THE TRANSFORMATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL LOCATION: DİLOVASI FROM 1990S TO PRESENT

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Title: The Transformation of an Industrial Location: Dilovası from 1990s to Present

This study scrutinizes the transformation of Dilovası, a densely industrialized location, from 1990s to present. It focuses on the effects of industrialization process of Turkey on Dilovası and through the data discusses the changing relationship between state and industry/industrialist and the environmental outcomes of the industrial density in the region. This time interval is analyzed in two sections. The period from the establishment of Dilovası Municipality in 1987 to the constitution of Dilovası Organized Industrial Zone in 2002 constitutes the first section; whereas post-2002 period constitutes the second. The set of oscillating discourses and practices between philanthropy and corruption is underlined in the first period. The second period, on the other hand, argues that Dilovası has become an industrial location which is almost autonomous and free from public inspection and an integrated place to the global capitalist economy. The Law of Organized Industrial Zone in 2000, as an outcome of the neoliberal institutionalization period in Turkey, provided vast authority and almost autonomous structure to the industrial regions. Focusing on Dilovası, which is declared as an organized industrial zone in 2002, this thesis discusses how it is included to this new setting and the outcomes of the process. Lastly it aims to consider the social, political and ecological results of the recent industrialization experience in Turkey.

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Başlık: Bir Sanayi Bölgesinin Dönüşümü: 1990'lardan Günümüze Dilovası

Bu çalışma, yoğun bir sanayi bölgesi olan Dilovası'nın 1990'lardan bugüne geçirdiği dönüşümü ele almaktadır. Türkiye'nin içinden geçtiği sanayileşme sürecinin Dilovası gibi yoğun bir sanayi bölgesine ne şekilde yansıdığı üzerinde durulmuş ve verilerden hareketle devlet ile sanayi/sanayici ilişkisinin değişen boyutları ile bölgedeki sanayi yoğunluğunun çevresel sonuçları tartışılmıştır. Bu zaman dilimi iki ana bölümde incelenmiştir. Dilovası Belediyesi'nin kurulduğu 1987 yılından Dilovası Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin kurulduğu 2002 yılına kadarki dönem ilk kısmı oluştururken, 2002 sonrası ikinci kısmı oluşturmaktadır. Birinci kısımda devlet ile sanayi/sanayici arasındaki ilişkide hayırseverlik ile yolsuzluk arasında gidip gelen söylem ve pratiklerin öne çıktığı vurgulanmıştır. İkinci dönemde ise, 1990'ların sonunda gündeme gelen yasal dönüşümleri takiben bölgenin küresel kapitalist sisteme entegre ve özerk bir sınai üretim merkezi haline geldiği öne sürülmüştür. Neoliberal kurumsallaşma döneminin ürünlerinden biri olan ve 2000 yılında çıkan organize sanayi bölgeleri yasası ile sanayi bölgeleri geniş yetkilere ve önemli özerklik yeteneğine sahip olmuşlardır. Dilovası örneğine yoğunlaşan bu çalışma, 2002 yılında organize sanayi bölgesi ilan edilen Dilovası sanayi bölgesinin giderek artan çevre sorunlarına rağmen nasıl bu yeni yapı içerisine dahil edildiğini ve bu durumun sonuçlarını tartışmaktadır. Son olarak Dilovası'ndan hareketle Türkiye'nin içinde bulunduğu sanayileşme süreci ve bunun toplumsal, siyasi ve ekolojik sonuçları ele alınmıştır.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will look at the industrialization process and its outcomes in Dilovası in two different periods. The first period will consider the 1987 to 2002, i.e., from the establishment of Dilovası Municipality to the constitution of Dilovası Organized Industrial Zone (*Dilovası Organize Sanayi Bölgesi*, DOSB from now on). The second period, on the other hand, will consider the 2002 and after departing from the legal transformations in the period after 2000 and its reflections in Dilovası. In the period between 1987 and 2002, the relationship between the state and the industry/industrialist is shaped by a motivation to ensure the capital accumulation processes and industrialization. The restrictions and limitations by the laws are surmounted with certain strategies. Especially in Dilovası case, the problems of infrastructure, environment and public health are ignored and trivialized through the instruments like corruption, philanthropy and bribery. Capitalist classes, in this period, systematically ignored the environmental concerns[1] and solved the problems occurred in this field through other mechanisms between state and industry/industrialist.[2]

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[1] Interestingly Erdal Karamercan, the head of TÜSİAD's commission on Industry, Services and Agriculture and at the same time the the chief executive officer in Eczacıbaşı Holding, underlined same ignorance and argued that the environmental issues are postponed for the sake of industrialization. See "Sanayileşme Adına Çevre İkinci Plana İtildi," *Hürryiet*, 5 June 2007.

[2] This approach becomes clear in the post-1980 period in which Turkey adopts export-oriented industrialization policy. Yet, the emphasis on post-1980 period should be

This study will scrutinize the basic dynamics of the relationship between state and industry in the post-1980 period in Turkey and in which ways this relationship transformed a certain location, Dilovası which is officially affiliated with Gebze, a province of Kocaeli city. According to this thesis, as an industrial location which started to be industrialized in the late 1960s together with the suburbanization of İstanbul-based industry, Dilovası, and its transformation from mid-1980s to present provide valuable information on understanding basic aspects and tendencies of industrialization policy of Turkey and its spatial configuration. Although Dilovası and its history of industrialization start in 1967, this thesis will particularly focus on its transformation from mid-1980s to present, because revealing the impacts of the neoliberalization in the field of industrialization and its spatial configuration in Turkey is one of the targets of this study.

Second stage, on the other hand, marks a period in which global capital becomes influential in terms of both capital flow and institutional change. Starting from the year 1998 this time span witnessed significant political and institutional transformations.[3] New social security laws and the transformation of social security system, rising influence of regulatory boards in economic field, changes in labor law, the occupation of capital in the previously public-oriented sectors like education and health, privatizations, rising influence of

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interpreted as the prior policies on environment (i.e. the policies of import susbstituting industrialization period) are more adequate and effective. Similar attitude towards environment is adopted and environment is seen as something negligible for the sake of industrialization. The lack of legal regulations in this field is a good proof for this approach. Problem should be seen from the perspective of late-industrializing country. In the İzmit Bay region, which became the locus of swift and dense industrialization after 1960s, it was only mid-1970s when the environmental problems became visible. For an example from local media, see "Hepimiz Kanser Olacağız," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 29 April 1976.

[3] Bkz. Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler *IMF Gözetiminde On Uzun Yıl: 1998-2008 Farklı Hükümetler Tek Siyaset* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2007).

financial capital and financialization, re-structuring local governments, and finally the law of organized industrial zone which is particularly important for this thesis are leading examples.[4]

Here, the effects of this transformation, which can basically be called neoliberalization that brings about the intensification of the power of the capitalist classes and the retreat of public power especially in the economic realm, on this specific field will be analyzed. Considering these discussions, in order to understand Dilovası, as a dense industrial location in Turkish level, we should argue basic concepts and periods theoretically. First, the relationship between the state and the industry/industrialist should be considered. The philanthropy/corruption axis will be discussed in depth since it constitutes a kernel issue in Dilovası context. Second part will evaluate the basic points of the transformation occured after 1980, and in addition the instruments of governance, which became everyday components of economic life, will be evaluated. Last part will look at the course and perception of environmental problems and its implications in Turkey which is a controversial and intriguing issue in the world as well.

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[4] This kind of periodization is not common but recent studies on post-1980 period in Turkey underline basic differences despite evident continuities. Emphases on governance are outcomes of the last decade especially with the rising influence of regulatory boards in the economic field. For instance, see Sonay Bayramoğlu, *Yönetişim Zihniyeti: Türkiye'de Üst Kurullar ve Siyasal İktidarın Dönüşümü* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), Huricihan İslamoğlu, "Yeni Düzenlemeler ve Ekonomi Politik: IMF Kaynaklı Kurumsal Reformlar ve Tütün Yasası," *Birikim*, no. 158 (2002). However, the beginnings of the neoliberal transformation rely on the military intervention in 1980. For studies based on this distinction, see Fuat Ercan, "Neoliberal Orman Yasalarından Kapitalizmin Küresel Kurumsallaşmasına Geçiş: Hukuk-Toplum İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Türkiye'de Yapısal Reformlar II," *İktisat Dergisi*, no. 437 (2003), Fuat Ercan, "Neoliberal Orman Yasalarından Kapitalizmin Küresel Kurumsallaşmasına Geçiş: Yapısal Reformlar I," *İktisat Dergisi*, no. 435 (2003), Yasemin Özdek, "Türkiye'de Şirket Egemenliği," *Monthly Review Türkiye*, no. 15 (2007). David Harvey, in one of his recent book, puts the military intervention in Chile in 1973 as the starting point of neoliberalization and the formation of neoliberal state in the world. See David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 7. I argue that military intervention in 1980 should be taken as a similar point of departure for Turkey as well.

In Turkey, academic research on the social and economic problems engendered by industrialization has mostly assumed a broader approach and analyzed the subject matter from within a national or global context. Though one could find exceptions, particularly during the last one or two decades, there are very few studies on how a locality has been transformed within the context of the long-term and broader counters of industrialization.[5] The present study aims to overcome this shortcoming of the scholarship by focusing on Dilovası, an industrial locality, which has been shaped by a heavy flow of capital since the late 1960s. Dilovası has recently attracted public attention with the pollution that the industrial companies operating in the region have caused and the high rates of cancer cases among the inhabitants of the region. A 2004 report prepared by a group of faculty from the Public Health Department of Kocaeli University revealed how serious the pollution and public health problem was in the region. According to this report one-third of deaths in the region were due to cancer.[6] As a result of increasing public concern with these problems the Grand National Assembly established a research commission which was to investigate the effects of industrial waste on the environment and human health in the region.[7] Shortly after, Dilovası

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[5] For example, see Faruk Ataay, "Türkiye Kapitalizminin Mekânsal Dönüşümü," *Praksis*, no. 2 (2001), Ali Ekber Doğan, "Mekân Üretimi ve Gündelik Hayatın Birikim ve Emek Süreçleriyle İlişkisine Kayseri'den Bakmak," *Praksis*, no. 16 (2007). Metin Özuğurlu's study on Babadağ, a textile center Denizli may also be an example. But its primal aim is not to look at geographical transformation but new working patterns. See, Metin Özuğurlu, *Anadolu'da Küresel Fabrikanın Doğuşu: Yeni İşçilik Örüntülerinin Sosyolojisi* (İstanbul: Halkevleri, 2005).

[6] This study is not published separately but some information about it can be found in the following report. See, TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Kocaeli'nin Gebze İlçesinin Dilovası Beldesindeki Sanayi Atıklarının Çevre ve İnsan Sağlığı Üzerindeki Olumsuz Etkilerinin Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan (10/254,258) Esas Numaralı Meclis Araştırması Komisyon Raporu* (Ankara: TBMM, 2007).

[7] This commission accomplished its mission in April, 2007 and published a comprehensive report. See, Ibid.

acquired a center-stage place among the wider public as a place of ecological destruction and disaster.[8]

However, this sudden and short-lived interest in the environmental and health problems in Dilovası seems to be fading. According to recent news published in a national newspaper, Dilovası started to breathe normally: "The insistent pursuit of *Radikal*,[*] civil society and the ministry gave results. There is no factory in Dilovası left without a water treatment system. The chimneys are continuously being checked. (…) Known for its industrial pollution and cancer cases for years, Dilovası, a district of Kocaeli, has started to breathe."[9] This rise and fall of interest in Dilovası in the mass media and public discussions enabled *Radikal* and its correspondent to win a prize of environmental responsibility,[10] but it seems to have changed very little fundamental in terms of politics and social relations in Dilovası.

Alas, there is much more to tell about Dilovası than that short interval of fame and pollution-cleaning period. In other words, it is impossible to understand the dynamics of Dilovası by looking at the environmental issues of the last few years isolated from the other social, legal and political developments of the last decades. Pondering the problem in this way,

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[8] For some examples see, Ergün Ayaz, "Sanayinin Yoğun Olduğu Dilovası'nda Kanserden Ölümler İlk Sırada," *Hürriyet* 2006, Yalçın Bayer, "Dilovası'nda Vicdanlar Sızlıyor," *Hürriyet*, 29 April 2006, "Dilovası'nda Kanserden Ölenlerin Oranı % 30," *Hürriyet* 2006, Şükrü Hatun, "Dilovası'nda Ekolojik Yıkım," *Radikal*, 6 July 2004, Ahmet İnsel, "Organize Çevre Katliam Bölgesi," *Radikal İki*, 26 November 2006, Saffet Korkmaz, "AB'den 239 Kat Fazla Zehir," *Hürriyet*, 14 May 2006.

[*] A Turkish daily newspaper

[9] Serkan Ocak, "Dilovası'nın Nefesi Açıldı," *Radikal*, 14 June 2007. "*Radikal'in, sivil toplumun, bakanlığın ve üniversitelerin ısrarlı takibi sonuç verdi. Dilovası'nda arıtmasız fabrika kalmadı. Bacalar sürekli izleniyor. (...)Yıllardır sanayi kirliliği ve kanser vakalarıyla anılan Kocaeli'nin Dilovası beldesi, nefes almaya başladı.*"

[10] "Radikal'e 'Dilovası' Ödülü," *Radikal*, 14 June 2007.

environmental destruction and widespread health problems are outcomes of the transformation witnessed in the last decades in Dilovası as well as in Turkey. Filters put in factory chimneys, which are mentioned as solutions to the problems in Dilovası in newspapers and governmental recommendations,[11] appear to be ineffective to understand the overall transformation and its outcomes. In addition, this bulk of discourse on Dilovası has a weird effect of localizing the problem. It is as if Dilovası is the only polluted region in Turkey due to industrial production and unfortunately, this indirectly implies that the cleaning of Dilovası will finish the problem of industrial pollution in Turkey.

This thesis focuses on Dilovası and its characteristics which did not appear in those recent endeavors: those are the legal, administrative and political transformation that took place in the last two decades. Thus, it aims to understand the current dynamics of industrialization in Turkey by looking at an industrial location which is widely acknowledged and known. It secondly aims to demystify the discourse of localization and argue that this set of problems is not peculiar to Dilovası, but rather valid for many locations in the current setting of capitalism in Turkey and probably in the world. Finally, I will examine the effects of neoliberalism on politics through industrialization and development.

Dilovası is officially affiliated with Gebze, which is a district of Kocaeli province, and has an estimated population more than 50,000.[12] It is 12 km to Gebze center, 35 km to Kocaeli city center and finally 60 km to İstanbul

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[11] For two examples, see, Ocak, "Dilovası'nın Nefesi Açıldı.", T. C. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı *Dilovası Gerçeği* (Ankara: T. C. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Müşavirliği, 2007).

[12] TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*, p. 3.

city center.[13] It is east of İstanbul and Gebze and west of Kocaeli; in other words, it is located between Gebze and Kocaeli, two of the most important industrial centers of the country. Administratively it is a municipality.

With the circulation of workers in addition to the passengers using the highways and railway transportation, it is being asserted that this estimated population of 50,000 rises to 80,000 each day. Yet, in spite of this high resident population and movement it is legitimate to argue that Dilovası is a small place of settlement. Its total area is roughly about 2,000 hectares, and 40 % of its total area is occupied by industry, whereas 35 % is wooded and 25 % is residential. It is surrounded by two small mountains on the eastern and the western sides.[14] To the northern side the ground rises, but compared to the mountains to the eastern and western sides this rise is much more gradual. At its southern boundary lies İzmit Bay, which is occupied by twelve middle scale ports. With its general outlook Dilovası looks like a big plate geographically isolated from other districts. The two small rivers that pass through the town should be mentioned, those are Dil Deresi and Eynarca Deresi.

These geographical location and features, and the transportation opportunities it has, provide a particular position for Dilovası. Two superhighways that connect İstanbul and Ankara pass through Dilovası. The Transit European Motorway (TEM) and D-100 (sometimes called E-5). Annual motorized vehicle traffic on these roads is estimated to be about 40 million, which means a huge volume. In addition to that, the railway that

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[13] Ayşe Pelin Pekcan-Yatmaz, "Dilovası Beldesi Çevre Bilgi Sisteminin Oluşturulması" (M. A. Thesis, Gebze Yüksek Teknoloji Enstitüsü, 2002), p. 38.

[14] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

connects İstanbul and Ankara passes through Dilovası. Last, the marine transportation facilities are an important part of the locality. As mentioned above, Dilovası has twelve middle scale ports that all belong to private companies. When one considers that there are thirty nine ports in Kocaeli municipality in general, it becomes easier to understand the significance of marine transportation in Dilovası.

Along with its geographical features it is important to mention the historical features of the region. The name "Dilovası" was not in use until 1967, not because there was another name employed, but because administratively there was no such place. There was a small neighborhood called Diliskelesi on the coastal side, which is administratively a neighborhood affiliated with Dilovası Municipality today. Diliskelesi neighborhood was affiliated with Muallimköy and it was also called Lower Muallimköy.

Today's Dilovası is known as Lower Çerkeşli. A short history of the region starts with the establishment of the İzocam factory in 1967. In other words it was İzocam that initiated industry in and formed a medium for people to migrate to the region. But the name Dilovası was not being used immediately afterwards. At the very beginning some people preferred to call it İzocam neighborhood. However, in ten years the name Dilovası, which is currently in use, was appropriated. Today's Dilovası Municipality, which is constituted of seven neighborhoods (Mimar Sinan, Cumhuriyet, Orhangazi,

Diliskelesi, Yeni Yıldız, Turgut Özal and Fatih neighborhoods, respectively from the most populated to least) was officially declared in 1987. Today two of these neighborhoods (Yeni Yıldız and Fatih) remain within DOSB.

Along with these features its current density of industrial potential makes Dilovası one of the most important manufacturing centers. According to the Dilovası Organized Industrial Zone (*Dilovası Organize Sanayi Bölgesi*, DOSB from now on) today there are 171 units of business enterprises employing more than 15,000 workers.[15]

This study separates into four chapters. Chapter Two underlines the theoretical discussions which are essential to an understanding of the issue. Three major themes, that I believe to be important and fruitful, are discussed in detail: first, the development discourse and industrialization in the post-1980 era; second, state and its transformation (specifically including issues like corruption, philanthropy and neoliberalization); and finally the environmental problems and its implications.

Chapter Three will comprise a brief history of Dilovası. This chapter tells the overall transformation of the region from the mid-1960s to the present. This section comprises of three sub-sections. The first examines the growth and dispersal of İstanbul-based industry. This is particularly significant for Dilovası since this thesis argues that it has been shaped by the suburbanization of İstanbul-based industry. The second one discusses the basic trends in industrialization in Dilovası. Lastly, the third one scrutinizes the

[15] It is difficult to say something definite on the number of employees in current setting in which informal employment became a norm even in heavy industries. Besides the service sector that Dilovası industry mobilizes is very diverse (but it is valid to say that predominant sector is logistics) and hard to count.

transformation of population in Dilovası. The sources of materials of which are the following: municipal records and reports of Dilovası Municipality, local newspapers, in-depth interviews, state statistics and other academic studies.

Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of Dilovası, the industrialization of the field and its social and political effects from the 1990s to present in terms of discourses of development, corruption/social responsibility projects and the role of state. It focuses on the relationship between state and industry in the 1990s departing from themes like corruption, social responsibility and benevolence projects. Environmental and health problems will also be discussed again in the context of state industry relations. Newspaper articles along with in-depth interviews with local inhabitants; municipal staff; current and former heads of the municipality, factory owners; factory staff; current and former workers in the factories in the region; former governor of Kocaeli who was involved in very much in the constitution process of DOSB; activists, deputy members and others will provide basic material for this section. Chapter Three also examines Dilovası after 2002 and the region's legal and administrative transformation. Three laws, the Law of Organized Industrial Zone, the Metropolitan Municipality Law and the Environmental Law changed the scene in Dilovası and transformed Dilovası into an almost independent self-governing industrial production islet. This chapter will look at both these regulations in detail and track the continuities

and ruptures in the Dilovası context. Finally, in the concluding chapter the results of the study will be revealed.

Dilovası started to be industrialized forty years ago. Its history of industrialization coincides with a massive migration and distorted urbanization. However, trends in urbanization and migration are minor concerns of this study therefore this introductory chapter will consider them as they affect the general trends in Dilovası. The literature on development and industrialization will be covered in detail in this chapter. Issues concerning the state and its role in Dilovası's industrialization are among the most important ones determining the course of Dilovası's development, thus it will form the second part of this section. Corruption, bribery, social responsibility projects and emphasis on benevolence will be the major themes of this part. Finally environmental issues should be covered theoretically in detail, thus last section of this chapter will be on environmental issues.

Dilovası is a production center on a global scale. Most of the manufactured goods are either industrial intermediary goods or consumption goods. A very small portion of this manufacture circulates in Dilovası and is consumed by the local people. Income generated in the region flows into either İstanbul, in which company management centers are located or world financial centers via İstanbul since there is a significant amount of foreign investment in the region. Most of the workers of more than 15.000 workers in the region commute from outside of Dilovası.

Still it is impossible and wrong to consider Dilovası only as a production center despite all this data. Dilovası and its *local* problems should be evaluated within the effects of the capitalist mode of production. The basic significance of this emphasis is inevitable, because issues like pollution, cancer, and epidemic diseases could not be understood if it is seen as an isolated production center. Yet all these theoretical reservations do not prevent us from considering Dilovası as a singular category of analysis or, as Harootunian calls it as an inflection of global capitalism.[16]

Some theoretical tools will be employed for this purpose. First and probably the most comprehensive one is the "development" concept. As a concept *invented* for the Third World[17] that has caused an amazing forms of the domination discourse it formed the most determinate political agendas of the postwar era. It is unthinkable to consider Turkish industrialization or industrialization in Dilovası without this overarching context.

Another concept is the vital concept of "globalization," which has become indispensable in the last two or three decades. The fact of globalization and the mentality of governance brought about in the last decade are important and almost a must to understand Dilovası within the recent debates. In this context, recent legal arrangements like the law of organized industrial zones and the law of metropolitan cities, incentives will be evaluated. Civil society activities in which industrialists largely engaged

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[16] Harry D. Harootunian, *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice and the Question of Everyday Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

[17] Concept is used previously (i.e. before World War II) but with a different content. The meaning underlined here is totally invented one after the World War II. For the changing connotations of the concept see, Raymond Williams, *Anahtar Sözcükler*, trans. Savaş Kılıç (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), pp. 124-126.

before the legal arrangements mentioned above will be evaluated as in-between transition points. The oscillation between corruption and social responsibility will be assessed in this context.

Last but not least, any study on Dilovası should consider the problem in the context of development as well as environment and health. Moreover, it is impossible to discuss these themes especially after 2004 when the region is considered to be a medical and environmental disaster area. This study tries to cover environmental and health problems in as much detail as possible while it looks at the problem of the allocation of urban place and decision-making processes.

CHAPTER II

CHANGING MEANINGS AND METHODS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT IN A NEOLIBERAL SETTING

"Development" as the key concept of modern territorial states was never used as extensively as in the twentieth century. It was utilized in diverse geographies as well as different political regimes in different time periods with different discursive strategies. As in the way it was employed in Soviet Russia's five-year plans, development was a means for catching up with capitalist civilization and overcoming it;[18] whereas in Japan the same discourse was in the service of the fascist regime in the interwar period.[19] In the postwar political context, it became the main tool of American foreign policy and other international institutions to intervene into the so-called Third World countries. In this new conjuncture, development was appropriated as the main target of Third World countries to catch up with the modern advanced industrial societies.[20]

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[18] Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), this study is important especially in terms of parallelisms it shows between perceptions of development of the Soviet Union and USA. Leading figure in Soviet context is Nikolai Bukharin and his distinct ideas on development. For Bukharin, see Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980).

[19] Harry D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[20] Arif Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1994), Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 3rd ed. (London: Pine Forge Press, 2004).

As development and modernization occupy a certain place in countries' political agenda, it also became essential for social scientists. This essentiality in social sciences caused a growth of comprehensive understanding about society in which one can discuss very broad phenomena from economy to environmental consciousness; from the place of women in society to illiteracy.[21] The common point for all these temporally and spatially differentiating perceptions is that they all emphasize a smooth organic whole despite their internal contradictions and inequality.[22] Moreover, the implicit historicist perspective it conveys puts forward the theoretical problems of the concept.

The first criticisms came out in the 1960s and 1970s from Latin America based dependency school.[23] These criticisms, with pioneers like Cardoso and Frank, underlined the global inequalities and global division of labor, besides relating the underdevelopment of the Third World to the development of Euro-America and its imperial history.[24] One of the most attractive concepts of Marxism, imperialism, was revived in theories of new imperialism. They generated a criticism of modernization theories and developmentalism.[25] However, the criticism of development is not peculiar

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[21] World Bank reports published from the very beginning to the present include large amounts of data on all these issues mentioned. For a recent example, see World Bank *Development and the Next Generation* (Washington: World Bank, 2006).

[22] Harootunian, *History's Disquiet*, Chapter 2.

[23] For an example on Turkey, see Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

[24] Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

[25] Among the leading theorists apart from Cardoso and Frank are the following: P. Baran, P. Sweezy, A. Emmanuel, S. Amin. For a comprehensive critique of all these

and limited to dependency theory as well; many other perspectives followed it.[26] But as James Ferguson argues, the pro-development theories and anti-development theories have one point in common and politically ask the same naïve question: "Do aid programs really help poor people?"[27] The pros say 'yes' whereas their opponents say 'no'. In addition opposing literature has a substantive argument: without imperialist intervention, underdeveloped countries would develop by themselves as well. Frank, one of the most passionate advocates of this view, argues that Latin American countries' development course ceased when the imperial interventions arrived. Contrarily, it accelerated when the imperialist interventions disrupted.[28] In other words the first generation of criticisms of developmentalism generated a Third Worldist perspective rather than a comprehensive critique of the discourse. Thus, the Third wordlist perspective made them reproduce the political and theoretical dilemmas.[29]

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approaches, see Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism* (London: Routledge, 1990).

[26] The most famous one is the World Systems theory and it is the one that has affected Ottoman historiography the most. See Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

[27] Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine*, p. 12.

[28] Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. For a detailed criticism of these arguments, see Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization," *New Left Review*, no. 81 (1973).

[29] For a recent critique including the current globalization debates, see Harry D. Harootunian, *The Empire's New Clothes: Paradigm Lost, and Regained* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2004). This period witnessed the powerful challenge of postmodernism to the so-called grand narratives. Feminism, cultural studies and the Foucault effect complicated the writing of world scale histories. According to Geoff Eley, some historians and sociologists with various areas of interest ranging from Africa to China and the Middle East pioneered a new discipline called historical sociology and continued to write macro studies both historically and geographically. This, for Eley, constitutes a paradoxical juxtaposition. See Geoff Eley, "Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Two Decades Later," in *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, ed. Terrence McDonald (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 204-205. Together with a paradoxical juxtaposition it also shows the difficulties experienced in problematizing the non-West until the 1980s.

