The Massacres of 1909: Violence in Revolutionary Context in Adana and its Hinterland

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Declaration of Originality

The intellectual content of this dissertation, which has been written by me and for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other examination or degree of higher education. The sources of all paraphrased and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly acknowledged herein.

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Abstract

The Massacres of 1909: Violence in Revolutionary Context in Adana and its Hinterland

Önder Uçar, Doctoral Candidate at the Atatürk Institute
for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2021

Prof. Dr. Cengiz Kırlı, Dissertation Advisor

This study is a reconsideration of the Massacres of 1909 in the light of the ethnoreligious relations in four urban centers (Kayseri, Maraş, Zeytun, and Antakya) from its hinterlands. Based on mainly Ottoman, British, and American Board Commission archival documents, it scrutinizes the history of these urban centers in the first year of the Young Turk period and explains the two massacres in Adana town center with the conclusions drawn from them. Demonstrating the ethnoreligious tensions, the protests against local governments, the role of religion, the agency of the commoner Muslims, and the power of Muslim notables between the Revolution and the Massacres; the study calls for a reevaluation of some predominant paradigms of causation, which are the dominance of the center over the regions, base over superstructure, and patrician over plebeian in interpreting the Young Turk regime's abstract principles, specifically on the rights of Ottoman Armenians. Also, the study investigates the relationship between the Massacres and the 31 March Incident and suggests going beyond the historiography that belittles the conception of reaction by dividing it into three stages: absorption, anti-revolution, and counterrevolution. The study argues that Massacres of 1909 were reactionary movements in the stage of anti-revolution, and their potential of turning into counterrevolution was a vital factor in making the already reluctant Young Turk policymakers abandon the realization of universalist principles regarding Ottoman Armenian rights.

151.319 words

Özet

1909 Katliamı: Adana ve Hinterlandında Devrimci Bağlamda Şiddet

Önder Uçar, Doktora Adayı, 2021
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Prof. Dr. Cengiz Kırlı, Tez Danışmanı

Bu çalışma, hinterlandındaki dört kentsel merkezdeki (Kayseri, Maraş, Zeytun ve Antakya) etno-dinsel ilişkiler ışığında, 1909 Katliamlarının bir yeniden değerlendirmesidir. Ağırlıklı olarak Osmanlı, İngiliz ve Amerikan Board Komisyonu arşiv belgelerine dayanarak bu kentsel merkezlerin Jön Türk dönemindeki ilk yılının tarihini irdelemektedir ve Adana şehir merkezindeki iki katliamı bunlardan çıkardığı sonuçlarla açıklamaktadır. Çalışma, devrim ile katliamlar arasındaki etno-dinsel gerilimleri, yerel yönetimlere karşı protestoları, dinin rolünü, sıradan Müslümanların failliğini ve Müslüman eşrafın gücünü göstererek; Jön Türk rejiminin soyut ilkelerinin, özellikle Osmanlı Ermenilerinin haklarına ilişkin olanlarının yorumlanmasında merkezin çevre bölgeler, altyapının üstyapı ve patrisyenlerin plebyenler üzerindeki baskınlığı hakkındaki bazı hâkim nedensellik paradigmalarının yeniden değerlendirilmesi çağrısında bulunmaktadır. Çalışma ayrıca, Katliamlar ve 31 Mart Olayı arasındaki ilişkiyi araştırmakta ve gericilik kavramını küçümseyen tarih yazımını, kavramı üç aşamaya ayırarak aşmayı önermektedir: Özümseme, devrim karşıtlığı ve karşı-devrim. Çalışma, 1909 Katliamlarının devrim karşıtı aşamada olan gerici hareketler olduğunu ve bunların karşı-devrime dönüşme potansiyellerinin, zaten gönülsüz olan Jön Türk politika yapıcılarının Osmanlı Ermenilerinin haklarını ilgilendiren evrenselci ilkelerin gerçekleştirilmesinden vazgeçmelerinde hayati bir faktör olduğunu savunmaktadır.

151.319 kelime

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To my mother

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All translations in the dissertation are mine, unless stated otherwise. In the transliteration of Ottoman Turkish phrases and terms, the simplest form of latinization is used, and ʻayn and hemze are only used to avoid confusion of meaning.

For the sake of simplicity, names and terms that are well known in contemporary English are rendered in conventional form. Thererefore, I use giaour, not gavur, and hodja not hoca. Other names and terms in Ottoman Turkish are generally transliterated in their modern Turkish form, but their well known versions are provided in paranthesis at their first appearance of the text.

The names of the places which are today within Turkey are presented with their contemporary equivalent except for those I was not able to locate. For example, I use Antakya, Zeytun, Haçin and Antep instead of Antioch, Zeitun, Hadjin and Aintab. The names of other places are presented in English. For example, I use Aleppo, not Halep. I have followed the Library of Congress's Western Armenian transliteration system for transliterating Armenians words with diacritical marks, except for those I was not able to detect.

In the quotations, I did not change the transliterations of the writers. Therefore, for example, in the quotations the word hodja may appear as hoja, not hodja, Zeytun may appear as Zeitoun, or Babikian may appear as Babikyan.

All mentioned dates in the main text are Rumi dates except the footnotes that refer to F.O. and A.B.C.F.M. documents, whose writers use Gregorian calendar.

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NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made detailed recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, syntax, and style of this dissertation.

1

Introduction

This dissertation is a study of the Massacres of 1909, which first erupted in the Adana town center, and then spread to other regions, and seemingly having cost about twenty thousand lives, most of which were Armenians. It endeavors to focus on the reflections of the Massacres in the nearby regions, to derive conclusions from those hinterlands, and to apply those conclusions to an analysis of the events at the center of the Massacre; Adana. The larger goal is to contribute to the attempts at understanding the occurrences in local and empire-wide politics during the first months of the Young Turk period.

When one mentions the Massacres of 1909, the reader will most probably predict that this work analyzes a large period that includes many years of both the Hamidian and the Young Turk era. At first sight, the reader also may expect that as it was the center of the Massacres, the dissertation will focus on mostly the story of Adana town. A third possible prediction can be that the dissertation will put the Massacres into a larger context and provide a broad explanation of its reasons and results, most of which will be mainly about property transfer.

This dissertation, however, is an attempt to contribute to the fulfillment of other gaps in historiography. The first fulfillment attempt is exploring and analyzing the occurrences in the towns within the remote hinterlands of the Massacres. Although there are great contributions to the historiography of the Massacres, few of them analyze the stories of these towns, because they were

not explored in detail. This dissertation is an attempt to fill this gap by focusing on the events in certain nearby town centers affected by the Massacre, namely Kayseri, Maraş, Zeytun, and Antakya. Ethnoreligious tensions had already been existent in all the hinterlands when the news from the massacre in Adana spread to them. The people in these towns reacted to the Massacres varyingly: Tension increased to a high level in all of them, yet in Kayseri and Zeytun no killings occurred, whereas in Maraş, there were limited murders, and yet in Antakya, terrible full-scale massacres. In Adana, there were two waves of massacres: The first one resulted in the extermination of Armenian peasants in the periphery of the town. Yet within the Adana center, Armenians were partially successful in self-defense. Later, however, they would face the same fate as those in the periphery with the second massacre. These facts show us from the get-go that what took place there by mid-April 1909 was a series of massacre attempts, some of which, unfortunately, succeeded. Throughout the dissertation, I use the historical concept of Cilicia to point to the facts that concern all regions affected by the Massacres. Yet I am aware that although Cilicia is the most applicable term to refer to the territories around Adana, it does not have specific boundaries. For example, whether we should consider Antakya as part of Cilicia or not is doubtful. Or Kayseri certainly does not belong to Cilicia. So, although I extend the concept of Cilicia to refer to all towns observed in this work, rather than calling the events Adana Massacre or Cilicia Massacres, I use "the Massacres of 1909" to refer to the different waves and regions under consideration.

Second, although there are summaries about the pre-revolutionary days and the aftermath of the early Young Turk era, here, the provided story and its analysis are mostly about the events between the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and mid-1910, when the judiciary process for dealing the Massacres ended. Countless counterclaims by contemporaries of the Massacres, the limited number of works on the subject,[1] and the availability

1 Until a few years ago, historians were still pointing to the lack of studies on the Adana Massacres, the center of the incidents. See Meltem Toksöz, "Çukurova'da Sosyoekonomik Dönüşüm ve 1909 Adana Katliamı," in *1915 Siyaset, Tehcir, Soykırım*, eds. Fikret Adanır, Oktay Özel (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), 252; Kemal Çiçek, "Adana Olayları Hakkında Bildiklerimiz Bilmediklerimiz" *1909 Adana Olayları/Makaleler*, ed. Kemal Çiçek (Ankara:

of a very large amount of resources made me avoid coming to hasty conclusions about greater questions, such as the reasons and the outcomes of these massacres.

Third, rather than the economic issues such as competition and property transfer, which are touched upon more frequently in the works on similar subjects, this dissertation puts its focus on the political culture. During the presentation of the series of events in detail, I try to observe and analyze the mentalities that allow us to understand the diversity of interpretations that regarded the relation of two vast political subjects of that time: The revolutionary politics and the Armenian Question.

So, in brief, it must be noted from the beginning that the greater part of the work is devoted to the discovery and the analysis of the events that occurred in the much less studied hinterlands. The observation of the much-disputed case of the Adana town center utilizes the conclusions drawn from these hinterlands. What will come forward in both the hinterlands and the Adana town center are the political mentalities of the agents that dealt with the events between the Young Turk Revolution and the Massacres of 1909. The analysis of these mentalities will allow me to make comments about the interpretations of constitutionalist rights of Ottoman Armenians.

I believe that the dissertation has the potential to merit a reevaluation (but not a reversal) of some predominant paradigms of causation within the scholarship on the subject. These can be listed as the hegemony of:

-the central over the regional,

-base over superstructure,

-and patrician over plebeian,

in determining the new regime's abstract principles, specifically on the rights of Armenians.

TTK Basımevi, 2011), 9; Taner Akçam, "Önsöz" in *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor (Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri by Garabet Çalyan, Adana'da Adalet Nasıl Mahkum Oldu by Artin Arslanyan, Adana Raporu by Hagop Babikyan)*, ed. Ari Şekeryan (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2016), 20-21.

§ 1.1 "Bending the Sticks" by "Following up the Surprises" in Two Fields of Ottoman Historiography

Above, the reader can notice that I refrained from the reversal of the paradigms right away. This hesitation stems from two causes. The first is that the Massacres of 1909 is a sub-topic of certain large fields of Ottoman-Turkish-Armenian historiography, a fact that makes one cautious about reaching hasty conclusions. After starting to read on the subject, the researcher will see that Massacres of 1909 are a sub-field of two great fields, namely, the history of the "Armenian Question" and the history of transformation into the Impersonal State[2] in Turkey, or what I will call here Transition Studies.

The Massacres of 1909 were above all, ethno-religious conflicts between some local Muslims and some non-Muslims, mainly the Armenians. Almost everywhere, these Muslims took the offensive by falsely claiming that there was a serious Armenian separatist plot. Armenians were able to barely defend themselves for a while in a few cases. In most of them, their sufferings were incomparably larger than the Muslim offenders, a fact which was also admitted by Ottoman officials. The subject of the Massacres is therefore a sub-field of the historiography of the Ottoman Empire's "Armenian Question". Consequently, the researcher faces countless problems in the field, some of which are the intolerable extent of the denials and legitimizations of Ottoman Armenians' tragedies and harassments made by different agents devoted to those denials and legitimizations. Furthermore, there is a great diversity of countless documents in very different languages which are located in a large

2 Heide Gerstenberger's concept impersonal state does not exclude different forms of transformations to bourgeois states. In this sense, it is kind of a response of the Marxian revolutionary historiography to the challenges made by the Revisionist French Revolutionary historiography. According to Gerstenberger, the impersonal state is the one that limits itself with the law and sets the market free. In impersonal state, the sphere of politics was to be differentiated from the economic sphere. From that time on, separated political power could not be used for private enrichment in principle Constitutions of impersonal states also guarantee private property. See the last part of Heide Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*, trans. D. Fernbach (Leiden; Boston : Brill, 2007), 629-687.

number of places, and concomitant difficulties in detecting exact stories due to countless counterclaims and the sheer scale of the literature itself. Other than those common difficulties, the fact that the Massacres of 1909 occurred between the Hamidian Massacres and the 1915 Genocide, the two much wider scale events, constitute another problem: These two larger events cast their shadows over the Massacres of 1909 in multiple senses.

The Massacres of 1909 occurred almost simultaneously with the famous 31 March Incident. The two claims, first, that the 31 March Incident was a counterrevolution, and second, that the Massacres were a part of the 31 March Incident, render The Massacres of 1909 the sub-field of another literature: The works on the transformation to impersonal state, or Transition Studies, whose great popularity have declined in line with the fall of Marxist historiography and historical sociology. The Turkish version of this decline also has a peculiar dimension: Contrary to its other more popular versions in England, France, and Germany, when it started to decline, Transition Studies were not so mature in Turkey. British Marxist historians, Revisionist contributions to the French Revolution historiography, and critiques of Sonderweg, all of which were most popular during the 70s and 80s, became better known in Turkey in the 2000s, which means that they started to be widely known in Turkey only after they fell off the agenda in the globe.[3] Therefore, answers to the questions such as how the transition from the Empire to the Republic took place, whether continuities or breaks were more dominant in this transition, or whether the timing of the break -if it has ever existed is in 1908 or 1923, were answered by using theoretical instruments which were much too outdated in

3 Some books' year of translation to Turkish can give us an idea about the fact: For example, Christopher Hill's famous The English Revolution, 1640, which was an unsuccessful attempt of defending the classical bourgeois revolution idea, was translated in 1983. His future works left his previous argument behind, yet among them, only "The World Turned Upside Down" was translated to Turkish in 2013. Another great figure of the classical bourgeois revolution idea, Albert Soboul, was also discovered earlier. His "La Révolution Française" was translated in 1969. Furet's response is also translated at a relatively early time (1978), yet even some most famous works were translated much later, such as Citizens by Schama (1989-2015), Echoes of the Marsellaise by Hobsbawm (1990-2009). As for German transformation, despite some references being made to them, all works are still waiting to be translated.

Western historiography.[4] Because of the changing trends, historians no longer feel the need to give new answers to those questions. In this sense, references to these bourgeois revolutions were not a coincidence in the misreading of the consolidation of the current regime in Turkey as a democratization process.[5] Given that works on the concept of counterrevolution were even rarer and relatively late to appear in western historiography,[6] the 31 March Incident, which remains as an "incident" only, and which casts another shadow on the Massacres of 1909, has to be tackled anew. Given that even detecting the Massacres' relation with the 31 March Incident itself is lies ahead of historians as a problem of great importance, this is not an easy task.

The second cause seems to be the large size of the subject itself. Simply, given the existence of the enormous amount of Ottoman archival documents, most of which were either used improperly or not used at all, the researcher faces many sub-fields of the subject.[7] Although demonstrating success in picking useful documents is a prerequisite for being a good historian, the volume of first-hand documents in the Ottoman archives forces the researcher to focus on only some aspects, which still wait to be discovered and elaborated. It seems that only after observing those aspects can we construct take a more vivid picture of the Massacres. For example, a careful and interested reader can easily notice right at the beginning that three districts, Mersin, Kozan (Sis), and Cebel-i Bereket, which form the closer hinterland of the Massacres, are excluded in this work. Some other aspects, like the Massacres' impact on foreign relations of the Empire, the relief works, or the changing economic

4 For a summary of those outdated criteria, see Önder Uçar, "Türkiye'de Tarihyazımı ve Burjuva Devrimleri: Bazı Gereksiz Kıstaslar," *Tarih ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar* 16, (2013): 145-178.

5 For two typical examples, see Ömer Laçiner, "Şimdi Alternatif Zamanı," *Birikim* 220-221, (August-September 2007): 43-49 and Ahmet İnsel, "Burjuva Demokratik Dönüşüm ve Sol," *Birikim* 220-221, (August-September 2007): 50-55.

6 Clarke Garrett notes that even by 1994, there were no books that have claimed to survey counterrevolution, except the 1961 year book of Jacques Godechot. See Clarke Garrett, "The Myth of the Counterrevolution in 1789," *French Historical Studies* 18, no. 3 (Spring, 1994): 784-800.

7 For an example of ignoring the detailed Armenian testimonies in the Ottoman archival documents, see Aydın Efe, "Mursaloğlu Mustafa Şevki Paşa," *History Studies International Journal of History* 5 no. 2 (March 2013): 155-169. For a work that confuses Hayri Bey Incident, see Ali Karahan, 1909 Maraş Olayları, (Master's Thesis, Selçuk University, 2008), 80-81.

conditions are also excluded in this work. It seems that the maturation of a theoretical explanation of the Massacres of 1909 is dependent on producing several works on several sub-fields.

Throughout the dissertation, I search for the events in the hinterland of the Massacres of 1909 through documents and simply do what Robert Darnton does in his path-breaking book, *The Great Cat Massacre*, which he describes as "following up the surprises provided by an unlikely assortment of texts".[8] The methodology of Darnton, who used documents that "cannot be taken to typify" but "provide ways of entering into" his object of study, the eighteenth-century thought of France, can be inspiring.[9] In the introduction to his work, Darnton explained that methodology as follows:

> … I have pursued what seemed to be the richest run of documents, following leads wherever they went and quickening my pace as soon as I stumbled on a surprise. Straying from the beaten path may not be much of a methodology, but it creates the possibility of enjoying some unusual views, and they can be the most revealing.[10]

By doing so, Darnton shows that limiting objectives to detecting unusual views can make significant contributions to historiography. For two reasons, I think that following up the surprises can be fruitful in studying the Massacres of 1909 too: As they are the common subject of these two large fields, detecting the seemingly unusual views that can raise historians' eyebrows can be rewarding. In this study, such points will mostly be about themes that can lead us to question certain widely accepted arguments. In other words, pointing to such clues can help us, as in the conception popularized by Lenin, "bend the stick" on the views to be questioned. In fact, many great debates that made important contributions to historiography can be seen as attempts to bend the sticks. Debates between Marxist and Revisionist historians of the French Revolution, the transition debate among

8 Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre: And Other Episodes in French Cultural History,* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 5.

9 Ibid., 5-6.

10 Ibid., 6.

British Marxist historians, specifically between Dobb and Sweezy over the emergence of capitalism, the Asiatic mode of production debate among Turkish socialists, or the controversy between Thompsonians and structuralists can be seen as such attempts to bend the sticks in specific directions in their discussions.

Ottoman official correspondence, letters and reports of the American Board Commission for Foreign Missions, British consular reports and articles in Ottoman newspapers on the Massacres of 1909 provide information that encourages the researcher to engage in some bending. In these documents, I try to follow thought-provoking clues. Wherever I discover such clues that lead us to question our existing views, I stop and try to present them in more detail.

The surprising points thus detected, forced me to search for concepts that can allow us to reevaluate the subject, and I tried to solve this problem by adhering to the conceptions of Sahlins and warnings of Dirlik. As I will explain below in more detail, Sahlins's pointing to the meaning of *"inter est"*, and his *putting signs into action* allows us to explain the different agents' interpretations of the new regime's principles through a holistic approach, or the totality of all "spheres": economic, social, religious, cultural, etc. that allows us to bend the first stick: of attributing a determinant role to the economic, structural and rational to emphasizing the role of the cultural, eventful and emotional and pointing to the whole. Considering Dirlik's warning about our losses in rejecting foundational categories led me to bend the second stick: of rejecting foundational categories to reclaiming some of them by adding new layers (absorption, anti-revolution, and counterrevolution) and to searching for how some others (liberty, equality, and justice) were put into action. To put it more clearly, I suggest reusing the concepts of reaction and reactionaries to address some Muslim mobilizations against the new state and local Armenians. Taking the disadvantages of the old usage of the concept of reaction into account, I suggest dividing the forms of reaction into three moments: Absorption, anti-revolution, and counter-revolution. Reactionaries resist the foundational but abstract categories of

constitutionalist revolutions[11] first, by absorbing them, which means making interpretations that transform their essence; second, through anti-revolution movements, a concept that I borrow from Lucas, and which means, in my words, pushing limits of legal collective actions by questioning those categories in a partially organized way; and third, through counterrevolutions: well-prepared organizations that openly reject those categories. Because the application of foundational categories to Ottoman Armenians had a decisive role in their being put into action, the Armenian question and the transitions to impersonal states were closely linked to each other. And finally, the various stories in the neglected hinterlands forced me to bend the third stick: of attributing the power to shape revolutionary and ethnic policies from the capital to the provinces, and from upper to lower classes. By combining the three bendings, and by keeping in mind a lesson from the French experience –that it is the revolutionaries whose response will determine whether anti-revolutions turn into counterrevolutions or collaborations– I will conclude that the Massacres of 1909 show that the Armenian Question had a huge role in extending the reactionary Muslim movements. Furthermore, those movements were so popular that even if the central state had tried to stand against them, it was doomed to fail, no matter which group was controlling it. In some places, the reactionaries could easily absorb the foundational principles from the beginning. Where they could not, they showed their destructive potential in partially organized reactionary movements, which started immediately after the Young Turk revolution and reached their peak with the coincidentally simultaneous 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909. Although they were able to dish out relatively severe punishments in the capital, seeing the enormous potential of the reactionaries, the coalition in the central state between the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti) and some bureaucrats could not dare to do the same in Cilicia, where anti-revolutionaries started to question the new regime openly. By failing to crush them and by being confined to some limited punishments, the central state prevented the emergence of an openly counterrevolutionary

11 For the definition of constitutionalist revolutions, and its comparison with the Bolshevik type, see Sohrabi's introduction: Nader Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran*, (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 3-14.

movement, yet that came at the cost of foundational principles themselves. In that sense, the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909 can be considered as a turning point; a victory of reaction.

I must issue three warnings before beginning to present the bendings. First, in none of these arguments I intend to bend the stick intentionally "too far", which was explained by Tony Cliff as a part of Lenin's political strategy.[12] Doing so can risk replacing one over-bending with another, just like what revisionist historiography had done in French Revolution historiography in terms of substituting socio-economic determinism with cultural determinism.[13] So, for example, when I argue that the events in Maraş show that religious factors could have played a more decisive role than we used to think in the attacks against Armenians and criticize historians for downplaying Islam's role not only in Maraş but also in the 31 March Incident, I will not reject the role of other factors that mobilized the Muslim crowds during the event. On the contrary, I will argue that the scholars had bent the stick too far towards the material interests of the reactionaries. In this sense, the sticks will be bent to make them as straight as possible, like what Lars T. Lih thought was Lenin's intention.[14]

12 Cliff claims that "… readiness to bend the stick too far in one direction and then to go into reverse and bend it too far in the opposite direction was a characteristic that he retained throughout his life"... At every stage of the struggle, Lenin would look for what he regarded as the key link in the chain of development. He would then repeatedly emphasize the importance of this link, to which all others must be subordinated. After the event, he would say: "We overdid it. We bent the stick too far," by which he did not mean that he had been wrong to do so. To win the main battle of the day, the concentration of all energies on the task was necessary." *See* Tony Cliff, *Lenin I,* available at *https://www.marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1975/lenin1/chap02.htm#f63*

13 William Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution*, (Oxford [England] ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1999), 38.

14 According to Lars T. Lih, Lenin's ambition in bending the stick was not tactical, but methodological: The only source about Lenin's saying the phrase bending too far was Plekhanov. Crucial here is the contrast between going too far (Plekhanov's reading of what Lenin said) and Lenin's actual emphasis on making the stick as straight as possible. See: Lars T. Lih, "Lenin Disputed," *Historical Materialism* 18, no. 3 (2010): 108-74; Lars T. Lih, *Lenin Rediscovered, (*Chicago: Highmarket Books, 2008), 27.

Another forewarning; I have absolutely no claim to being the first bender in any subject. Readers can detect prior similar actions in historiography. Take the first bending for example: The role of locals and common people in shaping the Young Turk state's ethnic policies have already started to be underlined thanks to the increasing popularity of other historiographies. In that sense, for example, Çetinkaya's pointing to the role of uncontrollable Muslim people in Greek boycotts, Kaiser's display of the civilian forces in the Genocide in Diyarbekir Province, the more recent call by Kurt to shift the attention to the common people's role in the 1915 Genocide, Bloxham's using "cumulative radicalization" conception of Mommsen in Ottoman historiography, Suny's "affective disposition" that pointed to "cognitive and emotional state of the perpetrators" or preferences to cite Gerlach's conception of "extremely violent societies" are notable.[15] Yet their valuable contributions are mostly regarding ethnic policies and not the revolutionary principles. Der Matossian, on the other hand, also makes contributions in both fields simultaneously. For the second bending, we can put it simply as such: The rejection of attributing a determinant role to the economic, structural, and rational is already obvious in every sense. However, we will see below that interestingly, historians predominantly still do not make that rejection in analyzing the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909. Third, there are foundational categories that have been reclaimed early, such as Kansu's call for renaming the 31 March Incident as a counterrevolution.[16] In all these senses, this dissertation is written with a motivation to avoid one

15 Christian Gerlach, "Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide", *Journal of Genocide Search* 8, no. 4, (2006): 458; Doğan Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014); Ümit Kurt, *Antep 1915: Soykırım ve Failler*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 17-40; Donald Bloxham, "The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy", Past& Present, no. 181, (Nov. 2003), pp. 141-191; Grigor Suny, *Ancak Çölde Yaşayabilirler: Bir Soykırım Tarihi,* (İstanbul: Aras Yayınları, 2016), 20; Hilmar Kaiser, *Diyarbakır'da Ermeni Kıyımı*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015), 11-103.

16 However, Kansu defines the Incident simply as a plot of the men of the old regime. See his third chapter on 31 March Incident in Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey 1908-1913*, (Boston: Brill, 2000), 77-126.

cause of the "Goldhagen Effect", which can be summarized as falsely and ignorantly claiming to be the first discoverer and elaborator of, historical facts that have already been well known by historians.[17] And my final warning is that by bending the stick, I do not refer at all to dealing with the claims of denialist historiography: The more we ignore them, the more freely we can clear our minds during our researches.[18]

By keeping the methodology and the initial warnings in mind, this dissertation attempts to search for two interrelated subjects, both of which are steps to relate the two great fields mentioned above –the Transition Studies and the Armenian Question. The first subject is the mutual effect between local power relations and the new regime, and the second is the variations in interpretation of the new regimes' principles regarding the Ottoman Armenians. In other words, during the work, I try to answer the following question: "How did different people, the statesmen, and politicians in the capital, as well as the officials, soldiers, notables, religious leaders, and common people in the localities interpret the abstract principles of the new regime when it came to their application to Ottoman Armenians' rights?"

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17 Goldhagen claimed to have been the first historian who discovered that ordinary Germans had committed the Holocaust crimes willingly. In addition to this originality claim, he heavily criticized the historians for having nothing to say about the role of ordinary people. In addition, for many historians, his work had many problems: His explanation of the Holocaust was very simple and vulgar: It was only the exceptionally genocidal antisemitism of nineteenth and twentieth-century Germany that caused it. Also, there had already been a "context already densely occupied by publications and research in progress" for ten years. All those annoyed the historians. Yet his acts brought the role of ordinary Germans into the public agenda: his book became a best-seller. So, this great public impact, in a sense, was at the expense of removing the Holocaust "once again from history, making it the consequence of a totally exceptional set of developments". Geoff Eley calls this process, the "Goldhagen Effect". See Geoff Eley, "Ordinary Germans, Nazism, and Judeocide," in *Goldhagen Effect: History, Memory, Nazism –Facing the German Past*, ed. Geoff Eley, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 1-37. For another introduction of Goldhagen phenomenon, see; Raul Hilberg, "The Goldhagen Phenomenon," *Critical Inquiry* 23, no. 4 (Summer, 1997): 721-728.

18 Hilmar Kaiser touches upon how getting away from dealing with denialism pawed the way for more fruitful works. Hilmar Kaiser, *Diyarbakır'da Ermeni Kıyımı*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015), 4-6.

Both power relations and the debates over the principles of the new regime were stirred up by the Young Turk Revolution. Taking advantage of the Revolution, Armenians, certain Muslim notables, and some Muslim officials presented challenges to the existing local power relations in the provinces. Regional variations in such challenges seem to have influenced the other two aspects; the ways certain other local Muslim notables reacted and the relations between the challengers themselves. Depending on the local conjuncture, their worldviews, and their interests, relations between the reactionaries and challengers, and between the challengers themselves varied. During each of those interactions, ethno-religious conflicts played a decisive role. In the end, when reactions peaked during the massacre attempts and the simultaneous 31 March Incident, some challengers would try to stand together against the reactionaries, whereas some would not. Based on searches through Ottoman official documents, and partly through A.B.C.F.M. (American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions) papers, British Foreign Office archival documents, and several newspapers, this thesis focuses on the choice between challenging and reacting for Muslim notables and officials in the region during the first year of the Young Turk period. It is the very events around these choices that allow us to re-evaluate some key points in Ottoman-Turkish-Armenian historiography. The atmosphere these people faced and their choices at critical moments will reveal the facts that will be helpful in bending the sticks of causation mentioned at the beginning of this introduction. Yet before presenting them in detail, I highlight a theoretical starting point below, which consists of a combination of two concepts developed by Marshall Sahlins and Arif Dirlik.

§ 1.2 Putting Foundational Categories into Action

Entering a field where historians have large disagreements regarding issues such as the worldview of the Young Turks or how to define the 31 March Incident, dealing with such actors' political moves is like stepping onto a minefield. When researchers focus on political actors' actions, they usually keep in mind a debate over-interpreting their ties with the democratic legacy of Turkey. The sharp contradiction between the initial liberal political

atmosphere and the following well-known disasters tends to confuse our minds as to whether to reclaim or reject the Young Turk legacy as part of the endless struggle for democracy in Turkey. On one side, there are arguments to the effect that Unionist Young Turks were not much concerned about liberal and progressive principles. Historians that defend this position argue that demanding a constitution was a sign of their conservativism and that their main goal was not a revolution but a restoration. Moreover, their liberal demands did not stem from a sincerely held liberal worldview. Quite the opposite: their demand was instrumental to the preservation of the state.[19] On the opposite side, Young Turks were hailed as sincere pioneers of liberal democracy, as they irreversibly brought about constitutionalism. The more extreme version of this argument accepts the Union of Progress as the single force of liberalism, excluding all other Young Turk forces as monarchists.[20]

Earlier, I noted that the main objective of this dissertation is to identify power struggles and the evolution of ideas over revolutionary principles - which are interrelated. Despite their duality, it seems that the two opposing positions do have an agreement when it comes to the notion that a sincere liberal worldview held by political actors is a prerequisite for the establishment of liberal democracy. For both sides, instrumental reason –like saving the state- had nothing to contribute. In that sense, both arguments on Young Turks' political thoughts have consensus on considering both power struggles and ideas as belonging to separate domains. Such a view limits us to accept either of two arguments: Political views versus power struggles in determining Young Turk political actors' motives.

Was it solely their political views that determined the Young Turk period actors' whole behavior? Or were they merely opportunists who easily changed their attitudes to acquire power? One example of postulating that duality is

19 Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 209; Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey*, (Syracuse: N. Y: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 182-185; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)*, 313; Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki, 1908-1914*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007), 33; Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, (London; New York: Verso, 1987), 54.

20 Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, (London, New York, Brill: 1997); Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey*.

the memory written by Mahir Said [Pekmen] Bey, an anti-Unionist deputy of Ankara at that period. At the beginning of his much-underrated analysis of the 31 March Incident, Mahir Said Bey compares the Young Turk Revolution to its inspiring model, the French Revolution, in terms of the political actors' self-definitions, and points to a critical difference: While there had been, and still were monarchists in the French parliament, such a fact could not be observed in the Ottoman and Turkish cases. Contrary to the French case, no one in the Empire claimed to be a monarchist. How can we explain this difference? Pekmen foregrounds forward Ottomans' "weak character" (*seciyesizlik*), which was a product of the Hamidian regime:

> In order to establish and maintain its rule, despotism *(istibdad)*, starts to ruin the character (*seciye*) of the people. A people with a strong character can never stand domination. Knowing this, Abdülhamid, first of all removed the men around who had strong characters… Therefore, at the end of his reign, there were almost no mean and independent persons around. We cannot expect individuality and a free movement. However, if there is one thing that we cannot forgive in them and all those men of the regime, it is that they are supporters all regimes, in all ages.
>
> Once it is on the way out and in transition, a way of government that has continued for centuries, cannot possess any defender. As soon as constitutionalism was proclaimed, as we have presented, everyone, including the Sultan, had become supporters of it. No one among the beneficiates of the despotic government appeared to dare to claim that the monarchical government was more expedient…For example, in France today, there are supporters of empire and monarchy. They always raise their voices in the press and in the assembly, and explain and declare their ideas by all means… This situation (the Turkish case t.n.) is both good and bad for new governments. The benefit is that it immediately attracts supporters, it is not opposed seriously in the first days; its evil is that it never possesses serious and sincere supporters.[21]

21 Mahir Said Pekmen, *31 Mart Hatıraları: İsyan Günlerinde Bir Muhalif*, eds. Hasan Babacan & Servet Avşar, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), 15-16.

We observe in this passage that Pekmen's reasoning is very similar to that of scholars. Just like them, he defines the lack of principles, lack of sincere political beliefs as having a weak character. For him, it was solely the seeking of power that defined political actors' behavior during the late Ottoman to early Turkish political history. Yet apart from this ahistorical distinction between the French and the Ottomans, in fact, men of ideas and men of interests were not that distinct. When pointing out that cultural categories can acquire new functional values, for example, Sahlins notes that once the very word interest refers to their fusion. In Sahlins's words:

> Contradiction arises from the inevitable difference between the value of a sign in a symbolic system, i.e., its semantic relations to other signs, and its value to the people using it. In the cultural system, the sign has a conceptual value fixed by contrasts to other signs; whereas, in action the sign is determined also as an "interest," which is its instrumental value to the acting subject. Recall that the word 'interest' derives from a Latin impersonal construction (*inter est*) meaning 'it makes a difference'.[22]

Sewell, in his summary of Sahlins's view, also notes that:

> Undertaking an action always subjects a sign or cultural category to the plans or intentions of the person who acts. Actions, as we have seen, are acts of the reference, but they are also acts of reference by a person, which means that the act inflects the meaning of the sign in accord with the interests of the actor.[23]

Sahlins's conclusions drawn from the transformation of Hawaiian concepts appear also to be valid in times of revolutions. Let us observe the different attributions of meanings to crowd actions as an example: Sewell notes that

22 Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 150.

23 William Hamilton Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005), 203.

even the fall of the Bastille, the most symbolic crowd action of the French Revolution, was conceptualized as a revolutionary act by the National Assembly days later. It was hailed as such only after seeing that it had changed the balance of power against the monarchy. In fact, it was very similar to the crowd actions that occurred previously. After summarizing those parallelisms, for instance, Lucas agrees that:

> …Therefore, whether noisy or silent, the crowd was a definable actor in the play of Ancien Régime politics. It was a critical public that existed before the elite critics of the Ancien régime broke out of the private world of salons and academies. Some authors have characterized this crowd as "prepolitical" or as effecting "primitive political gestures. This is really to use the politics of the Revolution as the touchstone. Yet it does raise the question of how the politics of the crowd adapted to the revolutionary context and to what degree they were transformed. The contention here is that there is a direct continuity between the functions of the prerevolutionary crowd and the functions of the crowd in the Revolution, between the value system the crowd articulated before 1789 and its development thereafter."[24]

However, this would change after the first phase of the revolution was thought to be completed:

> By later 1789, however, the revolutionary authorities had largely completed their occupation of the public space of politics and they had inherited the functions of the Ancien regime state. The enactment of martial law in the aftermath of the October Days enshrined the contradiction between the legal revolution of the elites and the popular revolution of the crowd. Inheriting the functions of state power, it is hardly surprising that the new authorities should also have inherited much of the Ancien regime's relationship with the crowd.[25]

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24 Colin Lucas "The Crowd and Politics between 'Ancien Regime' and Revolution in France," *The Journal of Modern History* 60, no. 3 (September 1988): 439.

25 Ibid., 452.

In short, this work offers to take the fusion proposed by Sahlins seriously, and apply it to the Young Turk case to end the differentiation between pure sincerity and pure opportunism. It is the very interaction between the two that reshapes signs, that *puts* them *into action*. The signs to be observed here as they are put into action are the principles of liberal-democratic revolutions; heeding Arif Dirlik, who, in his powerful criticism of post-colonialism, once wrote that "We also need to ask what else is rejected in the process of repudiating 'foundational categories,' 'essentializations,' 'enlightenment ideologies,' and 'stable identities'".[26]

By replacing "is" with "was" and "rejected" with "lost", this sentence can be repurposed to explain the Turkish case of today. Each great disappointment over failed democratization in Turkey; the authoritarian transformations of Unionists between 1908 and 1913, of the Democrat Party between 1946 and 1960, and of AK Party between 2011 and today, is –combining the highlight by Dirlik and conception of Sahlins– "putting foundational categories into action", or imbuing new values onto concepts and transforming institutions over the period of time that they ruled the country. In today's afterglow of democracy, avoiding the tendency to consider worldviews and material interests as separate fields can be beneficial in understanding those echoing disappointments. One reason for the ignorance was "an overemphasis on theory which substitutes theory for life" that "may deepen the problem it is intended to resolve".[27] As Turkish social scientists were not successful in seeing the direction of the authoritarian rule in Turkey for a long time because of the ignorance of those rejected values that Dirlik quoted above, this work sets out to be part of a search for the history of those repudiated values, along with repudiated moments of threats against them.

If we can reinterpret the occurrences during the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909 by liberating ourselves from the "overemphasis on theory which substitutes theory for life", actions that will be presented here, such as the rejection of the rule of law, claiming the lives of non-Muslims, or attacks

26 Arif Dirlik, *Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 171.

27 Ibid., 16.

on Young Turk politicians cannot be viewed as actions which are just another form of modernity, or constitutionalism. Rather, they will function as clear examples of, combining the highlight by Dirlik and conception of Sahlins, "putting foundational categories into action", through which we can return to the hermetic tradition of Blake that Thompson recalls: the one "which was always in flux, in conflict, in decay and in becoming", the one which can make us succeed "to think co-existent 'contrary states' and to marry heaven and hell.[28]

The concept of putting foundational categories into action is beneficial in two ways: First, the concept ends the useless differentiation between ideas and interests when we deal with the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909, and allows us to understand them as a reflection of holistic relations, which is, as noted above, a major problem in Ottoman-Turkish-Armenian historiography. Second, it reclaims the critical importance of certain concepts that scholars once had cared about: writing history with an "insurgent spirit".[29] Among them, the concepts of reaction and reactionary are reclaimed in this work: However, here the renewed concept of reaction does not only confront with progress under the banner of counterrevolution. Depending on the situation, it can embed and transform it. Below, I am trying to dwell on each benefit of this approach separately.

§ 1.3 First Bending: Adding the "Superstructural" to the Explanation of the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909

It was previously noted above that existing scholarship on the Young Turk period tends to take ideas and power struggles as separate domains, a preference that this thesis claims should be avoided. When it comes to the analysis of the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909, one domain, the power struggles, comes to the fore as the determinant of the other, the ideas.

28 Edward P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory: Or an Orrery of Errors*, (London: Merlin Press, 1995), 152.

29 Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 203.

In this section, we dwell on examples from arguments concerning each incident.

Unfortunately, just a brief observation of the arguments on the 31 March Incident's features reveals that, other than the outdated Kemalist paradigm, Young Turk historiography has formed an absolute consensus on underestimating the impact of "superstructural" factors, particularly the ideological motivations –which is basically religion. Scholars from various backgrounds tend to belittle Islam's role, treating it as a simple instrument with only limited, ancillary effects on the event. In most of their analyses, they point to so-called "real" or "underlying" material reasons which were "covered" by Islamism, which appears as no more than a "language", an instrument to form tactical alliances with various political groups or to broaden the political base.

As the leading historian identifying himself with the Unionist reading of the era, Kansu defends the position that the 31 March Incident was a "well-organized monarchist attempt to restore the old regime".[30] In line with his argument that liberal opposition to the CUP consisted of monarchists, he believes that this political group collaborated with Abdülhamid in preparing a coup to bring back absolutist monarchy. He claims the Kemalist argument on the 31 March Incident, which can be summarized as "a spontaneous religious reaction on the part of a supposedly ignorant and unenlightened population which revolted against the modernizing elite, or the military and civilian bureaucrats, who had been trying to reform Turkey" was a myth which was formulated much later after the event for the sake of their modernist legitimacy. In fact, "true nature of the event was laid bare before the eyes of the public not only in the pages of the foreign but also the Turkish press" just after the Incident.[31] In the new Turkish edition of his work, Kansu more clearly adds that the "real" point that has to be dwelled on is counterrevolutionary politicians' agency.[32]

30 Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey*, 75.

31 Ibid., 78.

32 Aykut Kansu, *İttihadçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016), 76.

A similar argument can also be found in Feroz Ahmad's study on the CUP: Ahmad does not believe in Abdülhamid's involvement, yet he agrees that the Incident was organized by the liberal opposition. In that respect, religion was "used as a weapon" against the CUP. It can be observed that religious and political spheres were not closely related to each other, instead of having distinct dimensions: Once the government was forced to resign, for instance, the "meaningless demand for sharia" was over, and politicians took the scene. Liberals replaced them.[33] For example, it seems interesting to him that other secular groups, as well as non-Muslims, for which Islamism could have been a threat, were not harmed.[34]

Originally written in 1970, a year in which Islam was not thought to be a defining parameter in the Muslim world all around, Ahmad's underestimation seems understandable. This is also true for Sina Akşin's book, which was published with the title "*31 Mart Olayı*" (The 31 March Incident) in the same year. Although the incoming challenge of political Islam in the mid-nineties made him change the title as "*Şeriatçı Bir Ayaklanma: 31 Mart Olayı*" (A Pro-Sharia Uprising: The 31 March Incident), he nevertheless kept his main argument that the Incident was an outcome of the liberal opposition's push for power. Akşin presents two other mainstream approaches to the event at the beginning of the book's last chapter, which concerns his overall analysis: The first explanation brings Abdülhamid's responsibility to the foreground. Another is that it was a Unionist plot, whose first defender was Mizancı Murad Bey. In a footnote, he writes about another view which "maybe" accepted as a fourth one: That the event was prepared and carried out exclusively by the sergeants of the chasseur battalions. Writing that Rıza Nur was the first to claim this idea, Akşin discredits it from the beginning and does not dwell on it.[35] For Akşin, the real motivations of the coup's agents were all, in fact,

33 Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 64. However, One fact that Ahmad gives as an example to his idea about liberal's control, that İsmail Kemal was elected as the new president of the Chamber of Deputies is not correct. In fact, İsmail Kemal Bey was a candidate, yet not elected.

34 Ibid., 64.

35 Sina Akşin, *Şeriatçı Bir Ayaklanma: 31 Mart Olayı*, (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1994), 229. In fact, although he gave various examples to the changes in soldiers' religious lives after the Revolution and believes that it was Hamdi Çavuş but no one else who organized the rebellion, even Rıza Nur clearly expressed his belief that religion was instrumental both for the

secular: Like almost all historians, he underlines the liquidation of ranked army officers that pushed them to join the revolt and the low-rank soldiers' reaction to the new training methods.[36] Religious students and ulema also had secular motivations. For example, religious students' movement can be "explained concisely with their willingness to take revenge for the change to the law that would force them to serve in the military."[37] By claiming that the opposition used religious propaganda to provoke these religious students and soldiers, Akşin avoids explaining why these very underlying secular demands were not touched upon.[38] He claims that the sharia was also instrumental in providing a protective shield, without which the rebels could not have revolted.[39] Having the confidence of the secular conditions of the 70s, Akşin not only follows an instrumentalist-functionalist logic but also underestimates the religious threat to the daily liberties: Although he writes that the "atmosphere" of those days was forcing even the secular newspaper İkdam to "request" from women that they abide by the "customs of sharia",[40] when they go out, he believes that as the Ottoman Empire was a secularizing state; the extremist actions would have remained temporary even if the rebels had succeeded.[41]

With his effort to whitewash the atrocities of the rebels, Ali Birinci also tries to belittle the role of Islamic discourse in the 31 March Incident intentionally through various -and mostly banal- ways. First, in his false claim that the word *irtica* appeared lately, he only provides the articles of the newpapers in İstanbul, who had no option but to write in a neutral tone at least in those days.[42] Second, without an explanation, he claims that the

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journalists of Volkan and for these soldiers to get rid of Unionists. For them, religion was "only a word". See Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım* v. 2, (İstanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1967), 294-302.

36 Akşin, *Şeriatçı Bir Ayaklanma*, 231-234.

37 Ibid., 294.

38 Ibid., 293.

39 Ibid., 248.

40 Ibid., 244.

41 Ibid., 295.

42 Ali Birinci, "31 Mart Vak'ası'nın Bir Yorumu", *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 12, (İstanbul: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 199.

demand of *şeriat* was nothing but a general disapproval.[43] Third, he needlessly dwells on the banal argument that the mutinied soldiers did not demand restoration of the new regime, as they did not say "we do not want Constitutionalism".[44] Fourth, he tries to minimize the role of religious figures by presenting them as people who were "almost forced" to join the rebellion by the soldiers.[45] Finally, he indirectly admits his political intention to accuse the whole secularist heritage of Turkey by claiming that the Unionists' "bombastic discourse of reactionism" (*irticai edebiyatı*), whose domination continued until that day according to him.[46] Seeing all these errors, it is not surprising that such motivations can make a historian to deny that an event which led to the fall of the cabinet, and the murder of a deputy and a minister was a major revolt by writing that while Action Army was marching on İstanbul, the soldiers returned to their barracks and the Parliament returned to work.[47]

İsmail Kara, a leading scholar who made important contributions to the history of Islamist thought in the late Ottoman Empire and Turkey, touches upon the 31 March Incident several times in his work "*İslâmcıların Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet*" (Islamists' Political Thoughts I: Caliphate and Constitutionalism). Although he can be regarded as an Islamist, Kara cannot be dissociated from the other scholars in terms of his thinking that religion was instrumental in the 31 March Incident: To discredit the concept "reaction" (*irtica*) by claiming that is an "ideological" word, he writes that the 31 March Incident being defined solely as a reaction "totally overshadowed" its "constitutionalist and democratic features", together with recognizing "the nature of opposition's channels to establish relations with the people by also using religious symbols".[48] At first look, Kara seems to accept that the instrumentality of Islam in politics has led to some side effects on the people, when he writes that the usage of Islam as an "instrument" or "a banner" by the

43 Ibid., 200.

44 Ibid., 200.

45 Ibid., 201 202.

46 Ibid., 205.

47 Ibid., 208.

48 İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların siyasal Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet*, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2017), 7.

Palace and the enlightened, "has also helped the rise and strengthening of Islam's social and political aspects".[49] Yet when it comes to the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, he defines the source of the resistance shown by the people to the legitimization of the idea of union by the ulema as "traditional", not religious, though he states that equality (*müsavat)* was not possible in the laws of non-Muslims (*zimmî*).[50] This ignorance seems intentional, as it is also observed in his neglect of previous Islamic discriminations against non-Muslims, in his overemphasis on the European states' and Russia's new "discriminative policies" that touch upon "the weak points" of non-Muslim Ottomans:[51] Those policies forced the Ottoman government to make "egalitarian regulations, which gave birth to inequalities against Muslims and privileges for the non-Muslims as a result".[52]

In his book chapter entitled "*31 Mart: A Fundamentalist Uprising in İstanbul in April 1909?*", Erik Jan Zürcher analyzes the event. About the Islamic character of the 31 March Incident, he writes that sharia had a large role, yet he notes that this label was inadequate. Other than the claim that it was the Liberals who instigated the Incident, what Zürcher gives as an explanatory reason for this inadequacy, which is sharia's having no relation with other demands and the insurgents' having no clear formulation of how sharia should have been implemented, and the non-existence of the call for the abolition of the Constitution are, again, shows the tendency of the scholarship to needlessly look for a clear program of anti-revolutions.[53] By calling it "a rallying cry" for insurgents and bringing forward the "practical political advantages" of Unionists' labeling the event as Islamist, Zürcher also takes his part in the instrumentalist paradigm.[54]

As a historian who makes the deepest analysis of the parallelisms and differences between the two constitutional revolutions in Iran and the

49 Ibid., 23.

50 Ibid., 29, 33.

51 Ibid., 29.

52 Ibid., 20.

53 Erik Jan Zürcher, "31 Mart: A Fundamentalist Uprising in İstanbul in April 1909?", in *Young Turk Revolution and the Ottoman Empire: The Aftermath of 1908,* eds. Noémi Lévy-Aksu nd François Georgeon, (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2017), 206-207.

54 Ibid., 207.

Ottoman Empire, Nader Sohrabi takes a more nuanced stance in his work. He argues that:

> Despite a good deal of speculation, government communication and newspapers show that none of the elite competitors had a direct hand in the uprising. That is, neither the Palace, nor the Porte, nor the Liberals initiated the anti-CUP outburst. Contrary to received wisdom, even Dervish Vahdeti and his top aides do not seem to have had any role in instigating it, and from all indications, they too were taken by surprise. Nor did they reject constitutionalism, as evinced by their writings in these stormy days. Many religious societies associated with the Society of Muhammad, however, did support the counterrevolution around the empire. The Liberals, initially joyful at the CUP' s ouster, became increasingly wary of the anti-constitutional slant of the movement, and, in a sudden turnaround, attempted to calm the public as best they could.[55]

We can therefore argue that when it comes to the question of agency, his argument is nearer to the one that Akşin discredits from the start. However, although he mentions the resentment towards the relatively secular policies of the new regime, Sohrabi's argument about the instrumentality of religion was similar. This time, it is not the elites but the soldiers themselves who used religion in the formulation of their material demands:

> The soldiers' primary concern was not with the religious policies of the CUP, but once the opposition articulated its demands in that language, none of the actors could take lightly the empowering, delegitimating challenge of the language of religion. This forced others to move beyond the soldiers' central concern and focus on the religious aspect of their criticism. The Palace responded by emphasizing its firm dedication to the laws of Islam. The Liberals made instrumental use of it, and the CUP reacted by incorporating the language of religious opposition and making rhetorical concessions. Like the revolution, the

55 Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran*, 225.

> counterrevolution was a multi-actor, multivocal event that brought together groups with a variety of interests who finally articulated their demands in the same voice, but this time in the language of religion.[56]

So, although religion was a medium to bring the opposition together under a single banner for Sohrabi as well, his difference from the others is that he rightfully notes that religion was also a concern in its own right anyway, if not the primary one. And very importantly, once religion took to the scene, it led to its own outcomes. Islam is inherent not only in the causes but also in the effects. Consequently, contemporaries of the Incident did not take religious language lightly.

A similar perspective on the 31 March Incident was also reflected in the Massacres of 1909. In fact, if one half of politically motivated explanations consists of blaming a few collaborators of the old regime, the other half is, naturally, pointing to their material interests. Contemporaries who tended to underline the similarities between the two events usually explained the Massacre by claiming that certain Muslim notables, who had once benefited from the old regime tried to massacre the Armenians as part of a secret plan of Abdülhamid.[57] That view is also repeated by historians.

This view is still influential in contemporary works that touch upon the subject of this study. In his "*Shattering Dreams of Revolution*", Der Matossian, for example, cites and agrees with the claim of Sohrabi about the role of religion.[58] However, examples from Cilicia show that religion was not simply an instrument in such mobilizations. In both Maraş and Kayseri, district governors were called "giaour", and both were blamed for cooperating with them. Although the rice cultivation issue was believed to be the underlying reason for the attacks on Hayri Bey, the District Governor of Maraş, his prohibition of a prayer was essential in the legitimization of the riot against

56 Ibid., 225.

57 Ari Şekeryan (Ed.) *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor*; Mouchegh Seropian, *Les Vepres Ciliciennes: Les Responsabilités, Faits et Documents*, (Alexandrie: Typo-Lithographie Centrale, 1909).

58 Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattering Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire,* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014), 151-152.

him., increasing ethno-religious tension was not its simple side-effect. In Adana, the massacre was privately explained by the locals through the supposed but unacceptable equality between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The historians' comments on both the 31 March Incident and The Massacres of 1909 show that, rather than a religious counterrevolution, what really came to the fore now was a mobilization attempt by the excluded non-Unionist Young Turks. Certain paradigm shifts both local and around the globe are in parallel with this change, like the recognition of Islamism as a variety of the modern, or the decline of Kemalist modernism's impact on scholarship. However, very interestingly, justifying the denial of the role of religion by claiming that it was a mere instrument, or a simple reflection of the material reasons resembles the vulgar version of orthodox Marxism, as it also tends to defend that in the last instance, the superstructure, to which the religious sphere belongs, is a reflection of the economic base. In this sense, the existing scholarship cannot go beyond, but on the contrary, falls behind its Kemalist predecessor. However, several elements mentioned in this chapter show that in order to deal with the subject, one must take a holistic picture into account, just like Thompson once had suggested:

> Historical materialism offers to study social process in its totality; that is, it offers to do this when it appears, not as another 'sectoral' history –as economic, political, intellectual history, as history of labour, or as 'social history' defined as yet another sector- but as a total history of society, in which all other sectoral histories are convened. It offers to show in what determinate ways each activity was related to the other, the logic of this process and the rationality of causation.[59]

A very brief observation shows that questioning the existence of so-called "underlying" reasons for counterrevolutionary movements and ethnoreligious violence has a history. The first steps of this critical approach can be seen in the very rise of cultural history itself. For example, by 1973, in her famous article "*The Rites of Violence*", which is about the religious violence in 16th century France, Natalie Zemon Davis questioned historiography's

59 Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, 95.

"tendency to identify the 'real' elements in the disturbance as the social ones, social being defined only in terms of a conflict of poor against the rich, artisans against wealthy burghers or craftsmen, and wage earners against manufacturers and merchants".[60] The similar change can also be observed in the historiography of the French Revolution. No matter what their political stance was, the contemporaries of the Revolution were well aware of the fundamental impact of religion in the resistance to the Revolution.[61] Since then, the trend has shifted towards material explanations. For example, many of the first leading historians occupying the Chair of the History of the French Revolution in Sorbonne, Aulard, Mathiez and Soboul, all of whom were secular republicans, had downgraded the role of the "sacred" in their observation of the process of establishing the Cult of Reason and the following Cult of the Supreme Being. For all three, political and social terms were used to explain the underlying reasons of their forming.[62] Yet even among the founding generation, there were counter voices: Marcel Reinhard, for example, wondered "whether this religion-cum-church building was ever driven by a genuine 'desire to found a religion' or where at bottom it was simply a matter of 'political tactics'".[63] And he "stands out the sacred as an essential defining characteristic of religion".[64] Bringing either material or sacred motivations to the fore went on in the following generations: By the sixties for example, comparing two sub-regions in the famous *Vendée*, Charles Tilly argued that the defining factor in supporting or opposing the revolution was the economic integration of the rural and the urban.[65] Recognizing these factors, however, Tackett for instance, added that religious culture and church structures also have to be taken into account: The "nexus of interaction" between urban and rural areas in the religious sphere should also be

60 Natalie Z. Davis, "The Rites of Violence" in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1975), 155.

61 James Roberts, *The Counter-Revolution in France 1787-1830*, (New York: MacMillan Education, 1990), 31.

62 Arno J. Meyer, *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions*, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 2000), 153-157.

63 Ibid., 157.

64 Ibid., 158.

65 Charles Tilly, *The Vendée*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), 6-9.

examined.[66] This continued later in the 2000s, as can be seen in Woell's work "*Small-Town Martyrs and Murderers: Religious Revolution and Counterrevolution in Western France 1774-1914*". There, Woell defends that "With regard to the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamic, for example, few other issues polarized political opinion more during the French Revolution than religion."[67] As is the case at the end of most stick-bending exercises, works aiming for synthesis have appeared later, such as the one of James Roberts, entitled "*The Counter-Revolution in France 1787-1830*": In his introduction to his book, Roberts presents different perspectives that give weight to either religious or non-religious factors. After presenting Tackett's bending towards religion, he makes a final bending towards the material and argues that "it is no longer possible to reduce the force of religion to a simple supporting role but we do need to turn back to the social, economic and political sources of the rebellion for a fuller explanation."[68]

With their far greater power, even the sultans themselves had chosen to escape the previous dilemmas between new modern principles and Islamic thought. Take the Tanzimat regime's policy of religious conversions that Deringil shows for instance: very roughly, the regime ended the execution of the *mürted* (ones who were converted from Islam) and forceful *ihtida* (conversion to Islam) for two reasons: One was to avoid the "supreme headache" (*tasdi-i âlî*), the concept that refers to the distress caused by foreign ambassadors, and the other was the necessity of the age (*icab-ı asriyye*), which refers to keeping up with modernity. However, the state chose to keep this policy change a secret between its bureaucrats, because once they observed that the Sultan no longer followed the hadith that ordered the executions, the Muslim public would question his power's legitimacy.[69] A similar dilemma

66 Timothy Tackett, "The West in France in 1789: The Religious Factor in the Origins of the Counterrevolution." *The Journal of Modern History* 54, no. 4 (December 1982): 717-718.

67 Edward J. Woell, *Small Town Martyrs & Murderers: Religious Revolution and Counterrevolution in Western France 1774-1914*, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006), 23.

68 James Roberts, *The Counter-Revolution in France,* 39.

69 Selim Deringil, *19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Devleti'nde İhtida ve İrtidad*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017). For the concept *tâsdi-i ali*, see p. 71, for hiding the orders, see pp. 52-53; for the hadith, see p. 47, for not wanting *ihtida*, see pp. 86-87, for the concept *icab-ı asriyye*, see p. 104.

was also to be faced in the Constitutional period: Kara explains that the ulema somehow managed to theorize the adaptation of the fraternity principle to Islam by defining four "circles" of it: real fraternity (*uhuvvet-i nesebiyye*), religious fraternity (*uhuvvet-i hassa-i İslamiyye*), patriotic fraternity (*uhuvvet-i vataniyye*) and humanitarian fraternity (*uhuvvet-i insaniyye*). In that way, non-Muslims could be brothers and sisters of the Muslims. Yet when it comes to the principle of equality (*müsavat*) with non-Muslims, the "dhimmi" law was definitely against it. The ulema's choice in this dilemma was, in Kara's words, "sliding over through silence".[70] So, the ignorance of the scholars about the 31 March Incident can be seen as a continuation of that similar escape, or sliding over.

Dwelling on the historiography of a contemporary of the Ottoman Armenian question, Jewish Pogroms in Imperial and Revolutionary Russia, can be fruitful in providing instruments for explaining the Cilician case by providing a holistic picture. In his great contribution that presents the general trends in the waves of Jewish pogroms, David Engel points to three closely interrelated elements that caused them: The lack of hegemony of the newly emerging *Rechtsstaat*, the ongoing ethnoreligious hierarchies in the society, and the high speed socioeconomic changes in general.[71] Engel points to the fact that all similar violent actions occurred in a specific period of time, which is between the beginning of the nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries. This was a time of the emergence, taking shape, and becoming hegemonic of the *Rechtsstaat*. Before the emergence of the notion of *Rechtsstaat*, justice was a personal matter. In Engel's words, justice was "often achieved less through formal, lasting institutions than by ad hoc extrajudicial and infrajudicial vehicles for resolving conflicts -vehicles recognized as entirely legitimate by the societies that employed them".[72] State efforts to replace the old notion of justice with impersonal mechanisms did not succeed immediately, as the

70 Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasal Görüşleri I*, 32-33.

71 Actually, Engel does not make a threefold distinction within the process that he summarizes. The following paragraphs make a summary, and the classification belongs to me.

72 David Engel, "What's in a Pogrom? European Jews in the Age of Violence," in Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in East European History, eds. Jonathan Dekel-Chen, David Gaunt, Natan M. Meir, and Israel Bartal (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 26-27.

coercive mechanisms that could impose them were still unaffordable. Therefore, the states had to acquire the consent of their citizens by demonstrating that "the new *Rechtsstaat* accorded with traditional notions of justice and helped to sustain a fundamentally moral social order". But "whenever the *Rechtsstaat* appeared to be subverting the time-honored moral order, they were prepared to take to the barricades *en masse* to force its restoration".[73]

The arguments up to this point resemble the history from below tradition, which points to the traditional roots of social resistance movements. The inferior position of ethnoreligious minorities was also a part of this understanding of social justice. In the Russian Jewish case, for example, Jews' social position was "rooted in custom, sanctioned by religious teaching, and generally enshrined in contract".[74] Simultaneously with the appearance and taking shape of the new form of impersonal justice, Jews' traditional social position was breaking down in Russia. Their population started to grow. They started to immigrate to towns and cities, and their role in new and key sectors of the economy constantly increased. Therefore, the just ethnoreligious hierarchy in the minds of the majority was collapsing, which led to a great resentment on the part of the Christian majority.

The resentment was also reinforced by the other changes in socioeconomic life. The rise of the industrial economy, the building of railroads, and the state's role in promoting them "altered traditional production and distribution patterns", having "swept away traditional social frameworks" generating "deep anxiety and insecurity among masses of people becoming less and less able to control their own situations".[75] All changes in these three spheres were parts of parallel catastrophes. Jews' growing visibility, the changes caused by the modern economy, and the new form of impersonal law which was conflicting with the traditional notion of justice were things to be resisted by the Russian majority. In addition to all these, sudden shifts in political conjuncture were motivating the crowds to enforce their old traditional and personal form of justice on the "violator" Jews. In this sense, it

73 David Engel, "What's in a Pogrom? European Jews in the Age of Violence," 28-29.

74 Ibid., 30.

75 Ibid., 29, 32.

was not a coincidence that Russian pogroms erupted simultaneously with three important political shocks: the assassination of Alexander II, the 1905 Revolution, and the revolutionary sequence between 1917 and 1922.

It is not an exaggeration to argue that Engel's evaluation summarized above was perfectly valid for Muslim Armenian relations not only in Cilicia but in the entire Ottoman Empire. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Empire was on the way to transforming into an impersonal state which was to be governed according to the rule of law. Together with the formation of a capitalist economy, the transformation of the new notion of justice, which was to welcome non-Muslims as equals, was not in accordance with the ancient, popular, Islamic "natural justice". Until 1908, on different occasions, some Muslim people had already tried to re-enforce their natural justice within their own ancient personalized framework. Although the abstract notions of the revolution seemed attractive to some of them at first, in fact, the final form it assumed in 1908 was the completion of a process that they bitterly resisted.

Cilicia was the region where this process could be seen in the clearest manner: Its speed of socioeconomic transformation was faster than any other place where Armenians made up a significant portion of the population.[76] Plus, perhaps nowhere else in the Empire was there a region where economic progress was so far ahead of the formation of state infrastructure. Because of this great gap between economic and state-infrastructural progress, some sub-regions of Cilicia and its hinterlands, like Adana and Antakya were the hardest places in the Empire to persuade people to obey the new notion of justice. In addition to all these, post-revolutionary Cilicia was perhaps one of the freest zones for Armenians to express themselves, and where the Armenian revolutionary parties' interpretation of the new regime's principles was the most profound. Therefore, those peculiarities were most probably making Armenians into the symbols of all of the changes some Cilician Muslims were complaining about. The parallel attacks on government officials before the massacres, and some Muslims' cursing of liberty were pointing to their justifying logic, which is summarized by Engel for the Russian Jewish case:

76 For the story of this rapid transformation, see Meltem Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean*, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010).

> Either during or following the violence, perpetrators expressed some complaint about the victims' group, claiming collective injury or violation of one or more of their own group's cardinal values or legitimate prerogatives as a result of some action allegedly taken on behalf of the low-ranking group by one or more of its members, or by that group as a whole. And, according to the perpetrators, the injured, higher-ranking group could be made whole only through violent action unmediated by the mechanisms that the state normally provided for resolution of disputes or redress of grievances.[77]

In many cases of increasing tension that I will focus on, we will observe that some local Muslims were complaining about the state officials' supposed favoritism towards the Armenians. Some of the officials complained about by the local Muslims were representers of the new *Rechtsstaat*, who were usually not doing anything that went beyond carrying out its principles – sometimes they were doing even less than they ought to have done. However, for locals, it was those old contracts in line with popular Islamic law which were violated by the officials. At such moments, the locals tried to use the means that they had been familiar with: Evoking the old notion of handing out justice personally. Whenever the crowd did this, depending on their own audacity, coercive power, or worldview, the officials had the options to either stand against the aggressors or bypass the legal procedure of the *Rechtsstaat*. We will observe that in Kayseri, Cemal Bey resisted the Muslim crowd twice; and in Zeytun, Halil Bey argued with army officers to decrease the tension. These two persons' correspondence will show that at such moments, their views on minority rights and revolutionary principles had played a positive role in their responses. Still, we will observe that the appearance of Armenian radicalism, which was presented by Muslim denialists as justification for the atrocities in 1909, shook such moderate persons too: Early responses by Cemal Bey, British vice-consul Doughty-Wylie and several American missionaries are full of criticisms of radicalism. In a conjuncture that even shook those persons, it was natural for less devoted persons, such as self-proclaimed Unionists in Adana, to decide to take part in attacks on Armenians. In fact, the Adana case

77 David Engel, "What's in a Pogrom? European Jews in the Age of Violence," 24.

will show that they were not against using the hatred as an opportunity to shift the balance of power in their favor.

§ 1.4 Second Bending: Reclaiming the Concept "Reaction" by Dividing it into New Layers: Absorption, Anti-Revolution, Counterrevolution

The second benefit to combining Sahlins's and Dirlik's conceptions, putting foundational categories into action, is in detecting the ways of altering the principles of the revolution, of explaining the "Shattering Dreams" by observing the occurrences of the Massacres and their common features with the 31 March Incident. In fact, what happened during the days of the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909 can be accepted as uncoordinated but simultaneous attempts to *put certain foundational categories into action*. Some agents, both in the localities and in the capital, tried to alter the essence of some of the revolutionary principles, an action which can once again be called "reactionary". Here, reactions, or reactionaries will be classified into three levels: Absorption, anti-revolution, and counterrevolution.

Giving birth to a *Rechtsstaat* was the absolute, the main claim of constitutionalist revolutions. Naturally, whenever its advocates thought that a movement was targeting its notions, they labeled it as counter-revolutionary. There are several explanations to the many Ottoman and Armenian historians' discrediting the concept of counter-revolution and counter-revolutionary. One reason is another kind of confusion caused by contemporaries: During periods of post-revolutionary interregnum, many kinds of counterrevolutionary profiling coexist and compete with each other, making it too difficult for historians to decide which is closest to reflecting reality. Especially the contemporaries' tendency to use it as a label of defamation to destroy the reputation of their political rivals, such as Unionists' cheap shots -calling nearly all opposition monarchists- decreased the popularity of the concept. Another reason is a point that was already dwelled on in this work: Usually, the act of labeling attributes consciousness to those movements, and whenever historians do not identify a declaration that reflects self-consciousness, they reject the labeling automatically. After all, if a

person does not openly claim to be counter-revolutionary, they cannot be referred to as such. Finally, another reason may be the general tendency in social sciences to abandon the concepts that reflect all kinds of progressivism.

Yet none of these reasons justify the lack of conceptualization of the movements which really targeted the very basic notions of *Rechtsstaat*. Indeed, many subjects of this work fell under this category. Above all, whatever their motivations and self-presentations were, these movements (threats against, or assaults on Armenians in and around Cilicia, together with the revolts against officials in the capital and the provinces) were reactions to the newly declared equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, to the liberties of non-Muslims, to the execution of some certain laws, and to several other side-effects of the new political order.

After the Revolution, different interpretations of the application of the new revolutionary principles, especially the liberty principle, to the rule of law and minority rights, had appeared among Muslims in the provinces. These interpretations could have been shaped to some extent by political organizations. Unionists, liberals, non-Muslim political organizations, and all other actors took part in these interpretations. However, the Young Turk Revolution occurred during their very limited existence in Anatolia. Leaving aside their own search for a political identity at the center, newly legalized parties were not hegemonic. Even in Adana, the most populated and most commercialized urban center to be dealt with in this work, the CUP branch seems to have been an arena of party members who could not agree on various cases, and its leader, İhsan Fikri, was a person who had most probably lost his ideological connection with the early ideologues long before, and who had integrated into the Hamidian regime during the last years. In the absence of any hegemonic program in the provinces, interpretations of revolutionary principles became even more abstract. Petitions and correspondence between the bureaucrats in the Ottoman archives give the impression that some interpretations seem to be more tolerant than others, yet exact classification of those different levels of tolerance is naturally impossible. Still, there seems to have been a range of interpretations from changing almost nothing on minority rights to forming an order very close to the Western ideal types of liberal democracies.

The interpretations of the new principles regarging minority rights seem to have depended on various factors. First, there were individuals' rather personal attitudes, which could have been shaped by education, experience, and personality. For example, in the following pages, it will be seen that what made Sub-District Governor Halil Bey oppose the hawkish policies of army officials in Zeytun was his five years working experience in British occupied Cyprus. Or what made Cevad Bey, the Governor of Adana, not interfere in the pre-massacre conflicts between Muslims and Armenians was his passive character. Second, there was the ability to adapt to the new order. As long as individuals could continue to keep their economically and socially exclusive positions in some manner, they did not oppose the new order. Persons of the old regime could have a very intolerant interpretation, yet at the same time they were able to begin or continue to profit, earn salaries, receive promotions, and be respected. Third, there were the minorities' new forms of agencies. The appearance of all-new symbols, signs, political parties, confident attitudes, and radical expressions in their daily lives were shaking the Muslims. Most of the works on the Adana Massacre tend to point to this fact,[78] yet little attention is paid to the fact that such changes shook not only more conservative elements but also moderate Muslims, and even the missionaries.[79]

If we take into consideration that those three variations shaped and reshaped individual and group behavior towards the regime again and again, then we can acknowledge that counterrevolutions do not appear immediately: Rather, they are over-time products of the relations between revolutions and those who resist to its outcomes. Counterrevolutionary moments appear when hopes for moderation within the new regime fade away totally. In the French case for example, during the first months, counterrevolution was only existent in the minds of a few emigres:

78 Some examples can be observed in Matossian, "Shattering Dreams of Revolution," 165; Abdurrahman Şeref, *Son Vakanüvis Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi: II. Meşrutiyet Olayları, 1908-1909,* eds. Bayram Kodaman, & Mehmet Ali Ünal, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996), 71.

79 For using those foreigners' arguments as an apology for Muslim offensive, see Yücel Güçlü, *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909: Cemal Paşa and Beyond*, (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Toronto; London: Hamilton Books, 2018), 231-235.

> The counterrevolution that mattered was a mass uprising where all of these factors coalesced: loyalty to the old religious order, grumbling at higher taxes and rents, and other resentments that still had to be defined. This powerful sense of wrong also had to be joined to the cause of a root and branch restoration of the 'Old Regime', however it was defined. At first, there was what Colin Lucas calls an 'anti-revolution', a diffuse series of resentments, discontents, and rumblings that expressed ordinary folks' unhappiness that the promises of the Revolution had been so discouraging. At some point, the anti-revolution in some places became the counterrevolution, but not always.[80]

Returning to our case, it can be argued that Mahir Said Pekmen's argument about the lack of self-identifying monarchists in Turkey, which was presented above, comes as a result of ignoring this separation. Differentiating anti-revolution with counterrevolution is fruitful in understanding the confrontation with the revolutionary principles. Actually, there really is a difference between "resentments, discontents, and rumblings" and a total rejection of the new order. However, the events during the first year of the Young Turk Revolution show us the need to add another, earlier stage to the confrontations: Absorption, which refers to putting liberal revolutions' categories into action peacefully.

We will mostly be observing that between the Young Turk Revolution and the 31 March Incident, the main actors that are under focus here, the local Muslim elites, had kept many habits of the old regime in their pockets, covering them with the new conceptions and institutions of the old new regime. These mostly ignored agents will provide the foresight that future works about the Anatolian provinces will most probably show us how these elites' ongoing Ancien Regime attitudes also played a part in depreciating the new regime over time. As they took part in the political struggle, they must

80 Donald M. G. Sutherland, *The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest for a Civic Order*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 99.

surely inject their old habits of the Hamidian regime into the Young Turk one, causing the "shattering of the dreams of revolution" from the very beginning.[81]

Wherever they can absorb the foundational categories, a *"plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose"* situation plays out through various cases. For example, in Kayseri, confronters tried to benefit from the rule of law principle to avoid revolutionaries' "arbitrary" actions that deprived them of power. In Adana, old Muslim landowners quickly took control of the local bureaucracy and shut its doors to self-proclaimed Unionists. In Antakya, a member of a very old large estate owning family was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, and to quote in the perfect description in the documents, "secured and increased his despotism by being elected to the parliament".[82] After the massacres, the famous writer Arshag Chobanian would write that "the great extent to which the old regime, the old barbaric mentality, was alive within the so-called new regime".[83]

Yet whenever their absorption had failed or was threatened, confronters could show their resentment by pushing the limits of the new regime's legitimacy.[84] This is why for example, a large number of Maraş Muslims decided to mobilize against Hayri Bey when he tried to enforce the law that limited rice cultivation; why İhsan Fikri Bey saw the tension over Armenians as an opportunity to attack Governor Cevad Bey, seeing that he had no intention to reject his bid for political power as the leading Unionist in Adana. Furthermore, we will see that although they were able to adapt to the new regime to some extent at first, seeing that other locals and the central state started to target them, the gentry in Asi Valley would switch sides.

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81 Matossian, *Shattering Dreams of Revolution*.

82 BOA. DH.MKT, 2704/107, 1a, From five peasants of Alaeddin village to the Prime Ministry, December 5, 1324.

83 Anahid (Paris), no. 5-6, August-September 1909, 141, cited by Hrachik Simonyan, *The Destruction of the Armenians in Cilicia, April 1909*, trans. M. Brown and A. Arzumanian (London: Gomidas Institute, 2012), 164.

84 The first part of Hilmar Kaiser's great work, which shows how Diyarbakır elites redefine their positions against the regime according to their successes and failures to adapt to the new regime, is deeply inspirational in this sense. See the first chapter of his book: Kaiser, *Diyarbakır'da Ermeni Kıyımı*, 11-103.

Especially at such moments of crisis, or whenever the failed absorbers could dare to challenge the legality of the regime by various means (refusal to obey the security forces' orders, insulting officials, attacking administrative units' top officials), they enter this anti-revolution stage. It will be argued here that right at this point, relations between Armenian radicalism and the members of the new regime determined the moment of tensions' turning into either massacre or mediation. In Kayseri for example, we will see that such mediation was possible between the officials and Armenian political leaders, whereas in Adana, it was not: In Kayseri, the Muslim mobilization in the previous winter had changed the situation by a lot: It allowed Cemal Bey to be aware of the danger, and it seems that Armenian local elites had also understood the role of mediation. Together, they could negotiate, and even cooperate to ease the situation, which they succeeded in doing. Yet in Adana, Cevad Bey's passiveness, together with the more radical challenges made by Armenians, did not allow them to prevent the massacre.

As two levels of reaction, absorption and anti-revolution are stages in which their agents claim to be loyal to the political order. We saw that what turns them into counterrevolution, the total rejection of the foundational categories, or giving up on putting them into action depends on the regimes' response. Below, I will try to focus on conditions that shape that response.

§ 1.5 Third Bending: Two Limits on Resisting to the Reactionaries: Local Agency, and the Ordinary People

1.5.1 *Government and Armenians as Simultaneous Targets*

The powerful image of Ottoman-Turkish states vis-a-vis the civil society was first replaced with a weaker image.[85] Regional studies that question the duality between the state and the society soon became predominant in Ottoman

85 For two strong criticisms, see Demet Dinler, "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi", *Praksis* no. 9, (Winter, Spring 2003): 17-54; Anıl Varel, "Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisine Katkı: Özne-Merkezcilik Sorunu". *Mülkiye Dergisi* 44, no.4 (2020): 609-642.

historiography.[86] Various contributions made by recent studies, such as questioning the boundaries between state and the society, pointing to cooperation rather than conflicts and pointing to alternative regional models of modernization are useful in understanding the field.

This trend was also reflected by the scholarship on the Armenian Question: The oldest works that touch upon the Massacres of 1909 were claiming that the Ottoman state was fully involved in their perpetration. The Massacres, in this sense, were seen as an earlier, let us say, a dress rehearsal of the 1915 Genocide.[87]

The contemporary works on Adana also left that argument aside and started to point to the local factors rather than the central state.[88] By relying on the cases from the hinterland, this dissertation goes even beyond them and argues that during the first year of the new regime, very interestingly, government and Armenians had been targeted simultaneously: Whenever ethno-religious tensions reached their peak in each town, the top civilian officials were usually targeted by local Muslims. Moreover, in nearly all of them, the governor, district governor, or subdistrict governor was blamed for collaborating, having close relations, or even plotting with Armenians. Threats against the top civilian officials and against Armenians went hand in hand.

Throughout the dissertation, we will observe several examples of this simultaneity. One of them will be from Kayseri: Noticing his relatively good relations with Armenians, in Kayseri, the Muslim crowd attacked District Governor Cemal Bey twice, first in winter, and second during the Cilicia Massacre days, on the grounds that he was favoring, hanging out with, and even plotting with Armenians. In each attack, rumors of a massacre spread,

86 For a defense of rejection of those dualities, see the Introduction by Meltem Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean.*

87 The most popular example is Vahakn Dadrian, "The Circumstances Surrounding the 1909 Adana Holocaust", in Armenian Review 41, no. 4/164 (Winter, 1988): 1-16. For a critique of such teleological views, see Chapter 2 of Yektan Türkyılmaz, "Rethinking Genocide: Violence and Victimhood in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1915", (Ph.D. Thesis, Duke University, 2011).

88 See Matossian, *Shattering Dreams of Revolution*; Tetsuya Sahara, *What Happened in Adana in April 1909: Conflicting Armenian and Turkish Views*, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2013).

and Armenians retreated to their neighborhoods. Another simultaneous threat is also observed in the Maraş case: In that same winter, after he had warned an imam who insulted non-Muslims in his prayers, the Muslim crowd claimed that District Governor Hayri Bey had prohibited Quranic verses. They forced the imam to "curse the infidels" and then stoned Hayri Bey's house, shouting that he was a "giaour". That act increased the ethnoreligious tension within the town, causing Armenians to retreat to their neighborhoods. After the Cilicia Massacre, the army officers would define Hayri Bey Incident as an attack against the regime. These events can be useful in understanding the Adana Massacres: Although he was blamed to be a perpetrator, it seems that Cevad Bey, the infamous Governor of Adana was himself heavily threatened just prior to the First Massacre: Muslims massively protested him for his inability to catch an Armenian murderer, and he felt seriously threatened. American missionaries would witness that when Christian officials were killed in front of him at the beginning of the Massacre, Cevad Bey would shout "they will kill us!". Such examples will show that those Muslim mobilizations can also be seen as riots against the local governments, making them simultaneous targets along with Armenians, a fact which should be dwelled on further.

These riots also had to do with the Ottoman state's weak infrastructural power in many senses.[89] Several examples from this dissertation show that weaknesses in infrastructural power were in play throughout Cilicia, and security problems were an important dimension of this. Throughout the regions of riots, the lack of sufficient forces was deeply felt. Even in Zeytun, where it kept regular forces for years to prevent a revolt, the state could not catch a small number of Armenian escapees that had previously attacked Sub-District Governor İbrahim Paşa. In almost every case, things got even worse wherever the state tried to call up reserve (*redif*) soldiers to control the situation. Such reserves were almost always recruited from nearby because the

89 By infrastructural power, I refer to Michael Mann's famous conception, "the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm". See Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State : Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results". *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie* 25, no. 2 (1984): 185–213.

infrastructure of transformation was not developed enough to deploy soldiers from a distance. To make matters worse, the state could not feed those soldiers, could not distribute enough ammunition, and it could not provide them with uniforms. As a result, they could not be kept under control. On many occasions, they engaged in plunder (Kayseri), or even worse, they took part in the massacres (Antakya, Adana).

The Ottoman state's infrastructural power was also insufficient to handle the situation in the Massacres' aftermath: It could not even detect the number of losses in the Massacres, let alone organize effective relief works. In Adana for example, we will see that the central state's persistent demands for the numbers could not be met by the local administration for weeks, and the correspondence gives the impression that this was genuine incompetence rather than a put-up job to deceive foreigners.

The Empire also could not properly punish those who attacked its top officials, because the locals, especially the Muslim notables, had enough power to counterweigh the state. Everywhere, whenever they felt the state's attempts to increase its pressure, the elites held demonstrations, wrote petitions, used their lobbying powers in the capital (mostly through MPs), and most of the time, were able to successfully save their skins. The Maraş case is a good example in this sense: In Maraş town center, the number of Armenian losses was very small after the massacre, and so the Court-Martial was mainly interested in the previous Hayri Bey Incident –the death of the District Governor after the protests. The small number of Armenian losses in Maraş disabled the offenders in Hayri Bey Incident to justify their offense with an Armenian threat. If they were able to do so, that could have affected the public and the central state, just like in Adana. Yet even in a case in which it was only its top official who had been the target, the state could take a limited action: First, its officials could do nothing. Only after implementing the Martial Law in the post-Massacres days would the state try to punish the offenders, yet this move would face great Muslim resistance.

Various aspects of those riots, therefore, show the limits of the Ottoman central state's powers even by the early 20th century. Even in the Cilician provinces, local elites still held great power. Although the turmoil during the

days of the Revolution in Anatolia is presented and analyzed by historians,[90] the continuation of these disorders also deserves attention. The totality of those events will show that in terms of determining ethnic policies and the limits of liberty, attention should focus more on provincial forces rather than on the central ones, as the power of the former seem to be much greater than we have been led to believe. In this sense, it may be claimed that this work was an attempt to accomplish the 1909 version of what Hilmar Kaiser did for 1915 Diyarbekir: Shifting attention to the non-governmental powers in the Massacre.[91]

1.5.2 *Regional Elites vs Ordinary People in the Massacres*

As noted above, the recent trend in scholarship is towards pointing at the agency of non-state actors in shaping ethnoreligious policies. However, those non-state actors are usually limited to some local Muslim elites.[92] If we take the well-known difficulties in searching for the lower class Muslims' agencies into account, this seems perfectly normal. On this point, this dissertation is also an attempt to reveal their role by presenting the possibility of their uncontrolled behavior. Contrary to the claims made by the victims,[93] it seems that in some cases, there was not a chain of command relation between local

90 Kudret Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri: İkinci Meşrutiyet'in İlanı: Temmuz-Ağustos 1908*, (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1999).

91 Kaiser, *Diyarbakır'da Ermeni Kıyımı,* 5.

92 For example, although Ümit Kurt claims that he searches for the ordinary people's role in the 1915 Genocide in Antep and openly calls historians for doing the same, what he actually presents is the story of local elites. See Kurt, *Antep 1915*. In fact, this trend looks familiar with the one within the scholarship of anti-Christian riots of 19th century. For example, in his book chapter "Of Crowds and Empires", Juan I. R. Cole shows this change by comparing Hourani's study of the riot in Jiddah in 1858 with Khoury's work on the disturbances in Damascus in 1860. For Cole, while Hourani pointed to the role of provincial notables, Khoury showed that the crowds "acted their own initiative in opposition to the wishes of most Muslim patricians". After presenting them briefly, Cole suggests that "in some instances we would be wise to glance even further downward, into winding streets and crowded quarters, in identifying political actors of consequence. See Juan I. R. Cole, "Of Crowds and Empires: Afro-Asian Riots and European Expansion, 1857-1882", *States of Violence*, eds. Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2009), 292-293.

93 See *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor*.

Muslim elites and Muslim masses. On the contrary, in moments of crisis, the masses could surpass and even threaten the elites when they tried to stop them. For instance, we will observe that during the massacre in Antakya, where class differences were too rigid and great landlords' power seemed absolute, masses went out of control easily, and the landlords who tried to calm those common people could barely protect themselves from their wrath. Neither the high officials nor the Armenian locals would believe that story, however. Reserve soldiers' attitude can be cited as another example: It was widely believed that reserves were intentionally used to massacre the Armenians. And in fact, wherever they were deployed, reservists joined the mass killings and plunders. Aware of this potential danger, local Armenians sent many telegrams in various cases pleading to avoid their summoning from the very beginning. The actions of these reserves, however, were not bound to orders. Even as soldiers, many ordinary Muslim men were refusing to listen to their officers, as they believed the instigated rumors about Armenian attacks were real. These rumors themselves provide another example: Although contemporaries and historians believed that those rumors were fueled intentionally, they rarely consider the fact that those rumors were sweeping everywhere because the common people were also ready to believe them. This sincerity, for example, was noted by the British vice-consul regarding the First Massacre in Adana.

The denial of the masses' role was deeply related to the populist trust in the masses. Because revolutions affiliated themselves with "the people" since the fall of the Bastille, revolutionaries refuse to acknowledge people's taking part in what they call counterrevolutions, which, for them, could only stem from plots of a few enemies of the revolution. Most historians, especially the Marxists, assumed this attitude without questioning. But in fact, masses were not simply deceived when they took part in such movements, and recognizing their own agency should not be limited to their "positive" doings.[94]

The positive attribution to the mass agency was one of the most durable canons of the classic interpretation of the French Revolution. Despite such

94 For a very strong critique of this crowd perspective, see Lucas, "The Crowd and Politics".

challenges appeared as early as early 70s,[95] the faith in masses persisted even in France until the end of the twentieth century. In the introduction to his great work "The French Revolution and Empire", for example, Sutherland wrote that "It is no longer possible, as it was at the conference at Rennes in 1985, for someone to deny that an authentic and popular counterrevolution existed, to deny that 'the people' could possibly be counterrevolutionary".[96] So by the mid-80s, that denial was still existent.

The tendency in existing historiography to absolve the masses of criminal responsibility is understandable, as the agency of the commoners cannot be accepted as easily as the crimes of policymakers at the center. For example, even in German historiography, when Hans Mommsen and Martin Brozsat developed their "cumulative radicalization" approach, which added "the initiatives from below" to the explanation of Nazi brutality, traditional historians, who were still for a "narrower conception of responsibility tightly drawn around Hitler", reacted furiously.[97] When these traditional "intentionalists" were arguing with the "structuralists" in the late 1970s, only the agency of relatively high and middle class people were on the agenda.[98] During those years, people from lower classes were still untouched: Even the "structuralists" accepted that people could compromise with the regime, yet they also argued that the people were mostly able to draw the line at the Nazis' "interference, penetration, and control". For example, Tim Mason followed this trend and pioneered the approach of "silent refusal" of the working class.[99] Only after the changing atmosphere after the fall of socialism in the early 1990s, in Eley's words, this "immunity against Nazi influences previously ascribed to the working class has definitively gone".[100] Actually, after the years during which the pressures from below were discovered and elaborated, the stick was bent sufficiently and there emerged a synthesis between the points

95 George V. Taylor, "Revolutionary and Nonrevolutionary Content in the 'Cahiers' of 1789: An Interim Report," *French Historical Studies* 7, no. 4 (Fall 1972): 501-502.

96 Sutherland, *The French Revolution and Empire*, 3.

97 Geoff Eley, *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in Germany 1930-1945*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 14-15.

98 Ibid., 15.

99 Ibid., 16-17.

100 Ibid., 21. See Eley's footnote 90 on page 55.

of "structuralists" and "intentionalists". The fusion can be observed, for instance, in Ian Kershaw's conception of "working towards Führer", through which "initiatives were taken, pressures created, legislation instigated -all in ways which fell into line with what were taken to be Hitler's aims, and without the dictator necessarily having to dictate".[101]

Such a negative mass agency has to be existent also in the Ottoman case as well: The assumption after the Revolution was that, common people could and should not be blamed for ill actions. This willful ignorance was even more necessary for the Ottomans, as blaming an ethnic group as a whole meant killing the possibility to coexist later. So, when the Massacres of 1909 occurred, everyone, including the Armenian political elite, put the blame on notables, who must have incited the innocent people. Most of the political groups and bureaucrats must have made that convenient accusation intentionally, and most local victims did the same naively. And some conflicts among the local elites could have made some of them attempt to reinforce that belief in order to eliminate their rivals. The sum of these factors, together with focusing too much on the role of the elite-state cooperation in order to combat denialism could have made Ottoman-Turkish-Armenian historiography not pay enough attention to the Muslim masses' role.

§ 1.6 Result: Reconciling with Anti-Revolutionary Attitudes

The variations in interpretations and different reflections show that there is no such a thing as a standard class or political party behavior in terms of the interpretation of the new regime's principles and minority rights at different moments: Civilian and military officials, large estate owners, petty farmers, merchants, members of ulema, or members of a political party did not depict a specific kind of behavior which is peculiar to their classes or political parties. Given that nuances existed even when the Unionist single-party dictatorship held complete power and the state was determined to bring an end to the

101 Geoff Eley, *Nazism as Fascism,* 28; Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 530.

Christians' existence in Eastern Anatolia,[102] we should expect a great variety of actions during the first months of the new regime, when no group had consolidated its power, when all groups were in search for a well-defined program, when all new ideas were in full motion. This is why for example, while a subdistrict governor could choose to defend Armenians by risking his life in Kayseri, another governor could choose to remain passive in Adana. Or while large estate owners could mobilize ordinary people in a revolt against the subdistrict governor with anti-Armenian rhetoric in Maraş, much larger estate owners can be threatened by the masses during Antakya Massacre, which was a turning point in their decline. While an opponent of the CUP could try to prevent the Antakya Massacre, the Adana CUP branch leader could justify the killings. These examples show that historians should be cautious when they refer to civilian/military bureaucracy, bourgeoisie, land-owners, or ulema as coherent single agents who arbitrated the limits of liberty, particularly the ones of non-Muslims.

Since officials are the most visible group of people in the archives, their inconsistencies are more visible than the others: Depending on the changing situations that they faced, even a single official, let alone the whole bureaucracy, could have seemingly contradictory attitudes in different cases. While he was heavily criticizing Armenian revolutionaries, for example, Cemal Bey thought that his destiny would be no different from that of the Kayseri Armenians, and would choose to prevent a massacre at all costs. While İbrahim Paşa, who was appointed to the Sub-District Governorate of Antakya, was winning the sympathy of Armenians and other Christians in the region due to his efforts in relief works, the Maraş Court-Martial would punish him for his misbehavior that risked the order in Zeytun. And while Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of Regulatory Forces, was pushing

102 For an article pointing to those differences, see, Hilmar Kaiser, "Regional Resistance to Central Government Policies: Ahmed Djemal Paşa, the Governors of Aleppo, and Armenian Deportees in the Spring and Summer of 1915." *Journal of Genocide Research* 12, no. 3-4 (2010): 173-218. For a critique that downplays those differences, see Ümit Kurt, "A Rescuer, an Enigma and a Genocidaire: Cemal Paşa." in *End of the Ottomans: The Genocide of 1915 and the Politics of Turkish Nationalism*, eds. Hans-Lukas Kieser, Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Seyhan Bayraktar and Thomas Schmutz, (London; New York; Oxford; New Delhi; Sydney: I.B. Tauris, 2019), 221-245.

hard for punishing the offenders of the Hayri Bey Incident, he was heavily criticizing Halil Bey's tolerance towards Zeytun Armenians and was for heavy punishment of some Armenians in Adana, whose participation even in their self-defense was deemed questionable. Whenever the central state was called in to solve those differences, they defended their positions, and in those defenses, they provide us with valuable information about their worldviews. This dissertation is mainly focused on the interpretation of the new regime's principles concerning minority rights. On different occasions, from the first days of liberty to the great convulsion of 31 March, various Muslim interpreters redefined their positions towards the new regime in this sense.

Civic rights and liberties of Armenians were totally bound with the new order, and the very existence of Armenians as equal citizens was a problem for a vast majority of the Muslim population in the provinces from the beginning. Even during the immediate reactions to post-revolutionary celebrations, attacks against Armenians went hand in hand with the challenges against the new regime. Beyond the rights of Armenians, the revolution, and the new order of things, including some relatively liberal officials' actions were affiliated with irreligion and with Christendom and seen as acts of the giaour.

Apart from ideas that were shaped by the people's backgrounds, as days went by, the emergence of a radical and proactive Armenian agency shook the more tolerant interpreters, some of whom would switch sides, or at least, remain passive against the attacks on the regime. Moreover, realizing their limited capacity to adapt to the new order led some to follow the same path. These reactionaries' formulation of their views through the new regime's abstract principles was not peculiar to the Ottoman case. Even in the classical French model, negative reactions had turned counterrevolutionary in time. In order to make a distinction between such movements and counterrevolutions, they were referred to here as anti-revolution, which points to all forms of resistance to the broadening of liberties and rule of law. Anti-revolution does not have a clear program, yet exhibited at different times and spaces, it can challenge the foundational principles on several occasions in the daily lives of either individuals or masses. Its transition to counterrevolution depends on the new regime's ability to moderate or eliminate the anti-revolution. In the

absence of both, anti-revolutionaries put aside the project of putting the new principles into action, and abandon them altogether.

In this sense, the 31 March Incident was a momentous occasion both in the capital and in the countryside for total mobilization, to challenge the regime, to threaten the new regime by pointing at the possibility of turning into counterrevolutionaries. It was an opportunity for different reactionaries to massively join in with the then premature counterrevolutionary threat. In this sense, the link between the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909 was that both were different anti-revolutionary movements that challenged the new regime's fundamental principles without explicitly declaring so. Rather than secret plots, simultaneity can explain the link between the Massacres of 1909 and the 31 March Incident. They were not coordinated, nor were they part of a coherent secret plan.

Whenever and wherever conditions allowed the reactionaries to forcefully take the upper hand, a challenge appeared for those more tolerant figures, both moderate and liberal. Some would choose to resist the pressure by risking their careers (Halil Bey in Zeytun), and even lives (Cemal Bey in Kayseri), whereas some would give up easily (Cevad Bey in Adana), or even join in with the reactionary crowd (İhsan Fikri Bey in Adana).

Given the limited capacity of the central state –even if the majority of its officials and politicians themselves would be convinced to be assertive– provincial forces seem to have been powerful enough to create several obstacles to the new regime's building of hegemony: In a conjuncture where the electorate and parts of the local bureaucracy were in a widely intolerant mood, the regime's further liberalizing political moves were doomed. It seems that this fact would have a deep impact on policymakers, particularly at the CUP headquarters. As it will be seen in the following pages, it was that very resistance that played the key role in making local Muslim Unionists in Adana shift their position. Perhaps future studies will show that seeing the need to ally themselves with the Muslim population not only in Cilicia but also throughout entire Anatolia, the CUP headquarters would repeat nation-wide their local comrades' shift over a longer period. Such an argument can explain Mahir Said Pekmen's argument as such: Unlike the French case, counterrevolutionaries did not appear in Turkey, because the Ottoman

revolutionaries did what the French did not: Compromising with the anti-revolutionaries at the cost of the revolution itself.

§ 1.7 Sources

This dissertation is mainly based on primary sources of Cumhurbaşkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA) in İstanbul. Other than BOA documents, several A.B.C.F.M. papers and Foreign Office Correspondance of the United Kingdom are used. There are also references to some Ottoman newspapers, and memoirs.

Within the Ottoman bureaucracy, events during the period between the Revolution and Cilician Massacres were concerning the local governments, Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of War and the Armenian Patriarchate. This was also reflected in the archives. In the dissertation, Bab-ı Âlî Evrak Odası (BEO.), Dahiliye Mektubi Kalemi (DH.MKT.), Dahiliye Muharebat-ı Umumiye İdaresi (DH.MUİ.), Dahiliye Şifre Kalemi (DH.ŞFR.) documents constitute the source of the vast majority of the documents. There are also documents from various files: Sadaret Amedi Kalemi Evrakı (A.AMD.), Sadaret Meclis-i Vükela Evrakı (A.AMD.MV.), Sadaret Evrak Kalemi Evrakı (A.VRK.), Dahiliye Evrak Odası (DH.EO.), Dahiliye Mektubi Kalemi Perakende Evrakı (DH.MKT.PRK.), Dahiliye Muamelat (DH.TMIK.M.), Dahiliye Sicil-i Ahval Defterleri (DH.SAİDd…), Dahiliye Siyasi Kısım (DH.SYS), İrade Askeri (İ..AS.), İrade Adliyye ve Mezahib (İ..AZN.), İrade Dahiliye (İ..DH.), İrade Harbiye (İ..HB.), Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları (MV.), Şura-yı Devlet (ŞD.), Yıldız Arzuhal Jurnal (Y..PRK.AZJ.), Yıldız Esas Evrakı (Y..EE..), Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat (Y.MTV.) and Zabtiye Evrakı (ZB.). Translation of a considerable number of documents about the subject have previously been printed by the Prime Ministry.[103] These documents are predominantly about the incidents in Adana and Cebel-i Bereket. So, except in the chapter on the Adana town center, they were used very rarely.

103 *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2010).

Official correspondence regarding The Massacres of 1909 can offer us more than we expect in the documents pointing to similar problems. This is mainly because the period was somewhat of an interregnum: In that first year of the regime, the power vacuum enabled many worldviews to exist and both officials and locals could express themselves relatively freely.

Another source is the correspondence of the American Board Commission for Foreign Missions. Since the work of Kieser, the scholarship is quite aware of the potential offerings of A.B.C.F.M. papers.[104] In this dissertation, I try to focus more on their private letters and reports, in order to detect or check the events more accurately. Also, there is Foreign Office correspondence. During and after the massacres, British diplomats tried to observe the incidents closely. They provide us relevant information about the course of events in Adana, which does not appear in the Ottoman archival documents.

Although they form only a minority of the sources in this dissertation, newspapers also have to be mentioned. The reason behind the preference to rely on them less is that detecting the occurrences during the periods of high tension was impossible in those newspapers. Also, the information they provide about the events in the provinces is usually very limited when compared to official correspondence and missionary letters and reports. Yet whenever they provide clues about certain tendencies and provide conflicting perspectives, they are cited. Two groups of newspapers hold a peculiar place in the thesis: Interestingly, the Ottoman archives include some translations of certain articles published by Ottoman Armenian newspapers. The reason for their translation by the officials was mostly to deny or refute their claims. Yet I preferred to present some of them whenever they proved useful in detecting the true events as much as possible. Also, the local newspaper of Adana, İtidal, has a special place in the chapter that deals with the Adana town center. All volumes of İtidal are transliterated by Uçar, Soydemir and Erkan.[105] Although it was published by İhsan Fikri, the accused leader of the CUP's local branch

104 Hans Lukas Kieser, *Iskalanmış Barış: Doğu Vilayetleri'nde Misyonerlik, Etnik Kimlik ve Devlet 1839-1938*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005).

105 *Adana İtidal Gazetesi (5 Eylül 1908 – 31 Temmuz 1909),* eds. Ahmet Uçar, Selman Soydemir, Kemal Erkan, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014).

and a highly controversial figure of the Massacres, İtidal provides exceptionally detailed information about the town in general.

Certainly, the greatest shortcoming of this dissertation is the lack of Armenian sources. Although I had tried to learn Western Armenian at an early stage of writing, I had to abandon this attempt soon. This is why I am hesitant about coming to conclusions about the interpretations made by Ottoman Armenian agents. Yet wherever I meet their views in other sources in Ottoman Turkish and English (like the translations of Armenian newspapers in the Ottoman archives, parliamentary speeches, A.B.C.F.M. papers, U.K. Foreign Office documents, memoirs and reports), I tried to focus on them in detail. As a result, I occasionally make generalizations such as "Armenian public"; "Armenian locals"; or "Armenian politicians" throughout the work. This is not to ignore different kinds of fractions among Ottoman Armenians. On the contrary, while reading, careful readers will notice that even among the same Armenian political parties, there were different opinions at several moments, such as the difference between the reflections of local Hnchak branches in Kayseri and Adana or the post-massacres discussions during the following ARF Congress. So, being aware of the fact that such generalizations have the risk of oversimplification, I used such terms whenever large segments of the Ottoman Armenian community seems to have in agreement, such as the critique of the judiciary process, the victimhood of the local Armenian population, or who the perpetrators had been.

§ 1.8 Structure of the Study

Chapters are organized spatially in the dissertation. First, I try to narrate the two massacres within Adana town. The following chapters are on the hinterland: Kayseri, Maraş, Zeytun, and Antakya. In the final chapter, making use of the previous chapters, I try to analyze the different interpretations of the Massacres. At this point, I must warn the reader that all chapters reconstruct a detailed narrative of the events in each town center. There are two reasons to this: First, except for the events within Adana town, this thesis is a preliminary work in the sense that it narrates the stories of the hinterlands

for the first time. Second, countless counterclaims made by both sides of the conflict forced me to observe and present the events in detail. The variety of claims on events and the coexistence of multiple ideas in letters, telegrams, and petitions can puzzle the researcher to more of an extent than usual. However, it is the very confusing fluidity of expressions that allows one to check for the occurrences. Seizing documents by the throat more strongly – rather than avoiding to do so– seems to be a better method in that very sense.[106]

The first chapter is on the much disputed two massacres within Adana town. This chapter mainly consists of a detailed narrative, because several agents made many conflicting claims about the events themselves. The reader will observe that in this chapter I often refer to the events in the hinterlands that may help in writing an accurate story. In Adana, the background of the Young Turk rule was exceptional in three senses: First, during the office of the last Hamidian Governor Bahri Paşa, Armenians were under relatively better conditions, and they remained unharmed. Second, his office was exceptionally long, which enabled him to totally control the notables. Third, that total control alienated almost all Muslim notables, which would lead to a far greater vacuum of power after the revolution. To fill that vacuum, two groups of notables came to the forefront. During their struggle, the older generation of notables was able to overcome the self-proclaimed Unionist younger notables and took control of the local government. Seeing that, under the leadership of İhsan Fikri, the losing Unionists started to blame the new Governor Cevad Bey for remaining passive. Unionists' relations with the Governor further worsened in time: In their newspapers, they targeted Cevad Bey very gravely. The Armenian community also had problems with the Governor. The prelate (*marhasa*) Moushegh Seropian's personal attitudes and relatively radical position alienated the power bloc in Adana, as he was for tackling the status quo much further. His dispute with the Governor went on, and tension increased day by day. However, until the Massacre, it never reached a level as high as that of Kayseri and Maraş. During all that tension, alienated Unionists maintained their very positive discourse on Armenians. Yet Unionists and

106 Selim Deringil, "The Study of the Armenian Crisis of the late Ottoman Empire, or, 'Seizing the Document by the Throat'", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 27, (2002): 35-59.

Armenians did not form an alliance against the group in power. The existing tension rose with a murder committed by an Armenian young man, and lack of security measures put Cevad Bey into a situation similar to Cemal Bey of Kayseri. He was blamed for protecting Armenians. Seeing that, Unionists started to participate in the protests against Cevad Bey. The news of the 31 March Incident must surely have pacified all persons who could have taken part in moderation. In the absence of moderation, security forces, and central authority, the first massacre started. During that first massacre, thanks to the proper organization of Armenian revolutionaries, Armenians were able to defend themselves to some extent in the town. However, self-defense was much harder in the villages, as first, they were settled on plains, and second, there was a large number of immigrant farmworkers. Armenian peasants were exterminated. After two and a half days, both sides agreed on an armistice. During that armistice, Unionists allied themselves with the Governor and the old notables and claimed that Armenian revolutionary plots had caused the event. Just after the arrival of regular forces, a second massacre started, and disarmed Armenians could not defend themselves against the much more angered Muslims and some regular soldiers. As these regular forces came from the armies that formed the famous Action Army, some contemporaries and historians claim that the CUP had a role in this second massacre. However, the structure of these forces shows that they were not under the total control of Unionists.

The following four chapters are about the four urban centers in the hinterlands. In addition to their assistance in detecting the exact stories from counterclaims for Adana Massacres, each of them provides us valuable information to develop arguments about several subjects concerning the several subjects mentioned above.

The second chapter is the story of the Kayseri town center. Kayseri cannot be taken as part of Cilicia, yet it was one of the closest districts to the great tension of the Massacres. No lives were lost in Kayseri, yet ethnoreligious tension rose to a great level twice, and during both instances, Muslim crowds tried to attack District Governor Cemal Bey. During the first days of the revolutionary days, a new challenger coalition emerged under the leadership of Hulki Paşa. This group included Armenians. Parallel to other towns, the

challengers tried to get rid of some men of the old regime, which even led to the previous District Governor's death. Yet legal appeals by some resistors would bear fruit, and they would get rid of Hulki Paşa by transferring him elsewhere. During those days, Cemal Bey was appointed to the District Governorate. Cemal Bey's first thoughts about Armenians were not that positive. Given his extraordinarily good relations with Ottoman Armenians in his future career, those negative words grab attention. By referring to American missionaries' similar criticisms about Armenian radicalism, it will be argued that moderate figures like Cemal Bey, or foreigners were also wobbled by that radicalism. Yet that was not an excuse for massacre attempts: Cemal Bey's response, as one of these moderate figures, was to resist the attacks on Armenians. In autumn, some Muslims' relationship with Cemal Bey deteriorated due to his good relations with Armenians, and in winter, they attacked him in his office by claiming that he was protecting and hanging out with Armenians. That increased ethnic tension and Armenians decided to withdraw to their homes. The government responded to that crisis by sending in regular forces. Soon, when the news of the Massacres arrived in Kayseri, tensions rose to a heightened level once again, and some Muslims would try again to attack Cemal Bey. They failed once more, yet the risk of an ethno-religious clash rose to its highest level. Thanks to the regular officers, Cemal Bey, and Armenian revolutionary leaders, a massacre was prevented in Kayseri. However, Cemal Bey would be transferred to İzmid a few weeks later. During his office, Talat Bey, the Minister of Interior would come to İzmid, and tell the notables that Cemal Bey had favored Armenians too much in Kayseri. Talat would deny that event, which would start the quarrel between the two. The story in Kayseri will provide us some clues about the role of the hatred of Armenians in the reactionary movements, which were existent in its both stages of absorption and anti-revolution. More importantly, it reveals the tensions between moderate supporters of the new regime and the lately emerged Armenian agency.

The third chapter is about the Maraş town center. There, only a few killings had occurred during the Massacres. However, the tension had been high previously. Just like in Kayseri, there was a great anti-revolutionary movement before the Massacres. In late autumn, Hayri Bey put rice regulations into force.

The regulation was limiting rice cultivation. As rice cultivation had been very profitable, this decision alienated many farmers. Around similar days, Hayri Bey also prohibited a prayer that curses non-Muslims. The two actions gave birth to a Muslim mobilization against him. The crowd stormed his house by claiming that he had prohibited Quranic verses, and he was a "giaour". Hayri Bey, on the other hand, claimed that the real reason for that attack was rice regulation, and he had only prohibited an ordinary curse. Scared by the slogans of the Muslim crowd, who came forward cursing infidels, Armenians withdrew to their houses, and ethnoreligious tension rose to a high level. The government, in response, called Hayri Bey to Aleppo. Already sick, he passed away on the road to Aleppo. Whenever the central state tried to tackle the issue later, the officials could not dare to investigate the event, let alone punish the offenders. It was only with the formation of the Court-Martial due to the Massacre in the countryside, the state would try to catch and punish the offenders by relying on the regular forces' presence. Yet that would also be costly, as local Muslims would resist them: By holding demonstrations, lobbying through MPs, and sending countless petitions and telegrams, they defended that, first, they had not attacked Hayri Bey; second, that he had prohibited Quranic verses; third, that the previous incident had nothing to do with the Court-Martial; and fourth, that the existing procedure was against constitutionalism. The army responded by claiming that what the people had done to Hayri Bey was a reactionary attack on constitutionalism, and had to be tackled by themselves. These two arguments led to a further argument about certain principles of constitutionalism. In the end, some persons would be punished, yet they would be pardoned later. As for the rice regulation, although the soldiers had put it into effect again, in a very short time, the state would take a step back. Other than showing the limited state capacity to deal with the notables, this chapter will enable me to question the role of economic determinism in the analysis of the course of events not only at the regional level but also within the political struggles at the capital. Although Hayri Bey and the Court-Martial officers were claiming that it was the rice regulation issue that made the notables bring forward the prayer issue, the prayer was about the relationship with Muslims and non-Muslims, and it seems that part of the mob was motivated by the prayer issue. The protests also had increased

the risk of the massacre to a great level. In addition, the polemics about constitutionalism and the rule of law will reveal the different interpretations of their meaning. We will see that at the end, it would be the interpretation of the notables who would prevail over that of the soldiers, who thought that the "Hayri Bey Incident" was a counterrevolutionary movement. During this chapter, I agree with their view and argue that the incident was a typical anti-revolutionary action.

The fourth chapter is on Zeytun, the famous Armenian town and the center of a subdistrict within Maraş. As it was a center of Armenian resistance, the revolution shook Zeytun in a quite particular way. Possibly because of an Armenian mistress, some Armenians stoned sub district governor İbrahim Paşa's house, and they escaped. Upon the elites' mediation, some people who had stoned him surrendered. Yet he did not keep his promise and had them arrested. So, the remaining people decided to take refuge in the mountains. The news of the Massacres arrived in Zeytun under these conditions. After learning about the news, tension rose to its highest level. İbrahim Paşa retreated to the barracks, which was ten minutes away from the town, and this further stoked the already existent panic among Armenians. Because of all those tensions, Zeytun's notables wanted him to be dismissed. After the immediate crisis was over, he left the town. Despite those accusations, the lack of bloodshed seemed to constitute a success for him. İbrahim Paşa was sent to Antakya, where he performed quite well in restoring order, which led to him gaining the sympathy of Armenians there. The Antakya Court-Martial rewarded him. However, thinking that he had instead increased the tension in Zeytun, the Maraş Court-Martial dismissed him from office. In Zeytun, his successor Halil Bey was for mediation when it came to dealing with the ones who attacked İbrahim Paşa. He tried to mediate through notables and guaranteed that ill-treatment would be avoided. However, the Court-Martial and other soldiers were for hawkish policies. As days went by, the tension between Halil Bey and the soldiers increased, and they complained about each other. In those complaints, they tried to affiliate their own policies with constitutionalism, and a fresh debate on the new regime's principles had emerged. In the end, soldiers won the debate, yet their hawkish policies bore little fruit, as they were unable to capture the runaways. İbrahim Paşa's very

different appearances in his two offices will allow me to take a step which was taken by the German historiography long before: That is, basically, questioning the problem of agency within the scholarship. At different points of putting foundational categories in action, agents can behave in seemingly inconsistent ways. Halil Bey's office, on the other hand, will reveal the bureaucrats' different perspectives in dealing with the Armenian Question. Just like Cemal Bey's hard times with the locals in Kayseri, Halil Bey's polemic with the other officials over the interpretation of Armenian rights in Constitutionalism shows the limits of resistance to the first two stages of reaction.

The fifth chapter continues with the Antakya town center, where the Armenian community was exterminated. Asi Valley, the region where Antakya was located, was a place of huge class differences. There, the Sunni gentry was controlling almost all arable lands, and Alawite peasants were totally under their domination. Although a new class of artisans started to challenge them in time, they seem to have maintained their position: For example, one of the strongest men of the gentry, Bereketzade Rifat Ağa was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. It was seeming like they were adapting to the new regime's conditions. Yet very interestingly, it was the massacre-counterrevolution that would reverse the situation. After that turning point, the gentry would ally with the opposition, and artisans would become the men of the CUP. How did this happen? After the Massacre, some leading figures of the gentry, including Rifat Ağa's brother Refet Ağa, were accused of perpetrating it and were put in prison. Both Armenians and officials were sure about their involvement. Among the accused, there was also Avnullah Kazımî, the founder and first president of the Committee of the Devotees of the Nation (*Fedakaran-ı Millet Cemiyeti*), who was passing through Antakya on way to his new office of District Governorate of Kerkük. He was also to be accused of planning the massacre by both local Armenians and the CUP. However, three signs show that despite the gentry's infamous cruelty that also went on after the massacres, they had no involvement in it. First, the testimony of Kazımî, and Refet Ağa's letter, which was immediately sent to his elder brother were extraordinarily convincing about their sincere yet failed efforts to stop the ordinary people. Second, Rifat Ağa's experience in İstanbul during the 31

March Incident shows that there was absolutely no direct chain of command link between the two anti-revolutionary movements –one at the capital and the other region. And Third, some similar cases in the Court-Martial show that local rivals tried to benefit from the Massacre by accusing their opponents. So, the story of Antakya will be a warning in the sense that the victims can fail in detecting the perpetrators. Also, it will make me reconsider the role of the masses in collective crimes. By showing their potential to take the initiative from the notables, I will argue that the contemporaries' discourse of "deceived innocent people" was, in a way, both a fabrication and an expression of the will to solve the differences. Moreover, I will argue that the critique of the neglection of the mass agency should not be limited to the positive doings. Also, the chapter will show how these anti-revolutionary massacres occur spontaneously and without well-defined agents.

The last chapter is about the aftermath of the Adana Massacres: After the second massacre, Cevad Bey was replaced with Mustafa Zihni Paşa. Martial Law was declared, more new forces were deployed, and a Court-Martial was formed. Yet, let alone catch the offenders, or start effective relief works, the state could not even detect the number of losses for weeks. Moreover, both Armenians and local Muslims started to defend their positions, and put enormous pressure on the government. Armenians were arguing that the attacks were part of counterrevolution, a plot organized by Abdülhamid and his villains. Local Muslims on the other hand were claiming that Armenians had been preparing for a revolution that would cause European intervention and lead to an autonomous Armenian state. The MPs allied themselves with the central bureaucracy in denying their responsibility and blamed the local administrators from the beginning. But when it came to further actions, policymakers in the capital were paralyzed: Above all, they tried to understand what actually had gone on in Adana, and formed an investigation committee, and waited for the committee's and the court Martial's reports. The Court-Martial report was blaming both sides, yet was putting most of the blame on the Armenian revolutionaries, and approved the doings during the Hamidian Massacres. The investigation committee's report was mainly blaming the Muslim notables and officials, but that was signed only by its bureaucratic members: the two MPs did not agree to write a common text. After those

reports and more heavy responses by Armenians, the central state decided to take some steps that would calm them: A new governor, Cemal Bey, the famous Cemal Paşa of the future, was appointed. A new Court-Martial was formed, and some notables were put on trial. Above all, the cabinet publicly declared that Armenians were innocent. Those steps, as well as the executions of some Muslims, made the Muslim notables furious, and they even threatened Cemal Bey. Among them, especially some local Unionists, including İhsan Fikri and İsmail Safa made the harshest criticisms. Although some of these notables received some light punishments, soon they would begin to be gradually pardoned. And the local Unionists soon would ally themselves with the party headquarters: İhsan Fikri would die in exile, yet his comrade, İsmail Safa would be a prominent member of the CUP: Despite those tensions after the massacres, he would later become one of the main figures of the local CUP. Then, he would become Kemalist governor of Adana during the War of Independence, and a politician in the Republic. This last chapter will be the confirmation of many arguments made in the chapters on the hinterlands in many senses: First, the different reports and changing declarations will show the confusion within the Muslim policymakers over the interpretation of what the rights and liberties of Ottoman Armenians should have been. Second, the changes in the cabinet, discussions within the parliament, the dialogue between the CUP and ARF, and the reactions of the local forces will display how the official discourse was formulated through negotiation and conflicts in the capital and in the region. During this whole process, the role of different interpretations of the new regime's abstract principles will show how the anti-revolutionary potential continued to threaten the regime even after its so-called victory against the reactionaries.

