SNAPSHOTS OF POPULAR TURKISH NATIONALISM:
NEO- KEMALISM, BESTSELLERS AND FACEBOOK

DİDEM TÜRKOĞLU

Boğaziçi University 2008

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Didem Türkoğlu

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"Snapshots of Popular Turkish Nationalism: Neo-Kemalism, Bestsellers and Facebook," a thesis prepared by Didem Türkoğlu in partial fulfillment of the requirements fort he Master of Arts in History degree
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This thesis has been approved and accepted on 3 September 2008 by:

Assoc. Prof. Nadir Özbek_____
(Thesis Advisor)

Ass. Prof. Cengiz Kırlı_____

Ass. Prof. Berna Yazıcı_____

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Title: Snapshots of Popular Turkish Nationalism: Neo-Kemalism, Bestsellers and Facebook

This thesis takes snapshots from contemporary popular culture to understand manifestations of Turkish nationalism. It focuses on neo-Kemalist version of Turkish nationalism which is defined as a new type of Turkish nationalism emerging in the 1990s emphasizing political action and civil society. This focus is based on analyses of best sellers such as *Those Crazy Turks* and *Metal Storm*. These analyses are products of discourse analysis of the books and interviews with the readers of *Those Crazy Turks.* The thesis also examines a new medium for the Turkish nationalism to be articulated: Facebook. Being a popular internet-based networking sites, protests are organized and realized here. When the analysis of the books/readers and Facebook/users are put together, neo-Kemalist discourse surfaces as specifically targeting the youth to take action. Yet the ambiguities and paradoxes neo-Kemalism implies lead to a dichotomous picture. This thesis argues that the dichotomy lies in many points of the discourse swinging between Orientalism and Occidentalism, the "virtual" and the "real," past and future, conservation and transformation, militarism and civil politics, action and passivism, pessimism and optimism. All these sensitive points are blended with the language and symbolism of consumer culture. In the struggle of neo-Kemalist discourse to have hegemony over other versions of nationalism, producers and user of this discourse embrace this language and symbolism.

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Başlık: Popüler Türk Milliyetçiliğinden Kareler: Neo-Kemalizm, Çok Satanlar ve Facebook

Bu tez, Türk milliyetçiliğinin tezahürlerini anlamak için popüler kültürden kareler ele almaktadır. 1990'larda sivil toplumun altını çizerek ortaya çıkan neo-Kemalist milliyetçiliğin üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu odaklanma *Şu Çılgın Türkler* ve *Metal Fırtına* gibi çok satan romanların analizinden yola çıkarak yapılmaktadır. Bu analiz de kitapların söylem analizine ve okuyucularla yapılan görüşmelere dayandırılmaktadır. Bu tez aynı zamanda Türk milliyetçiliğinin kendini ifade ettiği yeni bir araç olan Facebook'u da incelemektedir. İnternette yer alan popüler bir iletişim ağı sitesi olan Facebook'ta çeşitli protestolar organize edilmekte ve gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bahsedilen kitapların/okuyucuların ve Facebook'un/ kullanıcılarının analizleri bir araya getirildiğinde gençliği harekete geçmeye çağıran bir neo-Kemalist söylem ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ancak bu söylem muğlaklıklara ve çelişkilerin varlığı ikiliklere de işaret etmektedir. Bu tezde bu ikiliklerin ortaya çıktığı Şarkiyatçılık-Garbiyatçılık, geçmiş-gelecek, sanal-gerçek, muhafaza-değişim ve militarizm- sivil siyaset gibi pek çok noktanın olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Tüm bu hassas noktalar tüketim kültürü dili ve sembolizmi ile iç içe geçmekte ve neo-Kemalist söylemi üreten ve kullananlar da hegemonya mücadelesinde bu dil ve sembolizmi kullanmaktadırlar.

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To My Grandmother,

Fatma Dalyan

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"POPULAR" IN NATIONALISM STUDIES

The title of the thesis refers to snapshots, but it could as well refer to "flashes", as used by Walter Benjamin. I do not claim to present a structured analysis of Turkish nationalism that tries to grasp the whole of the possible dynamics that give birth to and sustain Turkish nationalism. Instead, in this thesis I will examine the question of "popular" in relation to Turkish nationalism. My emphasis will be on neo-Kemalism, a new formulation of Kemalism that puts more emphasis on "civil society" and its attempt to present itself as "popular." To be able to have a deeper understanding I will focus on popular novels and a new yet "popular" medium namely a networking site called Facebook. My discussion of Facebook will not be limited to a discussion of neo-Kemalism, but will be a more general one since Facebook has become an important field to claim "popular support" even if it is basically a networking site.

Like every other nationalism, Turkish nationalism assumes popular support from the very beginning, irrespective of different interpretations within itself (be it conservative, liberal, Kemalist). Therefore, first, I have to clarify what is meant by the term "popular" before discussing popular nationalism. Consequently, I will start with looking at how "popular" is located in the studies of nationalism. As will be seen, classics in nationalism studies tend to view the phenomenon from the perspective of the elites and put emphasis on nation-building. There is an assumption

in most of the cases when nationalism is spread through society thanks to the efforts of the elites and supported by a nation-state it is natural that it will survive. I argue the contrary in this thesis. The sphere of the popular is, in fact, a sphere of consent and contestation for the nationalist discourses to reproduce themselves. It is a sphere in which the boundary between the official and the civil does not exist even if we imagine them to be separate. Moreover, for nationalism to survive and claim the support of the populace it has to contest in this sphere for legitimization. Having these assumptions, in this thesis I will provide snapshots from popular novels and a popular networking site to see the dynamics of "the popular" regarding contemporary Turkish nationalism.

When it comes to the literature on nationalism studies there is a whole different set of literatures produced by scholars who deal with the subject of state, ideology, militarism, social movements, identity, and so on since nation-state and nationalism are part of the social phenomena of modern ages. Therefore, there are important scholars working on different subjects whose perspective have to be mentioned if one attempts to make a literature review on nationalism. However, I do not aim to make a complete literature review to locate how "popular" has been integrated into nationalism studies. Instead I will point out some rather well-known theoretical perspectives that will be useful for opening a discussion about the "popular."

Apart from the perspectives that approach nationalism as a primordialist phenomenon that has existed from time immemorial and thus is "natural", I will focus mainly on modernist and ethno-symbolist approaches to the study of nationalism. In the first approach, the scholars argue that nationalism is a modern phenomenon. I believe it to be an important starting point from which to discuss

nationalism and throughout this thesis I will also be looking at nationalism in relation to modernity. Nevertheless, there are differences in understanding how modernity is related to nationalism among them as can be seen in the perspectives of John Breuilly, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernst Gellner ,Paul Brass and Benedict Anderson.

John Breuilly approaches nationalism as a political ideology used by the elites to establish and maintain a nation-state structure.[1] Paul R. Brass has an instrumentalist understanding which envisions nationalism as a tool for the elites to govern the masses and gain political power.[2] Both writers have a very state-centered perspective that heavily depends on the manipulation of the elites to explain the popular support of nationalism. Therefore the "popular" has no place in their theoretical framework other than being reduced to a reflection of the desires of the elites. Ernst Gellner, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of industrialization and explains nationalism as an imposition of the "high culture" of the elites upon the whole society.[3] Since there is a need to impose cultural homogeneity for industrialization necessitating a homogenous society to work its principals, the elites impose their culture (high culture) upon the low cultures (cultures of the masses). This being the case, the agency is again reserved for the elites and nationalism is indoctrination on the part of the masses.

Eric Hobsbawm interprets nationalism in relation to modernism and the social engineering of the elites. Even if Hobsbawm criticizes approaches that focus on the

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[1] John Breuilly. *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1994)

[2] Umut Özkırımlı. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (NewYork: Palgrave,2000)p.109

[3] Ernst Gellner. *Nations and nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1983). For a separate chapter on Kemalism, see Ernst Gellner. *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell,1994).

elites as the sole actor, his emphasis on the invented traditions in relation to nationalism does not give much room to the rest of society.[4] What he sees as popular nationalism is reduced to a term called "popular pre-nationalism." It seems to refer to prior supra-local identities and the popular base for the elite to manipulate the masses into nationalism.[5] This perspective of social engineering may be useful to understand the motives and strategies of the elites in building and trying to maintain a nation-state yet again by focusing on the top, it loses the dynamics of struggle and acceptance below.

Benedict Anderson in his famous work *Imagined Communities* tires to connect the birth of nationalism with the timing of a new cultural system and defines nationalism as a product of print capitalism, a new understanding of time (homogenous, linear, empty) and the decline of religious communities.[6] These changes coincide with the changing structure and understanding of the public sphere and lead us to think about the mechanisms through which nations are imagined. He argues that once the concept of nation is imagined then, like a fire, it spreads to different geographies in modular forms. He draws a distinction between popular and official nationalisms, but seals the fate of the former with the birth of the latter. What he means by referring to official nationalism is the combination of the idea of nation

[4] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[5] E.J. Hobsbawm. *1780'den Günümüze Milletler ve Milliyetçilik "Program,Mit, Gerçeklik* (Nations and Nationalism since 1780 "Programme, Myth,Reality" (Cambridge University Press,1992 İstanbul:Ayrıntı,1995).

[6] Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (NewYork: Verso,1991).

with the dynastic or state power.[7] Once they are associated, we are again in the realm of the elites and the focus once again moves from below to the top.

All of the perspectives I have mentioned so far rightly emphasizes the effect of modernity in giving birth to nationalism, but since they try to capture a theory to explain the birth of nationalism as a whole, they tend to focus too much on the state and the position of the elites as if society naturally follows what they have been taught. This is a very harsh and simplifying criticism when the differences in the approaches of the scholars are considered, yet their motivation to seek structures and beginnings leads to a black hole in terms of how nationalism survives and changes through the interaction between different actors both above and below.

One such criticism to modernists was raised by ethno-symbolists such as Anthony Smith. The main problem for this perspective is "what made the people follow the elites in nationalism?" Smith tries to answer this question by pointing out pre-existing ethnic bonds before the dawn of nationalism such as myths and symbols that have been used by the elites afterwards.[8] He proposes the term "ethnie" to explain what predates nation in which the emphasis is on common myths, culture, history and territory.[9] Based on one's conception of nation, "ethnie" may seem very close to a definition of nation, but the distinction between nation and ethnie is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is most important for understanding the "popular" in nationalism theories is his contribution of national myths to the discussion. Through the construction or reenactment of myths that were previously in circulation, national myths become another tool to create a popular national history.

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[7] Ibid..p.86 and 159.

[8] Anthony D. Smith. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell,1988).

[9] Ibid.. p.22-30.

However, as can be deducted from many examples and the discussion in this thesis, the creation/imagination/invention of nations, myths or traditions is not a onetime endeavor. In Smith's words,

> It is one that involves ceaseless re-interpretations, rediscoveries and reconstructions; each generation must refashion national institutions and stratification systems in the light of the myths, memories, values and symbols of the 'past' which can best minister to the needs and aspirations of its dominant social groups and institutions .[10]

I believe that this is an important perspective to take into account to understand changes within a certain type of nationalism. Unfortunately, Smith stops at this point by assigning agency to the dominant figures of a given generation without exploring the mechanisms, possible tensions, interactions, power relations and the involvement of the state as an institution or as a contested field for the elites.

Michael Billig, on the other hand, deals with the question of "what leads to the reproduction of nationalism in the established nations of the West?" The answer to that question, to which the title of his book *Banal Nationalism* refers, is everyday practices.[11] "The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building."[12] According to Billig, the presence of such unwaved flags silently but continuously reminds us of "our people" and "our way of life" so that at times of crisis it will give way to waved flags. There is no distinction in terms of hot and banal nationalisms. By framing nationalism as such Billig tries to oppose the distinction that "ours is patriotism (thus positive) and theirs is nationalism (thus negative)."

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[10] Ibid..,p.206

[11] Michael Billig. *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage,1995)

[12] Ibid..p.8

He traces the basis of banal nationalism in the speeches of politicians, discourses of the media (even the national map in the weather forecast silently reproduces the national boundaries) and the social scientists that tend to focus on the extreme forms in the negligence of what is common and embedded in everyday life as well as those who "naturalize" nationalism by casting it away as a product of universal human psyche, an urge to belong. The value of Billig's approach to the study of nationalism is that it looks beyond the process of nation-state building and it does not take the reproduction of nationalism for granted. Moreover, by looking at everyday life to the symbols and discourses that are perceived to be so common, this approach gives important hints to explain the activation of national feelings in times of crisis. Even if the purpose of this thesis is not to point to the unwaved flags in Turkish nationalism, this perspective opens a path to locate the "popular" in the reproduction of nationalism. In Michael Billig's analysis it tends to be located in the messages of the media and the symbols of the state to which the citizens are constantly exposed. Even if the voices of the individuals that possibly receive, accept or refute these salient messages are absent, this analysis lies at the crossroads of the state and the public sphere in forming the "popular", which I will discuss more in the coming sections.

So far, pointed out some theories that are considered among the classics of nationalism studies. The emphasis of the process of nation-building and the emergence of the nation-state seem to dominate these perspectives with some exceptions, like Michael Billig. As Craig Calhoun, who proposes to analyze nationalism as a discourse rather than a political ideology, argues the best way to capture the complicated and specific natures of different nationalisms in action may

indeed lie in focusing on individual cases.[13] Even though these analysis may be case-specific and may have a hard time explaining how nationalism shapes the world in general, it may still be helpful in finding the dynamics of nationalism and struggles in its reproduction. It is especially true if one tries to refute that members of society "naturally" follow the designs of the elites or the ideology of the state apparatus. To be able to do that, in this thesis I will look at some aspects of Turkish nationalism that are reproduces through popular culture and presented as "popular nationalism" by different actors.

Popular Nationalism : Problems of Definition

According to Umut Özkırımlı, nationalism has come to mean a " hegemonic discourse, a mentality supported by institutions and a framework to perceive , interpret and explain political and social reality."[14] In this framework nationalism cannot be reduced to a tool used by the elites for power, but it at the same time infiltrates the everyday life and popular culture, giving birth to popular nationalism.

This popular nationalism has three different aspects, according to the Özkırımlı. The first one refers to the discourses which run against the understanding of nationalism that has been imposed by the official ideology. The second is

[13] Craig Calhoun. *Milliyetçilik* (İstanbul. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları,2007) pp.28-32.

[14] Umut Özkırımlı. "Türkiye'de Gayriresmi ve Popüler Milliyetçilik" *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce-Milliyetcilik* , vol. 4 (Istanbul: Iletisim,2002)p.706.

reflections of nationalism in popular culture and everyday life. Finally the third refers to the "popularization of nationalism" in the last 25 years.[15]

I will also refer to popular nationalism but I will not discuss a type of nationalism that can be called "popular nationalism." How nationalism is reproduced in everyday life or how it has been popularized or labeled as "popular" and thus came to posses hegemony through its presence in the everyday life by the usage of popular media will be studied. In doing so, I do not intend to separate the realms of the popular and that of the state in forming culture. In fact, such a separation would make studying the construct of the "popular" meaningless. Stuart Hall, in defending the importance of "popular culture", argues that the realm of the popular culture has the potential to take the form of a struggle against a power-bloc as well as being the stronghold of the powerful. Thus "it is the arena of consent and resistance. It is partly where hegemony arises, and where it is secured."[16] Consequently by looking at what is labeled "popular" thus considered as part of the "popular culture" I will discuss this potential of resistance and consent towards the attempts of hegemony.

I will not go into the details of the discussion about the usage of culture in relation to popular culture. Nevertheless, I will briefly point out different meanings given to culture from the framework Terry Eagleton provides. He points out four types of culture in terms of different perspectives that relate themselves to the concept of culture.[17] These types are culture as civility, culture as identity, culture as commercialism and culture as radical protest. Even if Eagleton approaches these

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Stuart Hall. "Notes on the Deconstructing 'the popular'"*Popular Culture: A Reader*, eds.Raiford Guins&Omayra Zaragoza Cruz (London: Sage,2005)p.71.

[17] Terry Eagleton. *The Idea of Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

types as different currents as I will show how in the example of Facebook, they exist next to each other and intermingle through the same medium. “Culture as civility” refers to the enlightenment understanding of culture with its universalist tones that equate culture with civilization.[18] Those who do not posses this type of culture are considered uncivilized. “Culture as identity” on the other hand, can best be described as taking culture as a way of life, against the universalism of “culture as civility.” Therefore against universalism, it emphasizes particularity. “Culture as commercialism” can be summarized as consumerism and mass culture. This seems to be the power of culture in dominating our horizon of politics. “As politics spectacularized, commodities aestheticized, consumption eroticized and commerce semioticized, culture seemed to have become the new social ‘dominant’ as entrenched and pervasive in its own way as religion in the Middle Ages, philosophy in the early nineteenth century Germany or the natural sciences in Victorian England.”[19] Finally, “culture as radical protest” is a perspective that approaches culture to challenge the status quo with a commitment to change. As will be discussed in the fourth chapters some mediums such as the Internet provide us the opportunity to experience all four forms of culture. A case in point is the Facebook and the discussions that have evolved around its popularity. Facebook provides a venue as a symbol of global Internet culture (thus a sign of culture as civility in this so called age of communication) while providing an opportunity to customize and produce different applications that enables to produce and reflect a “culture as identity.” It is also part of the important commercial chains on the Internet while providing images and trends that enhances consumerism while at the same time

[18] Ibid., p.64.

[19] Ibid., p.124.

through its publicity and popular "face" can also be used to challenge the status quo and make one's voice heard in protest. Therefore, the Internet is a totalizing medium of culture as defined by Terry Eagleton. Thus the Internet offers an opportunity to see how these different approaches to culture interact with each other and, for the purpose of this thesis, how nationalism reproduces itself via popular culture.

Here, on the Internet, the state does not have direct involvement in the production of these cultures (it can only try to restrict its consumption, as in the case of banning YouTube) but it is nevertheless present in the production through the individuals that act in the name of the state. They either claim to be the defenders of the state or the ideology of the state or the voices of the state itself by having an organic conception of the state that equates society and the state. I in this respect agree with Yael Navaro-Yashin when she points to private individuals "assuming a representation of the state through his action or persona."[20] This assumption of roles is what she calls the faces of the state. These faces come up in the everyday practices of individuals as a result of actions and discourses not necessarily connected to state institutions. I will argue that these faces pop up not only on the streets and bookstores (as will be discussed in the chapter on popular novels), but also within Facebook, which supposedly is the public looking glass. This representation of the state is very important for the analysis in this thesis since it highlights how "the official" can interact with "the popular." There is no direct presence of the state, but also representations through the members of "the popular", creating a solid imagery of the state in the public sphere.

[20] Yael Navaro-Yashin. *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* Princeton: Princeton University Press,2002,p.2.

Further more, for Navaro-Yashin, the public life in which the so called popular culture is produced, "is not an institution or a site, imagined as domains with limitations. Instead, it is intended as a category that would allow the study of the political in its fleeting and intangible, transmogrified forms."[21] By looking at the public life from this perspective, one can also grasp the different forms of the entity we call the state. This entity has been able to continue its existence despite the attempts of deconstruction thanks to the "fantasies" for the state.[22] These fantasies would move it beyond deconstruction since criticisms towards the state will target the structures not the fantasies. Therefore, even if the failure of certain aspects and institutions of the state occurs, as a fantasy it will continue its existence. Likewise, even if the usage of nationalist discourses for the legitimization of otherwise unacceptable policies are criticized or even mocked through the saying of *vatan, millet,Sakarya*[23] in the everyday life, nationalism still means a lot to the individuals in their identification with their environment in different cases like football matches, forming groups on Facebook or hanging Turkish flags.

When these different aspects related to the discussion between the official and popular line in the public sphere or the boundaries of the popular culture is considered, it becomes clear that one cannot discuss the official or the popular as if they are separate realms. They have to be studied within their interrelated nature especially when the official has a claim of being popular. Without seeing the faces of the state in the public sphere one cannot understand how Facebook turned into a "Flagbook" in 2007 for Turkish users. In this light, throughout this thesis I will not

[21] Ibid., p.3.

[22] Ibid., p.4.

[23] *Country, nation,Sakarya* is a saying that refers to the exaggerated heroism in the discourses of various types like the politicians' speeches and poems for children that lacks correspondence to real life.

discuss popular nationalism as another form of nationalism but will approach it as a discourse used by different actors as well as a realm of contestation for building hegemony. It is hard to come up with a working definition of popular nationalism since there is no such form of nationalism. Every nationalist interpretation has to claim a "popular" basis and provide legitimization of its existence by having a hegemonic presence in popular culture as a reflection of the support in the public sphere. This means that popular culture is one of the grounds for acceptance and resistance as well as reinterpretations.

Turkey experienced a boom of culture in the 1980s and 90s as a result of neo-liberal policies, the introduction of mass media as well as the impact of the 1980 coup d'etat that imposed an apolitical vision of society. This period was also a time when many "hybrid languages"[24] were formulated that amalgamate different Turkish nationalisms. Tanıl Bora rightly points out that the emphasis on the identities, symbols and the "civil" in the popular culture also led nationalism to successfully establish itself in it. Further more, Bora continues, there is a struggle between different interpretations of Turkish nationalism, or in other words, Turkish nationalisms, to dominate the field of popular culture, to be integrated to the official interpretation of Turkish nationalism that reproduces itself through state institutions. Having agreed on the struggle of hegemony between Turkish nationalisms that I exemplify in the discussions on popular novels and Facebook it is argued that the official itself is very present in this struggle through the individuals assuming this position.

[24] Tanıl Bora. *Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı,* p.129

Popular Nationalism in Turkey: "How to Discuss?" or "Whose Popular?"

Turkish nationalism most of the times is presented as a modernization project tailored by the elites who imposed their will on society. There may be discussions of failure or success, but whichever the case society is depicted as the silent follower of the elites.[25] Therefore, many studies focused on the elites and the state apparatus to understand Turkish nationalism. One such perspective is offered by Çağlar Keyder, who considers nationalism in the triangle of state, society and modernity.[26] He presents Turkish nationalism as an outcome of the transition from empire to nation-state when the "legitimating discourse of state authority" had to be changed due to modernity. Yet what he underlines is a distinction between the West and the Third World as a result of the over presence of the state in drawing the boundaries of the nation from top-to-down in the latter case. Thus in this framework, "Turkish nationalism is an extreme example of a situation in which the masses remained silent partners and the modernizing elite did not attempt to accommodate popular resentment"[27] Moreover, society in this scheme is not able to create its own popular culture since even that is imposed by the elite. This perspective is open to the criticism of reducing nationalism to the official state-centered nationalism where the society does not have an agency.

Consequently, this type of literature started be criticized due to the emergence of concepts like "civil society" or "culture" as important indicators of nationalism as

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[25] Ernst Gellner, Çağlar Keyder, Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Taha Parla are some of the scholars that comes to mind.

[26] Çağlar Keyder. "Whither the Project of Moderntiy? Turkey in the 1990s" in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* , Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (ed.)(Seattle: University of Washington Press,1997).

[27] Ibid., p.43.

well as a result of an interest on the part of the scholars to show points of resistance to the hegemonic ideology of the state . There seem to be three tendencies regarding the study of Turkish nationalism in the post-1980 period. The first one is composed of an attempt to redefine the premises of Turkish nationalism produced by Turkish nationalists, both by scholars and those who are involved in the movement. Second and third approaches discuss the issue from a critical perspective. The second one focuses on the institutional aspect, namely the changing nature of MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and state policies concerning nationalism, while the third one focuses on the different faces of nationalism in civil society or nationalism in popular culture.

Why is there such an interest in studying nationalism outside the state institutions? According to Meltem Ahıska "in the fierce environment of global capitalism which fragments the whole but re-defines the fragment, Turkishness is not easy to secure; it has to be defended against others more militantly and wildly."[28] This defense shows itself not only in the actual politics, but also in the field of popular culture which plays a crucial role in ensuring legitimacy in the eyes of the society as will be discussed below.

The discussion aims to show different theories and case studies that seek to explain Turkish nationalism in civil society and popular culture. By providing a short presentation of these cases, I aim to reach a wider discussion that problematizes the approaches to the "popular" and the question of agency.

As has already been pointed out regarding the problems in defining popular nationalism, the definition of the "popular" is the starting point from which discuss

[28] Meltem Ahıska," A Deep Fissure is Revealed after Hrant Dink's Assasination" *New Perspectives on Turkey* , no. 36,(spring 2007) p.162.

popular nationalism. Though not related to nationalism, I agree with Meral Özbek's analysis of popular culture in Turkey when she says that what is more decisive for describing one's perspective on popular culture is one's understanding of the "popular."[29] In her book *Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski*(Popular Culture and Arabesque of Orhan Gencebay) she takes arabesk music as a case study for understanding a certain socio-economic class in its historicity. Her perspective is far from descriptive. She includes critiques of modernism by keeping in mind the creation of a distinction between high and low cultures and focuses on the dynamics which gave way to the popularization of cultural products. In doing so, she uses mainly the framework proposed by Stuart Hall according to which different perspectives of popular culture are discussed and popular culture is presented as an area struggle and resistance for different groups. In other words, for Stuart Hall and Meral Özbek popular culture is a sphere in which change is negotiated through the encounter between hegemonic aspirations and resisting popular traditions.

This does not necessarily mean a distinction between hegemonic groups and the rest. I prefer to take the realm of popular culture as an area in which those who aspire to be hegemonic have to struggle and make themselves accepted. It is in this process one finds resistance or counter-struggle as well as acceptance. Yet this sphere does not have to be built upon more material grounds such as practices or music consumption, but it includes discourses as well as symbolic practices in everyday life.

Once we take the sphere of popular culture as such the next step in the discussion is related to "how to locate nationalism within this sphere." Clearly, the perspectives that emphasize the role of the elites to the point of absence of the rest of

[29] Meral Özbek. *Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski* (İstanbul: İletişim,1991).

society cannot be located. In that line, popular culture is presented as another aspect of social engineering without any form of negotiation or resistance. As Meltem Ahıska rightly says it only means a forced association of the nation with its "builders."[30] I believe the perspective developed in *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (The Magical Gate of Radio: Occidentalism and Political Agency) by Ahıska challenges this forced association very well. It is important to investigate subjects situated in the middle of national "projects" by the nationalist elites because without considering the desire, fear and reflection of these subjects one can only look at these projects as if they are monolithic discourses. We have to remember that nationalist policies penetrate different levels of the social life in their claim to be systematic composures while at the same time they gain some meaning through the daily and conflictual encounters.[31] Once we reach this level of daily and conflictual encounters then the image of the presence of a monolithic discourse in the name of Turkish nationalism falls to pieces.

Out of these pieces arise different forms of Turkish nationalisms with different visions appealing to different segments of society. These Turkish nationalisms compete with each other for hegemony different components that define Turkishness. The different forms of Turkish nationalism are opened to discussion by scholars like Baskın Oran (in terms of *Atatürk milliyetçiliği*/Atatürk nationalism which I will discuss in the second chapter) and Tanıl Bora, who highlights different discourses of Turkish nationalism in the 1990s.

Bora builds his perspective from the assumption that we have been living in an age of atomization which transforms traditional and modern communities by putting

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[30] Meltem Ahıska. *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (İstanbul: Metis,2005) p.18.

[31] Ibid.,p.27.

together diverse frameworks of different times and places. In this uncertain setting of post-modernism nationalism offers "a home in a homeless world."[32] He studies Turkish nationalism from a leftist critical oppositional[33] point of view. He tries to refute two common perspectives regarding nationalism. The first refers to a leftist position labeling nationalism a "false consciousness" connected to an illusion and supported by manipulation. [34] At the same time, he refutes any understanding that takes "nation" as a given or that tends to "normalize" nationalism. His main starting point is that nationalism reduces action into a "national reflex" in which negotiations and deliberations are erased. Thus there is no room left for politics and deliberate action. This is one of the main lines of Tanıl Bora's stance against nationalism which is present in both *Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı*(The Dark Spring of Nationalism) and *Medeniyet Kaybı* (Loss of Civilization). Even if both of the books are composed of articles written for journals, mainly *Birikim*, they nevertheless share a consistent approach which highlights the complexity and the multiplicity of the actors involved as well as the effects of political conjuncture, globalization and neo-liberal environment.

The complexity of the actors leads to multiple discourses of Turkish nationalism that were blended by globalization and neo-liberalism in the 1990s. According to Bora, the official nationalism/ Atatürk nationalism, which is different from other types of Turkish nationalism such as Kemalist, Islamist, Liberal, Radical has a mental perspective focused on the state itself and on populist attributions of

[32] Tanıl Bora, *Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı* (İstanbul: Birikim,1995) p.7-8

[33] Ibid.. p.8

[34] Tanıl Bora. *Medeniyet Kaybı: Milliyetçilik ve Faşizm Üzerine Yazılar*(İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları,2006), p.8

heroism. [35] Apart from the radical understanding of Turkish nationalism that is represented by the MHP line, there are different discourses that proliferated in the changing environment of the 1990s. Kemalist nationalism(*ulusculuk*) , for example, is a reaction against neo-liberal hegemony and rise of the Islamist movement demanding a Kemalist revision of secularism which will be discussed more in the second chapter.

Neo- liberal nationalism focuses on the modernization /capitalization and achieving the level of development of the West as the ultimate goal and proof of the success of the Turkish nation. On the other hand, Islamist nationalism perceives Turkey as the potential leader of the Islamic world[36]. It can be summarized as emphasizing the Islamic tones of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis which will also be discussed in the second chapter. As can be seen in their difference of emphasis, these Turkish nationalisms have different visions for the Turkish nation in the past as well as the future. This being the case, they appeal to different parts of society that have certain political understanding despite their claim to define the whole Turkish nation. This difference and appeal consequently result in different definitions of "popular" which will be discussed in detail regarding neo-Kemalism and Kemalist nationalism in the second chapter. Suffice it to say that how to discuss popular nationalism can only be answered by which nationalist perspective we are dealing as well as what is presented as "popular" in the main stream media. This presentation of what is popular in the main stream media can be caught in the presentation of the news and commercials. They are the two areas for a lithmus test to designate what is "popular."

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[35] Tanıl Bora. 'Nationalist Discourses in Turkey' *the South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102:2/3, (summer 2003), p.437.

[36] Ibid.

Consumerism

Nurdan Gürbilek defines the atmosphere of the 1980s as living on display. According to her, "the voice of the 80s was a voice that discovered private life and wanted to make this private life public after the long dominance of an official discourse." [37] This voice opted to use the language of consumerism to make itself heard. The proliferation of the mass media, the opening of private radio and TV channels, market liberalizations and the strengthening of the image industry through commercials gave the stimuli in making the voice of consumerism strong.

Consumerism is an understanding and practice which is presented as a medium of building identities or reactions reducing life choices to the personal choice of consumption. Conspicuous consumption is not a new phenomenon, yet what makes consumerism distinct is its power to formulate one's happiness and one's individuality through consumerism. People are categorized according to their consumption patterns and any political act can be symbolized by these patterns which codify people as consumers. To be able to gain such dominance in the social practices one has to wait for the rise of global capitalism and the accompanying image bombardment in the mass media. As John and Jean Comaroff describe millennial capitalism, they define consumption as the prime mover. "Increasingly it is the factor, the principle, held to determine definitions of value, the construction of identities, and even the shape of the global 'ecumene'."[38]

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[37] Nurdan Gürbilek.*Vitrinde Yaşamak*, 4th ed. (İstanbul: Metis,1992) p.120-121.

[38] Jean and John Comaroff. "Millenial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming" *Millenial Capitalism and theculture of Neo-Liberalism* (Duke University Press,2001)p.4

When life is dominated by consumption to this extent some scholars such as Philip McMichael or Susan Hegeman start to discuss the transformation of the "citizen state" into the "consumer state." According to Susan Hegeman the "consumer state" as narrated by Comaroff and Comaroff "is a polity in which identity, at all levels, is defined not merely by the consumption of objects, but also by the consumption of the past."[39] The discussions regarding the birth of a consumer state are beyond the scope of this thesis and I will not argue that Turkey has become a "consumer state" since the 1980s. Instead I argue that there have been important components of consumerism after the 1980s that may be discussed in relation to this concept. As I will argue in the coming chapters, we face a situation in which political action is taken through the consumption of objects like pins, scarves, flags and books with their embedded meanings. Moreover, this consumption is not limited to objects, but is also related to the consumption of the past as well as images. Chapter Three discusses how popular novels are related to the consumption of the past while Chapter Four discusses consumerism through imagery and the Internet. However, to have an idea about post-1980 consumerism in Turkey and its relationship to nationalism, I will briefly mention some cases. I argue through these cases that consumerism is a crucial aspect to understanding how "popular" Turkish nationalism(s) are expressed and reproduced both as a local and global reaction to the neo-liberal environment.