The crisis of capitalism in the 1970s[30] and the haunting liberal discourse changed the course of developmentalism in certain ways. Globalization was welcomed at the beginning for the capacity to criticize the national developmentalism and the "irrationalities" it conveys.[31] Soon after, neoliberal attack, which spread throughout the whole world under the name of globalization, caused serious polarizations at the center as well as in the periphery in the 1990s. It demonstrated that it is impossible to utilize same developmentalist discourse with the same content.[32] At this point, concepts like structural reforms, adjustment policies, integration to the global economy and institutional efficiency gained importance in the socio-political realm.[33] Hybridity and multiculturalism formed the prevailing cultural discourse of this new scene.[34]

The same period witnessed an increase in both urban and rural poverty. In other words, globalization had a dual effect on developing countries: growing integration to world capitalist markets on the one hand, and social exclusion and informalization on the other.[35] This polarization can be seen

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[30] There are lots of different appearances and names of this crisis. Most important ones are oil crisis and debt crisis for the third world.

[31] Didem Danış, "Çağlar Keyder ile Görüşme," *Express* February 2006.

[32] But still some works are being published nourished by classical dependency theory. For an example on Turkey, see Mehmet Odekon, *The Costs of Economic Liberalization in Turkey* (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 2005).

[33] McMichael, *Development and Social Change*, p. 127.

[34] For the cultural references of globalization, see Arif Dirlik, "Modernity as History: Post-Revolutionary China, Globalization and the Question of Modernity," *Social History* 27, no. 1 (2002), Elizabeth A. Povinelli, "The State of Shame: Australian Multiculturalism and the Crisis of Indigenous Citizenship," *Critical Inquiry* 24, no. 2 (1998).

[35] The best place to see this dual effect is, of course, Africa. James Ferguson discusses the articulation and disarticulation of the local with the global in detail in his following work. See James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), especially 1-23. Also see Asef Bayat, "From 'Dangerous Classes' to 'Quite Rebels': Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South,"

best in metropolitan areas in the Third World. Business districts and residential areas articulated to the global order on the one hand, ghettos and settlements of extreme poverty on the other.[36] Studies on themes like urban transformation projects, poverty/new urban poverty and gentrification have attracted the attention of non-governmental organizations and academics as well as municipalities.

Yet this is not limited to the metropolitan areas of developing countries. There have been world-wide regional developments; some regions have become consumption centers whereas others have become industrial production centers. Both imply serious concentration. The best example of this concentration in the global division of labor is the industrial parks and districts of China.[37] Producing for the whole globe these districts are places that this polarization can easily be seen. But it is not only China or other East Asian countries where these spatial differentiations have emerged.

International Sociology 15, no. 3 (2000), Arif Dirlik, "The Global in the Local," in *The Postcolonial Aura* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).

[36] Respectful energy and time are being spent on themes like the restructuring of urban landscape. For some studies on Turkey and global scale, see Bayat, "From 'Dangerous Classes' to 'Quite Rebels': Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South.", Ayfer Bartu Candan and Biray Kolluoğlu Kırlı, "Neoliberalizm ve Yerel Yönetimler Bağlamında Kentsel Dönüşüme Nasıl Karşı Durulabilir?," *İstanbul*, no. 60 (2007), Sema Erder, *İstanbul'a Bir Kent Kondu: Ümraniye* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1996), Necmi Erdoğan, ed., *Yoksulluk Halleri: Türkiye'de Kent Yoksulluğunun Toplumsal Görünümleri* (İstanbul: Demokrasi Kitaplığı, 2002), Oğuz Işık and M. Melih Pınarcıoğlu, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk: Gecekondulaşma ve Kent Yoksulları, Sultanbeyli Örneği* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), Çağlar Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion in İstanbul," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 1 (2005), Hatice Kurtuluş, ed., *İstanbul'da Kentsel Ayrışma: Mekânsal Dönüşümde Farklı Boyutlar* (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2005). Although it is much more visible in Third World metropolis the same polarization is also observable in the leading capitalist countries of the world. See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

[37] For a popular depiction of the concentration in the Chinese city and countryside, see Jasper Becker, *Dragon Rising: An Inside Look at China Today* (Washington: National Geographic Society, 2006).

The topic of this thesis is a similar industrial production area which is formed as an outcome of this global process of capitalist development. One of the secondary questions of it is as follows: how did the temporal/spatial transformation of the last four decades influence the relatively small plain of Dilovası and transform it into a major industrial and commercial center of the country?

The Dilovası region started to industrialize as the logical extension of the industrial development effort started in the 1960s. Together with the 1980s, the process accelerated and now it is one of the most important industrial and commercial bases of Turkish economy. Multinationals interested in region from the very beginning and accompanied by this national and international interest Dilovası gathered the largest private chemical and steel factories of the country.[38] In line with this development Dilovası attracted large amounts of people in the internal migration process. Population was just 400 in the year 1967 whereas it was 50.000 in 2007 which means a 50 times increase.[39] Dilovası is located in the middle of the third (Körfez) and fourth (Gebze) provinces of the list of economically developed provinces and administratively related to Gebze.[40] It is an industrial production center strictly speaking open to world market. But the dual process mentioned above has come true: as an industrial and commercial location it is open to global

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[38] Çolakoğlu Metallurgy, Diler Iron & Steel, DYO, Marshall, Polisan, Unilever, Basf Chemical, Dow Chemical are some leading examples.

[39] See, Kent Yapı Planlama *T. C. Dilovası Beldesi Analitik Çalışma Sonuçları* (Gebze: Dilovası Belediyesi, 2001), TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*.

[40] Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı *İlçelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması* (Ankara: DPT, 2004), p. 85.

economy; however, it also faced with the other face of globalization in terms of social exclusion and informalization.

There is a widespread opinion that today industry is slipping from advanced capitalist countries to the periphery.[41] According to this opinion the original locations of industry like England, Germany, the USA and even Japan, are de-industrializing whereas countries like China, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey and the former Eastern Bloc are industrializing and becoming the industrial production centers of the world.[42] In one respect, it is asserted that the geographical allocation of industrial production slides. Yet, according to that view, the de-industrialization of these old industrial centers does no point to an impoverishment or decrease in life standards and welfare, but indicates that these societies passed to a post-industrial welfare level in which the service sector (predominantly finance) dominates the economy on a global scale. Likewise the industrialized countries do not witness an increase in welfare. Industry does not generate an entire development comprising the whole society. Thus, the name attached to this era, i.e. neoliberal development, broke the homogenizing power of the nation state in the globalization age. Industry became an issue which is not to be spread nation-wide, but focused

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[41] For a typical pespective, see Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, *Deindustrialization: Its Causes and Implications* (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997). This paper by two IMF economists takes deindustrialization as a natural consequence of further growth in advanced economies. Another recent research by an international auditing firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, asserts that E 7 countries (emerging economies of the world, China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) will pass the G 7 of today (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy and Canada) in terms of GDP by 2050. The re-location of industry as well as economy is a renowned idea circulating in the world in these days. See John Hawksworth, *The World in 2050: How Big will the Major Emerging Market Economies Get and How can the OECD Compete?* (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006).

[42] Of course, some parts of the world, like Africa, are neither de-industrializing nor industrializing. Yet as Ferguson argues, they should still be included in the global scheme. Some outcast people as well as outcast regions are outcomes of the same polarizing process. See Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, first chapter.

and concentrated in some certain satellite locations.[43] This mode of production that is limited to certain satellites aims targets consumption in a similar satellite like centers rather than a nation wide or world wide one. In other words, some production centers (say, some countries like China, Malaysia or places like Dilovası) produce for the world market, but especially for some consumption centers (say some countries like the USA; Europe, or cities like İstanbul).[44]

There are important reasons for the spatial reorganization of industry at a global level. The most important of them was the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s. David Harvey, a leading theoretician of this crisis, argues that it came out because of the dual characteristic of capital. According to his view, inspired by the classical texts of Marx, capital has an inherent tendency of spatial-temporal concentration,[45] but at the same time it has inclined to crisis because of its internal contradictions. It searches for another spatio-temporal fixes to overcome its crisis.[46] The geographical concentration and dispersal goes hand in hand with capitalism. The internal inclination to crisis, for him, prevents capital from staying in a certain space and time for a long time. When

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[43] One of the famous and recent think tanks of Turkey, the TEPAV (*Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı*) underlines this issue too much. See Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Enstitüsü Sanayi Politikaları Çalışma Grubu *Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri ve Kamusal Yetkiler: Faydalar ve Sorunlar Nelerdir?* (Ankara: Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı, 2006), Güven Sak, *Sanayi Politikası, Bölgesel Kalkınma ve Kümelenme Stratejisi* (Ankara: TEPAV, 2006).

[44] This general picture recalls Manuel Castells' concept of network society, See Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). For a compilation of well known studies underlining this form of transfromation, see David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate* (London: Polity, 2000).

[45] Harvey sometimes calls it fixation. For example see, David Harvey, ""New" Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession," in *Socialist Register 2004*, ed. Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (London: Merlin Press, 2003).

[46] David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital* (London: Verso, 1999), p. 417.

crisis approaches capital looks for other places to exploit.[47] As Harvey notes, "Spatial dispersal begins to look increasingly attractive."[48] In this context, the geographical reorganization and allocation of industry in the last three decades were outcomes of the crisis of capital accumulation and the responses to that particular crisis.

If this variation in the equation is true, then it points to a significant change in the old liberal understanding, because the creed based on development and industrialization held the opposite for the previous two centuries. According to the old liberal creed, industrialization and the social transformation it brings with it –bourgeois revolution together with democracy, equality, etc. - should be a sign of development in its full sense. The globalization and neoliberal development perspectives however broke this creed. Today the largest consumption centers of the world are not the largest production centers. Similarly the largest production centers of the world have far from democratic governing systems; they are more likely to be governed by autocratic regimes and their welfare levels are not as high as those in advanced capitalist states; let alone the problems in income distribution. Along with the welfare differences, there are internal differentiations (especially

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[47] This idea of geographical spread is inspired by Rosa Luxemburg and her idea of capitalist expansion to the non-capitalist markets. See Harvey, ""New" Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession." Harvey here, departing from Luxemburg and the inclusion of non-capitalist markets to the capitalist markets (Luxemburg calls it imperialism) draws a uni-linear understanding of capital expansion. Therefore he overemphasizes the role of capitalist "West" and underestimates the agency of other parts of the world. For some criticisms of this underlining this argument, see Fuat Ercan and Şebnem Oğuz, "Sınıfsal Bir İlişki ve Süreç Olarak Ölçek: Kamu İhale Yasası," *Praksis*, no. 15 (2006).

[48] Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, p. 418.

geographical) within those countries. The USA is a good example of the former whereas China is for the latter.[49]

Secondly, new neoliberal setting annulled the inherent connection with nationally sovereign state working with the rule of law and well-functioning market capitalism. The fields of extraction in Africa, as James Ferguson calls it, do not require countries with good governance and less corruption. Unlike Atul Kohli and other novel developmentalist writers,[50] Ferguson underlines the break between gated production centers (for oil production in Angolan context) and places of civil war within the same country.[51] In addition, Ferguson presents this form of extraction as a new model in almost all African countries. Protecting economically valuable and exploitable places with laws and arms and leaving other economically invaluable and no exploitable areas intact is the new strategy of development and articulation to the global capitalism in Africa.[52] Accordingly, he underlines the privatized forms of security as the most recent innovation of global capitalism and interprets as the transformation of sovereignty.[53]

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[49] The transformation of production process is considered in many studies. For a recent example see, Harvey, ""New" Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession." For a macro study evaluating both instances, see Becker, *Dragon Rising*, Andrew Glyn, "Imbalances of the Global Economy," *New Left Review*, no. 34 (2005).

[50] See Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[51] Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, pp. 198-199.

[52] Ibid., p. 201, 204.

[53] Ibid., p. 205, 207. This perspective has parallelisms with the emphasis on the changing importance of territory by Charles Maier. Maier arues that the territoriality as the main concern of modern nation states started to decline in 1960s and together with the globalization this became more and more evident. See Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000).

These transformations reveal important points for the geographical allocation of industry in the world. Industry determined the agenda of almost all countries in the twentieth century. The opposite would have been surprising since it is a source of massive power. The preservation of the modern territorial structure was possible with equivalence between states. Including the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, many countries initiated industrial growth for a more rational and efficient mode of production.

Thus, it is valid to argue that development via industrialization protected its central role after World War II. Especially for the so-called Third World it became an issue of integrating to the world capitalist system in a more efficient way. A wide literature on this issue can be found on Japan and the Asian tigers.[54] The slide of the geography of industrial production, on the other hand, is a matter of last couple of decades. The basic agenda for industrialization in Asia for instance raised the debate on the role of the state. The developmental state and Asian models of governing the economy revived the debates on state and the formation of capitalism.[55] Depending on a strict state/society distinction these perspectives suffer from institutionalist naivety. Second, they underline the importance of industrialization and development at the expense of democratic functioning. Last but not least this perspective of the developmental state leads us to see states as weak and strong states by

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[54] For a recent and a good compilation on the issue, see M. Woo-Cumings, ed., *The Developmental State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

[55] Most famous example of this developmental apparatus is Japan and its Ministry of International Trade and Industry. For a classical book on that, see Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). The role of state and capitalist development is an issue that is never demoded. Despite criticisms, this classical form of developmentalism is still widespread today. For a very recent example, see Kohli, *State-Directed Development*.

looking at their capacity to integrate national economies to the global capitalist system.[56]

The same discussions are being held about Turkey, too.[57] The geographical dispersion of industrial capital underwent some transformations in the post war period. As for Turkey, some of the industrialization leaps experienced by the state and some formerly non-industrialized areas of the country started to be industrialized by huge state enterprises. The best example of this in Turkey is the Kocaeli region. But there is another dynamic for some formerly rural areas of the country in becoming industrialized. This is the suburbanization of the İstanbul-based industry and will be discussed in detail below.

Industrially speaking, Turkey was not an advanced country in the 1950s. Eighty percent of the population was living in the countryside and apart from certain basic goods, industrial production was quite low and export was at a minimum level.[58] The following period, however, was one in which a

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[56] This is very visible in Kohli's account of successful and unsuccessful states. According to his three types of states (those are neopatrimonial states, cohesive-capitalist states and fragmented multiclass states) Nigeria represents the neopatrimonial one, that is, to say unsuccessful state, Brazil represents fragmented-multiclass state that is to say it lies in between and finally Korea represents the cohesive-capitalist state. See Kohli, *State-Directed Development*, pp. 1-15.

[57] For some recent studies on industrialization, see Rekabet Kurumu *KOBİ'ler ve Rekabet Politikası* (Ankara: Rekabet Kurumu, 2004), Ümit Şenesen and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen, "Üretimde Dışalıma Bağımlılık: 1970'lerden 2000'lere Ne Değişti?," in *İktisadi Kalkınma, Kriz ve İstikrar*, ed. Ahmet H. Köse, Fikret Şenses, and Erinç Yeldan, *İktisat Üzerine Yazılar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), Fikret Şenses, ed., *Recent Industrialization Experience of Turkey in a Global Context* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), Fikret Şenses and Erol Taymaz, "Unutulan Bir Toplumsal Amaç: Sanayileşme: Ne Oluyor? Ne Olmalı?," in *İktisadi Kalkınma, Kriz ve İstikrar*, ed. Ahmet H. Köse, Fikret Şenses, and Erinç Yeldan, *İktisat Üzerine Yazılar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), Nurhan Yentürk, "Birikimin Kaynakları," in *İktisadi Kalkınma, Kriz ve İstikrar*, ed. Ahmet H. Köse, Fikret Şenses, and Erinç Yeldan (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003).

[58] For an analysis of Ottoman Turkish manufacturing before 1950, see Donald Quataert, ed., *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

strong will on the way to becoming industrialized was expressed and development policies were implemented. Industrialization became the common emphasis of all successive governments. However, in line with the global conjuncture, the tendency in Turkey has taken two paths: import substitution before 1980 and post-1980 export-oriented policies in line with so-called integration to the world.

However, understanding the basic macro tendencies of industrialization within the context of this thesis is not enough. One must also demonstrate the spatial distribution of industry and in which direction it developed; the industrialization of Dilovası is related not only to macro tendencies but also to the changing geographical location of Turkish industry. Therefore, we have to approach the issue from the perspective of industrial geography.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to talk about wealth in industrial geography studies. However, Erol Tümertekin's works present important clues in terms of understanding Dilovası.[59] According to Tümertekin, İstanbul traditionally constituted the heart of Turkey's industry in the 1950s and is still so. More than seventy percent of the country's industrial production is accomplished in İstanbul and to surrounding area. Yet, the geographical distribution of industry has significantly changed since then. The İstanbul-centered industry is becoming suburbanized, in Tümertekin's words and constantly widening. This widening was first towards the west and east, but soon moved beyond the city boundaries and expanded towards Edirne-

[59] Erol Tümertekin, *İstanbul, İnsan ve Mekân* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2006). Also see Erol Tümertekin and Nazmiye Özgüç, *Ekonomik Coğrafya: Küreselleşme ve Kalkınma* (İstanbul: Çantay Kitabevi, 1997).

Tekirdağ-Kırklareli to the west and Gebze-Kocaeli-Adapazarı to the east. This expansion is now moving towards the southwest and southeast of the Marmara region, as well.

The center of industry in İstanbul first involved some parts of the historical peninsula, the Golden Horn shores and Bomonti. At the end of the 1960s, and later on, Kartal-Maltepe on the Anatolian side of the city was industrialized whereas this corresponded to the Topkapı-Bakırköy destination on the western side. As time went by, all districts of the city on the east and west were industrialized. With the 1970s, this tendency transcended İstanbul's boundaries. However, we should note that regions including İzmit and Adapazarı outside İstanbul showed a similar tendency. According to some assumptions of the State Planning Organization, İzmit and its environs were chosen as industrial sites in which big public facilities like Tüpraş[60] and Petkim were established much before this suburbanization. Still, as far as the geographical distribution of industry is concerned, the spreading of İstanbul-centered industry constitutes the main dynamic. As we will see in the coming parts, it is possible to state that the development in Dilovası has occurred as a result of these tendencies.

[60] Its former name is İpraş (İstanbul Petrol Rafinerileri A.Ş.). İpraş was established in 1959 and started the production process in 1960. It was a joint venture between the Turkish state and the America-based Texas Oil Company (Texaco). Its name changed in 1982 to Tüpraş (Türkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A. Ş.). The Texaco partnership ended in 1982; it was privatized in 2006 and bought out by the well-known Turkish cartel Koç Holding.

Neoliberal Globalization and the Changing Form of Relationship between State and Capital

Post war era, from 1945 to the mid 1970s, generally depicted as the golden era of capitalism. It was an era of social state and social policies based on class compromise. David Harvey calls this postwar class compromise "'embedded liberalism' to signal how market processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained."[61] It lasted until the neoliberal attack in the 1980s and "neoliberal project dissembled capital from these constraints.[62] The Keynesian redistributive economic policies were abandoned gradually and the counter-attack of capital started.[63] Social policies,[64] and working conditions worsened[65] and real wages, which were seen as demand creating factors immediately turned into a

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[61] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 11.

[62] Ibid. Also see Nadir Özbek, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Sosyal Güvenlik ve Sosyal Politikalar* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2006), pp. 23-24.

[63] Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002* (Ankara: İmge, 2005).

[64] Özbek, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Sosyal Güvenlik ve Sosyal Politikalar*, p. 24.

[65] In terms of working patterns this transformation is mostly depicted as transition to flexibility. Mass-production and mass-consumption system that is constructed around a certain labor regime has undergone a transformation. New neo-liberal era of labor policy is based on "assaults on labor and national collective bargaining agreements, dismantling of the family wage and the spread of generalized economic insecurity, downgrading of national regulations ensuring equal employment opportunity, occupational safety, and workers' rights." See Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, "The Urbanization of Neoliberalism: Theoretical Debates Cities and the Geographies of "Actually Existing Neoliberalism"," *Antipode* 34, no. 3 (2002): p. 364.

cost factor.[66] With the advent of the global competition discourse these cost factors came face to face with an attack on a global scale.[67]

The neoliberal transformation of the 1980s to the present is handled from many aspects. Debates on governance, for instance, have occupied a central place since the beginning of the last decade. But before the term "governance" starts to appear on our agenda, i.e., until the end of the 1990s, the restructuring of the state apparatus is discussed in many ways. Main target was to restore the class power all over the world.[68] In Turkey, formal and informal incentives and supports had great impact on capital accumulation. Privatizations and incentives constitute the formal incentives[69] whereas fictitious export and similar tax corruptions constitute the informal incentives.[70]

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[66] Yüksel Akkaya, "Türkiye'de 1980 Sonrası Emek-Sermaye Arasındaki Bölüşüm Mücadelesinde Grevlerin Yeri," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 86 (2000). Also see Yüksel Akkaya, "Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskacında İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık," in *Neoliberalizmin Tahribatı: Türkiye'de Ekonomi, Toplum ve Cinsiyet*, ed. Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (İstanbul: Metis, 2004).

[67] David Harvey called this transformation with the concept of "accumulation by dispossession" as an attack of capital to the formerly state-led sectors of society. See, Harvey, ""New" Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession." Some Marxists interpreted this re-capitalization of those segments of society with a classical concept that is primitive accumulation. See Jim Glassman, "Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by Extra-Economic' Means," *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 5 (2006).

[68] This term, the restoration of class power, is used by David Harvey. See David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development* (London: Verso, 2006), especially first chapter. Harvey, refering to Dumenil and Levy, employes this concept to underline that the neoliberal transformation is not a simple transformation in the economic field but a political project to achieve the restoration of class power. Also see, Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, "The Neoliberal (Counter-)Revolution," in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, ed. Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston (London: Pluto Press, 2005), Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 16.

[69] Rıza Aşıkoğlu, *Türkiye'de Yatırım Teşvik Tedbirleri* (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1988).

[70] It is not common to argue that fictitious export is a way of capital transfer. For an example, see Koray R. Yılmaz, "İktidarın Meşruiyetinden İktidarın Eleştirisine: Kapitalist Küresel Kurumsallaşma Sürecinde Yolsuzluk Analizi, Türkiye Örneği," *Toplum ve Blim*, no. 108 (2007). Following the 2001 crisis and great scandal of bank bankrptcies some other studies with similar emphases are published. For an example, see Nedim Şener, *Tepeden Tırnağa Yolsuzluk* (İstanbul: Metis, 2001).

The term "governance" on the other hand, has occupied an important place in the last decade. The governance model in Turkey emerged in late 1990s and appeared as a powerful model especially after the 2001 economic crisis with the myth of separating the economy and politics. The most important feature of the concrete regulatory bodies in which the governance model is embodied (supreme boards in Turkey) is that they compose all three realms of authority in their regulatory specific area: legislative, executive, and judiciary.[71] This basic feature goes in line with arguments of the radical transformation of political power.[72]

Although the first argument is very important, the second one has some problematic points. Separating the economic and the political through abstracting the economy from the political realm reduces the economy to a technical problem. Despite this relatively new argument it is difficult to argue that the basic political mechanism, which is described as the separation of powers. This will be discussed in detail at the end of the section but first the details of the term "governance" and neoliberal re-formation of space should be examined.

Governance has a fundamental argument: according to which the economy should be de-politicized in both rules and institutions. This argument implicitly asserts that politics is a problematic and unforeseeable realm whereas the economy should be based on rational foundations and isolated from the unforeseeable nature of politics. Only then can it function in its

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[71] Bayramoğlu, *Yönetişim Zihniyeti*, p. 15.

[72] Ibid., p. 413.

autonomous realm.[73] This argument lies at the starting point of liberal economics as well and it revived after the crisis of the 1970s.[74] The main features of the argument are as follows. First, public administration should work with the market rules; second, globalization changed the role of nation-states fundamentally. Mutual dependency should replace the full independence perspective.[75] In other words, the scale of nation is not enough for a successful and rational economic program. Process should be determined globally. Third, the globalization process is in parallel with the localization process. To democratize the political authority thorough decentralization constitutes the main argument. What is discredited here are the central bureaucratic organizations and planning mechanisms. Last, the development discourse of the previous period re-emerges with the concept of neo-liberal development.

The relationship between neoliberalism and development signifies three fundamental points. First, limiting the role of the state in the economy at the discursive level, reducing production costs like wages, and third, export oriented growth and industrialization.[76] In the post-1980 era, a large campaign was employed against the state economic enterprises and in favor of privatization. This discourse developed in line with world trends and in Turkey, Özalism became the first manifestation of it. In fact Özal and his economic policies did more than simply prepare the Turkish economy for global capitalism. The first manifestations of independent boards were

[73] Ibid., p. 114. Neo-classical economics is a powerful tool to construct economy as a scientific discipline based on hard data. TV programs on economics composed of endless statistics are other tools of this hegemonic atmosphere.

[74] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 12.

[75] Bayramoğlu, *Yönetişim Zihniyeti*, p. 114, Paul Cammack, "The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Materialist Perspective," *Historical Materialism* 11, no. 2 (2003).

[76] Bayramoğlu, *Yönetişim Zihniyeti*, p. 131.

exercised in Özal period in a very wide realm. Independent funds started to play an essential role in the Turkish economy. Oktay Yenal describes it as follows:

> The leading funds affiliated with the Prime Ministry and the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade in the years between 1984 and 1986 are as follows: the Collective Housing Fund, the Public Participation Administration, the Development and Supporting Fund, the Resource Utilization Support Fund, the Investment Goods Production Incentive Fund, the Support Price Stability Fund, the Advertising Fund, the Social Solidarity and Mutual Aid Fund and the Mining Fund (...) Apart from these there are more than hundred funds affiliated with several ministries.[77]

Yenal explains the justification for these funds and the new type of public budget structure as a result of seeking efficiency and speed. The "Planned Development Principle" accepted by the 1982 constitution and the "Economic Stability Measures" put into practice forced the state to take some measures in many fields. The increasing intervention of the state in the social life raised the public expenditures significantly. The state started to seek extra budgetary income in order to finance the costs of increasing intervention to the social and economic life. In this period various funds are constituted to support housing, infrastructural investments, country wide incentives for private sector investments and export, providing price stability in fundamental goods, financing of social projects and developing and modernizing defense industry. Bureaucratic obstacles and formalities stemming from the lack of flexibility because of the legal structure of the budget cause significant delays in realizing investments. The flexibility and comfort that the Funds bring out

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[77] Oktay Yenal, *Cumhuriyet'in İktisat Tarihi* (İstanbul: Homer, 2003), pp. 110-115, my translation.

is important. Another common characteristic of these Funds is that they are not subjected to laws like General Accounting Law no 1.050, Court of Auditors Law no 832, and Public Procurement Law no 2886.[78]

In other words, those funds were very like boards of today and could easily avoid legal and administrative inspection. In addition, productivity and speed were vital justifying concepts of this post-1980 period. The state enterprises were criticized due to their lack of efficiency, rising corruption, clumsiness and complex bureaucratic structures. The private sector, on the other hand, was praised as a rational and efficient economic actor. This marked a new form of relationship between state and capital after 1980.