2

Adana Massacres

Among all the incidents surrounding the Massacres of 1909, the two massacres within Adana town center are the most noteworthy episodes that captured the attention of both contemporaries and historians. There are two well-known reasons for their significance: First, in terms of human and economic losses, the Adana Massacres were the greatest catastrophes. Second, they were the starting and closing events of the sequence of massacres. Throughout this work, I try to deal with another critical aspect: For contemporaries, Adana Massacres were very important also in the sense that they made a huge impact on several actors' interpretation of various aspects of social and political life in the Young Turk regime. Not only the events themselves but also the reactions shown by different groups led many agents to crystallize, reconsider, or confuse their ideas.

To look for the traces of these changes, first, we have to know the things that went on during the period. Because the subject is about an ethnoreligious conflict, the claims on these sources are very contradictory. The high sensitivity of fact-checking in Ottoman Armenian historiography is very challenging. On this point, the repercussions in the hinterlands of Cilicia are very beneficial for us to come to some conclusions about the contradictory claims about the events within Adana town. So, here in this chapter, there will be references to the occurrences in the hinterlands, whose fuller stories are covered in the following chapters.

So, in this chapter, I try to accomplish two things: The first one is the narration of the background of the Massacres and the course of events during the Massacres in detail. One significance of this detailed narration, I hope, will be its instrumentality in the final chapter, which is about the comparison of the different interpretations of the process. The second one is to bring forward the seemingly surprising facts that do not fall into the existing discourses developed by contemporaries and historians. These facts, hopefully, can be instrumental in forming a comprehensive explanation in the following pages.

Also, I must note that by mentioning the name Adana, I do not refer to the whole province. I only focus on the town itself for two reasons: First, in the sources, rural areas do not appear sufficiently. Second, other town centers within the Adana Governorate were not in remote hinterlands, and unlike those towns of the hinterlands, inhabitants of the towns within the Governorate witnessed the events directly: In remote hinterlands that I focus on, the repercussions were triggered only by telegrams which point to the news and rumors about the massacres. However, Kozan, Mersin, or Cebel-i Bereket districts not only received the news and rumors from various actors around Adana, (witnesses, looters, runaways, the wounded, the reserve soldiers, officials, and even foreigners) but also witnessed the effects directly. Presuming that this significant difference between hinterlands and closer towns must have affected the interpretations within the latter in a unique way, I decided to work on them separately in a future study. Whenever the events in those places affected Adana town, I point to them by relying on mainly secondary sources.

§ 2.1 The Late Hamidian Background of Adana: Bahri Paşa, Armenians and Muslim Notables

When the news of the proclamation of liberty was received in Adana, the city had been governed by Süleyman Bahri Paşa for eleven years.[1] Among Bahri Paşa's contemporaries, no governor was able to keep his seat for such a long

1 "Bahri Paşa'ya Cevab," *İtidal*, no. 6, 6 November 1324, p. 3 (Adana İtidal Gazetesi, p. 131).

time –except Ahmed Ratib Paşa, the Governor of Hejaz.[2] Therefore, from the very beginning, it can be stated that one exceptional feature of Adana that draws attention is that it had a relatively stable local government during the last years of the Hamidian Regime.[3] The towns to be dealt with in the following chapters will show that the repercussions of the Revolution took shapes peculiar to each locality's power relations, which cannot be easily defined either by nationalist historiographies or historians who do not go beyond catechisms of any political group. So, the collapse of Bahri Paşa's exceptionally stable rule should have been more devastating than any other region in terms of local power relations.

A brief look at the archival documents during his era gives the impression that Bahri Paşa's success was somehow managing to limit the local Muslim notables' power. And very interestingly, he may have cooperated with some Armenian notables to counterbalance them. The Hamidian background of the town was also exceptional in this sense: The Turkish and French texts written by local Armenians after the Massacres portray Bahri Paşa as a friend and protector of Armenians. Given the Hamidian regime and its Armenian policy, that exceptional relation needs explanation. However, contemporary local Armenians' texts are of little help because their explanations are not persuasive: For example, in one of the most popular booklets on the subject, Garabed Chalian mentions these good relations, yet he does not explain how they had been improved: Bahri Paşa, in his words, "anyhow, contrary to his other evil doings, had not adjusted to the anti-Armenian policy, which was seen by all as an instrument of promotion". Çalyan also mentions the role of Moushegh Seropian, the prelate of Adana and the most prominent future scapegoat for the Massacres in the eyes of many local Muslims, in the formation of warm relations, yet all he explains is that Seropian was "a very

2 "Bahri Paşa'ya Cevab," *İtidal*, no. 6, 6 November 1324, p. 4 (Adana İtidal Gazetesi, p. 132). Abdülhamit Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri: Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi: 1895-1908*, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2007), 89-90.

3 For Bahri Paşa's career and an introductory article about his governorship in Adana, see Yurdal Demirel, "Adana'nın Valisi Süleyman Bahri Paşa (1898-1908)," in *Tarihte Adana ve Çukurova, Cilt III,* eds. Yılmaz Kurt, Fatih Sansar, (Ankara: Akademisyen Kitabevi, 2016), 205-223. In that work, Demirel provides Paşa's background in detail.

experienced and intellectual man … had started to get all his demands met".[4] Actually Seropian also wrote about this background: He confirms those relations and claims in his book "*Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*" that Bahri Paşa was "a friend of Armenians": According to him if Paşa had not stood against the anti-Armenian conspiracies with all his might, the Adana Massacre could have been carried out in 1906-1907.[5] This blindspot cautions us that the statements from the post-massacre texts cannot be taken as granted, even if they claim to represent the oppressed. Also, we must consider that both authors mentioned above were members of the Reformed Hnchak Party –not to delegitimize them as denialist historians did, but to keep in mind that one of their aims in writing their texts were to clarify the view of their party, which clearly must have engaged in discursive maneuvers like all parties.[6]

Was Bahri Paşa really a "friend" of Armenians? The claims about his role in protecting Musa Bey in the famous Gülizar case hardly leads one to think so: It was believed that Bahri Paşa at that time convinced Abdülhamid that "Musa Bey should be protected at all costs because the symbolism alone could cost the sultan dearly in the East."[7] Also, there were claims that during his

4 Karabet Çalyan, "Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri (1909)," in *Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor*, ed. Ari Şekeryan, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2015), 28-29.

5 Mouchegh Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes: Les Responsabilités, Faits et Documents*, (Alexandrie: Typo-Lithographie Centrale, 1909), 6-11.

6 Garabed Chalian was a member of Reformed Hnchak Party. His report on the subject was introduced by the party itself. See the single page introduction in Çalyan, "Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri (1909)". Seropian had been such an important member of the party that he was one of the members who negotiated for his party's cooperation with Social Democrat Hnchak Party on 24 November 1907. The negotiations bore fruit, as the two parties renewed their relations. Seropian's party was transformed into a new one called Ramgavar (Liberal Democratic) Party with the help of Social Democratic Hnchak Party. See Kévorkian, Armenian Genocide: A Complete History, (London: Tauris, 2011), 56-57. According to Kévorkian, the new party "enthusiastically embraced Ottomanism", and "this was a bitter pill to swallow for the Hnchak leaders, who denounced Ottomanism as a form of Turkism".

7 In 1889, Gulizar, an Armenian girl from Muş was kidnapped by Musa Bey a Kurdish tribe leader. The obstacles during the attempts to free Gulizar and send Musa Bey to the court were a turning point in the Armenian liberation movement, as it made many Armenians begin to think that armed struggle was a better option. For these events, see Owen Robert Miller, "'Back to the Homeland' (Tebi Yergir) –Or, how Peasants became Revolutionaries in Muş," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 4, no. 2 (November 2017): 287-308.

office in Adana, he had fleeced some Armenians by saying that they were traitors belonging to terrorist organizations.[8] Such dualities do not seem surprising, as today the scholarship is aware that a single agent can appear in contradictory ways in different cases regarding the Ottoman Armenians.[9] In the following chapters of this work, such contradictory agents will appear – like two versions of İbrahim Paşa's story in Zeytun and Antakya, or the gentry's shifting attitudes in Antakya. Therefore, here I will confine myself to noting that to go further in understanding the background of the Adana Massacre, Bahri Paşa's relations with Armenians in different cases should be observed in more detail.

Bahri Paşa's ability to overwhelm some powerful Muslim local elites also had something to do with his long term in office, as he seems to have faced no powerful local opposition. Here, I try to dwell on two names as representative examples, who would come to the foreground after the Massacres: Among the contemporaries, Bağdadizade Abdülkadir and İhsan Fikri, both of whom were thought to be the leading figures in the Massacres, were also the forthcoming figures of the two different Muslim notable groups. Some sources point to these groups' rivalry when they provide background information to the Massacres. Yet interestingly, the Armenian ones among these sources present both as perpetrators of the Massacres. If true, how these parties became allies just before the Massacre has never been explained.[10] On the other hand, in their claims made after the Massacres, local Muslims stay very silent: In the archival documents and the newspapers, they do not point to a rivalry between them. So far, the scholarship has not provided a clear explanation of how this rivalry had determined the Massacres. For example, in his introduction to "*1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor*", Akçam writes that "if you

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For Bahri Paşa's role, see PRO, FO 424/178, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, 28 Nov. 1894, 300.

8 For the claim about Bahri Paşa's "fleece", see "Bahri Paşa'ya Cevab," *İtidal* no: 6, 6 November 1324, p.3-4, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 132)

9 For an example see the story of Ali Cenani Bey, summarized and analyzed by Ümit Kurt: "Antep 1915: Soykırım ve Failler" (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2018), 89-113.

10 It is only Seropian who would later write that İhsan Bey had allied with the Governor and gave his support for the execution of the massacre plan. See Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 28.

ask where is the Union and Progress within this picture, you will explain the Adana Massacre. The Union and Progress of Adana was within the line 'if the patrie is in question, the rest is incidental'".[11] Der Matossian, on the other hand, mentions that duality, yet abruptly moves on to the issue of Armenian agency, and does not explain the role of the rivalry.[12] So far, it is only Sahara who provides such an explanation, who accepts Seropian's claim that Armenians' refusal to take part in that struggle led local Unionists to break away from them.[13] The following chapters on the towns within the hinterlands of the Cilicia Massacre will show that post-revolutionary competition between Muslim notables and their relations with state officials were crucial in understanding the relationship between the Revolution and the Massacres. This chapter, in a sense, is an attempt to discover some facts about this blind spot, and relate the discovered facts to the changing power relations of various social groups in the town.

Bağdadizade Abdülkadir and his son Abdurrahman were pointed by all Armenian claimants as two very powerful organizers of the Massacre. Abdülkadir was not from an old notable family of Adana. Nevertheless, he formed and enlarged his own business in a short time, and became a powerful landowner and merchant. His enemies, including Bahri Paşa, usually underline his poverty on the day of his arrival in Adana from Baghdad to imply that he increased his power through cruelty and corruption.[14] Like many local notables, Abdülkadir also served in state offices: For example, by 1308, he was the *müstantık* of Adana.[15] Soon, he would be a member of the

11 Taner Akçam, "Önsöz" in *Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor*, ed. Ari Şekeryan, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2015), 13.

12 Matossian, *Shattering Dreams of Revolution*, 164.

13 Tetsuya Sahara, "The 1909 Adana Incident (Part 2): The Young Turk Revolution and the Muslim-Armenian Confrontation in Adana," Meiji University Liberal Arts Collection Vol. 467 (2011, 3): 467, 54.

14 See, for example, BOA, BEO, 1857/139219, 3a, From Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, March 19, 1318. In this document, Bahri Paşa's usage of the Word "istibdad" is interesting if we take the period into account.

15 BOA, DH.MKT, 1963/84, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, June 8, 1308.

Adana Administrative Council, and later would only be replaced by his son, Abdurrahman.[16]

When he claims that Turkish notables had always had animosity against Armenians because of their economic prosperity, Prelate Moushegh Seropian cites Abdülkadir's name as an example: According to him, Armenians' commercial supremacy and their prominent place in the agricultural industry was the rationale for him and other Adana notables to form a secret organization to detriment Armenians at any cost. He also claims that this group had also tried to massacre Armenians during the Hamidian Massacres, yet had failed.[17] In the chapter on the Antakya Massacre, I will note that the belief in conspiracies was a general phenomenon of all political agents of the Young Turk era, just as it was the case during the French Revolution or Hamidian Massacres. Here in Seropian's ideas about Abdülkadir's role, we observe such reasoning. It is too early to claim Abdülkadir's possible involvement in the Adana Massacres right here, yet a very long document in the Ottoman Archives, dated 1309, raises the possibility that Seropian was right about Abdülkadir's feelings about Armenians. In fact, it is very surprising to find themes that are exactly the same as today's nationalist historiography in a historical document that was written even before the first Armenian political movements in Anatolia.

The document is an informer report (*jurnal*) given by Abdülkadir's son Mehmed to the Yıldız Palace. It does not have a specific date, yet in the text, Bağdadizade Mehmed, who was another son of Abdülkadir and an official in the Ministry of Finance, informs about a letter from his father that he had received recently -by 22 February 1307. Mehmed's informer report starts with the claim that there had been Armenian plots in Adana for quite a period, and they had reached a high level that began to draw attention. He continues by summarizing Adana's critical importance for Armenians: Adana was important both geographically and symbolically, as it was ten hours away from Cyprus, and the land of the last Armenian Kingdom, whose throne was still kept in the Sis Monastery, the capital of the Catholicosate. He goes on to

16 Abdurrahman Bağdadizade was the Governor of Adana during the War of Independence, and at the end of the war, he was exiled as one of the 150 persona non grata.

17 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 8-9.

mention that Armenians formed just one-tenth of the population and that they tried to recover it by organizing themselves. Since the birth of their "love of the nation", which was about seven or eight years ago, this organization had grown considerably. They were successful in dividing the Muslim nation into two hostile parts and managed to acquire some state power in their hands. They captured the seats of court inspector, prosecutor, and head judge and united themselves. Although they were negligible in terms of their number, their common purpose made them much more effective than the Muslim officials. For example, Muslims would lose almost eighty percent of the court cases against Armenians. After the claims about state staffing, Mehmed goes on about Armenians' economic power: Thanks to their general wealth, which was progressively increasing day by day, they acquired Muslim lands at a bewildering pace. This disproportion between their population and the size of their lands deserved political attention. Mehmed then presents Abdülkadir's letter about the subject. In the letter, Abdülkadir claims that the Adana branch of Armenian revolutionaries was the superior of the Kozan, Cebel-i Bereket, Mersin, Tarsus, Zeytun and Maraş branches. Their head was Mıgırdıç Efendi, the Prelate at that time, and their vice-president was Karabet Gökdereliyan, who was also a member of the lower court. Armenian bandits from Zeytun and Cebel-i Bereket were under their command. Abdülkadir also lists six officials' names in this Armenian cadre including Gökdereliyan. He ends the letter by suggesting to replace or dismiss them. Then, Mehmed continues by summarizing other letters from his father, which are full of claims about Armenian organized activities including preaching, training militias, assisting revolutionary escapees, bringing militants of the Kumkapı Incident to Adana, and collaborating with the English.[18]

Two aspects of this informer report merit further attention: First is the logic of explanation. Whether it was a sincere belief or just an instrument in power struggles, it surely shows that the scenario of an organized Armenian plot existed in the minds of one of the town's most powerful Muslim notable families, who were thought to be the eventual perpetrators. Second, it was written in a much earlier time: Even before the appearance of Armenian revolutionary activities in Anatolia, some Muslim notables had already started

18 BOA, Y..PRK.AZJ, 22/49, From Mehmed Bağdadizade to the Yıldız Palace.

blaming Armenians. Mehmed writes that the quoted letter from his father was written about one and a half years prior. So, it was most probably written between September 1890 and January 1891. By that time, serious Armenian revolutionary activities in the Empire were only the recent Kumkapı and Erzurum Demonstrations. Given that the Hamidian Massacres were a turning point in increasing Armenian revolutionary activities, the Bağdadizade family's early attempt does not seem to be a reaction to them.[19] Rather, for now, it looks like a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Attempts by the Bağdadizade family seem to have borne fruit, as the police decided to monitor all Armenian authorities in Adana by November 1308.[20] One of their primary targets, Karabet Gökdereliyan, an Armenian lawyer, a bureaucrat, and a large estate owner from Adana, would later suffer quite a lot: He was arrested on 23 October 1311, and sentenced to death. He was pardoned in the general amnesty on 13 January 1313, yet was still detained. Then, he was invited to the *mabeyn* on 14 November 1323, yet was arrested and tortured in Beşiktaş police headquarters for four months. After spending about fourteen or fifteen years in prison, Gökdereliyan feared being murdered and resolved to escape to Egypt. There, by April 1324, he gained the support of the Egypt Commissariat and demanded to return to his hometown.[21] Gökdereliyan's story shows that unlike the portrayal of contemporary Armenian locals, not all Armenians were happy during the last years of Bahri Paşa's rule, a fact that warns us about the dangers of accepting their claims unquestioningly.

The Bağdadizade family also suffered during the governorate of Bahri Paşa, who was able to curtail Bağdadizade's power by first kicking him out of the administrative council and then sending him into exile, together with two other ex-council members, Hafız Hüseyin Efendi and Gergeri Ali Efendi, by

19 Razmik Panossian & Michael J. Dwyer, *The Armenians, From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 214-215.

20 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM, 502/67, November 19, 1308.

21 BOA, DH.TMIK.M, 271/16, 1a, From Gökderelizade Karabet to the Egypt Commissary, April 10 1324; BOA, DH.TMIK.M, 271/16, 2a, copy of the letter from Egypt Commissary, April, 19, 1324.

20 January 1316.[22] The struggle went on even after the exiles: According to Abdülkadir, when he was in exile in Urfa, the Governor and the Consul of Iran arranged an attack by thirty to forty bandits on his farm and wounded his men, accused his son of murdering those bandits and kept him in prison for two months during harvest season. After his pardoning on 27 February 1317, he returned to Adana, yet this time, Bahri Paşa captured one of his letters to Mehmed and arrested his other son for two months. And in June, Paşa decided to construct a police station on his land on which he was cultivating tobacco.[23]

What about the second Muslim notable group, the future self-proclaimed Unionists in Adana? On this subject, the existing literature points to the doings of that group's leading figure, İhsan Fikri, to detect the local CUP's role in the Massacres. İhsan Fikri's position was critical indeed because he was the leader of the CUP branch of Adana.[24] Therefore, claims regarding his role in the Massacres unlock the doors to various other arguments about the relation between Young Turks and Armenians. Second, his newspaper *İtidal*, all of whose issues were transliterated by Ahmet Uçar, Selman Soydemir, and Kemal Erkan, is one of the foremost sources that provide information about the events between the Revolution and the Massacres. Third, information about his life is available in the greatest of detail, in these three authors' very meticulous introduction to İtidal's transliteration.[25] In this introduction, Uçar, Soydemir, and Erkan write that İhsan Fikri Bey had worked as an official of the Ziraat Bank in İstanbul and Salonica, and was a member of the first CUP. After his membership was uncovered, he was sent to exile in Diyarbekir.[26] It seems that his relations with Young Turk groups continued there. At the beginning of 1899, he was arrested and sent to Payas together with Mehmed Ziya Efendi, the famous Ziya Gökalp of the future. From there, he was brought

22 BOA, ŞD, 2130/7, January 20, 1316, copy of the telegram from Adana Governorate and four persons from high officials.

23 BOA, Y..PRK.AZJ, 48/9, July 1, 1319.

24 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 12.

25 "Giriş: İtidal Gazetesi'nin Yayınlandığı II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Hakkında Kısa Bir Değerlendirme," in *Adana İtidal Gazetesi (5 September 1908 – 31 July 1909) Cilt I*, eds. Ahmet Uçar, Selman Soydemir, Kemal Erkan, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2014), 1-56.

26 Ibid., 7.

to Adana.[27] The next year, he was hired as the vice-president of the Industry School. Soon, his position within the city would be reinforced: He became the school's president, and in 1904, he married Fatma Hanım, the daughter of Kasım Bey, member of the City's Administrative Council and of the famous Ramazanoğlu family. He took the fifth rank Order of the Mecidiye on 8 July 1905.[28] Yet after two years, he resigned from office following an investigation. He became a member of the Administrative Committee of the CUP's Adana branch, which had opened shortly before the Revolution.

This early adventure shows that İhsan Fikri Bey's ideological links with the CUP headquarters were just as established as the ones of the other Anatolian branches that had settled in different corners just after the Revolution, which were thought to have shared significantly fewer things in common. After he departured from the regional core of the Young Turk opposition, the movement went through many changes: The first CUP was disbanded, and it took many years for the Young Turks to reorganize under different names. Ideological differences emerged between different groups, and one of them found a newly emerging partner within the country and formed a new CUP together. It looks like İhsan Fikri could not catch up with those major developments, and additionally, he had reconciled with the regime through his contacts, most probably including Bahri Paşa himself. Yet the investigation and resignation seem to have made him an enemy of Bahri Paşa, whom he would attack fiercely in his newspaper İtidal after the Revolution.[29]

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27 Ibid., 11-13.

28 Ibid., p. 15. Their son Cavid [Oral], would be MP for seven terms, and Minister of Agriculture for three terms, two from CHP and one from AP. See Ibid., 17.

29 According to those articles, Bahri Paşa had not been promoted to governorate on merit. He was so ignorant that he could not write his name. His relations with the Yıldız Palace that made him untouchable. He was also such a corrupt man that any land conflict in the governorate had been solved through bribery. He had also threatened many Armenians with accusing of being revolutionary, and he had taken bribes. After his departure, his son was forced to pay back a lot of money to the people. If not, Paşa could not have left the town alive. In such claims, reality and demonization go hand in hand. In fact, the claim that Paşa came from Kurdistan as a very poor guy was not true, as his grandfather, father and brother had a long career in the bureaucracy. Claims about his ignorance also seem untrue, as he had learned Arabic, Persian, and Armenian. Before Adana, he served as the sub district governor of Bitlis, deputy district governor of Beyoğlu, district governor of Üsküdar, Priştine and

To sum up, the pre-revolutionary adventure of Bağdadizade Abdülkadir, İhsan Fikri and Karabet Gökdereliyan, the three major figures that would come to the fore in the Massacres representing different groups of notables, show that they had already been alienated from Bahri Paşa's rule in that period. Another representative figure, Prelate Moushegh Seropian, on the other hand, had such close relations with the Governor that even in his book written after the Massacres, he refrained from the post-revolutionary trend to criticize him. So, these figures' backgrounds do not fit into the classical definitions of conflicting sides in the classical views of bourgeois revolutions. The future chapters on the towns in the hinterlands will also show the same inconsistency. In the next part of this chapter, we will observe that a similar confusion goes on with the post-revolutionary relations: After the Young Turk Revolution, some of those notables would try to fill the power vacuum, which should have been greater than other provinces due to Bahri Paşa's long rule and ability to suppress them successfully. Because greater power vacuums lead to larger conflicts, Adana would become an arena of a greater power struggle between the Revolution and the Massacres. On one side, there would come forward a relatively older and more powerful group, and on the other, a younger generation, who seemed to be more attached to the Young Turk opposition. A further problem is putting the Massacres into a revolutionary political context, as both self-claimed revolutionaries and groups who were thought to be counterrevolutionaries were accused of taking part in the Massacres. This creates the potential for leading one to comment not only on the event itself but also on the 31 March Incident and the CUP's changing Armenian policy. The accusations on both sides and their denials confuse the reader further. In this chapter and in the following chapters, it will be asserted that detecting the agents' exact doings in such events is much harder than it is usually assumed, and so, one has to take into account the agents' roles during the Massacres in more detail to get as close as possible to the truth.

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governor of Mamüretülaziz. For İhsan Fikri's claims, see "Bahri Paşa'ya Cevab," *İtidal*, No. 6, 6 October 1324, pp. 3-4 (Adana İtidal Gazetesi, p. 131-132).

§ 2.2 Social Relations in Adana Between the Revolution and the First Massacre

Just like in other towns, we have limited information about the immediate happenings in Adana after the proclamation of the constitution. It seems that the status quo of the town was challenged about a week later: On 1 August, the deputy treasurer of Adana wrote about the events very briefly, stated that the government's power was very limited in the countryside, and the signs of hatred among the people were increasing.[30] Shortly after, news about Bahri Paşa's resignation came to İstanbul.[31] According to Ali Münif [Yeğenağa], the future long-running MP of Adana, Bahri Paşa had gotten kicked out of the town following a slew of insults.[32] Yet at that time, this was denied by a member of the coalition that drove him out: In the local newspaper İtidal, for example, Artin Arslanyan rejected those claims, and wrote that there was no anarchy in the town. Criticizing the anonymous foreign writer of a letter, which seems to have spread the news about the situation, Arslanyan wrote that "by 11 July 1324, we do not need foreign pieces of advice and tutelage", as the CUP was representing the people's feelings and informing the government.[33]

Arslanyan's articles in İtidal merit attention because after the Massacres, he would write a booklet that puts the blame on İhsan Fikri. The article shows that at the beginning of the new order in Adana, they were in cooperation. Perhaps personal ties also reinforced their cooperation, because Arslanyan was the French teacher in the Industry School –İhsan Fikri's old workplace.[34] Yet we do not have more information about their relationship before the Revolution. At least, it is certain that they were part of a large coalition that claimed to represent the CUP in Adana.

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30 BOA, DH.MKT, 1296/35, 1a, From Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Interior, August 30, 1324.

31 Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri*, 189.

32 *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları,* ed. Taha Toros, (İstanbul: Isis Yayınları, 1996), 48.

33 Artin Arslanyan, Red ve Tekzib, İtidal, No. 1, 23 August 1324 p.4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 68).

34 BOA, DH.MKT, 1288/86, 3a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Deputy Governorate of Adana, September 19, 1324.

In fact, this coalition seemed to be very broad in Adana at first. The list of donors for the construction of a new tomb to Tevfik Nevzad, the liberty martyr whose grave was in Adana, is a sign of that. On the list, we observe the names of Abdülkadir Bağdadizade, Gökdereliyan Karabet and İhsan Fikri together. After the CUP branch itself, Abdülkadir Efendi proved the most generous person with a four liras donation, who was followed by the Dashnaksutiun Branch and Gökdereliyan Karabet with three liras each. İhsan Fikri donated one lira.[35]

Contemporary locals, who start their works with the motivation to prove that the Adana Massacres were the outcome of an organized –Muslim or Armenian- plot tend to portray the period between the Revolution and the Massacres as the story of an intentionally increased tension between communities. Therefore, in both Armenian and Turkish versions of contemporary texts, there appear two blocs of communities as groups of agents: Muslims on one hand, and Armenians on the other. Among the two camps, contemporary Armenians also tried and succeeded to articulate the revolutionary dimension, by claiming that Armenians were representatives of progress, whereas Muslims represented the counterrevolution, and the Massacre was also part of a counterrevolutionary plan.[36] The much more

35 "Tevfik Nevzad Bey'in İnşası Mukarrer Bulunan Kabri Masarif-i İnşa'iyesine İştirak Buyuran Zevat," *İtidal* no: 3, 30 August 1324, p.3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 76)

36 After writing about his belief that the massacres was planned by Hamidians, Garabed Chalian lists the murders and attacks before the massacres see Garabet Çalyan, "Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri," in *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor* ed. Ari Şekeryan, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2016), 28-41. Moushegh Seropian also makes a similar summary of the murders, insults and attacks. He believes that the Muslim notables had waited for an opportunity to attack on Armenians since the Hamidian Massacres. Yet he also implies that the massacres were instructed by Yıldız Palace. See Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 20-30. Hagop Terzian does not clearly write that there was a planned action yet while making a similar list of events, he implies that they were "mysterious". See Hagop Terzian, Hagop. H. Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, trans. Ara Stepan Melkonian ed. Ara Sarafian (London: Gomidas Institute, 2009), 3-9. He also implies that the telegram sent by Adil Bey, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior "had a major significance in the unforgettable catastrophe", as it wrote "protect the foreign nationals." See Ibid., 11. In the following parts, we will observe that contemporary Armenians believed that this was a message that implied the approval of massacres. Yet this does not seem to be the case. Artin Arslanyan also believes that the event

serious later events, among which the 1915 Genocide looms the largest, cast a shadow on the prior ones, and so, the revolutionary dimension in the Massacres of 1909 was forgotten in time. This fact, together with a very similar motivation to struggle against the other side in general, caused historians to follow the contemporaries' analysis, yet even the ones fighting denialism did not revive the revolutionary dimension. In time, probably because they started to realize the harmful side-effects of the motivation to prove the existence of atrocities, historians started to pay attention to the revolutionary dimension once again. Thanks to this attention, historians started to point that the Muslim community in Adana had not been a unified bloc society before the Massacres: It seems that there were two political groups, one claiming to follow the CUP, and the other, distancing itself from it. Contemporary Armenians had touched upon, yet glossed over this by claiming that the Unionist claims of one group were only superficial.[37] Contemporaries' confidence in this claim, together with the respect due to their historical sufferings and the lack of sources seem to have prevented historians from searching for the link between this newly rediscovered and more popular national struggles. Here in this work, one argument will take the following form: The link between the internal struggles among Muslims and the Massacre was not a cause-effect relationship. Yet this does not mean that those internal struggles have nothing to teach us about ethnic relations. We will see

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was caused by the locals that support despotism. See Artin Arslanyan, "Adana'da Adalet Nasıl Mahkum Oldu?," in *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor* ed. Ari Şekeryan, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2016), 97. Mehmed Asaf, possibly the most hostile official towards Armenians, is certain that the Armenian Prelate Seropian planned the "Adana Revolt". See Mehmed Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları ve Anılarım*, (Ankara: TTK Yayınevi, 1986), 5-7. Ali Münif [Yeğenağa] has a relatively nuanced position. He writes that the event was caused by the ones who tried to benefit from religious enmity. However, he also writes that some Armenians' attitude and behavior triggered the "Adana Revolt". What Turks had done was to overreact. See *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları,* ed. Taha Toros, (İstanbul: Isis Yayınları, 1996), 46-57. Zamir Bey (Damar Arıkoğlu) also believes that the Armenians were preparing for a revolt that would lead to foreign intervention. See. Damar Arıkoğlu, *Hatıralarım* (İstanbul: Tan Gazetesi ve Matbaası, 1961), 45-50. In the future pages, we will also observe that after the first massacre, İhsan Fikri and İsmail Safa would immediately come to similar conclusion in their newspaper articles.

37 Garabet Çalyan, "Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri", 44.

that the First Adana Massacre was a turning point in the relation between two Muslim groups: After the Massacre, the CUP side decided to end hostilities with the other Muslim side. Plus, they turned against Armenians, who had been their allies until the First Massacre. The reason for this switch of allegiance was twofold: First, the CUP side was losing the conflict with the other Muslims, and second, the partially successful self-defense of Armenians during the First Massacre had sincerely shocked them. In fact, in these two senses, the story of this CUP branch represents the longer story of the CUP HQ across the Empire. It is this aspect of the Adana Massacres that has the greatest potential to contribute to our understanding of the history of Muslim-Armenian relations in the Ottoman Empire.

2.2.1 *The Self-Proclaimed Young Turk Bid for Power in Adana*

Despite his weak ties to the CUP HQ, İhsan Fikri Bey became the head of the Committee's Adana Branch after the Revolution.[38] He also started to publish the local newspaper İtidal together with İsmail Safa [Özler], the future veteran Unionist and later Kemalist politician.[39] It seems that İhsan Fikri Bey's first aim was to become the deputy of Adana in the Chamber of Deputies, so he announced his candidacy on 9 September.[40] Yet the CUP decided to nominate Ali Münif [Yeğenağa] instead of him. We observe no signs of resentment over this decision: İhsan Fikri gave his support to Ali Münif. [41]

Having turned his eyes towards local politics, İhsan Fikri's disappointments in his bid for power continued through time. At the local scale, he faced an additional barrier with the appearance of another power group: Despite his initial support for the Revolution, Bağdadizade Abdülkadir established a rival committee to the CUP called the Agriculture Club.[42] İtidal never targeted Abdülkadir himself and mentioned the Club's name only once.

38 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 12.

39 İsmail Safa would be the Governor of Adana during the War of Independence. He would be MP for three terms, and also would take part in various cabinets as the minister of education.

40 "Muhterem Vatandaşlarımıza," *İtidal*, no: 3 9 September 1324 p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 88).

41 "Ali Münif Bey," *İtidal*, no:4 24 September 1324 p.1. 98

42 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 13.

Nevertheless, in that single mentioning, the tension could be felt: When the news of the establishment of the Ottoman Agriculture Committee was published, İhsan Fikri suggested that the Agriculture Club unify with this Committee, as the Club's actions were not in line with agricultural affairs.[43] Later, the local branch of the CUP would expel Abdülkadir Efendi's son, Abdurrahman, from membership, forcing him to join the anti-Unionists.[44]

Another attempt by İhsan Fikri to increase his power was seen in his interference in the police. According to the Court-Martial report, after his trip to İstanbul, he brought a new chief of police to Adana –he even paid his ferry ticket fee.[45] However, this chief of police, Niyazi Efendi, was not welcomed in the city: The crowd claimed that they would not accept him as the chief of police by openly declaring that they preferred Ramazanoğlu Tevfik Kadri Bey, the previous mayor of the town and the acting chief of police instead. Although it resisted at first, the government accepted that fait accompli and appointed Kadri Bey to the post.[46] İhsan Fikri's İtidal criticized the government's decision.[47] Later, İtidal would complain about the police and security problems again and again.

During the early fall of that year, İtidal's language was not that aggressive, and its attempts to interfere in governmental affairs were limited. Soon, as his attempts to get power would fail, İhsan Fikri's pen would turn much sharper in dealing with the groups that had ties with the opposing group, as they began to gain the upper hand in the town. İtidal would attack certain persons in particular: Among them were Governor Mehmed Cevad Bey; Ali İlmi, the owner of a rival newspaper Rehber-i İtidal; some Administrative Council

43 Osmanlı Ziraat Cemiyeti, *İtidal*, no: 8, 9 December 1324, p.3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 159).

44 İrtem, *Ermeni Meselesinin İçyüzü*, 163.

45 BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, Record of Adana Court-Martial, June 24, 1325. *(*Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları)*, Başbakanlık Basımevi, Ankara, 2010.

46 BOA, ZB, 623/3, From the Ministry of Police to Adana Governorate, October 12, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2676/16, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Police, November 23, 1324.

47 "Memurinin Hakk-i Azıl ve Nasbı," *İtidal* no: 11, 24 December 1324, p.1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 200).

members; and Gergeri Ali, a companion of Abdülkadir and İhsan Fikri's successor in the Directorate of the Industry School.

İhsan Fikri's party became more and more aggressive by early December. On 4 December, İtidal presented two pieces of news regarding a couple of conflicts. First was the establishment of a rival newspaper called Rehber-i İtidal: İtidal wrote that they had been hearing that the great notables (*küberâ*) were going to establish a newspaper to misguide minds and keep İtidal busy. Its owner's reputation was well-known, and responding to him would be humiliating.[48] According to Moushegh Seropian, this newspaper was under Bağdadizade Abdülkadir's control.[49] The second piece of news was about a denouncement concerning corruption in the Industry School: An official of the school had denounced its director Gergeri Ali Efendi; and in response, Ali Efendi had dismissed him. Noting that it would not dwell on the accusation, it was written that this was unfair.[50] As the former director of the Industry School, İhsan Fikri would repeatedly demonstrate his interest in the issue in the newspaper.

About a month later, İhsan Fikri started to criticize Governor Cevad Bey. Cevad Bey had been appointed to the Adana Governorate as early as 15 October 1908.[51] We can guess that between October and January, İhsan Fikri's group tried to recruit him to their side, yet day by day, the rival group was proving more successful in doing the same. On 7 January 1324, İhsan Fikri targeted Cevad Bey by claiming that during his four months' office he had achieved nothing serious: He did not have a hardworking spirit. His lack of spirit, according to İhsan Fikri, had handed the administration to the old imperious (*mütehakkim*) people, and their despotic influences were preventing the country from experiencing liberty.[52]

What was Cevad Bey thinking about İhsan Fikri Bey? His opinion can be seen in his response to another one of İhsan Fikri Bey's criticisms of Mehmed

48 "Rehber-i İtidal," *İtidal* no: 7, 4 December 1324, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 139).

49 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes,* 22-23.

50 "Hizmet mi Kabahat mi?," *İtidal* no:7, 4 December 1324, p. 2-3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 141).

51 BOA, DH.SAİDd.., 112/143.

52 "Vali Beyefendi," *İtidal* No 13: 7 January 1324 p. 1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 231-233).

Hüsrev Bey, the District Governor of Mersin, in the 15 January 1324 issue of İtidal.[53] The Ministry of Interior took this criticism seriously and asked for an investigation.[54] After two weeks, Cevad Bey wrote that as the province had a very limited number of literates, İtidal was trying to sell more copies by populist (*avamperesdane*) exaggerations. Articles like the one about the Mersin District Governorate were results of ambitious personal interests.[55] The rival newspaper Rehber-i İtidal also wrote that İhsan Fikri had tried to get appointed to the Mersin District Governorate by applying to Ali Paşa, the Commander who took control of the Adana Governorate after the Revolution.[56]

On 23 January 1324, İtidal started to push for elections for the Provincial Administrative Council in "Why Are Elections Running Late", the article in which İhsan Fikri needed to claim that he was not looking for government office.[57] Most probably because of the end of hopes for reconciliation, three weeks later, İtidal pushed further: It wrote that the terms of half of the members of Administrative Council and Courts were over, and they were about to be elected. Members of the Administrative Council were holding their offices for ten years. That was because they got along well with the previous governor. At first, they had feared people's attacks, yet in time they had realized the limits of popular pressure, and the kindness of the Governor. The Governor was honorable, kind, educated, well-mannered; yet he was acting just like Bahri Paşa. In response to the news that the councilors were discussing choosing the ones to resign for elections by lot, İhsan Fikri called

53 "İçel Mutasarrıfı," *İtidal*, no:15, 15 January 1324, p. 1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 263-265).

54 BOA, DH.MKT, 2730/23, 3a, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, January 24, 1324.

55 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2813/32, 1a, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 4 ,1324.

56 "Aynen Varaka," *Rehber-i İtidal*, no: 2, 11 February 1324, p.2.

57 "İntihabat Niçin Geri Kalıyor?," *İtidal* no: 17, 23 January 1324 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 295-297).

for the resignation of all and threatened them by writing that their end could be the same as Kamil Paşa's.[58]

In the same issue, there were articles about other challenges: The first one was about Rehber-i İtidal, in which it was noted that its owner was an atrocious man of the despotic regime, and they would not engage in a response to him.[59] The second was about the court case regarding his successor in the Industry School, and his enemy Gergeri Ali: Hayri Efendi had informed an official about the corruption of the school's director Gergeri Ali Efendi about five to ten days after the Revolution. The first case in the Administrative Court was on 10 February. In the article, a man named Vedad writes about his dialogue with his friend. The dialogue is surprisingly similar to the discourse of Armenians: They state that Liberty and Constitutionalism had made the "great ones" upset. Some were involved in embezzlements, others in cruelties, and some in threats. The people were looking forward to the Court's decision in order to be certain of its impartiality so that they could go on their appeals. It was only the dawn of Constitutionalism now; and after the sunrise, the great ones' eyes would be blinded. The case was postponed to 15 February.[60]

Administrative Council Elections took place in the beginning of March: Bağdadizade Abdurrahman, son of Abdülkadir; and Semekyan Artin Ağa replaced Subhi Paşa and Kalos Bey. İtidal was furious about the unchanged seat of Debbağzade Hacı Ali Efendi: He was the most complained of Council member and was sick. The newspaper openly threatened him by writing that as long as he kept his seat, his opponents would talk about his past, and then who knows what kind of old wounds would be reopened. At an old age to be

58 In early February, there were rumors about an agreement between the "old and the new". See "Şehrimiz Muhbirimizden," *İtidal*, no: 20, 4 February 1324, pp. 2-3, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 352). Those days Kamil Paşa resigned from Prime Ministry as he took a vote of non-confidence. İhsan Fikri, "Makale-i Mahsusa: Meclis-i İdare-i Vilayet Azaları," *İtidal* no: 22, 14 February 1324, p. 1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 376-378.)

59 "Son Cevap ve Teessüf," *İtidal* no: 22 14 February 1324, p. 1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 378).

60 Vedad, "Mekteb-i Sanayi Meselesi ve Mahkeme-i İdare-i Vilayet," *İtidal* no: 22, 14 February 1324, p. 4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 390-391).

respected, he would be targeted rightfully, people would talk about his abuses, ignorance, and thieveries.[61]

Soon, the tension between two groups reached such a level that they tried to show their power through demonstrations: Sabri and Asaf Efendi, two proponents of the İhsan Fikri fraction, who had been fired from the Industry School after the Revolution, applied to the Governorate and informed that they were going to do a demonstration against the Director, Gergeri Ali on 13 March. After a few hours, two other men came to the Governorate and said that they were also going to do a demonstration in favor of Gergeri Ali, at the same place. Cevad Bey asked for the Ministry of Interior's solution on 11 March.[62] That same day, Ali İlmi, the owner of Rehber-i İtidal and the enemy of İhsan Fikri, sent a telegram to the Prime Ministry, claiming that the two scheduled demonstrations were increasing the tension.[63]

Naturally, Governor Cevad Bey was not welcoming of the demonstrations: The next day, he wrote to both the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Interior about the danger of these demonstrations. He wanted the central government to allow him to forbid them.[64] The Prime Ministry however was for permitting them.[65] Nevertheless, Cevad Bey invited their leaders and convinced them about the dangers and to cancel their programs.[66] The following day, İtidal claimed that the meeting of Vasıf and Hayri Efendi was postponed due to heavy rain.[67] In the same issue, İhsan Fikri also denied that the demonstration was organized by him and that he was planning to make himself appointed to the directory of the Industry School: These accusations were for the purpose

61 8 March 1325 "Meclis-i İdare Azalığı," *İtidal*, no: 26, 8 March 1325, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 447).

62 BOA, DH.MKT, 2776/44, 1a, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, March 11, 1325.

63 BOA, BEO, 3523/264213, 2a, From Ali İlmi to the Prime Ministry, March 11, 1325.

64 BOA, BEO, 3523/264155, 2a, From Adana Governorate to the Prime Ministry, March 12, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2776/44, 2a, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, March 12, 1324

65 BOA, BEO, 3523/264155, 1a, From Prime Ministry to Adana Governorate, March 12, 1325.

66 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2824/60, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, March 13, 1325.

67 "Miting," *İtidal*, no: 28, 14 March 1325, p. 1, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 479).

of acquitting Gergeri Ali. He had no ambitions for directorship, council membership, or a government office. He had resigned from the directorate three years ago.[68]

As days went by, the tension rose further. Three days later, an entire page of İtidal was allocated to the Industry School issue. There, İhsan Fikri wrote that –just like himself- the public opinion was for Hayri and Vasıf Bey: Their opponents had rushed to the Governor and had warned him that the demonstration could turn into a protest against him. These opponents organized another counter-demonstration to force the government to prevent both demonstrations. However, as the government allowed the demonstrations, Cevad Bey invited Hayri and Vasıf Bey, told them in soft words that they were the victims of their superiors, and expressed his wish for Hayri Bey and Vasıf Bey to be rewarded. Governor also told that the court case was on Monday anyway. By telling all these, he convinced them to cancel their demonstration. For İhsan Fikri, "this incident was an epilogue of the long ongoing clash of words between the supporters of despotic ideas and the libertarians; in more open terms, between some rascals who had usurped the title of notables (liberty lover patriots who were worthy of the title notable were excluded from this invective) and honorable fellows, the real members of the nation, who desired to benefit from the happiness to be brought about by the current governance" (read it: the regime). All those events were the results of the Governor's weakness. He was following the old path of the Yıldız Palace: He devolved his power to a few influential men, and the governorate's situation was much worse than before. He spent all his time writing in his office like an old woman. As long as he stayed, there would be trouble. He was neither a thief nor an ignorant man: He was kind and gentle, yet was not a man to be governor. He was being manipulated easily. If he left the office by himself, that would be his greatness.[69] In addition, on those days, posters writing about the weakness of the governor appeared on the streets of

68 İhsan Fikri, "Mızrak Çuvala Sığmaz," *İtidal*, no: 28, 14 March 1325, p. 4, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 490).

69 İhsan Fikri, "Geçen Günkü Mitingler Neye Kaldı? Vali Bey'in Telaşı!," *İtidal* no: 29, 17 March 1325, p. 1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 491-493).

Adana.[70] Most probably the reason for this attack was the acquaintance of Gergeri Ali: İtidal reacted to the court's decision by publishing Hayri's article which was full of accusations against Ali, including the description of how he had covered up his corruption.[71]

The heavy words against the Governor in the previous issue had also reignited the opposing movement: Some members of the Administrative Council, including Debbağzade Hacı Ali Efendi, tried to organize some notables to sue against İtidal. The group had sent one member, Yusuf Tanba, to the Armenians, Greeks, and Protestants. Yet, all three refused to participate in the complaint. İtidal claimed that many Muslims, Greeks, and Armenians had visited its office to express their support.[72] It seems that Armenians were trying to remain neutral in this conflict, as they also had refused to take part in İhsan Fikri's demonstration against Gergeri Ali. However, two Armenians, Arslanyan and Harutyun Semikyan testified against Gergeri Ali in his trial.[73]

An article published in İtidal just a week before the Massacres reveal that tension between two Muslim groups had reached the highest level: In the article, finally, the newspaper openly targeted Ali İlmi, the owner of the rival newspaper Rehber-i İtidal: When liberty had been proclaimed, despots had been surprised and worried. They awaited their fate. Among them, there had been corrupt officials, and Ali İlmi had been one of them. He had previously been sent to Cebel-i Bereket's correspondence office by Bahri Paşa. There, this corrupt man had become even richer than Bahri Paşa. Then, with the revolution, he had escaped to Adana under the rain of the people spitting at him. He had isolated himself within a hotel, yet later, he realized that there was an increase in the number of people who had joined the party of despotism and that they would hold on to power. So, he decided to establish a newspaper. He attacked İtidal, yet having seen that his newspaper did not

70 Süleyman Kani İrtem, *Ermeni Meselesinin İçyüzü: Ermeni İsyanları Tarihi, Bomba Hadisesi, Adana Vakası, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıtları*, ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, (İstanbul: Temel, 2004), 163.

71 Hayri, "Mekteb-i Sanayi Meselesi ve Safahatı," *İtidal* no: 31, 24 March 1325, pp. 2-3, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 527-531).

72 Son Havadis: Vali Beyin Lehinde, İtidal no: 30, 21 March 1325, p.4, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 518-519).

73 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Cilicciennes*, p. 28.

sell, he closed it. His party had been taking the youth's bids for equality as an insult, and they had not shown consent to that in any way. They decided to form a new newspaper and captured the newspaper Çukurova.[74]

All these events reveal that there was a serious conflict between two groups of Muslim notables in Adana: On one side, there was a relatively older and more powerful group, who had been weakened by the previous Governor of the old regime, yet struck back with the revolution. Gergeri Ali and Bağdadizade Abdülkadir come forward as representative figures of this party. They took part in the post-revolutionary mobilization that forced Bahri Paşa out of the province and hailed the Revolution. Their once curtailed but still great power was sufficient for taking control of the provincial bureaucracy after the revolution. The new Governor Cevad Bey allied himself with this group, as he did not want to challenge the restored status quo.

On the other side, there was a younger generation, who seemed to be more attached to the CUP, who rallied around the newspaper İtidal and the Adana Branch of the CUP. İhsan Fikri and İsmail Safa were their most popular members at that time. During the first revolutionary days, they were happy with the revolution in Adana, as their power had also been diminished during Bahri Paşa's office. They were seeking more dramatic changes in the local government so that it would pave the way for their re-entry to it. Yet the older group was successful in controlling the local government, and day by day, this self-proclaimed Young Turk group became more and more resentful. Encouraged by the CUP's success in replacing the Kamil Paşa cabinet with that of Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, perhaps they thought that their movement could gain momentum in challenging the restored status quo. In late winter and early spring of 1909, their opposition came to such a level that they were harshly criticizing the governor with heavy words, and trying to interfere with the appointments and court cases in Adana. Just before the Massacres, they were even trying to mobilize a demonstration to show their real popular power to their opponents.

74 A.Şazi, "Hürriyetin İlk Devresi-Müstebidlerin Halecanı-İlmi'nin Kovulması, Rehber'in kahramanlığı ve Muvaffakiyeti-Eskiler Canlanıyor, Kim Kimi Himaye Ediyor – Çukurova'nın Şaşkınlığı," *İtidal*, no: 31, 24 March 1325, p. 1, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 521-522).

2.2.2 *Armenians and the Two Muslim Parties*

The news on İtidal shows that as early as late September, ethno-religious tension began to rise in Adana: On 24 September 1324, it was written that it had come to their attention that in order to create and benefit from trouble, some persons, who had lost the influence and dominance they had in the old age, made suggestions against national unity by secretly starting to disseminate the claim that Armenian compatriots were entertaining the idea of forming an autonomous government: This caused some Armenian compatriots to come to the newspaper and the CUP headquarters, demanding a disclaimer." İtidal added that such initiatives could not affect national unity.[75]

In many sources, there are signs of such increasing tensions between Armenians and Muslims throughout the whole province between the time of the Revolution and the Massacres.[76] Scholars also noticed and mentioned those changes; yet most probably as the works that they refer to are not that mature, many hesitate to make bolder assertions that a group of reasons was more definitive than the others. There are many examples that show this hesitation: At the end of his detailed work, Kemal Çiçek presents a table that lists claims made by contemporaries, yet does not come to a conclusion.[77] In his introduction to the "Three Reports" written by three local Armenians, Taner Akçam makes a summary of first impressions and concludes by writing that there are still many things to do.[78] In her two articles on the subject, Meltem Toksöz also points to the great confusion among the contemporaries.[79] In his first article on the subject, Bedross Der Matossian applies the concept "public sphere" to explain the Massacres by noting that it

75 "Redd-i Eracif," *İtidal*, no:4 24, September 1324, p.2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 100).

76 See footnote 36 in this chapter.

77 For the table, see Kemal Çiçek, "Adana Olayları Hakkında Bildiklerimiz Bilmediklerimiz" *1909 Adana Olayları/Makaleler*, ed. Kemal Çiçek (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2011), 51-57.

78 Taner Akçam, "Önsöz" in *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor,* 20-21.

79 Meltem Toksöz, "Çukurova'da Sosyoekonomik Dönüşüm ve 1909 Adana Katliamı," in *1915 Siyaset, Tehcir, Soykırım*, eds. Fikret Adanır, Oktay Özel (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), 147.

was the weak public sphere that caused the disaster. However, in his following book, the concept disappears.[80]

But there are also attempts to come to clearer conclusions. Other than the provocation theses, the most popular explanation among scholars is the economic competition as a driving force of the relations between Muslims and Armenians.[81] Although I try to bend the stick to the seemingly "superstructural" elements throughout this work, the great role of these relations in the totality of everyday relations is undeniable and deserves to be summarized as part of it. Among all Ottoman regions that have a significant Armenian population, the great agricultural potential of the Çukurova Plain leaps out as a peculiarity. If we recall the previous Armenian policy of the Bahri Paşa administration, we can easily guess that Cilician Armenians must have prospered more than their fellows that lived in any other regions in the Empire. Many Armenians of Çukurova were cotton weavers, agricultural machinery traders, title holders.[82] The already existent economic resentment must have grown after the Revolution, as the new conditions would lead to an even sharper welfare gap between Armenians and Muslims. All these conditions must have made Çukurova a kind of a safe haven for Armenians, as the number of Armenians grew during the last few years before the Massacres: According to the Court-Martial report, the Armenian population grew by 48% between 1903 and 1909.[83]

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80 Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattering Dreams of Revolution,* 151-152; Bedross Der Matossian, "From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution: The Adana Massacres of 1909." Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 6, no. 2 (August 2011) 152-173.

81 See Meltem Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean*, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010), 197; Uğur Ümit Üngör and Mehmet Polatel, Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property, (London: Continuum, 2011), 130; Stephan Astourian, "Testing the World Systems Theory, Cilicia (1830s-1890s)", (Ph.D. Thesis, UCLA, 1996), 563-567; Tetsuya Sahara, "The 1909 Adana Incident (Part 1): The Adana Province During the Nineteenth Century", Meiji University Liberal Arts Collection Vol. 456 (2010, 9), 99-127.

82 Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean,* 166, 172, 185.

83 BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, Adana Court-Martial Record, June 24, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*). In his book, Sahara argues that it was the Armenians from the hinterlands that emigrated to Adana town center. See Tetsuya Sahara, *What Happened in Adana in April 1909,* 84-88.

Prior to the Massacres, thousands of migrant workers used to come to Çukurova for harvest seasons.[84] It is believed that the presence of migrant workers that year turned fatal: Sinan Dinçer, for example, estimates that the famines before the harvest must have made the workforce competition harsher than before, and that could have increased the conflict between Muslim and Armenian migrant workers.[85] Although Dinçer's argument makes sense, a demand by Governor Cevad Bey cannot but confuse our minds about the exact effect of the presence of migrant workers: On 22 February, he wrote to the Ministry of Interior that the good weather conditions led to an incomparable increase in the cultivation of cotton and sesame, and many workers were needed from nearby provinces.[86] Other than this document, so far we have no clue about how many workers had come that year, and whether if their labor supply had exceeded the demand or not. Yet we can be surer about the fact that just before the Massacre, there were more migrant workers present than usual.

The impact of agrarian competition can be observed in a particular dispute which was so serious that it led to the resignation of Catholicos Sahag II and to the attempts to organize mass demonstrations in various towns. This conflict was a land dispute over the "Taylan Farm", which was located near Sis. The dispute over the Taylan Farm had a long history. It was cultivated by the

84 Meltem Toksöz, "Çukurova'da Sosyoekonomik Dönüşüm ve 1909 Adana Katliamı," in *1915 Siyaset, Tehcir, Soykırım*, eds. Fikret Adanır, Oktay Özel (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), 254.

85 Sinan Dinçer, "Adana Katliamı ve Göçmen İşçiler Meselesi," in *1915 Siyaset, Tehcir, Soykırım*, eds. Fikret Adanır, Oktay Özel (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), 256-263. Some small articles in İtidal confirm the importance of immigrant workers' impact on security: One article on 4 December writes that at the end of March, forty to fifty thousand workers would come to Adana each year, and they would return in late August. About fifteen to twenty thousand of them would fill the streets each Tuesday to visit the market. See "Grev ve amele Komisyonu," *İtidal* no:7, 4 December 1324, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 142). İtidal suggested on 14 March that shacks should be built for them, as those workers were the most miserable people, who deserved charity, coming from Bitlis, Diyarbekir and even further places. See "Ameleye Bakalım," *İtidal*, no: 28, 14 March 1325, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 480).

86 BOA, DH.MKT, 2762/33, 1a, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 22, 1324.

priests of the Sis Monastery, the seat of the Catholicosate. However, parts of it had been occupied by several Muslim groups, mostly nomads at different times since the mid-19th century: The Catholicos made appeals in the early 1840s, 1850s, and 1880s to prevent such occupations.[87] The dispute erupted again in 1906 because there were claims that the farm was the property of the previous Catholicos, and as he had passed away, the land should have been confiscated. The intention behind that claim was to settle Muslim immigrants there. On the other hand, the Catholicosate was defending that the farm was the monastery's possession. The Catholicosate was planning to settle Armenians to the farm instead of immigrants.

Seeing that his community was about to lose this conflict, Catholicos Sahag II decided to protest the government's decision by resigning from his post and by organizing mass demonstrations in the nearby provinces. On 4 February, he resigned: He justified his action by writing that transferring the possession of the estates that had been bought by his community to others would ruin his monastery, and he had to absolve himself of the responsibility. These words were described as an epistle of malice (*agrazname)* by the governorate, who also informed the capital about growing unrest around Sis: In Haçin, the Armenian populated subdistrict of Sis, the Armenian rabble's awkward acts, along with their coming together at nights and use of arms worried the Muslim people.[88] The next day, the Governorate informed the Ministry of Interior that the deputy Catholicos had sent telegrams to the prelates in Maraş, Zeytun, Yozgad, Gürün, Divriği and Malatya.[89]

The ministry ordered the Governorates of Aleppo, Ankara, Mamüretülaziz, and Sivas to prevent Armenian demonstrations with a ciphered telegram on 8 February.[90] Yet in Adana, a demonstration was made on 8 February. At the end of the demonstration, "in the name of five thousand

87 Tetsuya Sahara, *What Happened in Adana in April 1909: Conflicting Armenian and Turkish Views,* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2013), 91-92.

88 BOA, DH.MKT, 2745/71, 1a,1b, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 6, 1324.

89 BOA, DH.MKT, 2745/71, 2a, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 7, 1324.

90 BOA, DH.MKT, 2745/71, 4a, Ciphered telegrams from the Ministry of Interior to the Governorates of Aleppo, Ankara, Sivas, Mamüretülaziz, February 8, 1324.

Armenian demonstrators", their leaders, including Seropian and Çalyan sent a telegram to the Prime Ministry and protested the Taylan Farm decision.[91] The government decided to send an investigator to the province, and ordered the Governorate to investigate the dispute.[92]

After the attempts to organize demonstrations to protest the state's Taylan Farm decision, the tension in Haçin reached such a level that people in the town started to walk around in small groups. The mufti told the government that they believed that Christians were certainly going to massacre them. The District Governor of Sis visited Haçin and called up the reserve soldiers, as there were no regular soldiers available and the gendarmerie was ineffective.[93] The prelate of Haçin, in response, told the district governor that they were able to provide the required assurances concerning the security of the town, and he would resign if the reserves were to be called up because that would signal the government's distrust. The subdistrict governor and the mufti changed their positions and claimed that they were safe. The district governor decided to deploy a limited number of reserves, and advised the government to dismiss the subdistrict governor.[94] In fact, Armenians were also worrying about an ethnic conflict: The Prelate was complaining that murderers who had killed two Haçin Armenians had escaped from prison and had not been found. After the kidnapping of an Armenian woman, Armenian peasants started to come to the town to protect themselves.[95]

Just before summarizing the events around the struggle over estates, we observed that scholars underlined the critical role of economic competition, yet they were emphasizing its role hesitantly, most probably because of the

91 BOA, BEO, 3496/262176, 3a, in the name of Adana Armenians, from Avadisyan, Samuel Pişazyan?, Manuk, Prelate Moushegh, Çalyan Karabet to Prime Ministry, February 8, 1324.

92 BOA, BEO, 3518/263845, 1a, From Prime Ministry to General Directorate of Land Registers, 10 March 1325; BOA, BEO, 3521/264057, 1a, From Prime Ministry to Adana Governorate, March 13, 1325.

93 BOA, DH.MKT, 2745/71, 3a, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 7, 1324.

94 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 410/85, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 12, 1324.

95 BOA, BEO, 3525/264303, 2a, From Nersis, the Prelate of Haçin to Prime Ministry, March 17, 1325.

lack of works on the subject. If we recall the tendency to make a separation between "base" and "superstructure" –though these concepts were not mentioned- and to belittle the superstructural factors' role in the analysis of the 31 March Incident, we can say that when it comes to the role of extra economic factors, the historiography of the Adana Massacres was not that assertive. In fact, many factors are touched upon by historians, which can be generalized as the birth of a new Armenian agency in the town: Appearance of new symbols, new discourses, and new parties all point to the broadest interpretation of the new principles of the new regime. These changes are essential to understand the large differences between the widespread and relatively conservative interpretation and its turning into an anti-revolutionary stage during moments of ethno-religious tensions.

Previously, I noted that there had been a donation drive to rebuild the tomb of Tevfik Nevzad. The decision was taken in a commemoration held at the graveyards of Tevfik Nevzad and Ziya Paşa. This commemoration was part of the post-revolutionary celebrations that captured historians' attention for a certain period of time, as they were reflecting on an exceptionally positive atmosphere in terms of the relations between different communities of the Empire. However, in the next chapter, the immediate attacks on Armenians in Kayseri will show us that signs of incipient fractures started to show themselves more boldly even at the time of those celebrations. This was somehow felt by historians. In his fruitful analysis of post-revolutionary celebrations, Der Matossian for example points to a difference between Christian Ottomans and the others: While Christians opened their holy spaces to such intercommunal activities, Muslims and Jewish allowed them only in the vicinity. By pointing to this difference, Matossian asks: "Does this phenomenon point out incipient fractures in the unity proclaimed by the post-revolutionary rituals?"[96] In fact, the commemoration in Adana on 25 August reveals such a fracture: The graves of the two liberty heroes were just near the Ulu Mosque, and Cevad Bey, the Governor would later say that Karabet Gökdereliyan had unfurled an "Armenian flag" during the

96 Matossian, *Shattering Dreams of Revolution*, 39.

commemoration. According to Cevad Bey, at that time Muslims had not reacted, yet "as the excitement had grown, the bitter memories were evoked".[97]

Perhaps the most alarming post-revolutionary change for many Muslims was regarding the right to bear arms. Before the revolution, non-Muslims did not have the right to carry weapons. After the old prohibition was lifted, non-Muslims could openly buy and carry weapons. Through the old route of arms smuggling, guns were so massively sold that according to British vice consul Wylie, even schoolboys started to carry arms in the region. In his words, "the swagger of the arm-bearing Armenian and his ready tongue irritated the ignorant Turks".[98] The widespread negative impression was heightened also by the Armenian clergy: It is well known that during his preaching, Prelate Moushegh was encouraging Armenians to buy arms, one of his many doings that turned him into a scapegoat. In reality, his encouragement was not unique: In the following chapters, we will observe that many prelates did the same thing in the hinterlands, and all of them, including Seropian, were going to defend themselves by claiming that they had advised their people to buy arms to defend the constitutional regime. Moreover, there are signs that at least some of the priests' language was also polarizing. For example, from Wylie's report, we can observe the words used by Moushegh Seropian, together with their effects on some Muslims:

> What can be thought of a preacher, a Russian Armenian, who in a church in a place (not in the province, however) where there had never been a massacre, preached revenge for the martyrs of 1895. Constitution or none, it was all same to him. "Revenge" he said, "murder for murder. Buy arms. A Turk for every Armenian of 1895." An American missionary who was present got up and left the church. Bishop Mushech, of Adana, toured his province preaching that he who

97 *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi*, 79. Cevad Bey was certainly not there because he was appointed to the Adana Governorate one day before. He should have been informed about the event later. See BOA, İ..DH, 1469/72, August 24, 1324.

98 PRO, FO 424/220/30752, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 24 July 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 8 August 1909 (Rec'd 16 August), No. 48.

> had a coat should sell it and buy a gun…. What the bishop must surely have known was that his words would carry far and wide by the incurable loquacity of his race, and the effect upon the Turks -whom he knew to be savage, ignorant, and fanatical -would only be dangerous. A man who believed that a massacre was coming, would he not have made a secret rather than an open propaganda in favour of self-defence.[99]

In his article on the Zhitomir Pogrom in Russia, 1905, Stefan Wiese notes how the Christian peasants misinterpreted the shooting exercises performed by the Jews of the Bund in the forests close to their villages: Although these exercises were made for self-defense purposes, they saw them as an "indicator of the Jews' desire to launch an attack in order to seek revenge for earlier pogroms": As a result, rumors about imminent attacks by the Jews had been fueled before the pogrom.[100] There was a similar cause and effect relationship in our case: As some Armenians started to carry out shooting exercises, in the eyes of the Muslims in Cilicia, their actions were taken not only as the violation of Islamic jurisprudence but also as the emergence of a new threat. The practice was seen as the sign of organized action, a factor that most probably fed the rumors of a secret revolutionary plan.

Another great change considering the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims was regarding the military exemption tax (*bedel-i askeri*). Non-Muslims would no longer be obliged to pay taxes that implied their status as secondary citizens (*dhimmis* in Islamic Law). As the *bedel-i askeri* had earlier replaced the discriminatory cizye tax while maintaining its spirit, many commoners and members of ulema alike considered *bedel-i askeri* as the continuation of the secondary citizen status of non-Muslims. When the massacre had occurred, the abolishment of the exemption tax was on the agenda of the parliament: The first discussions in the Chamber of Deputies to

99 Ibid.

100 Stefan Wiese," Zhitomir 1905: 'Spit Back with Bullets!' Emotions in Russia's Jewish Pogroms, 1881 — 1905," Geschichte und Gesellschaft , 39, no. 4 (Oktober - Dezember 2013): 494.

that end were made on 16 March 1325.[101] Believing that the Chamber would certainly vote for abolishment, the state was already preparing for the necessary measures of implementation.[102] In the countryside, even before the enactment of the law, there were rumors about the abolishment of the tax and acts of resistance to its payment.[103] The issue was to be discussed in the Chamber on 3 June 1325. During that discussion, Nazaret Dagavaryan, the deputy of Sivas, said that until that time, Turkish people were divided; the sovereign nation (*millet-i hakime*) of Turkish-Muslims on the one hand and the subject nation of non-Muslims on the other. Yet as the seventeenth article had provided equality, the subjects (*reaya*) were now to be equal with the sovereign Muslim nation, and they were obliged to protect the state with their blood.[104] Hristo Dalçef, the Bulgarian socialist deputy of Siroz, added that as they no longer wished to consider themselves as secondary subjects, people were sending telegrams demanding for conscription instead of paying the exemption tax. The policies predating Constitutionalism had to be abandoned because until that time, Muslims had been sovereign and non-Muslims had been subjects. (His words were heckled by the other deputies).[105]The speeches of the deputies show that abolishment of the military exemption tax and non-Muslims being able to serve in the army constituted a challenge against discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims, which carried both spiritual and material effects. Although the demands for the abolishment of exemption tax became louder after the Massacres, the demands had started before it.[106] The eagerness of non-Muslims was seen as an arrogant challenge, which had to be punished. According to Seropian, in Adana, the authorities and notables were exasperated when they learned the Armenians' intention to

101 Ayfer Özçelik, *Sahibini Arayan Meşrutiyet: Meclis-i Mebusan'ın Açılışı 31 Mart ve 1909 Adana Olayları*. (İstanbul: Tez Yayınları, 2001), 90.

102 Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni*, 136.

103 Özçelik, *Sahibini Arayan Meşrutiyet,* 105,

104 Ibid., 97-98.

105 Ibid., 100-101.

106 For the demands of the abolishment, see Ohannes Kılıçdağı, "Socio-Political Reflections and Expectations of the Ottoman Armenians After the 1908 Revolution: Between Hope and Despair", (Ph.D. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2014), 253, 263.

refuse to pay the military tax.[107] Accusations made by two Muslims also confirm the reaction: According to these, while Osman Nuri Efendi, the ex-mufti of Belen, had been sitting in his shop during the Massacre, a few persons had come to the ex-mufti's shop and asked: "if killing them is halal or not". In response, he said that "since they do not pay the military exemption tax…" (*bedel-i askeri*) and stopped speaking. According to one accuser, by stopping, he had "assented to their words" (*tervic*).[108]

Above, we observed that the words used by Seropian in his preaching were criticized even by the Protestant priests and British vice-consul. It seems that after the revolution, such speech also took place between ordinary people. For example, just a few weeks before the Massacres, Muslims in the Cebel-i Bereket district complained about the local Armenians' attitude: According to them, Armenians were saying that they would "take and give brides from each other" ("*kız alıp kız vereceğiz*"), implying that non-Muslim men could marry Muslim women without converting to Islam.[109] In the eyes of the Muslims, these words were so outrageous that they would be mentioned within the reports written by the Court-Martials.[110] In the following chapters we will see that anger with Armenian agency was observed in many towns, and even moderate Muslim liberals, British diplomats, or Protestant missionaries were bothered by Armenian agency.

In short, in the eyes of many Muslims, Armenians had become intensely irritating in many senses after the revolution. For all classes, economic competition became more serious. For many common Muslims, the idea of equality with non-Muslims was simply ideologically unacceptable, and the changing attitudes in daily lives were frustrating for them. The sudden

107 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 26.

108 BOA, DH.MUİ, 28-2/12, 2g.

109 BOA, DH.MKT, 2779/26, 1a, Ciphered Telegram from Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, March 14, 1325.

110 For the First Court-Martial's report, see BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, Adana Court-Martial Record, June 24, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*). For the report of İsmail Fazıl Paşa, the president of the Third Court-Martial, see BOA, BEO, 3661/274536, August 14, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*). In the quotation within the report of İsmail Fazıl Paşa, intermarriages were directly related to liberty and equality.

appearance of Armenian political groups and their unaccustomed activities were also annoying them. This complex process as a whole seems parallel to the Russian masses' reaction to the developing *rechtsstaat*, which was explained in the introduction. In the following pages, we will observe that the very resentment was reflected by the offenders, showing the anti-revolutionary character of the moments of tension and the massacres themselves.

A legitimate question can be asked at this point: Such resentments must have been visible everywhere, even at the capital. For example, although there was some misinformation about the events in the capital, Farhi's arguments about the view of the common Muslims should have been accurate. All the points that he underlined (demonstrations, demanding of rights, acquiring of arms and taking part in political life) were most probably very annoying not only for the capital but also for all regions where Muslims and Christians coinhabited.[111] Yet nowhere did those changes result in a bloodbath.

Although explaining the peculiarity of the region is not the task of this work, by keeping the comparative researches in mind, an educated guess can be made that three factors made Cilicia exceptional: First, we can guess that thanks to the previous administration that allowed Armenians to prosper, there had already been greater rivalries, which became fiercer after the revolution. Second, most probably the constant emigration that had been going on in recent years was increasing economic competition for all classes. And third, thanks to the relatively better state infrastructure, unlike Eastern Anatolia, the impact of the revolution must have felt deeper in the region: The local forces could not easily suppress the bid for power of all dissidents. So, most probably, the hands of local Armenians were relatively free. All these peculiarities must have led to the greatest resentment of Muslims from all classes. Through memoirs and reports, we will observe briefly that common Muslims would not hesitate in expressing their hatred of the new political regime that allowed Armenian agency.

Let us return to the events that give us clues about the increasing tension. The first news of the clashes from the countryside came as early as mid-

111 David Farhi, "The Şeriat as A Political Slogan: Or the 'Incident of the 31st Mart'", Middle Eastern Studies 7, No. 3 (October 1971): 282.

October. For example, Sahag II, the Catholicos of Sis, wrote on 13 October that armed villagers from around had come to Sis (Kozan) for Ramadan: On the road, they had encountered a caravan heading to Adana. They had beaten and wounded Armenians of the caravan and had threatened that in the morning there would have been a massacre.[112] That same day, Governor Cevad Bey wrote that the District Governor assembled the notables and walked around the town, and advised the people. He demanded daily reports and ordered a reserve battalion to be called up in Feke.[113] The danger subsided quickly and the reserves were not called up then.[114]

On 10 December, a letter complaining about Armenians' situation in Adana was sent to the newspaper Pozantiyon. It published the letter on 17 December. In the letter, it was written that Armenians' conditions had been better during despotism: The military commander had beaten an Armenian who had been trying to take his relatives who had fought with members of the fire brigades. Annoyed with the commander, the Prelate had applied to the Governor, yet he had insulted the prelate. In response, the Prelate had told that he would beat the Commander. Another incident was in Misis: There, some Muslims attacked a house in which Armenians were celebrating the opening of the Parliament.[115]

The Prelate's bold reaction is a sign of a serious argument between him and the Governor. In response to that published letter, Governor Cevad Bey wrote in a ciphered telegram that the event in Misis was a vulgar matter –a common denial which we will become familiar within the following chapters. As for his argument with the Prelate, he wrote that Seropian was an anxious person: At times he was interfering in the officers' works, and he was acting

112 BOA, BEO, 3421/256511, 3a, 13 October 1324, From Sahag II to Prime Ministry.

113 BOA, DH.MKT, 2641/29, 1a, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, October 13, 1324.

114 BOA, DH.MKT, 2650/34, 1a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, October 16, 1324.

115 BOA, DH.MKT, 2706/75, 3a, Translation of the letter from the 17 December 1324 issue of the newspaper Pozantiyon: Adana'nın Hali. The beaten Armenian's name was Çopur Dikran. According to Seropian, during his presentation, Governor Cevad Bey told them: "What do you believe, you Armenians, to have become since the Constitution". See, Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 23.

like the holder of a national title rather than a religious one. According to the Governor the reason behind his aggressiveness was that Catholic Prelate was elected to the Administrative Council rather than himself.[116]

About two months later, Armenians were shaken by a murder in the Hamidiye village: There, an Armenian student of the Tarsus American College was murdered with bullets, and then was "cut into pieces like a lamb". The Hnchak branch in Adana demanded an investigation publicly in the newspaper Pozantiyon.[117]

The tension between Prelate Moushegh Seropian and Governor Cevad Bey reached a higher level after the Prelate's visit to the subdistricts Osmaniye, Bağçe, İslahiye, Hassa, and Erzin in the Cebel-i Bereket District. Upon his return, Seropian wrote a very long and detailed report about the situation there, which was full of harsh criticisms and heavy words: He wrote that he had been somehow able to protect their national rights under the old regime, yet he had been unable to report some local problems at that time. Now the opportunity to mention them had come. He added that "in order to prevent the repetition of Lobanov's words -that trying to reform Turkey is a waste of time, Turkey cannot be reformed in the least- the tendency of the old government to ruin the motherland had to be destroyed completely." So, even at the beginning, Seropian was suggesting that if radical transformations did not occur, hopes to reform the country would fade away. He continued his report by mentioning many Muslim notables' counterrevolutionary doings in the district one by one: The officials were under the notables' control. There were systematic insults, thieveries, threats, and beatings. Christians were not allowed to enter councils and were prevented from buying estates. Among the many names he mentioned, Seropian complained about the doings of District Governor Mehmed Asaf the most: He was, for Seropian, a corrupt despot who did not assemble the Administrative Council and who prevented the election of an Armenian to the parliament.[118] At the end of his long report, Seropian

116 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 408/123, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 3, 1324.

117 BOA, DH.MKT, 2709/42, 1a, A Savage Murder: Translation from the 30 December 1324 issue of Pozantiyon.

118 Asaf does not deny that in his memoirs. See Mehmed Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları ve Anılarım*, 7. However, that time, he denied Seropian's claim about the election, showing us

made ten demands, which were, the appointment of a powerful and liberal district governor; the forming of a completely new gendarmerie; the punishment of persons who insulted Armenians; the dismissal of influential persons and officials; the exile of landlords who were undermining security; the forming of a commission that would give back the usurped lands and goods without a trial; the distribution of land to the tribes so that they would be encouraged to engage in agriculture; spending municipalities' revenues for local needs through councils elected from among the people; the abolishment of certain taxes; the election of Armenians to Administrative and Judicial Councils; moving the capital of the district from Erzin to a proper town; forming the subdistrict Payas again and making Dörtyol its capital; and returning the lands in Nacarlı that were usurped by Muslim immigrants back to Armenians. The last two demands were, for Seropian, the most urgent ones. He concluded his report by writing about his hope that the Provincial Administrative Council would take necessary measures "without delay".[119] He also sent the copies of the report to the Prime Ministry, the President of the Chamber, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, the Patriarchate and Turkish and Armenian newspapers. Hukuk-ı Umumiye, the journal of Fedakaran-ı Millet Cemiyeti, published the report.[120] Although he did not mention it in his report, later in his book, Seropian would write that he had been convinced that Muslim notables and the ulema had been preparing for a conspiracy against the Constitution, and Armenians would be their first target. So, with this thought, he had advised Armenians to arm themselves.[121]

The tone and demands, together with the revelation of the report in the capital's press were totally unacceptable to the Governor. He attached the

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once again that researchers should be very careful in checking officials' claims on such issues. See, "Aynen Varaka," *Rehber-i İtidal*, no: 3, 20 February 1324, p.2.

119 BOA, DH.MKT, 1303/39, From Seropian to Adana Governorate, January 15, 1324.

120 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 22. Later, Seropian would imply that Avnullah Kazımî had taken part in the counterrevolutionary plot by coming to Antakya. However, it was Kazımî's political party that was publishing the newspaper that he had sent his report. See, Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes*, 29.

121 Ibid., 21.

report and sent it to the capital.[122] The district governor of Cebel-i Bereket, Asaf Bey, also complained about him, writing openly that as a result of Seropian's advice, Armenians in Dörtyol were fueling massacre rumors, brought Armenian peasants nearby into their village, walking around in arms, making demonstrations at weddings, building houses and churches without permission, refusing to pay taxes, and occupying Muslim lands. All those were signs of a "secret intention".[123] On the day of the arrival of the Prelate's report, the Ministry of Interior demanded Seropian be dismissed.[124] Before the First Massacre, Seropian had already left the town and gone to Egypt.

2.2.3 *The CUP Branch's Reaction to the Rising Ethnic Tension*

It was already noted that the existing scholarship mentions the split among Muslim notables while summarizing the events before the Massacres, yet does not establish its relation to it. To answer the question "what does this split have to do with the Massacres", we must also summarize these two groups' relations with Adana Armenians.

So far, we have very little information about the relations among the first group, the old power bloc. The report of Bağdadizade Abdülkadir and his son Mehmed presented above was very crucial. It showed that even before the Hamidian Massacres, there were beliefs among the Muslim notables of his party that Armenians were cooperating economically and politically for a secret national cause. Nevertheless, this was a singular and very old document.

How about the second party of younger self-proclaimed Unionists? In fact, their articles in their newspaper, İtidal, give us information not only about their stance but also allow us to guess their opponents' attitudes. Given that their leading members, İhsan Fikri and İsmail Safa were accused of organizing the Massacre, very surprisingly, their newspaper İtidal shows no signs of animosity towards Armenians. In fact, many counter-examples reveal

122 BOA, DH.MKT, 1303/39, 2b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, January 26, 1324.

123 BOA, DH.MKT, 2785/12, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, March 22, 1325

124 BOA, DH.MKT, 1303/39, 3b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, March 2, 1325. It is worth noting that on the draft paper, the words "treacherous fabrications" (*eracif-i hainane*) were written but scratched out.

that until the Massacres, İtidal tried to stand with the Armenian community. During that period, their discourse was very similar to that of the Armenians' post-massacre discourse, which can be summarized very briefly as the forces of the old regime trying to provoke Muslims against Armenians for the purpose of counterrevolution. This surprising fact forces us to read these articles of İtidal.

The article titled "To My Armenian Brothers" by İsmail Safa for example, reveals how the self-proclaimed Unionists viewed the background of the Armenian question and what kind of policy they were for during the first phase of the new regime: After expressing his euphoria about the new regime, İsmail Safa wrote that what Armenians had done during the Hamidian Massacres had been in fact a reaction to the despotic regime: Yet the regime had convinced everyone, including himself that the events had been the result of Armenians' will to establish their own country. İsmail Safa wrote that it had taken time for him to understand that that was the strategy of despotism: It presented Muslims as cruel and Armenians as traitors. He finished his words by lamenting the old sufferings of Ottoman Armenians.[125] In the following pages, we will observe that after the Massacres, he would abandon this idea altogether.

Another example of self-proclaimed Unionists' show of solidarity with Armenians is the newspaper's welcoming of many changes regarding the new Armenian agency in the new regime. For instance, although the previous examples from different regions showed that Armenians' conscription was totally unacceptable for many Muslims, İtidal welcomed it. One example was İtidal's welcoming of the news that among the reserve soldiers mobilized against İbrahim Paşa, the leader of Milli Tribe, there were Armenians.[126] In another issue, İtidal would also demand a multi-nation battalion for Adana.[127] Also, the newspaper's attitude towards Armenian theatres was very positive at

125 İsmail Safa, "Ermeni Kardeşlerime," *İtidal*, no: 9, pp. 2 13 December 1324, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 168-169).

126 "Osmanlı Ordusunda ilk Ermeni Asakiri," *İtidal*, no:4 24 September 1324 p.3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 104). Ironically, those forces had massacred many Christians who were under İbrahim Paşa's protection. See Kaiser, *Diyarbakır'da Ermeni Kıyımı,* 41-54.

127 "Milli Asker," *İtidal*, no: 10, 17 December 1324, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 189).

first: For instance, İhsan Fikri and Artin Arslanyan came together and made speeches about the importance of theatres and the fraternity and union of Turks and Armenians to the audience of a play called "Oppressed Armenians or a Self-Sacrificing Officer" (*Ermeni Mazlumları Yahud Fedakar bir Türk Zabiti*).[128]

As late as February, when the clashes between the Prelate and the Governorate became apparent, the CUP Adana branch was still organizing demonstrations with Armenians: To protest the new press regulation of the government, they assembled in the Nation Garden. There, Çalyan Karabet made the opening speech that explained the reason for the demonstration. The speeches made by İhsan Fikri Bey, Tevfik Efendi, Selman Efendi, and İsmail Safa Bey followed his. Finally, Seropian made the closing speech, which was particularly praised by the newspaper which wrote that "this capable orator's clearly made demonstration and certain expression about the need for press freedom made those present extremely impressed and excited, and the speech was listened to among loud applauses".[129]

İtidal also took a moderate stance towards the demonstrations made for the Taylan Farm. It wrote that the Catholicos had applied to the authorities in due form, and it resigned to avoid responsibility –the words that Catholicos himself used. The newspaper requested the report of the governorate's newspaper to see the counter claims, so that they could write their neutral argument, yet added that just like they could not give consent to the usurpation of their mosques' lands, they could also not tolerate the same in the case of Armenians. [130]

İtidal's reaction to any news that could contribute to ethno-religious tension was very disapproving during the whole period between the Revolution and the Massacres. We have already seen that as early as September, the newspaper condemned those who fueled rumors. The line was

128 "Tiyatro," *İtidal* no: 12 2 January 1324, p. 2, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 220).

129 *"Bu muktedir hatibin kemal-i fesahatle irad ettiği berahin ve serbest-i matbuatın vücubuna dair olan katiyet-i ifadesi huzzarı fevkalade müteessir ve müteheyyic bırakmış ve nutuk büyük alkışlarla dinlenmiştir".* "Yeni Matbuat Nizamnamesi ve Miting," *İtidal*, no: 20, 4 February 1324, pp. 1-2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 348-349).

130 "Miting (Ermeni Kilisesinde)," *İtidal* no: 22 14 February 1324, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 381-382).

sustained in December: Although it did not mention Armenians, the newspaper condemned the beatings of Armenians that Pozantiyon wrote about.[131]

İtidal's reaction to the rising tension in Tarsus was even sharper: On 17 February, hearing gunshots, the people rushed into the animal market. There had been rumors of Armenians raiding the armory or Muslims cutting down Armenians. The crowd eventually disbanded thanks to the clever acts of the two communities' notables. İtidal wrote that some rascals and scoundrels who were trying to benefit from troubles were using such events in order to create an incident between communities.[132]

A very similar rumor was fueled a few days later in Adana: On the night of 22-23 February, a rumor broke out that Armenians were about to take over the armory. The reason was that soldiers stationed near the armory were carrying out a search in some houses, looking for an escapee called Arab Mahmud.[133] On 24 February, İtidal published its comment, saying that fueling such rumors was treason, as it would cause both Muslims and Armenians to suffer great harm: Both communities' notables had to advise against the rumors. It concluded by writing that "It is a shame that, in the age of freedom, let alone the occurrence of an incident, that there is even loud talk about such in Adana, which had maintained its peacefulness and greatness even during the disastrous Armenian Incidents that occurred during the age of despotism".[134]

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131 "Polis İdaresi'nde Dayak," *İtidal*, no: 10, 17 December 1324, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 185).

132 "Tarsus'dan," *İtidal* no: 23 19 February 1324, p.4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 406).

133 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2824/33, From Adana Governorate To the Ministry of Interior, March 4, 1325. Arab Mahmud had been sentenced to death, yet he had managed to escape from prison on 20 January. His two murders had led to an excitement in the town. For his escape, İtidal mocked with the Governorate. See ("Hapishaneden Firar," *İtidal* no: 17, 23 January 1324, pp.1-2, [Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 298]). Seropian writes that Mahmud had escaped with the help of Abdülkadir, so that he would show his force to the Governor. Yet Seropian's such claim casts doubt, as he wrongly notes that the escape occurred on the night of the Governor's first arrival. See Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes,* 15.

134 "Son Havadis: Heyecan-amiz Şayiat," *İtidal* no: 24, 24 February 1324, p 4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 423).

After learning about the event, the Ministry of Interior sent a telegram to Adana, in which it wrote that telegrams were sent to European newspapers about fake news suggesting that either Christians or Muslims were attacking each other. Such news was making people nervous, making them close their shops, giving the impression that there was no security. Although they were being falsified, the people were getting nervous, so they had to be assured. Security had to be provided, and investigations had to be made. Ones who spread the rumors had to be found and punished.[135] After four days, the government decided to send a very similar ciphered telegram to all Governorates and self-contained District Governorates.[136]

İtidal published that telegram on 2 March and commented that provoking the communities out of nowhere was the highest treason and amounted to murder: If the government had caught some of those people, that would have ended. Justice should have crushed them, and "those enemies of humanity should peg out from their grief and sorrow in their dungeons of misery."[137]

In short, it was certain that even a few days before the Massacre, the self-proclaimed Unionists were claiming that they were for good relations with local Armenians. They made self-criticisms about their erroneous thoughts during the Hamidian Massacres. They cooperated with Armenians in demonstrations. They not only falsified rumors that could have raised ethnoreligious tensions but also blamed and heavily criticized "old forces" – just like Armenians had done. However, as we will see below, their discourse would shift into just the opposite after the Massacres. Conversely, the local Armenians would blame them for being among the forces of counterrevolution. What changed this close relationship will be the question

135 BOA, DH.MKT, 1304/8, 3a, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, February 24, 1324.

136 BOA, DH.MKT, 1304/8 2a, Ciphered telegram from the Ministry of Interior to the Governorates of Aydın, Hüdavendigar, Konya, Ankara, Kastamonu, Trabzon, Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Mamüretülaziz, Diyarbekir, Baghdad, Basra, Beirut, Aleppo, Adana, Syria, Musul, Edirne, Salonica, Kosovo, Manastır, and District Governorates of İzmid, Biga, Çatalca, Jerusalem, February 28, 1324.

137 *"Onlar, o insaniyet düşmanları sefalet zindanlarında, kahırlarından, kederlerinden gebermelidirler"*. "Eracif ve Dahiliye'nin Telgrafı," *İtidal* no: 25, 2 March 1325, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 429-430).

to be kept in mind in the following pages, as this very change has the potential to explain the Unionist attitude towards anti-revolutionary threats to the new regime and the Armenian rights.

2.2.4 *Security Problems in Adana*

It is well known that the regime change led to security problems throughout Anatolia in late 1908 because of several reasons, like the shake of security forces and mobilization of masses. The scholarship also revealed that that Adana had some extra security problems.

One source of the problem was the situation of security forces in the province. We have already seen that Ramazanoğlu Kadri Bey was made the Chief of the Police by force, an event which backfired in İhsan Fikri Bey's bid for power. It seems that such intra-institutional clashes went on later: For example, in the middle of March, the mayor Ali Efendi resigned from office because of his clash with Kadri Bey. It was written in İtidal that Kadri Bey had wanted to dismiss a watchman. The mayor resisted that on the grounds that watchmen were his personnel and firing them was would fall under his jurisdiction. He had applied to Governor Cevad Bey, who however transferred the case to the Administrative Council, and the Council gave its decision in favor of Kadri Bey. To protest that decision, Ali Efendi resigned. Such events, for İtidal, was caused by the Governor's lack of power and collaboration with the old influential persons.[138]

Another problem was the working conditions of the security forces in Adana: It seems that in contrast to other regions, being a gendarme or a police officer was less popular in the region, as there were better options for work: A gendarme's wage was lower than that of the workers. The Governorate tried to tackle the problem several times: On 5 November, it demanded gendarme reform be implemented immediately. Unanswered, it wrote again on 11 December. Three days later, the Ministry of Interior wrote that the reform would start simultaneously with other provinces.[139] On 31 January, the

138 "Belediye Reisinin İstifası," *İtidal* no: 30, 21 March 1325, p.4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 519-520).

139 BOA, DH.MKT, 2693/40, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, December 11, 1324.

Province's Administrative Council took several decisions and informed the capital about it: The Governorate wrote that the Council believed security problems in Adana was one of the pressing issues of the time. The Council decided to hire 150 policemen, reform the gendarme, and increase their wages. Plus, it decided to form gendarme and police schools "like in Rumelia", build stations and telephone cables, to "strengthen and maintain the civilized society".[140] Yet the Government limited hiring to 86 policemen. Although it allowed reformation, it also ordered that the wages should be kept constant until the new budget was approved.[141] Worse, the government decided to send two of the existing policemen to Jerusalem in early March.[142]

It is worth pointing out that many scholars noted that the region had also been an important station in gun smuggling: An important number of illegal arms used to be brought in by sea. Turkish nationalist historians also tend to underline that the Adana coastline was the primary choice of smugglers for sending weapons to Armenian populated regions. From the documents, we observe that after the revolution, the Adana Governorate started to complain about the lack of forces in the watchtowers on the shores. It seems that some soldiers were deployed elsewhere after the revolution, and the existing gendarmes were not sufficient to replace them.[143]

The result was the circulation of a great number of guns in the hands of ordinary people. Both Muslims and Armenians frequently fired their guns on any occasion. Mass discharging of weapons into the air became routine. Concerning the complaints about those shootings, İtidal published several articles, which show that it was terrorizing the people: For example, the shootings on 30 January were "just like a bombardment", and because of such shootings, many persons could not go out into the streets.[144] Another example was the article about the shootings in eid-al-ahla, which were again, "like a

140 BOA, DH.MKT, 2756/3, from Adana Governorate To the Ministry of Interior, January 31, 1324.

141 BOA, DH.MKT, 2776/4, 1a, From the Ministry of Police to Ministry of Interior, 3 March 325; BOA, ZB, 331/93 from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Police, March 22, 1325.

142 BOA, ZB, 331/23, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Police, March 3, 1325

143 BOA, DH.MKT, 2738/67, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, December 27, 1324.

144 "Yine Silah Sesleri," *İtidal* no: 19, 31 January 1324, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 331).

bombardment": some windows were broken by bullets at the time. Such shootings had become a tradition, and were taking place daily.[145] The increase of shootings in religious festivals seems to have been a tour de force by religious communities, and this was increasing the tension between them. For instance, the district governorate of Beyoğlu demanded of the Government to prevent Christians from such shootings during Easter, warning that armed Muslims could counteract.[146] That year, the Government wanted both Greek and Armenian Patriarchates to prevent their communities from shootings.[147] A week before the Massacres, guns were being shot just under the Government building. Even the prosecutor was worried, he had to go to his house by wagon.[148]

Another problem was the crowds' disobedience towards the police. We will also see in the following chapters that Muslim crowds in Kayseri and Maraş showed disobedience to the security forces. It seems that the same problem was also present in Adana. For example, on 13 December, people took an arrested person from the hands of the police. For İtidal, the reason behind such actions was the police's immorality and negative attitude during the old regime.[149] However, as the previous examples reveal, hatred against the Christians was a critical factor in such events. We will show below that the Massacres started with such a show of disobedience by the Muslim crowd in Adana.

Only three days before the eruption of events, İtidal published an article about the problems of both immigrant workers and security forces: Because even their paltry wages had been unpaid, the Gendarme had resigned in Tarsus. About forty to fifty thousand immigrant workers were about to arrive. The appearance of the smallest incident nearby could lead to a great event, and it was a "matter of life and death". The newspaper was right about the

145 "Silah Atmak," *İtidal* no: 11, 24 December 1324, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 203).

146 BOA, DH.MKT, 2754/7, From the Ministry of Police to the Ministry of Interior, February 12, 1324.

147 BOA, ZB, 482/107, From the Ministry of Police to the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates, February 7, 1324.

148 "Silah Endahtı," *İtidal*, no: 31 24 March 1325, , p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 526).

149 "Polisler ve Ahali," *İtidal*, no: 9, pp. 1-2 13 December 1324, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 166).

danger, yet its opposition to the Governor led it to misplace the blame on him by mocking his response stating that the Government had not heeded his warnings.[150] In fact, as seen above, the Governor was right about his excuse.

§ 2.3 The First Adana Massacre: What Seems to Have Happened?

This part is an attempt to observe the real happenings during the Massacres. This is the most treacherous minefield for the researcher because there are various counterclaims about the very facts, let alone the explanations of those facts. To overcome that problem, referring to deductions from the nearby cases which were explained in the previous chapters can be helpful. Below is such an exertion.

The series of the events were triggered by an inter-religious murder – which coincidentally occurred only a few days before the 31 March Incident. On 27 March, Friday, an Armenian young man, Ohannes, son of Yapıcı Karabet from Şabaniye, shot İsfendiyar and Sevindikzade Rahim with a revolver. One rumor has it that those Muslims were ruffians who had been demanding that "he immediately satisfy their bestial desires and then lend them his wife for the same purpose".[151] After his rejection, he had been brutally beaten. Ohannes had applied to the police to demand protection, yet he had been ignored. Having wounded the two, Ohannes was able to escape and disappear.[152]

As shown just above, at the time the crime occurred, there had already been serious security problems within the town. Shootings had not been prevented, the number and prestige of police and gendarme had been at the lowest level, and there had been some resistance to the security forces. A non-Muslim killing two Muslims came on top of that. The two wounded Muslims

150 "Hükümetsizlikten Korkulur," *İtidal*, no: 32, 28 March 1325, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 541-542).

151 Simonyan, *The Destruction of the Armenians in Cilicia, April 1909*, 35-36.

152 "Vakanın Mukaddematı," *İtidal*, No. 33, 7 April 1325, p. 2-3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 557); Simonyan, *The Destruction of the Armenians in Cilicia, April 1909*, 35-36. Terzian, in his memoirs, writes that the murder had occurred on the Monday evening before Easter. See Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 9.

died from their wounds soon.[153] On 29 March, Sunday, the victims' relatives carried İsfendiyar's body through Turkish neighborhoods. Then, they surrounded Ohannes's house. His family members said that they did not know where he was. The crowd broke into the house, severely beat the family, and wrecked everything. When the family and their neighbors went to the government office to ask for protection, Cevad Bey evicted them from his office and ordered them to hand over Ohannes. Hearing that news, an Armenian priest visited the Governor, who promised that the attack would not occur again. Yet, on the other hand, some Muslims were demanding Ohannes be arrested at once. Yet the police failed to do so, and resentment grew: The victim's family threatened the government by saying that they would find the murderer by themselves if the government would fail to do so. When the second wounded Muslim died, the crowd was inflamed. The second funeral was even greater. The crowd, that time threatened that if Ohannes was not handed over, they would wreck the entire Tosbağı Kalesi Quarter. Seeing that, the inhabitants of the quarter came to the city center. At that time there appeared a rumor that Armenians, including Karabet Gökdereliyan, were hiding Ohannes. Very strangely, on Easter Monday, Governor Cevad Bey officially demanded Ohannes from the Armenian Diocese. We do not know his motivation for doing that: Maybe he sincerely believed in that rumor; maybe he found it useful to blame Armenians to deflate the mob's pressure, or he was forced to do so. The Diocese replied that they did not have Ohannes, and it was not theirs but the government's duty to capture a criminal. Rumor had it that when the Armenians refused the Governor, Gökdereliyan brought forward the case of the escape of Arab Mahmud, a criminal who had been sentenced to death yet had escaped from prison to underline the government's incompetence. According to another rumor, the Governor had secretly

153 According to the newspaper İtidal, İsfendiyar died two days after the event. See, "Vakanın Mukaddematı," İtidal, no: 33, 7 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 557-8). Terzian writes that İsfendiyar had died immediately, and the second Muslim died four days later. See Hagop Terzian *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 9-11.

advised his Arab Catholic friend not to go out too often, increasing the terror of the towns' Armenians.[154]

Why did this murder have such a great impact? Was that only a pretext for an already prepared collective Muslim action? The examples in the following chapters give the impression that the murder was not just an instrument for carrying out a secret massacre plan: During the previous winter, the Muslim crowd had attacked two district governors, Cemal Bey in Kayseri and Hayri Bey in Maraş, on the grounds that they were very tight with Christians. Especially in Kayseri, some Muslims were complaining that Armenians were arming themselves, and Cemal Bey was collaborating with them, as evidenced by him releasing the Armenian shooters. In this sense, the murder of Muslims by an Armenian put Governor Cevad Bey in a more serious situation. In both Adana and Kayseri, one main reason for the resentment was many Muslims' feeling of insecurity in the face of Armenians. It was the new regime that allowed Armenians to arm themselves, and Muslims were feeling insecure. One of the victims being notable allowed his relatives and friends to express their anger collectively. It seems that, given his timidity, which would be underlined by persons from various groups, Cevad Bey was puzzled from the beginning, and started to give concessions by responding to the Muslims' extra-legal demands, such as demanding Ohannes from the Armenian Diocese. We will see that in Kayseri, another extra-legal demand had already been made in winter: Some Muslims wanted Cemal Bey to declare martial law.

Another coincidence was that on Sunday, Armenians were celebrating Easter. Shooting guns in Easter was a Christian tradition at that time, yet during that particular Easter, conditions were different throughout the Empire: For example, warned by the District Governorate of Beyoğlu, the

154 Seropian, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes,* 31-32, Güçlü *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909: Cemal Paşa and Beyond*. (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Toronto; London: Hamilton Books, 2018), 248; Muslims would later underline that Arab Mahmud case had nothing to do with Armenians, as he had killed two Circissians. BOA, DH.MKT, 2909/34 from mufti Mehmed Lütfü, in the name of all ulema and notables of Adana, to Prime Ministry, August 7, 1325; BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 from Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, 27 June 325; "Vakanın Mukaddematı," İtidal, no: 33, 7 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 557-8); Simonyan, *The Destruction of the Armenians in Cilicia, April 1909*, 36; Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 9-11.

government had already been alarmed and ordered the two patriarchates to advise against shootings, as in that first year of the new regime, there was a high probability that shootings would be more frequent and there could emerge a Muslim reaction.[155] In Adana, there already had been many complaints about gun shootings, yet whether Christians fired more frequently nor not is not very well known: There are no comments made regarding that day, except the Patriarchate's report that Christians had been in terror on Easter day. The Patriarchate does not mention any shootings.[156] Yet most probably, they shot their guns more frequently as a show of strength.[157]

Soon, the people from both sides started to walk around in arms. They started "to look askance at each other for three days".[158] Things started to get out of control by 31 March evening. Many villagers and immigrant workers had come to the town as it was the town's market day. According to Terzian, on that evening, the "preliminary moves for the massacre had begun", as "new attacks and criminal activities were taking place all over the city".[159]

So, at the time the 31 March Incident started, Adana had already been tense: There were individuals' attacks on Armenians and even insults to the local government. This single factor reduces the possibility of an organized plot by any nationwide political agent: Yıldız Palace, the CUP Headquarters, or any Armenian political party. However, we are certain that people in Adana knew that something was going on in the capital. So far, we do not know what news from İstanbul was received in Adana. We know that on 1 April, the official telegrams from İstanbul were expressing the Incident very

155 BOA, ZB, 330/120 From the Ministry of Police to the Ministry of Interior, February 12, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2754/7, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, February 12, 1324.

156 19 April 1325 BOA, BEO, 3543/265707-2 from Armenian Patriacrhate to Prime Ministry. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları)*.

157 Süleyman Kani İrtem, *Ermeni Meselesinin İçyüzü*, 173. Süleyman Kani was appointed to the District Governorate of Cebel-i Bereket after the Massacres. He took place in the investigations and relief works. Although his works on history were not reliable sources, as relatively more detached observations make his memoirs a useful source.

158 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 from Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325.

159 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians,* 11.

inexplicitly.[160] However, we are certain that the people at least knew that there was a disturbance in the capital, as the Governor would later write that news of the 31 March Incident had been "sparking the minds and imaginations".[161] On 31 March, disobediences entered a new phase: A man called Karaköseoğlu Mahmud and grocer Bahri started to shoot their guns into the air. To the police that came to prevent them, they brought up their failures to capture Armenians. One rumor has it that they said that an Armenian had killed two Muslims, yet he had not been captured. Another goes that they said that they were not arresting Christian shooters. They escaped to their houses and told the people to continue shooting. The shootings went on.[162]

That evening, a rumor had spread that some Muslims, including a woman's having been murdered in the vineyards. Hearing that rumor, the Muslim crowd boiled over: They started to assemble on the streets and coffeehouses around the government building. According to Cevad Bey, the government quickly investigated and refuted that claim, and announced that nothing had happened. The people's pressure made the government attempt to solve the problem by finding Ohannes that night. Commander Mustafa Remzi Paşa took soldiers and policemen with him and looked for Ohannes everywhere until the morning, yet they could not get him. Cevad Bey, together with the Persian consul Hakim Efendi, walked through the streets, and soldiers patrolled until the morning. The police had captured the first man who was thought to have fueled the rumor of vineyard murders, yet the crowd took that man from the police by force.[163]

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160 For example, in his memoirs, Mehmed Tevfik Bey, the Governor of Ankara writes how he tried to infer the events from the official telegrams sent to the provinces, showing that even understanding the occurrences took a long time for the people there. However, at least, many mentions of sharia could make officials like him understand the possibility of a reactionary movement. See, Biren, *Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, 18-19.

161 *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi,* 83.

162 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 From Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, Adana Court-Martial Record, June 24, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları)*.

163 Abdurrahman Şeref 82. A report says that the rumor had it that four Muslims, including two women, had been murdered. BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 From Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325; Vakanın Mukaddematı, İtidal, No. 33, 7 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 558).

That night, a great Muslim crowd assembled again, this time near the Government building. There, the first killing occurred: an Armenian, Carpenter Lütfik was thought to be a "spy" -of Armenians- and was clubbed to death. The police seized a man who claimed that he knew the murderer, yet that man was also taken back by the crowd.[164] The available sources do not inform us about what the local Armenians were doing until that point. It seems that this murder alarmed the Armenians: According to Creelman, after learning about Lütfik's death, two hundred fedayees mobilized themselves ready.[165]

The same night, two American missionaries, Dr. William Nesbitt Chambers and his nephew Lawson P. Chambers came to the Government building. They were concerned about the tension for an additional reason: the next day they were going to host the fiftieth annual convention of the Central Turkey Mission of the American Congregational Board.[166] They warned the Governor about the situation. Cevad Bey repeated what most governors do in such situations: Typically, he denied the rumors, assured that nothing would happen and all precautions had been taken.[167]

Yet things got worse the next day: On 1 April morning, Police arrested Karaköseoğlu Mahmud, the shooter, again, yet the crowd also once again forcefully retook him. Many Muslims appeared in white turbans and gathered in the streets near Armenian shops. They were "armed with knives and clubs, which they tried to hide under their coats".[168] According to Cevad Bey, fifteen

164 Güçlü, *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909,* 147; *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi* 82; BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 From Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325

165 James Creelman, "Will Christendom Remain Silent?," *Pearson's Magazine* 22, no. 3 (September 1909): 294. James Creelman was a Canadian-American journalist who had already been famous for his interview with Porfirio Diaz in February 1908. Creelman visited Adana shortly after the Massacres.

166 Meltem Toksöz, "Adana Ermenileri ve 1909 'İğtişaşı'", *Tarih ve Toplum* 5, (Spring 2005): 149, 155.

167 Creelman, "Will Christendom Remain Silent?," 294; 82; Süleyman Kani İrtem, *Ermeni Meselesinin İçyüzü*, 178; Henry Charles Woods, *The Danger Zone of Europe: Changes and Problems in the Near East*, (London: T.E. Unwin, 1911), p. 129; Sahara, *What Happened in Adana in April 1909?*, 109.

168 Creelman "Will Christendom Remain silent?," 294.

thousand workers were with them. Seeing that, Armenians closed their shops, and Muslims did the same.[169] The religious leaders and notables from all Christian sects assembled in the Armenian prelacy. They formed a delegation which was formed of locals and foreign nationals to see the governor, who invited both themselves and Muslim notables and ordered them to walk around the streets and advise people.[170] He wanted them to tell their people to open their shops.[171]

After a while, the First Massacre started. There are different claims about how it erupted: The First Court-Martial would later claim that it was another murder that started the event: İmamzade Nuri Efendi's death at the hands of an Armenian. [172] The investigation committee would report that during the efforts to open shops, another rumor that Armenians had raided Tosbağı, a Muslim quarter had erupted. The Muslim crowd had rushed there intending to save their families and seeing that, Armenians thought that Muslims were about to attack, and fired their guns on them. [173] Cevad Bey would later claim that the first shootings came from different points: An Armenian had ridden his horse towards the bridge, had cursed Islam, and had fired his gun. At the same time, a bullet shot by Sisliyan Avedis, the translator, had killed Çerkes Mehmed. [174]

Creelman would later tell a longer and different story: A mullah in a green turban led the Muslim crowd with another mullah who had waved a green banner and cursed Christians. Some people chanted Quranic verses. All Armenians but the fedayees left the marketplace. They had a blond and boyish captain who had been motivating them by saying that the time had come to show themselves to be true Armenians and Christians. The Muslims started to loot a few shops. In response, fedayees fired their revolvers into the air. Yet

169 *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi,* 82.

170 *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi,* 82; Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 14.

171 *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi,*82-83.

172 BOA, BEO, 3621/271523 Adana Court-Martial Record, June 24, 1325. *(*Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları)*.

173 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 from Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325

174 *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi,* 83.

the mob had pushed further, and a general pillaging had started. After that, the Massacres had begun. [175]

Herbert Adams Gibbons, the American journalist who would later contribute to Ottoman historiography, was a scholar at the Tarsus American College, and he was at that time in Adana with American missionaries for the Annual Meeting. He had the chance to spend a lot of time with the Governor and the Military Commander during the bloodiest days of the first phase of the Massacres. The first part of his story is very similar to that of Creelman: He was among the persons who went to the marketplace together with the Commander Mustafa Remzi Paşa. He would later write that the Commander wanted the Armenian deputy Bishop to move about ten yards ahead, yet he refused to do so. While they were arguing, shootings by young Armenians started in the center of the market. The military commander had not "the courage to endeavor to disperse the mob; he returned to his residence and did not venture to go out for two days. Throughout the whole troubles he remained in a pitiful state of funk."[176]

Gibbons's group then met a young military officer with fifty soldiers hurrying to the scene of the shooting. A mob "armed with swords, sticks, axes, pruning-hooks –but no guns" was following the soldiers. The mob was led by an "old green-turbaned fellow, calling down imprecations on the Giaours". When Gibbons's group warned that officer of the mob, "he replied that he had not asked them to come with him." The officer would do better to disperse them with threats to shoot, yet he had taken them under his protection. Some "kindly-disposed Turks" advised the group to withdraw themselves. After that, shop-shutters were smashed and looting started. They watched the plunderers for a few minutes, and then hurried to the Government Building.[177]

After the plunder, the group, including him and L. P. Chambers returned to the Government Building. There, at the entrance of the courtyard, they saw a wounded Turk. "The sight of this blood seemed to enrage even the soldiers on guard." He and Chambers demanded from Cevad Bey personally a guard

175 Creelman "Will Christendom Remain Silent?," 294-5.

176 Güçlü, *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909,* 193.

177 A.B.C.F.M. Reel 660, No:? from H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909).

to take them to the American School, which was in the middle of the Armenian Quarter. Cevad Bey refused, yet they insisted and followed him upstairs. The mob was furious and crying out that the Armenians were killing them, and wanted arms to defend themselves.[178]

Gibbons and Chambers decided to go back to the school without a guard. Yet some friendly Turks stopped them by the gate of the Government Building and told them not to do so. They returned to the building, went to the little telegraph office to find Cevad Bey again. Yet as soon as they entered, they were hustled into a little room by the Judge of the Government Court. There, they witnessed the murder of two Armenians in front of Cevad Bey:

> At my side was a distinguished Armenian (a member of the municipal government, I believe) who had come to confer with the Vali as to means of preventing trouble. A fellow with a long sword sprang forward and struck him down. The Mufti put his arms around me; the Judge grabbed my hand; and I was pushed or dragged out into the hall and into the front room, where the Vali and several officers were standing. Others brought Chambers in after me; but I did not see him for two or three minutes, because I was looking through the open window, not three feet from the Vali, into the room where we had been. I could see the sword still rising and falling, and hear the cries of the dying man. Others of the mob were killing another Armenian behind the table in the same room. Outside, on the steps of the building, three more Armenians were being beaten and stabbed to death.[179]

178 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909).

179 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909). The names of the two murdered Armenians are known: They are Artin Shadakian (Şaderikyan), a member of the Municipal Council, and an official named Parsum. Both were called by the Governor to give advice to the people. See Duckett Z. Ferriman, *The Young Turks and the Truth about Holocaust at Adana in Asia Minor During April 1909,* (Yerevan: Armenian Genocide Museum- Institute, 2009 [April 1911]), 18; and BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/81, Ciphered Telegram from Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, 9 May 1325; "Vakanın Mukaddematı," İtidal, no: 33, 7 April 1325, p. 1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 559.)

What was Cevad Bey's reaction to those murders? According to Gibbons, the Governor:

> …made absolutely no effort to stop this murdering, on the other hand, he displayed great cowardice, and cried "They will kill us!". I suppose he was afraid for his own skin, because he had not given them arms upon their first demand. By the advice of the Mufti I had taken to a corner, so as not to be seen out of the window. When shooting was heard the Vali came up beside me, and tried to get behind me. I demanded roughly, "What are you doing? You can stop this miserable business. Do you not know that you will be responsible?" He had paid no attention to me, other than to judge my rather large form as ample shelter (he is a little man); and now he cried again, "Where is the *Ferik*? Where are the soldiers?" and, turning to an officer, he commanded, "Go to the window and call the soldiers." The man responded, "Call them yourself".[180]

Then the group went to the Governor's house: They were far away from the house, a hundred yards or more, yet even that road was dangerous. According to Gibbons, Cevad Bey was the "first one by fifteen yards to reach the shelter of the Konak. We deemed it beneath our dignity to do more than walk, but he thought differently!" [181]

All these words show that Governor Cevad Bey totally lost control and he was fearing for his own life at that stage. More importantly, the eruption of the events shows that the first stage of the massacre started as a mobilization that threatened the Governor himself. Although he would not mention them in his petition, which was to be presented in the final chapter, it is certain that Muslims' protests due to his inability to capture Ohannes, the Armenian murderer, their disobedience regarding the security forces, and their final rush

180 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909).

181 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909).

at that moment to take arms from the government must have made Cevad Bey recall recent such events nearby (Kayseri and Maraş), which had erupted in the winter of 1908-1909. As a powerless person who had previously left his affairs into the hands of Muslim notables, he did not show any resistance to the Muslim mobilization after that point. So, it hardly seems that the Governor was a conspirator of the First Massacre.

2.3.1 *The Successful Self Defense and the "Flight Crowd"*

So, the conflict seems to have begun in this way. It is very important to underline that, in contrast to previous Hamidian Massacres, for the first three days of the conflict, Armenian fedayees in Adana seem to have prepared for such an attack, and so, more or less successfully defended their people, until an armistice was made. As a result, although it led to a bloodbath in some nearby regions and in its villages, the conflict did not turn into a massacre at that first phase in the Adana town center. The greater suffering was to occur during the second phase, which turned into a much worse massacre than the previous ones under the old regime.

This successful mounting of self-defense looks like a turning point in the sense that it made the idea that Armenians were preparing for a separatist revolution hegemonic among a large group of Muslims. We have already seen that this idea was in the minds of the soon to be accused Bağdadizade family even before the Hamidian Massacres. The scale of such ideas' popularity in the minds of notables and masses is unknown, yet the signs presented in this work increase the possibility that it was large enough for each agent to take it into account in their political actions. It was most probably after the relatively successful self-defense, in Adana, nearly every Muslim notable, including the members of CUP, who were strongly for cooperation with Armenians, sincerely came to the conclusion that the armed resistance proved that Armenians had been following their own discordant agendas. We will see that this sincerity would soon be confirmed by Doughty-Wylie, the British consul who went to the town on the very first day of the conflict. To defend themselves against accusations, they would strongly insist on that belief.

The Turkish, French, and English texts written by Armenian contemporaries, tend to keep quiet about the successful first phase, most probably because of the hegemony of the equation of armed resistance with separatism. Rather, they dwell on the second phase much more.[182] Yet in his memoirs, Hagop Terzian that only after the series of Muslim attacks did the Armenians start to organize a self-defense. According to Terzian, "almost all of the first day was spent looting the markets and massacring Christians who lived in the Turkish quarters outside the centre of the city or hotels in these areas".[183] Terzian also writes that the Armenians in the Armenian quarters that time had not known about the massacres, and had at first waited for the government troops. Yet seeing the soldiers and policemen had joined the mob in attacking the Armenian quarters, they decided to defend themselves fiercely.[184]

One very significant peculiarity of the First Adana Massacre is the partially successful self-defense put up by the Armenians, as it led to the appearance of a "flight crowd": In his "*Leveling Crowds*", in which he focuses on religious conflicts of the Indian subcontinent, Tambiah dwells on the "spiral of rage and panic": There, he shows that in such ethnic conflicts, both feelings coexist and alternate with each other in aggressor majorities: Once some individuals from the minority try to defend themselves, the preexisting rumors about the threat posed by the minority becomes unquestionably true for the aggressive majority. At that point, the majority can turn into a "flight crowd".[185] In the 1983 Sri Lanka Riots, for example, he underlines that the Sinhalese fear of the Tamil Tigers made any self-defending Tamil individuals into a terrorist by definition, which changed the Sinhalese Crowd's mood dramatically.[186] So,

182 Ari Şekeryan (Ed.) *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor*; Mouchegh Seropian, *Les Vepres Ciliciennes: Les Responsabilités, Faits et Documents*, (Alexandrie: Typo-Lithographie Centrale, 1909).

