that Russian forces were busy constructing roads around Rizan, and that at the evenings only scouting activity was observed around the area. The SB, along with information provided from other battlefronts and other commanderships, disseminated a collective intelligence report providing valuable information on each front.[113]

5.3.4.3 Mesopotamia and Sinai Palestine

As the strategy of Britain in Mesopotamia was to secure its route to India while supporting the Western Front, the Ottomans also fought on the Palestine Front to threaten the Suez Canal, in an attempt to distract the British Army from the Western Front. However, the British assault plan failed in February, 1915. Leading into 1917, the attacks from the British army became stronger and posed an increasing threat in Egypt,. In March, 1917, the British military tried to assault and capture Gaza, however their attempt resulted in failure. The Ottoman 4th Army received support, allowing them to repel a second attack from the British forces in April. On the third attempt, the British were able to occupy Jerusalem on 8 December.[114] The report transmitted from the Security General Directorate, obtained from the Sub-Governor of Jerusalem, clearly shows the intentions of the British army. In the report, it was stated to not expect the British to surrender the area easily, as it is a route from the Suez Canal to the India trade route. As the conditions worsened in

112 Reports, especially on victories, were also provided to all divisions and corps as they would increase the morale of the soldiers. ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200-I:76. "From the Second Branch to Staff Operations", undated.

113 ATASE, BDH: F:281, D:201, I: 6. "Intelligence summary on Caucasus, Iraq and Western Front", 28 Mayıs 1332/10 July 1916.

114 Edward J.Erickson, Ibid., 127-136.

Algeria, Tripoli and Benghazi due to insufficient naval forces, the Ottoman forces would be left out without necessary supplies between Ariş and Suez.[115]

As the Ottoman Empire's plan for this area did not go as intended, intelligence reports increased, asking for further analysis and recommendations from the SB. After the Battle of Katia, during the raid on the Suez Canal (which was the only successful battle Ottomans won during the Second Raid), interrogations from prisoners were reported to the SB. In the report sent by the 4th Army Commander, Cemal Paşa, it was stated that the British army was building a trench 20 kilometers North, in order to allow cannon fire towards the canal. Based on Cemal Paşa's statement, it would prevent the Ottoman army from advancing. The scout team and a spy, disguised as a British soldier, managed to get a map and sketches of the enemy's fortification in the Katia encampment. This information was sent to the SB for analysis. The Fourth Army was also able to gather and send a penalty book, two campaign regulations, and three notebooks for analysis. The report also stated that on Port Said, there was the 15th Division Headquarters, commanded by General Courtney. However the SB requested that the interrogations be crosschecked in regards to the British army.[116]

Information on deployment and logistics through observing transportation systems was easier and more effective. Navy manoeuvres and train movements was simple intelligence that required little preparation to acquire, making it easier for the SB to analyseç

Among the easily tracked sources for the SB were navy vessels. For example, early intelligence tracked the movement of the navy at all

115 ATASE, BDH, F:258, D:1066, I:7-1."From Macid, the Subgovernor of Jerusalem, to Security General Headquarters and From Security General Headquarters to Second Branch", 5 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330/18 October 1914.

116 Cemal Pasha noted that the intelligence report was derived from the prisoners interrogation and spies but was not crosschecked. ATASE, BDH, F:272, D:911, I:001-01. "From the 4th Army Commander Cemal Pasha to Second Branch". 29 Nisan 1332/5 May 1916.

times. Data was kept on the people getting in and out, direction of travel, and possible intentions. Harbor masters typically provided the aforementioned information to the SB. When the Ottomans wanted to reduce combat on the Western Front, and keep the British army occupied in the Iraq region, three reports from the Beirut harbor master were simultaneously transmitted to the General Staff, also followed by the fleet command. The first report stated that the Captain of a British battlecruiser, which made port in Jaffa (Tel aviv), invited a Russian General to have a discussion. This report was justified by the Commander of the 4th Army, Zeki Pasha. In the final document, it was stated that the British battlecruiser took sail to Port Said area, Iraq. This cipher letter served as early intelligence, allowing the Ottoman Army to take precautions against a possible attack. It should be noted that as they were easier to track, the movement of the navy and army was significant in keeping the British focus away from the Western Front.[117] In the same report, other naval activity was also noted, but the SB was not able to determine a clear analysis for its purpose. In a report sent by Beirut Governor, Bekir Sami Bey, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then relayed to the SB on 15 January, 1915, it was stated that the Askold Battleship arrived to Tripoli Port. By sending a steamboat, they observed an Iranian flagged boat that had moved North while bombing the coastlines. Explosions could be heard from Tripoli, but it cannot be determined whether or not the boat was attacking a railroad bridge.[118]

Iraq was among the Fronts that gained significant importance after the declaration of war. When the army was deploying its troops from the garrisons in September, 1914, perhaps the biggest strategic mistake was leaving only two divisions in Mesopotamia. However, when the Ottoman Army succeeded during the Dardanelles campaign, the forces in Mesopotamia were reinforced, allowing the war to last until 1918.[119]

117 ATASE, BDH, F:429, D:29, I: 020-001,002. "Cipher telegram concerning early intelligence about navy maneuvres."

118 ATASE, BDH, F:268, D:140, I:1,2.

119 Eugene Rogan, Ibid., 217.

The war in Iraq began with the attack from the Indian Army's 6th Division on 5 November, 1914. From the intelligence reports, it can be concluded that that the Front became a concern after February and March. On the 5th of November, the British Army was repelled at Ctesiphon, forcing them to retreat to Kut al-Amara. However, in this front, particularly after Spring, 1916, the British Army underwent significant changes in Mesopotamia. Eventually, the war ended with the British victory on 11 March, 1917.[120]

The SB conducted similar intelligence activities in Iraq. Information concerning casualties, movement and duration of battles was telegrammed immediately after following the military engagements. The information was first analysed by the analysists in the combat area, then transmitted to the SB. For example, Iraq Area Command sent a report of a small battle that took place. In the report sent by Iraq Area Command, on 21 January, 1915, it was written that two British infantry regiments, two battery forces, one machine gun squad, a cavalry squad and a gunboat were observed by scouts moving against Hoy. Due to the early warning the enemy was forced to retreat following a five-hour conflict.[121]

The Yıldırım Army Group, established to defend Palestine, Iraq and Syria, transmitted a report on 31 October, 1916. The report included information from prisoner interrogations concerning the 180th Brigade's 2/18 London Battalion, in India. From the prisoners' interrogation statements, they were able to collect and estimate the number of soldiers. In the report it was stated that in the 60th Division, there were 150 soldiers per squad, who were receiving logistic support from Britain since the beginning of December. In the same interrogation, the amount of soldiers in the 10th Infantry Division's 29th,30th and 31st Battalions

120 Edward J. Erickson, Ibid.,150.; Edward J. Erickson, *Ottoman Army Effectiveness* (London: 2007) 62-63. Fırat Nezihi and Behzat Balkış, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, İran-Irak Cephesi 1914-1918*, Vol.3, Part. 1, (Ankara: 1979), 57.