An interesting case study for a neo-liberal interpretation of nationalism is offered by Derya Özkan and Robert J. Foster by focusing on the advertisement

[39] Ibid..p.33.

campaigns of Cola-Turka.[40] The main argument of this article is that within the context of globalization under the label of "positive nationalism", we are witnessing a redefinition of citizens as consumers. "Positive nationalism," which has been used by Serdar Erener -who is responsible for the advertisements of Cola Turka- refers to, according to the authors, an "idealized representation of how nations ought to imagine and conduct themselves in a world order predicated on the ideology of neoliberalism"[41] Of course the fact is that consumer commodities had been attributed "national" qualities before. Moreover, it can also be argued that the emergence of consumer citizenship in the context of Turkey coincides with the propagation of *yerli malı* (national products.) Yet what seems to be different in this case is how the content of these discourses are designed to fit in the neo-liberal environment or the climate of globalization. It has the aim to combine national culture with globalism producing the "nationalism of globalism," which tries to secure the global recognition of Turkishness. This discourse emphasizing the global shares common elements with the discourse of "reaching contemporary civilization" as well as the neo-populist line of Özal. However, the authors do not go into a deeper analysis.

Another interesting point that should be added here is their attempt to link the neo-liberal nationalist discourse to anti-colonial nationalism. Here, again, they do not provide a satisfactory explanation, but I believe rather than arguing for such an equalization it would have been more interesting to discuss it in the context of Turkish Occidentalism, as discussed by Meltem Ahıska. It is a certain type of Occidentalism that essentializes the West, which incorporates anti-Western

[40] DeryaÖzkan. Robert J. Foster. "Consumer Citizenship, Nationalism, and Neo-liberal Globalization in Turkey: The Advertising Launch of Cola Turka" *Advertising& Society Review*, vol 6, no.3, (2005).

[41] Ibid.,p.1.

discourses, while still using the West as the point of reference for modernization (as the embodiment of contemporary civilization). At the same time one should also note that such an Occidentalist discourse should not be taken by its face value since it is also used for a generic form of legitimation irrespective of the characteristics attributed to it. In discussing the function of Occidentalism in the context of Turkey, Meltem Ahıska points out the fact that it is used as a basis for the collective fantasy that enables political subjectivity and political power.[42] The images of Occidentalist discourse seem to have combined with the consumer culture. Accordingly, the political subjectivity here is formulated through the practices within the consumer culture.

As can be seen from the discussions consumer culture is associated with Westernization, which has always been one of the crucial points of discussion in Turkish nationalism. Ironically, the discontent with global capitalism is vocalized through nationalism which uses "the global" in the forms of global culture. This irony is valid especially for the case of examples of nationalism on Facebook. One has to prove the power of the "local" or the "national" to its local/national targeted audience on the stage of the global.

The discussion regarding "popular" forms of contemporary Turkish nationalism is surrounded by the question of the boundary between the official and the popular as well as which for which section of the society one has a claim to be "popular." Irrespective of what kind of "popular" representations one has in mind, for a specific type of Turkish nationalism it will be voiced through consumerism Thus, the popular culture in question will be blended with the consumer culture of

[42] Meltem Ahıska. *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (The Magical Gate of Radio: Occidentalism and Political Subjectivity) (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2005)p.99.

the neo-liberal era, as I briefly discussed citing Terry Eagleton's forms of culture as well as in reference Comaroffs' "millennial capitalism." One should also add the wave of putting emphasis on civil society and popular culture as an outcome of this era which changed the way nationalist discourses are shaped as will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

KEMALISM AND POPULAR NATIONALISM

Kemalism is a controversial concept in terms of what it includes and excludes. *Atatürkçülük* (Atatürkism) is also used as a synonym, but depending on the context it may contain different interpretations and both of the terms may come to be used by opposing groups. (In the1960s, while the left uses the term Kemalism the right tends to use *Atatükçülük*[43]) What is generally understood by Kemalism is the principles formulated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that form a certain vision for the Republic of Turkey. However, such a definition does not explain the whole discussion around the concept. The discussions point to different aspects of the concept. Is it an ideology or a state of mind? Is it hegemonic? Is it the official ideology of Turkey? Does it have a popular basis? Was it formulated by the elites after Mustafa Kemal's death or was it a genuine construct for the modernization ideal of Atatürk? Are there different types of Kemalism?

The questions can be multiplied, but in this thesis I will not go into these discussions and try to discuss Kemalism per se. What I am interested is how those who declare themselves as Kemalist or *Atatürkçü* imagine the boundary between official and popular (if they ever imagine such a boundary.) Based on this imagination what kind of politics in general and nationalism in particular do they recognize? One of the main tenants of Kemalism as declared in the principles of Atatürk is nationalism and it defines the relation between state and society. Therefore, the interpretation of nationalism is directly linked to the perception of the

[43] Levent Köker, "Kemalizm/Atatürkçülük: Modernleşme, Devlet ve Demokrasi" *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce-Kemalizm* (İstanbul: İletişim,2001) p.97.

society and the popular. Of course, the interpretations are very contextual even if they have been claimed to be one and the same since the establishment of the republic. I will try to draw a sketch of change in these interpretations. My main focus will be the question of what kind of changes these understandings underwent in the contemporary political scene? By trying to provide some possible answers to these questions I will try to make sense of the discussions I provide in the third and fourth chapters regarding the "popular" in contemporary Turkish nationalism. In this chapter I will argue that a new interpretation of Kemalism started to dominate the political scene in the 1990s and 2000s. This understanding, which can be termed as neo-Kemalism, targets "the popular" more directly compared to the previous decades. It uses "the popular" more actively as a basis for legitimization and claims to be the root of "popular nationalism." This claim goes beyond a mere assumption of being popular. Those who embrace this interpretation are actively present in cultural production to emphasize this popularity.

Kemalism in the "Classical" Period: 1930s

"What Should Be Popular?"

The designation of the 1930s as the "classical" period of Kemalism is open to question. My main reason for choosing the 1930s as the classical period is the presentation of the period as a "golden age" to return to by contemporary Kemalists. Even if Kemalism presents itself as a "progressive" idea, this desire to return and revive the glorious past makes it possible to label it a form of conservatism. Therefore, to be able to understand a conservative perspective it is crucial to analyze

how this golden age is presented. Moreover, even if one argues that Kemalism was formulated after Atatürk's death, this formulation certainly claims to reflect the spirit of the 1930s. Consequently, in this section I will focus on how the period of the 1930s is presented as the heyday of Kemalism and what kind of characteristics can be seen in terms of approaching the "popular." I argue that the Kemalist discourse mainly endorsed the "popular" by imagining it in the "should" mode.

The imagination of the "popular" in "should" mode is derived from an understanding that the rest of the society easily and voluntarily follows the lead of the leaders. Since the 1930s was a period of simultaneous nation and state building, the Kemalist leadership was in the position of teachers while society is depicted as the obedient student. Of course, this was a presentation formulated by the elites as a basis for the legitimization of their actions. However, this perspective is also argued by many scholars who read this period as a modernization project imposed by the elites. The problem with such a perspective is of course an underestimation of the resistance to and negotiation with the everyday life practices of the project. This was rightly pointed out by Meltem Ahıska in her work *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı*(The Magical Gate of Radio). By imagining the elites in the early Republican period as a monolithic entity and taking their discourse as the reflection of reality, we underestimate not only the subjectivity of the elites but also the subjectivity of the rest of the society.[44]

Reşat Kasaba reads Kemalism as a modernization project, "a monolithic power" that dominated the Turkish society till the 1980s.[45] In making a comparison

[44] Meltem Ahıska., *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (İstanbul: Metis,2005) pp.90-95.

[45] Reşat Kasaba. "Eski ile Yeni Arasında Kemalizm ve Modernizm" *Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (eds) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı,2005) p.13,15.

with the Early Republican era and the atmosphere of the 1980s he makes the assumption that the society voluntarily and enthusiastically followed the modernization project of the elites. What made the 1980s different was the unwillingness of society to make sacrifices for this project. This unwillingness was related to the collapse of the state-oriented modernization according to the author, even if it does not mean the collapse of the modernity itself.[46] I will not go so far as to argue a collapse of the state centered modernization or the failure of Kemalism per se. What is interesting here is that Kasaba assumes a monolithic and hegemonic Kemalism that held society in its grip until the 1980s. In this line, "classical" Kemalism fell with the rise of civil society and popular culture.

Taha Parla and Andrew Davison evaluate Kemalism as a coherent ideology that is "articulated and ratified primarily by Mustafa Kemal."[47] The discourse of nationalism is used by the Kemalist elites to avoid criticism by claiming to represent the will of the nation. They analyze Kemalism as a corporatist ideology that instrumentalize nationalism to build the structure it envisions. Here again just like the examples I presented about the "classics" of nationalism in the first chapter, nationalism is interpreted through its function as a creation of the elites where society has no option but to follow.

By making these criticisms of Reşat Kasaba and Taha Parla I do not imply that the Early Republican period was not a period in which the elites tried to build a national identity. The Early Republican period was dominated by the discourse of nation building and the reforms undertaken in this period in the cultural sphere

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[46] Ibid., p.28.

[47]Taha Parla and Andrew Davison. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (NewYork: Syracuse University Press, 2004) p.10.

reflect a desire to tailor an identity. That is why I refer to this period in the "should" mode. Yet by emphasizing this mode one has to be aware of the fact that this is a discourse produced by the elites which may have resonated among the society, but was used in different ways even by the elites themselves, both as a means for policy making and political justification.

In the discourse that refers to the popular as "what should be popular" the society is imagined as a student waiting to be taught what is wrong and what is right. The main reason the society/nation needs a teacher is that previously it has been deceived by some greedy dark powers like the sultanate or the religious establishments. The society is ignorant but this is not its fault. In a way , the society has not come of age so cannot be held responsible for its actions until it is educated by the elites and comes to age. Then comes the narrative about what a good Turkish citizen "should" do to reach to the "contemporary level of civilization" or to be a proper nationalist. A schoolbook on the history of the Turkish Republic written in 1931 states that:

> The people of the Turkish Republic have to prove that they are civilized through their mentality and ideas. Every Turkish person who claims to be civilized should show that she is civilized in her family life and through the way she lives her life.[48]

Once the elites start to talk in this "should" mode they also define themselves as necessary and indispensable as the possessors of the knowledge about how the Turkish nation can prove itself. However, it does not work that smoothly. To be able to give the message you seek, you have to think about your audience and communicate with it, which puts the elites in a position to improvise.

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[48] *Tarih-IV: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, (İstanbul: Devlet Matbası,1931).p.233, cited in İsmet Parlak. *Kemalist İdeolojide Eğitim: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Tarih ve Yurt Bilgisi Ders Kitapları Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: Turhan, 2005) p.327

Nationalist discourses have a claim to be all-encompassing for the members of the nation. Therefore, you have to address the popular even if you want to change it. This creates paradoxes and leads to interaction between what can be called the ideals of the elites (or the way they imagine the nation) and the imagination of the rest of the society, even if we assume a distinction between the elites and society. This is evident in the radio talks of the Early Republican era as analyzed by Meltem Ahıska.[49] The comments and plays aired in this period in fact reveal the paradoxes between the imagined national present and the everyday realities of the people. Yet as a result of the mere fact that this imagined national present had to be put into the present of the everyday lives of the listeners, the conditions of this everyday life were haunted by the talks and the plays. In some cases these discrepancies were addressed indirectly, of course just to be explained to fit into the imagined national present. This, in turn, can be interpreted as the point of interaction. Even if the teacher tells the students what they should do, she has to address them since she cannot talk to the walls.

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Neo-Kemalism: What is New?

The place of Kemalist ideology within the civil society, or in other words outside the state mechanism, is seen as the litmus test for the ability of Kemalism to be hegemonic.[50] In describing the Kemalism of the 1930s Mesut Yeğen claims that it

[49] Meltem Ahıska, *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (İstanbul: Metis,2005)

[50]Mesut Yeğen, "Kemalism ve Hegemonya?" *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce-Kemalizm*, vol.2 (Istanbul: Iletisim,2001), pp.56-74, Necmi Erdoğan. "Kemalist Non-Governmental Organizations: Troubled elites in the Defense of a Sacred Heritage" in *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism* (ed.),Stefanos Yerasimos , (İstanbul: Ergon, 2000) pp.251-283, Nur Betül Çelik, "Kemalizm: Hegemonik Bir Söylem" *Modern Türkiye'de*

is not possible to define Kemalism as a hegemonic ideology due to its lack of acceptance by civil society, its indifference to acquiring social consent and, more importantly its inability to build a moral and intellectual leadership that would correspond to a national-popular imagination.[51] Interestingly enough, he draws a line between the Kemalism of the 1930s and Atatürkçülük of post 1950 period. He does not take Atatürkçülük as a direct continuation, but as transformation of Kemalism. From this point onwards Kemalism is no longer the signifier of a specific political program as was the case in the 1930s but becomes a point of reference that has been used and transformed by multiple ideological programs.[52] Thus Kemalism comes to signify everything and nothing at the same time. Turkish political life has been haunted by multiple "ghosts of Kemalism."[53] Nevertheless, these ghosts came to life with the 1990s. In Yeğen's words " on the one hand, the popularity loss of the idea of Western secular and national Turkey sociologically and politically has weakened an indispensable characteristic of an ideology- the power to offer a future- for Kemalism, and yet reactions to this sociological process of Kemalism gave a new fuel. In other words, the strong opposition it faced in the 1990s highlighted the idea of a modern , secular and national Turkey."[54]

This seems to be the point where Kemalism gained acceptance in civil society and thus a possibility of establishing hegemony. Ironically Mesut Yeğen recognizes

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Siyasi Düşünce-Kemalizm (vol.2) Istanbul: Iletisim,2001, pp75-91,Meltem Ahıska. *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (İstanbul: Metis,2005).

[51] Mesut Yeğen. "Kemalism ve Hegemonya?" *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce-Kemalizm*, vol.2 (Istanbul: Iletisim,2001), p62.

[52] See note 11, Ibid., p.74.

[53] Ibid., p.66.

[54] Mesut Yeğen. "Kemalism ve Hegemonya?" *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce-Kemalizm*, vol.2 (Istanbul: Iletisim,2001) p.70.

this possibility at a point in time where one can argue that the opposition to Kemalism is quite strong. Furthermore, for Mesut Yeğen there is an important degree of heterogeneity among those who follow Kemalism and their interpretations of Kemalism are rather different from each other. Thus, he refrains from concluding that finally Kemalism achieved a hegemonic status.

Necmi Erdoğan[55] makes an important contribution in this regard in looking at the Kemalist NGOs such as *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*(Association of Atatürkist Thought) and *Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (Association for Supporting Modern Life)*. Erdoğan interprets these organizations as attempt to form a civil basis of hegemony. The discourse produced by these institutions are thus in line with the Kemalist discourse, in terms of their emphasis on modernization, rationality, secularism, in short, the governmentality of everyday life.[56] Yet their "civil" emphasis brings a different outlook which is called Neo-Kemalism by the author.

> Neo-Kemalism views itself as 'national forces without uniforms' that would save the land from the internal enemies, following the 'national forces in uniforms' The civil aspect of neo-Kemalism is evident in its emphasis on 'civic consciousness' and political participation of citizens. Central to the development of neo-Kemalism and the Kemalist NGOs is the sense of the lack of "a civil society capable of protecting the system[57]

Moreover, the actors in this framework are referred as the well-educated and Kemalist youth who are symbols of a "new Kemalist identity," unlike some other young people who remain unconscious of their duty.[58] This emphasis on the young

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[55] Necmi Erdoğan, "Kemalist Non-Governmental Organizations: Troubled elites in the Defense of a Sacred Heritage" in *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism* (ed.),Stefanos Yerasimos , (İstanbul: Ergon, 2000) pp.251-283

[56] Ibid., 258.

[57] Ibid., p.267.

[58] Ibid., p.268.

people and duty is interesting. I will discuss it partly towards the end of this chapter and more in detail in the analysis of *These Crazy Turks.*

An interesting case to which Bora refers is the popularization of the tenth anniversary anthem (*onuncu yıl marşı*). He argues that there was a dual meaning attached to this anthem which lay in the background of its popularization in the form of a "remix." He takes this case as a successful example of how the official discourse produces its own popular symbols and thus manages to create a connection with the populace. This connection is built upon a nostalgia for the past success of the early Republican period as well as a political message for those opposed to the Welfare party at the same time. " *Onuncu Yıl Marşı* is , in a way, a nostalgic "remix" that aims to recreate the national romanticism of the Early Republican period. In another way it has also become a tune of self-encouragement for those who are frightened by the Islamist policies of the Welfare Party. With the intervention of the army/ national security council and the removal of the Welfare Party from power, it has turned into a war cry and a song of victory. *Onuncu Yıl Marşı* , in contemporary terminology, is in fact 'Anthem of February 28th' ."[59]

Esra Özyürek on the other hand, while agreeing on the theme of nostalgia in this popular remix, emphasizes the contrast between the lyrics of the anthem and the condition it was remembered.[60] Obviously, this anthem is one of the popular manifestations of constructing the 1930s as the golden age of Kemalism or the Republic. The lyrics may have lost their context in terms of being proud of the bigness of the population or the construction of railways as Esra Özyürek points out.

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[59] Tanıl Bora. "10. Yıl Marşı, 28 Şubat Marşı" in *Medeniyet Kaybı* p.42.

[60] Esra Özyürek. *Modernlik Nostaljisi: Kemalizm,Laiklik ve Gündelik Hayatta Siyaset* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi,2008) pp.220-222.

However, the anthem also served a pedagogical purpose about how a Turk should be which emphasizes some of the Kemalist themes of the 1990s: defense and progress.

> Bir hızla kötülügü geriligi bogarız,/We swiftly strangle the evil and backwardness
> Karanlıgın üstüne günes gibi dogarız./ We rise like the sun upon the darkness
> (…)
> Türk'üz Cumhuriyet'in gögsümüz tunç siperi,/We are Turks our chest is shield of bronze
> Türk'e durmak yarasmaz, Türk önde Türk ileri/Stopping is not proper for a Turk, Turk is ahead, Turk is forward

The popularization of this anthem is only one of the examples how the road to the "popular" and the "civil" was constructed in the mid 1990s which formed the basis of the neo-Kemalist interpretation of nationalism. Another striking example is the figure of Atatürk. The figure of Atatürk was used as an important symbol of the official and his statues and pictures were already in circulation prior to the 1990s. However, what seems to have changed in this period is the influence of consumerism on this imagery which turned Atatürk's picture into a commodity in the symbolic struggle between the Islamists and secularists.[61]

The perspectives and examples I have discussed so far point to a change in the discourse of Kemalism that has not been there previously. In this chapter I aim to discuss the different aspects of these changes and their relation to nationalism in the context of the "popular." To achieve this end, I need to situate this wave of change within the context of the 1990s together with the language of Turkish nationalism in this period.

[61] For further discussion, see Yael Navaro Yasin and Esra Özyürek.

How to Discuss Kemalist Nationalism

Tanıl Bora describes four different languages of Turkish nationalism in the 1990s: the official Atatürk nationalism, Kemalist nationalism, liberal nationalism and Turkist radical nationalism.[62] What he refers to as official Atatürk nationalism more or less corresponds to the "classical" Kemalism; while the second, Kemalist nationalism is the neo-Kemalist version of nationalism. According to him the most important attribute of Atatürk nationalism or official nationalism is its focus on the state. This version of Turkish nationalism has a big disadvantage due to its problematic relationship with the popular. The rituals are rather state-oriented, which means that they fall into the danger of being cold, banal and artificial, such as the symbols of the nation-state, like flags and pictures of Atatürk in state institutions.[63]

Neo-Kemalism, on the other hand (Tanıl Bora uses Kemalist nationalism and neo-Kemalism interchangeably), has an emphasis on civil society with some leftist lines.[64] According to Bora, neo-Kemalism was a reaction to the 1980 coup d'etat, which according to some Kemalists leaned over to the right to the extent that it distorted Kemalism as an official ideology.[65] Interestingly enough, neo-Kemalism used the very same symbols of the official nationalism making the figure of Atatürk an official as well as a popular symbol. In this respect, it seems that the line between

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[62] Tanıl Bora. *Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı* (İstanbul: Birikim,1995) p.100.

[63] Ibid., p.103.

[64] Tanıl Bora distinguishes a line of Kemalism which has a claim to be "leftist." He notes that this line emphasized anti-imperialism in the 1960s and the1970s as the main basis of its claim to be left while in the 1990s the main basis became secularism. As can be seen in the reactionary tones of Kemalist nationalism prevalent around the discourse of *Those Crazy Turks* and the imagery on the "Flagbook" in the 2000s both secularism and anti-imperialism form the basis of legitimation.

[65] Ibid., p.206.

the official nationalism and the neo-Kemalist version of Kemalism is quite ambiguous. This being the case, at some point Bora himself refers to neo-Kemalism as a dialect of the official nationalism. Whether it can be called a dialect or a transformation of the official line in the 1990s, there is an interesting tension here that needs to be discussed further.

The important characteristics of neo-Kemalism that can be deduced from the discussions in the literature mentioned above are a sense of defense, emphasis on the civil society and a special call for the youth. As will be discussed in the third chapter, among these three characteristics, the call for the youth is the crucial one in order to have a deeper understanding of the remaining two. The call to the youth points to how neo-Kemalists formulate the past and the present. Based on these formulations they project future scenarios of threat and hope to the youth to make them take action. The discussion of this projection will be dealt with in detail in the third chapter but to contextualize this call I want to mention how the youth itself situate the youth in the political climate of the 1990s.

Question of Youth: to Conserve or to Transform

From the very beginning Kemalism has a call towards the youth, a call for duty. One of the embodiments of such a call is infamous *Atatürk'ün Gençliğe Hitabesi* (Atatürk's Adress to the Youth) which lists the duties of the youth. The only reason for the existence of Turkish youth is presented as the defense of the republic and its independence. This is a well known text which is generally memorized during the primary education. As can be seen throughout this text, youth is associated with

the call for duty in the Kemalist discourse but this duty or the way the call is made is rather contextual.

In the early Republican period, the youth was also associated with the Republic as can be seen in the radio talks as discussed by Meltem Ahıska.[66] The concept of youth was also taken as a symbol of resistance to getting old and thus death.[67] However, in the neo-Kemalist interpretation even if the call of duty preserves its place and becomes even more vital, the republic is no longer referred to be young. This can also be interpreted as according to the threat conceptions of the neo-Kemalists the republic "as we know it" is facing an illness of oblivion which may lead to its death if precautions are not taken. In the website of *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* (one of the neo-Kemalist NGOs), the reason of its establishment is stated as to take action against those try to destroy the principles laid by Atatürk and his reforms.[68]

Between 1995-1996 Buket Türkmen conducted a field study among high school students about the formation of their subjectivity and the struggle over Islam and secularism in the public sphere.[69] The targeted population that became the subject of her study is today is within the range of 26-30 years of age. This is one of the subgroups that use Facebook widely and thus will be the subject of my discussions in Chapter Four. Since I will look at Facebook as a realm of struggle

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[66] Meltem Ahıska. *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2005).

[67] Ibid., p.233.

[68] Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği. "Kuruluş Nedeni" [online]: "http://www.add.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=52&Itemid=162" [17 August 2008]

[69] Buket Türkmen. "Laikliğin Dönüşümü: liseli Gençler, Türban ve Atatürk Rozeti" *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri: Bir Atölye Çalışması* , Nilüfer Göle (ed.) (İstanbul: Metis,2000).

between different group to be the "face" of Turkey and thus dominate the public sphere, one of the dividing lines among popular groups on Facebook is between Kemalists in their emphasis on secularism and those who oppose them.

As noted in the discussion over neo-Kemalism, the 1990s was a decisive decade for the formation of the discourses around the public sphere and civil society to defend or oppose the Kemalist understanding of secularism. Since this tension was revealed through a symbolic struggle there was widespread usage of Atatürk pins by those who supported the Kemalist line. Buket Türkmen takes this as a point of departure and tries to study the reflection of this tension among the high school youth by categorizing them in three camps: pin-wearers, headscarf supporters and Kemalist Muslims.[70]This third category seems to be reserved for those who are in between, who have been raised in an environment that follows Muslim tradition (however it is defined) but accepts the figure of Atatürk for the purpose of remaining mainstream.[71] Even if such categorization is open to discussion for various reasons, there is an important variable that surfaced during the research: the effect of neo-individualism. Neo-individualism is defined by the rising consumer culture and a need among the youth to create a distinction , an image of individuality. Since this neo-individualism is symbolized by the codes of consumption, it becomes an important motivation to question and create the boundaries of identity while offering an opportunity to resist the holism in the education system.[72]

If one accepts this perspective of neo-individualism as an outcome of the consumer culture of the late 1980s and 1990s then it is possible to lift the stigma of

[70] Ibid., p.125.

[71] Ibid., p.126.

[72] Ibid., p.146.

"apolitical" youth. As was the case in Atatürk pins and necklaces in the form of Turkish flags that became very popular in 1990s were also forms of showing opposition to the rising political Islam and Kurdish movement. Thus it is possible to argue that the politicization of the 1990s was seen not only in the campaigns such as "*sürekli aydınlık için bir dakika karanlık*"(one minute darkness for continuous light) which was against the Susurluk scandal but it also reflected itself through the consumption of symbols such as Atatürk pins. This is important not only to understand the basis of neo-Kemalism as such but to discuss the way the youth of the 2000s have been politicized.

Kemalist nationalism in the 2000s is discussed widely. Yet there is confusion about what it comes to mean, what it includes and excludes. Just to provide an example I would like draw attention to a discussion on Facebook.[73] The people in the group discuss the reactions and protests against the policies of AKP and agree that it should be closed due to its threat to secularism. Members of this group are mostly young university students or recent graduates predominantly from middle class. At one point the discussion leads to the question of "What is Atatürkist nationalism?"Some of the discussants try to make summary of the principles of Atatürk in reference to contemporary problems while the others see such a question pointless since it can be clearly understood from the speeches of Atatürk. This type of nationalism is seen as the greatness of this understanding (since it is defined as not fascist and non discriminatory of language, religion or race in defining Turks). When this greatness is put on a scale and a member notes that Atatürk was so great that

[73] I will discuss Facebook in detail in the fourth chapter. However, just to illustrate the confusion about Kemalism among the people who actually embrace its ideas I will focus on one of the Kemalist groups demanding the closure of AKP on Facebook. For details see appendix ix.

Gorbachev had his picture on his desk, there is immediate reaction and accusation of not respecting Atatürk by daring to measure his greatness.

Then the discussion comes to a point in which the gaze of the West and Occidentalist positioning dominates. Some of the people in the group complain about the insufficiency in introducing the ideals of Atatürkist nationalism. Thus the discussion of the content of Atatürk nationalism is seen as irrelevant and they are satisfied with making some well known quotations and references such as "everybody is a Turk irrespective of race, religion or language and that our national ideal should be reaching contemporary level of civilization." The accusations towards this understanding of nationalism is either seen as a misunderstanding on the part of the outside world or deliberate manipulation by the enemies inside.

Thus, this world of Kemalist understanding is based on the presence of enemies and a devoted call to the golden age of the early Republican period. As I will discuss in the coming chapters this description will determine how it is constructed within the popular culture.

In Place of a Conclusion

In this chapter, rather making a full-fledged argument about neo-Kemalism and its dynamics, I lay a background to formulate the questions that will be discussed in the third and fourth chapters. I drew a line between the 1990s and the previous period due to a change in the points of emphasis in the discourse of Kemalism. Even if I refer Kemalism and neo-Kemalism as abstractions this does not mean that I approach them as a state of mind that has its own consciousness. As has been mentioned in the discussions on Kemalism, it is important to keep in mind that these

discourses are produced by people according to certain needs and motives and we cannot understand these discourses without the subjectivity of its producers and their context.

Keeping this in mind, the discussion evolved around the question of how we can describe the climate of the 1990s that emphasized popular culture and civil society as the realm of politics. In this description, neo-Kemalism is the ideology that adopted Kemalism into the rhetoric of civil society for very practical reasons: defense. This need of defense led to a call to society, especially the youth, to take action. This action, again in line with the dynamics of the period, took the form of "popular" everyday life practices that increased the visibility of the discourse. This trend seems to be continuing in the 2000s and is taking on many forms such as popular novels or the Internet groups which will be discussed in the coming chapters.

CHAPTER III

THOSE CRAZY TURKS AND *METAL STORM*: NATIONALISM IN POPULAR NOVELS

When discussions on nationalism are considered, it can be argued that much of the weight is put on the ideologies produced and consumed by the nation-states. Yet it has to be underlined that the discourses that refer to these ideologies which focus on nation-states or to-be-nation-states show themselves in various forms in the everyday practices, that these discourses are produced by various actors. Therefore it is very important to look at the politics of popular culture if we are to have a deeper understanding of these discourses. Whether our primary concern is "rising nationalism" or the patchwork nature of nationalism in the everyday life, the channels that give way to the popularization of official discourses play a crucial role. Since what is constantly there tends to be overlooked and in time starts to be seen as "normal" what I want to draw attention is the nationalism endorsed in two popular books: *Those Crazy Turks* [74] and *Metal Storm* [75].

By focusing on these books I will map the nationalist discourse that is reflected and sometimes reproduced in these books which shows the ambiguity inherent to these nationalist discourses. I will argue that it is this ambiguity that makes these discourses powerful and functional with the capacity of adaptation to changing socio-economic and political environment.

[74] Turgut Özakman. *Şu Çılgın Türkler* (Ankara: Bilgi, 2005).

[75] Orkun Uçar. Burak Turna. *Metal Fırtına* (İstanbul: Timaş, 2004).

The best-seller of 2005 was *Those Crazy Turks* while *Metal Storm* made it to the fourth rank in the same list. [76] Both of the novels were discussed in the news due to their relevancy to current debates. I will discuss this relevancy in the coming sections more in detail. Just to give some hints, at the time, the top three sources of potential threats were perceived to be the US presence in Iraq, a possible separate Kurdish state and a possible EU desire to divide Turkey.[77] Shortly, it can be said that *Those Crazy Turks* tells the story of how we have struggled against the West in the War of Independence which could only be named as "craziness" by the Western rationality while "Metal Storm" asks the question of what if conspiracy theories were real and the US decided to invade Turkey. *Those Crazy Turks* reminds us about our glorious past- the war of independence- to rescue the youth from the threat of oblivion which may lead to alienation from the national identity.[78] On the other hand, "Metal Storm" warns us about a similar oblivion/unconsciousness which might become a grave danger in the near future. However, in both of the books the shadow of the past in which such a danger was circumvented falls upon the present and the future. According to the narratives, this danger showed itself in its clearest form under the banner of a peace treaty, the Sévres Treaty.

"Şampiyon: Şu Çılgın Türkler" *Radikal Kitap*, 23 December 2005.

[77] For details see the next section or see: Umut Özkırımlı, "Nationalism in Turkey" *Tempo*, (April 2006).

[78] Sezgi Durgun. "Homo Balkanicus, Çılgın Türkler ve Diğerleri" *Toplum ve Bilim*, 105, pp.245-64.