183 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 17.

184 Ibid.,, 19.

185 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 278.

186 Ibid., 287.

"the aggressor community perceives its actions as defensive and protective.[187] We can argue that right after the first gunshots by the Armenian fedayees, the panicked Muslims fell into the mood that Tambiah explains in the Sri Lanka Riots: Already in circulation since the beginning of 1890s, the rumors about Armenian preparations for a separatist revolt was confirmed for those Muslims. Moreover, there are claims that after those gunshots, the fedayees fought a regular battle in defense of the Armenian Quarter. According to Creelman, for example:

> They posted marksmen in the windows commanding strategic points. They threw up barricades in the streets. They poured volleys from the roofs. Scores of Moslems fell under this steady and careful fire. The mob wrecked many of the shops, but it could not penetrate into the Armenian residential quarter. As the Young Armenians picked off their enemies the streets were red with Moslem blood.[188]

And according to Gibbons:

> The Armenians withdrew to their quarter of Adana, which is situated on a hill, and converted the houses that held advantageous positions into fortresses. Here the fighting went on for two days, during which the Armenians succeeded in beating off their Turkish assailants. [189]

So, it is this impressive start, the trained Armenians being "in command of the situation"[190] , that made Muslims a "flight crowd" in Tambiah's terms: They

187 Ibid., 284. In his analysis of Kishinev Pogroms of 1903, Lambroza also underlines the similar effect of self-defense: According to him, the violence started just after Jewish workers and merchants confronted the Christian mob with crude weapons. With self-defense, the Jews of Kishinev protected their property but the level of violence increased. See Shlomo Lambroza: "The Pogroms of 1903-1906", in *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*, eds. John Doyle Klier, Shlomo Lambroza, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 198-199.

188 Creelman "Will Christendom Remain silent?," 295.

189 Güçlü, *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909,* 193.

190 Creelman "Will Christendom Remain silent?," 295.

rushed into the Government Building with that mood. In his report, Major Doughty-Wylie, the British Consul of Mersin, another witness whose observations are taken as an important reference by all historians of the field, confirms that feeling: He noted that the Turks were not trusting of Armenians in general. Carefully noting that such fears could not justify massacres, Wylie notes that the Turks appeared to have believed the Armenians were revolting and hence deserved punishment. The idea that there had been Armenians who had prepared to attack and kill all Muslims was everywhere. That untrue rumor, according to Wylie, had enflamed the bigotry and anger of officials and the people. The Major reported that he had not encountered any of those fedayees, and he never believed in the rumors: While he was walking around, he had never observed an attack by Armenians. All battles were fought around Armenian Quarters. There, guns had been fired from houses for self-defense.[191]

Most probably, contrary to Wylie's report that there had absolutely been no fedayees at all, in fact, there were a few fedayees in the town: For example, the organized shooters in the marketplace had to be them. At least, Hagop Terzian wrote that there had been 173 defenders, and he lists the number of defenders in each important place, which shows that there was an organized effort.[192] Yet Wylie has to be right in noting that there was not an Armenian offense. The Muslims' fear of fedayees was an exaggeration, yet a sincere one for many of them, as Wylie suggests.

Terzian writes about the Muslim reaction after the first stage of the self-defense: According to a few Haçin Armenians of Hasır Pazarı Street, who would later have taken refuge, after taking weapons from the government, the crowd went to Valide Sultan Mosque: There, Muslims were beating drums, crashing cymbals and singing religious songs. Many hodjas, *softas,* and sheikhs made "inflammatory declarations of holy war, after which they, with one voice, swore an oath that they would not leave even one Armenian alive".[193]

191 BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, translation of the letter from English deputy consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander in Adana, dated 19 July 1909.

192 Hagop. H. Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 21.

193 Ibid., 20.

Wylie arrived in Adana that afternoon: As soon as he learned the news of the conflict, Wylie went to Adana by train. After learning that the Governor and the Commander were in the municipality, he went there and demanded some soldiers. They said that they would not be responsible for his life under any circumstances and assigned a few soldiers, without any officer, to the Consul. At night, he went to the American Consulate. Seeing that they were in danger, he ordered two of his soldiers to guard the building. He did the same thing at the Ottoman Bank. He returned to the Government Building and told the officials that he was going to come again the following day, and would need fifty soldiers under an officer's command, and a horse. He looked for a British and an American (Chambers and Gibbons) and learned that they had been in the Government Building for hours, and had witnessed the murders. He went to the American Consulate again and then went to Tripani, a Greek factory owner. On that first day, the four soldiers under his command served him loyally.[194]

Concerning the attitude of army officers, Gibbons wrote about young officers' hospitality in the Governor's house. Yet neither the Governor nor the Commander tried to dispatch them to "quell the rising storm". A few of them were detailed to the tops of the minarets. From there, they fired upon Armenians rather than looters and incendiaries. The only place the soldiers had guarded was, according to Gibbons, the prison.[195] The shootings from the minarets, according to S. Trowbridge, started that afternoon.[196]

2.3.2 *2 April Thursday: Peasants and Reserves Enter the Scene*

On that first night, Cevad Bey wrote to the Prime Ministry that the disorder had de-escalated, and they were waiting for 150 reserve soldiers from Tarsus and Misis.[197] However, things got more violent the next day, 2 April. When

194 BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, translation of the letter from English deputy consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander in Adana, dated 19 July 1909.

195 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909).

196 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No.637-639, From S. Trowbridge to Peet, Adana, (20 April 1909).

197 BOA, BEO, 3536/265127, From Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, April 1, 1325.

they came from Misis after daybreak, the reserves killed an Armenian in front of the steps of the Government Building.[198]

When Wylie left them, Gibbons and Chambers were with Governor Cevad Bey and Mustafa Remzi Paşa. The Government Building was very close to the Taşköprü Bridge, which connected the city with the eastern bank of the Seyhan River. From the building, they saw that the peasants from the east were trying to enter the town via the bridge, and troops stationed there were firing to prevent them. According to Gibbons, "it was the only effort that we saw made to keep out the country people", and "this however, was not kept up long." [199]

When Wylie returned to the Government Building that morning, he saw some soldiers without a commander, participating in the massacre. Wylie was able to take about fifty soldiers and Ali Bey, the Gendarme Commander with him and left the building with Chambers. According to him, in the building, there were about four hundred regular soldiers, and no high-ranking military officer had agreed to leave the building and join Wylie to end the massacre.[200]

In his report, Gibbons writes that shortly after Wylie left, "arms were distributed to the country people / bashibazouks, who were without uniform. They were yelling out and demanding these arms." Gibbons made a formal protest in the name of the United States and Wylie against that action. Cevad Bey replied that they were reserve soldiers that he had summoned. However, those weapons were being distributed randomly, without lists. Gibbons personally took Cevad Bey to the window and showed that. Also, he pointed out that a number of them showed "most patently their ignorance in the

198 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909). That man was the soldiers' waggoner. See BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, translation of the letter from English deputy consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander in Adana, dated 19 July 1909.

199 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909). .

200 BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, translation of the letter from English deputy consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander in Adana, dated 19 July 1909. That day, Mustafa Remzi Paşa wrote to the Capital that the number of the regular soldiers was insufficient. See BOA, BEO, 3536/265166, Copy of the telegram from Mustafa Paşa, the Commander of Adana, April 2, 1325. Abdurrahman Şeref also confirms that there were four hundred regular soldiers. See *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi*, 83.

manner in which they handled the guns."[201] Commander Mustafa Remzi Paşa also wrote on that day that the called up local reserves were hesitant in shooting the plunderers, saying that they were co-religionists.[202] Some of those reserves joined the attackers. The government did not have enough uniforms to give them. Soon, many reservists, especially the ones from Karaisalı would return to their homes thinking that their own families were in danger.[203]

Also, according to Terzian, at the dawn of the second day, the attack "redoubled on all sides": It seems that the distributed Mauser rifles were advantageous for Muslims, as "thick walls, large rocks, and marble columns, like paper, were too weak to withstand the terrible Mauser bullets". They were forced to seek shelter in churches and in foreign-owned premises.[204]

After he left the building, Wylie made his soldiers march in the streets. With a few exceptions, wherever they passed through, both sides ceased fire. Yet the streets were narrow, and as soon as Wylie and soldiers passed by, battles started again. They went to American and French schools and the train station. There, he scattered many people who were coming to the city with the intent to plunder and kill. On his way to the American School, Wylie learned that two American missionaries, Henry Maurer and Daniel Miners Rogers, had been murdered while they had been trying to extinguish a fire that had threatened their school. According to Wylie, they had been killed point-blank by five Turks who had promised to spare them. He took them to the School while they were still alive. On the road, from the top of a minaret, someone fired on them and fled. Near the tobacco regie building, Wylie was told that some wounded Turkish soldiers were near some ruins. He went to take their bodies. There were about eight to ten women corpses and a Turkish soldier. There, an Armenian shot Wylie's arm from close range, and escaped.[205]

201 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909).

202 BOA, BEO, 3536/265166, Copy of the telegram from Mustafa Paşa, the Commander of Adana, April 2, 1325. *(*Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları)*.

203 *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi*, 83.

204 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 24.

205 BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, translation of the letter from English deputy consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander in Adana, dated 19 July 1909. For the story of the missionaries' death, see the survival Throwbridge's account of the events in A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No. 634.

Terzian personally witnessed Wylie's coming to their quarter: They surrounded Wylie and begged with tears to forgive them that "he was wounded because of us". Wylie also wept and told them that he could not make them understand, and he was forced to go back to Mersin.[206]

Gibbons writes that the news of Wylie being shot led to great confusion in the Government Building. In his report to Wylie, Gibbons added: "Several of the officers expressed the opinion to me that you (Wylie) had been served right for mixing in a business that was none of your affairs; and they were quite confident that you would receive censure and no sympathy from your superiors." Cevad Bey also intended to do nothing for Wylie's relief. When Gibbons wanted to go to Tripani Factory, where Wylie was believed to have gone with fifty soldiers and a surgeon, Cevad Bey refused and said as Armenians were firing everywhere, it would surely mean going to death. Gibbons insisted that the streets were not being patrolled. Finally, the Commander unwillingly gave guards and a surgeon to Gibbons. At that time, Chambers returned with Wylie's ciphered telegrams reporting the two missionaries' death. [207]

On that evening, a new rumor raged: Gökdereliyan, who had left the town for Sis about four or five days before the Massacre, was about to come to Adana with four to five hundred fedayees. Some Armenians also seem to have believed in that rumor. He was expected to come over the Taşköprü Bridge, therefore many Muslims went there and waited for him, yet no such thing did occur. [208]

Contrary to Wylie's report, on that second day, the Commander wrote that Wylie had witnessed that Armenians had decided to revolt and had expressed his pleasure with the preparations. According to the Commander, the proof of the planned revolt at that time was the revolvers found under the clothes of Armenian women, who were searched by Muslim women.[209]

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206 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 25.

207 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From H. A. Gibbons to Major Doughty-Wylie, Mersina, (2 May 1909).

208 "Gökdereliyan Karabet'in Şehre Hücum Edeceği Şayiası," *İtidal*, no: 35, 15 April 1325, p. 4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 585).

209 BOA, BEO, 3536/265166, Copy of the ciphered telegram from Adana Reserve Battalion Headquarters to the Ministry of War, 2 April 1325. *(*Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909*

2.3.3 *Uneasy Ceasefire (3 April, Friday)*

The attack on Armenians became heavier as reservists arrived on the second day, yet the defenders were able to stand their ground for a while. Moreover, there are claims that they were even able to secure some Armenian civilians in the Turkish Quarter by taking them into churches and schools.[210] However, they were running short of ammunition by the evening. According to Terzian, on the second night, they convened a meeting, and after a long argument, they decided to defend themselves until the last moment, because surrender would definitely mean massacre.[211]

On the third day, just before midday, the news that most of the Armenian quarter had been lost spread and terrified the Armenians around Terzian. The panic increased. The Muslims withdrew, yet they had run out of military supplies. Also, people, including Terzian's one-year-old son, died from hunger. The bullets began to land in the courtyard the civilians were in. The Armenians decided to ask the government for mercy. They asked him to go to the government.[212]

L. P. Chambers writes that the armistice was put in place on Friday afternoon:

> While I was waiting (on Fri. p.m.) for a guard to take me into the Armenian quarter I saw my uncle appear. He looked very haggard and worn. With him were some leading Armenians, including the Gregorian priest. It seems that on Thursday evening the leading Armenians had decided to make an attempt to communicate with the government, asking for governmental protection. Their letter was taken to the serai on Friday morning by a friendly hodja, Tekelizade Hacı Osman Bey, whose house is in the Armenian quarter; and in reply to the letter a large company of soldiers, led by Osman Bey and some commanders, and followed by a host of bashi-bozouks, promenaded

Adana Olayları). However, Wylie did not make an official statement in this line. We do not know whether he was lying or Wylie at that time lied to him.

210 Güçlü, *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909*, 169.

211 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 28.

212 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 29.

> the streets of the besieged quarter, accompanied by my uncle and some of the leading Armenians as they came up to these persons' houses.[213]

According to Terzian, the governor did not accept Osman Bey's request immediately. His refusal was protested by Osman Bey. Then, after much cajoling, Cevad Bey agreed to an armistice on the condition that the Armenian notables sign a document asking for pardon.[214]

While soldiers and Armenian notables were walking down the streets, W. N. Chambers ascended to the roof of his house. From there, as a fluent Turkish and Armenian speaker, he ordered both Armenians and Muslims to ceasefire by waving a white pocket handkerchief. He shouted the Armenians to put up white flags so that they could convince some doubtful Muslim riflemen that they were ready to surrender to the government. Also, a Jesuit Priest forced a Turkish bugler to play the ceasefire call.[215]

According to İtidal, the Muslim mob began to assemble behind the soldiers while they were heading towards the Armenian Quarter. The commander warned them again and again. As they did not listen to him, the soldiers wounded some of those Muslims and got them to scatter. Very interestingly, Armenian fedayees joined the parading soldiers on the road.[216] After that, the advising notables and some soldiers went back to the Government Building. Along the road, Muslims were clapping their hands and cheered on. About two thousand Muslim villagers were still demanding weapons and soldiers, claiming they were without protection. The soldiers wounded some of them, yet they still did not scatter. Some notables advised them, and they returned. Yet the rumor that Gökdereliyan and his fedayees were about to arrive was still circulating. Some villagers were still trying to

213 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From L.P. Chambers to Peet, (4 May 1909); "Safahat-i İhtilal'den Mabad: 3 Nisan Cuma: Sabah Oldu," *İtidal*, no: 35, 15 April 1325, p. 4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 586).

214 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 30.

215 Güçlü *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909,* 173-174.

216 "Safahat-i İhtilalden Mabad," *İtidal*, no: 36, 18 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 597).

cross the bridge and come to the city. That group was also scattered by soldiers shooting. [217]

By evening, the Governorate ordered a curfew and declared that anyone who would continue shooting and set fires would be considered rebels and would be shot. [218] That same day, the Sheikh-ul Islamate also ordered the Adana ulema to advise the people against the skirmishes (müsademe) that were against sharia and the Constitution. It also informed that the Patriarchate would do the same thing.[219] According to Terzian, the first Adana Massacre, which started at 10:30 a.m. on 1 April, lasted till 1:00 p.m. on 3 April. So it had gone on for 50 hours.[220]

Despite the armistice, problems went on: On that Friday night, three or four large fires broke out in the city according to L. P. Chambers: A line of fire across the city could be seen, as well as the vineyards and the villages. They were all out by the next morning. [221] Terzian writes that the mob was still trying to attack during the evening. Yet that time, the soldiers started to fire their Mauser rifles into the air on the behalf of Armenians. The soldiers cautioned Armenians from firing weapons, assuring them that they should not be frightened. That night, the Armenians of the town could sleep at last.[222] On the second day of the ceasefire, the government demanded Armenians' weapons. They hesitated, yet Wylie convinced them by promising that nothing would happen. Also, the Patriarchate sent a telegram of confidence.[223]

The first massacre in the town center had ended in that way, yet the bloodbath went on in the rural areas, as well as in the districts of Kozan and Cebel-i Bereket for a few more days.

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217 "Safahat-i İhtilalden Mabad," *İtidal*, no: 36, 18 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 598).

218 "Safahat-i İhtilalden Mabad," *İtidal*, no: 36, 18 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 598).

219 "Telgraf, Adana Niyabet-i Şer'iyesi'ne," *İtidal*, no: 33, 7 April 1325, p. 1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*,. 552).

220 H. H. Terzian, *Kilikio Aghetu*, 38-39, cited by Simonyan, *The Destruction of the Armenians in Cilicia, April 1909,* 49.

221 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From L.P.Chambers to Peet, (4 May 1909).

222 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 32.

223 Ibid., 34.

After Adana, the bloodiest scene of the massacres was the Cebel-i Bereket District. The Ottoman Archival documents give the impression that before the massacres, there had already been two kinds of hostilities, one among the Muslim elite and another between the Armenian and the Muslim communities.

Signs of tension between Muslims and Armenians could be observed as early as October. That month, there were threats against the Armenians, and the district governor Mehmed Asaf Bey had to visit Dörtyol, a large Armenian populated village, for investigation, and from the notables of the nearby villages, he received the promise that they would not let anything transpire that could lead to trouble. To Mehmed Asaf, the mufti and some officials in Erzin were responsible for the tension.[224] A very interesting petition sent by "patriots" (*muhibb-i vatan*) also shows that there had been hostility against Armenians, as the writers of the petition noted that through the efforts of the prelate, the Armenians were lobbying to make Dörtyol the capital of the district so that they could demand an Armenian governor: According to them, the capital of the district should have been moved from Erzin to Osmaniye to frustrate such efforts.[225] Tensions must have grown after the report of Seropian that we dwelled on above, as it was mainly about the situation in this district. After the report, Mehmed Asaf Bey's animosity became more visible.

On 1 April, Mehmed Asaf Bey wrote that he had distributed about 150 Schneider rifles to the "townspeople".[226] On 4 April, he made several claims that Muslims were under Armenian attack, and cabled several agitated telegrams to the Governorate, nearby districts, and the capital.[227] He even suggested that four hundred prisoners in Payas would make "a perfect

224 BOA, DH.MKT, 2862/85, Copy of the Telegram from Cebel-i Bereket District Governorate to Adana Governorate, October 19, 1324.

225 BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 72/28, From "Patriots" to the Ministry of Interior, November 5, 1324.

226 BOA, BEO, 3669/275159, from Cebel-i Bereket District Governorate to Adana Governorate, April 1, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

227 BOA, BEO, 3669/275159, from Cebel-i Bereket District Governorate to Adana Governorate, April 4, 1325.; BOA, BEO 3535/265123, from Adana Governorate to the Prime Ministry, April 4, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

battalion" if guns and ammunition could be sent there.[228] We observe that local Armenians could successfully resist the massacre attempts at various points in Cebel-i Bereket. Among them, the Dörtyol Resistance takes attention: Although their water supplies were cut during the ten days' siege, the Armenians of Dörtyol resisted successfully and suffered only a small amount of losses.[229] As a result of his terrible administration, on 30 April, Mehmed Asaf would be dismissed by the order of the Ministry of the Interior.[230]

By 6 April, the incidents were still going on, and the local government's calls for help threatened the armistice in Adana town according to Governor Cevad Bey.[231] The estimated number of deaths within the town seems comparable: Creelman for example, writes that about six or seven hundred Muslims and about a thousand Armenians lost their lives. [232]

228 BOA, BEO, 3669/275159 from Cebel-i Bereket District Governorate to Adana Governorate and to the Ministry of Interior, April 4, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

229 See Yesayan, "Yıkıntılar Arasında", 223-224, 229; BOA, DH. MKT, 2810/72 Copy of the Telegram from the Headquarters of the Second Battalion of the Sixteenth Regiment. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

230 BOA, DH. MKT, 2810/72 Copy of the Telegram from the Headquarters of the Second Battalion of the Sixteenth Regiment. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

231 BOA, BEO, 3537/265233, From Adana Governorate To Prime Ministry, April 6, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*). However, according to the report of the Investigation Commission, it was Cevad Bey himself who had led to the spread of violence in the countryside, because while he had been informing the districts and subdistricts about the event in the town center, he used the word "iğtişaş", disorder, which at that time referred to an Armenian Revolt since the Hamidian Massacres. BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 From Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325. For the conceptualization, see Edip Gölbaşı, "The Official Conceptualization of the Anti-Armenian Riots of 1895-1897: Bureaucratic Terminology, Official Ottoman Narrative, and Discourses of Revolutionary Provocation." *Etudes Arméniennes Contemporaines, The Massacres of the Hamidian Period (I): Global Narratives and Local Approaches* 10, (2018): 37.

232 Creelman, "Will Christiandom Remain Silent?," 296.

In nearby vineyards and villages, Armenians did not have any instruments for self-defense; and had been exterminated. According to Wylie, they had been cut down like sheep.[233] Creelman would also later add that:

> On the very day that peace was restored in Adana the Moslems sacked and burned every Christian house on the plain, murdering the men and carrying off the women and children. Wholesale orgy of blood and fire. I have traveled over a part of the district, and nowhere did I find a Christian house un-burned or a Moslem house disturbed. Nothing in the annals even of that land of war and rapine is more appalling. The villagers tore their Christian victims like wild beasts, shouting the name of the Prophet and cursing all infidels. More than two hundred villages were attacked. For days the hunting of men became a regular sport.[234]

L. P. Chambers's words to Mr. Peet about the villagers that came to Wylie on Friday also shows that the events that had erupted in Adana center turned into a massacre in the rural areas:

> Meanwhile Turks from the villages and some from the city came in weeping with, I now believed, feigned tears to tell of Armenian attacks on their villages, Turks cut to pieces, etc. Armenian refugees appealed to the consul with stories of similar treatment at the hands of Turks, few Armenians daring to appeal to the serai except the heads of the communities, and they also with fear and trembling. Later reports, "official" reports included while proving the stories on both sides to be somewhat exaggerated, show that the stories of Armenian refugees had much basis in truth while the stories of Turks were practically totally false. The sickening details of these stories you are already familiar with from the massacres of '95-'96.[235]

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233 BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, translation of the letter from English deputy consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander in Adana, dated 19 July 1909.

234 Creelman, "Will Christendom Remain Silent?," 297.

235 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, From L.P.Chambers to Peet, (4 May 1909).

The difference between the town center and the rural areas in terms of self-defense can also be observed in the British documents: According to the British officials, the estimated number of deaths during the first massacre in Adana was 600 Muslims and 1,600 Armenians. According to them, the number of deaths in the outlying districts could not be less than 10,000 to 15,000, as many villages were "entirely wiped out". [236]

The 31 March Incident most probably had prevented the newly formed Cabinet from dealing with the Massacre: At first, it decided to send two regular battalions from the Second Army, and two regular companies from Beirut, as well as two reserve battalions from Mersin, Tarsus, [237] Dedeağaç and Gelibolu to Adana.[238] Later on that same day, the Fifth Army informed that it would not send the troops from Beirut.[239] The Adana Governorate demanded at least three regular battalions next day.[240] As late as 6 April, three days after the armistice, the Government cabled that three regular battalions of the Second Army were going to be sent.[241] Foreign powers also decided to send their warships to Mersin. On 5 April, a French warship arrived. It would be followed by British, Russian, German, American, Austrian and Italian ones.[242] The government also decided to dismiss Cevad Bey and replaced him with Babanzade Mustafa Zihni Paşa, the District Governor of Burdur on 8 April.[243]

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236 PRO, FO 424/219/20735, List of Casualties and Refugees at Adana, enclosure in From W. Graham Greene to Foreign Office, Admiralty, 2 June (Red'd 3 June) 1909, No. 118.

237 BOA, BEO, 3534/264992, From the Ministry of War to Prime Ministry, April 2, 1325. *(*Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları)*.

238 BOA, BEO, 3535/265119, From Prime Ministry To Adana Governorate, April 3, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

239 BOA, BEO, 3536/265166, Copy of the telegram from Mustafa Paşa, the Commander of Adana, April 2, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

240 BOA, BEO, 3535/265119, From Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, April 3, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

241 BOA, BEO, 3537/265233, From Prime Ministry to Adana Governorate, April 6, 1325 . (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

242 Raymond Kévorkian, "The Cilician Massacres, 1909," in Armenian Cilicia Richard Hovannisian and Simon Payaslian (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2008), 347.

243 BOA, İ... H.. 1454/74, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, April 8, 1325.

The shops in Adana were reopened on 7 April.[244] On that day, certain Armenian notables asked Consul Wylie to prevent Seropian's return to Adana from Egypt.[245] When he arrived in Mersin, he was prohibited from disembarking. Seropian protested that prohibition, yet went back to Egypt. In one of his reports, Wylie notes that the Armenian notables' demand to prevent Seropian's disembarking was persuasive for doubtful Muslim religious authorities: During the "Parliament of Hojas" on 8 April:

> … when the question of the disarming of the Armenians was mentioned, some of them declared that the Armenians did not wish for peace, as they still kept their arms. I said that they did, and that I could prove it. They had themselves asked me to prevent their own Bishop from coming, and I had done so. This produced an instantaneous effect, every Hoja jumping to his feet and coming to shake hands with me.[246]

Actually, for both Wylie and some missionaries, the Armenian political groups and notables were too radical. They would later criticize Seropian and his comrades heavily: In his report, for example, Wylie wrote that many insolent speeches had been made by some Armenians previously when he was mentioning the claims that the Prelate had provoked the Muslim people. Dr. Thomas Christie would also write about his "criminal folly" later to Barton.[247] Moreover, he would later write to Bell that:

> The hotheaded Bishop of Adana went all over his diocese, proclaiming these doctrines; another man who was very active in this direction was

244 BOA, BEO, 3538/265303, From Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, April 7, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

245 PRO, FO 424/219/17612, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 21 April 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 4 May 1909 (Rec'd 10 May), No. 83.

246 PRO, FO 424/219/17612, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 21 April 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 4 May 1909 (Rec'd 10 May), No. 83.

247 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 663, No.211, From Thomas D. Christie to Barton, Tarsus, (14 August 1909).

> Geukderelian of Adana, who had lain in prison for twelve years, and who has really remarkable intellectual abilities. In our talks with these men and their followers we tried to show them that an unsuccessful revolution is a crime; and that with ten Moslems to one Armenian in this region, and with the army and the Government against them, an Armenian revolt MUST be a failure. All sensible Christians agreed with us; but there were enough of the other story to greatly irritate the Turks with their vain boastings and preparations.[248]

As a person who thinks that Armenians' "national traits repel rather than attract an Occidental", Gibbons was also arguing in the same way: In one of his reports sent to the Paris editor of the New York Herald, he wrote that some of the leading Armenians of this province, including the bishop, had acted in a foolish and impolite way. They had bought arms and had talked indiscreetly in public. They had held open meetings in churches where a great deal had been said about a revival of Armenian literature and history. "This movement has all along caused great anxiety to the missionaries who have seen clearly that it was no more than the waving of a red rag before a bull." There had been little encouragement here for them to join hands with the Turks. "The new regime has not as yet taken hold in Cilicia and the power here has remained in the hands of fanatics and old regime leaders." However, "A very small portion of the Armenians had been out-and –out revolutionists. Two revolutionary clubs were places "where enthusiasm for Armenia ran riot, and where a few hotheads wasted evenings in declaiming incendiary speeches. These men dressed themselves up in uniform and pretended to be forming an Armenian army. It is doubtful if these numbered 500 out of a population of 30,000." He also added that "if it was a revolution that the Turks had feared and if it was revolution that they had wished to suppress, they could very easily put a stop to any talk even of revolution, by descending upon these clubs and throwing their members into jail." So, the purchasing of firearms and the swagger and enjoyment of liberty on the part of Armenians had been angering the Muslims: "We may call it an occasion for the massacres in Adana and Tarsus. But even this occasion was lacking in many of the smaller places, and

248 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 663, No.173 (May 6 1909).

certainly throughout the country where neither ignorant Turk nor equally ignorant Armenian knew what the words revolution or conspiracy or liberty meant. It is a significant fact, is it not, that the massacre started everywhere in the province on the same day."[249]

In spite of their relatively nuanced position on the subject, recent works of denialist historiography are still trying to bring forward several aspects of Armenian radicalism to label Muslim masses' atrocities as a reaction to a separatist revolt.[250] However, the future pages will show us that the criticisms made by foreign observers cannot legitimize the atrocities not only in the sense of common humanity but also in the sense that the critiques of radicalism were very different from that of Muslim offenders. In the following chapter on Kayseri, we will observe that such a criticism was made also by liberal Muslim officials. Yet drawing a line between Armenian radicalism and the very basic rights of citizenship, both Muslim officials and foreign observers tried to stop the killings and other sufferings with all of their efforts. Moreover, the final chapter on the aftermath of Adana Massacres will show that even under the pressure of condemnation, the Muslim convicts in Adana show almost no pity to the losses of Armenians in their letters and petitions to the government. This fact, together with the Muslims' references to constitutionalism shows that there were sharp differences between the interpretations of the moderates and themselves. This can also be seen most brightly in the articles of İtidal, which were published after the First Massacres. The second importance of these articles is that for the Armenian contemporaries and for the historians that approve their views, they were among the provocations that led to the second massacre in Adana. And a third one is that they were written by the forthcoming figures of the local CUP branch, İsmail Safa and İhsan Fikri. So, all features of these articles make them worth focusing on in great detail.

The articles were written during the uneasy conditions of the ceasefire. In those days, the reopening of shops could be seen as a sign of normalization.

249 Gibbons' words are quoted from A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No.706-707, From Mrs Trowbridge to her parents, (13 May 1909).

250 For two examples, see Güçlü, *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909* and Kemal Çiçek, "Adana Olayları Hakkında Bildiklerimiz Bilmediklerimiz".

Yet the ceasefire was uneasy: Many Armenians were still hiding in schools, churches, and foreign factories at that time.[251] The Armenians could not send any telegram to inform about the massacre: The governorate had forbidden it. The telegram officials were editing Armenians' telegrams, only allowing sentences like "We are all fine".[252]

On the day of the shops' reopening (7 April) İtidal published its first issue after this first massacre. In the issue, the newspaper's tone was dramatically different from before. Both missionaries and Armenians considered the newspaper's two articles in the issue a great provocation for the second massacre. The first was written by İsmail Safa, who had justified Armenian resistance against Hamidian Massacres previously and had hailed the Armenian nation for its struggle against the old regime. His long article was titled "A Terrible Revolt (!)" (Müdhiş Bir İsyan [!]): There, he repeated that Armenians had been oppressed during the old regime, yet claimed that a while after the revolution, they had started their preparations for "their secret mission": The reason for that terrible event was their ambitions for independence. As for the previous pro-Armenian discourse of the newspaper, he claimed that they had been sensing the Armenians' rude and revolutionary attitude, yet they had preferred not to incite other Muslims to feel that. To boost their ego, they had written sincere and positive articles about Armenians. That even lead to some hostilities among Muslims. Yet Armenians, step by step, prepared for their mission: they bought arms and spoke rudely against Muslims. That provocation had been made intentionally because they intended to justify their actions as a reaction to Muslim attacks. As they had seen that nothing had come of their provocations, they had started to commit murders. Referring to the murder of two Muslims by an Armenian, he claimed that they had been killed without a reason. Also, the lack of adequate security forces had been worrying Muslims a lot. Poor Muslims had been caught unarmed when Armenians had started shootings. As reserves and villagers had rushed in, finally the Armenians had realized that they would not succeed in their aims and had pleaded for mercy. It seems that in addition to his telling of the story, the final words were also

251 "Will Christendom Remain Silent?," 298.

252 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 33.

unacceptable for Armenians and missionaries: He concluded his words by saying that Armenians still had not handed over their arms to the government, and so, "Muslims' minds were full of the thought and fear that the shootings would start again and the present peace was just a temporary armistice. Let us see what the end of it will be."[253] Trowbridge for example, wrote that the "long and bitter" article had been considered an "ugly threat": It was true for him that agents of the Armenian revolutionary societies had been at work in this province for months past and had aggravated the already strained relations between Turks and Armenians". He also approved the prevention of Seropian's return. Yet the whole community could not be responsible for those doings.[254]

The second provocative article was the first volume of a series of articles that would tell the course of events. It was written by İhsan Fikri himself, and titled "Stages of Revolution" (Safahât-i İhtilâl). In his introduction to the series, he wrote that some of his Muslim brothers had warned about the revolutionary feelings and aims of Armenians, yet he had cursed the ones that had fueled such rumors. He added that Armenians had decided to establish an independent Cilician state, because of its geographical position and historical background. To accomplish it, they had tried to change the demography and brought in many Armenians from the east. In the following pages, he wrote about the events day by day, during which he presented Muslims as innocent people who were caught by surprise. The series would go on in the following weeks, together with many denials and refutations of several claims; and only after the warning of the Government would he eventually end it. The shift of İhsan Fikri's discourse was not only about his attitude towards Armenians.[255] On the top of that, contrary to his previous

253 "Müdhiş Bir İsyan (!)," *İtidal*, no: 33, 7 April 1325, pp. 1-2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 553-555).

254 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No.568-569-570, From Stephen v. R. Trowbridge to Mr. Peet, Adana, (23 April 1909).

255 "Safahat-i İhtilal," *İtidal*, no: 33, 7 April 1325, pp. 1-2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 553-555); "Safahat-i İhtilal'den Mabad," *İtidal*, no: 35, 15 April 1325, pp. 3-4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 582-587); "Safahat-i İhtilalden Mabad," *İtidal*, no: 36, 18 April 1325, pp. 3-4 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 597-602); "Kuva-yı Mürettebe Kumandanını Ziyaret," *İtidal*, no: 37, 21 April 1325, pp. 2-3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 612).

accusations against Governor Cevad Bey, especially about the security measures; İhsan Fikri this time defended that he had done his job perfectly: He wrote that the government tried to take measures and that although the Governorate consistently wrote that there had not been enough security forces, the central government had ignored this. And when Cevad Bey left office, he would also write about their gratitude for his efforts during the disorder. [256]

Above, we have observed that only a few days before the first Massacre, these self-proclaimed Unionists had been heavily criticizing the Governor who had allied with the old notables. And they were continuing in praising the Armenian community. How can we explain such a change of attitude? First of all, the articles show that although they had had a strong discourse of alliance with Armenians, in fact, they had also not been "approving" of Armenians' behavior. So, they were not as close as they had claimed to be. Still, this alone cannot explain the shift.

To understand self-proclaimed Unionists' attitudes better, their behavior during the course of events in the first massacre has to be observed closely. Yet unfortunately this crucial point constitutes a blind spot: we have very limited information about it. Neither foreigners nor locals provide enough information about their exact doings. Hrachik Simonyan notes that although İhsan Fikri did not take part in the massacres personally, he was one of the principal instigators and the organizers of the second massacre.[257] Later, the investigation committee would imply that self-proclaimed Unionists tried to benefit from the situation: Hoping that they would make him resign from office, they led the crowd in inviting the Governor to do his work, and even insulted him.[258] This seems very logical: Until the Muslim crowds began to

256 "Hükümetin İhtimamı," *İtidal*, no: 33, 7 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 558), "Askerin Kifayetsizliği Müslümanların Silahsızlığı," *İtidal*, no: 33, 7 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 559; "Vali-i Cedidimiz," *İtidal*, No. 35, 15 April 1325, p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 581).

257 Simonyan, *The Destruction of the Armenians in Cilicia, April 1909,* 57.

258 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 From Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325; Ferriman also tells a detailed story of their actions, such as wearing turbans and making speeches to kill Armenian males, yet that seem fabricated. See Ferriman, *The Young Turks and the Truth about Holocaust*, 16

disobey the provincial government, İhsan Fikri's party had been continuously underlining that the government was ignoring the demands for security. Plus, only about two weeks ago, the party had tried to stage a demonstration with the aim of mobilizing the people to show their strength to the Governor, who had been ignoring their demands for sharing power. So, people's violent protests at the beginning should have been a golden opportunity for the self-proclaimed Unionists. Yet this point begs another question: If the party was still agitating against the Governor at that moment, what made them lend their support to the Governor after the Massacre? This can be explained, first, by the provincial government's passiveness in stopping the Muslim crowd: Unlike the Maraş and Kayseri cases, in Adana, Cevad Bey decided to remain passive during the tension. Second, the flight crowd effect mentioned above should have made the "Armenian Separatist" threat appear as reality in the eyes not only of other Muslims but also themselves: Having seen no prior example, the organized self-defense should have seemed to them like the verification of the claims about an Armenian separatist rebellion. So, it seems that the massive anti-revolutionary mobilization and the successful self-defense by the Armenian revolutionaries seem to have changed the position of the local Unionists. In this sense, the Massacre showed the Unionists' potential to move closer to the anti-revolutionaries if Armenian rights and liberties were the question.

§ 2.4 The Second Massacre

After nine days of the armistice, the second massacre occurred. This massacre was different from the first one in several ways. First, unlike the first one, it did not trigger a new wave of killings in the rural areas or in the districts. It occurred only in central Adana. Many alternative explanations can be made for this: Maybe the Muslim offenders in the countryside had already finished their killing, plundering, and dishonoring actions. As Tambiah shows, such actions are usually short-lived orgiastic actions.[259] Or maybe a potential Armenian threat in their minds was already gone after the mass killings. We have to keep in mind that offenders in the Adana town center were unable to

259 Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds,* 279.

enjoy such an orgy in the first massacre. On the contrary, they were surprised by the successful Armenian resistance. This brings us to the second difference: Unlike the first one, Armenian resistance was absent in the second massacre. Maybe that was because the fedayees had left the town during the armistice: Creelman claims that the fedayees had left the city before the second massacre.[260] Whether they really did or not, we can recall Terzian's memoirs that described the weakening of the local Armenians' defensive capabilities during the last hours of the first massacre. Third, in contrast to the first massacre, during which officers and regular soldiers had not established control of the situation for a long duration, the regular army soldiers seem to have been one of the main agents of the second massacre. Here, whether the three battalions from the Second Army had participated in the mass killings or not is critical, because the fact that they were regular forces and that the Second Army took part in the Action Army would lead to claims that the CUP headquarters was also for mass killings.

The total number of deaths during the second massacre was not obtainable by the British officials, yet it was judged to be between 1,000 and 3,000. After this second massacre, there were about 17,000 refugees under the care of Europeans.[261]

Among the documents, the texts written by Anglophone missionaries and the British Consul seem useful. Also, Hagop H. Terzian wrote his terrible experience in detail. However, even within them, the stories are not clear, and worse, the agents' doings, which were blurred in the first stage, are even more ambiguous in this second phase.

The story of the Second Massacre starts with the arrival of three regular battalions of the Second Army on 12 April, Sunday morning: They settled around the barracks and government building until noon.[262] It was during this settlement process when half a dozen or more shots were heard. What those shots were, unsurprisingly, would become a matter of debate later. L. P.

260 Creelman, "Will Christendom Remain Silent?," 296, 298.

261 PRO, FO 424/219/20735, List of Casualties and Refugees at Adana, enclosure in From W. Graham Greene to Foreign Office, Admiralty, 2 June (Rec'd 3 June) 1909, No. 118.

262 Redd-i Eracif," İtidal, no: 41, 8 May 1325, pp. 1-2, (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 668-669).

Chambers summarizes the alternative rumors as follows: That Turkish soldiers had fired on thieves, that soldiers had started to shoot at innocent Armenians, that Armenians had fired into a crowd at the station, and the official claim that from some Armenians had fired on a patrol from the Monsheghian school and had killed some soldiers.[263] There were also shots at the regular forces' tents and at the British consulate. [264] Terzian writes that on that day, he saw a large crowd near the clock tower. He ran to the prelacy in panic. Yet the people did not want to believe that and he also agreed with them. That day, some individuals started to harass Armenians on the streets. Then, in the evening, he saw about fifty softas running after an Armenian boy, shouting that the infidel's son (*gâvurun oğlu*) was setting fire to a mosque. They began to fire their handguns as they reached the group. Then, a part of the mob fired their guns from a distance at the newly arrived soldiers and ran to them, claiming that fedayees have attacked the Turkish quarters.[265]

According to both Wylie and Chambers, the reaction to the shootings were immediate: Suddenly terror became the order of the day, and hundreds of people rushed into a house where shootings had come from.[266] Chambers underlines that there was no pause between the first shot and when the soldiers began a destructive firing upon the Monsheghian school, in which a couple of thousand refugees were staying. That fact led him to think that the massacre was planned.[267] The local Muslims would later claim that the Second Massacre was a provocation by Armenian Revolutionaries, and their aim was to make foreign powers directly intervene in the crisis: To accomplish their goal, they had shot the soldiers from the bell tower of an Armenian church. This was also the idea of Cevad Bey. However, the Joint Investigation Committee would later report that they had personally checked this claim and

263 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No: ?, From L. P. Chambers to Peet, Adana, (4 May 1909).

264 "Redd-i Eracif," *İtidal*, no: 41, 8 May 1325, pp. 1-2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 668-669); A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No: ?, From L. P. Chambers to Peet, Adana, (4 May 1909).

265 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 41-42.

266 BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, From the Ministry of War to Prime Ministry, Translation of the Official Report from British Deputy Consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander in Adana, July 19, 1909.

267 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No: 651-653, From Stephen v. R. Trowbridge to Peet, Adana, (28 April 1909).

noticed that it was impossible to see the soldiers' camp from that tower. It appeared that the revolver shots came from a Muslim's house.[268]

Wylie writes that he did not know the reason for this second massacre. Yet he refuses the Muslim claim, as such an Armenian plan was too absurd in many ways, including the neglect in protecting their own relatives before undertaking such an action, or the minute possibility of foreign intervention. On the other hand, he expresses his trust in the regular soldiers: He states that he does not believe that these battalions caused the event. Yet he adds that some of the participants were seduced right from the beginning. He guesses that plunderers and the people who had already been accused of the first massacre were worried about the possible repercussions and had previously resolved and tried to provoke those soldiers. He also notes that many of the Turks were sincere in their belief that their state, their religion, and their lives were in real danger.[269] Although it refused the accusations against the regulars, İtidal confirms that regular forces did go to the scene one hour before nightfall.[270]

In short, the witnesses' accounts show that most probably some local Muslims provoked the newly arrived battalions.

That night, according to Wylie, there were terrifying battles and fires.[271] Trowbridge also notes that "all night long there were alarms and the sharp reports of the soldiers' Mauser rifles, without the reassuring bugle calls which had been kept up until Sunday evening."[272]According to Chambers, thirty soldiers and irregulars had poured a merciless fusillade upon Monsheghian school, and particularly if any refugees appeared and tried to escape the firing

268 *Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi*, 84, 103.

269 BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, From the Ministry of War to Prime Ministry, Translation of the Official Report from British Deputy Consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander in Adana, July 19, 1909.

270 "Redd-i Eracif," *İtidal*, no: 41, 8 May 1325, pp. 1-2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 668-669).

271 BOA, A.VRK, 715/73, From the Ministry of War to Prime Ministry, Translation of the Official Report from British Deputy Consul to Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander in Adana, July 19, 1909.

272 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No: 651-653, From Stephen v. R. Trowbridge to Peet, Adana, (28 April 1909).

was increased."[273] The mob, according to Terzian, willingly setting Armenian buildings alight in front of their eyes: Fires had been set ablaze everywhere and they advanced towards Armenians. The Armenians had two options: either burn alive or be shot by the mob. Some of them, like Terzian and his family, who live near the church made holes in walls and entered the church by passing through one house to another.[274]

Whatever the reason was, Chambers was right in his argument that the firing of shots by a few Armenians on a patrol could not be a "justification for the murderous fusillade by soldiers on all the 2,000 refugees in the school; men, women, and the children alike"[275] Monsheghian School burned down Sunday night. Refugees trying to flee from the burning building were shot down by soldiers.

On Monday night the fires raged and spread. Three large Armenian schools, the Gregorian cathedral, and the large Protestant church were burned.[276] That Monday, with his four soldiers, Wylie went to the American School and to Chambers's house, which was full of refugees. From there, he went to the Government Building. There were a few revolver shots in the streets. He observed that guards from the Second Army were disciplined, and they were doing their jobs well. Wylie took fifty soldiers from the Governor and went to the French Jesuit School. The fire was threatening the school, so he took more than two thousand refugees away from there, with the help of L. Chambers, French priests, and two officers from the Second Army. The French School would burn later. Then, Wylie was invited by regulars to join the search for weapons in the Armenian Church. During the search, well-trained regular soldiers showed great respect to the priests and they found nothing but ten or twelve old weapons. The regulars were behaving well, yet Wylie also notes that there were many mutineers in the streets. It seems that Wylie was disappointed, because for the next day (Tuesday) Trowbridge also

273 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No: 651-653, From Stephen v. R. Trowbridge to Peet, Adana, (28 April 1909).

274 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 42.

275 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No: ?, From L. P. Chambers to Peet, Adana, (4 May 1909).

276 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No: 651-653, From Stephen v. R. Trowbridge to Peet, Adana, (28 April 1909).

notes that the soldiers were still "very anxious about the soldiers in the city because during the day many of them had mutinied and had commenced to plunder": One group had plundered a large number of gold coins from a German flour mill, and that "made the British Consul very much disheartened, because he had been relying on the troops to prevent anarchy."[277] According to Chambers, conflagration continued uninterrupted till that morning. In the end, the Monshegian School, the Lower Gregorian Church, the Jesuit Father's Church and School, the Protestant Church, the Catholic Armenian Church and School, and the Jesuit Sisters' School were destroyed.[278] Most probably after seeing all these, Wylie decided to threaten Cevad Bey with foreign intervention:

> In the Konak there was usual confusion. I told the Vali that if he could not protect foreigners I would telegraph at once for troops, that he must send guards at once to the American Mission, and that I would give him till midday to restore quiet. It seemed to me that this could be done, and by 11 A.M. it was, practically, but there was still plundering, and the fires were terrible.[279]

In the previous evening, captains of foreign warships had met to "concert combined action", and had telegraphed Cevad Bey to warn him, and Esad Rauf Bey, the District Governor of Mersin was told that "if similar troubles occurred at Mersina the commanders of the foreign warships would land sufficient armed men to ensure the safety of their consulates and other foreign property."[280]

The participation of regular reinforcements from the Second Army in the crimes was shocking for many because they were believed to be the saviors of

277 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No: 651-653, From Stephen v. R. Trowbridge to Peet, Adana, (28 April 1909).

278 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No: ?, From L. P. Chambers to Peet, Adana, (4 May 1909).

279 PRO, FO 424/219/17615, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 28 April 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 6 May 1909, No. 85.

280 PRO, FO 424/219/20735, From Captain Thursby to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe, "Swiftsure" at Mersina, 26 April 1909, enclosure in From W. Graham Greene to Foreign Office, Admiralty, 2 June (Red'd 3 June) 1909, No. 117 D.

the new regime. After all, the official discourse was to be that the Action Army, which was formed by battalions from the Second and Third Armies had saved Constitutionalism. Actually, the events in İstanbul show that this official discourse was also fabricated: there are evidence which show that even the Action Army's officers had difficulties in controlling their troops, some of which tended to switch over to the anti-revolutionaries. When the Action Army was at the gates of İstanbul, for example, to prevent an armed conflict, Nazım Paşa, the Commander of Hassa Troops, was saying in the Parliament that:

> How do we know that the coming soldiers will not switch to the side of the rebels when they confront the ones in here? I know the Second Army troops; liberty and constitutionalism mean nothing to them.[281]

And in fact, in his memoirs, Kazım Karabekir notes that he had faced such a danger. Very interestingly, his method of convincing his soldiers was touching upon their anti-Armenian feelings: During the final phase of the operation of the Action Army, on Kazım Karabekir's suggestion, his division occupied Teşvikiye, so that they could block the connection between Yıldız Palace and Taşkışla Barracks. During his observation, a battery commander from the Third Army came to him in a hurry, and said that the situation of his battery was terrible, as Yıldız soldiers had arrived and had sat on the cannons by saying that they were coreligionists: Their shouting; "Allah Akbar" had amazed them, and they had started to talk to and fraternize with each other. The commander worried about them switching sides. According to Karabekir, that could become the start of a crushing defeat. He took the commander and walked to the cannons. Seeing them, some Yıldız soldiers ran upon and surrounded them closely, shouting again that Taşkışla soldiers were also Muslims. In Karabekir's words, he had to speak a "magical" (*tılsımlı*) word to calm them. After saying that they were also Muslims, and made them choose a negotiator, he speaks those magical words:

281 Pekmen, *31 Mart Hatıraları: İsyan Günlerinde Bir Muhalif,* 183.

> By wearing turbans and uniforms, some Armenians have mingled with İstanbul soldiers. To destroy our country by playing off our Army, they have killed many of our officers. Our poor soldiers, have been shaken and believed in the words of those cursed; here among chasseur battalions in Taşkışla, there are many of them. Chasseurs have come and informed us about these. We are skirmishing with the Armenians in Taşkışla. Muslims are coming and uniting with us. And we are making our doctors and hodjas examine them. After understanding whether they are unforeskinned or foreskinned, we admit them. Let me ask you, has a soldier ever killed his officers?[282]

These "magical" words would convince all soldiers: They would accept to send their sergeants for negotiation, and those sergeants would be immediately neutralized when they entered the headquarters.[283]

Knowing the mood of such troops, now we can turn to another explanation of the second massacre, which would be made to Wylie after about ten days: According to this explanation, which was made by some soldiers themselves, two factors led to their confusion, namely, first, their lack of information about the town itself and its people, and second, the provocation that it had been Armenians who had fired upon them:

The freshly arrived "Roumeliots" were pitching tents on their camping ground when shots fell among them from the direction of the Armenian quarter. They were told that these shots were fired by the Armenian revolutionaries. As they had arrived recently, the troops had known nothing about the town and the Armenian quarter. Troops were hurried off into the streets, but all was in confusion and fires were breaking out:

> The soldiers found some of the other soldiers both killing and looting and the place full of Bashi-Bozuks. It became necessary to clear the streets, which was very difficult for them in the bewildering alleys, more especially as they did not know who were friends and who were enemies. In the part of the town they did know order, after the first five

282 Kazım Karabekir, *Hayatım*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008), 271-272.

283 Ibid., 271-272.

> minutes, was strictly maintained and there were no fires. The shots fired at them which started the whole affair are said now by some of the Roumeliots to have been fired by Turks either with the wish to bring about a quarrel between the different sorts of soldiers or to raise more hope to rush the hated Armenian quarter.[284]

So, there is no reason for believing that the Second Army's other battalions in Adana could behave differently than the ones marching to the capital. Contrary to Wylie's trust in the regular troops, given their general mood, the participation of these soldiers, who had lacked information and had been told that Armenians had started the trouble, in the second massacre seems quite a par for the course.

The mood of the regular troops can be observed in the account of Terzian: During their rescue, the regular army officer made a great effort to calm his soldiers. After the officer dispersed the mob and declared that the irregulars were to disperse, he ordered the trumpeter, after whose call about fifty soldiers came. Then:

> The officer ordered the soldiers to fix bayonets and to line up on both sides of the street. The order was immediately obeyed and the officer, coming forward, said encouraging words to them, moving them to pity us and not to deviate from military discipline. He also added that if they deviated from orders, they would face the strictest sanctions. The soldiers, on oath, promised to obey orders to protect our lives.[285]

On their road to the Jesuit church, the mob "showered thousands of insults" and wanted to attack, but the soldiers opposed them by firing their guns. When Terzian asked the officer to save a half-dead woman on the road, he ordered them to hurry as fast as they could, "frightened that his soldiers' mood would change".[286] In addition, Trowbridge's witnessing shows that even the

284 PRO, PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 7 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

285 Hagop Terzian, *Cilicia 1909 The Massacre of Armenians*, 45-47.

286 Ibid., 47-48.

celebrations for Mehmed V's accession to the throne were going to lead to a new massacre on that Tuesday evening:

> But just toward evening the news of the accession of the new sultan arrived from Constantinople. A weird kind of rejoicing began in the city, with a discharge of cannon from the barracks. This was answered by a general fusillade all over the city, lasting for over an hour. A fierce effort was made by some of the Turkish citizens and soldiery to get at the Armenian refugees and shoot them down, but the officers worked hard by bugle calls and rapid patrols to turn the excited emotions of the people into a harmless celebration. [287]

In short, although there are claims that the regular troops were not involved in the mass killings, the limited evidence and supporting cases show that most probably at least some of them participated. Yet given that the officers could barely control their soldiers, this had little to do with the intentions of officers. So, most probably, the central branch of the CUP had almost no role in the massacre.

§ 2.5 Conclusion

To analyze different interpretations of the Massacres of 1909, observing the two massacres within the Adana town center was crucial. This chapter was an attempt to present background and narrate the events that occurred during the two massacres within Adana town. Because this chapter was mostly about detecting the events themselves, here, in conclusion, I prefer to be less assertive, and the arguments are mostly estimations regarding the happenings. On certain occasions, I referred to the incidents in the hinterlands: By pointing to some parallelisms between the events in Adana and the towns of the hinterlands, I tried to show the need to observe them in detail.

In the sixth and especially the seventh chapters, we will see that just like the arguments within the historiography of the Massacres, the question of

287 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 665, No: 651-653, From Stephen v. R. Trowbridge to Peet, Adana, (28 April 1909).

perpetration was at the center of different interpretations of the Massacres. Because of this reason, I tried to present some clues about certain persons who were blamed for plotting the events. Each observed person was representing different social groups. They were Bağdadizade Abdülkadir Efendi, a notable who was a symbol of despotism and reaction for the Armenian public; İhsan Fikri Efendi, the head of the CUP Branch, whose participation in the conflict was the sign of Unionists' "real" intentions; Cevad Bey, the Governor, who was another symbol of the involvement of the state; and Moushegh Seropian, who was seen as a separatist revolutionary that attempted to establish an Armenian state. In fact, none of these persons' actions fit into their accusers' portrayals: Bağdadizade Abdülkadir did not benefit from the despotic old regime, as he was harassed and sent to exile by Bahri Paşa, the last governor of the Hamidian regime. Also, at the beginning of the new regime, he joined the post-revolutionary activities, showing his intention to take part in the new power bloc –and it seems that he was very successful in doing so. İhsan Fikri Efendi was not a typical Unionist that suffered under the old regime: Although he had been sent into exile once, he was able to take part in the Hamidian bureaucracy. Also, until the First Massacre, in many cases, he gave his support to local Armenians in his newspaper–at least he did not favor the opposing side. Cevad Bey's relations with Seropian were certainly tense, yet the accounts of the foreigners show that he was not determined to take action against Armenians. Rather, he was targeted by the Muslims just before the eruption of the first massacre, and he was sincerely scared to death. Seropian's attitude was irritating not only for the Muslims but also for the missionaries and diplomats, yet he was not "so revolutionary" in two senses: First, like İhsan Fikri Efendi, he could have adapted to the despotic regime too –perhaps more than İhsan Fikri Efendi, as he was still defending Bahri Paşa even after the Massacres, a time when the ex-Governor had been a scapegoat for a long time. Second, Seropian was from the right-wing of the Armenian political organizations –the liberal- Ramgavar Party, whose Ottomanism was irritating for Hnchaks. If nobody was fitting into any models of explanation, how can we explain the whole story? To solve this problem, I will observe the events in the hinterlands in the following chapters to rethink the patterns of behavior during the period, and then at the final part, I will return to the post-massacre

discourses, and I will defend that they were shaped by a mixture of sincere misreading, local struggles, and political motivations both at the capital and the regions, which were also shaped by negotiations and pressures of different social and political groups.

Although it was mainly a narration, this chapter had some fragments of explanations, some of which were made thanks to the observation of the hinterlands. One of them was regarding the intention of one accused figure, Bağdadizade Abdülkadir. At the beginning of the chapter, an informer report written by him and his son was enlightening in many senses: First, it showed the serious competition between Muslim and Armenian notables long before the Massacres. More importantly, their accusations showed that they were portraying the Armenian notables as plotters against the state. The claims were very similar to the ones made by denialist historiography, which shows that they were not later state productions: On the contrary, they were "organic" and developed by the notables even before the appearance of Armenian political activities in the Empire. Whether this notable family was sincerely believing in Armenian plots or only producing such ideas for their advantage was not very obvious, yet at least I can say that they were existent long before the Massacres, and it was highly probable that they were to be used again during the first months of Young Turk period.

When he tries to underline the importance of ending the distinction between structure and event, Sahlins defends that "an event is not just a happening in the world; it is a relation between a certain happening and a given symbolic system."[288] The murder of Muslims by an Armenian just before the Massacre was a perfect example to this: A simple murder, which could be seen as an ordinary crime before, triggered the Massacre. The murder's timing was a complete coincidence. Contrary to the dominant contemporary belief, it had nothing to do with a "Hamidian plot" of the 31 March Incident. In fact, what the two events share in common was being two forms of anti-revolutionary movements of the Muslim crowd. These protests show a second explanation of the mood of the Muslim masses. Examples from the next chapter will show that during the period after the Revolution, many Muslims started, or continued to believe that Armenians would cause serious security

288 Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 153.

problems or even a rebellion. This murder was, in their eyes, proof. They heavily protested, even threatened Governor Cevad Bey. In this sense, the anti-Armenian Muslim crowd action was both a threat and an opportunity to shift the balance of power by local Unionists. The crowd action forced the governor, who already had serious problems with some Armenian notables, and he let things evolve. During the following chapters, we will detect similar crowd actions that caused Hayri Bey's death in Maraş, that seriously threatened Cemal Bey in Kayseri, that pacified, even terrified the seemingly powerful Antakya gentry. In this sense, unlike Kayseri, where the Governor (Mehmed Tevfik [Biren]), military commander of the regular battalion, and district governor Cemal Bey could successfully negotiate with the local Armenian political elite; in Adana, there were no moderates to negotiate and collaborate with Armenian self-defendants. Although denialist historiography tends to underline the radicalism of Armenians through Adana Prelate Moushegh Seropian's actions, which surely did exist, that was not peculiar to Adana: We will also observe that prelates in Kayseri, Maraş, and Zeytun were also complained about by Muslim officials. A brief look at the Muslim Armenian relations seems to be enough to argue that the background of the great Muslim resentment had a lot to do with economic factors, because the economic competition appears to have been more intense after the revolution at almost all class levels, from large estate owners to the seasonal workers. Nevertheless, the sudden changes in other spheres seem to have explanatory power too. The appearance of new symbols, new political parties, new discourses, new attitudes led to a richer, more radical, armed, organized, and confident Armenian image for many Muslims, some of whom had already been thinking that they should have been taught a lesson.

A third explanation was about the position of the local bureaucracy. Very surprisingly, the massacres started with several Muslims' protests, complaining that they were not protected from Armenians. We have to note that another reason for the Adana Massacre can be the very lack of serious threats that Kayseri and Maraş had faced during winter: In the following chapter, we will observe that in Kayseri, after the first tension in winter, regular troops were sent to the town, and the officials should have been more alerted. And in the chapter that follows, we will observe that the tension was resolved

by calling off the district governor and leaving the offenders unpunished in Maraş. So, when the news of the Massacre in Adana was received in those towns, the officials could deal with the situation in Kayseri, and already satisfied with the government's passive response, only a small number of killings occurred in Maraş. Adana and Antakya, on the other hand, were two towns where the state and the Armenians did not face such a massive challenge. Maybe that was why the Adana Governorate's demands for improving security had been ignored by the government.

A fourth explanation revolves around the immediate Armenian response to the killing attempts. In the sixth chapter, we will see that there was no Armenian resistance in the Antakya Massacre, a fact which was admitted by the Aleppo Governorate itself. However, in Adana, there was relatively successful self-defense by Armenian revolutionaries, which was a very critical factor in understanding the legitimization of Muslim assaults, uniting the local Muslims, and causing the even more brutal Second Massacre. Armenians' relatively well-organized resistance was spun and presented as the proof of their separatist-revolutionary plots, whether sincerely or instrumentally. The show of self-defense not only united the Muslim community, whose first failed attempt within the town was a spontaneous reaction. It also should have forced them to be better organized during the ceasefire. Although the Second Massacre is a blind spot for researchers, the limited signs point to the possibility of Muslim notables' provocation. However, the newly arrived regulars did not prevent the Second Massacre. On the contrary, a limited number of them even joined the attackers, who caused a terrible bloodbath within the town.

A fifth explanation regards the competition among the Muslims, a fact which was underlined by many without explaining its role in the Massacres. This explanation will be made in the following pages –by observing the hinterlands, I will defend that Armenian-Muslim relations were part of local struggles in some cases, and the rivals' attempt of benefiting from the changing conjuncture had some side-effects of its own. Here in this chapter, I confined my work to arguing that in Adana the struggle could have been more serious because the power vacuum left by Bahri Paşa after the revolution was greater than in any other region. His exceptionally long office, his relatively

warmer relations with some Armenians, and his suppressing of all local notables seem to be important peculiarities. What seems most important is his shadow over the post-revolutionary struggles among the notables: The more powerful the predecessors are, the greater the following power vacuum will be. And greater power vacuums lead to more serious struggles. In Adana, an older generation of notables, who had once been suppressed by Bahri Paşa, appeared as the ones in control. That was not acceptable for the younger Unionists, whose attempts to gain power within the local bureaucracy failed in time. Although they wrote very positive articles about Armenian revolutionaries, and although they persistently advised strong and close relations with Armenians, their obsession with the governor, who was a puppet of their rivals in their eyes, reached such a level that they were ready to take advantage of anything that could topple him down. So, when the opportunity came with the Muslim crowd's protests about the governor's failure to capture an Armenian murderer, they quickly took part in those protests, which turned into an anti-Armenian riot. In this sense, these local Unionists were not men of principles when it came to Armenian rights: They quickly abandoned their refutations of an Armenian plot, which was rumored for a very long time. We will observe that some other figures faced a similar problem in the hinterlands, and their choices were different from that of the Unionists of Adana. In the last chapter, we will observe the changing attitudes of Unionists stationed at the center of national politics, and notice that there was a serious difference between the local branch and the party headquarters –yet only for the time being. This whole story shows that "Armenian Questions" at each local level were a part of all kinds of power struggles, affecting each other, having different peculiarities and similarities.

The second and fifth explanations –the different aspects of Muslim-Armenian relations and the Armenian question being part of power struggles in general- point to the need to develop a holistic approach in dealing with the subject. In the following chapters, I try to observe the events that occurred between the revolution and the massacres in some towns of the hinterlands by adhering to such an approach. Each story confirms the necessity to keep a holistic approach, as each shows several aspects of different "spheres" that were highly interrelated to the interpretation of the new regime's principles

concerning the rights and liberties of Ottoman Armenians in the Young Turk era.

3

Kayseri

> *…artık mutaasıbin ve avam-ger mutasarrıfı katletmekle de müteselli olmayacak bir raddeye geldiği gibi Ermeniler hakkında da ötedenberi mevcud olan adaveti arttırırlar.*[1]
>
> –BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 9a, the report of major Hamid Zafer Bey: The Reasons of the Kayseri Incident.

In the winter of 1908-1909, the ethnoreligious tension in Kayseri was considerable: There had been ongoing attacks on Armenians since the post-revolutionary demonstrations in mid-June. Although the number of these attacks seems to have decreased after the end of these demonstrations, they became more frequent during the fall. Soon, it came to such a level that the Muslim crowd attacked Cemal Bey, the district governor of Kayseri, on the grounds that he had been favoring Armenians, who had been preparing for revolt. According to some local Armenians, a massacre was imminent. In spite of the attack, no lives were lost, and Cemal Bey stayed in office. The

1 *…the anger of religious fanatics and the rabble boiled to such a degree that they would not have been calmed down even by killing the district governor, and the hostility towards Armenians which had existed all along, had become activated.*

central government decided to send regular troops to Kayseri to prevent serious incidents, and ordered their commander, Major Hamid Zafer Bey, to conduct an investigation. Above, we see a quote from his report, which will be presented in the following pages in detail. We will see that according to the commander, some notables decided to get rid of Cemal Bey, and to do so, they settled up a plan which was based on anti-Armenian agitation.

In the report of the commander, there is an important yet neglected factor: Although the hatred of Armenians appears as an instrument, the commander does not state a concrete, underlying reason for the conflict between the notables and the district governor. In the following chapters, we will observe that in Maraş, Antakya, and Adana, ethnoreligious hatred was also considered as instrumental, yet the claimants always presented a "real" reason for the incidents. So far, I do not observe any explanations in Kayseri in the documents. So, the critique of this instrumental reasoning will be left to the following chapter on Maraş. Yet in this chapter, I start to question this reasoning by pointing to a very interesting fact which was mentioned in the quote above: In all three states of turmoil in Kayseri, (the post-revolutionary demonstrations, and two waves of mass protests and attacks on Cemal Bey in winter and during the Massacres of 1909) both local Armenians and government officials were targeted simultaneously. Plus, in the last two of them, the officials and local Armenians were targeted by very similar agents, who complained about an alliance between the two. In this chapter, I try to focus on the relation between the attacks on the local governments and the threats against Armenians. I try to reveal the first two layers of reaction to the new regime, which were defined as absorption and anti-revolution in the introduction. While doing this, I also try to observe the role of the hatred against Armenians beneath each layer of reaction.

During this part, both layers will be observed in the three movements in Kayseri. First, there were attempts to halt the post-revolutionary demonstrations that demanded the implementation of constitutionalism. Even at the first phase of the reactionary resistance, exploiting the already existing public hatred against the non-Muslims can be observed not only during mass movements but also in the complaints to the central government. Yet the supporters of the new rule, under the leadership of the commander,

Hulki Paşa, who also collaborated with Dırtad Efendi, the Prelate, were able to eliminate some infamous figures of the old regime by arresting them. Seeing their failure in using force, the reactionaries tried their chance in applying the central government, passing from anti-revolution to absorption by trying to the challenging movement as illegal. They did this by bringing forward his collaboration with local Armenians. They succeeded to eliminate the movement's leader, Hulki Paşa by making the government dismiss him. However, the newly appointed district governor, Cemal [Keşmir] Bey would continue in displeasing the reactionary Muslim elites. Although he was criticizing some Armenians' push for liberty for being too radical, Cemal Bey was defending their newly obtained basic rights. This was sufficient for the reactionary forces to present him as collaborating with Armenians in a plot against them. Seeing that he would not show consent to their demands, the Muslim mob in the town passed to the anti-revolutionary mode, attacking Cemal Bey twice, first in the winter of 1908-1909 and second, in the counterrevolution of April 1909.

Both of these attempts also show the relationship between reactionary politics and Armenophobic hatred at the local level. Local Armenians also thought that these movements were massacre attempts: They retreated to their houses and expressed their fear from a massacre in their telegrams. They were not exaggerating, as the Muslim mob justified their attacks on Cemal Bey on the grounds that he was a giaour who was collaborating with Armenians in their secret plot to massacre the Muslims. This chapter mainly dwells on these movements' stories which allow us to comment on two histories which are first, of the Young Turk Revolution and second, of the Ottoman Armenians. Our story starts with the aftermath of July 1908 and ends with the dismissal of the district governor, which is a true sign of how forces of the anti-revolution could resist, adapt and survive under new conditions.

Above, I mentioned that the commander points to an activation of the hatred, which existed all along, by some notables. These words imply that the common people were passive instruments. This was typical for most of the interpreters of the events and principles of the new regime. Throughout the following chapters, we will observe that many supporters of the new regime, who worried about a counterrevolution, were heavily influenced by this way

of thinking: Especially in the Armenian public opinion, there was a widely popular discourse which implies this instrumentality: In the provinces, some beneficiaries of the new regime started their preparations for a plot that would lead to the restoration of the old regime and provoking the Muslim community into attacks against Armenians. These plots resulted on the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909. However, in the first part of the previous chapter, we saw that even the most forthcoming figures, who were thought to have followed this strategy (Bağdadizade family, Prelate Seropian, or İhsan Fikri), did not fit into such models in reality. Some signs also point to such inconsistencies in Kayseri too. For example, some Muslim notables, who had taken part in the revolutionary committee in Kayseri would participate in the following incidents, which were thought to have been counterrevolutionary. In this sense, it seems that we have to tackle the problem of agency. In this sense, the second theme of this chapter will be concerning the confrontation between moderate admirers of the new regime and the Armenian radical interpretation. We will observe that while he was always sympathetic to Armenians, Cemal Bey, the district governor, criticized and complained about the local Armenians' changed attitudes after the revolution, finding them too radical and provocative. This may seem odd at first look. However, similar reactions from a different group of moderates, the missionaries, will show that the newly emerged Armenian agency after the revolution was irritating even for such figures. I believe that this fact forces us to reconsider the difference between the two groups' interpretations of the new principles, together with the reflection of these differences to their daily relations. Pointing to the tensions between relatively moderate liberals and Armenian radicalism will give us an idea about the more intolerant and even threatening reactions of reactionary local Muslim elements.

§ 3.1 Background

Located between Cappadocia and Cilicia, Kayseri has always been a significant urban center in Asia Minor. As an early center of Christianity, the town was an important intellectual and theological center in the fourth

century.[2] Under Byzantine rule, Kayseri was part of the Anatolic and Armeniac "themes". Armenian presence around the town grew in the eleventh century, leading to an establishment of a prelacy of the Armenian Church.[3] During the last five centuries, the town was under Ottoman rule. It was part of the Karaman province during Mahmud II's reign. During the first years of the Tanzimat period, Kayseri became a sub-province of the Bozok province before finally, in 1867, becoming a district of the Ankara province, making Ankara governors superiors of Kayseri district governors.[4]

Hovannisian believes that Armenians' demographic strength declined under Ottoman rule. However, it seems that during the late Ottoman rule, Armenians partially regained their lost strength. While the rate of Christians in the town was 21.9% in 1584, by 1902 this had increased to 36,8%. By 1908, among the 54,011 inhabitants, 34,704 people were Muslims, whereas 19,307 people were Christians.[5] Matossian underlines several factors that affected these changes during the nineteenth century: Caucasian immigration, natural disasters like earthquakes, famine, cholera epidemics; urbanization, and economic factors. He argues that there was a gradual rise in the Armenian population in the nineteenth century, yet a slight decline occurred in the last two decades. For him, Hamidian massacres could have played a role in this.[6]

During the nineteenth century, Ottoman non-Muslims surpassed their Muslim counterparts in many aspects of economic life and Kayseri presented no exception. For example, in 1824, William Martin Leake was writing about relatively good relations among all Kayserian merchants and shopkeepers: They all visited each other and hired each other's sons as apprentices at that

2 Richard G. Hovannisian, "Armenian Caesarea/Kesaria" in *Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri and Cappadocia*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2013), 2.

3 Ibid., 3.

4 Hasan Duman (Ed.), Osmanlı Yıllıkları, Salnameler ve Nevsaller, (İstanbul : İslâm Konferansı Teşkilâtı, İslam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültürü Araştırma Merkezi (IRCICA), 1982), 115.

5 Hovannisian, "Armenian Caesarea/Kesaria", 3; Kemal Demir & Suat Çabuk, *Türk Dönemi Kayseri Kenti ve Mahalleleri*, (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları no: 188, Kayseri), 126.

6 Bedross Der Matossian, "Ottoman Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri in the Nineteenth Century", in *Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri and Cappadocia,* ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2013), 193.

time.[7] However, with the Tanzimat period, Armenians and Greeks started to dominate the town's commercial life. By 1872, among 2,900 shops in Kayseri, 1,200 belonged to Armenians and Greeks. At that year, there were 2,336 households in the town. This shows that more than a half of the Christian households owned a business.[8] Among them, Armenians controlled many marketplaces, from which they were exporting pastrami, fermented sausage (*sucuk)*, cotton, wool, leather, carpets, bronzeware, wheat, barley, dry fruits, seeds, and yellow berries; while importing clothes, woolens, metals, cigarettes, sugar, coffee, oil, and various Western products. Moreover, they manufactured several products, including silks, carpets, muslins, and drapery. They were master goldsmiths, butchers, tailors, carpenters, and drapers. Furthermore, they were prevalent in many professions, as acting doctors, dentists, pharmacists, architects, painters, poets, and musicians.[9]

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Kayseri was the scene of many ethnic tensions between Muslims and Armenians. Armenian opposition in Kayseri gained momentum with the establishment of the Hnchakian Party in 1885.[10] Together with Merzifon, Yozgat, Çorum, Amasya, Develi, Boğazlıyan, Aziziye, Talas, and several other towns, Kayseri became one of the initial bases of Armenian opposition movements at the end of the 19th century. These movements came into view through Hnchakist placards, which appeared simultaneously in these towns on 6 January 1893, which is Christmas Day in the Julian calendar.[11] It seems that the placards had been

7 William Martin Leake, *A tour in Asia Minor, With Comparative Remarks on the Ancient and Modern Geography of that Country*, (London: 1824), 105-106; Kemal Demir & Suat Çabuk, *Türk Dönemi Kayseri Kenti ve Mahalleleri*, 167.

8 Kemal Demir & Suat Çabuk, *Türk Dönemi Kayseri Kenti ve Mahalleleri*, 168.

9 Bedross Der Matossian, "Ottoman Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri in the Nineteenth Century," 198-200.

10 Ibid., 203.

11 Ahmet Kolbaşı, *1892-1893 Ermeni Yafta Olayları (Merzifon-Yozgat-Kayseri)*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2011), 258.

centrally distributed from the party branch in Merzifon, the site of the Hnchakists' first recorded secret meeting in September 1892.[12]

Six placards were seen in Kayseri.[13] As Toygun Altıntaş reveals, the events in the Kayseri district were important, as they were signaling the mob's entry into the field as a new dynamic in the Armenian question: The ordinary people not only started to join in the suppression but they also took part in the seizure of property and physical violence. This "laid bare the security-minded priorities of the Hamidian state to the Muslim population and did not hesitate to integrate them into mechanisms of surveillance, suppression, and terrorization" which would escalate tensions between Muslim and Armenian communities.[14] Although some officials tried to limit mob violence, the government showed no intention to punish offenders. It seems that the mob was even allowed to fully go out of control: In reaction to a murdered Muslim, peasants and people from Kayseri destroyed Armenian orchards, burned several buildings, and simply dispersed after the arrival of gendarmes. In response, the government merely ordered officials to meet with notables to promise that the revolutionaries would be punished and to counsel them to avoid vengeful attacks and obey the officials.[15]

These measures did not produce peace. Over months, Hamidian Massacres would spread to many parts of Anatolia, including Kayseri. Tension rose in the fall of 1895 and a massacre occurred on 30 November 1895. Although Armenians put up self-defense, several hundred of them were slaughtered by Muslims who were supported by gendarmes. Yet compared with other towns, Kayserian Armenians suffered little. Despite the new district governor's efforts, the situation was still tense in March: many Christian shopkeepers kept their shops closed for a while longer.[16]

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12 Toygun Altıntaş, "The Placard Affair and the Ankara Trial: The Hnchak Party and the Hamidian Regime in Central Anatolia, 1892–93," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 4, no. 2 (November 2017): 317.

13 Kolbaşı, *1892-93 Ermeni Yafta Olayları*, 314.

14 Altıntaş, "The Placard Affair and the Ankara Trial", 326.

15 Ibid., 327.

16 Matossian, "Ottoman Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri in the Nineteenth Century," 205-207.

§ 3.2 Post-Revolutionary Demonstrations and Their Aftermath

As provincial archives of Anatolian cities are mostly absent, correspondence between the provincial bureaucracy and the central government comes forward as the most important primary source for historians dealing with provincial history. However, because of the post-revolutionary turmoil, the correspondence in the late summer of 1908 was very limited. The archival documents from that period are rare. We are provided with only a little information about what exactly happened in the provinces at that time.[17] Therefore, historians must rely on the newspapers and memoirs to detect the post-revolutionary events. Yet once the first events were over, the provincial bureaucracy once again started to communicate with the central government. These archival documents written between late 1908 and late 1909 include some important details.

Only two letters written to the national newspapers and Ahmet Hilmi's [Kalaç][18] memoirs provide information about Kayserians' immediate reaction to the Young Turk Revolution. One of these letters, written to İkdam, and the memoir are presented first by Emiroğlu in his work.[19] The letter is written by an anonymous firsthand eyewitness, while the memoir's author, Ahmet Hilmi shares his much later observations as he visited the town in the aftermath of the events. The second letter was written to the CUP Headquarters and published in Tanîn on 17 August.[20]

The anonymous writer of the letter to İkdam point to some local Muslims' efforts to prevent post-revolutionary celebrations: According to the letter, the

17 In this sense, Kudret Emiroğlu's famous work, "Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri" is an invaluable collection of the information on the post-revolutionary events throughout the region. See, Kudret Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri: II. Meşrutiyet'in İlanı,* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1999).

18 Born in 1887 in Kayseri, Ahmet Hilmi [Kalaç] was a Unionist bureaucrat. After his services in the bureaucracy, he attended the famous Sivas Congress as the deputy of Kayseri in 1919. He was elected not only to the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies but also to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for seven times, all as the deputy of Kayseri.

19 Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri*, 179-183.

20 "Kayseri Vakası," *Tanin*, no. 3, 17 August 1324, p. 3.

district governor of the town Ahmed Arifî Bey did not organize an official celebration of the proclamation of liberty: After a while, on 19 July, some army officers brought their banners, assembled in the marketplace, and prayed there as a celebration. Local Armenians followed the officers, by going through a ritual at their church. A group of people went to the government house and proclaimed liberty openly. This forced the district governor Arifî Bey to participate in the celebrations. Two Muslim "lads" (*delikanlılar*) could not stand these celebrations, as it was dominated by Armenians: They wounded two Armenians with their daggers and revolvers.[21]

The letter also notes that after celebrations, the crowd mobilized and raided the Government Office twice more. The first wave of attacks came on 25 July: A group of Muslim and Armenian people assembled in a mosque and demanded the recall of some officials from office. That day, about three thousand people assembled in front of the Government House. Their primary target was Hafızağazade Şeyh İbrahim, the deputy mayor and the most hated person at that time. This is followed by the events on 28 July: the commander of the Kayseri reserve regiment, Mehmed Hulki Paşa, told the crowd that there is a rumor of a peasant attack on the town. The reason for the attack was common criminals' not benefiting from the amnesty. The commander prevented a prison rebellion and organized patrols to reduce the panic. At that time, people were fleeing and closing their shops. Paşa arrested Şeyh İbrahim, his son in law, and an officer. The two lads that injured Armenians apologized for their assault and were forgiven by the Armenians. After two days, on 30 July, they were brought to the Army Headquarters. Paşa negotiated with the Armenian Prelate, the district governor, and the local elites, and decided to jail İbrahim.[22] In a fateful turn of events, the health of the district governor Ahmed Arifî Bey deteriorated in the evening and later passed away.[23] For many, the reason for his death was the stress of the events.

According to another letter written to the Unionists, it was the district governor who had provoked peasants from Havil Village. These peasants were known for their bigotry and ignorance. The author of the letter claims that he

21 Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri*, 179.

22 Ibid., 179-180.

23 BOA, DH.MKT, 1280/85, 1a, From Reşid Bey to the Ministry of Interior, 31 July 1324.

provoked the peasants by saying that "Armenians will be given an autonomous state" (*Ermenilere beylik verilecekmiş*). The ignorant masses had rushed into the town, hoping for looting. The Armenian community had feared a massacre. Yet after one or two days, the newspapers had arrived from İstanbul, and the situation had been clarified. Muslim and Armenian people had united and demolished the government building. The district governor had died of fear. The Young Turk Committee and some Armenian persons had been directing the people. These revolutionary people (*erbab-ı inkılab*) had formed a temporary administration. One thousand and five hundred people had become members of the CUP, and among them, forty persons had been elected as the administrators. Half of them were Muslims and half of them were Armenians, and they were given the task of providing security, punishing the ones who caused the revolt, and finally, working for the appointments of new officials and the election of a mayor and MPs.[24]

Following all those events, Ahmet Hilmi visited his hometown in September. In his memoirs, he shares his observation that how continuity and change had gone hand in hand. On one hand, many old local officials were gone. On the other hand, certain persons who had been pursuing their interests in the old times had quickly adapted to the new situation. Who the Unionists were was not known at that time. Only certain army officers were claiming to represent the new regime.[25]

To pursue a brief analysis about this first struggle, it can be argued that although both letters and the memoir were surely written from the demonstrators' perspective, they enable us to present an introduction about the process. First of all, they show that the news of the Revolution led to a division among the locals. One group, what we will call the forces of anti-revolution, tried to avoid reflections of the regime change on to the local scene, and the other group, the challengers, pushed for a change in the balance of power. The social composition of the two blocs seems to be typical at first sight: The anti-revolution bloc seems to consist of a majority of the Muslim notables, while the challengers seem to consist of some army officers and non-Muslims, particularly Armenians.

24 "Kayseri Vakası," *Tanin*, no. 3, 17 August 1324, p. 3.

25 Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri*, 180-181.

Second, even the very news about the regime change, let alone the Armenian jubilation, or the soon to be changing conditions of "liberty", was confronted with a resistance of Muslim mobs. Moreover, the attacks by some "lads" against Armenians, and peasants' rumors about an autonomous Armenian state show that some ordinary Muslims immediately associated the new regime with Armenians: In the following chapters, we will observe countless examples to this tendency: Some examples will show how this tendency was used by the elites, and some will reveal how this same tendency could get out of their control. The last conclusion is about the top officials' situations. Arifî Bey's mysterious death was not an exception in the region. By saying this, I do not only mean the attacks on the officials during the joy of liberation. These attacks went on until the end of 1909, and in most cases that will be summarized in the future pages, they were not seen as revolutionary as the ones in July 1908. Moreover, very interestingly, in most of them, ethnic tensions went hand in hand with those threats.

Ottoman Archival documents on events after that moment start to provide some information about the struggle between the two groups in Kayseri. The first observable move is that of the challengers: Just on the day after the district governor's death, the Ankara Governorate received a telegram which was signed by the "Ottoman Community of Union and Progress, Kayseri branch". Writers of the telegram demanded the office of the deputy district governorship be given to Kamil Bey, the previous district governor of Amasya, who had once served in Kayseri. The demand was ignored, as the government had already given this office to the deputy Muslim judge.[26] Most probably, this was sent by some challengers in the town. Their leader in Kayseri seems to be Brigadier General Hulki Paşa, the Commander of the Seventh Reserve Division in Kayseri. His immediate acts show that after learning about the revolution, he started to take the town's administration into his committee's hands. Above, we saw that after the conflicting mobilizations, he had succeeded in doing so.

Yet soon his de facto control met with a new kind of resistance. His opponents at this time started to target Hulki Paşa himself by complaining about him in their telegrams to Ankara and İstanbul. The first sign of this is a

26 BOA, DH.MKT, 1280/85, 2a, From Reşid Bey to the Ministry of Interior, July 31, 1324.

telegram sent by the acting district governor (the deputy Muslim judge) to the Ankara Governorate. In this telegram, he complained about Hulki Paşa and Drtad Efendi, (Drtad Balian, or Trdat Palian), Armenian Prelate of Kayseri. According to the deputy district governor, Hulki Paşa end Drtad Efendi together formed a "Committee of Union". This Committee, which had forty members, often demanded officials' previous salaries and people's taxes, whose payment time had not even come. The acting district governor for the immediate arrival of the newly installed district governor for the sake of controlling Kayseri.[27] The Ministry of Interior wanted the Ministry of War to perform the necessary actions.[28] In his reply to the Ministry of War, Hulki Paşa did not deny his actions, writing that he was practicing "active tutelage" (*vesaya-yı müessire*).[29]

Simultaneously with the deputy district governor, Şeyh İbrahim, the arrested old deputy mayor, and one of the primary targets of the challengers, began sending telegrams full of complaints to the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Ministry. Although he was a beneficiary of the Hamidian Ancien Regime, İbrahim was aware that the post-revolutionary government would pay attention to arbitrary actions which were against the rule of law –one important complaint before the revolution was this very tendency. In his several telegrams to İstanbul, he underlined the arbitrariness in Kayseri by using post-revolutionary vocabulary. In the following chapters, we will observe that despite their various motivations, in nearly all cases, all agents in any kind of political polemics made strong references to Constitutionalism. İbrahim's response is the first example of the tendency. According to Şeyh İbrahim and his son Hüsnü, Hulki Paşa had harbored ill will against them for a long time. Just after the revolution, he had arrested him arbitrarily. Moreover, Hulki Paşa was liaising with the Armenian Prelate and trying to extend their custody. This was the reason for several accusations against him.

27 BOA, DH.MKT, 1289/97, 1a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 8, 1324.

28 BOA, DH.MKT, 1289/97, 2b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, August 24, 1324.

29 BOA, DH.MKT, 2615/15, 1a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, September 2, 1324.

The deputy public prosecutor, Âşir Bey, demanded to submit them to the court, but this legal demand was ignored by Hulki Paşa.[30] In another telegram, İbrahim claimed that in accordance with the Armenian Prelate's purpose, Hulki Paşa arbitrarily released some detainees who were accused of murder. He repeated the acting district governor's claim about the Union Committee of the commander. There were rumors that its members prepared an arrest warrant the date of which was illegally set to be written long before. According to İbrahim, all these actions meant that in Kayseri, there was a government within a government, making one recall the time of janissaries.[31] After three days, along with his son in law Hilmi, he also applied to the Council of Ministers. The two repeated the same complaints and added that a branch of the "Committee of Ottoman Union" did not exist in Kayseri. In other words, they implied that Hulki Paşa's Union Committee had no relations with the headquarters of the CUP in Salonica. In addition, they reminded that both the central government and the CUP's headquarters prohibited any interferences in local governments.[32] After two weeks, Hulki Paşa was also complained by the deputy public prosecutor (*müddei-i umumi vekili*) Âşir Efendi to the Ministry of Interior for being ignorant.[33]

Within the same weeks, both Hulki Paşa's and Şeyh İbrahim's supporters began to send telegrams to İstanbul. When the Ministry of Interior ordered the Ankara Governorate to investigate the clash, the Governor took İbrahim's side: It responded that Hulki Paşa's interferences were ongoing and asked for his recall.[34] A week later, the deputy public prosecutor Âşir Bey wrote about Hulki Paşa's committee again: he mentioned imprisonment of Şeyh İbrahim

30 BOA, BEO, 3400/254978, 2a, From Hafızağazade İbrahim and Hüsnü to Prime Ministry, September 4, 1324; BOA, BEO, 3400/254978, 1a, From Prime Ministry to Ankara Governorate.

31 BOA, DH.MKT, 1298/20, 2a, From Hafızağazade İbrahim to the Ministry of Interior, September 4, 1324.

32 BOA, DH.MKT, 2615/15, 2a, From Hafızağazade İbrahim and Hilmi to the Council of Ministers, September 7, 1324.

33 BOA, DH.MKT, 1298/20, 1a, From Hafızağazade İbrahim and Hilmi to the Ministry of Interior, September 24, 1324.

34 BOA, DH.MKT, 2623/19, 1c, September 8, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2623/19, 4a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, September 1, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2623/29, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, September 22, 1324.

and Hilmi, and the Paşa's attempt to claim their ten years' salary again. He had tried to release İbrahim yet could not succeed. By then, the routine investigation was in process. The wording of the deputy public prosecutor in this reply merits attention: Âşir Bey did not hesitate to note that those who complained about Şeyh İbrahim's possible release were from "one specific nation" (*belli bir kavimden*). Together with the implications made by İbrahim, these words show that post-revolutionary clashes among the elites also had an ethnic dimension. Second, this vocabulary reveals that even within the recent post-revolutionary atmosphere, a government official thought that such a way of discrediting one specific group of people could affect the center's decisions.[35]

Following those complaints, the deputy district governor launched an investigation.[36] After about two weeks, Ankara Governorate repeated the claim that Hulki Paşa had established a committee and an arbitrary local government, which resulted in many disputes, and suggested that the Ministry of Interior demand his dismissal from the Ministry of War. In his same ciphered telegram, the Governor also claimed that the Armenian Prelate in Kayseri was an immoral man and he did not have good intentions.[37] As most probably it was the locals who were informing the Governor about the Prelate, this must be taken as an important fact regarding the whole hinterland of The Massacres of 1909: After the Massacres, Moushegh Seropian, the Prelate of Adana would be put on trial as the greatest scapegoat, blamed for triggering the events by preaching in an extremely enthusiastic way. Here in Kayseri, we observe the first signs of a similar clash, which will also be seen in Maraş and in Zeytun.

The Ministry of Interior accepted the Governorate's offer and openly demanded Paşa's dismissal from the Ministry of War.[38] But in its first reply,

35 BOA, DH.MKT, 2623/19, 2a, From the Governorate of Ankara to the Ministry of Interior, the copy from the Deputy Public Prosecutor, October 1, 1324.

36 BOA, DH.MKT, 2631/23, 1b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, October 2, 1324.

37 BOA, DH.MKT, 2643/59, 2a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, October 16, 1324.

38 BOA, DH.MKT, 2643/59, 3a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, October 19, 1324.

the Ministry of War refused this demand by citing Hulki Paşa's claims: Paşa had written that Şeyh İbrahim had been a man of despotism. His arrest had been demanded by all people. He had been released a few days later. Paşa wrote that he had taken no money from İbrahim. In fact, he had "donated" two hundred liras for the upcoming School of Industry *(Sanayi Mektebi)*. Hulki Paşa also implied that his action was in favor of the CUP: The school was being established by a lieutenant who was sent from Salonica by the Committee.[39] The Ministry of Interior informed Ankara about the situation:[40] Hulki Paşa was not dismissed for that time, yet it seems that his power in the town was in jeopardy.

§ 3.3 On Different Ideas about Liberties of non-Muslims Among Liberals

So far, it is observed that Armenians in Kayseri faced several hostilities even after hearing about the news of the revolution. During the celebrations, two of them were attacked. Some locals made the Ankara Governor complain about their religious leader, Prelate Drtad Efendi. Within the same period of days, ethnic tension in Kayseri began to be expressed on the occasion of certain other events: One of them was about the election process. As in other regions, elections were a form of conflict among Kayserians too. In an objection telegram written by some notables to the Ministry of Interior on 17 October, a group of persons objected to the election process: They claimed that mayor Feyzullah Efendi had taken and hidden some documents and demanded his dismissal from the Ministry of Interior.[41] After three weeks, the opposing camp also sent a telegram to the ministry. According to them, the complainers themselves had subverted the elections through tricks and intimidation. What takes attention is that among those tricks, there were

39 BOA, DH.MKT, 2657/12, 1a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, October 22, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2657/12, 2a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, October 22, 1324.

40 BOA, DH.MKT, 2657/12, 3a.

41 BOA, DH.MKT, 2645/86, 1a, From Ohannes Taslakçıyan?, Serkiz Zambakcıyan, Kördümüzade? Ömer, Hacı Güdlükzade? Şükrü ve Abdizade Abdullah to the Ministry of Interior, October 17, 1324.

threats against non-Muslim secondary electors.[42]

On 4 October, another sign of increasing ethnic tension in Kayseri appeared in the newspapers: İkdam republished an article originally published by Ceride-i Şarkiyye. According to the letter despite "the district governor's good intentions and efforts", there were ones who had evil intentions and who were looking for a way to create trouble: Some Muslims had tried to take the gun of an Armenian policeman and the next day the policeman was forced to take off his uniform. In this way, the people found an outlet to let off steam. The Ministry of Interior sent the article to the district governor Cemal Bey, and demanded information.[43]

The phrase "good intentions and efforts" by Cemal Bey merits attention. For historians who know Cemal [Keşmir] Bey's later career, this was perfectly normal, as throughout his career, he had developed much better relations with Armenians than most of his colleagues: In 1915, for instance, as the governor of Mamüret-ül-Aziz, Cemal Bey would refuse to take part in the Armenian deportation orders, and that would cost him his office.[44] As a tough opponent of the Unionists, after World War I, he would become the Minister of Interior in one of the Damad Ferid Paşa cabinets. During his office, he would stand for a hawkish policy against Unionists and would try to follow a reconciliatory policy for Ottoman non-Muslims. In an interview with Moniteur Oriental, he would state that eight hundred thousand Armenians had been massacred.[45] According to Celal Bayar, the Unionist politician of that time and future president of the Turkish Republic, this interview would lead "people" to refer

42 BOA, DH.MKT, 2666/70, 1a, 1b, From Matyos Kalgayan?, Gübgübzade Bekir, Akçakayalı Amade? Hüseyin to the Ministry of Interior, November 10, 1324.

43 BOA, DH.MKT, 2646/71, 1a, "Anadolu'da Ermeniler," *İkdam*, October 4, 1908.

44 Kenan Esengin, *Milli Mücadele'de Vilayetler ve Valiler*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1975), 267.

45 For the details about this interview, together with Cemal Bey's Armenian policy, see Osman Akandere, "'Artin' Cemal Bey'in Dâhiliye Nazırlığı Esnasında Ermeniler Lehine Yaptığı İcraatlar ve Verdiği Demeçler," *Yeni Türkiye* 60 (2014): 1-14. The article of Erol Akcan and Recep Murat Geçikli also informs about Cemal Bey's opposition policies during the War of Independence. Erol Akcan & Recep Murat Geçikli, "Milli Mücadele'de 'Artin' Cemal ve Faaliyetleri," *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 60, (Spring 2017): 1-22.

to Cemal Bey as "Artin" Cemal.[46]

Given all these events to come, Cemal Bey's reply to his Ministry on 24 October is very surprising, as it was full of denials and accusations. He claimed that the events had been misreported: Policeman Artin Efendi had not been dismissed; he had decided to resign by himself. Yet it was true that Muslim people had complained about him: During his patrol, some Muslims, who had seen a young Armenian man carrying a gun in the market, had warned Artin Efendi about the situation: As carrying guns was prohibited, he had to arrest the man. Yet he had not seized the gun and had let him escape.[47] In a time when common people could find the courage to attack public officials, something beyond a warning could have occurred: The probability that an assault had indeed taken place was much higher, and even if he was not dismissed, Artin Efendi's resignation could not have been made willingly. In his response, Cemal Bey not only denied the event but also made serious accusations against some Kayserian Armenians: For a period, they were trying to create trouble and blame Muslims in various ways. In marketplaces, some Armenians were walking around with posters depicting several Armenian nationalist symbols, like the old ruins of ancient Armenia's capital, Van, and old Armenian Kings with their coat of arms painted on. Armenian youth and "hangdogs" (*esafil takımları*) were intent on buying and firing arms. Two unknown Armenians had walked around the region and spread terrifying rumors that Armenians were going to be massacred and be made disappear. In a quarrel about an unpaid debt issue in Atpazarı, some Armenians insulted all Muslims and openly said that "any willing man should take his gun and knife and come to us", which was, according to Cemal Bey, a call for a massacre. To him, Prelate Drtad Efendi was responsible for these. He even expressed his thought that it was Drtad Efendi who organized these events. Very interestingly, he needed to talk about Muslims' attitude against the regime, claiming that all Muslims were against despotism. Yet his so-called evidence was the advice given to the Muslim mass by the ulema.[48] Reading this statement, one can rightfully ask why the ulema felt the need to give such

46 Celal Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım: Milli Mücadele'ye Gidiş*, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası), 2132.

47 BOA, DH.MKT, 2651/104, 1a, From Cemal Bey to the Ministry of Interior, October 24, 1324.

48 BOA, DH.MKT, 2651/104, 1a, From Cemal Bey to the Ministry of Interior, October 24, 1324.

advice to the Muslim people. In fact, this looks like a signal towards just the opposite.

Given his future protective measures, this early response of Cemal Bey is very surprising. Even more surprising is that, as it will be shown below, future events in Kayseri before and during the anti-revolutionary upheavals would bring Cemal Bey to the foreground as a savior and protector of local Armenians. What chain of events in such a limited time altered his position? How can we explain this change?

One explanation highlights a possible strategy: Maybe Cemal Bey at first tried to seem friendly to the Muslims who were for an ethnic clash and planned to limit their actions in this way, through influencing them. Yet he was unable to continue. Another explanation can put forward his personal life: that he had not been different from his many colleagues about his attitude towards non-Muslims, yet a pivotal event changed his thoughts forever. However, both explanations prove too speculative, as such an event has not been detected so far in the archives.

Cemal Bey's complaints concerning the appearance of a new Armenian agency take attention: As noted in the introduction, the presence of nationalist symbols, buying of arms, and talking more confidently in public, all of which irritated Cemal Bey, have captured historians' attention before. Such changes are well-known today, yet the negative reactions to it are not touched upon enough. At most, bigoted ones are mentioned. Cemal Bey's story provides us a window onto this subject and reveals that negative reactions were displayed not only by anti-revolutionary forces but also moderate, relatively liberal figures. Here, we can benefit from analyzing similar reactions shown by other moderate figures that have very different backgrounds. In fact, there were also other moderate, non-counterrevolutionary, and even Armeno-friendly figures complaining about the sudden appearance of Armenian agency in the public sphere. Supporting examples to be presented here are views of some missionaries of the American Board Commission for Foreign Missions (A.B.C.F.M.) Their letters and reports reveal that, as more moderate figures, just like Cemal Bey, they were also highly critical of some Armenians' attitudes.

Before presenting these criticisms, we have to recall that disputes between

American missionaries and Armenian revolutionaries have a well-known story. The author of the most popular work on missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, Hans Lukas Kieser, introduced these disputes years ago: He showed that although missionaries were highly critical about Ottoman Armenians' conditions under the Hamidian regime, they were critics of Armenian revolutionaries.[49] That led Armenian revolutionaries to believe that missionaries were collaborating with the Ottoman Government.[50]

The Young Turk Revolution raised both radical Armenians' and moderate missionaries' hopes about a brighter future for the Empire, but this shared perspective did not alter the tension between them. Although both sides were enthusiastic about the "proclamation of liberty", they maintained their differences about how to define its limits. What were these differences? Although sources from Kayseri are absent,[51] letters from other places (Harput, Merzifon, Adana, and Antep) can help us with this point.

Where to draw the limits of liberty would become the first and one of the most important questions that revealed the differences among the Empire's citizens, a fact that did not escape the A.B.C.F.M. missionaries' attention. In the Report for the year 1908-1909, for example, the Director of the General Turkey College of Antep was writing that "No word was more frequently used and more variously defined than the word 'liberty'".[52] Although we feel that this question was on the Ottoman people's minds, we still do have a dearth of works focusing on it.[53] But the discussions around such questions merit more attention, as the future pages will show that it would be among the many causes that determined the Empire's political future. Here below, A.B.C.F.M. missionaries' observations in the provinces will be presented, as they show

49 Kieser, *Iskalanmış Barış*, 315.

50 Ibid., 320.

51 In his work Kieser mentions some letters written by Brenin, the Jesuit Abbot of Kayseri, yet the book Lettres d'Ore, in which those letters are published, was not available.

52 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 661, No.338, Report of the Director of General Turkey College, Aintab, Turkey-In Asia, 1908-1909.

53 An important exceptional work is the chapter "Debating the Future of the Empire" in Matossian's "Shattering Dreams". In this chapter, Matossian observes the articles published by Armenian, Jewish and Arabic newspapers. Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattering Dreams of Revolution*, 49-71.

that a group of radical Armenians' understanding of liberty was for pushing the limits of the people who internalize the new regime much further than most provincial Muslim masses and elites.

In what ways were those radical Armenians pushing too far in the eyes of these more moderate figures? Unfortunately, correspondence from the Kayseri region does not provide examples. However, letters and reports from nearby towns, like Merzifon, Harput, and Antep can help us with this issue. In Merzifon, for instance, one missionary, Theodore Elmer, was complaining that his students in Anatolia College were following "most fanciful ideas as to the meaning of the new liberty": Arrogantly, Armenians were claiming for themselves "all the credit for the introduction of the new regime in Turkey", and "expected to put in practice their ideas of liberty in the government of Anatolia College". They were claiming that all reforms in İstanbul were due to Armenian revolutionary parties' activities. The teachers of Anatolia College did not allow their Armenian students to place upon college buildings banners like "All honor to the Armenian martyrs of liberty ect." The missionaries forbade this because they:

> …knew something of the feelings of the local Turkish population toward the Armenians, and knowing this we also knew that after the first wave of Turkish rejoicing over the relief from the despotism of Abd ul Hamid had calmed down they would turn their attention to some of the unexpected and unpleasant effects of the era of liberty on the relations between them and their Christian fellow subjects…This had displeased the Armenian students and some of the teachers very much." Their disagreements led Armenians to severely blame missionaries for not sharing these ideas of great importance. In the words of Elmer, they frequently placed them in the same category with Abdülhamid and called them despots and representatives of the old regime." Some Muslims threatened Armenians toward the end of Ramadan. This scared them a lot, yet after the threat seemed to be over, they made demands for "an era of liberty in the college". They issued an ultimatum, demanding the abolition of all tests and examinations in the English language. Soon, however, they withdrew the ultimatum.

> Some Armenian teachers also tested the limits. They drew up a paper in which it was stated that "a new era of liberty had dawned over Anatolia, and that everything in the future including the government of the college would have to be done in the light of that liberty." They condemned the college and compared some of the teachers with the worst ministers of Abdülhamid. They wrote that if radical reforms were not made immediately, the college would be broken up. Seeing this conflict, students expected that the management would be transferred to themselves. Inspired by the Ottoman parliament, they formed one of their own. "To them the new liberty meant that every institution in a country which had a parliament must also have a parliament". This question was not settled when Elmer wrote the letter. They managed "to keep it within reasonable bounds to the end of this school year". It shall be a debating society next year.[54]

Even more serious tensions were on display at the Central Turkey College in Antep. According to a brief report, during the first term after the revolution, "everything turned about the question, 'What is liberty?'". It was freely discussed in classrooms, in private conversations, and in college newspapers. Furthermore:

> Eventually a conclusion different from that held by the professors was reached by the students. The boys felt themselves free to disobey any college law of which they did not approve, while the faculty insisted that true liberty consists in faithfulness and obedience to the constitution and authority of the college.[55]

Students demanded that as censorship had been abolished in the capital, professors should have no further supervision over the essays, orations, and

54 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 620, No.429, Letter from Theodore Elmer to Rev. James L. Barton, Marsovan, (23 June 1909).

55 A.B.C.F.M. Reel 661, No. 416-418, A Brief Report of Current Affairs in Affairs in Central Turkey College Submitted to the Cilicia Union on Behalf of the Board of Managers of the College. March 1909.

editorials of the students. In September, the students demanded to attend a speech delivered by an Armenian political speaker, Bonapartian Efendi. Juniors and seniors were given permission, yet lower classes were not allowed, "on the ground that the younger boys had not so much to do with public affairs, and that their first duty was to their studies in college." Yet five of the lower-class students disobeyed and attended the meeting. Later, on Vartanants Day, some Armenian students demanded a holiday. Yet lessons were held as usual. This time 107 boys left the college.[56] Another student who had been expelled entered a classroom with a gun and threatened the faculty with violence. Someone pinned anonymous, disrespectful, and threatening letters to the doors of the house of the director. Three students were suspended but they rejected to leave college grounds. They were backed by 200 students. Many of them armed themselves and offered resistance. Then, shots were fired into classrooms and the dormitory of the teachers. As college exercises became impossible, the college sent a communication to the American Consul at Aleppo. Thanks to him, Turkish officials offered protection. Even before his reply, a small guard of soldiers was stationed at the college for a week. Because of these troubles, there were no exercises between 3 and 29 March.[57]

The personnel in Harput also had similar complaints. In her letter to James L. Barton, Mary Daniels wrote that female students had come to the opinion that liberty meant freedom from all restraint. They were saying that "there was freedom in all parts of Turkey except the girl's school and they were slaves".[58] By 9 March, B. N. Barnum, on the other hand, was very happy to observe "the quiet manner of his own boys" in a town where all young Armenian speakers preached revolution.[59] In his letters, Barnum was criticizing Armenians in many ways, such as "foolishly" concentrating their votes in the elections (as

56 A.B.C.F.M. Reel 661, No. 416-418, A Brief Report of Current Affairs in Affairs in Central Turkey College Submitted to the Cilicia Union on Behalf of the Board of Managers of the College. March 1909.

57 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 661, No.338-343 Report of the Director of General Turkey College, Aintab, Turkey-In-Asia, for the Year 1908-1909. Submitted to the Board of Managers

58 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 707, No.95, Letter from Mary L. Daniels to James L. Barton, Harpoot (31 December 1908)

59 A.B.C.F.M. Reel 705, No.595, Letter from B. N. Barnum to "Dear Friends", Harpoot, (9 March 1909).

this led to a respective Turkish vote concentration and foreclosed the opportunity of electing a Christian as MP),[60] making "too much show of liberty", and purchasing arms openly and in great numbers.[61]

Even in the annual report of İzmir, a city much far away from the ethnic tension between Armenians and Muslims, it was written that "A wave of patriotism broke over the Armenians that carries with it elements that cannot be for the best interests of the nation." It was added that clubs organized throughout the country "have degenerated into associations of disloyal men and women rousing each other's worst feelings by the extravagant recital of past cruelties borne and the necessity of arming to resist possible future attacks." This, according to the report, had led to two results: First was the encouragement of a sentiment of revenge, thus deadening any spiritual aspiration. And second, "aggravating the Turks to keen suspicion that the Armenians, instead of accepting the blessing of freedom and justice in a worthy spirit of true patriotism to the government are developing a spirit of separation and opposition".[62]

All these examples from A.B.C.F.M. reports and letters reveal that the push for liberty by some members of the Armenian community was far too radical even for moderate and enlightened defenders of the new regime, like A.B.C.F.M. missionaries, or bureaucrats like Cemal Bey, let alone Muslim elites and masses in the provinces.

Here it must be noted that underlining this fact does not amount to an excuse of atrocities. On the contrary, it is useful in showing how perpetrators of massacres themselves would exploit radicalism by underlining it as an excuse of their actions: Any reader who takes a glance at the secondary sources on the Cilicia Massacre can see these reasons cited ubiquitously. Most probably, many of them were deliberately painting both radical demands and the most basic rights with the same brush. However, the critiques of the emerging radicalism that we mentioned above were making sharp distinctions

60 A.B.C.F.M. Reel 705, No.572, Letter from B. N. Barnum to "Dear Friends", Harpoot (27 October 1908).

61 A.B.C.F.M. Reel 705, No.599, Letter from B. N. Barnum to "Dear Friends", Harpoot (21 April 1909).

62 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 618, No.589, Smyrna Annual Report (1908-1909).

between Armenians' most basic rights and radical demands. In any case, it was the missionaries for example, who wrote in their annual report on İzmir 1908-1909 that Armenians' far greater enthusiasm than the other nations after the Revolution was understandable, as they were the most oppressed nation in the Empire.[63] Or it was one anonymous missionary who wrote after the Cilicia Massacre that difference in understanding and applying the New Constitution by Muslims and Armenians was one important reason for the massacre. This author added that:

> During the declaration of the New Constitution I was travelling among some cities and villages in four different provinces of Turkey. I could not help seeing the difference between Moslems and Armenians by their questions and expectations from the New Constitution. The former were asking whether they shall be able to marry freely with Christian girls as well as Turks? Will the Government decrease the tax on fields, on animals? The officers were thinking of the increase in their salary and the due payment, etc. But the latter were shining with joy that they will be able to build Church buildings and open schools in neglected parts of the towns and villages, and have meetings, day or night, for the progress and civilization of the country. The fact shines like the sun, while speech soars but to the moon to show the truth. As soon as the Armenians believed the unbelievable news of the New constitution, they did open new schools, and in many ardently longed for places did prepare expensive reading rooms, organized useful clubs, spoke publicly of the neglected needs of the country, and thought how to supply them as soon as possible… In short, the Armenians were the first to enter the wide-open gate for the progress of the country. They were the first in belief, first in joy, first in action

63 In the Annual Report of İzmir, for example, it was written that "I believe all would admit that the Armenians far surpassed all others in the intensity of their enthusiasm and the spectacular character of their demonstration. The reason is on the surface. The nation that suffered most under the galling cruelty of the old despotic regime would naturally herald the introduction of a better day with feelings of deepest emotion." A.B.C.F.M., Reel 618, No.589, Smyrna Annual Report (1908-1909).

in this new world of life. This is their fault- this is their 'Rebellion!'.[64]

To return to Cemal Bey, it was him who would write after the massacre attempts in Kayseri that his purpose is "to make all Christians in our motherland say 'his-majesty Sultan Mehmed V is also our sultan, the Ottoman land is also our homeland'".[65] His case to be summarized below is a good example of counterrevolutionary local conjuncture's bringing certain moderate Ottoman bureaucrats and radical Armenians closer. Below, it is shown that, as the situation got worse in the town, Cemal Bey would even cooperate with the radical Armenians.

§ 3.4 Increasing Tension in Late Fall

Three weeks after Cemal Bey's criticism of Armenians, tension rose again, this time through rumors of an assassination. In a letter published in *Manzume-i Efkar* on 14 October, it was claimed that an Armenian priest who had been going from Kayseri to Everek had been murdered by Circissians. Men in his company had survived, but they had been robbed and had arrived at Everek. The subdistrict governor of Everek ignored all complaints for five days. Fearing a massacre, local Armenians had closed their shops and young Christians had formed a self-defense force. Armenians were also in fear of the army.[66]

At that time, Cemal Bey was still critical of Drtad Efendi, the Armenian prelate. Together with Ebubekir Hazım Bey [Tepeyran], the new Governor of Ankara, he blamed the Prelate for Armenians' retreat to their neighborhoods. According to the two, a group, which also included the Prelate, was trying to bring about a set of "regretful" events: The group was trying to spread all sorts

64 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 708, No. 385, "A Spectacle to Men and Angels", 1 Cor. 4,9, Anonymous Letter to Mr. M… (14-27 April 1909, Adana).

65 *"Yegane maksadım ise vatanımızda bulunan Hristiyanlara 'Sultan Mehmed Han-ı Hamis hazretleri bizim de padişahımız, vatan-i Osmani bizim de vatanımız dedirtmekten ibarettir."* BOA, DH.MKT, 2828/52, 2a, Ankara Governorate transmits the telegram of the District Governorate of Kayseri, April 27, 1325.

66 BOA, DH.MKT, 2652/52, 1a, twenty people from the self-defense committee in Everek writes about the copy of Manzume-i Efkar to the Ministry of Interior, October 22, 1324.

of gossip and movements in the town. Armenian youth's self-defense force was also organized by this group's club. Reliable Armenians were also not pleased with the Prelate. They suggested that the Patriarchate could change the Prelate as a gesture of good intention. At the end of the telegram, Hazım Bey repeated the demand for Hulki Paşa's transfer.[67] The Ministry of Interior sent these demands to the patriarchate and the Ministry of War.[68]

Within those days, some persons favoring Hulki Paşa also sent a telegram to the Ministry of Interior and demanded that he stay. For them, after the revolution, plotters (*fesadcılar*) muddled the people's minds, yet thanks to Hulki Paşa, public order was ensured. And then Şeyh İbrahim, his son in law Hilmi, and his gang fueled a rumor that Paşa was going to be transferred and be put on trial. The telegraph was forwarded to the Ministry of War.[69] Four religious teachers also wrote to express their worries about Şeyh İbrahim's release.[70] Yet their attempt cut no ice: On 8 December, the Ministry of Interior informed Ankara that processes to lay off Hulki Paşa had been set in motion.[71] The complainers could apply to the courts if they wished to seek redress.[72] He was replaced by Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa, who previously served on the Greek border.[73] Hulki Paşa's party seems to have lost the struggle, and the ones close

67 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 406/90, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior, October 25, 1324; BOA, DH.ŞFR, 406/11, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior, October 28, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2653/35, 1a, Ciphered telegram from Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, October 25, 1324. In this last telegram, the district governor became more neutral towards the Prelate, as he began to state that even if he did not participate in these movements, the public opinion was accusing him.

68 BOA, DH.MKT, 2653/35, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Justice, October 27, 1324.

69 BOA, DH.MKT, 2639/30, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, October 12, 1324.

70 BOA, DH.MKT, 2640/18, From four religious teachers of Kayseri to the Ministry of Interior, October 25, 1324.

71 BOA, DH.MKT, 2687/90, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, December 8, 1324.

72 BOA, DH.MKT, 2687/90, 2,a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, November 22, 1324.

73 BOA, DH.MKT, 2735/88, 1a, Ciphered telegram from Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, 27 January 1324.

to Şeyh İbrahim took the upper hand with this success.

Yet their success was not complete, as the patriarchate firmly rejected to dismiss Drtad Efendi. The Armenian Patriarchate would answer the removal demand after about two months. In the response, the Patriarchate defended its prelate: Drtad Efendi had been able to successfully and loyally serve the country, and there were no doubts that he would have gone on in the same way. Unless the actions complained of were proven, the dismissal of a Prelate would be against not only the constitution but also the wellbeing of the country and justice.[74]

In fact, Drtad Efendi was among those who denied the murder news, a fact which must have been known by Cemal Bey, because both of them signed the same telegram of denial.[75] In a few days, Cemal Bey sent two more telegrams to Ankara. In the first one, he went on blaming Armenians again, noting that the newspaper *Manzume-i Efkar* was "like a fire starter, for not only Kayseri but also any province which Armenians do live in".[76] In the second telegram, he gave some information about the news of the priest's murder: Two priests named Boğos and Ohannes were robbed by Circissians, but they were unharmed. [77]

The two sides continued to blame each other after this event. Some Muslim notables of the town sent telegrams in which they blamed the Prelate.[78] In his answer to the Ministry of Interior, which asked about the seriousness of these claims, Cemal Bey wrote that there was an agreement reached between two communities. But again, his examples for the prevalence of order reveal that he felt the need to take certain measures. He brought both sides' religious leaders, notables, and army officers together. There, they

74 BOA, DH.MKT, 2753/17, 1a, From the Armenian Patriarchate to the Ministry of Justice, January 29, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2753/17, 2a, From the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior, February 7, 1324.