These three elements have been widely discussed in detail in the post-2002 conjuncture. Boratav argues that the wage regime between 1980 and 1989 witnessed a substantial transformation and real wages decreased a considerable amount. The revival of worker movements in 1989 brought an end to this sharp setback but was unable to change the overall worsening in the labor market.[79] Yüksel Akkaya argues that in the same period there was serious pressure on the working class and it witnessed series of strikes in 1989, 1993 and 1994. But, according to Akkaya, despite these strikes the long-term decrease in wages continued and the proportion of unionized workers also continued to decrease and finally the informal structure of the labor market deepened.[80]

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[78] Ibid., pp. 111-113. Also see, Uğur Emek, *Kamu Maliyesinde Fon Uygulaması* (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Yayını, 1992).

[79] Korkut Boratav and Ergün Türkcan, eds., *Türkiye'de Sanayileşmenin Yeni Boyutları ve KİT'ler* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınıları, 1993), pp. 2-3.

[80] Akkaya, "Türkiye'de 1980 Sonrası Emek-Sermaye Arasındaki Bölüşüm Mücadelesinde Grevlerin Yeri," p. 219.

Export-oriented industrialization strategy, on the other hand, replaced the import substitution strategy, and development was identified with export rates. This strategy underlining competitive power[81] and advantages in the production process caused a substantive transformation in the production process. Along with the above-mentioned regulations in the labor market, limited arrangements and legal penal sanctions on issues concerning the environment (in other words, diminishing the cost of environmental expenses), various incentives on investments became the leading themes of the period. The basic problem of neoliberal development is that it shows the development process as a technical issue apart from politics. In one respect, the production and allocation of resources of the country, which is by definition a political problem, is pushed outside of politics.[82] But it is important to note that some dissident economists seem to share this un-political arrangement of the economic realm. Korkut Boratav, one of the leading critical economists of the country, underlines the importance and necessity of a purified planning apparatus: "New institutions like brain/coordination centers purified of routine tasks and obligations as a new planning organizations, in addition to that ministries of which the functioning and institutional structures are re-defined and lastly new regulatory bodies like the Risk Capital Institution will form the basic corners of contemporary institutional structure."[83] Departing from this point Boratav criticizes the economic policies of the period and in place proposes a high technology-intensive industrialization with high rates of

[81] For a criticism of the national competitive power idea, see Şenses, ed., *Recent Industrialization Experience of Turkey in a Global Context*, especially introductory chapter.

[82] İslamoğlu, "Yeni Düzenlemeler ve Ekonomi Politik."

[83] Boratav and Türkcan, eds., *Türkiye'de Sanayileşmenin Yeni Boyutları ve KİT'ler*, pp. 13-14.

additional value.[84] This perspective interestingly overlaps with current proposals on governance.[85]

Turkey witnessed a fundamental institutional transformation in the years after the 1999 and 2001 crisis. Supreme boards donated with extensive authority are the most important symbols of new governance perspective and in this period several boards were being constituted.[86] The symbolic name of this period was not Turgut Özal but Kemal Derviş, a former World Bank bureaucrat and current head of the United Nations Development Program. There are four basic problems with these boards. First is their strong emphasis on the classical distinction between politics and economics; second, their problems with legislation; third, their relations with international institutions; and fourth, the institutional structure with which they have contact.[87] It is argued that the boundaries between legislative, executive and judiciary power are blurred for these boards and their area of regulation; and they act from

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[84] There are many studies underlining the inherent relationship between technology intensive production and the dependency of Turkish industry to foreign countries. For some examples, see Ahmet Çakmak, "Globalleşen Dünyada Türkiye'nin Yeri," in *Globalleşen Dünyada Türkiye'nin Yeri*, ed. M. Serhan Oksay (İstanbul: Kadir Has Üniversitesi, 2004), Ahmet Haşim Köse and Ahmet Öncü, "İşgücü Piyasaları ve Uluslararası İşbölümünde Uzmanlaşmanın Mekansal Boyutları: 1980 Sonrası Dönemde Türkiye İmalat Sanayi," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 86 (2000), Odekon, *The Costs of Economic Liberalization in Turkey*, Ahmet Öncü and Ahmet H. Köse, "Dünya ve Türkiye Ekonomisinde Anadolu İmalat Sanayii: Zenginleşmenin mi Yoksa Yoksullaşmanın mı Eşiğindeyiz?," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 77 (1998), M. Melih Pınarcıoğlu, "KOBİ'ler, Kolektif Verimlilik ve Sorunları," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 86 (2000), Şenesen and Günlük-Şenesen, "Üretimde Dışalıma Bağımlılık: 1970'lerden 2000'lere Ne Değişti?.", Şenses and Taymaz, "Unutulan Bir Toplumsal Amaç: Sanayileşme.", Oktar Türel, "Dünyada Sanayileşme Deneyimi: Geçmiş Çeyrek Yüzyıl (1975-2000) ve Gelecek İçin Beklentiler," in *Küresel Düzen: Birikim, Devlet ve Sınıflar*, ed. Ahmet H. Köse, Fikret Şenses, and Erinç Yeldan, *İktisat Üzerine Yazılar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), Yentürk, "Birikimin Kaynakları."

[85] Development with high technology and additional value is being defended by a very wide group of economists. It surprisingly includes some dissident economists who construct their criticism on current policies of exporting intermediary goods without research and development input. For example, see Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler *IMF Gözetiminde On Uzun Yıl*.

[86] Bayramoğlu, *Yönetişim Zihniyeti*, p. 283.

[87] Ibid., p. 301.

time to time as both judicial and legislative organs.[88] Exceeding the limits of authority and regulating certain areas are important in the context of this thesis.[89] Despite certain differences a similar process is undertaken in Dilovası as well.

Today there are a three-part decision making and executing bodies in Dilovası, the Dilovası Municipality, DOSB and the Kocaeli Metropolitan Municipality. The first one has very limited power after the recent changes in the laws. The second one is an almost autonomous body that governs and controls the organized industrial zone. The third one is highly empowered metropolitan municipality after the law known as the Metropolitan Municipality Law enacted in 2004. This relatively recent three-part structure creates confusion in the decision-making processes in Dilovası. In the second chapter the problematic relationship between these three and their role in local politics will be discussed in detail.

Apart from this three-headed decision making process it is important to talk about issues like corruption, as well. According to this thesis, corruption in Dilovası played a significant role in the making of Dilovası in the 1990s before the constitution of DOSB and transition to the model of governance. Yet it is very difficult to discuss corruption in this thesis for three reasons. First, corruption is a criminal activity. This makes it much harder to collect information about it and this is not an investigation. Thus it is not common to find people talking about corruption, but they imply some forms of it under

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[88] For an interesting example on that see, Ibid., pp. 316-320.

[89] But of course it is impossible to argue that governance is a unilateral process that structures itself without any political resistance. Fuat Ercan and Şebnem Oğuz's article on Public Procurement Institution draws the struggles between the Justice and Development Party government and global capital. See Ercan and Oğuz, "Kamu İhale Yasası."

different names. Second, it is not possible to determine its numerical dimensions because of its very nature. In this sense it resembles an informal economy which cannot be measured definitely. The third problem is the specific time and place in which this thesis is interested. Most of the parts of corruption mentioned here are still active in the economic, social and political processes in Dilovası. Still the newspaper articles about and interviews conducted with people provide enough information on which to comment.

Modernity in Turkey is largely discussed with reference to a Weberian sociology and its terminology. Thus the dualities like rational/irrational and substantive/formal are taken as departure points. This leads us to an understanding of modernity from legal institutional processes. This perspective defines all processes other than formal and rational ones as outside of modernity and assigns them certain adjectives (Asian mode of production, populism, oriental despotism, etc.). Many studies following this distinction envisage temporal and spatial hierarchies and overlook the simultaneous temporality.[90] However, different studies have been published in recent times which consider themes like corruption, philanthropy and bribery (to which this study also pays particular attention) within a framework of capitalist modernity.[91] The basic difference of these studies is that they do not identify

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[90] For some important examples see, Ayşe Buğra, "The Place of the Economy in Turkish Society," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2-3 (2003), Ayşe Buğra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987). For a example on environmentalism see, Fuat Keyman, "Modernity, Democracy, and Civil Society," in *Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and Development?*, ed. Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005).

[91] Cengiz Kırlı, "Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi," *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 4 (2006), Nadir Özbek, "Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism and the Hamidian Regime, 1876-1909," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 1 (2005), Gaye Yılmaz, "Şirketlerin Sosyal Sorumluluğu," *Sendikam*, no. 7 (2006), Yılmaz, "İktidarın Meşruiyetinden İktidarın Eleştirisine."

the capitalist modernity as it ought to be rather they look at the place that these facts occupy within the capitalist modernity. In other words, these studies do not see corruption, bribery and philanthropic activities as deviations from modern formalism, but parts of actual political struggles.[92] This study also follows this route.[93]

For Marxists, on the other hand, the reason why corruption as a field of study is dismissed, results from the duality that the concept implies. Corruption implicitly points to an uncorrupted, in other words, regularly working state mechanism. The ethical connotations it have also complicates the use of the concept. That is to say there is a presupposition that with the abolition of corruption and the accurate functioning of the state apparatus we can live in a just and right order. Left thought has spent considerably long time on state theory and discussed the state as a relatively autonomous thing or an apparatus for class hegemony. So it is not surprising for left academics not to

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[92] A recent thesis by Hatice Ahu HatipKarasulu provides a similar framework for understanding mafia organization in Turkey. Rather than classical perceptions of mafia (kabadayı for instance) HatipKarasulu posits the transformation of mafia in a neoliberal setting and discusses the informal networks between state and business. She evaluates huge scandals of corruption in Turkey (like Civangate and Turkbank privatization) under this neoliberal transformation. See Hatice Ahu HatipKarasulu, "Making Sense of Mafia in Turkey: Conceptual Framework and a Preliminary Evaluation" (Ph. D. Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2005).

[93] Recent years witnessed numerous studies on corruption in Turkey and most of them are due to the crisis in 2001. Almost all of them underline the decay of the state and bureucracy and in addition to economic corrupiton there are also works on political corruption in Turkey. For some examples see, Yalçın Bayer, *Rüşvetin Belgesi* (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1995), Güler Kömürcü, *Şubat 2001 Krizinin Ardındaki Yolsuzlukların Çetelesi: Buza Yazılanlar* (İstanbul: Su Yayınları, 2001), Türkan Önder, *Batan Bankalar, Bağımsız Denetim ve Meslek Ahlakı* (İstanbul: Beta, 2001), Tuncay Özkan, *Parsadan Hikâyesi: Cumhuriyet Tarihindeki Örtülü Ödenek Yolsuzlukları* (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1996), Saygı Öztürk, *Madalyalı Mahkum* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2004), Abidin Şahin, *Vurgun Yemiş Siyaset ve CHP* (Ankara: İmaj Yayınevi, 2001), Nedim Şener, *Kod Adı Atilla* (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2004), Şener, *Tepeden Tırnağa Yolsuzluk*, Erbil Tuşalp, *Çürüme* (İstanbul: Papirüs, 1995), Erbil Tuşalp, *Vatan Millet Sakarya Çete Parti Mafya* (İstanbul: Günizi Yayıncılık, 2002), Ferhat Ünlü, *Susurluk Gümrüğü: Kaçakçılık, Çete, Devlet* (İstanbul: Birey Yayıncılık, 2000), Recep Yazıcıoğlu, *Popülist Politikaya, Tıkanmış Ekonomiye, Yozlaşmış Sisteme: Sil Baştan* (İzmir: Yazıcı Basım Yayıncılık, 1999).

discuss corruption on this platform. However, in the last period there have been some alternative studies on corruption pointing out its role in institutionalizing global neoliberal policies and discourse. They also underline that in the post-1980 period corruption has played an important role in the transfer of capital to the bourgeois classes in Turkey.[94]

Perspectives on Environment

As mentioned above, Dilovası is famous for its devastating environmental problems. Some scholars have even called it a place of ecological destruction.[95] Along with its environmental problems it is also famous for outbreaks and the recent cancer epidemic issue. These two matters occupy an important place in the current setting of Dilovası. This is why this section will look at theoretical material on the environment.

Environmental problems became extensively visible to the broader public in the late twentieth century. As they became mundane elements of ordinary people's lives they also attracted the attention of many academics. Some NGOs came out which were solely concentrating on this problem and besides both national and international governmental bodies spent time on possible solutions. But it is not correct to argue that environmental problems emerged in this period. The term "environmental crisis" is widely used today but if one assumes that it is a phenomenon of the post war era one would be entrapped in mere technologism. In place of this it is important to grasp it as a

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[94] Yılmaz, "İktidarın Meşruiyetinden İktidarın Eleştirisine."

[95] Hatun, "Dilovası'nda Ekolojik Yıkım."

form of social relationship and historicize it.[96] John Bellamy Foster perceives the problem as a form of relationship and argues that many civilizations even before capitalist modernity fell because their problematic relationships with nature. This view is important to from mere technologism, which is common.[97]

Yet it is correct to argue that together with modern capitalism there has been certain leap in environmental problems. The harmful and devastating effects of industrial capitalism on the environment/nature[98] could first be seen in nineteenth century industrial centers. Charles Dickens' imagined place called *Coke Town* is a powerful and famous depiction of nineteenth century English industrial centers which are probably the most polluted areas of the world.[99] Urban historian and naturalist Lewis Mumford is one of the most radical critics of this industrial civilization and in his famous work *The City in History* he describes this city as follows: "So large masses of people had never lived in such a violently ruined environment before in the written history"[100]

The fact that this violently ruined environment pushed many thinkers of the period on the question and industrial pollution had great effects on the imagination of the thinkers of the nineteenth century. Many environmentalist currents from romantic ecologists to conservationist movements, from Marxist

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[96] John Bellamy Foster, *Savunmasız Gezegen: Çevrenin Kısa Ekonomik Tarihi*, trans. Hasan Ünder (Ankara: Epos, 2002), p. 12.

[97] Ibid., pp. 37-56.

[98] This differentiation is important. I use them interchangeably but keeping in mind Escobar's warning. Escobar argues that what transforms nature into environment is the logic of capital (environmental economics in this case) which perceives nature as an input of the production process. See Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 196.

[99] The most famous one among these cities is Manchester on which Friedrich Engels wrote a book. See, Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[100] Quoted in Foster, *Savunmasız Gezegen*, p. 67.

perspectives to anarchist environmentalist discourses appeared in this era. It is not mistaken to argue that the roots of various environmentalisms reach back to this period.

Despite all, it is not easy to assert that there were powerful environmentalist movements until the last three decades. No movement defined itself departing from pure environmentalist inspiration until the 1970s. Environmentalism did not occupy a central place even on the 1968 movements' agenda. Although it inspired later approaches, 1968 and its criticism of environmental problems did not go further than apocalyptic perspective. Then it is possible to argue that theoretical approaches as well as political movements concerning environmentalism emerged as powerful social matters in the last three decades although the environmental problems are much older than that. It is also important to emphasize that the environmentalist discourse of this period shows a great variance in terms of political stances.[101]

What are the major lines of the criticisms of the last three decades? There are many classifications. One of the leading Marxist environmentalists, Joel Kovel, defines five subtitles: green economics, deep ecology, bioregionalism, ecofeminism and social ecology. After criticizing all these titles Kovel names his own perspective as ecosocialism and describes major

[101] Needless to say that there were philosophical studies on this theme previously. But most of those studies' basic problem is the relationship between nature and human; and it is a part of a bigger philosophical understanding. *One Way Street* of Walter Benjamin is a good example. See, Walter Benjamin, *One-Way Street and Other Writings* (London: Verso, 1979). But Hans Jonas' studies a little bir more important than others. His interwar studies inspired many studies concerning the position of nature in the atomic age in the postwar era. See, Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of An Ethics for the Technological Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

characteristics.[102] Martinez-Alier, another leading ecologist, defines three main subtitles: the cult of wilderness, the gospel of eco-efficiency and the environmentalism of the poor/environmental justice.[103] I will take Martinez-Alier as a point of departure since it is more applicable to the Dilovası context.

The first movement Martinez-Alier defines departs from the idea of sacred nature and proposes to protect wildlife. In fact, the Wilderness Society, a civil organization active since the 1930s in America, defends the basic premises of this current and recommends national parks as a conservation strategy.[104] The idea that soil, water, etc., are sacred is a central tenet of this perspective. Solutions like building national parks depend on the idea to constitute isolated natural environments apart from human intervention.

Aldo Leopold and deep ecologist Arne Naess are important names of this movement. This movement became powerful in the 1970s and many critics labeled them post-materialist theses. Post-materialism here refers to an environmental perspective that emerges in a prosperous society at a certain production level. In other words it was seen as the environmentalism of the rich. But Martinez-Alier disagrees with this view and instead argues that rather than prosperity chemical pollution and nuclear threats, i.e., physical threats which have become increasingly visible, have affected them.[105] This conservationist approach is criticized in many respects. Hasan Ünder criticizes deep ecology from five different points and two of them are essential for this

[102] Joel Kovel, *The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World?* (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 152-189.

[103] Joan Martinez-Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation* (Northhampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002), pp. 1-15.

[104] Timothy W. Luke, "The Wilderness Society: Environmentalism as Environationalism," *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 10, no. 4 (1999): pp. 1-2.

[105] Martinez-Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor*, pp. 3-4.

study. First, this approach does not propose a political criticism and takes capitalism as given and unchallengeable. Second, it relates problems like famine to the inability of the world to carry so a great population and does not appeal to a criticism of allocation. Yet it seems to argue that nature re-situates its balance thorough the dead of excess populations.[106] In addition to that Timothy Luke argues that this perspective is highly Eurocentric and nationalist.[107] Martinez-Alier's criticism in the same direction puts forward that it does not criticize economic growth, industrialization, urbanization but situates itself on the problem of population excess and therefore is far from generating a political perspective.[108]

The second movement, the gospel of eco-efficiency, is the one most visible in the public sphere. It is also known as eco-managerialism and introduced a powerful concept to the environmentalism debates: sustainable development. The concept is highly effective but equally blurred and it is essential in the context of this thesis. Because Third World industrialization is usually related to the concept of sustainability and it has a very loaded conceptual baggage behind it.[109] But before, the concept and its main characteristics should be explained.

Unlike the first view, the idea of sacred nature disappears and in its place idea of nature as an economic element appears. According to Martinez-Alier "Representatives of this second current scarcely use the word 'Nature';

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[106] Hasan Ünder, *Çevre Felsefesi: Etik ve Metafizik Görüşler* (Ankara: Doruk, 1996), pp. 204-205.

[107] Luke, "The Wilderness Society."

[108] Martinez-Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor*, p. 14.

[109] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, pp. 192-201.

rather, they use ‘natural resources’ or even ‘natural capital’ or ‘environmental services’. (...) It is today a gospel of engineers and economists, a religion of utility and technical efficiency without a notion of the sacred.”[110] Environment is attached to concepts like efficiency, sustainability, and wise use of resources. Environmental economics, the popular discipline of the 1990s appeared in this context. New environmental technologies targeting sustainability became leading issues. Moreover, the problem is reduced to a scientific matter in which politics disappears. Visvanathan summarizes it as follows: “Ecology thus becomes a managerial science mopping up the ecological degradation after industrialization.”[111] Martinez-Alier perceives German green movement as the leading perspective of this current.[112]

The third current is the environmentalism of the poor. Other names for it are environmental justice or popular environmentalism. Martinez-Alier argues that this current challenges the first two movements. Its basic feature is that it attaches any environmental problem with political processes and problematizes concepts like economic growth, and social inequalities. In addition to that they slide the emphasis from the moral aspect to the social aspect. Martinez-Alier includes some peasant movements and Third World environmentalisms in this group.[113] The basic emphasis of these movements is

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[110] Martinez-Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor*, p. 5.

[111] Quoted in Ibid., p. 6.

[112] Ibid., p. 8. This approach is harshly criticized by Marxists. For some examples, see James O'Connor, "Sürdürülebilir Kapitalizm Mümkün mü?," in *Marksizm ve Ekoloji*, ed. Göksel N. Demirer, Metin Duran, and Gökçer Özgür (Ankara: Öteki Yayınevi, 2000), Martin O'Connor, ed., *Is Capitalism Sustainable: Political Economy and the Politics of Ecology* (New York: Guilford Press, 1994). Besides, Arturo Escobar argues that this is a discourse dictated under the name of development. See Escobar, *Encountering Development*.

[113] Martinez-Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor*, pp. 12-14. Also see Joan Martinez-Alier, ""Environmental Justice" (Global and Local)," in *The Cultures of*

the soil and the right to use the soil however; this is not to take soil as sacred in the sense of the deep ecologists or like their use it. She also adds that economic growth and social inequalities also occupy a central place or these movements.[114]

The way Marxists perceive the problem is also important for this study. James O'Connor, one of the leading theorists of crisis in the 1970s, also influenced ecological studies. O'Connor's crisis theory proposed that capitalism is destined to create crises and it is not able to solve them.[115] In line with his capitalist crisis analysis O'Connor argues that capitalist modernity is destined to cause ecological crisis and that capitalism cannot solve this contradiction.[116] He argues that efforts to find a solution to this crisis within the capitalist order employ the concept of sustainability, but he strictly underlines that neither capitalism nor its ecological policies are sustainable. Departing from O'Connor, Kovel describes it as follows: "The combination makes an ever-growing ecological crisis an *iron necessity* so long as capital rules, no matter what measures are taken to tidy up one corner or another. (...) the problem with capital is that, once installed, this process becomes self-perpetuating and expanding."[117] Indispensability, the indispensable collapse of capitalism, and the expansion of capitalism are some of the central precepts of

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Globalization, ed. Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

[114] Martinez-Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor*, p. 15.

[115] James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of State* (New York: 1971).

[116] O'Connor, "Sürdürülebilir Kapitalizm Mümkün mü?," p. 19. For a similar perspective on the current global setting see Smith and its concept of nature as accumulation strategy, see Neil Smith, "Nature as Accumulation Strategy," in *Socialisr Register 2007: Coming to Terms with Nature*, ed. Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (London: Merlin Press, 2007).

[117] Kovel, *The Enemy of Nature*, p. 39, emphasis mine.

this perspective. The rising pollution in the Third World is due to the inherent characteristics of capitalism. Departing from classical imperialism theories this perspective calls the process ecological imperialism and generally recognizes the process as the exportation of advanced capitalist societies' pollution to the periphery.[118]

Those are the main perspectives on the environmental problems of the last decades. Some names are given without going into detail[119] but only some of them are important in the context of the present study. The eco-efficiency perspective, which presents a scientistic look, is the first one. Defenders of this perspective argue that Dilovası region's problems could be solved with a technological, rational and scientific set of interventions. Unsurprisingly publications by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the TBMM Commission Report employ this perspective the most.[120]

Some words must be said on the concept of sustainability. The concept of sustainability, according to Escobar, is a means for translating environmental problems into a technicist language. Ecological crisis and its worldwide recognition once again have enabled western scientists to say something about the other parts of the world.[121] The distinction between nature and culture re-appeared and, according to Escobar, the concept of

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[118] Most famous study of the field is Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 [1986]). Although it ends at the beginning of the twentieth century its conceptual tools inspired many studies following it. Also see, Foster, *Savunmasız Gezegen*, pp. 97-122.

[119] For a detailed critique of all these approaches see, Ramachandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York: Longman, 2000).

[120] See, T. C. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı *Dilovası Gerçeği*, TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*.

[121] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, pp. 192-193.

sustainability was used to reproduce the old subject-object binary.[122] Despite all its claims to scientific endeavor, Escobar defines sustainability as an ideological concept which precedents development rather than sustainability. All these three emphases are important for this study: language of scientific discourse, nature-culture/east-west binaries and last reviving development emphasis despite all reservations. All three discourses are visible in the debates on Dilovası.

As mentioned above, this perspective identifies nature as resource and therefore articulates itself to classical economic theory of limited resources. But as Escobar underlines the reception of nature and its exploitation is not new: "The capitalization of nature has been central to capitalism ever since primitive accumulation and the enclosure of commons. The history of capital is thus the history exploitation of production conditions including the ways in which capital impairs or destroys its own conditions."[123] Within the long history of capitalism the exploitation of nature and use of it for primitive accumulation are useful tools to understanding the environmental problems worldwide. According to that, environment as resource is seen as economic input, but no investment made on environment. In Marxist terminology this is called primitive accumulation through absolute surplus value.[124]

The sacredness of soil, weather and water is a tenet which was ruined years ago in Dilovası context. Although older inhabitants of Dilovası express their nostalgia for the old Dilovası and its fruit gardens continuously they no

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[122] Ibid., pp. 193-194.

[123] Ibid., p. 200.

[124] Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (New York: Penguin, 1990).

longer perceive the problem as a simple violation of an ideal by greedy industrialists. So it is difficult to understand Dilovası and its environmental problems with a naïve view of sacred nature. Sustainability is different because it is employed often by industrialists as well as ministries. So the discursive analysis of the ideology of sustainability is important to understand the political setting in Dilovası. Lastly theories on environment and capitalist transformations should be mentioned to locate the problems in Dilovası in a broader context.

To sum up, it is necessary to think of development, industrialization and neoliberal globalization as ideological tools, their manifestations in the globalization era and lastly the place of environment together to understand the transformation in Dilovası. Subsequent chapters will look at the developments in Dilovası from this theoretical background.

CHAPTER III

A BRIEF HISTORY OF DİLOVASI AS AN INDUSTRIAL LOCATION

Considering the theoretical discussions above, this Chapter Three will provide a short picture of industrial Dilovası. Dilovası was industrialized in the historical-geographical conditions that occurred in the 1960s of Turkey. The major characteristics of this period were as follows. First of all, industry became the basic tool and target of development in the periphery. Development was identified with industrial society and industry gained priorities with respect to agriculture. Both the Turkish experience of industrialization in the post-war period and Dilovası's development as an industrial location are issues to be thought of in this context.

Nevertheless industrialization as a social target and numerical data about it are not enough to understand the industrialization process and the contradictions it brings out. Besides as Turkey's and other developing countries' experience show, industrialization does not point to a single economic policy. Contrarily, the state's articulation to the process and the situation of class struggles vary the structural policies of industrialization. Import substituting industrialization and export-oriented policies which were both observed in the post-war era were two completely different economic policies. Despite the differences both discourses of industrialization employed

a development discourse implying an organic whole. However, the class struggles illustrated that industrialization is not an aim that is shared without problems by all segments of society. These theoretical problems should be considered in a study on industrialization and the developmentalist discourse should be critically evaluated.

In this context, this section will look at the İstanbul-based industry and the way it transformed its environment. Dilovası, according to this study, is an outcome of the migration of industry from İstanbul to the periphery and this makes it important to understand the development of industry in İstanbul. Last the basic reasons for Dilovası's attraction and the temporal development of industry will be revealed. Locating Dilovası in a context of the national and international context of industrialization and following the evolution of its development are other aims of this chapter. The transformation of the population and general trends of urbanization will be the final two sections of this part. To define Dilovası as something more than an industrial location is the vital concern of this chapter.