Projecting the Past and the Future on Present: "'They' are Scheming to Get Us"

These references to the Sévres Treaty forces us to take a closer look at the framework that has been widely used and known as "Sévres Syndrome". "Sévres Syndrome"[79] is composed of themes of victimization, siege, isolation, betrayal and martyrdom. In other words, what Sévres Syndrome includes is the sense of being besieged and the fear of plot against Turkey by external powers for partition/division of Turkey just like the treaty suggested in 1920. It has attracted special attention as a crucial point in the narrative of the "transformation" from the Ottoman Empire into the Republic of Turkey:

> According to national history, the Ottoman state fell victim to the destructive projects of all the major powers of Europe: its former subjects have –under the influence of foreign provocation-usurped the tolerance of the Empire; the newly founded states-though very weak by themselves-have appropriated Ottoman lands with the help of powerful states; this 'malevolent alliance' was able to defeat and deceive the empire.[80]

This is the national scheme derived from the "lessons of history" and used on many occasions as a framework for the analysis of certain international and internal crisis which can be used , apart from the Kurdish movement or the PKK, in the context of EU policies or a conference on Ottoman Armenians . In this respect it can be argued that references to a conspiracy that seeks to revive the Sévres Treaty have become so widespread that it has attained a status of a semi-official theory increasing its reliability. Therefore, it is not a big surprise to see that the main plots of both of

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[79] Baskın Oran. *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar; kavramlar, Lozan, iç mevzuat, içtihat, uygulama*,(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004); Dietrich Jung. Wolfango Piccoli. *Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East*, (London ; New York : Zed Books ; New York , 2001).

[80] Tanıl Bora, "Turkish National Identity: Turkish Nationalism and Balkan Problem" *The Balkans and the New World Order.* Conference held at Marmara University 1993, p.102.

the books evolve around Sévres Syndrome which, I believe, is one of the main reasons for their success. They managed to grasp the contemporary environment of fear. In doing so, they provide us with some hints as to why such a fear is vivid for Turkish society.

In a research conducted in February 2006 by Umut Özkırımlı about nationalism, it was shown that the biggest potential threat was perceived to be the USA while half of the respondents believed that the EU was trying to divide Turkey just like the Sévres Treaty suggested.[81] This shows us that there is a strong connection between the theme of "Metal Storm" and existing fears in the society. Due to the timing and the framing of the research we do not know how much the book itself affected this atmosphere but Umut Özkırımlı mentions an interesting point that may be helpful to draw an analogy. He points out to the fact that even if the Valley of the Wolves: Iraq just arrived at the theaters a significant minority among the respondents had already seen it. Since that movie was based on avenging the "*çuval*" incident with references to a Christian and Jewish conspiracy, it has certain commonalities with "Metal Storm" in terms of reproducing and benefiting from the existing fears in society. From this perspective it can be argued that both of the books' audience was somewhat ready to accept conspiracy theories while the books fed this already existing atmosphere of fear and uncertainty.

A possible answer that comes to mind would be that the current situation of international relations, indeed, resembles the environment that gave birth to Sévres. Moreover, the existence of a Kurdish separatist movement and the discourses of some Armenian nationalists make such a threat of division very real. This is exactly

[81] 35.6% of the respondents believed that the biggest threat for Turkey was coming from the USA while 25.6% of the respondent were pointing to a possible Kurdish state in the northern Iraq as a source of threat. According to the same research 50.3% of the respondents believed that EU was trying to divide Turkey even if some of them still supported entering EU. (Umut Özkırımlı, "Nationalism in Turkey" Tempo, April 2006)

what is argued by Turgut Özakman, the writer of *Those Crazy Turks* and a member of the general council of a neo-Kemalist NGO*, Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*. However, it has to be kept in mind that nationalism always offers a set of meanings and relations to understand the world and the place of the nation. In doing so it creates certain myths and frameworks to be used for the reproduction of nationalist understanding. As suggested by George Schöpflin, "myth is one of the ways in which collectivities- in this context, more specifically nation- establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own system of morality and values,"[82] which means that rather than their reflection of reality it is their perception that makes these myths crucial.

When we look at "Sévres Syndrome" from such a perspective the dictum of the past on the present and the future seems to be an indispensable feature. Yet it has to be noted that this dictum of the past is created by the very present. That is why Turgut Özakman calls for the youth to face their present enemies by reminding them of the past one and how they were defeated. As has been pointed out by the references made in the book, the grandsons and granddaughters of the past enemies who betrayed Turkish nation today occupy important positions and thus we see that treason is in fact something genetic. Yet it shows us indirectly that these myths do not appear out of thin air. While serving the purpose of standardization- offering a hegemonic framework of explanation- they are also tried to be controlled by the political and intellectual elites. Even if there are some minor changes in this chain of constant production and consumption, through its repetition it almost becomes a structure, visible in different discourses.

[82] George Schöpflin. *Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe* , (London: Hurst&Company,2000) p.80.

As pointed out above, while one of the representations of this popularized structure is *Those Crazy Turks* another one is *Metal Storm.* The reality effect of *Those Crazy Turks* is created through the correspondence of yesterday and today, through references, footnotes, photographs and giving detailed descriptions of the places including their names as used today. This is created as if we are on a time machine in which the fuzzy borders of the present and the past haunt us. The book starts with the preparations for war in 1 April 1921 after a brief introduction that summarizes WWI and its immediate aftermath. This introduction in line with the spirit of the book is supported with the pictures of influential politicians and some anecdotes that depict the acceptance of defeat by the sultan. The book ends with the start of cease fire talks highlighting the victory of "those crazy Turks" that changed their destiny. The book is full of details of attacks and the resistance of the Turkish people and their sacrifices giving voice to fictional characters to highlight the spirit of the time. The narrative is also supported by maps, known speeches of the politicians and military personnel to tell the "real" story of the "revival" of the Turkish nation.

It has interesting side effects. Even if "historical novel" is written on the cover of the book, the aim of some of the readers would be to learn real history that has escaped historical textbooks which I will discuss below. Another interesting detail regarding bookstores should be added here. This fuzziness of past and present is also relevant for the border between a historical novel and a history book. In some bookstores such as *Alkım* even if there is a spatial separation between historical novels and historical research books, one would find *Those Crazy Turks* in the shelf of historical research books which would add up to this reality effect I mentioned before.

Learn Your Past and Be "Crazy"

Metal Storm builds up its reality effect not only by being based on conspiracy theories that are already in circulation in the Turkish public but also through the usage of detailed military jargon. The narrative is based on the theory that the USA is after the mineral Borax which will take the place of petroleum and decides to invade Turkey while exterminating the Turkish people. In the mean time, it would be the "traditional enemies of Turkey" like the Armenians or the Greeks who would replace the Turkish people. These enemies are represented as persona or as a group whose aims are very clear and very articulate from the start. It is as if all the world knows that the aim of these nationalities and thus the individuals are set in the grand historical stage in the background and they are merely playing their "natural" parts.[83]

In all this scheme, even if individuals are active throughout the book, the real actor is a sort of a crusader mentality in which people are embedded either as perpetrators or as defenders. Added to this atmosphere is another dosage of fear through the introduction of a new weapon which merges techniques of physical and psychological warfare. Thus we are introduced to an all-encompassing control mechanism that Timothy Melley refers as a signifier of a "broad array of social controls."[84] There is a secret plan that works behind the stage, pulling strings to

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[83] We can clearly see this kind of narrative in the sections where the reader is introduced to a a meeting of US generals or politicians. Whenever they make a remark about the status of Turkey or Turks they either refer to "national characteristics of Turks" such as bravery and oblivion or they refer to their historical desires haunting them through time like the desire to get rid of Turks and live in Anatolia or to divide teh Turkish state or finish what they have started in the WWI. (just to see an example among many, see. Metal fırtına, p.151)

[84] Timothy Melly, *Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America* (Cornell University Pres,2000) cited in Jodi Dean, "Theorizing Conspiracy Theory"

bend the world to its own desire which in our case, is very familiar from the past experiences. Not only the secret plans and the actors involved are making references to this past but even the name of the secret operation that will seal the fate of Turkey is Sévres. The mentality of the operation Sévres reveals itself with the following lines:

> From the very start, the aim was to destroy the Turkish state, and above all to throw the Turks away from Anatolia. The Europeans would no longer need to deal with a Muslim and a fighter nation. Israel and the Arabs would be satisfied with the fact that the water resources that they wanted would be safe, they would be happy that it was under the safeguard of the Americans. The Armenians and the Kurds would finally receive the lands they wanted. Who knows, maybe the Greeks could have found a state in the black sea region. Above all, the Borax, Thorium and Uranium resources would pass to the hands of the Americans, more specifically Adrian Lynam III.[85]

Here there is an interesting reference to Sévres which attributes an evil face to Western rationality. It seems very rational for it to invade and it is easier to make the neighboring regions happy with this act. Following this line, it is not only an essential part of the sinister plans of the West, but this plan fits very well into its rationality. In this way it is possible to make a connection with *Those Crazy Turks* in depicting the West as rational which is different from us but which in itself is evil and finally can be overcome by the "crazy" actions which seem to be an important characteristic of the Turks. This usage of "crazy" is deprived of its negative connotations and emphasizes brevity which is so unexpected that cannot be comprehended by rationality, yet would be successful. This presentation is very common throughout both of the books. It may be the heroic brevity of war of independence of it can reflect itself in the form of a member of the Turkish intelligence going all alone to the US and take its cities hostage by the threat of

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Orkun Uçar. Burak Turna. *Metal Fırtına* (İstanbul: Timaş, 2004), p.151.

blowing up bombs, using such means that could not be foreseen by the US intelligence.

This may be interpreted as a reflection of Orientalism. The West is represented as rational while "us" as Turks are emotional. Yet in this reflection the connotations are reversed. While being rational is filled with negative connotations, being crazy is put opposite to it with positive ones. It can be argued that this kind of reversal can give some clues about one of the faces of popular Turkish nationalism seeking pride vis-à-vis the West which "dictates" its rule in the unequal power relationship of EU accession.

The Clash of Orientalism and Occidentalism

Comparison with the West can be argued to be one of the most important components of the political discourse in Turkey. References to "them" and "us" are common when it comes to positioning Turks or the progress of Turkey. These references can be analyzed within two frameworks: Occidentalism and Orientalism. Leaving the historical evolution of these frameworks aside I will focus on the effects of these frameworks on imagining Turkish nationalism and the interrelated relationship of Occidentalism and Orientalism in reference to the discussions in *Metal Storm* and *Those Crazy Turks*.

Orientalism as defined by Edward Said refers to a discourse created by the Western gaze as a representation of a so-called Orient irrespective of the Orient's reality since it reflects more of the West than the Orient and the inherent unequal relationships between the two.[86] Occidentalism, on the other hand, refers to a

[86] Edward W. Said. *Orientalism* (London : Penguin, 2003)

representation about the West which also includes power relations just like Orientalism does albeit in a different fashion. Meltem Ahıska refers to the framework provided by the concept of Occidentalism as "describing the set of practices and arrangements justified in and against the imagined idea of 'the West' in the non-West."[87] Consequently, she describes Occidentalism as "a field of social imagination through which those in power consume and reproduce the projection of "the West" to negotiate and consolidate their hegemony in line with their pragmatic interests."[88] In this respect the "West" is imagined together with its "gaze" on the "Orient" which becomes a basis to give or produce meaning and explanation to certain policies, understandings or events.

When looked at from this perspective Orientalism and Occidentalism through their respective hegemonic constructions are indeed intertwined. I believe this intertwined nature of the both concepts play a critical role in trying to understand Turkish nationalism(s).[89] When we look at the discourse of Turkish nationalism there are constant references to the "West" which depending on the context can have positive or negative connotations. Yet this presence cannot be explained simply through the hegemonic presence of the Orientalist discourse and its influence on the elites since these references are very contextual and come with a package of power struggle at home. What I mean by a power struggle at home is the fact that

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[87] Meltem Ahıska. "Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern" *South Atlantic Quarterly* vol.102:2/3, (Spring/Summer 2003),p.366.

[88] Ibid.

[89] I deliberately use "Turkish nationalism(s)" since I believe that it is based on different understandings and premises rather that focusing on Turkish antionalis as if there is only one type of understanding , multiple versions should be recognized. I may have used Turkish nationalims in singular for the cases when I will be referring to the common characteristics of different versions.

reference to the "West"(as a constructed imagery) and its attributed characteristics can be used to legitimize or delegitimize certain discussions. As I have noted before, of course, this discursive struggle is not separate from the Orientalist one it even uses the Orientalist vocabulary but positioning of the actors needs more discussion.

Meltem Ahıska, when she discusses how the Turkish nation was imagined in the early Republican period through the usage of radio and how different agents were positioning themselves in the process emphasizes two points in reference to Occidentalism.[90] First, there is a constant reference to the "West" which reflects itself not only as a discourse of backwardness in comparison to the West but also a reflection of the power of the "West inside" (read as the modern center , the state, the modernizing elite) on the "East inside" (read as periphery). Second, this imagining, this fantasy is actually in dialogue with the West and defines itself accordingly.[91] In other words, the Occidentalist discourse in itself is very contextual and referential while embodying multiple actors and power relations in the heart of Turkish political discourse and Turkish nationalism.

In light of these arguments, let us return to the discussion of "craziness." One of characteristics of the Orientalist discourse is the depiction of the West as rational while the East remains irrational or emotional. Of course this is very much related to gendered representations since the East comes to be the exotic and the female one. This Orientalist discourse is also related to modernity and rationality. Since the West is the epitome of rationality what remains for the East is its irrational actions, which in turn explains why the East is not modern. Thus in this context "craziness" as an irrational characteristic would be attributed to the Orient in a negative fashion.

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[90] Meltem Ahıska. *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (İstanbul: Metis,2005)

[91] Ibid., pp.42-46.

Based on this assumption what *Metal Storm* and *Those Crazy Turks* make is to reverse these connotations.

The reversal of the negative meaning attached to "craziness" is achieved through its association with brevity, which is one of the proud characteristics of the Turkish nation. Yet this reversal of the discourse is related to the assumption of how the West sees the Turkish nation. Emotions of nationalism and the will to sacrifice in the name of the Turkish nation are caught with one phrase: "craziness." What is reserved for the West, this time, is a cold blooded rationality which fails to make sense of the craziness of the Turks. This incapacity to understand the craziness hints at a change in the balance of power, which previously favored the West. This time the balance is shifted to the favor of the Turks as a result of the acts which are only perceived by the Western rationality as "craziness." It was the winning card in the past (those crazy Turks) and it will be the seed of hope in the future. (the Metal Storm) It also seems that this kind of an imagining found a great appeal among the Turkish population, who felt themselves encircled in an environment of fear and conspiracy as will be discussed below.

This appeal of the theme of "craziness" points to a frustration which seems to be different from the Occidentalism in the Early Republican era or the Occidentalist perspectives towards the EU which refer to the West in again a paradoxical but more positive manner. In the case of the Occidentalist discourse of the early Republican period the West has been used as referential point to construct the hegemony of the ruling elites while at the same time providing an answer to the hegemonic power of the West in the Orientalist discourse.[92] Consequently the image of the Turk is

[92] Meltem Ahıska. *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (İstanbul: Metis,2005)p.309

designed according to how the West see "us."[93] Moreover, the West preserves its place as a point of desire as a point of reference to achieve certain status. This West is, of course, reified and comes to embody positive and negative attributes at the same time depending on what kind of boundaries to which we refer. Still, the West is depicted as the point of destination, the characteristics attributes were also claimed to be the current or future characteristics of the Turkish nation.

"Craziness" on the other hand points to a slightly different way of definition. Turks (read as true Turkish nationalists, not the collaborators) are claimed to be "crazy," beyond the comprehension of the Westerners. Since this is an inherent characteristic it has been praised while the rationality of the West is downgraded. In this sense it fits in the anti-Western perspectives, it stands as a way to "defeat" the West. It can reflect itself in not signing the Sévres Treaty and continuing to fight or it can reflect itself in taking a nuclear bomb to the heart of the USA and threatening "the most powerful country in the world" for self-defense. In both of the cases the hegemony of the West is encountered and reversed, but in a non-Western, irrational way. Then it comes to a point where balancing the unequal power relations in the Orientalist discourse is not achieved through reaching the same status as of the West but by using one's non-Western strength which was initially seen as a weakness in the Orientalist discourse.

In *Those Crazy Turks* only those who are Turkish patriots/Turkish nationalists can understand the power of "craziness." Others who have already accepted the defeat and who are conspiring against the movement in Ankara would label the National Struggle as a pointless adventure and as "craziness". In reference to the demands of the Ankara government at the Lausanne talks in 1921 a journalist, Ali

[93] Ibid., p.84.

Kemal (who is defined as Armenian-Artin- Kemal because of his criticism of the Turkish army), is stated to have said, "I hear that, in London, they [Kemalists] demanded, like children 'We want İzmir, We want Edirne, we want Adana' even 'We want full fledged independence.'"(…) "If they were not crazy they would not have tried to dictate terms of peace to [koskoca] Lord George as if we won the world war."[94] The explanation comes from Turgut Özakman "There would be many who considered waging a war against imperialists, the victorious states, the Greek army, the Armenian and Pontus gangs craziness when you did not have anything at hand." (…) " It is the National Struggle that is the name of this proud and beautiful craziness."[95] Thus craziness is fighting and winning against imperialism even when every one other than those involved in the national movement agreed with a French diplomat when he said "Be realistic and come to terms with us. Since the ox-chart [symbol of the National Struggle] cannot defeat the truck [imperialism]"[96]

It is possible to argue that "craziness" is not a term that is used in English as a synonym of insane. It has a far more positive connotation. It is also true that in Turkish it has been attributed a positive meaning the usag of which is highly contextual. The "popular" discourse in the 1990s in Turkey in fact refers to "craziness" though from a different aspect. As has been described by Can Kozanoğlu, "craziness" was used as a compliment to the point that it has created craziness fetishism.[97] It was especially used by those who embace the consumer culture and "craziness" referred to doing something trendy and innovative. This

[94] Turgut Özakman. *Those Crazy Turks* (Ankara: Bilgi,2005) p.36.

[95] Ibid., p.20

[96] Ibid., p.136

[97] Can Kozanoğlu. " Yeni Ülkücü Kimliği, Pop Müzik ve 'Çılgınlar Gibi'..: Camiye, Kışlaya, Diskoya ve Yatağa.." *Pop Çağı Ateşi* (İstanbul: İletişim,1995), p.137.

partly explains why the title is received so enthusiastically yet the association of Turkish nationalism and craziness has a lot to tell other than the title being only a trendy one. However, in this thesis I do not dwell upon this aspect much. The main reason is the way it has been represented by Turgut .Özakman in his book. When craziness is used as a word that would remind early 1990s it means connection to the global trends in line with consumer culture. Turgut Özakman on the other hand uses it as an adjective which is reserved only for the Turkish nation. "Others" are defined essentially not "crazy" and incapable understanding the craziness of the Turks. How the audience treated/understood/used "craziness" is another question that will be addressed below.

A Question of Audience

The audience of *Those Crazy Turks* has an important characteristic that needs to be underlined once again, it is young. When the interviews of the writers or more openly in the case of Turgut Özakman the preface of *Those Crazy Turks* are examined, it is very clear. I think this focus on the youth needs to be analyzed further in order to understand the borders of the popular as well as changing nature of the political.

Youth is an important categorical and discursive reference not only for nationalism but also for the modernity itself. I have already discussed this part in the first chapter in the context of the Kemalist project of modernization and nationalism. Youth as a category is imagined within well-defined boundaries and given specific missions. When we take a snapshot of the Kemalist framework of youth we would find the discourse of calling the youth to duty for the sake of the Kemalist revolutions. However, as Ahıska rightly points out, "the youth that has been defined

as innovative and revolutionary in the nationalist framework of Kemalism and yet when ever youth has taken the initiative to fulfill this mission, it has turned out to be a nuisance for the state." Thus, ironically, in the 1970s, "the youth that has been codified as revolutionary in the nationalist framework ended up with the accusation of being revolutionary against the nation."[98]

In the Turkish context, as is commonly pointed out, post-1980 generations are depicted as apolitical and "lost" in the consumer culture.[99] However, as has been pointed out by Leyla Neyzi, "in the age of the media, the youth is challenging its own representation and is creating new global spaces to express its identity."[100] In the immediate aftermath of the coup d'état there may have been a wave of depolitization especially when the families discouraged politics to "protect" their children which is coupled with a new wave of consumerism of the neo-liberal era. I do not want to make a direct connection between consumerism and depolitization immediately. Yet conspicous consumption and consumer culture definitely contributed to this process by affecting the priorities and agenda of the youth culture. However, this emphasis on consumer culture and an almost nostalgic search for

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[98] Meltem Ahıska. " 'Genç Olamayan Gençler' Üzerine Bir Deneme" *Defter*, 37, (1999) p.14.

[99] According to Leyla Neyzi, the characteristics attributed to the youth in the national imagery of republican Turkey have undergone considerable change in the turning points of 1950 and 1980 dividing it into three periods. In the first period ranging between 1923 and 1950, the new nation was materialized in the educated youth with a projection of a modernizing project. This faded away with the political polarization and student movements in the following decades (1950-1980) when the youth was presented as out of bounds and a threat to the establishment while the youth itself was advocating that they were acting in the name and for the well-being of the society. Even if the discourse regarding the presentation of the youth has changed, still the mission to change the society continued specifically referring to the urban youth. (Leyla Neyzi. "Nesne yada Özne? Türkiye'de "gençliğin 'paradoksu'" *"Ben Kimim? Türkiye'de Sözlü Tarih, Kimlik ve Öznellik* (İstanbul: İletişim,2004))

[100] Leyla Neyzi. "Nesne yada Özne? Türkiye'de "Gençliğin 'Paradoksu'" *"Ben Kimim? Türkiye'de Sözlü Tarih, Kimlik ve Öznellik* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004) p.105-106.

previous decades may be an obstacle to see political engagement where it could be found.

The arena of the popular is a fruitful area in which to see what kind of politics these apolitical generations are producing since it also the arena of consumerism. It should also be noted that at a time when it has been approved by certain families to go into the streets for occasions such as the infamous Republican meetings, the youth once again acquires the status of being political actors who need to be awakened from oblivion, but once awakened would act accordingly. Interestingly enough this situation of oblivion is also explained by the existence of some conspiracies against Turkey. A fan of *Those Crazy Turks* summarizes his opinion as follows: "When imperialism understood that it cannot take Turkey down by means of war, it besieged Turkey by other channels. First by dividing us right-left then alevi-sünni they managed to make us kill each other and finally with the coup d'etat of 1980 imperialism got what it wanted. The youth after the coup d'etat has never read, never researched, we officially became a consumer society." (23/m/student)[101]

In this kind of environment certain practices such as reading certain book or hanging flags start to gain new meanings. These practices can be changing profile pictures into Turkish flags as seen in some popular websites such as Facebook or it can be reading *Those Crazy Turks*. Thus, there is a renewed call for getting political- whether it is defined as such or not- to defend certain type of nationalism which can be labeled in the context of *Those Crazy Turks* Kemalist or a neo-Kemalist version of

[101] " Emperyalizm Türkiye'yi savaşla ele geçiremeyeceğini anlayınca başka kollardan kuşattı. Önce sağ-sol olayları sonra Alevi-Sünni olayları ile insanlarımızı birbirine kırdırmışlardır ve de sonuçta 1980 darbesiyle birlikte emperyalizm istediğini elde etti. Darbeden sonra yetişen gençlik hiç okumadı, araştırmadı, resmen tüketim toplumu olduk." Interview with Demir Arıkan (name is changed), 27 November 2007

Turkish nationalism as discussed in the second chapter. This call for remembrance and action is put into words by Turgut Özakman as "Our youth is longing for others' struggle of independence since it is not told to them that the National Struggle was the first war of independence that was fought and won against imperialism. They are alienated from their own history, their on heroes."[102] "Dear youth! War of Independence is one of the most legitimate, most righteous, most holy wars in the world. Be proud of your ancestors who have forced imperialism and its accomplices into submission who have created a new and modern state from ruins, do not let the liar put any shame on this pride."[103]

Even if there seems to be a chance for the "apolitical" youth to get rid of this label, this way is also predetermined and in some ways embedded in the consumer culture. Thanks to its ambiguity nationalism has become a ready-made explanatory package for different contexts and it involves buying and reading certain books as well as participating in boycotts. An important point here is the extent to which this process of reproduction has penetrated into daily lives or what can be called as popular culture. If we take nationalism as an abstraction the spaces where it is materialized are also important arenas of commodification where nationalism makes its influence felt through the commodities we come across in the daily life. In other words what happens is that an ideology through the medium of symbols turns into commodities which in itself may not be a very novel phenomenon. In the 1990s

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[102]" Milli Mücadele'nin emperyalizme karşı verilmiş ve kazanılmış ilk kurtuluş savaşı olduğu anlatılmadığı için gençlerimiz başkalarının kurtuluş mücadelerine imrendiler. Kendi tarihlerine, kendi kahramanlarına yabancılaştılar." Turgut Özakman *Şu Çılgın Türkler* (Ankara: Bilgi,2005), p.9.

[103]"Sevgili Gençler! İstiklal Savaşı, dünyadaki en meşru, en ahlaklı, en haklı, en kutsal savaşlardan biridir. Emperyalizmi ve yamaklarını dize getiren, bir enkazdan yepyeni, çağdaş bir devlet kurmayı başaran atalarınızla gurur duyun, şehit ve gazi atalarınızın onurunu yalancılara çiğnetmeyin." Ibid., p.688

necklaces with crescent and stars were popular. Today another possibility is in the form of an older medium, books which started to be sold in supermarkets as part of marketing strategies.

When we look at nationalism as a form of strategy as has been deeply discussed by Meltem Ahıska, Fırat Genç and Ferhat Kentel,[104] the way it has been used is more important than how it has been constructed. The writers remind us, in reference to Michel de Certau, that the strategies offered to us are consumed through the daily tactics of everyday life. This being the case, "whatever has been offered, commodity, service, idea, information or a weapon, cannot be consumed according to the foresight of the producers, marketing agents, academics, generals or institutions. The consumption of an individual in itself is another production."[105] From this perspective it is rightly argued that every act of consumption is in a way an act of reproduction.

So far, I have dwelt upon the side of the producers and the products and now, it is time to turn to the consumers. Consequently, it is crucial to understand in which ways these productions are consumed by the targeted audience. Therefore, I will examine how these books are perceived by the readers. However, due to limitations I will focus on a group who has read and appreciated *Those Crazy Turks*. One reason for such a focus is the way these two books were received in the media. *Metal Storm* was treated more ambiguously and the way it represented the Turkish army was criticized by certain circles. It has been criticized for depicting the Turkish army as weaker than it is and there were even conspiracy theories arguing that the writers were paid by "some outside forces" to destroy trust of Turks in the army.

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[104] Ferhat Kentel, Meltem Ahıska, Fırat Genç. *'Milletin bölünmez Bütünlüğü': Demokratikleşme Sürecince Parçalayan Milliyetçilik(ler)* (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2007)

[105] Ibid., p.20.

Those Crazy Turks, on the other hand, was praised and started to be read as a classic in the high school literature classes, gaining a semi official status.[106]The title has started to be used widely in the media in different occasion such as football matches. Since *Those Crazy Turks* was also the best seller of the year 2005, I will focus on its targeted audience and, more specifically, the Turkish youth.

Here, there were problems in reaching such an audience. My starting point was the popular culture, so I believed it might be even more fruitful if I used the most popular medium of the youth, the Internet. Consequently, I focused on one of the most popular contemporary sites, "Facebook". I will specifically discuss Facebook in the coming chapter, but I just want to make a note here. There were two main groups dedicated solely to the book *Those Crazy Turks* with a combined size of approximately 600 members as of December 2007. This may seem a small number but it should be kept in mind that it is only a group of fans. Other fans can be found on Facebook through their declarations of the book as their favorite book on their personal info pages.

Methodologically, I targeted questions to 50 randomly selected people between the ages of 18 and 30. I received nineteen answers and supported them with interviews. This is, of course, far from being representative yet I hope the analysis of such open-ended question will nevertheless enable me to ask certain questions that may shed some light on the popular nationalism of a young, well-educated, upper-

[106] I cannot provide statistics here but high school students that I have talked pointed that *"Those Crazy Turks"* was recommended either by their history or literature teachers and offered as a book to make term projects. This resembles my experience as a high school student when we were taken to see movies like "Kurtuluş" and "Cumhuriyet" at school hours.

middle class internet users with a sympathy for the neo-Kemalist type of political vision.[107]

When all of these changes are considered the call of Özakman to the Turkish youth to remember the past struggles and enemies becomes more meaningful. The emphasis the civil society and the heroic individuals during the War of Independence in Özakman's narrative is also relevant for reflecting the contemporary concerns of neo-Kemalism as well. The message of *Those Crazy Turks* is very much in line with the "civil" emphasis of neo-Kemalism. Therefore, the question of how this call was received on the part of youth who are somewhat sympathetic to Kemalist ideology becomes more important to answer. However, I do not think that this kind of a call to youth or the added individual stories add up to giving agency to these people. Just like the characteristics attributed, the agency still remains in the hands of the Western powers or the national spirit that resists them. This is especially so when we consider that fact that people were described as acting simultaneously as if coordinated by the national spirit.

This is shown in the answers given by the respondents about the oblivious and apolitical position of the youth as well as the current problems of Turkey. The respondents clearly state that they are interested in the politics although only three of them are actively involved in politics or affiliated with political groups. Yet they share the same conviction that "we" as the youth are not paying enough attention to what is going on.

The main theme that surfaces in the discourses of the readers is a comparison between the past and present in terms of the degree of activism and voluntarism in

[107] I should also note that among 19 respondents only 4 of them were female. The respondent were coming form different cities yet they are big urban centers like Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Bursa, Sivas, Eskişehir and Tekirdağ. They were either students at universities or they were graduates , coming from 14 different university.

the name of the state/nation. Here, what is meant by activism is not necessarily political activism, but a rather vague understanding of doing something. Yet even this vague "doing something," or because of that, contemporary youth is accused of passiveness, while voting in an international poll to make Atatürk the most beloved leader or opening a Facebook group to praise or attack another group for not paying due respect become , in this framework, "doing something."

Those Crazy Turks: Readers

Yasemin İpek Can points to the fact that there is an interesting discourse in such voluntarism. Here I refer more to the discourse of taking voluntary action to help defend the state/republic/nation. [108] The agent is constructed from a nationalist perspective in which the good of state, the nation and the society all melt in the same pot. Thus, it becomes the duty of the citizens to fill in the spaces left by the bureaucratic state in its neo-liberal transformation.[109] Can discusses this transformation while making a note of the ideological background that surrounds these voluntary actions, such as the need to defend Kemalism and the Kemalist ideals under a government that is trying to destroy it. What is noteworthy in this context is that civil society that is obliged to take voluntary actions, is imagined just like the nation-state, including all the citizens.[110] It produces an interesting paradox between the "us" and "them" division since "they" are theoretically speaking part of "us."

[108] Yasemin İpek Can. "Sivil Toplum, Neo-Liberal Dönüşümler ve Gönüllülük" *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 108 pp.88-129.

[109] Ibid., p.109.

[110] Ibid., p.111.

This becomes very visible when Kemalist groups use Ataturk's youth and Turkish youth interchangeably, which was discussed in the second chapter.

The emphasis on civil society and the heroic individuals of the War of Independence in the narrative of Özakman is also relevant for reflecting temporary concerns of neo-Kemalism as well. Therefore, the question of how this call was received by the part of the youth who are somewhat sympathetic to Kemalist ideology becomes critical. However, I do not think that this kind of a call or the added individual stories add up to giving agency to these people. Just like the characteristics attributed, the agency still remains in the hands of the Western powers or the national spirit that resists them.

Before going into the details of how this "we" is perceived, it seems better to start with the motivation to read the book *Those Crazy Turks.* As mentioned above, it was the best seller of 2005 and was followed by another book called *Diriliş* (Revival) by the same author which narrates the Dardanelles battles of 1915 and is expected to have been a best seller as well. So far this expectation seems to be fulfilled according to the reports.[111] *Revival* is leading in the best seller charts. It seems that those who read *Those Crazy Turks* are also reading *Revival*. This makes one wonder what has made 500-600 paged historical novels so popular.