75 BOA, DH.MKT, 2651/104, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Justice, October 27, 1324.

76 BOA, DH.MKT, 2661/15, 1a, Hazım Bey transmits the two telegrams of Cemal Bey, dated 28 October, to the Ministry of Interior, October 30, 1324.

77 BOA, DH.MKT, 2661/15, 1b, Copy of second telegram.

78 BOA, DH.MKT, 2655/33, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, October 30, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2656/14, 3a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate.

reinforced their unity, and the chief Muslim cleric said a prayer of goodwill for this sake.[79] Armenian merchants, on the other hand, claimed that they did not fuel the rumor about the priests' murder: Even the patriarchate was not informed about the event. Yet with malicious intent, the district governor had misrepresented Armenians to the government. The denunciation of the event had to be investigated. These demands coming from the Armenians were also to be published in İkdam. Although both sides were blaming each other for fueling these rumors, in time, they would reconcile.[80]

It seems that after his release, Şeyh İbrahim quickly went to Ankara. It was reported in the newspaper *Serbestî* that there were rumors about him fueling the revolt with the help of Hilmi. In the article, it was also noted that although he was a man of the Ancien Régime and his source of wealth was usurpations, he had not been put on trial as he still had allies in İstanbul.[81] In his answer to the ministry about the situation, Cemal Bey finally accepted that something had taken place: He noted that a small contention had grown and some rumors had appeared, yet at that time Kayseri was "terrificly" (*korkunç derecede*) peaceful. He also noted that İbrahim's son Hilmi had not been carrying out such actions.[82]

Yet in time, contrary to Cemal Bey's claims, the tension in Kayseri continued to grow. That time following the murder rumor, some neighbors began to clash. On 25 December, *Manzume-i Efkar* published a letter from Kayseri. The first sentence of the letter was "the constitutionalism is in all but name": Each day a new event would break out and murder would occur. One example was an assault on an Armenian who was trying to prevent the ones stoning his house. The letter was also published in İkdam on 10 January:

79 BOA, DH.MKT, 2656/14, 1a, 2a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 2, 1324.

80 BOA, DH.MKT, 2657/63, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, *İkdam*, November 1, 1324.

81 BOA, DH.MKT, 2662/93, 1c, Serbestî, November 3, 1324.

82 BOA, DH.MKT, 2662/93, 3a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 11, 1324.

İkdam demanded from district governors not to remain passive towards such actions.[83]

§ 3.5 The Second Incident: The Muslim Mob's Assault on Cemal Bey

After about one month, the ethnoreligious tension reached its zenith. On 24 January, a more frightening massacre rumor was spread: It was said that Muslims and Christians killed each other in Merzifon and Zeytun. 120 people were massacred in Merzifon alone and Armenians were intending to throw bombs at Muslims in Kayseri. That time Cemal Bey, who had previously blamed Armenians for such rumors, wrote that it was some Muslims who were spreading those rumors. He noted that he had taken extreme measures to ensure security: Rumors were falsified and religious leaders were dispatched to advise the people. Yet it seems that these measures bore no fruit, as he added that Armenians started to close their shops and Muslims started to assemble in several streets. The order was given to conscript reserve troops, and Cemal Bey wanted the Ministry of Interior to falsify the Merzifon and Zeytun rumors officially. The ministry fulfilled this demand.[84]

The tension reached its peak in late January when the Muslim mob directly attacked Cemal Bey. What sparked the attack is not too clear in the archival documents. Other than the report that I touched on at the beginning of this chapter, all we have here, for now, are Cemal Bey's statements.[85] He would write that he had been found by some Muslims to be too permissive towards

83 BOA, DH.MKT, 2705/40, 1c, *İkdam*, January 10, 1909; BOA, DH.MKT, 2705/40, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate.

84 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 409/144, 1a, From the District Governorate of Kayseri to the Ministry of Interior, January 24, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 12a, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/49, From the District Governorate of Kayseri to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2732/67, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to the District Governorate of Kayseri, January 24, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2732/67, 1a, From the District Governorate of Kayseri to the Ministry of Interior, January 24, 1324;

85 The post-counterrevolution documents would give much info about this assault in the following pages.

Armenians. Five days before the attack, a group of young Armenians insulted some gendarmes in front of a police station and wounded one of them. The offenders were sent to court, yet they were released. About the same days, a young Armenian man opened fire into the air. The gendarme arrested this man, but he was also released the following day. These two events angered the Muslim crowd: Armenians' gratuitous use of firearms and harassment of security forces were not found acceptable.[86] In a way, Muslims blamed Cemal Bey rather than the judiciary for this. Cemal Bey asked the chief Muslim cleric to calm the people. When he tried to do so on 26 January, some Muslims replied that they did not trust and did not want Cemal Bey, as he was not treating Muslims and Christians equally. Moreover, they claimed that some nights he was drinking alcohol in Christian houses.[87]

The following day, some Muslim notables went to Cemal Bey's office and in his words, they "made some illegal demands and proposals like to discipline (*tedib*) the ones who carry and fire guns by imposing martial law". In response, Cemal Bey invited judiciary officials to the room and made them tell the notables about the impossibility of fulfilling these demands.[88] Immediately after that, according to him, more than two thousand Muslims gathered at the government building. There, they repeated the same accusations along with newer ones: Cemal Bey had been drinking alcohol with Christians and had danced with Christian women. He also had released Christian criminals. They wanted him to resign.[89] They broke the local assembly room's gate and tried to attack Cemal Bey. In a town, where the previous district governor had died in such trouble, this was openly an intention to kill him.[90] The new

86 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 13a, From Cemal Bey to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/61, 2a, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324.

87 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/23, 2a, appendix to the telegram.

88 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 13a, From Cemal Bey to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/61, 2a, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324.

89 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/23, 1a, the Ministry of War transmits the ciphered telegram of High Command of Kayseri, January 27, 1324.

90 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/61, 2a, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 13a, From Cemal Bey to the Ministry of Interior January 27,

commander of the Kayseri regiment dispersed the crowd with his reserve soldiers and officers, but they rage on in small streets and districts. Patrols went to the streets and the chief Muslim cleric and some notables were commanded to calm down the people. Yet despite the orders, local Armenians feared the mob that could even dare attack the district governor. They closed their shops and withdrew to their own neighborhood. On the same day, the Ministry of Interior sent a long telegram to "*ulema* and Muslim and Christian notables of Kayseri via deputy Muslim judge and chief Muslim cleric": The Merzifon and Zeytun rumors were falsified, and a warning was made that objections concerning the releases of Armenians must be made to the local government in Ankara. If it would bear no fruit, then they might apply first to the ministry, and finally, to the National Assembly. Seeking other means would render all of them responsible, and it was noted that this telegram had been sent in order to protect all from such a liability .[91] It seems that the new commander, Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa, also remained passive, as the Governor of Ankara had to send the Minister of Interior to inform the Ministry of War to make it give the necessary orders to the commander.[92]

As a precaution, the commander and members of the local assembly decided to increase the number of reserve soldiers. Both the commander and the chief Muslim cleric suggested forming an investigation committee that could investigate the tension between the district governor and the Muslim people. Cemal Bey, on the other hand, claimed that existing judiciary personnel in Kayseri would be insufficient. He wanted another deputy public

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1324; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/23, 1a, The Ministry of War transmits the ciphered telegram of the Commander of Kayseri, January 27, 1324.

91 BOA, DH.MKT, 2733/81, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the ulema of Kayseri and Muslim and Christian notables via the deputy Muslim judge and the Chief Muslim Cleric, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 13a, From Cemal Bey o the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/61, 2a, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2818/23, 1a, The Ministry of War transmits the ciphered telegram of the Commander of Kayseri, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2735/53, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry, January 28, 1324

92 BOA, DH.MKT, 2735/88, 1a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2735/88, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, January 28, 1324.

prosecutor to come and launch an investigation. Apparently, he did not trust Âşir Bey, the local deputy public prosecutor. This was understandable, above we saw that Âşir Bey was too close to the resistant camp, which was aligned against Armenians. He was even not above using discriminatory words about Armenians. The Governor accepted both offers put forth by Cemal Bey, the commander, and the chief Muslim cleric. He thought that Ömer Lütfü Bey, the judge of the Court of Appeal in Ankara could perform this task. He wanted the Ministry of Justice to appoint him.[93]

Some Armenians of Kayseri had further demands for the investigation. In their several telegrams to the Ministry of Interior and the presidency of the House of Commons, they expressed their fear of worse events to come and wanted the governor himself to come to Kayseri: The attack on Cemal Bey had made them "recall the old days" of Hamidian Massacres. chief Muslim cleric Mehmed Enver Efendi and deputy Muslim judge Rahmi Efendi agreed with them. Hence the Ministry ordered Hazım Bey to go to Kayseri and conduct the investigation by himself.[94]

The Chief Muslim cleric and the deputy Muslim judge also wanted to increase the number of recruits. The government decided to send a battalion from nearby. But this decision led to a panic among Armenians. Many Armenians, including the deputy district governor, sent another telegram to the Ministry, expressing their fear: If those troops were reserve soldiers from nearby, the painful events of the past (read: Hamidian Massacres) would certainly be repeated. It was the gendarme and those soldiers themselves who had caused the troubles. Only regular troops from another city could be helpful in preventing such a massacre.[95] This fear concerning reserve battalions would also be seen in other cases, for several reasons. First, the

93 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 14a, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior, January 28, 1324.

94 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 19a, From Ahmed Rıza Bey to the Ministry of Interior, February 18, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 1a, From the Armenians of Kayseri to the Ministry of Interior, January 29, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 2a, From Chief Muslim Cleric Mehmed Enver and Deputy Muslim judge Rahmi to the Ministry of Interior, January 29, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 3a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, January 29, 1324.

95 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 5a, From the Armenian notables to the Ministry of Interior; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 6a, From the Deputy District Governor of Kayseri Gazaros Bey to the Ministry of Interior, January 29, 1324.

reserve soldiers were recruited from among the Muslim mob who had already been party to the conflict. Second, as we will see below, the state did not have the capacity to keep them in order: The balance of power between reserves and regulars was often in favor of the former, making them hardly controllable. Moreover, the army could not provide them with enough uniforms. All this clearly gave the impression that the state armed Muslims against Armenians in such cases.

The government took the demand for regulars into consideration. On 30 January, it decided to send the Fourth Battalion of the Fourth Infantry Regiment from İstanbul to Ereğli via train. From there to Kayseri, the battalion would travel on foot. For a quick maneuver, logistical support was needed, and the governor of Konya had to fulfill this duty. On the same night, soldiers arrived at Ereğli.[96] The battalion arrived at Kayseri on 9 February and after that, Armenians reopened their shops.[97]

Interestingly, the first information Hazım Bey shared from Kayseri after his arrival was not about the recent ethnoreligious tension. He launched his investigation by first collecting information about the post-revolutionary events that cost the old district governor Arifî Bey's life on 26 July. An arrest warrant was issued for six Armenians and eleven Muslims. He repeated that the previous commander Hulki Paşa had formed a committee named the CUP and had led it, which sentenced some officials to death at that time. The Armenian Prelate was also a member of the committee.[98]

Hazım Bey also investigated Cemal Bey's political actions. During his investigation, he was told by the Prime Ministry that according to "reliable people", Cemal Bey had also become a member of a committee and had been trying to add Christian notables to its ranks. After two days, Hazım Bey responded: He learned that after his return from İstanbul, Cemal Bey had

96 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 7a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior January 30, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 8b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Governorate of Konya, January 30, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 9a, From the Governorate of Konya to the Ministry of Interior, January 30, 1324.

97 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 4a, From the acting Governor of Ankara Ferik Hasan to the Ministry of Interior, February 9, 1324.

98 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 10a, Ciphered telegram from the Governor of Ankara in Kayseri, February 17, 1324.

tried to form a committee of officials and notables, yet he could recruit only three Muslims and two Christians. This was unacceptable for an official who should have been impartial. For this reason, he had to be transferred to another province. Yet for Hazım Bey, the state could not change its official right after a revolt that demanded his resignation. The state could not show such a sign of weakness. Before Cemal Bey's transfer, the attackers should be punished. Afterward he could move to another province of his own accord.[99] In short, it seems that rather than the offenders of late January, the Governor was at first investigating the actions that were part of the attempts of challengers in Kayseri. The following week, Hazım Bey reported the results of his investigation: It was decided to judge thirty-one persons, but some of the accused were influential ones who had many supporters. Because of this, the deputy public prosecutor Âşir Efendi demanded the trial's transfer to another province. The governor found this argument reasonable and suggested Çorum as the new place. The Ministry of Justice took up this suggestion.[100]

It can be observed that after Hazım Bey's arrival and calming down of the Muslim crowds, relations among Kayseri's elites began to change. One of these changes was between the Armenian Prelate Drtad Efendi and district governor Cemal Bey. As it was noted above, they were not fond of each other prior: Cemal Bey had levied several accusations against him. Yet after the attack on Cemal Bey, Drtad Efendi and all representatives of Christian communities in the town sent a telegram to the Ministry of Interior. In the telegram, they noted that they were thankful to Cemal Bey, yet they did not mention the governor's name.[101] This was most probably intentional, as he was clearly supporting the anti-revolutionaries. Hence, after a few days, animosity between the Governor and the Prelate would be observed in the telegrams sent

99 BOA, BEO, 3504/262756, 2a, From Hazım Bey to the Prime Ministry, February 19, 1324.

100 BOA, BEO, 3510/263223, 3a, From Hazım Bey to the Prime Ministry, February 25, 1324; BOA, BEO, 3510/263223, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Justice, February 26, 1324; BOA, BEO, 3510/263223, 2a, From the Ministry of Justice to the Prime Ministry, March 4, 1325; 4 Mart 1325 BOA, DH.MKT, 2769/105, 2b, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, March 4, 1325.

101 BOA, DH.MKT, 2807/99, From the Greek acting Prelate Atnas?, Armenian Prelate Drtad, Chief Muslim Cleric of Kayseri Enver, Protestant Prelate, Catholic Prelate Arsin? to the Ministry of Interior, February 23, 1324

to İstanbul. Surely his attack on the challengers accelerated their convergence.

Governor Hazım Bey's comments about the post-revolutionary clashes were also published in the newspapers. In the newspapers, he called those events terrible and noted that old district governor Arifî Bey's death was related. Drtad Efendi denied Hazım Bey's claims: After the revolution, the crowd had gathered to overthrow Şeyh İbrahim and his officials. It was Şeyh İbrahim's threats that had led to Arifî Bey's death. Drtad Efendi also wrote that the governor had lied, as his brother in law Nail Bey, the regie manager in Kayseri was such an enemy of Cemal Bey that he instructed regie guards to partake in those clashes. After Şeyh İbrahim had gone to Ankara, Hazım Bey altered his investigation process in accordance with his demands.[102]

In his telegram to the Prime Ministry, Hazım Bey wrote that it had been decided to send the Prelate to the court. That made the Prelate nervous, so he made such claims. Despite legal options he could pursue such as applying to the courts, he was instead trying to complain about him directly to the Prime Ministry.[103] Hazım Bey was implying that, in this respect, by trying to bypass the legal process, Drtad Efendi took almost the same action that he had complained about a few months ago. Hazım Bey became mayor of İstanbul on 6 March, and Mehmed Tevfik Bey replaced him.

Following his arrival, Hamid Zafer Bey, the major of the regular troops that came from İstanbul, also wrote a report in which he summarized and analyzed the events in this second incident, the first attack on Cemal Bey in January. Cemal Bey would send this report much later in May. Here, some major points in the report will be presented to understand the details of the incident. Hamid Zafer Bey confirms that the conflict was between the district governor and a clique within Muslim notables: These Muslim notables had decided to provoke the rabble against Cemal Bey so they could present him as an incapable man and get him discharged. After this decision, rumors had been fueled. According to a denunciation to the police, forty Armenian priests had come to Kayseri with intent to carry out bombings. The district governor

102 BOA, BEO, 3515/263599, 3a, From the Armenian Prelate of Kayseri to the Prime Ministry, March 7, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3515/263599, 4a, From the Armenian Prelate of Kayseri to the Prime Ministry, March 5, 1325.

103 BOA, BEO, 3515/263599, 2a, From Hazım Bey to the Prime Ministry, March 10, 1325.

had been ignoring them so that they could have exterminated Muslims. According to another rumor, both sides were massacring each other in Zeytun and Merzifon, and order to massacre Christians was given by the government. However, the district governor had been spending his time with Christians day and night. By the way, the district governor himself was not a Muslim. Another day, a rumor had been fueled that Armenians had attacked a Muslim woman who was passing through their neighborhood. The release of Armenians who had attacked soldiers in the post had also been attributed to the district governor's attitude. So, to repeat, "the anger of religious fanatics and the rabble (*avamgerler*) boiled to such a degree that they would not have been calmed down even by killing the district governor, and the hostility towards Armenians which had existed all along, had become activated". On 26 January, when the district governor was at the local administrative council, the municipality council member Hacı Nuri and police superintendent Nuri, who were "plotters" had appealed to him. They claimed that the Armenians had raided a mosque in Yeni Mahalle. The offenders had been arrested, yet Muslims had been armed and the town market had been "lost". Cemal Bey had sent the chief Muslim cleric to the great mosque to counsel the Muslims. He also had sent the Prelate Drtad Efendi and deputy district governor Camcıyan Karabet to counsel the Armenians. Next day, at about 5:00 p.m., about ten to fifteen religious fanatics in company with regie guard official İmamzade Reşid Ağa and thousands of men, "who had known nothing about what was going on", had begun to assemble in front of the government building. The district governor summoned the commander, the deputy Muslim judge, and the criminal court judge (*ceza reisi*). He instructed them to make the necessary explanations. Seyidzade Mehmed, a member of the committee, said that the men who were listed by the committee had to be arrested. Cemal Bey responded harshly and said, "I am the district governor of the Constitutional government. I do not recognize you, and I am not afraid of your threats. I only recognize the law". After that, the commander and the committee went outside. The people outside began to shout: "the district governor is a Christian. We don't want him; we will finish him". They began to attack the building. The room had been closed, and it was guarded by police Mehmed Efendi, Yunus Çavuş, deputy district governor's brother, and

İmamzade Reşid Ağa, a member of the committee. The mayor tried to repel the attackers, but they did not disperse: they shuttered the doors and windows. The army building was just in front of the government building, but officers did nothing. The deputy gendarme commander and police commissar demanded help from the army, yet the officers were passive, as they claimed that they had received no orders from the commander, who had been at the market. At 10:00 p.m. the commander arrived with two hundred soldiers. The crowd responded by "clinging to the bayonets". On Wednesday, the district governor did not go to the government building. On Thursday, when the crowd was about to start a fresh attack, a new telegram arrived. It was written by the Ministry of Interior, addressing all the people of Kayseri via the deputy Muslim judge, the chief Muslim cleric, and other religious leaders. With that telegram, the Ministry informed that a regular battalion was about to arrive at Kayseri. With this information, the Muslim people dispersed, yet the Christians still did not open their shops. The ex-governor had wanted to protect his brother in law, regie manager Nail Bey, and had gotten some people arrested to this end. These had in fact participated in mob actions yet had not been the real "conspirators" (*erbab-ı fesad*). The arrested were İmamzade Mehmed Efendi, who was from the "majlis of the forty" of Hulki Paşa, two religious scholars, and ten plebes. Although they eventually had to be released on bail, they still had been detainees for a while. For that time, it was only the regular battalion that prevented a fresh demonstration from breaking out. So, an impartial council had to come to Kayseri.[104]

Major Hamid Zafer Bey's report provides us with valuable information about the incident: The first point is regarding the ongoing political struggle between the two groups. It seems that Cemal Bey had gotten closer to the challenging group that gathered around Hulki Paşa during the celebrations. This party naturally included Armenians. His taking part in this party led to a dispute between him and the anti-revolutionaries, who had taken some steps by releasing İbrahim, dismissing Hulki Paşa, and allying with Ebubekir Hazım Bey, the Governor. A second point is the daily expressions of hatred among the Muslim people against Armenians. To mobilize them, the anti-

104 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 9a, the report of major Hamid Zafer Bey: The Reasons of the Kayseri Incident.

revolutionaries benefited from "the hostility towards Armenians, which had been existent all along". Hamid Zafer Bey writes as if people were passive instruments to be used by the notables, yet the already existing hatred clearly had a role in the circulation of the amplified rumors. Third, Cemal Bey resisted their demands by pointing to the rule of law: In fact, what he refused was arbitrary demands of the notables, signaling the loss of their Hamidian advantages. If we also take into account that the incident took place halfway between the Revolution and the Counterrevolution, we can argue that these three points show the relationship between the questions of the rule of law, Ottoman Armenians' rights, and the central state's authority to protect them. Yet here, attitudes of the Governor and the Commander show that whenever it came to the duty of the state to stand against the people, high rank officials were not in favor of using that authority to provide such protection. That in part has to be related to their worldviews, yet we must also keep in mind that the soldiers that would have had to be relied on in case of a different course of action were insufficient: The reserve soldiers were extremely dangerous locals, and the regulars were not strong enough.

§ 3.6 "Counterrevolution" in Kayseri

The third incident in Kayseri reached its peak on 11 April and eventually ended on 23 April.[105] It did not start simultaneously with the 31 March Incident in İstanbul, like the first massacre in Adana, yet the massacre surely affected the town, as it paved the way for more realistic and horrifying rumors. During this last event, ethnic tension and opposition to the district governor again went hand in hand: The mob showed its hostility towards Cemal Bey openly. The most remarkable and widespread words uttered were, again, about the district governor's favoritism towards Christians. Also, in contrast to the previous incident, there was a serious clash between Cemal Bey and the commander of Kayseri, Hüsnü Paşa.

Even during the presence of Governor Hazım Bey in Kayseri, the ethnoreligious tension was still. One sign of this tension can be observed in

105 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 16a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 27, 1325.

an arms trafficking issue that came up nearby in the middle of February: According to the documents, at that time, two Armenians were transporting two chests from Ereğli to Kayseri. They were to use the cart of a Muslim. Because of an unknown reason, they had a fight. The two then began to look for another coachman in Bor. The Muslim guy began to tell the people that there were revolvers in the chests.[106] The rumor he spread accelerated the increasing tension among people of Bor: The Fourth Battalion had already passed through Bor a few days ago, so they knew the events in Kayseri very well, and those chest owners were from Kayseri.[107] On 15 February, some people from the town noticed that in front of an inn, two chests were pulled down from a cart, and it seemed that they were unusually heavy considering their volume. They wanted the owner to open them. Despite all insistence, he claimed that he did not own the stuff inside and refused. Some men who became suspicious went to the government building. The crowd around the chests grew bigger, and after further insistences, some other Armenians also began to say that the chests should not be opened. This defiance by the Armenians "increased the rage and agitation of Muslims to maximum". A man named Nuri pierced a hole in one of the chests using his ax. Through the hole, people saw bullets, and some of them grabbed a few handfuls from the chest. At that moment, the district governor arrived and ordered that the chests be carried to the government building. There they were opened and some Montenegrin revolvers, bullets, and butcher knives were found. A rumor that a third chest was secretly carried to an Armenian house followed this event. The crowd assembled again, went to the government building, and insisted that the other chest must be found. The district governor sent officers to the house in question, yet they could not find anything there. Seeing that they were leaving the house empty-handed, the crowd insulted the officers. Some "kids" who were older than twenty years old went to the church and knocked on its door. They said that there were bombs inside the church and that they were going to find them. They began to throw stones at the gate, and a few windows were broken. The keeper did not open the door, and some

106 BOA, DH.MKT, 2766/71, 1a, From the Governorate of Konya to the Ministry of Interior, February 17, 1324.

107 BOA, DH.MKT, 2766/71, 2a, From the District Governorate of Niğde, February 18, 1324.

notables chased these young men off. After all these events, ten Muslims and two Armenians were arrested.[108] Some of these detainees would later send a telegram to İstanbul and would claim that there were 8,000 bullets in the chests, and some Armenians, who were the real criminals, had threatened the people: They, on the other hand, were innocent.[109] Later, the district governor gathered Greek, Armenian and Muslim notables in the government building. All sides signed a letter of guarantee in which they promised that no clash would occur in Bor.[110]

Within the same days, Kayserian Armenians in İstanbul received some telegrams. In those telegrams, their townsmen noted that they were safe and remaining at their homes. Most probably, they received news from Bor and they felt the need to inform and calm down their relatives in İstanbul. However, an article in the *Manzume-i Efkar* shows that the Armenians in İstanbul thought that the troubles had erupted in Kayseri anew. The Ministry of Interior meanwhile, noted that there was no news regarding such. Along with sufficient security forces, the governor himself was in the town, and hence initiating a new attempt at violence was impossible. Despite that response, the newspaper continued its claims by noting that there is proof that a new conflict had broken out. The ministry ordered the governor to disclaim the news, informing that arrests had been made. Thanks to the regular troops, security had prevailed and it was very sad to see that such publications could still go on.[111]

Impacts of the Massacres of 1909 which began about the same days as the

108 BOA, DH.MKT, 2766/71, 4a, Governor of Konya transmits the telegram of deputy public prosecutor of Niğde, February 21, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2766/71, 1a from the Governorate of Konya to the Ministry of Interior, February 20, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2766/71, 8a, February 24, 1324.

109 BOA, DH.MKT, 2766/71, 7a, From the suspects in Bor to the Prime Ministry, February 20, 1324.

110 BOA, DH.MKT, 2766/71, 2a, The Governor of Konya transmits the telegram of deputy Public Prosecutor of Niğde, February 18, 1324.

111 BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 17a, "Kayseri Ahvali", Manzume-i Efkar, February 18, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 18a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Ankara in Kayseri, February 19, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2737/62, 20a, From Hazım Bey to the Ministry of Interior, February 21, 1324.

31 March Incident, started to be observed in the villages of Ankara, Konya, and Sivas in the days after. On 5 April, the Ministry of Interior wanted MPs of Kayseri to send a telegram that could decrease the tension.[112] Yet the government's attempts to calm the provinces bore no fruit. On 8 April, a few hundred Muslims attacked Armenians in the villages of Hamidiye, Niğde. Two Armenians were killed and one was wounded. Others were taken into the government building for shelter. Hamidiye was fifteen hours from Niğde, and the gendarme commander of the region was ill, which rendered deploying gendarmes impossible. From the center, only ten cavalries were sent. The district governor of Niğde permitted the subdistrict governor to transfer gendarmes from Çiftehan and Ulukışla. The district governor also demanded an able officer and about thirty gendarmes from Mehmed Nazım Bey, the Governor of Konya. In response, the governor wanted a company of regular troops that were sent to Kayseri to go to Niğde.[113] The government decided to receive these regulars from Kayseri and to call up Kayserian reserves again.[114]

The decision led to mounting panic in Kayseri. Cemal Bey was convinced that he could not preserve the order if the government's orders were to be carried out. It seems that he was agreeing with Hamid Zafer Bey's claim that it was the regular soldiers who were preventing a new incident from breaking out. During that time, a real massacre took place in a nearby location, and these soldiers were to be replaced with reserves. In order to be relieved from the burden of responsibility, he decided to resign on 9 April. To dissuade him from resigning, Mehmed Tevfik Bey called him to the telegram machine. He told Cemal Bey that the Ministry of War decided to keep some regulars in Kayseri. He added that he did not approve of even the mentioning of his resignation. Cemal Bey, in response, stated that he had resigned to maintain his honor. Kayserian people were extreme bigots, and the reserves could easily be seduced to their cause. Although the events in Adana had spread to Sivas and Niğde, nothing had happened in Kayseri so far, thanks to the measures.

112 BOA, DH.MKT, 2796/47, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Presidency of the House of Commons, April 5, 1325.

113 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 412/16, 1a, The Governorate of Konya transmits the telegram of the District Governorate of Niğde, April 8, 1325.

114 Biren, *Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, 39.

Four to five hundred regulars were in the town, and each day a squadron was patrolling the necessary villages. This was reducing the tension and was discouraging the potential offenders. "At the time, it was as if both Muslims and Christians were sitting on a timebomb". Cemal Bey consented to call up reserves, yet demanded that the regulars stay. He also added that the commander-general agreed with him and wrote to communicate the situation to the Ministry of War. Presuming that the Ministry of War would consider it, Mehmed Tevfik Bey thought there would be no need for resignation, and ended his talk with Cemal Bey.[115]

Yet after three days, on 12 April, news that there was an Armenian attack on Muslims spread from Kayseri villages. Later, it was understood that there was no attack, but as he felt that danger was imminent, Mehmed Tevfik Bey warned the authorities in Kayseri that some Armenians from Adana could take refuge in Kayseri.[116] Meanwhile, Cemal Bey and the commander complained about a Hnchakist Armenian called Azvosti.[117] About ten days before, Cemal Bey had informed Governor Mehmed Tevfik Bey that Greeks had provided a piece of secret intelligence about the Hnchakian branch: An Armenian who had recently come to the town from Romania had formed the branch and he had been demanding about ten or twenty liras from each Armenian through threats. Local Armenians had been resisting the branch and they had wanted to connect with the party's headquarters in İstanbul. Governor Mehmed Tevfik Bey had been suspicious about all such news: Rumors among the Greeks could be untrue.[118] Yet the Ministry of Interior had taken it seriously and ordered an investigation.[119] In the commander's and district governor's repeated complaint, it was written that Azvosti was urging Armenians to buy arms. He was not wanted by Armenian notables. If he was allowed to stay in Kayseri, tensions could not be resolved. Azvosti had already refused the Police commissar's and regular troop commander Lütfi Bey's

115 Ibid., 39-40.

116 Ibid., 40.

117 Most probably this person was Azad Vostanig. See Matossian, "Ottoman Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri in the Nineteenth Century," 208.

118 BOA, DH.MKT, 2796/58, 1a, Ankara Governorate transmits the telegram of the District Governor of Kayseri, April 2, 1325.

119 BOA, DH.MKT, 2796/58, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate.

orders to leave the town. He claimed that he would stay with about a hundred gunmen, and would have to fire on them if necessary. The two officials demanded the Russian consul to notice him. Mehmed Tevfik Bey, in response, calmed them: It was normal for both sides to be afraid. This was especially true for Armenians, as they were the minority. The man must have mustered gunmen because of this. The government had to avoid a panic, be calm, and investigate Azvosti's intentions. Maybe it was fear that prevented them from leaving Kayseri. There was no Russian consulate in Ankara, and İstanbul could not take the initiative, so they had to do so by themselves. Anyway, Tevfik Bey believed that there was a misunderstanding.[120]

On 13 April, Cemal Bey suddenly resigned again. He advised that he be replaced by the commander.[121] Kayseri's Christian religious leaders immediately sent a telegram to the Ministry of Interior to prevent the acceptance of the resignation.[122] After learning about Cemal Bey's resignation, Mehmed Tevfik Bey called the regular troops' commander (most probably, Hamid Zafer Bey) to the telegram machine, as he appeared to the governor to be "a man of sound mind". In their conversation, he reported that the Hnchak leader who had arrived two months ago and had urged the Armenians to buy arms, and that had made some Muslims suspicious. Rumors from the villages caused Muslims to gather at the government building and insist to take guns from the armory. There was no assault on the armory, and they dispersed after voicing demands and showing force. The Christians however, were extremely scared by this and retreated to their houses. Hnchaks assembled in their club. At night, together with two gendarmes, deputy district governor Gazaros Efendi removed the Hnchak leader from the town. He opined that there was nothing to worry about, except the Christians' pointless fuss, yet Cemal Bey's resignation had led to a panic, and it should not have been accepted. In response, Mehmed Tevfik Bey advised him, the commander-general, and

120 Biren, *Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, 41-43.

121 BOA, DH.MKT, 2880/2, 2a, Ankara Governorate transmits the ciphered telegram of the Sub District Governorate of Kayseri, June 13, 1325, Biren, *Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, 43.

122 BOA, DH.MKT, 2797/84, 2a, From the Christian religious leaders of Kayseri to the Ministry of Interior, April 13, 1325.

Cemal Bey to act and discuss Cemal Bey's resignation together. Lütfi Bey openly stated his opposition to the notion that the commander general should take Cemal Bey's office. Later, Cemal Bey withdrew his resignation.[123] From the late documents, we learn that Christians' petition to him had been effective.[124]

Above, we saw that the reason behind Cemal Bey's first resignation was that the government called up reserves and ordered to send away regulars, as this was too dangerous by his account. In his second attempt, in addition to the danger, we observe that he also had serious disagreements with the commander-general of the reserve troops, as his attitude was just the opposite. First, contrary to Cemal Bey, the commander-general had an extraordinary tolerance towards the Muslim mob. In his telegram sent to the Ministry of War in those days, he justified the Muslim mobilization: The district governor had not treated Muslims and Christians equally, and his accusations against certain Muslims had offended the people. The Ministry of War did not rely upon the commander's statements, as it noted that whether these claims were true was not known.[125] The contradictory claims by the commander and the district governor put the central government in a difficult situation. A few days after the last incident, the Ministry of War commanded the Governor of Ankara "to put an end to the disputes and to report the reality".[126]

The second act of the Commander was to arm the reserve soldiers. On 11 April, some reserve soldiers broke some arms chests and plundered them. No investigation was carried out about this event, however. And the third act of the commander general was to make a speech in honor of the new Sultan's accession to the throne. In this speech, he used the words "here, your wish came true". What he meant to do was not clearly understood, yet future investigations would show that these words frightened Armenians severely,

123 Biren, *Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, 43-44.

124 BOA, DH.MKT, 2880/2, 2a, Ankara Governorate transmits the ciphered telegram of the Sub District Governorate of Kayseri, June 13, 1325.

125 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 24a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, April 18, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 23a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, April 20, 1325.

126 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 20a, Ciphered telegram from the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, April 25, 1325.

leading them to close their shops.[127] We can guess that "the wish" was most probably the overthrow of Abdulhamid II, and by saying these words, the commander was blaming Armenians in front of the Muslim crowd.

On 17 April, Governor Mehmed Tevfik Bey informed İstanbul: In Kayseri, a group of Muslims demanded guns and attacked the armory, yet they were stopped with necessary measures taken. Seeing these Muslims' attempts, Armenians had hidden in their houses and Hnchaks had taken up arms and assembled in their club. An incident was prevented from breaking out by sending the Hnchak leader out of town. During the events, Cemal Bey, who had been a man of wisdom, was unnecessarily making a fuss, exaggerating the attack on the armory. There were no persons who could stand proxy for Cemal Bey in the town. The task was offered to the commander, yet he respectfully declined and preferred Cemal Bey to maintain his post. In such a situation, Mehmed Tevfik Bey ordered Cemal Bey to continue. Mehmed Tevfik Bey also reported that he had sent principal clerk (*mektubi)* Eyüb Sabri Bey for an investigation, and advised to replace Cemal Bey: He could be sent to another province, and a new, neutral district governor could be appointed to Kayseri in his stead.[128]

So, Governor Mehmed Tevfik Bey, the Commander Hüsnü Paşa, and major Hamid Zafer Bey were thinking that Cemal Bey's resignation was an extreme reaction. For them, the Muslim crowd came to the government building, demanded guns, yet after the given advice, they were scattered. Hnchak leader was also transferred elegantly and order was secured. In his later response to Hüsnü Paşa's claims, Cemal Bey justified his reaction, believing that the event had been much more serious than they had assumed: In the town, clamors like "they are cutting Muslims, what are you waiting for" had been made, and –just like in Adana– Muslims had flooded (*fevc fevc*) the government building and armory. He asked the Paşa to deploy a small number of soldiers to the streets. Yet he, his men, and Hacı Osman Efendi, the captain

127 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46,16a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 27, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2828/52, 5a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 3, 1325.

128 BOA, DH.MKT, 2797/84, 3a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 17, 1325.

of the first battalion, turned the rumors that Armenians had been attacking and massacring Muslim villagers into an official reality by openly saying that Muslims' reaction was natural. It was senior captain (*kolağası*) Lütfi Bey, a man of the Paşa who had surrounded the Hnchak leader's house. In addition, the Paşa had called up and armed hundreds of very angry reserves who were frightening Armenians intensely. When Cemal Bey demanded not to arm those reserves, he had said "If Armenians attack, Muslims will massacre, you first, and then all officials". According to a rumor which went around reserve soldiers, Armenians of Zeytun were intending to suddenly attack Muslim villages in Kayseri and massacre them. The District Governor had not taken necessary measures. Those soldiers had been saying "inshallah a rifle will be fired and we will finish him first". At that time, the regular Fourth Battalion which had come from İstanbul was still in Kayseri. Major Hamid Zafer Bey could have put an end to the events, yet the Paşa's attitude towards him was threatening. Despite all the complaints, Cemal Bey noted that Paşa harbored no ill will: He was but a credulous populist (*avamperest*) man without courage. Most probably this was to imply that Paşa was not among the counterrevolutionaries. Cemal Bey had two suggestions: First, he should take control of Hamid Zafer Bey's Fourth Battalion, as it could be kept away from Paşa's command. Second, reserve soldiers could be sent to Haçin, which had already demanded reinforcements. The governor found those suggestions reasonable.[129]

Finally, the government decided to send four reserve battalions to Haçin. Yet now, another problem was to beset them: The province could not afford their deployment, as they had not started collecting cattle taxes. The Financial Office (*defterdarlık*) demanded authorization to take out a loan worth two thousand Turkish liras. It repeated this demand again and again on 11, 18, and 20 April, but it could not get a reply.[130] As they were armed, bored and not paid, reserve soldiers began menacing the town. It seems that the fears expressed by the chief Muslim cleric and religious leaders of Greeks, Catholic

129 BOA, DH.MKT, 2798/93, 1a, Ciphered telegram from Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 18, 1325.

130 BOA, DH.MKT, 2805/27, 1a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 21, 1325.

Armenians, and Protestant Armenians about the reserve troops scaring Christians on 15 April were proven right.[131] Some of them got drunk, some of them arbitrarily underpaid the shops. In response, some Christian shops were closed once again.[132] Finally, the High Command of Adana Regulatory Forces (*Kuvva-yı Mürettebe*), the army sent by the central government to Adana after the massacre, informed that those reserve battalions were not needed, and the Ministry of War commanded to disband them.[133]

§ 3.7 Aftermath

As this third incident was over, discussions about whether the district governor or the commander should be sent to another province started, together with the possible timing of their transfers. The state consulted different persons' opinions about the subject. Their responses were also part of a discussion about what exactly the conjuncture was in Kayseri. In this discussion, there are some important details about both the previous incidents and the contemporary ones.

Naturally, one official whose opinion was asked for was Eyüb Sabri Bey, the investigator who was sent to the town from Ankara. At first hand, Eyüb Sabri Bey confirmed Cemal Bey's criticisms: The commander was biased against Christians: The rate of the Christian population in proportion to Muslims was only 25%, but he had believed in false rumors (of Armenian assault) and had been suspicious about them. Also, there had been security problems in the assembling of the reserve soldiers. He had attempted to arrest the Hnchak leader in a town which had witnessed the old events (he meant the Hamidian Massacres) which was unwise. In addition, he ordered the soldiers on patrol to "advise Muslims that you run into to shoot the Armenians that they spot", a fact which was confirmed by the major of the

131 BOA, DH.MKT, 2797/65, 1a, From the Governor of Ankara to the Ministry of Interior; April 10, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2797/65, 2b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, April 13, 1325.

132 BOA, DH.MKT, 2805/27, 2a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 22, 1325.

133 BOA, DH.MKT, 2810/48, 1a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, April 28, 1325.

regular troops. Eyüb Sabri Bey was against the idea that the change of commander would lead to a reaction by Muslims. There were two reasons for this: First, the commander was not loved that much by Muslims, and second, the telegram sent by Mahmud Şevket Paşa to the people of Kayseri discouraged the agents involved in the previous events.[134] For Eyüb Sabri Bey, it was Cemal Bey, the Hnchak leader and the regular troops' major (Hamid Zafer Bey) who prevented Kayseri from turning out like Adana.[135] The Muslim mob and some Muslim notables disliked Cemal Bey, yet other Muslims and all Christians were pleased with him. He should stay a while, and only later had to be transferred to another place, if possible, by promotion. If he would be sent away together with the commander, Christians would possibly not utter too much discontent.[136]

Governor Mehmed Tevfik Bey agreed with Eyüb Sabri Bey. The commander was not a malevolent man, yet he was unable to perform his duty. Also, Kayseri's gendarme major had to be an officer who was trained in Rumelia. Yet these two dismissals could pave the way for a Muslim reaction. For this reason, the district governor also had to be sent for another duty. Yet the gendarme commander had to be replaced at once.[137] According to the Governor, the clash between the district governor and the commander would go on even if they were to temporarily make up. This duality, in a town where there had been a longstanding discontent between Muslims and Christians, the tiniest of rumors to suddenly grow out of all proportion. In this last incident, there had been rumors that Christians would attack first. Then, reserve soldiers were assembled for Adana. All these badly affected Christians. Still, both sides' proponents were sending telegrams to Ankara, and the district governor and the commander were behind that. If the government

134 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 22a, Ciphered telegram from Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 23, 1325.

135 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 21a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 18-20-22, 1325.

136 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 22a, Ciphered telegram from Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 23, 1325.

137 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 21a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 18-20-22, 1325; BOA, DH.ŞFR, 412/27, 1a, the Governor of Ankara transmits the telegram of Eyüb Sabri Bey, April 22, 1325.

were to decide to change only one of the two, either Christians or Muslims would get into a panic. So, the governor advised the replacement of both persons and that their successors should arrive at Kayseri simultaneously.[138] This last suggestion was rejected by the Ministry of Interior with an interesting argument: Because of the Adana Incident, Armenians were trying to accuse the government. If the district governor was replaced and a small incident was to occur, they would ascribe this to the government and would blame it for an intentional setup. For this reason, it was inappropriate to change the district governor.[139] In those same days, Eyüb Sabri Bey also gave new information that favored the commander. His famous speech in front of the government building "had left a mark on Armenians' minds", yet there were no signs that this speech had made a great impact on them. Reserve soldiers had looted ammunition, yet Sabri Bey was doubtful of this event's impact too. The commander had come here from Taşkışla HQ, yet one could not claim that he had participated in the crimes of the ex-Sultan. In addition, other than this event, no one had heard of him causing any serious harm.[140]

On 25 April, the governor had sent a notice to the commander and the district governor. They replied to it on 27 April: The commander claimed that he was not resentful towards Cemal Bey, yet he also noted that Cemal Bey had ignored his efforts to restore order. The commander was upset, as until that day he had never experienced such an unconformity. Cemal Bey also claimed that he had no personal problems with the commander. The clash between them had started on 12 April, the second day of the last Incident, and it was about the measures to be taken. The Adana Incident had shown what slackness could have led to. And in today's Anatolia, along with Muş and Maraş, it was Kayseri that had to be paid the closest attention. His one and only purpose was "to make all Christians in the motherland say that his-

138 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 17a, From the Governor of Ankara to the Ministry of Interior, April 26, 1325.

139 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 13a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, April 26, 1909. During the January Incident, the Christians of the town really believed that they would be without protection if Cemal Bey left Kayseri. Look BOA, DH.MKT, 2738/85, 2a from priest Brenin to the Ministry of Interior.

140 BOA, DH.MKT, 2828/52, 3a, Ankara Governorate transmits the telegram of the Principal Clerk, April 27, 1325.

majesty Sultan Mehmed V is also our sultan, the Ottoman land is also our homeland". However, to please some religious fanatics and reactionaries, the commander did not even meet with Christians. He had already been telling the people that he was going to retire.[141]

The governor did not believe that there was no conflict between the two[142] and despite the Ministry of Interior's reply, he repeated his advice about Cemal Bey's transfer: He made many efforts to stop the events. The transfer had always been Cemal Bey's own demand. A new duty which might please him could be assigned.[143] Next day, Cemal Bey wrote that an assassination plot against him came forward for the second time: Meanwhile, gossips to the effect that "the protector of Christians is leaving" were spreading in the town. For him, the motivation behind the assassination plot was that he had prevented looters. His resignation could flurry Christians, for this reason, he repeated his demand to be transferred to another duty.[144]

For the governor, Cemal Bey's words were confirming his own opinion about the transfers.[145] But after two days, Mehmed Tevfik Bey adopted his position to the one of the Ministry. For now, Cemal Bey should stay, yet it was his demand to go to another province, so he must be replaced in the long run. He told the district governor that he should stay for a while and asked Eyüb

141 BOA, DH.MKT, 2828/52, 1a, 2a, Ankara Governorate transmits the telegrams from the District Governorate of Kayseri and the Command Post, April 27, 1325.

142 The governor was right to think in this way. Although they deny it, in fact, during the whole summer the polemic between the two went on. Cemal Bey heard the rumors that the commander was saying that he could please Christians yet could not please Muslims. Cemal Bey wrote the Ministry of Interior that these words may affect European public opinion very badly. He claimed that he risked his life to protect Christians from "military massacre" and by doing this he served all Ottomans. He was ready to resign if the public opinion believed in the opposite. BOA, DH.MUİ, 27-1/46, 2a, From the District Governor of İzmid, Cemal Bey to the Ministry of Interior, October 11, 1325. For the people's support to the District Governor and the denial of the polemic BOA, DH.MKT, 2908/35, 1a, From the people of Kayseri to the Ministry of Interior.

143 BOA, DH.MKT, 2828/52, 4a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 28, 1325.

144 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 15a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 29, 1325.

145 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 412/95, 1a, April 29, 1325.

Sabri Bey about the possible reasons for changing only the commander.[146] Eyüb Sabri Bey told him that the commander had to change, as his attempts to reconcile the two had proven a failure. He wanted to return to Ankara.[147] By May, the government began to take up a position in favor of Eyüb Sabri and Cemal Beys. On 7 May, Salih Efendi, the commander of the fifth Gendarme battalion in Kayseri, was suspended from duty. He was replaced by Giridli Ahmed Ağa.[148] Another man who opposed Cemal Bey, the deputy public prosecutor Âşir Bey, was appointed to Çankırı in June.[149]

In his telegram to the Ministry of Interior, Governor Mehmed Tevfik Bey listed Cemal Bey's demands and wrote that the governorate did everything in its power to meet them. Cemal Bey first demanded the discharge of gendarme major Salih Efendi which was granted. Second, he wanted the discharge of the commander Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa. The required telegrams were sent to the Ministry of War. Third, he demanded that the gendarme battalion be added to the regulation program (*tensikat*). For this purpose, councils were formed and the necessary procedure was accelerated.[150] Fourth, he requested certain

146 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 11a, the ciphered telegram from Ankara Governorate, May 2, 1909.

147 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 10a.

148 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 26a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, May 10, 1325; 20 Mayıs 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 25a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, May 20, 1325.

149 BOA, BEO, 3591/269324, 1a, From the Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Justice, June 22, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2877/58, 1a, From the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior, June 25, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2877/58, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, June 4, 1325. Soon, Salih Efendi would be acquitted. He was even permitted to sue Cemal Bey and Tevfik Bey for their accusations. See BOA, DH.MUİ, 64-1/26, 2a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, 26 January 1325. In this document, it was stated that he had been put on trial in the "Kayseri Court-Martial". However, in no other documents there was such a court. We know that the Ministry of Interior asked about the court that he was to be judged, yet I could not find a response. See BOA. DH.MKT, 2847/55, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, June 4, 1325.

150 The region's gendarme organization had many problems. One of them was about their salaries. In early April, Governor Tevfik Bey wrote that gendarmes could not get their February salaries and they were very miserable. BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2828/45, 2a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 6, 1325. In May, Cemal Bey suggested that rather than increasing the number of old gendarmes who were about thirty-five and forty years old who think about their families more than their missions, one must hire young and

procedures regarding the district court and the deputy public prosecutor in particular. The Ministry of Justice started the necessary procedure and the district governor was informed about the situation. In sum, the governor believed that he had done everything he could, and he was still trying to get information from the district governor about his complaints about the district's officials.[151] In the meantime, Danyal Paşa, former commander of the Sivas regiment was appointed to Kayseri. The Ministry of Interior informed Ankara about this, brought up the change of the public prosecutor, and issued a strong warning: If there would be other conflicts and quarrels between Kayseri's officials, then the Ministry would see the district governor as the main cause for them, and the responsibility would be his to own.[152]

It seems that by June, his superiors believed that they had done everything they could for Cemal Bey. However, one very important subject, the judicial proceeding of the January Incident's agents was not mentioned by them. The failure to meet this demand is observable in another series of telegrams among the district governor, the governor, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of War: From a private letter, Mehmed Tevfik Bey learned that about thirty-five to forty Christian families were preparing to emigrate from Kayseri. According to the letter, the reasons for this planned emigration were the commander not being changed and the absence of new regulations on the gendarme in the town. In his response concerning the event, Cemal Bey informed Ankara that after the "13 April Incident" not forty but more than a hundred Greek families[153] and Armenians had prepared for emigration, yet after the guarantees that he had given, they had decided to delay their move

high school graduated men should be recruited. The Ministry of Interior transmitted the suggestion to the Ministry of War BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 27a, May 5, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 29a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, May 9, 1325.

151 BOA, DH.MKT, 2880/2, 1a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, June 15, 1325.

152 BOA, DH.MKT, 2880/2, 3b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War and to Ankara Governorate, July 6, 1325.

153 So far a sign of an attack on Greeks of Kayseri town-center does not exist in the Ottoman archives. Yet by the end of May, nearby Greek villages were under Muslims' attack BOA, DH.MKT, 2839/93, 1a, The interesting thing here is that for this case, the Government was informed by a telegram sent from İzmir to the Greek Patriarchate.

to autumn. Cemal Bey continued:

> In constitutionalism, it is difficult to employ officials who got used to the arbitrary administration (*idare-i keyfiye*) of thirty-three years. Neither the court nor the officials in other branches are trustworthy. Each expression of hate by the officials against Christians reinforces the rabble's feelings and encourages them. In despair, I was compelled to resign on 13 April. After the petition of the people that aroused my patriotism, I abandoned my idea to resign. Although all sides understood the meaning of Kayseri, until now no serious actions were taken. Sadly, one can see that the Ancien Regime's tendency to refrain from setting things straight when they get out of control is still present. The ones who need the state bureaucracy to act can do nothing but wait and shiver at the doors of judiciary or government doors. In fact, if this situation continues, then this emigration issue will return to the agenda. Although I am trying to calm public opinion as much as I can, the greatest assurance of security is bound to action.[154]

What had been done between the last two incidents? At the end of February, the ex-deputy public prosecutor, Âşir Bey had suggested to the Ex-governor of Ankara, Hazım Bey, that the trial of this incident should have been moved to another town. Hazım Bey considered Çorum as a suitable place.[155] By mid-March, fourteen people were arrested. These people had participated in both the first and the second incidents.[156] By the time the last event had erupted, the devolution process had not yet been completed.[157] The Ministry of Justice

154 BOA, DH.MKT, 2880/2, 2a, Ankara Governorate transmits the telegram of the District Governorate of Kayseri, June 13, 1325.

155 BOA, BEO, 3510/263223, 3a, From Hazım Bey to the Prime Ministry, February 25, 1324.

156 BOA, DH.MKT, 2775/2, 3a, From the deputy Public Prosecutor of Kayseri to Ankara Governorate, March 17, 1325.

157 BOA, DH.MKT, 2806/47, 1a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 21, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2806/47, 2b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, April 25, 1325.

reached the decision as late as early May.[158] Therefore, little was done. Above, we saw that major Hamid Zafer Bey wrote in his report that the offenders in January were not punished. Cemal Bey confirmed the major and made some criticisms: One of his targets was the ex-governor Hazım Bey: He had not arrived at Kayseri on time and later he had not made any query. Another target of his criticism was the deputy public prosecutor Âşir Bey. He had released the reactionaries and engaged in misconduct. He had always spent his time with these men who were fueling the Muslim-Armenian hostility. It was not them but ten weak persons who were sent to Çorum. Hulki Paşa was accused of murder as he and his men played the central role in the first post-revolutionary incidents. Some of those men were arrested while some were released. About the deputy public prosecutor, he told that the hardest thing to come by in him was righteousness.[159]

Cemal Bey decided to make a new demand for the prosecution of these suspects in late May. As the Maraş Massacre had occurred just after the Massacres of 1909, a Court-Martial was established there. He wanted the agents in Kayseri to be sent to the Court-Martial in Maraş "for the security of whole Anatolia", as "the events that occurred in Kayseri were far more serious than the Maraş Incident". To prove his point, he produced another summary of the events, yet this time he addressed the deputy public prosecutor's actions: The ex-district governor had lost his life during the post-revolutionary incident. When he arrived in Kayseri, Cemal Bey found the local government in a very weak position. This emboldened the bullies. In the January Incident, the number of attackers who targetted the government building had exceeded a few thousand. The attack had continued for about three or four hours, doors and windows were broken. The deputy public prosecutor had been present during the entirety of the events, yet he could not dare to launch an investigation. At first, he wrote to the Ministry of Justice that a regular army force was needed to take the statements of the bullies and reactionaries. However, after the troops arrived, he began to present the attack as a minor

158 BOA, DH.MKT, 2828/10, 1a, From the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325.

159 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 7a, Telegrams of the District Governor of Kayseri, May 18 and 21, 1325.

event. Also, the ex-governor had deliberately not taken the statements of various notables, including ones of religious leaders. If these two men had shown the courage to reveal the truth, then the people could not have dared to attack the armory on 12 April. Despite all these, after the third incident, only ten weak persons had been transferred to Çorum. The real bullies and reactionaries had stayed in Kayseri, and the news that even the ten weak men would return to Kayseri had negatively influenced people.[160] At the end of his telegram, Cemal Bey demanded a trial for both the ex-governor and the deputy public prosecutor.[161] After a few days, he sent a new telegram in which he repeated the same warnings, and stated that new events were bound to occur if this tolerance continued. He repeated that the agents of January were the same as the ones of April. The solution was not to increase the number of troops but to follow the legal procedures.[162]

At the end of June, the Ministry of Justice sent a long article, including a petition written by ex-deputy public prosecutor Âşir Bey and the investigating judge (*müstantik*). The Ministry commanded the first judge of Kayseri to investigate Âşir Bey. On 15 June, he reported that Âşir Bey had made no errors concerning the previous procedures. Arrests and releases were in due form. In this large town, judiciary officials had many tasks to do, yet Cemal Bey was keeping the men busy by making complaints again and again. Moreover, he tried to start a conflict between police commissars and these officials by making the police work against them. Although it was forbidden to open fire, a seventeen or eighteen year old young shooter, Hayık, had not been arrested but released with Cemal Bey's order. The main reason for the January Incident had been the illegal administration of Cemal Bey. His alcohol drinking and dancing with women in Christian houses had not been rumors but the truth, which had also been confirmed by ex-governor Hazım Bey and the inspector Ömer Lütfü Bey. On 27 June, the first judge of Kayseri sent a telegram and

160 The detainees who objected to their transfer to Çorum were kept in Kayseri until the final decision on the move BOA, DH.MKT, 2841/7, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Presidency of the House of Commons, May 30, 1325.

161 BOA, DH.MKT, 2853/42, 1a, the telegram sent by the District Governorate of Kayseri, May 19, 1325.

162 BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/46, 8, the telegram sent by the District Governorate of Kayseri, May 24, 1325.

noted that Cemal Bey had still been complaining about officials, and they even had begun asking to avoid work by finding excuses. They wanted to resist the district governor and the first judge wanted the Ministry of Interior's support.[163] In mid-August, the Ministry of Justice also rejected to include the Kayseri court in the ongoing reform program.[164]

Cemal Bey's demand to punish the offenders, therefore, bore no fruit. As shown above, the officials were discussing his removal from Kayseri, which had also been demanded by Cemal Bey on several occasions. At the end of August, the time had come to change the district governor of Kayseri. On 23 August, Cemal Bey was excused for one month so that he would come to İstanbul.[165] On 10 September, he was appointed to İzmid.[166] On 24 August, Muammer Bey, the subdistrict governor of Aziziye, and a Unionist, was promoted to district governorship and appointed to Kayseri.[167] He wanted to be excused for one month to visit İstanbul,[168] but The Ministry of Interior rejected him: The events had stopped, yet the Ministry believed that he had to remain on duty in a town where anything could happen.[169]

The regular battalion which had been sent from İstanbul in January stayed in Kayseri until the end of September. At that time, the Ministry of War wrote

163 BOA, DH.MKT, 2905/78, From the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior, July 29, 1325.

164 BOA, DH.MUİ, 5-1/42, From the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior, August 19, August 24, 1325.

165 BOA, DH.MUİ, 4-1/14, August 23, 1325.

166 BOA, DH.MUİ, 6-2/13, 3a. At the end of summer some people from Kayseri wanted Cemal Bey to be given Legion D'Honneur for his efforts to protect Christians. But the government rejected this demand on the grounds that an official cannot take a foreign medal. BOA, DH.MUİ, 23-1/34, 2a, September 26, 1325; Cemal Bey was not happy with this decision, as he was believing that he had to be promoted to the governorship. He criticized the Ministry's decision heavily by claiming that just like during the ancien regime, not merit but "intimacy to an office" (*bir bâba intisab*) is determining promotions. DH. MUİ 6-2/13, 6a, From the District Governorate of Kayseri to the Ministry of Interior, July 14, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2896/69, 1a, From Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior.

167 BOA, DH.MUİ, 12-2/17, 2b, September 3, 1325.

168 BOA, DH.MUİ, 12-2/17, 2a, From the Governorate of Sivas to the Ministry of Interior, August 29, 1325.

169 BOA, DH.MUİ, 12-2/17, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Governorate of Sivas, September 6, 1325.

about the difficulties in keeping the battalion in the town: There were not enough places to host the soldiers, so they were sleeping in several mosques and religious schools. There were problems with their exercises. For this reason, the First Army demanded its battalion be brought back to İstanbul. The Ministry of War brought the issue to the attention of the Ministry of Interior. After the approval of the governor of Ankara,[170] the battalion returned. So the state's extraordinary measures to address the risk of a pogrom in Kayseri ended, and life returned to normal –for the time being.

§ 3.8 The Polemic between Cemal and Talat Beys: Early Signs of Denial and Religious Populism

Later during his office in İzmid, the Kayseri Incident would be a matter of debate between Cemal Bey and the new Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey, the head of the CUP who would become Talat Paşa. He replaced Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa in August 1325. The polemic would lead to a conflict between the two: It started with the complaints of some officials in İzmid who were dismissed by Cemal Bey. They claimed that Cemal Bey was drinking alcohol and hanging out with two Armenians, an accusation very similar to the Kayseri offenders' justifications. They even would not hesitate to blame Cemal Bey for his actions in Kayseri. Talat Paşa sent an inspector to İzmid, and the inspector wrote to the Ministry that Cemal Bey's hanging out with two Armenians had led to a reaction and antipathy in İzmid. During the investigation, Cemal Bey went to İstanbul without permission, claiming that he was ill and in need of treatment there. Upon that, Talat Bey appointed him to the District Governorate of Bolu. As that was a downgrade, Cemal Bey reacted severely.

This reaction reveals important signs about Talat Bey's way of administration: Cemal Bey claimed that during his office in İzmid, Talat visited the town on his trip to Konya, and in his absence, he repeated the Kayseri offenders' claim that Cemal Bey had only served Christians in Kayseri.

170 BOA, DH.MUİ, 22-2/35, 2a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, September 24, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 22-2/35, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Ankara Governorate, September 28, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 22-2/35, 4a, From the acting Ankara Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, October 6, 1325.

Cemal Bey resigned from office as a protest, yet Talat Bey told him this had been a "joke", and he withdrew his resignation. After stating this joke claim, Cemal Bey refused to go to Bolu. Talat Bey denied Cemal Bey's joke claim and dismissed him from state duty.[171]

This affair served as the first occasion in which features of the future Armenian policy of the Talat Paşa controlled CUP cliques were revealed. This policy was to involve finding a middle way between going along with the some Muslim people's hatred and holding onto the state monopoly of violence; and two forms of denial –first, a soft one, by claiming to have joked, and second, a firm rejection of the whole affair.

In his recent biography of Talat Paşa, Kieser points to the double effect of the 31 March Incident on the CUP. The interesting thing is that the Committee's confrontation with the huge anti-Armenian potential of the Muslim population was simultaneous with the process of taking state power into its hands, as evidenced in taking seats in the cabinet. In this sense, Talat's visit that Cemal Bey mentions is symbolic: Accompanied with Cavid and Bedros Halajian, Talat's visit to the provinces started out on 14 October 1909. Figures like Rambert welcomed this visit, as "these sirs will realize how much there is to gain in terms of prestige and knowledge of the country, encountering themselves the people and matters of the provinces". For Rambert, this was also "a revolution in the habits of administration". Rambert and his friend Huguenin Paşa, director of the Anatolian Railway still thought these persons to be a trusted group.[172]

Kieser believes that this mood started to deteriorate by late 1909, and the 31 March Incident played a role in this. As for Talat Bey, he notes that:

> After the counterrevolution of April 1909, he had taken responsibility as a minister in an Ottoman capital that remained in a state of emergency. Once faced with populist Islamist rebellion, the young minister staggered and failed to maintain constitutional principles of

171 For this aftermath story, which shows some early signs of Talat's way of governance, see the documents in BOA, DH.MUİ, 76-1/72 and BOA, ŞD, 3067/35.

172 Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Talaat Paşa: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide*. (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), 80.

> equality, freedom of the press, and justice in the provincial administrations. The same is true with his handling of movements for autonomy in Albania and Yemen, and particularly of a daunting Hamidian heritage of unpunished crimes, increased by the April 1909 Cilicia Massacres.[173]

Cemal Bey's claim fits perfectly into this argument. Talat Bey's expression of his approval of the Kayserian Muslims' claim in İzmid shows that even by late 1909, Talat had started to see the necessity to get along with the Muslim elites and the people in the provinces, whose understanding of the revolutionary principles were much different from that of the Armenians. In this sense, the Incident can be one important turning point in shaping the CUP's Armenian policy. Again, in Kieser's words:

> There was a soul in Talaat's breast that cared about the Armenians, and he knew well that cooperation with them was the key for a modern, constitutional Turkey. Armenian international networks and lobbying were, however, tools that Talaat and the CUP feared and hated. They could not accept these means as a necessary lever for realistic politics. They also feared vocal Islamic opposition and mob violence organized by regional lords. There was, therefore, another soul in Talaat— mirroring the mentality of key members in the committee— that did not believe in equal cooperation but considered the co-optation of local Muslim forces as the only possible domestic realpolitik. In contrast to the ARF, the CUP possessed violent alternatives. The unpunished, unforgotten massacres of the 1890s, even if publicly ostracized in the Ottoman capital, remained a powerful pattern of destruction instead of cooperation. It is plausible that in his crisis, Talaat might already have thought about the option of getting rid of the Armenians.[174]

173 Ibid., 63-64.

174 Ibid., 86-87.

One final note can be that Cemal Bey's assertion about Talat Bey's claim to have been joking also fits into Talat Bey's character, or "'capacity' of saying things with a powerful smile but doing something different" already experienced by figures like Mizancı Murad Bey or İbrahim Temo.[175] Clearly a peculiar way of denial of such actions.

§ 3.9 Conclusion

Today we know that in some urban centers of the Ottoman provinces, certain local notables and officials considered the proclamation of liberty as an opportunity to change the balance of power. The first theme in this chapter was the Kayserian version of these movements: In Kayseri, some army officers led these challengers, forcing the local government to proclaim liberty. Then, they demanded dismissals and dealt a major blow to some men of the Hamidian Ancien Regime. Yet their advance was immediately confronted by an anti-revolutionary camp, whose capacity to resist the challengers was still high in the new conjuncture. As they controlled the local government, they tried to prevent the proclamation of liberty at first. Yet the commander, Hulki Paşa took the revolutionaries' side, and the notables' resistance was backfired. By keeping the conception of the three stages of resistance to the new regime (absorption, anti-revolution, and counterrevolution), it can be argued that after the failure of their first form of resistance, the resistors started to pass to the absorption, which seemed to have been successful at first. Furthermore, they started to use their influence to counter-balance the challenger bloc. One part of their strategy was targeting Hulki Paşa, the most powerful figure among challengers. While doing this, they exploited the new regime's principles: They underlined the arbitrariness of the challenging actions in Kayseri and questioned challengers' institutional links to the revolutionaries in Macedonia.

Another important theme, which was a touch upon both in the first part (the post-revolutionary movements) and the following parts (the two attacks on Cemal Bey), was cases that reveal the links between the revolutionary

175 Ibid., 62.

politics and the "Armenian question". We know that as they suffered a lot under the Hamidian Ancien Regime, many Armenians took part in the challenges with greater enthusiasm than Muslims. However, enthusiasm was not the only difference of attitudes between the majority of Muslims and themselves. Some Armenians' understanding of the new regime principles was much too liberal and radical even for a wide range of the defenders of the new regime. These moderates resented their new agency. This can be observed more clearly in the events that occurred during Cemal Bey's office. His first reaction to the news of attacks on Armenians shows that as a relatively moderate figure, he was also annoyed by the new forms of Armenian agency at first. However, most probably as the old local power holders pushed forward for a more complete restoration, gradually, he moved closer to the challengers.

In the first case, the resistor Muslim notables exploited the widespread hatred to reduce the challengers' power. We observed that even during the initial anti-revolutionary stage, some of them threatened the Armenians. Then, in the absorption stage, they used the central government's intolerance to undermine Hulki Paşa's position by implying that he was largely supported by Armenians. In the end, they succeeded in eliminating Hulki Paşa, by making the Ministry of War recall him. Another important fact was that the longtime hatred for Armenians among the Muslim people also reinforced the resistors. Soon, Cemal Bey, the new district governor, would replace Hulki Paşa in being the greatest authority that stood against the defenders of the status quo. For the anti-revolutionary camp, staying within the new system, even pointing to the need for following the legal procedures was enough to harm the challengers: By presenting his arbitrary measures, they successfully eliminated Hulki Paşa. In order to do the same to Cemal Bey, they would be forced to radicalize and would drift towards illegal forms of resistance. Where these Muslims were not successful in holding their power through institutional avenues of the new regime, they passed from absorption to anti-revolution. While doing this, the hateful crowd rose again: This was not that difficult under conditions where the relations Muslims and non-Muslims were deteriorating: Where even the moderates resent to it, the ones who were totally alien to the new regime's principles, mostly the Muslim masses must

have been much more reactionary. They reacted even during the first celebrations and attacked Armenians, perceiving the revolution as the formation of an Armenian state. Their harassment went on during the fall of 1908. So, Cemal Bey's close relations with some Armenians could be exploited: By pointing to these, they presented him as a secret ally of theirs, fueling the most exaggerated rumors of an Armenian plot. After a certain point, the Muslim crowd attacked him on such grounds. This caused Armenians to retreat to their own neighborhoods, thinking that a massacre could be at their door.

The central government was in a very weak position to produce a response to this attack. It did not have sufficient numbers of civilian and military personnel devoted to the new regime's principles. It also could not rely on its local reserve soldiers. From the capital, it sent in regular forces, whose journey was made under harsh conditions. Also, members of the judiciary (Âşir Bey), and even the Governor of Ankara himself (Hazım Bey) had personal ties with the offenders. Therefore, they were unwilling to punish the offenders. All these show the limits of central state power in Kayseri during the first year of the constitutional regime.

Despite all this strife, Cemal Bey held on. Yet the news of the Massacres was another opportunity to get rid of him. This time, the rumors seemed much more realistic than the previous ones: News of the massacre was alarming and the Armenians' recent retreat to their neighborhoods and preparations for self-defense was seen as a preparation for an attack. Being not a counter-revolutionary but a populist (*avamperest)*, Hulki Paşa's successor, Hüsnü Paşa did not question the rumors and was in a collision with Cemal Bey. They argued over the issue of calling up the reserve forces. These soldiers were from the very Muslim mob that had raised the ethnic tension. Together with the mob, they tried to take weapons and ammunition from the armory by force. Some of them succeeded. Under those conditions, Cemal Bey, working unwillingly in Kayseri since his arrival, lost his temper and decided to resign. It was the Governor of Ankara, Mehmed Tevfik Bey, and major of regulars, Hamid Zafer Bey who managed to calm him. They stood firm and prevented Kayseri from becoming another Adana.

The central government's reaction was a little different from the one during the previous incident. This time, due to the revolutionary mode after the suppression of the 31 March Revolt, there was pressure from Armenian and Western public opinions. Yet despite all possible measures, the local Muslim elites' power was unmatched. The government tried to fulfill some important demands of Cemal Bey concerning security and reforming the provincial bureaucracy. Yet this was only partially successful. Worse, when it came to punishing the offenders, the central government again failed to demonstrate its power.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the story of Kayseri in the first year of the Young Turk regime regarding ethno-religious relations, state power, and revolutionary political conjuncture. First of all, all three moments –the post-revolutionary events, the first assault on Cemal Bey, and the events during the 31 March Incident– showed that relations between Muslims and Armenians in the post-revolutionary Ottoman Empire were highly related to different understandings of the revolutionary principles. Statements of American missionaries from nearby regions and early correspondences of Cemal Bey revealed that the gap between some Armenians' interpretation of these principles in the provinces and that of moderate figures seems to be very wide, let alone the conservative Muslims. For instance, Armenian Prelate Drtad Efendi's early conflict with Cemal Bey shows that the conflict between Muşeğ Seropyan and Adana officials was not peculiar to Adana.

In this regard, the anti-revolution was existent from the very beginning, and it was deeply interrelated to the hatred against Armenians. In hindsight, the revolutionary dreams may have started to shatter even during the first days of the Young Turk Revolution. The interesting fact is that, in Kayseri, attacks against Armenians and government officials went hand in hand, carried out by this same group during the last two events, making one question if the state played an encouraging role in similar tensions.

Another important fact to be noted is the central government's terribly limited infrastructural power. After the first assault on Cemal Bey, it could not react quickly, had to send armed forces from the capital – a process that took a long time. Even this was barely enough to prevent the next attempt,

which was simultaneous with the 31 March Incident. During that event, it had to rely on reserves. Moreover, it was unable to severely punish the offenders.

Talat Bey's polemic with Cemal Bey is also striking in the sense that policymakers of the CUP started to reflect on their inabilities. The new phase of political struggle that they entered was required electoral and bureaucratic support, and to acquire such, they had to get along with the provincial Muslims. Crushing of the counterrevolutionaries in the capital should not make us think that it was defeated as a behavior. On the contrary, they may have prevailed in the long run. It was highly possible that within the CUP, voices for more pro-Muslim policies started to gain the upper hand after the great upheaval of the 31 March Incident. Talat's maneuvering with his double-plays –criticism of Cemal in front of the Muslims in İzmid on one hand, and his denials on the other– by early 1910 is not a coincidence in this sense.

4

Maraş

Meşrutiyet bir kısım ahalinin ve bahusus eben an ced devlet ve millete sadakat ve hidmetle maruf ulema ve eşrafın zulm ve itisafla mahv edilmesi, vükela ve erkan-ı devlete mazlumiyetlerini işittirememeleri değildir. Evvelce de arz olunduğu vechle Memâlik-i Osmaniye sahihan meşrutiyetle idare olunuyor ise meşrutiyet ve adaletten hissemend edilmekliğimizi değilse gördüğümüz zulm-i ihkak-ı hakkı Allah'a bırakarak cerr etmek veya başka bir hami aramak üzere haberdar edilmekliğimizi masumane ekiden istirham eyleriz ferman.[1]

– BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 8a, Telegram from three detainees in Aleppo to the Cabinet, August 15, 1325.

1 As submitted before, we firmly and innocently demand to be given our share from constitutionalism and justice if the Ottoman State is really ruled by constitutionalism, or if not, be informed that we should either leave the unjust oppression to God or look for another protector.

> *Vicdan-ı pak-ı askeriyelerine müracaatla sual ederiz: Heyetimizin Maraş'ta ifa-yı vazife edebilmesi mümkün müdür? Sınıf-ı gayr-ı Müslime rüesasının kableliğtişaş telgrafiyyen vukubulan müracaatlarıyla müsbet olduğu üzere akdemce olduğu gibi bu kere de keyfe tabi olmak muamelat-ı ahireden dolayı atiyyen dahi emniyet-i dahiliyenin ihlal ve şimdilik değilse de idare-i örfiyenin lağvından sonra hal-i sabıkın iadesine yardım etmez mi? Yılanın başı serbest kaldıktan sonra kuyruğuna ilişilmesi faide verir mi?*[2]
>
> – BOA, BEO, 3597/269767, 5a, Telegram from Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey to the Ministry of War, June 24, 1325.

The series of events that are summarized in this chapter cost fewer lives than those in the Adana Massacres. Within the Maraş town itself, there were seven losses, while by 27 April, the state could detect 43 losses within the whole district governorate.[3] In fact, these repercussions of the Massacres of 1909 on Maraş town center is not the main theme of this chapter. Instead, what deserves more attention for the purpose of this work is the Muslim people's attack on Hayri Bey, the District Governor, in the winter of 1908-1909.

Just like the attack on Cemal Bey in Kayseri, some Muslims in Maraş attacked their district governor Hayri Bey on religious grounds, which can be defined as insulting Islam. During the attack, the Muslim mob claimed that he was a giaour who collaborated with the unfaithful. And just like in Kayseri, hearing the slogans of the offenders, the Armenians retreated to their houses,

2 By appealing to the "clear conscience" of the Minister of War, we ask: Is it possible for the Court-Martial to perform its duty? As proven by the non-Muslim leaders' pre-disorder applications via telegram, would not those arbitrary implementations lead to the violation of security and the restoration of the former situation, if not now, after the lifting of Martial Law? If the snake's head was free, would teasing its tail offer a benefit?

3 See part 4.4 entitled Maraş and the Massacres of 1909.

fearing a massacre. Because of this incident, Hayri Bey would be forced to leave the town and come to lose his life on the road to Aleppo. This event, which will be called "The Hayri Bey Incident" in the following pages, will be at the center of this chapter.

Very interestingly, the investigation and trials of the Incident could start only after the Massacres of 1909, because the officials could not start the process in the absence of enough armed forces. This was because the offenders were mostly the powerful notables of Maraş. When the investigation started with the Martial Law, the officers faced with their strong resistance: Throughout the whole process Muslim notables made lobbies, organized demonstrations, and sent many correspondences. During this process, there was also a polemic between the Muslim elites and the army officers. Above, in the two quotations, we see the arguments of each side of this polemic, which was about whether the Incident had been related to the "reaction". The reader will notice that this was also a polemic about how to interpret the new regime principles. On one side, the offenders claimed that what they had done was right: The incident had been a peaceful demonstration. Also, they argued that it was in line with constitutionalism because it was a protest against a prohibition of a Quran verse. Being put on trial by the Court-Martial was arbitrary, and it was against the constitution. On the other side, army officers defended that the attack on Hayri Bey was related to the "reaction", because the notables used extra-legal force against the government. Moreover, the officers accepted the view of Hayri Bey, who had believed that the Muslim elites had put forward a prayer issue to cover the motivation behind their attempt to get rid of him. In fact, the movement had been caused by his effort to put a law that regulated and limited rice cultivation into effect. So, for the officers, the Incident had been an act against the rule of law.

In this chapter, I partially agree with the argument of the officers. I try to demonstrate that Hayri Bey Incident was another anti-revolutionary movement because it was really a show of extra-legal force to prevent the implementation of the law. The careful reader can realize that the first quotation above shows that as their view was ignored, the notables started to question the new regime itself. The reader at this point can recall that this feature, which can be summarized as the anti-revolutionary potential to

transform from anti-revolutionaries to counterrevolutionaries, from the introduction. One main theme of this chapter is that point: Although the Court-Martial officers pushed for taking strong measures, the notables' resistance partially prevented them.

Another major theme in this chapter is the role of religion in anti-revolutionary movements. In the introduction, I tried to show the contemporaries' tendency to remain silent about the confrontation between religious discrimination justified by Islamic principles and the universalist equality principle: Even the sultans avoid entering this sphere. In this case, the officers also remained silent on the religious sphere, which was brought forward by the notables again and again. In the introduction, we also observed that the historiography also belittled the role of religion in such movements: In the analyses of many historians popular Islam was nothing but an instrument in the 31 March Incident, which is defined by me as the greatest anti-revolutionary movement of the era. It is in this chapter I give credit to the importance of the rice issue, yet I object to the idea that religious motivation was only instrumental. I question the instrumental reasoning. Prevention of the prayer had a role of its own, both as a cause and an effect of the Incident. This is because the prayer was a Quranic verse: Its forbiddance was an open rejection of the religion itself. So, the religious aspect itself was also a motivation for many offenders. Even if the rice cultivation had been the case for some Muslims, the religious discourse itself would have very serious side effects, which deserve to be taken seriously: During the Incident, the Muslim mob cursed Christians, blamed Hayri Bey for being a Christian, and Armenians of the town were so scared that they had to retreat to their houses. In this sense, the story of this chapter confirms one argument in the introduction -that instead of old-fashioned determinism, we should observe several spheres' influences on each other.

The Court-Martial officials' relating the Hayri Bey Incident with the 31 March Incident will confirm another argument, which was made in the introduction and the previous chapter: that there was a close relationship between the anti-revolutionary movements and the hatred of non-Muslims, particularly the Armenians. In this sense, the trial process after the incident showed an early sign of how the new regime fell short of the constitutionalist

expectations of the large segments of the Ottoman Armenian public: This sign is the attitude and the correspondence of the high-ranking army officers sent after the Massacres. They show that in the minds of the officials of Regulatory Forces and Court-Martial, the relation between revolutionary principles and the situation of Armenians were not much related to each other. In fact, these officers, who showed their enthusiasm for defending the regime against the reactionaries, followed such a hawkish Armenian policy that they would be warned by the central government. The local Armenian community would be treated very roughly, leading to many complaints.

§ 4.1 Background

Flourishing at the juncture of four regions (Cilicia, Mesopotamia, Eastern and Central Anatolia), Maraş has always been a town influenced by different cultures. The fact can be observed from the variety of its previous names, such as Maraj, Marqas, Marasion, Markaji, Marasin, Marassa, Mer'aş and Germanikeia.[4] The region has been inhabited since the rise of the Hitite Empire. After Hitite rule, Assyrians took control of the town for about two hundred years. Then they were replaced by Persian, Greek, and Seleucid Empires. After a period of Armenian control, it was conquered by the Roman Empire. Because it lies between several greater regions, the states which control each of these regions have always entered into great conflicts for control of the Maraş region. Therefore, from the arrival of the Caliphate armies until the conquest of the Ottoman Empire, the region passed into several hands, including the First Crusades, Danishmends, Nureddin Zengi, Seljuks of Rum, Ayyubids, Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, Ilkhanate Empire, and Mamelukes.

For a very long period of Ottoman rule, Maraş was the capital of the Dulkadir State, the former vassal of Mamelukes. By 1866, Maraş became a district of the Aleppo Governorate, which was 44 hours away at the beginning

4 Fevziye Eker, "Kahramanmaraş'ın Tarihi Coğrafyasına Bir Bakış," in *Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 10, no. 2 (June 2013): 26.

of the 20th century.[5] The number and names of its subdistricts changed several times until 1908. By that year, Maraş had five subdistricts, namely, Zeytun, Elbistan, Göksun, Pazarcık and Maraş center.[6] Soon after, in 1915, Maraş would become an autonomous district.[7]

By 1908, 67,974 people were living in Maraş. Among them, 46,557 were Muslim, 19,694 were Christian, 213 were Jewish and 1,510 were foreign citizens. Within the greater district, there were 138,311 Muslims, 34,615 Christians, 213 Jews and 1,510 foreigners. While the percentage of Christians within the town center was about 29%, it was only 19% in the greater district, which shows that local Christians were more urbanized than the Muslims.[8] It is believed that due to the educational, financial, and political support of foreign powers, the Christian population grew in the last decades.[9] However, the percentage of Christians seems stable between 1869 and 1908. In fact, there was a slight decrease from 22% to 20%.[10]

So far, there is no detailed work that dwells on the happenings in the Maraş town center during the Hamidian Massacres. However, there are some very detailed documents about it, which are published by the General Directorate of the State Archives. These documents point to a series of conflicts related to the Zeytun Rebellion, dated November 1311. According to these documents, throughout the whole Maraş district, 218 civilian Muslim men were killed, whereas the number of Armenian casualties was 352 men and 14 women.[11] Although these documents reflect anti-Armenian prejudices and

5 Harun Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu*, (Kahramanmaraş: Dulkadiroğlu Belediyesi, 2015), 9.

6 In that year Göksun replaced Andırın as the subdistrict center. See Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu,* 20.

7 İlyas Gökhan, *Başlangıçtan Kurtuluş Harbine Kadar Maraş Tarihi*, (Kahramanmaraş: Ukde Kitaplığı, 2011), 28.

8 Harun Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu,* 54.

9 See Yaşar Alparslan's introduction to the Anonymous booklet that is written to answer Aleppo Governorate's questions about Maraş in Yaşar Alparslan & Emin Toroğlu, *1914 Yılı Maraş Kazası*, (Kahramanmaraş: Noya Medya, 2015), 12-13.

10 Harun Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu* ,78.

11 BOA, HR.SYS, 2791/5 ; BOA, HR.SYS, 2810/2; (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni İsyanları II*, [Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2008])

the tale of events and the numbers were naturally speculative, they point to the existence of a very serious conflict which claimed many lives.

In the previous chapter that touched upon the events in Kayseri, post-revolutionary upheavals within the town were the starting point. These serious conflicts in Kayseri were observed through secondary sources and some newspapers because documents on that incident in the Ottoman Archives were very sparse. Unfortunately, this is the same for post-revolutionary Maraş. Making matters worse, there are no secondary works mentioning the event. The limited documents give the impression that there were relatively fewer demanding and violent events in the town.

§ 4.2 Hayri Bey Incident: Was it the Rice or the Prayer?

In the previous chapter on Kayseri, almost all happenings covered Cemal Bey. Therefore, presenting his worldview at the beginning of the chapter was crucial in understanding the events through his reflections on them. For the Maraş case, things are a little different: In the Ottoman Archives, Hayri Bey's previous career does not provide many clues about Hayri Bey's worldview: He was appointed to the Sub-District Governorate of Kırşehir in June 1317, and Mersin in April 1318, and Divaniye in June 1322.[12] For an event which we choose to entitle in reference to his name, this lack of information seems like a major loss. However, his leaving the scene with his immediate death will bring other actors to the foreground in the debates about the interpretation of the Incident. In this respect, our lack of knowledge about his worldview becomes less significant.

Mehmed Hayri Bey was appointed to the District Governorate of Maraş in September.[13] So when the news of the revolt against the District Governor was received in the capital on 14 December, he had been the district governor for about three months. On that very day, Hayri Bey informed the Ministry about the background of the movement against him. His telegram is worth dwelling on for three reasons: First, it is the only document that showed his

12 BOA, DH.SAİDd.. 2/730; BOA, DH.SAİDd.. 80/173.

13 *Tanin,* no: 50, 6 September 1324, p.8; BOA, BEO, 3399/254922, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, September 4, 1324.

perspective. Second, it has the most detailed account of events. Third, the Court-Martial, which would investigate the event, give sentences, and argue with the Muslim notables over constitutionalism, would build its argument on the base of this telegram. Below is his summary: One month prior, on Friday, while he had been showing his Christian guests around, the preacher of a nearby mosque had made a prayer that invoked the phrase "والمشركين واقتل الكفرته وال غجر ته".[14] His guests protested that prayer and left the scene. After the prayer, Hayri Bey summoned the preacher privately and counseled him in the following manner: He stated that the need for different communities to get along well had been more important than ever. The cursing had not been rightful. It would have been more legitimate to say good prayers to the Caliph. One had to be cautious about prayers, which could become material for dangerous dissidence. For Hayri Bey, the prayer matter had been closed after this advice. However, six days prior, in the district administrative council, it had been decided that in compliance with the rice regulation, permission should be granted to plant rice between January and February, on the fields that the law allows. In response to that decision, chief Muslim Cleric Mustafa Efendi, Accounting Chief Clerk Hasan Efendi, Devezade Hacı Mehmed Efendi and his brother Ömer Efendi, Hüdayizade Tahsin Efendi, Bayezidli Ali and Hakkı and Mehmed Beys and other cohorts, all of whom "had been used to plant rice illegally and had gotten involved in anti-constitutionalism at every turn" had threatened Hayri Bey not to implement the regulation. After his resistance, by taking advantage of his illness that made him bed-ridden for four days, they encouraged the mob to take action on the matter of the prayer. They had threatened the preacher by instructing him to curse the infidels. After that, Hayri Bey summoned the chief Muslim cleric and other people again and counseled them by showing the books about Islamic law. On the day of this telegram, following the Chief Muslim Cleric's advice and preaching in the afternoon prayer, some provocateurs had taken the green flag that they had strived to raise against the constitutional rule, had given it to a mob of two hundred people, and had made them head to the government building. Seventy or eighty hundred

14 This is an ordinary prayer in Arabic, which means "And kill his kufrth and his gypsies and the mushrikeen"

people had joined them on the road to his house. When they came near the house in which he was lying sick, they demanded him to leave Maraş, shouted, and broke some windows. They scattered later in the evening. With the arrival of Colonel Halid Bey, the Commander of Maraş, security was ensured, as he had sent patrol units. Upon Hayri Bey's request, regular troops were brought in. He wrote that a very comprehensive investigation committee and a battalion of regular soldiers had to be sent in immediately.[15] Hayri Bey also added that the offenders were contemptuous of the new regime and they looked at their Christian townsman with evil intent.[16]

Hayri Bey sent the same telegram to the Governorate of Aleppo too. Yet both the central government and Aleppo Governor Reşid Bey refused Hayri Bey's demands from the beginning: The Governor summoned him immediately to Aleppo "to prevent uglier events". Even though his illness prevented him from making this trip, he had to appoint the Deputy Muslim Judge as deputy.[17] It seems that the insurgents' lobbying bore fruit: Within the same day of the rebellion, on 14 December, they simultaneously sent several telegrams to Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and Sheikh al-Islamate. In most of the telegrams, there was a different claim about the prayer issue: It was mentioned that Hayri Bey prohibited reciting Quranic verses. The curse that Hayri Bey mentioned in his telegrams was absent in their telegrams. One telegram, in which it was written that people were troubled with the attack on the district governor shows that there were also ones supporting Hayri Bey, yet that was all. Both groups –for and against the district governor- accused each other of being among the "despots" (*müstebidler*) who wanted the restoration of the old regime -an early sign about the interpretations of the new regime's vocabulary. When Sheikh al-Islamate and the Presidency of the Senate inquired about the events, the Ministry of Interior informed them that

15 So far we did not know whether he implied Hamidian Massacres or post-revolutionary events.

16 BOA, DH.MKT, 2702/74, 1a, 1b, From the District Governorate of Maraş to the Ministry of Interior, December 14, 1324.

17 BOA, DH.MKT, 2695/84, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, December 15, 1324.

Hayri Bey was called back.[18] Yet already suffering from dysentery, Hayri Bey passed away at the Antep American Hospital. In the future pages, we will observe that his death would be a matter of debate: While the Court-Martial officers would believe that it had been the Incident that cost his life, the convicts would defend that the protests had nothing to do with his death.

The offenders were subdued the Friday following Hayri Bey's departure: Colonel Halid Bey, the Commander of Maraş, wrote that on that day more than five thousand people assembled in the Grand Mosque, which was a lot more than usual. There were people who came from the outskirts. There, the crowd waited to see how the Friday sermon would be made. The Commander told the preacher to perform it as it used to be done. The sermon given in the old fashion style pleased the people. For the commander, the security problem in Maraş was over after that event for the time being.[19]

4.2.1 *The Rice*

The story of the Hayri Bey Incident in the Ottoman archival documents was as such. In the following pages, we will observe two interconnected debates that came forward during the struggle between the Court-Martial officers and the local Muslim convicts. The first one was about whether the Incident was counterrevolutionary or not, and the second one was whether the rice issue was the incident's underlying cause or not. For the army officers, the Incident was surely counterrevolutionary, and religion was instrumental for the locals' desire to continue illegal rice cultivation. For the locals, on the other hand, the Incident had nothing to do with counterrevolution; rather it was a continuation of revolutionary movements. Also, they claimed that the protest was not about rice cultivation at all. Rather, the real reason was a religious one.

The argument of the soldiers was parallel to the analysis of the 31 March Incident by the scholarship, which was briefly summarized in the introduction. Both believed that religion had an instrumental role in those

18 BOA, DH.MKT, 2733/3, 1a, Copies of the telegrams from Maraş people to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, December 14, 1324; BOA, DH.MKT, 2702/81, 1a, From Maraş people to Sheikh-ul-Islamate. December 14, 1324.

19 BOA, DH.MKT, 2706/67, 1a, From Deputy District Governorate of Maraş to the Police Ministry, December 20, 1324.

movements. Against those, I defended that such instrumental reasoning should be left out. Here I have to remind the reader that I do not deny the huge role of material interests as a motivation. In fact, the first thing I try to do below is to summarize the importance of rice cultivation in the economy of the town.

The few persons who wrote about the event later shared the same instrumentalist logic as the soldiers: According to Besim Atalay, for example, the brief account of the Hayri Bey Incident was as such: To prevent malaria in the town, Hayri Bey wanted rice regulation which had never been implemented to be put into practice. The regulation was to limit rice cultivation. As they had large rice plantations, some elites were against this regulation, and they looked for ways to get rid of Hayri Bey. Soon, his objection against a curse against Christians would come to their minds as an opportunity. They would claim that Hayri Bey prohibited Quranic verses, and mobilize the mob against him. And the title of the chapter of this story was "A Religious Reaction" (*Bir İrticâ'-i Dini*).[20]

Missionaries and local Armenians were also thinking that the real cause of the Hayri Bey Incident was rice regulation. In his 14 January 1909 letter to James L. Barton, Dr. Frederick William MacCallum wrote the following about the Incident: Two weeks prior, the governor had been relieved of his office, because he had been charged with urging "the mullahs to omit a verse from the Quran in the Friday prayers". the verse in question was calling down curses on Jews and Christians. Yet the governor took the ground that "as all were brothers and fellow citizens now, that part should be dropped. This was regarded as an attack on Islam". This was the excuse for the demonstration against him, yet probably the real cause was:

> …his opposition to the plans of certain rich men who have large rice fields near the city. There is always a great deal of malarial fever caused by these fields, and to prevent this, the governor had declared that henceforth the law should be enforced and no new fields permitted within 4000 meters of the city. These rich men however need the

20 Atalay, *Maraş Tarihi ve Coğrafyası*, 80-81.

> religious fanaticism of the mob to accomplish their purpose of getting rid of this man…[21]

Why was rice regulation so important? What kind of changes could its implementation lead to? The discussions which took place in a session of the Chamber of Deputies a year after the Hayri Bey Incident is quite useful to understand how rice cultivation altered the social life of a locality in a variety of ways.

One dimension of the change is the great productivity of rice cultivation. For example, according to Rıza Paşa, the deputy of Karahisar-ı Sahip who defended the extension of rice cultivation, the cultivation of 5 *dönüms* of rice was more productive than cereal cultivation of 100 *dönüms*. Cereals would occupy a farm for about one and a half years and keep the farmer busy during this period. Rice, on the other hand, is "done" between March and September. While cereals needed fertilization once in ten years, the rice did not have such an issue.[22] Rice cultivation also had some disadvantages: One of them is that it enables illnesses like malaria, which can break out depending on the climate of plantation areas. Some deputies in the Chamber drew attention to this danger.[23]

A second problem was the distribution of the water needed for cultivation among the farm owners. These two problems were triggering a competition between them. High productivity rendered rice attractive, but because of health problems and water distribution issues, only some landowners stood

21 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 664, No.156-157, Letter from Dr. Frederick William MacCallum to Rev. James L. Barton, Marash, (14 January 1909).

22 M.M.Z.C. Term 1, Volume 2, Session 33, İ:33 19 January 325, pp. 62-63.

23 M.M.Z.C. Term 1, Volume 2, Session 33, İ:33 19 January 325, pp. 64, 84-88. However, this problem could vary according to region. For example, in one session, Ali Cenani Bey (deputy of Aleppo), Abdullah Azmi Efendi (Kütahya) and Artas Yorgaki Efendi (Salonica) drew attention to rice cultivation's impact on public health. Countering them, Ali Cenani Bey again, Mehmed Vehbi Efendi (Konya) Rıza Paşa (Karahisar-ı Sahip) and Mehmet Şevket Paşa (Divaniye) argued that rice cultivation's negative effects on health were limited in their districts. In Şevket Paşa's example of Baghdad, there were rice plantations only ten meters away from settlements, and no epidemics were seen. Accordingly, Galip Efendi (Karesi) criticized the new amendment for settingthe limit on the distance only by considering places like İstanbul and Hüdavendigar.

to benefit from it. This could trigger competition among the elites.[24] Rıza Paşa (Karahisar-ı Sahip) cited an example illustrating this subject: In the distant past, immigrants from Dağıstan and Rumeli had arrived in Bursa and had been given lands suitable for rice cultivation which they embarked upon. Especially people from Dağıstan had found a "plentitude" of a ratio of 1:80. People of Rumeli had followed suit. The ones who had seen this and had missed the opportunity these lands presented –they were the ones who had the control of the provincial council- had then banned rice cultivation. For this reason, rice cultivation in Bursa had remained prohibited for more than 20 years. The people of Bursa decided to consult the Chamber of Deputies after the revolution concerning this matter. According to Rıza Paşa, rice plantation could also help notables control small landholding rice farmers, whose lands of five to ten dönüms were called "*çorbalık*".[25]

It was state officials who decided on the extent of these limits. As officials were usually from local notables, the main criterion for decision depended more on relations based on self-interest than on science. Another example cited by Rıza Paşa on this fact is striking: As he learned from the governor of Bursa, under the effect of "influentials", the town's inspector of health wrote a report in which he noted that rice threatens public health. The agronomist official, on the other hand, is scared of receiving no visitors (referring to the social exclusion) in the town and was influenced by his relatives.[26] Despite all these obstacles, there was populist rhetoric that all people must have the right to plant rice. It is observed that some deputies in the Chamber represented this thought in the discussions.[27]

Among these various talking points, it seems the high productivity of rice cultivation and its potential to cause malaria frequently came forward in Maraş. Malaria was a big problem in the region, yet whether rice paddies near the town center were causing it had always been a matter of debate. For

24 M.M.Z.C. Term 1, Volume 2, Session 33, İ:33 19 January 325, pp. 74-75.

25 M.M.Z.C. Term 1, Volume 2, Session 33, İ:33 19 January 325, pp. 63.

26. M.M.Z.C. Term 1, Volume 2, Session 33, İ:33 19 January 325, pp. 75.

27 For example, Mehmed Vehbi Efendi (Konya) defended that people were suffering from this law, and it must be abolished, so that everyone could plant rice. M.M.Z.C. Term 1, Volume 2, Session 33, İ:33 19 January 325, pp. 63.

instance, Atalay writes that in Maraş, "agriculture is performed according to traditional patterns; rice is planted the most; rice, which is planted near the town smothers the surrounding with malaria".[28] Alparslan and Toroğlu, on the other hand, give more detailed information about the issue and claim otherwise:

> Malaria: Although rice is cultivated 2,500 meters to the Southwest of Maraş, malaria is seen very rarely. Presumably, the wind that is mentioned above prevents mosquitos from getting into dwellings. However, this does not mean that there is no malaria at all in Maraş. Malaria is an illness that is seen quite a lot. This malaria is not a product of Maraş, it is rather coming mostly from Pazarcık. The worker and sharecropper mob that travels to Pazarcık carries it back with their return… There, nearly all Maraş people who go to Pazarcık for work are diseased by malaria and because of ferocious fever, they fall like ninepins.[29]

Rice's place in the economy of Maraş has always been significant: Although 60% of its lands were mountainous, Maraş had fertile plains and relatively warm weather in the south. The town of Maraş, which is about 550-700 meters above sea level is within that sub-region. Because its climate is affected by the Mediterranean Sea as well as Eastern and Central Anatolian lands, several forms of agriculture are available in the region.[30] Rice had a significant place among them: Rice in Maraş, which is called "the yellow paddy" was peculiar. It does not go into porridge easily, and it had a taste of its own.[31] It had a better quality than the Indian rice by the beginning of the 1890s. Its quality made rice one of the most important export goods in Maraş. It was sold in Middle Asia, Egypt and other regions of the Ottoman Empire.[32] Another important

28 Atalay, *Maraş Tarihi ve Coğrafyası*.

29 Alparslan & Toroğlu, *1914 Yılı Maraş Kazası*, 71-72.

30 Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu*, 2, 8, 9.

31 Alparslan & Toroğlu, *1914 Yılı Maraş Kazası*, 11.

32 Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu*, 101. How much rice was produced at that time in Maraş centre is not clear: Sources provide different tables: In the anonymous 1914 report transcribed by Alparslan and Toroğlu, 500.000 kıyye is

point is that common people could partially benefit from rice cultivation too. Because a few landowner families took the control of most arable lands in Maraş in those years, the remaining people were sharecroppers, petty producers, and gardeners.[33] It is also important to note that Armenians were also important rice cultivators in Maraş. Large fields were in the hands of merchant families such as Kherlakians, Topalians, Muradians, Arekians, Varjabedians, and the Kesadjekians.[34]

The conflict between rice's economic benefits and public health issues continued to cause tension between the state and the locals which would last until the end of the 1940s when the usage of DDT began.[35] By 1909, most probably the terrible economic conditions were increasing the possibility for much higher tension: When he visited Maraş after fourteen years in 1909, Swiss missionary Léopold Favre reported that the economic condition of

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the number. Şahin gives the number 5.000.000 okka by quoting the list of Atalay. Given that in both lists, the amount of other products was exactly the same in number but different in measurement units (except rice) either Atalay or the writer of the 1914 report had made a mistake (by adding or removing a zero and changing the measurement unit). If both numbers are compared with the one claimed by cuinet for production in 1890 (10.000 kile), it is seen that the ratio of rice production to other cereals was 645/10. If we accept the ratio of the anonymous writer of 1914 (600/10), then it can be claimed that production ratio did not change much. Yet if we accept Atalay's ratio (60/10), than this means that there was a great rise in rice cultivation in those last years. For Quinet's table, see Harun Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu,* 133. For the other list, see Atalay, *Maraş Tarihi ve Coğrafyası*, p. 177; and Alparslan & Toroğlu, *1914 Yılı Maraş Kazası*, 80-81.

33 Alparslan & Toroğlu, *1914 Yılı Maraş Kazası*, 65; Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu*, 141.

34https://www.houshamadyan.org/mapottomanempire/vilayetaleppo/sandjakofmarash/economy/industry-and-commerce.html

35 For a dramatic story that points to the dilemma, see the article about a Maraş shepherd's dream in a local newspaper in Christopher Gratien, The Mountains are Ours: Ecology and Settlement in Late Ottoman and Early Republican Cilicia, 1856-1956, (Ph.D. Thesis, Georgetown University, 2015), 610-612. While he writes about the clash over rice cultivation, Gratien also mentions the Maraş people's complaints about rice regulation in 1909, yet does not write about Hayri Bey Incident. See Ibid.,. 281.

Maraş was much worse than before.[36] The telegram which was sent from representatives of Armenians, Catholics, Protestants and Jews in the town to the Ministry of the Interior on 2 December 1324 shows the deteriorating economic structure of Maraş, together with its evolution and its effects on Christians. According to them, the subdistrict's geographical location was not suitable for the advancement of trade and craft. Roads for which they were paying taxes for 18 years were still not built. The subdistrict's imports were exceeding its exports by 90,000 liras and this was increasing poverty. Their primary craft, textile production and trade (*Alacacılık*), which was a kind of weaving, were "quite dead". The number of workers in this sector had fallen from 2,000 to 500. For this reason, about half of the people were permanently unemployed. Inflation had also increased their suffering. Another means of living, agriculture, was also insufficient. In Maraş, each household was supplying its annual cereals by summer. Yet that year more than 1,500 families had no food from day to day, and they were desperate for "one dark penny" as a daily wage. Many families of five or six persons had to share one quilt and would walk barefoot in the cold. Some indigents who failed to pay their taxes were imprisoned for about seventy-eighty months. For the remaining ones, notice letters were being written. People were applying to religious representatives, demanding food and the release of those imprisoned. The ecclesiastics demanded the delay of tax collection and asked for financial aid for the inhabitants.[37] For a town that had 281 handlooms by 1890, this was a terrible economic picture.[38]

The importance of rice cultivation can be observed not only in the pre-Incident documents but also in the reports written after the declaration of Martial Law. In addition to the trials, the Court-Martial also decided to tackle this issue and demanded a report about the health problems that rice cultivation lead to. The committee examined rice farms' effects on public health. Those farms were the ones which were at a maximum of five kilometers

36 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 618, No.875-876, Report of Mr. Favre to the International Committee, Constantinople (15 December 1909).

37 BOA, DH.MKT, 2686/78, 1a, 1b, From Armenian, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious leaders to the Ministry of Interior, 2 December 1324.

38 Harun Şahin, *XX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Maraş Sancağı'nın İktisadi, Mali ve Sosyal Durumu*, 84.

from the town. The committee decided that those rice farms were bad for health: Especially during summer -when the report was also written- rotting animal and vegetable corpses on the bottom of the marshes were creating a harmful gas. The gas would spread on the winds from the southwest and east of Maraş carrying the gas to the town. This was leading to Malaria.[39] According to the second article of rice regulation, rice cultivation was forbidden in the areas within five kilometers of the outermost household of Maraş. It could be planted nearby the villages to the extent that the regulation allowed. The water had to be kept draining. Before sowing, farmers had to get a certificate by applying to the government with a petition on which they had to write about their land's fertility, borders, owners, and a promise to obey the regulation. In Maraş, rice was planted in March. They had to apply about two months before the sowing, ie. between the beginning of January and the end of February. Those rules would be valid for Pazarcık and Göksun and were going to be declared in public.[40] The committee wrote to the headquarters to implement the regulation and demanded a map from the district governorate to detect the areas available for cultivation.[41] So, in the middle of June, the Court-Martial completed the change for which Hayri Bey had died.

With the Court-Martial's departure and the coming of the season of sowing, objections against the implementation of the rice regulation would start to surface. Those who wanted cultivation to be free, sent a common telegram to the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Ministry, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Ministry of Law. In their telegram, which is full of complaints, Karagökzade Mustafa and his thirty-two friends wrote about rice cultivation's benefits: Thanks to rice, people were earning 40,000 liras each, and the treasury was taking in 10,000 liras. Rice was also making the land more fertile. Until now, no one had been harmed by it. Yet despite these, the governorate's telegram on rice cultivation which had been sent to İstanbul was ignored. The regulation was implemented only in the farms near the town.

39 BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 10a, June 19, 1325.

40 BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 11a, June 19, 1325.

41 BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 12a, numro 625 From Bekir Sadık, the President of Maraş Court-Martial to Maraş Headquarters, From Maraş Headquarters to the District Governorate of Maraş, July 5, 1325.

The infulential persons' farms and peasants remained exempt. The thirty three persons ended their telegram by asking sarcastic questions: Were they seen as foreigners that they were banned from rice plantation? If they were going to be prohibited even in the constitutional era, to whom could they hope to turn? Sowing season was about to come and they wanted the state to tackle the problem immediately.[42]

An amendtment to the regulation was also on the Chamber of Deputies' agenda at the time. The new regulation was expected to be passed before sowing season, yet the demands in the petitions were met immediately: The Agriculture Council noted that the demands for the continuation of the old way of cultivation had to be met. The Ministry of Interior forwarded this to the Governorate of Aleppo.[43] The agriculture official of the governorate was in Keseb at the time of those correspondences.[44] After his return from Keseb, he was sent to Maraş and wrote an alternative report against the previous one written by the committee that had included Court-Martial officers. After examinations and "discussions with owners of rice farms", it was concluded that if carried out with true methods, there was no reason to fear pollution of the town's air. Marshes three or four hours away from the town center could be turned into forests to alleviate the harm. In the summer, they were going to inspect the cultivated areas again.[45] The Forestry and Mining Ministry also

42 BOA, DH.MUİ, 65-36/3, 1a, From Karagökzade Mustafa and his company to the Ministry of Finance, January 30, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 65-36/4, 1a, From Karagökzade Mustafa and his company to the Chamber of Deputies, January 31, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 5a, From Karagökzade Mustafa and his company to Prime Ministry, January 31, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 6a, From Karagökzade Mustafa and his company to the Ministry of Interior; BOA, DH.MUİ, 65-36/2, 1a, From the ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Interior, February 6, 1325.

43 BOA, DH.MUİ, 65-36/5, 2a, January 31, 1325; 2 Şubat 325 BOA, DH.MUİ, 65-36/1, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, February 2, 1325.

44 BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 3a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 21, 1325.

45 BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 15a, Copy of Report March 27, 1326; BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 8a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Forestry, Raw Materials and Agriculture, March 10, 1326.

approved the report, except for an issue about forest watchmen.[46] In sum, after a revolt which had been caused by the implementation of a regulation –which had already been on the books-a committee in which army soldiers were in majority, wrote a report that rice cultivation was detrimental to public health. When the regulation was about to be amended, the state felt the need to meet the counter demand in Maraş. Even if for a short time, the state allowed rice cultivation illegally. The counter-report was written after the permission. Law and responsibility for public health took a backseat to local pressure.

4.2.2 *The Prayer*

The previous part revealed the huge role of rice regulation in the Incident. Hayri Bey's appeal for limiting rice cultivation by implementing a regulation that had long been ignored during the old regime in a time when economic conditions were so bad could have rendered the town even more precarious. For this reason, Hayri Bey faced great resistance: As he did not back down from his wish to implement the regulation, some elites of the town mobilized a group from the mob –who were most probably rice cultivators. However, their justification for this mobilization could not be the objection to a regulation's implementation. They had to find another pretext: That was to be about religious feelings. In an anonymous report written in 1914, it was written that: "The first point that catches the eyes of a stranger who came to Maraş is that its inhabitants' religiosity, which coincides with extremist bigotry".[47] In this context, Hayri Bey's interference in a specific prayer during a sermon after the Friday prayer a few weeks prior was a golden opportunity for his enemies.

Yet did that green flag, once it had been raised, stay only instrumental? It does not seem so: As we will see below, the prayer issue had triggered an outpouring of ethno-religious hatred. The certain thing is that the ones who wanted Hayri Bey to flee the town used the pre-existing hatred against non-Muslims: Hayri Bey was claimed to be a giaour, and Armenians retreated to their houses in fear, an action which always leads to mutual suspicions and

46 BOA, DH.MUİ, 59-2/33, 13a, the Ministry of Forestry, Raw Materials and Agriculture to the ministry of Interior, May 22, 1326.

47 "*Maraş'a gelen bir yabancının ilk nazarına çarpan bir husus sekenesinin son derece taassuba tevafuk eden dindarlığıdır*" Alparslan & Toroğlu, *1914 Yılı Maraş Kazası*, 64.

the fueling of rumors in nearly all similar cases. The whole story also shows that religion is not merely a simple instrument. Rather, it was a determinant not only in the causes but also the effects of the event: The attempt to limit rice regulation, which was claimed to be the cause of mobilization against Hayri Bey, was not absolute, as Armenian merchant families were also rice cultivators. Although we do not know whether all of their cultivation was to be affected by the regulation, some of it was bound to be. The absence of the rice issue in the two detailed articles of Manzume-i Efkar that will be mentioned below also supports this estimation. In that respect, the religious pretext of the Muslims was not simply a reflection of rice cultivators' interests in total. And when it comes to the effects, the impact of religion seems much more obvious: The fact that the "forbidden" prayer was about non-Muslims, along with the discriminatory expressions during the mobilization surely triggered the tension between two religious groups. Just like Guha agreed for power in his analysis in his well known "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency", the rice issue was not "a content wrapped up in a form external to it called religion".[48] All those facts are clear indications of the necessity to bring religion back into the analysis of the movements that were once regarded as counterrevolutionary.

The "my word against yours" situation in explaining the prayer that triggered the Hayri Bey Incident merits attention: On the one hand, we saw Hayri Bey's claim that what he advised not to pray was some ordinary words, saying "واقتل الكفرته وال غجر ته والمشركين". The prayer meant "and kill his kufrth and his gypsies and the mushrikeen". By openly writing the prayer and saying that it was an ordinary one, Hayri Bey clearly tried to give the impression that the phrase was neither a hadith nor a Quranic verse. He implied that the words were not that holy, as they belonged neither to Allah nor the prophet Mohammad. On the contrary, the offenders insisted that what Hayri Bey had prohibited were the words of Allah: they claimed that it was the "*Fensurna*", the last verse of *Sura-al-Baqarah*. That means "You are our Protector, help us against the unbelievers".

48 Ranajit Guha, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency", in *Selected Subaltern Studies* eds. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 78.

An alternative story about the prayer came from Besim Atalay years after. When he wrote about the Incident, Besim Atalay stated that in Maraş, praying "*Allahümme kahhar ağdaena, ağdaeddin vakhar kâfirete*"[49] after the sermon (*hutbe*) was a "tradition". What Hayri Bey did, according to him, was calling the imam of Ulu Mosque and saying "now there is a war, so why the need to make Christians suspicious? Even though we prayed for their suffering, how many giaour had died? If you can, work to lift Muslims to the level of Christians"[50] This story is contradictory, because, at that time, the Ottoman Empire was not at war with anyone else. Yet laying that aside, the prayer that Atalay mentioned is actually a hadith, words believed to belong to the prophet Mohammad, which means "my God, curse our enemies, your enemies and enemies of the religion". The Fensurna verse, on the other hand, is a different prayer, and includes the phrase "*fensurnâale'l-kavmi'l-kâfirîn*".

Whose claim was true? Indeed, a document revealed by Mesut Demir shows the possibility that the two prayers –the hadith that Atalay mentions and the verse that offenders insist on- were made together: During a demonstration made to celebrate the abolishment of capitulations in Yozgat by 1914, a religious scholar (*müderris*) spoke a prayer that includes both the hadith and the verse.[51] So, probably, both were made part of the same prayer, and they were said during the times of rising ethnic tensions: It being a banal tradition in Maraş is highly probable. Therefore, it is very possible that Hayri Bey tried to downplay his fatal mistake by his claim that the prayer had not been Quranic, that it had been an ordinary curse.

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49 "*Allahümme kahhir a'dâenâ ve a'dâeddîn*"

50 "*Şimdi harp var, Hıristiyanları böyle dualarla kuşkulandırmaya ne lüzum var? Bin seneden beri kahırlarına dua ettiğimiz halde kaç gavur öldü? Elinden gelirse İslamların Hıristiyanlar derecesinde yükselmesine çalış*" Besim Atalay, *Maraş Tarihi ve Coğrafyası*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1924), 80-81.

51 Mesut Demir, "Kapitülasyonların Kaldırılmasının Yozgat'ta Kutlanması –Bir Dua ve Bir Hakaret Davası," *I. Uluslararası Bozok Sempozyumu 5-7 May 2016 Bildiri Kitabı, II. Cilt: Yozgat'ın Siyasî, İçtimaî ve İktisadî Tarihi*, (Yozgat: Bozok Üniversitesi, 2016), 176-183. In his quotation from the document that includes the prayers, Mesut Demir puts an "and" (*ve*) between the two prayers. Yet in the original document, there are no words between the two prayers. So most probably they were part of a single prayer. See the document BOA, DH.EO, 637/144 Lef no: 11 in page 181.

Yet whosever claim was true, we must keep in mind that all prayers that were mentioned above were regarding the relations between "believers and non-believers". Moreover, both are contentious, uttering heavy words about non-Muslims. In addition, the belief that Hayri Bey is a giaour, as he hangs out with them is very similar to the ones that were in play in the attacks on Cemal Bey in Kayseri. Most probably, such complaints appeared as a result of the Revolution, as it was the Revolution itself that enabled officials to spend more time with non-Muslims freely. For example, in several parts of Anatolia, high-rank bureaucrats started to visit Armenian schools and churches.[52] It is very likely that the increasing contacts also had a private dimension for some of these officials like Cemal Bey and Hayri Bey. So, it is certain that there was a contentious religious motivation in the Hayri Bey protests in two senses: Intervening against prayers and having close relations with Christians. And it is that very religious motivation that would seem irreconcilable with the new state's principles about equality among its citizens of different faiths because the Muslim crowd's demand was to continue reciting prayers that insult the Christians.

Furthermore, the prayer issue had triggered tension between Armenians and Muslims. This can be seen in the two articles published by the Armenian newspaper Manzume-i Efkar. Although the details in those articles included some fiction and there were errors in the names that they mentioned,[53] there was enough evidence to the fact that the incident had a relation with the hatred against non-Muslims. The first article was a report published on 14 January, after Hayri Bey's death, titled "Signs of Bigotry and Paşa's Loss of Life from Fear". It included a lot of details that pointed to the background of the incident: Deputies of Maraş, Kadızade, and Bayezidli Bekir, were remnants of despotism. The people had objected to their election. Yet deputies' relatives, comrades, and some Turkish notables had tried to bring out the mob's bigotry

52 For such examples, see Ohannes Kılıçdağı, "Socio-Political Reflections and Expectations of the Ottoman Armenians After the 1908 Revolution: Between Hope and Despair", (Ph.D. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2014), 30-32.