121 ATASE, BDH, F:5, D:200, I: 35."From Second Branch to Staff Operations", 8 Kanun-u Sani 1330/21 January 1915.

were also revealed. The SB also conducted its own analysis, predicting the possible locations of 60th, 74th and 75th Divisions and components in Iraq. After referencing with their own informants in the area, the SB provided the table below regarding the battalions.[122]

Table 5.9 Intelligence Report on the Divisions' Components in Iraq

29th Battalion	30th Battalion	31st Battalion
6 Irish Regiment	1 Irish Regiment	2. Irısh Regiment
1 Leicester Regiment	30 machine gun troop	5. Irısh Regiment
6 leicester Regiment	30 Artillery	31 machine gun troop
29. machine gun troop		31. Artillery
29 Artillery		

The scouts and interrogated prisoners also observed the time of march and health precautions of the British forces around Iraq. An undated report from the Yıldırım Area Command states that the British Army marched on foot for 50 minutes, followed by a rest for 10 minutes. The report also contained information regarding nutrition. Based on the statements from the interrogation of four different captives it was stated that the British forces were forbidden to drink water from the wells, and usually consumed canned products and peximedia. The Ottomans used this information to track how far the British army can travel, and how it could affect actions in Sinai and Palestine.[123]

In this part I have analysed tactical/combat intelligence and presented cases from the frontlines that were transmitted to the SB Headquarters during World War I. This section showed that the SB, originally a military intelligence section, also conducted newly formed tactical combat intelligence operations at this time. The analysis was limited to the intelligence reports provided from other sources. As tactical intelligence was mostly conducted within the fronts, sources such as scouts, aerial reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, informants, and refugees

122 Written from the Iraq Area command, it was stated that the local people started rebellion against the British army between Basra and Najaf and although the British sent a big armed force to supress the rebellion. ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:362, I:02. "From the Second Branch to Yıldırım Army Command", 18 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332/ 31 october 1916.

123 ATASE, BDH, F:440, D:1729, I:03. "From the Yıldırım Area Command to Second Branch", undated.

had a larger contribution. The reports sent to the SB were mostly provided in accordance to canalizing all valuable information considered "intelligence" to the SB.

5.3.5 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the extended duties of the SB during World War I. Though conducting foreign political intelligence was not a job of the SB, after the defeat in the Balkans, World War I conditions and the application of Martial Law shifted this organization into a more centralized position. The SB, in terms of foreign intelligence, became a top-level intelligence provider for the decision-makers. The SB, while conducting political intelligence, contributed to the policy of carrying out war strategies by focusing on the economic, social and political conditions of the neutral, hostile and allied states.

Next, I focused on the original tasks of the SB as a military intelligence section. I have presented that the SB took part in strategic military intelligence and sought to understand the political aims of military operations, as well as the capacity and organizations of their armies. In the third section, I focused on the operational and tactical levels of intelligence. For the operational and tactical level, this chapter showed that during World War I, the distinction between two were not as clear as today due to the limitations of the technology. I first focused on SIGINT and interception; however this part was limited as the Ottomans did not have a well-established landline, and the archives contain limited material on the matter.

In terms of operational intelligence, I first focused on the topography section, which provided the Ottoman Armies maps of trenches, and deployments of hostile armies to support Ottoman commanders and other army units in devising battle strategies. Second, I focused on the operational intelligence reports regarding disposition, movements and organizational changes that contributed to operations. The last part of this chapter focused on the tactical aspect, or combat intelligence, during the war. I have analysed three battlefronts, providing information on the urgent intelligence gathered from the military units on the frontlines,

that were subsequently disseminated by the SB. After the declaration of war on the, the SB's extended responsibilities greatly increased the complexity of the institution. Gathering information about the hostile states' armies, deployment, ammunition, railroad construction, capacity, public sphere, carriers, officers, mobilization, espionage, counter espionage, domestic and foreign security, timely intelligence and many other practices regarding military, politics and the society were gathered from a variety of sources. As the mission grew larger, the tasks became increasingly more complex. The efficiency of the SB cannot be accurately determined, as the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the war. However, we can clearly state that it had established a large intelligence network, despite the challenges that come with innovating the collection, analysis, processing and dissemination of intelligence within a global conflict. This chapter, along with propaganda-censorship and domestic intelligence, demonstrates that compared to the divided forms of other intelligence organizations, the Ottoman Empire centralized intelligence under the War Ministry. Each source contributed to the functions of the SB, creating a "total assessment" provider of intelligence.

Conclusion and Future Areas Of Research

Much research has been carried out on the political atmosphere after defeat in the Balkans, the 1913 coup, the mobilization for World War I, the militarization of the society, increased power of War Ministry and the mobilization of the economy. In this reseach, I wanted to explore the situation of intelligence at a time when Ottoman ruling elite determined the the idea that the army was the only salvation. As I have presented in my dissertation, the SB was granted too much institutional power which was another indicator of the power of the War Ministry. Thousands of empirical documents have shown us that the SB demonstrated a tendency to centralization of intelligence during World War I. In order to present the centralization tendency, I first discussed the activities of the SB in the nineteenth century. Due to dual-executive system of the General Staff, the SB did not have much effect and the channel of information was canalized to Yıldız Palace. For this reason, the numbers of staff in the SB decreased. Although military attaches conducted intelligence tasks under the order of the SB, their intelligence reports were mostly canalized to Yıldız Palace. Therefore, the efficiency of the SB was limited and it had mostly prepared reports derived from the summarized press publications. The unclassified ATASE documents of the Balkan War era could not provide much information about the activities of that period. Therefore, I could only reach the information as written in the books and studies published from the General Staff. The classification in the First World War catalog was better than the Balkan War and thanks to the helpful attitude of the staff, I had the opportunity to access many documents. The fact that the First World War catalog was not classified and the conditions of application was too strict for a long period of time, were a factor in the lack of research regarding SB.. For these reasons, my access to too many documents provided paved

the way for my research. Nevertheless, as it will be stated in "future areas of research", there are many parts that still remain and open to study. Thousands of empirical documents at our disposal showed us the idea that the army was the only salvation from the Balkan war to the First World War mobilization was reflected in the re-organization of the SB. For this reason, before I discussed the centralization process, I presented information about the general condition of the Ottoman state from the Balkan War to the First World War. The reflections of Turkish nationalist policies, canalizing public support and re-organization of the army, were contributors to SB's institutional power.

Before focusing on the SB, in the second chapter I drew attention to topics such as the general definition of intelligence, traditional intelligence cycle, sources, information gathering disciplines, analysis, and the levels of intelligence. Then I focused on the centralization regarding the tasks and administrative structure of the SB headquarters. I showed how the SB was given a huge workload of tasks and underwent a quick re-organization in a short time. I also presented that the institution which was only responsible for foreign military intelligence in the nineteenth century was tasked with many different duties such as propaganda-censorship, domestic intelligence and foreign political, military and partly economic intelligence at the beginning of World War I.

Then as a second indicator in this centralization tendency, I discussed how the sources and information flow was canalized to the SB. Just like canalizing information flow to the Yıldız Palace during the Abülhamid period, the flow of information was channeled to the SB, therefore to the War Ministry. Of course, World War I was a major factor in canalizing intelligence as carrying out war strategy and effort was the duty of the War Ministry. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the flow of information changed in this direction. In doing so, the only sources were not the SB's own agents or staff or other components of the General Staff. As seen from both ottoman archives and ATASE, other institutions shared the information they acquired with the SB. It was the SB that prepared summarised intelligence reports from a variety of sources, rather than other intelligence providers. After giving general infor-

mation about information flow and the sources, I presented about the coordination and analysis of other departments in the SB headquarters. As each department had a separate task, these departments also coordinated with each other in a period when domestic and foreign intelligence overlapped. For example, if information about spying activity was sent from a foreign source, the first department and second department analyzed it together and disseminated that intelligence. In the later chapters, I have presented examples of how the SB performed its duties along with their conceptual explanations.