When asked, the motivation of the respondents that liked *Those Crazy Turks* can be summarized in five categories. The most important reason (seven respondents) seems to be the need to learn history. The fact that the book was shelved among the history books rather historical novels in bookstores such as Alkım and the claims of the author himself about the accuracy of his research make sense here. Nevertheless, this reason itself does not stand as an explanation because it

[111] *Radikal Kitap* 1 August 2008.

necessitates another follow-up question: why is there such a sudden interest in history? This question is answered through the comments that arise from other questions, which seems to be imagining the past as a replica of the contemporary threats and the connection between the official and the popular through the media.

In the answers for the motivation of reading *Those Crazy Turks*, second place (four respondents) is reserved for the popularity of the book and discussions about it in the media. Media, here, is an important signaling effect on pointing out what can be popular through its coverage of what "is" popular. As the answers of the respondents show, announcement of the "popular" and the way it is presented (by putting emphasis on the craziness) contribute to the "popularity" of the book in question. Not only news coverage in the media, but also the relation of the book with TRT movie "Kurtuluş"(Liberation) plays a role here. One of the respondents stated that he decided to read the book when he heard that the scenario of "Kurtuluş" was based on "Those Crazy Turks." "Kurtuluş" is a TV series sponsored by TRT in 1994 that focuses on the War of Independence. Just like the movie "Cumhuriyet" its scenario was written by Turgut Özakman. "Cumhuriyet" was shot in movie format in 1998, in accordance with the 75th anniversary of the Republic, to narrate the immediate aftermath of the War of Independence as was presented as the continuation of the TV series of "Kurtuluş." Özakman himself gives reference to "Kurtuluş" by stating that due to the problems with the budget his original scenario was reduced to one-third of what had been planned. In this sense he further states *Those Crazy Turks* is much more than "Kurtuluş."[112] This is an important link between the media , in this case the state television, and the presentation of history through "popular."

[112] Turgut Özakman. *Şu Çılgın Türkler* (İstanbul: Bilgi,2005) p.11.

There is yet another institution that provides the link between the "popular" and history that adds to the "popular" in Turkish nationalism. That is education. Just as "Cumhuriyet" was watched by students as part of the extracurricular activities organized by schools[113]" *Those Crazy Turks* became an almost compulsory books in Turkish or literature classes. It is one of the subjects of the terms projects for the students or is a part of the reading list in literature class.[114] Thus, the book becomes "popular" yet "compulsory", it is a sign of how Turkish citizens are curious about their history yet it is supported by state institutions and is granted an almost semi-official status and finally became the best seller of 2005. Our attention is thus drawn to the book by the mainstream media.

In this respect, starting from the mid-1990s one can argue that there was an official attempt to rewrite the official history. This attempt may have presented itself as counter-official and "popular," but as was the case with the 75th anniversary celebrations, the construction of the popular had an official standing. What was new in this respect was not assuming the acceptance of the populace through state rituals of education, but leading the populace to take an active part in the reconstruction. Of course, the role of those who would be actively contributing had already been decided by the existing official narrative on Kemalism. Therefore it was not

[113] Having been a high school student at the time of the release of "Cumhuriyet" I was one of the students that watched the movie with my classmates. Special sessions were organized by the movie theaters according to the demand coming from the school authorities. As students , we had to watch the movie and write an essay about it in the literature class. In addition, by going to the movie with the whole school we were granted a day off the school which was the most attractive part of going to the movie for the students. This was nothing particular to our school since there were many schools organizing movie sessions for its students at least in Ankara.

[114] Hasan (age 15) whom I met by coincidence was an example of using that term together with students of the same grade in his school he was responsible for reading *Those Crazy Turks.* Of course this example does not mean that all the students in high school education are reading this book as part of their classes. Süleyman (age 13) was reading the book on a bus while underlining some passages he found interesting. When I asked him why he was reading it he said "I want to learn history and I am reading it out of curiosity."

rewriting per se, but it was in Berna Yazıcı's words[in reference to the wave of "rewriting" in late 1990s with the movies like Sarı Zeybek, Cumhuriyet and Kurtuluş], "discovering humans and emotions in 'our' history."[115] One can read "humans" as the ideal national subjects taking active part to create and defend the ideals of Turkish nationalism and "history" as the moment of foundation of the Turkish nation-state which seems to cover the period between WWI and 1938, the death of Atatürk.

The other reasons for reading the book are stated as the recommendations from a family member, interest in what Atatürk accomplished and finally, the name of the book itself. Here "craziness" plays a key role in such an interest and when combined with my analysis of its usage in the book. Craziness, as already been discussed, is valued as a positive emotional yet heroic attribute of the Turkish nation as opposed to the sinister rationality of the West. One of the respondents commented on the reason for his choice of the book as follows: "It is because I know that Turks are crazy; many of my relatives were martyred in this war."[116] Thus the book seems to serve as another example of the enactment/approval of already existing "knowledge." This approval is again associated with the positive meaning attributed to "craziness."

The motivations I presented above are in parallel with what they found most interesting in the book. The favorite parts of the book are described as the most favored characteristics of the Turkish nation as imagined in the book. Characteristics such as being altruistic (a child donates his only pocket money 5 *kuruş*; a lunatic donates his *çarık* with holes), clever (a young officer manages to steal artillery from

[115] Berna Yazıcı. " 'Discovering Our Past': Are 'We' Breaking Taboos? Reconstructing Atatürkism and the Past in Contemporary Turkey" *New Perspectives on Turkey*, (Fall 2001) p.3.

[116] (23/m/ law student)

the hands of the British), proud (rather than saluting a foreign officer as if he is superior, another young officer disobeys Ziya Paşa and rips his epaulettes in protest) are followed by a sense of being besieged by enemies. One of the respondents concluded his comments as follows: "I understood in this book that how much those who wanted to divide us at the time were red-blooded. It is unforgettable to remember the words of Kitchener 'We will fight till we annihilate the Turks' when compared to Mustafa Kemal paying due respect to an enemy's flag on the ground in the Dardanelles." [117]

Having presented these introductory motivations of reading and approving of the book, now I can pass on to how these people perceive the world in relation to the book and what kind of politics they have in mind, which is very much related to the call for politics in the Facebook groups mentioned above. When the question of "why do you think the book became a best seller" was asked, the answer was either related to its ability to tell history in a fluent easy-to-read manner (six respondents) or to a need in society that makes a connection between the situations of the past and the present.(six respondents) In fact these factors are closely related when the discourse that results in the second factor is considered.

The environment of 2005 was perceived similar to the time of War of Independence; enemies are plotting, the nation is weak and some are in oblivion and there is a consequent rise of a nationalist wave. Even if there is a minority of 4 respondents that thinks that the success of the book was thanks to its successful name (craziness again) or coverage in the media (four respondents in total), the general tendency seems to underline this reflection of the present to the past.

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[117] "Interview with Erkan Demir in 25 November 2007(28/m/businessman). *"Ben kitapta daha çok o dönemde bizi bölmek isteyenlerin ne denli gözü kara olduklarını bu kitapla daha iyi anladım. Lord Kitchener'in 'Türkleri yok edinceye kadar savaşacağız' sözü ile Mustafa Kemal'in Çanakkale Savaşı'ndaki yerdeki düşman bayrağına saygı gösterişi tabi unutulmaz. "*

Here I would like to refer to the quotations since they themselves are quite telling. "The country was wanted to be put into the conditions of 1919 (which is still the case) and the masses needed to find strength somewhere. This led them to their own history of independence. The book came just in the nick of time upon such a demand."[118] "The negative polities pursued by countries such as the USA and France against the name of the Turk (such as Armenian Genocide) finally led a nation who remained negligent of its own history, learn history."[119]

The themes of oblivion and negligence of the youth towards its own history reflected itself in the quotations above is in fact a very central one forming the main motivation of the author to write the book itself. In the introduction, Turgut Özakman describes the current state of the Turkish youth as follows: "Our youth longs for the independence war of others since they have not been told that the National Struggle was the first war fought and won against imperialism. They are alienated from their own history, their own heroes." These lines were so tempting that I decided to ask the respondents specifically about this quotation to see what kind of image they themselves had of the Turkish youth. Interestingly, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (fifteen) agreed with the above quotation yet who is guilty under these conditions is generally put as some forces other than the youth even if there are some who directly blame the youth themselves.

> Unfortunately the youth has adopted such a lifestyle that their time passes with the imitation of others, negligence and dealing with

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[118] Interview with Osman Yılmaz in 19 November 2007(22/m/ university student-member of CHP's youth organization). *" Ülke yeniden 1919 şartlarına itilmek isteniyordu, ki bu hala devam ediyor. Vatansever kitlele bu durumda bir yerlerden güç almak zorunda hissettiler kendilerini. Bu da öz tarihlerini, bağımsızlık mücadelerini okumaya itti onları. Kitap böyle bir talebin üzerine hızır gibi yetişti."*

[119] Interview with Metin Yavaş in 21 November 2007(24/m/grad student). *"Başta ABD ve Fransa gibi bir çok dünya devletinin Türk ismine karşı yürüttükleri olumsuz politikalar, (Ermeni Soykırımı) en sonunda tarihine kayıtsız kalan bir millet tarihini öğrenmeye sürükledi diyebilirim."*

> trivial things. They are like "French" (Fransız kalmak) when it comes to who is doing what in the areas which affect both their country and their very selves. (…) Contemporary youth asks 'Can I earn money from history?' 'If not, why would I have anything to do with history?' they think. They are in such an understanding that 'Ottomans conquered the world and look at our conditions now, am I the only one to save the country, let's enjoy ourselves…'[120]

Here, it is clearly the youth itself to blame but it could be "big powers" or an ambiguous entity that decides on how to teach history.

> Imperialism has always been underestimated and the national struggle was presented as a war between Turks and Greeks. I think it is done on purpose because imperialism continues under the title of globalization. (…) Probably the barons of globalization would not like the youth to learn the truth. It was in their interest to create heroes other than Mustafa Kemal, especially when it is this easy to create a hero for a country.[121]

The insufficient history teaching is seen as the root of contemporary problems. As seen in the above quotation it has also been encouraged or even designed by the enemies of Turkey. Insufficent history teaching is also used as an excuse to explain why the Turkish youth is looking elsewhere for role models.

> It is very true if we think that there is a real lived history beyond what they teach us as history and unfortunately since they do not teach us history properly the youth longs for other histories. When our history books try to explain Sakarya war or Büyük Taaruz in three pages then they start to take example from other armies such as the Red Army

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[120] Interview with Mehmet Gündöken in 27 November 2007(28/m/businessman. *"Bu zamanki gençlerin yaşam tarzları malesef özentilik, vurdum duymazlık ve boş işlerle uğraşma ile geçtiğinden ülkemiz hangi dönemlerden geçiyor, kim ne ediyor gibi hem kendi hem de ülkelerini n geleceğini etkileyen konularda tabiri caizse 'Fransız' kalıyorlar. (...) Bu zamanın gençleri de 'tarih bana para veriyor mu?' 'yok vermiyor. Ben de tarihi ne edeyim. Zamanında Osmanlı almış toprakalrı yedi cihanda şimdi ne haldeyiz, ben mi kurtaracağım ülkeyi, hadi keyfimize bakalım' anlayışı şu anki gençliğin en büyük görüntüsü bence."*

[121] Interview with Aydın Tezcan in 27 November 2007 (22/m/student). *"Emperyalizm kısmı hep atlandı ve Milli Mücadele bir Türk-Yunan Savaşı'na dönüştürüldü. Bunda kasıt olduğunu sanıyorum. Çünkü emperyalizm bugün küreselleşme adıyla yaşamoını sürdürmekte. Amaçları da açıkça ortada. Altmış yıla yakın bir süredir biz de kendimizi küresel aleme kaptırmış durumdayız. Herhalde işin altındaki gerçeklerin gençlere öğretilmesi küreselleşme baronlarının hoşuna gitmezdi. Mustafa Kemal yerine sahte kahramanlar yaratmak onların işine geldi, hele hele bir ülke için kahraman yaratmak bu kadar kolaysa."*

> instead soldiers like Fahrettin Altay, Fevzi Çakmak and all of Mehmetçik from the highest ranking to the lowest.[122]

It seems that not only understanding history but also Atatürk can be at the root of the problem, as stated by one respondent : " Unfortunately some circles try to put Atatürk into a stereotype and idolize him so as to make him forgotten. Therefore, I congratulate Turgut Özakman for telling us the history of the first war fought and won against imperialism."[123]

Even if they are in the minority the rest of the respondents refuted the statement of Turgut Özakman. In one of the cases the respondent after stating that the National Struggle was not the first war against imperialism ("I learnt this term that the war between Japan and Russia was the first") agrees that we can say that we are alienated from history if we are to include Ottoman history in the question ("we should welcome Ottoman sultans as our heroes as well"),[124] while in another case a respondent did not believe that a nation that had struggled so successfully against imperialism can be alienated from its own history.

> It is impossible for a nation who crushed the imperialist games and rebelled against the whole world like us to be alienated from its history. Since Turkish nation has experienced this kind of victory so many times that it can only be said that they become normalized. Yet now it is

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[122] Interview with Serdar Kaya in 28 November 2007(23/m/student of law). *"Çok doğru, bizim öğrendiğimiz tarihin dışında bir de gerçek bir yaşanmış tarihin olduğunu düşünüyorum ve malesef bize gerçekleri doğru şekilde anlatmadıkları için gençler başkalarının yanlış tarihine özeniyorlar. Tarih kitaplarımız Sakarya savaşını veya Büyük Taaruzu sadece bir kaç sayfada anlatmaya çalışınca bunun sonucu olarak Fahrettin Altaylar, Fevzi Çakmaklar ve diğer en alttan en üste kadar bütün Mehmetçik yerine başkalarının , kızıl ordu gibi, ordularına özeniyor ve örnek alıyorlar."*

[123] Interview with Sevgi Eren in 28 November 2007(28/f/white collar worker in private sector). *"Ne yazık ki Atatürk belli kalıplara sokulup putlaştırılarak unutturulmaya da çalışılmaktadır bazı kesimler tarafından. O nedenle emperyalizme karşı verilmiş ve kazanılmış ilk kurtuluş savaşını en güzel anlatan bu kitabı yazdığı için Turgut Özakman'I çok tebrik ediyorum."*

[124] One may suspect that such kind of a line can be seen among the supporters of AKP with an Otoman nostalgia but when asked about his vore in the last elections he states that he voted for CHP.

> realized that it is a different victory, it has become a reflex. A lively pulse is beating here."[125]

This "reflex" and "lively pulse" reminded me of the optimist atmosphere created after Republican meetings since they were presented as a reflex of the "populace" when it was felt that something was in danger and the government was not acting accordingly. It was presented as the time to take the initiative. This initiative is reflected in the voluntarism of neo-Kemalism and the mission it gave to the youth. By reminding the youth the golden age of Turkish nationalism, in this case the glorious war of Independence, which in this narrative is all too familiar to the contemporary youth the analogy between the past and the present is set very clearly. The call is likewise becomes clearer: Be crazy like your ancestors and then you will win. What will be won in this case is not a new country but a future in which once again the proud Turkish nation rises and follows Mustafa Kemal's ideals.

Conclusion

In this chapter by looking at the two popular novels I discussed one aspect of the popular, in connection to nationalism. My emphasis was on the different discourses in the books and the way they were received. Since *Those Crazy Turks* is presented as more popular and the title of the book itself has become a catchy phrase used in the media in different occasions like football matches, I gave priority to this book in this chapter. Through the interviews I conducted I analyzed different aspects of how the book is perceived among the young people.

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[125] Interview with Barış Gündoğdu in 28 November 2007 (28/m/pharmacist) *"Emperyalizmin oyunlarını yedi düvele başkaldırdık, onları yendik diyn bir ulusun yabancılaşması gibi bir şey söz konusu değildir. Sadece bu tip zaferleri Türk ulusu çok yaşadığından dolayı, normal bir şey gibi gelmiştir. Refleks oluşmuştur çünkü bu zaferin şimdi farklı bir zafer olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Diri bir nabız atıyor hala."*

The tone of the book praises the neo-Kemalist version of nationalism is which civil society takes action to support Turkish nationalism and defend Turkey against her enemies. The emphasis is put on the sacrifices and the mission of the youth. The question of youth has been a point of special analysis in the second chapter as well because it is an important aspect of the civil activism as argued by the neo-Kemalists. Themes like defense and awareness rising are emphasized more compared to the Kemalist discourse of progress that is also associated with the youth.

"Craziness" is presented as essentially a national trait of the Turkish people that surprises the outside world. It is presented as a source of pride and hope for changing the dark picture of the present state of Turkey, which is encircled by enemies again just like at the time of Independence War. This trait builds its uniqueness in reference to the gaze of the West. This gaze and its perception is the very basis of the Occidentalist roots in Turkish nationalism. This gaze necessitates activism to defend/conserve the Kemalist ideals and spirit to present a united face to the outside world just like the struggle of faces on Facebook which will be discussed in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER IV

FACEBOOK

> *I am afraid: Does not Facebook, the fashion of our day, meeting/reuniting point, reminds of fast-food, even the way it sounds? What is left behind yet what is still ours is presented as if a "job" that can be done in haste. What I created, what I owned, what I protected, what I fought for is left to the mercy of a search engine, is that what a person is supposed to say?! If, among millions of e-mail addresses, the address of my primary school teacher or literature teacher cannot be found does that mean that they are outdated, or is it us that thinks of being up-to-date an alchemy in another ground?*[126]
> Küçük İskender[127]

Facebook was presented as a big hit in the summer 2007 by the mainstream media in Turkey. From that point onwards it has become an important discussion point making its way up to the news on TV and preserved its place in the headlines for a couple of weeks. It was a new cyber community in which members register with their real names, create circle of friends, upload pictures, form groups and use applications of different sorts. Before the interest of theTurkish media, there was already a considerable membership from Turkey. From the point it became headline news onwards, there has been a huge acceleration of membership.[128] It has come to

[126] Ürküyorum: Günümüzün yeni modası, buluşma/kavuşma noktası Facebook bile ses olarak fastfood'u çağrıştırmıyor mu?Geride kalan, ancak yine de bize ait olanla yeniden bir araya gelebilmek bile alelacele yapılacak bir "iş"miş gibi lanse ediliyor. Yarattığım, sahiplendiğim, koruduğum, uğrunda savaştığım değerleri bir arama motorunun insafına mı bırakacağım demeli insan?! O milyonlarca mail adresi arasında ilkokul öğretmenimin ya da lisedeki edebiyat hocamınki yer almıyorsa, onlar mı çağdışıdır yoksa biz çağdışılığı başka zeminde bir simya mı sanmaktayız?

[127] Küçük İskender, *Medusa'nın Makası* (İstanbul: Sel yayıncılık, 2008)

[128] NTVMSNBC. "Facebook son bir ayda Türkiye'deki üye sayısını, üç katına çıkardı. 275 bin civarındaki üye sayısı bugün 860 bini buldu." Available [online]: "http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/425538.asp" 28 February 2008]

such a point that for those unable to understand English, visual maps or video clips have been made to describe how to use Facebook and finally a Turkish language option for Facebook emerged. By August 2008 Turkey emerges as the fourth country in terms of the volume of membership and the volume of the Internet traffic of Facebook.[129] Before going into details of what the popularization of Facebook meant for understanding popular Turkish nationalism, it is important to dwell upon what does such a network means for "the social" in general.

Facebook seems to be a " successful"[130] combination of the "virtual" and the "real." Theoretically, it is a network for the socialization of the real people in virtual space. As of April 2008, it has become the most popular global social networking site exceeding 130 million unique visitors in a month.[131] Yet this mere fact that the border between the virtual and the real becomes fuzzier gives us a hint about the potential ambivalence of relationships. Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, argues that Facebook is not about making new connections:

> Our whole theory is that people have real connections in the world. People communicate most naturally and effectively with their friends and the people around them. What we figured is that if we could model what those connections were, we could provide that information to a set of applications through which people want to share information, photos or videos or events. But that only works if those relations are real. That's a really big difference between Facebook and a lot of other sites. We're not

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İngiliz The Sunday Times gazetesinin haberine göre, 2007'de dünya çapında büyük etki yaratan Facebook adlı arkadaşlık sitesinin üye sayısı, 26 Ekim-25 Kasım döneminde en yüksek büyümeyi Türkiye'de gösterdi. Bu tarihlerde Türk kullanıcı sayısı yüzde 466 artarken, ikinci sırada yüzde 171'le İsrail yer aldı. Radikal. "Facebook" Available [online]: "http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=246497" [5 February 2008]

[129] See Appendix L

[130] Facebook's budget has reached to $15 billion in less than four years. Under its rapid grow, in October 2007, Microsoft Corporation paid $240 million for the company's 1.6 percent stake.

[131] Comscore. "Facebook" Available [online]: "http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2396" [20 August 2008] for detailed charts see Appendix K

> thinking about ourselves as a community – we're not trying to build a community – we're not trying to make new connections.[132]

This modeling of the real connections in the world resulted in reflecting a certain understanding of a community through its offer of "netwoks" and "groups." Even if Zuckerberg claims that Facebook was not meant for making new connections, it has definitely contributed to the imagination of communities. Benedict Anderson, in his famous work *Imagined Communities,* coined nation as an imagined community. It is an imagined community because the face-to-face interaction of each member is impossible yet members continue to have a mental image of such an affinity. This mental image is virtually realized in the micro cosmos of Facebook with the possibility of showing off to the outside world what a nation means.

Through sites like Facebook it becomes possible to develop a certain voluntary citizenship identities. There is a variety of networks offered for the users. These networks can be based on your firm, your school or the locality to which you opt to belong. You can be a member of multiple networks, but membership to country networks is limited to one. By belonging to such a network you can discuss the topics you choose with your co-networkers, follow events that target this network or be advised by the network members and become a member of groups in which the prerequisite for acceptance is membership in a certain network. You do not have to be a citizen of a certain country to become a member of this network; however through your choice, you form a certain the Internet citizenship. To be able to become a member of another country's network you have to renounce your previous network membership. Of course, you can opt to belong none of the networks or you

[132] Time. "The Future of Facebook", Available [online]: "http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1644040,00.html" [06 November 2007]

can become a member of your school network only. This option of having the freedom of non-allegiance does not mean that you denounce your "real" identity, your current citizenship, since Facebook is said to have been built upon real relations. It is this reality affect that distinguishes Facebook from other networking sites and makes what can be termed " Internet citizenship."

The concept of "net citizenship" is used by Hamza Aktan while discussing the reflections of Turkish racism on the Internet.[133] He analyzes the comments in popular news sites and racist web sites through a distinction between real citizenship and net citizenship. Consequently, he draws a distinction between reality and the Internet in terms of the construction of identities. The Internet accordingly provides a medium to go beyond what is proper to declare in your real life. You can easily show your hatred without any fear of punishment social or legal since you keep your real identity secret.[134] This may be true for the sites Aktan analyzed but the picture changes drastically when it comes to the analysis of Facebook. Even if the degree of reality Facebook comes to represent can be discussed, the most distinguishing characteristic of Facebook is a mimicry of reality and social relations. In this respect, even if you do not declare your true identity (in most cases people do declare their names, work places, education history, interests and photographs) by adding your friends to your circle you make at least a semi-declaration that lifts the protective anonimity that can be seen in the cases of comments in news sites.

[133] Hazma Aktan. "Web 'otağ'larından sokağa Türk Irkçılığının Tezahürleri" *Birikim*, 215,pp.43-48

[134] Ibid., p.48

Is Facebook a Medium of Popular Politics ?

The network of Turkey (as of 4/3/2008) has 1,816,171 members and 78% of the users prefer not to list their political views.[135] This may lead to an assumption that the majority are in fact not interested in politics or hesitates to make their political position public. However, the picture changes dramatically when most popular groups within this network are taken into consideration. Facebook offers data about "what is popular today in this network"[136] and under the title of groups, the most popular ten as of 4/3/2008 are highly political.(seven out of ten). They concentrate on topics like Kemalism, religion, secularism and nationalism. The list goes as follows: *Dünya çapındaki En Büyük Türk topluluğu*[137] (Biggest Turkish group in the world)(170,264 members), *Atatürk'ün en karizmatik lider olduğuna inananlar*[138] (Those who believe that Atatürk is the most charismatic leader) (59,026 members), *"Üniversitelerde türbana hayır" diyen 1000000 kişi bulurum arkadaşım!* [139](I can find 1000000 people who say "no to headscarf in the universities", dude!)

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[135] I must also note that this network is not necessarily composed of people living in Turkey or Turkish citizens, but there is a huge amount of members on Facebook who prefer not to belong to any network. Therefore I would speculate that people who use Facebook and affiliated with Turkey should be over two million.

[136] The criteria of popularity here is not the total number of membership but recent membership activity and postings.

[137] Facebook. "Dünya Çapındaki En Büyük Türk Topluluğu" Available [online] "http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=10181102929" [5 March 2008] (Appendix A)

[138] The description of the network states that" if you believe that Atatürk is the most charismatic and unique leader of all times let the whole world realize our number"(http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=10877647743) (accessed 5/3/2008)(Appendix B)

[139] Facebook. "*Atatürk'ün en karizmatik lider olduğuna inananlar* " Available [online]: "http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=7788463273"[5 March 2008] (Appendix C)

The group puts Atatürk's Bursa speech as its description. The originality of this speech is debatable yet it is noteworthy that this speech is remembered at this time. The content of the speech highlights the importance of taking action even resorting to violence if the republic is seen in danger. It calls for the action of the individuals themselves rather than waiting for an institutional response from the state. Its fascist tone is used to legitimize para-militarist organizations.

BURSA NUTKU

Türk Genci, devrimlerin ve cumhuriyetin sahibi ve bekçisidir. Bunların gereğine, doğruluğuna herkesten çok inanmıştır. Yönetim biçimini ve devrimleri benimsemiştir. Bunları güçsüz düşürecek en küçük ya da en büyük bir kıpırtı ve bir davranış duydu mu, "Bu ülkenin polisi vardır, jandarması vardır, ordusu vardır, adalet örgütü vardır" demeyecektir. Elle, taşla, sopa ve silahla; nesi varsa onunla kendi yapıtını koruyacaktır.

Polis gelecek, asıl suçluları bırakıp, suçlu diye onu yakalayacaktır. Genç, "Polis henüz devrim ve cumhuriyetin polisi değildir" diye düşünecek, ama hiç bir zaman yalvarmayacaktır. Mahkeme onu yargılayacaktır. Yine düşünecek, "demek adalet örgütünü de düzeltmek, yönetim biçimine göre düzenlemek gerek"

Onu hapse atacaklar. Yasal yollarla karşı çıkışlarda bulunmakla birlikte bana, başbakana ve meclise telgraflar yağdırıp, haksız ve suçsuz olduğu için salıverilmesine çalışılmasını, kayrılmasını istemeyecek. Diyecek ki, "ben inanç ve kanaatimin gereğini yaptım. Araya girişimde ve eylemimde haklıyım. Eğer buraya haksız olarak gelmişsem, bu haksızlığı ortaya koyan neden ve etkenleri düzeltmek de benim görevimdir."

İşte benim anladığım Türk Genci ve Türk Gençliği!

BURSA SPEECH

The Turkish Youth are the owner and guardian of the Reforms and the Republic. They are convinced to the necessity and correctness of these, more than anyone else. They have assimilated the Reforms and the form of the government. The instant they notice a slightest or greatest quirk, or an attitude, which would weaken those, they will not say:"This country has its police, its gendarme, its justice organization"With their hands, stones, sticks and arms, whatever available, they will defend their own creation. The police will come, ignore the actual criminals, capture them as the guilty.They will think that"The police is not yet the police of the reforms and the republic" but will never ask for mercy.The courts will prosecute them. They will think again:"So, the justice organization needs to be improved, re-structured suitable to fit the regime"they will think.

They will be jailed. Although they will appeal by way of legal means, they will not bombard the premier and the congress with telegrams, asking for their mercy to be released, to have preferential treatment for having been innocent and not guilty.
They will say: "I did the necessities of my beliefs and convictions. I am right in my interference and action. If I have ended up here unfairly, it is my responsibility to correct the causes and influences, which resulted in this injustice."

This is my understanding of the Turkish Young and the Turkish Youth.

(73,394 members), *Atatürk'ün gençliği kaç kişiyiz tüm dünyaya gösterelim hadi Türk genci*[140] (Let's show to the world how many Atatürk's youth are, come on Turkish youth) (211,545 members), *Alkolü siyasi simge yapalım, üniversitelere sokalım*[141] (let's make alcohol a political symbol and make it enter to universities) (35, 630 members), *Bu gruba üye olun Türk bayrağıyla guiness rekorlar kitabına biz girelim*[142] (be a member of this group and we enter the Guinness records with Turkish flag) (115,395 members) and finally *Hz. Muhammed (SAV)in ümmeti kaç kişiyiz dünyaya gösterelim*[143] (Let's show how many we are, the community of Prophet Muhammed) (95,258 members)

The numbers of the members may seem less significant compared to the overall members in the Turkey network, but this does not change the fact that the

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[140] Facebook. "Atatürk'ün gençliği kaç kişiyiz tüm dünyaya gösterelim hadi Türk genci" Available [online]: "http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=5549996683" [5March 2008] (Appendix D)

By February 2008 this group becomes the biggest group in "Turkey" network. In the description section of the group's homepage they state that "We can say this is the first group with nearly 200,000 members in Turkey. We can proclaim it to those who make claims. We do not make any claims, it is just let those who love Atatürk show it to the world." They also make a note that they accept advertisements on the condition that they are not against the benefit of Turkey or Turkish traditions. According to the announcement the income from these advertisement would be used for a campaign to help schools in need.

[141]Facebook. "Alkolü siyasi simge yapalım, üniversitelere sokalım" Available [online]: "http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=21613109472" [5 March 2008](Appendix E)

In the description the motto of the group is declared to be "Don't stop, continue drinking" just after noting that "we can also use the same justification to enhance freedoms." Here they open a parenthesis to explain that they are a humorous opposition group with no intention to decry religion.

[142] Facebook. "Bu gruba üye olun Türk bayrağıyla guiness rekorlar kitabına biz girelim " Available [online]: "http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=7777324761" [5 March 2008] (Appendix F)

The description of the group openly calls for a need of recognition by the others with the symbol of national flag. "Let the whole world see your greatness. Let the world see our flag. Respecting the flag. That's it"

[143] Facebook. "Hz. Muhammed (SAV)in ümmeti kaç kişiyiz dünyaya gösterelim" "Available [online]: "http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=20053119312"[5 March 2008]

most popular groups are predominantly political ones. An example that is significant for comparison is the group *seksenlerin sonunda doksanların başında çocuk olmak*[144] (being a child at the end of eighties and at the beginning of nineties)(194,758 members). This group is one of the biggest in the Turkey network and, as the title suggests, it is a group that shares memories of childhood like popular cartoons and reflects childhood culture of a generation.

This being the case, it is significant in two ways for our purposes. The first is to provide a comparison in terms of numbers with popular political groups since it is one of the most-if not the most- popular apolitical groups on the Facebook by Turkish users. Second, it also gives us hints about predominance of youth in Facebook (one has to remind that initially it was created as a network for university students). I should also note that when people reminisce about the good old days the definition of childhood is associated with brands or the fashionable shoes that could not be afforded by the lower classes.[145] In a way from some aspects, the children of the lower classes never knew how it was to be a child towards the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s.

Returning to the political groups mentioned above, their titles suggest a desire to prove the power of one's group to "others" through publicity. I believe it is the way how this publicity is framed that makes a difference in the struggle to dominate a public space, in our case Facebook. This public space works in a twofold manner. We can say that these groups target in their discourse two different audiences, the inner/ domestic circles or what can be said to be the audience in the world display

[144] Facebook. "seksenlerin sonunda doksanların başında çocuk olmak " Available [online]: "http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=6323912253" [8 April 2008] Appendix G)

[145] One can mention many examples. Wearing the colors of LCWaikiki and Benetton, roller blades, having a computer, watching video tapes are defined as part of being the markers of childhood for a generation.

window. Of course, it is not easy to make such a clear cut categorization since they are tightly intertwined. The inner circles are targeted to dominate the domestic front and create a face of Turkey that is presentable to the inner and outer enemies. This seems to be the driving force behind the obsession for counting how many "we" are in the groups. This call for numbers in themselves are significant in telling that there is a drive to represent the face of Turkey in some cases. Is it going to be in the colours of Kemalist youth or in the line of the colours that are seen as threats to Kemalism or will it take a more apolitical line? On the other hand, the groups that seem to target the world market so to say in proving/showing the biggest Turkish group, the biggest flag etc, have a show of effect on the domestic market as well.