53 The editor of the newspaper meant Kadızade Hacı Hasan Fehmi Efendi from Kadızade. Bayezidli Bekir must be the other deputy Şükrü Bey, yet so far I could not find out that he has another name. Also, district governor Hayri Bey was not a Paşa.

against Christians. After the prayers in the mosques, they used bad words against the "giaour" and organized a demonstration against the District Governor "Paşa", who is a "really good man" and was not supporting the despots. After the Friday prayer that Paşa had taken part in, provocative words that can galvanize the people had been shouted from the pulpit. Paşa, on the other hand, had tried to calm down the people and had said "there is no giaour here, we are all brothers and sons of the motherland". The following day, many Muslims gathered and raised the holy banner. Ten thousand men attacked the government building and shouted "we will kill the Paşa, who protects and is fond of the giaour", but they could not have found the Paşa. The second article was another more detailed version of the story with reference to a letter written on 25 December. According to the letter, on 14 December, all Muslims had assembled at the Great Mosque. Some had brought weapons and some had sticks. A mullah had climbed to a high place and said "well, sons of Mohammad, the time has come. Let us show our religion's strength. Let us go to the District Governor's house. He is an infidel anyway because he forbade us from praying to God". Other mullahs had agreed with him and provoked the people by saying "yes, we confirm that the Paşa is a giaour. He is always with the giaour. He is going to the churches and preaching there. Now our first mission is to kill this swine." The crowd had responded to them by shouting "long live the Sultan". They had raised the holy banner. In front of the District Governor's house, more than ten thousand people shouted "long live the Sultan, long live Sultan Hamid". To understand what they had been for, Paşa had gone to his window and asked "my sons, what is going on, what do you want?". Before his final words, the crowd had begun swearing and said "quickly, come down, we came here to kill you, the enemy of religion, swine, giaour". The Paşa was scared and fled to his Armenian neighbor's house by jumping from roof to roof. The mob had realized that the Paşa had escaped, and broken all windows. Then they attacked the Ottoman Club, yet many of them stayed in the mosque and they sent many telegrams against the district governor. The Paşa was called to Aleppo by telegram. Although he had taken the road with fifteen cavalrymen, the poor Paşa was scared and died at the Antep American Hospital before arriving at Aleppo. In those days, the Armenian community was in great fear, because they were getting prepared

to massacre them. The report ends with the lamentation "Where is liberty, where is the constitution?".[54]

The reactions of two other newspapers, Şura-yı Ümmet and Volkan, that represented two other political perspectives can also be cited as examples to two different approaches: As a Unionist newspaper caught in between the local Muslims and Armenians, Şura-yı Ümmet summarized the events on 26 December under the title "An Incident in Maraş": The newspaper chose to mention that Hayri Bey prohibited "Fensurna", the last sentence of Baqarah's last verse. Yet the newspaper also wrote about Hayri Bey's telegram in which he defended himself. His claim about the rice regulation was also published, yet his claim that he prohibited another prayer did not appear in the article.[55]

Two days later, Şura-yı Ümmet's article was cited in Volkan, the newspaper published by Derviş Vahdeti, the famous counterrevolutionary figure of the 31 March Incident. The newspaper's commentary about the incident began with the sentence "Oh God!" (*Aman ya Rabbi*): It exaggerated the event by writing that such a sad event has never existed in history. Yet the saddest event was not Hayri Bey's death: Rather, it referred to the prayer issue. Heavy terms were used in the newspaper for Hayri Bey, such as malign (*habis*), cruel (*gaddar*), ignorant (*cahil*) and crazy (*mecnun*). The newspaper made no comments about the rice issue and ended with the suggestion that Hayri Bey should have received an exemplary punishment.[56] So, it seems that the mood of the newspaper was similar to that of the offenders, and just like them, Volkan preferred to downplay the rice issue.

54 BOA, DH.EO, 545/27, 1a, Copy of the 14 January issue of the newspaper Manzume-i Efkar.

55 "Maraş'ta Bir Hadise," *Şura-yı Ümmet*, no: 140, 26 December 1324, p. 5.

56 "Şura-yı Ümmet'den: Maraş'da bir hadise," *Volkan*, no: 17, 28 December 1324, p. 3. (Available at *Volkan Gazetesi 11 Aralık 1908-20 Nisan 1909*, ed. M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, [İstanbul, İz yayıncılık, 1992], 75).

§ 4.3 Maraş and the Massacres of 1909

4.3.1 *Rising Ethnoreligious Tension Between Hayri Bey Incident and the Massacre in Maraş*

The documents show that the Incident had clearly a role in the rising ethnoreligious tension in the following days. The most detailed document, the report written by Commander Halid Bey, shows that several dimensions of this tension were very similar to the one in Adana: To communicate with the capital directly during his later trial, Halid Bey forwarded İstanbul two copies of this report, which had previously been sent to the Aleppo Regular Army Headquarters. There he explained the new events that occurred between 2 and 6 January. At the center of this tension were three elements that also existed in Adana: A priest's doings, mutual armament, and distrust: According to the Commander, a preacher called Der Nerses from Haçin came to the town and started to preach in Armenian schools and churches. He was claiming that he had a duty to establish the ancient Armenian National Assembly in Maraş, Zeytun, and Adana. Four representatives visited and told the commander that in his preachings Nerses had said "we need to arm ourselves in order to respond to the ones who do not obey and serve the laws by using our guns". They had added that for that reason some atrocious (*evbaşan*) Armenian people started to buy weapons. Yet they did not know how to use them: An Armenian had accidentally fired his Mauser while he was toying with it in the market. The single bullet hit one Armenian in his palm and his side and caused his death after five hours. Christian people had been saying that "this priest is encouraging our children to buy and supply arms. We do not want his preachment", so the Armenian representatives had closed down the school and the church that Der Nerses was going to preach. The story told by the representatives confirmed the ones of the soldiers on patrol: They had told the commander that as the church doors closed, more than two thousand Armenians had assembled there. Some of them began to shout. Soldiers dispersed them. The preacher was also fueling massacre rumors: He was telling that Muslims had been acquiring arms in great numbers and were going to massacre the Christians. The government and soldiers had to guard them. The commander assured the Armenian representatives and sent them

back. Following their leave, many Muslim notables and ulema had come and told that Christians were buying too many weapons: Armenian revolutionary committees were supplying a considerable number of guns and were distributing them in Maraş and Zeytun. The commander had assured them too and had given counsel. Later he learned that they told the same things to the deputy district governor.[57] That day, the commander reinforced the patrols and imposed fresh orders to the officers. Some of these officers brought him important news: According to the rumors, a group of Armenians were going to loot the armory and were going to start a massacre. The commander called the regular captain immediately and ordered him to be on alarm, make prison guardians stand by at the prison, and form new patrols, ten soldiers each, at the barracks and the armory. They were to be replaced every two hours.

On the day the first report was written, seeing the increasing tension, the Deputy District Governor demanded one reserve battalion be called to arms. At the same time, a commission that included both communities' religious leaders and notables was formed. Under the presidency of the Deputy District Governor, they started to negotiate to decide how the tension could be reduced. The following day, at nine o'clock, this commission was going to hold a meeting with the Armenian Prelate and the Committee of Union and Progress branch. The commander had also sent the representative of the Ottoman Fraternity and Solidarity Committee to the deputy district governor. The deputy district governor had visited the commander again and had told him that he had sent a cipher telegram to the governor to request soldiers or permission to call up reserve soldiers. At the end of his first report, the Commander wanted to warn the Ministry: Similar news was spreading not only in Maraş and Zeytun but also in other parts of Anatolia inhabited by Armenians. This situation was certainly remarkable. The Commander asked for permission from the Aleppo Regular Soldiers HQ to go to the Armenian Central School and asked what kind of a stance ought to be taken in case of a possible eruption of a violent event. In the second report, the commander informed that the danger was over: A meeting had taken place the following day. Speeches had been made, counsel had been given and negotiations had

57 Just before the writing of this report, the subdistrict governor Fatin Bey was appointed to the deputy district governorate.

taken place. It was promised that shooters would be punished. At 9 o'clock, more than ten thousand people from both communities had come together at the Armenian Central School. The benefits of rule of law and constitutionalism had been talked about. Those who opposed them would be punished. Everyone had to unite and be allies under the identity of the Ottomans. Deputy District Governor and Prelates had also made speeches. The commander wrote that this meeting had highly beneficial effects.[58]

4.3.2 *Central State: Inabilities and Denials*

Although Commander Halid Bey and Manzume-i Efkar were pointing out that the Hayri Bey Incident was related to ethnic relations, the central government denied the fact. Via Takvim-i Vekayi, the Ministry of Interior rejected the claims written in Manzume-i Efkar. According to the Ministry, the event was a "vulgar matter" (*adi mesele*): A disagreement between the District Governor and a few members of the ulema morphed into a very different shape over time. Rumor was that the Governor prohibited the ulema from performing their religious duty. Animated by this rumor, some Muslim people organized an aggressive demonstration against Hayri Bey's personality. The animosity between the Muslim and Christian peoples was immaterial. And Hayri Bey died of natural causes.[59] This "official" description would be challenged by the military officials after the Cilicia Massacre, a fact that would lead to an important conflict between them and the local Muslim elites.[60] However, we will not observe the religious aspect in the soldiers' objections. Instead, what they brought forward was the mobilizing against a state official for material purposes, the rice issue. From the first telegram of Hayri Bey himself to the latest documents, we will observe that pointing to or ignoring the religious aspect was a strategy for legitimization. In this respect, the tendency of the state officials to ignore the religious aspect intentionally.

58 BOA, DH.MKT, 2734/8, 1a, Copy of the Telegram from Halid Bey, the Commander of Maraş to Aleppo Regular Headquarters, January 6, 1324.

59 BOA, DH.EO, 545/27, 1a, Translation from the 14 January issue of the newspaper Manzume-i Efkar.

60 As we will see later, the court-martial committee that arrived after the massacre would argue that there was a relation between the massacre and Hayri Bey Incident.

Regardless of its "real" reason, causing the death of a district governor was a serious event that had to be examined. Yet it seems that the government could not even investigate it, let alone punish the offenders. This can easily be seen in the report written by the deputy district governor, Fatin Bey. In the report that he sent to the Governor, Fatin Bey used very similar words to the ones in the telegrams which had been sent by the enemies of Hayri Bey: He wrote that because of his tempered character, Hayri Bey had become too familiar with the common people. This decreased the government's influence in Maraş. In line with the offenders, he added that what Hayri Bey prohibited was the Fensurna prayer, part of a Quranic verse. For the ban on rice plantation, Fatin Bey chose to bring forward the conditions of poor people: He wrote that the ban affected many poor people negatively, who had been benefiting from this form of agriculture. He also added that the demonstrations were not that violent: During these, only one window was broken by a single child. He also denied that there were conflicts between Muslims and Christians. Also, upon Governor Reşid Bey's request for the names of the protestors, Fatin Bey, in response, openly wrote that finding out who these people were was impossible, and they had to make peace with this fact.

After the Massacres of 1909, when he would be asked about the Hayri Bey Incident investigation, Governor Reşid Bey would write that, after a short time, Fatin Bey had been appointed to the subdistrict governorate of Kosovo, and "beat it and went away". Despite the usage of this vulgar phrase, Governor Reşid Bey himself had also preferred not to take the bull by its horns previously: In his answer to the central government's question about how the investigation was proceeding, he simply quoted Fatin Bey's words and added that due to the district governor's death, there were no further need for it.[61] Administrators at that time simply did not risk themselves by confronting the local elites. It was only after the Massacre that the Court-Martial committee would try to complete the investigation. The hesitation by the state officials can be seen as their preference: Maybe they preferred to go along with notables. Yet such a preference was also about the state capacity to control

61 BOA, DH.MKT, 2743/33, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 27, 1324.

them. In fact, we will observe that having been aware of the problem, even the foreign diplomats would warn the Ottoman government that some officials should not have been punished for delaying serious investigations. It was the post Massacre measures that allowed the state to tackle the problem.

Within Maraş, the events related to the Massacres of 1909 started on 4 April and ended on the morning of 5 April. While the Muslims' assault was more limited within the town center, it was more serious in the nearby villages. In this section, first, the central state's early reactions will be presented. That will be followed by the attempt to increase central state power by placing Maraş under Martial Law and forming a Court-Martial. Then, the Court-Martial's relations with Armenians, Muslims, and the local government will be analyzed. What will follow is the great power struggle between the Muslim Maraş elites and the Court-Martial, regarding two subjects: the trial of the convicts and rice cultivation. We saw that in the end, the Muslim elites would be triumphant on the cultivation front. And during the trial, they would show great resistance. On the first front, we will see that the central state arrested the ones who were believed to have participated in the Hayri Bey Incident at first, but this action faced enormous pressure directed at the capital: The local elites would use many means to force the government to change its decision. They would mobilize the women, for protest. After their failure, they would write numerous petitions and lobby for the release of those arrested. In their petitions, they would underline Hayri Bey's action regarding the prayer again and again and claim that the attack on him was just an ordinary offense. For them, this was the reason why they should have been judged by regular courts. These petitions' rhetoric and strategy would be met by the Court-Martial's response, which was to form another rhetoric claiming what they had done to Hayri Bey was no ordinary crime: It had been an attack on the new regime, and it was tied to the counterrevolution. Thus started a polemic about the features and boundaries of the new regime, showing us the different perspectives on what its principles should have been. What comes forward in this part is this very polemic and the struggle between the elites and the officials.

4.3.3 *The Massacre: First Reactions and Declaration of Martial Law: Difficulties in Re-establishing State Authority*

On 4 April, district governor Haydar Bey gave the Ministry of Interior the first news about the Incident in Maraş: Within Sarayaltı Market, four Christians had been massacred, and three persons had been heavily wounded. Upon the event, patrols were sent out.[62] After a few days, three people among the wounded died as well. Among the accused, nine persons were arrested. Both Governor Reşid Bey and District Governor Hayri Bey downplayed the events: Reşid Bey had claimed that the events had been a small incident at first.[63] Haydar Bey also wrote that the town was secure and markets were open. He also did not forget to add that "foreign institutions are safe".[64] By 27 April, the state was able to find out that 43 people were killed and 23 people were injured. Still, there were towns in which the number of dead were unknown.[65] Soon it was learned that in the town of Andırın of Göksun subdistrict, 23 persons were killed, and 404 people were in need of relief.[66]

According to the American missionaries, however, problems were more serious: At the day of the massacre, sixteen Armenians were killed and many more were wounded. No other killings followed afterward. Yet the surrounding villages and towns had been looted and burned and the men were almost exterminated. Also, it was learned later that 400 Armenian men who had gone to the Adana fields for seasonal work were also killed. The towns and villages of Adana which were nearer to the southwest of Maraş were also destroyed. Their population was more than 8,000. Many of them were refugees in Maraş, and about 10,000 people were looking for relief in the district. After the massacre, people in the town were afraid and could not go

62 BOA, DH.MKT, 2796/59, 1a, From the District Governorate of Maraş to the Ministry of Interior, April 4, 1325.

63 BOA, DH.MKT, 2804/71, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 23, 1325.

64 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2828/54, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 7, 1325.

65 BOA, DH.MKT, 2812/57, 1a, Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to Prime Ministry, April 27, 1325.

66 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2834/27, 1a, 1c, 1c, 1d, 1e, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 14, 1325.

to work for a while, and all business was at a standstill.[67] Despite its attempts to downplay the horrors, the local government was in fact caught in a very weak condition during the massacre. According to MacCallum, the government "while on the right side was weak": It lacked trustworthy soldiers. Some Muslims were still threatening Armenians openly.[68]

The process of seizure and placing on a trial of the alleged criminals seems to have proven that MacCallum was right. The deputy prosecutor Abbas Efendi and investigating judge somehow could not start the investigation, as they were worried about the coalition of forces that they were going to be up against. They evaded responsibility by demanding to move the court to Aleppo. For this purpose, they decided to communicate directly with the Ministry of Justice.[69]

The deputy prosecutor and the judge received from the Ministry the instruction that they wanted, yet they could not escape the reactions of the offenders. On the days when the accused were transported to Aleppo, a new incident erupted: On 29 April, eight hours after their transfer, according to the deputy prosecutor, four or five hundred women from the accused persons' families came to the government building. Although they were counseled against their actions twice, they assembled again, insulted the deputy prosecutor Abbas Efendi himself and some officials. Moreover, they even attacked the chief Muslim cleric and some members of the ulema, who came there to address them. The next day, they assembled again and broke the court's windows. They were only scattered by the soldiers. State representatives in Maraş were paralyzed against the local elites and their mobilized groups. District governor Haydar Bey heard about a serious rumor that recruited reserve soldiers would unite with their families and attack the

67 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 664, No.172-173, From MacCallum to Bell, (20 May 1909); A.B.C.F.M., Reel 660, No.?, Reports received from Marash and Adana, (7 May 1909); A.B.C.F.M., Reel 661, no:788, Supplementary Report of Marash Station, (Rec'd 5 August, 1909)

68 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 664, No.172-173, Letter from MacCallum to Bell, (20 May 1909)

69 BOA, DH.MKT, 2815/50, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 27, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2830/141, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 2, 1325.

government.[70] Moreover, Abbas Efendi wrote that two prompters of the attacks, Kadızade Mustafa Efendi and Mehmed Efendi, who was member both of the town's administrative council and its court, had been organizing meetings in their houses. They were planning to disturb the peace in order to prevent the remaining twenty-six suspects' transfer. They were overtly revealing their old secretly held despotic ideas. The people were also feeling offended by Abbas Efendi's actions and were threatening his family. Because of the inadequacy of the existing forces, people's ignorance, and their taking offense, he could not perform his duty. For Abbas Efendi, all these proved right his idea about the necessity of transfer.[71]

The women's attack on the government building terrified not only the local officials but also Armenians. They were scared and closed their shops once again. Governor Reşid Bey advised notables and made the shops reopen, yet some shops were closed again the following day. Then, the Governor firmly warned the district governor, chief Muslim cleric, notables, and religious leaders: Such movements could not be tolerated in a town where more than 400 regulars were located. All measures had to be taken, and one had to find and arrest the instigators of this latest event.[72] The Ministry of Interior vainly demanded to recall people's guns as a precaution. Both Muslims and Christians were in possession of serious guns like revolvers etc. In Zeytun, people produce martini rifles and the tribes in the district were fond of carrying these guns. But according to the local administrators, there was not a force powerful enough to recall and collect these weapons.[73]

To some officials, what had happened in Maraş was not a simple ethnoreligious conflict. The event, just like the one in Adana, could be part of the counterrevolution. This suspicion can be seen in the correspondence

70 BOA, BEO, 3548/266063, 3a, Ciphered telegram from the District Governorate of Maraş to the Ministry of Interior, April 30, 1325.

71 BOA, DH.MKT, 2822/14, 1a, From the Ministry of Law to the Ministry of Interior, Copy of the telegram from deputy prosecutor of Maraş, May 4, 1325.

72 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2830/141 The Ministry of Interior transmits the ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior dated May 2, 1325, to the Ministry of War, May 8, 1325.

73 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/17, 1a, 1b, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 3, 1325.

between the army officers in Maraş and Adana: Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander of the special army called the Adana Regulatory Forces talked with senior captain Cevad Vecihi Bey on the telegram machine on 2 May at 5 a.m. The Colonel asked whether the four men, who were arrested for being the instigators of the women's attack, were of the reactionaries (*irticaiyyun*) or not. Cevad Vecihi Bey's answer was very interesting and confirming: According to him, a month before the Action Army entered İstanbul, Prince Burhaneddin Efendi had sent a telegram to the elders of Maraş. In his telegram, he wrote that Islam was about to be lost, and ordered them to massacre the constitutionalists and the giaour. Cevad Vecihi Bey himself, educated officers, officials, the district governor, and forty-five people from the Committee of Union and Progress were defending liberty. According to the plan, the reactionaries would first massacre those people with their fedayees, scatter soldiers, massacre Christians, and burn and loot the town. The prompters were some important people of Maraş. The purpose behind the women's assault was to annoy the government and soldiers, provoke violence, and plead thousands of people to attack the government. They were going to execute the commander, the district governor, and the officers. And then they were going to massacre Christians. At the time that the telegram was received, new rumors suggested daggers were being sharpened. Men not mobilizing after the women also captured Mehmed Ali Bey's attention: For him, this showed they lacked either a plan or courage. Because of the threat's seriousness, the commander felt the need to write that they had a sufficient number of mountain artillery pieces.[74] These words reflect the typically exaggerated suspicions in the post 31 March atmosphere that confirm the false belief that the monarchy had direct involvement in the Incident. However, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Interior took the claims about the Prince's involvement seriously. The Aleppo Governorate was ordered to investigate the news.[75] Six men and seven women were arrested for being the instigators of

74 BOA, DH.MKT, 2819/98, 1a, The Ministry of War transmits the copy of the telegram from Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey to the Ministry of Interior, May 3, 1325, Rec'd May 4, 1325.

75 BOA, DH.MKT, 2819/98, 2,a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, May 5, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2819/98, 3b, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, May 7, 1325.

the women's assault. No clues were found about the Prince's involvement, yet investigations would go on.[76] This correspondence shows that the initial motivation behind the thought that both Hayri Bey Incident and the Massacre were reactionary movements was the belief in plots. In fact, this was not solid ground: In the Antakya chapter, I will try to demonstrate how the beliefs in plots were preventing the contemporaries from coming to valid conclusions in their analyses of the events. However, it seems that in Maraş, the rationale of the officers would evolve as they would not mention their suspicion from an organized plot. Rather, they brought forward the concrete actions, which are targeting the top-ranking state official for the purpose of securing their illegal cultivation.

The dispute among the civilian officials was another important problem that weakened the central state's power: After the Incident, Governor Reşid Bey and Haydar Bey started to argue about the incident. To Reşid Bey, one reason behind the Incident was the district governor himself. At the time the massacres broke out, it had not been much since Haydar Bey had come to the office. For this reason, he could not have comprehended the town's situation.[77] However, Haydar Bey was thinking just the opposite: The Incident occurred because the governorate did not execute the measures that he asked for. Now, they were looking for his faults. Nevertheless, since he started his duty in the town, even foreign people had been admiring his performance. Haydar Bey demanded an investigation to be conducted in accordance with constitutional procedures.[78]

In short, for the central government, there were very serious problems that undermined its power in Maraş: First, the central government could not protect its own personnel from the people, let alone detain the accused without trouble. Second, attacks by government officials went hand in hand with a very strong anti-non-Muslim discourse and so, ethno religious tension

76 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2834/31, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 13, 1325.

77 BOA, DH.MKT, 2804/71, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 23, 1325.

78 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/18, 1a, 1b, 1c, From the District Governorate of Maraş to the Ministry of Interior, May 3, 1325.

increased sharply. Third, although no clues were found, it was thought that the Muslim mobilizations in the town were connected with the reactionary forces, who were also thought to be the organizers of the 31 March Incident. Fourth, civilian officials themselves were arguing with each other. For all these reasons, more effective measures had to be taken. District Governor Haydar Bey wrote to the Governorate that martial law had to be declared in Maraş and personally informed the Ministry of Interior about the situation. The ministry also informed the Prime Ministry.[79] On the day following Haydar Bey's telegram, the Prime Ministry wrote its answer. Sending the accused of Maraş to the Court-Martial in Adana was on the agenda, yet even sending them to Aleppo led to a new assault. Unless at least two regular battalions were sent to Maraş, there could be neither a Martial Law nor a Court-Martial. For this reason, the Prime Ministry had thought to send troops before the declaration. Mahmud Şevket Paşa, commander of the Action Army, was also informed about the situation and he agreed with the Prime Ministry. He would personally investigate the troops suitable for being dispatched to Maraş, and would inform the Ministry. Still, the Prime Ministry ordered the Aleppo Governorate to ask whether the declaration after or before the deployment would be more appropriate.[80] The Council of Ministers also discussed the issue. On the meeting, it was decided to declare martial law after the regular army's arrival.[81] In addition, the Ministry of Interior ordered the Governor to use force against those who were instigating the people.[82]

After the Massacre, Reşid Bey asked for six regular battalions for the whole province. However, the Fifth Army, which commands the units in Aleppo replied that it was impossible to send regular troops. Units of other armies

79 BOA, BEO, 3548/266063, 3a, Ciphered telegram from the District Governorate of Maraş to the Ministry of Interior, April 30, 1325.

80 BOA, DH.MKT, 2812/57, 3a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, May 2, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2812/57, 4b, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, May 2, 1325.

81 BOA, DH.MKT, 2816/38, 3b, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, May 5, 1325.

82 BOA, DH.MKT, 2816/38, 2b, Ciphered telegram from the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, May 4, 1325.

were demanded from the ministry of War.[83] By 23 April, 442 regular soldiers were stationed in Maraş and 460 were in Zeytun. 380 reserves were in Elbistan, 525 were in Zeytun, and 565 were in Maraş. Reserve soldiers were locals and in disorder. There had been a written promise that regular battalions from the fourth army were going to arrive, yet they did not. The Governor repeated that Maraş needed a regular battalion.[84]

Just as in Kayseri, the presence of so many local reserve soldiers in Maraş frightened the Christians. For this reason, the Adana Regulatory Forces Headquarters decided to send the Konya reserve battalion and Kilis battalion into the town. Only the most orderly local reserve battalion was going to be kept. The Commander of Maraş was still demanding a regular battalion, yet for Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the troops to be sent would be adequate. As the tension was very high in Antep, another regular battalion was to be sent there. Mehmed Ali Bey predicted that after all those deployments, three reserve battalions would be disbanded.[85] On 4 May, the Governor asked the time of the battalion's arrival and whether this was the battalion implied when it was written that battalions would be deployed.[86] By 7 May, the Konya battalion was in Mersin. It was this battalion after whose arrival the martial law was to be declared.[87] The 2nd Battalion of the 82nd Regiment arrived in Maraş on 10 May. At about the same time, the Konya battalion came to İskenderun. The Governor repeated his warning about local reserve soldiers and suggested that two companies sent to Süveydiye from Karaman could be redeployed in Maraş.[88] Soon, the Governorate informed that the Konya reserve battalion finally arrived in Maraş by 16 May, and on 19 May the Ministry of War wrote

83 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2828/54, 1a From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 7, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2828/54, 2a, 3a.

84 BOA, DH.MKT, 2804/71, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 23, 1325.

85 BOA, DH.MKT, 2816/27, 1a, Ciphered Telegram from Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, April 28, 1325.

86 BOA, A.AMD, 1115/80, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 4, 1325.

87 BOA, DH.MKT, 2820/29, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, May 7, 1325.

88 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2834/5, Ciphered Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 10, 1325.

the Ministry of Interior that it ordered to disband local reserve battalions of Maraş and İskenderun.[89]

Meanwhile, there were too many arrestees in Maraş.[90] Scores of persons were detained. To solve the problem, the Governor offered an interesting solution: These detainees were becoming increasingly disgruntled as they had been kept in prison for a long time. Their release could have a positive effect on security.[91] In a short time, a complaint that their release had allowed them to dare threaten Christians was received by the Ministry of Interior. Thus, the Ministry gave the same order that it had given to the Governor of Ankara in Kayseri previously: The Governor of Aleppo himself had to go to Maraş and accelerate the investigation.[92] Just like his counterpart, Governor Reşid Bey had no intention to go there. Two days later he relayed the telegram that he received from the district governor: Only four people were released and three of them were detained again. They were looking for the last one.[93] The next day, the investigation about the assault on Hayri Bey was completed and the instigators were handed over to the court.[94]

§ 4.4 Maraş under Martial Law

After the first events, the state tried to demonstrate its power via the deployment of sufficient forces and imposition of martial law in Maraş. The army began to try to take the initiative by 7 May. That day at 5 a.m., the first

89 BOA, DH.MKT, 2832/97, 1a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, May 19, 1325.

90 At that time, Maraş Prison was full. The Ministry of Interior was planning to send some prisoners to Payas and Bodrum. BOA, DH.MKT, 2808/103, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Deputy governorate of Aydın, April 28, 1325.

91 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/11, 17a, Ciphered telegram From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 20, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/11, 16b, From the ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry and Ministry of War, May 21, 1325.

92 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/76, 10b, Ciphered Telegram from the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, May 25, 1325.

93 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/78, 1a, From the district Governorate of Maraş to the ministry of Interior, May 26, 1325.

94 BOA, BEO, 3557/266718, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, May 27, 1325.

regular soldiers arrived in Maraş. Their presence would "ensure the presence of forces which would fire upon the mob if necessary whereas the local troops could hardly have been trusted to do so".[95] It seems that knowing this, the army tried to show its presence as much as it could in order to cause the offenders to lose heart. The bands played to welcome them on the day they arrived, and later, they marched through the streets shouting "Long live Liberty" –clearly a sign that commanders were thinking that the incident was reactionary.[96] With the proclamation of martial law, all shops would be closed by 8 p.m., and no one would be allowed in the streets after 9:30 p.m.[97]

After their arrival in Maraş, the Court-Martial went into action very quickly. Relying on their power, the officers wanted to preserve the order. To achieve their goal, they challenged both the Armenians and the Muslims of the town. They searched for evidence regarding the two plots, first, a revolutionary Armenian one, and second, a reactionary Muslim one. The second would be affiliated with the Hayri Bey Incident too. They investigated the rice cultivation issue and limited sowing. However, neither Armenians nor Muslims were happy with the Court's decisions, and in various ways tried to resist them. Naturally, the Muslim resistance was much greater, and so the army's effort, which had seemed to be successful at first, would soon prove fruitless when it came to either punishing the offenders or putting rice regulation into effect.

4.4.1 *Martial Law and Local Armenians*

It seems that segments of the Armenian public were of the belief that there would be severe punishments. For example, Şahe Efendi, the Armenian Prelate of Aleppo sent telegrams to several authorities in İstanbul and wanted proclamation of martial law, the return of looted possessions and women who had been forcefully converted to Islam, and hanging of the ones who

95 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 664, No.174, Letter from MacCallum to Bell, (20 May 1909).

96 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 664, No.174, Letter from MacCallum to Bell, (20 May 1909); A.B.C.F.M., Reel 663, No.871-872, Letter from Lee to Barton.

97 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 664, No.181-182-183, Letter from MacCallum to Bell, (18 June 1909)

participated in the massacres as an exemplary.[98] Missionaries were also expecting that the offenders would be hanged.[99] However, although the central government would recognize Armenians' innocence in the long run, it could not meet those demands. Far from it: In the end, Armenians would be extremely dissatisfied, and that would lead to polemics between them and the officials.

Actually, already before the proclamation of martial law, local Armenians were in a very serious condition. The claim of the Deputy Armenian Patriarchate about the state's responsibility was an early example: It claimed that the government was still collecting taxes from areas that were affected by the "disorder". They were thinking that the people of Maraş were preparing for an attack on Zeytun. Armenians were being arrested and their travel was being obstructed. Officials were not doing their job concerning looted possessions. The names of officials and influential persons who led the assaults were obvious, yet they were not arrested. Some were captured yet later released. Reserve soldiers also participated in the massacre and lootings.

In response, Governor Reşid Bey wanted all those claims to be proven: Where are the places that Armenians were obstructed from traveling? Who were the officials that engaged in looting and did not perform their duties? Where were people forced to pay taxes? Except for Antioch, where did reserves participate in lootings and massacres? If the deputy patriarchate could not answer these questions, then it had to give orders to the Prelates not to hide the truth with hostile accusations that can drive a wedge between good-willing people, and not keep officials, who were trying to perform their duties under great difficulties, busy with rumors. For Reşid Bey, applications which were sent from Aleppo, Maraş, and places like Yozgat –that had nothing to do with the disorder- to the offices in İstanbul and newspapers like

98 BOA, DH.MKT, 2815/70, 1a, From Armenian Prelate Şahe to Prime Ministry; May 1, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2812/103, 1a, From Armenian Prelate Şahe to Prime Ministry, May 11, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3559/266871, 2a, From the Presidency of the Upper House to Prime Ministry, May 11, 1325.

99 Lee believed that the murderers could be executed outside Maraş. MAcCallum also thought that some of them could be hanged. See, A.B.C.F.M., Reel 663, No.869, Letter from L. O. Lee to James L. Barton, (13 May 1909); A.B.C.F.M., Reel 664, No.181-182-183, Letter from MacCallum to Bell, (18 June 1909)

Pozantiyon had the purpose of presenting Armenians as completely innocent and oppressed and to engineer an outcome where they receive more than their due assistance. That response of Reşid Bey's seems like a typical reaction of an Ottoman governor. In fact, he had put forth negative and even discriminative discourses on Ottoman Armenians in general. Nevertheless, in the same telegram, Reşid Bey also had positive statements about Armenians too: During the disorder that occurred throughout the whole Aleppo province, Armenians had always been in a defensive position (*vaziyyet-i tedaüfi*). In the province, Muslims had suffered 90 losses, whereas 454 Armenians were killed. Muslim losses being very small revealed that Armenians had been "victims" and "stricken with assault" (*mağdur ve düçar-ı tariz*). Despite this statement, the Governor reminded that there were serious accusations against the Armenians in Adana.[100]

Things did not change much for Armenians even after the declaration of Martial Law. In spite of the massacre, relations between the district's Armenians and the Court-Martial remained tense. Although not to the same degree as against the Muslims, the Court-Martial committee was suspicious of Armenians too, as they thought that under the leadership of Armenian revolutionary organizations, they had a plan to provoke a revolt. Because of this suspicion, the Court-Martial did not hesitate to take punitive measures. The measures went as far as arresting the members of Dashnaktsutiun. Just like in other regions where the effects of the Adana Massacre were seen, the

100 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2834/27, Ciphered Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 14, 1325. For the discourses on Armenians in his memoirs, see Rey, *İmparatorluğun Son Döenmlerinde Gördüklerim Yaptıklarım 1890-1922,* 16-37, 214. Nevertheless, a governor's writing about his province's Armenians' innocence much before the state's official statement that Armenians had been innocent is important. Of course, this does not make the Governor's claims as absolute truths: Even a long time after the polemic between the Governor and the deputy patriarchate about giving back the looted commodities, Armenians in the region were claiming that they could not take their looted commodities back. For example, in the telegram sent by priest Serkis on behalf of the people of Göksun on 15 December 325, it was written that although they had withdrawn from the trials of the murderers who killed their 12 people, contrary to the promises that they would take back their belongings, they still were seeing their remaining animals in the hands of murderers, a fact which was making them cry their hearts out BOA, DH.MUİ, 77-1/16, 2a, From Priest Serkis to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, December 15, 1325.

Maraş Court-Martial also punished the Armenian Prelate of the town. The government felt the need to interfere in these sanctions.

Although some Muslims were sentenced for their involvement in the Massacre, in general, the Armenian community in Maraş complained about the inadequacy of punishments of Muslims, the failure to return the looted possessions, the harshness of punishments of Armenians, and the lack of aid. A.B.C.F.M. missionaries made similar observations: Although there were 300 Muslims in prison, the Court-Martial had allocated "all its time to trying to find traces of the Armenian Revolutionary Society in Marash". Both Turks and Armenians were terrified, and all classes, especially the poor were suffering.[101] Among the many imprisoned Armenians, some of them, including an academy teacher, were severely beaten.[102] Armenians pronounced their feelings through newspapers, petitions and applications to consulates as usual, increasing the tension between representatives of the central government and themselves. Simply put, during the martial law period, the central government did not satisfy the Armenian community.

The dialogue that occurred between Colonel Halid Bey, the deputy commander of Maraş, and Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander of the Adana Regulatory forces on 12 June, two weeks after the Court-Martial's formation, is an important example that reflects multiple dimensions of this tension. Halid Bey wrote that during the previous week, the French vice-consul had visited the commander's office three or four times: He had made impolite demands which had been contrary to jurisprudence. He had said, "the old conventions no longer exist in Turkey. I am the protector of Christians". The vice-consul claimed that Court-Martial Officers had been using force against Armenians and had been imprisoning them. He demanded the release of some Armenians and protested the Commander and regular Major. Furthermore, he threatened these officers and said that he would write to the consulate. Finally, he said, "you will see, I will create a political collision". For Halid Bey, if this vice-consul remained in town, a new incident between Muslims and Christians would likely break out. Halid Bey believed that plots by Armenian organizations and their documents were

101 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 664, No.186, Letter from MacCallum to Bell, (13 July 1909).

102 A.B.C.F.M., Reel 663, No.878, Letter from Lee to Barton, (21 July 1909).

uncovered, and the owners of these documents had foreseen their punishment. Two months ago, it had been written to the headquarters in Adana that for this reason, by taking advantage of their plotting character they had been urging the vice-consul to interfere. Because of his complaints, which besmirched the government's honor, this vice-consul had to be dismissed. In his response, Mehmed Ali Bey wrote the commander that he had to avoid correspondence with vice-consuls. Vice-consuls could communicate only with civil servants. They could only address governors and district governors. No matter their religion or ethnic community, all persons that caused the incidents were Ottomans. And as they were Ottomans, they had to be treated equally. Army officers had to be busy with their own duties and had to avoid communication with consuls. They could not involve themselves in politics. Security needed to be protected and equity had to be provided. Nevertheless, Mehmed Ali Bey wrote to the Ministry of War and asked for necessary actions to be taken against the vice-consul: It was very sad to see such actions of a representative of a state which had friendly and benevolent relation with the Ottoman State.[103]

Armenian newspapers broke the news about the confrontation between the Commander and the French vice-consul over the treatment of Armenians. On 23 July, Hayrenik, Manzume-i Efkar, and Jamanak published an article titled "Beatings in Maraş": Maraş Court-Martial's actions were regrettable to everyone. Fifteen Armenians had been beaten. Bedros Sahagyan, who lived in Maraş was imprisoned. Moreover, a few days ago, a person called Artin had been heavily beaten and had been sent to his home half dead. The French vice-consul had examined Artin personally and had personally made a complaint about the commander. That had made the Commander so angry that he kept Artin arrested for nine more days.[104] When the Ministry of Interior inquired about the event with the Governorate, it wrote that Artin had been detained

103 BOA, BEO, 3598/269847, 3a, Ciphered Telegram from Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey to the Ministry of War, June 13, 1325.

104 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/76, 3a, Copies from the newspapers Hayrenik, Manzume-i Efkar and Jamanak, dated July 23, 1325.

because he had been a member of the Dashnaktsutiun Committee.[105] For the district governorate, merely being a member of Dashnaks was enough for his arrest. It justified that action on the grounds that they were ordered by the government to do so: At that time, the government sent a telegram to all Armenian inhabited provinces. It was about the Dashnaktsutiun Committee: From an order that the Van Governorate had interrupted, it was understood that the Dashnak Party's Van Central Committee took a decision to restart revolutionary activities, to arm all non-Muslims, to engage in inciting indoctrinations, and to start training and the formation of national battalions. The Ministry was anticipating that the same decisions could be taken in other provinces as well. So, it sent a circular to them, ordering the governors to observe and investigate the committee branches' leaders and members. The Ministry had to be informed and necessary measures had to be taken immediately.[106] The district governorate mentioned this order. Yet in its answer, the Ministry of Interior noted that what the District Governorate had done had nothing to do with its order: No one could be arrested if there was no lawful need. People only had to be warned about not taking actions against law and jurisprudence.[107]

Another subject the Armenian community and the Court-Martial confronted was the trial of Der Nerses, the Prelate of Maraş. It is written in the sentence report that an Armenian denouncer had said that a committee was formed in the town with conspiratorial intent. The first investigation committee collected many documents regarding the rising tension that Commander Halid Bey had written about after the Hayri Bey Incident: Der Nerses, who had come from Haçin was elected as the Prelate of Maraş in January 1324. After his arrival, he started preaching to form a religious assembly and a corporal assembly. In his first preaching, he advised his

105 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/76, 2b, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, August 1, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/76, 9a, Deputy Governorate of Aleppo transmits the telegram of the District Governorate of Maraş on August 6, August 10, 1325.

106 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/76, 4b, Top Secret, Ciphered Telegram from the Ministry of Interior to Mamüretülaziz, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Erzurum, Sivas, Ankara, Adana, Aleppo and Trabzon Governorates, May 25, 1325.

107 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/76, 1a, Ciphered Telegram From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, August 25, 1325.

community to keep guns. Following that sermon, some Armenians started buying arms. One person, Mesrob, merchant Mesrobyan's clerk, accidentally shot himself with his gun and lost his life. After this event, some people who were angry at Der Nerses went to the church to interrupt his sermon. Another group had closed down the school and locked church doors. A very dangerous incident was about to break out when patrols dispersed the crowd. Because of this breeding bad blood, mistrust both among Armenians and between Muslims and Armenians was on the rise. Muslim notables and ulema had appealed to the government and the commander regarding this tendency. For the notables, Der Nerses had encouraged people to commit a massacre. Many impassioned letters and writings concerning Armenia's independence were captured. These provide evidence for the existence of a committee for the independence of Armenia. Despite such claims, in his testimony, Der Nerses stated that the reason for his encouragement of purchasing arms was not for an independent Armenia. He claimed he had done this to protect the constitutional regime.[108] Later, upon deputy district governor Fatin Bey's order, he altered his second sermon at the same place. However, according to the committee, his first speech and alteration was a true sign of his attempt to bring out a massacre. Even if his intention was as he claimed it to be, the provision of security was the government's duty. For this reason, his advice was not in line with his religious position. In addition, he had also confessed that he had been arrested twice, one in İstanbul for two months, and another in Aleppo for six months, for similar reasons. So, he had a criminal past. For all these reasons, the Court-Martial committee unanimously sentenced Der Nerses to life imprisonment.[109]

The Court-Martial's decision was too harsh for several reasons. First, as seen above, Maraş really had a security problem as Der Nerses had foreseen. Although the Court-Martial claimed that it was the state who had to provide security, the Prelate had made the recommendation to purchase arms in a town that the state could not perform its duty. Second, the Prelate's criminal

108 Actually, according to the investigation committee, in his preachment in the Central School, he said "From now on we will not surrender to despotic ones too easily. We will not close our doors and we will not allow them to cut each of us like cattle as they had done before".

109 BOA, İ.AS, 96/46, 2b, Maraş Court-Martial, August 12, 1325.

record belonged to the old regime. In a period when such old convictions were considered unjust, recalling those convictions did not fit into the spirit of the constitutional regime. Third, there were objections to the evidence concerning the idea of an independent Armenia. For example, in the case of Şükrü Selenyan, an Armenian in Maraş, despite the lack of evidence, the court handed out sentences based solely on a testimony of a child who was beaten with sticks to produce it.[110] Finally, when it learned that the Prelate was sought, the Ministry of Interior itself wrote to the Governorate to be more moderate concerning this subject.[111] Nevertheless, the Court-Martial ruled for this heavy sentence. In its meeting on 25 October, the Council of Ministers reached a decision on Der Nerses: Against the deputy district governor's warning, Der Nerses noted that he had advised buying guns against the despots. That had been misunderstood and he had revised his speech later. Those actions did not merit punishment. So, it was appropriate to pardon Der Nerses and appoint him elsewhere. The Council ordered the Ministry of Law to take necessary measures and informed the Ministry of War about the situation.[112]

In short, the actions of the Court-Martial officers seem to have been a huge disappointment for the Armenians of Maraş. They did not treat Armenian political organizations as their superiors and comrades did in the capital. Moreover, they were suspicious about an Armenian plot. The difference between the attitudes of the Action Army, who allied with the Armenian political organizations in their march to İstanbul, and the Regulatory Forces, who saw those very organizations as seeking insurrection was striking in that manner. That difference was also reflected in the central state's intervention in the court processes, as seen in the trial of Prelate Der Nerses. In the next part, however, the very same group of army staff will appear as defenders of the new regime -they even mentioned the statements of local Armenians to support their argument that Hayri Bey Incident had been a reactionary movement against the regime. The contrast between their two positions reminds us that

110 DH.MUİ, 14-1/70, 2a, From Şükrü Selanyan to the Ministry of Interior, September 8, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 14-1/70, 3a, From the ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry.

111 BOA, DH.MKT, 2855/94, 1b, Telegram from the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, June 11, 1325. On the telegram, it was written that they were seeking the Prelate of Haçin.

112 BOA, MV, 133/85, October 25, 1325.

we need to acknowledge the grayness of agents when it comes to the interpretations of the new regime principles. I will touch upon this issue in future chapters.

4.4.2 *Martial Law and Muslims*

The Maraş Court-Martial's position could not satisfy the Armenians. However, some Muslims also had complaints regarding the Court-Martial, whose attempt to punish them came up against great resistance. This resistance is well documented in the Ottoman archives with three identifiable dimensions: The first is about how to define the Hayri Bey Incident. The second is about rice cultivation. And the third is the resistance of the people who were accused of participating in the Massacre. In the long run, the government would have to give great concessions on all three issues. This part is mainly about the conflict over the definition of the Hayri Bey Incident, which constitutes the first dimension.

4.4.2.1 Reasons of Early "Regretful Negligence" Revisited

During the process of the proclamation of martial law, the government inquired the Aleppo Governorate about the Hayri Bey Incident again. Governor Reşid Bey reminded the report by Fatin Bey, the deputy district governor who had been appointed before Haydar Bey: Fatin Bey had stated that an investigation could not have taken place. Then he had "beaten it" and (*savuşup*) went to Kosovo, following his appointment. Following that, the Governor once more instructed the new district governor Haydar Bey to do the job. Upon the orders of the Ministry, he was notified. Still, Haydar Bey confined himself to stating that starting an investigation of all offenders was not appropriate: An official from the Governorate had to come to the town to do it. Upon the new order from İstanbul, Reşid Bey wrote to Haydar Bey again, yet he had not gotten an answer. Now, as there was an investigation committee, the Governor wrote to them.[113] The attitude of those government officials shows us the central government's weakness again: The Prime

113 BOA, BEO, 3557/266718, 3a, 3b, 3c, From Aleppo Governorate to Prime Ministry, May 9, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/5, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325.

Ministry considered the Governor's answer a demonstration of "regretful negligence" in legal proceeding: The local government must take advantage of martial law and must follow the legal procedure concerning those who attacked Hayri Bey with impunity. The Prime Ministry ordered the Ministry of Interior to write to all governorates to encourage them to be more proactive -an action that shows how serious the weakness of the central state was. Four days later the Ministry informed all governorates about the neglect in Maraş: They had to follow the legal procedure concerning similar actions in their areas and they always had to make sure to maintain governmental power at a serious level.[114] On the following day of this telegram, the Governorate wrote that the investigation committee had arrested the accused.[115]

The limits of the state power in the region can be clearly observed in the correspondence about the deputy prosecutor Abbas Efendi, who had come to the foreground as one person that had caused the negligence: Both because of his passiveness in the Hayri Bey Incident and his weakness after the massacre, he had been dismissed and the investigating judge had been appointed elsewhere.[116] Both district governor Haydar Bey and the investigation committee defended Abbas Efendi: To Haydar Bey, after the Maraş Incident, the town witnessed his good service and activity. Continuing his service in the town until the committee's investigation would be very beneficial. The committee also approved that Abbas Efendi was trying hard to work on the Hayri Bey Incident.[117] In a telegram that he had sent to the committee, an investigator wrote that the deputy prosecutor was an honorable and hardworking man. However, he had exaggerated the number of women that had assaulted him: Despite the number of offenders not even amounting to

114 BOA, BEO, 3557/266718, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, May 12, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 1302/5, 3b, Telegram from the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate and to all Governorates, May 16, 1325.

115 BOA, BEO, 3557/266718, 4a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 17, 1325.

116 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2835/8, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, May 17, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2835/8, 2a, From the ministry of Law to the Ministry of Interior, May 20, 1325.

117 BOA, DH.MKT, 2846/25, 3a, From the District Governorate of Maraş to Aleppo Governorate, June 9, 1325.

between thirty and forty, Abbas Efendi wrote that there were four to five hundred women.[118] Governor Reşid Bey also wrote that Abbas Efendi could not have performed his duty, because he was scared.[119] The officials' defending Abbas Efendi's passivity can be seen as an act of solidarity among the officials. However, we observe that a foreign diplomat also defended Abbas Efendi: When the Ministry of Interior asked the Ministry of Law to reevaluate its decision about the deputy prosecutor, it wrote that the French vice-consulate was also confirming that Abbas Efendi had no bad intentions.[120] It seems that his inaction was acceptable, as conditions were very difficult. He failed to perform his duty, not because of his ill-will but because he was not powerful enough. The French vice-consul's agreement with them shows that the officials' inability was understandable even by the foreigners, as they also accepted the fact that in post-revolutionary Anatolia, the central government had insufficient power -even in the district capitals- to punish those who had attacked the highest official. The state could at least try to accomplish this task only under martial law and thanks to the regular soldiers deployed. In this sense, it was quite normal for the Prime Ministry to use the words "taking advantage of" the martial law in its order to investigate and try the ones responsible for the Incident.[121] As it will be observed below, even this attempt was going to face great resistance.

4.4.2.2 First Sentences and Acts of Resistance

As discussed above, the arrested locals' resistance had started to be felt even before martial law: They tried to mobilize women –and maybe reserve

118 BOA, DH.MKT, 2846/25, 3b, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, June 13, 1325.

119 BOA, DH.MKT, 2846/25, 4a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, June 16, 1325.

120 BOA, DH.MKT, 2834/53, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Law, May 25, 1325. The officials' and diplomats' defense of Abbas Efendi changed the government's attitude partially: The Ministry of Law did not cancel its decision of dismissal, yet it changed the justification of it: The reason became "some circumstances" and his illness in his ears. See BOA, DH.MKT, 2834/53, 1a, From the ministry of Law to the Ministry of Interior, June 16, 1325.

121 BOA, BEO, 3557/266718, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, May 12, 1325.

soldiers- to intimidate the officials. Yet after seeing that using hard power bore no fruit, they decided to shift to lobbying and sending petitions to the capital.

Complaints about the first arrests began within days. Hüdayizade Mehmed Tahsin's telegram was one example. Mehmed Tahsin claimed that it was Haydar Bey, the last district governor, who was the sole cause of the Maraş Incident, and he could prove it: Haydar Bey belonged to the Unionist Committee outwardly, yet in fact, he was of the reactionaries. Various examples had proven that reactionaries secretly stoke such events that result in a slide backward. At that time, in Maraş, constitutionalism was not in power, because laws were not being obeyed: He had been kept in custody illegally for five days. For that reason, he asked for an investigation.[122] For the Governor, on the other hand, Mehmed Tahsin was arrested because of his involvement in the Maraş Incident, and the district governor had no part in his arrest.[123] Here, Mehmed Tahsin's way of defending himself was an early sign of the convicts' future defense strategy. In the previous chapter we observed that after the post-revolutionary events, the notables who initially lost their power also followed the same strategy, yet the notables of Maraş would go much further in following them: As it will be shown below, they would often make strong references to constitutionalism by labeling the procedures as unlawful and arbitrary. On top of that, they would defend that those arbitrary actions were in fact in line with the attitude of the old "despotic" regime. At this point, let us recall that after the first post-revolutionary upheavals, the anti-revolutionaries in Kayseri also labeled the mobilization against them as unlawful and arbitrary. In this sense, the similarity in strategy is striking.

When it started to take decisions following their arrival in Maraş at the end of May, the Court-Martial committee adopted the views of Hayri Bey. A sentence record on accounting chief clerk Hasan Efendi, which was written on 14 June, shows that: Until 30 May, Hasan Efendi was on duty. As the accusations against him were incompatible with the honor of officialdom,

122 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2836/109, From Hüdayizade Mehmed Tahsin to the Ministry of Interior, May 14, 1325.

123 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2839/29, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 21, 1325.

permission was asked from the Adana Regulatory Forces Headquarters for dismissing and arresting him. At his interrogation on 13 June, the chief clerk told that he had been working at the district's accounting office since 1295. Taking Hayri Bey's claim seriously, the Court-Martial asked if he owned a rice farm or not: Hasan Efendi said that it was his mother who owned a rice farm, not him. He claimed that he had good relations with Hayri Bey: he had personally written and signed the resolution to implement the rice regulation on 9 December. Hayri Bey had also loved and trusted him. For example, he appointed him as the chief of the education branch. Hasan Efendi also thought that Hayri Bey had been a just man who served the town's progress. The Court-Martial Committee showed him Hayri Bey's telegram in which he was also named among the despotic persons who had been accustomed to illegal rice cultivation. In response, Hasan Efendi claimed that he had not taken part in the events, he did not know who the participators had been, and he had not talked with anyone about that subject. He also underlined that no one had made a testimony against him. However, in its justification of the sentence, the Court-Martial fully adopted Hayri Bey's views on his telegram: The Incident had occurred because Hayri Bey had wanted the District Council to sign the decision to implement rice regulation. Although there were no witnesses and no clues against him, it was a small possibility that Hayri Bey had accused him without reason. His name was also written in a memorandum which had the quality of being a will –as it was Hayri Bey's handwriting. Hasan Efendi could not go unpunished as he had remained completely neutral in an event that everybody had known; as instead of being a witness, he had provided no explanations by claiming that he had heard nothing; and as Hayri Bey would not have accused him without a reason. For those reasons, the Court-Martial decided to remove him from the district's accounting office, for which he had served for thirty years, and he was dismissed on the condition that he could work in another district.[124] In short, the committee accepted Hayri Bey's writings as true. For them, rice regulation was the main reason behind the revolt against him. Also, Hayri Bey's statement was accepted as proof of Hasan Efendi's guilt. Yet that proof was not

124 BOA, BEO, 3615/271098, 4a, Maraş Court-Martial Decision, June 14, 1325.

enough to punish him severely. So, instead of placing him in jail, he was removed from office.

This sentence led to a new discussion: Did court-martials have the right to decide on official duties? According to the Prime Ministry, they were authorized only for judging and determining their punishments. It was the Ministry of Finance who had the authority to make a decision about its official's position. The Prime Ministry informed the Ministry of Finance about the situation.[125] The Ministry also saw no need to dismiss him. The sentence was unorthodox. However, court-martials were also taking similar decisions about other officials. Therefore, a ruling by the Ministry could lead to confusion as it may have served as a precedent.[126] The Prime Ministry answered that the judgment was not final.[127]

Such interferences by the Court-Martial seem to have been disapproved by the Ministries themselves. Together with this, the elites' lobby, most probably through the MPs of the town, influenced the Prime Ministry to revise its attitude concerning the Hayri Bey case towards the end of June. On 20 June, it wrote to the Ministry of Interior that regular courts should handle the Hayri Bey case: The Court-Martial was established to judge the ones who had taken part in the disorder, meaning the Massacre. Taking up the investigation of an action that was but a petty crime that occurred about five or six months prior might not have been legal and just. The motive behind the Court-Martial investigating the case was the concerns regarding the town's notables' influence on the regular courts. Yet at that time, they could not affect regular courts in the face of the strong presence of the army.[128] The Ministry of Interior forwarded this view to the Ministries of Law and Justice.[129] The Ministry of War strongly objected to this telegram: This tutelage would affect the people's minds and would negatively affect the Court-Martial's work.[130] Yet the Prime Ministry repeated its view about sending the case to the regular

125 BOA, BEO, 3608/270551, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Finance, July 14, 1325.

126 BOA, BEO, 3615/271098, 2a, From the Ministry of Finance to Prime Ministry, July 26, 1325.

127 BOA, BEO, 3615/271098, 1a, , From Prime Ministry of to the Ministry of Finance, July 28, 1325.

128 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/13, 2a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, June 20, 1325.

129 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/13, 1b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Law, Ministry of Law, and Aleppo Governorate, June 21, 1325.

130 BOA, BEO, 3592/269347, 2a, From the Ministry of War to Prime Ministry, June 22, 1325.

courts, and disagreed with the Ministry of War: Notifying the deputies was not appropriate.[131]

4.4.2.3 Debates on How to Interpret Hayri Bey Incident

Previously, in the introduction, it was noted that wherever a "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*" situation prevails by absorption of foundational categories, the reaction does not turn into anti-revolution. On the contrary, they try to use the order of things to their advantage. In that sense, we also observed a striking similarity between the anti-revolutionaries' discourses in Kayseri and the early responses of Maraş arrestees, both of which were pointing to the rule of law. Here, we will dwell on that similarity, and see that the judicial struggle between Muslim notables and soldiers in Maraş was also a debate about the definition of the Hayri Bey Incident in political terms. This debate, which is to be summarized below, reveals multiple readings about not only the Incident but also the revolutionary principles. The Hayri Bey Incident showed that whenever absorption seemed impossible, reactionaries openly questioned the principles. We will see that such a questioning also went on in the petitions and telegrams sent by the local Muslims.

Mehmed Tahsin's early response, which was summarized above, was the first sign revealing the notables' discourse. This discourse can also be observed in various similar attempts: For instance, a telegram forwarded to Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of the Adana Regulatory Forces, by the Maraş Commander within days of the Prime Ministry's decision: It was written by two Maraş MPs, Şükrü and Fehmi Beys, to the Chief Muslim Cleric Feyzi Bey and Kadızade Rıza Bey. In the telegram, MPs told the notables that it was unacceptable in terms of constitutionalism and the principle of justice that even though they had not taken part in the 31 March Incident that they were sent to the Court-Martial for "complaining" about Hayri Bey. More interestingly, they claimed that the Incident was very similar to the post-revolutionary demonstrations against despotic officials that had occurred

131 BOA, BEO, 3592/269347, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of War, June 23, 1325.

everywhere. They also urged the notables to apply to necessary offices and inform them.[132]

Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander of the Adana Regulatory Forces, responded to the Prime Ministry's shift of attitude in a very aggressive and impassioned way. In that response, he also provided an alternative analysis of the Maraş Incidents, associating them with the Counterrevolution. Both the emotional expressions and the analyses make this text worth focusing on: For Mehmed Ali Bey, following the orders is a binding duty yet the Prime Ministry's order was violating his duty of honor. The previous assault was not only on Hayri Bey but also against constitutionalism and it single-handedly enabled the other attacks against the new regime. For this reason, they had to arrest and condemn many notables and people connected with the Maraş deputies. But because of some interventions and mediations, the Ministry of Law ordered them to deliver those people to the civil judiciary. Beyond any doubt, they were going to be freed by the judicial officials, who were almost entirely tainted and untrustworthy. Following up, the Colonel concluded his words with the quote at the beginning of this chapter and finished his words by writing that the members asked for permission to leave the region.[133] From this text we observe that despite his distrust, he chose to rely on local Armenians' statements. Also, he affiliated the Hayri Bey Incident with the Massacre, because during both the perpetrators offended the regime. In addition, he was certain about the capacity of the notables to control the

132 BOA, BEO, 3592/269347, 3a, Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey transmits the telegram of the Deputies, June 21, 1325. "*31 Mart 325 hadise-i müessefede medhaldar olmadığı halde tulu'-i nur-ı hürriyette her tarafda bazı muhibb-i istibdad memurin aleyhinde yapılan nümayiş gibi sabık Hayri Bey hakkındaki şikayetten dolayı idare-i örfiyeye tabi tutulmak adalet ve meşrutiyete kabil tatbik olmadığından makamata serien müracaat eyleyip acizlerine itası elzemdir*." This telegram is important in two ways: First, it shows that the deputies stood for the notables and form a pressure group on the central government. Secondly, it shows that the deputies considered both the attack on Hayri Bey and the demonstrations that occurred during the revolutionary days in Anatolia as similar events. The telegram copy shows this: So, figures which seem "revolutionary" in July 1908 can be seen "counterrevolutionary" later. Yet for the actors, there were no differences between the collective actions of July 1908 and 1908-1909 winter. At least, they could set a defense strategy in line with this view.

133 BOA, BEO, 3597/269767, 5a, From Mehmed Ali Bey, Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, to the Ministry of War, June 24, 1325.

masses.[134] The Minister of War supported the Commander in this crisis: It reminded the Prime Ministry that it was the Prime Ministry who ordered the arrestees to be judged by the Court-Martial. For this reason, the Court-Martial gave its final sentences on this matter.[135]

Meanwhile, the arrestees complained that the Court-Martial had not executed the order to transfer the case to the civilian court.[136] According to them, the previous district governor Haydar Bey and the previous deputy prosecutor (Abbas Efendi), whose weakness had been proven, had previously poisoned the committee's mind. So, when they commenced their work, members of the Court-Martial Committee had already been inclined towards their thoughts. And at that time, as the order that they received was so harsh for them, they would associate the Hayri Bey Incident with the Court-Martial. This committee could not remain neutral, so they asked for an order for their release and the appointment of a special committee formed by civil servants and deputies to take over the task of the Court-Martial.[137]

Yet Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey's resistance was ongoing: He underlined once more that the Hayri Bey Incident was not a petty crime. It was a murder and an attack on constitutionalism. He repeated that MPs of Maraş had given orders to the suspects; applications and interventions had been made in the capital, and after all of these, the case had been presented as a petty crime, leading to the order to transfer it to the civil judiciary. As civil investigators had also witnessed, despite the Governor and Appeal Prosecutor's neglect, District Governor Haydar Bey had personally applied to the Ministry of Interior with the intention to restore government order, and he had been successful. The reason why arrestees and deputies were complaining about him was twofold: One was to cover their crimes, and the other was to make

134 Yet in the Antakya Chapter, we will observe that we have to be careful about the limits of the notables' power.

135 BOA, BEO, 3597/269767, 2a, From the Ministry of War to Prime Ministry, June 25, 1325.

136 BOA, DH.MKT, 2876/45, 4a, From Hüdayizade Ökkeş and Bayezidzade Mehmed Hakkı to the Prime ministry, June 24, 1325.

137 BOA, DH.MKT, 2876/45, 2a, 2b, From Karaküçükzade Mustafa Emir, Mahmudzade Ref'et, Karaküçükzade Mehmed, Kadızade Mustafa, Hüdayizade Tahsin, Çokadırzade Tavram to the Ministry of Interior, June 25 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2876/45, 3a, June 30, 1325.

their despotic ideas' implementation permanent by reducing the influence of the constitutional government's representative.[138]

Following this correspondence, the Court-Martial regained its strong position: The Prime Ministry decided to write that as the Court-Martial had completed the trial of the Hayri Bey Incident, there was no need to transfer the case to the civil judiciary.[139] At the end of the trial, some persons who caused Hayri Bey's death were sentenced to imprisonment between six months to three years. The secondary criminals were sentenced to imprisonment terms ranging from one week to six months.[140]

The convicts continued their objections even after the sentences were announced. They started to send longer petitions to several branches of the central government. Seeing that they could not prevent their imprisonment, some convicts tried to form a different discourse about the Hayri Bey Incident: In their petition sent to the Prime Ministry on 13 July, for example, they claimed that they applied to the government to prevent an attack on Hayri Bey: They thought that as Hayri Bey had forbidden the speaking of a Quranic verse, bigoted people could cause undesired events, and by the right granted to them by the 11th and 14th articles of the Constitution, they wrote a petition that warned the government. After their previous petitions in which they had complained about the Court-Martial's actions, the police chief informed them that their punishment would increase. For the rice cultivation, they defended themselves by adding that among the twenty-two persons that had informed about the Hayri Bey Incident, no one had anything to do with farming in general, except two or three persons. They repeated their claim that the exact reason behind the Hayri Bey Incident was his prayer ban. For them, fact that

138 *"… Setr-i cürm maksadından münbais ve elhaletülhazihi hükümdar-ı meşrutiyetin şahsı olan reis-i hükumetin bilasebeb nüfuzunu iskatla Efkar-ı müstebidanelerinin icrası anlarda sabit kadem olmalarından mütehassıldır."* BOA, BEO, 3597/269767, 4a, Ministry of War transmits the telegram from Mehmed Ali Bey, Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325. This reaction of the commander is extremely important, as it reveals that constitutional regime's one of the greatest problems was local elites' rejection of the central authority.

139 BOA, BEO, 3597/269767, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministries of Interior and War, June 9, 1325.

140 BOA, BEO, 3605/270365, 1a, From Prime Ministry to Ahmed Rıza Bey, July 12, 1325.

the crowd carried no weapons also proved that they had no intention to use force. They also claimed that none of the petitioners had been in the assembled group. So, if there had been a crime, it was those criminals who should have been punished, not them.[141] In this manner, for the first time, some convicts tried to distance themselves from the offenders.

It seems that some convicts decided to make new claims after the approval of their sentence by the Adana Regulatory Forces Headquarters on 18 July. In a telegram sent to the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Law, and deputies of Maraş, they tried to prove that they had not caused the district governor's death by bringing forward Hayri Bey's illness: He had been suffering from dysentery since his arrival in Maraş. In addition, he lost his life on the road to Aleppo, at the Antep American Hospital. In the American Hospital doctors' report, it was written that Hayri Bey had died of dysentery.[142]

The more important theme of the same telegram is that it likened the Hayri Bey Incident to the post-revolutionary demonstrations: They wrote that during that period, in many provinces, many governors, district governors, subdistrict governors and other officials had been forcefully removed amidst insults and beatings; yet doing nothing to those provinces' people while prosecuting only Maraş's people, who had objected to an open attack on Islam, was unjust.[143] This attempt can remind the reader one warning in the

141 BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 3a, From Kilislizade Mahmud Nedim, Hüdayizade Mehmed Tahsin, Emir Mahmudzade Fuad Osman to Prime Ministry, July 13, 1325. Deputy Muslim Cleric Esad Efendi also kept the attackers at bay by writing to Sheikh al-Islamate and noting that he had informed the government that time. He had expected to be rewarded yet he had been punished. BOA, DH.MKT, 2891/79, 1a, Deputy Muslim Cleric Esad Efendi to Sheikh al-Islamate, July 11, 1325.

142 BOA, A.VRK, 712/10, 1a, From Emir Mahmudzade Osman, Bayezidzade Mehmed, Müderris Mehmed, Müderris Ahmed, and Hüdayizade Memiş to Prime Ministry, July 21, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 10a; 11a, From Emir Mahmudzade Osman, Bayezidzade Mehmed, Müderris Mehmed, Müderris Ahmed and Hüdayizade Mehmed to the Ministry of Law, August 2, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 13a, From Maraş MPs Fehmi and Şükrü to the Council of Ministers.

143 BOA, A.VRK, 712/10, 1a, From Emir Mahmudzade Osman, Bayezidzade Mehmed, Müderris Mehmed, Müderris Ahmed, and Hüdayizade Memiş to Prime Ministry, July 21, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 10a; 11a, From Emir Mahmudzade Osman, Bayezidzade Mehmed, Müderris Mehmed, Müderris Ahmed and Hüdayizade Mehmed to the Ministry of Law,

introduction: That today the historians of the French Revolution are aware of the fact that the in terms of the crowds' value system and functions, there was a continuity before and after 1789, yet it was the governments who defined them revolutionary or counterrevolutionary, and their definition was mostly dependent on strengthening or diminishing the revolutionary state power.[144] In this case, although the repertoire of contention[145] was most probably remained almost the same before and after 1908, and so, the convicts were right by pointing to the commonality. Yet that time, both the content and the addressed central state were completely different.

Another important feature of the document is that it shows that the convicts started to refer to the constitutionalist principles more stressfully. They not only presented their treatment as unlawful but also related them with their soaring expectations for their lawful treatment. They wrote that despite the Court-Martial's bans, they managed to send telegrams, and thanks to those telegrams, it was ordered to deliver the case documents to civil courts: Yet the Court-Martial ignored the orders. To the convicts, the Court-Martial committee members were despotic non-experts: They arrested people without basis, insulted and tortured them. The ones who were sentenced to more than one year were transferred to Aleppo prison. They ended their argument by writing that if in constitutionalism and civilization judgments were made in this way, they could not object to anything. Civilized world opinion would be aggrieved and furious because of the things that they had faced.[146]

August 2, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 13a, From Maraş MPs Fehmi and Şükrü to the Council of Ministers.

144 Colin Lucas "The Crowd and Politics between 'Ancien Regime' and Revolution in France," *The Journal of Modern History* 60, no. 3 (September 1988): 439; 452.

145 Here I refer to the conception of Charles Tilly, See Charles Tilly, The Contentious French, (Massachusetts, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), 4.

146 BOA, A.VRK, 712/10, 1a, From Emir Mahmudzade Osman, Bayezidzade Mehmed, Müderris Mehmed, Müderris Ahmed, and Hüdayizade Memiş to Prime Ministry, July 21, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 10a; 11a, From Emir Mahmudzade Osman, Bayezidzade Mehmed, Müderris Mehmed, Müderris Ahmed and Hüdayizade Mehmed to the Ministry of Law, August 2, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 13a, From Maraş MPs Fehmi and Şükrü to the Council of Ministers.

Three days later, in a much longer petition sent from many convicts to the Ministry of Law, some convicts continue referring to constitutionalism in a seemingly emotional way. They wrote that if the constitutional government would not listen to their innocent voices, then they would look for a different place to apply to: No conscience could accept that after waiting for the justice of constitutionalism during the thirty-three years of oppression, they were exposed to fresh oppression instead of justice. The convicts went so far that they claimed that their case had similarities with the famous Dreyfus affair: To reveal Dreyfus's innocence, French people had made many sacrifices. They did not want to believe that their government would ignore their application and not allow them to be judged in a fair court. There was no evidence against them. If there were any witnesses, they wanted them to make their testimonies in front of them. They wanted to make their just trial known to the civilized world. If the shame of being sentenced would not be lifted, they wanted a copy of their sentences, so that they would hang them on their necks and reveal them in the Final Judgement.[147] The Ministry of Law also joined them and while forwarding this petition it showed its discomfort caused by the Court-Martial ignoring orders and handling a case which ought to have been handled by the civil judiciary.[148]

The task of the Maraş Court-Martial's investigation committees was reaching conclusion in September. The Council of Ministers decided to lift the Martial Law after their mission was over.[149] On 11 October, the Ministry of

147 BOA, İ..AZN, 90/3, 3a, From various notables of Maraş to the Ministry of Law, July 24, 1325. *"Fransız kavminin Dreyfus'un masumiyet ve beraetini izhar için ne derece fedakarlık ibraz ettiği malum iken esasen hükumet-i İslamiye olmak hasebiyle adaletle tesis edip meşrutiyet-i idareye nailiyetle bir kat daha tersın edilen hükümetimizin böyle yirmiyi mütecaviz eşhasın masumiyetlerine dair feryadı ısga ve bir mahkeme-i adile hususunda aleni muhakemeye müsade etmeyeceğine inanmak istemiyoruz."*

148 BOA, BEO, 3619/271425, 6a, From the Ministry of Law to Prime Ministry , August 1, 1325. So, in short, the debate over the connection between Hayri Bey incident and the Massacre turned out to be a debate about authorization between state institutions. This also reveals the complexity of the state's evaluation of the Massacres: As long as the state is considered as a singular unit, generalizations about the massacres will always face with objections.

149 BOA, MV, 132/70, September 27, 1325.

Interior wrote to the Aleppo Governorate, and with the end of Martial Law, it ordered the committee members to return to their own troops.[150]

In the absence of Martial Law, soon after their sentencing, Maraş Convicts started to demand amnesty. They were inspired by the fact that an amnesty for 41 persons who participated in the Adana Massacre was on the agenda. 52 convicts repeated their demands that they had made before on 4 November, 12 November, and 6 December. They referred to those 41 persons being pardoned and wanted either to be tried again or be pardoned as well. For them, that those 41 persons had been sentenced by the Court-Martial and yet were later pardoned clearly showed that the Court-Martial committees were unlawful.[151] Still, there was no inclination towards pardoning the ones sentenced by the Maraş Court-Martial.[152] In April, Fahri Bey, the new Governor of Aleppo sent an urgent telegram to the Ministry of Interior. In his telegram, he wrote about the Maraş district governorate's suggestion of an amnesty: As some convicts in Adana, Antioch, and Keseb, together with the non-Muslims and ones that attacked the government had been pardoned, not pardoning the 49 persons whose punishment was about to be over could lead to a fresh rise of hatred among the people.[153] Such arguments strengthened the hands of those demanding an amnesty. After a while, 31 Muslims sent a telegram to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies via deputy Şükrü Bey. They wrote about the example of Adana and demanded an amnesty again. They claimed they should have been pardoned in compliance with the principle of equality.[154] The Chamber of Deputies decided to send a notification to the Prime Ministry to pardon those people on the national

150 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-3/49, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, October 11, 1325.

151 BOA, A.VRK, 722/42, From convicts to the Sultanate, February 19, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 83-17/2, 1a, From convicts to the Presidency of Chamber of Deputies, February 19, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 83-17/5, 1a, From convicts to Prime Ministry, February 19, 1325.

152 BOA, DH.MUİ, 83-17/3, 1a, March 14, 1326.

153 BOA, DH.MUİ, 87-2/10, 11a, 13a, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 11, 1326.

154 BOA, DH.MUİ, 121-11/2, 1a, From 31 Muslims of Maraş to the Presidency of Chamber of Deputies, June 4, 1326.

holiday.[155] The Prime Ministry asked the Ministry of Interior about the situation. In its response, the Ministry of Interior wrote that amnesty for the Adana Massacre convicts was for the people who were sentenced to less than six years. Maraş convicts who were also sentenced to less than six years should also be pardoned. Yet those who received longer sentences were going to be excluded.[156]

§ 4.5 Conclusion: Dilemma for the Regime

What conclusions can be derived from this story? First of all, we observed that similar to the Kayseri case, there was a great mobilization by the local Muslim notables against the highest official between the Revolution and the 31 March Incident. The Maraş version of this mobilization was referred to here as the Hayri Bey Incident. More interestingly, in both mobilizations, the district governors were accused of collaborating with, or even being "the giaour". Given that previous scholarship mostly tends to claim that the officials were participators of atrocities not only during the Hamidian Massacres but also the 1915 Genocide, this point merits attention, showing the great pressure from locals to shape the different Ottoman regimes' ethnic policies.

Again, similar to Kayseri, events in Maraş revealed many weaknesses of the central state in several aspects. It could not protect its greatest representative in the town during his term of office. After his death, it lacked the power to punish the offenders for months. When it arrested some of them immediately after the massacre, which was not that massive within the town, it could barely keep the suspects away from their relatives. It was only the arrival of regular soldiers from the center, under the name of Regulatory Forces, that allowed it to find the courage to declare martial law.

Yet even the Court-Martial faced a great deal of resistance from the local Muslims. The locals were even initially successful in forcing the state to transfer their case to the local courts. The strong counter-reaction by the soldiers avoided it, yet they were pardoned anyway within a very short period

155 BOA, DH.MUİ, 121-11/2, 2a, June 5, 1326.

156 BOA, DH.MUİ, 121-11/3, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, July 14, 1326; BOA, DH.MUİ, 121-11/ 1, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, July 29, 1326.

of time. They were even successful in canceling the limits imposed by soldiers on rice cultivation in the long run.

The Court-Martial presenting itself as the champion of revolution during its dealing with the Hayri Bey Incident must not lead us to ignore its terrible relations with Maraş Armenians. Our limited information from the documents shows that after the massacre, the soldiers treated the Armenians very badly: Complaints of torture and beatings were made, and the officers were even confronted by the French consulate. Just like in Kayseri, the prelate of the town (Der Nerses) became the scapegoat not only for the court-martial officers but also for their predecessors.

For me, the more important lesson of Hayri Bey Incident was that just like in the Kayseri case, the first year of post-revolutionary Maraş shows how economic, political, ethnic, and social objects of study in different academic sub-fields should be taken into consideration in the scholarship, as they were intimately interconnected. To deal with the Hayri Bey Incident and the struggle between the Court-Martial and the local Muslim notables; one has to revolve around the impact of the changing political atmosphere, rice cultivation, certain prayers' meanings, ethnic relations, revolutionary discourses, and relations between the central state and the locals. Yet despite the complexity, it can be argued that Hayri Bey Incident was an anti-revolutionary movement that shared many similarities with the events in Kayseri. We observed that during their struggle, the Court-Martial and the convicts formulated two opposing discourses about what had happened in the town during previous months. For the Court-Martial, whose view was closer to me, the convicts were counterrevolutionary figures: They attacked the regime twice, first with the Hayri Bey Incident and second, with the Massacre. However, in those documents, the convicts often made strong references to constitutionalism. Furthermore, they labeled the judicial procedures of the Court-Martial as unlawful and arbitrary, noting that those actions could only take place in the old regime of "despotism". Also, they implied that they were on the revolutionary side. For example, Maraş's convicts reinforced their position by claiming that the Hayri Bey incident was just the same as the post-revolutionary demonstrations against despotic officials that had occurred everywhere. After waiting for the justice of constitutionalism during the

thirty-three years' oppression, instead of justice, they were exposed to oppression.

One very similar confusion was also in play in Kayseri: Ahmed Hilmi's statement –that many persons of the old regime and opportunists took their part in the new regime- and the discourse of the resistance camp in that town was an early, simple but adequate warning that it can be too daring a step to dub the two camps in Kayseri as revolutionary and counterrevolutionary upon first sight. Here, we are faced with a huge problem: How should we interpret the provincial actors' attitudes towards the new regime's categorizations and principles, such as revolution and progress? How had the foundational categories of the Revolution been put into action by some of the Muslim elites in Maraş? In another sense, what made this incident anti-revolutionary? Here, we have a top-rank state official (subdistrict governor Hayri Bey), who tried to implement a legal, legitimate state law (rice regulation). Obedience to law is part of a social contract between citizens and the state. Yet this had been violated by some of its citizens at the local level before the revolution. To violate an official contract, local agents must use unofficial sources of power. In the Maraş case, it seems that local elites' unofficial power, no matter what it was composed of, was keeping the official power at bay until the Revolution. Most probably, changing political conditions at the center had affected the locality, and this encouraged the state officials to act. Hayri Bey tried to enforce official power. (We do not know whether his intention was only to do what he had believed he should have done or to benefit from the new conditions to make a move in a power struggle he had already been engaged in).

The official was warned not to use one of his official powers. Yet he insisted. At that point, the locals had options: they could obey yet look for official ways to change the law. Yet that could take a long time, and would have serious financial costs and therefore diminish their power. They could disobey the law openly, yet that could mean the cancellation of the contract between them and the state. Or they could look for ways to replace the person exercising official power: Maybe the new official could be forced not to use his power. They had to roll the dice, yet the way of doing so also may have varied: That could be done by using their sole unofficial powers. Yet that would also

result in the cancellation of the contract. The new revolutionary state had a greatly refreshed legitimacy, and it could not be challenged either by disobedience or by forcing its representative out: They had to convince the legitimate state itself to remove the official.

If we only take the rational motivations into account, then we can argue that the official's intervention in a religious matter provided the resistors with can be regarded as a golden opportunity. This should have been the case for some. However, we can also recall one reference in the introduction, which is Engel's pointing to the Russian pogroms as movements during which the traditional notion of justice was not completely replaced by the rechtsstaat. Hayri Bey Incident fits well into this explanation. By presenting that intervention as an official act (forbiddance) that prevented them from their holy duty (mentioning a hadith and a verse), the Muslims claimed that the official had broken the contract (that it is the state's duty to provide conditions for its citizens to perform their religion) between the state and its citizens. This claim allowed the resistors to act as if the contract was not binding on them either. So, they could renounce the state's monopoly of using force and show their unofficial power. As their coalition became broadened thanks to the religious motivation, this power seemed greater than it had been thought to be. While doing that, they were totally silent about the official's implementation of part of the contract (law).

The official's strategy was twofold: First, he presented himself as a person who did not break a contract at all: He did not use his official power (to ban). What he employed was a semi-official power (advice) to avoid a religious performance, which was not that sacred (an ordinary prayer, the words of which were neither a hadith nor a verse).

Second, he also added that the resistors were ignoring the new post-revolutionary contract between the state and its citizens who had been thought to be (ex-)non-co-religionists. These citizens were claiming that the religious performance was insulting them. Believing that all citizens should have been equal under the new political conditions, the official tried to prevent the insult, and therefore to protect the new contract. Beyond a fact of ignorance, he revealed that it had been the resistors themselves who had broken the contract between them and the state by ignoring and preventing

the implementation of a law. All their acts at that time were directed towards that same purpose. Therefore, they had to be punished.

Some points come forward in these opposing claims: The first one is regarding the religious performance itself. For the official, that was not sacred, as it was an ordinary prayer. For the resistors, on the other hand, it was sacred, as it was a prayer that included the words of Allah and his prophet. The second one is whether the religious performance was insulting or not for the ex-non-co-religionists. We saw that both prayers were regarding the non-believers and used heavy words for them, so it was surely insulting.

This was a great dilemma for the principles of the new state. It should have allowed its citizens to perform their religion, yet some practices of religion were irreconcilable with the state's universalist principles. The same attitude was also seen in the defenders of the new regime. We have already seen the newspaper articles that informed the public in the capital: While Volkan was extremely aggressive, even Unionist Şura-yı Ümmet did not provide a harsh response to the news, let alone the official Takvim-i Vekayi, which totally denied the seriousness of the threats against non-Muslims. We can therefore assert that the Young Turk state's initial response was to cover up this dilemma, rather than to square with it: It accepted that its official had broken the contract and he was relieved of his office. However, it went totally silent about the resistors breaking the contract of obeying the law. When it came to the damage they did to its contract with (ex)-non-co-religionist citizens by insults and showings of force, the state openly chose the way of denial.

Even when they found the courage to face up to the local elite after the declaration of martial law, representatives of the central state did not choose to bring to the fore the threats against Armenians. On the contrary, they tried to arrest, and have even beaten some Armenian individuals.[157] What concerned them more was the attack on the representative of the state, the district governor. This is in line with the idea that the new regime was associated with a strong "rational" and "scientific" state apparatus and any

157 Their approach in tackling the Armenian question was to be better presented in the following chapter about the story of Zeytun.

attack to diminish its power was seen as a sign of reaction by them.[158] From the first telegram of Hayri Bey himself to the latest documents, we will observe that pointing to or ignoring the religious aspect was a strategy for legitimization.

For Court-Martial officials, who came to the town in the political atmosphere of the defeat of the 31 March Incident, Hayri Bey Incident had been simply an event in a similar fashion. For the convicts, on the other hand, it was a version of post-revolutionary mobilization. To prove that, they used a very revolutionary tone, even referring to the Dreyfus Case of the French Third Republic. Again, in this case, the instrumental reason, that the convicts' use of revolutionary concepts was simply part of a disingenuous strategy to save themselves, was avoided. Rather, by referring to Sahlins in the introduction, it is noted that it also partially involved sincerity, resulting in the transformation of categories. Yet living in an age when those categories were losing their foundational essence, we depart from the previous trend that accepts the attempts for transformations as simply other faces of modernity. The very existence of the polemic between the two sides, in this case, reveals the anti-revolutionary character of the Incident, as anti-revolutions are movements whose agents try to transform but do not reject the revolutionary discourse. Although the officers' attitude had the potential to push them into the counterrevolutionary stage, it seems that that was prevented by the policymakers in the long run.

The debate around whether the main motive behind the mobilization against Hayri Bey was the rice regulation issue or the prohibition of prayer, at first sight, seemed to parallel the mainstream paradigm around the reason for the 31 March Incident: No matter whom they saw as the main agents of the event, nearly all respected scholars, representing different paradigms, believe that behind the religious discourse, there lied a "real" material reason: A logic very similar to the outdated version of Marxist determinism that point to the

158 As Nader Sohrabi points out in his work, constitutionalism was a hopeful doctrine of self-strengthening. More than liberalism, it was also seen as a "scientific doctrine of state strength through rational administrative transformation." Constitutional states were seen as "the most streamlined, merit based, rational, indeed 'scientific' systems" *Sohrabi, Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran,* 16, 21.

superior role of the base against the superstructure. Yet the Hayri Bey Incident, which was thought by the Court-Martial to be a proto-version of the 31 March Incident, revealed that the religious sphere cannot simply be that instrumental, for two reasons: First, the Armenian rice cultivators could not be mobilized with religious motivation, and second, the result of the mobilization increased the ethnic tension to a great level, a fact which cannot be belittled as a side-effect.

5

Zeytun

> *Demek ki Zeytun'da kıt'al zuhuruna meydan vermeliydim. Çünkü olvakit ben de bazı idare memurları gibi mahkum olmaz idim.*[1]
>
> – BOA. DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 3, from İbrahim Paşa to the Ministry of Interior, 26 November 1325.

As one of the few towns where the Armenian population form the majority in the Ottoman Empire, Zeytun was a scene of several ethnoreligious conflicts. Even before the birth of the concept "Armenian Question", there had been several clashes within and around the town: Historians mention conflicts in the years 1780, 1782, 1808, 1819, 1829, 1832, 1835, 1836, 1840, 1842,1843-44, 1850, 1852, 1853, 1854 and 1857.[2] Also with the emergence of the problem at the second half of the nineteenth century, there were very serious conflicts in Zeytun in 1861-62, 1878-79 and 1895-96. More clashes would also follow those during both the 1915 Genocide and the Turkish War of Independence: These last two clashes would lead to the town's Armenians' annihilation and being renamed as Süleymanlı. Although it had such a contentious history, very interestingly, there was not a loss of life in Zeytun during the very near Cilicia

1 So I should have given the Massacre in Zeytun go-ahead. Because in that case, just like some administration officials, I would not have been sentenced.

2 Erdal İlter, *Ermeni Meselesinin Perspektifi ve Zeytun İsyanları*, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1995), 93-98. İlter calls all these clashes as Armenian revolts.

Massacre. Yet that does not mean that Zeytun looked calm those days: Zeytun people were also faced with moments of very high tension during the period that this work focuses on.

Let alone the difficulties of explaining any kind of non-existence in history, the absence of ethnoreligious conflicts in Zeytun during that period is hard to explain. The Ottoman archives offer us a small number of documents for an explanation. Yet they have a lot to offer on another subject: The contradictory attitudes of Ottoman bureaucrats over the Armenian policy. What comes forward in this chapter is the story of two disagreements among the Ottoman bureaucracy over two issues: The first one was about the debate on whether the town's subdistrict governor, İbrahim Paşa, had succeeded to prevent an ethnic clash or led to the increase of such a risk during the Cilicia Massacre. While İbrahim Paşa believed that he had to take the credit and be rewarded, some Zeytun people and Maraş Court-Martial thought otherwise. The Court-Martial even would punish him. Yet their colleagues and the people from different religious backgrounds in Antakya, the town of İbrahim Paşa's next office, believed that he was so devoted to easing the Armenians' lives in the aftermath of the Massacre that he could not have been responsible for the events in Zeytun. After some brief information about Zeytun's social and geographical peculiarities, the story of this confusion will be the first subject to be dealt with in this chapter: There will emerge a cautionary lesson that the same single agent could perform both great and dirty deeds on similar occasions when it comes to the Ottoman Armenian issue.

Pointing to such gray figures in works that deal with mass murders may seem odd at first hand. This had also been true for the historiography of the most infamous crimes committed by the Third Reich. For example, when he tried to show the agents' contradictions and paradoxes in his "*Life in the Third Reich*" in mid-1980s, Richard Bessel needed to write that:

> Understandably with the history of Nazi Germany, it has been tempting to paint pictures in stark black and white, clearly delineating good and evil -for was not the Third Reich the most thoroughly evil political system ever created? However, life is not like that. Human

> beings are bundles of paradoxes, and the choices they are forced to make rarely are clear-cut.[3]

For Bessel, people can both complain about and be pleased by different policies of a single regime: For example, in Nazi Germany, people may have

> …despised corrupt and arrogant Nazi Party bosses, feared from Gestapo agents or informers in their workplaces, felt aggrieved by the government's attempts to hold down their wages, and certainly did not want to go to war, might at the same time have felt pleased that Germany was able to rearm and that Hitler could force the incorporation of Austria and the Suedetenland into the Reich, be grateful that they were back at work after years of unemployment, or be extremely impressed by the holiday programmes offered by the 'Strength through Joy' organization.[4]

It is not a coincidence that the fluidity of agency is underlined in a book entitled "*Life in the Third Reich*", as with the rise of studies on daily life in Nazi Germany, which is called *Alltagsgeschichte*, historians started to embrace "the shades of gray implicit in this mode of questioning for which there are more than two – black or white –answers…" and "looks to stories of collaboration and resistance. The fact that they are often the same stories is precisely the point".[5] Such studies, like the work of Detlev Peukert, showed that even the lines between "victims" and "perpetrators" can be blurring: Instead, one has to analyze "the multiple ambiguities of ordinary people making their choices among the various grays of active consent, accommodation, and nonconformity". Opponents of Nazism, even the resistance fighters, can be "weighed down by the experience of persecution, by the sense of their own

3 Richard Bessel, *Life in the Third Reich*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), xvii.

4 Ibid., xix-xx.

5 P. Steege, in A. S. Bergerson, E. Mailänder Koslov, G. Reuveni, P. Steege, and D. Sweeney, "Forum: Everyday Life in Nazi Germany," German History, 2009, vol. 27, no. 4, 562, cited by Geoff Eley, *Nazism as Fascism,* 46.

impotence, and of the petty compromises that were the imperative for survival".[6]

Recognizing such paradoxes help to "create a disturbing gap between popular perceptions of Nazi Germany and the concerns and findings of many historians".[7] Yet, this should not be equated with "an apologetic historiographical tendency tout court" -it also has a critical potential, as the concept of every day is a contested terrain. The apologetic normalization is "contingent, rather than necessary".[8] It seems that the historiography of the Armenian question has not tackled the problem of agency as adequately as the Nazi Germany historiography did. This was most probably because the struggle against denialism kept the scholarship busy with proving the existence of atrocities, a fact that might have made pointing to the fluidity of agencies seem much more disturbing. In this sense, the case of İbrahim Paşa may be a modest contribution to the future studies that tackle the subject.

Previously, in the chapter on the story in Kayseri, we observed that during the final great ethnoreligious tension, there were serious disagreements among the top civilian and military officials over how to tackle the problem. While Cemal Bey was for mediation, the military commander defended a harsh policy. The second story of this chapter will be a similar case, this time between the following subdistrict governor Halil Bey and the military officials in Zeytun, Maraş, and Adana. Luckily, we have a greater amount of documents on this polemic: After the immediate danger was over, the Maraş Court-Martial accused some Armenians of raising the tension in the town and wanted to demonstrate its force to the people. This decision itself raised the tension once again, and this time it was not only between the people and officials but also within the officials themselves: Coming from a different background, the new subdistrict governor Halil Bey was for a dovish policy in dealing with the situation: He thought that counsel, mediation and soft punishment would be more effective. The hawks among the military, on the

6 Detlev Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany. Conformity and Opposition in Everyday Life,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 79-80, 243, cited by Geoff Eley, *Nazism as Fascism,* 45.

7 Richard Bessel, *Life in the Third Reich*, xxi.

8 Martin Jay, "Songs of Experience: Reflections on the Debate over Alltagsgeschichte", *Salmagundi*, 81 (Winter 1989): 35.

other hand, were to press on. Their polemic in the documents verifies the two previous arguments of the dissertation. First, it confirms the argument in the chapter on Kayseri: The attitude of Halil Bey was very similar to that of Cemal Bey in Kayseri, and shows us the different opinions about what the Armenian policy of the Empire should have been. Second, it verifies the argument put forward in the chapter on Maraş: There, we observed that the officials did not relate the revolutionary politics and the solution of the Armenian Question. Their polemic with Halil Bey supports this argument.

§ 5.1 Background: Geographic, Social and Economic Conditions of Zeytun After the Revolution & First Tensions in Fall and Winter

Zeytun's geographical, social and economic structure had many peculiarities: First, as noted above, its population was almost completely Armenian, and it was surrounded by many Armenian villages. Second, economic conditions were very harsh in the region, as there were very few arable plots of land. Third, as a mountainous town, it was isolated from its surrounding, and the state was mostly unable to project its power there. Therefore, it was governed mostly by its own notables: its inhabitants used to keep away from state authority and were able to resist it whenever the state tried to reverse the situation.[9] All three facts combined to render the town a tough nut to crack: Economic and geographic conditions made banditry a livelihood for most people. Security problems could not be dealt with because of the infrastructural problems, and its ethnic composition made it an attractive target for Armenian political opposition. Not only themselves but also Ottoman state authorities could easily attribute a political meaning to any ordinary criminal case in Zeytun.

A report which was written in February 1909 by Muhlis Mehmed Bey, the deputy commander of Zeytun, provides useful information about all of these

9 This is also reflected in the legend that the town had exemption from taxation and autonomy, which was written in a lost official order by Sultan Murad IV himself. In the Ottoman records, such a document was not found. See İlter, *Ermeni Meselesinin Perspektifi ve Zeytun İsyanları*, 90.

issues. In the report, the commander presents an analysis from an official's perspective.[10] The report seems to be written in response to tax collection problems encountered after the revolution, as it begins with this subject: To deal with the problem, religious leaders and notables of the town were invited to the government building and a meeting was held. At the end of the meeting, the commander was convinced that the people needed cereals.[11] The commander also made a social analysis in the report: He grouped the people of Zeytun in three: The higher and middle classes had the ability to pay their taxes. It was told that those within this group had to pay their debts, together with the vineyard tithe (*bağ aşarı*), which was a fixed tax, paid in the name of the whole people. However, most people were poor and in need of financial aid. For this reason, they unanimously demanded to postpone tax collection until harvest time. The commander also wrote about the impact of Zeytun's geography on its social life: First, the town was surrounded by mountains from the north, and with rivers from other sides. Although its terrain was not sufficient to contain and sustain four to five hundred houses, there were 2,500 of them built on top of each other. Zeytun's surroundings were also mountainous, and it did not have arable land. The townspeople were making their living by gardening and their means of transportation were mules. For years, they had been bringing their cereals from Elbistan and Göksun, which were sixteen and thirteen hours away. Because of price rises in the previous year, people of Zeytun had been unable to buy enough cereals. In addition, no financial aid had come from elsewhere. However, even the poor had managed to pay their taxes at the time. In this new year, cereal prices were lower than the previous year, yet as some "provocateurs" were confusing people's minds, they were not paying their taxes and were continuously writing to their national communities and certain people in İstanbul about their poverty and seeking aid. Thanks to such fake news, they had collected a surplus of aid from

10 According to the commander, the report was re-sent in June, as it had been ignored by the capital previously. BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 5a From the deputy Commander of Zeytun, Muhlis Mehmed bin Hüseyin to the Prime Ministry, June 3, 1325.

11 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 5a From the deputy Commander of Zeytun, Muhlis Mehmed bin Hüseyin to the Prime Ministry, June 3, 1325.

all around. Moreover, each person borrowed one and a half liras from Ziraat Bank as seed money (*tohumluk*), by joint surety (*kefalet-i mütesilsile*). While some had bought clothes and some had paid their debts with the money, others it into pocket-money. Yet "because of their nature and savagery" (*tıynetleri ve vahşilikleri eseri olarak*) the majority had bought revolvers, ammunition, and black powder. The commander concluded his report with these suggestions: The town's geography allowed no possibility for people to progress and prosper. They were certainly going to continue banditry by claiming that they were miserable. Also, the existence of about thirty large villages, which were populated completely by Armenians, encouraged them to make Zeytun into an autonomous territory like Lebanon. This could keep the state and the nation seriously preoccupied. As a matter of fact, the state could also turn those poverty claims into an opportunity: If people of Zeytun were resettled in the large and fertile lands of Adana and Aleppo, they would become both prosperous and civilized by breaking the habit of banditry and savagery. Militarily, there would no longer be a need to keep an infantry battalion and an artillery unit in Zeytun. They could be deployed in a more appropriate place.[12] So, although Zeytun's structural problems were well known, some state officials did not believe in its inhabitants' poverty. Worse, they were even suspicious that Zeytun Armenians were spending the financial aid they had received to arm themselves. And even at that time, forced deportation was thought to be a good option to tackle the problem.

Following the Young Turk Revolution, the first signs of an ethnoreligious tension in the Zeytun subdistrict came to the surface with the news about some local Muslims' emigration. In mid-October, Hayri Bey, the district governor of Maraş, noted that some Muslim families from Çukurhisar and Tanur villages of Zeytun were preparing to emigrate to Çukurova. Regarding the first news, there were two reasons for Muslim emigration: They had begun to fear that Christians had been planning to attack them. Measures by state officials and the reactions from the capital show that the state considered the changing demography in favor of the Armenian population as a threat. First,

12 BOA. DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 2a From the Deputy Commander of Zeytun, Muhlis Mehmed bin Hüseyin to the Prime Ministry, June 3, 1325.

a policeman was sent to advise the villagers not to leave.[13] After a while, Muslim peasants were convinced. The subdistrict governorate of Zeytun wrote that the regular troops' return to Zeytun was more helpful than any preaching and advice.[14] Soon afterward, the first piece of information about the region was confirmed: The Çukurhisar board of alderman (*ihtiyar heyeti*) had informed that they were fearful due to rumors about an impending massacre. Another matter of complaint was poverty. Still, up to then, only a few persons had emigrated. The subdistrict governorate told them that those in need could borrow money from the bank and asked them to promise that they would not emigrate. Moreover, the district governorate of Kozan, which the Adana road passes through was asked if anyone from Zeytun had arrived: The district governorate replied that no one had come.[15] The Ministry of Interior wrote to the Ministry of Trade and Public Works that there was a need to give instructions to Ziraat Bank to lend money.[16]

In fact, Zeytun Armenians were also complaining about economic problems, which were reflected in Armenian newspapers: They were writing that there had been a famine in Zeytun. Reşid Bey, the Governor of Aleppo, wrote that as the price of cereals had risen, the "poor mob" was having trouble in supplying themselves for the upcoming winter. The Patriarchate had written that 57 liras had been sent as aid from the Catholicosate and 140 more were to be sent. However, no aid had arrived yet. In Zeytun, there was a need for about 2,000 liras. Reşid Bey demanded an order be given to Ziraat Bank to lend this money to the people.[17]

Soon afterward the investigation committee wrote a joint report. After the investigation, officials came to the conclusion that, in the town, the fairness of

13 BOA. DH.MKT, 2646/6, 2a From Aleppo Governorate to Ministry of Interior October 20, 1324

14 BOA. DH.MKT, 2661/91, 1a,, 2a Copy of the telegram from the District Governorate of Maraş on the people emigrating to Çukurova, November 1, 1324.

15 BOA, DH.MKT, 2670/46, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November, 4, 1324.

16 BOA, DH.MKT, 2661/91, 4a From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works, November 4, 1324.

17 BOA, DH.MKT, 2670/46, 3a, 4a The Ministry of Interior transmits the telegram of Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works, November 8, 1324.

constitutionalism "could not be inseminated one by one": For this reason, the town's Christians, most of whom were Armenians, had fired their guns in the post-revolutionary celebrations. Together with the doings of some "unperceptive people" who had joined those celebrations later, this had led to some rumors.[18] To counter these, officials had arranged meetings in Armenian and Protestant churches, also inviting most of the Muslims. At these meetings, people had been told about the reasons for previous events and the benefits of constitutionalism. Then everyone had hugged each other. About the issue of emigrations, they wrote that it was not a serious problem: only three households in Çukurhisar had left, and measures had been taken to make them return.[19]

Zeytun's economic problems were touched on in more detail in their report: In the prior year, instead of applying to the government, those who had become indigent because of inflation had borrowed a loan of cereals with an interest rate of 50%. And in that year, the debts that they had paid with their own harvests further complicated their situation. Most of them were "living from day to day by cooking gruels with the flour that they stored to make bread". Many households had emigrated to the Kars[20] region in Adana to make a living by being farmworkers, including adults and children. These emigrants were planning to return in spring. Some of them had not even felt the need to take their livestock along with them. Thanks to the local government's assurances and compulsions, many had changed their ideas about emigration. Ziraat Bank was ordered to lend credits to the poor, yet many of the poor did not have deeds. The amount of money needed to get them would be almost equal to their loans. And the state could not have forced the well-off ones to pawn their deeds. For this reason, the debtors had to be told to wait until an order to lend them money by joint guarantees was given. However, people in

18 On the documents, we cannot see what those actions had been. Yet possibly, the inspectors meant attacks on state officials. Just like in many other towns, such assaults were made in Zeytun. See BOA, DH.MKT, 2691/25, 2a The letter from Maraş District Governorate on November 13, 1324.

19 BOA, DH.MKT, 2691/25, 1a, 1b The report from Maraş District Governorate on November 8, 1324.

20 Today's Kadirli, Osmaniye.

the region would not show patience for much longer. Also, the aid which had been told was going to be sent by the Patriarchate had also not been received.[21]

Upon the complaints by the local subdistrict governorate, the investigators also inspected Vağarşag Efendi (Vagharshag Vartabed Arshagouni), the Armenian Prelate of Zeytun. There were various complaints about him in the reports: Vağarşag Efendi was not getting along with other officials. He was making incitements for the removal of many officials from office, regardless of fairness. For example, during the meeting of the administrative council, he had turned to the finance director and publicly said "this sir had previously done evil and immoral things, our people do not want him" and he had insulted him with indecent words. He had further said, "equality is spoken of… where is equality? Still Muslim officials are being sent". The officials replied by saying that mentioning the words 'government' and 'Ottoman nation' does not remind Zeytun only: In the constitutionalism such unjust words cannot be spoken. The prelate's main duty is particularly to work under the guidance of the holy books, Lord's will, and the command of Union and Progress. The Prelate was also indulging Armenians when it came to tax collection. He had openly told the investigators, in full view of the people, that tax collection in the town of Afşin was unjust. Because of his immature and immoral temperament, together with the local government's tolerance with motivation to prevent a complaint, the collection had been completely stopped. Furthermore, the people were demanding to be recruited by saying that military tax is abolished. Vağarşag Efendi also ended his speech at the meeting to advise the people by saying "long live the heroes of Zeytun". These words had broken the hearts of Muslims and indulged the other side. A proper response had been given to this injustice and ensured that the people would embrace each other. Upon the statements made by Protestant and Catholic Prelates, notable aghas and themselves, the committee decided that it was unfavorable for Vağarşag Efendi to be in charge in Zeytun.[22] Maraş's district governor Hayri Bey also wanted to replace Vağarşag Efendi: It was most of all

21 BOA, DH.MKT, 2691/25, 1a,, 1b The report from Maraş District Governorate on November 8, 1324

22 BOA, DH.MKT, 2691/25, 1a,, 1b The report from Maraş District Governorate on November 8, 1324.

on the shoulders of religious leaders and ulema to tell people about the need for the main Ottoman nations to manage to live together. However, Vağarşag Efendi was indulging the ignorant people and alienating them from each other.[23] The investigation committee also detected the ones that fueled the massacre rumor in Çukurhisar. At that time, there was no security problem in the region. Yet there was a need for officials. The existing ones were very sluggish people.[24]

On the very same days of the investigation, Prelate Vağarşag Efendi objected to the parliamentary election results. In his telegram sent to the Patriarchate, he wrote that the Zeytun candidate who had received 21 votes had not been elected, whereas in Aleppo there had been elected deputies who had only received 18 votes from the electoral delegates. In Maraş, Muslims had been united behind two candidates which had led to the defeat of the Armenian one. All deputies in the district were Muslims. In compliance with their right to equality, the Patriarchate felt the need to apply to the relevant authorities.[25] The District Governor of Maraş, Hayri Bey, rejected those claims and wrote that the Prelate was an immoral person. He should not have been allowed to remain in office.[26]

After a few days, the tension between Vağarşag Efendi and the officials rose dramatically. The ones who had fueled the rumors that had made Çukurhisar peasants want to emigrate were detected, and one of them, Bedros, the village's miller, was arrested.[27] Vağarşag Efendi demanded his immediate release. He assembled the "ignorant people" around the government building, which was perceived as a threat to the deputy subdistrict governor. Zeytun's notables reprimanded him and the crowd was disbanded. District Governor

23 BOA, DH.MKT, 2691/25, 2a The letter from Maraş District Governorate on November 13, 1324.

24 BOA, DH.MKT, 2691/25, 1a, 1b, The report from Maraş District Governorate on November 8, 1324.

25 BOA, DH.MKT, 2680/16, 1a, The Armenian Patriarchate transmits the telegram sent by Zeytun Prelate on 10 November to the Ministry of Interior.

26 BOA, DH.MKT, 2680/16, 2a From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 19, 1324.

27 BOA, DH.MKT, 2691/25, 1a,1b, The report from Maraş District Governorate on November 8, 1324.

Hayri Bey was of the opinion that the Prelate staying would lead to very troublesome events: He repeated his demand to remove Vağarşag Efendi from his office in Zeytun.[28]

Despite the tensions, Sis Catholicosate, the superior religious body of the Zeytun Prelacy, refused to remove Vağarşag Efendi from office: It wrote that the reason behind the denunciation was the subdistrict governor's grudge against him. Vağarşag Efendi's service during the era of despotism had proven his loyalty. His removal without any explanation could lead to complaints by people.[29]

Previously, it was noted that there were tensions between Armenian prelates and government officials in different regions of Cilicia. The most well-known example was the one between Moushegh Seropian, the Prelate of Adana, and Cevad Bey, the Governor of Adana. After the Massacres, Seropian would become the greatest Armenian scapegoat, and he would be sentenced to death. We also have observed a very similar clash previously in the Kayseri case: There, District Governor Cemal Bey and Drtad Efendi had some quarrels before the reactionary attacks on Cemal Bey. Here, both Hayri Bey's demand and the Catholicosate's resistance were very similar to the clash in Kayseri: Hayri Bey, as a moderate person who even tried to prohibit the prayers that insult non-Muslims, found the Prelate's actions to be exceeding the limits of liberty. And again, as in Kayseri, the higher religious authorities, (The Patriarchy in the Kayseri case, the Catholiscate in the Zeytun case) refused to remove the prelate. These examples point to a tension that went beyond the Adana case, which is to be dwelled on later.

Meanwhile, two important events occurred. First, on 6 December, the subdistrict governor of Zeytun, Yuvanaki Efendi was appointed to the subdistrict governorate of Prijepolje and left Zeytun. He was replaced by the previous subdistrict governor of Ordu, İbrahim Halil Paşa.[30] Born in Trabzon,

28 BOA, DH.MKT, 2691/25, 4a Ciphered form Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, December 3, 1324.

29 BOA, DH.MKT, 2716/86, 1a, From Catholicos of Sis to the Ministry of Justice, December 15, 1324.

30 BOA, BEO, 3457/259233, 1a From the Prime Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior, 6 December 1324. Some people in Zeytun had opposed Yuvanaki Efendi. The religious leaders of the town claimed that they would accept any subdistrict governor other than a Greek

İbrahim Paşa had mostly worked around the eastern Black Sea region: He had served as the subdistrict governor of Antab, Of, Ünye, Giresun, and Ordu. He had been removed from office after the revolution, yet at that time, he was appointed to Zeytun.[31] Members of the Armenian community objected to his appointment: The newspaper Manzume-i Efkar published an article about his bad actions (*irtikab*) during his office in Giresun.[32] In an Armenian populated town center, this was to cause some further problems.

The second event was the Hayri Bey Incident in Maraş. As the news of the Incident was heard, tension flared up within Zeytun. Ten days after the Incident, the Commander of Maraş, who undertook the duty of district governor, wrote that officials were noticing that the people of Zeytun were arming themselves: In the reports, it was written that the whole of Maraş Armenians had been buying vast amounts of guns, gunpowder, and bullets for about two months. People had been distributed five or six chests of Mauser rifles and revolvers twenty days prior. Also, Zeytun Armenians were having confrontations among each other: Two groups of people from two different neighborhoods attempted to a gunfight in the marketplace. Police, some shopkeepers and other people had come from around and had prevented the fight.

Yet this had led to another clash, that time between a group of people and state officials: Bullets were fired on houses that belonged to the vice-deputy subdistrict governor, some officials, and certain influential people. Their windows had been broken and regie guards had been beaten in the market. New events were expected on Sunday. Also, tax collection had stopped in the

official. See BOA, DH.ŞFR, 407/22, 1a,1b, Ciphered telegram from the Governorate of Aleppo to the Ministry of the Interior, 6 November 1324.

31 BOA, DH. SAİDd… 47/385; BOA, DH. SAİDd… 150/295.

32 BOA, DH.MKT, 2723/32 1a. Unfortunately, this article is not available in the BOA Ottoman Archive. Actually, there were complaints of him in that office. Yet as he had "a powerful personality", he was appointed to Ordu later. See BOA, DH.MKT, 1127/3, 2a From the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry, 7 October 1322. In this next duty, there were accusations about bad actions (*irtikab*) and oppression of (*taaddiyat*) Christians. Yet as the Administrative Council of Trabzon decided that those accusations were groundless, he returned to his Office later. See BOA, DH.MKT, 1275/27, 12a From the Ministry of the Interior to the Prime Ministry, 21 July 1324.

town. For the commander, the reason behind the events was a lack of authority. Neither İbrahim Paşa, the new subdistrict governor nor the new commander of Zeytun had arrived. They had to come immediately. Another reason was a lack of soldiers. The number of gendarmes was low, and soldiers in the Zeytun barracks had to be reinforced. Platoons could not be sent to the town, as soldiers were not strong enough to fight fire with fire in case of an assault. Because of the Hayri Bey Incident, the Maraş town itself needed soldiers. Yet no soldier could be sent from Zeytun to Maraş. The Fifth Army and the Regular Headquarters in Aleppo had shown no response to the demands. "The event in 311"[33] had also started in this way, so military problems had to be addressed immediately.[34] The Ministry of Interior also took the situation seriously: It ordered İbrahim Paşa to move faster and demanded of the Ministry of War to give the orders to transfer the commander immediately.[35] After a week, on 7 January, Said Bey, the commander of Zeytun, left Maraş for Zeytun with two companies alongside.[36]

The tension was eased upon his and the soldiers' arrival. However, on 29 January, commander Said Bey, who was appointed as the acting subdistrict governor at that time, wrote to the deputy district governor of Maraş that tension could resume anytime, as the confrontation among the Armenians went on: Some Zeytun Armenians' ideas turned darker. Their leader was Dülut, son of Miran. People were asking about the number of soldiers in the barracks every day. Some people of the town, on the other hand, did not want to attack the barracks. There were 280 soldiers in the barracks and this number, as the previous events had shown, was not sufficient.[37] Governor of

33 Here the commander was pointing on the reflections of the Incident in 1895-96 in Zeytun, which is called the events of 311. In February 1896, Zeytun Armenians had raided the barracks and had killed all its 230 soldiers. Grigor Suny, *Ancak Çölde Yaşayabilirler*, 150.

34 BOA, DH.MKT, 2705/37, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Minisrty of Interior, December 27, 1324; BOA, DH/ŞFR. 408/62, 1b,1c, From Aleppo Governorate to the Minisrty of Interior, December 25, 1324.

35 BOA, DH.MKT, 2705/37, 2a, Ciphered telegram from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, Sheikh-ul Islam and Aleppo Governorate, December 30, 1324.

36 BOA, DH.MKT, 2716/31, 1a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, January 7, 1324.

37 Again, this time Said Bey is referring to the events in 1895-96.

Aleppo, Reşid Bey also wrote about rumors that Zeytun people were buying arms from Adana, potassium nitrate from Kayseri, and cereals from Maraş: those rumors had to be investigated.[38] Meanwhile, Said Bey confirmed the rumors that the governor had asked about: With the 1,500 liras and aid money (that they took by presenting themselves as poor to the government), Zeytun people had bought guns, revolvers, and ammunition, arming themselves fully. Those guns were illegally smuggled in from ports in Adana. They were also practicing their aim with the tin pipes at night. Some of them were for attacking the barracks. Others were for making Zeytun an autonomous district with a parliamentary decision. Also, the tension had spread to Elbistan, as its Muslim inhabitants heard about the events in Zeytun. Its local administrative council officially demanded to either assemble the reserves or arm the people with the guns in the Elbistan armory. To satisfy the people, it was mandatory to call up 400 reserves. Governor Reşid Bey approved conscription. At that time, İbrahim Paşa, the new subdistrict governor of Zeytun held the duty of deputy district governorate in Maraş. The new district governor Haydar Bey had just arrived in Aleppo. Reşid Bey sent him immediately to Maraş and ordered İbrahim Paşa to go to Zeytun. Elbistan was lacking a subdistrict governor too. Reşid Bey demanded a more powerful person to be appointed as the deputy subdistrict governor there.[39]

The Ministry of War wrote to the Ministry of Interior that the Aleppo Governorate did not officially demand a call up. It wrote neither to the armies nor to the headquarters in Adana and Aleppo.[40] The Fifth Army ordered to delay the call up and reserves started to be disbanded. However, for Reşid Bey, it was mandatory to keep a certain number of soldiers in Elbistan as a precaution against the Zeytun people's actions. He said that he had insistently written to the Fifth Army Headquarters again and again. Still, a few days prior, it had been ordered to dispatch the Antep platoon. He wanted the Ministry of

38 BOA, DH/ŞFR, 410/13, 1a, 1b, 1d, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 29, 1324.

39 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 19a, From … Osman to the Ministry of War, January 31, 1324; BOA, DH/ŞFR, 410/31, 1a, 1b, 1c, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 1, 1324.

40 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 17a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, February 2, 1324.

War to give orders to the Fifth Army.[41] The Ministry gave the order, but the Fifth Army wrote that regular units were insufficient. The number of infantry and artillerymen in Zeytun was not enough. They were not getting help from the Maraş battalion. The Ministry, as a response, ordered to call up the reserves, and "a sufficient number" of troops were mobilized and a dispatch was made to Zeytun.[42]

On the days of this dispatch, the new district governor of Maraş, Haydar Bey, analyzed the telegrams about Zeytun and sent a short report to the Aleppo Governorate on 19 February: There were four reasons behind the tension in Elbistan. First, influential persons had exploited Zeytun people's actions for their personal interests, coaxed officials, and made them send telegrams. A second reason was that regular troops in Göksun and Andırın had been sent to the military operation against İbrahim Paşa, the leader of the Milli tribe. Fake rumors had been fueled to make those soldiers return to those towns. The third reason was the deregulation of arms trading: People had easily bought arms and accidents had occurred. The accidents had been exaggerated in those areas that previously witnessed other disorders, making people suspicious of each other. Finally, some senior officials in the Maraş district took part in such correspondence because of their lack of experience. Hayri Bey wrote that he had advised everyone the following: Ones that fuel those rumors had to be arrested, and they had to avoid expecting all action to be taken by the state.[43] With the feeling of danger passing at that time, it was decided that some reserves in Elbistan be disbanded. Forty soldiers were deemed enough to guard the artillery depot.[44]

41 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 26a, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 3 (received in 4th), 1324; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 24b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, February 4, 1324.

42 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 18a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, February 5, 1324; BOA, A.VRK, 698/78 from Maraş Headquarters to the Prime Ministry, February 11, 1324.

43 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2822/90, From the District Governorate of Maraş to the Aleppo Governorate, February 19, 1324.

44 BOA, DH.MKT, 2783/22, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, February 28, 1324; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 12a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, March 15, 1325.

Despite the rising tension and lack of administrators, nothing happened in Zeytun during the winter, unlike Kayseri and Maraş. This was most probably because of the balance of power. The state officials believed that an attack on the barracks was possible and thought that their forces were not sufficient to meet such an offensive in case of conflict. Additionally, the Muslims in the region were suspected from an Armenian attack. In this case, such suspicion was much more realistic, as the "memory of 311" in this region was very different from the others: Here, it was the Armenians who attacked and massacred the soldiers in the barracks. But now, officials were also aware that Armenians were divided among themselves.[45]

§ 5.2 Tension During the Massacres of 1909 and the Curious Case of İbrahim Paşa

The totality of the documents shows that although the tension of the Hayri Bey Incident had spread to Zeytun, nothing happened. The Massacres of 1909 proved to be a far greater challenge, however. When news about the Massacres was received in the town, all the tensions between the Ottoman administration and Armenian Prelate, between Armenians and Muslims in the vicinity, and between Zeytun Armenians themselves were still existent. However, once again, there was no bloodshed in the town. As written above, given that the town was one of the most contentious, with a long history of massacres and revolts, this surely draws attention.