The partition of economic periods of republican Turkey in the twentieth century is largely an issue of compromise. According to that, between 1923 and 1930 was a period of recovery. As a result of the conjuncture that the crisis in 1929 created the years between 1930 and 1939 witnessed protective policies and state initiated industrialization. 1939-45 was a period of instability due to World War II. In the post-war period, roughly

from 1946 to the 1960s, the system was organized according to the transfer of agricultural surplus to the urban sectors. This plan was implemented until 1953 but with the world conjuncture it had a crisis. The import substituting model, based on producing intermediary goods, was implemented after the *coup d'état* in 1960. This economic policy lasted until 1977, when the debt crisis emerged in the Third World. This crisis necessitated the change of the ISI policies. A period of three years witnessed widespread social unrest and contradictions. The 24 January decisions and another *coup d'état* in 12 September 1980 constituted the ground for neoliberal economic policies.

Neoliberalization steadily worked until the end of the 1980s but economic "stability" could not be attained. But it is valid to argue that the economy was restructured through neoliberal priorities in the 1990s, in that sense there was a continuation. The Marmara earthquake in 1999, the economic crisis of same year and the 2001 economic crisis sharpened some contradictions.[125] This classification is shared by most of the studies specified below. However, emphases and the agency attributed to different classes vary according to the political stance. Yet it is important to note this classification.

Before locating the industrialization of Dilovası in the context mentioned above it is necessary to discuss the industrialization of İstanbul because what made Dilovası a dense industrial location was the suburbanization and dispersal of İstanbul based industry to the outskirts of the city.

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[125] See, Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002*, Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, Çağlar Keyder, *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası* (İstanbul: Metis, 1996), Şevket Pamuk, "Karşılaştırmalı Açıdan Türkiye'de İktisadi Büyüme, 1880-2000," in *İktisadi Kalkınma, Kriz ve İstikrar*, ed. Ahmet H Köse, Fikret Senses, and Erinç Yeldan (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), Mustafa Sönmez, *1980'lerden 1990'lara "Dışa Açılan" Türkiye Kapitalizmi* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1992), Yenal, *Cumhuriyet'in İktisat Tarihi*.

The Growth and Dispersal of İstanbul-Based Industry

İstanbul has always had a vivid economic life and it was usually a consumption center since it had been the capital city of empires for a very long time. Therefore it is clear that it occupies a distinct place among cities.[126] In the first decade of the post-war period under the Democrat Party regime, mechanization in agriculture caused widespread dispossession and migration to the cities.[127] The primary aim of the migration in that period was İstanbul with its developed urban economy despite deficiencies in industrial demand for labor. The estimated population of one million at the beginning of the 1950s gradually increased and İstanbul entered into a constant process of growth.[128]

The industrialization endeavor at the end of the 1950s changed this picture in many ways. With the advantage of its powerful and varied economic life, İstanbul reproduced its traditional central place continuously and became the most important industrial location of the country. Industrial concentration in many places of İstanbul including the historical sites of the city added a pulling effect of the city along with the pushing effect of the rural.[129] Employment possibilities in the industrial sector rose in the 1960s and this

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[126] Çağlar Keyder, ed., *İstanbul: Between the Global and the Local* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

[127] Bahattin Akşit, "İçgöçlerin Nesnel ve Öznel Toplumsal Tarihi Üzerine Gözlemler: Köy Tarafından Bir Bakış," in *Türkiye'de İçgöç*, ed. Ahmet İçduygu, İbrahim Sirkeci, and İsmail Aydıngün (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1997), p. 26, Oya Köymen, "Bazı İçgöç Verileri (1950-1980)," in *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere*, ed. Oya Baydar (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999), p. 263, Ferhunde Özbay and Banu Yücel, "Türkiye'de Göç Hareketleri, Devlet Politikaları ve Demografik Yapı," in *Nüfus ve Kalkınma: Göç, Eğitim, Demokrasi, Yaşam Kalitesi*, ed. Ferhunde Özbay (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2001), pp. 13-15.

[128] Çağlar Keyder and Ayşe Öncü, *İstanbul and the Concept of World Cities* (İstanbul: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1993).

[129] Özbay and Yücel, "Türkiye'de Göç Hareketleri," pp. 15-17.

changed both the volume and the form of the migration. As Şenyapılı puts forward, some parts of the city first became worker neighborhoods and districts.[130] *Gecekondu* became one of the central themes of the social issues starting from this early period.[131]

When we look at the geographical allocation of industry we see a spreading tendency from the central places of İstanbul to the outskirts. Tümertekin claims that first concentration until the 1970s took place on the historical peninsula and other old places of the city like Eminönü, Mercan, Haliç and Bomonti. But 90 % of the industry concentrated in this location was of a small scale.[132] However, industry started to develop and seek new places shortly. Two priorities dominated this search for new lands: first proximity to the central business districts and the second cheap plentiful lands. Industry caused the rise of urban land prices and therefore cheap land for industry could only be found in places outside of the city. Then industry suburbanized within this process. This was the cause of the industrialization towards Ambarlı, Küçükçekmece and Büyükçekmece in the west.[133] The same is valid for the Gebze-Kocaeli line in the east and, therefore for Dilovası.

The major precedence of industry in the outskirts of the city was the legal and administrative status of those places. Although these places were organically connected to the İstanbul city center, they were not related to the

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[130] Tansı Şenyapılı, *Gecekondu: 'Çevre' İşçilerin Mekanı* (Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Mimarlık Fakültesi, 1981).

[131] There are number of studies on *gecekondu*. For some basic works from the 1970s to present see Erder, *Ümraniye*, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk*, Kemal Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[132] Tümertekin, *İstanbul, İnsan ve Mekân*, p. 57.

[133] Ibid., p. 58.

legal restrictions of city administration and this generated a convenient situation for the industrialists. Tümertekin describes this process:

> Thus, all the villages and independent municipalities, situated on the Londra Asfaltı until Ambarlı, benefited from the bus facilities of İstanbul Municipality as far as their relationship with İstanbul and among themselves were concerned. However, by taking advantage of the legal opportunities provided to the village administrations and independent municipalities, they let and even promoted the random establishment of industry within the borders of residential areas.[134]

Industry was a very attractive thing due to the opportunities it gave to those exterior municipalities or villages close to İstanbul. Therefore, it is not surprising that they encouraged industry in formal and informal ways. But it is important to underline that the industrialists benefited from this lack of administrative restrictions. This advantageous position basically stemmed from the authority of these villages and small municipalities and their autonomy from the central administration of the city. Squatter houses together with industrial development changed the course of these places radically. Those lands that Tümertekin mentions were peripheral districts in the 1970s, but currently are central places in İstanbul: Sağmalcılar, Rami, Kağıthane, Levent, Zeytinburnu and Kazlıçeşme are some examples.[135] The suburbanization of industry for İstanbul, however, has been an ever lasting issue since then.

İstanbul illustrated a serious industrial development and enhanced towards Adapazarı on the east and Tekirdağ on the west. The Bosphorus, Topkapı and Büyükçekmece respectively on the west and Kartal, Maltepe and

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[134] Ibid., pp. 58-59, my translation.

[135] Ibid., p. 60.

Tuzla on the east became the route for this suburbanization within the city limits. Tümertekin argues that the lack of planning was the sole problem of this process.[136] However, from the perspective of this thesis it is not correct to see a lack of planning as the lack of state. Rather this phenomenon is to be seen as formal and informal incentives of the state. Industrial enterprise one way or another was encouraged to grow in those legally less problematic places. Thus rather than a lack of planning we should talk about a convenient incentive policy which was suitable for the condition of capital. This issue will be discussed in detail later.

Gebze is one of the main stops of enhancement in the eastern direction. Gebze, is a small connection point on the road to İstanbul from Anatolia until the 1960s, witnessed an industrial boom afterwards and therefore massive migration. The 1965 population of Gebze was 33,674. In five years it increased approximately 40 %, to 46,981. This gradual increase continued and by 2000 Gebze's population was 421,982; in other words, it became a middle scale city by Turkish standards.[137] The basic factor of this process was the suburbanization of İstanbul-based industry and its occupation of Gebze.[138] Similar processes took place in İzmit and Adapazarı. From the Çerkezköy region in the western side to Adapazarı on the east it looked like a single line of industrial production geography. According to *İstanbul Metropoliten*

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[136] Ibid., p. 75.

[137] Gülfettin Çelik, *İki Dönemde Bir Kent: Gebze* (Gebze: Gebze Ticaret Odası, 2000), State Institute of Statistics *2000 Census of Population: Kocaeli* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, 2002).

[138] The term "occupation" is widely used by people with both of its meanings. Recently the current mayor of Gebze, İbrahim Pehlivan, argued that Gebze has been subjected to an organized attack and occupied by Istanbul industry. See, Aktan Uslu, "Organize Bir Saldırı Altındayız," *Birgün* 2007.

Planlama ve Kentsel Tasarım Merkezi (İMP) the southeast and southwest lines of industrial enhancement were included in those two major lines. In other words, İstanbul and its area of effect grew to include the whole Marmara region physically.[139]

Basic Currents for Industrialization in Dilovası

İstanbul starting from the early 1960s until the present transformed the other cities surrounding it in terms of industrial and urban development. The subject of this thesis, Dilovası, is a place industrialized in this process. Dilovası as a little town related to Gebze, started to industrialize at the end of the 1960s. It is also possible to cite some of the characteristics Tümertekin mentions above. The village status of administration facilitated the process. Çerkeşli village, located six km north of Dilovası and Muallimköy village between Gebze and Dilovası administratively governed the region. The limitations of administration could easily be overcome and industrial plants could easily be constructed on agricultural lands. Although the licenses were being given by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement from the provincial center it was easier to continue the process in places with village status. Nevertheless, in terms of land structure, there were some difficulties experienced as well. The leading one was the patched configuration of the lands and property problems. For example, Polisan Chemical and Poliport Port Enterprise located on the coastal side of Dilovası faced the challenge of

[139] İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı Metropolitan Planlama ve Kentsel Tasarım Merkezi *İstanbul'un Desantralizasyonu ve Bölgesel Açılımlar* (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı, 2006).

gathering different parcels belonging to different people. Necmettin Bitlis, the owner of the factory, describes this process as follows:

> I bought the land in 1969-70, but they were divided pieces of land. After uniting these scattered lands and the approval of the projects, we started constructing the factory in 1974. First, I finished the dock. At the beginning of 1975, the first ship came to the dock. (...) Land parcels were too much divided and there were disputes. When I bought the land next to the seaside, a share of the land was held by a German. Of course, it would be wrong for us to be engaged in the construction before buying that share; that was impossible. While dealing with these problems, three or for years passed. Otherwise, we could have come earlier.[140]

Although the patched configuration of the land prevented some companies from constituting their plants immediately, the administrative structure (village status) enabled industrialists to come and settle in Dilovası easily. Dilovası experienced a slow but important industrialization process from 1967 when the first company, İzocam, came to 1987 when the municipality was declared. The companies that came in this two decades long period are still among the most important companies and plants of the country.

The first settler was İzocam Company of Koç Holding, in 1967. Factory construction took one year and production process started in 1968.[141] The second factory which invested in the region was Oluklu Mukavva Sanayi (OLMUKSA) of Sabancı Holding with an English partner. Later this company

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[140] Interview with Necmettin Bitlis. *1969-70 senelerinde araziyi aldım ama tabi buralar parça arsalardı. Bunların birleştirilmesi ve projelerin onaylanması ardından fabrika inşaatına 1974 senesinde başladık, ilk önce limanı bitirdim 1975 senesinin başında ilk gemiyi yanaştırdık. (...) Arsa parselleri çok parçalıydı ve ihtilaflar vardı. Ben aldığımda deniz kıyısındaki arsanın bir hissesi Almanyalı birisindeydi. Tabi adamın o hissesini almadan bizim inşaata başlamamız yanlış olurdu, mümkün değildi. Bunların teker teker alınıp tevhid edilmesi kolay bir işlem değil. Bu sorunları hallederken üç dört sene zaman geçti. Yoksa daha erken gelebilirdik.*

[141] Company web site, http://www.izocam.com.tr/Kurumsal.aspx?ID=1

opened new plants in different places in the country, but the Dilovası plant remained leading one.[142]

Subsequent to these two companies others invested in the region. Marshall Boya ve Vernik Sanayi A.Ş. (Marshall Paint and Polisher Corporation) took its first step in 1967, but factory construction lasted until 1972 when production began. Çolakoğlu Metalurji (Çolakoğlu Metallurgy), which is among the largest industrial organizations of Dilovası as well as in Turkey, invested in the region in 1969 and built its first steel workshop (*çelikhane*). Again, today's largest chemical company in the world, the BASF Company invested in Dilovası with its Turkish partner Sümerbank in 1970.[143] The BASF Sümerbank partnership was different than others in one respect. Sümerbank was the only public enterprise in the region. There was no public investment in Dilovası apart from the Sümerbank BASF partnership. Immediately after, Solventaş started to build its chemical storage facilities along the Dilovası coast. Polisan, which owns two international ports in Dilovası, was one of the first comers, but only started production in 1974.[144]

The fundamental reasons for the delay of the production process are as follows. First, the patched property structure comes as mentioned above. Another problem was the lack of infrastructure since it was not a residential area. For the large plants it was impossible to point out any infrastructural elements. Almost all of the factories built their own infrastructural needs themselves.

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[142] Company web site, http://www.olmuksa.com.tr/sirket_profili.htm

[143] Company web site, http://www.basf.com.tr/turkiye_de_basf.html

[144] Interview with Necmettin Bitlis.

NASAŞ, which was the most important aluminum factories of the period in Turkey, was established in the same time span. Another leading steel factory of the region and Turkey, Diler Demir Çelik (Diler Iron & Steel) was built in 1978. Yaşar Holding, on the other hand, invested in 1981 and finished construction in 1984. Atabay Chemistry, which is located on the northwestern side of Muallimköy today, came to the region in this first wave of industrialization, too.

The first wave of industrialization had discernible characteristics. First of all, these plants are still active in the region. Despite small changes in their administrations, they have developed to a significant level. The BASF-Sümerbank partnership, for example, ended in 2000 after BASF bought out all of Sümerbank's shares. Marshall Boya was sold to Akzo Nobel, which is one of the leading international players in the chemical sector. Koç Holding, during its restructuring program, sold İzocam to a Kuwait-France partnership in 2006.[145] NASAŞ, on the other hand, was first sold to Uzan Group and then to Kibar Holding. Now the factory produces under the name of Assan Alüminyum (Assan Aluminium).

Along with those changes at the administrative level, plants enlarged their capacities. Çolakoğlu Metalurji, for instance, opened its first steel processing workshop in 1969 and added a rolling plant in 1985, which enabled both technological improvement and an increase in capacity.[146] Diler Demir

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[145] *İzocam, Kuveyt-Fransız Ortaklığına Satıldı* (CNNTURK, 2006 [cited 13 July 2007]); available from http://www.cnnturk.com/EKONOMI/SIRKETLER/haber_detay.asp?PID=42&haberID=227040.

[146] Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı *Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı: Demir-Çelik Sanayii Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu* (Ankara: DPT, 2000), p. 14.

Çelik started production in 1980 in its rolling plant and in 1985 established another steel workshop. These two factories specialized in long products were the fifth and sixth largest companies in the Turkish steel industry respectively by 2004.[147] Çolakoğlu Metalurji, located on the coast, finished its investment in the new factory and dismantled the old factory.[148] Similarly OLMUKSA modernized its plant and increased capacity in 1977, 1983, 1987 and 1994.[149] This is valid for most of the other factories in the region.

As mentioned above, the most essential element of the industrialization in Dilovası is the suburbanization of the İstanbul-based industry. But the reason why Dilovası is industrialized more than other places along İstanbul's dissemination route should be explained. One fundamental characteristic of Dilovası on which everyone agrees is the transportation facilities it provides. When the first company came to Dilovası in 1967 there were two routes that connect İstanbul and Ankara. The first is D-100 land route which passes through Dilovası. The second is the railway along the coast. In addition to those ways the TEM highway was opened between Gebze and İzmit in 1980. The railway line was enhanced with a second line built between 1971 and 1973. Yet what make Dilovası most attractive are its marine transportation facilities. Powerful port capacity stands as the central attraction point for industrialists. Mustafa Türker, head of DOSB, underlines this potential: "When Dilovası first started to be industrialized Gebze was also a small town, too. But industrialist preferred the region especially because of its port

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[147] İstanbul Sanayi Odası *Türkiye'nin 500 Büyük Sanayi Kuruluşu 2004* (İstanbul: İSO, 2005).

[148] TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*, p. 156.

[149] Company web site, http://www.olmuksa.com.tr/sirket_profili.htm

potential, railway potential and its proximity to metropolis like İstanbul."[150] Today there are twelve middle scale ports in Dilovası and eight of them remain within the DOSB area. Still there have been other port constructions and come capacity increasing attempts.

Another significant feature is the topographical structure of the region. Dilovası Plain which occupies a relatively large area is surrounded by two hills on the east and the west and by İzmit bay on the south. This relatively smooth plain with its low slope degree enabled industrialists to settle in the region without fundamental infrastructural investments. With this feature Dilovası resembles Derince and the Körfez districts and very like them it is highly industrialized. But other regions like Tavşancıl and Hereke, which lie on the same route, have been industrialized in a limited share. Apart from Nuh Çimento (Nuh Cement Industry) in Hereke and two middle scale ports there is no widespread industrial concentration. Despite similar transportation facilities mountainous geography has prevented them from having industrialized.

Closeness to the market is another feature. Goods produced in Dilovası were aimed at internal market until the early 1990s. Export was not that high in volume and the actual buyer of those goods was needless to say, İstanbul with its large economy. Closeness to İstanbul i.e., the largest market forms another reason for industrial migration to Dilovası. Ports on the other hand enabled connection with external markets as well. Existing transportation facilities also provide ease in acquiring raw material. Since Dilovası industry

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[150] Interview with Mustafa Türker. *Dilovası sanayileşmeye başladığında Gebze de zaten küçük bir ilçe durumunda. Ancak sanayici bölgenin özellikle liman potansiyeli, demiryolu potansiyeli ve Istanbul gibi bir metropole yakınlığı dolayısıyla Dilovası'nı tercih etmiş*.

produces both inferior goods and consumption goods it wants to be close to other industrial plants and sources.

The possibilities that the land structure provided is not limited to geographical advantages. As Tümertekin explains places with village status or small municipalities around İstanbul encouraged those factories formally or informally. As mentioned above, Dilovası was officially affiliated to Çerkeşli and Muallimköy villages. Dilovası Municipality was established in 1987 but it did not function as a regulatory mechanism for industrialization. The former interest in industrialization doubled and subsequent to the establishment of municipality the region attracted much more industry and migration. Many people interviewed underlined the date 1987 as a defining moment and most of them argue that it worsened the complexity of the current situation. Halit Yaşar, former mayor of Dilovası municipality, describes it as follows:

> The first mayor did not know the issue of municipality, its powers and responsibilities. He didn't have a visionary understanding of urbanization and the future. He didn't have insight into urbanization nor did he have knowledge and experience about the field. He was a man who became the mayor due to specific conditions. Actually, there was a huge immigration to Dilovası. After it became a municipality, there emerged the concern that it would be harder to construct and therefore there was a rapid process of construction. The mayor of the time was not aware of what was happening. After it became a municipality, the official institutions which dealt with shanty towns took a step back. The understanding was that it was the municipality's responsibility to deal with it. In that period, those who felt close to the municipality continued the process swiftly. The weakness of the municipality and lack of its vision led to the spread of shanty towns which was impossible to overcome. If we sympathize with the poor, it can be said that these poor people had the opportunity to own a shanty house thanks to the fact that the municipality overlooked it. This led to satisfaction. However, there was a contrast in terms of constructing a

city where people could live properly. On the one hand, there were those who were glad and, on the other, there was a Dilovası which didn't look like anything and this concerned people.[151]

As in the case of construction, the same distortion continued in the case of industry. The idea that "That's okay, I've made my building, I've finished up my things" was effective in terms of establishing a distorted Dilovası. All the industrial establishments in Dilovası are distorted. Since I know the whole process thoroughly, I know how distorted the whole process is. The industrialists did whatever they could in terms of taking advantage of finding an inexperienced municipality. That lack of vision led to the fact that the distortion in industry became more insurmountable. The fact that the municipality was inexperienced, lack of foresight resulted in such a situation that the industrialist initiated a process of industrialization where he constructed buildings on all the land and the citizens found themselves in a process of uneven construction because of poverty. In sum, the cause of all these is the municipality. From 1987 to 1994, it was evident that the municipality would lead to distortion rather than amelioration. This is the material side of the issue. There is also the social dimension and that reveals the perspective of the municipality towards the citizen, the fairness of distributing the services and the political position of the citizen in social terms. It is important for the citizen to vote, to have a choice and participate in politics. But in Dilovası the citizen perceives the municipality as an institution dealing with nothing, encouraging squatter housing, independent of rules and regulations and finally an establishment to benefit from. This is one of the reasons for the bankruptcy of politics. This goes as far as the corruption stemming from the authorities in municipality.[152]

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[151] Interview with Halit Yaşar, *İlk belediye başkanlığı yapan arkadaşımız belediyeciliği ve belediyenin yetkilerinin ve sorumluluklarını, şehirleşmeyi gelecek ile ilgili bir anlayışı, şehirleşme ile ilgili bir prodüksiyonu bir öngörüye, bir bilgi ve birikime, bir vizyona sahip değildi. Tamamen şartların gidişatın önüne katıp gittiği biriydi. Zaten Dilovası'nda yoğun bir göç vardı. Belediye oluca bundan sonra artık yapamayacağız endişesi çevrede hızlı bir yapılaşmaya neden oldu. O zamanki belediye başkanı farkında değildi ne olup bittiğinin belediye olunca da gecekondu ile uğraşan resmi kurumlar da geri plana çekildi. Belediyenin ilgilenmesi gerektiği görüşü hakimdi. Bu dönemde kendini belediyeye yakın hissedenler daha da hızlı bir şekilde süreci devam ettirdiler. Burada belediye yönetiminin zafiyeti, yetersizliği, vizyonsuzluğu kendiliğinde altından kalkılamaz bir gecekondulaşmayı getirdi. Empati yaparak bakarsak doğudan geliş aç, fakir olanlar açısından durum şöyle özetlenebilir: sağ olsun belediye göz yumdu biz de gecekondu sahibi olduk. Onun açısından bir memnuniyet getirdi. Ama işin geleceği, insanların insan gibi sağlıklı bir biçimde yaşayabilecekleri bir şehir kurma açısında da bir tezat meydana getirdi. Bir tarafta sevinenler, bir tarafta ise hiçbir şeye benzemeyen bir Dilovası kaygılandırıyordu.*

[152] Interview with Halit Yaşar, *Yapılaşmada olduğu gibi sanayide de aynı çarpıklaşma devam etti. Fabrika kondurdum, işi bitirdim anlayışı her iki açıdan da çarpık bir Dilovası kurulmasına neden oldu. Dilovası'ndaki tüm sanayi kuruluşları çarpıktır. Tüm sürece hakim olduğum için hepsinin nasıl çarpık olduğunu ben bilirim. Sanayici de acemi bir belediye bulunmasının avantajından yararlanmak için elinden geleni yaptı. Aynı vizyonsuzluk sanayideki çarpıklaşmanın daha altından kalkılmaz hale gelmesine sebep olmuştur. Belediyedeki bilinçsizlik ve tecrübesizlik işin ehli olmama basiretsizliği, kurnaz işini bilen*

Dilovası Municipality, very like peripheral municipalities in İstanbul, utilized the advantage of being in the margins of city or provincial municipalities. Moreover, other than the municipal regulations legal arrangements regarding the environmental and health issues were very inefficient and ineffective in controlling this current of industrialization. A former environmental health technician who worked for years in Gebze region describes the process as follows:

> The officials who control the factory do not know the production process. First, the factories start to produce and then official procedures are completed. Regulations on air pollution were translated word for word from foreign languages between 1983 and 1985 and it is impossible to understand the regulations. The personnel do not know the goods produced and the production process. The information that the factories have given is accepted as data.[153]

This condition in a sense continued until the 1990s. The declaration of the Dilovası Organized Industrial Zone in 2002, the Metropolitan Municipality Law in 2004 and last the Law of Environment in 2006 changed this picture radically. The next section will be devoted to discussion of this transformation.

Another element making Dilovası attractive is incentives. Kocaeli city was an incentive region until 1985. Since there were various kinds of incentive

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sanayicinin sahip olduğu bütün toprağı yapılaştırarak bir sanayileşmeye, vatandaşında garibanlıktan sebep çarpık yerleşim oluşturmasına neden oldu. Özetle bunların müsebbibi belediyenin kendisidir. 87'den 94'e kadar belediyenin bir iyileşmeden ziyade çarpıklaşmaya yol açtığı ortadadır. Bu işin maddi boyutu. Bir de bu işin manevi sosyal boyutu var. O da belediyenin vatandaşa bakış açısı, hizmetleri dağıtmadaki adaletliliği ve adaletsizliği vatandaşın da sosyal anlamda siyasi konumunu ortaya çıkarıyor. Vatandaşın oy vermesi, tercih yapması veya siyasete katılması önemlidir. Vatandaş belediyeyi, hiçbir şeye karışmayan, gecekondulaşmayı teşvik eden, kural ve kaidelerden bağımsız ve sadece yararlanılması gereken bir kurum olarak görüyor. Bu siyasetin dibe vurmasının nedenlerinden biridir. Bu da belediye yetkilerinin yolsuzluk yapmasına kadar uzanıyor.

[153] Interview with A. Y. *Fabrikaları denetleyen resmi görevliler üretim sürecini bilmiyor. Hava kirliliği koruma yönetmeliği 1983-85 arasında yabancı dilden aynen tercüme ediliyor, yönetmeliği anlamak mümkün değil. Personel üretilen malın ne olduğunu, üretim sürecini bilmiyor. Fabrikaların verdiği bilgi veri kabul ediliyor.*

forms it is hard to pursue the traces of incentives. Although region-specific incentives ended up at the end of the 1980s for Dilovası, this place has always been a dense region for incentives in terms of sector based incentives (such as the chemical sector, shipyard sector, etc.) export incentives and foreign capital investment incentives. Informal incentive mechanisms like overlooking the delay of environmental investments were also common.