As the names of these groups suggest, there is a clear need to prove something to others. This "other" can change depending on the group motivations themselves. It can be placed outside Turkish borders or can be very much within them. Nevertheless, the popularity of Facebook gives a great opportunity to target both of them. On the one hand, being an international network Facebook gives a chance to present the "face" of Turkey to those who have misperceptions about it. On the other hand, it is also a ground to see who will dominate this face. Numbers here play a vital importance. Insistence on numbers as a bet to prove the strength of one's position, or political power, gives us a clue about the uncertainty and fear of being/becoming marginal between the lines.

This marginality can be read twofold. One is derived from the marginality of being a non-producer of culture (the activity of posting in these groups and becoming their members can be seen as a remedy), while the other is related to losing as distinctive groups (losing hegemony in decision-making, losing in the international hierarchy of nations.) Michel de Certeau refers to the former case as the

"marginality of the silent majority." Marginality is today no longer limited to minority groups, but is rather massive and pervasive; this cultural activity of the non-producers of culture an activity that is unsigned, unreadable, and unsymbolized remains the only one possible for all those who nevertheless buy and pay for the showy products through which a productivist economy articulated itself. Marginality is becoming universal."[146] This marginality is tried to be overcome by showing one's self on popular Internet sites like Facebook which are also seen as important areas for public visibility. Yet the extent of overcoming marginality as the silent majority remains debatable.

Of course, this marginality of being non-producers is not experienced similarly by different segments of the society. If Facebook can be seen as a way to decrease this silence of the majority, it is nevertheless the privileged who have access to the Internet and have some knowledge of English (even if there is a possibility to use Facebook with Turkish version of the application as well, it is still limited). A general overview of the profile of the users in the groups I have mentioned above leads to the impression of an overwhelmingly middle/upper middle class background for the users. This being the case, I still put a reservation before saying whether Facebook can be seen as a way to become cultural producers. Acts done in Facebook, such as putting flags as profile pictures, forming groups to call for political action or protest, can be seen as a political act but at the same time it has a sort of pacifying effect, giving the self-satisfaction of having done something by being a producer of a political discourse. It is possible to comment that this is the most effective political communication of our time, using popular sites on the Internet to make one's voice heard. Even if one has to accept that the Internet , due

[146] Michel de Certeau. *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.xvii.

to our relationship with it and due to the problems of getting together in the everyday routines, is a useful venue to mobilize people yet clicking a button may not necessarily mean a mobilization even if it definitely mean a sort of consent and acceptance.

Facebook seems to serve as a venue for different sorts of mobilization. If such kind of mobilization is not restricted to a simple click –thus a sort of salient mobilization, if one may call it—than it seems to have a potential for political mobilization. Of course, such kind of action is not reserved for nationalism or it is not something unique to Turkey. It is very common to start a group by saying that "I bet I can find x number of people who…" One of such groups is "I bet I can find 1000 000 people who don't like George W. Bush." This group declared November 24th as "Anti-Bush" day. Those who would like to join this campaign were to wear something blue and make whatever kind of protest they wished.[147] This mobilization, on the other hand, can reflect itself in attacking anti-nationalist groups as well. It resembles the "YouTube wars" on the Internet, in which nationalists attach each other. Thus while discussing nationalism in Facebook groups we have to be aware of this climate of politics and protest that exists among social networking and enjoying different applications and games.

Of course, at this point one should refer to not only politics but also culture. I have tried to refrain from using such a concept the instrumentalization of which is highly problematic. Since it has come to mean everything and nothing due to its widespread usage, it hardly serves as an analytical tool.[148] In some usages, culture comes to refer to an essence that excludes time and change or comes to mean an all-

[147] *Ajanda 2008 Yaratıcı Direniş* (İstanbul: Metis, 2007) p.162

[148] Frederick Cooper, Rogers Brubaker. "Beyond Identity" *Theory and Society*,vol.29 (2000) pp.1-47.

encompassing explanation shared by all society under every circumstance. This being the case it seems that I need to dwell upon the term "popular" rather than culture.

I have already discussed in the first chapter that the analysis of popular culture has to start with the question of "whose popular" we are talking about. Everyday life is also an area of contest between different discourses with different claims on what is "popular." Facebook is part and reflection of such an everyday life which is crucial for normalization of ideologies. In this respect it is very much a venue for popular politics. Due to accessibility to the Internet and English-based (at least initially) character of Facebook, this "popular" would not be representative of the whole populace yet again it does not have to be. The way it was presented in the media, the amount of people using the site, practices, communication and consumption realized there can be put together with the presence and struggle of different groups to make it an important site to look for/analyze the "popular."

Flagbook

In 2007, in the context of Turkish nationalism, Facebook became *Flagbook* for a large group of people when they replaced their personal "faces" with Turkish flags to protest and show solidarity. At a site where being an individual, being trendy and fashionable yet different is important, communal bonds still tends to show up in the scene albeit in a different form. Zigmunt Bauman, while describing "liquid modernity", states that "used as a metaphor for the present phase of modernity 'liquid' makes salient the brittleness breakability, ad hoc modality of inter-human

bonds."[149] Facebook from this perspective of a combination of the virtual and the real, easiness of making friends and sharing virtual drinks seems to be an example of this ad hoc modality which Bauman refers as "liquid modernity." Yet in the example that I will discuss below there are things not exactly fitting to draw a line between the modern and the post- modern, or modernity and liquid modernity.

In the environment of individualism and temporality (which Bauman refers as "liquid modernity") there also seems to be an interest in politics among the youth of Turkey. All of the groups mentioned above call for a sort of politicization, while group members criticize the apolitical nature of their fellow Facebook users. Forming such groups and being members of them are considered to be important political acts. When discussion boards of such groups or the discourse used in their descriptions are taken into account, an urge to prove oneself clearly surfaces. This urge can be related to identity politics in general but in our case there are two currents that are visible. One is on the national level, to prove their might against certain groups that they want to oppose and on another level there is the need to prove the might of the Turkish nation to the outer world. In the latter case there are prevalent marks of Orientalist/ Occidentalist discourse which are in line with the perspectives I discussed regarding the cases of *Those Crazy Turks* and *Metal Storm.* Even if formation of these groups and the discourses surrounding them may be considered temporal or even fashionable, when it comes to the case of Facebook, they are important parts of reconstruction sites of identity. There is definitely a degree of "breakability" and an "ad hoc modality" regarding the bonds created between Facebook group members from Bauman's perspective, but this fragmented nature of the bonds and discourses themselves makes up a structure in the end of the

[149] Zigmunt Bauman. "Zigmunt Bauman: Liquid Sociality" in *The Future of Social Theory* (London: Continuum, 2004)p.19

day if we treat Facebook as part of a place for everyday social practices as argued by Michel de Certau.

David Harvey, while discussing the time-space relationship from the perspective of post-modernity, discusses the importance of practices and their symbolic construction of sites.[150] From this perspective, he refers to de Certau's ideas about the partial localities of the city and their being the product of activities marked by the intentions of people living in there. Michel de Certau refers to pedestrian routes of everyday rhetoric that form a fragmented story instead of discussing the technological system of a totalitarian all-encompassing space.[151] These routes are instantly constructed, full of holes, intertwined with social practices they symbolize, just like the Facebook groups. These personal sites and virtual practices they accomplish form a structure of socialization while reflecting popular social practices for a certain group of people.

Having said this, I believe it would be fruitful to approach Facebook as a venue that reflects everyday social practices from a different time-space angle. These practices, to a certain extend, are free from the restriction of the spatial regulations of "reality" but at the same time they continue to create their own by mimicking the "real life." Therefore, the politization I referred to before stands at a crucial point to understand popular and everyday forms of nationalism for a group whose members are mainly young, educated and from an urban, middle/upper-middle class background. I emphasize this composition of Facebook users since it is indispensable in analyzing their standing and what kind of politics they envision. One of the best ways to trace this perspective is to follow their self-classification via

[150] David Harvey. *Postmodernliğin Durumu* (İstanbul: Metis,2003).

[151] Ibid., p.241.

being a member of a certain group. This membership not mean nothing more than a symbol to say that I agree with my friend who sent an offer to join this or that group but nevertheless it leads to a classification. Besides, when Facebook applications and they way friends are listed are considered, Facebook is nothing but classification. Here, I should make a note of Bourdieu's perspective according to which the relationship between power and classification.

> Systems of classification which reproduce in their own specific logic, the objective classes, i.e. the division by sex, age or position in the relations of production, make their specific contribution to the reproduction of the power relations of which they are the product, by securing the misrecognition, and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which they are based…[152]

Non-objective classes, on the other hand, play a more direct role in power relations since their existence is harder to "naturalize" compared to objective classes. In this logic we can argue that nationality can be treated as an "objective" class, but it has been supported by many "non-objective" classes when the composition of popular Facebook groups is considered. Membership in these groups is a manifestation of social contents and such a demand for "collective rhythms" is not only about the representation of social conflicts but also a need for a the groups members to restructure their group.[153] It is interesting that this restructuring works through consumerism.

I refer to consumerism at this point mainly because Facebook can be treated as a product and provides interaction through the consumption of applications designed by Facebook or its users serving as a database for market research. Facebook may not have a material basis but it definitely sells a service and, as I have

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[152] Pierre Bourdieu. *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge,NewYork: Cambridge University Press,1977)p.164.

[153] Ibid., p.63

pointed before, it is very much embedded in the international capital circles related to the Internet such as Microsoft. Its creator may have stated that he does not aim to create a community but Facebook uses symbols of the social reality and uses them as products. Consequently, the call for politization of the youth in this context is very much related to consumerism. Not only consumerism but also this emphasis on the voluntary actions that the Turkish youth should follow, i.e. being a member of a Facebook group to prove the might of the Turks, online voting to make Atatürk the greatest leader in quizzes, changing profile pictures into Turkish flags to prove that Turkish youth care about its country, reflect themselves in a neo-liberal environment which helps them shaped. Mobilization for flag waving, of course, has many components and dynamics outside the dynamics on Facebook however I prefer to leave this discussion to the conclusion. Since I will discuss some of the factors below I just want to quote an interesting summary of the situation: "*Hürriyet*'s outburst, power of Özkök, the comfort of following the opinion leader that does not necessitate thought or consistency, flag fetishism like meeting making sisters…"[154] The power of the media and the flag fetishism seem to play key roles in understanding the fever of flag waiving which reflected itself in turning Facebook into a "Flagbook."

[154] "Hürriyet'in gazı, Özkök'ün gücü, kanaat önderini takip etmenin fikir ve tutar gerektirmeyen konforu, mitingci ablalar modeli bayrak fetişizmi..."Nur Çintay. "Facebook Vatanseverliği: 'Aylin is askere gitmek istiyooo!'" Radikal 28/10/2007 (http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=237059&tarih=28/10/2007) (acessed 18/3/2008)


Images Presented in "Flagbook" between October-December 2007

In a period of days, Facebook became Flagbook for some users. A friend living abroad related the story as follows. "On 21 October, while I was checking my messages on Facebook, I realized that on the entourage application, which maps the profile pictures of people in my friends' list, was rather different than the day before. Some photos were shifted with Turkish flags and some other nationalist symbols. This was a clear sign showing that something was going 'really' wrong in Turkey." It was the aftermath of Dağlıca incidence. According to the mainstream media news, a Turkish military post in Dağlıca was attacked by PKK leaving 12 death and 10 "missing." It triggered organized/semi-organized protests by different organizations (including political parties) throughout the country. These protests were reflected in hanging flags from houses enhancing the visibility of these protests enormously.

The flag hanging campaign was not a first comer to the Turkish political scene. The spontaneity of hanging flags with an emphasis on civil approval has been a theme since the narrations of the public approval of Mustafa Kemal during the Independence War and its aftermath. Yet flag hanging as a "civil and spontaneous" protest of the Kurdish movement is relatively new, dating back to 1996. In June 1996 one of the hottest topics in the mainstream media was a national scandal presented in the form of a young man untying and pulling down the Turkish flag hanging on the pole during a meeting of HADEP, a political party led by Kurdish politicians and activists, meeting in Diyarbakır. Following the news, major TV channels and newspapers started a "flag campaign." It was a call to the Turkish public to put flags on windows of their houses and shops. In Navaro-Yashin's words, it was a campaign "introduced by the media giants as a spontaneous protest 'of the people against those

who want to divide the country'"[155] The flag hangings of October 2007 is another wave of such protests.

Since Facebook is proclaimed to be a reflection of "reality" these campaigns of flag hanging found their echo there as well, albeit with different yet interesting "faces."[156] Flags replaced profile pictures and Facebook turned into "Flagbook." There were groups formed to support flag waiving in profile pictures. The most popular of such groups was *29 Ekim'e kadar 1,000,000 Turk Bayrakli Profil* (1,000,000 profiles with Turkish flags until October 29th) to which membership reached 95 000.[157]



(1000000 profiles with Turkish flags till October 29th :We targeted the sun, even if we cannot reach it we will be approaching the stars)

[155] Yael Navaro-Yashin. *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* Princeton: Princeton University Press,2002)p.128

[156] Yonca Cingöz. Radikal. "Bayraklar 'Facebook'ta Dalgalanıyor" (http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=237109) (accessed 9/04/2008) There were not only flags but also black ribbons put in place of profile pictures to condemn terrorism.

[157] (http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=6808541855) (accessed 12/04/2008)

By the time we reach April 2008 membership has dropped to 65,339 and the percentage of the members who still keep Turkish flagged profile pictures has been around one percent. This shift in visibility and participation is one of the most important elements of nationalism on Facebook specifically and "popular" nationalism generally. The reactions are momentary driving out discourses and practices out of pool and once the agenda is changed they slowly die off only to be remembered in the next nationalist outburst. Consecutive outbursts give a sense of continuity for those who want to prove the power of nationalism but it also leads one to think about the salience of nationalism.

These fluctuations can also be interpreted through failure of the nationalist discourse in our daily lives as Meltem Ahıska, Ferhat Kentel and Fırat Genç argue in their analysis.[158] Yet when the discussions of the participants to these reactions are observed, though there are variations in their interpretation,[159] they also seem to be embedded in the daily lives of those people. One can refer to a failure of embracing the whole of the population targeted of course and this point needs further analysis to see why people did not abide by the nationalist call to put flags on their profile pictures.

Yet there is also a promise to fight with constant failure to appeal to all citizens. (just like there is a constant wave of nationalist outbursts in the last decade,

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[158] Ferhat Kentel. Meltem Ahıska, Fırat Genç. *'Milletin bölünmez Bütünlüğü': Demokratikleşme Sürecince Parçalayan Milliyetçilik(ler)* (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2007).

[159] There are variations in terms of referrring to love or duty towards Turkish nation as the main motivation for putting flags on profile pictures.

there is also a failure in being as "popular" as the organizers like) The fights against this failure is also a fight for the survival of nationalism. The group *29 Ekim'e kadar 1000000 Turk Bayrakli Profil* (1000000 profiles with Turkish flags till October 29th) was described by the founders as "29 Ekimler Bitmez…"/ "There is no end to October the 29th s" This description was explained in the following statement which was presented in the form of an oath.[160]

There is no end to October the 29th s

> The Sublime Leader of
> Turkish Nation!!!
>
> Everywhere, every time
> And under any circumstances
> I promise that
> I will never
> Abandon your principles,
> I will do what ever is in my power,
> To help my nation
> Live honorably in the way of
> Contemporary civilization
> Without sacrificing
> My language and religion
> I vow on my honor and pride

[160] *29 Ekimler bitmez...*

Ey Türk ulusunun ulu önderi!!

Her zaman, her yerde
Ve her kosulda, senin ilkelerinden
ayrılmayacağıma,
Ulusumun çağdaş uygarlık
Dogrultusunda
Onurlu bir şekilde
Yaşayabilmesi için
dilimden ve dinimden ödün vermeden
Elimden geleni yapacağıma,
Bu amaçla çok çalışacağıma,
Namusum ve şerefim üzerine söz verir,
Varlığımı Türk varlığına adarım.

Ne Mutlu
"Türküm" diyorum.

And I devote myself to Turkish substance
Happy I am that I say I am a "Turk."

This oath is indicative of the kind of nationalism it envisions. It has clear references to the speech of Atatürk to the Turkish youth (*Gençliğe Hitabe*). Interestingly, it was written as an answer that emphasizes the importance of religion which was not referred in the original text. The classical saying of "happy is a person who can say 'I am a Turk'" is transformed into "I am happy that I can say I am a 'Turk'" seems to be a reference to the slogans used in Hrant Dink's funeral: We are all Armenians.

Over all, this oath can be discussed within the framework Kemalist nationalism. According to Tanıl Bora, Kemalist nationalism (*ulusculuk*) is a reaction against the neo-liberal hegemony and the rise of the Islamist movement demanding a Kemalist revision of secularism.[161] Yet in this example there are two important points of reference: language and religion. These two areas are designated as no compromise zones in the declaration of the group. The language clearly targets Kurdish. Religion, on the other hand, can be interpreted in two separate yet interrelated ways. On the one hand, it can be seen as emphasizing the religious character of the definition of the Turk against some "others" different than Kurds. On the other hand it can be seen as a reference to martyrdom strengthening the idea of a sacred sacrifice for the sake of the nation. In light of the context the second interpretation seems to be more explaining with some tones added in terms of anti-Westernism. Since the PKK is perceived to be a tool of Christian Western powers to divide Turkey, religion becomes a source of uniqueness. It is possible to argue that

[161] Tanıl Bora. "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey" *the South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102:2/3, (Summer 2003).

Islam was a latent component of the Kemalist version of Turkish nationalism (it was part of the definition of Turk yet it was not declared to be a distinctive feature) Whether it is the effect of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis or rising anti-Westernism, religion seems to have a visible role as will be discussed below.

The fact that the wave of flag usage as profile pictures was not limited to simple Turkish flags, but in line with the motto of Facebook as a kind of "show-off" emphasizing the "personal", there were interesting variations and understandings of the Turkish flag. These variations give us hints about different understandings of Turkish nationalism with multiple components. The mere fact that different components of Turkish identity as perceived by the users are integrated into the Turkish flag is also meaningful in discussing what the flag has come to symbolize.[162] These different symbolisms after the analysis of a sample of these pictures can be categorized as militarism, Atatürk cult, religion and geography. The pictures I have used here are a selection from the pictures actually used by Facebook users. They are circulated through messages and displayed in different groups' pages. It is not possible to give data about the number of users who preferred a certain picture over the others but I can note that different versions of Turkish flag (through Photoshop) and crescent-star were very popular at the time. This being the case I will dwell upon the spectrum of symbolisms.

[162] When we look at the contexts in which the flags were waived for different reasons, one can point to the already defined symbols and relations yet such instances , by being a reproduction, also transforms and redefines preexisting symbols. As Marshall Sahlins suggests, " Engaged thus in life projects, the signs by which people act are brought into referential relation to the objects of their actions, thus giving particular contextual meanings to conceptual values. Again in action, signs are subject to contingent arrangements and rearrangements, instrumental relations that also potentially affect their semantic values." (Marshall Sahlins. *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of teh Sandwich Islands Kingdom*p.67-68)

Before going deeper into the analysis of these pictures one commonality has to be emphasized. There is a clear message in changing profile pictures into flags: the most important part of our identity is not our face right now but it is the fact that we are Turks. It is what makes us unique. Perhaps the most "successful" pictures are the ones below.



fig.1



fig.2

Finger prints are the most common way to determine one's identity, one's uniqueness so to say, just like the retina tests for the science fiction movies. They are crucial to find a culprit, to sign a document or to enter a high security building. Thus it is one step ahead of changing your face. Since they are the fingerprints and eyes which are one's unchangeable unique features, the crescent and star in these pictures successfully transmit the message that one's uniqueness and unchangeable feature is being a member of the Turkish nation. Having said so, I would like to move to different representations that were used for some time following October 2007.

Flags are symbols used for multiple purposes. One of the most common purposes is to symbolize states as they are called national flags. A national flag, however, does not only refer to the state itself. It is loaded with multiple connotations according to the context, such as nation, a certain team, opposition, government, different causes and protests. These connotations are not independent

of each other; mostly they come together in a baggage of symbolism and in certain cases legitimization. Due to the legitimizing force of nationalism, national flag also points at the different redefinitions of nationalism in terms of what it includes and excludes through these different connotations of flag waiving.

In reference to the demonstrations in which waiving Turkish flag was in the forefront, Meltem Ahıska, Fırat Genç, Ferhat Kentel point the chaotic nature of the references made such as traditional, secular, local and universal under the simplifying banner of nationalism.[163]

Militarism

Flagbook is an attempt to conquer the virtual space. This conquest has a double meaning. First, by conquering Facebook you have the feeling that you not only conquered your national public space, but also you have ended up in conquering an international arena. In this respect Facebook offers a great opportunity for the janus nature of nationalism. Thus flags are the absolute symbols of this conquest, as if putting the flag on top of a castle to announce both the outsiders and the insiders that the castle has been fallen or conquered.



Fig.3

[163] Ferhat Kentel, Meltem Ahıska, Fırat Genç. *'Milletin bölünmez Bütünlüğü': Demokratikleşme Sürecince Parçalayan Milliyetçilik(ler)* (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2007) p.9.

Once again, the atmosphere of the time has to be reminded here that the whole flag waving was triggered by the news of PKK attacking a military post, killing as well as capturing soldiers. This was presented as a legitimate occasion to opt for militaristic discourse which was everywhere in the mainstream media. Pictures of flags also reflected the atmosphere.

It was a message designed for internal consumption mostly but due to the nature of Facebook usage -proving something to the outside- as I have discussed before played its role. Here one can make a slight differentiation between them. The two pictures below use commandos on duty with flags as a protest for those killed and captured as well as showing solidarity with them. However, the picture above clearly deviates from this line. It is the colors red and white that reminds us of Turkish flag here. The background uses a scene from a military parade and message has been made clear : "Do Not Mess with Turks." It is possible to argue that this picture was designed primarily for external consumption. In other words, it is a message to give to the outside, a threat and a warning. The line ends with a full stop, but we know what follows due to the military presence in the background. "Do not mess with Turks. If you do…"

 fig.4

fig.5 

These three pictures are just examples among different variations of military-flag combination. In this format it is not only the nation we are identified with but

also the army. Thus comes the infamous cliché of "military-nation." This discourse is heavily supported by positive coverage of young men declaring that they want to go into the army. More importantly, women were highlighted while making statements that they would love to go to the army and fight against terrorists if possible. Consequently, the pictures in Facebook that I mentioned above are reflection of such kind of an attitude as well as a reproduction of "military-nation" discourse. Fig.4 actually has two different versions. The other version was accompanied by a slogan: "*Bu vatanı ya sev ya terket/Ben devamlı buradayım/Mehmetçik"* (Either love this land or leave it/ I am always here/Mehmetçik) Mehmetçik is a synonym for Turkish soldiers. The slogan is presented supposedly from the view point of Turkish soldiers forcing "love it or leave it" to those who live in Turkey.


fig. 6 (*Özgürlük için Çanakkale'de 250.000 şehit verdik. Bilirsiniz! Vatanımızın bütünlüğü için herkes canını vermeye hazır. Bilir misiniz?/*250.000 were martyred for freedom in Çanakkale, you know! Everyone is ready to be martyred for the unity of our motherland now. Do you know that?- Çarşı)

The military nation concept mentioned above was supported with a historical legitimization. Since Turks have always been a fighting nation there has always been a unity between the members of the nation and its military. At times of crisis this unity would surface itself just like the War of Independence or we can find it in the glorious achievements of the Ottomans. Not only that, but also Gallipoli. In line with the recent nostalgic emphasis on WWI and the heroic defense of the Dardanelles, there was also a reference to history through the martyrdom of the Turkish nation. Figure 6 is very interesting in this respect. This time there is a bilingual slogan written on the Turkish flag accompanying the figures of Atatürk and a soldier

reminding us the sacrifice made during the war of Dardanelles for freedom. Likewise, the slogan goes everybody is ready to sacrifice their lives for the unity of the motherland. Yet there is an ambiguous situation as to who "they are" since the slogan mentions the sacrifices in Dardenelles and then says "you know," which reminds us of the Western powers Ottoman empire fought against. Since it was written in English the audience targeted seems to have been the outside world. Being created by the fans of Beşiktaş football club (*Çarşı*) adds another connection between football and nationalism as reflected in Facebook. The connection between football fanaticism and nationalism has long been discussed. Such manifestations lead to an amalgamation between football culture and nationalism, attributing nationalism a fan-like discourse. In a way, the language of football fans echo in the consumer/fan culture of nationalism that emphasizes "craziness."

Atatürk Cult

There is a huge discussion about the place of the Atatürk cult in Turkish nationalism. It is mostly accepted that the Ataturk cult is a determining feature of Turkish nationalism in general, but when a scholar opts to discuss Turkish nationalisms in plural (as I aim to do) the picture becomes fuzzier and more complex since Atatürk does not carry the same weight and does not symbolize the same perspective for different understandings of Turkish nationalism in line with the views of different groups. However, I will not go into a theoretical discussion about Atatürk and Turkish nationalism. Rather than that, I will deal with the references to Atatürk in flagged profile pictures.

In this case it is possible to refer to two representations of Atatürk. One is more militaristic. He is presented in military uniforms or he is referred to as the victor of Independence War. The other seems to be more neutral, presenting Atatürk in civilian clothes or by adding pictures of Anıtkabir which his mausoleum. Pictures 7 and 8 are examples of the latter case.



fig.7



fig.8

In the three versions I included below we have Atatürk in a militaristic reference symbolized with the presence of "*kalpak*". "*Kalpak*" has come to symbolize the spirit of War of Independence and it is possible to observe people wearing "kalpak" in protests against the government.[164] Figure 9, on the other hand, reminds us of the monuments built to symbolize the mobilization of Turkish people during the War of Independence with a bust of Atatürk in the middle right under the Turkish flag.

[164] http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/04/080412_Turkey_update.shtml (accessed 12/4/2008) In a protest organized by Atatürkçü Düşünce Dernekleri on 12/4/2008 in Ankara with the title of "nati.onal sovereignty meeting" some of participants were reported to wear kalpak.



fig.9



fig.10



fig.11 (*Benim vatanımda ezan susmaz, bayrak inmez. Ya sev yada terket!)*

This last picture (fig.11) seems to be a nice combination of Islam, flag and the militaristic figure of Atatürk together with a slogan: "In my fatherland, the call for prayer is not silenced, flag is not lowered. Love it or leave it!" This reminds one of another type of Turkish nationalism, MHP type of ultra-nationalist version. As the last part of the slogan shows (Love it or leave it) it is a fascistic interpretation emphasizing the military might together with a racist definition of Turkishness combined with references to Islam.

Esra Özyürek devotes a chapter to the changing images of Atatürk and its commodification in the 1990s in her book *Modernlik Nostaljisi: Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Gündelik Hayatta Siyaset.*/ Nostalgia of Modernity: Kemalism, Laicism and Politics in Eveyday Life.[165] She marks the 1990s as the decade when state iconography of Atatürk through commodification was privatized as a reaction to the rise of Islamic symbols in the public sphere. In this decade, she argues, a new image

[165] Esra Özyürek. *Modernlik Nostaljisi: Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Gündelik Hayatta Siyaset* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi,2008).

of Atatürk became popular, Atatürk as an ordinary citizens enjoying a Western lifestyle. This is, of course, an important signal of the birth of neo-Kemalism which I discussed before. What is important for this section is how different images of Atatürk can be discussed. Producer of Atatürk sculptures categorizes these images as soldier, statesman and citizen (*halk adamı*)[166] Esra Özyürek emphasizes the usage of the third image more widely as a reaction to Islamists while emphasizing the "civil" nature of Atatürk. Based on the observations on "Flagbook" however, it can be argued that these images are used selectively even if I agree with Özyürek on the privatization aspect.

In the pictures above Facebook users emphasize more "classic" images of Atatürk. What we see in these pictures is either Atatürk as soldier or Atatürk as statesman. This is related to the militarism discussed above as well as the targetted audience. When different Kemalist groups positioning themselves against the AKP or Islamists in general we can also conclude that the third image becomes more popular.

Geography

Who we are is very closely related to where we are, especially in the mind-set of nation-states. This being the case, the profile pictures were also accompanied by the silhouettes of the map of Turkey along the flags. More specifically there were references to the Bosphorus or Anıtkabir as symbols of Turkey. The visibility of flags in crucial points of cities like Ankara and İstanbul has already been increasing by the giant flags put up by the authorities.

[166] Ibid., p.131.

 fig.12

 fig.13

Flag waiving has become a part of everyday life nowadays for reasons of protest, for commemoration, or to mark a certain piece of land with a stronger claim. The last case that I am referring is the case of the giant flags that decorate the shores of the Bosphorus which were not there a couple of years ago and their presence seems to make a stronger local claim than the universal. You are welcomed by these flags and then you come across the sign "welcome to Asia/Europe" on the bridge.

Yet this time what can be seen in the figures of 11 and 12 is another type of the naturalization of nationalism through geography. It is in the nature of geography- maybe latent- to reflect Turkishness. The sea and the sky (there were also many pictures of crescent and star in the sky) naturalizes and sites like the Bosphorus, which is a symbol of Turkey's uniqueness, become markers of this reflection.

Religion

I have included a brief discussion of a combination of religion and nationalism in relation to Figure 11. Nevertheless, this emphasis on religion needs further discussion since one cannot make a distinction between Kurds and Turks in terms of religion. Usage of mosques in Figures14 and 15 highlights a Sunni

character. However, Kurdish population in Turkey is Sunni as well as Alevi so it does not target Kurds as a group to protest PKK or Kurdish separatism. Why emphasize Sunni Islam?

 fig.14

 fig.15

One possible explanation would be to highlight martyrdom. However, the presence of mosques or presence of the word "Allah" in picture 14 does not automatically recall martyrdom. From another point of view we can consider it as a reflection of one of the components of Turkishness. Considering the crisis of the time, again it does not seem to be enough. However, it may have been more meaningful considering the connection of the PKK with northern Iraq and the US presence there. Since Kurdish nationalism/separatism is considered part of the Western conspiracies to divide Turkey, it can be interpreted as a protest against the Christian West as well as a reflection of Turkishness. Since Facebook is considered as a space to "represent" the nation both in internal and external fronts, it seems to be more meaningful.

The imageries presented above actually correspond to different understandings of Turkish nationalism which use different doses of religion, Atatürk, military and geography to define itself. This definition is of course contextual. When a secular tone is emphasized, just like in the case of neo-Kemalism, the supporters refrain from using symbols that have a direct religious message. The existence of these different symbolisms next to each other can be interpreted as the reflection of

ambiguity. This ambiguity of the contextual defining of the borders gives a capacity for a catch-all symbolism of the nationalist discourses. On the other hand, it also signals a struggle over being the hegemonic interpretation of Turkish nationalism, which will be discussed below.

The Targetted Audience: Domestic or International

Throughout the whole discussion on the symbols used in pictures an ambiguity or interplay about targeted audience was discussed. The message to the domestic audience is a message to show solidarity with the army and remind those who want to divide Turkey that "we" will not allow it because "we" are the Turkish nation how ever it is defined. I have tried to discuss different understandings and different symbolisms of Turkish identity through flags. One striking example was one with a strong reference to central Asia to the Orkhon monuments.[167] Figure 16 includes a quotation from these monuments where a ruler targets the whole Turkish nation as audience. "Who can ruin your tradition, your country if the sky above has not fallen down, if the earth below has not been cut through, be shaken and return to yourself" Thus we are reminded of the danger that awaits and has awaited Turkish nation throughout its history, but rest assured that we are strong enough to deal with them.