Rather than clarifying the reasons for this stable situation, the documents in the Ottoman Archives that talk about the story confuse us further: They are full of contradictory arguments about the performance of İbrahim Paşa, the

45 Despite this awareness, whether they had known the details of this duality among Zeytun Armenians. All we have are testimonials by Armenians. Three of them (who were going to take part in the later incidents that are to be summarized below) claimed that there was a Dashnak party, whose leader was buying weapons and saying that crescent should have been erased from the Ottoman flag. The people, who were accused of being this party's members, rejected and claimed that the accusers were from Hnchak Party, whose members were all runaways that had collected taxes from the people by using force. So, the officials could not prove the existence of a committee. See BOA, İ..AS, 101/41, 1b, Court-Martial Decision, September 24, 1325.

subdistrict governor at that moment. For some officials, including the ones in the Aleppo Governorate, avoiding bloodshed was his success. He was appointed to the subdistrict governorate of Antioch with the governorate's suggestion, shortly after the bloodiest massacre, to tackle the serious problems there. His performance in that office was also regarded as a success: The Antioch Court-Martial suggested that he be rewarded, and Christians of Antioch expressed their sympathies. However, soon he would be sentenced by the Maraş Court-Martial to removal from government duty for three years for his cowardice and powerlessness in Zeytun: That he left the town and moved at to the barracks was a show of his weakness, which was seized upon by the offenders who now found the courage to attack the government building.[46] This was a shock to İbrahim Paşa. To get this decision overturned, he decided to write about the events in Zeytun in detail and requested support from the Christians of Antioch and the officials from both Antioch and Zeytun. Many of them responded, and also demanded cancellation. It is those documents that inform us about what happened in Zeytun during the Massacres of 1909, yet they were contradictory, revealing the confusion that the state officials were in.

When the news of the Massacres was heard, İbrahim Paşa had been in office in Zeytun for forty-five days.[47] There were no losses in Zeytun despite the great tension. Although he was not impertinent, the aghas of Zeytun demanded his recall, and there were assaults on him. So, he was invited to Aleppo.[48] Shortly after, he was sent to Antioch, whose Armenian population had been massacred. He first served there as the deputy subdistrict governor,

46 BOA, BEO, 3666/274943, 1a, From the Prime Ministry to the Ministry of War, October 9, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Governorates of Aleppo and Adana and General Directorate of Security Affairs, October 14, 1325.

46 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 8a ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 21, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 9a from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 24, 1325; İ.. AS, 99/47, 4a, 4b, Maraş Court-Martial Decision.

47 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 3a, 3b, 3c, Telegram from İbrahim Paşa to the Ministry of Interior, November 26, 1325.

48 BOA, DH.MKT, 2865/12, 1a, Commission for the Registry of Officials, June 15, 1325.

yet soon after in June, on the governor's suggestion, he was appointed to the subdistrict governorate of the town.[49]

A Court-Martial was formed in Antakya to punish the offenders in the massacre. This Court-Martial reported that İbrahim Paşa was very successful in his duty: He had provided security and order until the Martial Law was declared and the Court-Martial was established. His effective and serious measures resulted in many criminals being caught. He continued his good performance during the work of the Court-Martial. He served well in housing and subsistence of Armenians, distribution of aid, house reparations, and repossession of plundered items. Due to his services, power, and experiences he had to be promoted to district governorship.[50] Three days later, the Court-Martial also demanded that he be rewarded with a commendation, and the Ministry of the Interior met this demand.[51]

In Maraş, however, opinions about him were varied. His successor in Zeytun, Halil Efendi, was implying that he was a relic of tyranny, who had escaped from Zeytun.[52] In November, the Court-Martial in Maraş removed him from government duty for three years for his criminal actions and powerlessness in Zeytun.[53]

Both new Governor Fahri Paşa and İbrahim Paşa objected to the decision. First, Fahri Paşa wrote that among his counterparts, İbrahim Paşa was a relatively good serving official and İbrahim Paşa wrote that he had not been summoned and investigated by the Maraş Court-Martial.[54] After two days,

49 BOA, DH.MKT, 2865/12, 4b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry, June 21, 1325.

50 DH_MUİ, 2-3/25, 2a, From Antioch Court-Martial to the Ministry of Interior, August 30, 1325.

51 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 3a, 3b, 3c, Telegram from İbrahim Paşa to the Ministry of Interior, November 26, 1325.

52 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 3a, 3b, From the Sub-District Governorate of Zeytun to the District Governorate of Maraş, August 27, 1325.

53 BOA, BEO, 3666/274943, 1a, From the Prime Ministry to the Ministry of War, November 9, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Governorates of Aleppo and Adana and General Directorate of Security Affairs, October 14, 1325; BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 43a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry, December 31, 1325.

54 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 8a, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 21, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 9a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 24, 1325.

İbrahim Paşa sent a long telegram, brimming with anger: He had learned the Court's decision from the newspapers and was shocked. As he had saved the town from the disorder (*iğtişaş*), referring to him as a powerless man was despicable. If it was a Court-Martial decision, was not the decision in Antioch by a Court-Martial as well? How could a subdistrict governor come off as powerful in one town and powerless in another? He added: "So, this means that I should have let a massacre happen in Zeytun. Because then, just like certain other administrative officials, I would not have been convicted".[55]

This sentence is important, as it shows that an Ottoman official was admitting that some officials who had responsibility in the Massacre had not been punished at that moment. In another report to the Aleppo Governorate, İbrahim Paşa wrote about the story in Zeytun during the Cilicia Massacre. Although this was written from the perspective of an official who wanted to defend himself from accusations, it is the document that explains the events in the greatest detail so far.

On the day of the Maraş events, İbrahim Paşa and the commander were in the government building. At about nine o'clock, they both received telegrams. One telegram was from the District Governorate of Maraş: It had been written that the Cebel-i Bereket District Governorate had informed about a few thousand Armenians assembling in Zeytun: They were about to move on the Cebel-i Bereket District. He had been ordered to blockade any passage. Another telegram was from the Cebel-i Bereket District Governorate itself: Muslim people in the district were in deep fear. The district was experiencing a full-scale revolt. A few thousand Armenian *fedayees* were inbound from Zeytun. No one should be allowed to pass from there. İbrahim Paşa had read both telegrams to the commander. He, in response, had shown the telegram sent to him from Maraş Headquarters: A revolt was ongoing in Maraş. It had been reported that one or two thousand Armenians from the nearby villages had entered Zeytun. The headquarters was asked if there had been an incident in Zeytun, and was ordered to take necessary measures. Meanwhile, Zeytun Armenians had started to receive telegrams from their

55 *"Demek ki Zeytun'da kıtal zuhuruna meydan vermeliydim. Çünkü olvakit ben de bazı idare memurları gibi mahkum olmaz idim."* BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 3a, 3b, 3c, Telegram from İbrahim Paşa to the Ministry of Interior, November 26, 1325.

friends and neighbors. In the telegrams, there were sentences like "we are all right" or "come here immediately because I am sick." These were also signs of an incident in Maraş.[56]

According to İbrahim Paşa, a minor panic was felt among the people upon learning the events: He had to remain close to the telegram post which was inside the barracks so that he could receive news from the Maraş disorder without delays. They had gone to the barracks with the commander, which was on a hill ten minutes away. When bells started to ring in about every church in the town, he and the commander decided to deploy soldiers and form outposts around the barracks. They then learned that a large number of armed people were encountered near the road to the barracks, and said people had prevented a private from passing through. Soldiers told them to disperse, yet they refused. However, as they did not engage in an attack, the soldiers did not interfere and merely remained on alert. On the night of that day, they tried to raid the government building and seize the weapons of the gendarmes. This was prevented, as the door to the government building had been locked shut. However, as the danger became too high, fiscal director Asadur Efendi transported the cash money and documents to their houses. In fact, soldiers had to be sent to the government building, yet their number was not sufficient even for defending the barracks itself. İbrahim Paşa could not have risked the barracks' defense. Moreover, such an action could have spread the disorder to the whole town and the nearby areas. Instead, he took measures to demand supplies and soldiers from Maraş and to invite the "tractable" (*söz anlar*) aghas to the barracks to tell them to advise the people. The seemingly inevitable events were prevented in this manner. Two days later, a battalion from Elbistan arrived, and the Muslim and Christian peasants who had fled were made to return.[57]

In this report, İbrahim Paşa also wrote about another incident that occurred about twenty days before the latest tension, which had led to Zeytun Armenians demanding that he be removed from his office: That day, stones

56 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 17b, 17c, From İbrahim Paşa to the Aleppo Governorate, November 28, 1325.

57 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 17b, 17c, From İbrahim Paşa to the Aleppo Governorate, November 28, 1325.

had been thrown at his house. Two days after the stoning, two officials had investigated the event and had arrested two persons. One suspect's father, who had been used to banditry, had left an insulting letter in front of the door of İbrahim Paşa's house, which was near the market and the government building. There, he had threatened the Paşa loudly: He had announced that if his son was not freed, he would engage in every kind of misdeed. Probably more than fifty people had gathered there and had watched the event unfold. Investigators had left the government building. Paşa had rushed into the hall accompanied by some other officials, yet the friends of the offender had already managed to pull the guy away. The arrest order was issued immediately, yet in Zeytun, catching such criminals was very difficult, if not impossible. Besides, the Maraş district had always deployed the most incompetent gendarmes in Zeytun and kept the better ones to itself. So, the gendarme could not have caught the man. Even soldiers could not succeed at the task.[58]

İbrahim Paşa was thinking that the Zeytun people had organized this event: Their purpose was to force him to leave the town because he was a Muslim and they had been looking for ways to get an Armenian appointed to the subdistrict governorate. For him, an article in the newspaper Manzume-i Efkar, which had been brought to the Prelate a few days before the insult took place was proof of that: In the article, it was written that although it had been previously decided that a Christian subdistrict governor would be appointed, instead a Muslim was sent to Zeytun. The article also discussed the importance of the town, its Armenian majority and suggested that the town should become an autonomous district governed by an Armenian. Three or four days later, Paşa learned that one day before the insult, Armenian people had assembled in the Armenian school, where the prelate had read the article out loud to the people. All those actions were part of a plot to remove him. Complaining about the officials who did not suit their way of life was ingrained in Zeytun people. In Maraş, he had met with another official, the deputy subdistrict governor Faik Efendi, who had been treated in the same way: They had stoned his house and had threatened him. So, when Paşa

58 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 17b, 17c, From İbrahim Paşa to the Aleppo Governorate, November 28, 1325.

arrived there, he ordered the offenders, along with a booklist of criminals be caught.[59]

Another reason for the tension between him and the Zeytun people concerned taxation: They were used to paying a very limited amount of tax. When he arrived, people insisted on refusing the payment of the livestock tax. They had determined an amount by themselves and did not heed any contrary counsel. Yet Paşa had told them that he was going to collect the taxes. Upon the orders from the District Governorate, soldiers had been sent to collect taxes, yet the Maraş Disorder had prevented this from being carried out.[60]

İbrahim Paşa ended his report with a comparison: During the Adana Incident, no people were harmed in Zeytun, the place which had the strongest tendency towards conflict. He should have been rewarded. Yet the Maraş Court-Martial had made a decision without calling and interrogating him. Such injustice was inconceivable. "Although rivers of human blood flood on one side, officials of there are being acquitted."[61] He on the other hand had been punished, let alone being rewarded. It was a disgrace that such a decision had been reached by the officials of constitutionalism.[62]

İbrahim Paşa presents several reasons for the tension between him and the Zeytun people. However, he did not tell anything about the reason for the first event, the stoning of his house by two Armenians days before the Massacres. Why did they do that? In all other attacks on government officials that we focused on previously, we observe an apparent reason. Yet all İbrahim Paşa showed are underlying reasons. Unfortunately, all we have on this matter is a document sent by the Ministry of Interior much later: In it, the Ministry inquired about an accusation against İbrahim Paşa: It was claimed that he had an Armenian mistress and that he brought her to Zeytun. About twenty Armenian lads could not let that stand and had stoned his house. Because Paşa

59 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 17b, 17c, From İbrahim Paşa to the Aleppo Governorate, November 28, 1325.

60 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 17b, 17c, From İbrahim Paşa to the Aleppo Governorate, November 28, 1325.

61 *"Öte tarafta insan kanıyla dereler aktığı halde oraların memurları tebriye ediyor."* BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 17b, 17c, From İbrahim Paşa to the Aleppo Governorate, November 28, 1325.

62 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 17b, 17c, From İbrahim Paşa to the Aleppo Governorate, November 28, 1325.

initiated a criminal prosecution, they took refuge in the mountains. Some of them returned through the mediation of religious leaders. Yet Paşa got them convicted. So, the other ones resorted to banditry. The disorder started because of all this. The Ministry asked the Aleppo Governorate if those claims were true.[63] Yet the Governorate denied it.[64] In short, İbrahim it is possible that two actions by Paşa could really have led to the increase of tension: First, he might have had an Armenian mistress, and second, he might have mishandled the aftermath by not cooperating with the religious leaders to take care of the situation.

Although some Zeytun Armenians did not want İbrahim Paşa, it seems that he was successful in forming good relations with both Muslims and non-Muslims in Antioch in a very short time. They sent telegrams to the capital, stating that he had served the town well. In the provinces, it was very common to force people to send such telegrams, yet the ones sent for İbrahim Paşa seem genuine. People from Süveydiye, for example, wrote that thanks to Paşa, they had been able to experience real liberty. Before him, the government used to watch them being treated like animals by the oppressors (*mütegallibe*). He also provided security to the subdistrict.[65] Greeks also sent a telegram, noting how the Paşa had been successful in providing justice and equality in matters regarding the events and demanded his stay.[66] Armenian headmen and the deputy religious head of Antioch Armenians also sent telegrams to the Aleppo Governorate: İbrahim Paşa had protected them like a clement father and they demanded his stay.[67] About fifty Armenians also defended İbrahim Paşa, who had worked day and night for seven months, provided security, saved their

63 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 16a, Ciphered telegram from the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, January 15, 1325.

64 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 5a from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 20, 1325.

65 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 13a, 13b, 13c,13d, Telegram from the people of Antioch to the Ministry of Interior, December 5, 1325.

66 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 5a, Telegram from the Greek people of Antioch to the Ministry of Interior, November 27, 1325.

67 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 23a, From the headman Agop and deputy religious leader İshak Ramayan on behalf of the whole Armenian people of Antioch to the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, November 30, 1325.

town from tyranny and despotism, established liberty and equality for the first time, arrested the offenders, collected aid and decreased their misery. Among the previous subdistrict governors, he was unmatched.[68]

Many members of the local bureaucracy also made similar demands: The Administrative Council of Antioch sent the Council of State the record written by the Maraş Administrative Court for İbrahim Paşa: It stated that İbrahim Paşa should be promoted due to his performance in Zeytun.[69] The Administrative Council of Antioch also prepared a record itself: Paşa had been rewarded for his service there, and he was praised by the Ministry of the Interior. He had won the whole Antioch people's sympathy.[70]

The Zeytun Regular Battalion also appreciated him in the record written on 8 April: He had acted completely in accord with constitutionalism. Zeytun people had shown up with their weapons to cause trouble, had cut the roads, and had prevented officials and soldiers from entering the town. There were no soldiers other than the fifteen gendarmes. The people were all Armenian, and there were no Muslims except the officials. Therefore, taking measures had been almost impossible. Yet he had succeeded in preventing a massacre.[71] All major bureaucrats in Antioch sent a very similar telegram later.[72] Upon all those requests, the Regulation Commission (*Tensikat Komisyonu*) of Aleppo, whose members were all major bureaucrats of Aleppo demanded of the Ministry of the Interior not to aggrieve İbrahim Paşa.[73]

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68 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 44a, From Antioch Armenians to Aleppo Governorate. In fact, in İbrahim Paşa's registry, there are signs of his capabilities in logistics. It is written that he had been successful in collecting taxes fully and on time, repairing bridges and roads, constructions and calling up reserve soldiers in his offices in Of and Ünye. See BOA, DH.SAİDd… 47/385-386 (29 Zc 1287).

69 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 3a, Copy of the report of Maraş Administrative Court, written on April 16, 1325.

70 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 12a, Copy of the report of Antioch Administrative Court, written on December 3, 1325.

71 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 4a, Copy of the report written by Zeytun Regular Battalion on April 8, 1325.

72 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 9a, 9b; 10b, Telegram from Sub-District Governorate of Zeytun, November 29, 1325.

73 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 13a, Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, December 15, 1325.

Despite all such attempts, it seemed at first that there was nothing that could be done for İbrahim Paşa. Just like in other similar responses, the Ministry of the Interior replied that Court-Martials' sentences could not be changed.[74] However, it could not remain indifferent: the appeals were forwarded to the Prime Ministry. Finally, the Council of Ministers pardoned İbrahim Paşa together with some Antioch aghas, Muharrem Paşa -previous subdistrict governor of Antioch, and a hundred and four convicts of the Adana massacre.[75]

§ 5.3 On the Contradictory Appearances of Agents

Different documents from the Ottoman archives provide diametrically opposed impressions about İbrahim Paşa's attitude towards non-Muslims. The Maraş Court-Martial decision, together with the claims of his successor Halil Bey and some Zeytun Armenians, imply that his attitude was negative in Zeytun; whereas the people of Antioch, regardless of their class and ethnicity use very praising words about him.

Most probably, all stories about İbrahim Paşa were accurate: His house was stoned about two or three weeks after his arrival. This was due to several reasons: He came to Zeytun with a bad reputation because of the previous claims about him. Also, because of the town's background, Zeytun Armenians' expectations from the new regime were much higher than their kin elsewhere, so they must have been more impatient. Facing a Muslim subdistrict governor had to have been very disappointing in this sense. Moreover, this new governor claimed that he was about to collect taxes efficiently. Given that he had demonstrated such an ability in his previous experiences, his first steps could have made the locals fear that he would succeed. Yet as the Hayri Bey Incident in Maraş has also shown, attacking the top-rank official in a town could not be justified by his legal actions, there had to be another excuse provided: This was the claim that he had an Armenian mistress. But just like

74 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 10a, Telegram from the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, December 8, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 12b, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, December 22, 1325.

75 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 42a, Council of Ministers Decision, April 11, 1326.

the Hayri Bey Incident, the claims were not simple pretexts to be ignored, as in such cases pretexts are motivations as strong as the underlying reasons. Perhaps the Paşa had an affair and this annoyed some young Armenians. İbrahim Paşa made further mistakes by being inconsistent about using force and mediation. Most probably, he promised the notables that he would not punish the offenders harshly. Yet he did not keep his promise when offenders surrendered. Even worse, this further breach of faith was made in the middle of the surrender process, as some offenders had previously fled to the mountains. All those factors gave birth to a very broad consensus among Armenians: Some of them did not want a Muslim, some of their young lads did not want a man that insulted them by having an Armenian mistress, and more moderate persons, who were most probably among notables, did not trust him and did not believe that he had the capability to govern the region after breaking his promise.

Above, we observed that İbrahim Paşa justified quartering in the barracks after learning about the Massacres by saying that the telegram machine was in the barracks. This makes sense, yet as a persona non-grata, he must also have felt the need to protect himself from the people: Even if the previous conflicts between him and the people had not taken place before, Zeytun people would still have mobilized themselves anyway. Yet whether they could have threatened another kind of official –like Cemal Bey in Kayseri- was another matter. Therefore, it is understandable that his previous actions that had paved the way for much more tension led the Maraş Court-Martial to punish him. Given that this court's decisions and ways of operating were found to be very harsh by Armenians,[76] İbrahim Paşa surely failed to govern Zeytun.

As mentioned in the beginning, explaining the lack of an armed conflict in Zeytun is not that easy. At least, it can be argued that the reason seems to be less İbrahim Paşa's attitude than the balance of forces there: Several officials, including the Paşa himself, believed that their forces were not strong enough to take the offensive in a conflict. They continuously referred to the "311 events", in which Zeytun Armenians captured the barracks and massacred the soldiers. It was surely this history and lack of soldiers that held them back. We also observed that Armenians were also divided about going on the

76 See the next part titled, "Aftermath…"

offensive. That seems to be both because of the balance of power and the different political conditions that rendered some of them more hopeful and cautious.

Conditions in Antioch were very different for İbrahim Paşa: Nowhere in Cilicia was there such a great consensus on the innocence of Antioch Armenians in 1909: Below, we will observe that from the beginning, there were absolutely no claims and no evidence that they had prepared for an offensive there: everyone believed that they were victims.[77] So, unlike Adana center, Antioch was very much in line with the popular interpretations in İstanbul that Armenians were innocent. When Paşa arrived in Antioch, Armenians were not seen as a threatening force: They had not been in the majority, they had not been concentrated in the mountains, and nobody believed that they had had radical ambitions. In addition, when Paşa arrived in Antioch, security had already started to be provided. So, Paşa's different attitude in Antioch was normal: There was no need for conflict in Antioch. All he had to do was to use his logistical skills to provide aid –and his previous successes in collecting taxes could have allowed him to accomplish that. Thus, non-Muslims in Antioch and officials, both civilian and military, were relatively satisfied and wanted his stay when he was dismissed.

From this story, we can conclude that when it comes to the subject of an official's attitude toward Armenian policies, one should know that he can have many different images depending on the different contexts. Searching for such agents' fuller stories, which are fruitful in understanding the ethnoreligious relations within the Empire, can be very helpful in putting those relations into a wider context. And, to do so, strongly seizing the documents by the throat[78] -rather than avoiding doing so- seems to be a better method.

77 See the following chapter on Antioch.

78 Selim Deringil, "The Study of the Armenian Crisis of the late Ottoman Empire, or, 'Seizing the Document by the Throat'", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 27, (2002): 35-59.

§ 5.4 Aftermath: Two Approaches Among the Officials in Dealing with the Runaways

Despite the tension, Zeytun was spared the Cilicia Massacre. However, this did not result in a stable period. In fact, the crisis dragged on over the summer: Above, we observed that some Armenian lads had stoned İbrahim Paşa's house. One of them had been arrested. Then, his father had threatened the Paşa, only to flee later. Much later, it was claimed that upon the religious leaders' mediation, some offenders had surrendered. Yet because Paşa had initiated a criminal prosecution, they had chosen to hide in the mountains. In June, those runaways sparked a new crisis in Zeytun. This time, the crisis was about the debate within the bureaucrats on how to deal with the runaways: The new subdistrict governor Halil Bey was for a dovish policy, which was approved by his superiors in Maraş and Aleppo. He tried to mediate through notables and made promises to follow a more humane procedure. The Court-Martial in Maraş and its superior office, the Adana Regulatory Forces, on the other hand, were for a hawkish policy and the use of force. In this crisis, the military and civilian officials frequently clashed. During the confrontation, they wrote several documents, which show us the existence of different stances among Ottoman officials about the new regime's Armenian policy in the very early phase of the Young Turk era.

The crisis started with the Maraş Court-Martial's invitation of twelve Zeytun Armenians to bear testimony. They were charged with an "assassination attempt" on the previous subdistrict governor İbrahim Paşa, together with certain officials and their families, revolting against the government, brandishing guns around the marketplace, producing Martini guns, and stealing the treasury money from the government.[79] As they did not show up, the Court-Martial decided to send a commission to Zeytun. This alarmed the Prelate of Aleppo: He warned the Aleppo Governorate that new events could occur if this commission went to Zeytun. When the Governorate asked about the situation, the Court-Martial retorted: It would only provide information to its superior, the Adana Regulatory Forces. The Ministry of

79 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 22a, 23a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 5 (rec'd 6), 1325.

Interior wanted the Prime Ministry to ask the Ministry of War to order the Court-Martial to be temperate.[80] Yet the situation worsened at the end of July: The individuals who were summoned fled Zeytun.

In fact, local officials' strategy to get a hold of those suspects was to collaborate with local Armenian elites and get them without using force. However, several mistakes, namely, arresting the ones who surrendered (which İbrahim Paşa had done before), differential treatment of suspects according to their class, and security forces' indiscipline, made matters worse. Here, we have a more detailed story: At the beginning of the process, some notables and religious leaders were invited right away. They were asked to go to the runaways to provide counsel. In response, notables and religious leaders asked for permission and some time to hold a meeting among themselves. At the end of the meeting, they decided to send Armenian, Catholic, and Protestant religious leaders as representatives to the locations that runaways were hiding at. Meanwhile, two persons that the Court-Martial wanted, Dülut, son of Serkis, and Çolakoğlu Oseb were brought to the government building. Dülut was of the honorable (*eshab-ı haysiyet*) and wealthy (*mütemevvilat*) people. His family was regularly providing meat for the army. The "Bastilosyan Great Lords" (*Bastilosyan Babaağalar*) vouched for him, and he was released. The lords also assured that some of them would also come. As for Oseb, it was decided to send him to the barracks. His transfer should have been made without losing time, according to the chief of the Court-Martial Commission: he should not have delayed even for five minutes. Yet despite correspondence officer Duran Efendi's warnings, sergeant Said, who was ordered to bring Oseb to the barracks, idled for half an hour. At last, Oseb was taken from jail, yet he "stuck" himself to the fences and started to cry out wildly. Said went to the chief and said that they could not get him out and they did not know what to do, in admission of incompetence. The chief became angry and ordered him to carry out his duty at once. Oseb's father, brothers, two aunts, friends, and wife learned about the situation and came to the government building. Many Armenians also started to gather and wait in front of the building. About twenty armed persons, including his relatives,

80 BOA, DH.MKT, 2858/87, 1b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry, June 15, 1325.

took Oseb back by force. At that exact time, religious leaders who had gone to provide advice were returning to the building. The ones who took Oseb swore at them and ran off. The religious leaders said that they had advised the runaways strongly, yet they were too scared: They had heard that the Maraş Court-Martial had treated arrestees, especially the Christian ones in cruel ways, striking and torturing them. They did not trust the Court. If a special committee would be sent from İstanbul, they would accept its invitation "all the way" (*her vechle*) and obey the order of the government. Upon this Oseb Incident, five to ten unwanted persons, including Dülut, who was vouched for, also joined the runaways. They started to rove nearby, armed.[81]

The resistance that Zeytun had frequently shown during the old regime's ethnic tensions made the state follow a more intricate policy. Shows of strength and negotiations had gone hand in hand for a long time. The Massacres of 1909 rendered this inconsistency more visible. Zeytun was kept outside the martial law zone, but the Maraş Court-Martial committee wanted to show the power of the central state. With the Oseb Incident, the contradictions within the officials became even more apparent: Soldiers who were for a show of strength raised their voices: Both the Maraş Command and the Adana Regulatory Forces Command wanted to use force to capture the runaways in Zeytun; dead or alive. They criticized the capital which did not provide them with a target: To them, state authority was undermined because of the latest incident. As Zeytun headquarters was not under the command of the Regulatory Forces, things that happened there had a very bad influence on

81 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 13a, Copy of the telegram from Adana Regulatory Forces Commander Mehmed Ali Bey, July 30, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 21a, 22a, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 4, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 4b, 4c, Report of the Maraş Investigation Commission, September 10, 1325. In the Court-Martial Decision's list of crimes, it is written that the ones who stoned the government building were two: They are Çolakoğlu Oseb and his father Çolak Panos. The decision does not say or imply anything about the timing of stoning, yet gives detailed information about Oseb's escape. So most probably, Oseb was among the ones who had stoned İbrahim Paşa's house, and Panos was the one that came to the government building and threatened him. Yet two questions remain unanswered: First is how Oseb could have gone out previously at that time. Second is where the other lads that took part in stoning. See, BOA, İ..AS, 101/41, 1b, Court-Martial Decision, September 24, 1325.

the Maraş people, through rumors. Runaways should have been punished most severely. The Adana Regulatory Forces Commander Mehmed Ali Bey also reminded that martial law had been declared in the whole district earlier: Later, it was thought that martial law was not a necessity in the countryside, as investigation commissions could instead be formed if the need was felt.[82] The Ministry of War supported the commanders involved in the situation.[83] The subdistrict governorate also accepted that the crimes of the individuals that the Court-Martial had summoned were regarding the martial law.[84] Therefore, the government authorized the Regulatory Forces in the Zeytun region.[85]

On 11 August, the army's first operation in the Zeytun countryside started. For four days, soldiers combed the region looking for the runaways.[86] With the military operations in the region ongoing, segments of the Armenian public started to object. In his telegram sent to the deputy Prelate of Aleppo, the Prelate of Zeytun wrote that in the last three days, soldiers had been beating the Armenians that they had encountered. A young man was wounded with a bullet. Poor people could not get out of their houses to receive their aid. This situation's continuation would be highly adverse.[87] Sahag Efendi, the Catholicos of Cilicia, sent two telegrams to the Prime Ministry and to the Patriarchate: Even though Armenian workers had been massacred with the excuse that they were "from Zeytun" in Adana, he had sent telegrams to Zeytun wherein he stated that they had to unite with Muslims, and he had

82 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 12a, Copy of the telegram from Maraş Headquarters written on August 2, 1325 & copy of the telegram from Adana Regulatory Forces Commander Mehmed Ali Bey, written on August 4, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3617/271224, 3a, Copy of the telegram from Adana Regulatory Forces Commander Mehmed Ali Bey, written on July 31, 1325.

83 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 14a, From the Ministry of Wat to the Ministry of Interior.

84 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 22a, 23a From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 5 (rec'd on 6), 1325.

85 After a few days, Maraş District Governorate wrote that Zeytun was under the command of Regulatory Forces. See BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 24a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 8, 1325.

86 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 6a, 6b, 6c, From Zeytun Sub-District Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, September 26, 1325.

87 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 4a, Copy of the telegram from the Deputy Prelate of Aleppo to the Patriarchate, August 15, 1325.

been very pleased that no events had taken place there. Yet now, he learned that in the gardens and yards, innocent poor people were being insulted and beaten. The events were evoking the despotic old regime and were not in line with constitutionalism. The results of sending in troops on miserable and hungry people who had been affected by famines would be terrible.[88] Soon, the subject was to occupy a central spot on the Armenian public agenda. The newspapers Hayrenig, Jamanag, Aravelk and Azadamard began to publish news about the Zeytun operation. In its 18 August issue, Azadamard published a telegram sent from Aleppo to the Patriarchate on 14 August: The Maraş Court-Martial was blamed for favoritism: By exceeding its authority, it had invited forty persons for questioning. In protest, Zeytun people had gone up to the mountains. They had no intention to start a revolt: they were only complaining about the Court. They were ready to be judged by a fair court.[89]

On 20 August, the Regulatory Forces Command wrote to the Ministry of War that six runaways had been captured, implying that their hawkish policy had proved to be more successful: As one of the runaways had been captured alive and another was wounded only in his arm, the Prelate of Zeytun and the lords realized that runaways could be captured dead or alive. Runaways had also come to the same conclusion. Six were brought in by the lords and religious leaders on 19 August. Among them was the son of the town's mayor. Other runaways would also turn themselves in gradually. Thus, there was no need for a military operation any longer.[90]

The new subdistrict governor Halil Bey, who had come to the town just a week before the Oseb Incident,[91] was the most prominent figure among the

88 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 3a, Copy of the telegram sent by Sahag Efendi, the Catholicos of Sis to the Patriarchate on August 16, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 11a, From the Catholicosate of Sis to the Prime Ministry.

89 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 16a, Translation from the 58th issue of the newspaper Azadamard, published on August 18, 1325: "Telegram to the Patriarchate (August 14)".

90 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-4/9, 3a, Copy of the ciphered telegram from Adana Regulatory Forces Commander Mehmed Ali Bey to the Ministry of War, August 20, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/84, 17a, From the Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 20, 1325.

91 As the director of Bursa High School, Halil Bey was appointed to the sub-distrcit governorate of Garzan in March 1325. About three months later, on 27 June, he became the subdistrict governor of Zeytun, replacing İbrahim Paşa, who was appointed to Antakya. BOA, BEO,

civil servants who were against using force. Halil Bey thought that the reason behind the runaways surrendering was less the use of force than his temperate attitude. During the whole process, he tried to stand against military operations. His writing to the district governorate of Maraş on 27 August, which was full of trenchant words illustrates his position: This document is important, as it shows him identifying his position with constitutionalist principles: Halil Bey was complaining about the heavy words in the telegram sent by the Maraş commander two days ago. To him, the local government being reprimanded in a location where martial law had not been declared was against constitutionalism. It amounted to an excess of the use of power. Halil Bey continued by writing about himself: He was not of those men who became a pasha, like his predecessor (İbrahim Paşa), who was a reminder of despotism. Previously, he had worked in Cyprus; in an era when people who had pronounced the words "constitutionalism" and "liberty" would have their tongues cut out and millions of people could not even have dared to dream of constitutionalism, he had served the English, who were real founders of constitutionalism, for five years for which he had been appreciated. He was proud of receiving such a lesson in constitutionalism. For his talents, the Ministry of Interior offered him a first-class subdistrict governorate. Upon the invitation of the Aleppo Governorate, he had chosen to serve in Zeytun, leaving high school headmaster positions and rejecting 25 English liras of salary offered by the Khedive. Since the breaking out of the incident, he had persevered and had not fled like his predecessor İbrahim Paşa. Instead of using force, he had preferred to solve the problems through counsel. History had shown that governments that abused their power never achieved permanent and real success. Halil Bey had advised religious leaders and notables for hours and had left no words unspoken. Thanks to those speeches, runaways had started to return one by one. He also had signed a written contract with Zeytun elites. Although he had been criticized for signing it, criminals had been detected thanks to that document and he had won the assistance of religious leaders and elites. Those who knew Zeytun's topography

3531/264759, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, May 24, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3595/269561, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior , June 27, 1325.

and its people's mood should have understood that no other strategy could have been followed.[92]

The commission of the Maraş Court-Martial opposed this policy for two reasons. First, its members blamed Halil Bey for the scandal of Oseb's escape: They asked why he had ordered to transfer Oseb by the police, whose number of personnel was only seven, without demanding soldiers from the barracks. Yet to Halil Bey, four or five infantrymen were enough for that mission.[93] He had preferred not to use soldiers in order to avoid frightening the people. And the gendarme could not have transferred Oseb, as they were incompetent. Halil Bey also claimed that the fiscal director Asadur Efendi and the deputy Prelate had been secret provocateurs.[94]

The second confrontation arose over the runaways who did not surrender. As we have seen above, both sides were of the opinion that it had been their own approach that had led the six runaways to surrender. To get the others, they preferred to pursue their methods further. On 5 September, the Maraş command accused the subdistrict governor of temporizing and providing no information to the army. He was ordered not to waste soldiers' time.[95] Another demand of the Court-Martial was to transfer the six captured Armenians to the barracks. subdistrict governor Halil Bey was keeping those "within the government house, seemingly free yet in fact, under surveillance". He was concerned about other runaways getting scared and not surrendering. Upon the continued insistence, he was obliged to send them to the barracks. Yet he complained that despite doing that, Maraş command was still interfering in his job. Temperance and patience could still produce results, however, the

92 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 3a, 3b, From Zeytun Sub-District Governorate to Maraş District Governorate, August 27, 1325. Most probably he preferred to sign a contract because of İbrahim Paşa's previous breach of faith mentioned above.

93 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 4b, 4c, Report of the Maraş Investigation Commission, September 10, 1325.

94 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 22a, 23a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 5 (rec'd on 6), 1325.

95 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 4b, 4c, Copy of the telegram from Maraş Headquarters written on September 5, 1325.

commander was instead exacerbating the problem.[96] The army responded very adversely: First, the officers made harsh criticisms. Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander of the Regulatory Forces, filed a complaint about all civil servants in the region: The district governor's arrival in Zeytun had delayed progress. The local government had granted a period of grace to the runaways, and it was compulsory for the army to obey it. The governor, district governor, and the subdistrict governor were all classmates and these buddies were not doing their jobs earnestly. To the commander of Maraş, Catholicos was the Aleppo Governor's boss. The commander wanted Halil Bey, who had been "appointed directly to the critical Zeytun subdistrict governorate from the position of school teacher", if not the governor himself, to be replaced. Agreeing with the commander, Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of the Regulatory Forces, supported him.[97]

On 8 September, the army launched a second operation that lasted for 24 hours. This was followed by a third operation on 14 September, which continued for 48 hours. The army could not capture the runaways with those operations. Even worse, three hours after the end of the last operation, runaways came to the town center through the road that the soldiers had just taken, and they fired their guns in the marketplace. The next day, another operation started and during an armed conflict, a woman was seriously wounded. The events seemed to prove that Halil Bey's dovish policy was right. This time he also criticized the way the operation was conducted: In this third one, which should have been started secretly, soldiers were dispatched in full view of the people, at a time when they did not normally leave the streets. Runaways shooting in the aftermath also showed that the operation had not been carried out seriously. If just a little portion of the seriousness that was shown in the investigation against him had been displayed in these operations, they could have produced results.[98] However, the soldiers were still insisting

96 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 4b, 4c, Copy of the ciphered telegram from Zeytun Sub-District Governorate to Maraş District Governorate and Aleppo Governorate, September 9, 1325.

97 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-4/33, 2a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, September 10, 1325.

98 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 6a, 6b, 6c, From Zeytun Sub-District Governorate to Ministry of Interior, September 26, 1325. DH_MUİ, 26-2/40, 2a, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, October 4, 1325.

on his dismissal: The Court-Martial interfered in the civilian administration: It decided to appoint a military officer to the subdistrict governorate of Zeytun.[99] Yet, Governor Fahri Paşa wanted to continue working with Halil Bey. In his telegram, he suggested the Ministry of Interior appoint Halil Bey to the subdistrict governorate of İskenderun.[100]

§ 5.5 On the Possibility of a Different Armenian Policy

The debate over the handling of the Zeytun Incident offenders is fruitful, as the officials were forced to express their ideas about what the Zeytun policy should be like. There was nothing surprising in the way the hawks acted, as they almost represent an ideal type of Ottoman-Turkish officials' way of dealing with the Armenian problem: Always suspicious of both dovish methods and Armenians' behavior, always for using force, and unsuccessful in creating a solution.

Much like Cemal Bey in Kayseri, Halil Bey was another exceptional figure in the Ottoman bureaucracy: He wanted to negotiate through notables, make them promises, and even did not hesitate to sign a contract and provide better conditions to the arrestees. He also stood against soldiers who interfered in his job. His five-year work in Cyprus must have been a real experience of both constitutionalism and minority policy of a liberal European power, allowing him to think about the integrity of both issues: a point that is tried to be underlined throughout this work. His ideas as stated in the documents reveal that there were bureaucrats in the Empire who could have provided a different solution if they had the opportunity. Yet, one must avoid discovering different "potentials" from here alone: It is very common for historians to gravitate to the exceptional figures and overestimate their presence when they deal with cases full of objectionable actions. In this story, it must be kept in mind that Halil Bey's method was so alien to hawkish soldiers that they attributed his doings to his inexperience: Surely, they believed that in Ottoman bureaucracy, things had always been done their way. And in the long run, this would not change: When he was recalled from his future duty in Jaffa in 1326, Halil Bey

99 BOA, İ..AS, 101/41, 1b, Court-Martial Decision, September 24, 1325

100 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 11a, Copy of the telegram from Aleppo Governorate, October 30, 1325.

would be replaced by İbrahim Paşa, who had been pardoned.[101] From Halil Bey's point of view, his despotic predecessor in Zeytun would be his successor later in Jaffa. Although he would return to the office of the district governorate of Drama during the Kamil Paşa government, soon, with the return of the CUP, he would be recalled and sent to Bursa as an exile. By 1916, the political atmosphere was so changed that not only his turning into a supporter of Entente Liberale but also his good relations with Ottoman Greeks in Drama would be brought up to discredit him.[102]

By the end of October, the Maraş Court-Martial began to reach decisions. Three of these come to the fore: The first one on İbrahim Paşa was already mentioned. A second important decision of the Court-Martial was about Vağarşag Efendi, the Prelate of Zeytun. It decided that he be replaced and forced him to exile in another place.[103] He was recalled from Maraş. Now, however, it was claimed that there were no religious leaders left who could perform religious duties. The District Governorate was inquired about the situation.[104] It was written that Vağarşag Efendi had delegated his duty to a deputy, so such a problem did not exist; religious works would continue.[105] Another objection to the Vağarşag Efendi decision came from the Patriarchate: According to a decision taken on 28 March 1307, the patriarchate had been granted concessions about religious persons' transfers, replacements, investigations, and trials. With the latest decision, the concessions had been ignored. The Patriarchate demanded the lifting of the

101 BOA, İ.. DH, 14/85, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry, November 14, 1326. İbrahim Paşa would promote to the district governorate of Hudeyde (Hodeidah) just after a week, and continue his Office until 17 July 1328. See 29 Z 1287, BOA, DH.SAİDd…150/295-296

102 BOA, DH.EUM 1.Şb, 5/34, 5a, From İstanbul Police Department to the Ministry of Interior, March 12, 1332.

103 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 27a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, December 20, 1325.

104 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 29a, From Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, February 3, 1325. BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 30a, Ciphered Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 30 (rec'd 31) 1325.

105 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 9a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, February 7, 1325.

prohibition on Vağarşag Efendi's exclusion order.[106] According to the Ministry of Justice, those concessions could not be valid in this judgment, as there were no official documents and orders about Vağarşag Efendi being a Prelate or a deputy Prelate. Therefore, he was not an official at all.[107] However, the Armenian community in Zeytun wanted him to stay. Sahag Efendi, the Catholicos of Sis, later made a demand of Cemal Bey,[108] who had been appointed to the command of Regulatory Forces and the Deputy Governorate of Adana: Vağarşag Efendi had important things to do in Zeytun. If possible, he would remove Vağarşag from office in person.[109] The Ministry of War approved this.[110] In April, the Aleppo Governorate also wrote that pardoning Vağarşag Efendi would be appropriate.[111]

Another important decision was about the twenty-one Armenians that took part in the İbrahim Paşa and Oseb incidents. By the end of October, the army had still been unable to arrest some of them. Seven of them were in the court as they were captured, while others were judged by default. On 31 October, the Court-Martial sentenced thirty Zeytun Armenians to varying years of imprisonment. Arrestees who either produced Martini guns or who went to the government building with guns during the time of the massacre were sentenced to three years, whereas the runaways who were believed to have committed the same crimes were sentenced to six years. Persons who retook Oseb by force received one year imprisonment.[112] At the time of winter, the runaways were still uncaught. An amnesty for convicts came on the

106 BOA, DH.MUİ, 53/50, 3a, From the Patriarchate to the Ministry of Justice, February 24, 1325.

107 BOA, DH.MUİ, 53/50, 2a, From the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior, February 28, 1325.

108 Future's famous Cemal Paşa

109 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 19a, Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate, March 16 (rec'd 17) 1326; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 17a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, March 22, 1326.

110 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 20a, From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Interior, April 5, 1326; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 15a, Ciphered telegram from the Ministry of Interior to the Adana Governorate, April 8, 1326.

111 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 14a, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, April 17, 1326.

112 BOA, İ..AS, 101/41, 1b, Court-Martial Decision, September 24, 1325; BOA, İ..AS, 99/47, 4a, Court-Martial Decision, November 8, 1325

agenda at that time. However, their eventual fate was worse than that of the Prelate: It was decided not to be granted, as some who were sentenced for the same crimes were still in prison. That would be against the principle of equality. Either an amnesty had to be granted to all or it had to be dropped from the agenda.[113]

§ 5.6 Conclusion

Ottoman archival documents about Zeytun in this period offer some important details. What we observe in the town was not an ethnoreligious conflict but several moments of tension: The post-revolutionary tension was about the emigration of Muslim peasants in the area, who had already been small in number. It seems that the possibility of a change in the demography in Armenians' favor alerted the state. Another important conclusion from that first tension is the officials' lack of sympathy towards Armenians, who were accused of buying guns with aid money.

The second tension was about the assault on İbrahim Paşa. The first attack on him just about twenty days before the Massacre shows us the need to observe the happenings as parts of a totality of factors, which were classified as either underlying or superficial reasons. According to the Maraş Court-Martial, his failure to handle the crisis could trigger a much worse event during the third tension; the Massacres. It seems that what had prevented the conflict was the balance of forces: Lacking sufficient troops, the army hesitated to suppress the disobedient Armenians, who somehow refrained from an attack like the one during the Hamidian era. Their choice –not taking advantage of a much more advantageous balance of power- can be seen as a sign of their willingness to adapt to the new regime, yet lacking sufficient documents that show their perspective, that argument cannot go beyond speculation. The fourth tension was over handling the crisis after İbrahim Paşa's leave. There, we observed two competing attitudes: One was Halil Bey's

113 BOA, DH.MUİ, 43-2/4, 5a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 20, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-6/8, 31a, From Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, March 13, 1326. Although there are many amnesties related to any kind of tensions in Cilicia, so far I could not find a document which shows that these persons were pardoned later.

dovish policy, and the other was the officers' hawkish one. It seems that the hawkish policy failed to handle the crisis, as the soldiers could not capture all the escapees. Although both sides claimed that the arrest of some offenders proved their own success, surely the policy of removing Halil Bey bore no fruit.

Both subdistrict governors' cases lead us to question the relation between actors and actions. İbrahim Paşa's case shows that actors can show multiple faces in different cases regarding the Armenian question, and scholars should be careful in their researches on and analyses of these. Halil Bey's case, on the other hand, points to a very different approach to the Armenian question among some officials. However, the same soldiers who seemed very progressive in the Hayri Bey case showed their other faces by heavily criticizing that dovish stand, a fact which foreshadowed the dreadful fate to come in the near future.

6

Antakya

-Was it the Armenians?
-No, on the contrary, Muslims. Monsters, who were thought to be obedient, fired upon me when I tried to ignore their threats and insisted to resist them. Without doubt, they are going to kill me. There is neither police nor the gendarme. I understood that they cannot be stopped without government force. For the sake of Allah, go to the government building, go to the barracks, and inform them.

– Mehmed Avnullah el-Kazımî, Son Müdafaa: (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Cihan, 1326), 34.

Ceddinden mevrus bir mahkumiyet-i mutlaka ile kapısında yaşadığı müteneffizanı için bütün mevcudiyetini maaile vakf ve feda etmiş ve akşamdan akşama bulursa bir darı ekmekle def-i cev'aı ağanın bir lütf-ı mahsusu olmak üzere kabul ve itikad edinmiş mütevekkil bir behiyyet-i tamme içinde imrar-ı hayat eden nur-i zeka ve hiss-i tefekkürden mahrum bir kitle-i beşerden sadır her türlü efal-i mezmuma behemehal bir saik ve müşevvike matuf ve merbut bulunur.[1]

– BOA, İ.AS, 96/10, 4a, Antakya Court-Martial Decision, August 23, 1325.

The two quotes above were expressed during the two courts at both of which the convicts were accused of taking part in the atrocities in Antakya. Among the convicts, Avnullah Kazımî, who was judged in İstanbul, was a state official (he was the district governor of Kerkük). The other three, Bereketzade Rifat, Halefzade Hüsnü, and Kuseyrizade Nihad were the seemingly most powerful landlords in Antakya, and they were put on trial at Antakya Court-Martial. Also, in both cases, one major theme was their ability to control the Muslim masses. For example, the second citation above shows that the military judges in Antakya were certain that the poor Muslim masses cannot take an action like massacre without the landlords' initiative. Although few of them had a similar empathy for the plebeian Muslims, many other agents were in total agreement about the landlords' absolute power in Antakya. Many local Armenians, foreign diplomats, and many high ranking Ottoman officials did

1 *In any case, any further actions taken by a human mass; who, as a family, devoted and sacrificed its whole existence for its influential men, at whose doorstep it is living with an absolute compulsion inherited from his ancestors; who accepted and believed that relief from hunger through a loaf of corn bread –if it can find such from evening to evening- is ex-gratia; who lives in submission to fate; who is deprived of the light of intelligence and feeling of thought; is dependent on and attributed to an incentive and a provoker.*

not believe them at all: In their eyes, being the strongest and most corrupt figures of Antakya, these notables were responsible. At least they had all the power to prevent the mass killings. In their eyes, these landlords were the forces of the old regime, so they were behind the counterrevolution in the town. However, the first quote makes us question the existence of such power: There, Kazımî recalls a dialogue between one of the landlords, Hüsnü Ağa, and the people who found shelter in another landlords' house: Hüsnü Ağa enters the house with two bullet holes on his flaps and tells about his shock caused by the disobedience of Muslim mob. Here, in this chapter, I take a bold step and come to an argument that is closer to the first citation -the words coming from the accused. The reader can immediately realize that such an action needs an early explanation for two reasons. The first and methodological one is that it is very hard for historians to ignore the broad consensus reached by contemporaries who were from various backgrounds. The second and moral necessity for explanation stems from the rejection of the victims' side, as the whole Armenian community seems to have been part of the consensus of accusation. Moreover, the victimhood of the Armenians of Antakya was absolute: Unlike other cases in this dissertation, neither the Muslim convicts nor the officials never mentioned any revolutionary activities in Antakya, as there was no organized self-defense. Nor do they point to the Armenians' changing post-revolutionary attitude. As a person who was not friendly to Armenians,[2] Governor Reşid Bey's words in his ciphered telegram to the Ministry of the Interior prove this fact:

> During the event which occurred because of the Adana Incident, Armenians were always in the defensive position. Despite the number of deaths being equal in the Kırıkhan region, where there were ninety Muslim dead, the very low number in all other regions show that;

2 Reşid Bey's views about the Ottoman Armenians can be seen in his memoirs. See, Ahmed Reşid Rey, *İmparatorluğun Son dönemlerinde Gördüklerim Yaptıklarım 1890-1922*. Haz. Nur Özmel Akın. (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2007), 16-33.

> without a doubt in this district, Armenians had really been the victims and the bullied.[3]
>
> … and until now, no signs that prove Armenians' organization have been found. Only, a bronze grenade which was filled with common gunpowder, as big as an orange, and which was said to be thrown by a killed Armenian on the people during the Kırıkhan Incident, was found by the zaptieh. But when asked, the Bilan investigation committee answered that as its owner had been killed, no conclusion could be drawn from the investigation on the issue.[4]

These sentences by the Governor show that the claims about an Armenian revolutionary plot did not exist in Antakya at all. So, why do I come to a conclusion different from that of the absolute victims? Above all, I have to warn the reader that what I do not put the words of the accused above the words of the victims. On the contrary, I aim to make a contribution to the historiography by deconstructing the consensus over what the official discourse about the Massacres should be, and come to an alternative explanation of what happened in Antakya. This story will show us another feature of anti-revolutions -that its agents do not have to be the beneficiaries of the old regime. In fact, having already adapted to the new order, they did not have to take such an action. Ironically, although they took no part in it, it was this very movement that accelerated their long-term decline in power.

Many elements force one to reconsider. Throughout this chapter, I bring forward them whenever they appear during the story of the Antakya Massacre. The first factor will be the peculiar class relations in Antakya. I explain those relations under the subtitle "Background". This part will show

3 *"Adana hadisesi dolayısıyla bu vilayet dahilinde zuhur eden vakayide Ermeniler daima vaziyet-i tedafüide bulunmakla beraber İslam'dan doksan kadar maktul olduğu haber verilen Kırıkhan mevkiinde her iki tarafın zayiatı müsavi ise de cihat-ı sairede taraf-ı diğerden zayiat ekall-i kalil olmasına göre bu vilayette Ermenilerin hakikaten hakikaten mağdur ve duçar-ı tariz oldukları şüphesizdir."* BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2837/12, 2a, Ciphered telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 14, 1325.

4 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 416/38, 1a, 1b, 1c, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, June 19, 1325.

that there had been very rigid class relations in Antakya, yet these relations were transforming when the Massacre occurred. However, this process was ignored in the analyses made at that time.

Then, I summarize the massacre briefly by relying on the official reports. This summary is naturally not as long as the one of the Adana Massacres. That will be followed by the correspondence about the court process and the two texts that reveal the perspective of the accused patricians. There, the reader will realize that one text, the letter written by Bereketzade Refet Ağa just after the massacres deserves particular interest, as it reflects the immediate situation, which seems very different from the portrayal of many. Then, I present and explain the other factors that allow me to question the accusations. One will be widespread -and in most cases, empty- beliefs in plots. The French historiography and recent scholarship in Turkey allow us to question the logic behind explaining both the 31 March Incident and The Massacres of 1909 as actions organized by some plotters. Another factor will be keeping one conclusion of the Zeytun chapter in mind: That we have to keep in mind one important contribution of Holocaust historiography, which is the awareness about the seemingly contradictory behaviors of individuals during massive assaults on an ethnic and/or religious identity. İbrahim Paşa's different faces in Zeytun and Antakya will allow us to consider the landlords as grey figures, who were most probably did not care about harassing people from all fragments of society, let alone the Armenians. Yet the disobedience they faced was so exceptional that they were wrongly accused of being the perpetrators. The last factor will be the one that I brought forward in the introduction: Sahlins's analysis of inter est has already reminded us that shaping a discourse is a complex process during which sincere thoughts and calculations are fused. So, we have to keep in mind that political struggles at the capital should have taken a role in this fusion. The second citation shows that the Court-Martial officials were having a romantic, kind of a populist perspective, which must also be shared by many other actors sincerely. However, rational matters such as competition between Muslim policymakers, their relations with Armenian political parties, and the reflections from Muslim masses all shaped the discourse about Antakya Massacre.

In this sense, this chapter prepares us for the story of the next chapter, which is on the process of the struggle over formulating the official discourse. My explanation will be that the Muslim masses went out of their control, and the Massacre occurred despite their efforts to stop it. I will try to show that the false accusations were shaped by complex factors such as failing to observe the changing power relations within the region, sincere beliefs in the existence of plots aiming to end the new regime, political constructions such as the Unionist blaming other Young Turk groups in opposition or political attempts to find scapegoats that purify the common people, and local rivals that took the accusations as an opportunity to curb their power. Another point of this chapter will be that these false accusations also misguide us in our observations of the link between the Massacres and the Counterrevolution, as they bring forward organizational links of some conspirators. In fact, there was a relation between the two events, yet that was mostly about the different faces of the same common spirit of the anti-revolution that was existent among the Muslim commoners.

§ 6.1 Background

Antakya, the center of the region, is one of the most ancient and most famous towns of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Secondary sources on the rich history of Antakya are countless.[5] Most probably, it was formed by Seleucus I, the general of Alexander the Great and the founder of the Seleucid Empire.[6] Later, the town became part of the Roman Empire. During the first years of the Roman era, the town prospered and enlarged, becoming the third most populated town after Rome and Alexandria in the 1st century A.D.[7] Antakya is also one of the first towns where Christianity had spread in the same century. It is believed that it was the first city where the followers of Jesus

5 For example, see Selahattin Tozlu, *Antakya (Hatay) Tarihi Bibliyografisi*, (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi, 2009).

6 Adem Kara, *19. Yüzyılda Bir Osmanlı Şehri Antakya*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2005), 17.

7 Mehmet Tekin, *Hatay Tarihi, Osmanlı Dönemi*, (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2000), 5.

Christ were called "Christian" for the first time.[8] The fall of the Roman Empire opened the way for various conflicts to emerge between different states in the region. First, the Persian Empire and then the Islamic Caliphate occupied the town during the 7th century.[9] Although the Eastern Roman Empire had reconquered Antakya in 968, the town was lost to the Seljuk Turks in 1084. The Christian reactionaries to the Islamic conquests, the Crusaders, came to Antakya just 13 years later and retook the town in 1097. In 1137, the Eastern Roman Empire had conquered Antakya once more, yet with the Mameluke conquest in 1268, centuries of continuous Muslim control started. The Ottoman Empire replaced Mamelukes in 1516.[10]

Just like nearby regions, the Governorate Regulation (*Vilayat Nizamnamesi*) and the military operation under the command of Derviş Paşa were simultaneous turning points in the consolidation of Ottoman rule in Antakya. Paşa's Fırka-i Islahiye had landed in İskenderun in 1865.[11] After two years, with the Regulation, Antakya became a subdistrict of Aleppo.[12]

Even today, Antakya is still one of the most cosmopolitan regions. At the beginning of the 20th century, Turks; Sunni, Alawite, and Orthodox Arabs; Kurds; Armenians, and Greeks were in the region. By 16 April 1325, Muslims' total population was 28,496 in Antakya and Bilan subdistricts. There were also 5,191 Christians. Within the town center of Antakya, there were 6,126 Muslims and 867 Christians. So, the Muslim population was very dominant within the town. This dominance was also observed in Kuseyr, where there were 7,002 Muslims and no Christians; and in İskenderun, where 3,302 Muslims and 335 Christians inhabited. Such dominance was not the case in Süveydiye and Bilan town center, however. Against 2,639 Muslims, there were 2,157 Christians in Süveydiye; and in Bilan town center, there were 841 Muslims and 782 Christians.[13] In any region where there are various Muslim groups, detecting their populations separately is important. Yet, the Ottoman government did

8 Ibid., 5.

9 Ibid., 6.

10 Ibid., 7-11.

11 Ibid., 106.

12 Ibid., 100.

13 BOA, Y..EE.. 37/40.

not make a distinction between Alevis and Sunnis; or between Turks, Kurds and Arabs. Cuinet's calculation can assist us in this matter: By 1891, he estimates that in Antakya, there were 20,000 Sunni Arabs, 10,000 Alawite Arabs, 13,000 Turks, and 3,000 Circassians. However, there are differences between his work and that of the Ottoman officials in terms of the total number of Muslims and Christians, a fact that leads us to doubt the accuracy of both.[14]

Although the Syrian Civil War has been testing its limits for more than a decade, Antakya is still a symbol of peace among different communities. However, this does not mean that there had been no prior ethnic conflicts. Before 1909, the region had already witnessed tensions such as the Hamidian Massacres. In 1895, İskenderun, Keseb, and especially Süveydiye were places of high tension.[15] However, this did not turn into a massacre. Although there were respective neighborhoods where Christians or Muslims were more populous, both groups mostly used to live together within the Antakya town center –a fact that shows the prevalence of peace and tranquility.[16]

To understand the complex social formation of the region, its geographical conditions should be summarized. Luckily, Ahmet Faik Türkmen, the Minister of Education of the short lived Hatay Republic, provides us with detailed information about these conditions. In his work, Türkmen classifies five different sub-regions and shows how each of their particular geographic conditions determines their distinct social formations by summarizing the class formations. Such a practice that resembles both Braudelian and Marxisant methodologies makes his work worth summarizing as a backdrop to our case.[17] These sub-regions are, namely, Asi Valley, the coastal region, Kuseyr Plateau, Amık Plain, and mountains.

Among the sub-regions, Asi Valley is the one that is of particular concern in the following pages, as Antakya town was located there. It derives its name

14 Tekin, *Hatay Tarihi*, 145.

15 For a basic introduction of some sources in the Ottoman archives about the subject, see Mehmet Geçer, 1895 Antakya-Süveydiye (Musa Dağ) Olayları, Yeni Türkiye 60/2014, pp. 1-13.

16 Adem Kara, *19. Yüzyılda Bir Osmanlı Şehri Antakya*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2005, p. 66.

17 Ibid.

from the Asi River, which flows between the mountains in the west and the Kuseyr Plateau in the east. This valley was the most populated area of Antakya, and all of its arable lands were in use. Its lands were fertile, and most profitable goods were produced in this sub-region, including silk, soap, vegetables, and fruits. This valley was the place where class differences were deepest. About 90% of the land was in the hands of the Antakya gentry, who were mostly Sunni "Turks" (Arabs), until the French occupation in 1918. They were inhabiting the Antakya town center and controlled their lands through Sunni housekeepers. The locals of the valley were totally "Turkish" (Arab) Alawites. They were very poor and could not even find enough wheat to eat. It was those Alawites who were cultivating the gentry's lands. This Alawite population was sufficient to cultivate the land, so no immigrant workers were needed in the valley.[18]

The agricultural conditions were much like the Asi Valley in the coastal sub-region. Yet its farms were not under the gentry's control. Rather, middle-class Arab Alawite farmers were dominant there.[19]

The conditions in the Kuseyr Plateau, which was in the east of Asi Valley, were very different. There, grapes and olives were produced as commercial goods, which were sold only in the markets of the region. The plateau lacked a major river. Instead, villages were located around the wells and oases. Here, there were two dominant groups. One was the rich gentry and the middle-income gentry from Antakya, both of whom were owners of relatively smaller estates than the ones in the Asi Valley. The second group was the landlords of Kuseyr itself, who were living in their own villages. Here, half of the population was landless, and the others had very small tracts of land.[20]

Another very important sub-region was Amık Plain, which was the main source of Antakya's wheat, barley, and corn. The Kuseyr Plateau lies to its south and the Kurdish Mountains stand to its north. The Asi Valley is to the west of this Plain. At its center, there is the Amık Lake, which would flood in the winters, rendering many tracts of land unusable. This Plain was in the control of Sunni Turkmen Beys, who owned large estates and numbers of

18 Ibid., 49-54.

19 Ibid., 54.

20 Ibid., 54-57.

villages. Its lower-class peasants, who were mostly Turks, were overwhelmingly landless, and small in population. Therefore, this sub-region was the place where seasonal immigrant workers were needed. In harvest season, peasants from Kuseyr Plain, Asi Valley, and Aleppo used to come and collect the wheat. This was vital for those workers, as they could only consume wheat by working there.[21] Also, in the spring, peasants from the same places would arrive to plant corn on the fallow land. Another group of seasonal migrants was the ones who used to bring their animals, sometimes even from Mosul, for pasture. The grass that the animals would eat were sold by the landlords.[22]

The final sub-region, the mountains which to the west, range from south to north, had much less arable land than the other ones. Its inhabitants were away from the reach of the gentry's and beys' dominance. The peasants, who were mostly foresters, were independent Turks, who did not work seasonally in the farms. They were inhabiting their own villages. The middle-income peasants did not interfere in the lives of smaller producers. Here lies the road from Antakya to İskenderun. Bilan was in the middle of it, and this town was exceptional in its social formation.[23]

Because Antakya was located within the Asi Valley region, the conditions of its various social classes should be summarized in more detail: What comes forward in this sub-region is the very rigid class-based social formation, which is essential for understanding what happened during the time period that we focus on: Above, it was written that the Sunni landlords were in total control in the Asi Valley. These landlords were called the gentry (*kibarlar*) in Antakya.[24] The others were middle class artisans (*esnaflar*) and peasants (*köylüler*). The power of the gentry over the rest was enormous at that time so that their customs and behaviors were well-defined and obeyed by its members, resembling feudal Europe, or even the Indian caste system. No

21 Cultivation of wheat was made in May.

22 Türkmen, *Mufassal Hatay Tarihi*, 57-60.

23 Unfortunately, Türkmen does not give information about in what terms Bilan was exceptional.

24 Türkmen *Mufassal Hatay Tarihi,* 599. As during the time of his work the annexation of Antakya by Turkey needed justification, Türkmen denies the existence of Arabs, and calls Arab Alawites as Turkish Alevis.

matter how rich they were, members from the lower two classes were not allowed to imitate the gentry's rituals. For example, there were no inter-class marriages and the wedding ceremonies were totally different. During visits, the gentry was always the host, and could not be hosted by the members of the other two classes. Each class went to different coffee houses, baths, barbers, schools. Even the poor gentry could not work in the town. Their women could not carry shopping bags. While no one in a room cared about the entrance of a woman from another class, no matter her age, any gentry woman's entrance into a room should have been welcomed by every other woman by standing up in respect. While the men from the gentry carried the titles Ağa or Efendi, (Bey was rarely used there), the men from other classes did not have such titles.[25] Among the artisan class, some were called the daredevils (*yiğitler*). Those entered the services of certain gentry households, becoming their bulldogs or overseers of farms. The remaining ones' wealth was usually usurped by the gentry, who had to give gifts to the prior group to maintain their loyalty.[26]

Türkmen also provides us information about the reasons for the class divisions: The geography of Antakya enabled a vast amount of soap and silk industries, together with fruit and vegetable farming, all of which were sources of great wealth. Also, the religious differences between Sunnis and Alawites were enforcing the class divisions. As the state was Sunni, they had been allowed to control the valuable resources. Turkmen warriors from other regions continuously occupied the lands of old inhabitants, forcing them to turn into artisans. Yet as they also lost their warrior-like character within the town, new warrior clans were cyclically replacing them after each generation.[27]

§ 6.2 Events During the Antakya Massacre

As separate from the cases in Kayseri, Maraş, and Zeytun, great mass killings occurred in Antakya and its vicinity. Apart from Antakya town, massacres erupted in Kırıkhan, a large village in the Bilan subdistrict; and in Keseb,

25 Türkmen, *Mufassal Hatay Tarihi*, 599-602; Tekin, *Hatay Tarihi*, 138.

26 Türkmen, *Mufassal Hatay Tarihi,* 605.

27 Ibid., 904-905.

another large village of the Cisr Şuğur subdistrict. According to the Aleppo Governorate's report, by 14 May 1325, there were 172 deaths in Antakya, 113 in Keseb, 93 in Kırıkhan and 8 in İskenderun. Also, the number of people in need of aid was 553 in Antakya, 5,127 in Keseb, 483 in Bilan and 230 in İskenderun.[28]

The Ottoman Archival documents and secondary sources allow us to observe the Antakya Massacre, at the end of which, according to the report of Favre, a Swiss missionary, the Armenians were nearly annihilated.[29] Below is the attempt to understand what actually happened in Antakya during the massacre. First, the documents written by officials to summarize the event are going to be presented in detail. The following story is written in the light of three reports. The earliest one is the ciphered telegram sent to the capital on 9 May by Reşid Bey, the governor of Aleppo, who summarized the report of the investigation committee of Antakya, which was sent just after the massacre. The second is written on 6 June by a figure now familiar to us: İbrahim Paşa, the previous subdistrict governor of Zeytun who was appointed to Antakya as the deputy subdistrict governor and who arrived at the town on 6 May. And third is a text written by Muharrem Paşa, the previous subdistrict governor on 1 July, addressing the Action Army to defend his doings.[30]

Their summaries will be followed by the judicial struggles. Then, stories written by the two accused men will be presented in detail. One is the private letter from Bereketzade Refet Ağa to his elder brother, Rifat Ağa, who forwarded that letter to the Chamber of Deputies; and the other is the pleading of Avnullah Kazımî in İstanbul Court-Martial, which was later published as a

28 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2834/27, Ciphered Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 14, 1325. Most of the ones in need of aid in İskenderun were from nearby towns.

29 In his report Favre also added that "in the Armenian quarter of Antioch only twenty men are left, besides women and children. A hundred houses were looted, and the entire contents carried off, but, as these houses were near to the Mohammedan quarter, they were not burned…." A.B.C.F.M. Reel 616, No. 875, Report of Mr. Favre (representing the Swiss Committee of Neuchatel) to the International Committee, Constantinople, 15 December 1909.

30 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/69, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/34, 2a, 2b, 2c, From Deputy Sub-District Governorate of Antakya to Aleppo Governorate, June 6, 1325; BOA, DH.EO, 553/116 From Muharrem Bey to Action Army Commandership, July 1, 1325.

booklet. The officials' writings will be combined into a single summary, but for the sake of understanding the accused persons' perspective and agency, they will be presented separately after the course of events.

The story begins with the news of the Adana Massacres: Three or four days before the Antakya Massacre, exaggerated news started to come from Dörtyol, causing anxiety. According to İbrahim Paşa, the main cause of the Antakya Massacre was this news. One day before the massacre, on 5 April, the subdistrict governorate took an order to call up at least four to five hundred reserves and to send them to Cebel-i Bereket and İskenderun. Because of this order, rumors had spread among the people. On the night of 5-6 April, Muharrem Paşa, some officials, and the commander of the Antakya reserve battalion went to the telegram house and corresponded with authorities until the morning. Muharrem Paşa demanded soldiers from Reşid Bey, the Governor of Aleppo. Yet Reşid Bey refused the demand and wrote that he would not send soldiers to Antakya. Then, news of the Kırıkhan Massacre arrived. When the British vice-consul demanded soldiers again and again, Muharrem Paşa replied to him by saying that nothing was threatening the peace and the government had taken the necessary measures.

On the morning of 6 April, Monday, Muharrem Paşa learned that Armenians had closed their shops which had led to new rumors. Thereupon, he took some of his officials and went to the marketplace. He advised the notables in the shop of Kuseyrizade Reşid Ağa. He had also sent Mardıros Efendi, a member of the administrative council, to invite Armenians back to their daily routine (Mardıros Efendi would later be killed during the events). On his return, Mardıros Efendi told Muharrem Paşa that Armenians were going to reopen their shops. Yet none but a few had actually done so. Later, Mardıros Efendi, priest Ermenak Efendi (he would also be killed) and Said Efendi, another member of the council, were sent to the deputy Armenian prelate. After a talk which lasted half an hour, the deputy prelate promised that everyone would return to work.[31]

31 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/69, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/34, 2a, 2b, 2c, From Deputy Sub-District Governorate of Antakya to Aleppo Governorate, June 6, 1325; BOA, DH.EO, 553/116 From Muharrem Bey to Action Army Commandership, July 1, 1325.

Just as the tension was about to decrease, another order arrived: The reserve soldiers had to be deployed to İskenderun before the night. The distribution of conscription papers increased the anxiety to a great level. A quarter hour before the beginning, Ermenak Efendi wrote private memorandums about the fear of Armenians to three notables: These were Halefzade Hüsnü Ağa,[32] another member of the council, Mardıros Efendi, and Bereketzade Refet Ağa. When they received the memorandums, they went to the church. While Bereketzade Refet Ağa and Halefzade Hüsnü Ağa were trying to calm down the Armenians that had gathered within the church upon the demand of the Armenian priest, gunshots started. There were different claims about the timing and agent of the first shooting: According to the officials, shootings started when the notables were within the church. On the other hand, according to Consul Fontana, the shootings started just after the notables left the church. The first shooter was not identified. One claim was that an Armenian goldsmith and his friends had shot first. There was also a rumor that some gendarmes were the first shooters. But there was yet another claim that an Arabian reserve soldier called Fahl fired his gun in the air and through the gateway of the church. The first shot was followed by others and

32 Another important household was that of Halefzade family. The family takes its name from Halef Bey, the son of, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa, who came to Antakya from Berat with an official duty. Soon, his son Halef Bey, was the governor (*mütesellim*) of Antakya when İbrahim Paşa, son of Mohammad Ali Paşa had entered the town. He continued his duty until İbrahim Paşa's forces' retreat. When the Ottoman rule was restored, complaints about him were made, yet a group of people was also mobilized to support him. Halef Ağa and his son Bekir died in 1860 in Mecca during a pilgrimage. One of his sons, Abdülvahid Ağa was the mayor of Antakya between 1881 and 1891 and between 1894 and 1896. Halefzade Hüsnü Ağa was the son of Halef Ağa's another son, Abdülgani. His big brother, Mustafa Süreyya was graduated from İstanbul Law Faculty and had worked in the Ministry of Interior. Hüsnü Ağa, on the other hand, was the registrar (*nüfus memuru*) in Antakya between 1900 and 1909. Neither the French occupation nor the annexation by the Turkish Republic would diminish the family's power: in 1920, Hüsnü Ağa would be the mayor, and then the district governor of Antakya, and his brother Süreyya Ağa would be mayor in 1921, and MP in the Syrian parliament in 1928. There he insisted to speak Turkish. Süreyya Ağa would be district governor of Antakya in 1938, and would be among the persons who formed the Democratic Party branch of Antakya in 1946. Hüsnü Ağa's nephew, Vahit Halefoğlu would be the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 1980s. For the information about this family, see Mehmet Tekin, *Antakya Tarihinden Yapraklar ve Halefzade Süreyya Bey*, (Antakya: Kültür Ofset Basımevi, 1993), 7-81.

people started to converge on the location the sounds had been coming from. This was accompanied by the rumor that Armenians had taken the offensive.[33]

When events in Antakya started on 6 April, Muharrem Paşa, gendarme captain and police commissar took fifteen gendarmes and went to the Armenian neighborhood Dörtayak. However, thousands of people had already been assembled, and "the word had hit the street" (*söz ayağa düşmüştü*). Reserve soldiers had left the barracks and had spread throughout the town. Most of them had joined the attackers. Even a few gendarmes had united with them. The remaining soldiers and officers had also left the barracks to guard the armory, which had been raided by the people. At that moment, Muharrem Paşa had only fifteen gendarmes, many of whom were locals. He left them there and went to the government building. After midnight, the captain, commissar, and gendarmes also came to the building but could do nothing in the town. Upon the Governor's telegram, Muharrem Paşa ordered to prepare ten gendarmes to protect the foreigners' buildings. During and after the event, he personally walked through the streets and the markets until the agitation was over. He also ordered soldiers to comb the streets and brought the Armenians that they could find to the government building. The massacre and fires continued heavily the next day and night.[34]

On the following night, (7 April) the Major of the Ordu reserve battalion came to the town. He had been able to gather about twenty-five reserve soldiers from the nearest villages. Together with those, he took some gendarmes which had previously been divided and dispatched them "to protect the foreigners' buildings". By using all armed forces, the Major formed small patrols, and they started to march around the town. The scattered families were transferred to the houses of notables and the people. On 9 April,

33 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/69, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/34, 2a, 2b, 2c, From Deputy Sub-District Governorate of Antakya to Aleppo Governorate, June 6, 1325; BOA, DH.EO, 553/116 From Muharrem Bey to Action Army Commandership, July 1, 1325; PRO, FO 424/221/40913, From Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther, Aleppo, 3 October 1909, enclosure in From Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 October 1909 (Rec'd 1 November), No. 69.

34 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/34, 2a, 2b, 2c, From Deputy Sub-District Governorate of Antakya to Aleppo Governorate, June 6, 1325; BOA, DH.EO, 553/116 From Muharrem Bey to Action Army Commandership, July 1, 1325; PRO, FO 424/221/40913,

a cavalry senior captain arrived from Aleppo with seventy regular soldiers, paraded them, and ended the events completely. Yet the events lasted longer in the villages.[35]

In the list prepared by relying on the information provided by the headmen, Muslims' losses were nine, seven men, and two women. Ten men and a woman were wounded. However, when reserve soldiers from Ordu arrived on the night of 7 April, no Armenians had been left in the squares and houses. In the town center and villages, 197 Armenians, 190 men and 7 women had been killed. In Antakya, all males above the age of 15 were murdered. Together with the others from Adana, Dörtyol, İskenderun, and Kırıkhan, the total number of deaths were 236. 11 men and 24 women were wounded. 104 dead were from the town center and 102 were peasants. Nearly all house goods, commercial goods, and commodities that belonged to the town center's Armenians were looted or set fire to and destroyed. Their houses, churches, and even graves were damaged. As for the Armenian church, only its walls and roof had remained to stand. Even the Protestant church and the Latin church cemetery had been damaged.[36]

According to the officials, the real organizers and provocateurs could not be identified because of two reasons: First, the Muslims and "Nusayris" (Arab Alawites), who had not been getting well in the past, were united and in alliance during those days. Second, the notables' influence in Antakya was really great. The officials also wrote that Avnullah Kazımî had arrived in Antakya three days before the incident and had departed three days later. By May 9, the claims that some influential persons had been among the provocateurs were not confirmed.[37]

After the Massacre, subdistrict Governor Muharrem Paşa had been dismissed and called back to Aleppo. The Prime Ministry demanded an

35 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/34, 2a, 2b, 2c, From Deputy Sub-District Governorate of Antakya to Aleppo Governorate, June 6, 1325.

36 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/34, 2a, 2b, 2c, From Deputy Sub-District Governorate of Antakya to Aleppo Governorate, June 6, 1325; BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/69, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325; PRO, FO 424/221/40913, From Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther, Aleppo, 3 October 1909, enclosure in From Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 October 1909 (Rec'd 1 November), No. 69.

37 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/69, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325.

immediate investigation of him. İbrahim Paşa arrived on 6 May as the deputy subdistrict governor. On 30 May, Reşid Bey wrote that he was personally going to go to Antakya. Finally, on 3 June, Martial Law was proclaimed in Antakya and the Court-Martial started to work. Muharrem Paşa would soon be acquitted on the grounds that he was "deceived by his subordinates".[38]

The summaries reveal that the news from the northern regions that were closer to the Adana Governorate led to rumors, which started the tension. In the absence of sufficient security forces, the order to call up reserves meant arming the common local Muslims who were affected by the rumors of the Armenian revolt. There were no signs of Armenian armed resistance, and their men were annihilated. The rage was so great that anything that resembled the presence of Armenians was destroyed. The great notables of the town were thought to be useful in calming down the people, yet after the gunshots, the massacre started.

In the following parts, the position of two persons in particular, Bereketzade Refet Ağa and Avnullah Kazımî will be brought to the fore. When the Massacre erupted, both persons were in Antakya town center. Both were accused of preparing and taking part in the Massacre soon afterward. The Armenian community, certain officials, and foreign diplomats were certain about their agency. Also, another important common feature of the two men allows us to look for the links between the Massacre and the 31 March Incident: Both had strong ties with the politicians at the capital: Refet Ağa's big brother Bereketzade Rifat Ağa was the deputy of Aleppo in the Chamber of Deputies, and was in the parliament building on the first day of the 31 March Incident. Kazımî on the other hand was the president of one of the first institutionalized opposition movements to the Unionists. After the Massacre, all fingers pointed to these men as perpetrators, portraying them as typical counterrevolutionary plotters: Many officials, local Armenians, and even

38 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/69, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2834/120, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, May 13, 1325; BOA. DH.MUİ 2-1/15, 20a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 30, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3589/269156, 3a, Copy: From Antakya Headquarters to Adana Regulatory Forces Headquarters, June 1, 1325; PRO, FO 424/221/40913, From Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther, Aleppo, 3 October 1909, enclosure in From Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 October 1909 (Rec'd 1 November), No. 69.

some Muslims were defending the claim that Refet Ağa was a landlord who tried to prevent constitutionalism to keep his enormous despotic power; and Kazımî was a political opponent who came to the region from İstanbul upon the orders of Abdülhamid himself, and that both had endeavored to organize the massacre.

Who were these two accused persons? Before the summary of several testimonies and arguments, their social-political position has to be presented. As written before, Refet Ağa was the brother of Rifat Ağa, who was the head of the Bereketzade household, and the MP of Aleppo in the new parliament. The Bereketzade family was such a powerful and typical gentry family of Asi Valley that at the end of his detailed analysis of this class, Türkmen presents Rifat Ağa as the key characteristic figure: He had managed to form good relations with all of Abdülhamid's company, married his brother to the daughter of Ali Muhsin Paşa, the Aleppo Governor of the time. Each summer he invited the most influential men to his houses. Anyone who had a demand from the government used to visit Rifat Ağa before the officials, as it was as if they were under his command.[39] After the parliamentary elections, Rifat Ağa was mostly in İstanbul as an MP, so he devolved his power in Antakya to his brother, Refet Ağa. In the following pages, Refet Ağa's letter to his elder brother, Rifat Ağa, is going to be a key document in understanding their capacity to control the masses. The conclusion drawn will be surprising in many senses.

Another important witness to the Antakya Massacre, Avnullah Kazımî, was the founder and first president of the Committee of the Devotees of the Nation, which was one of the first political organizations that opposed the CUP. Avnullah Kazımî, whose original name was Mehmed Selim, was from the Zorluhan family. The family was from Erzurum, yet at the time they resided in İstanbul, where his father, Zorluzade Hacı Hüseyin Hüsnü Efendi, had become Sultan Murad V's first secretary and foster brother. After his enthronement, Abdülhamid II sent Hüsnü Efendi into exile in the Aleppo Governorate. There, he passed away. Both Mehmed Selim and Süleyman Tevfik were sent into exile after the Ali Suavi Incident. After their return, they started to publish the newspaper Mürüvvet. After he understood that he was

39 Türkmen, *Mufassal Hatay Tarihi*, 908.

going to be arrested for writing an article, Mehmed Selim fled to the Balkans. Following that escape, he returned to Aleppo. There, he took the identity of another of his brothers, Avnullah, who had passed away when he was a child. After that point, he would be known as Avnullah el Kazımî, or Avnullah Kazımî. Soon, the rivalry between Fuad Paşa and Fehim Paşa would cause Kazımî to suffer once again: He was arrested and exiled to Sivas for life. After he tried to escape from Sivas, he was transferred to Sinob.[40]

After the Young Turk Revolution, Kazımî had returned to İstanbul. In a short time, he came to the idea that he and many Young Turks like him would not get on well with the Committee of Union and Progress. To oppose the Unionists, he formed The Committee of the Devotees of the Nation. This Committee was founded by the Young Turks who had previously been either in exile or on the run during the Hamidian regime and could not find what they had expected from the new regime later.[41] After the police raid on the Committee's headquarters and Kazımî's house on 12 January 1909, the Committee negotiated and partially reconciled with the government and accordingly, Kazımî was appointed to the district governorate of Kerkük on 10 March 1325.[42] During his travel to Kerkük, Kazımî visited Antakya, where his father's tomb lies.[43] As a member of the opposition who had been recently taken under custody, Kazımî's presence in Antakya during the massacre cast doubts on him. He would be arrested and judged by the Court-Martial in İstanbul. His defense at the court, which also tells many things about the

40 All these background informations can be found in Betül Coşkun, *Ümmü'l Muharrirat Halide Nusret Zorlutuna*, (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011), 31-34.

41 For detailed information about the committee, see Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu's works, "Meşrutiyet Üzerinde İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 'ne Karşı Hak Arama Mücadelesi: Fedakaran-ı Millet Cemiyeti," *Toplumsal Tarih Dergisi,* v. 137, 40-45; Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu, İkinci Meşrutiyetin İlk Yıllarında Sürgün ve Firariler Sorunu ve Fedakaran-ı Millet Cemiyeti, Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri, 7 no. 2, 133-150; Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu, *Osmanlı'da Devrim ve Fedakaran-ı Millet: İstibdat Dönemi Sürgün ve Firarilerinin Devr-i Hürriyet'te Mücadeleleri*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2018).

42 BOA, BEO, 3522/264139, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, March 11, 1325.

43 In a document, it is stated that he was from Süleymaniye.. See BOA, Y.MTV, 281/10, 1a, Ciphered Telegram from Sivas Governorate to Yıldız Palace, November 21, 1321.

massacre would be published later.[44] Kazımî's tale of the massacre, which is to be summarized below in detail, is extremely important as it shows how the Young Turks in opposition, who were blamed for being among the coalition of the agents of both the 31 March Incident and the Adana Massacre, thought about the two events.

§ 6.3 Objections to Antakya Court-Martial

By the end of August, the Antakya Court-Martial had finished its job in Antakya. Looking at the cases in Antakya, Keseb, Kırıkhan, and İskenderun, the Court had convicted 370 people. 311 of them were under arrest, and 56 were escapees.[45] 120 were sentenced for the Antakya Massacre.[46] The process summarized by the Antakya Court-Martial in its decision record for the case of the landlords and the subdistrict governor shows the court officials' certainty about the guilt of the landlords: After the warnings of the British vice-consulate about the possibility of a massacre in Dörtyol, the influent persons (*müteneffizan*) had guaranteed that no event would happen in Antakya, yet in fact, they had already decided to take part in it. According to their plan, they absolutely did not advise the people, although there were rumors that a massacre was going to happen. On 5 April, the priest Ermenak Efendi had officially thrown himself at the mercy of Refet Ağa. Yet he had not responded. The next day, Ermenak Efendi tried to do the same thing, this time with Hüsnü Ağa. The two had not done anything on 6 April, when it had been understood that the people filling the markets were about to kick start the events. The reserves who had been called up that day went around to the Armenian neighborhood. At that time, it had been obvious that "repelling those insects" was a patriotic duty. The two landlords invited the Armenians

44 Mehmed Avnullah el-Kazımî, *Son Müdafaa: Müşarünileyh Elyevm Fedakaran-ı Millet Cemiyyetinin Rei-is Müntahibidir*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Cihan, 1326).

45 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-2/88, 1a, Telegram From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, August 21, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-3/22, 15a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 21, 1325.

46 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-3/22, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Kastamonu and Aydın Governorates, August 29, 1325.

to the church. Relieved, the Armenians gave them candies and syrup. They were caught off guard and were massacred. That day, the two landlords also demanded the reserves not to be sent to Dörtyol, and the Court-Martial believed that this showed their intentions. According to Kuseyrzade Nihad Ağa, there were Armenian witnesses who told about his words being used for motivating the masses. Those witnesses were not reliable, yet with a single signal Nihad Ağa had managed to send back the Kuseyr people who had shown up for taking part in the massacre the next day, and that showed his enormous power which could have been used for preventive purposes.[47]

Ten days after the Court-Martial had finished its duty, members of the gentry started to express their first objections. Among those objections, three names, all of whom were sentenced to lifelong exile come to the fore: Bereketzade Refet, Kuseyrizade Nihad, and Halefağazade Hüsnü. They were very influential, as they were backed by Bereketzade Rifat Ağa. Both the sequence and strategy of objections of these three landlords were very similar to the case of Maraş: Adopting the vocabulary of the new regime, pointing to the unlawful process of the Court-Martial, lobbying through MPs, implying that they were not as powerful as implied and arousing pity for themselves were also seen in the struggle of the Antakya landlord convicts to save their skins. Another important point that they underlined was their efforts to prevent the massacre, a claim that will be dwelled on in the following pages.

In the first phase, Rifat Bereketzade and three landlords sent several telegrams to Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of the Adana Regulatory Forces, on 31 August and 1 September. In his telegram on 30 August, Rifat Ağa wrote that his enemies had tried to implicate him in the massacre, yet managed to find nothing: So, his brother Refet had become their new target. Although all people from all communities knew that in the name of humanity, he had tried to prevent the events by risking his own life, they had deceived the Court-Martial. Thus, he had been unjustly sentenced to permanent exile. Not knowing what they had been doing, the Court-Martial and the Investigation Committee had released many murderers and convicted many

47 BOA, İ..AS, 96/10, 4a, Court-Martial Decision, August 23, 1325

sinless people.[48] Rifat Ağa sent another telegram to the Commander on the same day, noting that his brother had not been present during the investigation, and had not been faced with any witness or accuser. Nor had any document making him a suspect been shown to him. Moreover, he had been convicted without relying on any article of law.[49] Both Bereketzade brothers and the landlords would repeat all these points made by Rifat Ağa again and again.

Kuseyrizade Nihad Ağa also sent a similar telegram to the Commander: He had been arrested at first, yet then he was released, as his good service had come to the surface through the testimonies of all Armenian men and women. Yet, although the Court-Martial's task had been finished, he had been arrested two days prior. In fact, he should have been rewarded for his service.[50] Halefzade Hüsnü Ağa's telegram to the Commander was sent on the same day: His exiling was a political decision. There had been no accuser or denouncement. People who had risked their lives must at least not be punished, if not rewarded. He would accept the most severe punishment if he had indeed been a provocateur or agent.[51]

The next day, Halefzade Hüsnü and Bereketzade Refet wrote to the Commander that at least their statements had to be taken by the Court-Martial.[52] On the same day, Rifat Ağa also sent a telegram for Rifat and Hüsnü Ağa: Both landlords had put their lives at risk for the sake of the unity of all communities. But the Court-Martial had condemned them "with a strange

48 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 36a, 37a, From Rif'at Bereketzade Efendi, the Deputy of Aleppo, to Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, August 31, 1325.

49 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 39a, From Rif'at Bereketzade Efendi, the Deputy of Aleppo, to Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, August 31, 1325.

50 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 40a, From Kuseyrizade Nihad to Adana Regulatory Forces Headquarters, August 31, 1325.

51 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 44a, From Halef Ağazade Hüsnü Ağa to Adana Regulatory Forces Headquarters, August 31, 1325.

52 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 33a, From Halef Ağazade Hüsnü Ağa to Adana Regulatory Forces Headquarters, September 1, 1325.

perspective that they had not prevented the events". This sentence could not be accepted by the constitutional world.[53]

After a few days, the notables started to send their objections to the central government. On 5 September, Bereketzade Refet wrote to the Prime Ministry that he had no such great influence in his hometown, he was just a trader. Moreover, in this objection, he started to construct a political discourse for the first time: He had consciously supported the idea of liberty and constitutionalism for a long time. That had caused certain oppressors to target him and had influenced both the investigators and the Court-Martial. İzzet Paşa, who had been in exile in Aleppo during the despotic regime; Fuad Paşa; Hasan Paşa, the Governor of Yemen; Zühdü Bey and Mustafa Nedim Bey could vouch for him. If he would be stricken with the grief of exile in this young age, this would result in nothing but his victimization due to his allegiance to the idea of liberty.[54] Halefzade Hüsnü wrote to the Prime Ministry on the same day, sarcastically refusing the claims that he held great influence: His only power had been the good service he rendered during the disorder. While he had been rescuing Armenians, who had been fired upon there. In fact, he had been expecting to be rewarded.[55]

The situation did not change during the following three weeks, which led Bereketzade Refet and Halefzade Hüsnü to send a new telegram to Sheikh-al-Islam, the Ministry of War, and the Prime Ministry: They had been under custody for fifty days. They added that many of the investigation committee's members were of the locals. Therefore, personal hostilities had affected its decisions. The total population of their family was more than seventy. They expressed their resentments that they were being treated like "looters of the old age, traitors, Yıldız villains". Both Muslims and Armenians were sorry for them. They also reminded that justice was the essence of constitutionalism.[56]

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53 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 35a, From Rif'at Bereketzade Efendi, the Deputy of Aleppo, to Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, September 1, 1325.

54 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 31a, 32a, From Bereketzade Refet Efendi to Prime Ministry, September 5, 1325.

55 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 30a, From Halefzade Hasan to Prime Ministry, September 8, 1325.

56 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-5/31, 5a, From Bereketzade Refet and Halefzade Hüsnü to the Sheikh-ul-Islamate, October 7, 1325; BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 6a, 7a, From Bereketzade Refet and

Representatives of the Armenian community, on the other hand, tried to stand against such attempts to cancel the sentences of those notables. The texts written by them show that they were certain about the role of the gentry, and their doings after the massacre were proving the fact. This can be seen, for example, in the telegram sent by Şahe Efendi, the Prelate of Aleppo: Rifat Ağa was trying to save some landlords who had been sentenced to light punishments by the Court-Martials. He had understood that they could not deceive state offices through telegrams. Thus, he had collected signatures from the Armenians, claiming that the landlords had been neutral. With those signatures, he had gone, first, to the Regulatory Forces HQ, and then to İstanbul. That attempt meant denying justice, protecting the villain, and paving the way to new disorders. Şahe Efendi wanted Rifat Ağa, who was damaging the honor of the deputy office by doing such things, to be warned officially.[57] When the three landlords were released on bail after a while, the newspaper Jamanak published that news sarcastically: The people were surprised, and could not describe the decision of the government. When he had returned to İstanbul, Rifat Efendi was applauded and hailed by the Turks. In fact, he really deserved applaud, as he had succeeded in something that the Patriarchate and the Sublime Porte could not: He had reversed the judgment. That was how an MP should be.[58] With the landlords' release, Antakya Armenians' complaints grew. On 10 December, Şahe Efendi, the Prelate of Aleppo wrote that after their release, their hostilities grew further: Let alone protecting hundreds of forlorn women and a few men, they were insulting them. They were sending provocateur children and indigents to the priest, who had come there to protect the people, to insult him. The priest could not withstand that treatment, he had to leave the town crying. All these could revive despotism. For two months, Şahe Efendi was receiving many letters and telegrams pointing that there was still no security in sight and that the

Halefzade Hüsnü to the Ministry of War, October 7, 1325; BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 8a, From Bereketzade Refet and Halefzade Hüsnü to Prime Ministry, October 7, 1325.

57 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 24a, From Prelate Şahe Efendi to the Ministry of War, September 12, 1325.

58 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/58, 3a, Translation from 306th issue of newspaper Jamanak, dated 15 October 1325.

landlords' continued presence could lead to new events. The appeals were fruitless. These landlords were the real provocateurs behind the hundreds of wretches, who were in the prison at that moment. So, the Armenians were demanding the execution of the Court-Martial's first conviction, which was a holy one.[59]

The Armenian community was not alone in their belief that the landlords were the main perpetrators of the Massacre. After hearing about the rumors of a pardon, at the end of December, Fahri Bey, the new Governor of Aleppo also sent a ciphered telegram, which contained very heavy words, to the Ministry of Interior: According to him, it was Rifat Ağa's measures that prevented the exiling of the landlords. In addition, although some common people had retaken the lands which had previously been usurped by the landlords, soon these lands were given back to the landlords. Through the Sheik-al-Islam, he had prevented the mufti, who had stood against him, from continuing to hold office. He regained control of the people, who had hated him. He had held meetings in which the crowd shouted: "long live Refet Ağa". And again, he had shown his hostility towards Armenians. Rifat Ağa was a man who could not get even one vote in Antakya. He was elected through some other measures. He wanted to increase his influence and reimpose his despotism. On this point, the attitude of certain notables and local newspapers was also worthy of attention. Seeing that the old cruel despots could oppress them even more with the influence they gain by becoming MPs, the oppressed were thinking that constitutionalism could not benefit them, and were joining the provocateurs.[60] Even if the news of a pardon was not true, its rumors were enough to have a very bad impact on the non-Muslims. They were not trusting the government, and the eruption of a new event was a possibility. Orders had to be given to keep the soldiers who were called back by the Adana Regulatory

59 BOA, A.VRK, 721/30, 2a, From Şahe Efendi, the Prelate of Aleppo to the Sultanate, December 10, 1325.

60 *"Eski mütegallibe ve zalimenin meşrutiyetin ilanından evvel gösteremedikleri satvet ve tahakkümü bu suretle mebusluk nüfuzuyla izhar eylemekte olmalarını gözleyen mazlumlar da meşruti hükümetten beklemekte oldukları faydaları iktitaf edememek beisiyle erbab-ı fesad ve tahrike iltihak etmekte"*

Forces Headquarters in Antakya.[61] After about two weeks, Governor Fahri Bey complained about Rifat Ağa again: He was organizing demonstrations in front of the government building. By doing this, he was provoking public opinion against the government. Refet, Hüsnü and Nihad Ağa were also working in line with him. So, they had to be sent into exile immediately, and soldiers had to be kept in the town.[62]

In reply to Fahri Bey's first telegram, the Ministry of Interior falsified the pardon rumors, yet, it was decided that the sentences of the Antakya Court-Martial were not fair: The judgment was going to be reversed, and the Adana Court-Martial was ordered to start a new investigation. The landlords were to be judged again.[63]

Soon, Adana's Second Court-Martial handed out new sentences to the landlords: The previous decision of the Antakya Court-Martial had been as such: Kuseyrizade Hacı Nihad Ağa had been exiled to Libya, Halefağazade Hüsnü Ağa and Bereketzade Refet Ağa had been exiled to any place out of Syria. The ex-subdistrict governor Muharrem Paşa had been retired, without any permission to return to government duty. All officials from Antakya in the local government had been dismissed. Yet the order from the Ministry of War was that any administrative sentence could not be executed. So, a new trial and a lawful sentence were ordered. The Court confirmed Muharrem Paşa's sentence. The officials had been substituted with others, which meant that they could keep their jobs. Yet the Court accepted that they were instruments of the local despots. Landlords' punishments were commuted: Kuseyrizade Nihad Ağa was exiled to Sinob for five years for fueling the incident. Halefağazade Hüsnü Ağa and Bereketzade Refet Ağa were sentenced to three years of exile to Rhodes as although they had promised the government that they would prevent the incident, and had the power to do so, they had not done anything, which showed that they had tacitly approved the

61 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-5/31, 9a, 10a, Ciphered Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, December 31, 1325.

62 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-5/31, 13a, Ciphered Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 13, 1325

63 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-5/31, 1a, Ciphered Telegram From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, January 6, 1325.

doings. Another reason was that they had reduced governmental power ever since. The three landlords were also banned from any government duty, such as serving as local council members.[64]

Naturally, this did not match Armenians' expectations. The interesting thing is that the new decision did not satisfy the convicts either. After three weeks, Bereketzade Rifat Ağa sent a new petition of appeal, signed by many MPs, to the Prime Ministry: The new Court-Martial in Adana also did not take the defendant to trial, and did not reach its decisions in accordance with an article of law. What it only did was to decrease the term of the sentence to three years. So, the technically illegal procedure went on. His family was well aware of the necessity and value of the country's well-being and security, and of the need for the fatherland's children to get along. However, the court-martials had been misguided, and they would insist on their decisions. Therefore, they demand the government to put an end to this situation.[65]

At the end of all of these struggles, after its meeting in which it decided to pardon 400 convicts at the enthronement of the Sultan, the Council of Ministers pardoned the three landlords, together with Muharrem and İbrahim Paşas. The Council based its decision on the fact that the Court-Martials had not based their decisions on an article of law.[66]

§ 6.4 On the Capacity of Local Elites to Control the Masses During the Massacre

The whole correspondence presented above shows that persons from various backgrounds commonly believed that the Antakya Massacre was the doing of what Ahmet Türkmen defined as the gentry and reactionary plotters sent from İstanbul. According to the Armenian headmen of Antakya, the influential ones (*müteheyyizan*) had power, yet together with sheikhs, ulema and gendarme, they "empowered and led the pinheads and counseled that 'no men with an Armenian name shall remain'". They had not prevented the events and

64 BOA, İ.HB, 28/11, 11a, January 11, 1325.

65 BOA, İ.HB, 28/11, 25b, February 7, 1325.

66 BOA, İ.HB, 28/11, 42a, April 11, 1326.

had not helped them for five days.[67] For Şahe Efendi, the Prelate of Aleppo, three landlords, Bereketzade Refet, Halefzade Hasan and Kuseyrizade Nihad had caused the disaster. They had been supporting the despotic regime ever since. They planned and organized the massacre to continue despotism by landing a blow to the constitution. Evidence to their attendance in the events had been found under the martial law.[68] Fahri Bey, the Governor of Aleppo who was appointed after the massacre, also wrote that at the end of his personal investigation, he decided that Bereketzade Refet and Halefzade Hüsnü Ağa had participated in the massacre, and sending them into exile was the most fundamental requirement of patriotism.[69] In his book Les Vepres Ciliciennes, Seropian, the Prelate of Adana also claims that Kazımî had been an agent sent to provoke the massacres.[70] British consul Fontana was also in agreement with them. For the gentry, he reported that:

> The massacre was worked up by the Antioch agas with the connivance of the authorities. The agas have been locally all-powerful; the idea of liberty and of the curtailment of their petty authority and power to tyrranise was abhorrent to them, and the Armenian was made the scapegoat upon which they were only too ready to vent their reactionary wrath. The Administrative Council was mainly composed of agas or their satellites. The kaimakam was aged and a mere tool in their hands.[71]

67 BOA, DH.MUİ, 31-1/49, 2a, From Armenian headmen of Antakya to the Sultanate, October 13, 1325.

68 BOA, A.VRK, 721/30, 2a, From Şahe Efendi, the Prelate of Aleppo to the Sultanate, December 10, 1325.

69 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-5/31, 9a, 10a, Ciphered Telegram from Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, December 31, 1325.

70 Seropian, Les Vepres Ciliciennes, 29. It is quite interesting that Seropian's famous report that increased the conflict between him and the officials in Adana was published by the newspaper Hukuk-i Umumiye, which belonged to the political party of Kazımî himself. See Seropian, 23. Given that Seropian knew that Kazımî was the member a Fedakaran-ı Millet, this inconsistency takes attention.

71 PRO, FO 424/221/40913, From Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther, Aleppo, 3 October 1909, enclosure in From Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 October 1909 (Rec'd 1 November), No. 69.

And for the situation of Kazımî, he thought accordingly:

> From the whole of my information and from my personal observations I am led to believe that the recent disturbance is the work of the reactionary party, whose secret agents, it is said, were travelling in the provinces distributing money and inciting the Mussulman population to cause troubles and massacres. One of these emissaries, named Ain Ullah Bey, who was travelling as a governor of Kerkuk, on passing through Alexandretta, had a long and private interview with our kaimakam, Rifat Bey, after which he left at once for Antioch and Aleppo, where I heard he was arrested. The very fact that massacres occurred at the former place soon after his visit there tends to prove that this man was really a secret reactionary agent, …[72]

Although there is a broad consensus about the gentry's agency, here I argue that the accusers may have been wrong in their claims. Above, I noted that there are various reasons to claim so, like the widespread belief in plots, the competition among the notables themselves and simply misreading the political conjuncture and the social conditions. Here, let us revisit the events during the massacre through the counterclaims of the two most forthcoming figures of the accused, whose sentences raise the readers' elbows. Luckily, we have two texts written by them. First is a private letter written by Refet Bereketzade to his big brother and the second is a booklet of Avnullah Kazımî's defense in the Court-Martial.

On 11 April, together with his son and a third person (most probably a relative), Bereketzade Refet Ağa wrote a letter to his elder brother Bereketzade Rifat Ağa, who was in İstanbul at that time as the deputy of Aleppo.[73] About 2 weeks after the massacre, on 22 April, Bereketzade Rifat Ağa forwarded this letter to Ahmed Rıza, the President of the Chamber of Deputies. In his

72 PRO, FO 424/219/23055, From Acting Vice-Consul Catoni to Consul Fontana, Alexandretta, 22 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 15 June 1909, No. 138.

73 Unfortunately, I could not detect the third signatory of the letter, who was most probably a relative of Rifat Ağa.

introduction, Rifat Ağa wrote that "through fake news, some provocateurs had succeeded to frighten the people and reach their aims": He warned the President that although the situation was calm at that time, one should stay alert. He also suggested proclaiming martial law in Antakya and deploying more reinforcements. He demanded his writings to be read at the parliament, or to be forwarded to the Prime Ministry.[74]

This letter makes important contributions to our understanding of the events during the Massacre. First, it gives us the details about the rumors. Second, it shows that communication with other regions was almost impossible in those days, a fact which undermines the claims that there was a coordinated conspiracy carried out throughout the region. Third, its literary style shows that Refet Ağa was extremely terrified by the event and felt very sorry for the fate of Armenians. Given that this was a private letter that was written only a few days after the Massacre, the text could not have been written with the motive to defend themselves against the accusations. So, in the letter, Refet Ağa appears as a man who desperately tried to help the Armenians without any assistance or at least, reliable information from the government.

Because Rifat Ağa forwarded it, this private letter is present in the Ottoman Archives. The letter, which was written four days after Antakya Massacre, provides an account of how Bereketzade Refet Ağa and the other two writers experienced the sequence of events. They start their letter by talking about the news from Adana: The previous week, mail about the Adana Incident had arrived in Antakya: On the day of the arrival of the mail, events started there too, and no mail could be sent. That day, they had understood that the events were not simultaneous. "Highly exaggerated news" that Muslim villages had been burned and Muslims had been murdered in Dörtyol, had come to Antakya. At that moment, those who had escaped from Kırıkhan had told that Kurds had attacked Kırıkhan and burned down the whole village. The fears of the people, who were already sufficiently agitated, grew further when the orders to deploy all reserves to İskenderun and Dörtyol were given. On Tuesday, the Massacre started. Although they tried to "step into the fire" and prevent the events, it had been impossible to do so. The

74 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/3, 2a, From Bereketzade Rifat Bey, the Deputy of Antakya, to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, April 22, 1325.

Massacre continued for two days. There were no soldiers, no officers, and no force. The reserves failed to be assembled and soldiers from the district did not arrive. It was "impossible to describe the situation". Everyone was in shock and great fear because of the distressing rumors coming in hourly. "Sometimes it was about Armenians attacking from the bridge, sometimes it was an attack of the Keseb Armenians". At nights, peasants had rushed for Antakya, demanding soldiers and guns. In that region, from the churches to the most basic houses, there was not even a single building that escaped the looting and damage. In the following days, they had barely protected and brought a few Armenians, who could be found here and there, to the government building. They estimated that there had been 150 dead. Among them, maybe three or four were Muslims. They had "a nervous breakdown and could not give any more details". They first wrote about their good condition, then implied the events with another telegram. On the previous night, about a hundred soldiers had arrived in Antakya. The situation was relatively calm for two days. People from Kuseyr and Arabs had come to loot, yet they had been repelled after the first wave of violence. Yet rumors that those from Kuseyr and Cisr had attacked Keseb had spread. They were hopeful that the offenders had been dispersed. They were more concerned about the attacks of Kurds, Kuseyr people, and Arabs with intentions to loot. Yet in Antakya, "what was done was done". Muslims and Greeks had no losses, yet for Armenians, "the damage had been done". They protected about a hundred and fifty to two hundred Armenian women and children in their houses. Although the Governor had always communicated with them, it had proven fruitless as there hadn't been enough forces and soldiers. However, they had thrown themselves into the fire and had tried to calm down the situation as far as they could. They were also hearing many things about İstanbul, yet because no mails could arrive, they could not get any details. They were thinking about İstanbul and Rifat Ağa's situation. The common declaration of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, which assembled together in Ayastefanos had been issued by telegram. They were "discovering" the situation in İstanbul "through such declarations and implications in all shapes

and sizes". The writers also recommend Rifat Ağa not tell anything about the letter's content to persons whom he does not trust.[75]

The second text is the pleading of Kazımî. In contrast to the letter of Bereketzade, this was written much later to defend himself in front of the court-martial in İstanbul. In fact, the literary style of the text gives the impression that some phrases were added to influence the judges. Yet it had many original details, through which Kazımî informs us about the attitude of the sub district governor, the reaction of the gentry and the masses to the event, how the Unionists dealt with the situation, and how Armenian victims suffered. And all descriptions are parallel with the claims of Bereketzade Refet Ağa. In this sense, the neglect of this pleading by the historians dealing with the Cilicia Massacre is surprising. Let us observe Kazımî's claims in detail.

After his appointment to the district governorate, Kazımî left the capital for Kerkük. While he was passing by, he planned to stay in Antakya, where his father's tomb lies, for a while. He first heard about the Massacre when he was with the subdistrict governor of İskenderun: A letter from the Dörtyol Forest Manager to his relative in İskenderun was brought to the subdistrict governor. In the letter, the official wrote that people in Dörtyol were horrified, his family was surrounded and all documents and files had been completely destroyed. Kazımî and the subdistrict governor were in complete agreement about telling people nothing about the letter's content. They counseled the receiver of the letter strongly to that effect.[76] That night, Kazımî came to Antakya. The brother of the owner of the house he was staying in, Vahid Ağa, a person who also "complied with constitutionalism all along" told him about the circulation of the news from Adana and Dörtyol in an exaggerated way, his fear from the possibility of acts of evil between different communities and the subdistrict governor's ongoing ignorance despite his warnings. He asked Kazımî to talk with the subdistrict governor, as his presence would be more effective. At that moment, Kazımî's greater concern was "Nusayri anxiety" (*gâilesi*). He did not fear the "Armenian problem", because Antakya had not been a scene of disorder during the Hamidian Massacres: For him, Antakya

75 BOA, DH.MUİ, 2-1/15, 22a, Letter to Bereketzade Rifat Bey, the Deputy of Antakya, April 11, 1325.

76 Kazımî, *Son Müdafaa*, 28.

was one of the most civilized regions. He also did not care much about Vahid Ağa's words, yet he had to think like an official, so at their first meeting with the subdistrict governor, he told him about the issue. Yet he found the subdistrict governor to be quite optimistic. He was an old, sweet, friendly, dovelike person, not like a civil servant at all.[77]

That day, the Aleppo Governorate sent its order to recruit all obligors, infantry, cavalry, cannon men, and reserves; to Antakya. This came as "very heavy" for people. Then, the İstanbul branch of the CUP sent a telegram to its Antakya branch, informing that the Action Army, which was composed of Second and Third Armies, had captured the Çatalca fort. As the Antakya branch declared this event publicly, rumors spread rapidly and affected people very negatively. Kazımî thought that Nusayris would see that as an opportunity. At first, the situation was calm and no security measures were taken. Weapons were provided to the applied reserves, and they were allowed to go back to their homes in arms.[78]

Armenians closed their shops the following day, and that drew attention. Saddened by those tensions, Kazımî decided to leave the town the following day. He went to the Great Mosque to visit his father's tomb. On the road, he saw some notables sitting in a shop. There were two members of the ulema, together with Nihad Ağa and Vahid Ağa. Hodjas and Nihad Ağa left the shop after they heard the call to prayer, yet soon, Nihad Ağa returned: He learned that there was an incident in the Christian neighborhood. As his house was in that neighborhood, he went there. Soldiers, who had taken their weapons from the Armory were passing through. Then, a person warned Kazımî: His clothes appeared strange, and an ignorant person could attack him, so it would be better to go home. When he did go out, he was faced with a flood of people. Kazımî went adrift and started to go in the same direction. He had tried to prevent the event by saying that panicking was not appropriate at that moment and attacking without understanding the situation was wrong. At last, a man, nearly attacking him, shouted:

-So, Armenians will destroy us and we will still keep quiet?

Kazımî replied:

77 Ibid., 29-30.

78 Ibid., 30-31.

-Son, who is destroying you, understand the situation for once, does the government not exist?

Yet as some others had closed in on him, he had to shut up. He retreated to his house. At that very moment, a gunshot was heard, and he involuntarily said to himself "what is done is done".[79]

Kazımî started to shout for gendarmes, officials, and soldiers in the yard. That night, Hüsnü Bey, Vahid Ağa's nephew, entered the house, shaking and whey-face. When people inquired after his health, he showed two bullet holes in the skirt of his dress. He replied to the inquiry "was it the Armenians" with "no, on the contrary, Muslims. Monsters, who were thought to be obedient (*muti*) fired upon me when I tried to ignore their threats and insisted to resist them. Without doubt they are going to kill me. There is neither police nor the gendarme. I understood that they cannot be stopped without government force. For the sake of Allah, go to the government building, go to the barracks and inform them." At that moment, they saw the subdistrict governor. He was giving them a blank stare. Kazımî told him to bring the gendarme, yet there were none. As he told to bring a few persons with an official uniform at least, they called up the municipal police (*zabıta*). But they said that they were busy guarding the armory and could not come. The gendarme captain also said that they went to the marketplace.[80]

Kazımî counts Vahid Ağa, Reşid Ağa, Hüsnü Ağa, Nazım Ağa, Refet Ağa, Raif Ağa, and Kamil Ağa as the men who had made great efforts to prevent the people from attacking and from looting the marketplace and to list the ones who could not be stopped. However, the gunshots had kept going during the night. All officials and municipal police had been gathered within the same mansion. Officials had hidden the children and women at their own houses. Especially, Vahid, Reşid and Nazım Ağa had "cried and beaten their knees continuously". Kazımî and others also joined them often in this display. At a certain point, Behçet and Ali Beys came to Kazımî with worry and told him that it was becoming increasingly dangerous, that the door of the mansion was closed, that the "insects" (*haşerat*) are going to attack them, as one man had

79 Ibid., 31-33. Kazımî writes that he later learned that an Alawite, who had been called up by the army, had made the first shot, targeting an Armenian. See Ibid., 40-41.

80 Ibid., 34.

told Nahid Ağa and his fellows that they learned that "the man that you hide under the name Avnullah el Kazımî in your mansion was an Armenian Committee chief, and his companion were Armenian fedayees. They informed us. We want them, or else we will storm the mansion and kill them there."[81] Nihad Ağa would later confirm this. He decided, once again, to leave Antakya the following day but he hesitated not only because of the accusation of being a committee member but also because his wagon drivers were Armenian. And in fact, "at the morning of the longest night in his life", he learned that the inn where his wagon drivers had been staying had been raided and they had been killed, together with other eight wagon drivers.[82] Out of money, Kazımî borrowed some from Reşid Ağa, found some other wagon drivers, and left the town, with some members of the ulema along with some officials and guards.[83]

After leaving the town, Kazımî passed through Kırıkhan. "Poor Kırıkhan was nothing but a fireplace". Neither a shop nor a living person remained. He reached Aleppo on 11 April. There, a friend of his said that the town was agitated, as the local government had received an anonymous telegram, in which it was written that after creating the events of Adana, Dörtyol, Antakya and Kırıkhan, Kazımî had arrived in Aleppo to start a revolution. He had decided to go to the Governor's office at once. There, Governor Reşid Bey's attitude towards him had been sincerely warm. Yet later, his room had been searched by the deputy prosecutor, who was accompanied by Unionist soldiers. The search had been even more detailed than those made during the despotic regime. Nothing had been found, yet the Armenian community in

81 Kazımî's daughter, Halide Nusret Zorlutuna, who was with her father during the massacre also confirms this story. See Halide Nusret Zorlutuna, *Bir Devrin Romanı*, (Ankara: TC Kültür Bakanlığı, 2000), 23-27. During the Adana Massacre, Faiz Bey, who is the reporter of Serbesti, the newspaper of the Young Turks in opposition to the CUP, was killed because he was wearing a fur cap. Most probably he was thought to be a fedayee. This fact makes the story of Kazımî's family persuasive enough.

82 Actually there is a record in which it is noted that on the second day of the massacre, some Armenians were killed within an inn. But while Kazımî gives the number of deaths as eight, there are five dead in the record. There, eight men managed to escape. See BOA, İ..AS, 90/24, 3a, August 2, 1325.