For this reason, I first started with tasks that differed from those in the nineteenth century. The first one was on propaganda and censorship. Even though propaganda and censorship were part of foreign and domestic intelligence, I presented them in a separate chapter because they were also methods used to construct a national identity in the Empire. I presented that the SB established a propaganda section called the "War Propaganda Branch" which tried to control-conduct propaganda through oral to musical methods and through press publications. I presented that, while conducting propaganda, the SB controlled many magazines and newspapers and recruited authors, sermons and preachers. I also presented that the SB fought against the propaganda of other states through using departments such as the SO (later OEA) and also the national press.

Censorship, on the other hand, increased the ability of the state to control the press for the easy conduct of propaganda. To conduct these tasks, I presented that the SB established censorship inspectorates and also censorship committees. Censorship was also an issue of importance to domestic intelligence as censorship inspectorates and committees also controlled institutions such as post-telgram centers. By this method, everything from letters to notes and newspapers were be kept under the control and surveillance of the SB. In addition, I presented that each newspaper editor had to have the approval of the censorship inspectorator and the position of the couriers were regulated as political and random. While political couriers were registered directly by the SB and did not require a credential from SB military passport

centers, the random couriers had to get through a strict censorship procedure before deliveries.

In the fourth chapter my concern was the domestic intelligence, another task that came along with World War I. In this section, I first discussed the concept of domestic intelligence and I emphasized the difference between counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. I discussed that counter-intelligence is a more passive measure of domestic intelligence, while counter-espionage is an active measure as it is used to neutralize the threat itself. At the same time, I argued that in a period when domestic and foreign intelligence overlapped, while different intelligence organizations were established for foreign and domestic intelligence in many countries, a centralization process was experienced in the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Even though there was a tendency to centralization, unlike many countries, the idea of counter-espionage - which is about neutralizing the threat - also began to institutionalize in the early 20th century. This was formed around the SB. Later, with this centralization tendency, I emphasized that the SB was not only limited to gathering domestic intelligence, but was also became the top institution to counter-espionage activities. Because of this duty, I have revealed that all the institutions related to security in terms of counter-espionage issues acted on the orders of the SB. First, I explained how an institution granted with such high authority took measures in its own headquarters and came to the point of imposing law on state officials. I also emphasized that the laws on deportations mostly affected the non-Muslim citizens. Of course, one of the biggest problems that came with the tasks was the shortage and insufficiency of staff. The shortage of personnel was inescapable as the SB established and assigned intelligence officers to censorship inspectorates, passport centers, army units and censorship committees in a very short time. This issue remained as a serious problem throughout the war. This section discussed the counter intelligence practices which are also defined as the passive measurements. The remainder of this chapter focused on the active measurements the SB orchestrated, also another contributing factor in the centralization process. With the active measurements, the SB kept many

issues under control from travelers to vehicles, vessels such as ships, trains, ferries, and fishing areas etc. In addition, the SB provided other institutions with details of the methods of espionage and gave orders to take measurements. The orders given by the SB revealed that the job description of the SB was not only in theory, but also very effective in practice. Other issues that revealed that SB was totally in control of domestic security were; the people who were suspected of being a spy could not be followed up without the intelligence officer's or the SB consent, and that other institutions carried out the tasks, under the order and responsibility of the SB. The last issue discussed in this section highlighted some of the problems caused by the centralization process regarding domestic intelligence. As the order on counter-espionage made the SB the only authorized and responsible institution regarding domestic intelligence, the sources of other institutions and also institutions themselves began sending all kinds of reports, analyzed or raw, directly to the SB headquarters. Therefore, the SB transmitted a lot of warnings on the problem. The main purpose here was gathering the intelligence under the SB and carrying out domestic intelligence practices under the control of the SB. While carrying out these tasks, other institutions were not disabled and they continued to exchange information among themselves. But ultimately, they had to report to the SB and carry out its orders. As it can be understood from the collective reports regarding espionage, the SB became the institution where all domestic intelligence was gathered.

My reason for discussing the foreign intelligence task of the SB in the last chapter was that it was already established as a foreign military intelligence organization in the 19th century. In order to give a general idea, I first illustrated graphs in the light of thousands of documents that have passed through a specific analysis about the types of intelligence the SB gathered. Then, I evaluated all these types of intelligence according to the levels of intelligence. Before assessing the foreign intelligence activities of the SB at a strategic level, I focused on the concepts, grand strategy and strategy and also the differences between operational and tactical intelligence. While strategic intelligence was required

for a longer-term policy, operational and tactical intelligence contributed to military purposes and required a shorter duration of analysis. As it was a period of war, political intelligence was gathered to carry out war-time strategy. The SB's operational intelligence focused on military aspects that could affect war operations such as military deployment, mobilization, weapon technology, health, ammunition etc. As for tactical intelligence, the difference between tactical intelligence in this period and today is quite different. Because tactical intelligence is more punctual and carried out for a momentary support to forces during an operation. However the technology of World War I was not suitable for this kind of momentary intelligence. In addition, the limitation in tactical intelligence was the urgency as it was analyzed by the intelligence officer, rather than the SB headquarters. What I observed were merely reflections of the tactical intelligence that was transmitted to the SB headquarters after the conflicts.

In assessing all these levels, I first evaluated the political intelligence the SB gathered in terms of strategy and war strategy. This section showed us that the SB gathered political intelligence that could affect war strategy such as political issues, parliament, government, social structure, the opinion of the public, and to some extent economic agreements. Therefore, the SB also tended towards centralization in terms of the control of foreign intelligence as well. While presenting political foreign intelligence, I first showed that the reports on neutral countries were prepared and presented on their possibility of joining the war. In addition, I presented that the SB also gathered political information about enemy states and their allies and other significant elements of war-time political strategy. Another important element in terms of strategic intelligence was military intelligence, which was the SB's main task since it had been established. At this point, I analyzed the reports on states' military strategies and aims for political gains in engaging war. The SB also focused on the information such as the amount, mobilization, capacity, military equipment and technology of armies. Then, I focused on operational and tactical intelligence, and first of all, I focused on topography to identify the deployment of armies and how to

use them to make an operational plan through maps for supporting the army units at the fronts. Later, the chapter focused on the flow of reports on the factors that affected an operation such as deployment, movement, army conditions, numbers, and health conditions.

In this section, I finally touched on tactical intelligence, in other words, combat intelligence. Combat intelligence reports were the finished reports which were sent to the SB after the incident happened. As during the war, it was mostly not possible for the SB headquarters to analyze regarding that it would a long time to transmit. Therefore, it was mostly examined by the intelligence officer in the army unit assigned by the SB. While discussing this part, I outlined the combat intelligence on three fronts. I focused on the tactical intelligence reports such as injured, situation report, conflicts, results of conflicts, air reconnaissance and scout reconnaissance. As in collective domestic intelligence reports, SB also obtained foreign intelligence from a variety of sources and prepared intelligence summaries from political to military. This is another indicator as no other department had disseminated collective intelligence summaries to other instutions during warfare.

All these duties showed that as the SB had the staff and analysists to conduct the intelligence cycle and also were authorized with a huge amount of tasks it conducted almost a 360 degree intelligence operation, that resulted in its centralization.

§ 6.1 Future Areas of Research

First of all, the documents about the SB were time-limited, close to the end of the war. Therefore, we do not know what happened to the SB at the end of the war. This is a subject open to further research. In addition, issues such as the efficiency of intelligence could not be addressed in my dissertation. To do so it is necessary to have access to the Staff Operations (Harekat Şubesi) documents. As ATASE limits the research to a single topic, I could not obtain many documents regarding staff operations. In addition, the effectiveness of domestic intelligence and its

social-economical effects are note mentioning. By following my footnotes, further research can be conducted on these topics.