[167] They are the monuments seen as one of the oldest written proofs of the existence of Turkish language. It dates back to the time of the Göktürk state, a state which is thought to have used the name Turk in its title for the first time. In this monument, a statesman addresses the coming generations and warns them against the future dangers and conspiracies. He concludes that as long as they remain united, nothing can defeat the Turks.

 fig.16 (*Ey Türk; Üstte gök çökmedikçe/Altta yer delinmedikçe/Senin ilini ve töreni kim bozabilir/Titre ve kendine dön.)*

This message in itself is also related to the message aimed at the international audience. The number of those who agree and present the first message of solidarity would turn into a message for the outside world as a proof of "our" unity. Yet this is not the only component of the message aimed at the outside world. There are also bilingual or even English messages attached to pictures which clarify the message targeted for outside. I have mentioned two such examples so far and a third one can be seen in figure 17.

 fig. 17(Terrorism threatens whole humanity. Let's stop it together/ *Terör tüm insanlığı tehdit ediyor. Teröre birlikte dur diyelim*)

This picture can be interpreted as a call for solidarity in the international arena with the reference to the whole humanity. Thus it is important to show that Facebook is used not only as an arena for proving one's strength or one's reactions to challenges but also as a way for seeking support. Yet this picture exists along with irredentist, threatening pictures as representations of "reaction."



(Figure 18: Suddenly, over night!!! 81- Düzce[the last city in the numerical order], 82-Kerkük 83-Musul A map is not drawn like that but here it is drawn like this…)

This was maybe the most striking picture circulated at the time on Facebook. The last line "a map is not drawn like that, but here it is drawn like this" underlines the reactionary nature of the picture against the maps showing southeastern Turkey as the separate state of Kurdistan. This picture is taken from a widely circulated message on Facebook but the map itself was used as a profile picture at the time. The first part of the message "One night suddenly!" follows Musul and Kerkük becoming Turkish cities with the traffic codes of 82 and 83. I have to remind that this written part of the message was used as a banner by Beşiktaş fans as well. Yet its circulation

in Facebook and its becoming a profile picture again signifies Facebook as a place for struggle, a place to give one's well-deserved answer to the outer world.

Anti-Nationalism on Facebook

In the first chapter I discussed four forms of culture as described by Terry Eagleton. They were culture as civility, culture as identity, culture as commercialism and culture as radical protest. I argued that Facebook lies in the intersection of these four forms and discourses. The discourse about being modern and being present on Facebook as a proof of being in tune with the contemporary level of civilization is reflection of culture as civility. The whole discussion around the profile pictures is a form of culture as identity. Facebook itself is the embodiment of culture as commercialism. Since all these different forms are pointed out throughout this chapter, what is left is the culture of radical protest.

My discussion of "Flagbook" can be interpreted as a form of protest, but Terry Eagleton refers to a challenge to the status quo with a commitment to change.[168] Since whole flag campaigns are the reenactment of the status quo, they do not form an example of culture as protest as used by Eagleton. He refers to the role of arts in that argument but I use it in a wider setting of manifestations of popular culture rather than arts. Facebook, in this sense, is not only a medium through which the status quo is reproduced but it is also a venue where protests to change the status quo is organized. As for Turkish nationalism, one such protest and challenge is

[168] Terry Eagleton. *The Idea of Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell,2000) p.126.

organized by an initiative called "*Irkçılığa ve Milliyetçiliğe DurDe!* /Say Stop to Racism and Nationalism!"

"Say Stop to Racism and Nationalism!"is formed by a group of activists that are organized through their the Internet site and Facebook group. They collect signatures against different sorts of nationalist or discriminatory acts as well as organizing street protests. The assassination of Hrant Dink was the turning point for the founders of the group since it is the sign of nationalism turning into racism together with many incidents like the assassination of priests. They decided to form a civil initiative that will be active on the Internet as well as on the street. They wrote a call for activism and published it on the Internet. Today, 2100 people follow their mailing list and 20.000 people have become members of this group on Facebook. Even if they use their Internet site, Facebook and mailing lists, they prioritize street activism. Cengiz Alğan finds Facebook quite useful since it makes it easier to announce events and reach a wider public.

"We know that there are many nationalist and racist sites on the Internet, but the interest we received showed that there was a gap for resisting such nationalist sites. The Internet is cheap, there are other groups that follow our site and announce them on their sites and mail lists like Diyarbakır, GençSiviller. There is a network intertwined in this sense."[169] Yet they give priority to street activism and Facebook is not used as a mimicry of the "real life" but a means for communication and organization.

> "Of course when it is not supported by street activism it is of little use. We organized the first protest against coup d'etat in Turkey and many groups supports us like Genç Siviller and Mazlum-Der. It appealed to different people;

[169] *Elbette The Internette milliyetçi ırkçı siteler çoklar ama bir direniş odağı olarak da böyle bir şeyin işe yaradığı görülüyor. İnternetin tabi pek çok faydası var. Birincisi ucuz. İkincisi çok yaygın duyurma olanağımız oluyor çünkü grubumuzu takip eden gruplar beliriyor: örneğin Diyarbakır diye bir grup ya da Genç Siviller. Birbirinin içine geçmiş bir ağ oluşmuş gerçekten de.* (Interview with Cengiz Alğan 5 August 2008)

> students, workers, academicians, those with the headscarf, those without headscarf, young or old…Our number reached ten thousand. That protest was organized completely through the Internet. I do not think attracting this much attention is not related to our ability but it was initiative that filled a gap since we organize through the Internet, horizontally. Groups when based on the Internet are not supported by the activism on the streets then it remains only in the virtual.[thus not long-lived and visible enough][170]

This street activism and visibility on the Internet attract attention to the issue of nationalism as well as the attention of the nationalists. This attention can reflect itself in the comments which sometimes turn into threats. According to Alğan the threats came first as part of comments put on the Facebook. Then there had been continuous attacks towards the mail group by those who openly declare themselves as fascist and members of MHP.

> As a result we had to change the format of the mailing list but the threats continue through phone calls.(…) Nevertheless, the threats come from the same group of people either from MHP or BBP. There are also some protests coming from some marginal CHP members but they are not in the form of threats rather they are in the form of insults. It is like the flames burn the brightest just before their extinction.[171]

Compared to the nationalist groups on Facebook, this group is certainly a minority but their visibility is a challenge. This is in this a sense a good example of

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[170] Interview with Cengiz Alğan 5 August 2008: *"Eğer sokak aktivizmiyle desteklenmezse bu faaliyet bence hiçbir işe yaramaz. Hiçbir işe demeyelim de çok az işe yarar. Türkiye tarihinde ilk defa darbeye karşı bir eylem yapıldı ve biz yaptık. Hemen Genç Siviller destek olacaklarını söyledi, Mazlum-Der destek olacağını söyledi. Çok sayıda, aydın yazar,sanatçı… İlk defa insanlar, üstelik de genç,yaşlı, türbanlı, türbansız,öğrenci,işçi,sendikacı…herkes bir anda yürümeye başladı. On bine ulaştı birden sayı. Daha önce izin almamıza rağmen demek ki korktular, kestiler önümüze. O eylem tamamen The Internet üzerinden örgütlenmişti mesela. (…) Bu kadar ilgi görmesinin nedeni bizim becerikliliğimiz değil bence. Çok yetersiz kalıyoruz, gerçekten o kadar aktivistimiz yok. Demek ki bir boşluk varmış Türkiye'de. (…) Asıl örgütlenme yerimiz The Internet ama sokakla desteklenmediği sürece görünüşte kalır ancak."*

[171] Ibid.: *sonra mail grubumuza saldırı olmaya başladı. Faşist olduğunu açıkça söyleyen iki üç tip saldırmaya başladılar ve grubu felç ettiler. Ve artık tehditler telefonla da gelmeye başladı. Tehdit aldığımız gruplar da hep aynı nedense: ya MHP'li ya BBP'li. CHP'lilerden de bazen geliyor ama tehdit düzeyinde değil aşağılama düzeyinde. Ortada duran CHP'ye oy verenlerden değil de aşırı milliyetçilerden. Hani derler ya ateşin dumanı en çok sönmeye yakınken çıkar. Şimdi bir kırılma yaşanıyor Türkiye'de.*

the public space and the popular being a struggle for hegemony that I mentioned earlier. I have mentioned that the different interpretations of Turkish nationalism can be considered in a struggle to dominate and be the hegemonic interpretation. There has been also a struggle to be the "face" of Turkey on Facebook and the symbols used on "Flagbook" were a reflection of this struggle. The presence of anti-nationalist groups in Facebook adds another dimension to this struggle. Thus the representation of the "real" in the virtual is not necessarily in the monopoly of nationalism. In fact, since Facebook is in a way an arena of the popular, those who want to show some resistance to the hegemony in different aspects use Facebook and its advantage of networking to make their voices heard. [172]

Interestingly enough, in the case of the group "say stop to nationalism and racism" there is also criticism of the former forms of protests. Just like the emphasis of neo-Kemalism there is an emphasis on and appraisal of "civility" and "civil reaction." What Kemalists meant from the "civil" is generally a reference to private individuals but in the case of the group "say stop to nationalism and racism" the definition of the "civil" is not necessarily private citizens but it is defined by being colorful and spontaneous.

> In anti- coup d'etat meetings we use one slogan only and people feel themselves comfortable joining us. People are scared of "classical" leftist protest where people are lined up like the military with red flags. We on the other hand laugh, we play pipes, we are all colorful. Everybody could join us. This is the real reaction of the civil society. The old top-to-down organization of the leftist groups started to become marginal.[173]

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[172] Here I do not only refer to the case of "say stop to nationalism and racism." Through the applications of Facebook it is possible to show to your friends that you are supporting a cause. It can be in the form of "stop armenian genocide lies" or it could be "stop the murders in Tuzla" or "support Novamed strike"

[173] Interview with Cengiz Alğan 5August 2008. *"Darbeye karşı mitinglerde sadece tek bir slogan kullandık ve insanlar rahatça bize katıldılar. İnsanlar klasik solcu protestoların asker gibi sıralanıp elde kırmızı bayraklarla yaptıkları protestolardan ürküyorlar. Bizse gülerek kahkahalarla, düdükler çalarak, rengarek yürüyoruz. Herkes bize*

Representation of the popular and the civil seems to be the common denominator of those struggling for visibility on Facebook.

Of course this group is not the only one that is active against nationalism. There are other groups that aim to protest nationalism and nationalist practices such as "*Barış Hemen Şimdi* (Peace Now)"[174] or "*Tahammülsüzlüğe Tahammül Etme* (Don't Tolerate Intolerance)."[175] Even if their visibility is far lower than some other nationalist groups their presence is valuable in their call for activism against nationalism. They are part of the struggle over the representation of faces in Facebook.

Facebook as a Realm of Struggle: Whose Face Will Dominate

In the beginning of the chapter I underlined that the importance of the Facebook lies in its mimicry of the real in the virtual. Through this mimicry just like in the "real" world it helps the imagination of the communities. In fact by cutting the bonds with the locality it even enhances this imagination. One such imaginations is what I called in the beginning of the chapter "the Internet citizenship." Through the declaration or practice users of Facebook may opt to form a community of the

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katılabiliyor. İşte bu sivil toplumun gerçek tepkisi. O yüzden de eski hiyerarşik sol örgütlenmeler marjinal kalıyor.

[174] As of 22 August 2008, the group has 5303 members. Facebook. "Barış Hemen Şimdi"Available [online]: "http://www.Facebook.com/group.php?gid=18575701472"[22 August 2008]

[175] As of 22 August 2008, the groups has 489 members. Its discussion board has been closed down due to the constant insults coming from nationalist members of Facebook Facebook. "Tahammülsüzlüğe Tahammül Etme"Available [online]: "http://www.Facebook.com/home.php?#/group.php?gid=20464539376" [22 August 2008]

Turkish nation. Then, rather than being a collection of faces, Facebook starts to be approached as a collection of faces of communities. Once it is imagined in this way then the struggle revolves around how the face will look like.

The urge to prove the strength of a given group in numbers is a reflection of the struggle over which imaginary will be the face of Turkey. Will it symbolize the historical roots or secularism or the principles of Atatürk or all of them at the same time? The campaign of putting Turkish flags on profile pictures (thus the birth of Flagbook) was a call to paint the face of Turkey in the virtual space in red and white. This seems to be the common denominator of the participants of the campaign. However, to what extent religion will be included and the presence of a strong military will be underlined? Will the numbers be enough to make a united face to the outside? How to account for the dissenting voices, anti-nationalists?

These are the only a few of the questions that can be asked about the struggle of the domination. However, there are no clear answers. There are no clear answers on Facebook or in the Turkish public sphere in general. It is the struggle itself that continues under many forms. As for the short time-period I have discussed, it seems that neo-Kemalist interpretation has put its mark on the face of Turkey on Facebook but it is by no means hegemonic or even permanent.

If Facebook offers the power of visibility to neo-Kemalism, it also comes with the pressure of the gaze. This gaze in its nationalist context would also draw the limits of the proper. With just once glance to your entourage you can see who joined the flag campaign and proved one's loyalty.[176] Therefore the measures of appropriateness (i.e., putting up Turkish flags on your profiles to prove solidarity) will contribute to the norms of the Internet citizenship. I have already discussed

[176] It is an application that you can use to see the profile pictures of all your friends put next to each other.

Occidentalism in relation to the "craziness" in "Those Crazy Turks." Participation on Facebook also shares the discourse of Occidentalism and the desire to be on par with the West.

In this case, however, it is easy to imagine that there is a Western level of development and Turks are finally reaching it. Facebook is a display window where Turks can show their Western face as well as emphasizing their distinction. This desire to emphasize distinction can be seen in insistence on using Facebook in Turkish. One can assume the discussion evolving around using Facebook in English or Turkish just a choice or a desire to use it more comfortably. Yet the discussions about Facebook prove that it is much more complicated.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The chapters discussed so far were presentations of my snapshots. They focused on the representations of contemporary Turkish nationalism in general and its neo-Kemalist version in particular. I started thinking about this thesis in terms of popular Turkish nationalism, but then I decided that it can only be referred to as "popular" Turkish nationalism since different versions have different claims of being popular. There are self-proclaimed popular Turkish nationalisms corresponding to different understandings of the populace. The rest of society, who do not necessarily follow their version of "popular," are either traitor, ignorant, or trying to deceive people with "wrong" understanding of nationalism.

Among many interpretations of Turkish nationalism that I mentioned only briefly in this thesis, like "official", liberal or radical, I tried to understand the neo-Kemalist version. This version came into being in the 1990s as a reaction to and in accordance with the changes in the political scene. In the 1990s threat perceptions focused on the Kurdish movement, the rise of political Islam, the deteriorating economy and the effects of global liberalism. It was also a time when "civil society" was praised as the savoir of democracy and consumerism as a reflection of political choice. It was also a time, discursively, the "popular" was as important as the "official" if not more. In this "popular" understanding, Kemalism is to be defended by civil society against the powers that try to use the official instruments to erode the

principles of Kemalism. Thus society is called to action to defend and to be a center of opposition. This call and wave of activism reflects itself in some NGOs as pointed out by the scholars as well as in the consumer performances and the symbolism in the everyday life.

In the 2000s, this climate continues to be dominant. This time with the background of the challenging EU negotiations, the memories of the 2000 and 2001 economic crisis and the rise of AKP as the victor of elections both local and country wide. In reaction, in the neo-Kemalist discourse nostalgia for the early Republican period is very dominant. This is best portrayed in the historical novel *Those Crazy Turks* discussed in detail in the third chapter. The fiction in this case is portrayed as the "reality" as a "successful" reconstruction of the past that is to shed a path for the recovery of the present. This association of the past and the present through the conspiracies, enemies and heroes is seen as one of the most important factors that made the book the best seller of 2005. In making this novel a popular one, the effects of the presentations in the mass media and the obligatory reading of the book at schools cannot be overlooked. Even if they are very important factors contributing to the "popularity of the book, to be able to understand the mentality of those who appreciate the book we need a closer study.

When those who declare themselves fans of this book are questioned as to what makes this book so special, important clues surface to explain the understanding of those who has a neo-Kemalist understanding. "Craziness" is the catch phrase. It is seen as an attribute of the Turks that proves their loyalty to the nation by making crazy sacrifices in time of need. This aspect of craziness is put against the cold-blooded rationality of the enemies and the conspirators that try to divide Turkey or try to destroy its path of development drawn by Mustafa Kemal

Atatürk. I tried to put different interpretations of the association of "craziness" with the Turkish national identity. It has been projected as non-Western and beyond the comprehension of those who are not Turkish nationalists. It is like the magical trait of sacrifice and glory with all the Occidentalist connotations and has been embraced by the media commentators to refer to current "victories." Thus it helps to envision an essential identity that highlights "us" versus "them" division while working to boost the pride of the members of this nation. This is in direct opposition to the projectory in "Metal Storm" even if both of the books are built around the idea of a Turkish nation surrounded by enemies and conspiracies.

Since one of the distinctive features of neo-Kemalism is its call for action in the civil society (sometimes it can also mean taking action to support the position of the military in politics) *Those Crazy Turks* aims to provide a map. It is especially a map tailored for the youth . Against the conspiracies that aim to put the Turkish youth into oblivion, the discourse in *Those Crazy Turks* puts the responsibility on the youth to be alarmed against the dire situation of the present that endangers the sacrifices made to build this republic. Unlike the emphasis in the earlier periods, the duty of the youth is not only to defense and walk the path of progress but also conserve. Of course conservation and defense are close allies in the mental maps of Kemalist discourses but it seems that since the Republic is no longer considered to be young, the conservation and the glory of the past seems to be emphasized more to make people react.

This emphasis on defense and taking action as a reaction to the contemporary threats is taking many shapes in the everyday life practices. These everyday life practices do not have to be in our "real" lives but they are also visible in our "virtual" lives. In Chapter Four, I focused on one manifestation of the virtual:

the Facebook. I took it as a new popular medium that enables the mimicry of the "real" lives. Facebook is the most visited site after Google in Turkey and membership exceeds two million people from Turkey. The profile of the users seems to be mostly educated and predominantly middle class. Based on this profile, I emphasized the construction of the Internet citizenship based on virtual practices and self-declaration. In this respect there is a certain political mobilization in a networking site which is not necessarily seen political or affective even by the participants. There is still a distinction between "click" response (in terms of its easiness and insignificance) and the power of the street activism. Yet these virtual protests add to symbolic constructions that tend to mimic the "reality." Therefore, this Internet citizenship has a dual function: the construction of the "virtual" as a reflection of the "real" and supporting the "real" through the "virtual."

This dual function is realized through the gaze. Faces on the Facebook are formed through the relationships and virtual performances. In the case of nationalism and the Flagbook I discussed in the fourth chapter, profile pictures are only one of the examples in which the international or national gaze is assumed and protests are designed accordingly. This international aspect adds different colors to the Occidentalist understanding and the discourse of "reaching the contemporary level of civilization." As members of Facebook, users are on the same level as participants of the most popular networking site in the world. From this perspective, contemporary level of civilization is already reached. However, the gaze of the West is still essentialized and the messages are targeted to this gaze, making Facebook a display window.

In this display window, there is ongoing struggle and discussion for the construction of Turkish identity. As can be seen in the case of "Flagbook" I

discussed, putting flags on profile pictures is one way of realization of "faces of the state"[177] on Facebook. These faces are constructed through the usage of different symbols referring to militarism, Atatürkism/Kemalism, geography and religion. I must note that in line with the fluid nature of Facebook and momentary flashes of nationalist outbursts, flag campaign on Facebook died off within a couple of months but it made an important visual impact and continued to be discussed in Facebook groups. Facebook groups provide a long term commitment compared to the Flagbook campaign. When the most popular Facebook groups in Turkey network are considered, more than half of them are political with a predominant neo-Kemalist outlook.

The usage of Internet as a venue for mobilization is one of the distinctive features of the neo-Kemalism in the 2000s compared to the neo-Kemalism of the 1990s. It may have been interpreted as a mere dissemination of technology, but the medium changes the message. Since Internet is so temporal and has been presented as a medium that gives voices to the silent (marginal in Certau's terms) majority, the mobilization that uses this medium is focused on being permanent and having a (loud) voice. This can clearly be seen in the obsession with numbers in Facebook groups discussed.

It not only changes the message, but also reflects the atmosphere of the time that is globalism, fragility and temporality. Internet in general and Facebook in particular reflects this atmosphere in their fragmented nature. This fragmentation is a result of not only their structures, but also the fragmented discourses and actions of the users. The Internet users are fragmented, caught between the "virtual" and the

[177] Yael Navaro-Yashin. *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* Princeton: Princeton University Press,2002.

"real." They are also fragmented due to the nature of the consumer society through its image bombardments and imposition of categories. This characteristic of consumerism especially targets the youth and uses Internet effectively as can be seen on Facebook. Moreover, this fragmentation is coupled with the question of identity and consciousness. When the discussions on Facebook groups and the images on "Flagbook" are considered this fragmentation makes itself very visible. I tried to point this fragmentation especially in the neo-Kemalist discourse but discourses on Facebook deserve much more attention which can be analyzed in another study.

Even if neo-Kemalist discourse and its interpretation of Turkish nationalism seems to have an upper hand compared to other interpretations of Turkish nationalism, there is an important majority that remains silent on political matters maybe only to show some reaction when such nationalist outbursts occur. I must add that I defined Facebook as a realm of struggle not only because there are different interpretations of nationalism or there are those who use a nationalist language as a reflex. I defined it as a realm of struggle because in addition to the struggles for hegemony there is also anti-nationalist struggle in the form of groups or in not participating to these flag campaigns.

Since my analysis show that nationalism is part of the discourses and practices in our daily lives whether "real" or "virtual", I aimed to understand how discourses and practices of individuals in the everyday life contribute to nationalism in general and neo-Kemalist version in particular. The people caught in the photographs I took in this thesis are struggling to form a face through their imagination of citizenship and usage of the gaze. This gaze reflects uneasiness about today, especially among the youth. Neo-Kemalist discourse targets this youth and adds a schizophrenic nature to its discourse. Today is full of threats and conspiracies

targeting the pride, memory and the very existence of Turkish nation. Then what is there in the future? There are only two alternative futures. In one of the future scenarios, just like in the years of the National Struggle, the Turkish nation is once again awakened to ruin the plans of the conspirators and the Turkish youth takes its destiny to its hands and continues the history of crazy glories on the path drawn by Atatürk. In the second scenario, the youth remain in oblivion and the conspirators prevail which would be the doom of the Turkish nation. Thus the youth are caught in a dichotomy. It has to take action and it has to defend.

This dichotomy is also reflected in the discourses when there is call for action. The tone of this call of action is rather militaristic that resembles the tone in National Security text books Ayşe Gül Altınay analyzed.[178] Yet this militaristic tone is coupled with the fear of political inaction on the part of the citizens. As mentioned on the Chapter Four, continous assumption/ consciousness of a .Westen gaze is one of the points of reference for this fear while the other is the "enemies within." This fear of political inactivity is tried to be compensated by the militaristic tone and optimist belief in the "craziness" of the Turkish nation.

As can be seen in the comments of the fans of *Those Crazy Turks* who come from the middle class and are between 18 and 30, the audience of *Those Crazy Turks* think that the youth has to take action (for sure.) Clearly there is a pessimistic vision of the present. This pessimism reflects the environment I noted earlier in this section. Yet the question remains that if the youth has to take action then in which direction? There is ambivalence. In the narrative of these young people there are enemies in the form of abstraction. Moreover, "whose fault the present situation is" is a question

[178] Ayşe Gül Altınay. *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey. (*NewYork: Palgrave, 2004).

that has multiple ambiguous answers. There is both pessimism and optimism for their future and they are looking at history and the tale of *Those Crazy Turks* as a source of optimism and guidance to change the worsening situation which in turn forms the bond between the past and the present. There is the reflection of the fear of loss, accompanied by a hope to change it. Therefore, it seems that there is a desire for change (for better perspective futures), but there is silence and question marks about the path to be taken. Nationalism and a neo-Kemalist vision are used to fill this silence. In a way this desire for change can be interpreted as a potential for politization. However, as long as their perception is caught in this dichotomous picture I mentioned above, this politization can only end up in what Tanıl Bora calls the "frenzy of the educated ignorance."[179] This is a frenzy rising as a result of the dislocation of the secular middle class (the basis of Neo-Kemalism) and a fear to lose their status which is articulated through nationalist reactions. On the other hand, as can be seen in the case of Facebook, these reactions preach conservatism (return to the "golden age") paradoxically, as a way to protect the Kemalist discourse of "reaching the contemporary level of civilization." When this level is already reached "virtually" then it becomes even more complicated to provide an answer to the question of "where the path leads after this level is reached?" Therefore, beyond targeting an enemy, neo-Kemalism fails to provide a roadmap for the future. Consequently, without the constant alarms for the enemies, it may not even be popular among the educated secular middle classes.

In conclusion, the snapshots I took and presented in this thesis focused on neo-Kemalist understanding of Turkish nationalism which is also presented as popular nationalism in line with the discourse of making Kemalism popular and civil.

[179] Tanıl Bora. "Tahsilli Cehaletin Cinneti" *Birikim* 211, November 2006 pp.36-40

I hope that in the end of this thesis these snapshots formed a sketch to understand some aspects of the "popular" in Turkish nationalism.

Unfortunately, my shots miss some important actors that should be included to have a wider perspective in this sketch. Those missing actors are the supporters of other types of Turkish nationalism and more importantly those who do not participate in such understandings. The users of Facebook who did not participate in the flag campaigns have to be taken into account to situate the struggle over nationalism on Facebook but due to the fluid nature of the Internet and the scope of this thesis they remained in the shadows. I tried to put a small spot to anti-nationalism on Facebook but it remained small. The same problem is present for the readers of *Those Crazy Turks*. Those who did not like the novel are missing in the picture I drew. However, they are left to complete the picture in another study.

APPENDIX A

Search

Applications edit

- Photos
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- Sticky!
- Terry Pratchett quotes
- Animated Gifts

more

Herkes ParaPuan Kazanıyor

Friends Inbox

home account privacy logout



Davet basına arkadaşlarınızdan 5 YTL, onların arkadaşlarından 2 YTL, onların da arkadaşlarından 1 YTL değerinde ParaPuan kazanın.

More Ads | Advertise

DÜNYA ÇAPINDAKİ EN BÜYÜK TÜRK TOPLULUĞU

Global

Group Info

DÜNYA ÇAPINDAKİ EN BÜYÜK TÜRK TOPLULUĞU
Just for Fun - Facebook Classics

Bu inanılmaz Facebook deneyimine katılmaya davetlisiniz.

Six Degrees of Separation teorisini kullanarak, dünya üzerindeki herkesi birleştirmek mümkün mü? Bu teori, dünya üzerindeki hehangi birine en fazla 6 kişi aracılığıyla ulaşabileceğimizi anlatır


Hemen katılın ve arkadaşlarınızı da bu inanılmaz projeye davet edin.

Yapmanız gerekenler :
1. Gruba katılın.
2. Ekranın sağındaki "Invite People to Join"'e tıklayın.
3. Bütün arkadaşlarınızı seçin (Deneyin başarılı olabilmesi için, bunu yapmanız gerekir)
4. "Send Invitation"i tıkla.

Bu kadar basit.

En iyi dileklerimle.

Serdar



View Discussion Board

Join this Group

Share

Related Groups

Bu Gruba Üye Olun Türk Bayrağı İle Guinness Rekorlar Kitabına Biz Girelim.
Common Interest - Beliefs & Causes

ATATÜRKÜN GENÇLİĞİ KAÇ KİŞİYİZ TÜM DÜNYAYA GÖSTERELİM HADİ TÜRK GENCİ
Organizations - Professional Organizations

Türk Milli Takımı (The Turkish National Football Team)
Sports & Recreation - International Sports

"Zeki ama çalışmıyor, çalıssa yapar" ögrenci grubu
Just for Fun - Fan Clubs

"AKP'NİN KAPATILMASINI İSTEYEN 10.000.000 KİŞİDEN BİRİ DE BENİM" PLATFORMU:
Organizations - Political Organizations

Group Type

This is an open group. Anyone can join and invite others to join.

Admins

- Christian Monte-Carlo (Monaco) (creator)

Photos

Displaying 4 of 1720 photos. See All



Videos

Displaying 2 of 72 videos. See All



Uyan Dostum Uyan!..
by Zeki Çıplak
5:26 Uploaded on Thursday.

View Video | 2 comments



Özgür Son Gidişim Klip www.ozgurrock.com
by Ozgur Web
4:31 Uploaded about 3 months ago.

View Video | 18 comments

Posted Items

Displaying 2 of 2714 posted items. See All



" NeRDe NeRDe CaNDaN SeVeN NeRDe... " Diyenler...
Facebook Group

" İŞTE BÖYLE GİDECEKSİN SALINA
SALINA,ARDINA BAKA BAKA
KİMİ BEKLİYORSUN DA BAKARSIN ARDINA
DEMEZLER Mİ ADAMA?
SEN BİR GURURSUZU SEVMEDİN Kİ
GÜZELİM,
Kİ GELSİN ARDINDAN.
O ASİLCE SEVDİ VE ASİLCE GİTTİ.....

Posted by Yusuf Altunok



TÜRK BİRLİĞİ
Facebook Group

APPENDIX B

home account privacy logout

Search

Applications edit
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- Sticky!
- Terry Pratchett quotes
- Animated Gifts

more

Meziz: Saglikli Atistirma




Atistirma ihtiyacinizi sebze ve bakliyat iceren Meziz cesitleriyle giderin. Meziz'de yag, transyag ve tuz oranlari normlardan cok az

More Ads | Advertise

ATATÜRK'ÜN EN KARİZMATİK LİDER OLDUĞUNA İNANANLAR

Global



Join this Group

Share

Information

Group Info

Name: ATATÜRK'ÜN EN KARİZMATİK LİDER OLDUĞUNA İNANANLAR

Type: Organizations - Professional Organizations

Description: SİZDE BU DÜNYADAKİ GELMİŞ GEÇMİŞ EN KARİZMATİK LİDER VE EŞİ GELMEZ BİRİ OLDUĞUNA İNANIYORSANIZ GELİN SAYIMIZI BÜTÜN DÜNYA FARKETSİN...

Hemen katılın ve arkadaşlarınızı da bu inanılmaz projeye davet edin.

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=21124445450

Yapmanız gerekenler :
1. Gruba katılın.
2. Ekranın sağındaki "Invite People to Join'"e tıklayın.
3. Bütün arkadaşlarınızı seçin
4. "Send Invitation"ı tıkla.

Bu kadar basit.

En iyi dileklerimle.

TOGOSA (TOLGA SAĞLAM)

Contact Info

Email: togosa2000@mynet.com

Street: TÜRKİYE

Recent News

....

BUTUN TURKLERI BIRLESTIRME TEORISI

....

Seven Degrees of Separation teorisini kullanarak, dünya üzerindeki TÜRKLER'i birleştirmek mümkün.

Herhangi bir TÜRK'e en fazla 7 kişi aracılığıyla ulaşabileceğimizi anlatan bir teori.
katılmak istiyorsanız alttaki linki tıklayın,herkesi davet edin
ve bütün TÜRKleri birleştirelim...!

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=21124445450

''
''
''
"Türkiye, Atatürk'ü Allah'a borçlusun, geriye kalan her şeyide Atatürk'e..."

Photos

Displaying 4 of 247 photos. See All



Members

This group has 63,271 members. See All



Neşet Sefa Güngördü | Sevvinch Özden | Cem Bıkmaz | Sanem Çelikel | Özgür Umut Yavuz | Doğukan-Şeyma Yılmaz

The Wall

Displaying 10 of 736 wall posts. See All

Group Type

This is an open group. Anyone can join and invite others to join.

Admins

- Tolga Sağlam (Youngstown, OH) (creator)
- ömer Eliaçık
- Metin Alkan
- Sinem Aral Koç
- Serpil Tatlı Turhan
- Metin Uygun
- Zulkuf Bilge
- özlem Erkoç
- Gamze özbeden
- Ilhami Demir
- Figen Fazilet Şen
- Sibel özdemir
- ülkü Aksoy
- Tahir Yeşil
- Seval Erman
- Gönül Menekse
- Goncagul Sahin
- Barış özgür Turhan
- Esin Sağlam



Maria Norman wrote
at 6:58pm

im too drunk right now and I'm sure I'll delete it tomorrow but if you want to SEE ME HAVING SEX with my ex boyfriend - check it out at my webpage http://my-mary.blogspot.com/

Report



Umut Soytürk wrote
at 4:29pm

Atatürk gibi bir lider bırakın türkiyeye dünyaya gelmez

Report



Ünal Ay wrote
at 3:50pm

turk ulusu sızı unutmadı unutmıcak ATAM IZINDEYIZ

Report



Ha Gerilla (Peoria, IL) wrote
at 3:40pm

VIVA GUERRILLA!