83 Kazımî, *Son Müdafaa*, 35-39.

Aleppo believed that Kazımî had played a role in the massacre. He had been considering to attend the parade in the honor of the new Sultan's enthronement, yet as he had heard about the rumor that two Armenian fedayees were going to kill him, he had decided to go to Kerkük in haste.[84]

At the end of thirty four days' trip, Kazımî came to Kerkük. Yet just after three days, he was ordered to return to İstanbul.[85] The First Court-Martial in İstanbul was going to judge him because of the 31 March Incident. His demand to be sent to a local court was rejected and he returned to Mosul on 5 May.[86] Kazımî, who had to pass through Aleppo on his way back, was faced with Armenians' protests as he was about to entrain. His portrayal of this event in detail is also important, as it shows how the Armenian community could err in detecting the agents of the offenses against them, and how they expressed their feelings when they confronted those that thought to be the offenders: Under the supervision of a major, who knew him yet dissimulated it, Kazımî entrained much earlier than the time of departure. The major had been ordered to protect him until the departure, so he unwillingly started a chat. At that moment, a few people in front of the train's door pointed at Kazımî and started shouting "here, here!". Seeing this, the major tried to get away.[87] The people gathered outside, their numbers had increased and they were grumbling about how they would show him after the major goes away. Hearing that, the major started to move more quickly. The crowd outside was completely Armenian. Among them, there were small kids and very old women. They were saying, "oh, the one who ruined our houses, who cut down our fathers, our women, our children, the murderer of ten-twenty thousand people, people's Azrael, our nation's destroyer, damn you", "hey the traitor, who destroyed Adana, ruined Dörtyol, burned Antakya, looted Kırıkhan, spoiled Maraş, who drank thousands of men's blood, bless the hands who will kill you".[88] Kazımî was thinking that, these thousand strong "miserable

84 Kazımî, *Son Müdafaa*, 42-47.

85 BOA, BEO, 3555/266555, 3a, From Avnullah Kazımî to Prime Minister Hilmi Paşa, May 8, 1325.

86 BOA, BEO, 3555/266555, 2a, From the Ministry of War to the Prime Ministry, May 8, 1325; BOA, DH.MUİ 134-5/1, Ciphered Telegram From Musul Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 8, 1325.

87 Kazımî, *Son Müdafaa*, 85-86.

88 Ibid., 86.

ignoramuses", some of whom were armed, were in fact deceived and wretched. Two men of the old regime had been walking around and provoking them. Kazımî thought that even if he had had the power to do so, he would not have dispersed them, because:

> … these unwary people were right in their attacks; as a result of the deception of some human-like persons, who are even more shameless than the most vicious ones, they really assume that I was the murderer of their fathers, relatives and acquaintance, the destroyer of their homes; seeing a blood sucking enemy; they were going to attack and take revenge for sure.

Kazımî added that he could not forget a wretched man shouting "hey, traitor who is not afraid of Allah, hey cruel one, how did you bring my father to your house, how did you hack him with the Persian knife, with your own hands", an old woman climbing onto the wagon stairs and crying "I must drink the blood of this traitor, who sliced open my only child", and her voice being heard like a whine amongst so loud an uproar.[89] He thought that using guns against those people would be unjust. He was completely sure that those wretches were convinced that he was an agent of the massacre. As the train officials saw that the situation was becoming more serious, the train left the station earlier than planned. So, the Armenians "were left like Siberian wolves howling behind in the distance." Yet he heard one saying "you escaped from us here, but you will not be rescued in Beirut."[90]

After the investigation, Kazımî was acquitted.[91] He demanded to go back to his office.[92] Although his appointment to another place came on the agenda, he was appointed again to the district governorate of Kerkük on 17 August.[93]

89 Ibid., 86-87.

90 Ibid., 88-89.

91 BOA, BEO, 3601/270023, 3a, From the First Court-Martial to the Ministry of Interior, June 30, 1325.

92 BOA, BEO, 3601/270023, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, June 1, 1325.

93 BOA, BEO, 3601/270023, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, June 4, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3627/272017,1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministries of Interior and War, August 17, 1325.

Probably because of his recent experience on the road from Kerkük to İstanbul, he did not travel back through Antakya and Aleppo. Instead, he went through the longer route of Russia and Iran.[94] Even after his dismissal from the district governorate of Kerkük, Kazımî and his family would still elect to return to İstanbul through the Tigris River and Suez Canal.[95]

Türkmen's information, officials' reports, several petitions written by both Muslims and Armenians point to very powerful landlord families, the gentry (*kibarlar)*. All sources gave the impression that this class seemed to be in full control of the townspeople: They were able to force even the wealthiest artisan families to accept their superiority in every sense. Among them, two families, Bereketzade and Halefzade came to the forefront: The Halefzade family controlled large estates and was able to hold very important offices in the local government. They competed with the Bereketzade family for a long time. Rifat Ağa, the head of the Bereketzade family, was the typical example of the gentry, who seemed to control nearly all local officials. Multiple people asserted that he had managed to usurp a lot of lands. Moreover, he seems to have adapted to the new regime by getting himself elected to parliament. Armenians and officials were of the opinion that his family was among the mobilizers. Even after his brother's arrest, he lobbied actively, mobilized the people in the town for demonstrations, and forced some Christians to support him in getting his brother released. And all those efforts bore fruit, as both Refet Ağa's and Hüsnü Ağa's punishments were reduced from lifelong exile to three years.

Despite the success of their lobbying, there was –and would continue to be- a consensus among public opinion about their responsibility. It is seen above that high-ranking officials in the region, the Armenian press, and religious leaders were all in agreement about their power. The Antakya Court-Martial, who had judged them previously, had also based its decision on their unutilized power to stop the events. It was the very existence of the massacre that pointed to their intention, as there was a consensus that they could have stopped the event if they had wanted to.

94 BOA, DH.MUİ, 19-1/70, 2a, From Deputy Governorate of Van to the Ministry of Interior, September 20, 1325.

95 See Halide Nusret Zorlutuna, *Bir Devrin Romanı*, 58-73.

However, the letter from Refet Ağa and the booklet of Kazımî project a totally different picture. Although relying on the convicts' statements to make a counterclaim is very risky, here, I argue that there are many signs that point to the possibility that the convicts could be right. First of all, the timing and the literary style of Refet Ağa's letter make his claims persuasive. Above, it was seen that there is a feeling of shock and despair in the letter: Just after the killings, Refet Ağa wrote about his sadness about the events and his pity for Armenians. He pointed to the lack of forces despite their requests, the lack of information from İstanbul and Adana, the many varieties of rumors and the speed of their spread, his efforts to stop the attacks from the vicinity, and his loss of nerve that blocked him from describing the evil doings. The key question here is that if he had the power to stop the unfolding of events, why did Refet Ağa write such a letter? Was the letter part of a plot to save himself from the authorities? This does not seem to be the case, as it was written only four days after the start of the Antakya Massacre (11 April). Given the difficulty of communication in that conjuncture –which can also be seen in the letter- it is almost impossible to organize such a plot. Moreover, the literary style of the letter shows that Refet Ağa was quite sincere in his feelings.

However, people from various backgrounds, the Court-Martial officials, the Governor and some Armenian individuals underlined that without the gentry's commands and approvals, a massacre was impossible. Why did they believe so? Two explanations can be entertained at this point: The first one is that, some of them unconsciously misread the social conditions of the region: The reflections described in Refet Ağa's letter and Kazımî's words show that losing control over the people in Asi Valley was alien even to the gentry itself. So, it must have been the same for the others. This naive ignorance had another face as well: The neglect of the common masses' agency. A significant segment of the Ottoman political elites, including the Armenian ones, developed and put forward their argument in line with a separation between the Muslim elites and the masses, tending to emphasize the events that could be seen as signs of an organized reactionary plot. In this logic, Muslim elites had absolute power, and Muslim masses appear as lacking all agency.

This unconscious but sincere misreading was most probably part of one universal reasoning: that such collective actions always result from

provocations, from deceptions by other actors. Conspiracy beliefs can appear anywhere and at any time.[96] During revolutionary upheavals, the same logic appears more strongly, this time in revolutionary vocabulary.[97] The Young Turk era was not an exception in this sense. At that time, for instance, many Armenians thought that the atrocities against themselves were secretly ordered by the government through the words about "protecting the foreigners" in 1895 and 1909 –a belief which is present even today. Many local Muslims, conversely, believed that Armenians were preparing to massacre Muslims in 1895, 1909, or 1915 –which formed the basis of today's denialist logic. Some Unionists not only formulated and used but also believed that Abdülhamid secretly organized a counterrevolution in 1909. There are also counter arguments, which are still alive today, that it was the Unionists who had allowed the counterrevolutionaries to revolt –so that they could justify their oppressive measures later. Today, even serious historians can imply that Unionists had abandoned Macedonia willingly in the First Balkan War.[98]

96 For an example that powerfully shows how actors from different backgrounds shared this same reasoning, see Ali Sipahi, "Deception and Violence in the Ottoman Empire: The People's Theory of Crowd Behavior during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 62 no. 4, (2020): 810-835.

97 Clarke Garrett reminds that "belief in conspiracy … was virtually universal among political actors in 1789", and it was no different in either English and American Revolutions: "The assumptions that underlay discussions of conspiracy in 1789 were nonetheless similar to those of 1688 or 1776". See Clarke Garrett, "The Myth of the Counterrevolution in 1789", *French Historical Studies* 18, No. 3 (Spring 1994), pp. 788-789. Also, Tackett shows how both revolutionary elites and the masses shared the similar alarmism, which also had a role in "Terror mentality". See Timothy Tackett, "Conspiracy Obsession in a Time of Revolution: French Elites and the Origins of the Terror, 1789-1792," *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (June, 2000): 691-713

98 As a historian who underlines the central state's "scientific" instrumental reason for ethnic engineering, Fuat Dündar argues that Unionists had made such a choice. For him, important Unionist army officers' being in Libya just before the Balkan Wars, their giving up the state power easily after the memorandum of the League of Savior Officers (*Halaskar Zabitan Grubu*) and their enormous demand for war were signs of an organized action of Unionists, so that they could throw the book at the opposition and additionally, focus on Anatolia as the base of their ethnically homogeneous state. Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendisliği (1913-1918)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 57-61.

Kazımî's belief that there had to have been unseen provocateurs that got him arrested; can be another example.

Belief in plots was not the only reason for this sincere miscalculation. Sometimes, a romantic way of looking at the masses also goes hand in hand with belief. In this logic, they are pictured as innocent sufferers whose minds can easily be manipulated. Take the Antakya Court-Martial's decision record for the case of the landlords and the subdistrict governor as an example: This logic lying behind its analysis of the massacre was explained at the first quote of the chapter.

> In any case, any further actions taken by a human mass; who, as a family, devoted and sacrificed its whole existence for its influential men, at whose doorstep it is living with an absolute compulsion inherited from his ancestors; who accepted and believed that relief from hunger through a loaf of cornbread –if it can find such from evening to evening- is ex-gratia; who lives in submission to fate; who is deprived of the light of intelligence and feeling of thought; is dependent on and attributed to an incentive and a provoker.[99]

Such romantic disbelief in mass agency and the distinction between the "innocent" people and the "real provocateurs" can also be seen in the discourse of other figures. For instance, the confidence of Ahmet Şerif, the Unionist journalist, about the subject can be observed in his words by February 1325: "After all, if the causes that brought out the Adana disaster with all of its terror and ferocity is analyzed, there will emerge the point that this was conducted not from the bottom up but from up to bottom. As the form and type of these conducts are known, it is redundant to repeat them."[100] Another example can be the Gregorian Patriarchate. In the initial response of the Patriarchate, we observe the implication that the Muslim masses, as well as the soldiers, were seduced by some counterrevolutionary notables. On 19 April 1325, the Patriarchate wrote to the Prime Ministry that it was the Yıldız

99 BOA, İ.AS, 96/10, 4a, Court-Martial Decision, August 23, 1325.

100 Ahmet Şerif, *Anadolu'da Tanin I. Cilt* (Haz. Mehmed Çetin Börekçi), (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1999), 160.

Palace which planned, organized, and executed the massacre with a "demonic skill and brutality of Genghis".[101] The despots, being kept in their offices, had found the opportunity to reinforce despotism. The massacre was the same as that of 1895. The Patriarchate added that:

> From the whole local notifications, (it is known that) let alone the joining of Circassian and Kurdish commoners, who had been made to assemble from everywhere during the detected incidents and calamities, just like their fellows in İstanbul, the gang of despotism and reaction must have also seduced Ottoman soldiers there through lies and slanders, as they helped and joined in breaking the chests, massacring, looting and raiding.[102]

Here, let us focus on the two related claims based on this reasoning: the power of the gentry and the powerlessness of the Muslim masses. Was the gentry that powerful? A previously unmentioned important point made by Türkmen can guide us here: When he notes that by the time he wrote his book (1937), those relations were completely over, he describes the process of this decomposition as such: Things started to change at the end of the 19th century. New economic opportunities allowed some members of the artisan class to acquire wealth very fast, allowing them to copy the gentry with more ease. Another cause was the centralizing state, which was making confiscations much harder for the gentry. Conscription made commoners face state power, and recognize that there were power-holders other than the gentry. Moreover, some of these commoners were becoming high ranked officials and returning to Antakya when they chose to continue their military career. The gentry tried to increase

101 "*Yıldız Sarayı'nın bir maharet-i ibliskarane ile tertib ve tanzim ve bir vahşet-i Cengizane ile tatbik ve icra ettiği katliam*" BOA, BEO, 3543/265707, 2a, From Armenian Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, April 19, 1325.

102 *"Evvel ve ahir vukuat ve fecaat-ı mebsutada her tarafdan toplatdırılmış olan avam-ı Çerakise ve Ekrad ve saire iştirak ettikleri şöyle dursun avene-i istibdad ve irticaiyyun oralardaki asakir-i Osmaniyye'yi dahi Dersaadet'teki emsalleri misillü nice kizb ve azviyyatla iğfal etmiş olmalıdırlar ki kasalar kırılması ve katliam ve nehb ü garet gibi efal-i cinaiyeye muavenet ve iştirak etmiş oldukları cümle-i ihbarat-ı mahalliyedendir."* BOA, BEO, 3543/265707, 2a, From Armenian Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, April 19, 1325.

its cultural capital and form good relations with the central state, yet other factors, like the Egyptian invasion, earthquakes, and immigrants with higher cultural capital all started to erode existing class divisions.[103] Class struggles and intraclass struggles became, for this reason, very harsh. In this struggle, the invasion by Mohammad Ali of Egypt played a critical role: Cooperation with Egyptians allowed a group of the gentry (Türkmen calls them the first group) to prosper much faster than the ones who did not do the same. After the Ottomans' return, the first group managed to continue to hold its power by cooperating with the Tanzimat regime. This led to the resentment of the second gentry group, moving them closer to the artisans and commoners. During the reign of Abdulhamid II, the first group prospered further, and the resentment went on. When the revolution occurred, the resenting second group, therefore, supported the Unionists. However, the first group, whose typical representative was Bereketzade Rifat Ağa, was able to hold onto its power, electing him as the deputy of Antakya in the parliamentary elections.[104] In fact, some documents support the view that the gentry's power in Asi Valley was in decline at the end of the century because of many reasons such as struggles amongst themselves, increasing state power, the changing demography and the challenge of the artisan class. Let us observe some signs of the limits of this decreasing power, most probably many of which were not familiar to the contemporaries by 1909.

The archival documents give the impression that all limits of the gentry's power seem to have been existent through the years. Land disputes, for instance, were an important dimension of those struggles among the gentry or between the gentry and other groups. For example, the lands in Alaeddin and Cuaydi[105] villages had led to a conflict between the Bereketzade family and other groups for a long time: One of the first examples attesting to the fact was Mehmed's complaint on 27 October 1303 that his land in the Cuaydi village

103 Türkmen, *Mufassal Hatay Tarihi*, 607-611.

104 Ibid., 912-917.

105 A name very similar to the village, which was mentioned as (جعيدينه) in the documents, can be the village Cuaydi-i Küçük, as Mehmed Tekin also mentions the name for a village. See Mehmet Tekin, *Hatay Tarihi*, 15.

had been looted by Bereketzade Rifat Ağa.[106] The immigrants would also complain that the land promised was still in the hands of the Bereketzade family. Such disputes also existed among the gentry themselves. In this sense, we observe that the two greatest families that we are dealing with, Bereketzade and Halefzade, did not hesitate to enter into conflicts among themselves.[107]

In all these conflicts, we find that very heavy words were used to describe Rifat Ağa: In the words of the Ministry of Interior, Rifat Ağa "had done as

106 BOA, DH.MKT, 1461/109, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, October 27, 1303. At that time, the land belonged to a French Company, named Antakya Agriculture and Industry Company, which had been established in Paris. In 1882, the Company had bought the land in order to build a railroad between Süveydiye and Antakya with a capital worth 1.5 million francs. The Bereketzade family, who were shareholders in the Company, seized the land after the company's bankruptcy. The company's deputy demanded the land back. See BOA, BEO, 350/26184, 2a, From Aleppo Governorate to Prime Ministry, February 5, 1309. In a letter sent from the Ministry of Interior to Yıldız Palace in September 1317, it is written that the land was worth 15,000 liras. According to the Ministry, after the company's bankruptcy, the land had to become state property, yet Rifat Ağa had seized it. There were complaints that some people's lands had been used by him forcefully for twenty years. See BOA, Y.MTV, 221/87, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Yıldız Palace, September 17, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2532/71, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, September 2, 1317. In another document dated the same year, it is written that immigrants were entitled to use Cuaydi land. The Ministry of Interior would later repeat that the state had to take over the land. See BOA, DH.MKT, 2547/42, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Muslim Immigrants Commission, October 8, 1317, BOA, DH.MKT, 2557/127, 1a, From The Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Land Registry (Defter-i Hakani) and Aleppo Governorate, November 5, 1317.

107 Rifat and Refet Ağa's dispute with Halefzade Abdülgani and his brother Vahid, for example, had even turned into an armed conflict. The Ministry suggested Bereketzade's exile to Diyarbekir. See BOA, Y.MTV, 221/87, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Yıldız Palace, September 17, 1317; -BOA, DH.MKT, 2532/71, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, September 2, 1317. After two years, Halefzade Mehmed Halef demanded the state seize the land and promised to pay one thousand liras as the first installment if the land would be auctioned. See BOA, DH.MKT, 568/63, 9a, From Halefzade Mehmed Halef to the Ministry of Interior, May 13, 1319. The Bereketzade family could even stand against the Ministry of Interior, as well as the immigrants. In the same year, Bereketzade Rifat Ağa even dared to oppose Memduh Paşa, the Minister of Interior, by writing to the Prime Ministry that the Paşa held a grudge against him. See BOA, BEO, 2291/171782, 4a, From Bereketzade Rif'at Efendi to the Council of State, November 27, 1319. However, the Prime Ministry backed Memduh Paşa and sent a warning to Bereketzade Rifat Ağa through the Aleppo Governorate. See BOA, BEO, 2239/167909, 1a, From Prime Ministry to Aleppo Governorate, August 4, 1319.

much harm as possible to the people of the region".[108] Tuğçezade Mehmed Ali, who claimed that he had been arrested because of the slanders of Rifat Ağa's men, wrote that he was not only cruel but also "a second government in Antakya", who pursued an "independent course".[109] According to another notable, Kalanaslı Mehmed Ağa, Bereketzade Rifat Ağa had the "attitude of old seigneur".[110] The use of these words in documents show that the great power of the gentry had become the target of various parties.

The various methods employed in these struggles that reveal the limits of the gentry's power also show us the limits to the sincerity at work in explaining the events. For some individuals and groups, any event can be instrumental in diminishing the power of their rivals. Portraying rivals as more powerful than they are can be one of them. A detailed example in the archives, which seems to be an about denouncement, shows how complex the relations and struggles were, and so, it is worth dwelling on: A few months before the revolution, on 19 May 1324, Kavakçızade Reşid sent a telegram to the Ministry of Interior, in which he reported on Kethüdazade Reşid Ağa: He had beaten, wounded and killed Hatice, who had been kidnapped and made his mistress at 15 years of age. His henchman, Ahmed, had taken her corpse, first to a zaptieh house, then to the cemetery, and had buried her without even ablution. After the judiciary learned about the situation, her body was found. The mayoral doctor Hasib Efendi examined the body, yet because he had been bribed, he had left out the signs of battery. He thereby prevented the possibility of detecting them in a second investigation. Hasib Efendi was removed from office. Kethüdazade was still claiming that Hatice had fallen from the roof. Nobody had been called for testimony.[111]

In his response, Kethüdazade Reşid Ağa claimed that he had been framed. He wrote that the name behind the slander was Bereketzade Hacı Rifat Ağa,

108 BOA, Y.MTV, 221/87, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Yıldız Palace, September 17, 1317.

109 BOA, DH.MKT, 120/40, 2a, From Tuğçezade Mehmed Ali to the Ministry of Interior, August 1, 1309.

110 BOA, DH.MKT, 123/47, 2a, From Kalanaslı Mehmed Ağa to the Ministry of Interior, August 9, 1309.

111 BOA, DH.TMIK.M, 270/54, 1a, 1b, From Kavakçızade Reşid to the Ministry of Interior, May 19, 1324; 21 Mayıs 324 BOA, DH.TMIK.M, 270/54, 2b, From Kavakçızade Reşid to the Ministry of Interior, May 21, 1324.

who had lusted after his wealth. His whole ambition was to take the people's goods. He had destroyed many families for this sake. Before, he had provoked the Antakya Armenians, troubled everyone, and then presented himself as having calmed down the strife and made all officials thankful to him.[112] Not to speak of what had really happened to poor Hatice, this document informs us about how the Muslim elites were well aware of the opportunity for using the Armenian question to increase their power by 1908. In a place where even the murders were used in power struggles, revolution and the massacre must have been of much greater use. This can be seen in the land disputes which gained momentum after the Young Turk Revolution. For example, five persons from the Alaeddin Village complained that the Bereketzade Family took control of many people's lands in the Alaeddin and Cuaydi villages. Their value was about four to five thousand liras. For them, the election to the Parliament of Rifat Ağa who was a "cruel and famous despot", had secured and increased his influence and despotism.[113] How Rifat Bereketzade had been elected in the parliamentary elections led to another conflict among the notables of Antakya. In his objection to the election in the name of the "Antakya Youth of the Fatherland Club" (*Antakya Şübban-ı Vatan Kulübü*), Muhammed Safvet wrote that Rifat Bereketzade had been elected through threats. He used the adjectives usurper, cruel, oppressor, and despot for Bereketzade. He added that if all MPs there were like him, they have to say R.I.P. to the Ottoman Nation, which was about to draw its last breath."[114] About the same days, Halefzade Nazım and Bereketzade Refet wrote that because of animosities, their families had been deprived of all kinds of rights during the old regime. They also claimed that the mayor manipulated the secondary voters, therefore the elections had to be repeated fairly. The Ministry of Interior wrote that as records had been provided, the Parliament

112 *"Ermenilere parmak vererek herkesi bir gaileye düşürmüş"* BOA, DH.TMIK.M, 270/54, 3a, From Kethüzade Reşid Ağa to the Ministry of Interior, June 5, 1324.

113 BOA, DH.MKT, 2704/107, 1a, From five peasants from Alaeddin Village to Prime Ministry, December 5, 1324.

114 BOA, A.VRK, 689/73, 1a, From Antakya Youth of the Fatherland Club representative Muhammed Safvet to Prime Ministry, November 4, 1324.

had to deal with the situation, yet ordered the governorate to investigate other claims.[115]

All these cases show that anything could have been instrumental for power holders to shift the balance between them. This brings us to the second possible explanation of the question of why various people were targeting the gentry, blaming them for the massacre. In a place where events of all scale were used instrumentally, from a single murder to elections, a great massacre could not have been an exception. It looks like some tried to take advantage of the accusations, or even fabricated the accusations to decrease their rivals' influence. These elites sometimes got their rivals arrested for taking part in the massacre. Or sometimes they simultaneously sued their rivals for usurping each other's lands. In some cases, whether the convicts were real murderers was of no interest at all. Sadly, the massacre's instrumentality must have contributed to the confusion over who the real provocateurs and killers had been, causing many of them to exploit the fact and get away with murders.[116]

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115 BOA, DH.MKT, 2666/71, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, November 9, 1324.

116 A record of the Antakya Court-Martial dated 2 August is worth summarizing as a good example to how the massacre could have affected the competition among the elites. According to the record, the Catholicosate of Sis had forwarded a denouncement to the Court-Martial by mail. According to the denouncement, together with a group of men, Naif, the headmen of Fu'a, İdlib, went to Keseb and Dörtyol and had joined in the looting. He had taken about 1,200 sheep and goats, and many more goods. In his telegram, the Prelate of Aleppo underlined that the arrested would be protected in the regular courts of Aleppo, and demanded their transfer to the Antakya Court-Martial. This demand was met. The denouncers had claimed that on Friday, together with his sons and men, Naif had entered Fu'a from the north, with six camels, carrying looted goods like carpets and an Armenian girl accompanied by his slave Cuma. However, there were two major inconsistencies in that claim. First, the northern road to Fu'a, from where Naif was thought to have entered the town, was on the road to Antep, not Keseb. Second, the day of entering the village was off. The Keseb Incident had occurred on 11 April, Friday. Fu'a was two days away. If Naif had entered the village on the same day, then that was a sign of his absence during the massacre. If he had entered the village on the following Friday, then that meant he had loitered around Keseb and Kusayr for a week. He should have been caught by the gendarme patrols. When the denouncers and witnesses were asked about those inconsistencies, they first claimed that they did not know about the denouncement. Then, they confessed that the document was written not by the gendarme but by İskender Rızk, a Greek Catholic. It was sealed in their name, and

As a household that had entered into many conflicts before, the Bereketzade family could not escape the people's attempts to take advantage of their decreasing power by bringing the land disputes to the court. This can also be seen after the Massacre, there were several applications to the Ministry of Finance and to the Parliament. The complaints about Rifat Ağa were that he had usurped the lands of many people in the Alaeddin Village during the Ancien Regime. The Antakya Administrative Council, in response, carried out an investigation and wrote a report on the subject. In the report sent to the Aleppo Governorate on 17 August, the Council wrote that Rifat Ağa really did take many people's lands. Ten days later, the Ministry of Interior ordered the return of those lands. Yet, the General Directorate of Land Registers (*Defter-i Hakani Müdüriyeti*) noted that Rifat Ağa had the right to appeal to the court. Rifat Ağa did appeal later, on 11 October, after the people had taken the land back. Yet one after the other, more demands on his lands came forth. These lands were given back too. Rifat and Refet Ağa's complaints were meritless. In the era of justice, permitting them to hold on to those lands would not be in line with the constitution's honor.[117] Of the 13 pieces of land demanded back, 11 were returned to their owners. Yet on those lands, Rifat and Refet Ağa had built many buildings and had planted trees. When the Aleppo Governorate inquired about the status of those properties, the Ministry of Interior decided to give those lands back to the Bereketzade

a notable of the village, Samud Satof joined them. The reason for this denouncement was the hostility between İskender and Naifcaused by a dispute over a piece of land. The investigators also added that during the massacre, Naif had been near another village, together with officers exterminating grasshoppers. No looted items had been found inside his house, and the number of his animals was normal. No Armenian girls had been found, and there were no witnesses in the village who had seen that he provoked people to join the massacre. As a result, the Court decided that Naif had been a victim: İskender Rızk had organized this slander, aided by Satof. They threatened Mehmed bin Hüseyin Aton to death for perjury. Ten witnesses also mentioned İskender's cruelty and asked for getting rid of him. The Court sentenced Satof to two years, and İskender to five years of imprisonment. See BOA, İ..AS, 90/24, 5a, Court-Martial Decision, August 2, 1325.

117 BOA, DH. MUİ, 6-3/1, 5a, From Antakya Administrative Council to Aleppo Governorate, November 17, 1325.

family.[118] The people who lost the lands once again then appealed to the Parliament.[119] A new investigation started, yet the Ministry of the Interior decided that the Bereketzade Family was to keep those lands until a decision was taken.[120] In addition, the Ministry wrote the Parliament a detailed report about whose official documents were more valid in such disputes: There were three reasons for such disputes: First is that some lands had been used without a title deed for years. During those years, many buildings had been built and trees had been planted, and so, the value of those lands had risen. Second, the land in the area had been bought through chamberlain (*mabeyn)* title deeds, and official procedure had not been followed. Third was the ambiguity of the lands' borders. Some had benefited from that ambiguity to make claims. There was no law addressing those issues, and legislation was needed. Until that time, the prevailing situation should not have changed.[121] In another telegram, the Aleppo Governorate demanded that the legislative process should be accelerated, as each day many people were appealing.[122] The Ministry repeated its order to maintain the status quo.[123] Meanwhile, Rifat Ağa lost his life.[124] After five months, his son, Bereketzade Arif, appealed to the Ministry of Interior again. His father had died, and the Council of Ministers' decisions on the land dispute was not being executed.[125] After a month, the Aleppo

118 BOA, DH. MUİ, 6-3/1, 3a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 26, 1325.

119 BOA, DH. MUİ, 6-3/1, 8a, From Sheihk Ma'ruf, and others from Bedrigiyye Village to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, November 29, 1325.

120 BOA, DH. MUİ, 6-3/1, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, December 8, 1325.

121 BOA, DH. MUİ, 6-3/1, 14b, From the Ministry of Interior to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, January 9, 1325.

122 BOA, DH. MUİ, 6-3/1, 18a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, January 17, 1325.

123 BOA, DH. MUİ, 6-3/1, 15a, From the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo Governorate, January 21, 1325.

124 So far I could not detect the exact date of Rif'at Ağa's death. By 28 March, it was written that Rif'at Efendi, had "recently" passed away. See, 28 Mart 326 BOA, DH.SYS, 50-1/4 From Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies to the Ministry of Interior, March 28, 1326.

125 BOA, DH.MUİ, 6-3/31, 2a, From Bereketzade Arif to the Ministry of Interior, June 20, 1326.

Governorate, once again inquired about who should have taken the land.[126] The land dispute, which had assumed a new form with the massacre, was still waiting to be resolved even a year later. These local examples show us the instrumental reasons behind the actions of some groups and individuals. For them, just like revolution, emigration, or an election, the massacre was an opportunity to reshape the balance of power in their favor.

If everything can be instrumental in the local power struggles, so must be the same in the politics in the capital. It will be too naive of us to think that sincerity dominated the formation of the discourses around the 31 March Incident and the Cilicia Massacre. Actually, there are many reasons that allow us to think that making a separation between the patrician "real" agents and innocent "deceived" people was beneficial for the policymakers' strategy to come to a consensus between the new post 31 March coalition –that of the CUP and some segments of the bureaucracy- and the Armenian political elite. The shift in the rhetoric from the report of the First Court-Martial to the one of the Second Court-Martial, or the partially successful pushes for the renewal of some judgments can be given as examples.[127] Although it is a very important side of the reconciliation, the other side, the concessions given by the Armenian political elite to the post 31 March coalition also has to be kept in mind. On this point, the assumed separation between the reactionary elites and the innocent seduced Muslim masses can also appear as a sign of this concession.

Sewell's work on the Bastille Incident was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis. It is seen that in that work, Sewell points to the fact that the storming of the Bastille was not welcomed by the Estates-General at first. The incident was hailed as positive only after a committee of deputies had realized that by attacking the Castle-dungeon, the people had shifted the balance of power between the Estates-General and the King. So, the Bastille moment was defined later, according to the deputies' political interests.

Accusing society almost wholesale in such great atrocities is never easy, regardless of time and space, because claiming that the totality or majority tried –or succeeded- to exterminate a minority can make the remaining

126 BOA, DH.MUİ, 6-3/31, 5a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, July 19, 1326.

127 This shift of the Court-Martials' attitude is to be summarized in the next chapter on Adana.

members of that minority totally lose their belief in the possibility of co-existence in the future, which will definitely be costly for both sides. Here, downplaying the majority masses' role is part of a concession given to that majority to form the basis of a possible future co-existence, because otherwise it can be taken as an insult and therefore undermine that very possibility. In the words of Gerlach:

> …Likewise, in the name of reconciliation, blame is afterwards usually put on certain political leaders, functionaries, and at best some private individuals. Punishment has to be limited. To admit that all sorts of social groups, organizations and individuals participated in violence runs counter to the attempt to restore social peace and to find values based on which society may live together in future.[128]

In fact, even in the Armenian elites' push for the recognition of the Armenians' innocence, there are signs of concessions for the sake of reconciliation. Take the resignation letter of the Patriarch as an example: This resignation was a rightful reaction to the government's tolerances towards the Muslim offenders, the most significant sign of which is in the First Adana Court-Martial's accusations directed at the Armenian community. Even in that text, the Patriarch underlines, in even stronger terms, that both Muslim and Armenian peoples were innocent:

> … Then, in the circle of the press, we observed a display of a Court-Martial's report, which is totally against the expectancies. While there is no doubt or suspicion that there is absolutely no coldness and hostility between the oppressed Armenian and Muslim people, and all incidents which are signs of that coldness and hostility were caused by the provocations and initiatives of the reactionaries whose names were written; it is both well-known by your highness and proven by the several examples of the past that the reactionary gang's calls for peace

128 Christian Gerlach, "Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide," 465.

> and fraternity in the name of both the victim and innocent sides will result in nothing but an insult to the feelings of peace and fraternity.[129]

This tone did not change after the resignation:

> It is certain that, as it was officially known that it also had happened in other provinces before and after 31 March, this success of the competent people of reaction in the region cited above resulted from their deception of the crowd, who cannot differentiate the good from the evil, through rumors and fake news such as "Armenians are going to attack Muslims, Armenians are arming themselves, they are going to throw bombs" and their ability to put forward fake pieces of evidence to support their deceptions. The reason such deceptions and fake evidence had resulted at least in some hesitation in people's minds is that the slanders already existed in their minds for thirty years; as such, the removal of these invalid ideas in a few days or months was deemed impossible.[130]

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129 "*Ahirren intizarın büsbütün hilafında olarak divan-ı harbin bir raporu alem-i matbuatta münteşir görüldü. Ermeni ve İslam ahali-i mazlume meyanında bürudet ve adavetin kat'a vücudu olmayıp bürudet ve adavetin alameti bulunan kaffe-i vukuatın suret ve sebeb-i zuhuru muharrerelessami irticaiyyunun eser-i tahrikat ve tasniyyatı idüğüne şekk ve şüphe yok iken her iki taraf-ı mağdurin ve masumin ahali namına yine irticaiiyyun güruhu tarafından sulh ve uhuvvete davetler asayiş ve uhuvvet hissiyatını tahkirden başka bir neticeyi müntec olamayacağı hem nezd-i samilerinde malum ve hem de mazinin emsal-i müteaddidesiyle müsbet bulunmakta idi.*" BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/82, 1a, From Armenian Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, July 7, 1325.

130 *"Erbab-ı irticaiyyunun havali-i mezkuredeki şu muvaffakiyetleri 31 Mart'dan mukaddem ve sonra diğer bazı vilayatta dahi vuku bulduğu resmen de malum olduğu veçh ile "Ermeniler Müslümanlar üzerine hücum edecekler. Ermeniler silahlanıyorlar. Bombalar atacaklar." gibi şayiat ve tasniat ile nik ü bedi tefrîk edemeyen ahaliyi iğfal ve bu iğfalatlarının sıdk u sıhhatine de bir takım sui tefsir edilmiş alaimi de ortaya atabilmiş olmalarından ileri geldiği muhakkaktır. Onların şu iğfalat ve suitefsirlerinin hiç olmazsa zihinlerde tereddütler husulüne ba'is olması otuz seneden beri o yolda azviyyatın zaten zihinlerde yer bulmuş olmasından ileri gelip şu efkar-ı batılanın öyle birkaç günler ve birkaç aylar içinde izalesi mümkün addolunamaması da zaruri idi.*" BOA, BEO, 3609/270623, From Armenian Patriarchate to the Prime Ministry, July 14, 1325.

Both the immediate responses of deputies and the discourse of the Patriarchate pointed to the interconnectedness of conscious efforts to draw a picture for reconciliation and unconscious naiveté. Neither finding the relation between the constitutionalist naiveté and the conscious efforts to form a discourse nor detecting which one was more determining was easy in those texts. The tones in many documents, like the Court-Martial decisions, parliamentary speeches, or the patriarchate reports can point to the coexistence of both. Nevertheless, some examples allow us to bring forward the conscious effort to keep the regime alive, showing that there seems to be a difference between what some political actors say in public and in private. The works which reveal the attitude of the Armenian political elite when they are on their own can be given as examples. For instance, Kaligian quotes Zohrab's defense in the Armenian National Assembly, being obliged to explain their behavior, which was criticized by various figures from the Armenian public:

> We Armenian deputies are reproached for having sympathetic relations and providing assistance to the Ittihad. You should know, compatriots, that the famed revolution of the Ottoman Constitution is still far from accomplishing its entire work. Indeed, that circumstance where the Muslim element, full of hatred, resumes their criminal oppression, is a sign that the Turk has not matured enough for constitutional order. We have not been idle and uncaring, but rather we have been cautious and slow, taking steady steps…[131]

Another example can be the Armenian Revolutionary Federation's fifth congress, which Avagyan writes about. He notes that during that congress in August 1909, there were serious arguments between the party's headquarters and provincial branches about continuing the alliance with the CUP after the 31 March Incident and the Adana Massacre: The branches were for the breaking up of that alliance, as they were seeing that the Committee was distrustful and supporting the Armenians' enemies. However, the

131 Dikran Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule, 1908-1914*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2011), 44.

headquarters pushed for the continuation.[132] In fact, this disagreement, which had its roots in the very first stage of the new regime[133] is a sign of the branches' much better awareness of the Unionists being under Muslim pressure. Most probably, local Armenian political elites were seeing the dominance of the Muslim elites in the CUP branches. Some also observed the role of the Muslim masses. Yet for the HQ, Unionists were the only progressive political group that could possibly keep themselves in touch with the new regime.

Armenian politicians' attitude when they were on their own shows that they did not deny the mass agency so strongly in their hearts. As a minority, they seem to have been aware of the need to find allies, some believed they had to continue their collaboration with the Unionist-led alliance. In this sense, blaming the whole Muslim community would undermine the possibility of maintaining collaboration. Therefore, they had to bring forward a discourse that put the blame on a few elites, rather than the crowds. In that way, they avoided a reaction from the alliance. Such conscious attempts will be useful for us in the following chapter for making sense of the interpretations of Adana Massacre as both causes and effects of negotiation between different social and political groups.

Until this point, by showing the fallacies that prevailed both in the localities and in the capital when it came to interpreting the events in Antakya; and by showing how such large events could have been instrumental in both local and national power struggles; it is argued that the official discourse on the 31 March Incident and the Massacre could have been a joint product of both an unconscious naive observation and instrumental reasoning -that in order to keep the regime alive, there had to be a consensus between the post 31 March coalition, in which Unionists and some bureaucrats shared the

132 Arsen Avagyan, "İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile Ermeni Siyasi Partileri Arasındaki İlişkiler," in *Ermeniler ve İttihat ve Terakki: İşbirliğinden Çatışmaya*, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2005), 69

133 Avagyan notes that a similar disagreement was also existent after the revolution. While the leaders of the ARF, who had limited information about the Ottoman society and politics due to either their being in exile or having Russian origins, thought that the struggle of the years was finally over; members of the party branches, who had fedayee origins were for keeping the Unionists at arm's length, thinking that constitutionalism was not assured. See Avagyan, "İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile Ermeni Siyasi Partileri Arasındaki İlişkiler," 39-40.

government power and the Armenian political elite. In this interpretation, some great local figures came to the fore as scapegoats. Yet it seems that those scapegoats, no matter what kind of people they were in terms of their relations with other people, had a much more limited role than others used to think - or accuse them of- in mobilizing the Muslim masses against the Armenians in the Antakya town center.

Above, Refet Ağa's letter was given as an example of the gentry's feeling of shock, despair, and lack of power. The same feelings were also expressed in Kazımî's pleading, in which he counts many notables, including the famous two, Bereketzade Refet Ağa and Halefzade Hüsnü Ağa, as the ones who did their best to prevent the massacre. As an outsider, Kazımî was able to observe not only the masses' anger but also the fruitless actions of the gentry, who even cried in despair, to prevent them. During his portrayal of this situation, Kazımî also quotes Hüsnü Ağa's words that express their shock: To repeat, when the people asked if he had been shot by Armenians, Hüsnü Ağa said that they had been Muslims, and labeled them as "monsters, who were thought to be obedient". So, the loss of their obedient men, as well as the death orgy taking place, were the things that the old gentry was lamenting.

The documents provide us small but several examples of the power of the "monsters". In his "*Last Defense*" for instance, we saw that what Kazımî feared even before the massacre was "Nusayri anxiety" (*Nusayri gailesi*).[134] Refet Ağa's letter to his elder brother was another example, in which he wrote that Kurds, people from Kuseyr and peasants had rushed into the town. In the Antakya Court-Martial report, there were Armenian witnesses that talked about Kuseyrizade's involvement in the massacre by motivating his people; yet there was no such claim that pointed to a relation between Asi Valley Alawites and the Bereketzade or Halefzade family. At this point, one has to remember the claims that the first shooter was an Alawite.[135] Also must be recalled that the report which pointed to the Alawites and Sunni Muslims getting along fine.[136] Furthermore, armed reserve soldiers joining the offenders point to the existence of the mass agency, as the recruits were all from the town.

134 Kazımî, *Son Müdafaa*, 29-30.

135 Ibid., 40-41.

136 BOA, DH.ŞFR, 413/69, 1a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 9, 1325.

To recall, Kazımî writes about his coming to such a decision at one point in the process:

> Henceforth, the existence of the danger, the low-lives, yellow dog provocateurs was certain. Yet who were they? That was impossible to know because such ephemeral people they were: cannot be seen, cannot be caught. Giant despots were so able to metamorphose…[137]

In fact, the reason for the so-called real actors' being unfigured by all figures (Kazımî, the Antakya Court-Martial, several figures from Armenian public opinion, and some Unionists and bureaucrats of the post 31 March coalition) was not their ability. So, consciously or unconsciously, the inability to detect the role of the masses in the conjuncture of 1909, is understandable. The thing to be touched upon is historians' tendency to apply the same logic for the whole period relevant to the Armenian Question. This tendency in Ottoman-Turkish historiography seems to have various reasons: One reason may be that the denial of the 1915 Genocide by the Turkish state forced the historians to focus on proving its existence by searching for the involvement of the central state.[138] Another one may be that its liberal-left heritage led the historians to deal with the problem with a left-wing bias that favored the masses.

In this process, Gerlach's conception of "extremely violent societies" was a step forward: In his article that presents the concept, Gerlach points out that their emergence has been in a positive correlation with another historical trend, which was "the idea and practice of political participation"; which joined the old three, namely, "nation-state formation, racism, and (as some scholars argue) the pressures of the capitalist world system".[139] Gerlach warns that "official persecution was not completely centralized but rather shaped to a degree by a myriad of suggestions from 'below'. It makes sense to add an

137 *"Artık tehlikenin ve adi alçak rezil sefil müfsidlerin, muharriklerin mevcudiyeti muhakkak idi. Lakin kimler idi bilinmek kabil değil çünkü birtakım eşhas-ı maneviye ki: ne görülür ve ne tutulur, koca müstebidler istihaleye ol kadar muktedirler ki…"* Kazımî, *Son Müdafaa*, 36-37.

138 This fact is previously underlined by Hilmar Kaiser in his great work. See Kaiser, *Diyarbakır'da Ermeni Kıyımı*, 2.

139 Gerlach, "Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide", 461.

additional focus on the participatory character of such violence. What needs to be examined is the interaction between central governments, different authorities, political organizations, professional associations, religious groups, and various other social circles.[140] Given Gerlach's warning that the differences between state-organized violence and pogroms, or communal violence have to be kept in mind, the case studied here was much more suitable to show the masses' role in the atrocities against the Ottoman Armenians.[141]

§ 6.5 On the Relation Between Massacre and "Counterrevolution"

> The victory of the Unionists after the 31 March Incident and the fall of Abdülhamid broke the spirit of the first group of the gentry, meanwhile, the death of the famous Antakya deputy Rifat Ağa came as an unexpected blow to them. Unionists' victory in the reign of Mehmed Reşad and the first group of gentry being put before the Court-Martial that came from Aleppo as a result of some Armenian incidents has diminished their influence over the people significantly. And the idea in the heads of townspeople and the rabble, that the first class gentry was capable of everything, that the government officials were putties in their hands, started to fade away. After the proclamation of constitutionalism, the second group of Antakya gentry took the scene. All second group gentry families and artisans started to gather around a middle aged enlightened person called Türkmenzade Ahmed Ağa. After the death of Bereketzade Rifat Ağa, Türkmenzade Ahmed Ağa, who opened the club of Union and Progress, was elected as the deputy of Antakya and held the office until French occupation. The election of Ahmed Ağa and the second group of gentry families entering the government offices and taking the

140 Ibid., 462.

141 Ibid., 462.

> Union and Progress Club into their hands in Hatay troubled the first group of gentry deeply. They entered the Entente Liberale, which appeared at that time, and confronted the second group of gentry families; henceforth the first and second group gentry families metamorphosed into Union and Entente, and between them, a fierce struggle started.[142]

What further contributions can the Antakya Massacre make to our understanding of the Young Turk Revolution? Here, once again, Türkmen's detailed work provides us with a good starting point, as in the quotation above he shows how the Massacre was a turning point in the struggle among the upper classes of Antakya. Above, we observed that the first stage of the story in Antakya was parallel to Kayseri and Maraş in the sense that some actors who were beneficiaries of the old regime could successfully adapt themselves to the new conditions. Continuity and change seemed to go hand in hand. Rifat Bereketzade's position was a good example to the fact: To repeat the five commoners who point to this *plus ça change, plus c'est la meme chose* situation brilliantly, "cruel and famous despot" Rifat Ağa's election to the parliament had secured and increased his influence and despotism.[143] This process can be given as a typical example of the first stage of reactionary politics, which I called absorption in the introduction. Yet very interestingly, we observed that it is the very "counterrevolutionary" event that started to diminish the gentry's power, as they were accused of plotting a "counterrevolution" referring to the series of events that I here call anti-revolution. However, the previous cases reinforced the idea that anti-revolutions appear only as a reaction to the failure of absorption. So, they did not have to take part in such an action. I believe that the alternative picture drawn by Refet Bereketzade and Avnullah Kazımî showed that their role in the event seems to be minimum, a fact that supports my argument about the relation between the two stages. Therefore, ideas that the first gentry group had taken part in the massacre was most

142 Türkmen, *Mufassal Hatay Tarihi*, 912.

143 BOA, DH.MKT, 2704/107, 1a From five persons from Alaeddin Village to Prime Ministry, December 5, 1324.

probably a misinterpretation, which was caused by both a misreading and instrumental reasoning, which were difficult to be separated from each other.

If one aspect of the misinterpretation was about the first gentry's role in massacring Armenians, the other one is about their taking part in the anti-revolution, or what many contemporaries called "counterrevolutionary plot". It is well-known that many people at that time claimed that the 31 March Incident was a counterrevolution, which was organized as a secret plot by Sultan Abdülhamid and his cohort and allies. This belief was also reflected in the first group of the gentry in Antakya. Just like in the previous part, several examples can be given to this misinterpretation. Take the Antakya Court-Martial decision record regarding the three landlords and the subdistrict governor for instance. The record starts like a revolutionary tribunal:

> Saving our holy motherland from the destructive effects of despots, who are living statues of the ominous age of despotism, is one of the greatest patriotic assurances for our children's felicity.[144]

And ends likewise:

> In fact, it was hoped that with the establishment of constitutional rule, that influence and illegal power was going to diminish and end. Yet as part of the government officials are of landlords and part of them are of the people, who are under the influence of the landlords, our honored constitutionalism's fruits of grants and progress are frustrated.[145]

144 *"Devr-i meşum-i istibdadın birer heykel-i zihayatı olan rical-i mütegallibenin tesirat-ı muhribesinden vatan-ı mukaddesimizi kurtarmak saadet-i ebna için en büyük teminat-ı vatanperveranedendir."* BOA, İ..AS, 96/10, 4a, Court-Martial Decision, August 23, 1325.

145 *"İdare-i meşrutanın tesisisyle bu nüfuz ve iktidar-ı na-meşruun fena ve nabud olacağı ümit olundu. Fakat hükumet memurlarının bir kısmının ağalardan ve kısm-ı diğerinin ağaların nüfuzu altında bulunan ahaliden bulunmalarına nazaran meşrutiyet-i muazzezimizin semere-i feyz ve atıfet-i iktitafı mümkün olamıyor."* BOA, İ..AS, 96/10, 4a, Court-Martial Decision, August 23, 1325.

We have already seen that the Armenian Patriarchate's objections are full of such implications. Among them, there are ones which also underline the counterrevolutionary features of the Massacre and its connection with the ones in İstanbul:

> It is proven that the tragedy of massacre, sabotage, extortion, and looting was prepared handily through the favors of reactionaries, enemies of constitutionalism and the Yıldız villains, and carried out in Adana, Tarsus, Hamidiye and villages and districts nearby; simultaneously, on the same day, with the 31 March-1 April incidents at the capital of the Sultanate.[146]

> It was natural that with the proclamation of constitutional rule, the establishment of fraternity and union among the different Ottoman nations would not be favorable for the position, influence, and interest of the submitted self-seeking gang. There, such people made attempts, secretly and openly, for the sake of the restoration of despotism, and in a way, opened the way for the creation of reactionary agitations and signals all around the province.[147]

If we succumb to the charm of this discourse, then Türkmen's analysis on the 31 March Incident's effects on the region's social formation quoted at the beginning of this part would begin to support the idea that the Massacre was

146 *"Alelhusus Adana ve tevabiinde zuhur eden katliam ve ihrak ve gasb u garet faciaları irticaiyyûnun ve Meşrutiyet düşmanlarının, Yıldız avenesinin himmetiyle bir suret-i mahiranede ve bir vakt ü zaman ile hazırlanmış ve aynı günde, aynı tarihde yani merkez-i Saltanat'taki 31 Mart ve 1 Nisan vukuatlarına müsadif olarak Adana'da, Tarsus'da, Hamidiye'de ve sair kura ve nevahide ika edildiği mertebe-i sübutdadır."* BOA, BEO, 3543/265707, 2a, From Armenian Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, April 19, 1325.

147 *"İdare-i Meşrûta'nın ilanıyla anasır-ı muhtelife-i Osmaniyan beyninde uhuvvet ve ittihadın takarrürü güruh-ı menfaatperestan-ı marûzanın mevki ve nüfuz ve menafiine elverişli olamayacağı tabii idi. İşte bu gibiler bir taraftan istibdadın iadesi uğrunda teşebbüsat-ı hafiyye ve aleniyede bulunarak 31 Mart Darbesi'ni vücuda getirdikleri gibi vilayatın her tarafında dahi birer suretle alâ'im ve tahrikat-ı irticakaranenin hudusuna imkan vermişler idi."* BOA, BEO, 3609/270623, From Armenian Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, July 14, 1325.

simply a reflection of an anti-revolution. Yet in fact, that fits perfectly into the CUP's official discourse on the 31 March Incident, which has to be questioned. If we do not question it, then we can fall into the trap of "revolutionary catechism", a concept developed by Furet to criticize Soboul for accepting revolutionaries' own myths about the order they destroyed.[148] We can adjust this concept to our case in the most extreme form of its Turkish version, the Unionist catechism, which can best be observed in its influence over the two detailed works of Aykut Kansu.[149] Simply, this Unionist interpretation of the Young Turk period defines its own movement as the sole representative of progress and condemns all other groups for being counterrevolutionaries.

When one follows the Unionist catechism, then other misinterpretations can consistently follow the previous ones. Let us focus on some doings of Rifat Ağa in İstanbul at this point as a first example. If there was a coordinated secret plan to make a counterrevolution, then the Bereketzade brothers would have been two of its agents, one in the capital and the other in a province. We observe that while he was lobbying for his brother's release, Rifat Ağa also tried to benefit from other MPs by getting them to form a pressure group. He wrote a petition and collected signatures from some of them. The profile of the signers of this petition can inform us about the different political groups' approaches to the massacre. On the clean copy of the list of signers, there are 60 signatures. 53 of them are seen in the list given by Aykut Kansu.[150] Among the signers, there were 22 Arabs, 17 Turks, 7 Albanians, 7 Greeks, and 1 Vlach. Not even a single Armenian had signed the petition. Only 8 of them were members of the CUP. 28 of them were independent. And 20 of them were members of Liberal Union *(Fırka-i Ahrar)* or Entente Liberale *(Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası)* or both. One is of the Ottoman Democrat Party.[151] So, signers were mostly from the opposition to the CUP. Rifat Ağa himself was also listed as a member of the Liberal Union. Such information can fit into the narrative of the Unionist catechism, as many signers can be portrayed as

148 William Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution,* (Oxford [England] ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

149 See his *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* and *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey 1908-1913*.

150 Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey.*

151 BOA, İ..HB, 28/11, 26a.

counterrevolutionaries. Yet we cannot ignore the fact that there were also Unionists on the list.

The information about Rifat Ağa's doings at the exact moment of the 31 March Incident by Mahir Said [Pekmen], the deputy of Ankara in opposition, whose observations we have benefited from previously, gives the impression that just like other opposition deputies who were blamed for plotting with Abdülhamid gang, Rifat Ağa was also caught by surprise. Let us dwell a little bit further on Pekmen's memoirs at this point, as it points to important –and unexpected- parallelisms between the events in the capital and in the countryside.

What comes forward in Pekmen's memoirs is the deputies' dialogue with the leaders of the chasseurs, which show that the revolt belonged to these soldiers and to these soldiers only. First of all, Pekmen argues that the words of the chasseur leaders point to a very profound understanding (*terbiye-i fikriye*). For example, when he heard sergeant (*bölük emini*) Mehmed for the first time, Pekmen had thought that he was an officer.[152] Mehmed's reaction to the deputies' blood and guts arguments was another example for Pekmen: In reaction to the arguments, he criticized the deputies for not being men of influence for the people, as they were not listening to each other.[153] The sergeants were also confident about their own worldviews: When some religious teachers demanded to enter the parliament and claimed to be the chasseurs' interpreters, the chasseurs refused them by saying that they had been looking to no one to be their voice. Impressed by them, Pekmen agrees that they really did not have such a need: They could express themselves, and he was convinced that it was the soldiers' doing:

> Actually, they really were not. Seeing that during the event no one but them were at the center, I do not care about the claims that Abdülhamid or the Union or Progress had organized the revolt. Inspired by the environment and the press, it was these petty officers

152 Pekmen, *31 Mart Hatıraları,* 114.

153 Ibid., 116.

> who did the revolt. And the government's disability and negligence had ensured it.[154]

If certain groups plotted against the new regime and plotters in the capital and the countryside were in coordination, in accordance with the Unionist catechism, then, the Bereketzade brothers should have been part of it. We saw that although there were many fingers from various groups pointed at Refet Ağa, his agency seems doubtful. So is his elder brother's. Several signs show that neither Rifat Ağa nor some other oppositional figures had planned the soldiers' revolt. The soldiers did not go out of control after a certain point. On the contrary, they were on their own from the very beginning. Here, the memoirs of Pekmen, whose arguments were discussed in the introduction, can be useful: In Pekmen's memoirs, first of all, Rifat Ağa does not come to the fore as much as other opposition figures. Together with İsmail Kemal, Mustafa Asım [Yörük] and Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşek]; Rifat Ağa was selected to the committee to be sent to the Yıldız Palace by the Parliament.[155] Yet they were unable to reach the Palace: Pekmen found İsmail Kemal Bey and Rifat Ağa in the Parliament's telegram room with some other deputies. İsmail Kemal Bey, with sorrow and in terror, told Pekmen that the soldiers did not allow them to go to Yıldız.[156] If we consider that even İsmail Kemal Bey, who would become the Unionist's main scapegoat after the Incident failed to break through a barricade, then the absence of Rifat Ağa's role can be understood. The following events further prove the absence: Although Pekmen somehow could leave the Parliament building before nightfall, Rifat Ağa had stayed there. When the soldiers fired their guns in the air to celebrate being pardoned by the Sultan, Rifat Ağa had panicked and jumped out of an upstairs window.

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154 "*Askerler 'biz kimseye muhtaç değiliz' derler. "Filhakika öyle idiler. Ben bunların vaka esnasında bunlardan başka ortada kimse olmadığını gördükten sonra, isyanı Abdülhamid yapmış, yoksa İttihad ve Terakki tertip etmiş tarzındaki iddialara kulak vermem. İhtilali, muhitten ve matbuattan aldıkları ilham ile Avcı Taburu'nun bu küçük zabitleri yaptı. Hükümetin zaaf ve gafleti de muvaffakiyetlerini temin etti"* Ibid., 114.

155 Ibid., 118.

156 Ibid., 124.

and the fall broke his bones. As the window was on the sea side, no one had noticed him, and he languished there until the morning.[157]

Although it can be the subject of a whole different work, at least I can claim here that all these signs allow us to formulate an argument about the agents of the counterrevolution in the capital: In fact, it seems that the opposition members attempted to interfere not before but after the revolt. For example, the newspaper Osmanlı decided to ally itself with the rebels after its journalists' meeting.[158] Also, Prince Sabahaddin's open letter to the soldiers was announced much later, not at the beginning.

In short, it seems that both in the capital and in the countryside, persons who were thought to have plotted seem to have taken no part in the 31 March Incident and the Cilicia Massacre. From the get-go, it was the uncontrolled ordinary people who revolted *per se*. In the sense of mass agency, there is a parallelism between the two events. In Pekmen's words, they were harmonious (*hem-ahenk*).[159] So, if there is a parallelism between the events in the capital and the region, in this case, it was regarding the passiveness of the so-called reactionaries–landlords in Antakya and politicians in İstanbul. So, the case of Bereketzade brothers is enough to refute the seemingly consistent revolutionary catechism -that there were conscious counterrevolutionaries, that these counterrevolutionaries had a class base, that they had made detailed plans to overthrow the revolutionary regime, that their revolt backfired and opened the way to their elimination. Yet if we take the three stages of reaction into consideration, then their two stories can be better explained: In Antakya, such old gentry had adapted themselves to the new regime, and successfully absorbed the revolutionary principles. So they did not have to take part in the anti-revolutionary movement. Yet ironically, against their will, the anti-revolutionary wave swept over Antakya, making them a target for the policy-

157 Ibid., 124. Later, Rifat Ağa would write that with his lame foot and injured shoulder, he had come to Antakya as a living dead. See BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/22, 36a, 37a, From Rif'at Bereketzade Efendi, the Deputy of Aleppo, to Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, August 31, 1325.

158 Ibid., 143.

159 Ibid., 146. Here, I must add that in fact, Pekmen underlines not the mass agency, but the religious motivation as the harmony between İstanbul and Adana.

makers at the capital. In this sense, Antakya Massacre also shows the spontaneous character of anti-revolutions.

§ 6.6 Patrician and Plebeian Behaviors

The belief in plots and the attempts to form a discourse that can be instrumental for the political struggles can be reasons for the contemporaries' misinterpretations of the agencies at play during the incidents that we focus on here. What about those of the historians? The explanation for their misinterpretations can be found in their outdated belief that each class has a definite kind of political behavior in certain circumstances. Actually, the historiography of revolutions did much help to overcome, let us say, this class behavior paradigm, since the fifties. Below, two versions of this overlap paradigm, first, about the dominant classes and second, about the lower classes are to be presented briefly.

Very well known, yet taken for granted in Turkish historiography and in the Orthodox/Marxisant scholarship of the French Revolution; the fundamental explanation of the Revolution is sought in the class struggle between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. In this version, the rise of the bourgeoisie is the ultimate cause of the revolution. Having acquired the economic power in a new form of wealth, personal abilities, and a new ideology that gave itself confidence, the bourgeoisie had searched for ways to obtain political power. The aristocracy's revolt against the monarchy was a great opportunity to do so. Through the National Assembly, the bourgeoisie destroyed privileges, some taxes, and certain laws, all of which had been barriers against its development. When the aristocracy allied itself again with the monarchy and attempted a coup, the bourgeoisie needed allies. Those allies would be the people in the cities and villages. While the Parisian people defeated the coup, the peasantry revolted against seigniorial dues and labor services and destroyed feudalism.[160]

Since Cobban's attack on it in the fifties, many aspects of this paradigm were heavily criticized. What concerns us here is some contributions made on

160 Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution,* 5-9 for the summary of this version.

one major aspect, what is called the class behavior paradigm. This paradigm has it that the bourgeoisie and aristocracy were two separate classes that had distinct and irreconcilable economic and political interests. Yet in time, several works show that such a clear-cut difference did not exist before the revolution. Among the critics, for example, Robert Forster showed that in economic outlook the nobility and the bourgeoisie had much in common in many parts of France.[161] This was also reflected in each class's political positions, which were not so distinct. In fact, during the first attacks on orthodox historiography, Cobban pointed to the lack of the overlap of classes and "class behaviors" in the National Assembly in Revolutionary France.[162] Another example can be the work of Sewell, who presented how Abbe Sieyes's political analysis, which had been seen as the main representative of the revolutionaries' ideology by the orthodoxy, was in fact ignored by the revolutionaries themselves; showing that there was no such thing as the bourgeoisie having a class consciousness.[163] As a result of these criticisms, starting even from Soboul's reaction to Cobban, the Marxists abandoned the paradigm of overlapping of class and political behavior: Many of them began to see the revolution as a series of events which was not caused by capitalists yet which opened the way for their flourishing by eliminating the obstacles to it.[164]

A similar shift was also seen in other revolutionary historiographies: In England, for example, Christopher Hill, who first had defended that "progressive sections of the gentry" – a rural bourgeoisie intended to sweep away the old feudal order; later focused on the subject again and defended that the English Revolution was not led by the bourgeoisie, yet as its unintended consequences had opened the way for capitalism's further development, and

161 Ibid., 14-15.

162 Ibid., 10-11.

163 See the part "A Failed Bourgeois Vision" in William Sewell Jr, "A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution", in *The French Revolution: Recent Debates and New Controversies*, ed. Gary Kates, (New York, London: Routledge, 1997), 149-155.

164 Jim Wolfreys, "Twilight Revolution: François Furet and the Manufacturing of Consensus in *History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism,* ed. Mike Haynes and Jim Wolfreys, (London, New York: Verso, 2007), 57.

it was that feature which made it a bourgeois revolution.[165] By observing the changed views about English and French Revolutions in their famous work "*The Pecularities of German History*", Eley and Blackbourn, argued that the Sonderweg paradigm had taken the old interpretations of both cases as granted and idealized them; and had defined the German road to modernity through what was lacking compared to those idealized versions: In fact, in neither of them did the bourgeoisie appear as a conscious agent that claimed state power directly for itself.[166] In addition, in bourgeois states, it is its very absence that empowers the bourgeoisie, as that absence makes them seem "natural", so they cannot be targeted directly".[167] Colin Mooers also adopted the argument that denies the need for agency and focused on results, arguing that it was the different obstacles to capitalist development which shaped the peculiarity of each country's transformation into capitalism.[168]

Many other examples to the misinterpretations caused by Unionist catechism can be found by observing consistencies both in the prerevolutionary era and in the counterrevolution's aftermath: Returning to the class conflicts in Antakya and Asi Valley, at first hand, some continuities in line with this catechism can be found: Let us return once again to Türkmen's story –this time about the very struggle between the first and second gentry. Türkmen writes that the first gentry group, allying itself with Entente Liberale, lost the 1912 parliamentary elections to the Unionist Türkmenzade Ahmed Bey. Their political power had decreased further with the Unionist single party regime, yet as they kept their economic power, they continued their struggle against the Unionist second group. Their resentment reached such a level that after Faisal's rebellion in Syria, some of them became Arab nationalists.[169]

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165 Geoff Kennedy, "Radicalism and Revisionism in the English Revolution", in *History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism,* ed. Mike Haynes and Jim Wolfreys, (London, New York: Verso, 2007), 26, 27, 29. Also see Christopher Hill, *The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill Vol: 3. People and Ideas in 17th Century England*, (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1985), 95.

166 Blackbourn & Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History,* 10, 144.

167 Ibid., 74

168 Colin Mooers, *Burjuva Avrupa'nın Kuruluşu: Mutlakçılık, Devrim ve İngiltere, Fransa, Almanya'daki Kapitalizmin Yükselişi,* (Ankara: Dost Yayınevi, 2000), 11.

169 Türkmen, *Mufassal Hatay Tarihi,* 913. Tayfur Sökmen is the typical example of these landlords.

During the final days of the war, the first gentry group organized a coup in the town: They arrested the commander, raised the flag of Faisal and declared the annexation of Antakya to the Arab government.[170] Because they used to produce grains in their lands, Amik lords, on the other hand, prospered during the Great War. These Turkish landlords started to dwell in Antakya during the war. Their war profiteering led to the further resentment of the Alawite locals. Despite this resentment, Türkmen writes that the second group of landlords made important contributions to the growth (*inkışaf*) of Turkish nationalism later during the War of Independence.[171]

Let us make a first-hand summary in line with the catechism: A strata which resemble the classical notion of the bourgeoisie had appeared among the artisan class in Antakya. Artisans gradually eroded the strict feudal rules defined by the gentry, which can be considered the aristocracy. The bourgeois artisans found some allies within the progressive aristocrats, benefiting from their intra-conflicts. This alliance found its political representation within the CUP, the defender of bourgeois revolution. Naturally, the conservative aristocracy remained in opposition. After the World War, the bourgeois-aristocratic coalition found Turkish nationalists as their new representative, whereas the conservative aristocracy could resist them by allying themselves with Arab nationalism. Finally, Turkish annexation ended the years long struggle between those groups and broke the final barriers to the development of capitalism in Antakya.

In fact, the social and economic transformation around Antakya is not alien to the points shown by the historiography. First, although the first gentry group's hegemony in the cultural sphere resembles feudal privileges, some signs show that regarding their economic activities, they were not that feudal, but rather capitalist. We have already seen that the commercial agriculture in the Asi Valley was so dominant that people in the region were buying their grains from without, mostly from the Amik Plain. In addition, the Bereketzade family itself was taking part in enterprises. They were even partners in a French company that had tried but failed to build a railroad

170 Ibid., 918-921.

171 Ibid., 914.

between Süveydiye and Antakya.[172] The capitalist economic activities of the Bereketzade family resemble Robert Foster's aristocrats who were also capitalists. Rejecting to be "hypnotized" by the noble "stereotype" of the orthodoxy, he points to the need for regional studies "confined to the treatment of the nobility as a distinct social group".[173] He shows that "the provincial noble was as likely to be an active, shrewd, and prosperous landlord", not "a class of urbanized absentees or fossilized rustics".[174]

Secondly, the two gentry groups of Antakya shared much in common also in political outlook. This can also be seen in the aftermath of the Empire: It is true that as the representatives of Unionism, the Türkmenzade family chose to take part in the Turkish nationalist movement. Ahmed Türkmenzade opened the first branch of the Association for the Defense of National Rights (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*).[175] He fled to Antep. But his brother, Abdülgani Türkmen would become the founder of the People's Party in Hatay and president of the Parliament of the Antakya Republic later.[176] He also became the deputy of Hatay in the Turkish National Assembly for three terms. Yet, on the other hand, there are also continuities that are reminiscent of what Meeker had once detected in the Rize region.[177] We see that members from both the Halefzade and the Bereketzade families took part in the political struggle within the French mandate of Syria in favor of the Turkish cause. Furthermore, they would become political elites of the Turkish Republic.

172 The company had a capital worth 1,5 million francs, yet it went bankrupt. Possibly justifying by his partnership, Rifat Ağa had taken some lands purchased by the company previously. Some had objected that these lands have to be state property. Halefzade family took this as an opportunity and by pointing to these objections, they tried to pick those lands up by auction. This led to a great conflict between these two households. See BOA, Y.MTV, 221/87, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Yıldız Palace, September 17, 1317; BOA, BEO, 350/26184, 2a, From Aleppo Governorate to the Prime Ministry, February 5, 1309.

173 Robert Forster, "The Provincial Noble: A Reappraisal." *The American History Review* 68, no. 3 (April 1963): 682-683

174 Ibid., 683, 684.

175 Mehmet Tekin & M. Mehtap Tekin, *Hatay Devleti Millet Meclisi Reisi Abdülgani Türkmen*, (Antakya: Güneyde Kültür, 2011), 12.

176 Ibid., 9.

177 Michael Meeker, *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity,* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2002).

Among the Halefzade family, as it was noted before, in the Syrian parliament in 1928, Süreyya Halefzade insisted to speak Turkish. He would become district governor of Antakya in 1938. Hüsnü Ağa's nephew, Vahit Halefoğlu would be the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 1980s.[178] The same continuity can also be observed in the Bereketzade and Kuseyrizade families: First, there are intermarriages between the families who were thought to be in the opposite camps: For example, among Abdülgani Türkmen's three sons in law, who were all politicians, there was Necmeddin Kuseyri, the mayor of Antakya in 1964, Dr. Adil Bereket, the mayor of Antakya between 1955 and 1957, and Hamit Melek, the deputy of Hatay between 1983 and 1987. And his mother-in-law was Kuseyrizade Nihad Ağa's sister.[179] Second, just like the Halefzade family, members of the Bereketzade family also took part in the political struggle for the sake of Turkish nationalism.[180]

The class behavior paradigm of the catechism also identifies a certain kind of behavior with the lower classes. In this identification, they are affiliated with an ideal type, having an absolutely approved morality. Since the National Assembly's approval of the storming of the Bastille, it has become almost obligatory for everyone, let alone politicians, to accept –or at least, not to object to the idea- that the "people" have positive virtue, regardless of time and space.

Above, through Sewell's work on the storming of the Bastille, it was seen that the absolute approval of the mass movement is defined according to its function in the power struggle between the National Assembly and the monarchy. Signs of catechism appear in historiography also in this way. Take the work of George Rudé, a leading historian in focusing on the popular movements in the French Revolution. What Rudé did, according to Lucas, was to be selective in detecting these popular movements:

> Moreover, within the Revolution itself, Rudé's definition of the revolutionary crowd is confined in practice to popular collective

178 Tekin, *Antakya Tarihinden Yapraklar ve Halefzade Süreyya Bey*, 7-81.

179 Mehmet Tekin & M. Mehtap Tekin, *Hatay Devleti Millet Meclisi Reisi Abdülgani Türkmen*, (Antakya: Güneyde Kültür, 2011), 17-21.

180 Ibid., 30-31.

> action to radicalize the Revolution… On the other hand, it leads him to exclude entirely (except for *Vendemiaire*) crowd actions that clearly display an awareness of the political issues of the Revolution and that constitute a conscious attempt to intervene but that do not operate to radicalize it-for example, the anti-Jacobin crowds at Lyon and Marseille in 1793 or the various popular resistances to the Revolution such as *chouannerie*, some aspects of the White Terror, religious riots, and so forth. Here a value judgment about what is "revolutionary" denies validity to any other form of crowd action, even when it can be classed as "political" in Rudé's own usage of the word.[181]

The same definition for the revolutionary crowd is also made, according to Lucas, by Georges Lefebvre, another leading historian of the classical approach.[182] These historians, approving the revolutionaries of the time, blesses the revolution itself, and so also, the agents of the events that contributed to its realization.

What about the many serious large mass movements which resisted, even targeted the revolution? They are simply ignored, as the "people" cannot be affiliated with counterrevolution. Accepting that the "people" can be "bad" subverts the idea about the their natural behavior. Therefore, those doings should be considered by the revolutionaries as part of a conspiracy and those engaged in them instruments of some plotters. The same applied to the historians influenced by the classical school. This is why much before the belief that ethnic cleansing was internal to modernity became the dominant paradigm, it was affiliated with lack of or reaction to a bourgeois revolution. One of the typical examples of this affiliation is the Sonderweg paradigm, which explains the Nazi terror and Holocaust with the lack of a bourgeois revolution in Germany: According to this explanation, the bourgeoisie and the people could not intervene in the political sphere as much as their French counterparts did; a fact that resulted in the defeat of progressive principles. This same tendency –by removing the bourgeoisie and only applying it to the

181 Colin Lucas, "The Crowd and Politics between 'Ancien Regime' and Revolution in France", 423-424.

182 Ibid 425.

people- continued later: In line with the "Thompsonian tradition", Tim Mason for instance, "wished to rescue the honor and dignity of the German working class from the defeat and humiliation indicted on it by the Nazis."[183]

The motivation to rescue the honor and dignity of the people, despite great efforts by hardworking historians like Mason, bore no fruit. In time, the stick was bent towards the other side: For the French case, for example, Taylor showed that the popular mood in revolutionary France was seriously conservative and it was the revolution that radicalized the people.[184] In German historiography, Eley revealed the problems of relying too much on *Honoratiorenpolitik* –the politics of notables- to describe the links between the Second and the Third Reich, showing that there had been a right-wing pressure from below rather than an aristocratic one in the late German Empire.[185] Corbin showed that the crowd's mentality could be so contradictory that the many elements both in favor of and in opposition to the revolution's legacy can coexist after many years, like burning a young noble with the belief that there was an alliance between nobles, priests, republicans, and Prussians, that all of whom were about to destroy the Second Empire. Moreover, that mentality was interpreted very wrongly by the different political groups.[186] The same was also true even for the Russian Revolution, as Orlando Figes showed that confused peasants held many irreconcilable concepts in their minds, like demanding a republic like England while electing a Tsar as their president, or believing that Lenin was a saint.[187]

183 Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 107.

184 Taylor, "Revolutionary and Nonrevolutionary Content in the 'Cahiers' of 1789: An Interim Report".

185 See the Introduction, Chapter I and Conclusion of Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Political Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000).

186 Alain Corbin, *The Village of Cannibals: Rage and Murder in France 1870*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 30-38.

187 Orlando Figes, "The Russian Revolution of 1917 and Its Language in the Village," in *Revolutionary Russia: New Approaches to the Russian Revolution of 1917*, ed. Rex A. Wade, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 87-101.

What about the Muslim masses in 1909? Above, we have already seen that the signs of the counterrevolutionary links at the patrician level were weaker than contemporaries and scholarship assumed, and conspiracy theories were fabricated. In fact, the evidence from the Antakya Massacre gives the impression that if there was a relation between the 31 March Incident and the Massacres, it was at the plebeian level. What made them "*hem-ahenk*" in the words of Pekmen was the great pressure exerted by the common masses. In the second chapter on Adana, we have already observed that Muslim resentments concerning the appearance of new forms of Armenian agency existed both in the capital and in the provinces. We cannot detect the ideas of the commoners directly, yet statements by other agents show that they openly expressed their hatred for these changes. For example, many Armenian witnesses of the massacres in and around Adana would later tell Yesayan about the sayings of the offenders: One woman from a village told her that the Muslim women told them the Armenians "had gone in heat like a dog" (*köpek gibi azmıştınız*) and asked them, sarcastically "where are your fedais, the defenders of your liberty" (*nerede sizin fedaileriniz, hürriyetinizin müdafaası*) and continued by saying "what was our sultan's crime? What was his misdeed that you overthrew him? You replaced him with liberty. Your giaour liberty".[188] Vice-consul of Mersin, Major Doughty-Wylie would also report that many Christians had been killed with the words "take that for your liberty!".[189] Consul Fontana would also report from Armenian women from Antakya that before the slaughtering, Muslims often cried "here is your 'hurriyet' –your liberty".[190] In the next chapter, we will observe that after the execution of their relatives, many Muslims were furious, as they really believed that it was the government who had ordered them to kill Armenians, a fact that shows a confusion very parallel to those from other parts of the world in similar cases.

188 Yesayan, *Yıkıntılar Arasında*, 114.

189 PRO, FO 424/220/30752, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 24 July 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 8 August 1909 (Rec'd 16 August), No. 48.

190 PRO, FO 424/221/40913, From Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther, Aleppo, 3 October 1909, enclosure in From Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 October 1909 (Rec'd 1 November), No. 69.

§ 6.7 Conclusion

If the discourse on the Antakya Massacre was in a way, artificial, what seems to be the alternative story then? What had actually happened in Antakya? The sources provide very limited clues to build up an alternative story –except Kazımî and Refet Bereketzade. Yet it seems possible to do so.

The massacre in the Antakya region was neither a nationwide nor a regional plan. It did not occur simultaneously with the massacre in Adana. Just like E.P. Thompson's famous phrase, the experience walked in "without knocking the door", and "announced" that there was such a great ethnic clash in Adana that the region needed reinforcements.[191] This knocking came in three forms: The first type was official, from the central and provincial government, and only pointing to an ethnic disorder. The second was also official, yet from the district government in nearby Cebel-i Bereket, claiming that there was an ongoing Armenian revolt. This second official claim especially must have strengthened the already existing third, unofficial, and spontaneous one: The rumors about an Armenian revolt in circulation across all Armenian inhabited regions for the longest time, especially gained further momentum after the Young Turk Revolution.

In a town where there was a very limited number of regular troops, the demanded reinforcements would be recruited from the local people, the reserve soldiers. These locals were strongly influenced by the rumors, and the exaggerated news were confirming them in their minds. Further confirmation came with the Armenians retreating to their homes: Such retreats were always increasing the tension to a great level, and in this sense, Antakya was not an exception. Lacking uniforms and discipline, the reserve soldiers were allowed to take their weapons and go to their homes.

This mistake was made in a town that was at the center of many sub-regions, each having very complex social formations of their own. Each sub-region was the scene of ethnic, religious, denominational, and class differences. Among them, Antakya belonged to the Asi Valley region, the fertile land where market products were cultivated in large estates that belonged to the Sunni gentry. This class once had enormous powers against

191 Thompson, *Poverty of Theory*, 11.

the artisans and the landless peasants, who were mostly Alawites. Yet several factors, like increasing infrastructural power of the state and commercialization, were undermining their power. Another reason for the decline was the conflicts within them: In time, and in a way, some members of the gentry penetrated the local government better than the others, benefited and prospered as a result, causing a division among this class.

The less powerful second gentry group was looking for ways to challenge them. In this sense, the changing conditions -blurring the old differences between the gentry and the artisans- which undermined the superiority of the first group was welcomed by them. But the first gentry group's ability to adapt to different conditions prevailed: They managed to keep their positions under Mohammad Ali of Egypt as well as the Tanzimat and the absolutist Hamidian regimes. That also seemed to go on after the Young Turk Revolution: One of their strongest and most significant representatives, Bereketzade Rifat Ağa, was elected to the Chamber of Deputies thanks to this ability. Everyone, the ordinary people, the state, and themselves, were certain about their enormous power in Antakya. In short, they represented a perfect example of the absorption stage of the reaction.

The significance of the Antakya Massacre was that it was a turning point in the local power relations because, with the Massacre, the first gentry group lost its dominance. Two perceptions of the event led to the rise of two kinds of challenges: First, it allowed some of their rivals to see the limits of the first gentry group's power. Second, some other rivals, on the contrary, believed otherwise, that the first gentry group's great power was a problem to be tackled at once. Most probably, the first group of challengers was among the locals and the second group was holders of central state power. So, two different readings of their power would lead the way to a firmer alliance not only between some members of the second gentry group and some artisans but also between this very first alliance and the Unionists at the center.

How two conflicting readings appeared simultaneously has to be explained by the very events during the Massacre. After the news, rumors and retreats increased the possibility of an ethnic conflict. In the absence of security forces, all eyes, including that of the subdistrict governor and that of the Armenian notables turned to the first gentry group, because there had

been a consensus about their absolute control of the local officials, artisans, and peasants. Confident in their abilities, the gentry did not believe in the potential for their loss of control and believed that they could easily handle the situation. Their relations with local Armenians are unknown: Unfortunately, we do not know whether they had thought that Armenians could have posed a threat, militarily or economically. Whether they had or had not, their confidence was high enough for them to dawdle over cooling down the situation.

What they did not take into account was that it was a golden opportunity for everyone who resented their power to show or push for otherwise. And everyone had accumulated reasons for resentment for years: Some members of the second gentry group; their allies among the artisans, the immigrants, and peasants, who believed that their lands had been usurped, or that they were being exploited and harassed for years; as well as some other landlords from another sub-region, Kuseyr plateau; could all instinctively show their resentment by refusing, or ignoring to listen to their calming words. There may have been some foreseeing persons who had even consciously seen the tension as an opportunity to show their power, yet they must have been very limited in number. Besides, we have no evidence of this so far.

Armenians had no weapons and no preparations for self-defense unlike the case in Adana. But this did not prevent the offenders from going on with the killings. This must have had several reasons. Among them, the instant observation that the first group of the gentry was powerless must have been one of them, assuring that the orgiastic pleasure of crowd action remained unchecked. The Alawite peasants from Asi Valley and Kurdish peasants from Kuseyr Plateau had rushed into the town. Their peasants, their artisans did not listen to them. Whether to show that they were in charge or because of their hatred, perhaps dominant groups of other sub-regions, such as Kuseyr landlords who started to inhabit Antakya had joined the attackers.

The so-called Armenian threat, which was believed to have existed, and the instinctive class hatred led people to refuse to obey the first gentry group's orders. For the plebeian groups, this was an orgy to be instinctively enjoyed. For the first gentry group, it was a terrible blow: These landlords, who most probably had underestimated the threat at first, had lost control. They were

not only ignored but also threatened, even shot at. Terrified and shocked, they could do nothing but retreat and assemble in houses at first. Some of them even expressed their shock and disappointment physically.

Yet when they soon tried to regain their power, most probably they tried to show the people that they were in control of the situation, a fact that made many think that they had been in control during the massacre too. Moreover, during their attempt, they did not hesitate to harass and terrify the Armenians that blamed them. So, just like in the case of İbrahim Paşa in Zeytun and Antakya, these persons were gray figures in terms of their attitude against Armenians: On the one hand, most probably they did not want Armenians to be butchered in the way that they had witnessed. Yet on the other, once they observed the accusations, they terrorized the Armenian community to get them to quit blaming them.

The two readings and responses appeared after the massacre: The ruling political elites in the capital (Unionist-bureaucrat alliance), together with some other regional elites, including the ones of the Armenian community and some officials, unconsciously blamed the ruling gentry and targeted them. They labeled this group as reactionary landlords in full control; natural enemies, plotters, and barriers against progress and modern state control. With this belief, some of them were sentenced to exile. Although their efforts to mitigate their punishments were somehow fruitful, the limited years of exile and their relatives in office being sent elsewhere were enough to diminish their power.

Especially during revolutionary turmoil, concepts developed in state centers that get applied nationwide always need reservations when it comes to analyzing the provinces. They are produced and applied with, sometimes more naive-idealistic, sometimes more instrumental reasoning. For example, in his book "*France 1789-1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution*", Sutherland argued that:

> The effect of much provincial and local history which has enjoyed such a vogue in the last twenty years has thus been much the same with the revisionist history. It too dissolved time-honoured interpretations because the Revolution begins to look quite different depending upon

> the locale, regional social structures and regime economies. Indeed, the gap between the Parisian and provincial revolutions is sometimes so great that some reviewers have wondered whether they are dealing with the same phenomenon.[192]

Accepting them without questioning will lead to misinterpretations. Willingly or not, this was what happened in Antakya. In fact, although they were not as powerful as they once had been, the first gentry group seems to have adapted to the new era, both economically and politically, as they were involved in both the capitalist economy and the new regime. The Massacre, in this sense, was not a sign of their unlimited power. On the contrary, it crystallized some local rivals' idea that their control over the people was in tatters. Maybe, this is why the central state could openly target them –an action that it could not take in regions where it had to depend on local elite power, as in many cases in the Eastern regions.

Ironically, the perspective from the capital furthered this crystallization not only through punishments but also by forming an alliance. The parties to this alliance were also coalitions in themselves: The central one between the Unionists and some bureaucrats joined its forces with the local one between the second gentry and some artisans. Some of the local rivals, who had already been trying to exploit every change for the sake of their power struggles, must have observed the new conjuncture quite well and tried to exploit the accusations against the first gentry group by demanding property and bureaucratic positions. This alienated the first gentry group further, leading some to look for alternatives. Already close to the oppositional Young Turks, they allied with Entente Liberale. The World War policies made some of them totally lose their belief in being ruled from İstanbul, and Arab nationalism appeared as a new option for them. However, the appearance of Ankara Government as a new power center opened a new phase in the power struggles.

192 Sutherland, *France 1789-1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution*, 9.

7

Adana: The Aftermath

Hülasa bir gün gelir de herhangi bir kuvvet Muşeg'in muhakeme evrakını tedkike adliye nezaretini mecbur ederse Genç Türk Hükümeti için pek büyük bir mahcubiyet ve mesuliyeti intac edebilecek bir mesele-i adliye karşısında bulunduğumuzu arza kendimi vicdanen mecbur görürüm.[1]

– BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2848/14, 1a, 2a, Ciphered telegram from Cemal Bey, August 18, 1325.

1 English: In short, in all conscience I feel compelled to submit that, if a day comes when any exponent would force the Ministry of Justice to investigate the trial documents of Moushegh, we would encounter a judicial problem that would cause a great embarrassment and responsibility for the Young Turk government.

> *Çok teessüf ederim ki, Adana vakasının ikinci günü, bir yabancı ülke vapuruyla İskenderiye'ye kaçan Monsenyör Muşeg o zaman elime geçmedi. Yine haklı olarak Harp Divanı tarafından gıyaben idama mahkum edilmiş olan bu zat elime geçseydi, onu da Bahçe müftüsünün karşısına astırırdım.*[2]
>
> –Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, ed. Alpay Kabacalı, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001), 387.

The two quotations above show the contradictions of one of the most influential figures in Young Turk history: Cemal Paşa, who had been appointed as the Governor of Adana in July 1325, when he had been a lieutenant colonel. We will see that one reason for his appointment was to balance the government policy slightly in favor of satisfying the Armenian public opinion. A while after he arrived in Adana, he started to revise some Court-Martial sentences. Cemal Paşa wrote the first sentence when he was revising the death sentence of the most famous scapegoat of the Massacres, Moushegh Seropian, the ex-prelate of Adana. However, it contradicts completely with the second quotation, which was from his memoirs written after the Genocide. We observe that foreign diplomats also observed such inconsistencies during his office in Adana. In the following pages, we will see that some diplomats would start to believe that Cemal Paşa was playing it by the ear. On the one hand, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the light punishments, yet, on the other hand, he did not object to the decisions. The doubts of the British vice-consul Chafy can be an example: According to him, Cemal Bey told the American consul that he would be satisfied "at the idea of Djevad Bey dangling at the end of a rope", yet that could lead to a fresh

2 I deeply regret that I could not get Monseigneur Moushegh, who had escaped to Alexandria by a foreign ferry on the second day of Adana Incident. If I would have got that guy, who had rightfully been condemned to death by the Court-Martial in absentia, I would also have hung him in front of the mufti of Bahçe.

massacre.[3] Also, when Cemal Bey saw that various heads of the Christian churches were waiting for him to protest the sentences, he:

> … replied (quibbling) that whereas it contained provisions sanctioning the condemnation of Armenians to fifteen years' penal servitude, the Penal Code employed by the court-martial was technically incompetent to pass heavier sentences than those given, on functionaries such as an ex-vali and ex-ferik. He admitted, it is true, the urgent necessity in such a case of a reform of the said Penal Code.[4]

According to Chafy, who thought that "quibbling" about the technical difficulties of handing out heavier punishments to officials was a form of "whitewashing": "the impression to be gathered from the attitude of the Young Turks here is that a motive dictated by some undisclosed policy does exist and that it is not altogether fear of the consequences which forbade them from imitating the wholesale épuration of the capital".[5] All these give the impression that talking out of both sides of his mouth constituted a continuity in his attempt to project a double image. In the introduction, I touched upon Cemal Paşa's more grayish position during the Genocide: Although two historians, Hilmar Kaiser and Ümit Kurt disagree about the shade of this grayness, what they share in common is the nuanced position of Cemal Paşa within the Unionist dictatorship.[6]

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3 PRO, FO 424/221/37546, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 29 September 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 6 October 1909 (Rec'd 11 October), No. 25.

4 PRO, FO 424/221/36619, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 22 September 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 29 September 1909 (Rec'd 4 October), No. 13.

5 PRO, FO 424/221/36619, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 22 September 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 29 September 1909 (Rec'd 4 October), No. 13.

6 Hilmar Kaiser defends that "the notion of a unified body of genocidal conspirators exerting unrestrained control over the entire Ottoman Empire cannot be sustained. The opposition against Talaat's and the ruling CUP's policy was stronger than has been assumed so far, reaching into the leadership of the party. At its core stood Ahmed Djemal Pasha and with him a divergent group of officers and civilians." See Hilmar Kaiser, "Regional Resistance to Central

However, it seems that the difference between Cemal Paşa's statements in post-1909 and post-1915 has little to do with being sly. For example, the same vice-consul would soon write that Cemal Bey had an "unabated vigour", and his sincerity was "above question". Yet as too optimistic a person who made premature reform announcements, "'the man in the bazaar' calls him 'réclameji' and 'boyaji' (the dauber in bright colours)".[7]

In fact, Cemal Paşa was not alone in changing his views on the massacre. For example, Sahara shows that Protestant missionaries, who witnessed the massacres in Adana, also altered their stories. Before the 1915 Genocide, H. A. Gibbons, C. H. Woods, and Dr. Chambers were not believing that there had been a Unionist conspiracy. Yet after the Genocide, all three started to believe that the CUP had been involved in the massacre.[8] All those shifts perfectly show that we have to take into account the shadow of 1915 in such memoirs. Yet here in this chapter, without denying the role of Genocide in reconsiderations, I try to bring forward another aspect: The previous chapters have shown that most probably two social pressures may have had a role in deteriorating Armenian policy of the Young Turk governments. One was from the Muslim plebeian classes and on the notables (as seen in Antakya Massacre), and the second was from Muslim notables and on the governments (as seen in Adana Massacres, the attack on Cemal Bey in Kayseri, and the Hayri Bey Incident in Maraş). In my opinion, the relationship between 1915 and 1909 was reciprocal in this sense:

In this chapter, I try to point to the possibility that the events between 1909 and 1915 (wars, territorial losses, and political rivalries) made the fervent Muslim notables' whose ignored interpretation of Armenian "Question" more and more appealing, a fact that reshaped not only the memories themselves but also their analyses. I hope to show that Cemal Paşa's office in Adana also

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Government Policies", 176. Ümit Kurt, however, believes that Cemal Paşa had his own responsibility for the genocide, and his "perception of the Armenian 'Question' was not so very different from the general stance of the CUP, and thus that of Talaat and Enver." See Ümit Kurt, "A Rescuer, an Enigma and a Genocidaire: Cemal Paşa", 222, 224.

7 PRO, FO 424/221/37546, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 29 September 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 6 October 1909 (Rec'd 11 October), No. 25.

8 Sahara, *What Happened in Adana in April 1909*, 14-16.

reflects the confusion among many Muslim policymakers after the Massacres. They were caught between: Previously, we observed that before Adana Massacres, there had been a conflict among some Muslim notables themselves. But by mid-April, the struggle seems to have been over. Except for a few impartial notables, all Muslims were united against Armenians during the Massacres. Two sides, who started to define themselves in ethnoreligious terms, emerged: "The Muslims" and "the Armenians". Each side tried to portray themselves as victims of the other, who had long been preparing for a sinister plot. From the beginning, local Muslim elites claimed that the Massacres were caused by Armenian Revolutionaries, who had been planning to establish an independent state by forcing foreign powers to intervene in the conflict. On the contrary, the local Armenians were arguing that the Massacres were part of the counterrevolutionary plan that triggered the 31 March Incident. The reaction of the policymakers at the Imperial level was more complex. The entire Armenian society was completely in agreement with the local Armenians. The Muslims, on the other hand, were confused. Some tended to be closer to the Armenian standpoint, yet many rejected the two claims: First, that local Armenians were completely innocent, and second, that the central bureaucracy had taken part in a plot. In short, the public opinion at the capital was shaped by multiple facts, including the observations and political strategies of foreign witnesses, politicians, and officials, which make up countless nuances that force the researcher to pay attention to. After many petitions, demonstrations, parliamentary speeches, party negotiations, official declarations, resignations, and even new ethnoreligious tensions at the local level, at least an official discourse did appear, yet it satisfied almost no one: Both local Muslims and Armenians would be alienated from the government, in which there was increasing Unionist control. Therefore, the main contribution of this chapter will be that the official explanation of the Adana Massacre at that time was the result of serious struggles between many actors: Local Muslims, officials and Armenians, foreigners, and several political actors in the capital all tried to shape the standpoint of the state. Below, I try to show how those struggles evolved during the months following the Massacres.

§ 7.1 The First Round

As early as the second day of the second massacre, as a dismissed governor who was waiting for his successor in Adana, Cevad Bey started to defend himself against accusations: According to the Governor, great difficulties resulted from the regrettable situation (*ahval-i müessife*) beginning with a surge of agitation, the presence of only three hundred regular soldiers, and reserves being locals lacking order and uniforms. For Cevad Bey, his measures were successful, as in three days, he had been able to end the events in a town where about fifty to sixty thousand people had revolted. He also criticized the government by adding that if repeatedly demanded soldiers had arrived in time, the event could have been ended earlier.[9] Following the new Governor Mustafa Zihni Paşa's arrival, he left the city on 19 April.[10]

By 16 April, some ulema from Adana wrote to the Ministry of Interior, establishing the local Muslim position: Previously, by organizing bloody revolutions in Eastern Anatolia, Armenian Committees had hoped for yet had failed to trigger European intervention and to thereby achieve independence. Afterward, they hoped for intervention in Cilicia. To achieve this new goal, they brought in and settled many Armenians. Taking advantage of the proclamation of liberty, they had bought many weapons and had made agitating speeches against Ottomanism. On the first day of the massacres, against the efforts of Muslim notables and ulema to prevent any events, they had lit "the torch of revolution" in multiple points, leading to the suffering of many innocent families. The ulema added that the revolt was also encouraged by despotism: The second event had certainly proved that Armenians were looking for foreign intervention. To prove that the event was not caused by them, the ulema also claimed that Muslims would not have benefited from such a revolution. They were surprised that Muslims were seen responsible for the revolution, and they felt the need to inform humanity about the ones who bore the responsibility: Muslims were ready to get along with Christians, as they had done in the past. If Armenians would leave their revolutionary ideas and be for living happily along with Muslims, Muslims would do the same.

9 BOA, BEO, 3539/265356, From Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, April 13, 1325.

10 "Azimet," *İtidal*, no: 37, 21 April 1325, p. 2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 611).

The official documents and weapons were enough to show that the revolution was an organized effort. Therefore, the fake claims of Armenians, aiming to misguide public opinion should be ignored.[11] The importance of this document is that the position it reflects was identical with the denialist historiography's explanation of the Massacres of 1909. Here the reader can recall that in Adana Massacres chapter, I presented an inform letter written by Bağdadizade: Although it was most probably written much before the rise of Armenian political parties, it was pointing to a political plot by local Armenians. Lacking enough sources, despite Bağdadizade family was one of the most likely suspects in the Massacre, I hesitated to claim that this idea continued to determine Bağdadizade family's attitude. Nor I can argue that bringing forward revolutionary or separatist activities before their increase shows that such Muslim notables had invented them for their success in the local power conflicts. Nevertheless, in my opinion, it allows arguing that the possibility of an Armenian revolt had been existent in the minds of some Muslim notables. When we take both the inform and the text written by ulema into consideration, we can suspect that maybe it is the authentic, original local interpretation that would become dominant within Turkey in the long run. It seems that although accepting the claims of officials without critic is a common problem in Turkish denialism, this factor alone cannot fully explain the hegemony of the local Muslim discourse, because the final official position of the regime of that time was very different from that of the locals.

The immediate responses from the Muslim locals were as such. What about the policymakers in the capital? The parliamentary discussions can give us some clues about it: On 18th April, the Chamber of Deputies called Adil Bey, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior to provide information about the Adana Massacres. After Cevad Bey's telegram about the second incident was read, the initial response of Arif Hikmet Bey, the Unionist MP of Biga, was that what Cevad Bey had done was simply playing with words to save his skin, which was typical of despotism's officials. After he added that those who caused that massacre should have been identified and heavily punished, he

11 BOA, DH.MKT, PRK, 2829/124 from Ulema of Adana to the Presidency of the House of Commons, April 16, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

was applauded.[12] The acting president, Talat Bey said that no MP could disagree with Arif Hikmet Bey. After him, Varteks Efendi implied that the Governor's claim about the presence of fedayees was not true, and underlined that the 31 March Incident was simultaneous with the massacre.[13] It seems that the harmonious mood in blaming the governor changed when some deputies proposed to put Adil Bey to the Court-Martial. That proposal was made by six Armenian and two Muslim MPs, namely, Arif Hikmet, Ali Cenani, Dağavaryan, Kiygam, Boyacıyan, Babikian, Varteks and Vahan. After the proposal, Hamparsum Boyacıyan spoke first and stated that "as everybody has now understood, the Armenian nation was not at fault at all.."[14] When he started to talk about the order about foreigners, Dağavaryan Efendi interrupted him by saying that the order about foreigners meant "hit Armenians and leave the foreigners".[15] İsmail Bey of Gümülcine, a Unionist deputy who would join the opposition soon by forming a new party, objected to them, and said that neither a governor nor an undersecretary could be put to Court-Martial by a proposal. He also added that interpreting the words "do not touch the foreigners" as an order to kill the Armenians would be wrong, as the "Action and Liberty Army" had saved the embassies not to ignore others but to prevent foreign intervention.[16] Ironically, Talat Bey also said that no just official could have given such an order.[17] The other speeches show that on that day the MPs did not have clear information about very basic issues, like whether martial law had been proclaimed or not.[18] For that reason, the Chamber of Deputies decided to invite Adil Bey on that same day.

When he attended the parliamentary sessions, the first thing Adil Bey did was to read Cevad Bey's first telegram on 1 April. This was a unique moment in Ottoman history: For the first and the last time, an Ottoman bureaucrat appeared before the deputies to make an explanation about the government's responsibility in collective violence against the Armenian population. He

12 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325, 110.
13 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 110.
14 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 112.
15 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 112.
16 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 113.
17 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 115,
18 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 115, 118.

defended his Ministry's words about the issue of foreigners and protested the arguments suggesting that it implied calling for a massacre. He said that the government had performed well.[19] He went on by reading other telegrams from Adana and said that as a bureaucrat, he had to rely on the information given by the Governorate, and he had no authority to overrule that. Also, he talked about the impossibility of identifying the exact number of losses. Concerning martial law, he revealed that there was confusion: Governor Cevad Bey had written that martial law had been declared, and they had approved it. Then, the new governor wrote about the need to proclaim martial law. The government, on the day of Adil Bey's speech, asked whether it had actually been proclaimed or not. The local officials also had to be investigated. Boyacıyan, in response, criticized Adil Bey for ignoring the previous complaints about Cevad Bey. Zohrab Efendi heavily criticized the government for failing to identify the number of losses in fifteen days and added that as there was no information, he had to relay the number of Armenian losses provided by the Greek translator of the French Consulate in Mersin, which was stated as between 20,000 and 30,000. For Zohrab, as all cries for help were coming from Armenians, here, they were the victims.[20] In response to Zohrab Efendi, Adil Bey said that they had taken all necessary measures in a very difficult situation: When the event erupted on Tuesday, the cabinet had already resigned. The new cabinet was formed on the next day. He learned that he had been appointed to the Ministry of Interior, yet he did not accept and resigned in the evening. In order to avoid a cabinet crisis, however, he served as acting Minister of Interior. When he said that they had performed their duty under such a condition, many MPs said bravos.[21] As the polemic between Zohrab Efendi and Adil Bey went on, many Muslim MPs raised their voices to support the undersecretary. Varteks Efendi lost his nerve and said that applauding such a government would mean silencing their voices: The government had to have played a role in the disorder. The shouting increased, and he told the Muslim MPs that "you are right gentlemen, that dead men never want assistance, the killed deserved to die because they are Christians".

19 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 120.

20 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 129-130.

21 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 131.

The deputies continued shouting in protest. After that, both Emrullah Efendi and Aristidi Paşa made calming speeches. Emrullah Efendi underlined the need to wait for the investigation: The telegrams sent from Adana had no importance, as news could be very different than the reality. Aristidi Paşa also made a populist speech emphasizing the brotherhood of all innocent Ottoman nations, putting the blame on both sides' common enemy, Sultan Abdülhamid.[22] In the previous chapter on Antakya, we saw that blaming third parties, such as Abdülhamid or secret sinister forces was functional in coming to an agreement. Here, Aristidi Paşa's closing speech can be seen as a sign of a similar reflex to prevent conflict among the Armenian and Unionist deputies.

Putting the blame on Abdülhamid was also the starting point of some figures that shape the Ottoman Armenian public opinion. Yet, for many Ottoman Armenians, officials in the capital were also responsible for the Massacre. This discourse can be observed in the long declaration of the Armenian Patriarchate, which was made on 19 April, the following day of the parliamentary session. The Patriarchate argued that the Massacre was prepared by Yıldız Palace: After the proclamation of the constitution, only some offending persons in the capital were arrested, so the leader and the gang of despotism had maintained their places of power, and had found the opportunity to prepare for the restoration of the old regime. The Patriarchate had tried to warn the Ministers of Interior, yet what they only did was to inquire local officials about the situation. In response, the officials always denied the facts and blamed Armenians, and gave dubious assurances. The government was confined with appointing the officials, which had only resulted in the transfer of danger from one place to another. Other than Viranşehir, in many towns, such as Bitlis, Bayburd, Trabzon, and Kayseri, rumors that Armenians were preparing for an attack had been fueled to provoke Muslims, a fact which was, beyond doubt, an introduction to the 31 March Coup. After summarizing the events in Adana, the patriarchate concluded that the event was very similar to the Hamidian Massacres, underlining that the massacres in Adana were simultaneous with important breakpoints in İstanbul: The first, with the 31 March Incident, and second, with the Action Army entering İstanbul. At the end of the declaration, the

22 M.M.Z.C., Term1, Volume 3, Session 63, 18 April 1325 133-134.

Patriarchate made eight demands: First, formation of a Court-Martial, whose officers would be drawn from the Action Army; second, delivery of Governor Cevad Bey and General Secretary Adil Bey to the Court-Martial; third, announcement of the first two actions in all cities; fourth, sending a commission composed of reliable persons, including one or two members of the Patriarchate to check the Court-Martial's actions; fifth, dismissal of new Governor Mustafa Zihni Paşa, about whom there was no evidence for his belief in constitutionalism; sixth, return of the looted goods and the forcing of offenders to compensate; seventh, catering to the offended, who had been left without food, water and estate; and eight, providing materials for repairs and rebuilding. The Patriarchate concluded its words by adding that as previous events had shown, leaving the offenders unpunished would indicate that Armenians' lives, honor, and property were "halal" for the offenders.[23]

Troşag, the journal of Dashnaksutiun, also reacted to the events in the Chamber of Deputies immediately and sent a letter of protest, which shows the early signs of conflict over the Massacres between the party on one hand and the CUP and the central bureaucracy on the other: In the session, the Ministry had relied on the false information of the provincial government, and had blamed Armenians as the primary provokers of the Adana Disaster in order to cover up the real murderers. That was an insult. Armenians were not to blame in that massacre, which was carried out by bigoted people under the command of government officials and in the presence of soldiers. So, the party was appealing to the sense of justice within the Chamber of Deputies, and was warning that leaving the murderers unpunished would lead to new disasters.[24]

§ 7.2 The Early Reactions of Officials

The first telegrams and petitions sent by the Muslim notables of Adana show that although the massacres stopped, the rage of the Muslim population in

23 BOA, BEO, 3543/265707-2, from Armenian Patriacrhate to Prime Ministry, April 19 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

24 BOA, DH.MUİ, 130/48, From Troşag, the journal of Dashnakhsutiun Party, to the Presidency of House of Commons. Transmitted to the Ministry of Interior on May 10, 1325.

Adana was still very elevated at the end of April. Through their reports about the events after the massacres, British officials also confirmed the fury. In fact, the agitation among the Muslim commoners reached such a level that some Muslims started to explicitly pronounce their hatred for foreigners. Because of this reason, when a French commander had received orders to evacuate Adana and take with him all French priests and nuns on 16 April, Wylie "begged him privately to leave behind somebody if he could", because he was worrying that the evacuation of Adana by the French "would leave the English and the Americans there isolated", which was "an enormous encouragement to renew the fire and robbery". Wylie also notes that the next day, following the Friday prayer, there had been some preaching in the mosques "on the unwelcome interference of foreigners, and the considerable army that is assembled here to prevent them taking the country." Hearing about this, he told his Turkish friends that "Great Powers do not even remotely contemplate occupation".[25]

In terms of expressing the hatred of Armenians, officials' attitude was not very different from that of the local Muslims: By 17 April, police were parading through the streets with strings of Armenian prisoners.[26] In prisons, torture and ill-treatment was common, and it seems that Armenians were forced to give false testimonies.[27] According to Wylie, "even among the "best of the Turks", there was a "unanimous distrust, and even hatred of Armenians".[28] He was thinking that the safety of Armenian refugees was resting on "Roumeliot

25 PRO, FO 424/219/18455, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 28 April 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 11 May 1909, No. 96.

26 PRO, FO 424/219/18455, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 28 April 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 11 May 1909, No. 96.

27 For a description of the tortures and false testimonies, see Artin Arslanyan, "Adana'da Adalet Nasıl Mahkum Oldu?," in *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor* ed. Ari Şekeryan, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2016), p. 91-93. Arslanyan's claims would be verified by Bizdikyan. See PRO, FO 424/221/36601, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 15 September 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 23 September 1909 (Rec'd 4 October), No. 6.

28 PRO, FO 424/219/17612, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 21 April 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 4 May 1909 (Rec'd 10 May), No. 83.

troops".[29] Yet these troops did not get along well with all Armenians: According to Major Drage, for example, they "could scarcely stifle their repugnance for the Armenians".[30]

On 19 April, Martial Law was proclaimed throughout the province, except the Mersin District.[31] In one week, the Court-Martial committee left for Adana. In addition, it was decided to form a special investigation committee.[32] These measures can be seen as the first signs of increasing central state control. However, the officials were indecisive: It seems that among the statesmen in the capital, there was confusion about defining the series of events in Cilicia. This confusion was reflected in the performance of civilian and military appointees, and therefore, not much progress was made in the first weeks of the aftermath, a fact that can be observed through the reports written by British officials.

Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the commander of the "Regulatory Forces", had arrived earlier, on 17 April.[33] In the previous chapters on Maraş and Zeytun, Mehmed Ali Bey's attitude towards local Muslims and Armenians was observed closely: On one hand, the Hayri Bey Incident showed that he related central state control over the locals with defending constitutionalism passionately. On the other hand, he not only approved the ill-treatment of Armenians in Maraş and Zeytun but also heavily criticized figures like Halil Bey, who was for a dovish policy.

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29 PRO, FO 424/219/18455, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 28 April 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 11 May 1909, No. 96.

30 PRO, FO 424/219/20735, Report by Major Gilbert Drage, "Exmouth" at Mersina,, 10 May 1909, enclosure in From W. Graham Greene to Foreign Office, Admiralty, 2 June (Red'd 3 June) 1909, No. 118.

31 BOA, A.AMD, 1114/49, Record, April 19, 1325. Mersin was the only place where no killings did occur. This was seen as the success of its governor, Esad Rauf Bey. As we will see below, this success would make him appointed to one of the investigation committees. Esad Rauf Bey would return to his Office in Mersin during the War of Independence, and his son Selim Rauf Sarper would later serve as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Turkish Republic.

32 BOA, DH.MKT, 2810/40, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, April 26, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

33 PRO, FO 424/219/21027, From Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe to Admiralty, "Exmouth" at Marmarice, 12 May 1909, enclosure in From W. Graham Greene to Foreign Office, Admiralty, 4 June (Rec'd 5 June) 1909, No. 118.

The British documents show that his attitude towards both groups was the same in Adana. Both soldiers, Wylie and Admiral Curzon-Howe were relatively confident about his abilities in providing security. By the end of April for example, Curzon-Howe noted that he was a man of "firmness and command", since whose arrival the general state of the Governorate "undoubtedly improved". He had "greatest zeal, common sense, and tact."[34] Wylie also noted that Mehmed Ali Bey at first seemed "an intelligent man and a good soldier." However, Wylie also noted that the Colonel "certainly detests Armenians".[35] In those days, Mehmed Ali Bey accepted the local Muslim view wholesale:

> Mehmet Ali Bey again repeated that the real cause of the outbreak was a carefully through-out Armenian plot. The Armenian Bishop Mushech was to be King, with Guerderelian as Commander-in-chief. At Haçin they had actually, he said, raised the Armenian flag and had men in uniform enrolled as soldiers, both there and at Dortyol. They chose the critical moment in Constantinople, and selected Adana, rather than Van or Zeitoun, as their capital, on account of the nearness of the sea. They hoped to provoke foreign interference, which would have been impossible further inland. He agreed with me after a little that perhaps the late Sultan might have seen the opportunity to discredit by massacre any other Government than his own.[36]

When it came to the locals, however, Mehmed Ali Bey was more deliberate as a stranger who knew nobody: When he was warned about the local figures like the Bağdadizade family, he told Wylie that he would find out about it.[37] It

34 PRO, FO 424/219/21027, From Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe to Admiralty, "Exmouth" at Marmarice, 12 May 1909, enclosure in From W. Graham Greene to Foreign Office, Admiralty, 4 June (Rec'd 5 June) 1909, No. 118.

35 PRO, FO 424/219/18455, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 4 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 11 May 1909, No. 96.

36 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 6 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

37 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 6 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

seems that Mehmed Ali Bey's answer to Wylie was not making an empty promise to satisfy the vice-consul temporarily, as within months, his view would change. The disappointments for Mehmed Ali Bey started with his failure in calming down the local Unionists: From the pages of İtidal, for example, we observe that on the day of the first parliamentary discussions, (18 April) Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey invited İhsan Fikri Bey to demand "help in calming down" the situation. İhsan Fikri Bey replied that he had been accused of supporting Armenians because of İtidal's previous issues: He had said that the reason for writing "Safahat-i İhtilal" was to defend the Muslims against slanders in the newspapers of İstanbul and İzmir. After being unmasked, Armenians had panicked. He also added that he would help the commander, yet his refutations would continue.[38]

The report written by Wylie on 25 April shows that the mood of Mehmed Ali Bey and his officers changed in about a week, as he writes that the "Roumeliot officers here are beginning to see more and more the difficulties of their position; they say that there is nobody here they can trust, nobody who is not an intriguer and a fanatic. Reaction is not, I think, likely to take any active shape while they are here, but the whole feeling of the country is or will be against it". The troops still had the potential for going out of control, and seeing that, Mehmed Ali Bey started to send reserve soldiers out of Adana "nearly as fast as he gets them in".[39] The British officials also noted a similar change of attitude by Military Commission officials: When they arrived on 1 May, they seemed to have been convinced that there had been a great Armenian plot. Yet soon, both vice-consul Wylie and American missionaries started to believe that "justice will be done by them", as they were "impressed by the impartiality shown" during their interrogation.[40] Actually, the army officers did not hesitate to show their force to the notables even during these first weeks: For example, in mid-May, they could make two Turks who had

38 "Kuva-yı Mürettebe Kumandanını Ziyaret," *İtidal*, no: 37, 21 April 1325 p. 2-3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 612-613).

39 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 8 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

40 PRO, FO 424/219/20297, From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 25 May 1909 (Rec'd 1 June), No. 115.

threatened Christian witnesses before the court-martial parade through the town with their offenses hung on a scroll around their necks –a decision which produced a "good effect" according to Wylie.[41] In the following pages, we will see that although the soldiers' adherence to impersonal central bureaucracy had shielded them from local notables' influence, their negative attitude towards local Armenians would not ease as much as the foreigners expected. As a result, neither local Muslim notables nor the segments of the Armenian public would be satisfied with their administration.

The other official in power was, naturally, the new Governor of Adana, Mustafa Zihni Paşa, who would be replaced by Cemal Bey soon. Born in 1838, he was a very experienced bureaucrat who had previously served in the cabinet for years. In the Ottoman archives, he appears as a Governor who lacked the instruments to handle the situation properly. However, it seems that it was not only the absence of state means that prevented him: Being a conservative, his handling of the situation in the town was disapproved by Ottoman Armenian public opinion and the foreign diplomats. Complaints about him began almost immediately with his arrival. For example, by 19 April, Wylie reported that:

> The new Vali is also always with a certain fanatical Hodja. He even sends for this man when I go to see him. I know from the Russian dragoman that he has already been trying, through the unpaid dragoman here whose interests are entirely in his hands, to get a declaration that the whole affair was caused by the Armenians and by nobody else.[42]

41 PRO, FO 424/219/22027, From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 8 June 1909 (Rec'd 14 June), No. 128.

42 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 2 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103. The ambassador G. Lowther was also thinking that Mustafa Zihni Paşa's appointment to Adana had something to do with Bağdadizade family, as both had connections with Baghdad. So far, I could not find anything to prove this connection. See PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

A day after the proclamation of martial law (20 April), Governor Mustafa Zihni Paşa invited Muslim and Armenian notables and religious authorities and made a speech. According to İtidal, his speech "made a great impact". On its issue published after that speech, İhsan Fikri published an article titled "Towards Accord" (*İtilafa Doğru*). In the article, he wrote that the public opinion was absolutely sure about the involvement of Yıldız Palace, as the two disorders had occurred simultaneously with the two events in the capital. His concluding words show that putting the blame away from common people was also beneficial for them: "let us, still, pretend that our Armenian citizens had been deceived by Yıldız".[43]

So, we observe that just like the Parliament, locals were for making Abdülhamid the scapegoat, an action instrumental for finding a middle way. However, collusion did not occur. Worse, as the struggle for the definition of the Massacres went on, the tension increased again. This can be observed once again, in İtidal, in which İhsan Fikri went on his "mission" to refute the claims made by the press outside Adana: Even in his article entitled "Towards Accord", İtidal claimed that it was Armenians who either had tried to bring despotism back or had wanted to benefit from the situation: There were neither religious fanatics nor people for despotism in Adana, and all Muslims were for Constitutionalism.[44] By claiming so, İhsan Fikri was refuting his own previous claims about the despotism lovers' existence in Adana. After four days, the newspaper went on: it announced that the hostile articles had forced them to continue to the series of "Safahat-i İhtilal". In that article, İtidal put the blame on "opportunist Armenian notables".[45]

Giving no concession from their position, on 26 April, some Muslim notables, including Bağdadizade Abdülkadir, repeated their claims again: Looking forward to forming an Armenian Kingdom, Armenians had brought in thousands of fedayees in the guise of workers. They gave them arms, and day by day, they increased their threats against and domination over the

43 İhsan Fikri, "Ermeni Hemşehrilerimize: 'İtilafa Doğru'," *İtidal*, no: 37, 21 April 1325 pp. 1-2 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 606-609).

44 "Tekzib," *İtidal*, no: 37, 21 April 1325 p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 624).

45 "Safahat-i İhtilalden Mabad," *İtidal*, no: 38, 25 April 1325 p. 3 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 628).