As a result of both the lack of classification and restrictions in the archive, only a small amount of information could be obtained about ciphering applications, the SB's own agents, SIGINT and interception practices. Therefore, a research project on the signals corps (Muhabere Sınıfı) would contribute to the area. Likewise, the documents on the fourth department (political and confidential) of the SB are very limited. Considering that organizations such as the SO and later OEA are called as an operational unit of intelligence in many studies, it is necessary to investigate that they may have worked with this part and organized clandestine operations. Due to such a centralized structure, it is highly possible that both the SO and OEA carried out operational activities under the SB as the SB was in a higher institutional position in Supreme Command Headquarters.

By observing studies that suggest the Abteilung IIIb was tasked with similar duties to the SB, the assumption is that the SB was influenced by this institution. However, in ATASE, as the correspondence with the German General Staff in folder is in the German language, they are not given to the researcher. For this reason, this subject is an issue that warrants further investigation. Deception and obtaining information on other intelligence institutions is an inescapable task of an intelligence institution. But as I presented in the third chapter, while the SB gathered intelligence on spying organizations, it is unlikely that it did not gather information on other famous intelligence organizations such as MI5 and MI6. Even if it did not, it is another part that could be discussed regarding the efficiency of intelligence that the SB gathered.

As the ATASE documents are being transferred to State Archives, after their classification and opening to researchers, all these topics need further analysis. The last item of importance is what happened to the SB during war of independence. Again, as the documents on the SB finished before the end of World War I, I was not able to make a comment.

Nowadays in Turkey the National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı) is also a centralized intelligence organization. The

background of this tendency can be traced back to the SB. However, this is just a theory because further research on the Turkish War of Independence and early Republican period must be analyzed very carefully. After the Ottoman's defeat in World War I, and during the War of independence, there were many established organizations that also conducted some intelligence tasks. Therefore, theoretically one can look for a similarity between the National Intelligence Agency and the SB, but one must not forget the two aforementioned periods.

Some of the organizations were, as follows: *Karakol Community* (Karakol Cemiyeti-Established on October 1918),*Felah Group* (Established 13th April 1920-Felah Grubu(First name of establishment was Hamza Grubu), *Zabitan Group* (Zabitan Grubu - Established on 27 October 1920), *M.M.Group* (M.M Grubu), *Military-Police Organization* (20 January 1920 - Askeri Polis Teşilatı) and the *Press and Intelligence Directorate* (May 1920 - Matbuat ve İstihbarat Genel Müdürlüğü). The Karakol Community was also as a clandestine organization which served to support the war of independence. [124] The Felah Group in Istanbul, on the other hand, secretly helped the Ankara Government and carried out the tasks of intelligence, ammunition (mühimmat işleri) and supply (levazım işleri).[125] The M.M Group mostly served for dispatching ammunition.[126] The Military-Police Organization served as a military intelligence section for the early republican period.[127]

All the aforementioned organizations were established by private efforts whereas the Military Police Organization and the Press and Intelligence Directorate was established by the Ankara Government. However, some authors discuss whether the Military Police Organization or the Press and Intelligence directorate acted as full intelligence organizations. Therefore, rather than pursuing an anachronism, an analysis for

124 Musa Gürbüz, "Karakol Cemiyeti" (Master's Thesis, Ankara University, 1987), 26.

125 Mesut Aydın, Ibid., 33.

126 Bülent Çukurova, Ibid.

127 Hamit Pehlivanlı, Ibid.

the period between the end of World War I to the early republican period is a priority.

Last but not least, I presented in the introduction that, during the reign of Abdulhamid II, the intelligence reports were mostly canalized in the Yıldız Palace. There is another organization during Abdulhamid period called the YSS (Yıldız Secret Service-Yıldız Hafiye Teşkilatı), which observed the common opinion and reported to the Sultan for a possible opposition. However, according to Mehmet Ali Beyhan this institution was not properly analyzed and although there was such a service, its structure as an administration scheme was not visible. In addition, he emphasizes that the Sultan also gathered military attaches to serve for foreign intelligence.[128] As stated, the role of the SB and its sources (mostly military attaches) are in the Yıldız Documents in the State Archives. But the SB's role in the 19th century in the ATASE archives can be better analyzed. As my timeline was limited to 1914-1918, I could not obtain those documents.

128 Mehmet Ali Beyhan, Ibid., 939-950.

Appendix A First Re-Organization of Second Branch



Appendix B Transcription of the First Re-Organization of the Second Branch

Osmanlı Ordu-yı Hümâyûnu
Başkumandanlığı Vekâleti
Erkân-ı Harbiyesi
Aded

Başkumandanlık Karârgâhı
2. İstihbârât ve Matbû'ât Şu'besi

İstihbârât ve Matbû'ât Şu'besi - Dost ve düşman ordularına âid istihbârâtı cem' eder. Bu ma'lûmâta müsteniden vaz'iyât-ı harbiyeyi mütemâdiyen harîta üzerinde tesbît eder. Matbû'ât-ı dâhiliye teftîş ve ta'kîb ederek kendi ordumuzla dost ordulara dâir neşriyâtda bulunmalarını men' eder. Bu şu'be harekât-ı harbiye şu'besinin muvâfakatıyla neşri câiz ve lâzım olan haberleri matbû'âta tevdî' eder. Kezâ dost ve düşman devletler hakkında ma'lûmât almak üzere matbû'ât-ı ecnebiyeyi teftîş eder. Mezkûr şu'be ecnebî muhâbirleriyle ataşemiliterlerine âid husûsâtla iştigâl eder. Bu şu'be kendi câsûslarımızı idâre ve düşman câsûslarını tarassud eder. Bu husûsda ba'zı jandarma zâbıtânıyla polis memûrları mezkûr şu'benin emri altındadır.

2. İstihbârât ve Matbû'ât Şu'besi
Müdîr - Erkân-ı Harb Binbaşı Kâzım Bey
Erkân-ı Harb Binbaşı Kadri Bey Romanya
Süvâri Binbaşı Sâdık Bey Rusya
Piyâde Binbaşı Mehmed Ali Bey Bulgaristan
Erkân-ı Harb Yüzbaşı Hüsrev Efendi Rusya
Piyâde Yüzbaşı Tevfîk Efendi Yunanistan
Piyâde Yüzbaşı Nusret Efendi Bulgaristan
Piyâde Yüzbaşı Cemâl Efendi Sırbistan
Piyâde Yüzbaşı Hakkı Efendi Yunanistan
Piyâde Yüzbaşı Evrâk Hayri Efendi

Mülâzım-ı Evvel Rızâ Efendi Almanya
Mülâzım-ı Evvel ------ Efendi İtalya
Mülâzım-ı Evvel ------ Efendi Yollar

Polis ve Jandarma Heyeti:
Polis serkomiserleri
Komiserleri ve memurları
Source: ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H1, I:001

Appendix C Second Re-Organization of the Second Branch



Appendix D Transcription of the Second Re-Organization Document of the Second Branch

İstihbarat ve Matbuat Şubesi Müdiri Binbaşı Kazım Bey
Taksim-i Vezaif
I. Balkanlar
Amiri: Erkan-ı Harbiyye Binbaşısı Kadri Bey
Yüzbaşı Nusret efendi(romanya)
Binbaşı Mehmet ali bey(Bulgaristan)
Yüzbaşı Tevfik efendi (Yunanistan)
Yüzbaşı hakkı efendi (Yunanistan)
Yüzbaşı cemal efendi (Sırbistan)
II
Vaziyeti Umumiye
Müdir Erkanı Harbiyye Binbaşısı Kazım Bey
Süvari Binbaşı Sadık Bey itilaf-ı müselles(karalanmış)/rusya
Erkanı Harbiye Yüzbaşı Hüsrev Bey
Mülazım-ı Evvel Rıza Efedi -mütenevvia
Mülazım-ı Evvel Şevki Efendi(karalanmış)
Mülazım-ı Evvel Sabri Efendi- Yollar, Hudud
Jandarma Mülazım-ı Evvel Abdurrahman Efendi sansür memuru(karalanmış)
Yüzbaşı Hayri Efendi- Evrak Memuru
II.
Yüzbaşı Tevfik Efendi
Mülazım-ı evvel Abrurahman Efendi
Mülazım-ı Evvel sabri efendi- Yollar
III.
Mülazım-ı Evvel Rıza Efendi-Mütenevvia
Sansür-Mülazım-ı Evvel Ali Şefik Efendi

Source: ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H1, I:001a

Appendix E Final Re-Organization and the Tasks of the First Department of Second Branch



Source: ATASE, BDH, F:321, D:569, I:027

Appendix F Tasks of the Departments of Second Branch





A	1/2
D	420
F	1-2

1.