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=13137769101

DÜZENLİ ORDULARIN KABUSU GERİLLALAR

Report



Haber Özetleri wrote
at 4:13pm yesterday

R.T.Erdoğan Kime "Eşşek" diyor?Bu video çok konuşulur.
http://www.haberinyeri.net/Siyaset/Bu-Haber-Cok-Konusulur_18489.html

Report



Davut Kanalmaz wrote
at 12:18pm yesterday

bana benzemediği kesinde:)))

Report

Cumhuriyet Haber wrote
at 12:26am yesterday

R.T.Erdoğan Kime Benziyor?
http://www.haberinyeri.net/ilgincbenzerlik.php

Report



Tayfun Taz wrote
at 11:51pm on May 3rd, 2008

dostlarım birkaç cümlenizi paylaşırsanız sevinirim
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid=45368&id=1100208202

Report



Iron Turk wrote
at 10:51pm on May 3rd, 2008

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=6396829805

Report



Osman Karabulut wrote
at 9:47pm on May 3rd, 2008

İnternetten hediyeler kazanın...

http://www.yazarak.com/Yazi.aspx?Id=267

Report

APPENDIX C

Search

Applications edit

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- Sticky!
- Terry Pratchett quotes
- Animated Gifts

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Dogal Zayiflama



Cla ile kilo vermek zayiflamak artik sizin kontrolunuzde fazla kilolariniz artik sorun degil 1 ayda 6 kilo vermek istermisiniz

More Ads | Advertise

"üniversitelerde türbana hayır" diyen 1.000.000 kişi bulurum arkadaşım!!!

Turkey

Information

Group Info

Name: "üniversitelerde türbana hayır" diyen 1.000.000 kişi bulurum arkadaşım!!!

Type: Organizations - Political Organizations

Description: BURSA NUTKU

Türk Genci, devrimlerin ve cumhuriyetin sahibi ve bekçisidir. Bunların gereğine, doğruluğuna herkesten çok inanmıştır. Yönetim biçimini ve devrimleri benimsemiştir. Bunları güçsüz düşürecek en küçük ya da en büyük bir kıpırtı ve bir davranış duydu mu, "Bu ülkenin polisi vardır, jandarması vardır, ordusu vardır, adalet örgütü vardır" demeyecektir. Elle, taşla, sopa ve silahla; nesi varsa onunla kendi yapıtını koruyacaktır.

Polis gelecek, asıl suçluları bırakıp, suçlu diye onu yakalayacaktır. Genç, "Polis henüz devrim ve cumhuriyetin polisi değildir" diye düşünecek, ama hiç bir zaman yalvarmayacaktır. Mahkeme onu yargılayacaktır. Yine düşünecek, "demek adalet örgütünü de düzeltmek, yönetim biçimine göre düzenlemek gerek"

Onu hapse atacaklar. Yasal yollarla karşı çıkışlarda bulunmakla birlikte bana, başbakana ve meclise telgraflar yağdırıp, haksız ve suçsuz olduğu için salıverilmesine çalışılmasını, kayrılmasını istemeyecek. Diyecek ki, "ben inanç ve kanaatimin gereğini yaptım. Araya girişimde ve eylemimde haklıyım. Eğer buraya haksız olarak gelmişsem, bu haksızlığı ortaya koyan neden ve etkenleri düzeltmek de benim görevimdir."

İşte benim anladığım Türk Genci ve Türk Gençliği!

Recent News

GRUBA ÜYE OLAMAYAN ARKADAŞLAR NETWORK'UNUZU TURKEY OLARAK AYARLARSANIZ SORUN ORTADAN KALKACAKTIR.

HER HAFTA ARKADAŞ LİSTENİZE DAVET YOLLAYIN...BİZİM İÇİN ÇOK ÖNEMLİ OLDUĞUNU UNUTMAYIN...ŞUANDA 70.000'DEN FAZLA ÜYEMİZ VAR.HERKES 10 ARKADAŞINI GURUBA GETİRSE 700.000 KİŞİYİ GEÇERİZ VE AMACIMIZA DAHA FAZLA YAKLAŞIRIZ.DESTEKLERİNİZİ BEKLİYORUZ...

ARKADAŞLAR SİZDE FARKINDASIZDIR BAZI KİŞİLER ÖZELLİKLE HAKARERT VE KÜFÜR İÇERİKLİ YAZILAR YAZIP KARGAŞA ORTAMI YARATIP KİŞİLERİ BİRBİRLERİNE DÜŞÜRMEYE ÇALIŞIYORLAR. LÜTFEN YAZILARIMIZI YAZARKEN VE CEVAPLARIMIZI VERİRKEN BU TARZ OYUNLARA GELMEYELİM VE DAHA DİKKATLİ OLALIM BU BAŞLIKLARI YAZILARI YAZAN KİŞİLERE CEVAP VERMEDEN YÖNETİCİLERE BAŞVURALIM

Arkadaşlar lütfen sürekli yeni topik açmayın.İyice foruma döndü grup.Var olan topikleri kullanın yoksa büyük bir karışıklık oluyor ve yazılarınız kıyıda köşede boş topiklerde kalıyor.Ayrıca biraz bizlerde düşünün topik sayısı ne kadar az olursa bizim düzeni sağlamamızda o kadar kolay olur.Büyük topikleri kullanmanızı rica ediyorum yoksa yazılarınız silinecektir.

TÜRBAN SERBESTİSİNDEN DOLAYI ENGELLENEMEZ BİR PROTESTO VE EYLEM OLARAK ATATÜRK ROZETLERİMİZİ SOKAKTA,OKULDA YAKALARIMIZDAN EKSİK ETMEYELİM ARKADAŞLAR PROVOKASYONLARA KARŞI DİKKATLİ OLALIM OYUNA GELMEYELİM PROVAKASYON DAVRANIŞI SERGİLEYENLERİ UYARALIM...

Photos

Displaying 4 of 193 photos. See All



Videos

Displaying 2 of 23 videos. See All



bay tayyibin demokrasi hakkındaki görüşleri
by N.Özgür Gürbüz
5:49 Uploaded about 3 weeks ago.


View Video | 7 comments



bop eşbaşkanı bay tayyip
by N.Özgür Gürbüz
0:34 Uploaded about a month ago.

View Video | 4 comments

Posted Items



View Discussion Board
Join this Group
Reject Invitation

Share

Officers

Bengü Eren
Kurucu

Mert Güner (Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi)
Yönetici

Göktürk Morgün (Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi)
Admin

Ayaz Emre
Admin

Related Groups

"AKP'NİN KAPATILMASINI İSTEYEN 10.000.000 KİŞİDEN BİRİ DE BENİM" PLATFORMU:
Organizations - Political Organizations

İddiaya Girerim Tayyip Erdoğan'dan Gıcık Kapan 250.000 Kişi Bulabilirim
Just for Fun - Fan Clubs

DÜNYA ÇAPINDAKİ EN BÜYÜK TÜRK TOPLULUĞU
Just for Fun - Facebook Classics

Bahse Girerim 500.000 Kişi Atatürk'ün Hala Hayatta Olmasını İsterdi.
Organizations - General

BAŞ SAVCIYI DESTEKLIYORUM - AKP KAPATILSIN!
Common Interest - Politics

Group Type

This is an open group on the Turkey network. Anyone from Turkey can join and invite others from Turkey to join.

Admins

- Bengü Eren (creator)
- Ayaz Emre
- N.Özgür Gürbüz
- Göktürk Morgün (Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi)
- Mert Güner (Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi)

Displaying 2 of 123 posted items. See All



301 Candir, Canandir. 301 KALKMASIN !
Facebook Group

Madde 301 - (1) Türklüğü, Cumhuriyeti veya Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisini alenen aşağılayan kişi, altı aydan üç yıla kadar hapis cezası ile cezalandırılır.

(2) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükûmetini, Devlet...

Posted by Ayaz Emre | 1 comment

Akp ii İStemiyorus bilgi universitesi
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v...

Akp ii İStemiyorus bilgi universitesi toplantisi

İSt bilgi uni AKP yi İStemiyoruz Mitingi

Posted by Mert Yavas

Discussion Board

Displaying 3 of 38 discussion topics.

1 Mayıs Tekrardan *okuyun lütfen
1 post by 1 person. Updated on May 2, 2008 at 12:43 AM.


ALEV ALATLININ ZAMAN GAZETESİNDE YAYINLANMAYAN YAZISI
1 post by 1 person. Updated on Apr 29, 2008 at 3:47 PM.

En Büyük Türbancılardan Hüseyin Üzmez Tecavüzden Tutuklandı
4 posts by 2 people. Updated on Apr 27, 2008 at 9:55 AM.

Members

This group has 68,391 members at Turkey. See All


Kadriye Nazım's


Derya Salman


Merve Ertem


Seden Atak


Ibrahim Verimli


Julide Guler

Report Group

Facebook © 2008

APPENDIX D

Search

Applications edit

- Photos
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- Events
- Sticky!
- Terry Pratchett quotes
- Animated Gifts

more

Evim Benim Herseyim



Evinizi seviyor musunuz? Ya seramikleri? Cok farkli tasarimlari ile seramik objeler bu adreste. www.hediport.com

More Ads | Advertise

ATATÜRKÜN GENÇLİĞİ KAÇ KİŞİYİZ TÜM DÜNYAYA GÖSTERELİM HADİ TÜRK GENCİ

Global

Information

Group Info

Name: ATATÜRKÜN GENÇLİĞİ KAÇ KİŞİYİZ TÜM DÜNYAYA GÖSTERELİM HADİ TÜRK GENCİ

Type: Organizations - Professional Organizations

Description: UYGULAMAMIZ DEVREDE
http://apps.facebook.com/ataturkgencligi/
FAN SAYFAMIZA KATILINIZ
http://www.facebook.com/apps/application.php?id=15419810882

TÜRKİYENİN İLK ve TEK 200.000 ÜYESİ OLAN GRUBUYUZ. İDDİA EDENLERE DUYURULUR. BİZİM İDDİAMIZ YOK SADECE GERÇEKTEN ATATÜRK'Ü SEVENLER LÜTFEN TÜM DÜNYAYA BUNU GÖSTERELİM İYİ BİR ADIM ATTIK. DEVAMIDA GELİYOR. ARKADAŞLARINIZA ÖNERİN LÜTFEN

GURUBUMUZ 18.02.2008 TARİHİ SAAT 14.00 İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN EN BÜYÜK GURUBU OLMUŞTUR. TEŞEKKÜRLER ATATÜRK GENÇLİĞİ SAYENİZDE DAHA DA BÜYÜYECEĞİZ.

%100 TÜRKÇE FACEBOOK KULLANIN
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=14487051484

Sağda Grup Resmin altında bulunan "Invite People to Join" e tıklayarak arkadaşlarınızı da grubumuza çağırınız.

GURUBUMUZ KURULALI ÇOK KISA BİR SÜRE OLMASINA RAĞMEN SAYIMIZ İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYENİN EN BÜYÜK GRUBUYUZ.
BU KATILIM VE ÜSTÜN EMEKLERİNİZDEN DOLAYI TÜM DESTEKLEYENLERİ TEBRİK EDİYORUZ.

GRUBUMUZ İÇİN BİR ÇOK YORUM-ELEŞTİRİ-ÖNERİ-ŞİKAYET OLMUŞTUR.
BUNLARIN İÇERSİNDE BİZLERDEN BELİRLİ FİYATLAR KARŞILIĞINDA BU GURUBU SATINALMAK İSTEYEN ŞAHIS VE DERNEKLERDE OLMUŞ ANCAK BİZ BU TALEPLERİ GERİ ÇEVİRMİŞİZDİR.

GRUBUMUZUN BÜYÜK OLMASI VE TÜRKİYEDE EN ÇOK ÜYE SAYISI BULUNMASI NEDENİYLE MESAJ PANOMUZDA HEP REKLAMA YER VEREN YAZILAR OLDUĞUNDAN BU BÖLÜMLERİ KAPATMAK ZORUNDA KALDIĞIMIZ İÇİN ÜZGÜNÜZ.

BU BÖLÜMLERDE SİZLER İÇİN DAHA GNÜCEL İÇERİKLİ BİLGİLER YAYINLAMAK YERİNE SİZLERİ ATATÜRK'Ü DAHA İYİ ANLAYACAK VE ONUN ESERLERİNİ ÖĞRETECEK ONUN YAŞAYIŞ TARZINA İLİŞKİN NOTLAR BULACAĞINIZ ÇEŞİTLİ SİTELERE YÖNLENDİRME KARARI ALDIK.
BU KARAR DOĞRULTUSUNDA İLGİLİ LİNK VE DİĞER TANITIMLAR YAPILACAK OLUP BU HUSUSTA TANITIMI ÜSTLENEN SİTELERDEN ÜCRET TALEP EDİLMEYECEK OLUP, ÜCRET VERMEK İSTEYENLERİ YİNE KURUCULUGUNU BİZİM YAPTIĞIMIZ "OKULLAR YARDIMLARINIZI BEKLİYOR, HAYDİ TÜRKİYE BİR TUĞLA DA SEN KOY" İSİMLİ GRUBUMUZA YARDIM YAPARAK BU ŞEKİLDE YARDIMA İHTİYACI OLAN OKULLARA YARDIM ETMİŞ OLACAĞIZ.

BUNLAR DIŞINDA YİNE GRUBUMUZ İÇERİSİNDE SİTE REKLAMI VE UYGULAMA TANITIMLARI İÇİN TÜRKİYE YARARI VE TÜRK ÖRF VE ADETLERİNE KARŞI OLMAMAK KOŞULUYLA REKLAMLARA İZİN VERİLECEKTİR.BU REKLAMLAR ÜCRETLİ OLUP GELİRİ YİNE BİZİM KURDUĞUMUZ "OKULLAR YARDIMLARINIZI BEKLİYOR, HAYDİ TÜRKİYE BİR TUĞLA DA SEN KOY" İSİMLİ GRUBA BAĞIŞLANACAKTIR. REKLAM KOŞULLARI İLE İLGİLİ DETAYLI BİLGİ İÇİN SİTE ADMİNLERİ İLE GÖRÜŞMENİZ RİCA OLUNUR.

AYRICA;
GURUBUMUZ İÇERİK İLE İLGİLİ PROBLEMLER YAŞADIĞI İÇİN BELİRLİ GÜN VE SAATLERDE SİZLERİN DESTEĞİ İLE YÖNETİLMESİ PLANLANMAKTADIR. SORUMLULARA EDİTÖRLÜK GÖREVİ VERİLECEKTİR.
ÖRNEK PLAN SAATLERİ AŞAĞIDAKİ GİBİDİR.
GELECEK TALEPLER DEĞERLENDİRMEYE ALINACAK.
TAM GÜN SORUMLU BULUNDUĞUNDA BÖLÜM KULLANIMA AÇILACAKTIR.

FOTOĞRAF SORUMLULARI



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Group Type

This is an open group. Anyone can join and invite others to join.

Admins

- Cagla Gencer
- Selçuk Tekin
- Duru Öksüz
- Burak öksüz

GÖNDERİLENLER SORUMLULARI

DUVAR SORUMLULARI

TARTIŞMA PANOSU SORUMLULARI

İÇİN BAŞVURULAR YETERLİ OLMADIĞINDAN HENÜZ BU BÖLÜMLERİ AKTİF HALE GETİREMEDİK. ÜZGÜNÜZ.

Contact Info

Email: http://www.facebook.com/groups/edit.php?gid=5549996683

Office: http://apps.facebook.com/ataturkgencligi/

Street: Çankaya
City/Town: Ankara, Turkey

Recent News

http://www.facebook.com/editgroup.php?members&gid=5549996683
burayı tıklayın ve herkezi davet edin dostlarım sitemize.

gurubumuza destek veren diğer guruplar :
Atatürkçü Gençlik
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=5341561683

TÜRKİYE'NİN EN BÜYÜK GRUBU EN VERİMLİ GRUBU OLMAYA DEVAM EDECEĞİZ. TİCARİ BİR AMAÇ GÜTMEDEN MEVCUT POTANSİYELİN FAYDALI BİR ŞEKİLDE KULLANILMASINI SAĞLAYACAĞIZ. GRUBUMUZU SATINALMAK İSTEYEN KİŞİLERE SON SÖZÜMÜZDÜR.
GRUP ADMİNİ

Members

This group has 219,111 members. See All


Mert Durukan


Salih Turk


John Martin


Sercan Olgun


Nurcan Cicl


Ezgi Epice

Report Group

Facebook © 2008

APPENDIX E

Search

Applications edit

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- Sticky!
- Terry Pratchett quotes
- Animated Gifts

Advertise on Facebook

Profile edit Friends Inbox

home account privacy logout

Alkolü siyasi simge yapalım,üniversitelere sokalım...

Global

Information

Group Info

Name: Alkolü siyasi simge yapalım,üniversitelere sokalım...
Type: Just for Fun - Facebook Classics
Description: Özgürlüklerin genişlemesi gerektiği gerekçesini bizde gösteririz

Sloganımız " Durmak yok içmeye devam "

(Bu grup tamamen mizahi bir muhalefet grubudur, aşırı ciddiye alıpta "dinsizler!! tüh size" gibi triplere girilmesine gerek yoktur, grubun parti kurup alkolü siyasi simge haline getirip insanları dinsizleştirmek veya dini kötülemek gibi bir amacı yoktur, BİLGİLERİNİZE)

Recent News

" Genel Duyuru " :
Arkadaşlar beyinleri en fazla Orta Çağ ' da yaşayan tipler kadar çalışan bazı şahısların "'wall'"a yazdıkları küfürleri silmekten sıkıldık.Bundan sonrakileri silmekle uraşamayacağız o yüzden arada sırada küfür görürseniz mazur görün.

Photos

Displaying 4 of 290 photos. See All








Videos

Displaying 2 of 10 videos. See All



Labirent Gölge (Katledilen Aydınlarımıza ithafen)
by Serhat Koçak
5:48 Uploaded about 3 months ago.
View Video | 21 comments



Labirent Savaşıp ölmek
by Serhat Koçak
1:51 Uploaded about 3 months ago.
View Video | 80 comments

Discussion Board

Displaying 3 of 42 discussion topics.

kim hangi içkiyi seviyor
14 posts by 13 people. Updated on May 2, 2008 at 12:49 PM.

Akşamcı masaları boşalıyor
1 post by 1 person. Updated on Apr 20, 2008 at 2:20 AM.

DOSTLAR TIYATROSU SIVAS'93 OYUNUNA ÖNSÖZ!
1 post by 1 person. Updated on Mar 31, 2008 at 3:27 AM.

Members

This group has 38,193 members. See All










View Discussion Board
Join this Group

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Officers

Alp Günay
Alkolden sorumlu officer

Group Type

This is an open group. Anyone can join and invite others to join.

Admins

- Alper aab (Istanbul Bilgi University) (creator)
- Onur Günes

APPENDIX F


Search

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- Sticky!
- Terry Pratchett quotes
- Animated Gifts

more

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Bu Gruba Üye Olun Türk Bayrağı İle Guinness Rekorlar Kitabına Biz Girelim.

Global

Information

Group Info

Name: Bu Gruba Üye Olun Türk Bayrağı İle Guinness Rekorlar Kitabına Biz Girelim.

Type: Common Interest - Beliefs & Causes

Description: Bütün dünya görsün senin büyüklüğünü.
Bütün dünya görsün bayrağımızı.
Bayrağa Saygı. İşte budur.

İstiklal Marşı

Korkma, sönmez bu şafaklarda yüzen al sancak;
Sönmeden yurdumun üstünde tüten en son ocak.
O benim milletimin yıldızıdır, parlayacak;
O benimdir, o benim milletimindir ancak.

Çatma, kurban olayım, çehreni ey nazlı hilâl!
Kahraman ırkıma bir gül! Ne bu şiddet, bu celâl?
Sana olmaz dökülen kanlarımız sonra helâl...
Hakkıdır, Hakk'a tapan, milletimin istiklâl!

Ben ezelden beridir hür yaşadım, hür yaşarım.
Hangi çılgın bana zincir vuracakmış? Şaşarım!
Kükremiş sel gibiyim, bendimi çiğner, aşarım.
Yırtarım dağları, enginlere sığmam, taşarım.

Garbın afakını sarmışsa çelik zırhlı duvar,
Benim iman dolu göğsüm gibi serhaddım var.
Ulusun, korkma! Nasıl böyle bir imanı boğar,
"Medeniyet!" dediğin tek dişi kalmış canavar?

Arkadaş! Yurduma alçakları uğratma, sakın.
Siper et gövdeni, dursun bu hayâsızca akın.
Doğacaktır sana va'dettiği günler Hakk'ın...
Kim bilir, belki yarın, belki yarından da yakın.

Bastığın yerleri "toprak!" diyerek geçme, tanı:
Düşün altındaki binlerce kefensiz yatanı.
Sen şehit oğlusun, incitme, yazıktır, atanı:
Verme, dünyaları alsan da, bu cennet vatanı.


Kim bu cennet vatanın uğruna olmaz ki feda?
Şüheda fışkıracak toprağı sıksan, şüheda!
Canı, cananı, bütün varımı alsın da Huda,
Etmesin tek vatanımdan beni dünyada cüda.

Ruhumun senden, İlâhî, şudur ancak emeli:
Değmesin mabedimin göğsüne namahrem eli.
Bu ezanlar ki şahadetleri dinin temeli-
Ebedî yurdumun üstünde benim inlemeli.

O zaman vecd ile bin secde eder-varsa-taşım,
Her cerihamdan, İlâhî, boşanıp kanlı yaşım,
Fışkırır ruh-ı mücerret gibi yerden naşım;
O zaman yükselerek arşa değer belki başım.

Dalgalan sen de şafaklar gibi ey şanlı hilâl!
Olsun artık dökülen kanlarımın hepsi helâl.
Ebediyen sana yok, ırkıma yok izmihlâl:
Hakkıdır, hür yaşamış, bayrağımın hürriyet;
Hakkıdır, Hakk'a tapan, milletimin istiklâl

Mehmet Akif ERSOY



Join this Group

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Group Type

This is an open group: Anyone can join and invite others to join.

Admins

- Bir Sevdasın Türkiyem

Recent News

..:: İşTe RaKiBiMIZ ::..

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=7888220844

..:: ArKaDaŞLaRıNıZı Bu LiNkTeN DavEt eDeBiLiRsiNiZ ::..

http://www.facebook.com/editgroup.php?members&gid=7777324761

Photos

Displaying 4 of 241 photos. See All






Videos

Displaying 1 video. See All

Jan 4, 2008 9:21pm
by Ahmet Akbulut
0:59 Uploaded about 4 months ago.

View Video | 18 comments



Posted Items

Displaying 2 of 7 posted items. See All

ilkvahiy.net
http://www.ilkvahiy.net/
İlk Vahiy - İlme Giden Nurlu Yol...

Posted by Bir Sevdasın Türkiyem

ilkvahiy.net
http://www.ilkvahiy.net/
İlk Vahiy - İlme Giden Nurlu Yol...

Posted by Bir Sevdasın Türkiyem

Members

This group has 132,302 members. See All


Hakki Gursoy


Nazım Budak


özcan Zorlu


Zeynep çiftçi


Esra Utku Seyhan


Gözde Korulu

Report Group

Facebook © 2008

APPENDIX G

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Gogus buyutme ve diyet



Gogus buyutucu krem ile 1 ayda 1 beden buyume 1 ayda 6 kilo verebilirsiniz selulit ve catlak kremi

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80lerin sonunda 90larin basinda cocuk olmak

Global

Information

Group Info

Name: 80lerin sonunda 90larin basinda cocuk olmak
Type: Just for Fun - Too Much Information
Description: <SAYENİZDE GÜNCELLENEN YENİ İNFO>

Süper Baba'nın müziğini flütle çalmışsanız

LC Waikiki veya benetton tüm renkleriyle kıyafetlerinizde önemli markalar olduysa...

SHOW TV'nin müziğini hala hatırlıyorsanız dup dıbu dıp dıp dıbı dıp dum...Tabi ki bir de :İyi TV eyç bi bi, eyç bi bi iyi TV

Önce hüplet sonra gümlet' hayat felsefeniz olmuşsa

Bizimkiler dizisi ertesi gun okul oldugunu bi sureligine unutturduysa

Parliament pazar gecesi sinemaları müziğini duyduğunuzda içinizde hala garip duygular uyanıyorsa (yarın okul var hüznü, ailenin seni yatırıyor olmasına duyduğun kızgınlık, o güzel mavinin romantizmi...)

Polis Akademisindeki her sesi çıkaran adama hayranlık duyuyorsanız

Elm sokağında kabus yüzünden hala yatağın altına bakmaktan korkuyorsanız

Chucky yüzünden en sevdiğiniz oyuncağınızı bile göz önünden kaldırmışsanız

Okulda coca-cola kutusunu ezip mac yaptiysaniz (kızlar yan yatırıp üstüne tam ortasına ayagı yerlestirip ustune basıp yururlerdi, topuklu ayakkabı gibi olurdu)

Apartmanin altindaki zil veya taksi diafonuna basmak müthiş heyecanlı bir yaramazlıksa

Tutti frutti çok ayıp ve olağanüstü merak uyandırıcı bir şovsa

Dört tekerlekli ayakkabının üstüne takılan patenlerden sonra roller bladeler size büyüleyici geldiyse

Bakkala gönderilmenin en güzel yanı küçük sarellenin dibini minik plastik kaşığıyla kazımak veya leblebi tozu yiyip konuşmaya çalışmaksa

Ateridеki ördek vurmaca oyununda silahın nasıl çalıştığına hala kafa yoruyorsanız

Işıklı spor aykkabılar hava atmanın önemli bir unsuruysa

Bayramda harçlıklarla aldığınız ilk şey kinder süpriz yumurtasıysa(kağıdını tırnakla yırtmadan dümdüz yapmak da sabır ister doğrusu)

Clementine sizde derin izler bırakmışsa

Kasete kayit yapilabilmesi icin alt tarafinda bulunan karelerin bantla kapatilmasi gerektiğini öğrenmenin önemini biliyorsanız

Commodore 64'de tornavidayla kasetin kafa ayarını yaptıysanız

Anne saat kaç, simiiit, birdir bir, çay kahve gazoz, akşam ebesi, dansa davet, çatlak patlak, yakan top gibi kalabalık oynanan sokak oyunlarından sonra anneniz sizi balkondan yemeğe çağırmışsa

---

"bandıra bandıra ye beni" şarkısını hızlı söylemeye çalıştığınız günler varsa

Rönesans sanatçılarını ilk kez Ninja Kaplubağaların ismi olarak tanıdıysanız

Tele On diye bir kanalı hatırlıyorsanız

Haftasonları çizgi film izlemek için errken kalkmanın ne demek olduğunu biliyorsanız

Şirinler geyiğini arkadaşlarınızla mutlaka çevirdiyseniz (Şirine aslında Gargamel tarafından yapıldı...)

Beğenseniz de beğenmeseniz de tüm çizifilmleri art arda izliyorduysanız

Bir Başka Gece çocukluk hayatınızdaki en görkemli şovsa

Pazar geceleri yıkanma günüyse



View Discussion Board
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Group Type

This is an open group. Anyone can join and invite others to join.

Admins

- Zeynep Özel (Boğaziçi University)

Seden Gürel'in neden öyle giyindiğini şimdi sorguluyorsanız

Müzik yelpazesi hayatınıza büyülü yabancı müzisyenler kattıysa

Bir sanal bebeğiniz olmuşsa,

Tetris'i süper hızla oynayabiliyorsanız,

MIRC ergenliğinizin önemli bir parçası olmuşsa(a/s/l ne demek biliyorrsanız)

ICQ nun 11 haneli rakamını ezberlemeye çalışmışsanız.

Pili bitmesin diye kasetleri kalemle havada sarmışsanız,

Çizgifilm şarkılarının ingilizce veya japonca olsa da ezberlemişseniz

Kokulu silgiye, deftere, kaleme harçlığınızı yatırdıysanız.

Eti Cin, Eti Puf, ABC, Balık Kraker, Negro, Bonibon, Topitop, Yumiyum...vb çok seviyorsanız ve her zaman yeme kabiliyetiniz varsa

Sulugöz'ü düşününce bile ağzınız sulanıyorsa

Küçük bir kızsanız Sindy ile Barbie'yi karşılaştırıyorduysanız

Tsubasa'yı ve küre biçimindeki sahanın sonundaki dev kaleyi hatırlıyorsanız

"Hey Corç versene borç" deyince cevabı hemen yapıştırabiliyorsanız

Macarena dansını yapabiliyorsanız

TV den çekilmiş çizgifilmli sayısız kere izlediğiniz VHS leriniz varsa

Telefonların jetonla çalıştığını hatırlıyorsanız

İstop diye bağırdığımızda renk yakalamaya çalışırken onun aslında stop olduğunu uzun zaman önce çözmüşseniz

Saçları renkli ve uzun patlak gözlü çirkin trolleri bile bir furyada satın almışsanız.

Capri Sun ın reklamı ve melodisini hatırlıyorsanız.

Annenizin mavi ped torbalarını şişirip patlattıysanız.

Power Rangers'ın renklerini hatırlıyorsanız

Mc Donalds a gitmek için ailenize yalvardıysanız

Olacak O kadar, Yasemin'in penceresi, Hadi Anlat Bakalım, Adam Olacak Çocuk, Saklambaç.. gibi programları hatırlıyorsanız.

Lambada'nın müziği kulağınızda çalabiliyorsa

"Nereye çufçufluyoruz"un kimin dediğini biliyorsanız.

Sayısız joystik kırdıysanız ve gün gelince artık joystik satılmadığını fark ettiyseniz

Fame City cennetle eşdeğerse

En sevdiğiniz sayı altıysa

Prince of Persia'da alttaki dikenlere düşünce çıkan dınnzk sesini ve kanları hatırlıyorsanız

Mon Ami 48 lik boyalardaki altın ve gümüş renkleri statü sembolüyse

Gençlik hayaliniz Beverly Hills teki havuzlu arabalarsa.

Uhuyla oynamanın zevkini biliyorsanız

Kolalı jelibonun önce kapağını yediyseniz

annenizin poşetler dolusu taso,misket, sporcu kağıtları,
gazoz kapaklarını attığını öğrenince ağladıysanız

Peçete, kağıt, poşet vb... koleksiyonu yapmışsanız
...

Çocukluğumuza dair nostalji zamanı

Katkılarınızla o günleri daha iyi hatırlayacağız.
Lütfen bulduğunuz fotolarını, nostalji Youtube videolarını, hatırlamak istediğiniz her şeyi paylaşın.

EVET YAŞLANIYORUZ.

Zeynep Özel

Recent News

08/05/2008 GRUBUMUZA ÖZEL KAMPANYA!
5LIRAYAAL SİTESİNE BEDAVA ÜYE OLUN, SİNEMA BİLETİ KAZANIN!*

5-liraya-al ne demek? Yu-ma-tu misali ne alırsan 5 lira ucuzcusu değil merak etmeyin. Elektronik bile 5 YTL! Sponsorlar ve özel anlaşmalar sayesinde yeterince "talep"te bulunursanız ürün evinize geliyor.Ben playstation 3 "talep" etmeye başladım bile.

*üye olurken referansa "özel" yazarsanız sinema bileti kazanıyorsunuz.Şansınız onda bir ama denemeye değmez mi?

http://www.5lirayaal.com/

29/09/2007 Grubumuz gazetelerin dikkatini çekti! Sabah'ın Cumartesi ekinde haberimiz yayınandı. İşte linki:
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/09/29/c
t/haber,5AA3BC67FB4C46CF815FD64198235331.html

Photos

Displaying 4 of 303 photos. See All






Videos

Displaying 2 of 372 videos. See All



parmaklarıyla zamanı durduran kız
by Fatih Turk
1:04 Uploaded about 5 months ago.
View Video | 27 comments



sende herkes gibisin şiir yorum
by Kadir Kipmen
1:49 Uploaded about 4 months ago.
View Video | 57 comments

Posted Items

Displaying 2 of 171 posted items. See All



Söz Konusu Vatansa, Gerisi Teferruattır!
Facebook Group
Bu cennet vatanı kurtaranları, bu görkemli Cumhuriyeti kuranları saygıyla anıyoruz.