Muslims of their city, who had no fault except politeness and willingness to get along even during the Armenian rebellions and revolts that had wreaked havoc on Anatolia. They were sincerely for the progress of the motherland, yet their advice and requests to prevent this disaster had been fruitless. Faced with Armenian bullets, Muslim ulema and notables had entered churches and fortified houses and repeated their requests with sweet talks and expressions of grievance. Upon their return, Muslims who had been impatiently waiting for the end of the revolt had applauded them. For the Second Massacre, they wrote that they had left everything to the government, yet Armenians implemented their plan to form their own government through foreign intervention and they had let fly bullets on the soldiers, particularly on those from Rumelia. A that time, the skirmish was between soldiers and Armenian rebels only. Although this was the reality, they were surprised by Armenians' applications to consulates, European authorities, and foreign newspapers to put the blame on Muslims. Armenians were claiming that they were for Ottoman constitutionalism, yet if they were sincere in such, they would not have applied to foreigners: Instead, they would have given consent to the decisions of the state.[46] İtidal also touched upon the issue of appeals to foreigners by Armenians. The newspaper even claimed that the Armenians were assembling in the train stations to arouse sympathy towards themselves. Those actions were showing that Armenians' sense of Ottomanism had died.[47]

Five days after İhsan Fikri's announcement about the resumption of Safahat-i İhtilal, Mehmed Lütfi, the mufti of Adana sent another telegram to the Ministry of Interior in the name of all Muslims: After reading about the parliamentary discussions, they decided to send this telegram. According to him, although their losses were greater than Armenians, they had remained silent, yet it seemed that this was a mistake, because it had resulted in

46 BOA, DH.MUİ, 130/41, From several Muslim notables to Sheik-ul-Islamate, April 26, 1325.

47 On the other hand, it has to be noted that Muslim's opening the door for reconciliation was through blaming a few Armenian provokers and claiming that innocent Armenian population was deceived; which is a very similar discourse with that of Armenians: "And we want to find the blame on a few mean murderers, and to believe that our other Armenian countryman had been carelessly and naively deceived by them." "Osmanlılar İçin Kendi hükümetlerinden Başka Müracaatgah Olmamalıdır," *İtidal*, no: 38, 29 April 1325, p. 1 (Available at *Adana İtidal Gazetesi*, 637-638).

accusations going unanswered. Some MPs had shown such hatred and one-sidedness that they had even disclaimed the temperate words of Cevad Bey, who found it inconvenient to expose Armenian treason thoroughly. Their disinformation was making people say that the Adana Disaster had been caused by fanatic and reactionary Muslims with the aim to bring back despotism. After asking how Muslims, who had suffered from despotism for thirty-three years, could have made such an attempt, he wrote that they were sure that Armenians had caused that revolution in order to establish an imagined Armenia. Probably it was those Armenians who must have been deceived by the bloody Sultan who had wanted despotism's restoration.[48]

While the notables were insisting on their discourse, sufferings of the Cilician Armenians went on, leading to complaints both by the Armenians and the foreigners: This can best be seen in the appointment of Bağdadizade Abdülkadir Bey to the presidency not only of the Turkish Relief Committee but also the Commission of Inquiry. Seeing him as "a notorious robber", "a bitter fanatic", and a man who was "freely accused of having started the massacre", Wylie could only explain his appointments with him being "an old friend of the Vali's". According to Wylie, on the first day of the massacres, Abdülkadir Bey had gone down to the bazaar with twenty armed men, and on his farm, all Armenian cultivators, numbering about 200 and entirely unarmed and helpless, were butchered.[49] Naturally, there seems to have been serious corruptions within both committees: For example, according to an Arab notable employed by Wylie on the Relief Committee, while the loot was being gathered from his quarter, he was told "in the *konak* to pass round the word that all the loot need not be given back, but only a little without value".[50] Wylie had been wounded in that quarter, and so he was perfectly certain that very few Turks had been killed there, "while hundreds of Armenians were

48 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2830/20, 1a, 2a, In the name of Muslim people of Adana, From müfti Mehmed Lütfü to the Ministry of Interior, April 29, 1325.

49 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 2 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103; PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 8 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

50 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 8 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

burnt alive; the women were outraged and then killed. Every house is full of plunder".[51]

The Ottoman Armenian public opinion also raised its voice in response to the first measures taken by the local government. The press published letters from Adana, which complained about the events after the massacre. Azadamard, for example, published a letter written by 25 April, in which it was written that there were great efforts to put the blame on Armenians: In Adana alone, there were about three hundred Armenian prisoners, and the judges were those who had ruined many lives before. Moreover, Abdülkadir (Bağdadizade) was walking around Mersin freely.[52]

On 29 April, Jamanak also published a report of the patriarchate, in which it was complaining that leading perpetrators were walking around freely, whereas Armenians were being faced with heavy persecutions: Armenian women were being kidnapped and being forced to convert to Islam. Reserves were still walking around without their uniforms. Protecting the notables and oppressing the weak were the habits of old despotism, and that was intolerable.[53] The security problems were also confirmed by Wylie. For example, by the end of April he reported that even an Armenian farmer who was under escort had been threatened by "Bashi-Bazouks": In spite of the encouragement of his Turkish bailiff, faced with Muslims threatening "If you go on further you will never come back", the farmer returned to the town emptyhanded. Many similar stories, all of which "utterly despises the Vali's assurances that all was perfectly safe under his protection" had been heard by the vice-consul in those days.[54]

Meanwhile, Governor Mustafa Zihni Paşa was constantly responding to orders for the acceleration of the investigations for which he did not have sufficient cadres and instruments for taking into account the enormity of the event. On 24 April, for example, after one of his telegrams in which he wrote

51 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 8 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

52 BOA, A.VRK, 704/23, 2a, From Pozantiyon: Adana Katliamı.

53 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2831/78, 1a, From 909th issue of the newspaper Jamanak, dated 11 May 1909.

54 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 8 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

that measuring Armenians' misery was too hard, the Prime Ministry responded that it was "regretful" that even after about a month, correct information about the number of losses was still not gathered.[55] On the same day of that warning, Mustafa Zihni Paşa wrote about the first numbers: The total number of Armenian deaths within the whole province was 1,455, whereas Muslims had lost 1,924 lives. There were also 382 Armenian and 533 Muslims wounded. After presenting those "indefinite" numbers, Paşa added that those numbers were estimates. He also underlined that many losses were from other provinces. The Governor also expressed his distrust with the officials: Just like their inability to stop the event, they were unlikely to investigate. The ongoing tension was also preventing the investigation and was heavily affected by the events, both sides were exaggerating their losses. Although he admitted that his numbers were far from the truth, and "really the clash was too heavy and bloody, and as a result, Armenians were more grieved than Muslims", the Armenian claim that there were about thirty thousand losses was also incorrect, as the total Armenian population in Adana was 48,447.[56] The next day, he wrote that he had written everywhere to identify the number of people in need. He also added that he needed some time to establish order: The people were still so terrified that when they faced one another in empty streets, they would worry about a possible attack.[57] The Governor's ciphered telegram cabled three days later told about the difficulties in more detail: After approving the decision to send a special investigative commission, he wrote that the police were still too weak to identify the criminals. The local judiciary was also composed of powerless persons, who were afraid of the possible reaction to an investigation. Plus, whenever an official said something against one side, he was immediately being accused of favoritism. So, it was certain that with the existing local officials, they could not accomplish their mission. The Court-Martial had to investigate and question all officials without exception, and the Commission had to conduct

55 BOA, BEO, 3543/265703, From Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, April 24, 1325, From Prime Ministry Vilayete. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

56 BOA, DH.MKT, 2807/40 from Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 25, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

57 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2830/97, 1a, Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate, April 26, 1325.

mobile investigations throughout the whole countryside. The existing Investigation Committee was reporting that they were not detecting that the event had been caused by Armenians, who were heavily victimized by lootings, murders, and fires. They were working hard to find and return the plundered goods: Many of them had been found, yet they were expecting to find a very small amount of the overall losses.[58]

By 5 May, 104 Muslims and 89 non-Muslims were under arrest.[59] That day, Governor Mustafa Zihni Paşa made new demands to complete the investigation. Before those demands, he did not hesitate to write that everything was being done to turn the European public opinion against the Ottoman Government and Muslims: Moushegh and his friends, in particular, had probably made a fuss. To overcome them, the government had to assure public safety, dish out impartial and fast punishments, and provide the conditions for livelihood, as well as compensations. The Court-Martial was on the investigation, yet the area it was working on was too large. The head of the Court-Martial, Yusuf Kenan Paşa and he were sure that one Court-Martial could not finish the task in a reasonably short time. To overcome that difficulty, additional Court-Martials had to be formed, and some reinforcements had to be sent.[60] The next day, he repeated that demand.[61]

What were the first responses of the central government to the double pressure? We observe that, on one hand, it oppressed the Armenian newspapers to some extent, and on the other, it tried to force the local government to tackle the issues that lead to the complaints in those newspapers. The government believed that the news in the Armenian press was full of untrue exaggerations and that such articles were leading to increasing tensions. So, it decided to temporarily close some of those newspapers, among which was Manzume-i Efkar.[62] Owners of newspapers

58 BOA, DH.MKT, 2810/74 from Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, April 29, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

59 BOA, DH.MKT, 2819/55 from Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 5, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

60 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2835/111, 2a, Ciphered Telegram from Adana Governorate, May 5, 1325.

61 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2835/111, 1a, Ciphered Telegram from Adana Governorate, May 6, 1325.

62 By 4 May, Manzume-i Efkar was closed for eleven days. See BOA, DH.EO, 548/110, May 4, 1325.

allowed to continue printing were invited and warned. The Ministry of Interior was for pushing for more closures. Yet when asked for its opinion, the Prime Ministry wrote that it was impossible to close all those newspapers: The owners were to be invited and warned once again.[63] On 16 May, Manzume-i Efkar was officially warned by the Prime Ministry.[64] After just ten days, it was closed for a period of four months.[65] Pozantiyon was also halted from 28 May to 9 June.[66]

But the claims in those newspapers were not totally ignored. About the same days, the Ministry of Interior explicitly ordered the persons who were listed as criminals by those newspapers to be interrogated. For example, as early as 28 April, it ordered the Adana Governorate to investigate Abdülkadir's doings.[67] On 2 May, it asked about the articles of İhsan Fikri.[68] One week later, the Ministry sent a list of persons who were claimed to be perpetrators of the massacre. The list was published by the newspaper Tsayn Hayrenyats, which claimed that it was prepared by Kigork Arslanyan and Serkis Suin, two priests sent by the Patriarchate. Other than old Governor Cevad Bey and Commander Mustafa Remzi Paşa, there were many Muslim notables on the list, such as Bağdadizade Abdülkadir and his son Abdurrahman, Gergerli Ali, İhsan Fikri, Debbağzade Hacı Ali and his son Ragıb, Police Commissar Zor Ali, old Alaybeyi Hüseyin Daim, Bosnalı Salih and others. It was also written by the newspaper that while those men were walking free, about a hundred Armenians were arrested and put in chains: The reactionaries were totally in control of Adana.[69]

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63 BOA, DH.MKT, 2817/85, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, May 6, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

64 BOA, DH.MKT, 2827/30, 1a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, May 16, 1325.

65 "Teotig Yıllığı" in Zabel Yesayan, Yıkıntılar Arasında, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2014), 299.

66 Simonyan, *The Destruction of the Armenians in Cilicia, April 1909,* 164; BOA, DH.MKT 2838/98, 1b, from the Ministry of Interior to the Action Army Headquarters, 28 May 1325.

67 BOA, DH.MKT, 2808/72 from the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, April 28, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

68 BOA, DH.MKT, 2812/14 from the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, May 2, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

69 BOA, DH.MKT, 2820/82, 4a, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, May 9, 1325. That article was also published by Tan.

On 12 May, Governor Mustafa Zihni Paşa answered the questions about the arrests of Muslim notables: He wrote that he had warned Armenian notables and priests several times, including the ones sent by the Patriarchate for the investigation, that they had to specify the names of Muslim notable perpetrators. There were unsigned notifications, yet they did not openly make an official accusation. Concerning the numbers, he wrote that it was a lie that there were fifty thousand casualties. The real number was less than ten thousand, yet because all governorate officials were powerless men, he could not identify the true number. He finished his words by writing that the "fuss" (*yaygara*) would go on until the last Armenian arrestee remained.[70] The next day, the Governor cabled another ciphered telegram, in which he reminded the immigrant workers' factor: Each year, about fifty to sixty workers were coming to the province, and many workers had come that year too. Therefore, identifying the exact number of losses was very hard. He wanted the Ministry of Interior not to hurry; he was for reaching as accurate a number as possible.[71]

In short, the newly appointed officials were representing two policies during the first weeks after the massacres: On one hand, there were army officers who arrived at the town with the idea of an Armenian uprising in their mind. Their ability to keep themselves away from the notables' influence started to change their position, but not by much. On the other hand, although the Governor tried to present himself as a person who lacked the necessary instruments (which was absolutely true), he tended to cooperate with Muslim notables, who continued to claim that there had been an Armenian uprising. So, the unmet requirements seem to have been partially instrumental for Mustafa Zihni Paşa to cover up his close relations with them. Therefore, as early as 25 April, Wylie started to believe that the Paşa should be dismissed, as "nothing good can be expected" of him.[72] In fact, in a few weeks, that was exactly what the CUP would do by appointing Cemal Bey, the future Cemal Paşa to the governorate.

70 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2834/26, Ciphered Telegram from Adana Governorate May 12, 1325.

71 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2834/12, Ciphered Telegram from Adana Governorate May 13, 1325.

72 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 8 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

§ 7.3 The Second Round: Commissions and First Executions

Two developments during late spring signaled a new phase of the struggle over the interpretation of the Massacres. One of them was the arrival of Armenian authorities from the capital, such as the Patriarchate commission and most notably Hagop Babikian, the Unionist MP of Tekfurdağı and member of the Joint Investigation Commission, which included two high ranking officials, another Unionist MP of Sinop (Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşek]) and Esad Rauf Bey, the District Governor of Mersin. With their arrival, the conflict between the Muslim notables and the Armenian political elite became much more serious. The reason for the conflict was that with the arrival of Babikian, the notables faced claims on the other extreme for the first time: While they were continuing their claims about the Armenian plot, Babikian would come to the conclusion that Armenians were absolutely innocent.

During this conflict, the position of army officers and vice-consul Wylie occupied the middle: For example, according to Wylie, by 3 July:

> No one in authority now thinks that the Armenians were prepared for a rising or to declare their independence. The idea is rather that they were agitating politically for decentralisation, and were perhaps plotting a real rising later on in the year. Among the Hodjas and the ordinary Turks there is still a firm belief that the Armenians were in rebellion, but neither the court-martial nor Kemal Bey would maintain this.[73]

The officials also believed that there was "no excuse for the horrible atrocities committed" in the villages. But they were thinking differently about the self-defense within Adana: There, they believed that Armenians had begun the shooting and that they were responsible. Among them, even Esad Rauf Bey, the District Governor of Mersin whose performance and objectivity during and after the massacres were praised by many and some Armenians, such as

73 PRO, FO 424/220/29785, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 19 July 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 4 August 1909 (Rec'd 9 august), No. 43.

Prelate Seropian and Gökdereliyan were blamable.[74] It seems that British vice-consul Wylie was in agreement with the officials about the reality of, at least, some faults made by Armenian notables in the town, as he openly wrote that:

> Babikyan says that the Armenians gave no cause for massacre. This is true enough, for in no circumstances can massacre be justified. But if he means as he seems to mean that there were no faults on the Armenian side, he goes too far. Considering the country and the people, there was certainly provocation in the violent and insulting language which was all too common. There remains too the propaganda for the buying of arms… As to Bishop Mushech, whom Babikyan declares to be innocent, he may be a much maligned man. He can be proved to have toured his province exhorting his flock and others to buy arms at any price, and if he was not a dangerous man, why did his own people ask me to keep him away from Adana?[75]

So, when the Court-Martial had sentenced four Muslims and six non-Muslims to death by mid-May, the Armenian public opinion was frustrated.[76] The Armenian political and religious elites tried to get the sentences canceled. For example, on 23 May, Troşag sent a telegram from Geneva, demanding of the "Islamic justice of Government" the prevention of Armenians' execution and stating his belief that the Prime Ministry would be impartial: Some Armenians could be accused of defending themselves overzealously, yet they could not be the provokers of the massacre. Instead, the real provokers should be punished.[77]

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74 PRO, FO 424/219/23148, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 4 June 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 17 June 1909 (Rec'd 21 June), No. 140.

75 PRO, FO 424/220/29785, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 19 July 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 4 August 1909 (Rec'd 9 august), No. 43.

76 BOA, BEO, 3562/267093, Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, May 16, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

77 BOA, A.VRK, 705/68, Translation of the telegram from Armenian Committee called Troşak in Geneva to Prime Ministry, June 5, 1909.

Another example is the reaction of Babikian, who visited Wylie privately after hearing about the death sentences, and said that the Court-Martial had already made up its mind "to put all the blame on Armenians." According to Wylie, Babikian was so hopeless that he considered giving up on his mission and returning to the capital.[78] He demanded the executions be postponed, yet Kenan Paşa, the head of the Court-Martial, responded to him harshly: He complained that the Commission was interfering in the Court's acts by writing some demands against their decisions to the Prime Ministry. The Court had always taken the principal of equality seriously. If such one-sided interferences would go on, then the Court could not work properly. And to provide order, their decisions should be executed immediately.[79]

Mustafa Zihni Paşa followed Kenan Paşa the next day: He cabled the Prime Ministry and noted that "although Armenians indeed had suffered an extreme cruelty without a doubt",[80] acquitting the Armenian persons who had dared to kill the Muslim population would have a very bad impact on many Muslims. They could not demand that all Armenians go completely unpunished by stating that they were defending their lives. They also believed that they had defended themselves. Interestingly, the Governor added that he had previously told the Court-Martial that "at the first action, more Muslims than non-Muslims should be punished".[81] In any case, for the Governor, because the number of Muslim offenders was much higher than the Armenians, the results would be the same. Yet as the conflict had started between the Court-Martial and Armenians, Mustafa Zihni Paşa asked for the

78 PRO, FO 424/219/23148, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 4 June 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 17 June 1909 (Rec'd 21 June), No. 140.

79 BOA, BEO, 3570/267681, Ciphered telegram from Kenan Paşa, the President of Adana Court-Martial, dated May 24, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*). In spite of this reaction, according to Babikyan, the Court-Martial had assured that "the next batch of fifteen" were to be all Turks from the villages. See PRO, FO 424/219/23148, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 4 June 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 17 June 1909 (Rec'd 21 June), No. 140.

80 "*Hakikatte her ne kadar Ermeniler son bir derece-i gaddaranede mağdur olduklarında şübhe yoksa da*"

81 Most probably, the Muslim number of prisoners of death was increased from four to nine because of that reason.

Prime Ministry's opinion.[82] The Prime Minister reminded the need for an exemplary punishment, which would end and dispel the doubts about the government's justice and neutrality. The position and dignity of the country would be furthered in that way. The Prime Ministry informed that it ordered the execution of six Armenian and nine Muslim prisoners on death row.[83]

The Ministry of Interior cabled Mustafa Zihni Paşa the next day, on 26 May. In it, the Ministry sincerely expressed its admiration of the Governor's work in Adana, yet explained the reasons behind its insistence on demanding the number of losses in more detail: Armenian newspapers and foreigners affected by Armenian Committees were causing public agitation through false accusations. Based on those figures, even the Patriarchate was engaging in the same. In order to refute them, a perfect investigation was needed. Delay was having a bad impact both within and without. True, the gravity of the work and limited instruments were preventing them from reaching quick conclusions; yet lacking a principal conclusion after such a long time was leading to comments that the government was hiding the truth. Some demands of the Governor had been met: The judicial officials had been replaced, and a second Court-Martial committee was on its way. Concerning the losses, the Ministry noted that the identified numbers could be one or two hundred more or less than actual and that would not be that important. The difference between the number given by the Governorate (more than five thousand) and the Armenian claim, which was about forty and fifty thousand was evident. However, the concluding words from the Governorate's previous telegram, stating that the number was below ten thousand was causing doubts. In writing that, the Ministry was referring to Mustafa Zihni Paşa's statement that all officials were powerless persons, so the real number had not been identified yet. Finally, the Ministry warned the Governor that the number of losses could be increased by a little from then on, but if it was possible that

82 BOA, BEO, 3568/267534, Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, May 25, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

83 BOA, BEO, 3568/267534, Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, May 25, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

another five thousand could be added later, then, needless to say, the ongoing investigation would be regarded as a sham.[84]

Immediately after the execution orders, the Patriarchate and Babikian made their last attempts to stall them. The Patriarchate forwarded the local Armenians' claims that the prisoners on death row were not murderers but honorable and loyal persons, and warned that execution of innocent people would be another disaster. Babikian also criticized the investigations: while the murderers' testimonies were accepted as proofs, the information provided by neutral American missionaries was being ignored.[85]

On 28 May, those six Armenians and nine Muslims were executed in Adana.[86] The next day, the Prime Ministry cabled the governorates, ordering them to announce the executions as an object lesson.[87] The executions led to fresh trauma in the Armenian public. Among the executed, Kasab Misak especially became a symbol of Armenian innocence for them. According to Garabed Chalian, Misak had been among the many who had been tortured to give false testimonies.[88] Artin Arslanyan also mentions Misak as a victim, writing that he had been with his family throughout the Massacre.[89] Also, in her famous book "*Among the Ruins*", Zabel Yesayan writes that she had met with Misak's poor mother, and adds that as Misak was being brought to the gallows, he had sung a very sad song that had even affected the soldiers. Yesayan added that Misak had deserved punishment, not for the crimes he was accused but for not joining the resistance, for behaving like a coward.[90] Misak's reaction shows that, in stark contrast to the Muslim perspective,

84 BOA, DH.MKT, 2835/88, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, May 26, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

85 BOA, A.VRK, 706/16, From Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, May 27, 1325.

86 BOA, BEO, 3560/266965, From Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, to the Ministry of War, My 28, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

87 BOA, BEO, 3572/267892, From Prime Ministry to all Governorates and Autonomous Districts, May 29, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

88 Garabet Çalyan, "Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri," 66.

89 Artin Arslanyan, "Adana'da Adalet Nasıl Mahkum Oldu?," in *1909 Adana Katliamı: Üç Rapor* ed. Ari Şekeryan, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2016), 95.

90 Zabel Yesayan, *Yıkıntılar Arasında*, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2014), 29, 149 150.

Armenian resistance was seen and hailed as an act of self-defense in the eyes of the large segments of the Ottoman Armenian public. This perspective can be seen in the summaries provided by Yesayan: For example, according to her, the Armenians in Adana town had fought "like lions".[91] Also, she repeatedly noted that the successful resistances had made their nation proud, like the ones in Sis, Haçin and Kars.[92]

Most probably motivated by the sentiment that they proved able to help each other after a massacre for the first time,[93] many Armenian public figures did its best to prevent any criminal sanction. This can be seen in the frustration of the Armenians in Adana after the execution: Religious leaders of Gregorian, Catholic, and Protestant Armenians, Ancient Assyrians, Assyrian and Greek Catholics, and Chaldeans protested the executions: Christians had suffered without reason during the massacre. Their hopes for continued residence and assurance were bound to the Court-Martial's justice, yet its actions up until that point had destroyed these hopes. Instead of provocateurs, ordinary criminals were being searched for. For many Muslims, the accused and executed were ignorant Muslims who had obeyed the orders. And among the Christian convicts and executed there were those who were either slandered or who had legitimately defended themselves. The Court-Martial was definitely following a policy of condemning Christians. They concluded their words by writing "Now then, to whom should we cry about our sufferings, with what should we assure and console our helpless communities? For the sake of God, show mercy".[94]

Babikian also reacted very heavily in his telegram to the Prime Ministry: He noted that he was in complete agreement with the Christian religious leaders in Adana. Anticipating the result of the Court-Martial's actions, he had applied for the postponement of executions, yet he had been ignored. That was because the Court-Martial was not carrying out its primary mission,

91 Ibid., 122.

92 Ibid., 165, 168, 175.

93 Ibid., 70.

94 "*Şu halde derdimizi kime ağlayalım, biçare cemaatimizi ne ile te'min ve tesellî edelim; Allah aşkına merhamet buyurunuz!..*" BOA, DH.MKT, 2852/32, June 4, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

which was to judge Muslim notables immediately and leave the judgment of ordinary crimes to regular courts. Yet it had failed to do so in the two months that had passed: Instead, relying on the testimonies of most evil people like Bağdadizade and civilian and military officials who had joined the attackers, it was investigating an Armenian uprising and oppressing the Armenians who had defended their lives. The Court had become even crueler after the executions, and more and more Armenians were emigrating. He concluded his words by saying that that was a last warning.[95] Most probably to avoid the tension between the two sides, the parliament considered sending another MP from a different community to Adana to take part in the inspecting committee. Emmanuel Karasu, the Jewish MP from the CUP was chosen for the task. However, he never did go to the town, because the committee declared that it had finished its work.[96]

§ 7.4 The Third Round: Official Records and Reports, Showdown and Taking Moderate Measures

By mid-June, it was heard that the record to be announced by the Court-Martial was going to mention an organized Armenian separatist attempt as one reason behind the massacre.[97] Learning that, both the mufti of Adana and Adana MPs continued their pressures to release arrested Muslims by pointing that their claims had been proven.[98] Christian religious leaders, on the other hand, wrote that they strongly protest the accusations that they had revolted: Since despotism, they had been loyal subjects, and committed in the struggle to defend the new regime. They had not revolted. Instead, they were attacked by forces of despotism and reaction. At the end of the event, they had appealed to the government and had joined them on the first occasion. They were ready

95 BOA, BEO, 3580/268490, 2a, 3a, From Hagop Babikyan to Prime Ministry, June 8, 1325.

96 BOA, BEO, 3583/268717, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, June 12, 1325; BOA, ŞD, 2789/13, 3a.

97 BOA, DH.MKT, 2861/27 from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War, June 17, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

98 BOA, DH.MKT, 2861/28 from the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, June 17, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*),.

to do anything for the salvation of the fatherland, and they were not seeking revenge. Their demand from all Muslim citizens was union and alliance, and revival of the fraternity which had been observed at the time of the proclamation of liberty. They sincerely loved their sultan, their Young Turk brothers, the Committee of Union and Progress, Action Army, and all Ottomans loyal to Constitutionalism.[99]

At the end of June, two conflicting reports were presented to the public. The first one was the record of the First Court-Martial and the second was the Joint Investigation Commission report. The long record of the Court-Martial, declared on 24 June, was both a summary of the course of events and an analysis that angered Armenians. The second report of the Joint Investigation Commission had a different approach than the Court-Martial: It was relatively objective, and as a result, it was targeted for criticism by local Muslims.

The Court-Martial record started with the rejection of claims prevalent in Armenian public opinion -that the 31 March Incident and the Adana "Disorder" had been prepared by the same agent: The Court-Martial wrote that there was no evidence proving the link between the two. After underlining that point in the introduction, the Court-Martial record begins to tell the story of the last years of the old regime: Under the rule of Bahri Paşa, the Muslim people were oppressed by the influential ones and the officials, yet as they remained the ruling nation (*millet-i hakime*) and because of their ignorance, they had not reacted. Armenians, on the other hand, "instead of coming to their senses after the disciplinary slap in their face in the year 311" (*üç yüz on bir senesi[nde] yedikleri sille-i te'dîbden uslanacakları yerde*), continued their efforts for independence. Seeing that foreign powers had very limited interests in provinces like Bitlis and Van, they decided to concentrate their efforts on Adana, where those powers' intervention could have led to their separation from the Ottoman Empire. They had brought many Armenians to the province, and in six years, the Armenian population had increased by 48%. They also had brought in many weapons through Cyprus and Beirut. After the proclamation of liberty, they paused, especially after seeing that England, their primary protector in their eyes, supported the

99 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2852/132, 1a, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, June 18, 1325.

Ottoman government. Muslims, having no hatred against any nation, had embraced non-Muslims. However, Armenians' wish to benefit from liberty and equality excessively and too freely was not welcome. Moreover, the formation of Hnchak, Dashnak, and Troşag clubs throughout the province had cast doubts.[100]

For the Court-Martial, while the ordinary Muslims had remained docile before and after the revolution, Armenians had a clear program of revolution and foreign intervention that would have led to a new Armenian state. After pointing out that difference, the report went on with the continuities in the provincial bureaucracy and further Armenian actions: After the revolution, some officials were eliminated, yet the running of the governorate had not been placed in powerful hands. Instead, Cevad Bey, a powerless governor who had been raised under despotism continued local government as it had been. So, the Muslim and Armenian people had gotten corrupted day by day. Armenians and Prelate Moushegh first and foremost had made violent speeches. They had published pictures of fedayees and Armenian kings and badges. Muslims, on the other hand, had been divided into two parties, whose conflict intensified because of the aims of İhsan Fikri Bey, the previous director of the Adana Industry School. Also, both nations had purchased arms massively and had fired them often. The gun traders had fueled rumors about a possible conflict to sell said guns. As the Governorate arrested Muslim shooters and release Armenian ones, the Muslims had resented, and their dissent had grown in time. After talking about those conflicts in detail, the report went on by describing the happenings during the Massacre. In that summary, what comes forward first is the Governorate's failure to control reserve soldiers and the common people. Second, the Court-Martial pointed to the lack of disciplinary measures after the Hamidian Massacres, which had made some Muslims believe that their potential offenses would go unpunished. Therefore, they committed terrible things: The Court accepted that what Muslims had done was very bloody, brutal, inhumane, and savage. It also summarized how passive all top officials had been. And after the event, all they had done was to arrest and question Armenians, innocent and guilty

100 BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, Adana Court-Martial Record, June 24, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

alike, under ridiculous accusations. The Ministry of Interior had also ignored the police and gendarme organization of the province. For the Court-Martial, the ones responsible for the regretful event were, first and foremost, the Ministry of Interior, Governor Cevad Bey, Prelate Moushegh, Armenian revolutionaries, İhsan Fikri and his friends, Gergerizade Ali and his supporters, Abdülkadir Efendi, the Gendarme Commander, Police Director Kadri Bey, Adana Reserve Battalion Commander Remzi Paşa, and other security and judicial officials at the Governorate center.[101]

Both nations, according to the Court-Martial, had understood their mistakes, and as a result, they were blaming each other, claiming that the other side was completely responsible. The Court rejected both accusations in the record: There had been preparations made by some Armenians, but many Armenians and Muslims had protected their neighbors from their own communities. So, calling all Armenians enemies of the state or treating all Muslims as bigots and cruel would both be unjust. In short, the reason behind the event was some Armenians' revolutionary ideas, their attempt to take advantage of the Constitution in an insolent manner, the government's extreme weakness, and Muslim people's revolt against both the government and Armenians, especially because of their ignorance.[102]

The record concluded with the Court's suggestions for punishments: There were so many applications that even ten Court-Martials could not finish investigating all in one or two years; and the continuation of Martial Law would result in many more death sentences and other punishments of the children of the motherland. Furthermore, the perpetrators were so many in number that punishing all would result in turning all villages and towns into prisons by fencing them in. It would involve executing at least five or six hundred persons, which would amount to another massacre and loss of manpower. However, the punishments made so far were not enough either. So, the state had to confine itself to punishing the most terrible murderers and Armenian revolutionaries only. And it had to reconcile both communities on

101 BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, Adana Court-Martial Record, June 24, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

102 BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, Adana Court-Martial Record, June 24, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

the anniversary of the proclamation of liberty, 10 June.[103] That day, the Court-Martial also sentenced Moushegh Seropian to death: According to the Court, it was proven that he encouraged people to buy arms so that they would have revolted, resisted and called for a foreign intervention that would lead to the formation of an independent Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia.[104] Also, the Second Court-Martial decided to send Karabet Gökdereliyan into exile at Benghazi for life.[105] So, although the Court-Martial put the blame on bureaucrats and notables from both sides, it was in agreement with the local Muslim community about the fact that Armenian revolutionaries' acts were the main reason behind the event.

The Joint Investigation Commission report followed the Court-Martial record three days later. In the absence of two MPs, Yusuf Kemal Bey and Babikian Efendi, it was signed by the members of the bureaucracy. The importance of the report lies not only in its differences from the Court-Martial record but also in that it contains certain information that has not been detected in other sources so far. Unlike the record, which included an analysis of the situation in the old regime, the report's starting point is the conflict among Adana's Muslim elites, which was summarized above. The report makes an important contribution to our knowledge about the conflict between self-proclaimed Young Turks and old notables by stating that Gökdereliyan Karabet, the famous Armenian notable, had been on the side of the older second group: While İhsan Fikri was against Governor Cevad Bey, "Gergeri Ali team, including the famous Gökdereliyan" was for him. This is very surprising because as an Armenian notable, one can assume that he should have been closer to İhsan Fikri's side during this conflict. Yet it seems the fact that he was among the older generation of notables was more determining. Therefore, just like Kayseri, Maraş, and Zeytun, the towns that show us very limited but certain clues about intra-Armenian struggles, a very

103 BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, Adana Court-Martial Record, June 24, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

104 BOA, BEO, 3621/271525, From the Ministry of War to Prime Ministry, June 30, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

105 BOA, BEO, 3661/274503, From Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, October 17, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

similar fact, which might have been overshadowed by the Massacres may also have been at play in Adana.[106]

Another important difference of the report compared to the Court-Martial record was the absence of the twin conspiracy idea: that Armenians had secretly been for an independent Armenia, and that there was a certain plan of counterrevolutionaries. The Commission explained the massacre mainly through the series of mistakes made by the provincial government, such as being very passive and spreading the news of the first conflict by cabling the districts, using the word disorder *(iğtişaş)* to describe the situation in Adana which had previously been used to refer to Armenian "revolts".[107] A particularly important result of the government's passivity was the failure to control mounting tensions, leading to the emboldening of both Armenians and despotic ignorant Muslim people.

Apart from highlighting Gökdereliyan's position, another very important and unique contribution of the report concerns the position of self-proclaimed Young Turks during the days just prior to the Massacres. The report says that as the famous triggering event of the murder of two Muslims increased the tension further, a large group of Muslims invited the government to perform its duty with the opposition party's (Young Turk group's) encouragement. The group even insulted the government to force the Governor to resign.[108] Since scholars search for the position of the local Young Turks to interpret as a sign of their party's position on the Armenian question at that time, this claim is very significant. We are certain that İhsan Fikri's positions against Armenians and against the old Muslim notables before and after the Massacres were completely different. Yet, it was looking like the shift had occurred as a result of a sincere but inaccurate reading of Armenian

106 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 from Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, 27 June 325.

107 For the usage of the concept iğtişaş in anti-Armenian movements, see Edip Gölbaşı, "The Official Conceptualization of the Anti-Armenian Riots of 1895-1897," 37. The concept is not seen in ethnic riots that erupted in Albania and Lebanon during Tanzimat. See Maurus Reinkowski, *Düzenin Şeyleri, Tanzimat'ın Kelimeleri: 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Reform Politikasının Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırması*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2017).

108 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 from Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, 27 June 325.

revolutionary actions: After the first gunshots by Armenian revolutionaries, they seem to have become convinced of their secret intentions. However, the Commission points to a different possibility: Perhaps, it was not the gunshots that triggered the Massacres but their opportunism that was behind the shift in the Young Turks' position. Bringing up Armenian revolutionary resistance after the fact as an excuse could have been instrumental for their strategy to use it as an opportunity to shift the balance of power in their favor.

The Commission's estimate of the losses was much larger than that of the local government: While the population records were pointing to 1,487 Muslim and 4,196 non-Muslim deaths, the total number seemed to be near 15,000 according to the Commission. The writers concluded their report with a list of suggestions; first, placing the provincial government in strong hands; second, forming a new judiciary very similar to the ones in Rumelia; third, some reforms in the gendarmerie and police; fourth, deploying regular troops permanently; fifth, forming gendarme stations; sixth, reorganizing the administration units of Cebel-i Bereket District, which includes turning Dörtyol, an almost completely Armenian populated village, into the capital of a new subdistrict; and seventh, turning Mersin into an autonomous district. According to the Commission, the number of persons that had caused the Massacres was very few; and instead of punishing ignorant people, the Court should dish out exemplary punishments to those few provokers. Among the commissioners, Artin Efendi, the Judicial Inspector of Salonica, also added that some facts in the report were proofs of reaction.[109]

These orders did not result in putting an end to the conflict. On the contrary, during July, pressure from both sides reached its highest level: During that month, first, the Patriarchate reacted to the new threats and attempts to pardon the offenders; second, an interview with Babikian led to a great Muslim reaction in Adana, with repercussions including the Court-Martial's resignation. That was followed by the resignation of the Patriarch to protest the government's tendency to accept placing the blame on Armenians. These reactions by the Armenian side forced the government to follow a more

109 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/66 from Joint Investigation Commission of Adana to Prime Ministry, 27 June 325.

moderate policy. It publicly declared that the Armenians had been innocent, and replaced Governor Mustafa Zihni Paşa with Cemal Bey.

On 25 June, Tasvir-i Efkâr published an interview with Babikian. That interview irritated the officials and the Muslim public opinion in Adana. In the interview, Babikian stated that European newspapers' reports on the Massacres were not exaggerations. He added that reactionaries and despotism were the two main causes of the event: Even after the first celebrations, by August, constitutionalism was targeted as a Christian phenomenon, increasing the hatred against them. For Babikian, neither Abdülhamid nor İzzet Paşa had caused the events, as reactionary and despotic tendencies had already been existent in Adana. Babikian rejected all accusations against Armenians: The incidents had not been caused by them, there had not been an intention to establish a Cilician state, and Prelate Moushegh Efendi had played no role. For him, it was quite the opposite: He had warned the Governor in January about the possibility of an incident.[110]

Babikian also provided some details which would be denied by both the Governor and the Court-Martial. He stated that according to the report of the Governor, there were 20,008 deaths in total. 620 of them were Muslims, and the others were non-Muslims, most of whom were Armenians. The Court-Martial, on the other hand, was employing Sisliyan Avedis, an informer from the Hamidian era, as the investigating judge. Moreover, it was taking wrong decisions, such as condemning an Armenian, Keşişyan, a person whose innocence had been testified to by many, to death.[111]

Interestingly, Wylie, the British vice-consul, reported that many of his statements were untrue. On 3 July, he denied some remarks of Babikian, and reported that his account of Wylie being wounded "which he professes to have had from my own lips, is purely imaginary". That was "of a piece with much

110 "Edirne Mebusu Agop Babikyan Efendi ile Mülakat", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, no. 39, 25 June 1325, pp. 1-2.

111 "Edirne Mebusu Agop Babikyan Efendi ile Mülakat", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, no. 39, 25 June 1325, pp. 1-2.

of the graver parts of his statement", and "his wisest course is to deny the interview altogether".[112] Wylie was thinking that

> Babikyan's facts are in some cases wrong, which is to the last degree unfortunate. He had a good case, but his inaccuracy has spoilt it. Every misstatement will be held up as the result of relying on Armenian priests, with whom Babikyan principally consorted. It will be held up as a type of their work of those unscrupulous and dishonest people (I speak as a Turk). The men who are supposed to have prompted Babikyan will be called liars, traitors, and slanderers. They in their turn will reply with murderer and robber, and peace and prosperity will be further off than ever.[113]

It seems that Wylie's prediction about new quarrels would be proven accurate in a very short time. On the day of the interview, the Prime Ministry asked the Governor about the numbers given by Babikian.[114] In reply, the Governor restate the impossibility of identifying the exact number, and added that it could be the unproven number given by the Deputy Prelate.[115] The First Court-Martial officers lost their temper after seeing the interview. On 6 June, they wrote very heavy words for Babikian: In his interview, which was full of accusations, there were no true points at all. He tried to blame Muslims fully and cover up the Prelate's doings, and present Armenians' murders as self-defense. It was Babikian himself who was one-sided, and his words about

112 PRO, FO 424/220/29785, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 19 July 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 4 August 1909 (Rec'd 9 August), No. 43.

113 PRO, FO 424/220/29785, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 19 July 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 4 August 1909 (Rec'd 9 august), No. 43.

114 BOA, BEO, 3621/271522, From Prime Ministry to Adana Governorate, June 25, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

115 BOA, BEO, 3621/271522, From Adana Governorate to Prime Ministry, June 27, 1325.

Sisliyan and Keşişyan were totally false.[116] That day, the First Court-Martial officers resigned in protest.[117]

Some Muslim locals also reacted heavily to Babikian's interview: On the same day of the resignation, they went to the Governorate to complain about him.[118] Also, İhsan Fikri cabled the Prime Ministry on that day. His telegram was full of heavy words: He had been under arrest for five days by the order of the cabinet. His only fault was his publications that had defended the rights of Islam, soldiers' and the government's honor, and his understanding was that in order to consolidate its power, the cabinet wanted to win the sympathy of this-and-that. The release of Asaf Bey proved that Babikian was slandering them, and even if Babikian was not ashamed of that release, it was a dishonor for the cabinet. It was not them but Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, who had also caused the 31 March Incident, who sparked the Adana Incident, because he had ignored the Governorate's warnings and had not sent enough forces. İhsan Fikri threatened the government by adding that a constitutionalist cabinet would investigate their actions in the future. Addressing the ministers once again, he added that the end of Abdülhamid, who had been their benefactor, was a cautionary example. İhsan Fikri concluded his protest by writing that he was demanding justice, which was broken by the despotic government with the aim of satisfying "the liar" Babikian.[119] Bağdadizade Abdülkadir Efendi also wrote to the Ministry of Interior and denied Babikian's claims.[120] In addition, Faik Bey, the member of the Investigation Committee, criticized Babikian in his interview published in Tasvir-i Efkar. Soon, Babikian would

116 BOA, BEO, 3607/270490, July 6, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

117 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2842/20, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, July 6, 1325. The government would not accept their resignation, and the First Court-Martial would continue working. See PRO, FO 424/220/30766, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 28 July 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 11 August 1909 (Rec'd 16 august), No. 51.

118 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2842/20, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, July 6, 1325.

119 BOA, BEO, 3626/271945, From İhsan Fikri to the Presidency of House of Commons, July 6, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

120 BOA, DH.MKT, 2881/51, From Bağdadizade Abdülkadir to the Ministry of Interior.

admit in another interview that the previous interview had been made as soon as he had returned from Adana, and he also had noticed several misinterpretations. Yet he had been so tired that he had not asked for the correction of the mistakes that were not essential to the problem.[121]

Most probably because of the Babikian affair, the Muslim notables' wrath would fall once again upon the Armenians. On 4 July, the Patriarchate wrote to the Prime Ministry, complaining about some Muslims' open threats and a declaration made by the Presidency of the House of Commons: There had initially emerged some hope for justice, yet news from Adana and the declaration had made them lose their hopes. In its declaration, the Presidency had dared to claim that the Massacres had been caused by the hostility between two communities, which was both slander and an insult against the oppressed people's sacred feelings. This slander was covering up the provokers' crimes. Worse, the Presidency had written about a general amnesty in honor of the first anniversary of the revolution on 10 July. The sad point was that in their meeting with the two commissioners of the patriarchate, Muslim notables had not even refrained from threatening them with another massacre. Thousands of Armenians had lost their hopes and had taken the risk of emigrating to Russia by converting to orthodoxy, and new emigration caravans to America had appeared again. If the leaders of reaction would escape justice, then reactionaries would provoke people, even soldiers, for new massacres in other provinces of Anatolia. After that threat of the notables, the agitation had reached such a level that the patriarchate could not cool it down.[122] It seems that together with the refusal of the amnesty offer of the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, Babikian's interview played a role in the increasing tension which escalated further with Muslims' threats, as vice-consul Wylie noted that an "ugly rumour was passed round, prior to the fête of the constitution, to the effect that if there was no amnesty the Turks would kill as many Christians as they could to emphasize their disagreement with

121 Tasvir-i Efkar, 9 July 1909, 31 July 1909, cited by Sahara, *What Happened in Adana in April 1909*, 24.

122 BOA, A.AMD, 1124/76, from Armenian Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, July 4, 1325.

the views of Babikian. This story sufficed to send half Adana in terror to Mersina".[123]

Just before presenting his report in the Chamber of Deputies, on 19 July, Babikian lost his life in İstanbul. It was announced that he had a heart attack, but the timing of his death led to speculations about the possibility of murder. On one side, some Armenians were believing that Babikian was killed by the Muslims who did not want his report to be announced in public. On the other hand, some Muslims were implying that he was murdered by Armenian Revolutionaries. For example, Yusuf Kemal Bey, his partner in the commission, would later write in his memoirs that he had personally seen Babikian the day before he had passed away: He had been very nervous and he even had asked, "do you have pity for my children".[124] However, it seems that Babikian lost his life due to natural causes: Due to the investigation, he had been under great pressure for weeks: the Muslim reaction to his statements was especially very harsh. Plus, the high temperature of Adana had affected his health negatively: Since his return, he had been suffering dyspnea.[125]

Just like Babikian, the Armenian Patriarchate gave a strong reaction to the Court-Martial record. The Patriarchate wrote to the Prime Ministry that the Court-Martial had taken the investigations made by the local provokers into consideration, and gave sentences according to their predilections. The Patriarchate insisted that there were no hostilities between Muslims and Armenians, and put all the blame on reactionaries, whose names they had listed earlier. The record was simply the continuation of despotism's slanders against Armenians. Even the Patriarchate itself was receiving its share of those slanders, and that was preventing it from even pronouncing the Armenian nation's feelings, let alone assisting the demands for justice. If the government would not disclaim the accusations and would not reveal the reactionaries,

123 PRO, FO 424/220/30766, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 28 July 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 11 August 1909 (Rec'd 16 August), No. 51.

124 See Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, *Vatan Hizmetinde*. (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981). 117-119.

125 "Zayi-i Elim," *Tasvir-i Efkar*, no. 64, 21 July 1325, p.2.

then the Armenians would be inculpated, and the Patriarch, together with his council, would be forced to resign.[126]

Babikian's funeral took place on 21 July. It became national mourning for Ottoman Armenians: The Patriarchate, schools, and shops were closed. Unionists also paid their respects to their comrade, and covered his coffin with the CUP flag.[127] However, even after his death, local Muslims continued to accuse and insult Babikian: For example, by 7 August, Mehmed Lütfü, the mufti of Adana could still use the words "the malicious Babikyan".[128] Şair Eşref, the vice-Governor of Adana at that time, would hail Babikyan's death in his two poem verses:

Rapor tanzîm ederken hânesinde Mösyö Babikyan,
Yalan yazdırmamak üzre kolundan tutu Cebrâîl.
Tutuldu nutku birden söyleyip yazdırmak isterken
Yapıştı ensesinden bârekallâh, boğdu Azrail

Böyle görmek dilerim hepsini meb'ûsânın
Ki ola gayret-i milliyesi zikre şâyân
Giden ervâhtan ikmâl ile tahkîkâtı
Âhirette yazacaktır raporu Babikyan.[129]

126 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 93/82, 1a, From Armenian Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, July 7, 1325.

127 "Teotig Yıllığı" in Zabel Yesayan, Yıkıntılar Arasında, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2014), 300.

128 BOA, DH.MKT, 2909/34 from Mufti Mehmef Lütfü, in the name of all Adana ulema and notables, to Prime Ministry, August 7, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

129 *While drafting a report at home, Monsieur Babikyan,*
Held his arm to prevent him from lying, Gabriel did.
As he wished to tell and dictate, he choked up suddenly
God bless, seized him by his neck and, strangled him, Azrael did.
I wish to see all deputies as such
So his efforts for his nation, worth citing.
Popping off, finished investigating
Will write the report in the afterworld, Babikyan,
Eşref, *Bütün Eserleri*, eds. Ö. Faruk Huyugüzel, Şerife Çağın, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2006), 404.

In fact, among the three positions (The Court-Martial Record, Joint Investigation Committee Report, and Babikian's interview), all of which were declared by the end of June, the central government started to take actions in favor of the second one: The Joint Committee's report seems to have been a turning point in the government's dealing with the situation. Based on this report, by the end of June, the Council of Ministers decided to put Cevad Bey, Asaf Bey, Mustafa Remzi Paşa, Bağdadizade Abdülkadir, Boşnak Salih, İhsan Fikri and İsmail Safa on trial by a new (Third) Court-Martial. İsmail Fazıl Paşa was appointed to the Court's presidency.[130] By 22 July, the Third Court-Martial began the trial of ex-Governor Cevad Bey and ex-Commander Mustafa Remzi Paşa.[131] The Council of Ministers decided to keep the ones facing trial in custody until the end of the procedure.[132] Asaf Bey had already been put on trial before; yet contrary to expectations, he was acquitted by the Second Court-Martial on 1 July.[133] This sentence was criticized by the Prime Ministry, which insisted on a new trial for him.[134] To protest the government's decision to put Asaf Bey on trial again, all officers of the Second Court-Martial resigned.[135]

Most probably after observing the government's change of attitude, the notables of Adana sent an interesting telegram to the Prime Ministry, in which they were implying that they were ready to negotiate with the government for the sake of the state: They were thinking that the state was also aware of the fact that the Incident was organized by Armenian separatists. Yet the arrest of Abdülkadir and İhsan Bey showed that the cabinet had decided to resolve the

130 BOA, BEO, 3621/271523, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of War, July 7, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

131 BOA, DH.MKT, 2892/12, From Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, July 22, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

132 BOA, DH.MKT, 2872/7, From the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Police, June 28, 1325; BOA, DH.MKT, 2872/68 from the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, June 28, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*); Meclis-i Vükela Kararı, İtidal, No. 69, 6 July 1325, p. 2 (Adana İtidal Gazetesi, p. 950-951).

133 BOA, DH.MKT, 2873/58 from Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, June 29, 1325; BOA, BEO, 3669/275159, July 1, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

134 BOA, BEO, 3607/270490, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, July 15, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

135 BOA, BEO, 3669/275159, (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

problem to the detriment of Muslims. Very interestingly, the Muslim notables implied that they would tolerate the government's decision to ignore the Armenian Revolutionaries' role as a political strategy: they would "appreciate that not looking for a political reason was wisdom on the part of the government". Yet resolving the problem to the detriment of Muslims was not in line with the justice that they expected from Constitutionalism. They concluded by touching on the issue of Babikian's statements, writing that his lies could not harm the honor of the Muslim people.[136]

Although the Muslim notables implied that they could make some concessions, by July, the state started to take more considerable steps towards satisfying the Armenian public opinion, and while doing so, the Muslim reaction grew once again: The government decided to write a public announcement in which the government would declare that Armenians had been innocent in the Massacres. Ministers of Justice, Finance, Education, Commerce, and Public Works were to establish a commission for the job.[137] Another step was the appointment of Cemal Bey to the Deputy Governorate of Adana by arguing that Mustafa Zihni Paşa had been slow in solving the problems of the province.[138] This appointment had to be related to two changes. First is the change in the cabinet itself: On 23 July, Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa, the Minister ıf Interior resigned from office.[139] He was replaced by Talat Paşa that same day.[140] Ferid Paşa was appointed to the Ministry of Interior just after the beginning of the 31 March Incident, so his replacement with the CUP's leader was the sign of a serious shift in the balance of power in favor of Unionists. The second change was the Salonica Agreement, also known as the

136 BOA, BEO, 3626/271945, From Muslim ulema and notables to the Presidency of House of Lords, July 4, 1325; BOA, A.VRK, 716/23, 1a, From Muslim ulema and notables to the Ministry of Interior, July 4, 1325.

137 BOA, BEO, 3609/270623, Meclis-i Mahsus, July 15, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*). Actually, this was a demand of the Patriarch. According to Lowther, he also wanted the government declare that the six executed Armenians were innocent. Yet that was refused. See PRO, FO 424/220/30766, From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, 11 August 1909 (Rec'd 16 August), No. 51.

138 BOA, A.AMD, 1126/60, July 19, 1325.

139 BOA, BEO, 3612/270881, From Prime Ministry to Council of State, July 23, 1325.

140 BOA, İ,DH.. 1476/58, July 23, 1325.

20 August Agreement, signed between Unionists and Dashnaks. With this agreement, the two parties agreed to collaborate against reactionaries and refute the claims that Armenians were for an independent state.[141]

Cemal Bey left the capital on 31 July.[142] Two days after Cemal Bey's departure, on 2 August, the government made its declaration of Armenian innocence. This is a unique declaration in the sense that the Ottoman government, for the first time, officially declared that the Ottoman Armenians were not responsible for the collective violence that they suffered from. The Ministry of Interior cabled the following to all provinces, except Hejaz, Yemen, and Tripoli. It wrote that during the old regime, some parties of the Armenian community had worked for a political agenda: Yet no matter how it had appeared and had taken shape, it had been the outcome of an unbearable despotism. In contrast, Armenians' sincere loyalty to Constitutionalism was proven recently, and they even accepted that their welfare was bound to their loyalty to the Constitutional Ottoman government. The suspicions that Armenians were still following a political agenda were totally unreal. The Adana Incident was explained through the despotic old regime, which had tried to destroy the feeling of the national fraternity. The sentiment among Armenians was affected by two factors: First, Constitutionalism and Liberty were interpreted wrongly by the simpleminded, and second, the sudden appearance of the members of the Dashnak and Hnchak parties, whose names, titles, and ways of actions were unknown by the common people led to ungrounded fears. These two factors caused rumors, which in turn also affected the Armenian community. Both sides developed mistrust for each other. It was essential to end that distrust and reestablish fraternity. Unfortunately, however, the highest officials' poor administration both increased that tension and made the people behave in reckless ways. It was obvious that the event had not been caused by a decrease in the Armenian community's ancient loyalty to the Ottoman Government. Therefore, the real provokers and the weak officials were to be lawfully punished. However, sadly, there was some continuation in erroneous thoughts

141 Dikran Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule,* 46-47.

142 BOA, DH.MKT, 2899/23, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, July 31, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

among the communities, whose interests were naturally mutual. The untrue rumors had to be quashed everywhere. The officials had to work for that purpose, and all actions against constitutionalism and security had to be punished without neglect. The Ministry ordered the officials to announce the declaration in provinces.[143]

Many Muslims of Adana reacted very heavily to the declaration. In their telegram to the Prime Ministry, they wrote that the source of that declaration, the report of the Investigation Commission, was completely false: That declaration was a violation of Muslim people's rights. Refuting the report's claims one by one was very easy, as it was full of factual errors, such as the claim that Arab Mahmud had killed two Armenians. It was written either prejudicially or under instruction. The Muslims had no interest and no purpose in such an event, so they could not have created it. Muslims would avoid proving that the event had been caused by an Armenian plot that aimed for independence, and accept the state policy, yet on the condition that it was not to be used against themselves. They would always defend the innocence of Muslims, who had lost their wealth and their country. Six hundred Muslims had been under arrest for three months, and the remaining were pacified, waiting to see the results of other possible slanders. Butcher Haço's words to the priest before his execution, the revolutionary orders from Van, and the weapons found in Adana showed the real causes behind the event. While the facts were so obvious, the Muslims would never accept the least of responsibility after the statements of the people like the district governor of Mersin and Babikian Efendi. The declaration of the state had to be made after completing all investigations.[144]

143 BOA, DH.MKT, 2902/98 from the Ministry of Interior to all Governorates and Autonomous District Governorates except Hejaz, Tripoli, Yemen, Benghazi, August 2, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

144 BOA, DH.MKT, 2909/34 from Mufti Mehmef Lütfü, in the name of all Adana ulema and notables, to Prime Ministry, August 7, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

§ 7.5 Fourth Round: The CUP Central HQ in Power

In a report in which he complained about Mustafa Zihni Paşa, Wylie wrote that "if the Reform party in Turkey wish to govern this province they must do so by means of their own men, with force and determination behind them".[145] With the arrival of Cemal Bey, one of the most powerful and determined Unionists took control of Adana; a fact that makes this case exceptional, as in none of the cases that we focused on in the previous chapters could we observe the performance by any high ranking Unionist administrator, who had maximum support of the Committee. So, to understand the Unionist interpretation of Armenian rights in the early phase of the new regime, Cemal Bey's office offers us a lot. Yet in the beginning, we must also keep in mind the warning I made in the introduction –that scholars still discuss whether Cemal's doings during the Genocide can be seen as a nuance that deserves to be observed closer or not.[146] His office in Adana can also be valuable in terms of making a contribution to this debate. Right from the get-go, however, I must note that the documents reveal cases that can reinforce both arguments concerning the existence of the nuance, and confuse us further: On one hand, foreigners point to his inconsistencies, which can actually be verified by comparing his correspondence and his memoir. On the other hand, the documents also show that his Armenian policy in Adana was so unacceptable that, he had serious quarrels with Muslim notables, a fact that reveals to us the limits of any alternative policy –provided it ever existed. At the first phase of his administration, expectations from Cemal Bey seem to have been high, as he tended to show the determination that Wylie demanded. For instance, according to Chafy, the British acting vice-consul, Cemal Bey was evidently facing the situation "in an attitude radically different from that of the old-fashioned type of provincial governor". For him, Cemal Bey had "the chance of making a fine reputation for himself and the prestige of the army and Young Turkey to vindicate before the eyes of Europe". He seemed "anxious to establish at once a modus vivendi between the two elements". Cemal Bey also

145 PRO, FO 424/219/19397, From Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 8 May 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, 17 May 1909, No. 103.

146 See footnote 102 in the introduction and footnote 6 in this chapter.

pleased Chafy by asking him privately if he can help him identify the persons whom he suspected of "putting deliberate obstacles in the way of reconciliation".[147]

Three days after the Muslim protest of the declaration of Armenians' innocence, the Ministry of Interior sent a ciphered telegram to Cemal Bey, ordering him to advise the Muslim notables to the following effect: The declaration was not accusing Muslims. Instead, the government was aiming to forget about the past and defend the interests of the motherland and the Muslims.[148] So, one of the first critical tasks of Cemal Bey was ending the conflict between the state and the notables.

The next day, Cemal Bey informed the Ministry about his dialogue with the local Muslims: The previous night, he had met with Muslim ulema and notables in the CUP Branch building. About two hundred and fifty to three hundred people had assembled. For two hours, Cemal Bey had continuously talked about the difficult situation the government was in. In response, they cried and swore that they would obey him and that they would help him in building an orphanage for Armenian children. Cemal Bey had also read and explained the government's declaration. They responded by saying they had previously not understood the text, and now that they did, they would send a telegram to the Ministry to thank the government. That night, Cemal Bey was going to meet with Armenian religious leaders. According to him, the security conditions were improving: He had written a magnificent governorate order, and had organized a parade military parade.[149] On 14 August, the ulema and notables sent the telegram that Cemal Bey had written about: From that telegram, in which they had stated their gratitude to the government and promised to work in coordination with the state, they wrote that Cemal Bey had told them that the incident was a "twist of fate" (*mukteza-yı şive-i kader*)

147 PRO, FO 424/220/34186, From Acting Vice-Consul R. E. W. Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 25 August 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 6 September 1909 (Rec'd 13 September), No. 92.

148 BOA, DH.MKT, 2909/34 from the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, August 10, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

149 BOA, DH.MKT, 2914/1 Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate, August 11, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

and the outcome of "evil eye" (*göz değmesi*).[150] These words show that Cemal Bey's strategy was to handle the situation at first without accusing the notables: He put the blame on no one but "fate". In this speech, we observe the final version of the official discourse of the Massacres. Facing the firm stances of both the Armenian public opinion and the local Muslims, the state came to the conclusion that the event was the devil's work. Therefore, we can argue that it solved the problem by depersonalizing it. Soon, this official discourse would be repeated by Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi: After presenting many counter claims about the Adana Massacre, he claimed that although Prelate Moushegh and the local government made serious mistakes, the event was, in fact, a result of misunderstanding caused by the new era. He illustrated his brief analysis with a quote from an ode by Nâbî, an early modern Ottoman poet, to color up this conclusion:

> *Ne sendendir ne bendendir ne çerh-i kîne-verdendir*
> *Bu derd-i ser humâr-ı neşve-i câm-ı kaderdendir.*[151]

On the day that Muslim notables sent the telegram about Cemal Paşa's speech, İsmail Fazıl Paşa, the head of the Third Court-Martial, who had finished his task in Adana, sent a fresh report to the Prime Ministry. The importance of the report lies in the fact that it reflects the final position of the government. Fazıl Paşa started his report by listing the three previous explanations of the Massacres. The first explanation was that the event was caused by Armenians who were seeking independence. The second was that it was the doing of reaction. And the third one was that Muslim bigotry and savagery which was triggered by the despots had led to the attacks on innocent Armenians. For Fazıl Paşa, none of those explanations came near the truth: In fact, after one and a half months of investigation, he had come to the conclusion that there had not been any action for Armenian independence. Neither had

150 BOA, A.VRK, 713/53, 1a from Mufti Mehmed Lütfü, in the name of all Adana ulema and notables, to the Ministry of Interior, August 14, 1325.

151 It is neither you, nor me, nor the malicious fate,
It is the hangover of the joy of the glass of destiny, that caused this headache
Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi Tarihi, 129.

Abdülhamid and reactionaries been involved. As for the Armenians, they also had not been completely innocent and naive. The reality for Fazıl Paşa was that the real cause of the Massacres was "ignorance": The population in Adana and its hinterland was much more ignorant than the other people in Anatolia. Moreover, each year, together with Aydın and Kaçar and other nearby tribes, forty to fifty thousand workers would come in from Diyarbakır, Harput, and Bitlis (for harvest). After thirty years of despotism and Bahri Paşa's cruelty, one could not hope for any sign of morality among those people, whose eyes had been dazzled by the light of liberty after the revolution. Some short-sighted Armenians who presumed themselves vigilant had considered themselves to be in the middle of France and had forgotten their fellow citizens' level of comprehension. They had bought arms, practiced with them, held theatre plays about the Armenian kingdom and brandished badges, and had even started to say "we are going to give away each other's daughters in marriages", all of which had offended the Muslims. The situation had been so tense that even the slightest event had been enough for the eruption of an event. After stating that reasoning, Paşa made some suggestions for precautionary measures.[152]

In mid-August, Fazıl Paşa's Third Court-Martial handed out new sentences to major officials and some notables: Ex-governor Cevad Bey was sentenced to six years of suspension from any government duty. Commander Mustafa Remzi Paşa was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. Bağdadizade Abdülkadir Efendi was acquitted, yet was exiled to Hejaz for two years. İhsan Fikri was exiled for two years and prohibited from publishing. İsmail Safa was also sentenced to one month's imprisonment.[153]

Additionally, what merits attention in Cemal Bey's attempt to calm down the Muslim notables is that he brought forward the condition of the state itself to justify the policies that put the notables in a difficult situation in their eyes. This seems logical, as we saw above that the notables had implied that they could make concessions for the sake of the state. In fact, bringing forward the

152 BOA, BEO, 3661/274536, August 14, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

153 BOA, BEO, 3661/274536, August 14, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

state's position was not simply a means for acquiring their consent, as most probably they really felt that the government was in a very difficult situation after the Massacres: It not only shook the close relations between Unionists and Armenian political parties but also allowed Great Powers to interfere in domestic affairs –in the last phase of the Massacres, they did not even hesitate to threaten the Empire with landing armed forces to protect foreigners. In this sense, we can presume that the state was worried about a repetition of the invasion of Alexandria in 1882, which was justified by the British on the grounds of Muslim attacks on foreigners during the Urabi Revolt.

Acquiring the consent of the Muslim notables, Cemal Bey started to revise some Court-Martial sentences. We can observe that his suggestions to modify the sentences favored extremely dissatisfied segments of the Armenian public opinion: For the Armenian convicts, he noted that the punishments were too heavy. What comes forward regarding the Armenian convicts were his new suggestions about the sentences of Karabet Gökdereliyan and Moushegh Seropian. On 15 August, he sent a ciphered telegram in which he suggested the sentence of Gökdereliyan be reconsidered. Cemal Bey openly wrote that the sentences of officials such as of the ex-Governor and of the ex-Commander were too lenient. But the decision for Gökdereliyan, which was exile to Benghazi for life, was too harsh: This very intelligent man's only fault was to aggrieve the fools with his speech. Cemal Bey suggested the Council of Ministers reduce his sentence to three years of exile to Rhodes on the condition not to return to Adana. Although changing Court-Martial decisions were impossible, the Ministry of Interior found that applicable.[154] Yet Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey was against such a change, noting that Gökdereliyan was much more influential than Abdülkadir Efendi.[155] On the same day, Cemal Bey also wrote about ex-Prelate Moushegh Seropian's death sentence ruled by the First Court-Martial. On that day, he wrote the words quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Cemal Bey had also written in the telegram that the death sentence given to Moushegh Efendi was "one of the biggest judicial

154 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/3, 2a Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate, August 15, 1325; BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/3, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, August 18, 1325.

155 BOA, BEO, 3661/274503, Copy of the ciphered telegram from Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, dated 21 September 1325.

mistakes": Testimonies were not taken by the Court-Martial itself. The only evidence seemed to be a letter from an arms merchant. The Court-Martial's decision, which was based on illogical lies and words by a sixty-five years old Armenian, was highly questionable. Cemal Bey wrote that Seropian was actually guilty, however, he did not understand how the Court-Martial accused him of thinking about reestablishing Cilician Duchy: To provoke Armenians against Turks and to make them follow a political position, he had said everything to them without any thought given, and that had been the reason for the agitation of ignorant Muslims. If he had been accused of unintentionally causing the massacre of two fraternal nations and sentenced to dismissal from office for life like Cevad Bey, no one would have objected to that decision.[156]

As the Muslim festival Eid-al-Fitr approached, tensions once again started to grow in Adana. Rumors of an impending massacre became so serious in time that the dragomans of the Russian, German, and Austrian consulates collectively called on vice-consul Chafy to ask his advice on the situation.[157] By the end of September, Armenians started to arrive in Adana from villages and many of them, even the poorer ones who could hardly afford to travel went to Mersin in fear, ignoring the repeated assurances of the Government and the leading European residents.[158] It seems that in terms of accepting that there really was a danger, Cemal Bey's response to the tension was similar to all other administrators that appeared in this work: In spite of his "categorical assurance" that such a possibility was "not even to be considered", he would

156 "*Hülasa bir gün gelir de herhangi bir kuvvet Muşeg'in muhakeme evrakını tedkike adliye nezaretini mecbur ederse Genç Türk Hükümeti için pek büyük bir mahcubiyet ve mesuliyeti intac edebilecek bir mesele-i adliye karşısında bulunduğumuzu arza kendimi vicdanen mecbur görürüm ferman.*" BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2848/14, 1a, 2a, Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate, August 18, 1325.

157 PRO, FO 424/221/37546, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 29 September 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 6 October 1909 (Rec'd 11 October), No. 25.

158 PRO, FO 424/221/39990, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 13 October 1909, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 October 1909 (Rec'd 1 November), No. 51; PRO, FO 424/221/40913, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 20 October 1909, enclosure in From Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 October 1909 (Rec'd 1 November), No. 68.

later tell the vice-consul that "he had not himself slept a wink the night before Bairam, but had personally patrolled the streets".[159]

Two events seem to have worsened the conditions during those weeks. The first was the resignation of the Patriarch, and the second was the execution of many Muslims by the government. At the end of September, Patriarch Turyan resigned as a result of an institutional conflict concerning the sentences of convicts of the Adana Massacres. The Patriarch believed that the sentences of high-ranking officials were not sufficient, and he was against executions of the common Muslims and Armenians. Yet the government declined his demand on the grounds that the Patriarchy had no rights to interfere in judicial procedures, defending that under the new constitution, the Patriarchy's privileges were only religious, as all Ottoman subjects were granted equality before the law. In the National Council of Armenians, a commission was formed to examine the quarrel between the government and the Patriarch to look for the possibility of a compromise. If a compromise could not be reached, then all prelates and priests would follow the Patriarch and all church services would be suspended.[160]

Death sentences also came as a blow to the town, driving a wedge between the government and the local Muslims once again: According to Ali Münif Bey, the Unionist MP of Adana, after learning about the death sentences of three Armenians and thirty-six Muslims, the Muslims became furious. The existence of the mufti of Bahçe in the list also shook them. In order to prevent the executions, he talked with Prime Minister Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, and after his influential speech, he took Paşa's promise to refrain from the executions of Muslims.[161] On 30 October, the Council of Ministers decided to reduce fourteen Muslim and four Armenian convicts' capital punishment to life imprisonment.[162] But some other convicts were executed on 27 and 28

159 PRO, FO 424/221/40913, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 20 October 1909, enclosure in From Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 October 1909 (Rec'd 1 November), No. 68.

160 PRO, FO 424/221/38364, From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 12 October 1909 (Rec'd 18 October), No. 34.

161 *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları,* 54.

162 BOA, DH.MKT.PRK, 2850/145, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, October 30, 1325.

November. Among the twenty-five executed, all were Muslims. According to Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the fact that no Armenians were executed made Muslims very upset.[163] After the first executions of the fourteen Muslims on 27 November, large Muslim crowds came together at the funerals. Chafy states that the crowd seemed surprised, as they were still believing that what they had done during the Massacres was following the government's orders to kill Armenians. So, in Chafy's words, when eleven more Muslims were executed, and Cemal Bey patrolled the streets without his mounted escort, the "attitude of the crowds was now far more menacing. Bitter words flew fast, and it is said that not a few were addressed to the Vali personally. In any country but Turkey rioting would have been certain. But this is Turkey. The Government had firmly declared its will, and the population bowed to that of Allah". Yet this does not mean that the government had no fear of the people. There were death sentences which were not executed, and that led to new rumors. Later, "fifteen wooden tripods constructed for the first executions six months ago have been ostentatiously burnt in front of the Konak".[164] That may have appeased the Muslim population for the time being, yet during the following month, Cemal Bey's attempt to appoint a mufti from the capital also led to opposition. In mid-January, some Muslim women in the streets dared to openly threaten Christians, foreigners, and "'giaour' Vali" with a new

163 BOA, BEO, 3535/265082_5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 Copy of the telegram from Mehmed Ali Bey, Commander of Adana Regulatory Forces, dated November 29, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*). In his memoirs, Ali Münif Bey claims that the executions had a role in the cabinet change: He writes that Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa's failure to keep his promise to prevent Muslim executions resulted in a great reaction from the MPs: One day after his suggestion to force him to resign, Hilmi Paşa resigned. See *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları*, 56). This reason might have a role, yet it seems that the famous Lynch affair, which led to a great conflict between British and German interests in Mesopotamia, had a much decisive role in the Prime Minister's resignation. For a detailed information about Lynch affair, see Kansu, *İttihadçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 154-162.

164 PRO, FO 424/221/46733, From Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 15 December 1909, enclosure in From Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 21 December 1909 (Rec'd 28 December), No. 68.

massacre.[165] Cemal Bey's nominee would resign in a few days, seen by Wylie as "a victory for the hojas in Adana".[166] By early 1911, the tension between two communities would increase again.[167] In the end, Cemal Paşa would return to the capital.[168] All these stories show that Cemal Paşa's belated actions in Adana, which could reinforce both arguments about his agency during the Genocide, should be observed in more detail in future works.

§ 7.6 Convicts' Resistance and Amnesties

In the chapter on Maraş, we observed that the notable convicts who had dared to attack local officials and Armenians were able to exert a strong pressure on the government to save their skins from exemplary punishments, and in a way, they succeeded in doing so, receiving very light sentences or acquittals from the civilian or military judiciary. In their defenses, their main strategy was denying their doings, underlining the rule of law, and in some cases, questioning the new regime's principles. They defended their cases in a unified manner and they acted accordingly. The Adana convicts, on the other hand, gave different responses: First of all, we cannot observe uniformity in their reactions. For example, Cevad Bey, the ex-Governor, acted submissively. Abdülkadir Bağdadizade was submissive too, yet it seems that step by step, he successfully lobbied to reduce his punishment. The local Unionists (İhsan

165 PRO, FO 424/222/4239, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 24 January 1910, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 2 February 1910 (Rec'd 7 February), No. 24.

166 PRO, FO 424/222/5145, From Vice-Consul Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 28 January 1910, enclosure in From Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 3 February 1910 (Rec'd 14 February), No. 26. This mood was also confirmed by Ahmet Şerif in his famous letters. By March 1326, he wrote that while the most intelligent Armenians in Adana were very happy with Cemal Bey, the most enlightened Muslims were saying the opposite. See Ahmet Şerif, *Anadolu'da Tanin*, 191.

167 Dikran Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule,* 70-71.

168 For a brief analysis of Cemal Paşa's doings in Adana, see Nazan Maksudyan, "1909 Adana Olayları Ertesinde Cemal Bey'in Adana Valiliği ve Osmanlıcılık İdeali," Toplumsal Tarih 174 (Haziran 2008):22-28. Even by mid 2010s, I personally witnessed a local historian in Adana openly saying that Cemal Paşa's name should not be given to the streets and neighborhoods in Adana, as he had favored Armenians after the events.

Fikri and İsmail Safa) on the other hand, were very aggressive. Contrary to the official discourse that declared the innocence of Armenians, they continued blaming them and threatened the government, both allusively and openly. Moreover, İhsan Fikri even escaped the gendarme, and without being punished for it, was able to change his place of exile, which shows that within the Government there were politicians and bureaucrats who had sympathies towards him. Throughout the whole process, the state looked for ways to pardon the convicts, and after some partially successful attempts, it managed to.

On 13 August, ex-governor Cevad Bey objected to the Court-Martial decision. In his petition to the Ministry of Interior, he wrote that he was not officially informed about the Court-Martial decision, yet he had learned of his punishment, which was six years of suspension from any government duty. Cevad Bey characterized it as a very heavy punishment: He was fully aware that the disasters caused by the Adana Disorder were a black mark for Ottomanism which had put the state under great ongoing danger. Because all those had occurred during his office, he was weeping and would weep until doomsday. Yet was it only his weakness that caused it? At the time before the 31 March Incident, which part of the country was secure? In which place was there public order? Was it consistent with constitutionalism that his punishment was even heavier than those of the persons directly involved? He had learned that the Court-Martial punished him not for his bad intentions, but his weak character. Confirming that, Cevad Bey wrote that he was merciful, and he could not even harm animals. He even could not harm the ones who harmed him. Maybe that was not appropriate for a governor, yet punishing a person for his nature was unjust. For a rich person, six years of suspension may not have much effect, but for him, that was tantamount to execution, as he had not enriched himself illegally. Plus, he had tried to help the poor. He even was only able to go to trial by taking a loan. For that reason, Cevad Bey demanded a regular salary.[169]

Bağdadizade Abdülkadir did not display such resistance but tried to lobby for his release. As early as May 1325, his son Mehmed, who was residing in İstanbul, had tried to talk to Mahmud Şevket Paşa, whose only response was

169 BOA, DH.EO, 556/88, 1a, 1b, From Cevad Bey to the Ministry of Interior, August 13, 1325.

to advise him to trust the Court-Martial officials.[170] One year later, the head of the Third Court-Martial that had sentenced him, İsmail Fazıl Paşa himself, wrote to the Ministry of Interior to pardon Abdülkadir: He wrote that Abdülkadir Efendi was, in fact, innocent, and accusations against him were fabrications. It was the local conditions that led them to send him into exile. He was an eighty or ninety years old man, and his lands which he could not manage in his absence was the source of a considerable amount of taxes. He could benefit from the amnesty to come on enthronement day.[171] That attempt bore fruit, and the government allowed Abdülkadir Efendi to come to Damascus, the capital of the Syria Province, whose governor was İsmail Fazıl Paşa. In August, Paşa wrote to the Ministry of Interior again and demanded to allow Abdülkadir Efendi's residence in Adana.[172] He was not allowed to return to Adana, yet was given the permission to reside in any other place he chose. Abdülkadir Efendi chose İstanbul, and arrived in August 1326. In İstanbul, Mahmud Şevket Paşa promised to pardon him, believing in his innocence. However, his name was not on the list of the pardoned. When he wrote to Paşa to remind him, Abdülkadir Efendi implied that Talat Bey also understood his situation, by telling him that "Armenians' animosity was not against your personality, but your position." He claimed that he had no problems with Armenian citizens, who could not speak about that, as they were threatened by revolutionaries.[173] Finally, he was allowed to return to Adana in May 1327.[174]

Cevad Bey brought up his character and sorrow in his objection, and Abdülkadir Efendi kept a low profile. Yet local Unionists' words were heavy. Plus, their actions were more resistant. For example, as early as five days after his arrest, on 6 July, İhsan Fikri wrote to the Presidency of Chamber of Deputies that the reason for his arrest was the cabinet's attempt to garner sympathy. The cause of the Adana Incident was in fact, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa

170 BOA, A.VRK, 728/77, 3a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of War, December 14, 1326.

171 BOA, A.VRK, 728/77, 1a, copy of the letter from Syria Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, May 24, 1326.

172 BOA, A.VRK, 728/77, 2a, copy of the letter from Syria Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, August 11, 1326.

173 BOA, A.VRK, 728/77, 3a, From Prime Ministry to the Ministry of War, December 14, 1326.

174 BOA, BEO, 3897/292264, From Prime Ministry To the Ministry of Interior, May 11, 1327.

himself, who also caused the 31 March Incident. The fate of Abdülhamid, who had selected the members of cabinet himself, was an object lesson. As a young person who had suffered for thirteen years in prison for the sake of liberty, he was always ready to appear in court. The cabinet's cruelty would hurt not him but the nation and constitution.[175]

On 8 September, İsmail Safa, who was condemned to one month imprisonment, wrote to the Ministry of Interior, using much heavier words than those of İhsan Fikri. He wrote that they had hoped that injustice and tortures would come to an end with constitutionalism. Alas, they were under arrest. This current oppression made no sense, given the miserable and ungrateful history of Armenians, who had flooded the whole of Anatolia in blood. The government's indifference towards Armenian ambitions should have been unforgivable. Not punishing Armenians was a mistake, and it should not be compounded with targeting Muslims.[176] With fifteen other Muslim prisoners, he wrote a much harsher telegram to the Ministry of War, most probably around the same days: In it, after restating their claims concerning Armenian revolutionaries' actions and Muslims' innocence, they made complaints and threats: the blame had been put completely on Muslims, ignoring that there had been three to four thousand Muslim deaths, not counting the unidentified workers. About a thousand Muslims were in prison, whose five thousand family members were in need. On the other side, even four Armenians who deserved execution or life imprisonment were being pardoned due to the Patriarchate's threats. The committees sent there had not conducted sufficient investigations. Moreover, those demanding a fair procedure had been threatened with torture. All those actions meant that they were carried out orders. Was it that Muslims demanded justice of the government, while Armenians fussed and applied to foreigners the reason for their mistreatment? If Muslims had also followed that awful path, threatened the government, and applied to foreigners, then they would not have been

175 BOA, BEO, 3626/271945, From İhsan Fikri Bey to the Presidency of the House of Commons, July 6, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

176 BOA, BEO, 3650/273706, From İbrahim Efendizade Hamza and Kibarzade İsmail, to the Ministry of Interior, September 8, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

aggrieved.[177] While investigating that telegram, Cemal Bey was threatened through a petition which was signed by two hundred people. Yet after understanding that the telegram had been written by İsmail Safa, Cemal Bey gave his documents to the Court-Martial. As his action was inciting the Muslims to another massacre and to a revolt in prison, Cemal Bey suggested Safa be transferred to İstanbul and put on trial again.[178]

İhsan Fikri, on the other hand, managed to escape on the path of exile to Ankara. When he was handed over to the gendarme of Ulukışla, he somehow convinced them to release him.[179] Then he came to Alexandria, from where he demanded the Ministry of Interior allow his residence in İstanbul.[180] Uçar, Soydemir and Erkan gives us valuable information on the aftermath: With some guarantees about the possibility of acceptance of his demands, İhsan Fikri went to İstanbul. Whom he talked with there is unknown, yet it bore fruit, as his place of exile was changed to Konya. This visit to İstanbul was kept a secret. There, he stayed in Pera Palas Hotel under a different name, although the personnel knew his real identity. The police came to the hotel, but could not find him. Then, together with his brother, he went to his village, yet could not stay there for a long time, and traveled to Konya.[181] In Konya, İhsan Fikri would complain about the climate of the province. He suffered from bronchitis while there. Thanks to the medical report he got, he would later be transferred to Beirut.[182] But his illness persisted, and he passed away in Beirut.

177 BOA, BEO, 3647/273481, From İbrahim Efendizade Hamza and Kibarzade İsmail and others to the Ministry of War, September 22, 1325.

178 BOA, BEO, 3650/273706, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, September 15, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

179 BOA, DH.MUİ, 23-2/21, From Adana Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, November 8, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

180 BOA, DH.MUİ, 23-2/21, From İhsan Fikri to Egypt Commissary, October 8, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*).

181 "Giriş: İtidal Gazetesi'nin Yayınlandığı II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Hakkında Kısa Bir Değerlendirme," in *Adana İtidal Gazetesi (5 September 1908 – 31 July 1909) Cilt I*, eds. Ahmet Uçar, Selman Soydemir, Kemal Erkan, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2014), 55-56.

182 BOA, DH.MUİ, 23-2/21 from İhsan Fikri to Konya Governorate, January 28, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*); BOA, DH.MUİ, 23-2/21 Medical Report, January 28, 1325. (Available at *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*). BOA, DH.MUİ, 23-

The exact date of his death is unknown. According to his grandson, it was between 17 March 1910 and 17 July 1911.[183]

What about the common prisoners? In fact, even at the very early stage, there were attempts for a general amnesty, and the idea seems to have been approved by the politicians. In a text written by the Patriarchate, for example, we observe that as early as the beginning of summer, there were rumors that even a figure like Ahmed Rıza was looking for ways to declare a general amnesty. Yet the Patriarchate showed strong resistance to the idea at that time.[184] The attempts went on in late fall, and from the words of the Ministry of Interior, we understand that it was the reactions to the executions of Muslims that led to this shift of policy.[185] Yet the Parliament's approval was needed for general amnesty. Cemal Bey was worried that during the parliamentary sessions, Armenian MPs could make harmful speeches. So, very interestingly, he advised the government to convince them not to do so.[186] The Ministry of Interior took that suggestion seriously and forwarded it to the Prime Ministry.[187] However, it seems that the government could not convince the Armenian MPs because a general amnesty for the convicts of the Massacres did not come onto the agenda. After plans for a general amnesty failed, the government decided to pardon convicts in piecemeal fashion, utilizing the occasions of anniversaries of Sultan Mehmed V's enthronement, National Liberty Days, and Islamic festivals.

Nevertheless, the attempts for a full amnesty continued: On 12 April 1326, the Prime Ministry wrote about the first pardon by directly referring to the reaction of Muslims after the executions again: Following that, some names were provided by the Governorate and some were identified in the capital.

2/21 from Ministry of Interior to Konya Governorate, February 11, 1325, From Beirut Governorate to the Ministry of Interior, March 4, 1326.

183 "Giriş: İtidal Gazetesi'nin Yayınlandığı II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Hakkında Kısa Bir Değerlendirme," 55-56.

184 BOA, A.AMD, 1124/76, from Armenian Patriarchate to Prime Ministry, July 4, 1325.

185 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/60, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, December 3, 1325.

186 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/60, 1a, Ciphered telegram from Adana Governorate, December 1, 1325.

187 BOA, A.AMD.MV, 94/60, 2a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, December 3, 1325.

Eighteen Armenians were also added to the list, and by 16 February, it was decided to pardon one hundred and four convicts.[188] Second, on 8 July 1326, the government decided to pardon the convicts of the Court-Martials in Adana, Aleppo, Kosovo, Manastır, and İstanbul on National Holiday, which was two days later.[189] Another wave of amnesty came about on 28 November 1326, in honor of the sacrifice festival.[190] That amnesty pardoned convicts who had been previously sentenced to up to fifteen years.[191] And the remaining were finally pardoned in May 1327, again with the occasion of the anniversary of the Sultan's enthronement.[192]

§ 7.7 Conclusion

The whole story of this final chapter was the struggle over shaping the official discourse about what happened during the Adana Massacres. Thanks to the information provided by the previous chapters, we are now pretty certain about the existence of a complex set of motivations behind the several perspectives of the contemporaries: Different worldviews on how citizens should behave in the new regime, "rational" motives to increase economic and political power, sincere beliefs in revolutionary principles, misunderstandings of the occurrences, needs for political alliances in the locality and the capital, emotions, all affected different contemporaries' interpretations of the massacres in Adana. Moreover, we also observed that the shadow of later history -the Genocide- reshaped the agents' interpretation of their own memories, not to mention the explanations of historians themselves.

Just after the massacres, two perspectives appeared. Both were to stand the test of time -they are still alive in historiography today. One was the local Muslims' perspective: The incident was a well-planned Armenian revolt, the preparations for which had started a long time ago. And second, there was the

188 BOA, BEO, 3739/280389, From Prime Ministry to the Ministries of Interior and War, April 12, 1326.

189 BOA, İ..DH, 1482/28, July 8, 1325.

190 BOA, İ..DH, 1485/31, November 28, 1326.

191 See the table in BOA, İ..DH, 1485/31 1a, 2a.

192 BOA, İ...MMS, 140/11, 3a, From the Ministry of Interior to Prime Ministry, May 10, 1327.

perspective of nearly the entire Ottoman Armenian public: The event was a well-organized massacre, which was prepared by the counterrevolutionaries, directed from Yıldız Palace. Between the two, there was a very confused public opinion. The CUP headquarters and some high-ranking bureaucrats were parties to it.

Above all, behind both claims, there was a common feature: The deeply held belief in plots. From the previous chapters, we observed that it was universal and organic. Fears of conspiracies are fueled especially during upheavals like revolutions and wars. The Parisians storming the Bastille, the Russian peasants after the assassination of Alexander II, the Sinhalese in 1983, and the common townspeople in Antakya and Kayseri were all sincerely believing that they were about to be attacked. In the first chapter, we saw that the British vice-consul also came to a similar conclusion, as he wrote that Muslims in Adana had really been thinking that they were under an Armenian attack. On the other side, although they had been unharmed and some of them were even able to prosper in Adana, there was the Armenian nation, who, having kept the "memory of 311" in their minds, rightfully believed to have suffered a lot in the provinces during the Hamidian regime. The changed circumstances after the revolution, like security problems, bearing and practicing with arms freely, and the changed behaviors in daily lives must have made both sides more suspicious than ever. And seeing each other's actions, the belief in plots became a circular self-fulfilling prophecy.

On the other hand, the common belief in plots had important nuances in the perceptions of each group. Perhaps the most important difference was about the group to be blamed: While the many figures that represent the mood of the Armenian public were usually making a distinction between "counterrevolutionaries" and the deceived common Muslims, with a few exceptions the local Muslims always referred to "Armenians" as a whole. Some of them even claimed that they had tried to change the demography of the region. The parallel examples from Antakya showed that the distinction made by Armenian accusers at the capital was a mixture both of a sincere misreading and a carefully formed political discourse, which seems to have been instrumental in convincing the Unionist discourse to get closer to theirs -at least partially. There was also a fusion of rationality and sincerity in the

local Muslim accusation against the whole Armenians. However, the rational-instrumental aspect of their claims was not coherent with the perspective of the time -for example, the attempt to portray Armenians as collaborators with Abdülhamid was not a convincing option. Although the local Unionists tried to do so a few times, they could not insist on it. After all, the local Muslim notables' strength in shaping the official discourse was less due to their political intelligence than their demographic strength. If we recall the report sent by the Bağdadizade family even before the birth of Armenian revolutionary activities in chapter one, then we can argue that the accusers' rational motive lay in some Muslims' old habits. In this sense, the Armenian discourse was correct in pointing at the "counterrevolutionary" aspect of local Muslim behavior. Another feature that reinforced this aspect was, on the other hand, not so rational: Probably behind the accusation against all Armenians, there was also an all-inclusive hatred caused by the post-revolutionary changes in daily lives, most of which failed to be tolerated for ideological, religious, social, cultural and economic reasons. However, thanks to the conceptual distinction that I borrowed (the anti-revolution and counterrevolution), I could state that looking for a clear program and a complex organization was not necessary for such movements to be classified as anti-revolutionary. In fact, just like in Kayseri and Maraş, whenever the new regime entered a struggle against these anti-revolutionaries in Adana, they showed signs of questioning it, assessing their potential to turn into counterrevolutionaries. As I argued in the previous chapters, if there was a parallelism between the 31 March Incident and the Massacres, it was being anti-revolutionary movements.

Previously, I also argued that most probably the threat of turning into counterrevolutionaries had forced the government to yield to the anti-revolution in the long run. Actually, the regime's shifts in forming the official discourse on the Massacres were perfect examples of this situation. We saw that the regime stood its ground on only one point: The innocence of the central bureaucracy. In fact, when the Massacres erupted, the policymakers in İstanbul were really busy with the great turmoil in İstanbul: The whole state machinery collapsed for a few days: The previous government had just resigned and the new government was not even in control of the capital, let

alone the provinces. The parliament was under the threat of mutinied soldiers, some deputies were killed and many others went underground. An army, which was, in fact, a mixture of soldiers and guerilla bands was on the way to the capital, claiming that the new government was illegitimate, and contrary to the common belief, its commanders' authority over that army did not seem absolute. In those days, the paralyzed state could not mount a strong response to the Massacres. Yet this does not mean that they bore no responsibility at all: Throughout the thesis, we observed great ethnoreligious tensions between the revolution and the massacres, and in each case, the government response was weak: In winter, there had been two serious attacks on district governors in Kayseri and in Maraş, which had been seen as serious threats against Armenians. Yet the two governments of Kamil Paşa and Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa did not punish those offenders, allowing the offenders to be emboldened.

Among some military officers who arrived at the town in the first stage, there were signs of firm standing against the local Muslims. This can be observed in the performance of Colonel Mehmed Ali Bey, the Commander of the Regulatory Forces (remember that he did the same in the Hayri Bey Incident in Maraş). Such officials must have been for demonstrating state power to the locals. However, even they were intolerant of Armenians' claims, having little incentive to stop the continuing harassments, tortures, and heavy punishments. Apart from their own backgrounds, which are unfortunately not available to us, two facts may explain this attitude: The first was their desire to protect the state officials who were responsible, and the second was their partial loss of control during the Second Massacre.

As I mentioned above, a very critical difference of the Adana case was the firm stand of the large segments of the Armenian public. From the beginning, many politicians, the locals, and the Patriarchate uncompromisingly stated that the Armenians in Adana were innocent. Perhaps this position was the reflection of two of their features: One was the difference of their worldview in terms of defining their armed activities; what was seen as illegal, separatist, and revolutionary by the majority of the Muslim public was legitimate self-defense for Armenians. The second concerned the emotional aspect; for the Armenian public opinion: It seems that for many, the Massacres were not only about their great human loss and suffering. It was also a huge disappointment

with the new regime. In addition, for the first time in their history, there was a relatively liberal conjuncture that allowed them to respond more freely, like organizing aids, expressing their thoughts about the incident, and even criticizing the government. All those must have made the Ottoman Armenians defend the legitimacy of their cause in the most enthusiastic way.

Despite their efforts, however, it looks like, before mid-summer, the government had moved closer to the local Muslim view. The reasons behind that seem twofold: First, although it was believed that the Unionist control of government was more dominant than ever through the Action Army, many ministers that came to power with the 31 March Incident were still in the cabinet. Their new governor, Mustafa Zihni Paşa was possibly acting by knowing that this government was not so liberal. Second, the state's infrastructural shortcomings were significant: When the Governor was underlining the difficulties in controlling the locals, identifying the losses, and providing aid, he was partially right. Under these circumstances, two alternative reports, both of which had the potential to shape the official discourse, were made public almost simultaneously. The First Court-Martial record criticized both sides of the conflict, as well as the local officials. It also made a distinction between the conflicting elites and the innocent common Muslims and Armenians. This record satisfied the local Muslims, as they believed that their argument about Armenian revolutionaries was confirmed. Yet the record was so upsetting for many Armenians that the Patriarchate resigned and the whole clergy considered withdrawing from their duties. The writing process of the second report -of the Joint Investigation Committee- turned into quite a story, as its members from the parliament could not come to an agreement and decided to write separate reports. The remaining officials went on and wrote a relatively moderate report that focused on the events before the Massacres in more detail. Both this report and the statements made by Babikian, the deputy of Tekfurdağı, were heavily criticized not only by the local Muslims but also by the bureaucrats. Babikian especially became an object of hatred for Muslims. His untimely death led to new conspiracy rumors among Armenians. Yet most probably he died of natural causes. In fact, some of his statements were falsified by the British vice-consul. Perhaps,

behind his assertions, there was the agitated mood that affected almost the entire Armenian public.

The Joint Investigation Committee Report, the pressure by the Patriarchate, negotiations between Dashnaks and Unionists, and the changes in the cabinet started to reshape state policy soon: Cemal Bey was appointed to the Governorate of Adana, and a new Court-Martial was formed under the presidency of İsmail Fazıl Paşa, who would soon write a new report. The innocence of Armenians was officially declared by the cabinet, and some Muslim notables and officials, who were thought to be perpetrators were arrested. Rather than pointing to the agents, the report of İsmail Fazıl Paşa, the declaration of the cabinet, speeches by Cemal Paşa, and the writings of Abdurrahman Şeref were all referring to abstract notions as the causes of the massacres. They preferred to avoid blaming anyone by pronouncing concepts like evil eye, fate, and ignorance. Actually, such empty signifiers were nothing but a refusal to face what was absent amongst all other interpretations: The agency of the common Muslims. After all, the *civitas* could not be blamed in the constitutional order.

This ignored pressure by Muslim commoners would also be seen after the change of government policy. The Armenian public was not satisfied with the sentences given to the persons who were responsible in their eyes. Yet at least the innocence of Armenians was officially confirmed and the majority of the policymakers in the Dashnak Party, as well as the Patriarchate, felt that they had no option but to cooperate with the Unionists to improve the condition of their nation. Therefore, unlike the other Armenian political parties, after heated debates among themselves, they decided to reach a compromise with Unionists. The local Muslims, on the other hand, were not so docile: Already having mentioned that they could give concessions for the good of the state, they were convinced by Cemal Bey. However, local Muslims' relation with the state would become extremely tense due to various reasons. The most important reason was the waves of executions, which fell almost completely upon commoners. Still believing that they had been officially ordered to kill Armenians, they became furious. Just like the examples of Kayseri and Maraş, Cemal Bey's lifestyle and behavior were also not in accord with the Muslims of Adana. During his office, the massacre rumors went on, and some of them

were so serious that Armenians massively fled to Mersin. Also, the notable Muslim convicts showed strong resistance to the government's policy: Some lobbied in the capital, some escaped on the road to exile, and even in some cases, threatened the Governor. It looks like the Muslim pressure had prevailed in the long run, as the convicts were gradually pardoned shortly after by the state.

8

Conclusion

> *… Hatta tevsi-i mezuniyet kaidesince Deli Petro ve Büyük Frederickvari olan bir istibdad-i kanuniye memalik-i Osmaniye ve bilhassa vilayat-i ahaliyi nimet-i terakki ve medeniyeti temessül için uzun bir müddet tamim-i maarif ve sanayi tarz ve terakki ve hatta teehhül vesaire gibi ahval-i medeniye ve şahsiyelerinde bile muhtaçtırlar.* [1]
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> – BOA, DH.HMŞ, 32/69, 1a, From the Ministry of Interior to Adana Governorate, undated, (written after 25 February 1324).

During the dismissal procedure of Moushegh Seropian, the Prelate of Adana, the Ministry of Interior sent a long letter that justified the decision to the Adana Governorate. The author of the letter is unknown -there is no signature

1 Moreover, due to the rule of devolution of power, for a long time, this lawful despotism, which was Peter the Great-like or Frederick the Great-like, was needed by the Ottoman State and people in the provinces in order to absorb the benefits of progress and civilization in their proliferation and progress of ways of education, industry, and even in personal and civil affairs like marriage.

on it. It could have been written by Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Minister of the time; Adil Bey, his undersecretary, or a different high-ranking bureaucrat. The letter is worth discussing as a guide for understanding the dominant political thought within the Ministry of the Interior of the new regime. Interestingly, the letter includes an analysis of possible criticisms over sanctions like Seropian's dismissal: In the eyes of some journalists, such sanctions were signs of despotism and certain MPs may have agreed with them. Unlawful and arbitrary forms of despotism were destructive and distorting, yet a lawful form of despotism exhorts the government and the people. Justified by its paternalism, such a despotism could be seen as legitimate and necessary. The text continues with the quote above. In fact, few phrases as such can portray the difference between the post-revolutionary expectations and reality so lucidly: It is very striking to observe that the Ministry, which was under the leadership of a moderate liberal figure, could openly defend the need for a kind of "enlightened despotism" in a political atmosphere where the very word "despotism" was despised by literally everyone. Naturally, "despotism" was not used by these policymakers at the capital either: Without exception, all figures had to refer to the new regime principles. Yet such principles could be "interpreted" to seriously limit the fundamental rights and demands of the Ottoman Armenians. It is this very process of interpretation that this dissertation was mainly about.

§ 8.1 The Three Bending Revisited

Although the phrase from the Ministry makes a striking example, reading the words in isolation runs the risk of neglecting the different actors that took part in this interpretation process. We have to keep in mind that the policymakers at the capital could not easily shape the categories of the new regime by themselves. Several incidents demonstrated how regional Muslim forces in a way stood against actions that could have actualized the new rights and liberties that Ottoman Armenians expected. Actually, official documents on the events within the hinterlands of Cilicia point to great pressure from regions: For example, we have to notice that at the time the Ministry officials authored the text quoted above, serious events had already taken place in

Kayseri and Maraş, where the district governors -Cemal [Keşmir] Bey and Hayri Bey- were targeted by many Muslim townspeople, who had seen the officials' egalitarian policies as favoring, or even conspiring with Armenians. It is true that these two figures were far away from representing a state policy and that during the two crises, they were not treated well, let alone receive support from the central government or their colleagues. In this sense, we can also consider the military officers' hostility to Halil Bey, the sub-district governor of Zeytun, who was for a dovish policy in dealing with the Armenian runaways, as another example of exceptional officials. Still, we have to take into account the fact that whenever such officials appeared in the region during the first year of the new regime, the Muslim crowd targeted them simultaneously with Armenians, and each case had the potential to escalate into a massacre: Whenever the district governors were to be threatened, the crowd claimed that the officials were "giaours" or "infidels", leading Armenians to close their shops and retreat to their houses. In short, although the dominant mood within the Ottoman bureaucracy was not that promising, the archival documents showed that whenever exceptional officials appear, they encountered local Muslims. At such moments, attacks on district governors went hand in hand with threats against local Armenians, causing sudden surges in ethnoreligious tensions.

Furthermore, lacking the infrastructural power and gripped by revolutionary turmoil, the state could not mount a strong response to the attacks on its officials: It was unable to duly arrest the attackers, dispatch sufficient regular troops, and identify human losses. It simply failed in taking control of the situation: Whenever it tried to punish the offenders, it met serious resistance from the local Muslims. Given that the central state would play a decisive role only about six years later in the extermination of Armenians, this contrast is surprising, and it takes our attention to the role of pressure from below in reshaping the Armenian policy of Unionists. The events in the hinterlands show that events in Adana did not constitute an exception either, because, within the town, the Muslim crowd threatened the Governor at the onset of the Massacres – top officials in Adana could hardly be blamed for plotting them. In short, the regional factors really seem to have been more dominant in determining the crippling Armenian policy at the

national level. These findings show that the scholarship should support the argument which is already gaining ground in Ottoman Armenian historiography: to understand the "Armenian Question" of the Empire, regional Muslim forces have to be taken into account more seriously than they have been so far. Yet the quote above shows why I avoid bending the stick too far in the introduction: Making a reference to the enlightened despotism to legitimize the decision to unseat an Armenian prelate shows that even some moderate liberal figures within the Young Turk bureaucracy were against the actualization of the rights and liberties of Armenians, and worse, at least some of the highest-ranking bureaucrats were perfectly aware of the political-theoretical meaning of their action.

I hope that another bending that can contribute is the emphasis on the role of the common people in shaping this Muslim pressure. When existing scholarship points to the role of regional forces, it is mostly the Muslim notables that are referred to. Yet in this work, I tried to point to the usually neglected pressure emanating from the Muslim commoners, who apparently went far beyond preventing the realization of Ottoman Armenian rights and liberties. Although the documents provided relatively limited information to help us understand the characteristics of the Muslim crowd action in detail, it was sufficient to show the existence of several post-revolutionary unrests in the hinterlands before the Massacres. Moreover, the evidence regarding the Antakya Massacre, in particular, revealed that controlling the common Muslim people during the moments of high-level ethnoreligious tensions was more difficult than presumed: In such cases, the Muslim crowd was able to take the initiative, ignoring and even threatening the local elites, who were previously thought to have been so powerful that they could have prevented any attacks against Armenians easily.

Finding clues about the Muslim crowds' agency allowed me to question a widely accepted assumption of the contemporaries: While many Ottoman Armenians and some Muslim constitutionalists pointed to the parallelisms between the 31 March Incident and the Massacres of 1909, they reserved the blame for Abdülhamid and his "plotter gang" by referring to groups who had lost their beneficiaries after the revolution. According to that discourse, the common Muslim people and their popular Islamism offer almost no

explanatory power. The Muslim masses appear as simple instruments of the active agency of the plotters, which were the elites of the old regime. In fact, the differentiation made between the "innocent" or the "deceived" plebeians and the plotter patricians was, to some extent, a fabrication. For example, for the Armenian political elite, this discourse was instrumental for maintaining collaboration with Unionists, whose explanation of the 31 March Incident was also built upon drawing a line between the plotters and the deceived. After all, a group as a whole could not be blamed for such a vicious crime if the intention to coexist in the future remained. Besides, not only certain contemporaries but also the historiography itself sincerely underestimated the agency of the people. This shortcoming of the contemporaries can be understandable, as several factors such as having limited information, suffering traumas, or simply misreading could have affected them. However, being acquainted with the "history from below" tradition, which was built upon proving the agency of the common people, the scholarship should not have remained so unacquainted with the collective participation in massacres. In the absence of acknowledging the dark side of plebeian agency as in the case of the Massacres, the blame is usually put on the state and the political thoughts of the elites. Although the struggle against denialism regarding the 1915 Genocide was also a motivation in this, it became a cause of misreading. Overestimating the agency of the state and elite political thought still remains a major problem in analyses of the history of the struggle for democracy in Turkey. It seems that in sharp contrast with their eagerness to disprove the right-wing denials of the agency of the "people" in seemingly progressive movements, the historiography affected by the history from below tradition usually neglected the darker doings of the same agents, "the people".

The events in Maraş, Kayseri, and Adana showed that protests which had the potential to evolve into a counterrevolutionary movement appeared immediately; a fact that should lead us to problematize the very popular and attractive subject of the revolutionary joy, which was deemed by scholars to be an exceptionally positive moment in terms of the potential of Ottoman communities' coexistence. These unrests turned into great mobilizations by winter, especially in Maraş and Kayseri. I believe that such surprising cases must force us to reconsider the romantic neglect of the agency of the Muslim

crowd. For the future, I am planning to search for the dynamics of the autonomous role of the common Muslim people in shaping the Young Turk regime's ethnoreligious policies. I hope I can have the opportunity to scan the sources available to detect similar kinds of agencies in other regions and other important breaking points of this period in my future studies. I plan to turn my eyes to the ethnoreligious aspect of this sub-topic and search for the conceptions and approaches that point to the reciprocal impact of forces from above and below on the development of exclusionism. While talking about looking for similar cases before future research may sound like intention to engage in cherry-picking, I believe that the evidence I found in the dissertation is assertive enough to develop such a working hypothesis, plus, as seen above, an initial look at the related historiography seems promising.

The stories in this work also showed that the different cases that reflect the history of the Ottoman Armenians' struggle for their rights and liberties can best be examined by considering them as parts of holistic stories. In other words, each topic that considers the history of the Armenian question should be studied by taking all so-called "spheres" into account. In each chapter of the study, the ethnoreligious relations and several regional dynamics mutually affected each other: They were part of power struggles among the local elites (as in Adana and Antakya), between the local elites and the state officials (as in Maraş, in Kayseri, and again in Adana), and between the officials themselves (as in Zeytun). All other factors, such as some officials' hanging out with Christians (Maraş, Kayseri), drinking alcohol (Kayseri), and rumors of having an Armenian mistress (Zeytun); some Armenians' talking "arrogantly" in public, brandishing arms, displaying new nationalistic symbols (Kayseri, Zeytun, and Adana); the personal hostilities among local elites or statesmen (Zeytun, Adana and most probably Antakya), certain prayers about other religious beliefs (Maraş), the effects of drought in the hinterlands, emigration, transformation into capitalist agriculture (Adana), laws that consider economic activities (Maraş), political ambiguities like regime changes and changing cabinets, negotiations between political parties, and the long shadow of diplomats, all played serious roles in increasing or decreasing the local ethnoreligious tensions as well as shaping nationwide rhetoric about the events. These various cases revealed that lifestyles, cultural

symbols, economy, religion, diplomacy, ideology, and politics all played their parts interrelatedly, animating different factors that have to do with ethnoreligious relations. Even when one of them appears merely instrumental to the ethnoreligious relations, they produce their own authentic effects. Therefore, we have to question a dominant tendency in historiography, which draws clear boundaries between "real" or "underlying" material motivations and "instrumental" discourses in the events that interest the field. Throughout the thesis, by referring to Sahlins's two concepts (putting categories into action and interest), I tried to show that interpretation of the regime principles is not a simple byproduct of instrumental reasoning. In fact, it is a complex process in which sincerity and rationality go hand in hand, differing from person to person, bound to several external factors. For example, rather than underestimating the religious discourse of the commoners by claiming that they were the expression of dissatisfaction with material conditions, we should "bring religion back in" and restudy the events in the capital, as well as in the provinces, during the 31 March Incident by observing the peculiar role of the ambiguous popular Islamic discourse, like I tried to do in the analysis of the Hayri Bey Incident in Maraş.

As another popular yet disorganized movement that lacked a clear program, the Gezi Resistance can provide an inverse model to understand the anti-revolutionary movement in the capital and in Cilicia: Although Gezi Resistance was a heterogeneous movement, its proponents often refer to a common "Gezi soul". Here, the word "soul" usually refers to a mode of moral behavior, or in other words, a collective attitude regarding the basic principles of social morality. In this sense, "soul" refers to a holistic opposition that transcends all (political, economic, cultural etc.) spheres. This shift of attention seems to be necessary especially for understanding the struggle over the definition of not only the revolutionary principles but also Ottoman Armenian rights. It suggests a more holistic attitude towards different spheres; the economic, the social, the religious, the cultural etc. to reevaluate the Young Turk history in general. During my study, I became convinced that we may explain the 31 March Incident in these terms. I believe that this dissertation broadened my experience of working on such a vast nationwide turmoil,

encouraging me to dream of writing a holistic story of the 31 March Incident in the distant future.

§ 8.2 On the Problem of the Relation Between Agency and Action in Identifying the Massacres with Reactionary Movements

Against the arguments that discredit the usage of the concept of counter-revolution, the shared features of these movements as such made me apply to a new conception that points to that very commonality. Therefore, in this work, these Muslim mass movements were called anti-revolutions. Inspired by the historiography of the French Revolution, which has already dealt with similar problems, throughout the dissertation, I borrowed the concept of "anti-revolution" to clarify the position of these movements within the new regime. By making a distinction between counter-revolution and anti-revolution, the scholarship of the French Revolution defines the particular characteristics of movements which do take extra-legal actions without seriously demanding restoration: As distinct from counterrevolution, which has a better-defined program and which always consciously and openly rejects the revolution, anti-revolutions were ambiguous movements which oppose the revolutionary policies while maintaining their alleged loyalty to the regime. Anti-revolutions have a serious potential to turn into counterrevolutions, depending on the attitude of the new regime. The French model shows that after their suppression by the government these movements did transform into counterrevolutions. Also, we observed that the scholarship of the Jewish pogroms in Russia also affiliates its object of study with the lack of hegemony of the notion of rechtsstaat. In this sense, the concept of anti-revolution proves useful in pointing to the linkage between the Massacres of 1909 and the 31 March Incident by going beyond the discourses produced by the (un)intentional misreading by contemporaries. It is also beneficial for underlining these movements' common feature of taking extra-legal actions against the notion of rechtsstaat. Also, it liberates us from looking for a clear counterrevolutionary program. Rather, it brings to the foreground the concrete actions and behaviors of the common people. Constructing the

awareness that counterrevolutionary discourse flourishes only after the suppression of anti-revolutionists, the concept does not allow us to be deceived by the dominant loyalist discourse of the reactionaries in İstanbul and in Cilicia, like found in the normalizing scholarship, which overemphasizes the role of liberal opposition to the CUP and downplays the role of popular Islamism.

Believing that the increasing danger of entering into a renewed "Age of Catastrophe" not only in Turkey but also throughout the world forces us to avoid cynically belittling the democratic achievements throughout history, I think that in addition to the benefits summarized above, anti-revolution is also useful for making a humble contribution to satisfying the need for a general reconsideration of the legacy of struggles for the achievement of democracy by bringing progressivism back into the historical analysis. Putting the term anti-revolution into the analysis of the Young Turk period can challenge two ways of thinking within the scholarship: First, moments like 1909 and 1915 cannot be considered reactionary, because they were products of modernity itself. The second reasoning is that the Young Turk legacy should be rejected totally, as they were *génocidaires.* However, once we use the anti-revolution, a term which implies that an anti-revolutionary act can be made by a non-counter-revolutionary agent, then we can outrun these arguments by acknowledging that in terms of being progressive or reactionary, agency and action do not completely overlap. Such an acknowledgment can solve the great dilemma of the revolutionaries' turning into *génocidaires*.

Solving this dilemma of agency can also enable us to refocus on the Young Turkish steps in establishing the hegemony of the notion of the rule of law with a clear mind. In fact, several figures that appeared throughout the dissertation showed that whether consciously or not, a single agent can assume contradictory positions on the interpretations that were focused on. For example, we observed two different discourses of Talat Bey (fraternal in the parliament, highly discriminatory between Muslim notables in İzmid) and Cemal Bey (harshly criticizing the heavy sentence of the prelate in the documents, yet wishing to have hanged him in the memoirs). While İbrahim Paşa appeared as a very Armeno-friendly figure in Antakya, he was seen as an untrustworthy official who did not keep his promises by the Armenians of

Zeytun. Cemal [Keşmir] Bey presented two different images before and after the attacks on him. The Unionists of the Adana branch also presented a double image, but their evolution was in the opposite direction. And while the landlords of Antakya seem to have harassed Armenians before and after the Massacre, they tried to stand against the Massacre or at least limit its effects in the days it was carried out.

This dissertation showed that the challenges posed by the anti-revolutionary movements in 1909, clearly had a role in the start of abandoning the universalist principles of the CUP and its allies in the bureaucracy. Bringing forward the anti-revolutionary pressure from below and the regions, which showed its counterrevolutionary potential through the Incident and the Massacres will be a valuable contribution to understanding the process of the transformation of the Young Turk regime. By taking that factor into account, we will not confine ourselves to the power struggles in the capital, nor the wars as the turning points in ethnoreligious relations in the Empire. Rather, we can bring forward the concessions given to the regional forces, the universalists' loss of power within the Unionists; and the anti-revolutionary movements as the triggering factors of Unionists' deteriorating Armenian policy.

To me, the most striking phenomenon was the reinterpretation of the universalist principles by the Muslim masses, a process which I tried to explain by relying on what I called putting foundational categories into action. By combining the concepts of Dirlik and Sahlins, I tried to show how the abstract principles of the revolution were appraised by several agents differently, and how their various backgrounds, worldviews, material interests, and even personal courage were effective in the appraisal. Within a very short period, an exclusionist interpretation seems to have appeared. Through their slogans, petitions, newspaper articles, informs, and telegrams, many agents expressed their wish to limit the abstract principles with the Muslim majority. They tried to prevent the promised liberties and rights from being applied in a universalist way. Whenever a person who represent the new regime tried to stand against (or show unwillingness to join) the limited interpretation, they were targeted. The events after the Massacres in Adana especially showed that even in the most revolutionary conjuncture of post 31 March in which "the counterrevolutionary plot" was defeated and the

revolutionaries pretended to have shown their willingness to defend the new regime at all costs at the capital, the state policymakers could not openly condemn the massacre of Armenians in Cilicia. Every step towards universalism was faced with new resentment by the Muslim majority, and there were moments when they could even express their questioning of the most fundamental principles of the regime.

Seeing this, the policymakers, the majority of whom had already been –to say the least– hesitant about the actualization of the *Rechtsstaat,* were to reformulate it according to the demands of the Muslim majority that they had to rely on in domestic politics. This process can explain the arc of this dissertation. At its core, this work was about the success of a significant portion of the Muslim population in enforcing the already unwilling state to follow them in putting the foundational categories of the regime in action, which was a victory of anti-revolution, which did not need to go further and transform into counterrevolution.

It is very difficult for historians who study a subject that is -and always will be overshadowed by a far greater subsequent disaster because although the dangers of teleology are obvious, the historian feels obliged to say something concerning the latter. The relation between the Adana Massacres and the 1915 Genocide was a perfect example of such relations. In historiography, the local Unionists' attitude, the regulars' presence during the Second Massacre, and the light punishments by the government were seen as early signs of Unionist intentions to annihilate Armenians.[2] I believe that if there were links between 1909 and 1915, the similar secret intention of a similar singular agent, the Unionists, was not one of them. Cilicia in 1909 was a microcosm that showed that whenever the majority of the Muslim public in the provinces would put their hatred of Armenians into effect, the Unionists would yield to it. The whole process in the dissertation, I believe, revealed that when it came to the basic rights of Ottoman Armenians, the foundational principles did not hold priority in most of the Unionists' morality. What prevailed over the foundational principles varied from individual to individual. At one extreme, the desire for political power dominated the principles, and at the other, a state of mind that misread an oversimplified Armenian agency. Depending on

2 Vahakn Dadrian, "The Circumstances Surrounding the 1909 Adana Holocaust," 1-16.

which tendency dominated the other, all other obstacles to the establishment of a liberal state (the weak infrastructural power of the central state or the mood of party comrades, local elites, or masses) would seem either like real problems that needed great efforts to overcome, or simply pretexts. Only very few people chose to struggle against those obstacles, and as the thesis has shown, that was costly.

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