Another factor that makes Dilovası attractive is the condition of it in terms of labor structure. The growing population of İstanbul since the 1950s has provided a wide range of labor potential. Parallel to it, Gebze and İzmit have also witnessed a considerable rate of migration. Since Dilovası is close to all those places and there are sufficient transportation facilities, it was possible for workers to commute everyday. Besides, the growing population of Dilovası also provides a certain amount of workers for the factories. Along with them, relatively higher wages attracted workers to the region at the beginning. A worker who found a job in Nasaş in 1981 describes the situation as follows:

> I was employed at Nasaş in 1981. I was working in the laboratory. Nasaş was a big factory. Apart from that there were other big companies like İzocam, Çolakoğlu, Marshall and Polisan. I was commuting to work from Kuruçeşme, a district on the western edge of İzmit. There were many other commuters like me who came to work on service buses, but there were also friends coming from Dilovası or from Gebze, İstanbul. (...) What about the wages? They were quite fine. Before Nasaş, I had worked at a notary public and received a wage of 11,000 liras. Nasaş paid me 33,000 liras.[154]

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[154] Interview with Nerdim Terzioğlu. *Ben 1981 yılında Nasaş'ta işe girdim. Laboratuarda çalışıyordum. Nasaş çok büyük bir fabrikaydı. Onun dışında İzocam, Olmuk, Çolakoğlu, Marshall, Polisan gibi büyük fabrikalar vardı. Ben Kuruçeşme'den [İzmit'in batı çıkışında bir semt] servisle işe gidip geliyordum. Benim gibi servisle gidip gelen epey kişi vardı ama Dilovası'ndan gelen arkadaşlar da vardı, Gebze İstanbul tarafından gelenler de. (...) Ücretler nasıldı, gayet iyiydi. Ben Nasaş'a girmeden önce çarşıda noterde çalışıyordum. Noterde aylık 11.000 lira alıyordum. Nasaş'ta 33.000 lira alıyordum.*

To sum up, there were nine basic reasons for Dilovası and its industrialization process. First, it is on the way to the İstanbul-based industry's expanding route. Second, the administrative status at the beginning provided industry an advantage for easier settlement. Third, it offered a wide range of transportation facilities. Fourth, its topographic structure as a wide smooth plain supplied a broad area in which to settle and very few problems in terms of investments in the establishment process. Fifth, it was close to the largest market of Turkey, İstanbul. Sixth, it was close to raw material. Seventh, the formal and informal incentives provided for industrialists both by the village and municipality administrations formed an important attraction factor. The eighth factor is the central incentive mechanism provided for Kocaeli region for industrial investments. The ninth and the last one was the rich (in terms of both quality and number) labor market that the region provided. For these nine basic reasons and some other minor ones Dilovası became the industrially dense location that it is.

As mentioned before, Dilovası industry is large scale industry and mostly composed of the steel and chemical sectors. Apart from those two, port business forms another important sector. These three sectors are traditionally labor intensive sectors and they employ many more workers than other sectors like construction, high technology business, etc. Not surprisingly therefore they are the leading ones in working class movements. This is valid for Dilovası, too. Dilovası before 1980 witnessed large scale strikes and important

working class movements. Those were important in shaping Dilovası and its pre-1980 setting. Some of the important ones were as follows.

Petrol-İş and Otomobil-İş are among the most active trade unions in Dilovası. The most important reason for this is simply their scope of activity. The former one has the right to organize in the petrol and chemicals sector whereas the latter one is in automotive, metal production, steel and iron factories.[155] The most remarkable strike in this period was six months long, the Marshall Paint strike. 350 workers attended the strike. It started on 29 March, 1976 and finished on 14 October with a collective agreement.[156] The local newspapers paid a lot interest to this strike, because it was not only the longest strikes of the region, but also a successful one ending with a collective agreement.[157] Otomobil-İş was very active in the Gebze region and organized a large number of workers in Dilovası. For instance in Nasaş and Çolakoğlu, there are mass transfers to the Otomobil-İş union at different times.[158] There are many other large and small strikes.[159]

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[155] For Petrol-İş see, Oya Baydar, ed., *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 521-525. For Otomobil-İş see, Baydar, ed., *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2, pp. 473-476.

[156] Baydar, ed., *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2, p. 346.

[157] Local paper Özgür Kocaeli followed this strike very much. For some examples see, "6 Ay Devam Eden Grev Bitti: Marshall İşçileri Günlük 112 Lira Zam Aldılar," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 13 October 1976, "Diliskelesi'ndeki Marshall Grevi 140. Gününü Doldurdu," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 17 August 1976.

[158] For two examples see, "Çolakoğlu Demir-Döküm Fabrikasında Çalışan Üçyüz İşçi Otomobil-İş'e Katıldılar," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 27 May 1976, "Nasaş İşçisinin % 90'ı Otomobil-İş'e Üye Oldular," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 29 July 1975.

[159] For some examples, "Aysan'lı İşçiler Greve Evet Dedi," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 25 June 1975, "Otomobil-İş Elektrofer Çelik Döküm Sanayiinde Toplu Sözleşme İmzaladı," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 20 October 1976, "Otomobil-İş Sendikası ile Kroman Çelik Sanayii A.Ş.'de Toplu Sözleşmeler İmzalandı," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 16 July 1977, "Otomobil-İş Sendikasıyla Gebze'deki Ak-Kardan Arasında Yapılan Toplu Sözleşmeyle İşçiler Günde 68 Lira Zam Aldı," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 21 June 1975, "Selülöz-İş Olmuk'da Grev Yapacak," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 6 May 1976. For Gebze Akkardan strike see, Baydar, ed., *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 1, p. 29.

The 1980 *coup d'état* changed this picture very much against working class. Subsequent to the intervention the National Security Council appointed a Supreme Arbitration Board (*Yüksek Hakem Kurulu*) and gave it the power to limit and prevent strikes. The decree in the Collective Agreement, Strike and Lockout Law no. 2822 enabled this board to prevent almost all strikes. According to this decree, "No strike can be done against the inseparable unity of the state, nation, national sovereignty, republic and national security."[160]

This policy of the military regime and the Özal government influenced Dilovası very much. Until the famous 1987 Petrol-İş strikes throughout the country in 1987 there were no significant strikes in the factories in Dilovası. Petrol-İş organized 63 strikes simultaneously, including four large factories in Dilovası. Those are Polisan, BASF-Sümerbank, Marshall Paint and DYO.[161] The policy of suppressing the working class and keeping wages low was one of the core elements of the economic policy after the 24 January decisions. The basic characteristic of this period was its attitude against labor.[162] But as Boratav writes, this set of policies continued until the end of 1988 mostly thanks to the military regime and the legal restrictions mentioned above. The Özal government exploited this conjuncture very much but the later government by Demirel failed to sustain this anti-labor economic policy mostly because of these working class acts and strikes.[163] Dilovası can be seen as one of these instances. But the later period witnessed a large scale of strikes

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[160] Baydar, ed., *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 1, p. 511. *Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğüne, milli egemenliğe aykırı amaçla grev yapılamaz*.

[161] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 521-525.

[162] Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002*, p. 148.

[163] Ibid.

and movements both in Turkey and Dilovası. Spring Movements in 1989 led by public workers played an important role in breaking the anti-labor policies and a 140 % raise in wages changed the shape and scale of the strikes and other actions.

There have been many strikes and movements in Dilovası and some have been very radical ones.[164] But as Akkaya underlines, despite the increase in the number, scale and scope of strikes after 1980 they did not result in either improvement in the social political rights of the working class or number of union member workers. Besides, real wages continued to fall in the long run.[165] What is noteworthy in this new setting is the rising informalization even in sectors in which unions were traditionally powerful.

In the Dilovası context the symbolic event of this transformation was the Polisan affair which took place in 4 July 1995. The strike started in 17 April 1995 with 230 workers, who arranged a sit-down strike in front of the main door of the factory with their families in 4 July. The gendarmerie forcefully broke the strike and the union had to finish the sit-down strike in front of main gate but continued in the road. There occurred a dispute between 60 worker and the strikebreakers waiting in the oil station. Overcoming the gendarmerie barricade, the workers attacked the subcontractors. Five workers were injured and 70 were arrested.[166] Today the Polisan factory does not employ permanent staff. All of its workers are subcontractors who work for

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[164] For instance see the death fast in Polisan factory. See, "10 Polisan İşçisi Ölüm Orucunda," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 7 March 1996. This action finished in 14 March, see "Dilovası'nda Ölüm Orucu Bitti," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 14 March 1996.

[165] Akkaya, "Türkiye'de 1980 Sonrası Emek-Sermaye Arasındaki Bölüşüm Mücadelesinde Grevlerin Yeri," 239.

[166] Baydar, ed., *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2, p. 539.

contractors. H. A., one of strikebreakers in the Polisan affair in 1995, describes it as follows: "I worked for Polisan for three years seven months. I was a strikebreaker, unfortunately. I quit in 1998 and during this period I worked as a subcontractor for a contractor. I found a better job and I still work there."[167]

Today subcontracting and non-permanent employment is widespread in Dilovası. Unlike Polisan, other factories have experienced a more gradual transformation of their labor structure. A worker from Diler describes it as follows: "I worked in Diler between 1989 and 2001. I was a union member. Union actions were frequent at the beginning, but later on, subcontractor workers increased in number gradually. Because of collective bargaining our salaries increased; as the wages increased dismissals increased, too. I was fired in 2001."[168] Gradually or not informalization, worsening working conditions and falling wages are characteristics of the period after 1980 in the Turkish economy. This is not different for Dilovası.

It is worth mentioning that industry in Dilovası is not only composed of the factories on the Dilovası Plain. The northern side of the town is under construction for new organized industrial zones. There are four organized industrial zones being built in the plateau between Dilovası and Çerkeşli village. Those are *İMES*, *Kimyacılar*, *Makinacılar* and *Kömürcüler* organized

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[167] Interview with H.A. *3 yıl 7 ay Polisan'da çalıştım. Maalesef grev kırıcı olarak girdim oraya. 1998'de ayrıldım ve bu süre zarfında müteahhit için taşeron işçi olarak çalıştım. 1998'de daha iyi bir iş buldum ve çıktım hala orada çalışıyorum.*

[168] Interview with Engin Erdağı. *1989 2001 yılları arasında Diler'de çalıştım. Sendikalıydım, ilk girdiğim zaman sendikal eylemler yoğundu. Ancak son zamanlara doğru taşeron işçiler artmaya başladı. Toplu sözleşme ve zamlardan dolayı maaşlarımız artıyordu. Maaşlar arttıkça da işten çıkarmalar artıyordu. Ben de 2001 senesinde işten çıkarıldım.* For steel factories in Gebze (two of them are Diler and Çolakoğlu in Dilovası) also see Engin Yıldırım, "The Metal Workers of Gebze," in *Work and Occupation in Modern Turkey*, ed. Erol Kahveci, Theo Nichols, and Nadir Sugur (London: Mansell, 1996).

industrial zones. Those new organized industrial zones are also being mentioned in local and national media with the emphasis on their environmental effects. For an example, in an article published in *Özgür Kocaeli*:

> The majority of the Chemists' Organized Industrial Zone has 110 members, many of whom are significant businessmen of Turkey. The amount of investment to be made in this area will reach 1.5 billion YTL. The production of chemical materials constitutes the most dangerous and poisonous realm of industry. Baydır stated that the facility to be established will not harm the environment and no chemical waste will be released.[169]

On the one hand, this industrial expansion is seen as new investment and new opportunities for job, but on the other hand it is also seen as a new threat for environmental harm by the local governors. The current mayor of Gebze, İbrahim Pehlivan, calls this expansion of organized industrial zones an attack:

> Gebze is face to face with an organized brutal attack of industry. It is impossible to understand how the basin in Dilovası became an organized industrial zone comprising the neighborhoods within. It at most can be an "un-organized" industrial zone. There are three bases in the constitution process of an organized industrial zone; those are industrialist, local politician and bureaucracy. We cannot know who was involved in the constitution of the Dilovası organized industrial zone.[170]

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[169] See, "Kimya Fabrikaları da Dilovası'na Geliyor," *Özgür Kocaeli*, 21 November 2006. *Kimyacılar Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin büyük bölümü Türkiye'nin önemli işadamlarından oluşan 110 üyesi var. Bu alanda yapılacak yatırım miktarı da 1.5 milyar YTL'yi bulacak. Kimyasal madde üretimi, sanayinin en tehlikeli ve en zehirli alanını oluşturuyor. Baydır, kurulacak tesisin çevreye zarar vermeyeceğini, hiçbir kimyasal atığın dışarı verilmeyeceğini söyledi.*Also see "İMES'in OSB'sine 80 Milyon Dolarlık Altyapı Yatırımı," *Hürriyet*, 13 May 2007. *Sadece altyapı için 80 milyon dolarlık yatırım yapılacak. 2 bin 300 dönüm arazi içindeki 350 parselde 217 fabrika kurulacak. En küçüğü 2 bin 500 metrekare, en büyüğü ise 40 bin metrekare olacak. Parsellerin tamamı dolu.*

[170] Uslu, "Organize Bir Saldırı Altındayız." *Gebze, sanayinin organize olmuş vahşi bir saldırısı ile karşı karşıya. Dilovası'nda sanayi kuruluşlarının yer aldığı havzanın beldeden mahalleleri de içine katarak nasıl organize sanayi bölgesi olduğunu anlamak mümkün değil. Burası olsa, olsa "aorgani-ze" bir bölge olur. Organize sanayi bölgelerinin kuruluşunda*

Salih Gün, former deputy member and member of the commission on Dilovası, argues that Dilovası in particular and Kocaeli region in general are saturated with heavy industry that pollutes the environment the most. He proposes to relocate the industry in Turkey and stop the industrial expansion in the line from Edirne to Düzce in the Marmara region.[171] Contrary to Salih Gün, Mustafa Türker, head of DOSB and chief executive of Çolakoğlu Metalurji (the largest company in Dilovası), argues that both Dilovası and the Marmara region is hungry for industrial expansion:

> Now people say that Kocaeli region is saturated with industry. According to what? In other words this place should still be industrialized. But you can do that, as a state you can develop mass housing projects and prevent shanty towns while industrial plants are constituted. People working in those factories live decently in those mass houses. No problem. Yet some facilities should go to Anatolia as well. But you should provide incentives. For instance, we have nine million kilometers square of land here. Three and a half million of it are not yet activated. What are we going to do? Are we going to raise corn in the middle of an organized industrial zone? Of course we will build industrial plants. Three more organized industrial zones are being built to the northern side, *Makinacılar*, *Kimyacılar* and *Makina İmalatçıları*… and there is *Kömürcüler*. What has been done is being done to be beneficial.[172]

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sanayici, yerel siyasetçi ve bürokrasi olmak üzere üç ayak var. Dilovası OSB'nin bu şekilde kurulmasında kimlerin olduğunu ise bilemeyiz.

[171] For a study on the high rates of industrialization in Gebze region, see T. Kavzoğlu and M. Çetin, "Gebze Bölgesindeki Sanayileşmenin Zamansal Gelişiminin ve Çevresel Etkilerinin Uydu Görüntüleri ile İncelenmesi" (paper presented at the TMMOB Harita ve Kadastro Mühendisleri Odası 10. Türkiye Harita Bilimsel ve Teknik Kurultayı, Ankara, 28 March-1 April 2005). This study compares 1987 and 2002 and argues that industrialization in this period doubled and it caused equal rise in housing and decrease in forestry.

[172] Interview with Mustafa Türker. *Şimdi Kocaeli bölgesi doydu deniyor. Neye göre doydu? Bana göre de aç. Yani buraya hala sanayi gelmesi gerekiyor. Ama siz şunu yapabilirsiniz, sanayi kuruluşları kurulurken devlet olarak toplu konut olayını geliştirisiniz gecekonduyu önlersiniz. O tesislerde çalışan insanlar toplu konutlarda yaşarlar ve insanca yaşarlar. Hiç bir sorun olmaz. Ama Anadolu'ya da tesislerin gitmesi lazım. Onun için de teşvikler vermek gerekiyor. Ama burada mesela bizim burada 9 milyon metrekare arazimiz var. Bunun 3 buçuk milyon metre karesinde henüz tesis yapılmamış. Peki ne yapacağız? Organize sanayi bölgesinin içinde mısır mı yetiştireceğiz. Tabii ki sanayi tesisi kuracağız. Yukarıya üç yeni osb yapılıyor; makinacılar, kimyacılar ve makina imalatçıları... Bir de kömürcüler var. Yapılan herşey daha düzenli olsun diye yapılıyor*

Considering the nine specific reasons in the Dilovası context above, the industrialization of the plain was almost indispensable in line with the general socio-economic tendencies in Turkey. However, it is widely acknowledged that this rapid and dense industrialization in this region damages the capacity of the ecological infrastructure of the region.[173] The opposite views above put this contradiction forth very vividly. The idea of creating industrially specialized regions has already come true in Turkey in the Kocaeli region.[174] Nevertheless studies on environmental ruin how this particular region is convenient for such a concentration.

Population

The population of Dilovası is interestingly a real matter of dispute. The official records of the State Institute of Statistics give an unfamiliar account of Dilovası. As mentioned above, today's Dilovası used to be composed of separate neighborhoods officially affiliated with Çerkeşli and Muallimköy villages. The first data on the population of these two villages belong to the 1980 census. According to it the population of Çerkeşli was 4,035, whereas the population of Muallimköy was 1,964.[175] The 1985 population of these two villages are 7,227 and 3,375 respectively.[176] According to the first census

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[173] Assembly Report is the best example of this perspective.

[174] Zafer Çağlayan, Ankara Chamber of Industry's former president calls it a constellation strategy. See, Eylem Türk, "Çağlayan: Mikro Reform Dönemi Başlıyor," *Milliyet*, 24 July 2007.

[175] State Institute of Statistics *Kocaeli 1980 Census of Population: Characteristics of Population* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, 1983), pp. 5-6.

[176] State Institute of Statistics *1985 Census of Population by Administrative Division* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, 1986), p. 5.

conducted after the constitution of Dilovası Municipality, the population is 18,590 whereas the populations of these two villages are 877 and 723 respectively.[177] Populations of these two villages do not change dramatically in the period after the constitution of Dilovası Municipality. Therefore we can argue that Dilovası's former population in 1980 was approximately 4,500 and in 1985 about 9,000. This marks approximately a 100 % increase in population in every five year period.

The same trend continued in the following period. According to the data of 1997 the population count of Dilovası rose to 36,267 whereas Çerkeşli was 991 and Muallimköy 1,598.[178] But the 2000 population census posits counter data. According to that census the Dilovası population was 28,809, whereas Çerkeşli was 976 and Muallimköy 1,260.[179] There was a decrease in all three districts but Dilovası's among others marks a very severe decrease. When we consider the estimations by the municipality and the assembly report about the current population of Dilovası (it is estimated about 50,000) issue became more and more complicated. During my investigation in the institute I encountered this inconsistent data and asked the officials the reason. The Turkish Institute of Statistics explains it in a weird way. According to them 1990 and 2000 a population census was conducted whereas the one in 1997 was not a population census but a population count. Then they informed me that the 1997 research was a failure and the data on population is mostly

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[177] State Institute of Statistics *1990 Census of Population: Administrative Division* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, 1991), p. 5.

[178] State Institute of Statistics *1997 Population Count Administrative Divison* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, 1998), p. 5.

[179] State Institute of Statistics *2000 Census of Population* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, 2002), pp. 61-63.

mistaken. Although this is an explanation it does not elucidate the great change in Dilovası whereas other districts almost stay the same. According to official at the institute it could have been an outcome of deception in Dilovası in particular in order to obtain more shares from the general budget. Although it is a very informal way of extracting data on population it is still important and it justifies the data presented in 2001 report on the Dilovası population structure by the Dilovası Municipality.

Dilovası's estimated population today is more than 50.000. The composition of this population is highly complex. Dilovası has attracted migration from almost all regions of Turkey. But the east Anatolian region occupies a central place within this composition. Today it is estimated that more than 60 % of overall population is of Kurdish origin;[180] and it is easy to find the Kurdish daily newspaper *Welat* in the shop near the municipality. Needless to say, this complex population structure is an upshot of the migration movements that have taken place since the beginning of the industrialization process. Yet certainly, the forty-year long process is not a unique or unilinear one in which the population increased at a constant rate. This section will discuss the growth of population and formation of its complex composition.

As mentioned above the first migrants to Dilovası were factories and it was these factories that attracted the masses to Dilovası. İzocam Company built apartments for employees and initiated the settlement in Dilovası. In line

[180] There is an interesting news article published in *Gebze Gazetesi* in 1996 and it gives some hints about the weight of the Kurdish populaton in Dilovası. According to that people of Dilovası collected 4.000 signatures for ex-deputy member Melik Fırat, leading figures of Kurdish politics in Turkey. See "Dilovası Halkı, Melik Fırat için 4000 İmza Topladı," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 27 February 1996.

with migration of factories the first wave of migration to the region was relatively partial and at the end of the first twenty years Dilovası's population reached 10,000.[181] The major population increase took place immediately after the establishment of Dilovası Municipality. A study by Dilovası Municipality in 2001 argues that the rapid migration period for Dilovası was 1975-1990. The data collected here states the east Anatolian origin of migrants clearly. According to that study the allocation of household leaders in terms of region is as follows: 20.8 % Black Sea Region, 14 % Marmara Region, and % 59.8 east Anatolian Region. Whereas the allocation of household members is as follows: 10.4 % Black Sea Region, 45.6 %Marmara Region, and 40.1 % east Anatolian Region.[182] The portion of Mediterranean Region, Aegean Region and Middle Anatolian Region is relatively very low with respect to three regions above.[183] As these data show Dilovası attracted very dense attention from east Anatolian Region and it explains the current concentration of Kurdish population in Dilovası. Halit Yaşar, one of the leading figures of Dilovası and former mayor, describes the early period before the establishment of the municipality as follows:

> Dilovası was a location composed of the districts in Çerkeşli and Muallimköy. Diliskelesi used to be called *Lower Muallimköy* whereas Dilovası was called *Lower Çerkeşli Mahallesi*. Dil Deresi was the natural border of Muallimköy and Çerkeşli village. Dilovası, namely those two districts, began to expand with the famous immigration of people especially from the east in the 1970s and this nearly doubled the

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[181] This number is widely acknowledged by people in Dilovası. When we take 1985 population as 9.000 as mentioned above it is not illogical to argue that 1987 population is about 10.000. Yet it is to be mentioned that even some prominent people of the region (including current mayor Musa Kahraman) argue that Dilovası population in constitution of municipality was about 3.000.

[182] Kent Yapı Planlama *T. C. Dilovası Beldesi Analitik Çalışma Sonuçları*, p. 31.

[183] Ibid., table 2.7.

> population of Muallimköy and Çerkeşli. Of course, the density of the industry is great. I am not sure whether there is such a huge dense industry in such a small piece of land on Earth. There is no service, no road, and no water; there is nothing. People are carrying water from wells on donkeys. The idea of a municipality stemmed from these concrete needs.[184]

The years of this population movement are also interesting. According to the same study the original formation of the population in Dilovası was an outcome of the period between 1975 and 1990. 58.3 % of migrants migrated Dilovası 14 years or more. 28.1 %, on the other hand, migrated within a time span of 7 to 14 years, and finally 13.6 % of migrants came 7 years ago or less.[185]

The period until 1990 witnessed a considerable rate of migration but as the data above puts forward migration to Dilovası did not stop in 1990, rather it continued at a slower pace. Most of the interviewees underlined the role of the migration in the formation of Dilovası and most of them pointed out the role of municipality. The current mayor, Musa Kahraman, describes it as follows:

> My friend who won the local elections and became the first mayor was told that he should enable immigration from his hometown. He was told to help those people and in this way, there would be more people from his region and he would win the election. This is what he was told to do (...) this is not an appropriate way, but he acted in a

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[184] Interview with Halit Yaşar. *Dilovası Muallimköy ve Çerkeşli'nin mahallelerinden oluşan bir yerdi. Şimdiki Diliskelesi aşağı Muallimköy mahallesi şimdiki Dilovası ise aşağı Çerkeşli mahallesi diye geçerdi. Dil deresi Muallimköy ve Çerkeşli köylerinin sınır çizgisini oluşturuyordu. 1970'lerde başlayan o meşhur göç, özellikle doğudan ve ülkenin her tarafından gelen göçle birdenbire Dilovası yani o iki mahalle büyümeye başladı ve bağlı oldukları Muallimköy ve Çerkeşli köylerini hemen hemen ikiye katlamaya başladılar. Tabi sanayi yoğunluğu çok ciddi boyutta. Dünyada bu kadar küçük bir kara parçasında bu kadar yoğun bir sanayi var mı bilemiyorum. Ayrıca hizmet gelmiyor, yol yok, su yok, hiçbir şey yok. İnsanlar eşek sırtından su taşıyor kuyulardan. Belediye ihtiyacı bu somut ihtiyaçlardan dolayı ortaya çıktı.*

[185] Kent Yapı Planlama *T. C. Dilovası Beldesi Analitik Çalışma Sonuçları*, p. 33. Also see table 2.8.

> politically acceptable way. The mayor of the time, Ercan Dalkılıç, promoted rapid immigration from Erzurum, Bingöl, Kars and Ağrı. As a result of intensive immigration, the population of Dilovası rose from 3,000 to 20,000. However, the reason for the accumulation of population here is the existence of industry. People came with the thought that they could find jobs. This continued at a rapid pace after this place became a municipality.[186]

Labor migration is the core component of migration to Dilovası but political migration is also important. Ercan Teker, head of an NGO called Dilovası Ecology and Health Association (*Dilovası Ekoloji ve Sağlık Derneği*), relates his family's migration to the political problems in eastern Turkey:

> I was born in 1983 in Bitlis. When I was six, my family had to migrate to Kocaeli for social, economic and political reasons. My family directly migrated to Dilovası (...) In order to understand the Dilovası of the time we came; I think we should also talk about the Turkey of that period, especially the political events in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country. In 1989, the events in east and southeast parts of Turkey forced people to move to the west and the priority of the people was to find jobs and food, bread. Therefore, Dilovası as an organized industrial zone became a place which was greatly preferred.[187]

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[186] Interview with Musa Kahraman. *İlk belediye başkanlığını kazanan arkadaşım, bundan sonra böyle bir şansın olamaz, sen iyisi mi, memleketinden buraya göç getir. Bu insanlara, bu gelen insanlara yardımcı ol, senin burada kendi bölgenden insan çok olsun ki sen seçimi bir daha kazan, şeklinde kendisine yapılan bilgi beslemesiyle (...) doğru değil ama, siyaseten doğru kabul edilen bir bilgi beslemesiyle hareket etmiştir. O günkü Belediye Başkanı Ercan Dalkılıç, Erzurum'dan, Bingöl'den, Kars'tan, daha sonra işte, Ağrı'dan göç almaya hızlı bir teşvik getirmiştir. Yoğun bir göç neticesinde, 2 yıl içerisinde nüfusu 3 binden 20 bine çıkmış bir yer Dilovası. Ama, buraya birikimin tabii ki, birinci nedeni, burada sanayiinin oluşu. İş bulabilirim düşüncesiyle geldi insanlar, burası belediye olduktan sonra da hızla devam etti.*

[187] Interview with Ercan Teker. *1983 Bitlis doğumluyum. Altı yaşına geldiğimde bölgenin sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasi meselelerinden dolayı ailem Kocaeli'ne göç etmek durumunda kaldı. Ailem direk Dilovası'na göçtü. (...) Bizim geldiğimiz dönemin Dilovası'nı daha iyi anlamak için Türkiye'nin o dönemini özellikle doğu ve güneydoğudaki var olan siyasi olayları da konuşmak gerekir diye düşünüyorum. Dilovası'ndaki göç ve yoğunlaşma o dönemdeki zorunlu göç olaylarının bir sonucudur. 1989 döneminde Doğu ve güneydoğudaki olaylar oradaki insanların batıya doğru göç etmesini gerektirdi ve göç eden insanların birinci önceliği gittikleri yerlerde iş ve aş, ekmek bulabilmekti; bu yüzden bir sanayi bölgesi olan Dilovası çokça tercih edilen bir yer haline geldi.*

Forced migration was determining factor, especially between 1985 and 1990 in Turkey.[188] The story told by Teker is typical for a very wide range of people in Dilovası and it gives some clues about the composition of the population.