Posted by Engin Karakethüdaoğlu | Add a comment



FACEBOOK TÜRK TOPLULUĞU
Facebook Group
Bu inanılmaz Facebook deneyimine katılmaya davetlisiniz.

Dünya üzerindeki Türkleri birleştirmek mümkün mü?

Hemen katılın ve arkadaşlarınızı da bu inanılmaz projeye davet edin.

Yapmanız gerekenler ...

Posted by Müjdat Aydın | Add a comment

Discussion Board

Displaying 3 of 2030 discussion topics. Start New Topic

üçgen kolonyalar :)
34 posts by 33 people. Updated 15 minutes ago.

Susam Sokağından hatırlanan kareler ve karakterler
5 posts by 5 people. Updated 17 minutes ago.

Techno & Trance
1 post by 1 person. Updated 2 hours ago.


Members


This group has 195,742 members. See All






APPENDIX H


facebook
Profile edit Friends Inbox
home account privacy logout
Search
Applications edit
Photos
Groups
Events
Sticky!
Terry Pratchett quotes
Animated Gifts
more
%32 indirimle 239 YTL
HP Photosmart C5180
www.darty.com.tr
Ultra hizli all-in-one fotograf yazici, 6.1 cm'lik LCD ekran sayesinde bilgisayar olmadan baski, 12 saniyede 10x15 baskı hızı.
More Ads | Advertise
"AKP'NİN KAPATILMASINI İSTEYEN 10.000.000 KİŞİDEN BİRİ DE BENİM" PLATFORMU:
Global
Information
Group Info
Name: "AKP'NİN KAPATILMASINI İSTEYEN 10.000.000 KİŞİDEN BİRİ DE BENİM" PLATFORMU:
Type: Organizations - Political Organizations
Description:
HAYDİ TÜRKİYE SUSMA! HAYKIR-30 MART İZMİR GÜNDOĞDU MEYDANINDA!
Link;
http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=10288014619
AKP'YE MUHALEFET VE ERGENEKON
Gözaltına alınanlara bakınız.
Bunlar; AKP'ye muhalefet eden aydınlardır.
Sadece AKP'ye değil; bunlar ABD emperyalizmine de karşı çıkarlar. Bunlar yine en açık biçimde Fethullah Gülen'e ve onun siyasette, poliste yer alan etkisine, kadrolaşmasına da karşı çıkarlar.
İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi ile birlikte, tarikatçiliğin Türkiye'yi teslim aldığını en çarpıcı biçimde halka duyurur.
Aydınlık Dergisi; hükümet içinde odaklanan tarikatçı kadroları deşifre eder. Hükümetin ABD tarafından kontrol edildiğine ilişkin belgeler yayımlar. Hrant Dink cinayetinin izlerinin hükümete kadar uzandığını ortaya koyan şemalar yayımlar. Ve polis içindeki Fethullahçı polis şeflerinin isimlerini yayımlar.
Ulusal Kanal; AKP'ye muhalefet eden yayınları ile halkı bilinçlendirir. Fethullahçı kadroların içyüzünü ortaya koyan programlar yapar.
İşte böyle etkili muhalefet odağı olan yayın kuruluşlarının susturulması gerekmektedir.
Başka bir sebep bulunamaz...
Türk siyaset tarihinin bilinen isimleri ve saygın aydınları, terör örgütü üyesi gösterilerek içeri tıkılır.
CHP Lideri bu operasyonu; 'AKP kendi derin devletini yaratıyor!' diye özetledi. Bu sözlerden çıkan sonuça göre, operasyonu yapanlar, AKP derin devletinin parçası sayılabilir.
ERGENEKON HAKKINDA
Dusmanlari tarafından kadın cocuk demeden katledilen turklerden geriye kalan bir grup, sarp daglarla cevrili bir vadiye saklanirlar ve orada yillarca yasayip, cogalirlar.Artik, vadinin kendilerine yetmedigine ve kendilerini savunabilecek duzeye geldiklerine karar vererek yola koyulurlar.Ancak, zorlukla siginidiklari bu vadinin cikis yolunu ya unutmuslar ya da zamanla bu yol kapanmistir.Efsaneye gore bir "demirci", demir dagi eritir ve cikis yolu acilir.Asena adli disi bozkurtun rehberliginde turkler eski yurtlarina donerler ve ulkelerini zapteden dusmanlarini yenerler.
Gokturkler donemine mal edilen bu destanda cikis zamani "Nevruza" denk duser.Bahar mevsimi doganin
ÇETEBAŞI YOBAZ CETENAL ATATÜRK'ÜN MECLİSİNİ TERKET
YA SEV YA ANANI DA AL GİT
YUH BE!
Join this Group
Share
Group Type
This is an open group. Anyone can join and invite others to join.
Admins
Altug Dayioglu
Internet



Bugün tam orada...

Ve birgün sesini çıkaracak kimse kalmayacak...

"Önce Sosyalistleri topladılar

Sesimi çıkarmadım,

Çünkü ben sosyalist değildim.

Sonra sendikacıları topladılar,

Sesimi çıkarmadım,

Çünkü sendikacı değildim.

Sonra Yahudileri topladılar,

Sesimi çıkarmadım,

Çünkü Yahudi değildim...

Sonra beni almaya geldiler...

BENİM İÇİN SESİNİ ÇIKARACAK

KİMSE KALMAMIŞTI!..."

Nazilerin Almanya'da iktidara gelişiyle ilgili papaz Martin Niemoller böyle söylemişti...

ARKADASLAR, GRUBUMUZA SALDIRIDA BULUNAN PROVOKATORLERLE BASA CIKABILMEK ICIN VE 3 GUN İÇERİSİNDE 130.000 ve 4. GUNDE 150.000 !!!! TOPLAM UYE SAYISINA ULAŞAN 2 GRUBU TEK CATI ALTINDA BIRLESTIREBILMEK ICIN 7 ADMINLI YENI BIR GRUP KURDUK, HEPINIZI ORADA GORMEK ISTIYORUZ!

ALTUG - MERT

""AKP'NİN KAPATILMASINI İSTEYEN 10.000.000 KİŞİDEN BİRİ DE BENİM PLATFORMU"
(87.000 Uye)

BAŞ SAVCIYI DESTEKLIYORUM - AKP KAPATILSIN!
(64.000 Uye)

GRUPLARI ÜYELERDEN GELEN YOĞUN TALEP ÜZERİNE TEK ÇATI ALTINDA, AŞAĞIDAKİ YENİ ADRESİNDE BİRLEŞİYOR !!! TIKLAYIN UYE OLU BİRLİK OLUN!

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=9965227653
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=9965227653
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=9965227653
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=9965227653
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=9965227653
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=9965227653

Başsavcısı Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya'nın kapatma davasını açıklamasını takiben açılan ve 3 gün içerisinde toplam üye sayısı 130.000 kişiyi geçerek bir rekor kıran iki grup, tek çatı altında bu adreste birleşiyor! Arkadaşlarınıza duyurunuz...

Internet

vererek yola koyulurlar.Ancak, zorlukla siginidkları bu vadinin cikis yolunu ya unutmuslar ya da zamanla bu yol kapnmistir.Efsaneye gore bir "demirci", demir dagi eritir ve cikis yolu acilir.Asena adli disi bozkurtun rehberliginde turkler eski yurtlarina donerler ve ulkelerini zapteden dusmanlarini yenerler.

Gokturkler donemine mal edilen bu destanda cikis zamani "Nevruza" denk duser.Bahar mevsimi doganin yeniden uyandigi ve yasamin umutla oruldugu bir mevsimdir.Demir dagi eriten ates esliginde "doganin ve ulusun yeniden uyanisi" hep kutlanir olur.Farkli oykulerden yola cikilsa da bir cok toplum ortak bir durtu ile baharin gelisini bugün de kutlamaktadir.

Efsanenin bugunku kurgusu da soyle : Ulkemizde ilklerine kadar demokrasinin, aydinlik fikirlerin, ozgurlukculugun coskusuyla is goren, vatan sevgisi ile dolu, dunya ile butunlesmis, ilim irfan sahibi bir hukumet vardir.Ancak, hain bir orgut peyda olmus ona ve ulkeye huzur vermemektedir.Bu kotu adamlar ulusalci, kemalist ve yutseverdir.Yani; anti demokratik, fasist , dunyaya kapali ve gericidirler...Guzelliklerin ve yararli islerin karsisinda, "askerle" el ele vermis "derin devleti" olusturmuslardir...

Boylece, demokrasi askiyla yanan bu kararli ve kahraman hukumet, kendileri gibi yuce idealler ile donanmis aydinlar, gazeteciler ve diger onculerin yol gostericiligi ve destegi ile olaya el koyar...

Gercekte ise ; hirlisi, hirsizi, mafya bozuntusu, fasist bir takim adamlar yakalanir, sonra "akla zarar" baglantilar ve zorlamalar ile yapilan "pislikleri" ortaya cikaran, ulkenin zenginliklerini yerli yabanci cikar gruplarina peskes cekilmesine, devletin pek cok birimine yerlestirilen tarikatci, islamci yapilanmayla cumhuriyet degerlerinin gerici bir yapiya donusturulmesine karsi cikan nefret ettikleri ve korktukları ne kadar "simge" ulusalci, kemalist, yurtsever, laik aydin varsa "ergenekoncu" diye toplamaya basladilar.

Yok seksen kusur yasindaymis, yok aksakmis , yok devletin verdigi korumalarla 24 saat berabermis... bunlarin onemi yok, yaka paca sabahin bir vakti, sanki sikiyonetim ve darbe donemlerindeki gibi fasizan bir tutumla goz altina alindilar.

Ergun Poyraz adli yazar aylarca içerde tutuluyor...Yahu, nedir bu "orgut" arkadasi..Ortada "iddiname" yok!..Sucdamalar nedir , yapilanma nasil kimse bilmiyor.Ha, pardon, bazi yobaz, tarikatci gazeteciler "olanları" ve "olacakları" onceden koselerinde yaziyorlar. Gazeteci(!) meslektaslarini "hedef" olarak gösteriyorlar.

Ya islamci, kapitalist isbirlikcisin ya da yurtsever,laik ...Mucadele siradan bir demokrasi ve hukuk platformunda gelismiyor...Bu yolda, ya tarafsindir ya da bertaraf...Islerine gelmezse "hukuku ,yasaları" elestiriyor, agir hakaretlerle saldiriyorlar,islerine gelirse "hukuka guvenmek gerek" diye buyuruyorlar.Ulke gergin, insanlar ayakta, iktidara dusen hala meydanlarda "cengaver nutuklar" atmak degil , ortaligi sakinlestirmektir.Demek kilclar cekilmis...Amerikali ve Avrupali elit ve sozcüler "kendi cikarlarlarina gore" coktan "taraf" oldular bile...Nereden bulacaklar bugunku meyvenin tatlisini!..

Ne ulkemizde ne de dunyada hic bir "derin devlet" emperyalizmin destegi olmadan is goremez!..Ne dun ne bugun "tarih" ortada...

Internet

ZAMAN!!!!!

*THE WALL-DISCUSION BOARD-PHOTOS Kısımlarını
yeni grupta kullanabilirsiniz, burayı durdurduk

Recent News

Arkadaşlar, bunların elleri kolları çok uzun, bir sabah bir kalkarız grupların yerlerinde yeller esiyor.. Bu ihtimale karşı "bu oluşumu yedeklem amacıyla bir e-grup kurdum face book dışında, duyurursanız ve uye olursanız sevinirim..

CUMHURIYET DUSMANLARININ DUSMANI",
CUMHURIYETIN BEKCILERI E-GRUBU HAKKINDA
Bu Grup, AKP KAPATMA davasi konusunda bassavciya destek amaciyla kurulan ve 4 gun icerisinde 150.000 uye sayisina ulasan 2 facebook grubunun uyelerini bir araya toplamak icin kurulmustur. Bizimle aynı fikirleri paylasan ATATURK'un kurdugu Cumhuriyetin Bekcileri olan ve olacak tum arkadaslarınızı bu guruba davet edebilirsiniz.

BU GRUP BIR FIKIR PAYLASIMI-TARTIŞMA GRUBU OLMAYCAKTIR, YANLIZCA TOPLU HAREKET ETME, EYLEM, BULUSMA, GORUSME HABERLERİ VERECEK DOLAYISIYLA DA SINIRLI SAYIDA MAIL ALACAGINIZ BIR DUYURU PLATFORMU OLACAKTIR

Uye olmak için aşagidaki adreseboş bir mail atın:
CumhuriyetinBekcileri-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

Grup Sayfası: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CumhuriyetinBekcileri/

Uyelerimizin Başsavcı'ya destek vermek için, kenetlenmesi, 4 gunde 150.000 üye sayısına ulaşması, ve taciz saldırı içerikli mesajlarla boğuşuyor olmamız, internet sitelerine haber oldu, okuyun;
http://www.haberinyeri.net/Guncel/Akp-Kapansin-Diyen-53-Bin-Kisi_14424.html
---

Photos

Displaying the only photo. See All



Posted Items

Displaying 2 of 122 posted items. See All

ekodiyalog - EKOVOLE - rantiyenin sesi
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v...

OYUNA DEVAM...

Posted by Murat Uçar | 2 comments



FACEBOOK TÜRK TOPLULUĞU
Facebook Group

Bu inanılmaz Facebook deneyimine katılmaya

Internet

APPENDIX I



retrieved in 5/5/2008

Destek veren gruplar:
CUMHURİYET ŞEHİTLERİ
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=7318816053

ATAK (ATATÜRKÇÜ KADINLAR) HAREKETİ
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?
gid=19090565444

AKP ÇEK ELLERİNİ KIZIMIN GELECEĞİNDEN!!!
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?
gid=14988830329

ARKADAŞLAR AŞAĞIDA YAZAN KONUYU ORTAK BİR METİN VE ZEMİN OLUŞTURANA KADAR ERTELEDİK... 100.000 MAİLDEN KASTIMIZ EN AZ 100.000 PROTESTO MAİLİDİR. HAZIRLIKLAR TAMAM LUNCA DUYURACAGIM BU SAYFAYI LUTFEN TAKIP EDIN...

---

12 Nisan Ulusal Egemenlik Buluşması
(Kadıköy'den Gençlik Otobüsüyle Gelmek İsteyenler İçin)

Arkadaşlar 12 Nisan cumartesi günü Ankara - Tandoğan Meydanı'nda yapılacak olan ULUSAL EGEMENLİK mitinginde hepinizi aramızda görmekten mutluluk duyarız. 11 Nisan cuma günü saat 23.00 - 24.00 gibi Kadıköy Eylendirme Dairesi Otoparkı'ndan yola çıkacağız.İstanbul'dan katılmak isteyen bütün genç kardeşlerimizi aramızda görmek isteriz.Gelmek isterseniz, kemalistali@hotmail.com ve gdurukan@hotmail.com , moeyilgor@hotmail.com adreslerinden bize ulaşabilirsiniz...

Bizkaçkişiyiz Kadıköy Gençlik

Recent News

CUMHURİYETİN BEKÇİLERİ E-GRUBU

Arkadaşlar, bunların elleri kolları çok uzun, bir sabah bir kalkarız grupların yerlerinde yeller esiyor.. Bu ihtimale karşı bu oluşumu yedeklem amacıyla bir e-grup kurdum face book dışında, duyurursanız ve üye olursanız sevinirim..

CUMHURIYETIN BEKCILERI E-GRUBU HAKKINDA
Bu Grup, AKP KAPATMA davası konusunda bassavcıya destek amacıyla kurulan ve 4 gün içerisinde 150.000 üye sayısına ulasan 2 facebook grubunun üyelerini bir araya toplamak için kurulmustur. Bizimle aynı fikirleri paylasan ATATURK'un kurdugu Cumhuriyetin Bekcileri olan ve olacak tum arkadaslarınızı bu guruba davet edebilirsiniz.

Internet %100

CUMHURIYETIN BEKCILERI E-GRUBU HAKKINDA
Bu Grup, AKP KAPATMA davası konusunda bassavcıya destek amacıyla kurulan ve 4 gün içerisinde 150.000 üye sayısına ulasan 2 facebook grubunun üyelerini bir araya toplamak için kurulmustur. Bizimle aynı fikirleri paylasan ATATURK'un kurdugu Cumhuriyetin Bekcileri olan ve olacak tum arkadaslarınızı bu guruba davet edebilirsiniz.

'Cumhuriyetin Bekcileri' E-GRUBU BIR FIKIR PAYLASIMI-TARTIŞMA GRUBU OLMAYACAKTIR, YANLIZCA TOPLU HAREKET ETME, EYLEM, BULUSMA, GORUSME HABERLERI VERECEK DOLAYISIYLA DA SINIRLI SAYIDA MAIL ALACAGINIZ BIR DUYURU PLATFORMU OLACAKTIR

Uye olmak için aşagıdaki adresebos bir mail atın:
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Grup Sayfası: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CumhuriyetinBekcileri/

Uyelerimizin Başsavcı'ya destek vermek için, kenetlenmesi, 4 günde 150.000 üye sayısına ulaşması, ve taciz saldırı içerikli mesajlarla boğuşuyor olmamız, internet sitelerine haber oldu, okuyun;
http://www.haberinyeri.net/Gunce/Akp-Kapansin-Diyen-53-Bin-Kisi_14424.html

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==========
"""""""THE WALL HAKKINDA """""""""""
==========

THE WALL ONLINE ADMIN VARSA AÇIK OLACAKTIR.

ARKADAŞLAR BU GRUBA KARŞIT GÖRÜŞTEN KİŞİLER DE ÜYE OLUYOR., THE WALL'DAKI YAZIŞMALARI DEMOKRATİK BİR ORTAM OLSUN DİYE ENGELLEMİYORUZ. ANCAK KUFUR ETME, HAKARET ETME GİBİ PROVOKATİF YAZILAR GELECEKTİR. BU TARZ YAZILARI, PROPOGANDA YAPMAKTAN BAŞKA AMACI OLMAYANLARI THE WALL'DAN VE GRUPTAKI 'PHOTOS' DISCUSSION BOARD" GİBİ DİĞER HER ALANDAN SILIYORUZ.

SİZLERE DÜŞEN SELDEN AŞAĞI YAZAN KİŞİLERLE MUHATTAP OLMAMAKTIR ORAYA UYGUNSUZ, SAYGISIZ TERBİYESİZ YAZILARI YAZAN ANCAK VE ANCAK KENDİ CEHALETİNİ TEŞHİR EDER. BU AYIP DA ONLARA YETER. YAZIŞMAYI ENGELLEYİP BU İNSANLARA YOK VAR SAYMAK, ANCAK GERÇEKLERDEN KAÇIŞ OLUR. BURADA KAÇARSAK ERTESİ GÜN GELİP TEPEMİZE OTURACAK OLAN AYNI MİLİTAN RİŞİLERDİR!
EDEP ve TERBİYE SINIRLARI İÇERİSİNDE KARŞI FİKİR BEYAN EDECEK ARKADAŞLARLA TARTIŞMAK BİZİM İÇİN BİR ZEVK OLACAKTIR, ÇUNKU BİZİM DURUŞ NOKTAMIZ, DOĞRULARIMIZ, SAYLINDUKLARIMIZ AÇISINDAN GOCUNDUĞUMUZ BİR ŞEY YOK. BİZİM ARADIĞIMIZ ÇÖZÜM NE ARABİSTAN ÇÖLLERİNDEDİR, NE AMERİKANIN MECLİSİNDE, BİZİM ARADIĞIMIZ ÇÖZÜM KENDİ ÖZLEMİZDE, lütfen gruba en az bizler kadar sahip çıkın, seviyenizi koruyun!!!

Photos

Displaying 4 of 86 photos. See All

Internet %100

APPENDIX J

Bahse Girerim 500.000 Kişi Atatürk'ün Hala Hayatta Olmasını İsterdi.

Gogus buyutucu



Goguslerinizde 3 ayda 1 beden 6 ayda 2 beden buyume saglayabilirsiniz hemde tamamen dogal ve bitkisel olarak , nasil mi?

More Ads | Advertise

Information

Group Info

Type: Organizations - General

Description: "Benim naçiz vücudum elbet bir gün toprak olacaktır. Fakat Türkiye cumhuriyeti ebediyen yaşayacaktır"

Contact Info

Email: tnkfc@msn.com

Photos

Displaying 4 of 81 photos — See All






Videos

Displaying 2 of 9 videos — See All



Akatoo Alpha
by James Krellner
2:22 Uploaded about a month ago.

View Video



28 Nisan 2007....Ağlayan değil Çağlayan Olduk.....
by Fikret Ersen
8:31 Uploaded about a month ago.

View Video | 10 comments

Posted Items

Displaying 2 of 106 posted items — See All



301.MADDE NAMUSUMUZDUR DEĞİŞTİRİLEMEZ
Facebook Group

MADDE 301. - (1) Türklüğü, Cumhuriyeti veya Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisini alenen aşağılayan kişi, altı aydan üç yıla kadar hapis cezası ile cezalandırılır.
(2) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükûmetini, Devlet...

301 NAMUSTUR ŞEREFTİR TARİHTİR

Posted by Göktürk Ay

AYRIMSIZLAR DÜÞÜNCE HAREKETÝ " TÜRKÝYE KARDEÞLÝÐE ÝMZA ATIYOR !! "
http://www.ayrimsizlar.org

AYRIMSIZLAR DUSUNCE HAREKETI



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Events We'r

Kitap Dostları
Saturday, Nove

Related Gro

ATATÜRKÜN TÜM DÜNYAY TÜRK GENCİ
Organizations
Organizations

Sigara içmeye
Common Inter

"AKP'NİN KAF 10.000.000 K PLATFORMU:
Organizations

GELMİŞ,GEÇN ATATÜRK'TÜI bulabirim.
Organizations

Atatürkçü Ger
Organizations

Group Type

This is an ope join and invit

Admins

Fatih Çe

Posted by Birol öztürk

Discussion Board

Displaying 3 of 119 discussion topics

PERSEPOLIS 14 Mayıs 2008 günü saat 22.00'de CNBC-e televizyon kanalında
1 post by 1 person. Updated on May 12, 2008 at 11:15 AM.

ÖZEL HAVA GRUBU
1 post by 1 person. Updated on May 6, 2008 at 9:12 AM.

68 Kuşağından Deniz Gezmiş'i Dinlemek İstiyorum Diyen Gençlik Buraya
1 post by 1 person. Updated on May 2, 2008 at 7:36 AM.

Members

This group has 197,562 members. See All



Begüm Dinçman | Hatice Yücel | Yeşim çil | Ataturkun Cocuklariyiz | Gamze Er | Taylan Kurt Sdu

The Wall

Displaying 10 of 5032 wall posts See All

Members
This group has 56,924 members.
See All

The Wall
Displaying posts 1 - 20 of 18328.

See All



Mehmet Kara wrote
at 10:50pm
nüfüsa isteyen yazdırmalı tabiki. ben de zorunlu din dersine karşıyım istemeyen almamalı bu dersi. bunun la birlikte kapsamının genişletilmesinden yanayım. bu derse ayrılan ders saatinin artırılmasından yanayım özellikle ilköğretimin bütününde. çünkü din tam olarak devlet kontürolünde öğretilmelidir. aksi takdir de mağlum nefret ettiğiniz cemaatler hiç bi şekilde bitirilemez.
Report



Oğuz Devecioğlu wrote
at 10:42pm
Ben de ateistim ama bu bana aşağılama hakkını vermez.Çok defalar eleştirdim ama ağzımdan kötü bir söz çıkmamıştır.Ancak ben bu saygıyı gösterirken aynı şeyi de karşımdakinden beklerim.Zorunlu din dersi,nüfustaki otomatik İslam dini ibaresi gibi şeylerle dayatılmasına karşıyım
Report



Mehmet Kara wrote
at 10:37pm
bence de öyle senin tanımına katılıyorum. din dil ırk farkı gözetilmez atatürk milliyetçiliğinde. kendini bu devlete ait gören kerkes türktür. bununla birlikte dinine diline saygı gösterilmesini de bekler. burdan çıkan sonuç aramızda bir tane atatürk milliyetçisi olmayan biri var. dine insana saygısı olmayan biri. gökhan olduğunu tahmin ettiğim aşşağıdaki yazar.
Report



Ali Büyük wrote
at 10:34pm
maalesef atatürk milliyetçiliğini de dünyaya avrupaya tanıtamadık...onlara göre kemalizm 1940l yılların tek partici diktatörlüğünü temsil ediyor...avrupa ve batı demokrasi sosyal devlet gibi kavramlarla tanıştı ama biz hala bunlara muhtaçız
Report



Ali Büyük wrote
at 10:28pm
Aslı Margi Çakır wrote
at 10:10pm
ATATÜRK MİLLİYETÇİSİYİM. ATATÜRKÇÜ OLMAK HİÇ BİR DİNE HİÇ BİR MİLLİYETE BAGLI DEGİLDİR AKSİNİ DUŞUNEN VARSA BUYURSUN EĞER ÖYLE OLSAYDI GORBAÇOVUN MASASININ UZERİNDE KENDİ ÖNDERLERİ YERİNE ATATÜRK ÜN RESMİ OLMAZDI.

aslı margi sana katılmıyorum...atatürkün büyüklüğü gorbaçovun masasında resminin olmasıyla mı ölçülüyo...bu ne saygısızlık....gorbaçovun masasında atamızın resmi olmasaydı atatürkçülük değersiz mi diycektin.....ayıp..çok ayıp...
Report



Oğuz Devecioğlu wrote
at 10:27pm
Kardeşim Atatürk milliyetçiliğinin özü bellidir senin benim görüşüm diye birşey yok.Faşizmi reddeden Ne mutlu Türküm diyen din,dil,ırk kesinlikle gözetmeyen ayrımcılık yerine birleştiriciliği olan amacı milli değerleri koruyarak Türkiye'yi çağdaş uygarlık seviyesine taşımak olan bir olgudur.
Report



Mehmet Kara wrote
at 10:20pm
senin görüşünü de merak ediyorum oğuz. yanlış anlama dalga geçme amaçlı sormuyorum.fikir alış verişi olarak algıla.
Report



Mehmet Kara wrote
at 10:18pm
çeşitli görüşler var da herkes kendine göre yorum yapıo aslının görüşünü merak ettim
Report



Oğuz Devecioğlu wrote
at 10:16pm
Bu yaşa geldin öğrenemedin mi daha ne olduğunu???
Report



Mehmet Kara wrote
at 10:14pm
atatürk milliyetçiliği nedir?
Report



Aslı Margi Çakır wrote
at 10:10pm
ATATÜRK MİLLİYETÇİSİYİM. ATATÜRKÇÜ OLMAK HİÇ BİR DİNE HİÇ BİR MİLLİYETE BAGLI DEGİLDİR AKSİNİ DUŞUNEN VARSA BUYURSUN EĞER ÖYLE OLSAYDI GORBAÇOVUN MASASININ UZERİNDE KENDİ ÖNDERLERİ YERİNE ATATÜRK ÜN RESMİ OLMAZDI. BUNA BİRÇOK ÖRNEK EKLENEBİLİR. AMA BU ARKADAŞLARIN CIVIKLIGI İZMİR KARŞIYAKALI OLMAMDAN DA KAYNAKLANABİLİR. NE DE OLSA GAVURUZ YA ONDANDIR BU HAZIMSIZLIK.
Report



Mehmet Kara wrote
at 10:09pm
vay anassını gene yemişiz birbirimizi.
neyse insanlar konuşa konuşa....
Report



Deniz Özgür wrote
at 9:47pm
hepinize iyi akşamlar :)) aslıcım boşver düşünme böyle şeyler...bunların söylediklerini de ciddiye alma keza senin de söylediğin ve tahir inde dikkat çektiği üzere DOMALGAN ETTİRGENLER işte daha ne bekliyoruz?

bu arada güzel bir atasözü güvenme deliye işer halıya diyerek bu deliler beyinsizlerin söyledikleri doğru olsaydı eğer neler neler değişirdi bu dünya tarihi üzerinde :))
Report



Deniz Özgür wrote
at 9:44pm
neyse biliyorum şimdi burada akepeye hiç oy atmayan ama akepeyi destekleyen sefiller buna da bir kılıf uyduracaklar ama ne olursa olsun elinizi vicdanınıza koyun ve şunu kendinize çocuğunuza kızkardeşinize sevgilinize yapılan bir hareket olarak görün!! tek isteğim bu olmakla beraber bunun neresinde dini inanç neresinde ibadet allah aşkı?14 yaşında çocuk be!!!insaf!!!

arkadaşlar bu arada tekbir giyim sahibinin de 3 tane karısı olduğu ortaya çıkmış :))bu lavuk bağırıyordu değil mi ortalıkta ister seve seve isater döve döve kapanacak bu millet örtünecek demişti değil mi :))??
Report



Bora
at 12:

Kimisi
zengi
tarafı
peşin
mutlu
biraz
tüm b
geçici
bittiği
eski s
Tüm i
mutlu
var ki
ulaştı

ALLA
http:/
gid=1

Repor



Arif Şengüler wrote
at 11:34am

arkadaşlar anadolu zaten türk yurduydu

desteklerinizi bekliyorum

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=13790807170

Report

Cumhuriyet
HABERİN YERİ

Ulusal Gündem wrote
at 12:44am

R.T.Erdoğan Kime Benziyor?
http://www.haberinyeri.net/ilgincbenzerlik.php

Report



Göktürk Ay wrote
at 10:33pm yesterday

Saygıdeğer üyeler ; Türk tarihinin anlatıldığı düşüncelerin ve hayatın Türkçe konuşulduğu TÜRK OTAĞI mıza davetlisiniz.Otağımızda Siyaset yapmak yasaktır.Otağımızın amacı Türk gençliğine Türk tarihini aşılamak ve Türk tarihinin önemli ayrıntılarını sunmaktır
Saygılar.

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=66601113911

Report



Erkan çeçen wrote
at 6:23pm yesterday

arkadaşlar.. tuncay özkanın tv kanalını satmasına

APPENDIX K

WORLD WIDE GROWTH OF FACEBOOK

Comscore. "World wide growth of Facebook" Available [online]: http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2396 [20 August 2008]

Worldwide Growth among Selected Social Networking Sites

June 2008 vs. June 2007

Total Worldwide Audience, Age 15+

Home and Work Locations

Source: comScore World Metrix

	Total Unique Visitors (000)		
	Jun-2007	**Jun-2008**	**% Change**
Total Internet : Total Audience	**778,310**	**860,514**	**11%**
Social Networking	**464,437**	**580,510**	**25%**
FACEBOOK.COM	52,167	132,105	153%
MYSPACE.COM	114,147	117,582	3%
HI5.COM	28,174	56,367	100%
FRIENDSTER.COM	24,675	37,080	50%
Orkut	24,120	34,028	41%
BEBO.COM	18,200	24,017	32%
Skyrock Network	17,638	21,041	19%

Worldwide Growth for Facebook.com

June 2008 vs. June 2007

Total Worldwide Audience, Age 15+

Home and Work Locations

Source: comScore World Metrix

	Total Unique Visitors (000)		
	Jun-2007	**Jun-2008**	**% Change**
FACEBOOK.COM	**52,167**	**132,105**	**153%**
North America	35,698	49,248	38%
Europe	8,751	35,263	303%
Asia Pacific	3,712	20,712	458%
Middle East - Africa	2,974	14,951	403%
Latin America	1,033	11,931	1055%

APPENDIX L

FACEBOOK USAGE BY COUNTRIES

Facebook.com users come from these countries:

United States	36.0%
United Kingdom	9.9%
Canada	5.7%
Turkey	2.9%
France	2.8%

Alexa. “Facebook.com Users” Available [online]:

“http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details/Facebook.com” [20 August 2008]

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