1- Hariçten velev karargah-ı umumi şuabatına mensub bulunsun. İştigal olmalarına hiçbir kimse katiyen girmeyecek ve müsaade olunmayacaktır.
2- Kısımlardan vaziyefe aid malumat ve izahat almak isteyenler şube müdiriyetinden istizan-ı mecburiyetleri müracaat edenlere tebliğ edilecektir.
3- Şubeye muttasıl ve tahsisi bu cihet için tahliye edilen eski kısım odası hususi görüşmeler ve ziyaretler içindir.
4- Sükunetle mesaiye ve bilhassa izahaten maksut olan mahremiyete pek tesiri olan bu hususun temini …..rica olunur.

2.

1- kısım emirleri havale olunan muharrerat ve telgraflar muhteviyatını derece-i lüzum ve ehemmiyetlerine göre gerek mealen ve gerekse aynen veyahut tavsil ve teşrih ederek alakadar olacak makamat ve şuebata(şubelere) malumat vermekten ve hususu tamamıyla muntazaman takib etmekten doğrudan doğruya kısım amirleri sual edecektir.

2-şuubenin vezaifinden seferberlik devrinde işin derecesine göre evvela …..olacak makamat şunlardır.

a- Birinci harekat şubesi ve karargah-ı umuminin abahatı sairesi
b- Donanma kumandanlığı ve bahriye nezareti
c- Üçüncü ve dördüncü ordu kumandanlıkları ve dördüncü ordu kumandan vekaleti
d- Irak ve havalisi kumandanlığı
e- İran seyyar kuvvet kumandanlığı

3

Her daim kısımların birinci derecede dikkat edeceği mevad şu olmalıdır.

1, 3. Kısımlar:

1- Muhtelif menabinden gelen(kaynaklardan) ve her suretle istihsal edilen malumattan harekat-ı harbiye şubesini tenvir edecek kıymetli olacak mevadd (maddeler)ın tefriki(ayrılması) günü gününe münhasıra ve raporların tanzimiyle şubeyi mezkureye irsali.
2- Üçüncü dördüncü ordulara Çanakkale ve karadeniz boğaz kumandanlıklarına, ırak ve iran seyyar kuvvet komutanlıklarına, gerek menabii i resmiyeden ve gerekse dahil ve hariç gazete ve ajanslardan istihraç edilen(çıkarılan) faideli bil hassa harekati askeriyeye mütaailik malumatın vaktinde teblii
3- Düşman tebligat-ı resmiyelerinin aynen aid olduğu ordu kumandanlıklarına ogün bildirilmesine.
4- Gelmiş telgraf ve muharretda casusluğa ve şüpheli eşhasa mütaallik görüşen mevaddın ikinci kısma bildirilmesi

2.Kısım için

1- Gazetelerin sansür talimatına muvafık hareket edib etmedilierin tetkiki.

2-Tebligat ı resmiyenin her gazeteye …..dairesinde derç edilib edilmediğinin tetkik ve takibi

3- Sansür merakizinden gönderilmiş hariçten gelen ve harice giden telgraf kopyalarının tektiki, bundan her suretle menafimizi ihlal edecek havadislere dikkat edilerek bunun men-i ve takibine dair tedbire tevessül

4-Hariçten gelen ajansların tetkiki ile aleyhimize vaki olan gerek siyasi ve gerek askeri her türlü hususatın milli ajansı veya heyet-i istihbariye vasıtalarıyla sureti münasebede tekzibine zemin ihzarı ve bunların vakit geçirilmeyerek dahil ve harice neşr ve tamimi için mahallerine irsali.

5- Sansür merakizinden sonra, tevkif edilmiş telgraflar, gazetelerden taradılmış fıkralar ve mektublar hakkında muamele-i …icrası.

6- Polis müdiriyetinden gönderilmiş yolcu cetvellerinde görülmüş şüpheli eşhası ile harice mütemadi ve sıksık girib çıkanların polis müdiriyetinden istifsarı ve bunların hakkında takibat.
7- Dahili memleketde şüphelilerin ve teba-i muhassamanın mevaki-i askeriyeden dahili memlekete tesir ve tesirleri olmayacak menatıka tebdi-i muamelatına hazeri dikkat(bu maddeye aid muamelat dosyası akşamları müdiriyet odasında kilitlenecektir).
8- Var ise tebligat-ı resmiyenin ihzarı ve gazetelere ve makamatı ……..
9- Harbi- umumi safahatindeki teveddülatın haritalarda tebeyyünü, mühim ve …vukuunda kopyalarının birinci şubeye ve nazır paşa hazretlerine takdim edilmek üzere ihzar ve tesbiti.
10- Sansür merakizinden arzu edilmiş maksadı temin edecek vecihle ifayı vazife edilib edilmediğinin takib ve tetkiki ile bu ciyetin alim ve muntazam bir usul e vaz-ı çareleri

4

1- Ogün için çıkması lazım olan muamelat müsveddelerinden başka diğer müsvedat her gün bade zeval ve 4(öğlen 12 den sonra) de irae edilecektir.
2- Birinci ve üçünkü kısımlar malumatı müstakilen müdir muavini Edip Bey tarafından takib ve tetkik edileceklerden müsveddeleri evvela Edip Bey görecektir.
3- Gerek telgraf ve gerek muharreratı zirinden(ek) kısmı havalisi kenarından görülen (h) işareti muhteviyatının müdiriyetçe hülasa edileceğine deyü işaretin bitişikdeki (.I) işareti müdiriyet hülasasına gidildiğine alametdir.

Bu son alamet kısımlarca görülmezse kısım amirleri müdir muavinini haberdar ederler.

5

1- Rüfekadan her birinin tahsis mütalaa eyleyeceği gazetelerin yalnız hülasaları çıkarılmakla iktifa edilmeyip (hülsaları badezeval bir de müdir muavinine getirilecektir) muhteviyattan sansür vaz-ındaki gayeyi tecavüz eder suretde gerek askeri ve

gerek siyasi cereyan makal görülünce maktuu işaret edilerek müdiriyete vaktinde iraesi suretiyle ikinci kısım muavenet rica olunur.

Bundan başka gazetelerin mütalaasından dahil ve hariç ifkar ı umumi-yi sevindirecek ve….deki muzafferiyatı cerh ve iptal edecek suretde gerek milli ajans ve gerek Osmanlı heyet-i istihbariyesine verilmek üzere faideli …. İhzarı şubenin başlıca vezaifinden birini teshil edeceğinden rüfekanın bu nokta-i nazarda ….lerine pek intizar olunur.