Migration to Dilovası has always been a vital element of the Dilovası population. Despite the decrease in the rate of migration in the years following 1994 Dilovası continued to grow with migration. But there is one basic exception for that. Although it is difficult to demonstrate in a numerical way, it is valid to argue that the report that revealed high cancer rates in Dilovası made some relatively wealthy people leave the region.[189] Ercan Teker describes it as follows: "The expression of cancer had a negative effect on Dilovası in a way that we did not expect at the beginning. While we expected that it would enable us to discuss some problems easier and more often, some prominent people said that Dilovası will give us cancer and they started to leave Dilovası."[190]

To sum up, Dilovası has a population about 50,000 and it formed in the last 40 years. This population is highly complex in terms of ethnic and regional background but still the Kurdish population has the largest share. Despite Kurdish superiority in the population it is difficult to see an emphasis on Kurdish politics, evidently and radically. The best indication of it might be

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[188] Ahmet İçduygu and Turgay Ünalan, "Türkiye'de İçgöç: Sorunsal Alanları ve Araştırma Yöntemleri," in *Türkiye'de İçgöç*, ed. Ahmet İçduygu, İbrahim Sirkeci, and İsmail Aydıngün (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1997), p. 44.

[189] Since the current census by Turkish Institute of Statistics did not finish yet it is not possible to give some exact data on this issue. But many interviews underlined this process much and most of them related it to the recent cancer phenomenon.

[190] Interview with Ercan Teker. *Kanser ifadesinin başlangıçta tahmin etmediğimiz olumsuz bir etkisi oldu. Bazı sorunların daha kolay ve daha sık gündeme gelmesini beklerken Dilovası'nın önde gelenleri burası bizi kanser yapıyor diyerek Dilovası'nı terketmeye başladı.*

the current mayor Musa Kahraman, who belongs to nationalist party (Nationalist Action Party) MHP.[191] The central policies reflect the political picture of the region rather than ethnicity. Again another good example of this is the results of elections held in 2002. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) had a 52 % share among overall votes in Dilovası.

[191] For the exact numbers see, http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/belediyeler/index.php?belediyeid=126688

CHAPTER IV

DİLOVASI IN PERSPECTIVE: FROM THE 1990S TO THE FORMATION OF A NEOLIBERAL INDUSTRIAL SITE

A fifteen-year long process from the establishment of the municipality to the declaration of the organized industrial zone in 2002 affected Dilovası enormously. The most intensive development in terms of industrialization, migration and urbanization took place in this relatively short period. Dilovası was a place composed of just fourteen factories at the time the municipality was constituted,[192] yet in 2002 when the DOSB was constituted it was a giant industrial location composed of 171 factories. Today there are twelve ports and eight of them are located within the DOSB. As Mustafa Türker states, those ports realize 6.7 % of all Turkish foreign trade.[193]

A similar leap can be observed in migration trends in Dilovası. As mentioned in the previous chapter, almost all parts in Dilovası -including official and non-official ones- have different ideas about the population of Dilovası and even the State Institute of Statistics is included in this confusion. Yet it is possible to say that Dilovası's population was about 8,000 in 1987 and more than 30,000 in 2002 and last more than 50,000 today. Likewise the

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[192] To repeat once again, these factories migrated Dilovası in this early period are among the biggest companies of the country. In this respect the importance of the migration of industry before the establishment of municipality is important and determinate.

[193] "DOSB Başkanı Mustafa Türker'den Fransızlara Anlamlı Cevap: Dilovası Türkiye'nin Gururu," *Gebze Yenigün*, 15 November 2006.

urbanization speed also increased in this period. Problems caused by infrastructural shortages are visible mostly in this time period.

However, rather than the acceleration in industrialization, migration and urbanization trends this section will focus on the relationship between the state and the industry. Issues like corruption, social responsibility, social policy and bribery are basic themes of this chapter. Many people employed similar discourses on social, economic and environmental issues which doubled in the period subsequent to the establishment of municipality. This is a discourse oscillating between corruption and philanthropy and deeply determines the relationship between industrialists and the state as well as inhabitants. The emphases on corruption and clumsiness also affected the process of the constitution of the DOSB. This chapter will look at the role that this discourse plays and the way it shapes the process.

Between Corruption and Corporate Social Responsibility

Every Boon Comes with a Price

This thesis argues that the fusion of the discourses of corruption and philanthropy shaped the period between 1987 and 2002. Yet this emphasis does not overlook other processes as well. The overall conditions of the Turkish and world economy were discussed in detail in the previous chapters. Moreover, emphasis on this specific episode does not imply that they did not exist before or after. What is underlined is that the fusion of corruption and

philanthropy that shaped Dilovası both in terms of discourses and reality in this specific period and it had deep and permanent effects on Dilovası in particular. In addition, the political and administrative structure that has formed since 2002 prevents former institutional and non-institutional habits to function as it were before. The post-2002 conditions are the subject of the following sections. First, the place and outcomes of corruption, bribery, and social responsibility projects and philanthropy will be discussed in detail.

Dilovası Municipality was constituted in 1987. The first mayor was Ercan Dalkılıç, from the Motherland Party. Ercan Dalkılıç is an important figure in Dilovası. He was the first mayor of the municipality and he won the second elections, too and continued to be mayor until 1994 without interruption. He was a candidate in 1994 but lost to Halit Yaşar from the Welfare Party, another important figure in Dilovası. Dalkılıç continued to be active in politics in Dilovası and once again became a candidate for municipality and won in 1999 again from the Motherland Party. Halit Yaşar did not participate in this election. Dalkılıç at last left his place to Musa Kahraman, the current mayor, from Nationalist Action Party, in the 2004 elections. That is to say, Ercan Dalkılıç was in power in ten years of the fifteen-year long period mentioned above. Not surprisingly he is the one whose name is attached and discussed in discourses on corruption and philanthropy the most.

In his two and a half year long first period Dalkılıç and the new

municipality worked to build the institutional structure of the municipality. But since the municipality was constituted because of already existing problems, it was very difficult to overcome these problems. Musa Kahraman, the current mayor, who came in Dilovası in 1987, describes the conditions before and after municipality as follows:

> I came to Dilovası in 1987 as a teacher. Then, excuse me but, water of washbasin would go below the windows of the houses, through a plastic pipe, into the street. Canalization was outside. Dilovası was such a place. Just because of those factories down, people have randomly come and settled. Then, the population was said to be around 3,000. There was mud around. I mean, whenever it rained, the mud would take the shoe off your foot. But, there was another thing I observed, too. There were really nice vineyards. People had not stopped taking care of them, there were nice vineyards. Yet, I'd come to Dilovası at a time when they were confused whether to leave them as vineyards or surrender to industry. When it became a municipality, everything changed.[194]

Infrastructural shortcomings came first and it is difficult to say that the municipality was successful in this field even today. For an example of the problems that the municipality faced immediately after its establishment, we can look at the problems with the Atabay Kimya Factory, one of the leading companies of the region. The municipality sued the company and accused it of

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[194] Interview with Musa Kahraman, *Ben Dilovası'na 1987 senesinde öğretmen olarak geldim. O zaman afedersiniz, lavabolarının suyu bile evlerin penceresinin altından, plastik bir boruyla hortumla sokağa akan, lavaboları, kanalizasyonları dışarda olan bir yerdi Dilovası. Sadece şu aşağıdaki fabrikaların sayesinde insanlar gelmiş rastgele bir yerleşim olmuş. O zaman 3000 civarında nüfusun olduğu söyleniyordu. Çamur ortalıkta, yani bir yağmur yağdığı zaman ayakkabılarınızı ayağınızdan alırdı buranın çamuru. Ancak gördüğüm bir şey daha vardı. Çok güzel bağları vardı etrafta. Henüz bakımı bırakmamıştı insanlar, güzel bağları vardı. Acaba bağ olarak mı kalsak, hepten sanayiiye teslim mi olsak düşüncelerinin, bir çeşit kararsızlığın olduğu bir dönemde gelmiştim Dilovası'na. Fakat, belediye olunca her şey değişti.*

disposing its wastes in the city water network.[195] The consultative authority report published later puts the problem and solution forward like this:

> As the results of chemical tests indicate, the waste water of Atabay Factory consists of high levels of organic pollution. The fact that the waste water is released to the ground because of rain water and mingles with drinking water and the river can lead to dangerous results as far as health and environmental pollution are concerned. (...) Officials of Dilovası Municipality were advised to flush the line from Atabay Chemistry Factory to the water depot, the depot itself and the pipelines which reach the houses from the depot and warned against using drinking this water or using it for domestic purposes.[196]

In the period from the establishment of the municipality to the declaration of the DOSB in 2002, Dilovası municipality was obliged to deal with the infrastructural problems of both the residential area and the factories. The Public Works Law with law no. 3194 provided the municipality broad authority and obligations to both the residents and factories within their borders. This is the law that determined the major points of the relationship between the municipality and the industrialists, and the municipality and the factories in this fifteen-year long process.

Infrastructure was the most important problem of the region and it is still so. Yet in the first years of the municipality it was much denser than today. In local newspapers of Gebze Dilovası is depicted many times in terms of its infrastructural shortcomings ranging from sewer system problems to the

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[195] *Dilovası içme suyuna zehirli atık madde karıştırdığı iddia edilen Atabay Fabrikası hakkında belediye 127 milyon liralık tazminat davası açtı*. See, "Atabay'a Tazminat Davası," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 25 October 1988.

[196] "Atabay Kimya Bilirlişi Raporu," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 26 October 1988. *Yapılan kimyasal deney sonuçlarından da görüldüğü gibi, Atabay Fabrikası atık suları yüksek organik kirlilik içermektedir. Bu atıksuların arıtılmadan toprak araziye verilmesi, yağmur sularıyla içme ve dere sularına karışması, sağlık ve çevre kirlenmesi açısından tehlikeli sonuçlar yaratabilecek niteliktedir. (...) Dilovası Belediyesi yetkililerine, Atabay Kimya Fabrikasından su deposuna kadar hattı, su deposu ve bu depodan evlere kadar uzanan boru hatlarını defalarca su ile yıkaması ve bu suların kesinlikle içme ve evsel amaçlı kullanılmaması önerilmiştir.*

lack of electricity, from lack of a communication infrastructure to the problems of roads.[197] The young municipality's first move to solve the problems of infrastructure was to buy sewage trucks. The inhabitants could use them for a certain price.[198] It is hard to say that the municipality was able to go further in urbanization problems. The Dilkent project by the municipality, which was proposed at the very beginning by Ercan Dalkılıç, could not be fulfilled even today. In a newspaper article in those days Dalkılıç declared that everything is ready for the project:

> Dilovası Municipality mayor Ercan Dalkılıç came back with some gains from Ankara. Mayor Dalkılıç states that 'Our Dilkent project will be settled on 800 acres. 400 of it will be sold to cooperatives and in the other 400 there will be cooperatives for municipality staff and a *gecekondu* prevention area.[199]

This project is not on the agenda even today. Leave aside planned urbanization Dilovası after this process became one of the most problematic residential places of the entire Kocaeli city. It is much more complicated in terms of industry and the corruption/philanthropy axis is more visible in this respect.

Authority resulting from the public works law gave remarkable power to municipalities. The missing parts in environmental laws and the

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[197] For some examples see, "Diliskelesi Sakinleri Telefona Hasret," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 29 July 1988, "Diliskelesi Susuz," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 10 August 1988.

[198] *Dilovası Belediyesi fosseptikleri temizlemek için vidanjör satın aldı. 30 milyon liraya satın alınan vidanjör vatandaşın başvurusu üzerine hemen belirtilen adrese gideren fosseptik çukurlarını boşaltıp, temizliyor. Bu hizmete karşılık vatandaştan sadece 5 bin lira ücret talep ediliyor.* See, "Dilovası Belediyesi Vidanjör Satın Aldı," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 18 August 1988.

[199] "Dilkent için Herşey Tamam," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 12 October 1988. *Dilovası Belediye Başkanı Ercan Dalkılıç Ankara'dan eli dolu döndü. Başkan Dalkılıç, "800 dönüm yer üzerine Dilkent projemiz kurulacak. Bu yerin 400 dönümü kooperatiflere satılacak, diğer 400 dönüm yerin bir kısmında belediye personeli için kooperatif ve gecekondu önleme bölgesi yapacağız" dedi.*

shortcomings of the provincial organization of the ministry of environment pushed municipality to some sanctions.[200] Bu it is necessary to underline that there was a legal gap here. In the interviews done both industrialists and the administrative authorities mentioned this contradiction. Mustafa Türker, for instance, calls it irrational for municipalities to charge penal sanctions on environmental issues due to the public works law and adds that this changed with the recent legal arrangements.

> Formerly, the municipality held the authority of supervision. The municipality was responsible for public works. The City Directorate for Environment was authorized in terms of environment and this took place after the Ministry of Environment was founded. As far as public works are concerned, people from the municipality would come and intervene in all matters like construction, air pollution. After the Organized Industrial Zone was formed, this power was transferred to that body. After the environmental law in 1993, the municipalities had certain penal power. Even though to authority to fine somebody was upheld by the Directorate, municipalities would just come and fine someone based on the public works law. The public works law, as the name suggests, if a place where a construction is carried out was made dirty, a fine must be issued. But there were certain practices by the municipality saying that there was dust or smoke. Even after the Metropolitan Municipality law was enacted in 2004, some of the powers were transferred to the Metropolitan Municipality and they were held by the Metropolitan Municipality till the new law was passed. Yet, with this last law, all of them were again gathered under the umbrella of Ministry of Environment.[201]

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[200] Somersan, asserts that since the implementing regulations that the law number 2872 on environment which is accepted in 1983 did not come for a long time it was almost impossible to undergo an institutional environmental inspection until the beginnings of the 1990s. See, Semra Somersan, *Olağan Ülkeden Olağanüstü Ülkeye: Türkiye'de Çevre ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: Metis, 1993), pp. 30-32. This is started to change in recent times mostly because of the accession process with European Union. For some elementary moves, see Rana İzci, "The Impact of European Union on Environmental Policy," in *Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and Development?*, ed. Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005).

[201] Interview with Mustafa Türker. *Öncesinde bir çok açıdan denetim belediyenin yetkisindeydi. İmar açısından belediye yetkiliydi. Çevre açısından çevre il müdürlüğü yetkiliydi ki bu da çevre bakanlığı kurulduktan sonra oldu. İmar açısından tüm imar, zabıta, hava kirliliği gibi konulara belediyeden gelir müdahale ederlerdi. OSB olduktan sonra bu yetki tamamen OSB'ye geçti. (...) Belediyelerin 1993'te çevre kanunu çıktıktan sonra belli cezai yetkiler oluştu. Çevre ile ilgili ceza kesme yetkisi çevre müdürlüğünde olmasına rağmen belediyeler gelip imar kanuna dayanıp çevre cezası kesiyorlardı. İmar kanunu adı üstünde*

The former mayor Halit Yaşar indicates the same contradiction and says: "Municipalities in that period had authority over the factories but not in terms of environment. Factory owners were just taking measures in order not to be pressurized by the municipality."[202] Still it is possible to argue that the municipality used its authority over factories and the emphasis on pressure is important. Both municipalities and city directorate applied pressure on industrialists and volunteered them for some philanthropic activities. The boom in schooling and other infrastructural investments immediately after the establishment of the municipality can be interpreted in this way. As the title of this sub-section suggests, "every boon comes with a price."[203] This approach by Halit Yaşar is shared by many people, and it drew the general framework of the relationship between the municipality and the industrialists until 2002.

Not against the municipality and city directorate but with respect to them industrialists gathered around to solve some of their problems in a more organized way and constituted a foundation called *Dilovası Sanayicileri Vakfı* (DİSAV). Mustafa Türker current head of the DOSB, which can be seen as the extension of DİSAV, explains this foundation and its constitution grounds as follows:

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imar kanunu, bir yerin inşaat halinde bir yeri kirletmesi halinde ceza vermesi gerekirken tozunuz çıktı dumanınız çıktı diye belediyelerin uygulamaları oldu. Hatta Büyükşehir yasası çıktıktan sonra 2004 yılında, bazı yetkiler Büyükşehir'e devredildi yeni yasa çıkana kadar da bazı yetkiler büyükşehire geçti. Ama son yasayla bunların tümü yine çevre bakanlığı bünyesinde toplandı.

[202] Interview with Halit Yaşar. *O dönemde belediye imar planları açısından fabrikalar üzerinde yetki sahibi idi. Ama çevre açısından değil. Fabrika sahipleri sadece imar açısından belediye tarafından sıkıştırılmamak için önlemler alıyorlardı.*

[203] Interview with Halit Yaşar. *Her nimetin bir külfeti vardır.* Halit Yaşar said more on this subject and defined his and municipality's relationship with the industrialists as follows: *Sanayiciye dedim ki siz de buradan ekmek yiyorsunuz, ama her nimetin bir külfeti vardır. Sen Dilovası'nda yaşayan insanların toprağını, suyunu kirletiyorsun karşılığını yapacaksın. Her hukukta nimet ve külfet anlayışı vardır ve bunu herkes kabul eder.*

> When we constituted the foundation, we were faced with huge problems concerning the region. First of all, factories and urbanization were mixed with each other; second of all, Dil Deresi which was not polluted until the 1980s was serious polluted mostly because Gebze Municipality's dumping all the septic garbage not only Gebze region but also Tuzla and Bayramoğlu. It was not only industry that polluted the river. Besides, there was the problem of infrastructure which was extremely serious in the period. We built a school both as individuals and as the foundation; in addition to that a village clinic and finally telephone switchboard.[204]

Needless to say, the problems that were mentioned such as the mix of industrial and residential areas, pollution resulting from dumping water in Dil Deresi, and the lack of basic infrastructural things were not problems that the industrialists and municipality faced all of a sudden in Dilovası. But it is important that both industrialists and municipal staff underline the same problems and propose similar social responsibility approaches. In a local newspaper the same process is described like this:

> The regular meetings of Dilovası industrialists were held at the Atabay Touristic Facilities on Sunday. (…) Dr. Metin Eriş, the vice-president of BASF Sümerbank and the head of the committee, delivered a speech at the closing session of the meeting and offered that the industrialists in the region should found an association called "Dilovası Industrialists, Association." The suggestion offered by Metin Eriş was received favorably by the industrialists of the region. (…) The complaints of Dilovası industrialists… (…) The industrialists, who complained about the inefficiency of the various investments realized in the region through the medium of the industrialists of the region, wanted that a doctor should officiate in the SSK Hospital which had public housing. The industrialists, who said that the PTT did not work efficiently, explained that they would like to change the power house by establishing contact with ministry officials. The industrialists, who emphasized the threat of the roads from industry installation to E-5

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[204] Interview with Mustafa Türker. *Vakfı kurduğumuzda dağ gibi sorunlarla karşı karşıyaydık. Ilk olarak fabrikalar ve kentleşme iç içe geçmişti. Ikinci olarak Dil Deresi sorunu vardı. Dere 1980'lere kadar kirli değildi. Gebze Belediyesi'nin sadece kendisinin değil Tuzla ve Bayramoğlu'nun foseptiklerini boşaltmasıyla burası çok kirlendi. Burayı tek kirleten sanayi değildi. Bu derenin ıslahı sorunu vardı. Ayrıca çok ciddi altyapı sorunları vardı. Biz bu dönemde hem vakıf olarak hem de münferiden okul yaptırdık, sağlık ocağı ve telefon santralı yaptırdık.*

> decided to contact with the Overseers of Highways, 1st Region in order to build a side road in a short time.[205]

Emphases on infrastructural shortcomings and philanthropic activities went hand in hand in Dilovası. The amendment of Dil Deresi, forestation, building a new postal office and telephone switchboard, building a place for a dispensary clinic and most importantly new school buildings and some donations to other public institutions were leading ones.[206] But philanthropy and corruption were used interchangeably in some contexts. Atabay Chemistry, one of the most famous factories of the region which is largely accused of pollution, presents a good example of that:

> Due to the claim that it has polluted the environment and commingled chemical waste to the drinking water, Atabay Chemistry Industry, which Dilovası Municipality sued for damages, was locked up by the Provincial Gebze Administration. A committee headed by the county borough gendarme captain, Ahmet Kıyak, and the Environmental Health Technician, Ali Yıldız came and locked it up and affixed a seal to the factory around 11:30 yesterday.[207]

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[205] "Dilovası'ndaki Sanayiciler Dernek Kuruyor: Sanayiciler Bugüne Kadar Dilovası'na 5 Milyarlık Yardım Yaptılar," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 23 November 1988. *Dilovası sanayicilerini aylık mutad toplantıları Cumartesi günü Atabay Turistik Tesisleri'nde yapıldı. (...) Toplantının kapanış oturumunda bir konuşma yapan komite başkanı ve BASF Sümerbank Genel Müdür Yardımcısı Dr. Metin Eriş bölgede bulunan sanayicilerin Dilovası sanayiciler derneği adı altında bir dernek kurulmasını teklif etti. Metin Eriş tarafından yapılan bu teklif sanayiciler tarafından olumlu karşılandı. (...) Dilovası Sanayicilerinin Şikayetleri (...) Sanayicilerin katkıları ile bölgeye yapılan çeşitli yatırımların çalışmadığından yakınan sanayiciler lojmanı olan SSK Hastenesinde geceleri bir doktorun görev yapmasını istediler. PTT'nin randımanlı çalışmadığını bildiren sanayiciler bakanlık yetkilileri ile temas kurularak bu santralin değiştirilmesi yolunda çalışmalar yapacaklarını açıkladılar. Sanayi kuruluşlarından E-5'e çıkan yolların çok tehlikeli olduğunu söyleyen sanayiciler, en kısa zamanda bir yan yolun yapılması için Karayolları 1. Bölge Müdürlüğü ile irtibat kurulmasını kararlaştırdılar.*

[206] See, TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*, p. 155.

[207] See, "Valilik ve Kocaeli Çevre Sağlığı'na Rağmen Kaymakamlık Atabay'ı Kapattı!," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 26 October 1988. *Çevreyi kirlettiği, içme suyuna kimyevi atık karıştırdığı iddiası ile Dilovası Belediyesi tarafından hakkında tazminat davası açılan Atabay Kimya Fabrikası Kaymakamlık tarafından dün kapatıldı. İlçe jandarma bölük komutanı Ahmet Kıyak, Çevre Sağlığı Teknisyeni Ali Yıldız başkanlığında bir heyet dün saat 11:30 sıralarında fabrikaya gelerek fabrikayı mühürlediler. Fabrikanın iki ünitesi kapatılması tehlikeli olduğu gerekçesi ile 2 gün çalışmasına izin verildi.*

Another news item published three days later in the same paper puts the oscillation between the discourses of philanthropy and corruption. Atabay Chemical Factory, which donated 50 million liras to Tütünçiftlik Science High School, was opened.[208] An authorized person in the scope of the environment and public health of the period, while telling about some applications in his period, illuminates his "experiences," which almost everybody knows, but cannot say in an official manner, as such:

> While we were working, the senior civil authorities of the period and we, supervisors, for the solutions to the existing problems that we had determined, broke new grounds in some specific applications which would not affect the general comfort and agenda of the country and engender mutual damnifications on some levels. However, they were not formal applications. Since we, as the Turkish state, do not have any right to make anybody build a school, road, or drainages. We cannot want such things from anybody, especially, from the industry that supplies employment, taxation, and activities. However, we did it for the future of the city we were living in, because the overall budget of the city and the country were insufficient for such investments. Moreover, we were not able to struggle with them through the arguments that "you polluted the environment" or "you chose the wrong place for your industry," etc. The stone we threw was bigger than the dog we scared; furthermore, we could not go a step further. Therefore, by compromising with people, we both aroused the industrialist's charitable soul and made the citizen, who received service, contribute to the social peace. Our applications, eventually, will be remembered as positive in good time.[209]

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[208] "Tütünçiftlik Fen Lisesi'ne 50 Milyon Liralık Bağış Yapan Atabay Kimya Fabrikası Açıldı," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 29 October 1988. Same contrast can be seen in these two following news items about Diler Demir Çelik. See, "Diler Demir'den 400 Milyonluk Okul," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 13 October 1988, "Diler Demir'e Dur Denilsin," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 3 November 1988. For another example, see, "Diğer Fabrikalar Nerede? Yücelboru ve Marshall Gebze Emniyetine 2 Otomobil Bağışladı," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 11 October 1988.

[209] *Bizim çalıştığımız zaman dönemin en üst düzey mülki amirleri ile biz denetmenler saptamış olduğumuz mevcut problemlerin çözümü için ülkenin genel huzur ve gündemi etkilemeyecek, çeşitli düzeylerde karşılıklı mağduriyetleri doğurmayacak bazı özgün uygulamalara imza attık. Ancak bunlar resmi uygulamalar değildir. Çünkü kimseden, özellikle ülkeye istihdam, vergi ve canlılık veren sanayiden okul, yol, kanalizasyon... vb. yapmasını istemeye devlet olarak hakkınız olamaz. Ancak biz bunu yaşadığımız şehrin geleceği için yaptık, çünkü ülkenin ve şehrin genel bütçesi böyle türden yatırımlar için yetersizdi. Kaldı ki biz onlarla çevreyi kirlettin, yer seçimini yanlış yaptın v.b. argümanlarla mücadele edemezdik. Attığımız taş ürküttüğümüz köpekten büyük olurdu, üstelik bir arpa boyu yol alamazdık. İşte biz de bu yüzden insanlarla uzlaşarak hem onların hayırsever ruhlarını canlandırdık hem de*

A similar process is described from a different perspective by another former civil servant worked in the region:

> The municipality is in the system of unearned income. Factories without license are told to donate to Kocaelispor. One of the most renowned factories of the region, Atabay Chemistry could not be closed between 1990 and 1993. The officials were bribed. They say "let me be bribed, instead of Ankara." If there is technical equipment, which was not there till 1990s, it is not easy to use this power. Factories were threatening with exile. The municipality holds the power. The process has now been corrupted altogether. All the problems on the line of Adapazarı, Çorlu are the same. Social, political and environmental pollution are inside each other.[210]

Halit Yaşar, the former mayor of the Dilovası Municipality, underlines the same corrupted process as well: "Bribery and featherbed treatment were normal activities in that time in the municipality. People were paying their bribe and having their works done and leaving the municipality in a happily manner."[211]

Other investments and donations to the region can also be seen in this way. Almost all the large factories of the region related with pollution[212] are involved in philanthropic activities. Schools are the most popular way of investing in Dilovası as well as Gebze and Kocaeli. Currently there are five schools in Dilovası donated by Dilovası industrialists: those are Dilovası

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kendisine hizmet gelen vatandaş toplumsal barışa katkı sundu. Bizim bu uygulamalarımız nihayetinde zamanı gelince hayırla anılacaktır.

[210] Interview with A. Y. *Belediye rantın içinde. Ruhsatsız fabrikalara gidip Kocaelispor'a bağış yapın deniyor. 90-93 arası bölgenin en meşhur fabrikalarından Atabay Kimya kapatılamıyor. Memur rüşvet yiyor, Ankara yiyeceğine ben yiyeyim diyor. Teknik donanım varsa bile ki 1990'lara kadar yoktu, bu yetkiyi kullanmak çok zor. Fabrikalar sürgünle tehdit ediyordu. Yetki belediyede artık süreç hepten yozlaşmıştır. Adapazarı Çorlu hattındaki tüm problemler aynıdır. Sosyal, siyasal ve çevresel kirlilik iç içe.*

[211] Interview with Halit Yaşar. *O zaman belediyelerde rüşvet, adam kayırma olağan bir şey haline gelmişti. Adam hem rüşvetini veriyor hem de işini yaptırıyordu ve sevinçle dışarı çıkıyordu.*

[212] There are lots of punishments fined to the factories of the region. A list of total fines can be found in assembly report, see, TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*, p. 188.

Yahya Kaptan Anadolu Lisesi which was built in 1988; Dilovası Solventaş İlköğretim Okulu which was also built in 1988; Dilovası Polisan İlköğretim Okulu, which was built in 1992-93, Tavşancıl Marshall Boya Çok Programlı Lisesi which was built between 1997 and 1999; and finally Dilovası Mübeccel Çolakoğlu İlköğretim Okulu which was built in 2004.[213] There are other schools which were built out of Dilovası but again by Dilovası industrialists; those are, Diler Demir İlköğretim Okulu in Gebze, which was built between 1988 and 1989; Çolakoğlu Anadolu Kız Meslek ve Kız Meslek Lisesi in Gebze which was built in 1989, and Kroman Çelik İlköğretim Okulu which was built in Gebze in 2004.[214]

Mustafa Türker has a similar view on the reasons and current meaning of philanthropic activities:

> Since this place is declared as an organized zone afterwards it was not empty before. Now we are building a purification plant, there is a thirty kilometers long collector line in it. But none of these prevent industrialist involved in something social.[215] The reason industrialists get involved in these social activities before the 1990s and even the

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[213] T. C. Kocaeli Valiliği İl Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü *Dünden Bugüne Eğitime Destek* (Kocaeli: Megraf Matbaacılık, 2007), p. 99, 100, 112, 127 and 143.

[214] Ibid., p. 102, 108, 144. Kroman Steel factory is not located in Dilovası but Çayırova. Yet Çayırova Boru, another factory of the same holding is located in Dilovası. Besides, Kroman has an international port in Tavşancıl.

[215] Interview with Mustafa Türker, *Bölge sonradan organize olduğu için boş bir arazi değildi. Şu anda arıtma tesisi yapıyoruz yaklaşık otuz kilometrelik bir kollektor hattı var. Ama bunların hiçbiri sanayicinin sosyal olarak da birşeyler yapmasını engellemiyor. Doksan öncesinde hatta seksen öncesinde sanayicinin sosyal faaliyetlerinin daha az olması açıkçası ekonomik durumla ilgilidir. Şimdi bir dokuzyüzdoksan yılına kadar siz bir okul yaptırmak istediğiniz zaman cebinizden yaptırıyordunuz, Tabi onuda yapmak zorundasınız, daha sonra yasa değişti denildi ki yap, masraf göster. Bazı kesimler bunu gene halk tabiri ile sanayiciye kıyak geçiliyor şeklinde yorumladı, niye kıyak geçilsin ki sanayici devlete vergisini veriyor. Vergisini veriyorsa bu tür devletin yapması gereken şeyleri sanayici yapmak zorunda kalırsa onu teşvik etmek gerekir. (...) Ama eğer siz normal bir yatırım yapıyor gibi masrafınıza yazabiliyorsanız o zaman sorun yok. Çünkü onu vergiden de kaçırmıyorsunuz. Fabrikanıza nasıl masraf yapıyorsanız okula da öyle masraf yapıyorsunuz ve bunu da belgeliyorsunuz. O da gelişi güzel ben okul yaptım deyip kendinize bina yapıp okul yaptım diyemiyorsunuz. Gidiyorsunuz milli eğitime o işle ilgili bütün faturalarınızı milli eğitim onaylıyor. Bir teşvik olduğu için bu bölgede çok sayıda okul yapıldı.*

> 1980s is evidently has to do with economic conditions. Now, you had to pay from your pocket until 1990s. Of course, you had to do it, too. Later on the law changed and enabled us to show it as an expense. Some segments of society interpreted that this law is an advantage for industrialists. Why? Industrialist pays her tax. If it pays and it has to do something that the state could not accomplish then you should encourage it. (…) If you can show it as an expense when you make an investment, then there is no problem, because you do not avoid tax. You make an expense to the schools you built just like you make an investment to your own factory. And you cannot do it haphazardly. The National Education directorate approves all your documents. Since there is an incentive in this region so many schools could be built.

Evidently, philanthropic activities could be interpreted as aiming at two main targets.[216] First of all, they were the tools of a legitimating strategy for the industrialists. The investments practiced by the industrialists within the frame of philanthropic activities were previously the basic needs of Dilovası.[217] Furthermore it was not surprising that the people from the region favored these investments due to some deficiencies in the facilities of the state and municipality in Dilovası. Second of all those activities, let the industrialists avoid the legal fines and sanctions.

Therefore, the data mentioned above present two perspectives on the discourses of corruption and philanthropy. Yet another perspective was also

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[216] Kalaycıoğlu and Gönel argue that the rise in corporate social responsibility activities in Turkey is a result of rise in the activities of foreign capital in Turkey. In other words, they assert that the corporate social responsibility projects are initiated by foreigners and their Turkish counterpart learn from them. See, Sema Kalaycıoğlu and Feride Gönel, "The Role of Business in Environmental Policy-Making," in *Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and Development?*, ed. Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), p. 125, 127. This statement, I believe, is falsified by the data in Dilovası. Philanthropic activity is not a virtue that is learned from foreign capital. Contrarily it is employed as a legitimating tool for a certain time by both foreign and domestic capital on certain occasions.

[217] One may make an objection to the emphasis on philanthropc activities (especially schooling) in the period mentioned. Interestingly philanthropic activity by the industrialists is not common before 1980. İhsan Dede, one of the symbolic governors of Kocaeli (1985-1991), initiated this process and prompted industrialists to social assistance. A recent publication by Kocaeli Governorship reveals that schooling as a social assistance was almost non-existent before 1980. Just two schools in Gebze and one school in Körfez are endowed by industrialists. Three schools in Körfez on the other hand an one in Derince are endowed by either public economic enterprises (Tüpraş and Petkim) or army. See T. C. Kocaeli Valiliği İl Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü *Dünden Bugüne Eğitime Destek*, p. 90, 91, 178, 180, 181, 182.

voiced in the interviews. Ercan Teker, head of a Dilovası-based ecology and health association (Ekosder), underlined the importance of philanthropy for Dilovası, but argued that the personal interest of some civil servants and authorities prevented the expansion of philanthropic activities.[218] So in this new perspective, corruption is seen as an obstacle in front of a well functioning philanthropic mechanism.[219] Although this point of view seems contradicts the two perspectives mentioned above, it is useful for understanding the legitimacy of philanthropic activity even for a dissident figure in Dilovası. To sum up, the fluctuation of discourses between philanthropy and corruption shaped Dilovası and its distorted development in depth. As a strategy providing legitimation and avoiding sanctions philanthropy enabled the industrialists of the region to postpone their infrastructural investments.

Environmental and Health Problems Exposed

A groundbreaking ceremony of a purification plant is performed on 13 May, 2007 in Dilovası. This plant is being built in order to purify the industrial as well as residential waste water of Dilovası. In the ceremony Osman Pepe, the Minister of Environment and Forestry of the time, remarked an interesting point: "First contaminate, then clean. This costs so much. Then you should

[218] Ekosder is an important NGO in Dilovası context. It is established in 2005, immediately after the results of the Kocaeli Universty Public Health Department report on cancer is announced. They call themselves "compulsory environmentalists rather than volunteer environmentalists." (*Biz gönüllü çevreci değil, zorunlu çevreciyiz.*). Another important medium, in which the environmental and other social issues of Dilovası can be discussed and made public, is a web portal led by an inhabitant in Dilovası, that is www.dilovasi.org.

[219] Interview with Ercan Teker.

take measures at the beginning. You will design the industrialization according to the plans and programs and build appropriate factories."[220] In another news published in the *Hürriyet* newspaper in World Environment Day, Dr. Erdal Karamercan, the head of TÜSİAD's commission on Industry, Services and Agriculture and at the same time the chief executive officer in Eczacıbaşı Holding, argued that the environmental issues are postponed for the sake of industrialization and, lacking legal structure and inefficient control mechanisms, according to Karamercan, made it impossible to deal with environmental issues.[221] Kalaycıoğlu and Gönel on the other hand argue that industrialists who are squeezed between domestic and external constraints may be reluctant to deal with those incremental costs especially in unstable conditions of Turkey.[222] These three approaches are representative in terms of the relationship between industry and environment in Turkey. However, as it mentioned before and as it will be mentioned in this section it is not enough to call it simple lack or an outcome of economic unstability but a systematic approach and incentive for industrialization in Turkey.

Dilovası experienced important environmental and health problems in this period. The outbreak in August in 1994 depicts the best example. Yet Dilovası has not being linked to environmental or health problems until the

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[220] "Bu Sefer Toprak Temizleniyor," *Gebze Çağdaş Kent*, 14 May 2007. *Önce kirlet, sonra temizle. Bunun maliyeti o kadar çok ki. O zaman baştan tedbirini alacaksın. Planlara ve programlara uygun sanayileşme yapacak ve uygun fabrika kuracaksın.*

[221] "Sanayileşme Adına Çevre İkinci Plana İtildi."

[222] Kalaycıoğlu and Gönel, "The Role of Business in Environmental Policy-Making," p. 117.

cancer report announced by Kocaeli University.[223] However, the most famous environmental problem lived in Dilovası took place in this period. It was the cholera outbreak that occurred in August 1994. Twelve children died in this outbreak and it also attracted attention from the mass media.[224] However, the causes and outcomes of it are told differently from different perspectives and finally it had an unexpected effect and it made industrialists initiate an organized industrial zone. Halit Yaşar, the mayor of the period, tells it as follows:

> We undertook the responsibility of the municipality on 4 April in 1994. There was a well owned by the municipality on a piece land personally belonging to a citizen and the land was next to the farm of Çolakoğlu. The water was coming from there. 45 % of the houses in Dilovası lacked water. There was water where the current municipality now is and water was provided from there. There was no water apart from that and the municipality had done nothing in this respect. We came to power and we ran out of water! The well dried up. That was the hottest, dry period of the last fifty years. We distributed water to people with tankers. The Kayapınar district of Tavşancıl is next to Dilovası. People died there but they were counted as within the boundaries of Dilovası. The transportation of that place was carried out as if Kayapınar belonged to Dilovası but not to Tavşancıl. It changed a little bit but that's still the case. We treated people and distributed drugs for free during that period. Of course there were deaths and some of them were babies. We bought two pieces of land from Ballıkaya, certainly opened wells, planted a line of 8 km through the river and brought water to Dilovası. We solved the water problem of Dilovası in 75-80 days but there were deaths. Think about this, you come on the fourth of the month and these happened at the end of the month.[225] I was a mayor of one month that time. Refah Party was on a great rise in that particular period. These events attracted the attention of the press. Then, we established a water network in 45 % of Dilovası and constructed a water depot of 7,000 tones. The depot is a huge and

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[223] Halit Yaşar argued that until the cancer report in 2004, it was not common to think Dilovası as an disastrous area in terms of environment and public health. Rather it was seen as an environmentally polluted place.

[224] For information about the outbreak see, "Bir Çocuk Daha Öldü!," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 20 August 1994, "Gebze'de Kolera Var," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 8 August 1994, "Su, Zehir Oldu!," *Kocaeli*, 13 August 1994.

[225] Date given by mayor is misleading because the outbreak took place in August.

> hygienic one. We laid down steel pipes of 40 cm caliber at the water station at the mouth of Dil Deresi. By making the pipes effective, we terminated the water problem of Dilovası when there was a month to the election. Yet, solving the water problem of Dilovası was a return of 18 % vote loss. Then, I had a research conducted. People were wondering why this amount of money invested in road construction and water facilities was not given to them and spent for their employment. That distorted, absurd style of construction made the municipality an institution of benefit from. When the municipality did what it was supposed to do, everybody was shocked and nobody could understand. The man on the street was saying "I am unemployed; I do not care about asphalt."[226]

Necmetin Bitlis, one of the oldest industrialists of the region, tells of the same problem as follows:

> Gebze Municipality has created a dumping ground on the shoulders of Dil Deresi. The waste water of all of Gebze, Çayırova and Bayramoğlu penetrates Dil Deresi. As if it were not enough, the gully emptier collects the rubbish and leaves it on the shoulders. That all goes down to the river. When 20-30 gully emptiers leave the rubbish there, the river becomes a septic tank. Because it was summer, the level of the water had decreased (…) Then, I wrote to Kemal Nehrozoğlu under the auspices of DİSAV. I told everything exactly, took pictures and sent

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[226] Interview with Halit Yaşar, *Nisan'ın dördünde belediyeyi devraldık. Belediyenin Çolakoğlu'nun hayvan çiftliğinin yanında bir vatandaşa ait özel bir arsada bir kuyusu vardı. Su oradan geliyordu. Dilovası'nın yüzde 45'inde evlerde su yoktu. Şimdiki belediyenin olduğu yerde ve Diliskelesi'nin oradaki eskiden beri oturulan bölgede su vardı ve oradan su temin ediliyordu. Onun dışında su yoktu ve belediye bu konuda hiçbir şey yapmamıştı. Biz göreve geldik, su bitti! Kuyu kurudu. O dönem aynı zamanda son elli yılın en sıcak, en kurak dönemini yaşadık. Biz tankerlerle halka su dağıttık. Tavşancıl'a bağlı Kayapınar mahallesi Dilovası ile bitişiktir. Orada da ölümler oldu ama onlar da Dilovası'nda sayıldı. O bölgenin ulaşımı Dilovası üzerinden yapılıyordu. Sanki orası Tavşancıl'a değil; Dilovası'na aitmiş gibidir. Biraz farklılaştı ama hala öyledir aslında. Bir o dönemde tüm vatandaşların tedavilerini yaptık, bedava ilaç dağıttık. Tabi ölümler de oldu, bir kısmı bebekti. Biz Ballıkaya'dan iki tarla satın aldık, kesin kuyular açtık ve dere içinden 8 km hat geçirdik ve 75 günde Dilovası'na su getirdik. Toplam 75, 80 günde Dilovası'nın su sorunu çözdük ama bu ölümler de oldu. Şunu düşünün ayın 4'ünde siz geliyorsunuz, ayın sonunda bu olaylar oldu. Bir aylık belediye başkanıydım o zaman. O zamanlar Refah Partisi büyük bir yükseliş içindeydi. Bu olaylar işte o dönemde basının müthiş ilgisini çekti. Ardından benim dönemimde Dilovası'nın yüzde 45'ine su şebekesini döşedik ve Çerkeşli'ye 7000 tonluk su deposu inşa ettik. Çok büyük ve hijyenik bir depodur o. Dildersinin ağzındaki terfi istasyonuna da 40 lık çelik borular döşedik ve hem kuyuları hem de boruları işler hale getirerek Dilovası'nın su sorununu seçime bir ay kala bitirdik. Ancak Dilovası'nın su sorununu çözmek bana eksi on sekiz oy kaybı olarak geri döndü. O zaman araştırma yaptırdım. Halk bu kadar yol, su hizmetine giden paranın neden kendisine verilmediğini, neden işe girmeleri için harcanmadığını düşünüyordu. O ilk kuruluştaki çarpık, absürd yapılanma, teşkilatlanma halkta belediyeyi kendisinden istifade edilen bir kurum haline getirmişti. Belediye yapması gereken hizmetleri yapınca herkes şok oldu ve anlayamadı. Sokaktaki adam: "-ben işsizim, bana ne ya asfalttan" diyordu.*

> them to three municipalities as well. Ultimately, Governor Mr. Nehrozoğlu called me. He asked what the situation was and told us to come together. We gathered at DİSAV. That place later was turned into DOSB. All the industrialists and the entire municipality came together. It was in 1994. The municipality told that they had no other chance, no cleaning facility and that's why the gully emptiers would leave the rubbish there. I informed the governorship. If they didn't take the measures, there would be mass diseases. Since when it got much hotter that year, there was a cholera outbreak in Dilovası. Mr. Governor phoned me and asked me what that was. Then, I was the chairman of the board of trustees of DİSAV. I told him that was the case. I said I thought it was not cholera, it was dysentery. It stems from the fact that people use this water. As I told before, if you let the girl be on her own, if you let the houses on their own and uncontrolled, this is something predictable. Then, Mr. Nehrozoğlu and I came up with this idea of the Organized Industrial Zone. Due to bureaucracy, it was approved in ten years. If it had been approved then, there would have been no distortion.[227]

The most important effect of this outbreak is that it inspired the idea of an organized industrial zone. Both Kemal Nehrozoğlu, the governor of the period, and industrialists put forth the proposal to transform Dilovası industry into an organized industrial zone and limit the environmental problems deriving from it. Along with the issues of philanthropy and corruption environmental degradation and health problems were used to legitimize and justify the establishment of the organized industrial zone as a separate entity.

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[227] Interview with Necmettin Bitlis. *Gebze Belediyesi Dil Deresi'nin yamacını çöplük ihdas etmiş. Bütün Gebze'nin, Çayırova'nın, Bayramoğlu'nun çöpünün suyu dereye sızıyor. O yetmezmiş gibi buradaki evlerde kanalizasyon olmadığı için, vidanjörler pisliği topluyor ve yamaca bırakıyor. O da olduğu gibi dereye iniyor. 20 30 vidanjör oraya pisliği dökünce orası fosseptik deresi olmuş. Yaz olduğu için su seviyesi de azalmış. (...) Onun üzerine ben DİSAV şapkası altında [Kemal] Nehrozoğlu'na bir yazı yazdım. Aynen anlattım hadiseyi, resimlerini çektim gönderdim, üç belediyeye de gönderdim. Neticede vali bey, sayın Nehrozoğlu aradı beni. Durumu sordu anlattım. Toplanalım, dedi. DİSAV'ın yerinde toplandık. O yer sonradan DOSB oldu. Bütün sanayicileri, belediyeyi vs. topladik. Sene 1994'tü. Belediyeler başka çaremiz yok, arıtma tesisi yok o yüzden vidanjörler buraya atıyor, dedi. Ben valiliğe yazmışım, önlemleri alınmasa kitle hastalıkları olacak. Nitekim o sene temmuz ayında sıcaklar başlayınca Dilovası'nda kolera salgını diye bir şey çıktı. Vali bey telefon açtı ve nedir bu diye sordu. O zaman ben DİSAV'ın mütevelli heyet başkanıyım o vesileyle beni aradı. Dedim sayın valim, hadise bu. Bu kolera falan değil bence bir dizanteri. İnsanların bu suları kullanmasından dolayı oluyor. Kızı kendi başına bırakırsan az önce dediğim gibi, sanayiciyi kendi başına, konutları kendi başına bırakırsan bir kontrol altında olmazsa olacağı bu. İşte bu organize sanayi bölgesi fikrini o zaman sayın vali Nehrozoğlu ile beraber ortaya attık. Bürokrasiden dolayı on senede anca onaylandı. O zaman onaylansaydı bu çarpıklık da olmayacaktı.*

Of course it also caused opposition in local media,[228] but it lasted a short time and came to a line with the organized industrial zone idea.[229]

Dilovası after 2002

The Formation of Neoliberal Production Islet

Dilovası industry is comprised of an organized industrial zone which has been called the DOSB since 2002. The thirty-five year long period of unplanned industrialization without any overarching institution ended in 22 May of 2002. But as a matter and outcome of conjuncture this overarching institution detached industry from most of the municipal and governmental regulations. The Law of Organized Industrial Zone as well as the Metropolitan Municipality Law and recent Environmental Law enabled Dilovası industrialists to detach themselves as much as possible both from the regulations and recent problems of the environment and pollution. This section will consider this transformation departing from the laws in general and applications in particular.

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[228] See, "Çevre Sağlığı, Belediye ve Kaymakamlık Nerede? 100 Fabrika Ruhsatsızmış," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 17 August 1994.

[229] See, "DİSAV'ın Toplantısında Dilovası Tartışıldı: Vali Nehrozoğlu da Katıldı," *Gebze Gazetesi*, 1 November 1994. *DİSAV başkanı Dr. Metin Eriş, "Dilovası zaten organize ve yarı-organize sanayi konumuna uygun, bunu entegre ederek çözüme kavuşabiliriz" dedi. Vali Nehrozoğlu da Dr. Metin Eriş'in görüşüne katıldığını belirterek üç kişilik bir komite kurulması gerektiğini söyledi.*

The Law of Organized Industrial Zone

Organized industrial zones appeared at the end of the nineteenth century in the world. In Turkey they appeared in 1960 as an idea. The initial examples in the world were the ones established by the private sector in 1896 in England and others in America and Western Europe.[230] Similar formations took place in Turkey and other late-industrializing countries after World War II. The first example in Turkey was the Bursa Organized Industrial Zone, which was built in 1962 and started to operate in the same year.[231] Organized industrial zones emerged as an idea subsequent to the *coup d'état* in 1960 as a means for planned development and industrialization. An exceptional significance was attributed to them in all following development plans.[232] But although it was an old strategy and policy, it was lacked a comprehensive law until 2000. Organized industrial zones were administered by a dispersed set of regulations and decrees with the power of law.[233]

The main target is to promote and supervise industry which is seen as the basic tool of development. What is meant by promoting is the broad possibilities that are provided for organized industrial zones. Needless to say, most important is incentives. The tax exemptions and administrative autonomy that are provided by the law are other significant things. Key incentives supplied for organized industrial zones are "credits with low interest and long due dates, tariff exemptions, and easiness provided for raw material and

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[230] Mehmet Hüseyin Bilgin and Selçuk Ar, *İstanbul Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri ve Siteleri* (İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası, 2004), pp. 21-23.

[231] Ibid., p. 85.

[232] However it is important to remind that continous emphasis on industrial zones

[233] Bilgin and Ar, *İstanbul Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri ve Siteleri*, p. 33.

intermediary goods import."[234] Besides, organized industrial zones are supported by other incentive and exemptions by the Treasury Undersecretary, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and KOSGEBs (*Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli Sanayi Geliştirme ve Destekleme İdaresi Başkanlığı*).[235]

The first target of law no. 4562 is to provide a legal framework to a forty-year old policy. The law composed of 29 articles, defines organized industrial zones as follows in the third article:

> Organized Industrial Zones are the production areas of goods and services and they provide the conditions for the structuring of industry in appropriate areas, guide urbanization and prevent environmental problems. They aim to benefit from information technologies, to locate and develop types of manufacturing industry within the framework of a specific plan, to equip registered lands with the required infrastructure, social facilities in line with the needs and techno parks. They are run in line with what the law stipulates.[236]

The main emphasis is on the system and order. Following the second part of the law, in other words, the fourth and fifth articles consider the establishment and conditions of the organized industrial zones. The first paragraph of the fourth article stresses that the implementing regulation at the establishment stage is the Implementing Regulation on Place Selection (*Yer Seçimi Yönetmeliği*). This regulation, which was published in Official Journal no. 24408 on 21 May, 2001, is composed of 33 articles. According to it, in order to be able to constitute an organized industrial zone in a certain place the

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[234] Ibid., p. 76.

[235] For a list of these incentives and exemptions, see Ibid., pp. 79-82.

[236] Law of Industrial Zone, article 3. *Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri, sanayinin uygun görülen alanlarda yapılanmasını sağlamak, kentleşmeyi yönlendirmek, çevre sorunlarını önlemek, bilgi ve bilişim teknolojilerinden yararlanmak, imalat sanayi türlerinin belirli bir plan dahilinde yerleştirilmeleri ve geliştirilmeleri amacıyla, sınırları tasdikli arazi parçalarının gerekli alt yapı hizmetleriyle ve ihtiyaca göre tayin edilecek sosyal tesisler ve teknoparklar ile donatılıp planlı bir şekilde ve belirli sistemler dahilinde sanayi için tahsis edilmesiyle oluşturulan ve bu Kanun hükümlerine göre işletilen mal ve hizmet üretim bölgelerini ifade eder.*

permission of many public institutions is needed and there is an appendix in which list of these institutions are given in the law. Those are seven ministry, ten directorates and municipalities interested in the region.

Article fifteen designates the areas to be selected as organized industrial zones and makes a long list of places that could not be defined as organized industrial zone.[237] In another article specifically concerned with this issue, no. 20, there are seven different reference criteria mentioned. The foremost criteria are the location of the area, its location with respect to residential areas, its size and connections with main roads, property structure, cadastral conditions, its relationship with the municipality, whether it includes protected areas or not, and its location with respect to water resources.[238] According to articles no. 22 and 28, if it is not possible to find an appropriate or alternative place for organized industrial zones the commission is obliged to inform the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

All of the procedures, which the fourth article of the law no. 4562 and the regulation of this article direct us, are about an organized industrial zone to be established in a new place. But Dilovası industry is organized in a way that is completely out of the framework of this set of legal references and in this respect it is vastly different from other organized industrial zones. As mentioned in previous chapters, Dilovası industry's history has started with İzocam Company which came here in 1967, but the idea of an organized industrial zone appeared only in 1994 and the industrialists of the region

[237] Regulation article 15.