6

Gece nöbetinde kalacak rüfekada şu vazife taleb edilecektir.

1-akşam gazeteleri

2- Matbuat müdiriyetinden gelmiş hulasa-i matbuat

Bunların münhasıran tetkiki ve mühim görülen hülasaları çıkarılarak ertesi günü müdüriyete verilmesi.

20-21 kanunisani 330

İstihbarat Şube Müdiri Binbaşı Seyfi

Source: ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:420, I:001,001-001, 001-002

Appendix G War Propaganda Branch of the Second Branch



Source: ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:004-01

Appendix H Tasks of Censorship Inspectorates of Second Branch



Müfettiş 24 saatten 1 kere istihbarat şube müdiriyetini ziyaretle kendisine müsteacel olubda bildirilmemiş olan 2. Derecedeki havadisi rapor takdim edecektir.

Havadisi mühimme ve müstacel hadiseler için nöbetimi sansürü tarafından başkumandanlık istihbarat şubesine tebliğ üzerinden şehri dahili telgraf veya telefonla istical veya icabında emir erine istihdam olunur.

Müfettiş aynı zamanda uygun vakitlerde vazifedar olacak ve hükümet-i askeriye (doğrudan doğruya istihbarat şubesinin tensib ve kararıyla) neşr-i arzu edilecek havadisi alıp gazetelere tebliğ edecektir. Müfettiş memleketimizin mevcut ecnebi muhabirlerini şahsen görüp ve tanımak ve onlara aşağıdaki şartları taahhüd ettirmek mecburiyetindedir.

Muhabirlere taahhüt ettirelecek şartlar

1- Sansür talimatına tevfikan hareket edecekleri

2- Savaşa girip girmediği münkati olmayan memleketlere ait muhabirlere mensup bulundukları gazetelerden muntaman ikişer nüshayı getirip müfettişe takdim edekleri gazetelerinde muhalif ve mugayir (aykırı) talimat olarak bir mektup ve buna benzer bir haber görülürse muhabir mumaileyhin bila itiraz memleketinden ihraç edilecekleri.

Müfettiş mevcut zabit ve sivil sansürlerin tebeyyün edecekleri hallerine göre değiştirilmesine yerlerine başkalarının tayini lüzumu istihbarat şubesi müdiriyetine bildirilir.

Tebeyyün edecek bir hatayı müfettiş raporlar istihbarat şubesine bildirerek müdürin tayin edeceği cezayı tatbik eder.

Sansür azaları:

Zabitan: münavebe eylemek ve İstanbul telgrafhanesinde ve kendilerine tahsis edilecek …odada ifai vazife edeceklerdir. Emirlerine amade telgrafhane hademelerinden birer hizmetçi tayin olunur. Nöbet ve mesai-nin tarzı tertibi müfettişin tertib edeceği programa tabiidir.

Appendix I Second Branch's Regulations for Couriers



Harb Haline Mahsus Kurye Talimatı

1 Harb halinde kurye sınıfı devletlerin sınırlı olarak taşıtmak maksadıryla sehayat ettirecekleri zatlara derler. Sansür nizamnamesine ordu ve harekat-ı harbiyeye alakalı maddeler toplanmış çeşitli maddeler iç ve dış yasak maddeler (alışı satışı) kuryeler tarafından nakl olunmayacaktır.

2 Türkiye siyasi kurye ve rastgele kurye isimleriyle iki tür bu kurye tanır.

3. Aşağıdaki makam ve memurlara mensup kişilerin siyasi kuryeliği kabul olunacaktır.

a- Hariciye Bakanlığının muvazzaf siyasi memurları.

b- Elçilikler, eliçik kadrolarına dair muvazzaf siyasi memurlar.

c- Konsoloshaneler ve kadrolarına dair memurlar, asıl memurlar

d- Üniforma ile seyahat edecek kurye zabitleri

Siyasi kuryelerin şahısları ve zati eşyaları, gümrük ve sansür tarafından yoklanmaz.

1,2,3,4 maddelerinde açıkça yazılmış memuriyetlere mensup olmayan kuryeler evraklarını naklettikleri devletin tebassından olması şartıyla rastgele kuryede çalışacaklar.

Rastgele kuryelerin şahısları ve hususi eşyaları sıradan yolcu gibi uygulanarak yoklama edilecektir.

Siyasi kuryeler ile rastgele kuryelerin naklettikleri 5. Maddelerde yazılı şartları içeren resmi evrak ve paketleri gümrükten ve sansür tarafından yoklanmayacaktır.

3-Bu madde'nin 3 tane fıkralarında açıklanmış evraki ibrazdan zatlara Türkiye'nin mülki ve askeri memurları tarafından siyasi kurye muamelesi edilecektir.

1. Siyasi Kurye Pasaport

Bu pasaportta amilin siyasi kuryeliği hangi memleketden hangi memlekete gideceği yahut gidip geleceği üçüncü maddede yukarıdaki makam ve memuriyetten hangisine mesul olacağı tamamen izah edilmiş olacaktır. Bu üç şartı içermeyen pasaportlar üzerine siyasi kurye vizesi icra edilemez.

Siyasi kurye pasaportları istanbulda hariciye bakanlığının türkiyeye dönmeye ve memleketi Osmanlı

Source: ATASE, BDH, F:366, D:1458, I:008

Appendix J Political Intelligence Journal of Second Branch



A 1/2
D 714-A
F 1-5.5

نومرو : ٢٧ باسه قومانه‌لغی روزنامه‌سی در سعادت ١٢ نیسان ٣٢٤ جمعه

بورو غایت محرره

« برنس لیونوفسکی » خاطره‌سی

٤١٢ . آوسترالیا مطبوعات مهمه‌سی . . آنلان ـ انگلیز اقتصاتجه قدر لوندرا آنلان سفارتی ایله ایمان برلس « لیونوفسکی » نك ـ آتاتورك موجب هیجان اولان ـ خصوصی خاطره‌سی شدتله تنقید ایدیورلر .

برلس طوتدقلری صرف،استعمال ذاتیسنه مخصوص اولدیغی تنظیم ایدیلیکی حالده صورت محرمانه‌ده ارائه ایتدیکی بعض ذوات مروره طوتدقلری افشا ایدیلمش اولان یوخطره‌نك مختلف نقراتی آوسترالیا مطبوعاتی طوتدقلری نشر ایدیلمکده‌در .

آنلان ـ آوسترالیا اتحادی مضر وزائد عد ایتمکده اولان برلس لیونوفسکی مخطرمسنك برقسمنده دیپور :

« شرقده دنی براتفاق مثلث سیاستی تعقیب ایتمکدن عبارت عنعنهٔ مشئومه‌دن اولق قورتولدیغی ومفدراتری جوجومه تورکیه‌نك وشیقه آوسترالیا ـ مجارستانك مفدراتنه ربط ایتمکده‌کی خطای عظیمی اولق اعتراف وتسلیم ایتمه‌لی لازمدر .

آتاتیا . . بالخاص اقوامه قارشی تورك ومجار کبی ظالم وجبارلرك یاننده اخذ موقع ایتدی .

اتفاق مثلث وشرق سیاستلری اتخاذ وتعقیب ایتمکدن عبارت مشئوم ومضر خطا نتیجه‌سی اولدیغی اوتدن بری الك ای دوستلر وقومشولرمزی اولان روسیه بالضروره فرانسه‌نك وانکلترەنك قوللری آلتنه آتیلدی . واقصای شرقی حقده‌کی اتسانکلار تصوراتی ایله اولق مشغول اولمدن انظار دقتی یه آوروپایه چویردی .

بو حال بالخصوص شو نقطهٔ نظردن جالب دقتدرکه بر اتفاق مثلث سیاستی مفقود ومشروع فیلان یکباره احتمال یعنی مشترك بر روس وفرانسز تهرضی احتمالی یك اعلا برطرف ایدیلیویردی .

آوسترالیا . . ذاتاً مفدراتی آتاتیانك مفدراتنه تابع ومربوط برحکومتدر . آوسترالیانك برکون کلوب‌ده آتاتیاده تکرار توسیع قیود واراضی سیاستی تعقیب قیولنامه‌سندن قورقمه قطعیاً محل یوقدر . فالیچا ودالتاچا ایالتلری داخل حساب ایملکمزدن بیله اهالیسنك آتچی ضو آتاتورکن مرکب اولان آوسترالیانك آتاتیا ایله توحیدی حالنده آتاتی منافعی زیاده‌سیله متضرر اولمقدر . سیاسمتمزی ویانه وپشته غالباً جاری اولان نقاط نظره توفیقاً اداره ایدر ایسه‌ك شی ضرره اوغرایه‌جق . بیاً‌علیه :

متقاطر تلرك ارزولرلی تعلیمه مایل برخط حرکتی تعقیب ایتمه‌ره هیچ حاجت یوقدر . بویالکز لزومسز دگل بلکه‌ده تهلکه‌لی برمسلکدر .

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سفر مذکور . . علی‌العاده برماهیق حائز اولمایوب بلکه تأسیس ایتمکده اولدیغمز بنای شرقی جدیدك جبههٔ عظیمه‌سیدر .

صربستان اوروپا ایچون نه ایسه فلسطینده شرق ایچون اودر . برى آوروپا ایله آسیا بینده ، دیکری آسیا ایله افریقا آراسنده برر کوپری بانی موضعیدرلر .

آتاتیانك یوجریده‌کی مقصد اصلی سیاسیسی . . چاناق قلعه‌دن ایرانه قدر تشیل ایتمکدر .

آتاتیا . . یکی آتاتیا ایله امکی بزانس ایمپراطورلغی محتوی بر ایمپراطورلق یاخود جمهوریت یاپمق امثالدندر .

تهایت . . اوزون برتأخردن صکره یوجهتله هدف قارشی اتخاذ ایتدیکمز سیاست اجنبیه توضیح ایتمکدر . یو سیاستك هدفی یکدن اکتساب حیات ایمن غرب وبیودی مدنیتی‌در .

یو افکارك . . هندستانك استقلالنه متعلق آتاتورك توافق ایدیلمه‌سی برشیانهٔ خود بینی عد ایدیلمش . ایچی آسیاده‌کی آتاتورك حقیقهٔ حر وتدافعی اولان ماهیتنه برشاهددر .

برزمانلر مهد بشریت اولان شرقك بعض اقسامنه حر براداره تحتنده یوروك براستقبال موعوددر .

آتاتیا . . شرق اراضیٔ مهمه‌سی حکمدارلغنك انحصار احتراصاتی آلتنه موقتی تشئی ایله بر حسن انقیاده بولوندی . فقط طالعك یوایشده آتاتیادن یوز چویرمه‌سه سبب ، حریت سیاسیه فضائلنك عدم تقدیرلری وهنوز برحیات اولان مدنیات عتیقه‌نك اجحاف ایتدیکی احتمال وانکلترەنك ادراك ایدیلمسندن عبارتدر . فرصت درجه‌سنده بدئ سائی ایدیجك اولورسه‌ق آسیانك یوقسلوقده برمدنیت جدیده طلوع ایدیجك وبومدنیت ثروت وسعادت عالمه یوجریلك تحریباتی قدر جوق وبووك فوائد بخش ایدەجکدر . پوصورتله لایتی حرق بحر سفید سواحلی کشدیسنه جذب ایتمکله موقتی اولدیغی کبی یکی سای حرب وتشبثاتی . . عالمك اکتساب ثروت یارایه‌جق وبوثروتی سوریه سواحلی اطرافنده طوپلایه‌جقدر .

رومانیا

٤٢٠ . رسمی — روس ـ رومن مصالحه‌نامه‌سنك مئی اصلیسی موسقوده ٢٤/٢/٢٩ ده نشر ایدیلدی . یومصالحه‌نامه‌نك شایان دقت فاصلی شونلردر :

١ — رومانیا ایکی آی ظرفنده یارایایی تخلیه ایدەجکدر . یالکز رومن دەپوزله شنندوقر خلوتلك محافظه‌سی ایچون یوز کیشلك برقوت براقه‌جقدر . تخلیه ایدیلن مواقع سوویت قطعاتی طرفندن اشغال اولونه‌جقدر . یارایاتلك محافظه‌سی شهر وکوی مبعثلریله تودیع اولنه‌جقدر .

٢ — روسیه یارایایه‌کی جیوات واعانه دەپوزلری ترك ایتمکی تعهد ایدر .

٣ رومانیا هیچ برصورتله روس اهالی جمهوریتلرینه قارشی معاملات خصمانه‌ده بولونمایه‌جق ودیگر دولتلرك یوکی معاملاته ظهیر اولنمایه‌جقدر .

٤ — رومانیا اردوسی رومانیا اراضیسندن رجعت ایتدیکی قدر رده روس اراضیسنه عاقبه ایدیلمکدر .

٥ — دول مرکزیه‌یه قارشی عینی صورتله معامله‌ده بولونمه‌سی تقرر ایتدیکی تقدیرده روس ـ رومن اردو باش قوماندانلری تراسنده دائی مناسبت وارتباط تأسیس اولونه‌جقدر .

٤٢١ . رسمی — رومانیا حکومتی ٢٤/٣/٢٨ تاریخنده کیایا لیمان قوماندانلغنه کوندردیکی برتقرافامه‌ده ـ طرفیمه حاصل اولان ائتلاف اوزرینه طونه‌ده وطونه ایله دکر آراسنده‌کی ساحلده دول مرکزیه‌یه عائد سفن حربیه وتجاریه‌نك سیر وسفرلرینه مساعده اولونمدیغی بیلدیرمشدر .

Appendix K War Journal of Second Branch



Source: ATASE, BDH, F:241, D:H2, I:002

Appendix L Intelligence Branch Censor Desk Journal Cover



Source: ATASE, BDH, F:443, D:H1, I:001

Appendix M Intelligence Summaries from Various Sources of Second Branch



Source: ATASE; BDH, F:5, D:200, I:32

Appendix N A Surveillance Report of the Counter-Espionage Department of the Second Branch



2. Şube
4508

Polis Müdüriyet-i Umûmiyyesi'ne

Beyoğlu'nda Tarlabaşı'nda Fıçıcı Sokağı'ndaki apartmanın 12, 18 numaralı odalarında mukīm ve sâbıkan devr-i Hamîdî'de yâverândan olup bi'l-âhire rütbesi ref‘ edilmiş olan Ermeni milletinden Leon nâmında şahsın Mekteb-i Harbiye karşısında Pekmazek (?) apartmanında bir takım eşhâs tarafından geceleri vukū‘ bulmakda olan ictimâ‘larda isbât-ı vücûd etmekde olduğu ve arasıra İstanbul'da gāib olarak nerelere gitdiği belli olmadığı bazen fakīr ve bazen fevkalâde şık ve zengin elbiseler giymekde olduğu ve ekseriya Kadıköy İskelesi civarındaki pansiyon ve apartmanlardaki müste’cire kadınlarla görüşmekde olduğu ve İngilizce, Fransızca, Rumca ve Türkçe lisânlarını mükemmelen vâkıf olduğu ve İstanbul'daki düvel-i muhâsama casus komitesi mühim a‘zâlarından olduğu istihbâr kılınmış olmağla îzâhât-ı ma‘rûza dâiresinde me’mûrîn-i muktedire tarafından îcâb eden ta‘kībât ve tahkīkātın îfâ etdirilerek derdesti esbabının istikmâli rica olunur.