[238] Regulation, article 20.

applied for such a status in 1997 and subsequent to the law made in 2000 Dilovası industrial location became an organized industrial zone in 2002. In other words unlike the law, the DOSB is constituted not in a pre-planned area, but was transformed into an organized industrial zone. Yet this does not imply that the constitution of the DOSB is illegal but it is not in the articles mentioned above. Thus DOSB is constituted with reference to a regulation which was prepared according to law no. 4562, which is Organized Industrial Zone Application Regulation (*OSB Kanunu Uygulama Yönetmeliği*).[239] The temporary seventh article mentioned says:

> The place was selected and the commission of selection gathered on 1/4/2002. Yet, the 55th and 56th articles of this bylaw are not implemented on Organized Industrial Zones where there is construction in line with an approved construction plan.[240]

The DOSB is constituted with reference to the temporary seventh article because the place selection process started in 1997 and came to an end on 8 November 2001 with the selection of a 430 hectare site as an appropriate place to constitute an organized industrial zone. Since this date is before the date mentioned in the article it was possible to constitute the DOSB and it was declared on 22 May 2002 based on this temporary article.[241]

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[239] TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*, p: 144. *İlave ve Revizyon İmar Planlan 4562 sayılı OSB Kanunu ve bu Kanuna istinaden hazırlanmış olan OSB Uygulama Yönetmeliğinin Geçici 7nci maddesince, ilgili idaresince onaylanmış olan imar planlan altlığı üzerinden düzenlenerek sanayi alanlarındaki parsel düzenleri ve yapılaşma koşullan planı yönlendiren eşikler önceliğinde korunmuş; sosyal-idari ve teknik altyapı alanları ile donatılarak sanayi yapılanmasının kendi içerisindeki sürdürülebilirliği sağlanmıştır.Yine OSB Uygulama Yönetmeliğinin Geçici 7. maddesi uyarınca ilgili idarelerince onaylanan imar planlan ile belirlenen yapılaşma koşullan ilave ve revizyon imar planlanında korunmuştur.*

[240] Industrial Zone Application Regulation, temporary seventh article. *1/4/2002 tarihinden önce yer seçimi tamamlanmış veya yer seçimi komisyonu toplanmış ancak, onaylı bir imar planına göre üzerinde yapılaşma bulunan OSB'lerde bu yönetmelik hükümlerinin 55 inci ve 56 ncı maddesi hükümleri uygulanmaz.*

[241] TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*, p. 140.

Since the industrialists had solved their title deed and license problems previously with municipalities and other authorized institutions and made the land available in terms of the public works law it was easier to end this process in this way. But it is crucial to add a note here. The initial area envisaged for the DOSB was about 420 hectares, as mentioned. But today it takes up 920 hectares constituted of five parts.[242] In other words, it has more than doubled.[243] Three of these five parts were developed according to the public works law when the Assembly Commission Report was published. The organized industrial zone directorate is still working on the two other parts currently.[244]

There were problems in most of the criteria mentioned in the fifteenth article of the place selection regulation. But the flexibility that the temporary seventh article provided accepted the place selection decision in 2001 and allowed the DOSB to be constituted. The DOSB enhanced and reached its current borders after the establishment. Many problems have been experienced in the DOSB, which is divided into five pieces because of the geographical differences and non-intersecting borders, because of contradictions with law and regulations.[245] However, at the end the Dilovası industrialists succeeded in declaring the DOSB. Exceeding the legal regulations in some ways and to declare the DOSB in such a place in which it initially seemed impossible to

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[242] Areas of leading industrial zones in Turkey are as follows: Bursa Demirtaş OSB: 475 hectare, Kemalpaşa OSB (KOSBİ): 1300 hectare, Çerkezköy OSB: 1350 hectare, Gebze OSB: 420 hectare.

[243] For example, first part of current industrial zone is the first place declared as organized industrial zone. Subsequent to it in 9 June, 2003 second part, the Tavşancıl part is included in DOSB. See, TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*, p. 148.

[244] Ibid., p. 179.

[245] Assembly Report undertakes all problems faced with while including new parts to DOSB. See, Ibid., pp. 146-153.

constitute an organized industrial zone drew various criticisms.[246] Former mayor Halit Yaşar describes this process as follows:

> The sin of the organized industrial zone belongs to the mayor. He exceeded his powers and signed for the organized industrial zone without consulting the assembly. This is the greatest betrayal that could be done to Dilovası. It was a project designed with the aim of getting rid of the municipality's restrictions and forming a ghetto for themselves, without fulfilling any of the conditions for being an organized industrial zone. We investigated this when they gave us a petition. At that time, 7 new organized industrial zones were to be formed in Çerkeşli. If all of these organized industrial zones belonged to Dilovası, the revenues of the municipality would rise by 1,000,000 %. Afterwards, they unfortunately found such an incapable man and they made him sign and then they became an organized industrial zone. A railway passes through the area. There is e-5, e-6. It is composed of 10 pieces. There are 8 oil stations inside and two districts. It was a protected area and stretched from Ballıkayalar towards the sea. It started from 60 meters on both sided of Dil Deresi and it included Ballıkayalar. In order to become an organized industrial zone, they found a way to annul until Shell oil station. There is a historical bridge inside! This distorted organized industrial zone is the gift of MHP government. However, it wouldn't have been established if the latest mayor had not allowed it. This is a sin which can never be cleaned. It is a historical mistake.[247]

We considered the fourth article of the law no. 4562 and its related paragraphs and related regulation in peculiar the DOSB context. The application here is peculiar to the Dilovası context but following paragraphs

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[246] For some example see, S. Beşir, "Kapitalizmin Çöküntü Bölgesi Dilovası," *Gelecek* Eylül 2006, İnsel, "Organize Çevre Katliam Bölgesi."

[247] Interview with Halit Yaşar, *OSB olmasının vebali eski belediye başkanının boynundadır. Yetkisini aşarak ve meclise danışmadan osb olmasına imza attı. Bu dilovasına yapılabilecek en büyük ihanettir. Çünkü böyle bir OSB türkiye de dünyada da yok. OSB olmanın hiçbir şartına haiz olmayan, sadece belediyenin sınırlamalarından kurtulup kendilerine ait bir getto oluşturma amacıyla düşünülmüş yapılmış bir şeydir. Bunun benim zamanımda fikri ortaya çıkmıştı. Bize dilekçe verdiklerinde bunu araştırdık, o dönem çerkeşli de 7 tane yeni sanayi bölgesi kurulacaktı. Eğer bu sanayi bölgelerinin hepsi Dilovası'na bağlı olsaydı, belediyenin geliri 1 milyon kat artardı. Daha sonra ne yazık ki böyle basiretsiz bir adam buldular ve ona imzayı attırıp OSB oldular. İçinden tren yolu geçiyor, e-5, e-6 geçiyor. On tane parçadan oluşuyor. İçinde 8 benzin istasyonu 2 tane mahalle var.Sit alanıydı burası gidip onu da iptal ettirdiler. Sit alanı Ballıkayalar'dan denize kadardı. Dil deresinin 60 ar metre yan taraflarından başlayıp Ballıkayaları içine alan bir alandı. OSB olmak için gidip onu da bir yolunu bulup shell petrol istasyonuna kadar iptal ettirdiler. Tarihi köprü var içinde! İşte bu çarpık OSB MHP iktidarının hediyesidir. Ama en son belediye başkanı izin vermese olmazdı. Bu asla altından kalkılamayacak bir vebaldir. Tarihi bir hatadır.*

are valid for all organized industrial zones. The sixth paragraph of the same article signals another important point:

> According to the local zone plan that was enacted, it is the organized industrial zone which provides the license for land utilization, making projects for buildings and facilities, the construction of these buildings, opening and running a workplace. It is the organized industrial zones which control these. The organized industrial zones accept the payments regarding the license to open and run a workplace and these payments are transferred to the municipality or special city administration.[248]

The organized industrial zones as a legal personality are invested with vast authorities of licensing and auditing, as the paragraph above underlines. In other words, the organized industrial zone directorates give licenses to the factories and audit them. These were previously done by authorized state institutions. As a legal personality the organized industrial zone directorates take important parts of administrative authority over to themselves. The organized industrial zone administrations are selected from factory owners within the organized industrial zone itself and directorate's authority of licensing and auditing marks an administration which license and audit itself. With the vast authorization of the law, organized industrial zone administrations are exempted from both municipal and other civil control mechanisms. In addition they take over some of their crucial abilities. The DOSB licensed four business enterprises after its constitution, *İşyeri Açma ve Çalışma Ruhsatı Deneme İzni*. But more important is the licenses given to the two ports on the Dilovası coast. Those are licenses given to the extra filled

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[248] Article 4, paragraph 6. *Yürürlüğe giren mevzii imar planına göre arazi kullanımı, yapı ve tesislerin projelendirilmesi, inşası ve kullanımı ile ilgili ruhsat ve izinler ile işyeri açma ve çalışma ruhsatları OSB tarafından verilir ve denetlenir. İşyeri açma ve çalışma ruhsatının verilmesi sırasında işyeri açma ve çalışma ruhsatına ilişkin harçlar, OSB tarafından tahsil edilerek ilgili belediye veya il özel idaresi hesabına yatırılır.*

areas of Polisan Kimya A.Ş. and Çolakoğlu Metalurji A.Ş.[249] The Ankara Metropolitan Municipality mayor Melih Gökçek calls this vast authority of organized industrial zones a municipality within a municipality.[250]

The eighth paragraph of the same article gives information about the property structure of the selected area: "If there are privately owned lands in the selected area, these lands are gained via purchasing or expropriation. Regarding real property of this kind, articles of expropriation law no. 2942 are exercised."[251] Needless to say those organized industrial zones are legal personalities, but it is no more than a collection of private companies. Yet the law acknowledges a vast set of abilities. Although only public institutions are authorized to appropriate land in the name of public interest those organized industrial zones are authorized with the same right, too. The eighth paragraph of the fourth article provides this framework. The fifth article of the law which defines the features of the organized industrial zones puts it forth clearly:

> The Organized Industrial Zone is a legal entity, which has the right to carry out expropriation with the excuse of public good. The decision of public good is given by the ministry upon the application of the committee of the Ministry. The responsibility regarding the expenses for obtaining the ownership of the land and cost of the land belongs to the OSB legal entity.[252]

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[249] TBMM Dilovası Araştırma Komisyonu *Komisyon Raporu*, p. 156.

[250] "Gökçek'ten Organize Sanayi Kanunu'na Büyük Tepki Geldi," *Hürriyet*, 19 April 2007.

[251] Article 4, paragraph 8. *Seçilen bölgede özel mülkiyette olan araziler bulunması halinde bu araziler rızaen satın alma veya kamulaştırma yoluyla iktisap edilir. Bu nitelikte taşınmazlar hakkında 2942 sayılı Kamulaştırma Kanunu hükümleri uygulanır.*

[252] Article 5. *OSB, kamu yararı gerekçesiyle adına kamulaştırma yapılabilen veya yaptırılabilen bir özel hukuk tüzel kişiliğidir. Kamu yararı kararı, OSB müteşebbis heyetinin başvurusu üzerine Bakanlıkça verilir. Arazinin mülkiyetinin edinilmesinde yapılan masraflar ile arazi bedeli ödeme yükümlülüğü OSB tüzel kişiliğine aittir.*

As the article mentions evidently it is not the organized industrial zone directorate carries at the appropriation process. The organized industrial zone administrations demand a certain area to be appropriated and if it can justify that it is in the public interest, it can apply to the ministry. And if the ministry finds it suitable it may decide for appropriation in the name of the organized industrial zone administration.[253] In addition, the same article states that the price for appropriation is determined by the organized industrial zone administration. In other words, organized industrial zones do not appropriate certain land in theory by themselves, but in practice they can.

The law composed of 29 articles, determines the basic characteristics of the organized industrial zones in principal level, but the details concerning the application and administration can be found in the Organized Industrial Zones Application Regulation (*Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Uygulama Yönetmeliği*) which was published in the Official Journal on 1 April 2002. This regulation, which is composed of 18 sections and 218 articles, comprises all the details about organized the industrial zones' rights, responsibilities and administrative principles.

Vast authorizations given to the organized industrial zone administrations can be seen from the perspective of the current re-setting of global capitalism (the discourse of governance and the purification of market environment of private gains) as discussed in the introductory chapter. But before that in addition to the law of organized industrial zone one must discuss

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[253] Bilgin and Ar, *İstanbul Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri ve Siteleri*, 38. Besides, ministry provides credit for expropriation to the organized industrial zones at the establishment level according to the sixth paragraph of the fourteenth article. This is also discussed in detail in Organized Industrial Zone Application Regulation. See, article 10.

the metropolitan municipality and new environment law, too, because these regulations say important things about the relationship between the organized industrial zones, the municipalities and other governmental institutions.

The Metropolitan Municipality Law

The Metropolitan Municipality Law was made in 2004. This law which re-defines the legal status of metropolitan municipalities[254] was presented to the assembly by the 59th government (that is the Erdoğan administration elected in 2002) under the name of "Metropolitan Municipalities Law Proposal" (*Büyükşehir Belediyeleri Kanunu Tasarısı*) on 3 March 2004. After evaluation in various sub-commissions and some changes it arrived at the plenary session on 9 July. The Grand National Assembly Plenary Session negotiated this proposal in 9-10 July and accepted it. The law was legislated under the name of the Metropolitan Municipality Law no. 5216 and published in the Official Journal on 23 July, 2004.

The basic importance of this law, which is composed 33 articles, lays in the enhanced authority it gives the Metropolitan Municipalities. While there is an enhancement in the powers of the metropolitan municipalities there is a real retreat in that of the local municipalities. In other words, the law transfers some basic authorities of central state mechanisms to the metropolitan municipalities, but it does not make metropolitan municipalities share them with local municipalities. Localization and centralization go hand in hand and

[254] Legal status and borders of metropolitan municipalities are defined with a decree with the power of law made in 1984. This decree survived six years and left its place to another law (Büyük Şehir Belediyelerinin Yönetimi Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamenin Değiştirilerek Kabulü Hakkında Kanun) number 3030 made in 1990.

metropolitan municipalities, so to speak, take the form of local states. The temporary second article that defines the borders of the metropolitan municipalities underline that Kocaeli and İstanbul are exceptional metropolitan municipalities and the borders of the city is taken as the border of the municipality.

The Metropolitan Municipality Law had a dual effect on Dilovası. First, it subordinated Dilovası Municipality through empowering the Metropolitan Municipality in of the administrative limits of Kocaeli city. With the law, the Kocaeli Metropolitan Municipality became the only authority in almost all significant areas such as infrastructural services, transportation services, development and the construction of public facilities.[255] The Metropolitan Municipality Law stopped the Dilovası Municipality of the authority to have infrastructural services, development and construction of public facilities and transformed it into a simple low level municipality with limited power.

The second point is the relationship between the law and the DOSB. There is a note at the end of the seventh article defining the tasks, powers and responsibilities of the metropolitan municipality. After 23 paragraphs for the metropolitan municipality and five paragraphs for the local and first level municipalities, there is a note saying: "The authority and obligations that is acknowledged to the Ministry of Industry and Trade and organized industrial zones with the Organized Industrial Zones Law no. 4562 are not within the scope of this law."[256]

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[255] See, Metropolitan Municipality Law, section three. *4562 sayılı Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Kanunu ile Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığına ve organize sanayi bölgelerine tanınan yetki ve sorumluluklar bu Kanun kapsamı dışındadır.*

On the one hand the authority of the Dilovası Municipality is limited to a great extent and, on the other the same law leaves the organized industrial zones and their administrations intact. In other words, the organized industrial zones are detached from the broad area of authority and gain a certain level of autonomy. Mustafa Türker describes it as follows:

> Now this place has a special status. As I mentioned it became an organized industrial zone in 2002. Organized industrial zones are institutions constituted with laws and administered by elected people. Public institutions are also represented and if it is possible to say they are *autonomous* regions. They make their own zoning plans and in terms of administration they are autonomous, too. They govern themselves. Of course, they are limited with laws. This place has been administered as an organized industrial zone since 2002.[257]

When we consider that there are fifteen active organized industrial zones in Kocaeli and seven of them are waiting in queue either at the project level or at the constructing level, we can understand that a large portion of the city that is devoted to industrial production is governed by autonomous self-ruling organized industrial zone administrations. Yet along with these two regulations, another legal arrangement, namely the new law on environment, also provides legal ground for the organized industrial zones.

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[256] Article 7.

[257] Interview with Mustafa Türker, italics are mine. *Artık buranın özel bir statüsü var. dediğim gibi 2002 yılında burası organize sanayi bölgesi oldu. OSBler yasalarla kurulan ve yönetimler seçimlerle gelen ve yönetimlerinde organize sanayi bölgesinin kanunlarına uygun olarak devlet temsilcilerinin de olduğu bir yönetim şekli vardır ve tabiri caizse biraz özerk bölgedir. İmar açısından kendi imar planlarını kendileri yaparlar; yönetim açısından da yine özerktirler kendileri yönetirler. Ama tabi bunların hepsi yasalar ve yönetmeliklerle belirlenmiş çerçeveler doğrultusundadır. Şu anda 2002 yılından beri organize sanayi bölgesi olarak yönetiliyor.*

The Environmental Law

Legal regulations on environment gave the appearance of dispersed regulations without a certain framework until the Law on Environment, which was made in 2006. Law no. 2872 was legislated in 9 August 1983 and published in the Official Journal on 11 August 1983. It was re-defined and almost completely changed on 26 April 2006. New law, no. 5491 was a comprehensive law on the environment. In other words, there was an actual legal lack in terms of environment until 2006, which is a very recent date. This long pre-period, which sought to be administered mostly by decrees with the power of laws, caused widespread environmental exploitation. As discussed in the previous chapters this lack of legislation could be seen as a kind of incentives to encourage industrialization. Not forcing or initiating the industrialists to assemble environmental investments is understood as a kind of investment and production incentives, and as an outcome of long processes it produced an accumulated set of environmental problems. Again, what is important in the context of this thesis is the last paragraph of the eleventh article of this law which puts organized industrial zones outside of the scope of the law and defines them as responsible for themselves.[258]

Like the Metropolitan Municipality Law, the Environmental Law provides certain privileges for organized industrial zones. Both laws define and determine a large set of regulations but exempt organized industrial zones

[258] Environmental law, article 11. *Serbest ve/veya endüstri bölgelerinde bölge müdürlükleri, kültür ve turizm koruma ve gelişme bölgelerinde, turizm merkezlerinde Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı veya yetkili kıldığı birimler, organize sanayi bölgelerinde organize sanayi bölgesi yönetimi, küçük sanayi sitelerinde kooperatif başkanlıkları, mevcut yerleşim alanlarından kopuk olarak münferit yapılmış tatil köyü, tatil sitesi, turizm tesis alanları vb. kullanım alanlarında ise site yönetimleri veya tesis işletmecileri atıksu altyapı sistemlerinin kurulması, bakımı, onarımı ve işletilmesinden sorumludurlar.*

from these regulations. Just like the Metropolitan Law, the Environmental Law aliens the authority of the municipality and gives the responsibility to the administrations of the organized industrial zones and proposes ambivalent mechanism of auditing. There is no doubt that the law of the organized industrial zone brings some restrictions in terms of infrastructural and environmental issues, but the broad authority that is attributed to the administrations of the organized industrial zones was reinforced by two subsequent legal arrangements. Furthermore, this transforms organized industrial zones into autonomous zones as Mustafa Türker, current head of the DOSB notes. The legal arrangements do not threaten the organized industrial zone directorates in an environment in which auditing institutions do not work well at the practical level.

When we look at Dilovası before 2002, when it had not been declared a separate organized industrial zone we see that the industrialists dealt with many public administrations in depth, including the Dilovası Municipality. This relationship caused a mix of discourses which oscillated between corruption and philanthropy, as mentioned in previous sections. In line with the prevailing literature on corruption, it is seen as the exploitation of public interest for private gains and seen as a problem peculiar to public officials. This discourse, which implies that the enhancement of the private realm will finish the problem of corruption, was useful in the Dilovası context. Thus, the pre-2002 context completely changed after the constitution of the DOSB and

changed the form of the relationship between the public and the private. As mentioned above, in addition to the organized industrial zone affair, the Laws of Metropolitan Municipality and Environmental Law reinforce the autonomous structure of the organized industrial zone and have turned them into neoliberal production islets.

Regionalization and specialization as a development project which is served by the Justice and Development Party government, is an attempt that can be best seen in the organized industrial zones. Organized Industrial zones as a tool for integrating to the global economy and markets are welcomed.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This thesis examined the transformation of Dilovası from the 1990s to the present. Dilovası started to be industrialized in the late 1960s with the suburbanization of the İstanbul-based industry. As a place which attracted both domestic and foreign capital from the very beginning Dilovası witnessed the migration of both big and small scale capital. The flow of industry into the region started in 1967 with the İzocam Company, a member of Koç Holding in those days, and today by the year of 2007 Dilovası provides shelter for over 170 companies. It is the most important shelter for marine transportation in İzmit Bay. However, as this study has argued, the process of concentration in terms of industrial plants was not a unilinear, smoothless one. In line with conditions in a national and international scale the process either gained or lost acceleration.

The industrialists did not encounter many legal or administrative limitations until 1987 when there was no municipal administration in the region. The constitution of the municipality in 1987 changed the context of the relationship between the industrialist and the region. The new period witnessed a boom in the philanthropic activities of the industrialists and the rising discourses of corruption as well among public. *Dilovası Sanayicileri*

Vakfi (Dilovası Industrialists Foundation), which was initiated by the leading industrialists of the region, was established one year after the municipality was constituted. It is an outcome of an effort to re-arrange the relationship of the industrialists with the municipality and other government institutions. In addition, it brought in an institutional identity to the industrialists in the region. Beginning with it, the industrialists of the region became involved in several philanthropic activities including building schools, village clinics, a post office and a customs house along with the amendment of Dil Deresi, forestation and many others. Dilovası case constitutes only one side of the legitimating aspect of philanthropy in Turkey.

From the establishment of municipality in 1987 to the declaration of the DOSB in 2002 an oscillating discourse and activities between philanthropy and corruption shaped Dilovası. These activities provided legitimacy to the industrialists on the one hand, but on the other, it offered a setting in increasing the problem of environmental pollution in Dilovası. The "polluter pays" principle is corrupted into a bribery-driven "payer pollutes" scheme,[259] and this came true in the Dilovası context. As Kalaycıoğlu and Gönel argue, "Ironically, most of the firms in Turkey would rather pay penalties (fines) to the authorities when they are caught letting their industrial discharge flow into rivers, sewage systems, or seas instead of building treatment, refinery, and purification systems because of high costs and complicated codes."[260] At the end of this process, Dilovası became a region of dense philanthropic activity, widespread corruption and finally intense environmental pollution and health

[259] Odekon, *The Costs of Economic Liberalization in Turkey*, p. 121.

[260] Kalaycıoğlu and Gönel, "The Role of Business in Environmental Policy-Making," p. 122.

problems. What is noteworthy here is that the state, which is responsible for the preservation of environment and sustains health of the people, prefers not to deal with all these concerns but to focus on the continuity of industrial production for the sake of economic development.

2002 marks a rupture in the Dilovası context. Subsequent to the cholera outbreak in 1994, the Dilovası industrialists and governor of the period initiated the organized industrial zone idea and it matured in 1997. After the application to the Ministry of Industry and Trade place selection process was ended in 2001, and the next year the factories gathered in Dilovası is assembled together under the name of the DOSB despite all legal and administrative limitations. The declaration of the DOSB and immediately detached Dilovası industry from Dilovası and disengaged it from Dilovası Municipality. Along with it, organized industrial zones were untied from the area of authority of metropolitan municipality and the city directorate of environment with the subsequent laws made in 2004 and 2006 afterwards. With those recent regulations organized industrial zones were transformed into autonomous production islets. Neoliberalism's discourse of competition on a global scale provides the basis for the separation of economics from production and re-arrangement of production in a completely neoliberal capitalist mentality. Dilovası, I believe, presents a good example of such a transformation from early attack of neoliberalism without overarching legal arrangements to the institutional and structural adjustment, which is usually

called the mentality of governance.

Obviously as the material introduced here reveals, this is not a transformation from a sustainable, governable and preferable form of industrialization to the unsustainable and ungovernable form of industrialization. The former one is blind for the negative effects in terms of environmental and health issues for the sake of industrialization. The latter, on the other hand, puts forward a new form of politics in which economic realm is de-politicized and launched as a realm of scientific government. Governance, the ideology of this new form, becomes visible in the new laws introduced the best. The law of organized industrial zones (together with other complementary laws mentioned above) and its application in Dilovası industry in 2002 created such an autonomous industrial site which is free from most public inspection mechanisms and included Dilovası to the general picture of neoliberal globalization along with other organized industrial zones in Turkey which are more than 250 and increasing continuously.

From what has been discussed above, we may draw the conclusion that the course of industrialization in Dilovası between 1980 and late 1990s is shaped by a distinct form of relationship between state institutions and industry/industrialist. Philanthropic activity that could inextricably be linked with corruption is employed to provide the sustainability of industrialization and capital accumulation to the detriment of environmental pollution and public health troubles. However, due to the rising hegemony of neoliberal

institutional and legal arrangements and their manifestation in Dilovası context with DOSB, Dilovası witnessed a new form of relationship between state and industry/industrialist. This legal and institutional framework provided industry an autonomous structure in which they are isolated from the inspection of local governmental institutions. In the scope of these regulations Dilovası became a legally protected industrial production islet which is integrated to the global economy. This new setting is not peculiar to Dilovası but a novel strategy of industrialization considering the neoliberal policies in Turkey. In other words, the economic and legal transformation and its implications in Dilovası highlight the basic tensions of industrialization in Turkey. The sensibility of this new setting provided for industrial production will be observed in the near future.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

1) Necmettin Bitlis, chairman of the board of directors of Bitlis Holding. Dilovası, 26 January 2007.

2) Salih Gün, Former Republican People's Party deputy member of Kocaeli and the member of the Dilovası Commission established in TBMM. Former mayor of the Tavşancıl Municipality, which is near Dilovası. Tavşancıl, 2 March 2007.

3) Eyüp Ayar, Justice and Development Party deputy member of Kocaeli and the head of the Dilovası Commission established in TBMM. Ankara 27 March 2007.

4) Mustafa Türker, the head of the DOSB and the chief executive of the Çolakoğlu Metallurgy. Dilovası, 14 May, 2007.

5) Musa Kahraman, the current mayor the Dilovası Municipality. Dilovası, 8 June, 2007.

6) Halit Yaşar, former mayor of the Dilovası Municipality. Gebze, 26 June 2007.

7) Ercan Teker, the head of the Ekosder (Dilovası-based ecological NGO). Dilovası, 11 March, 2007.

8) Hasan Karataş, an old inhabitant of Dilovası. Dilovası, 21 May, 2007.

9) Hasan A., a retired worker from Çolakoğlu Metallurgy, currently artisan in Diliskelesi. Diliskelesi, 14 May, 2007.

10) Kemal Nehrozoğlu, former governor of Kocaeli city (1992-1996). By telephone, 14 March, 2007.

11) Alican Artut, an old inhabitant and former real-estate agent in Dilovası. Dilovası, 8 June, 2007.

12) Ali Y., a retired civil servant, who worked in Gebze Kocaeli provincial centers. İstanbul 4 February, 2007.

13) H. A., a worker in Polisan factory in Dilovası. Gebze, 3 March, 2007.

14) Nerdim Terzioğlu, a former worker in Nasaş. İzmit: 7 May, 2007.

15) Engin Erdağı, a former worker in Diler Iron & Steel Company. 22 March, 2007.

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