Seyfi

Eşkâli: Merkūm uzun boylu, kır bıyıklı, çatık kaşlı, sesi âdetâ, dişleri takma, el parmakların ucu top.

E, II. Kısım, Hüsrev
Gönderildi, 14-10
Source: ATASE, BDH, F:289, D:56, I:009-01

Appendix O Travelling Restrictions by the Second Branch



The signature of the director of Second Branch Seyfi Bey is on the right end of the page.

Source: BOA. DH.EUM.5.Şb. 9/6

Appendix P Intelligence summaries from Battlefronts and Army Commanderships



اوراق اوطه‌سنك نومروسی		عثمانلی اردوی همایونی باش قوماندانلغی وكالتی		مبيضك امضاسی
شعبه نومروسی		شعبه		تاريخ تبييضی
مسوديك امضاسی				مبيضه قونيلان نومرو
تاريخ تسويدی				مقابله‌جينك امضاسی
قلم اوطه‌سنك نومروسی				مقابله تاريخی

A 1-2
D 696
F 4-1

Osmanlı Ordu-yı Hümâyûnu
Başkumandanlığı Vekâleti

Kafkas Cephesi-12/5/4

1- Bitlis'in şimâl mıntıkasına gönderilen bir muhbir üç Ermeni taburunun cepheye gelmekde olduğunu görmüşdür.

2- Üçüncü Ordu cephesine Ruslar arâzîmizde bulundukça düşman telakki olunacağını müş'ir verdiğimiz beyânnâmeye cevâben ber-vech-i âtî beyânnâme bırakmışlardır:

"Beyânnâmenizden siz de bizim gibi ma'sûm kanı dökmekden müteneffir bulunduğunuz anlaşılıyor. Terk-i silâh ediniz. Üzerinizden imparatorunuz buyuruğunu (?) atınız.O vakit biz de sizin topraklarınızdan çıkarız. Sizin toprağınız bize lâzım değildir.

Dördüncü Ordu, 12/5/4

Yapılan tayyare istikşâfâtına nazaran düşmanın yeni takviye kıta'âtı aldığı anlaşılıyor. Bu takviye kıta'âtının 74'ncü Piyade Fırkası olduğu zanolunuyor. Hanyunus'daki düşman ordugâhları tezâyüd etmişdir. Telü'l-Sîne'ye doğru müte'addid taburlar yürüyüşü görülmüşdür. Düşmanın piyade merkez-i sikleti kendi sol ve süvari merkez-i sikleti sağ cenahındadır. Mevâzi'ini şiddetle tahkîm etmekdedir. Bu tahkîmât sahilden Telü's-Sîne'den Hanyunus cenûbuna sâhile kadar bir nısf dâire şeklindedir. Düşman malzemesinden (?) Şeyh Kur'ân (?)istikāmetinde bir şimendifer hattı yapmakdadır.

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T.C Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Arşivi (ATASE) Balkan Harbi Koleksiyonu(BLH.): K:1646/D:30

T.C Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Arşivi (ATASE) Birinci Dünya Harbi Koleksiyonu(BDH.): K:4/D:H1, K:5/D:H1:2, K:5/D:26, K:5/D:200, K:7/D:34, K:7/D:717, K:12/D:23, K:240/D:282, K:241/D:H1, K:241/D:H2,K:241/D:455, K:243/D:010, K:243/D:30,K:243/D:43,K:243/D:1009,K:243/D:1010,K:247/D:140, K:247/D:404,K:247/H1:2,K:247/D:404,K:247/D:1024,K:249/D:505, K:252/D:375,K:252/D:987,K:252/D:1045,K:252/D:1049,K:256/D:76,K:256/D:763,K:258/D:356,K:258/D:1066,K:260/D:H3:5,K:260/D:594,K:263/D:18,K:263/D:180,K:268/D:140,K:268/D:1106,K:269/D:140,K:269/D:594,K:269/D:1111,K:272/D:201,K:272/D:911,K:280/D:56, K:281/D:201, K:281/D:568, K:285/D:406, K:285/D:1161, K:289/D:56,K:289/D:59,K:289/D:425,K:289/D:1177,K:291/D:907,K:291/D:1185,K:299/D:443,K:299/D:864,K:299/D:1217,K:303/D:374,K:303/D:1231A,K:310/D:852,K:310/D:1260,K:313/D:001,K:313/D:381,K:313/D:909, K:313/D:1270, K:313/D:1271, K:320/ D:909, K:320/D:1975,K:321/D:346,K:327/D:403,K:321/D:436,K:321/D:569,K:321/D:1296,K:325/D:92,K:325/D:1310,K:327/D:403,K:327/D:1317,K:357/D:135,K:361/D:1445,K:366/D:420,K:366/D:320,K:366/D:420,K:366/D:1458, K:370/D:909, K:370/D:1475, K:373/D:1484, K:382/D:1521,K:383/D:1521,K:391/D:39,K:391/D:1549,K:409/D:275, K:409/D:296, K:410/ D:269, K:410/D:1621, K:413/D:367,

K:415/D:288, K:415/ D:1639, K:416/D:169, K:420/D:283, K:420/ D:1655, K:421/D:157, K:421/D:774, K:427/D:578, K:427/D:1685, K:429/D:29,K:433/D:12,K:434/D:713,K:434/D:714A,K:434/D:1048,K:434/D:1048A,K:434/D:1708,K:434/D:1709,K:434/D:1710, K:434/D:1711,K:435/D:363,K:435/D:731A,K:435/D:1712,K:435/D:1712A,K:436/D:361, K:436/D:713B,K:436/D:1048, K:436/D:1048B, K:436/D:1715,K:436/D:1716,K:437/ D:363, K:437/365, K:437/714, K:437/714C,K:437/D:1717,K:437/D:1718,K:437/D:1719,K:438/D:364,K:438/713,K:438/713C,K:438/D:1720,K:438/D:1722,K:438/D:1723, K:439/D:364A, K:439/D:1726, K:440/D:347, K:440/ 362, K:440, D:1729, K:441/D:347, K:441/D:1732, K:443/D:H1, K:443/ D:H2, K:443/ D:H3, K:443/D:H4, K:433/D:1708, K:488/D:367A, K:492/D:29, K:492/ D:1929, K:494/D:599, K:507/ D:225, K:511/ D:933,K:523/D:938, K:529/ D:223, K:531, D:024, K:531/D:22, K:531/D:24, K:531/D:25, K:531/D:27K:531/D:28, K:531/D:31, K:531/D:33, K:531/D:35, K:531/D:36, K:531/D:37, K:531/D:38, K:531/D:39 K:531/D:40, K:531/D:41 K:531/D:42, K:531/D: 2074, K:535/D:315, K:535/D:2092A, K:536/D:1229, K:543/ D:156, K:551/D:636, K:552/D:6,K:552/D:696, K:552/ D:2143, K:554/D:608, K:554/D: 2154, K:564/D:828, K:1646/D:30, K: 1845/ D:76A, K: 1831/D:18,K:1846/D:79, K:1851/D:110, K: 1857/D: 131,K: 1868/D: 174, K:2899/D:408, K:3437/D:21, K:3450/D:68, K:3919/D:84.

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